IAEA safeguards assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

1981-01-01

This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kelly, P.

1986-01-01

The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

The IAEA's safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

The IAEA's safeguards system. Ready for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-09-01

The publication reviews the IAEA's safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? What assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification?

IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khlebnikov, Nikolai

2001-01-01

IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

1994-09-01

This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in {open_quotes}Observational Skills{close_quotes}. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector`s job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector`s job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA`s consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program.

A technical analysis of the IAEA nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoon, J. W.

1998-01-01

In the post-Cold War era, the threats of horizontal nuclear proliferation emerge as the forefront security issue while the nuclear arms races among existing nuclear weapon states reduce to a remarkable extent. In this context, there arises lots of research attention to the IAEA nuclear safeguards which have been viewed as the core of international monitoring on the clandestine nuclear activities of potential proliferators. However, previous attention tended to highlight the political aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, centering on the possibilities and limitations of the IAEA's inspection authority. In contrast, this paper purports to focus on the technical aspects of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, so it can show the intrinsic problems of those safeguards in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This paper mainly deals with the technical objectives and options of the IAEA nuclear safeguards, the technical indices of clandestine nuclear activities, and some measures to improve the efficacy of the IAEA nuclear safeguards. Hopefully, this paper is expected to lead us to approach the issue of the North Korean nuclear transparency from the technical perspective as well as the political one

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-07-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

IAEA safeguards and classified materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

1997-01-01

The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

1994-09-01

This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in open-quotes Observational Skillsclose quotes. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector's job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector's job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA's consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program

The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-11-01

The present IAEA approach to safeguarding various types of nuclear facilities is examined. The IAEA safeguards objectives, criteria and specific techniques are addressed, with reference e.g. to concepts like timely detection, quantities of safeguards significance, and conversion times. Material accountancy and containment and surveillance as basic features of IAEA safeguards verification are discussed. Safeguards measures for specific facility types are considered and corresponding levels of IAEA safeguards experience are assessed. Outlines of expected IAEA safeguard approaches to large bulk handling facilities are discussed. The evolutionary nature of safeguards based on experience and research and development is mentioned

A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chatelus, Renaud [Consultant, Export Control and IAEA Safeguards Specialist, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

2012-06-15

The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the 'trigger list', as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, Renaud; )

2012-01-01

The additional protocols to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements include provisions about the reporting by states of their imports and exports of listed equipment and non-nuclear material, also known as the “trigger list”, as well as nuclear materials. Beyond declarations and their verification, IAEA Safeguards also looks at other Imports and exports as part of its efforts to build confidence on the absence of undeclared nuclear activities or material. In all cases, information about international transfers of interest to Nuclear Safeguards is closely related to export control activities. But, if much has been written about the material and equipment to be declared, neither IAEA Safeguards nor Export control related documents provide much explanation about what exports and imports actually are. In fact, precise legal definitions are to be found generally in national customs regulations and international agreements on customs and trade. Unfortunately, these are not necessarily in line with Safeguards understanding. It is therefore essential that IAEA safeguards comprehends the customs concepts and procedures that are behind Safeguards relevant information.

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Santi, Peter A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Hypes, Philip A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2012-06-14

This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PEPPER, S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

2007-01-01

The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R and D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-12-15

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R.J.S.

1996-03-01

Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.).

IAEA safeguards and detection of undeclared nuclear activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1996-03-01

Verfication of State declarations is an essential feature of IAEA safeguards. The issue of completeness of the declaration of all nuclear material, nuclear activities and nuclear facilities arises only in full scope safeguards, like those pursuant to NPT. Concentrating on the accountability aspect of nuclear material, the NPT safeguards system has achieved a high level of objective and quantified performance. Some of the basic ideas of the drafters of INFCIRC/153 (corrected) have been stalled. Non-proliferation concerns demand also for a detection probability for undeclared nuclear activities. Following the example of the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), advanced detection techniques are proposed, which go beyond the classical nuclear material accountability approach. Recent proposals for additional measures to strengthen IAEA safeguards conform to rules of NPT and related safeguards. Some proposals have been agreed generally, others can only be implemented on a voluntary basis between the State and the IAEA. The implementation will require additional resources and support for the IAEA. Great care is required to maintain the existing capability of the IAEA for a technically sound, independent, objective, and internationally acceptable judgement with available resources, and at the same time to change emphasis on certain elements of the existing safeguards system. (orig.)

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

Contribution of the Member State Support Programmes to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fortakov, V.; Gardiner, D.; Rautjaervi, J.

1999-01-01

Over the last twenty years, Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have provided invaluable technical support to IAEA Safeguards. This support has covered practically all aspects of traditional safeguards activities and also those activities recently proposed and introduced for strengthening the safeguards system. As of August 1997, there were fourteen Member States, plus EURATOM, with active programmes in support of IAEA safeguards and the activities conducted under these Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) are currently valued at an annual twenty million dollars of extra-budgetary contribution to the IAEA. The overall administration in the IAEA of the support programmes is the responsibility of Support Programmes Administration (SPA) in the Safeguards Division of Technical Services. This paper describes the roles and the contributions of the MSSPs, the functions of the MSSP administration activities, and the vital importance the IAEA attaches to the MSSPs. (author)

Recruitment of U.S. citizens for vacancies in IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.E.; Decaro, D.; Williams, G.; Carelli, J.; Assur, M.

1999-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on its member states to assist with recruiting qualified individuals for positions within the IAEA's secretariat. It is important that persons within and outside the US nuclear and safeguards industries become aware of career opportunities available at the IAEA, and informed about important vacancies. The IAEA has established an impressive web page to advertise opportunities for employment. However, additional effort is necessary to ensure that there is sufficient awareness in the US of these opportunities, and assistance for persons interested in taking positions at the IAEA. In 1998, the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) approved a special task under the US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) for improving US efforts to identify qualified candidates for vacancies in IAEA's Department of Safeguards. The International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) developed a plan that includes increased advertising, development of a web page to support US recruitment efforts, feedback from the US Mission in Vienna, and interaction with other recruitment services provided by US professional organizations. The main purpose of this effort is to educate US citizens about opportunities at the IAEA so that qualified candidates can be identified for the IAEA's consideration

IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-10-01

Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper S. E.; .; Worrall, L.; Pickett, C.; Bachner, K.; Queirolo, A.

2014-08-08

The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a a workshop on the subject of ”Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation.” The workshop was held at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. The workshop participants included software and hardware experts from national laboratories, industry, government, and IAEA member states who were specially selected by the workshop organizers based on their experience with software that is developed for the control and operation of safeguards instrumentation. The workshop included presentations, to orient the participants to the IAEA Department of Safeguards software activities related to instrumentation data collection and processing, and case studies that were designed to inspire discussion of software development, use, maintenance, and upgrades in breakout sessions and to result in recommendations for effective software practices and management. This report summarizes the results of the workshop.

Termination of international safeguards on nuclear material discards: An IAEA update

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Larrimore, J.A.

1995-01-01

The IAEA adopted a policy for termination of international safeguards on measured discards in mid-1994. The policy addresses a broad range of termination of safeguards on nuclear material in waste with a focus on conditioned waste arising from reprocessing. The safeguards relevant aspects of waste handling up to the point of termination must be approved, and a determination made that the waste type, form of conditioning and nuclear material concentration satisfy specific criteria. In addition, the State where the terminated waste will be stored is requested to notify the IAEA of future movement or processing of the waste. Cases of international transfers of conditioned waste are also addressed

IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

2014-07-01

The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jennekens, J.

1988-01-01

The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

2011-01-01

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

IAEA Safeguards: Present status and experience gained

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thorne, L.; Buechler, C.; Haegglund, E.

1983-01-01

IAEA safeguards are at the present under critical review with regard to their purpose and effectiveness. This paper describes the development of the IAEA Safeguards System from the early days, when procedures were developed on an ad hoc basis, to the present day. The development of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), and of sophisticated instrumentation, has been necessary to deal with the rapid growth in the quantities of nuclear material and in the number of facilities under safeguards. The paper also discusses some of the managerial and organizational issues that are inherent in such a large international inspectorate. (author)

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement and is furthered through a common understanding of the respective rights and obligations of States and the IAEA. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published IAEA Services Series No. 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding and improving cooperation in safeguards implementation. To meet their safeguards obligations, States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up their infrastructure to meet their specific needs. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to differences in the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes, their regulatory framework and other factors. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. This SIP Guide addresses the important topic of the provision of information by States to the IAEA. Declarations by States form the basis for IAEA verification activities, and the quality and timeliness of such declarations impact significantly the efficiency of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and their use is voluntary. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

IAEA Guidance for Safeguards Implementation in Facility Design and Construction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sprinkle, J.; Hamilton, A.; Poirier, S.; Catton, A.; Ciuculescu, C.; Ingegneri, M.; Plenteda, R.

2015-01-01

One of the IAEA's statutory objectives is to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. One way the IAEA works to achieve this objective is through the publication of technical series that can provide guidance to Member States. These series include the IAEA Services Series, the IAEA Safety Standard Series, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series. The Nuclear Energy Series is comprised of publications designed to encourage and assist research and development on, and practical application of, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This includes guidance to be used by owners and operators of utilities, academia, vendors and government officials. The IAEA has chosen the Nuclear Energy Series to publish guidance for States regarding the consideration of safeguards in nuclear facility design and construction. Historically, safeguards were often applied after a facility was designed or maybe even after it was built. However, many in the design and construction community would prefer to include consideration of these requirements from the conceptual design phase in order to reduce the need for retro-fits and modifications. One can then also take advantage of possible synergies between safeguards, security, safety and environmental protection and reduce the project risk against cost increments and schedule slippage. The IAEA is responding to this interest with a suite of publications in the IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, developed with the assistance of a number of Member State Support Programmes through a joint support programme task: · International Safeguards in Nuclear Facility Design and Construction (NP-T-2.8, 2013), · International Safeguards in the Design of Nuclear Reactors (NP-T-2.9, 2014), · International Safeguards in the Design of Spent Fuel Management (NF-T-3.1, tbd), · International Safeguards in the Design of Fuel Fabrication Plants (NF-T-4.7, tbd

Physical protection in relation to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sonnier, C.S.

1985-01-01

In this session, physical protection, nuclear material accounting and control, and containment and surveillance have been discussed, with emphasis on the interactions of these measures within the context of IAEA safeguards. In addition, the current physical protection equipment and techniques have been reviewed. The interactions can be summarized as follows. Although physical protection is a fundamental element of IAEA safeguards, it is solely a state/facility operator responsibility. While the IAEA has an interest in promoting the implementation of effective physical protection systems, it serves only in an advisory capacity. Nuclear material accounting directly involves the state, facility operator, and the IAEA. Facility records and reports provided by the state are independently verified by the IAEA. The SSAC is of fundamental importance in this process. Containment and surveillance measures are used by the UAEA. Installation and routine use of C/S equipment must be approved by the state and facility operator, and must not affect facility operations or safety

Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

2011-09-01

During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1994; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1994 toimintakertomus

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tarvainen, M [ed.

1995-05-01

Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out trough separate tasks concentrating on verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to the Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English.

IAEA Safeguards and technical support programs: POTAS in the 1990s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kessler, C.J.

1991-01-01

The US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) has since 1978 provided technology and technical assistance to the IAEA to support its nuclear safeguards activities. The present level of support, $6.9 million per year, equals 10% of the Department of Safeguards annual budget. During the next decade, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will face new technical challenges in carrying out its verification activities. To help the IAEA acquire the technology and other technical support that it will require in the 1990s, POTAS expects to continue its assistance, both in the areas established in the past and in additional areas dictated by newly identified IAEA safeguards requirements. This paper will look at the political and policy context within which the Department of Safeguards, and hence POTAS, operates, and how that context is expected to evolve over the next decade. The roles and functions of POTAS will be identified and discussed in terms of their historical evolution. Lastly, the paper will consider how POTAS is expected to change during the 1990s, both to maintain effectiveness in existing roles and functions, and to meet the challenge of the changing policy context. 5 refs

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-06-01

This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-04-01

This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1980-09-01

Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1993; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1993 toimintakertomus

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tarvainen, M [ed.

1994-03-01

Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out through separate tasks related to development of non-destructive measurement methods (NDA methods) for verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to a Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English. (editor).

Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1992; Suomen tukiohjelma IAEA:n safeguards-valvonnalle. Vuoden 1992 toimintakertomus

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tarvainen, M [ed.

1993-04-01

Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out through separate tasks related to development of non-destructive measurement methods (NDA methods) for verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to a Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English. (editor).

IAEA safeguards instrumentation: Development, implementation and control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rundquist, D.E.

1983-01-01

Extensive development efforts over the last 5 years have produced a number of new instruments to help the IAEA meet its safeguards obligations. Implementation of these new instruments is proceeding at a necessarily slower pace. To optimize the performance and reliability of the instrumentation systems when used in safeguards applications, increasing attention is needed to be spent on performance monitoring and control of the instruments. (author)

IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-07-01

What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards. Concept Paper: Knowledge Acquisition, Skills training for enhanced IAEA safeguards inspections

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

1993-11-01

This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ``Knowledge Acquisition Skills`` in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively.

Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

1983-01-01

Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

Physical protection in relation to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sonnier, C.S.

1984-01-01

The general structure of the safeguards system, the SSAC interfaces, and physical protection principles, equipment, and techniques are reviewed. In addition, the interactions between the State, the facility operator, and the IAEA are described

Quality assurance measures applicable to IAEA anomaly and discrepancy resolution (ISPO Task D.52). Program for technical assistance to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harms, N.L.; Smith, B.W.

1984-11-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program provides assurance to the international community that nations comply with their commitments for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This assurance is based on the capabilities of the IAEA safeguards program to detect diversion of nuclear material. Anomalies and discrepancies, which occur in the event of a diversion or concealment, are detected as part of the IAEA safeguards program. Anomalies and discrepancies normally result from innocent causes and it is the purpose of the resolution process to determine the significance of them. The IAEA is instituting quality assurance measures for the IAEA inspection process. This paper reviews the anomaly and discrepancy resolution process and describes quality control measures which are the basis for quality assurance. 13 references, 6 tables

The IAEA safeguards information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

1976-01-01

The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

The position of IAEA safeguards relative to nuclear material control accountancy by States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rometsch, R.; Hough, G.

1977-01-01

IAEA Safeguards, which are always implemented on the basis of agreements which are concluded between one or more Governments and the IAEA, lay down the rights and obligations of the parties; and the more modern types of agreement, in particular those in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, do this in quite some detail. Several articles, for instance, regulate the working relations between the States and the IAEA inspectorate. These are based on two basic obligations - that of the State to establish and maintain a ''System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material'' and that of the IAEA to ascertain the absence of diversion of nuclear material by verifying the findings of the States' systems, inter alia through independent measurements and observations. Other articles dealing also with the working relations between States and the IAEA rule that the IAEA should take due account of the technical effectiveness of the States' systems and mention among the criteria for determining the inspection effort, the extent of functional dependence of the State's accountancy on that of the facility operator. However, quantitative relationships in this respect are left to be worked out in practice. With the help of consultants and expert advisory groups a rationale has been developed and possible practical arrangements discussed with several States concerned. The rationale for co-ordinating the work of the States' inspectorate with that of the IAEA was to use a factor by which the significant quantity used for calculating verification sampling plans would be adjusted so as to reduce to a certain extent the IAEA's independent verification work in case the States would themselves do extensive verifications in a manner transparent to the IAEA. However, in practice it proved that there are a number of points in the fuel cycle where such adaptations would have little or no effect on the inspection effort necessary to achieve the safeguards

Current status of process monitoring for IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koroyasu, M.

1987-06-01

Based on literature survey, this report tries to answer some of the following questions on process monitoring for safeguards purposes of future large scale reprocessing plants: what is process monitoring, what are the basic elements of process monitoring, what kinds of process monitoring are there, what are the basic problems of process monitoring, what is the relationship between process monitoring and near-real-time materials accountancy, what are actual results of process monitoring tests and what should be studied in future. A brief description of Advanced Safeguards Approaches proposed by the four states (France, U.K., Japan and U.S.A.), the approach proposed by the U.S.A., the description of the process monitoring, the main part of the report published as a result of one of the U.S. Support Programmes for IAEA Safeguards and an article on process monitoring presented at an IAEA Symposium held in November 1986 are given in the annexes. 24 refs, 20 figs, tabs

Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mollah, A.S.

2010-01-01

Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

Strategic plan for the development of IAEA safeguards equipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khlebnikov, N.

2001-01-01

Full text: The need for a top-down Safeguards Strategy to focus departmental objectives was recognized by the Programme Performance Appraisal System (PPAS) performed on the Equipment Development Project in 1999. The Department of Safeguards prepared at the end of 2000 a 5-year Strategic Plan to identify the changes and improvements expected to take place over the 2001-2005 period. Those Strategic Objectives were supposed to be used to properly plan IAEA Safeguards activities and define appropriate and coherent R and D programmes. The present paper describes the strategic directions that the IAEA will follow in the area of equipment development in order to meet the Safeguards Department long-term objectives for 2001-2005. The paper, which is derived from the IAEA Strategic Equipment Development Plan, prepared by the Division of Technical Support, includes two parts: general principles and policies applicable to all equipment development tasks; specific strategic guidance. The paper will not describe the detailed plans which are prepared based on the strategic plan on a biannual basis. Equipment development activities have been divided in five major projects (NDA, Seals, Surveillance, Unattended Monitoring and Remote Monitoring). Strategic directions for each of these projects will be described in the paper. Separate sections will deal with equipment development strategic guidance in the area of additional protocol inspections, JNFL projects, illicit trafficking and Trilateral Initiative. (author)

IAEA fifty years: more than just safeguards. Interview with Professor Werner Burkart

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

2007-01-01

Professor Werner Burkart, IAEA Deputy Director General and head of the Nuclear Sciences and Applications Division, comments upon matters associated with the fiftieth anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agency was founded on July 29, 1957. Today it is a worldwide organization of the United Nations with 144 member countries and manifold duties in the field of nuclear power utilization. The mandate of IAEA is based on the 'Atoms for Peace' initiative, its essence being support of all member countries in the use of nuclear power as long as IAEA safeguards on the spot ensure that no military aims are pursued in those activities. The safeguards work serves to prevent military uses. IAEA recommendations for a global nuclear safety culture, the so-called Safety Standards, are employed by member countries as a basis of legislation and ordinances. The emerging renaissance of nuclear power will be accompanied by the IAEA especially with regard to the important aspects of harmonization, safeguards, safety, security, and readiness for emergencies. The interview took place in Vienna on September 20, 2007. The questions were asked by the President of the Swiss Nuclear Forum, Dr. Bruno Pellaud, former Deputy Director General of IAEA. (orig.)

Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards. Annual report 1994

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tarvainen, M.

1995-05-01

Implementation of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) during the calender year in question is summarized. FINSP is carried out trough separate tasks concentrating on verification of nuclear material, training and expert services to the IAEA. In addition to the Finnish summary, the report includes detailed description of each task in English

The future use of pathway analysis in IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Budlong Sylvester, Kory; Pilat, J.; Murphy, Chantell

2013-01-01

Pathway analysis has the potential to play an important role in the development of a safeguards system that is more information driven, leveraging all the information available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pathway analysis should be seen as an extension of traditional hypothesis testing used by the Agency in the past. The most attractive pathways based on the assessed capabilities of a given state can be identified and used in the development of state-level safeguards approaches. This ranking of pathways can be revised based on evidence of pathway use, or preparations for use, allowing limited safeguards resources to flow to the areas of highest concern. The possible uses of pathway analysis in the implementation of the IAEA's state-level concept are described along with implementation issues that will likely arise. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

IAEA preparations for the year 2000 compliance of safeguards equipment systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aparo, M.; Barnes, B.; Lewis, W.; Hsiung, Sue

1999-01-01

The Department of Safeguards, IAEA, has used equipment systems for acquiring relevant data to support safeguards evaluation and verification activities. Typically an equipment system consists of EPROM (embedded system), a connecting personal computer with instrument software for data acquisition, and may include data evaluation software. Complementing the equipment systems is a collection of general evaluation software systems (application software) which support the analysis of the acquired data. In preparing for the year 2000 compliance of all safeguards systems, SGTS (Safeguards Division of Technical Services) in IAEA, must ascertain the equipment systems and the evaluation software authorised for inspection use can properly operate through the passage of year 2000. We present the year 2000 challenge for these systems, the approach we use to tackle the problem, and the status of our year 2000 project. (author)

Preparing the 1993--94 Safeguards Implementation Support Programme for IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Green, L.

1993-01-01

The 1993-94 Safeguards Implementation Support (IS) Program describes the Department of Safeguards' program of implementation support for the coming two years. The main body of the document describes the IS program for IAEA. A detailed description of the individual IS needs for 1993-1994 is contained in an annex that specifies the nee, assigns priorities and lists tasks and activities underway to address the need. Other annexes address policy and procedures for program planning and management, current Member State Support Programs (MSSP) tasks, and identification of MSSP resources required for implementation of developed technologies that could be provided. The primary responsibility for supporting the implementation of safeguards technology is with the support divisions of the Department of Safeguards. However, in this time of limited resources it is essential that, where possible, the Department receives assistance from MSSPs that have the needed resources. This document should serve as a guide for IAEA, in planning implementation support activities and for identifying tasks for MSSPs wishing to provide assistance

European Commission and IAEA Celebrate 30 Years Co-operation on Nuclear Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

Full text: Today the European Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) celebrate 30 years of cooperation in the safeguarding of nuclear materials and facilities. This anniversary is marked by an event at the AEA Headquarters in Vienna. The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission has provided scientific and echnical support to the work of IAEA since 1981, with over 100 scientists and technicians working on more than 25 projects. The anniversary is also an opportunity for both parties to plan their future joint activities. ''Nuclear safety and security are absolute priorities for the EU and in this context expertise on nuclear safeguards is extremely important for global security,'' says Dominique Ristori, Director General of the Joint Research Centre. ''The JRC is constantly at work on state-of-the-art technologies for nuclear safeguards and training of nuclear inspectors to stay ahead of the evolving challenges, in its long-standing cooperation in support of the Agency's mission.'' ''The JRC has provided us with vital scientific and technical support which has helped us to implement safeguards more effectively,'' said Herman Nackaerts, Deputy Director General for Safeguards at the IAEA. ''This has had a positive impact on the security of all the citizens of the European Union and beyond.'' An important chapter in the collaboration between the two organisations is training: high-quality training programmes are provided by the JRC for the next generation of IAEA and EURATOM Inspectors. Other examples of cooperation include special tools to improve environmental particle analysis, a 3D laser-based verification system of nuclear facilities, new nuclear reference materials, and secure sealing for underwater nuclear spent fuel assemblies. Future cooperation between the JRC and IAEA will be in line with the new priorities of the IAEA to further increase the safeguards' effectiveness and efficiency, through a customized approach

Scientific and technical information as a source for IAEA safeguards state evaluation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Barletta, M.; Feldman, Y.; Ferguson, M. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria)

2014-07-01

The IAEA Department of Safeguards is continually working to refine its methodologies and procedures for the analysis of information relevant to the evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle in States that have safeguards agreements with the IAEA. This analysis is required to achieve an understanding of States' nuclear-related activities against which a State's declarations are evaluated for correctness as well as completeness, and to provide credible assurances on the peaceful uses of nuclear material in the State. To achieve this end, diversification of sources and comparison for consistency among available information is essential to ensure an accurate assessment of a State's nuclear activities. Open sources of information on scientific and technical (S&T) developments and research provide the Department of Safeguards with an enhanced basis to evaluate the technical capabilities of States. These information sources are regularly and systematically assessed to provide information about industrial capabilities, patenting activities and research and development activities in States as reflected through published scientific and technical literature. Using such sources, in addition to other, long-established safeguards information sources, helps the IAEA to draw soundly-based safeguards conclusions. The utility of this category of information in terms of the State evaluation process lies primarily in the comparison with other sources of information, especially State-declared information, and in the assessment of consistency of all safeguards-relevant information regarding nuclear fuel cycle technologies and activities in a State. The current paper aims to describe the use of S&T literature, how information from different sources is consolidated, how it is analysed and how it contributes in the overall process of State evaluation in the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (author)

Overview of IAEA guidelines for state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: objectives, diversion of nuclear material, and the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buechler, C.

1984-01-01

Topics discussed include IAEA safeguards statutes, project and transfer agreements, agreements pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, implementation of IAEA safeguards, diversion strategies, accountancy and surveillance systems, and verification

Canadian safeguards research and development in support of the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-03-01

Canada has established a safeguards research and development program whose purpose is to supplement the resources of the IAEA. The program of support is a coordinated effort for the development and application of safeguards techniques and instruments to reactors of Canadian design. This document sets forth those tasks that make up the program

IAEA Safeguards: Cost/benefit analysis of commercial satellite imagery

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersson, Christer

1999-03-01

A major milestone in the efforts to strengthen the Safeguards System was reached in May 1997 when the Board of Governors approved a 'Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements'. The Protocol provides the legal basis necessary to enhance the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities by using information available from open sources to complement the declarations made by Member States. Commercially available high-resolution satellite data has emerged as one potential complementary open information source to support the traditional and extended Safeguard activities of IAEA. This document constitutes a first report from SSC Satellitbild giving the Agency tentative and initial estimates of the potential cost and time-savings possible with the new proposed technology. The initial cost/benefit simulation will be further finalised in the following 'Implementation Blueprint' study. The general foundation and starting point for the cost/benefit calculation is to simulate a new efficient and relatively small 'imagery unit' within the IAEA, capable of performing advanced image processing as a tool for various safeguards tasks. The image processing capacity is suggested to be task- and interpretation-oriented. The study was performed over a period of 1,5 weeks in late 1998, and is based upon interviews of IAEA staff, reviews of existing IAEA documentation as well as from SSC Satellitbild's long-standing experience of satellite imagery and field missions. The cost/benefit analysis is based on a spreadsheet simulation of five potential applications of commercial satellite imagery: Reference information; Confirmation of Agency acquired and Member State supplied data; Change detection and on-going monitoring; Assessing open source information available to the Agency; Detecting undeclared activities and undeclared sites. The study confirms that the proposed concept of a relatively small 'imagery unit' using high-resolution data will be a sound and

The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-02-01

This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

IAEA concerns about advanced containment and surveillance concepts or other alternative safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

von Baeckmann, A.; Powers, J.

1981-01-01

Nuclear material accountancy is used in IAEA safeguards as a measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Over the past five years the IAEA has worked with its Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to quantify major terms of the objectives, i.e., timeliness of detection, significant quantities and detection probabilities. The Agency is using those quantifications, as recommended by SAGSI, as guidelines for inspection planning and for evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards. The guidelines are used in this paper, together with other criteria like cost-effectiveness, compliance with legal limitation and non-intrusiveness, as yard-sticks for the assessment of the potential capabilities of alternative safeguards approaches. 4 refs

Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anttila, M.

2000-08-01

The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in

Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. Safeguards and the role of the IAEA in physical protection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smolej, M.

1999-01-01

The physical protection and security of nuclear facilities and materials concerns utilities, manufactures, the general public, and those who are responsible for licensing and regulating such facilities. The requirements and process to ensure an acceptable physical protection and security system have been evolutionary in nature. This paper reviews the first step of such process: the State's safeguards system and the international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the relationship between these two safeguards systems. The elements of these systems that are reviewed include the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, physical protection measures, and containment and surveillance measures. In addition, the interactions between the State, the facility operator, and the IAEA are described. The paper addresses the IAEA safeguards system, including material accountancy and containment and surveillance; the State safeguards system, including material control and accountancy, and physical protection; the role of the IAEA in physical protection; a summary of safeguards system interactions.(author)

IAEA Safeguards: Cost/benefit analysis of commercial satellite imagery

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Andersson, Christer [SSC Satellitbild AB, Kiruna (Sweden)

1999-03-01

A major milestone in the efforts to strengthen the Safeguards System was reached in May 1997 when the Board of Governors approved a `Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements`. The Protocol provides the legal basis necessary to enhance the Agency`s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities by using information available from open sources to complement the declarations made by Member States. Commercially available high-resolution satellite data has emerged as one potential complementary open information source to support the traditional and extended Safeguard activities of IAEA. This document constitutes a first report from SSC Satellitbild giving the Agency tentative and initial estimates of the potential cost and time-savings possible with the new proposed technology. The initial cost/benefit simulation will be further finalised in the following `Implementation Blueprint` study. The general foundation and starting point for the cost/benefit calculation is to simulate a new efficient and relatively small `imagery unit` within the IAEA, capable of performing advanced image processing as a tool for various safeguards tasks. The image processing capacity is suggested to be task- and interpretation-oriented. The study was performed over a period of 1,5 weeks in late 1998, and is based upon interviews of IAEA staff, reviews of existing IAEA documentation as well as from SSC Satellitbild`s long-standing experience of satellite imagery and field missions. The cost/benefit analysis is based on a spreadsheet simulation of five potential applications of commercial satellite imagery: Reference information; Confirmation of Agency acquired and Member State supplied data; Change detection and on-going monitoring; Assessing open source information available to the Agency; Detecting undeclared activities and undeclared sites. The study confirms that the proposed concept of a relatively small `imagery unit` using high-resolution data will be a sound and

Knowledge Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konecni, S.; Carrillo de Fischer, J.

2016-01-01

Full text: Knowledge Management (KM) is an integral part of the Departmental Quality Management System because knowledge (i.e., the ‘know-how’, ‘know-when’, ‘know-who’, ‘know-why’, etc.) is needed to produce high quality products and services on a daily basis. The ability to continue providing such products and services is challenged each time an experienced staff member leaves the IAEA due to retirement or end of contract and takes with them important job-related knowledge. The most important assets in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards (SG) are people and their knowledge. The Department of Safeguards developed a knowledge management (KM) framework and the corresponding approaches as well as specific guidelines for its implementation. Knowledge retention (KR) is part of knowledge management and focusses on eliminating the risk of losing the critical job-related knowledge by putting in place a systematic knowledge retention plan. Particularly, for knowledge retention, the Safeguards Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP) developed a model to draw out and capture the critical knowledge and making it available for use by others. This paper describes the knowledge retention model/approach and lessons learned from implementing the knowledge management programme in SG. (author

RECRUITMENT OF U.S. CITIZENS FOR VACANCIES IN IAEA SAFEGUARDS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

OCCHIOGROSSO, D.; PEPPER, S.

2006-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relies on its member states to assist with recruiting qualified individuals for positions within the IAEA's secretariat. It is likewise important to the U.S. government for U.S. citizens to take positions with the IAEA to contribute to its success. It is important for persons within and outside the U.S. nuclear and safeguards industries to become aware of the job opportunities available at the IAEA and to be informed of important vacancies as they arise. The International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) is tasked by the U.S. government with recruiting candidates for positions within the Department of Safeguards at the IAEA and since 1998, has been actively seeking methods for improving outreach. In addition, ISPO has been working more closely with the IAEA Division of Personnel. ISPO staff members attend trade shows to distribute information about IAEA opportunities. The shows target the nuclear industry as well as shows that are unrelated to the nuclear industry. ISPO developed a web site that provides information for prospective candidates. They have worked with the IAEA to understand its recruitment processes, to make suggestions for improvements, and to understand employment benefits so they can be communicated to potential U.S. applicants. ISPO is also collaborating with a State Department working group that is focused on increasing U.S. representation within the United Nations as a whole. Most recently Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued a letter to all Federal Agency heads encouraging details and transfers of their employees to international organizations to the maximum extent feasible and with due regard to their manpower requirements. She urged all federal agencies to review their detail and transfer policies and practices to ensure that employment in international organizations is promoted in a positive and active manner. In addition, she wrote that it is

The position of IAEA safeguards relative to nuclear material control accountancy by states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rometsch, R.; Hough, G.

1977-01-01

IAEA Safeguards are always implemented on the basis of agreements which are concluded between one or more Governments and the Agency. They lay down the rights and obligations of the parties; the more modern types of agreements, in particular those in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, do that in quite some details. Several articles, for instance, regulate the working relations between the States and the IAEA inspectorate. Those are based on two basic obligations: that of the State to establish and maintain a ''System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material'' and that of the Agency to ascertain the absence of diversion of nuclear material by verifying the findings of the States' system, inter alia through independent measurements and observations. Other articles dealing also with the working relations States - IAEA rule that the Agency should take due account of the technical effectiveness of the States' system and mention among the criteria for determining the inspection effort, the extent of functional dependence of the State's accountancy from that of the facility operator. However, quantitative relationships in that respect are left to be worked out in practice. With the help of consultants and expert advisory groups a rational has been developed and possible practical arrangements discussed with several States concerned. The rational for coordinating the work of the States' inspectorate with IAEA's inspectorate was to use a factor by which the significant quantity used for calculating verification sampling plans would be adjusted in order to reduce to a certain extent the Agency's independent verification work in case the States would do extensive verifications themselves in a manner transparent to IAEA. However, in practice it proved that there are quite a number of points in the fuel cycle where such adaptations would have little or no effect on the inspection effort necessary to achieve the safeguards objective

EURATOM safeguards implementation in France and cooperation with the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oddou, J.

2013-01-01

International safeguards in France are applied both by: -) the European Commission (EC), through the Chapter 7 of the EURATOM Treaty; -) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as France is a party to the NPT and has concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA. With the exception of mining, France has a complete nuclear fuel cycle from ore concentrates to waste. Based on the legal framework of the EURATOM Treaty, all civil nuclear facilities and all civil nuclear materials are safeguarded by EURATOM wherever they are in France. Therefore the two conversion plants, the two enrichment plants, the three fuel fabrication plants, the 59 nuclear power plants including the EPR of Flamanville under construction, the 2 reprocessing plants in La Hague, the five facilities for waste treatment and numerous research centers and reactors of CEA are declared and controlled by the European Commission. The activities of the EURATOM inspectors are of various kind depending of the facility and the type of inspection. The most common checks are: identification and counting of the nuclear material, verification of accountancy declaration vs. physical follow-up of the nuclear material, non-destructive analysis and destructive analysis after sampling in large bulk handling facilities. There is a strong cooperation between IAEA and EC: the majority of IAEA inspections in France are joint team inspections with the EC. This pooling of equipment and teams can save money and human resources. Equipment for containment and surveillance are paid whether by the EC or by the IAEA and can be used by both bodies of inspectors. With the principle of 'One Job One Person', verification activities are done only once and it saves time for the inspectors and the operators. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

2010-01-01

Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

Improved IAEA safeguards for closed nuclear fuel cycles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

The paper recognises the limitations of nuclear material accountancy in applying safeguards to future large scale processing plants. For those plants the following will be necessary: (i) The inclusion of safeguards requirements in design criteria. (ii) Extensive application of containment and surveillance with monitors on personnel and goods exits, pipework, tanks, etc. (iii) Continuous inspectorate measurement of input and output flows. Local IAEA laboratories to ensure timeliness. (iv) Upgrading of process control information to enable the inspectorate to monitor the in-process inventory. The inspectorates knowledge of the in-process inventory will be valuable in their assessment of any alarms given by the containment-surveillance system

IAEA safeguards and the additional protocol in the Eurasia Region

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Murakami, K.

2001-01-01

Developing and implementing safeguards against misuse of nuclear material and facilities has always been the Agency's main activities. Like the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself, the development of the safeguards system has been an evolutionary process. The first safeguards inspection was carried out in 1962 (in Norway). In the sixties, the basic concepts behind safeguards were developed (INFCIRC/26, adopted in 1961, for some of you it might still have a familiar ring) and the number of inspections and types of facilities inspected grew slowly. With the advent of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, a more complete, albeit limited, system of safeguards covering nuclear material, equipment and facilities emerged. But the quantum leap came, of course, wit the entry into force of the NPT. Today, the IAEA has 224 safeguards agreements in force with 140 States. Nearly all of these States are NPT States. In the Eurasia Region, particularly the Newly Independent States (NIS) significant achievements have been made in the Safeguards Implementation. States with nuclear activities have the SG Agreement in force. Some states are already signing the Additional Protocol and it is in force in two of these States in the NIS region. Much progress has been made in the area of nuclear material and accountancy through the IAEA Coordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP). The programme was organized to co-ordinate the donor states activities and has been successful for the last seven years in providing assistance in the area of nuclear legislation establishment of the State System of Accountancy of nuclear material (SSAC) and other related areas. Improvement is still foreseen in these areas, particularly as more states in the region will be signing and implementing the Additional Protocols

Containment and surveillance -- A principle IAEA safeguards measure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sonnier, C.S.

1997-01-01

In October 1954, the Statue of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) had been signed by 70 nations. The Agency was established in 1957, and at the end of its first year of operation 130 professionals were employed in all departments. By the end of 1990, the number of professionals in the Safeguards Department had increased to over 270, over 200 of whom are designated inspectors. One of the unique features of the IAEA which directly interfaces with Member States is that of on-site inspections by international officials of the IAEA. This growth cycle, spanning some 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. This paper addresses the specific subject of technical means to maintain continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals--classically referred to as Containment and Surveillance

The US Support Program to IAEA Safeguards Priority of Containment and Surveillance

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Diaz,R.A.

2008-06-13

The United States Support Program (USSP) priority for containment and surveillance (US) focuses on maintaining or improving the reliability and cost-effectiveness of C/S systems for IAEA safeguards, expanding the number of systems that are unattended and remotely monitored, and developing verification methods that help streamline the on-site inspection process. Existing IAEA C/S systems have evolved to become complex, integrated systems, which may include active seals, nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments, video cameras, and other sensors. These systems operate autonomously. They send analytical data to IAEA headquarters where it can be reviewed. These systems present challenges to the goals of improved system performance, standardization, reliability, maintainability, documentation, and cost effectiveness. One critical lesson from past experiences is the need for cooperation and common objectives among the IAEA, the developer, and the facility operator, to create a successful, cost effective system. Recent USSP C/S activities include Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant safeguard systems, production of a new shift register, numerous vulnerability assessments of C/S systems, a conduit monitoring system which identifies tampering of IAEA conduit deployed in the field, fiber optic seal upgrades, unattended monitoring system software upgrades, next generation surveillance system which will upgrade existing camera systems, and support of the IAEA's development of the universal nondestructive assay data acquisition platform.

Against the spread of nuclear weapons: IAEA Safeguards in the 1990s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-12-01

This booklet describes the role of IAEA verification activities, or safeguards, in the non-proliferation regime and shows how safeguards provide confidence that States fulfill the obligations they have undertaken in relation to the peaceful use of atomic energy. It also describes ways in which this role could develop in the future

The continuing role of item-specific agreements in the IAEA safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeFrancia, Cristian

2012-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) 'safeguards system' serves as the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, under which the IAEA acts as an auditor, monitor and inspector of state-administered nuclear energy programmes. The system consists of agreements and practices that enable the IAEA to gain a clear picture of a state's nuclear activities in order to provide credible assurances that nuclear energy is used for exclusively peaceful purposes

Japanese Quality Assurance System Regarding the Provision of Material Accounting Reports and the Safeguards Relevant Information to the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goto, Y.; Namekawa, M.; Kumekawa, H.; Usui, A.; Sano, K.

2015-01-01

The provision of the safeguards relevant reports and information in accordance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and the additional protocol (AP) is the basis for the IAEA safeguards. The government of Japan (Japan Safeguards Office, JSGO) has believed that the correct reports contribute to effective and efficient safeguards therefore the domestic quality assurance system for the reporting to the IAEA was already established at the time of the accession of the CSA in 1977. It consists of Code 10 interpretation (including the seminars for operators in Japan), SSAC's checks for syntax error, code and internal consistency (computer based consistency check between facilities) and the discussion with the IAEA on the facilities' measurement system for bulk-handling facilities, which contributes to the more accurate reports from operators. This spirit has been maintained for the entry into force of the AP. For example, questions and amplification from the IAEA will be taken into account the review of the AP declaration before sending to the IAEA and the open source information such as news article and scientific literature in Japanese is collected and translated into English, and the translated information is provided to the IAEA as the supplementary information, which may contribute to broadening the IAEA information source and to their comprehensive evaluation. The other safeguards relevant information, such as the mail-box information for SNRI at LEU fuel fabrication plants, is also checked by the JSGO's QC software before posting. The software was developed by JSGO and it checks data format, batch IDs, birth/death date, shipper/receiver information and material description code. This paper explains the history of the development of the Japanese quality assurance system regarding the reports and the safeguards relevant information to the IAEA. (author)

Improving technical support to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rundquist, D.

1986-01-01

Changes present new safeguards challenges and require that the entire safeguards process become more efficient. A development process has evolved at the Agency that aids in matching appropriate technology to the needs, primarily through the mechanism of voluntary Member States Support Programme, which gives IAEA access to many of the worlds finest nuclear laboratories. The function of these programs is discussed in this article with particular emphasis on the Agency's co-ordination role. Besides a description of the Member States Support Programme the problems involved (coordination and communication aspects) as well as the results achieved are indicated. The support is categorized under the following headlines: 1) Information and expertise; 2) Instrumentation, methods and techniques; 3) Training; 4) Test and calibration facilities. As mentioned in the article Member States also benefit from the Support Programme. Other means of technical support such as multi-national co-operation programmes and bilateral research agreements are mentioned

Incident involving radioactive material at IAEA Safeguards Laboratory - No radioactivity released to environment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

Full text: Pressure build-up in a small sealed sample bottle in a storage safe resulted in plutonium contamination of a storage room at about 02:30 today at the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf. All indications are that there was no release of radioactivity to the environment. Further monitoring around the laboratory will be undertaken. No one was working in the laboratory at the time. The Laboratory's safety system detected plutonium contamination in the storage room where the safe was located and in two other rooms - subsequently confirmed by a team of IAEA radiation protection experts. The Laboratory is equipped with multiple safety systems, including an air-filtering system to prevent the release of radioactivity to the environment. There will be restricted access to the affected rooms until they are decontaminated. A full investigation of the incident will be conducted. The IAEA has informed the Austrian regulatory authority. The IAEA's Laboratory in Seibersdorf is located within the complex of the Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf (ARC), about 35 km southeast of Vienna. The laboratory routinely analyses small samples of nuclear material (uranium or plutonium) as part of the IAEA's safeguards verification work. (IAEA)

Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

2010-01-01

Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

Safeguards agreement and additional protocol - IAEA instruments for control of nuclear materials distribution and their application in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nasrulloev, Kh.; Mirsaidov, U.

2010-01-01

Full text: It is known that IAEA plays an important role in facilitation of nuclear non-proliferation as international authority which carries out nuclear inspections. Republic of Tajikistan in 1997 signed nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty. Then in 2004 Safeguards agreement, additional protocol and small quantity protocol were signed. During 5 years Republic of Tajikistan submits information on its nuclear activity as declarations, foreseen in article 2.3 of Additional protocol to Safeguards agreement. Currently 66 declarations are submitted. Information required in accordance with Safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol is figured on that IAEA could compile more detailed and exact conception about nuclear activity in Tajikistan and it has the following purpose: information will lead to more transparency, and make it possible to IAEA to ensure with high extent of confidence that in the framework of declared program, any unstated nuclear activity is concealed; the more exact and comprehensive information, the rare is questions and discrepancies are originating; required information is the basis for effective planning and IAEA activity realization, related not only with safeguards implementation in regard to declared nuclear material but also ensuring of confidence in absence of undeclared nuclear activity in Tajikistan. IAEA inspection mission consisting of Messrs. N.Lazarev and F. Coillou visited Dushanbe in 2008 for verification of republic’s declarations on account for and control of nuclear materials under Additional protocol and Small quantity protocol, as well as consultations were provided on correct declaration completing and providing information on all nuclear materials. Besides, in 2006, the training course was conducted in Chkalovsk with participation of Commonwealth of Independent States countries on Safeguards agreement and Additional protocol. These visits and events will facilitate to strengthening of weapons of mass destruction non

End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Badalamente, R. [Pacific Northwest Lab., Richland, WA (United States); Anzelon, G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Deland, S. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whiteson, R. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

1994-07-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

1994-07-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information

IAEA safeguards information system re-engineering project (IRP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitaker, G.; Becar, J.-M.; Ifyland, N.; Kirkgoeze, R.; Koevesd, G.; Szamosi, L.

2007-01-01

The Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities through the establishment of a new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. The Project provides a unique opportunity to enhance all of the information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance limited funds, available resources and Departmental priorities. To achieve its goals, the Project will require the participation of all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive plan that provides both a flexible and stable foundation for address changing business needs. The expectation is that high quality integrated information systems will be developed that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible on-line in a secure environment. (author)

Design features to facilitate IAEA safeguards at light water reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pasternak, T.; Glancy, J.; Goldman, L.; Swartz, J.

1981-01-01

Several studies have been performed recently to identify and analyze light water reactor (LWR) features that, if incorporated into the facility design, would facilitate the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This paper presents results and conclusions of these studies. 2 refs

IAEA safeguards: Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons. As the world's nuclear inspectorate, the IAEA performs an indispensable role in furthering nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Following the completion of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the IAEA has become the instrument with which to verify that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are kept through performing what is known as its safeguards role. Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for all its non-nuclear weapon State parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. With all but a handful of the world community as State parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to legal agreement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The IAEA takes account of all source and special fissionable material in countries under safeguards. Monitoring and verification activities focus on those types of nuclear material that are the most crucial and relevant to nuclear weapons manufacturing. This includes plutonium-239, uranium-233 and -235 and any material containing one or more of these. Safeguards activities are applied routinely at over 900 facilities in 71 countries. In 2001 alone, more than 21,000 calendar days in the field were devoted to verifying hundreds of tons of special fissionable material by more than IAEA 250 inspectors

Gamma techniques for IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards at centrifuge enrichment cascades

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aaldijk, J.K.; de Betue, P.A.C.; van der Meer, K.; Harry, R.J.S.

1987-01-01

On February 4, 1983, the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP) concluded that the safeguards approach involving limited frequency unannounced access (LFUA) by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to cascades areas together with inspection activities outside the cascade areas meets the IAEA safeguards objectives in an effective and efficient way. In this way, the risks of revealing sensitive information were also minimized. The approach has been defined clearly and unambiguously, and it should be applied equally to all technology holders. One of the conclusions of the HSP was that a nondestructive assay go/no-go technique should be used during the LFUA inspections in the cascade areas of centrifuge enrichment plants. The purpose is to verify that the enrichment of the product UF 6 gas is in the range of low-enriched uranium (LEU), i.e., the enrichment is below 20%

The IAEA`s safeguards systems. Ready for the 21st century; Le systeme de garanties de l`AIEA au seuil du 21e siecle; El sistema de salvaguardias del OIEA a punto para el siglo 21; Sistema garantij magateh gotova vstupleniyu v 21-j vek

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-10-01

The publication reviews the IAEA`s safeguards system, answering the following questions: What is being done to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons? Why are IAEA Safeguards important? what assurances do safeguards seek to provide? How are safeguards agreements implemented? What specific challenges have there been for IAEA verification? Can the IAEA prevent the diversion of declared Material? How has the safeguards system been strengthened? How much do safeguards cost? What is the future of IAEA verification? (author)

Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

2010-10-01

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

Safeguards surveillance equipment and data sharing between IAEA and a member state

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Seung Sik

1999-01-01

Efficiency and reliability are two prongs of implementation of safeguards policy. Unattended surveillance is getting wide acceptance through its field trials and technical advances. In achieving goal of safeguards, new safeguards system should provide less intrusiveness than conventional inspection. Unattended surveillance data share will be a major issue among some countries that have own national inspection scheme in place in parallel with international safeguards to check the resources consuming incurred by the repeated installations. Nonetheless, the issue has not been focussed yet among the States concerned, especially for the country like Korea with national inspection in operation. For balanced development in safeguards regime between IAEA and Korea, sharing of unattended surveillance data with SSAC needs to be worked out in conjunction with the joint use of safeguards instruments that is in the process

IAEA integrated safeguards instrumentation program (I2SIP)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arlt, R.; Fortakov, V.; Gaertner, K.J.

1995-01-01

This article is a review of the IAEA integrated safeguards instrumentation program. The historical development of the program is outlined, and current activities are also noted. Brief technical descriptions of certain features are given. It is concluded that the results of this year's efforts in this area will provide significant input and be used to assess the viability of the proposed concepts and to decide on the directions to pursue in the future

All-Source Information Acquisition and Analysis in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferguson, Matthew; Norman, Claude

2010-01-01

All source information analysis enables proactive implementation of in-field verification activities, supports the State Evaluation process, and is essential to the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system. Information sources include State-declared nuclear material accounting and facility design information; voluntarily supplied information such as nuclear procurement data; commercial satellite imagery; open source information and information/results from design information verifications (DIVs), inspections and complementary accesses (CAs). The analysis of disparate information sources directly supports inspections, design information verifications and complementary access, and enables both more reliable cross-examination for consistency and completeness as well as in-depth investigation of possible safeguards compliance issues. Comparison of State-declared information against information on illicit nuclear procurement networks, possible trafficking in nuclear materials, and scientific and technical information on nuclear-related research and development programmes, provides complementary measures for monitoring nuclear developments and increases Agency capabilities to detect possible undeclared nuclear activities. Likewise, expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery plays a critical role for monitoring un-safeguarded sites and facilities. In sum, the combination of these measures provides early identification of possible undeclared nuclear material or activities, thus enhancing deterrence of safeguards system that is fully information driven, and increasing confidence in Safeguards conclusions. By increasing confidence that nuclear materials and technologies in States under Safeguards are used solely for peaceful purposes, information-driven safeguards will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system. Key assets for Agency collection, processing, expert analysis, and integration of these information sources are the Information Collection and Analysis

Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

2010-10-15

Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

Private sector involvement in the US program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.E.; Epel, L.; Maise, G.; Reisman, A.; Skalyo, J.

1995-01-01

The US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) relies on technical expertise found in the U. S private and public sectors. Since 1993, the international Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) has sought to increase the role of the private sector in POTAS. ISPO maintains and continues to develop a database of US companies interested in providing technical expertise to the IAEA. This database is used by ISPO to find appropriate contractors to respond to IAEA requests for technical assistance when the assistance can be provided by the private sector. The private sector is currently providing support in the development of equipment, training, and procedure preparation. POTAS also supports the work of private consultants. This paper discusses ISPO's efforts to identify suitable vendors and discusses conditions that hinder more substantial involvement by the private sector. In addition, the paper will discuss selected projects that are currently in progress and identify common problems that impede the progress and success of tasks performed by the private sector

Transparency and other State-specific factors: exploration of Ideas for evolving the system of State-evaluations and safeguards implementation of IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Everton, C.; Leslie, R.; Bayer, S.; East, M. [Craig Everton, Russell Leslie, Stephan Bayer, Michael East, Australia (Australia)

2011-12-15

In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

Transparency and other State-specific factors: exploration of Ideas for evolving the system of State-evaluations and safeguards implementation of IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Everton, C.; Leslie, R.; Bayer, S.; East, M.

2011-01-01

In November 2010 the IAEA Department of Safeguards launched its Long Term Strategic Plan at the IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: 'Preparing for Future Verification Challenges'. A key element of the Long Term Strategic Plan is the further evolution of the State-level approach for safeguards implementation away from criteria driven safeguards approaches focussed at the facility level, to a safeguards system that is objectives-based and fully information-driven. The State-level approach is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States, incorporating comprehensive State evaluations and safeguards implementation approaches that make use of all information available to the IAEA. In further evolving the State-level concept State-specific factors and acquisition path analysis will become increasingly important in State evaluations and in the determination of safeguards approaches for each State. It will be important to determine objective modalities for incorporating these factors. Consideration of State-specific factors in determining safeguards approaches is not new - in fact, paragraph 81 of INFCIRC/153 (concluded June 1972) enumerates several such factors that can be considered. This paper will explore some ideas for State-specific factors that could be used in State-evaluations, and how these factors could be used for determining State-by-State safeguards approaches. Ideas for State-specific factors will include effectiveness of State Systems of Accountancy and Control (SSAC), transparency of States in their dealings with the IAEA, and characteristics of a nuclear fuel cycle of a State.

Containment and surveillance - A principal IAEA safeguards measure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

1997-01-01

The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future

Exploiting the Geospatial Dimension of Data in Support of IAEA Safeguard

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McDaniel, M.; Bleakly, D.; Horak, K. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico (United States)

2012-06-15

The nuclear fuel cycle is highly dependent upon geographic factors and each step in a state's nuclear fuel cycle occurs in geographically explicit locations. Because of this, information indicative of these activities is likely to have a strong geographic competent. Therefore, it is suggested that open source information management in support of State Level Assessments also be geographically focused. With an explicit geographic interface for collecting, evaluating, analyzing, structuring, and disseminating open source information, the information management challenges faced by the IAEA can be made more intuitive and result in more effective, information-driven safeguards analyses, potentially leading to more timely safeguards conclusions. This paper proposes an information management framework based upon geographic information systems (GIS) principles for open-source information analysis in support of international safeguards.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

2002-09-01

One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

Radiation detectors as surveillance monitors for IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fehlau, P.E.; Dowdy, E.J.

1980-10-01

Radiation detectors used for personnel dosimetry are examined for use under IAEA Safeguards as monitors to confirm the passage or nonpassage (YES/NO) of plutonium-bearing nuclear material at barrier penetrations declared closed. In this application where backgrounds are ill defined, no advantage is found for a particular detector type because of intrinsic efficiency. Secondary considerations such as complexity, ease of tamper-proofing, and ease of readout are used to recommend specific detector types for routine monitoring and for data-base measurements. Recommendations are made for applications, data acquisition, and instrument development

Radiation detectors as surveillance monitors for IAEA safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fehlau, P.E.; Dowdy, E.J.

1980-10-01

Radiation detectors used for personnel dosimetry are examined for use under IAEA Safeguards as monitors to confirm the passage or nonpassage (YES/NO) of plutonium-bearing nuclear material at barrier penetrations declared closed. In this application where backgrounds are ill defined, no advantage is found for a particular detector type because of intrinsic efficiency. Secondary considerations such as complexity, ease of tamper-proofing, and ease of readout are used to recommend specific detector types for routine monitoring and for data-base measurements. Recommendations are made for applications, data acquisition, and instrument development.

Collecting Safeguards Relevant Trade Information: The IAEA Procurement Outreach Programme

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schot, P.; El Gebaly, A.; Tarvainen, M.

2010-01-01

The increasing awareness of activities of transnational procurement networks to covertly acquire sensitive nuclear related dual use equipment prompted an evolution of safeguards methodologies. One of the responses to this challenge by the Department of Safeguards in the IAEA was to establish the Trade and Technology Unit (TTA) in November 2004 to analyse and report on these covert nuclear related trade activities. To obtain information relevant to this analysis, TTA is engaging States that might be willing to provide this information to the Secretariat on a voluntary basis. This paper will give an overview of current activities, sum up the results achieved and discuss suggestions to further improve this programme made by Member States. (author)

Strengthening IAEA safeguards using high-resolution commercial satellite imagery

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Hui

2001-01-01

satellite imagery, such as the above-ground high stack associated with the underground reprocessing plant at Israel Dimona nuclear complex is clearly visible in the IKONOS images. Furthermore, construction of nuclear production facilities not only involves a great many activities (such as the shipment of various materials), but also takes a long period of time. So commercial satellites with several days' revisit time and one-meter resolution would detect these facilities and activities. Finally, once these dedicated nuclear production facilities are operating, there would be some visible signatures to be detected by high resolution images, such as the vapor plumes from cooling towers associated with a plutonium-production reactor can be seen clearly in the IKONOS images. These case studies show the new high-resolution commercial observation satellite imagery should be taken as one useful tool but not the standalone tool for strengthening IAEA safeguards. (author)

The IAEA inspectorate, including new requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alston, W.

1998-01-01

The basic purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is 'timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material'. Safeguards implementation is regulated by the IAEA Statute and individual safeguards agreements. The IAEA Inspectorate and its scope are described together with the technical objectives and the concept of verification. Effective implementation of safeguards requires cooperation between the IAEA and the state concerned. To this end, agreements require that the State should establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material subject to safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of Member States. Is is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The IAEA is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities

The IAEA inspectorate, including new requirements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alston, W [International Atomic Energy Agency, Department of Safeguards, Division of Operations A, Vienna (Austria)

1999-12-31

The basic purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is `timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material`. Safeguards implementation is regulated by the IAEA Statute and individual safeguards agreements. The IAEA Inspectorate and its scope are described together with the technical objectives and the concept of verification. Effective implementation of safeguards requires cooperation between the IAEA and the state concerned. To this end, agreements require that the State should establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material subject to safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of Member States. Is is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The IAEA is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities

Strengthening Performance Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Villiers, V. Z. de

2015-01-01

This paper will describe an initiative to develop a management support tool to improve performance management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards. The envisaged mechanism should enable the Department to (a) plan, assess and report on the achievement of its objectives and (b) to improve its performance on a continuous basis. The performance management tool should be aligned with related processes in the Department and the IAEA as a whole such as strategic planning, programming and budget, the result-based management approach and various reporting mechanisms. It should be integrated with existing and planned information and other management systems. The initially, departmental working group that was established for this initiative focussed on two aspects: confirmation of the overall and specific objectives to be achieved by the Department of Safeguards, and compiling an inventory of indicators of activities, outputs and outcomes that were being used in the Department. This exercise confirmed that alignment and prioritization of activities relating to assessment of, and reporting on, performance could be improved. A value creation map was subsequently developed to assist in focussing the performance management tool to identified needs of stakeholders. Other activities of the working group included the determination of the desired characteristics of a hierarchy of performance indicators to be used to drive desired behaviour across organizational levels. Complexities to be handled included the following: · reflecting the appropriate component of the results chain (such as activities, outputs, outcomes and impact); · maintaining the linkages between objectives and performance indicators across organizational levels; · developing a balanced set of performance indicators (e.g. reflecting in-field and Headquarters activities, incorporating all main components of Departmental processes and balanced scorecard perspectives, measurable vs qualitative indicators); and �

The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitworth, A.

1996-01-01

The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

Safeguards activities in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osabe, Takeshi

1998-01-01

Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

Ultra-sensitive detection of nuclear signatures in support of IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hotchkis, M.; Child, D.; Tuniz, C.; Williams, M.

2003-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies a range of ultra-sensitive detection techniques to provide assurance that Member States are in compliance with their safeguards agreements. Environmental samples are collected which can contain minute traces of nuclear material or other evidence. Careful analysis of these samples reveals the nature of the activities undertaken in the vicinity of the sampling point. This paper reviews the analytical techniques that are being applied. To ensure that the IAEA has access to the best available methods, samples are distributed to a group of qualified laboratories around the world for analysis. The Accelerator Mass Spectrometry facility at the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) is part of this select group of laboratories, and is the only AMS facility currently accredited with the IAEA. AMS provides the highest sensitivity available for detection of particularly useful signature radioisotopes, including 129 I, 236 U and plutonium isotopes

NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kyd, D.R.

1993-10-01

Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

2008-10-22

In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and

Quality assurance procedures for the IAEA Department of Safeguards Twin Minolta Camera Surveillance System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geoffrion, R.R.; Bussolini, P.L.; Stark, W.A.; Ahlquist, A.J.; Sanders, K.E.; Rubinstein, G.

1986-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program provides assurance to the international community that nations are complying with nuclear safeguards treaties. In one aspect of the program, the Department of Safeguards has developed a twin Minolta camera photo surveillance systems program to assure itself and the international community that material handling is accomplished according to safeguards treaty regulations. The camera systems are positioned in strategic locations in facilities such that objective evidence can be obtained for material transactions. The films are then processed, reviewed, and used to substantiate the conclusions that nuclear material has not been diverted. Procedures have been developed to document and aid in: 1) the performance of activities involved in positioning of the camera system; 2) installation of the systems; 3) review and use of the film taken from the cameras

IAEA to implement Safeguards Additional Protocols in the EU

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed the entry into force today of the Additional Protocols for 15 States of the European Union - France, the United Kingdom and the 13 non-nuclear weapon States of the EU - and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The Protocols, which provide the Agency with better tools to verify compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments, entered into force when the European Commission informed the Agency that EURATOM's own requirements for entry into force had been met. The 15 States had provided similar notifications over the past years since signing the Protocols in 1998. The simultaneous entry into force of Additional Protocols for the 15 EU States is 'a very positive development and a milestone in our efforts to strengthen the verification regime', said Dr. ElBaradei. 'In my view, the Additional Protocol should become the standard for verification under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).' He added that the Agency had been preparing for the entry into force of the EU protocols and was confident that, in co-operation with the 15 States and EURATOM, it would be able to ensure effective and efficient implementation in the EU States. The Model Additional Protocol was developed following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme to ensure that the IAEA is given the information and access it needs for timely discovery of any similar activities in States that have pledged not to use nuclear material and activities for weapons purposes. In the past year, Additional Protocols entered into force for 22 countries, and the Agency will now implement Additional Protocols in 58 States, which includes the 15 EU States. The 10 countries joining the EU on 1 May 2004 - seven of which already have brought into force Additional Protocols to their respective safeguards agreements - are expected to gradually accede to the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol covering

Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

Development of IAEA safeguards at low enrichment uranium fuel fabrication plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Badawy, I.

1988-01-01

In this report the nuclear material at low enrichment uranium fuel fabrication plants under IAEA safeguards is studied. The current verification practices of the nuclear material and future improvements are also considered. The problems met during the implementation of the the verification measures of the nuclear material - particularly for the fuel assemblies are discussed. The additional verification activities as proposed for future improvements are also discussed including the physical inventory verification and the verification of receipts and shipments. It is concluded that the future development of the present IAEA verification practices at low enrichment uranium fuel fabrication plants would necessitate the application of quantitative measures of the nuclear material and the implementation of advanced measurement techniques and instruments. 2 fig., 4 tab

Knowledge Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carrillo-de-Fischer, J.; Martinez, J. D.; Konecni, S.

2015-01-01

Knowledge management is the discipline of enabling individuals and teams to collectively and systematically create, share and apply knowledge. The most important assets in the IAEA Department of Safeguards are people and their knowledge. The focus of the Department’s knowledge management activities are to create an environment within which people share, learn and work together. The efforts to manage the knowledge of an individual leaving the Department have been focused on helping the supervisor of the departing staff member to identify what critical knowledge needs to be retained, and how to retain that knowledge. The Safeguards Knowledge Management team developed a person-centred approach. This approach involves interviews with the staff member, co-workers and/or customers to identify the critical knowledge to be transferred. Although time consuming, this method has been found to be effective in capturing the needed knowledge. This approach has four steps: – Identify the critical knowledge to be retained; – Select the knowledge transfer methods; – Apply the knowledge transfer methods; and – Assess and refine the transfer process. The paper will describe the person-centred approach and lessons learned from implementing this programme in the Department over several years. (author)

Knowledge Management in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konecni, S.; McCullough, R.

2015-01-01

Knowledge management is the discipline of enabling individuals and teams to collectively and systematically create, share and apply knowledge. The most important assets in the IAEA Department of Safeguards are people and their knowledge. The focus of the Department is to create an environment within which people share, learn and work together. The efforts to manage the knowledge leaving the Department have been focused on helping the supervisor of the departing staff member to identify what critical knowledge needs to be retained, and how to retain that knowledge. The Safeguards Knowledge Management team developed a person-centred approach. This approach involves interviews with the staff member, co-workers and/or customers to identify the critical knowledge to be transferred. Although time consuming we have found that this method is most effective to capture the needed knowledge. This approach has four steps: · Identify the critical knowledge to be retained; · Select the knowledge transfer methods; · Apply the knowledge transfer methods; and · Assess and refine the transfer process. The paper will describe the person-centred approach and lessons learned from implementing this programme in the Department over several years. (author)

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-01-01

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

Canadian safeguards research and development in support of the IAEA program document outlining the various tasks which comprise the program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-12-01

Canada has established a safeguards research and development program, the purpose of which is to supplement the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The program of support is a coordinated effort for the development and application of safeguards techniques and instruments to facilities safeguarded by the IAEA. This document sets forth those tasks which comprise the program

A Comparative Study on Safeguards Implementation under Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeon, Jihye; Kim, Ki-Hyun; Lee, Young Wook [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-10-15

A Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) requires several conditions, so-called obligations, on the items under the agreement such as: 1) peaceful use, 2) retransfer consent, 3) consent prior to reprocessing or enrichment and 4) safeguards and security. These obligations of the NCAs are imposed by the supplier country. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its member states require similar activities. However, there is a significant gap in nuclear material accountancy between safeguards implementation under the NCA and CSA. The difference of those two frameworks is compared herein, focusing on the unique features of the NCA safeguards and its implications are presented. In this study, the NCAs between the ROK and Canada, Australia and US were analyzed since each of them is one of the ROK’s major nuclear trading partners. The safeguards implementation under the NCA is usually specified in an Administrative Arrangement (AA) under the Agreement. The ROK has two AAs in force with Canada and Australia among 29 countries with NCA. Recently, the AA with Canada was revised in December 2015, with those concepts mentioned above. The AA with the US is currently under discussion. Cooperation in nuclear energy between two countries could be further enhanced through reliable implementation of the NCA undertakings. Taking into account the unique features of the NCA, we need to establish effective strategy for fulfilling the obligation under the Agreement.

IAEA monitoring field trials workshop

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ross, H.H.; Cooley, J.N.; Belew, W.L.

1995-01-01

Recent safeguards inspections in Iraq and elsewhere by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have led to the supposition that environmental monitoring can aid in verifying declared and in detecting undeclared nuclear activities or operations. This assumption was most recently examined by the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), in their reports to the IAEA Board of Governors. In their reports, SAGSI suggested that further assessment and development of environmental monitoring would be needed to fully evaluate its potential application to enhanced IAEA safeguards. Such an inquiry became part of the IAEA ''Programme 93+2'' assessment of measures to enhance IAEA safeguards. In March, 1994, the International Safeguards Group at Oak Ridge hosted an environmental monitoring field trial workshop for IAEA inspectors to train them in the techniques needed for effective environmental sampling. The workshop included both classroom lectures and actual field sampling exercises. The workshop was designed to emphasize the analytical infrastructure needed for an environmental program, practical sampling methods, and suggested procedures for properly planning a sampling campaign. Detailed techniques for swipe, vegetation, soil, biota, and water associated sampling were covered. The overall approach to the workshop, and observed results, are described

Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

Safeguards Implementation in Kazakhstan: Experience and Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhantikin, T.

2015-01-01

Experience of Kazakhstan joined the NPT in 1993, just after desintegration of USSR, and enforced Safeguards Agreement in 1995 can be interesting in implementation of safeguards in non-standard cases. Having weapon materials and test infrastructure legacy, the country together with IAEA and several donor countries found acceptable approaches to meet NPT provisions. One of challenges was to provide protection of sensitive information that could be accidentally disclosed in safeguards activities. With support of several weapon countries in close cooperation with the IAEA Kazakhstan liquidated test infrastructure in Semipalatinsk, implemented projects on elimination and minimization of use of HEU in civil sector, decommissioning of BN-350 fast breeder reactor. Now the IAEA LEU Bank is going to be established in Kazakhstan, and more challenges are coming in implementation of safeguards. Some technical and organizational details will be described from the experience of Kazakhstan in these projects. (author)

Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

2015-01-01

Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

How safe are nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sullivan, E.

1979-01-01

Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

Is the IAEA's Safeguard Strategic Plan Sufficient?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sokolski, H.; Gilinsky, V.

2015-01-01

IAEA safeguards have much improved and the Safeguards Department is commendably planning to further its technical capabilities and to make full use of its authority. Will this be enough to keep countries from exploiting nuclear power programmes to develop nuclear weapons, or to be in a position to do so rapidly should they so decide? Depending on nuclear programmes developments worldwide, especially on expansions in enrichment and reprocessing, and on how international affairs unfold, the answer may well be no. The fundamental limitations on the Department's ability to prevent proliferation are not technical, but conceptual. The Department is clearly motivated to carry out its technical activities competently. Yet it takes a relatively passive view of its role in the worldwide development of nuclear power-whatever technology comes into use, and whoever deploys it, the Department promises to exert its best effort to safeguard. In our view the Department should be more open about what it can or cannot realistically safeguard, and therefore what technology is permissible for deployment in national programmes. The Department's Strategic Plan says at the outset that its verifications assist the Agency to fulfil its statutory objective to ''accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy. . . '' The Department should judge itself by how well it promotes international security, not by its contribution to expanding nuclear power use. The Department's Vision includes advancing toward a nuclear weapons free world. That vision should include keeping states from deploying technologies that put them within easy reach of nuclear weapons. Our paper will suggest how the Department might supplement its current plan to best accomplish this. (author)

Safeguards implementation at US facilities during 1986 and 1987

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wredberg, L.

1987-01-01

Safeguards procedures were implemented at three nuclear facilities in the United States during 1986 and 1987, namely, the Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant in Columbia, South Carolina; the Salem No. 1 light water reactor (LWR) in New Jersey; and the Turkey Point No. 4 LWR in Florida. These three facilities have been under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards since early 1986 in accordance with the voluntary offer agreement between the IAEA and the United States, which went into force in 1980. Because of limited manpower and budget resources allocated to safeguards in nuclear weapon states, only a limited number of facilities can be under IAEA safeguards inspections at a time. Facilities are, therefore, subject to inspection only during a 2-yr period in the case of the United States. After that period other facilities are selected for another 2-yr period from the list of facilities subject to safeguards under the agreement. The facilities have been selected so that they form a fuel cycle, i.e., the inspected reactors are fueled with fuel assemblies manufactured by the inspected fabrication plant. The IAEA applies full scope safeguards at the selected facilities based upon established implementation practice for the facility types

Overview of IAEA year 2000 activities in the Department of Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chitumbo, K.

1999-01-01

The IAEA Department of Safeguards established a project in 1996 for the year 2000 (Y2K) conversion activities. This project covered assessment, conversion and testing of the software applications, instrument evaluation software, embedded systems and Personal Computer (PC) hardware attached to various equipment. Significant progress has been made in converting the applications and instruments to be year 2000 compliant. At the same time Member states have made an effort as well in converting the systems used jointly at the facilities

IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodrigues, M.D.F.

1978-04-01

The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.) [pt

Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

Nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Estrampres, J.

2010-01-01

Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

Clarifying the role of the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, R.

1983-01-01

The IAEA has many roles in promoting the role of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The most significant role that the IAEA undertakes is the development and application of safeguards to nuclear material, other material, equipment and facilities; this work consumes about 35% of the IAEA budget. The authority, procedures and limitations for the application of safeguards were described together with the relationship between the IAEA and the States where safeguards are in effect. Claims that the IAEA is not adequately fulfilling its safeguard role are usually based on misunderstandings of its role and authority. The IAEA's relationship to inspected States is not adversarial, regulatory, or guarding. It provides assurance to all States that peaceful nuclear activities are not diverted to a military program and in so doing enhances the reputation of States to whom safeguards are applied. Safeguards would be only one of many factors that would be involved in a States embarking on a military nuclear program. If proliferation of nuclear weapons occurs, this may be due in entirety or in part to these other factors. Many States could now undertake a military program but do not do so, because of their enlightened viewpoint that such activities are not in their own, or the world's best interests. However, any trend to further proliferation of nuclear weapons could be diminished by: -a lessening of political and economic tension between States, -restrictions on the supply of required technology, equipment, and material, and -an effective IAEA safeguard regime. There has been a regrettable trend to politicization in the direction and operation of the IAEA. It is hoped that this trend will be reversed and that IAEA will return to its earlier more technical role. There is a pressing need for the general public and governments to more fully understand the IAEA's role and its limitations

Understanding national and international safeguards: an evolutionary process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Higinbotham, W.A.

1983-01-01

Domestic and international safeguards have been evolving and will continue to evolve. in the case of the United States, the concern was to protect the classified materials, at first. Then attention focussed on material accounting, then on measures to promptly detect theft by individuals with access, and later on physical protection to ward-off armed terrorists. The objective of the IAEA has always been to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not being diverted from the peaceful facilities that are under safeguards. The evolution has taken place in deciding how to provide this assurance, and in the definition of specific safeguards goals. In both cases the technology needed to meet the goals has improved due to R and D and to experience. A plea is made for more cooperation betwen those who develop and manage the policies, those who develop safeguards techniques, and those who are subject to national and IAEA safeguards. Some illustrations of the evolution of policies, inadequate coordination and general progress are given

Enhanced cooperation between IAEA and Republic of Korea on safeguards implementation at light water reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Wan-Sou; Kim, Byung-Koo; Yim, Seuk-Soon

2001-01-01

Full text: In Korea, national inspection has been initiated from the second half of 1997. From 1999, national inspection has been carried out for all nuclear facilities in Korea. In 2000, national inspections were performed successfully in 32 nuclear facilities including 12 PWRs, 4 CANDU reactors, 10 research facilities, 4 fuel fabrication plants and others. As the national inspection system settled down, both the IAEA and Korea were looking for possible ways of cooperation for mutual benefit. It was expected that considerable saving on inspection resources as well as more effective safeguards implementation could be achieved, if more enhanced cooperation work was realized. In 1999, the IAEA and Korea agreed to establish a working group for the enhanced cooperation between both sides. A working group, composed of experts from the IAEA and ROK, reviewed several options for enhanced cooperation on LWRs in Korea and suggested a measure for implementing the current safeguards approach for LWRs with remote monitoring. The basic concepts of the Enhanced Cooperation Scheme are: 1. The SSAC shall carry out all scheduled inspections for each facility for each year, while the Agency shall carry out the annual PIV and post-PIV, and a random selection of the remaining inspections; 2, The remote monitoring (RM) data necessary for technical and safeguards review shall be shared between the Agency and SSAC; 3. The IAEA shall bear the costs of purchasing RM equipment and communication operating costs from the central hub station in Korea to Vienna; the ROK will bear the costs of installing all RM equipment and communication operating costs from each LWR to the central hub station in Korea. Typically, around 8-9 inspections are performed for one LWR per annum under current safeguards approach; 1 pre-PIV, 1 PIV, 1 post-PIV, 3-4 interim inspections, fresh fuel receipts and simultaneous inspection. RM design includes 2 digital cameras (equipment hatch and spent fuel pond), VACOSS

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

2009-07-12

Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

The international safeguards profession

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, K.E.

1986-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Robert Bean; Casey Durst

2009-10-01

legal document. As such, it is written in a legalese that is understood by specialists in international law and treaties, but not by most outside of this field, including designers of nuclear facilities. For this reason, many of the requirements have been simplified and restated. However, in all cases, the relevant source document and passage is noted so that readers may trace the requirement to the source. This is a helpful living guide, since some of these requirements are subject to revision over time. More importantly, the practices by which the requirements are met are continuously modernized by the IAEA and nuclear facility operators to improve not only the effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards, but also the efficiency. As these improvements are made, the following guidelines should be updated and revised accordingly.

Agreement reached on integrated safeguards in European Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the European Commission, has reached agreement on arrangements to implement 'integrated safeguards' in all non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union with significant nuclear activities. 'This important milestone is the result of the constructive common efforts of all parties concerned. It is a clear signal of the importance attributed by the EU and its Member States, as well as the IAEA, to the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,' said Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission in charge of Energy. 'Once we have sufficient confidence that a State' s nuclear activities are purely peaceful, we can apply safeguards measures in a less prescriptive, more customised manner. This reduces the inspection burden on the State and the inspection effort of the IAEA, while enabling the IAEA to maintain the conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities,' said Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General and Head of IAEA Safeguards Department. Background The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the main international Treaty prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It entrusts the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices through the application of 'safeguards'. IAEA safeguards include comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols that enable the IAEA to conclude that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State. Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency ' s safeguards obligations. In the European Union, nuclear safeguards are implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty and trilateral agreements between Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA

Verification and the safeguards legacy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perricos, Demetrius

2001-01-01

; qualitative and quantitative measurements of nuclear material; familiarity and access to sensitive technologies related to detection, unattended verification systems, containment/surveillance and sensors; examination and verification of design information of large and complex facilities; theoretical and practical aspects of technologies relevant to verification objectives; analysis of inspection findings and evaluation of their mutual consistency; negotiations on technical issues with facility operators and State authorities. This experience is reflected in the IAEA Safeguards Manual which sets out the policies and procedures to be followed in the inspection process as well as in the Safeguards Criteria which provide guidance for verification, evaluation and analysis of the inspection findings. The IAEA infrastructure and its experience with verification permitted in 1991 the organization to respond immediately and successfully to the tasks required by the Security Council Resolution 687(1991) for Iraq as well as to the tasks related to the verification of completeness and correctness of the initial declarations in the cases of the DPRK. and of S. Africa. In the case of Iraq the discovery of its undeclared programs was made possible through the existing verification system enhanced by additional access rights, information and application of modern detection technology. Such discoveries made it evident that there was a need for an intensive development effort to strengthen the safeguards system to develop a capability to detect undeclared activities. For this purpose it was recognized that there was need for additional and extended a) access to information, b) access to locations. It was also obvious that access to the Security Council, to bring the IAEA closer to the body responsible for maintenance of international peace and security, would be a requirement for reporting periodically on non-proliferation and the results of the IAEA's verification activities. While the case

Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

2012-08-01

Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

Estimated incremental costs for NRC licensees to implement the US/IAEA safeguards agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clark, R.G.; Brouns, R.J.; Chockie, A.D.; Davenport, L.C.; Merrill, J.A.

1979-01-01

A study was recently completed for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commision (NRC) by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to identify the incremental cost of implementing the US/IAEA safeguards treaty agreement to eligible NRC licensees. Sources for the study were cost estimates from several licensees who will be affected by the agreement and cost analyses by PNL staff. The initial cost to all eligible licensees to implement the agreement is estimated by PNL to range from $1.9 to $7.2 million. The annual cost to these same licensees for the required accounting and reporting activities is estimated at $0.5 to $1.5 million. Annual inspection costs to the industry for the limited IAEA inspection being assumed is estimated at $80,000 to $160,000

SSAC at Your Service: Promoting Co-operation Between IAEA and Finnish SSAC for Safeguards Implementation (Within the EU)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haemaelaeinen, Marko; Okko, Olli; Honkamaa, Tapani; Martikka, Elina

2010-01-01

this matter. Finland is also active in supporting IAEA through safeguards support programme (FINSP), for example facilitating training courses for IAEA inspectors in Finnish sites. Enthusiasm and experiences with the view of IAEA demands are the driven forces. For example, safeguarding the final disposal of spent fuel is a task in which STUK has been pushing forward intensively and openly by searching for solutions and developing methods for non-destructive assay. (author)

Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Beyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Beddingfield, David H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Durst, Philip [INL; Bean, Robert [INL

2010-01-01

The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

International safeguards 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1979-01-01

First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

Nuclear Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Findlay, T.

2015-01-01

The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

Improvement and validation of isotopic libraries of commercial gamma spectra evaluation packages. Report on task FIN A 955 of Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nikkinen, M.

1997-06-01

The Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is running gamma spectroscopy analysis with various samples taken at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. It was found that the commercial gamma spectra analysis packages available do not include proper gamma-line libraries for the various tasks needed for the safeguards purposes because the libraries of these packages are often incomplete and outdated. New libraries were developed to satisfy the needs in the analysis tasks required for the safeguards purposes. These lines are limited by the number of gamma lines to avoid the problems with too many candidates for a single gamma peak. The work was carried out under the Task FIN A 955 Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. (orig.) (18 refs.).

The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, P.

1999-01-01

For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

A view to the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tsuboi, Hiroshi

2000-01-01

The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

A New Step for ''State-IAEA Cooperation'' Based on the Enhanced Cooperation Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jo, S.Y.; Kim, M.; Kim, S.

2015-01-01

Since joining the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements, the ROK has made some exemplary case of implementing the IAEA's safeguards policy in a State. It's the results of the ROK Government's persistent effort for nuclear transparency to maintain its peaceful nuclear activities which is indispensible in Korea. The history of the ROK SSAC development can be reflected on the trajectory of the evolution of the IAEA safeguards. The ROK SSAC has achieved technical capabilities required for IAEA safeguards, which was not possible without cooperation programme with the IAEA. The first memorable moment of the ROK-IAEA cooperation is the enhanced cooperation program for the ROK LWRs in 2001, introducing remote monitoring systems and some changes in interim inspections. The next chance for leveling the ROK SSAC up came with IS implementation. Two parties consulted what should be prepared for efficient implementation of IS through seven times working group meetings. The WG put out IS approaches which have been being applied for the ROK nuclear facilities since 2008. The IS implementation, which is based on the state level approach, allowed the ROK SSAC to get opportunities to improve more its technical capabilities about support for IAEA safeguards activities, developing verification devices and safeguards approaches for pyroprocessing related facilities. The IAEA and the ROK are putting strenuous efforts for strengthening safeguards cooperation based on the Enhanced Cooperation Arrangements which was signed in 2012, discussing the SSAC role in IAEA safeguards activities, joint use equipment, etc. Besides, two parties are considering introducing unannounced inspections at LWRs after several rehearsals. In this paper, the implication and importance of State-IAEA cooperation is presented based on the ROK's experience with summarizing the brief history of SSAC development and cooperation with the IAEA. (author)

The role of IAEA Safeguards in connection with nuclear trade

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Imai, R.

1977-01-01

IAEA safeguards is one of the means to prevent proliferation of military and/or explosive utilization of nuclear material. As such; safeguards can be a potent instrument, and its characteristics are primarily technical. Other means may include; a) political incentives which make possession of nuclear weapons unnecessary and undescribable; b) an extent of trade restrictions regarding certain sensitive material, equipment and technology; and c) accompanying requirements of physical protection. Peaceful nuclear industry has an aspect which naturally calls for international exchange. The technology itself represents one of the most advanced in our times, and therefore, should be shared throughout the world. Uranium resources of economic grades are found only in a limited number of countries. Many of the components of the industry, including reactor manufacture and fuel cycle, are very capital-intensive and technology-intensive, so that it would be natural that a relatively limited number of manufacturing or processing capabilities should serve the rest of the world. It is useful to look at the existing pattern of nuclear trade, as well as to forecast the effects of increasing trade volume. Regarding technology, the problem divides itself into three in order that safeguards should be effective and non-intrusive. There is a need to decrease international shipper/receiver difference by means of containment/surveillance as well as quick and accurate reporting. Obviously, its effectiveness will be maximized if all the world's trading partners should participate in a system of coordination. Improving technical effectiveness of safeguards is very important, once nuclear material is in a country. Thirdly, in addition to nuclear material accountancy, new techniques may be employed to recognize characteristic patterns of a nations's nuclear activities, or deviation from such a pattern. Tracing nuclear trade might become important input to such an analysis

Safeguarding the atom

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

1985-01-01

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant by IAEA Member State Support Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shin, H. S.; Kim, H. D.; Song, D. Y.; Eom, S. H.; Lee, T. H.; Ahn, S. K.; Park, S. H.; Han, B. Y.; Choi, Y.

2012-01-01

The objective of this project is to analyze the safeguard ability of pyroprocess facility and to establish the safeguards system for pyroprocess by developing the technology of nuclear material accounting for unit process, surveillance technology and nuclear characteristic analysis technology which are needed to demonstrate the safeguards technology of pyroprocess. Therefore, the development of a safeguards approach for pyroprocessing facilities is required as the interest of pyroprocessing increases. Regarding this issue, the IAEA made a contract the 3-years long Member State Support Program (MSSP) for the 'Support for Development of a Safeguards Approach for a Pyroprocessing Plant' with the Republic of Korea (ROK) in July 2008. Even though the pyroprocess technology is currently being developed all over the world, its safeguards approach has not been established yet, and especially, nuclear material accountancy technology which is the core of safeguards has not been established as well. Therefore, the development of new accountancy technology which is appropriate for the construction of pyroprocess facility is needed. Due to the nature of the process, pyroprocess has various kinds of process material form, and the composition of Pu and U isotopes included in process material is not homogeneous. Also, the existing nuclear material accountancy technology for a wet reprocessing facility is hard to apply because of a large quantity of gamma-ray radiation which is emitted from the fissile products in process material. In this report, the study for the development of a safeguards approach for a pyroprocessing plant pyroprocessing has been described. As the previous results six pyroprocessing facility concepts suggested by US, Japan, and Republic of Korea had been summarized and analyzed, and the determination principles were established to determine a reference pyroprocessing facility concept. The reference pyroprocessing facility was determined to be the ESPF of KAERI

IAEA safeguards technical manual

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-03-01

Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

IAEA safeguards information system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nardi, J.

1984-01-01

The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

2006-01-01

Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

IAEA's Implementation of the State-Level Concept

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Trimble, D.; Ballenger, J.; Levis, G.

2015-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has taken several steps over the years to strengthen its safeguards program, including successfully encouraging more countries to bring an Additional Protocol into force, increasing the number of countries that are subject to a broader range of safeguards measures, and upgrading its safeguards analytical laboratories. IAEA's latest strategy to further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards programme is to expand implementation of the 'state-level concept' to all countries with safeguards agreements. The state-level concept is an approach in which IAEA considers a broad range of information about a country's nuclear capabilities and tailors its safeguards activities in each country accordingly. IAEA officials have stated that broader implementation of this approach will allow the agency to better allocate resources by reducing safeguards activities where there is no indication of undeclared nuclear activities and to focus its efforts on any issues of safeguards concern. Several member countries, including the United States, support IAEA's plans to broaden implementation of the state- level concept, but other member countries - including some countries with significant nuclear activities - have raised concerns that the agency has not clearly defined and communicated how the state-level concept will be implemented or how it will stay within bounds of the agency's existing legal authorities. In September 2012, the General Conference passed a resolution that included a request for IAEA's Secretariat to report to the Board of Governors on the conceptualization and development of the state-level concept. In August 2013, IAEA released that report to the Board of Governors and started briefing member states on its content. Our paper will discuss (1) IAEA's efforts to clearly define and communicate how IAEA will implement the state-level concept and (2) the status of its

Novel technologies for safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

2009-01-01

Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

2007-01-01

Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

GPS positioning and desktop mapping. Applications to environmental monitoring. Report on task JNT B898 on the Finnish support programme to IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kansanaho, A.; Ilander, T.; Toivonen, H.

1995-10-01

Satellite navigation has been used for in-field applications by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety since 1993. Because of this experience, training in the use of GPS positioning and desktop mapping was chosen as a task under the Finnish Support programme to IAEA safeguards. A lecture and a field experiment was held in the training course on environmental monitoring at the IAEA headquarters in June 1995. Real-time mapping of the co-ordinates and storing information on sampling sites and procedures can make safeguards implementation more efficient and effective. Further software development are needed for these purposes. (author) (6 figs.)

ISSAS guidelines. Reference report for IAEA SSAC advisory service

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

All comprehensive safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Member States concluded on the basis of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) require the Member State to establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material subject to safeguards. In the years following the negotiation of INFCIRC/153, the IAEA's Secretariat and a large group of experts from Member States collaborated in the production of a set of guidelines to assist Member States in establishing their State system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials (SSAC). These guidelines, termed 'Guidelines for States' Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials', were published in 1980 as part of the IAEA's information series on the then developing safeguards system (IAEA/SG/INF/2). However, events over the past decade have changed the circumstances and requirements of the safeguards system. The IAEA, with support and assistance from Member States, embarked on an extensive multiyear effort to strengthen the safeguards system by increasing the IAEA's capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. The centre-piece of this effort is the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements (referred to as the 'additional protocol' and contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) approved by the Board of Governors in May 1997. The central components of strengthened safeguards and the additional protocol are increased access to information and increased physical access. The effective and efficient implementation of the strengthened safeguards system requires the SSACs to be effective and to cooperate closely with the IAEA. To achieve this aim the IAEA is, inter alia, revising IAEA/SG/INF/2, providing training and equipment to SSAC Authorities and providing an advisory service to Member States known as the IAEA SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS). Accounting for and control of nuclear material is also key for nuclear security. General Conference resolutions (e.g. GC(48)/RES

Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderson, A.R.

1977-01-01

The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rockwood, Laura

2001-01-01

The legal framework of IAEA safeguards consists of a number of elements, not at all of which are documents. These elements include the Statute of the IAEA; treaties and supply agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings; the basic safeguards documents, the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements; and finally, the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Board of Governors. After a discussion of these elements the major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Finally the procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguards agreements are described. (author)

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 10, no. 1(67). Mar-Apr 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: IAEA Board to Consider Proposal on Safeguards, IAEA Director General to Address NPT Conference in mid-April, IAEA Hosts UN System-Wide Meeting, Joint IAEA/EC/WHO Conference on Chernobyl Announced, IAEA Concludes Post-Chernobyl Research Project, Uranium Data in Environmental Monitoring, Director General Address in Chile, South Africa, the Philippines Host Nuclear Information Seminars, Upcoming IAEA Conferences, Symposia and Seminars, Isotopes in Water Resources Management, Environmental Impacts of Radioactive Releases, Joint FAO/IAEA Symposium on Crop Improvement, Other Conferences, Symposia and Seminars in 1995, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Developments (IAEA Safeguards Agreements, New NPT Members), Handbook on Nuclear Communications, SIT Campaign in Zanzibar, and other short information

The next generation safeguards initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tobey, William

2008-01-01

NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ogawa, T.

2001-01-01

Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

Some problems relating to application of safeguards in the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tolchenkov, D.L.

1983-01-01

By the end of this century there will have been a considerable increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA will therefore be faced with problems due to the increased volume of safeguards activity, the application of safeguards to new types of facility and to large facilities, the optimization of the existing IAEA safeguards system and so on. The authors analyse the potential growth in the IAEA's safeguards activities up to the year 2000 and consider how to optimize methods for the application of safeguards, taking into account a number of factors relating to a State's nuclear activity, the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards etc. On the basis of a hypothetical model of the nuclear fuel cycle that allows for the factors considered as part of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the authors assess the possible risk of diversion as a function of a full-scope safeguards effort. They also examine possible conceptual approaches to safeguarding large-scale facilities such as fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants. (author)

Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

2010-04-01

For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

Excerpts from the introductory statement by IAEA Director General. IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, 9 December 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1999-01-01

The document contains excerpts from the Introductory Statement made by the Director General of the IAEA at the IAEA Board of Governors on 9 December 1999. The following aspects from the Agency's activity are briefly presented: IAEA's safeguards, physical protection of nuclear material, the status of Agency's involvement in safeguards verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Agency's actions in connection with Y2K possible problems

The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pepper, Susan E. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Pickett, Chris A. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Queirolo, Al [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Bachner, Katherine M. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Worrall, Louise G. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2015-04-07

The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al; Bachner, Katherine M.; Worrall, Louise G.

2015-01-01

The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers' goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term ''software sustainability'' was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

2001-01-01

For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 9, no. 4(66). Oct 1994

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: IAEA Analyzing effect of US-DPRK Agreed Framework, Statement to General Assembly in New-York, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 October 1994, Congress of the European Nuclear Society, 4 October 1994, IAEA General Conference, 19 September 1994, Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials, IAEA Director General Blix honoured, Ukraine and IAEA sign Safeguards Agreement, International Convention on Nuclear Safety, Highlights of the 1994 General Conference, IAEA safeguards in the DPRK, Monitoring and verification in Iraq, IAEA safeguards system, Measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, African nuclear-weapon-free zone, South Africa's participation in IAEA activities, Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, IAEA technical co-operation activities, Technical assistance in the Middle East, Radioactive waste management, Water resources and production, IAEA budget and extrabudgetary resources for 1995, Staffing of the IAEA Secretariat, Nuclear safety and radiological protection, Scientific Programme at the General Conference, Environmental monitoring, High-energy accelerators and radioactive waste management, Global food security and sustainability, Other meetings, Air Transport of Radioactive materials, Accelerators for Research, Water Resources, Radiation Technologies in Health Care, Spent Fuel Storage, Nuclear Techniques in Agriculture, Comprehending Radiation Risks, Environmental Impact of Radioactive Releases, Strengthening Radiation Protection Infrastructures, and other short information

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 9, no. 4(66). Oct 1994

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1994-12-31

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: IAEA Analyzing effect of US-DPRK Agreed Framework, Statement to General Assembly in New-York, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 October 1994, Congress of the European Nuclear Society, 4 October 1994, IAEA General Conference, 19 September 1994, Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials, IAEA Director General Blix honoured, Ukraine and IAEA sign Safeguards Agreement, International Convention on Nuclear Safety, Highlights of the 1994 General Conference, IAEA safeguards in the DPRK, Monitoring and verification in Iraq, IAEA safeguards system, Measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, African nuclear-weapon-free zone, South Africa`s participation in IAEA activities, Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, IAEA technical co-operation activities, Technical assistance in the Middle East, Radioactive waste management, Water resources and production, IAEA budget and extrabudgetary resources for 1995, Staffing of the IAEA Secretariat, Nuclear safety and radiological protection, Scientific Programme at the General Conference, Environmental monitoring, High-energy accelerators and radioactive waste management, Global food security and sustainability, Other meetings, Air Transport of Radioactive materials, Accelerators for Research, Water Resources, Radiation Technologies in Health Care, Spent Fuel Storage, Nuclear Techniques in Agriculture, Comprehending Radiation Risks, Environmental Impact of Radioactive Releases, Strengthening Radiation Protection Infrastructures, and other short information

Some reflections on nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Campbell, Ross.

1981-01-01

The author doubts whether, in view of the 1976 policy of requiring adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent IAEA safeguards, Canada still needs the 1974 policy of bilateral safeguards on technology as well as material. The opinion is expressed that bilateral safeguards create difficulties for the IAEA, and are resented by some potential customers. Much better, if it were achievable, would be a code agreed by a convention of vendors and customers alike, to include sanctions against transgressors. The author expresses confidence in the IAEA, but perceives a need for more men and money. Also needed are better instruments to account for materials

Safeguards by Design Challenge

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise

2016-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Future issues in international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

1991-01-01

The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

Trade Analysis and Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

2010-01-01

In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

IAEA yearbook 1991

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

The IAEA Yearbook 1991 contains the following 6 chapters: Transfer of Nuclear Technology; Applications of Nuclear Techniques and Research (Also published separately as Part B of the IAEA Yearbook 1991); Nuclear Power, Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Management (Also published separately as Part C of the IAEA Yearbook 1991); Nuclear Safety Review (Also published separately as Part D of the IAEA Yearbook 1991); IAEA Safeguards; The IAEA (operating framework and functions). A separate abstract and indexing was provided for each chapter. Refs, figs and tabs

The role of IAEA safeguards in connection with nuclear trade

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Imai, R.

1977-01-01

IAEA safeguards are one of the means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear material for military purposes. As such safeguards can be a potent instrument, and its characteristics are primarily technical. Other means may include (a) political incentives which render possession of nuclear weapons unnecessary and undesirable; (b) extension of trade restrictions regarding certain sensitive material, equipment and technology; and (c) accompanying requirements for physical protection. Peaceful nuclear industry has certain aspects which naturally call for international exchange. The technology itself represents one of the most advanced in our times, and therefore needs to be shared throughout the world. Uranium resources of economic levels are found in only a limited number of countries. Many of the components of the industry, including reactor manufacture and fuel cycle, are vey capital-intensive and technology-intensive, so that it would be natural for a relatively limited number of manufacturing or processing capabilities to serve the rest of the world. It is useful to examine the existing pattern of nuclear trade, as well as to forecast the effects of increasing trade volume. Regarding technology, there is a need to decrease the international shipper/receiver difference by means of containment/surveillance as well as by rapid and accurate reporting. Obviously, its effectiveness will be maximized if all the world's trading partners participated in a system of co-ordination. Improving technical effectiveness of safeguards is very important once nuclear material is in a country. In addition to nuclear material accountancy, new techniques may be employed to recognize the characteristic pattern of a nation's nuclear activities, or deviation from such a pattern. Tracing nuclear trade might become an important input to such an analysis. (author)

Training the IAEA Inspectors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potterton, L.

2010-01-01

Newly recruited safeguards inspectors take to the field. There are currently 250 inspectors and every year the IAEA runs an introductory course on the safeguards systems for the organisation's newly appointed inspectors.

Safeguards techniques and equipment. 2003 ed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The 1990s saw significant non-proliferation related developments in the world, resulting in a new period of safeguards development. Over several years an assessment was made of how to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. In May 1997 this culminated in the adoption by the IAEA Board of Governors of a Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements which significantly broadens the role of IAEA safeguards. As a consequence, the IAEA safeguards system entered a new era. In 1997 the IAEA began to publish a new series of booklets on safeguards, called the International Nuclear Verification Series (NVS). The objective of these booklets was to help in explaining IAEA safeguards, especially the new developments in safeguards, particularly for facility operators and government officers involved with these topics. The current booklet, which is a revision and update of IAEA/NVS/1, is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. A completely new section on data security has been added to describe the specific features that are included in installed equipment systems in order to ensure the authenticity and confidentiality of information. As new verification measures continue to be developed the material in this booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. The basic verification measure used by the IAEA is nuclear material accountancy. In applying nuclear material accountancy, IAEA safeguards inspectors make independent measurements to verify quantitatively the amount of nuclear material presented in the State's accounts. For this purpose, inspectors count items (e.g. fuel assemblies, bundles or rods, or containers of powdered compounds of uranium or plutonium) and measure attributes of these items during their inspections using non

International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Henriques, Sasha

2011-01-01

The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

SARP-II: Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program, Revised

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kempf, C.R.

1994-01-01

A computer code, SARP (Safeguards Accounting and Reports Program) which will generate and maintain at-facility safeguards accounting records, and generate IAEA safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user, was completed in 1990 by the Safeguards, Safety, and Nonproliferation Division (formerly the Technical Support Organization) at Brookhaven National Laboratory as a task under the US Program of Technical Support to IAEA safeguards. The code was based on a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) for off-load refueled power reactor facilities, with model facility and safeguards accounting regime as described in IAEA Safeguards Publication STR-165. Since 1990, improvements in computing capabilities and comments and suggestions from users engendered revision of the original code. The result is an updated, revised version called SARP-II which is discussed in this report

Nuclear safeguards - a system in transition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

1999-01-01

'Classical' safeguards have a strong emphasis on nuclear materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - what has been termed the correctness of States' declarations. Following the Gulf War, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major changes are in progress to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the IAEA's authority, and there has been good progress in developing the new approaches and technologies required to ensure this authority is used effectively. IAEA safeguards are undergoing a major transition, towards greater emphasis on information collection and analysis, diversity of verification methods, incorporation of more qualitative judgments, and improved efficiency. These changes present major challenges to the IAEA and to the international community, but the end result will be a more effective safeguards system

The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

1989-01-01

The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

Evolution of a safeguards support program: POTAS past and future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kessler, J.C.; Reisman, A.W.

1992-01-01

When the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) became for the first time responsible for implementing full-scope safeguards in many countries, including countries with large and sophisticated nuclear programs. The IAEA's Department of Safeguards did not have the safeguards technology appropriate for these rapidly expanding responsibilities, nor did it have a research and development program to respond to that need. In response to this situation, the United States initiated the US Program of Technical Assitance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) in 1977. This program was originally intended to be a 5-yr, $5 million program. As the United States and the IAEA began to implement this program, several things rapidly became clear. Meeting the evolving safeguards technology needs would require much more than $5 million; within the first 5 yr, the United States allocated more than $20 million. This paper summarizes the policies activities, and practices POTAS has employed in support of IAEA safeguards program

Design measures to facilitate implementation of safeguards at future water cooled nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The report is intended to present guidelines to the State authorities, designers and prospective purchasers of future water cooled power reactors which, if taken into account, will minimize the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation and ensure efficient and effective acquisition of safeguards data to the mutual benefit of the Member State, the plant operator and the IAEA. These guidelines incorporate the IAEA's experience in establishing and carrying out safeguards at currently operating nuclear power plants, the ongoing development of safeguards techniques and feedback of experience from plant operators and designers on the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation. The following main subjects are included: The IAEA's safeguards function for current and future nuclear power plants; summary of the political and legal foundations of the IAEA's safeguards system; the technical objective of safeguards and the supply and use of required design information; safeguards approaches for nuclear power plants; design implications of experience in safeguarding nuclear power plants and guidelines for future water cooled reactors to facilitate the implementation of safeguards

Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gastelum, Zoe N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Henry, Michael J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Burtner, IV, E. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doehle, J. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Hampton, S. D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); La Mothe, R. R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Nordquist, P. L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Zarzhitsky, D. V. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2014-12-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.; Burtner, IV E.R.; Doehle, J. R.; Hampton, S. D.; La Mothe, R. R.; Nordquist, P. L.; Zarzhitsky, D. V.

2014-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL's safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide ''vision''@ for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

Accountability and Transparency: Essential Underpinnings of Quality Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Everton, C.; Floyd, R.

2015-01-01

The fundamental purpose of IAEA safeguards is to maintain confidence in the international community of the compliance of States with their respective non-proliferation commitments. The safeguards system for ensuring this compliance produces the most important output, the IAEA's compliance findings. Confidence in the findings of any compliance verification system requires some basic elements such as independence, accountability, transparency, and quality management systems. Quality management systems are an internal set of documents and procedures that, while clearly important, need to incorporate an external communication component in order to engender confidence as to how compliance is being managed and ensured. This paper will explore the importance of these fundamentals to confidence in IAEA safeguards compliance conclusions, with a focus on the external communication elements of accountability and transparency. Accountability and transparency will be considered with different communication channels through which safeguards implementation matters are explained and reported and at different levels, facility, State, regional, and the IAEA. This will include communications by: the IAEA and State authorities to the general public; State authorities to peers in other national safeguards authorities (regional and beyond); and, the IAEA and State authorities to the international community as represented through the Board of Governors and General Conference. Examples will be presented of good practices in these areas to encourage greater accountability and transparency in the work of safeguards. (author)

International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-12-31

Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

2010-01-01

IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) Technique: Cost-Effective Tool for NDA Verification in IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Braverman, E.; Lebrun, A.; Nizhnik, V.; Rorif, F.

2010-01-01

Uranium materials measurements using the ISOCS technique play an increasing role in IAEA verification activities. This methodology provides high uranium/plutonium sensitivity and a low detection limit together with the capability to measure items with different shapes and sizes. In addition, the numerical absolute efficiency calibration of a germanium detector which is used by the technique does not require any calibration standards or reference materials. ISOCS modelling software allows performing absolute efficiency calibration for items of arbitrary container shape and wall material, matrix chemical composition, material fill-height, uranium or plutonium weight fraction inside the matrix and even nuclear material/matrix non-homogeneous distribution. Furthermore, in a number of cases, some key parameters such as matrix density and U/Pu weight fraction can be determined along with analysis of nuclear material mass and isotopic composition. These capabilities provide a verification solution suitable for a majority of cases where quantitative and isotopic analysis should be performed. Today, the basic tool for uranium and plutonium mass measurement used in Safeguards verification activities is the neutron counting technique which employs neutron coincidence and multiplicity counters. In respect to the neutron counting technique, ISOCS calibrated detectors have relatively low cost. Taking into account its advantages, this methodology becomes a cost-effective solution for nuclear material NDA verification. At present, the Agency uses ISOCS for quantitative analysis in a wide range of applications: - Uranium scrap materials; - Uranium contaminated solid wastes; - Uranium fuel elements; - Some specific verification cases like measurement of Pu-Be neutron sources, quantification of fission products in solid wastes etc. For uranium hold-up measurements, ISOCS the only available methodology for quantitative and isotopic composition analysis of nuclear materials deposited

Measuring Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2011-01-01

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-07-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

1993-11-01

This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ''Knowledge Acquisition Skills'' in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively

Excerpts from the introductory statement by IAEA Director General. IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, 14 September 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1998-01-01

The document contains excerpts from the Introductory Statement made by the Director General of the IAEA at the IAEA Board of Governors on 14 September 1998. The following aspects from the Agency's activity are presented: nuclear safety, technical co-operation programme, safeguards and verification, fissile material treaty, nuclear material released from the military sector, Agency's involvement in safeguards verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Agency's inspections in Iraq in relation to its clandestine nuclear programme, and Agency's safeguards in the Middle East region

The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) in the Agency's safeguards measurement system activity in 1990

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bagliano, G.; Cappis, J.; Deron, S.; Parus, J.L.

1991-05-01

The IAEA applies Safeguards at the request of a Member State to whole or part of its nuclear materials. The verification of nuclear material accountability still constitutes the fundamental method of control, although sealing and surveillance procedures play an important complementary and increasing role in Safeguards. A small fraction of samples must still be analyzed at independent analytical laboratories using conventional Destructive Analytical (DA) methods of highest accuracy in order to verify that small potential biases in the declarations of the State are not masking protracted diversions of significant quantities of fissile materials. The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) is operated by the Agency's Laboratories at Seibersdorf to provide to the Department of Safeguards and its inspectors such off-site Analytical Services, in collaboration with the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) of the Agency. In the last years SAL and the Safeguards DA Services have become more directly involved in the qualification and utilization of on-site analytical instrumentation such as K-edge X-Ray absorptiometers and quadrupole mass spectrometers. The nature and the origin of the samples analyzed, the measurements usually requested by the IAEA inspectors, the methods and the analytical techniques available at SAL and at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) with the performances achieved during the past years are described and discussed in several documents. This report gives an evaluation compared with 1989 of the volume and the quality of the analyses reported in 1990 by SAL and by the NWAL in reply to requests of IAEA Safeguards inspectors. The reports summarizes also on-site DA developments and support provided by SAL to the Division of Safeguards Operation and special training courses to the IAEA Safeguards inspectors. 55 refs, 7 figs, 15 tabs

Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wonder, E.F.

2010-01-01

The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1999-01-01

An NDT presupposes a fundamental commitment by all parties to its final objective and hence requires a high and sustained level of confidence amongst all states concerned. The appropriate format for an Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (NDT) would probably be a multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty must necessarily include the five nuclear weapon states and a procedure would have to be found for securing the ratification of the threshold states without conferring upon them the status of nuclear weapon states. While the IAEA may well be able to carry out the safeguards tasks required by an NDT it would probably be necessary to establish a new international organization to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The experience of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, and of the IAEA in the DPRK, have shown how difficult the verification of international obligations is in the absence of a commitment to disarm, while the experience of the INF and START treaties, and of the IAEA in South Africa have shown how much simpler it is when the parties concerned are fully committed to the process. Verifying and safeguarding an NDT would be largely an extrapolation of activities already carried out by the nuclear weapon states under the INF and START treaties and by the IAEA in the routine application of safeguards as well as in its less routine work in Iraq, South Africa and the DPRK. Both the verification and safeguarding tasks would be made very much easier if it were possible to bring down to a few hundred the number of nuclear warheads remaining in the hands of any avowed nuclear weapon state, and to conclude a cutoff convention. Experience is needed to show whether the additional safeguards authority accorded to the IAEA by 'programme 93+2' will enable it to effectively safeguard the facilities that would be decommissioned as a result of an NDT and those that would remain in operation to satisfy civilian needs. Subject to this rider and on condition that the IAEA

Implications for advanced safeguards derived from PR and PP case study results

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boyer, Brian D.

2009-01-01

The proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) working group produced a case study on the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR). The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size collocated with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a spent fuel reprocessing facility using pyroprocessing technology. This study revealed how safeguards would be applied at such site consisting of integrated multiple fuel cycle facilities and the implications of what safeguards technology and safeguards concepts would need to be adapted and developed to safeguard successfully this Generation IV nuclear energy system concept. The major safeguards concepts driving our safeguards analysis are timeliness goals and material quantity goals. Because the fresh transuranic (TRU) fuel to be produced in the ESFR fuel fabrication facility contains plutonium, the ESFR will be reprocessing, using in the reactor, and storing material on site that will have IAEA defined 'direct-use material' in it with stringent timeliness goals and material quantity goals that drive the safeguards implementation. Specifically, the TRU fresh fuel, pyroprocessing in process material, LWR spent fuel sent to the ESFR, and TRU spent fuel will contain plutonium. This material will need to be verified at interim intervals four times per year because the irradiated direct-use material, as defined previously, has three-month timeliness goals and 8 kg material quantity goals for plutonium. The TRU in-process material is, of course, irradiated direct-use material as defined by the IAEA. Keeping the plutonium and uranium together with TRu products should provide a radiation barrier. this radiation barrier slows down the ability to reprocess the fuel. Furthermore, the reprocessing technique, if it has some intrinsic proliferation resistance, will need major modifications to be able to separate plutonium from the uranium and TRU mixture. The ESFR design

Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

1975-01-01

The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

Program of technical assistance to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - lessons learned from the U.S. program of technical assistance to IAEA safeguards. Final report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-06-01

The Defense Nuclear Agency is sponsoring a technical study of the requirements of a vehicle to meet the OPCW`s future needs for enhanced chemical weapons verification capabilities. This report provides information about the proven mechanisms by which the U.S. provided both short- and long-term assistance to the IAEA to enhance its verification capabilities. Much of the technical assistance has generic application to international organizations verifying compliance with disarmament treaties or conventions. In addition, some of the equipment developed by the U.S. under the existing arrangements can be applied in the verification of other disarmament treaties or conventions. U.S. technical assistance to IAEA safeguards outside of the IAEA`s regular budget proved to be necessary. The U.S. technical assistance was successful in improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards for its most urgent responsibilities and in providing the technical elements for increased IAEA {open_quotes}readiness{close_quotes} for the postponed responsibilities deemed important for U.S. policy objectives. Much of the technical assistance was directed to generic subjects and helped to achieve a system of international verification. It is expected that the capabilities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to verify a state`s compliance with the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} will require improvements. This report presents 18 important lessons learned from the experience of the IAEA and the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), organized into three tiers. Each lesson is presented in the report in the context of the difficulty, need and history in which the lesson was learned. Only the most important points are recapitulated in this executive summary.

Relations between SSAC and the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buechler, C.

1985-01-01

Nuclear and non nuclear material, services, facilities, equipment and information which are to be used for legally defined purposes may be deliberately diverted from these purposes. Actions aimed at the detection and deterrence of this diversion are known as safeguards. The development of safeguard regulations within the IAEA is described from a historical perspective in part 1 of this report. In part 2 potential divertors and diversion methods are described. Part 3 contains a description of current IAEA safeguards implementation, including discussions of accountancy, surveillance, containment and verification

Outcome and Perspectives from the First IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Norman, C.; Binner, R.; Peter, N. J.; Wuester, J.; Zhao, K.; Krieger, T.; Walczak-Typke, A.C.; Richet, S.; Portaix, C.G.; Martin, K.; Bonner, E.R.

2015-01-01

Statistical and probabilistic methodologies have always played a fundamental role in the field of safeguards. In-field inspection approaches are based on sampling algorithms and random verification schemes designed to achieve a designed detection probability for defects of interest (e.g., missing material, indicators of tampering with containment and other equipment, changes of design). In addition, the evaluation of verification data with a view to drawing soundly based safeguards conclusions rests on the application of various advanced statistical methodologies. The considerable progress of information technology in the field of data processing and computational capabilities as well as the evolution of safeguards concepts and the steep increase in the volume of verification data in the last decades call for the review and modernization of safeguards statistical methodologies, not only to improve the efficiency of the analytical processes but also to address new statistical and probabilistic questions. Modern computer-intensive approaches are also needed to fully exploit the large body of verification data collected over the years in the increasing number and diversifying types of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the world. The first biennial IAEA International Technical Meeting on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards was held in Vienna from the 16 to 18 October 2013. Recommendations and a working plan were drafted which identify and chart necessary steps to review, harmonize, update and consolidate statistical methodologies for safeguards. Three major problem spaces were identified: Random Verification Schemes, Estimation of Uncertainties and Statistical Evaluation of Safeguards Verification Data for which a detailed list of objectives and actions to be taken were established. Since the meeting, considerable progress was made to meet these objectives. The actions undertaken and their outcome are presented in this paper. (author)

Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jarman, Kenneth D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Joslyn, Cliff A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kreyling, Sean J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sayre, Amanda M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Schanfein, Mark J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); West, Curtis L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Winters, Samuel T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2017-02-07

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

Excerpts from the introductory statement by IAEA Director General. IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, 25 November 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1998-01-01

The document contains excerpts from the Introductory Statement made by the Director General of the IAEA at the IAEA Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. The following aspects from the Agency's activity are presented: inspections in Iraq in relation to its clandestine nuclear programme, conclusion of Additional Protocols to safeguards agreements, the strengthened safeguards system, Agency's involvement in safeguards verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), safety review at the Mochovce nuclear power plant in Slovakia, and the year 2000 (Y2K) computer system problems in the Agency's Member States

Two low-level gamma spectrometry systems of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Parus, J L [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Raab, W [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Donohue, D [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Jansta, V [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria); Kierzek, J [IAEA, SAL, Vienna (Austria)

1997-03-01

A gamma spectrometry system designed for the measurement of samples with low and medium radioactivity (activity from a few to about 10{sup 4} Bq in the energy range from 25 to 2700 keV) has been installed at the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf. The system consists of 3 low level detectors: (1) n-type coaxial Ge with 42.4% relative efficiency, 1.85 keV FWHM at 1.33 MeV (2) planar Ge with 2000 mm{sup 2} area and 20 mm thickness, 562 eV FWHM at 122 keV (3) NaI(Tl) annulus of 25.4 cm diameter and 25.4 cm height, hole diameter 90 mm. (orig./DG)

International safeguards: experience and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

1982-01-01

IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs

Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rames, J.

1999-01-01

This presentation discusses the legal framework of IAEA Safeguards which consists of a number of elements, including agreements calling for verification of nonproliferation undertakings, basic safeguards documents (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, INFCIRC/153 (Corr..), INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), INFCIRC/9/Rev.2, GC(V)/INF/39), the safeguards agreements themselves, along with the relevant protocols and subsidiary arrangements, and finally the decisions, interpretations and practices of the Boards of Governors. Major differences between the various types of IAEA safeguards agreements are outlined. Procedures involved in the initiation, negotiation, conclusion and amendment of safeguard agreements are described

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.

1998-01-01

Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R.; Morgan, James B.; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L.

2011-01-01

The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

Measuring Safeguards Culture

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2011-07-19

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

Recent advances in safeguards operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

1983-01-01

The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun

2015-01-01

But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

Excerpts from the introductory statement by IAEA Director General. IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, 8 December 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1997-01-01

The document contains excerpts from the Introductory Statement made by the Director General of the IAEA at the IAEA Board of Governors on 8 December 1997. The following aspects from the Agency's activity are presented: nuclear energy, Agency's inspections in Iraq in relation to its clandestine nuclear programme, Agency's involvement in safeguards verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols

Euratom Safeguards: Improving Safeguards by Cooperation in R&D and Implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schwalbach, P.; Schoop, K.; Ancius, D.; Marszalek, Y.; Smejkal, A.; Vaccaro, S.; De Baere, P.; Koutsoyannopoulos, C.; Meylemans, P.; Murtezi, M.; Persson, L.; Synetos, S.; Tempesta, S.; Canadell Bofarull, V.; Turner, D.; Goncalves, J.G.M.; Peerani, P.; Berndt, R.; Stringa, E.; Richir, P.; Sequeira, V.; Tagziria, H.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Zuleger, E.; Luetzenkirchen, K.; )

2015-01-01

Euratom Safeguards, implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty by the European Commission's Directorate Nuclear Safeguards, is the largest Regional Safeguards System and involved in many R&D activities of its own, often in close cooperation with external partners. Most of the results of these activities are shared with or offered to the IAEA. The work described in this paper is complementary to the projects run by the European Commission Cooperative Support Programme (ECSP) to the IAEA. The ECSP activities will be described elsewhere at this conference. The present paper will provide an overview on R&D activities run in addition to the ECSP, and will attempt to link them to the capabilities discussed by the IAEA in the Long Term R&D Plan. The range of topics will include work on unattended data acquisition systems (hard- and software), advanced data analysis tools, news from seals related technology, containment and design verification applications of 3D lasers, activities to keep standard measurement technologies sustainable etc. Work done with the IAEA in preparation of new facilities and facility types will be discussed briefly. The paper will also highlight some current challenges and make suggestions how to address them. (author)

TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPPING FOR IAEA SEALS.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

HOFFHEINS,B.; ANNESE,C.; GOODMAN,M.; OCONNOR,W.; GUSHUE,S.; PEPPER,S.

2003-07-13

In the fall of 2002, the U.S. Support Program (USSP) initiated an effort to define a strategy or ''roadmap'' for future seals technologies and to develop a generalized process for planning safeguards equipment development, which includes seals and other safeguards equipment. The underlying objectives of the USSP include becoming more proactive than reactive in addressing safeguards equipment needs, helping the IAEA to maintain an inventory of cost-effective, reliable, and effective safeguards equipment, establishing a long-term planning horizon, and securing IAEA ownership in the process of effective requirements definition and timely transitioning of new or improved systems for IAEA use. At an initial workshop, seals, their functions, performance issues, and future embodiments were discussed in the following order: adhesive seals, metal seals, passive and active loop seals, ultrasonic seals, tamper indicating enclosures (including sample containers, equipment enclosures, and conduits). Suggested improvements to these technologies focused largely on a few themes: (1) The seals must be applied quickly, easily, and correctly; (2) Seals and their associated equipment should not unduly add bulk or weight to the inspectors load; (3) Rapid, in-situ verifiability of seals is desirable; and (4) Seal systems for high risk or high value applications should have two-way, remote communications. Based upon these observations and other insights, the participants constructed a skeletal approach for seals technology planning. The process begins with a top-level review of the fundamental safeguards requirements and extraction of required system features, which is followed by analysis of suitable technologies and identification of technology gaps, and finally by development of a planning schedule for system improvements and new technology integration. Development of a comprehensive procedure will require the partnership and participation of the IAEA. The

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, A.

1997-12-31

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, A

1998-12-31

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules. The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forland, A.

1997-01-01

The object of this study is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid-1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The main aim of the study is not to describe the IAEA safeguards system as such. The focus will be on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective will be to single out the factors determining the result. In the course of the time span under study two international treaties were negotiated which were decisive for the development of international nuclear safeguards. These were the IAEA Stature (1956) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968). The Statue as well as the NPT contain articles on international nuclear safeguards. These articles limit themselves to spelling out the safeguards principles. It was thus left to the IAEA Board of Governors to develop the safeguards procedures in detail. Two IAEA safeguards documents were negotiated between 1959 and 1965 in order to implement the safeguards article of the Statue. The safeguards requirements of the NPT were spelled out in a new model agreement in 1972. 58 refs

The International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pezzutti, A.A.C.

1980-01-01

The origens, functions and objectives of the IAEA are analysed. The application of safeguards to avoid military uses of nuclear energy is discussed. In the final section the agrement between Brazil and Germany regarding IAEA safeguards, as well as the competence for executing the brazilian program are explained. It is, then, an informative study dealing with nuclear energy and its peaceful path, the creation of International Fuel Cycle Evaluation and nonproliferation [pt

Protecting safeguards information / Division of technical support

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

This DVD contains two films representing the key aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. 'Protecting Safeguards Information' is a narrative/fiction film which presents the Agency's information handling and protection measures. A security representative from a fictional nation receives a briefing on the procedures and methods used by the Department. These techniques will assure member states that the information they provide to the Agency is kept safe and confidential. 'Division of Technical Support' is a non-fiction documentary which presents a detailed look at the technical capabilities and management techniques used by the Agency in nuclear material accountancy. The film covers many aspects of safeguards equipment and techniques including: NDA and DA instruments, seals, surveillance, training, development and maintenance. Taken together, these films provide an introduction and overview to many important aspects of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (IAEA)

Nuclear safeguards policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1982-01-01

Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

National viewpoints: Views on strengthened safeguards from Australia, Cuba and South Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biggs, I.; Saburido, E.F.; Mxakato-Diseko, N.J.

1999-01-01

This paper presents views of Australia, Cuba and South Africa concerned with strengthened safeguards regime. Australia has been involved with the IAEA safeguards system since the first plenary meeting of the Conference on the IAEA Statute in 1956, joined the NPT in 1973 and began concluding bilateral safeguards agreements in 1977. Australia has the greatest respect for the IAEA coordinated efforts started in 1998 to strengthen and integrate the safeguards system. Cuba has always attached special importance to nuclear safeguards activities, recognizing their high priority as well as the important role they have in respect to international disarmament and security. South Africa supports the efforts in strengthening the safeguards activities and remains hopeful that the international community will address the challenges posed by the Trilateral Initiative between Russian federation, USA and IAEA in a mature and cooperative way

Containment and surveillance systems for international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ney, J.F.

1978-01-01

Important criteria in measuring the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards include timeliness of detection of diversion, timeliness of reporting such detections, and confidence in determining the amount of material diverted. Optimum use of IAEA inspectors, combined with adequate instrumentation, can provide a practical means for achieving these criteria. System studies are being carried out for different types of facilities that may come under IAEA safeguards to determine the proper balance between inspector's efforts and the use of safeguards instrumentation. A description of a typical study is presented. Based on the results of these studies, the program undertaken to develop those containment and surveillance subsystems for which the technical feasibility and operational acceptability need to be established is described

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This publication is aimed at enhancing States' understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in 'Safeguards Implementation Practices' (SIPs) to be published separately.

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

2012-08-01

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

Excerpts from the introductory statement by IAEA Director General. IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, 8 June 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1998-01-01

The document contains excerpts from the Introductory Statement made by the Director General of the IAEA at the IAEA Board of Governors on 8 June 1998. The following aspects from the Agency's activity are presented: nuclear testing, technical co-operation, programme and budget, safeguards, safeguards implementation report, Agency's involvement in safeguards verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Agency's inspections in Iraq in relation to its clandestine nuclear programme, security of material, measures to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear, radiation and waste safety, study of the radiological situation at the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa, and Agency's role in safety assessment of the Mochovce nuclear power plant

Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bean, R.S.; Bjornard, T.A.; Hebdich, D.J.

2009-01-01

In 2008, the '20/20 Vision for the Future' background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency's's roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on 'Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards'. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

The roles of Euratom and the IAEA in nuclear non-proliferation - a Euratom view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Szymanski, P.

2013-01-01

The IAEA safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The state-level concept that has been introduced by the IAEA in this respect allows and obliges the IAEA to take into account state specific factors to determine the set of safeguards activities to be applied in a State. The effectiveness of the EURATOM regional safeguards systems, its cooperation with the IAEA and its independence from States and operators are among the factors which the IAEA needs to consider in order to apply safeguards in an effective and efficient way. Socio-economic and political factors like the support to international non-proliferation should also be factors in this concept. The intended evolution of the state-level concept by the IAEA then should result in making better use of the activities of EURATOM safeguards. This is possible by the IAEA relying more on the EURATOM activities for the verification of declared nuclear material and the IAEA concentrating on getting assurance on the absence of undeclared materials and activities. Developing a regional-level concept that supplements the state-level concept can contribute to determine the extent to which the IAEA can make better use of EURATOM safeguards in the future. (author)

An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Durst, Philip Casey; Bean, Robert

2010-01-01

In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

International safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

1976-01-01

Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, Astrid

1998-12-31

The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

Negotiating supranational rules - The genesis of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forland, Astrid

1999-12-31

The object of this thesis is the evolution from 1954-56 up until the mid 1970s of the nuclear safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The evolution is traced not through the practical implementation of the safeguards system, but through the various multilateral negotiations through which it was created. The focus is on analysing the arguments advanced in the various negotiations, and the main objective is to single out the factors determining the result. The discussion is organised into the following chapters: (1) The statute of the IAEA, (2) The IAEA 1961 safeguard document (INFCIRC/26), (3) The IAEA 1965 safeguards document (INFCIRC/66), (4) The non-proliferation treaty, (5) NPT safeguards. 92 refs.

Safeguards by Design Challenge

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2016-09-13

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that is supported by detailed guidance and examples in safeguards implementation practices presented in other publications in the series. (This version is the 2016 update.)

Paying tribute to 25 years of safeguards leadership

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

After phases of intensive development in the 1970s and consolidation in the 1980s, the IAEA's international safeguards system is now in a phase of transition. The 1990s look to be a time when verification activities are further expanded in response to global developments and challenges in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. How far have safeguards come, and where are they headed? This article offers some thoughts and perspectives on the main challenges and opportunities facing IAEA safeguards, in the context of some recent developments and the overall evolution of the safeguards system

Topical and working papers on heavy water accountability and safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

This report contains the following papers: 1) Statement of IAEA concerning safeguarding of heavy water; 2) Preliminary Canadian Comments on IAEA document on heavy water safeguards; 3) Heavy water accountability 03.10.78; 4) Heavy water accountability 05.04.79

Quality management at the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory of IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aigner, H.; Doherty, P.; Donohue, D.; Kuno, Y.

2001-01-01

Full text: In the year 2000, SAL'S quality management system was certified for conforming with the requirements of the international standard ISO-9002: 1994. The certification incurred considerable efforts, both in manpower and capital investments. The expected benefits of a formal quality management system do not directly target the correctness and reliability of analytical results. SAL believes that it was already performing well in this respect, even before re-shaping its quality system according to the reference model. Systematic QA and QC procedures have been applied since the begin of SAL'S operations in the mid-70's. The management framework specified in ISO-9002: 1994 complements these technical measures. Besides its value of being internationally recognised and thus enhancing perhaps the credibility in the quality of SAL'S services, the quality management system in this form provides additional advantages for the customer of the services of SAL, i.e. the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA, but also for the control and management of SAL'S internal 'business' processes. The paper discusses if these expected additional benefits are indeed obtained and whether or not their value is in balance with operational and initial investment costs. (author)

Transit Matching for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

2015-01-01

In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

Establishment of IAEA knowledge of integrity of the geological repository boundaries and disposed spent fuel assemblies in the context of the Finnish geological repository. Experts' Group meeting Report on Task JNT/C 1204 of the Member States' Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Okko, O.

2004-05-01

The Geological Repository Safeguards Experts Group (Member State Support Programme tasks JNT/C1204 and C1226), agreed that annual meetings should be held to address interface issues between IAEA safeguards and radioactive waste management and to explore the use of safety and operational information to make International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards more effective and efficient for geological repository facilities. It has also been recognised that the safeguards measures for geological repositories are to be developed site-specifically. To address these issues to the planned Olkiluoto repository in Finland a meeting of experts in safety, geological repository operations,and safeguards from 6 States, European Commission, and IAEA was held in Olkiluoto and Rauma, Finland, during September 29 - October 4, 2003. The pre-operational phase of the Olkiluoto repository should be efficiently used by the parties involved in safeguards. The applicability and reliability of the potential new techniques and the efficient practices must be developed and proven before their implementation as safeguards measures to be applied at the subsequent stages of the repository development. The visit to the location of the proposed Olkiluoto repository and neighbouring areas and subsequent presentations enabled the working groups to discuss the various issues with reference to actual site conditions. The working groups were thus able to identify potential measurement and monitoring techniques and research and development requirements for consideration by the Finnish authorities, in addition to making recommendations to the IAEA on planned activities for carrying out before and during the early investigation phase of the proposed Olkiluoto repository. It was understood that all parties shall take good care of the implementation of the planned activities to ensure that proven means, approaches and the required verified information is at hand at the time the projected facility will

Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

2015-01-01

Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 11, no. 4(73). Nov-Dec 1996

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: Director General Reviews Changing Global Nuclear Agenda, IAEA Board of Governors, Nuclear Safety Convention Enters into Force, Safeguarding Fissile Materials Released from Defense Programmes, Technical Support to Newly Independent States in Non-Proliferation Field, Analysis and Screening of Safety Events Team (ASSET), Nuclear Power and Sustainable Energy Development, General Conference Adopts Safeguards, Safety Resolutions, UN General Assembly Commends the IAEA, IAEA Publications, IAEA Meetings, India Donates Analytical Instruments, World Food Summit, Bangladesh Studies Pollution Levels, and other short information

Safeguards information treatment in NMCC

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kojo, Yukiko; Tanigawa, Takanori; Iwai, Naobumi; Suzuki, Tsuneo

1994-01-01

The Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) has treated all information of the accounting reports, obligation control reports and plans of import/export or domestic receipt/shipment, etc. submitted by the facilities according to the domestic laws, and prepared the reports to provide the IAEA subject to the safeguards agreement and to provide the partner countries subject to the relevant bilateral agreements. The accounting reports are processed during two weeks in the latter half of month and dispatched to the IAEA by the 30th of the month. On the other hand, the obligation control reports are processed during two weeks in the first half of the next month. The other reports are processed on case's by case's basis and submitted to the IAEA or the partner countries at need. The data processing system consists of the quality check, database update, reporting and conversational inquiry sub-systems with the database management system (ADABAS) which keeps key indexes and summary database. (author)

International safeguards and nuclear terrorism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moglewer, S.

1987-01-01

This report provides a critical review of the effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards against potential acts of nuclear terrorism. The author argues that IAEA safeguards should be made applicable to deterring diversions of nuclear materials from civil to weapons purposes by subnational groups as well as by nations. Both technical and institutional factors are considered, and suggestions for organizational restructuring and further technical development are made. Awareness of the necessity for effective preventive measures is emphasized, and possible directions for further effort are suggested

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2006-07-01

A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 13, no. 3(80). Jul-Aug 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: IAEA General Conference Opens 21 September in Vienna, IAEA Board Concludes Mid-Year Review: Approves Six More Protocols to Safeguards Agreements, Safeguards Implementation in 1997 Reported, Study of Radiological Situation at Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls, Nuclear Inspections in Iraq Seeking Further Clarification, Pioneering Waste Repository Gets 'Green Light' in the USA, Status of International Conventions, Nuclear Techniques Targeted for Studying Water Pollution, Zimbabwe Farmers Realize Benefits from Nuclear Techniques, Waging a War Against Insect Pests, IAEA and WCO Formally Join Forces Against Illicit Trafficking, Annual Report for 1997, Range of Topics on IAEA Meeting Agenda, New IAEA Books, and other short information

Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

IMPACT OF THE U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM SAFEGUARDS INTERNSHIP PROGRAM

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PEPPER, S.; OSIECKI, C.

2006-01-01

The U.S. Support Program began funding an internship program in the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 2002. Since that time, 39 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been placed in one-year, paid internships with the IAEA. The management of the internship program was originally the responsibility of the International Safeguards Project Office but was transferred to the Office of Educational Programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory in 2004. Feedback on the internship program from the U.S. government and the IAEA has been positive. The interns have completed basic yet essential work for the Department of Safeguards and freed IAEA staff members to perform more complex tasks. The cost of an intern is low relative to other forms of human resources support. After the conclusion of their assignments, many of the interns go on to work for the U.S. government, the national laboratories, or companies in international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will discuss the work done by the interns for the IAEA, factors influencing the success of the internship program, and the effects the program has had on the careers of interns, in preparing the next generation to work in the nuclear industry, participation in INMM activities, and recruitment for U.S. citizens for safeguards positions

Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rezniczek, A.

2013-01-01

Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 15, no. 1(86). Jan-Feb 2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: the review of the 2001 draft budget, the return of the IAEA safeguards inspectors from Iraq, the strengthened safeguards system including the signature status of additional protocols as of February 2000, the nomination of the former IAEA Director General H. Blix as head of the new monitoring commission for Iraq, recent statements of the IAEA Director General, the sixth NPT review conference which will open in April 2000, IAEA symposia and seminars in the year 2000, states joining international conventions in nuclear fields, the industry forum convened by the IAEA on nuclear energy issues, cooperation of states against the Y2K problem, IAEA strategy to 2005, sharing lessons from Tokaimura accident, in memoriam of the former IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund, and other short information

Development of an IAEA Training Course for Future U.S. Inspectors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avgerinos Fitzwater, Savannah; Rynes, Amanda R.; Bracken, David S.; Metcalf, Richard R.M.; West, James D.

2011-01-01

U.S. citizens currently make up only 12% of the positions held in the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. While the United States has maintained a high level of support for the Agency over the duration of its history, the number of American inspectors currently in the field does not reflect this level of involvement. As a result, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Relations, as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) mission, has tasked Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a rigorous two week hands-on training program to encourage and operationally acclimatize U.S. Citizens who are interested in applying for IAEA inspector positions using IAEA authorized equipment at INL. Idaho National Laboratory is one-of-a-kind in its ability to train IAEA inspectors by including training at nuclear facilities on site and includes, for example, direct measurement of an active spent fuel storage cooling pond. This accredited course will introduce and train attendees on the major IAEA systems used in collecting nuclear safeguards data and performing safeguards inspections. Unique in the United States, these classes will give attendees direct hands-on training and will address equipment purpose, function, operating principles, application, and troubleshooting, based upon what would be expected of an IAEA Safeguards Inspector in the field and in the office. Upon completion, U.S. applicants will be better qualified to pursue a position in the IAEA Department of Safeguards Operational Divisions. In support, INL has recently established a new laboratory space to house state of the art nuclear safeguards instrumentation. Currently, equipment installed in the laboratory space includes attended systems: 3DLR (3-D Imaging Laser) for design information verification, a Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device for measurement of spent fuel, HM-5 handheld radiation detectors, quantitative neutron and gamma systems; unattended monitoring systems

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in ‘Safeguards Implementation Practices’ (SIPs) to be published separately

Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Arabic Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

This publication is aimed at enhancing States’ understanding of the safeguards obligations of both the State and the IAEA, and at improving the cooperation between States and the IAEA in safeguards implementation. It is principally intended for State or regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators, and is a reference document that will be supported by detailed guidance and examples in ‘Safeguards Implementation Practices’ (SIPs) to be published separately.

International inspection activity impacts upon DOE safeguards requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zack, N.R.

1995-01-01

The US has placed certain special nuclear materials declared excess to their strategic needs under international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This Presidential initiative has obligated materials at several Department of Energy (DOE) facilities for these safeguards activities to demonstrate the willingness of the US to ban production or use of nuclear materials outside of international safeguards. However, IAEA inspection activities generally tend to be intrusive in nature and are not consistent with several domestic safeguards procedures implemented to reduce worker radiation exposures and increase the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of accounting for and storing of special nuclear materials. To help identify and provide workable solutions to these concerns, the Office of Safeguards and Security has conducted a program to determine possible changes to the DOE safeguards and security requirements designed to help facilities under international safeguards inspections more easily comply with domestic safeguards goals during international inspection activities. This paper will discuss the impact of international inspection activities on facility safeguards operations and departmental safeguards procedures and policies

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 14, no. 3(84). Jul-Aug 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

Tis issue gives brief information on the following topics: Global Nuclear Issues on IAEA General Conference Agenda (27 September 1999, Vienna), Scientific Forum Looks At Nuclear Energy and Sustainable Development, IAEA Board Approves Year 2000 Budget, More Safeguards Protocols, Nuclear's Future: Director General Looks At Global Developments, Nuclear Plant Safety In Eastern Europe, Nuclear Law, International Symposium: The Mox Fuel Cycle, IAEA Teams With Partners On World Water Issues, The Y2K Computer Bug, Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols, States Join International Conventions in Nuclear Fields, Upcoming IAEA International Seminars and Symposia, and other short information

Work Group 1: Future Directions for International Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Casterton, J.; Meylemans, P.

2013-01-01

The State-Level Concept (SLC) is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States with safeguards agreements. It is based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a State level approach for each State, including a specific combination of safeguards measures. It is executed through an annual implementation plan. The SLC has the value of considering the State as a whole. It provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into account through all stages of safeguards implementation. The implementation of the SLC permits the IAEA to be responsive to all kinds of changes arising from continuous analysis. As a result the safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date. The SLC is implemented by the IAEA as a continuous process involving three major components: establishing knowledge about the State and drawing conclusions, determining the specific State level approach, and planning and implementing safeguards activities. The major products that emerge from this process are the State level approach, the annual implementation plan that is the basis for implementing safeguards activities in a State on an annual basis, and the safeguards conclusions, which are set out in the Safeguards Implementation Report on an annual basis. A better cooperation between IAEA and SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material), RSAC (Regional State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material is important for developing and implementing SLC. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, K.E.

1991-01-01

This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

The international framework for safeguarding peaceful nuclear energy programs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mazer, B.M.

1980-01-01

International law, in response to the need for safeguard assurances, has provided a framework which can be utilized by supplier and recipient states. Multilateral treaties have created the International Atomic Energy Agency which can serve a vital role in the establishment and supervision of safeguard agreements for nuclear energy programs. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has created definite obligations on nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to alleviate some possibilities of proliferation and has rejuvenated the function of the IAEA in providing safeguards, especially to non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the Non-Proliferation treaty. States which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty may receive nuclear energy co-operation subject to IAEA safeguards. States like Canada, have insisted through the bilateral nuclear energy co-operation agreements that either individual or joint agreement be reached with the IAEA for the application of safeguards. Trilateral treaties among Canada, the recipient state and the IAEA have been employed and can provide the necessary assurances against the diversion of peaceful nuclear energy programs to military or non-peaceful uses. The advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its guidlines has definitely advanced the cause of ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate objective should be the creation of an international structure incorporating the application of the most comprehensive safeguards which will be applied universally to all nuclear energy programs

Policy and technical issues for international safeguards in nuclear weapons states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Stanbro, W.D.

1994-01-01

Expansion of international safeguards into the military and commercial fuel cycles of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) -- the subject of previous proposals in international safeguards discussions and of studies in the safeguards literature -- has been given impetus by recent US government initiatives for safeguards on excess weapons materials and a verified fissile materials production cutoff. These proposals, if implemented, would have implications on the safeguards objectives, approaches, and technologies that are traditionally employed in international safeguards. This paper examines the modifications and innovations that might be required to the current international safeguards regime in meeting these proposed new roles. Although the examples given are in the context of the US materials and facilities, many of the conclusions are valid for other NWS. None of the statements in this paper represent official US position on policy for international safeguards in weapons states. Instead, the purpose is to identify policy and technical issues and to offer, where possible, options for their resolution. This paper limits consideration to the potential role of the IAEA in verifying these proposed initiatives for declared facilities, recognizing that there may also be a role for bilateral, multilateral, or regional verification regimes. Indeed, in some cases verification of weapons materials may be more appropriate for a bilateral arrangement. Because traditional IAEA safeguards may not be admissible for weapons materials, the concept of ''transparency'' is suggested as a less intrusive alternative providing some confidence that materials are as declared

Prospects for regional safeguards systems - State-level Approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peixoto, O.J.M.

2013-01-01

The increased co-operation with Regional Safeguard's System (RSAC) is a relevant tool for strengthening effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the international safeguard. The new safeguards system that emerges from the application of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) and the full use of State-level Concept is a challenge and an opportunity for effectively incorporate RSAC into the international safeguards scheme. The challenge is to determine how the co-operation and coordination will be implemented on this new safeguards scheme. This paper presents some discussions and prospects on the issues to be faced by RSAC and IAEA during the implementation of State-level Approach (SLA) using all information available. It is also discussed how different levels of co-operation could be achieved when SLA is applied by IAEA safeguards. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

1995-01-01

The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scholz, M.; Irola, G.; Glynn, K.

2015-01-01

Since 2008, the Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogramme of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has supported the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals to meet the needs of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Specifically, HCD's efforts respond to data indicating that 82% of safeguards experts at U.S. Laboratories will have left the workforce within 15 years. This paper provides an update on the status of the subprogramme since its last presentation at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in 2010. It highlights strengthened, integrated efforts in the areas of graduate and post-doctoral fellowships, young and midcareer professional support, short safeguards courses, and university engagement. It also discusses lessons learned from the U.S. experience in safeguards education and training as well as the importance of long-range strategies to develop a cohesive, effective, and efficient human capital development approach. (author)

Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols (French Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

1999-01-01

Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wigeland, R.; Bjornard, T.; Castle, B.

2009-01-01

The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization's purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations' approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

Safeguards and nuclear forensics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gangotra, Suresh

2016-01-01

Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

Concepts of IAEA nuclear materials accounting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oakberg, John A.

2001-01-01

The paper describes nuclear material accounting from the standpoint of IAEA Safeguards and how this accounting is applied by the Agency. The basic concepts of nuclear material accounting are defined and the way these apply to States with INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements is presented. (author)

Safeguards '85

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1981-01-01

IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 13, no. 4(81). Oct-Nov 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: IAEA General Conference Concludes in Vienna, Newly Elected IAEA Board of Governors, Director General Highlights Major Work Ahead, Statement to UN General Assembly, More States Accept Strengthened Safeguards Measures, Status of Additional Protocols, Signings at IAEA General Conference, USA Backs International Nuclear Fusion Project, September Meeting on Trilateral Initiative, Results From IAEA-Supported Projects, Database of Nuclear Medicine Best Practices, 1999 Seminar on Radiopharmaceuticals in Medical Treatment, International Symposium on Marine Pollution in Monaco, Safeguards Support From France and United Kingdom, Nuclear Inspections in Iraq, States Move to Join International Safety Conventions, Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Materials, Technical Team Trained in IAEA-Supported Project, Scientific Forum on Water Issues, International Scientific and Technical Meetings, New IAEA Books, and other short information

A study on the national safeguards system -Current status and suggested development-

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Wan Su; Kwack, Eun Ho; An, Jong Sung; Kim, Hyun Tae; Min, Kyung Sik; Park, Chan Sik

1995-03-01

In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system (SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. 14 tabs., 15 figs., 29 refs. (Author)

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

Approaches for increasing the cooperation between Member States and IAEA under SSS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rheem, Karp-Soon; Park, Wan-Sou; Kim, Byung-Koo

1997-01-01

With introduction of the Strengthened Safeguards System (SSS), both the IAEA and Member States are concerned about the limited resources to carry out the SSS activity and the potential increase of additional cost and burdens. Even though the IAEA has recently prepared a procedure of the generalized New Partnership Approach (NPA), its wider application to the general Member States is difficult at the present time. For the generalized NPA necessitates that SSACs of the Member States have sufficient technical capability in safeguards to carry out the necessary activities. Unfortunately a few Member States seem to be qualified to have the sufficient technical capability that the IAEA desires. In this topic, a new approach to increase the cooperation between Member States and IAEA under SSS is proposed such that effective supports can be provided to all of its Member States that are not technically competent in terms of safeguards experience. This is realized by so called 'tunneling effort', meaning that desired goals are accomplished by efforts from both Member States and the IAEA. The Member States having high technical competence in safeguards provide technical assistance to the Member States that are not competent until they attain to a certain level in technical capability, while the IAEA provides the guidelines, and coordinates the process. The formal introduction of the Quality Control concept to the safeguards management is proposed as well so as to efficiently reduce burdens from the implementation of the SSS. (author)

Safeguards Culture: Analogies from Safety Culture and Security Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Naito, K.

2013-01-01

The terminology of 'safeguards culture' has been used loosely by safeguards experts as an essential element for establishing an organizational environment of stakeholders for the effective and efficient implementation of international safeguards. However, unlike the other two triplet brothers/ sisters of 3S's (Safety, Security, Safeguards), there is no formally established definition of safeguards culture. In the case of safety culture, INSAG (the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group) has extensively dealt with its concept, elaborating its definition and key characteristics, and published its report, INSAG-4, as the IAEA Safety Series 75. On the other hand, security culture has also been defined by AdSec (the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security). In this paper, a provisional definition of safeguards culture is made on the analogies of safety culture and security culture, and an effort is made to describe essential elements of safeguards culture. It is proposed for SAGSI (the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation) to formally consider the definition of safeguards culture and its characteristics. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

The present status of safeguards in Turkey

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yilmazer, A.; Yuecel, A.

2001-01-01

Republic of Turkey signed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Vienna, Austria on January 28, 1969 and the Treaty was ratified by Turkish Parliament on March 29, 1979. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Republic of Turkey signed the Safeguards Agreement on June 30, 1981. Turkey accepted the international safeguards administered by IAEA and at the same time its subsidiary arrangements and Facility attachments were enforced for all nuclear facilities as an Non-Nuclear-Weapon State party to NPT. Regulation on Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control, which was prepared in accordance with Agreement Between the Government of Turkey and IAEA for the application of Safeguard in Connection with the Treaty on NPT, has been put into force since it was published in Official Gazette on September 10, 1997. This study presents the essential futures of national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Turkey

Report Of The Workshop On Nuclear Facility Design Information Examination And Verification For Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, Richard; Bean, Robert

2009-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA's Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility's general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility's layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards in the future

Development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Doo; Song, Dae Yong; So, Dong Sup; Kwack, Eun Ho [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

2000-04-01

Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this report, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described. 3 tabs. (Author)

Safeguards Licensing Aspects of a Future Gen IV Test Facility - a Case Study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lindell, M. Aberg; Grape, S.; Hakansson, A.; Svaerd, S. Jacobsson

2010-01-01

The scope of this study covers safeguards licensing aspects of a possible future Gen IV demonstration facility. As a basis for the investigation, the facility was assumed to be located in Sweden, comprising a lead-cooled fast reactor and a reprocessing plant with fuel fabrication. The aim has been to identify safeguards requirements that may be set by the IAEA and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, and also to suggest how the safeguards system could be implemented in practice. The changed usage and handling of nuclear fuel, as compared to that of today, has been examined in order to determine how today's safeguards measures can be modified and extended to meet the needs of the demonstration facility. This work is part of GENIUS, the Swedish Gen IV research and development programme, which emphasizes lead-cooled fast reactors. (author)

The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

2015-01-01

Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

US enrichment safeguards program development activities with potential International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards applications. Part 1. Executive summaries

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swindle, D.W. Jr.

1984-07-01

The most recent progress, results, and plans for future work on the US Enrichment Safeguards Program's principal development activities are summarized. Nineteen development activities are reported that have potential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards applications. Part 1 presents Executive Summaries for these, each of which includes information on (1) the purpose and scope of the development activity; (2) the potential IAEA safeguards application and/or use if adopted; (3) significant development work, results, and/or conclusions to date; and where appropriate (4) future activities and plans for continued work. Development activities cover: measurement technology for limited-frequency-unannounced-access stategy inspections; integrated data acquisition system; enrichment-monitoring system; load-cell-based weighing system for UF 6 cylinder mass verifications; vapor phase versus liquid phase sampling of UF 6 cylinders; tamper-safing hardware and systems; an alternative approach to IAEA nuclear material balance verifications resulting from intermittent inspections; UF 6 sample bottle enrichment analyzer; crated waste assay monitor; and compact 252 Cf shuffler for UF 6 measurements

Integrated safeguards: Australian views and experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.; Bragin, V.; Leslie, R.

2001-01-01

accesses, which in most cases have been undertaken at the Lucas Heights site. Under the integrated safeguards regime now being applied, the timeliness period for irradiated fuel has been changed from three months to 12 months, eliminating quarterly interim inspections. The four inspections each year have been replaced by one PIV (including comprehensive Design Information Verification activities), and an average of one unannounced inspection. The objectives of unannounced inspections include, to verify the fresh and spent fuel inventory and if possible the core fuel, and to confirm facility design information, the declared operation of the reactor, and the absence of undeclared activities. The term 'average' is important - to maintain deterrence, once an unannounced inspection has taken place, there will always be the possibility of a further unannounced inspection in the same year. Where possible, fuel transfers will be verified during the PIV or unannounced inspection(s), but the IAEA has indicated that if necessary additional inspections may be undertaken for this purpose. In addition to the inspections outlined above, there are five or six complementary accesses each year, mainly at the Lucas Heights site, but also encompassing uranium mines and LOFs (locations other than facilities). In most circumstances it is expected that complementary accesses would be carried out when inspectors are in Australia for routine inspections. The overall savings in inspection effort are expected to be about 45% (a reduction from 18 to 10 PDI) a year. However, this depends on whether additional inspections are required to verify fuel transfers - an area where Australia considers remote monitoring could be very useful. The paper discusses implementation issues such as the participation of national inspectors in inspections and complementary access, and the conduct of unannounced inspections. The value of unannounced inspections - i.e. inspections whose timing is unpredictable to the

Phase 2 Final Report. IAEA Safeguards: Implementation blueprint of commercial satellite imagery

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Andersson, Christer [SSC Satellitbild AB, Solna (Sweden)

2000-01-01

This document - IAEA Safeguards: Implementation Blueprint of Commercial Satellite Imagery - constitutes the second report from SSC Satellitbild giving a structured view and solid guidelines on how to proceed with a conceivable implementation of satellite imagery to support Safeguards activities of the Agency. This Phase 2 report presents a large number of concrete recommendations regarding suggested management issues, work organisation, imagery purchasing and team building. The study has also resulted in several lists of actions and preliminary project plans with GANT schedules concerning training, hardware and software, as well as for the initial pilot studies. In both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 studies it is confirmed that the proposed concept of a relatively small Imagery Unit using high-resolution data will be a sound and feasible undertaking. Such a unit capable of performing advanced image processing as a tool for various safeguard tasks will give the Agency an effective instrument for reference, monitoring, verification, and detection of declared and undeclared activities. The total cost for implementing commercial satellite imagery at the Department for Safeguards, as simulated in these studies, is approximately MUSD 1,5 per year. This cost is founded on an activity scenario with a staff of 4 experts working in an IAEA Imagery Unit with a workload of three dossiers or issues per week. The imagery unit is built around an advanced PC image processing system capable of handling several hundreds of pre-processed images per year. Alternatively a Reduced Scenario with a staff of 3 would need a budget of approximately MUSD 0,9 per year, whereas an Enhanced Imagery Unit including 5 experts and a considerably enlarged capacity would cost MUSD 1,7 per year. The Imagery Unit should be organised so it clearly reflects the objectives and role as set by the Member States and the management of the Agency. We recommend the Imagery Unit to be organised into four main work

Phase 2 Final Report. IAEA Safeguards: Implementation blueprint of commercial satellite imagery

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersson, Christer

2000-01-01

This document - IAEA Safeguards: Implementation Blueprint of Commercial Satellite Imagery - constitutes the second report from SSC Satellitbild giving a structured view and solid guidelines on how to proceed with a conceivable implementation of satellite imagery to support Safeguards activities of the Agency. This Phase 2 report presents a large number of concrete recommendations regarding suggested management issues, work organisation, imagery purchasing and team building. The study has also resulted in several lists of actions and preliminary project plans with GANT schedules concerning training, hardware and software, as well as for the initial pilot studies. In both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 studies it is confirmed that the proposed concept of a relatively small Imagery Unit using high-resolution data will be a sound and feasible undertaking. Such a unit capable of performing advanced image processing as a tool for various safeguard tasks will give the Agency an effective instrument for reference, monitoring, verification, and detection of declared and undeclared activities. The total cost for implementing commercial satellite imagery at the Department for Safeguards, as simulated in these studies, is approximately MUSD 1,5 per year. This cost is founded on an activity scenario with a staff of 4 experts working in an IAEA Imagery Unit with a workload of three dossiers or issues per week. The imagery unit is built around an advanced PC image processing system capable of handling several hundreds of pre-processed images per year. Alternatively a Reduced Scenario with a staff of 3 would need a budget of approximately MUSD 0,9 per year, whereas an Enhanced Imagery Unit including 5 experts and a considerably enlarged capacity would cost MUSD 1,7 per year. The Imagery Unit should be organised so it clearly reflects the objectives and role as set by the Member States and the management of the Agency. We recommend the Imagery Unit to be organised into four main work

Current trends in the implementation of IAEA safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Adamson, A.; Bychkov, V.

1993-01-01

A practical goal, embodying the principle that a minimum amount of material is required in order to manufacture a nuclear explosive device, is that safeguards activities should enable the timely detection of the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material. It is important to note that the safeguards activities are not restricted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (the agency) but impose obligations on both state (and consequently on facility operators) and the agency. The beneficiaries are member states of the world community which have enhanced confidence in the competence and probity of states with safeguards agreements. Neither safeguards nor the nuclear industry have remained stationary. As new techniques have been developed, they have found applications, and as new challenges were encountered, the system has responded, for example, through improved measurements; through new or improved techniques for the operator, state or agency; and through new regulations. This paper details approaches, procedures and techniques developed for new complex nuclear facilities. Trends toward increase efficiency and effectiveness, and developments leading to more automated analysis and collection of data and the development of nondestructive assay methods are examined. Also important are trends in the presentation of safeguards results to the states and the general public

Implementation Practices of Finland in Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martikka, E.; Ansaranta, T.; Honkamaa, T.; Hamalainen, M.

2015-01-01

The Member States provide the information to the IAEA according to the Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols. For example, the requirements to provide the reports and declarations are very general and there are no explanation what the IAEA is looking for from that information. It is important for the States to understand how their efforts to collect and provide information, and to facilitate IAEA verification activities, contribute to the achievement of objectives and finally to draw conclusions on the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear materials in a State. The IAEA is producing a new series of guidance called Safeguards Implementation Practices, SIP, guides, which are shedding light on the requirements and sharing the good practices of States. It is hoped that the SIP Guides will create a better understanding of the needs of the IAEA and the important role of States and facility operators in achieving safeguards objectives. The guides are also important for the States to share their lessons learned and good practices for the benefit of other States that might be developing their capabilities or enhancing their processes and procedures. The way is very wide and long, when a State decides to start up a new nuclear programme. At first there is a need for legislation, regulatory body, contact point, international agreements and then finally practical implementation of the safeguards in the nuclear facilities. There are a lot of issues to be prepared in advance to facilitate the IAEA's implementation of verification activities successfully, effectively and with the good quality. Using the structure of the IAEA's draft SIP Guide on Facilitating Verification Activities as a framework, this paper will describe the most relevant implementation practices and experiences in Finland. (author)

Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopatin, S.

2010-01-01

Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

Implementation of integrated safeguards at Nuclear Fuel Plant Pitesti, Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olaru, Vasilica; Ivana, Tiberiu; Epure, Gheorghe

2010-01-01

The nuclear activity in ROMANIA was for many years under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions this type of nuclear safeguards. Now, the opportunity exists to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and increase the accountancy and control of nuclear material by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS). The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA related to safeguards as part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol content published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between Nuclear Fuel Plant (NFP) representatives and IAEA inspectors was in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited NFP and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storages, technological flow, and was reviewed the disposal times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, measuring methods, weighting method and elaborating procedure of the documents and lists. At that time the IAEA and NFP representatives established the main points for starting the IS at NFP: performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI); communication of the days established for SNRI for each year; communication of the estimated deliveries and shipments for first quarter and then for the rest of the year: daily mail box declaration (DD) with respect to the deposit time for several nuclear materials i.e. advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), others. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and NFP (WRMD) has taken all measures to implement this objective. (authors)

Excerpts from the introductory statement by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei. IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, 22 March 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

1999-01-01

The document contains excerpts from the Introductory Statement made by the Director General of the IAEA at the IAEA Board of Governors on 22 March 1999. The following aspects from the Agency's activity are presented: nuclear safety, measures against illicit trafficking and for the physical protection of nuclear material, status of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, Agency's involvement in safeguards verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and inspections in Iraq in relation to its clandestine nuclear programme

Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

2010-01-01

In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

Principles in safeguards: A Canadian perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keen, L.J.

2007-01-01

L.J. Keen presented the Canadian perspective on safeguards. She noted that the IAEA safeguards system has responded well to challenges and has acted as the effective early warning system that it was intended to be. The exit from the non-proliferation regime by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has demonstrated how effective safeguards and verification are seen to be in detecting proliferation activity. The main areas of importance for Canada are effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. Effectiveness requires information and access, and assures citizens of the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Efficiency requires risk informed decisions for the sound allocation of resources and the early incorporation of proliferation resistance in design and construction, so that IAEA efforts can concentrate on where the risks are greatest. Openness and transparency include the public, and for the IAEA this includes its Member States since ultimately they control its activities and finances. Canada received its broader safeguards conclusion in 2005 and intends to maintain it. This will require continuous improvement in an era of rapid expansion of the nuclear industry. One problem foreseen is the adequate supply of qualified personnel, with the CNSC's resources growing at about 12%. The CNSC is looking at internal training programmes and internships

Advancement of safeguards inspection technology for CANDU nuclear power plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Jae Sung; Park, W S; Cha, H R; Ham, Y S; Lee, Y G; Kim, K P; Hong, Y D

1999-04-01

The objectives of this project are to develop both inspection technology and safeguards instruments, related to CANDU safeguards inspection, through international cooperation, so that those outcomes are to be applied in field inspections of national safeguards. Furthermore, those could contribute to the improvement of verification correctness of IAEA inspections. Considering the level of national inspection technology, it looked not possible to perform national inspections without the joint use of containment and surveillance equipment conjunction with the IAEA. In this connection, basic studies for the successful implementation of national inspections was performed, optimal structure of safeguards inspection was attained, and advancement of safeguards inspection technology was forwarded. The successful implementation of this project contributed to both the improvement of inspection technology on CANDU reactors and the implementation of national inspection to be performed according to the legal framework. In addition, it would be an opportunity to improve the ability of negotiating in equal shares in relation to the IAEA on the occasion of discussing or negotiating the safeguards issues concerned. Now that the national safeguards technology for CANDU reactors was developed, the safeguards criteria, procedure and instruments as to the other item facilities and fabrication facilities should be developed for the perfection of national inspections. It would be desirable that the recommendations proposed and concreted in this study, so as to both cope with the strengthened international safeguards and detect the undeclared nuclear activities, could be applied to national safeguards scheme. (author)

Review of the nuclear safeguards problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poch, L.A.; Wolsko, T.D.

1979-10-01

The issues surrounding nuclear safeguards are proliferation and terrorism. Protecting the nuclear fuel cycle against nuclear materials diversion has been the function of the NPT and the IAEA. However, because all nations have not signed the NPT and IAEA safeguarding inspections are not foolproof, the fuel cycle itself has been looked to as a possible way to alleviate concerns over proliferation. A civilian nuclear industry is not needed to produce weapon material, since research reactors can provide the necessary weapon-grade uranium or plutonium much cheaper and easier than commercial power reactors. Thus, altering the nuclear fuel cycle does not necessarily reduce the possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Only strict enforcement of the NPT and of the safeguard guidelines of the IAEA can achieve nonproliferation. Changing the fuel cycle does not present terrorists from stealing highly radioactive material to be used for weapons or from sabotaging nuclear facilities. Policing a nuclear facility by using guards, alarms, barriers, and searching and screening of employees is the only way to protect against terrorism, but these actions raise questions regarding civil liberties

Safeguards for geological repositories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fattah, A.

2000-01-01

Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

Entry into Force of the Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prieto, N.; Recio, M.

2004-01-01

The development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy has always been linked to verification of the truthfulness of such peaceful application. such checks must necessarily be undertaken by people or organisations possessing technical competence and a status of independence recognised by the international community. this is the case of the safeguards inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The history of safeguards dates back to the speech Atoms for Peace, given by the US President Eisenhower before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8th December 1953. In his speech, Eisenhower underlined the serious threat of the incipient atomic weapons race and the advisability of achieving a collective commitment to the peaceful use of atomic energy. the speech anticipated the setting up of an international agency that would cooperate in the technological development of nuclear energy and at the same time safeguard a material that should not be used for the clandestine manufacturing of weapons. This agency, the IAEA, was created three years later within the framework of the United Nations and is today the leading actor in the application of safeguards measures in relation to nuclear materials and facilities

U.S. next generation safeguards initiative: the human capital development program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scholz, M.A.

2013-01-01

The Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogram of the U.S. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is developing sustainable academic and technical programs that support the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals. This wide-ranging HCD effort endeavors to develop additional human resources to address current shortfalls, encourage U.S. experts to seek employment at the IAEA, and identify and train a new cadre of safeguards experts to meet the needs of both the United States and the IAEA for decades to come. In recent years, a convergence of factors has challenged the IAEA's ability to carry out its safeguards mission effectively. A staffing study shows that less than 20% of the international safeguards specialists in the U.S. workforce are 44 years of age or younger and that over 80% of the international safeguards specialists at the National Laboratories will be retired or otherwise resigned within 15 years. An aging workforce nearing retirement and growing workload, coupled with a safeguards budget that has remained essentially flat in real terms for nearly two decades, have posed particular challenges to the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Recognizing the trends, the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) launched NGSI in the fall of 2007. Since that time, the HCD subprogram of NGSI has sponsored over 300 safeguards internships at U.S. National Labs, organized eight annual short safeguards policy and technical courses, worked with ten universities to develop new undergraduate and graduate course-work on international safeguards and nonproliferation, established a highly competitive graduate fellowship program, and completed a human capital requirements study that closely examined the safeguards workforce within the U.S. National Lab complex. Of past NGSI students and interns, nearly four in ten pursue multiple NGSI

Evaluation of excess nuclear materials suitability for international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newton, J.W.; White, W.C.; Davis, R.M.; Cherry, R.C.

1996-01-01

President Clinton announced in March 1995 the permanent withdrawal of 200 tons of fissile material from the US nuclear stockpile. This action was made possible by the dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons stockpile size and a desire to demonstrate the US'' commitment to nonproliferation goals. To provide further assurance of that commitment, the US is addressing placement of these materials under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. An initial step of this overall assessment was evaluation of the nuclear materials'' suitability for international safeguards. US Department of Energy (DOE) field organizations reviewed a detailed listing of all candidate materials with respect to characterization status, security classification, and acceptability for international safeguards compared to specified criteria. These criteria included form, location, environment and safety considerations, measurability, and stability. The evaluation resulted in broad categorizations of all materials with respect to preparing and placing materials under IAEA safeguards and provided essential information for decisions on the timing for offering materials as a function of materials attributes. A plan is being prepared to determine the availability of these materials for IAEA safeguards considering important factors such as costs, processes and facilities required to prepare materials, and impacts on other programs

Evaluation for the status of the IAEA inspection at Hanaro and TRIGA Mark II and III reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Hyun Sook; Lee, Byung Doo

2007-11-15

Safeguards implementation of nuclear material was carried out at facility level in an effect to support the peaceful nuclear activities in KAERI. Safeguards implementation is to fulfill the obligations associated with international agreements such as IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. IAEA inspection is the most important and basic factor of the safeguards implementation for the purpose of verifying whether all source or special fissionable material is diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The status of the IAEA inspection at Hanaro and TRIGA Mark II and III reactor during 2001-2006 is evaluated in this report.

Evaluation for the status of the IAEA inspection at Hanaro and TRIGA Mark II and III reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun Sook; Lee, Byung Doo

2007-11-01

Safeguards implementation of nuclear material was carried out at facility level in an effect to support the peaceful nuclear activities in KAERI. Safeguards implementation is to fulfill the obligations associated with international agreements such as IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. IAEA inspection is the most important and basic factor of the safeguards implementation for the purpose of verifying whether all source or special fissionable material is diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The status of the IAEA inspection at Hanaro and TRIGA Mark II and III reactor during 2001-2006 is evaluated in this report

New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iwanaga, Masayuki

2000-01-01

The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

2015-01-01

There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuroi, Hideo

1986-01-01

This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

1994-07-01

DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL

The international safeguards system and physical protection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Lauppe, W.D.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

1990-02-01

The report summarizes and explains facts and aspects of the IAEA safeguards performed within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and shows perspectives to be discussed by the NPT Review Conferences in 1990 and 1995. The technical background of potential misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes is explained in connection with the physical protection regime of the international safeguards, referring to recent developments for improvement of technical measures for material containment and surveillance. Most attention is given to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their surveillance by the IAEA safeguards, including such new technologies and applications as controlled nuclear fusion, laser techniques for uranium enrichment, and particle accelerators. The report's concluding analyses of the current situation show potentials for improvement and desirable or necessary consequences to be drawn for the international safeguards system, also taking into account recent discussions on the parliamentary level. (orig./HP) [de

Specification of a VVER-1000 SFAT device prototype. Interim report on Task FIN A 1073 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nikkinen, M.; Tiitta, A.; Iievlev, S.; Dvoeglazov, M.; Lopatin, S.

1999-01-01

The project to specify the optimal design of the Spent Fuel Attribute Tester (SFAT) for Ukrainian VVER-1000 facilities was run under Finnish Support Programme for IAEA Safeguards under the task FIN A1073. This document illustrates the optimum design and takes into account the special conditions at the Ukrainian facilities. The requirement presented here takes into account the needs of the user (IAEA), nuclear safety authority (NRA) and facilities. This document contains the views of these parties. According to this document, the work to design the optimal SFAT device can be started. This document contains also consideration for the operational procedures, maintenance and safety. (orig.)

Statement to the forty-fourth regular session of the IAEA General Conference 2000. IAEA General Conference. Vienna, 18 September 2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2000-01-01

In his Statement on the forty-fourth regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA, the Director General of the Agency highlighted IAEA's achievements in connection with its major functions: as catalyst for the development and transfer of nuclear technology (nuclear power, nuclear fuel cycle and waste management, preservation of nuclear expertise, nuclear science and applications, laboratory and research activities, future challenges in nuclear technology), as a recognized authority on nuclear safety (international conventions, establishment of international standards, safety services, early shutdown of nuclear power plants, decommissioning issues, Kursk submarine accident, future challenges in nuclear safety), and as an instrument for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation (safeguards agreements and additional protocols, implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to Iraq, safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East, other verification activities, security of material, future challenges in verification. He also discussed the Agency's technical co-operation programme and the Agency management for maximum efficiency and effectiveness, and the new outreach policy

The Connection between the Areas of Safeguards and Physical Protection and Record and Memory Keeping

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ormai, Peter; )

2012-01-01

Safeguards are concerned with nuclear - especially fissile - materials and associated technology. In general, nuclear safeguards exist on different levels, each with different motivations (the facility operator, national authority, international authority). Safeguards basically comes down to accountancy on fissile material (mainly U an Pu), which seeks to verify the 'material balance'. For international nuclear safeguards, accountancy assures that nuclear materials are present and used as intended. International safeguards are called for by treaties and other agreements between parties. EURATOM and IAEA are the main actors. Implementing safeguards for geological disposal is considered a big challenge as it is a new area. Although the complementarity between safeguards and general RK and M preservation was pointed out, there are also substantial differences. With regard to complementarity, it was mentioned that the challenges for preserving of IAEA safeguards relevant information and documentation are the same as that of other long term archiving. An effective application of safeguards shall assure continuity-of-knowledge about the nuclear material in the repository. A variety of technical tools enables safeguards to provide accountancy and continuity of knowledge of nuclear materials.. On the other hand it was mentioned that safeguards are only interested in fissile materials, so e.g. not really in intermediate level waste. Moreover, safeguards records keeping is a State, not a waste agency responsibility. Some more fundamental, challenging differences were also pointed out. For instance, although the record-keeping requirements for retrievability and safeguards might be considered to be complementary, their aims are in fact opposite. Safeguards can only be abandoned in case of practical irretrievability. Whether this is possible remains a question mark. In any case spent fuel will never be regarded as 'waste' by the safeguards community. Another issue is the

Recent developments in the implementation of Euratom safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gmelin, W.; Bommelle, P.; Sharpe, B.W.; Love, B.

1983-01-01

The EURATOM safeguards system is based legally on the 1958 Treaty of Rome establishing the original Community of six (now 10) countries. Under this safeguards system, the Commission has, inter alia, ''to satisfy itself that any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third state or an international organisation are complied with'' (art. 77b). The practical implementation of safeguards within the Community is significantly influenced by the requirements of: (a) the three different agreements between the Community, its Member States and the IAEA, concerning the application of IAEA safeguards to some or all of the civil nuclear materials in the Community, and (b) the various agreements between the Community and certain third countries, concerning inter alia the application of safeguards within the Community to nuclear materials supplied, directly or indirectly, by these third countries. Within the past four years significant developments have occurred in both groups of agreements. The EURATOM safeguards organisation is the only multinational safeguards organisation in the world, and currently has a staff of some 120 inspectors, with appropriate administrative support, and can draw for research and development work on the resources of the Community's Joint Research Centre. The recent changes in inspection techniques, particularly in relation to non-destructive assay techniques, and the implementation of containment and surveillance measures, are discussed. A description is given of the experience gained in recent years in the operation of ''Joint Teams'' of EURATOM and IAEA inspectors in certain plants as well as the continuing experience gained under the normal regime, using the observation principle, as foreseen in the respective Agreement

The Site Approach - Lessons Learned from the Integrated Safeguards Approach for JNC-1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kikuchi, M.; Iso, S.; Tomine, K.; Hirato, Y.; Namekawa, M.; Takasugi, N.; Watanabe, M.; Tsutaki, Y.; Asano, T.; Nagatani, T.; Ninagawa, J.; Fujiwara, S.; Takahashi, S.; Kimura, T.; Kodani, Y.; Fukuhara, J.; Miyaji, N.; Kawakami, Y.; Koizumi, A.; Yamazaki, Y.; Nishinosono, S.; Sasaki, K.

2010-01-01

Integrated safeguards approaches for specific sites are recognized important elements in the design of a State-level approach under the concept of grouping facilities. Japan and the IAEA agreed further improvement of integrated safeguards implementation in effective and efficient manner, particularly at large complex nuclear sites in Japan. Japan and the IAEA developed the integrated safeguards approach for specific sites defined at Article 18 of Additional Protocol. In 2008, the IAEA started the three-year test implementation of JNC-1 site approach for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards implementation of UDU material handling facilities. Japan and IAEA agreed to adopt the sector concept in order to make clear of subjected nuclear material to be verified. The sector is defined as spatial assignment that treats the same material stratum beyond MBAs in the site. The arrangement of MBAs and related material balance calculations as well as statistical analysis is maintained as a fundamental safeguards measure. At the boundaries of each sector, appropriate unattended NDA system and/or C/S system are installed, and material flows across the boundaries are verified by the system or attendance of resident inspectors. For inventory verification of the nuclear material stayed in sectors, an appropriate numbers of randomly scheduled inspections will be implemented. IAEA can access to the randomly selected sectors within 2 hours after notification. NRTA based on frequent operator's declaration will be performed for achievement of timeliness detection goal. The JNC-1 site approach has been implemented under the enhanced co-operation between the IAEA and SSAC through joint use of equipment and arrangements for DA analysis. Especially, national inspectors are working with IAEA together for coordination with operators. Because NMCC lab analyses all DA samples taken from facilities and the analysis results will be shared by the IAEA, certain numbers of DA

Information collection strategies to support strengthened safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Costantini, L.; Hill, J.

2001-01-01

The IAEA Board of Governors approved the implementation of Part 1 of Strengthened Safeguards in June 1995. Since then, the collection and analysis of information beyond that provided by States parties and acquired by inspectors under NPT Safeguards Agreements has been an integral part of IAEA safeguards. The Agency has formally established internal structures and procedures to facilitate the effective use of open-source and other information not previously used in safeguards. Over this period the IAEA Division of Safeguards Information Technology (SGIT) has been building its collections of electronically held open source information. Some of these collections are quite nuclear-specific, such as material from the Monterey Institute in California, and nuclear news collections provided voluntarily by a number of Member States. Others are completely general news sources. Several of these collections contain many more reports than could possibly be reviewed by a human analyst. So a need has arisen for computerised search facilities to identify nuclear-relevant items from those collections. The Agency has more than one piece of software available to help searching and analysis of substantial collections of reports. Search 97 from Verity was chosen for this particular application because it is very straightforward to use, and it was expected that personnel from all over the Department of Safeguards would carry out these searches on a routine basis. The approach whereby special-purpose search mechanisms are designed for use by a large number of users, who are unfamiliar with the details of the search software, seems to be unusual if not unique to the Agency

UF/sub 6/ test loop for evaluation and implementation of international enrichment plant safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cooley, J.N.; Fields, L.W.; Swindle, D.W. Jr.

1987-01-01

A functional test loop capable of simulating UF/sub 6/ flows, pressures, and pipe deposits characteristic of gas centrifuge enrichment plant piping has been designed and fabricated by the Enrichment Safeguards Program of Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. The purpose of the test loop is twofold: (1) to enable the IAEA to evaluate and to calibrate enrichment safeguards measurement instrumentation to be used in limited frequency-unannounced access (LFUA) inspection strategy measurements at gas centrifuge enrichment plants and (2) to train IAEA inspectors in the use of such instrumentation. The test loop incorporates actual sections of cascade header pipes from the centrifuge enrichment plants subject to IAEA inspections. The test loop is described, applications for its use by the IAEA are detailed, and results from an initial demonstration session using the test loop are summarized. By giving the IAEA the in-house capability to evaluate LFUA inspection strategy approaches, to develop inspection procedures, to calibrate instrumentation, and to train inspectors, the UF/sub 6/ cascade header pipe test loop will contribute to the IAEA's success in implementing LFUA strategy inspections at gas centrifuge enrichment facilities subject to international safeguards inspections

ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palacios, E.

1998-01-01

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

IAEA inspection team conducting investigation in South Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

Full text: On 23 August 2004, during discussions about the initial declarations of the Republic of Korea (ROK) under the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, the ROK informed the IAEA that it had enriched nuclear material in the course of atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS) experiments that had not been declared to the IAEA. The ROK informed the IAEA that these experiments had been on a laboratory scale and involved the production of only milligram quantities of enriched uranium. According to the ROK, these activities were carried out without the Government's knowledge at a nuclear site in Korea in 2000, and that the activities had been terminated. Following receipt of this information, the IAEA dispatched a team of inspectors, headed by the Director of the Safeguards Operations Division responsible for the ROK, to investigate further all relevant aspects of this matter. The inspectors will report to the Director General upon their return to Vienna early next week. The Director General will be informing the Board of Governors of the IAEA's initial findings at the next meeting of the Board of Governors beginning on 13 September 2004. (IAEA)

UF6 test loop for evaluation and implementation of international enrichment plant safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cooley, J.N.; Fields, L.W.; Swindle, D.W. Jr.

1987-06-01

A functional test loop capable of simulating UF 6 flows, pressures, and pipe deposits characteristic of gas centrifuge enrichment plant piping has been designed and fabricated by the Enrichment Safeguards Program of Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., for use by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. Purpose of the test loop is twofold: (1) to enable the IAEA to evaluate and to calibrate enrichment safeguards measurement instrumentation to be used in limited frequency-unannounced access (LFUA) inspection strategy measurements at gas centrifuge enrichment plants and (2) to train IAEA inspectors in the use of such instrumentation. The test loop incorporates actual sections of cascade header pipes from the centrifuge enrichment plants subject to IAEA inspections. The test loop is described, applications for its use by the IAEA are detailed, and results from an initial demonstration session using the test loop are summarized

Protocol to suspend the application of safeguards pursuant to the Agreement of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol of 16 October 1998 suspending the application of safeguards under the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/237) of 26 February 1976 between the Agency, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the provisions for the application of safeguards pursuant to the Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the IAEA. The Protocol entered into force on 21 October 1999

Study on the development of safeguards information treatment system at the facility level

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, B. D.; Song, D. Y.; So, D. S.; Kwak, E. H. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

2000-05-01

Safeguards Information Treatment System(SITS) at the facility level is required to implement efficiently the obligations under the Korea-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, bilateral agreements with other countries and domestic law. In this paper, the requirements and major functions of SITS were considered, and the error checking methods and the relationships of safeguards information were reviewed. SITS will be developed to cover the different accounting procedures and methods applied at the various facilities under IAEA safeguards. Also, the resolved result of the Y2K problem in the existing nuclear material accounting program was described.

Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, H. D.; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I.

2002-05-01

DUPIC safeguards R and D in the second phase has focused on the development of nuclear material measurement system and its operation and verification, the development of nuclear material control and accounting system, and the development of remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system. Of them, the nuclear material measurement system was authenticated from IAEA and officially used for IAEA and domestic safeguards activities in DFDF. It was also verified that the system could be used for quality control of DUPIC process. It is recognised that the diagnostic software using neural network and remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system developed here could be key technologies to go into remote and near-real time monitoring system. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear fuel cycles like MOX and pyroprocessing facility as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 14, no. 1(82). Jan-Feb 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: 2000 Budget Goes Before IAEA Board of Governors, IAEA, Inspectors Relocated from Iraq, Review Meeting of Nuclear Safety Convention Set in April, Statements of IAEA Director General, The IAEA and Y2K Issues: Clearinghouse and Contact Point, Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols, More States Join International Conventions in Nuclear Fields, IAEA International Scientific Symposia and Seminars in 1999, New IAEA Books, and othe short information

A day in the life of a safeguards inspector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Henriques, Sasha

2016-01-01

Walking several miles through the winding, narrow corridors of a nuclear facility in protective gear while carrying heavy equipment, often escorted by facility operator personnel: welcome to the life of an IAEA safeguards inspector. Safeguards inspectors are an essential part of the global non-proliferation regime, carrying out verification activities, so the IAEA can provide assurances to States worldwide that other countries are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes or misusing nuclear technology. One important activity is the inspection of declared stocks of nuclear material: the IAEA is the only organization in the world with the mandate to verify the use of nuclear material and technology globally.

Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gastelum, Zoe N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Gitau, Ernest T. N. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doehle, Joel R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Toomey, Christopher M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2014-09-01

In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

Have IAEA safety precautions failed in Iraq

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gruemm, H.

1981-01-01

Israel's air raid on the Tamuz-1 research reactor (Osirak) in Iraq has given new impetus to the discussion of the potential and limits of international control as carried out by the IAEA in the framework of the non-proliferation treaty. A lack of faith in the effectiveness of IAEA control must be assuemd to be one of the main reasons for this attack. Prof. Grimm, vice chairman of the nuclear safeguards department of the International Atomic Energy Agency, comments on the possibility of producing nuclear weapons with the aid of this reactor and on the efficiency of present and projected nuclear safeguards measures. (orig.) [de

IAEA inspectors complete verification of nuclear material in Iraq

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

Full text: At the request of the Government of Iraq and pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iraq, a team of IAEA safeguards inspectors has completed the annual Physical Inventory Verification of declared nuclear material in Iraq, and is returning to Vienna. The material - natural or low-enriched uranium - is not sensitive from a proliferation perspective and is consolidated at a storage facility near the Tuwaitha complex, south of Baghdad. This inspection was conducted with the logistical and security assistance of the Multinational Force and the Office of the UN Security Coordinator. Inspections such as this are required by safeguards agreements with every non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT that has declared holdings of nuclear material, to verify the correctness of the declaration, and that material has not been diverted to any undeclared activity. Such inspections have been performed in Iraq on a continuing basis. The most recent took place in June 2003, following reports of looting of nuclear material at the Tuwaitha complex; IAEA inspectors recovered, repackaged and resealed all but a minute amount of material. NPT safeguards inspections are limited in scope and coverage as compared to the verification activities carried out in 1991-98 and 2002-03 by the IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 and related resolutions. 'This week's mission was a good first step,' IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said. 'Now we hope to be in a position to complete the mandate entrusted to us by the Security Council, to enable the Council over time to remove all sanctions and restrictions imposed on Iraq - so that Iraq's rights as a full-fledged member of the international community can be restored.' The removal of remaining sanctions is dependent on completion of the verification process by the IAEA and the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). It should be noted that IAEA technical assistance to Iraq has been resumed over

LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pepper, S.; Farnitano, M.; Carelli, J.; Hazeltine, J.; Bailey, D.

2001-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process

IAEA physical inventory verification procedures implemented at US and Canadian fuel fabrication plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gough, J.; Wredberg, L.; Zobor, E.; Zuccaro-Labellarte, G.

1988-01-01

IAEA has implemented safeguards at three Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication plants in the USA during the period 1982 to 1987, and it is in the process of safeguarding a fourth plant from 01 January 1988. In Canada IAEA safeguards inspections were implemented at all Natural Uranium (NU) fuel fabrication plants form 1972 onwards, and there are, at present, three plants under safeguards. The direct responsibility for the implementation of safeguards inspections in the USA and Canada lies with the Division of Operations B (SGOB) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. The senior staff that is at present directly engaged in the implementation activities has accumulated supervising inspection experience at about 50 Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) inspections at the Canadian and US fabrication plants during the period 1978 to 1987. This experience has been gained in close cooperation with the facility operators and with the support of the state authorities. The paper describes the latest PIV inspections at the Westinghouse Columbia plant and the Zircatec Precision Industries Inc. Port Hope plant. Furthermore, the paper describes the initial activities for the 1988 PIV inspection at the General Electric Wilmington plant including computerized book audit activities

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 14, no. 4(85). Oct-Nov 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: the new IAEA Board of Governors, conclusions of the 1999 IAEA General Conference, the return of the IAEA fact-finding team from Japan, future energy and nuclear power, talks on future IAEA verification of ex-weapon material, the IAEA and Y2K (steps against the bug intensify), African partnership for technology transfer extended, strengthened safeguards system (status of additional protocols), and other short information

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

1981-08-01

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

IAEA Newsbriefs. V. 12, no. 3(76). Jul-Aug 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

This issue gives brief information on the following topics: IAEA General Conference opens in Vienna 29 September, UN special session on environment and development, Safe storage of radiation sources, Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in 1996, IAEA/NEA review of 1996 performance assessment of US waste isolation pilot plant, and other short information

REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

2009-10-01

Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

2001-01-01

SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

Status and Prospect of Safeguards By Design for Pyroprocessing Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Ho-Dong; Shin, H.S.; Ahn, S.K.

2010-01-01

The concept of Safeguards-By-Design (SBD), which is proposed and developed by the United States and the IAEA, is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental consideration for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. The application of a SBD concept is of importance especially for developmental nuclear facilities which have new technological features and relevant challenges to their safeguards approach. At this point of time, the examination of the applicability of SBD on a pyroprocessing facility, which has been being developed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), would be meaningful. The ROK developed a safeguards system with the concept of SBD for Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) and DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) before the SBD concept was formally suggested. Currently. The PRIDE (PyRoprocess Integrated Inactive Demonstration) facility for the demonstration of pyroprocess using 10 ton of non-radioactive nuclear materials per year is being constructed in the ROK. The safeguards system for the facility has been designed in cooperation with a facility designer from the design phase, and the safeguards system would be established according to the future construction schedule. In preparing the design of Engineering Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), which will use spent fuels in an engineering scale and be constructed in 2016, a research on the safeguards system for this facility is also being conducted. In this connection, a project to support for development of safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility has been carried out by KAERI in cooperation with KINAC and the IAEA through an IAEA Member State Support Program (MSSP). When this MSSP project is finished in August, 2011, a safeguards system model and safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility would be established. Maximizing these early experiences and results, a safeguards system of ESPF based on the concept of SBD would be designed and

SGNucDat. Safeguards nuclear data for windows. Summary documentation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lemmel, H.D.; Schwerer, O.

1996-01-01

SGNucDat is a PC code displaying recommended values of nuclear data that are required for nuclear materials analyses by IAEA safeguards. Diskette and report available from the IAEA Nuclear Data Section, costfree upon request. (author)

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: 2010 and Beyond

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Whitney, J.M.; LaMontagne, S.; Sunshine, A.; Lockwood, D.; Peranteau, D.; Dupuy, G.

2010-01-01

Strengthening the international safeguards system is a key element of the U.S. non-proliferation policy agenda as evidenced by President Obama's call for more 'resources and authority to strengthen international inspections' in his April 2009 Prague speech. Through programs such as the recently-launched Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the long standing U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the United States is working to implement this vision. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched NGSI in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. Following a successful 2009, NGSI has made significant progress toward these goals in 2010. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced non-destructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. In December 2010, NGSI will host the Third Annual International Meeting on International Safeguards in Washington, DC, which will draw together key stakeholders from government, the nuclear industry, and the IAEA to further develop and promote a common understanding of Safeguards by Design principles and goals, and to identify opportunities for practical application of the concept. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews plans for upcoming activities. (author)

20 years of the implementation of the safeguards agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ramirez Quijada, Renan

2001-01-01

Peru has signed an INFIRC/153 type safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1979. The paper describes the nuclear material under control and outlines the organization and the activities related to the implementation of the safeguards agreements

The safeguards options study

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

1995-04-01

The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.