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Sample records for high-enriched uranium heu

  1. 31 CFR 540.306 - Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). 540...) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.306 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). The term highly...

  2. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage and disposition program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arms, W.M.; Everitt, D.A.; O'Dell, C.L.

    1995-01-01

    Recent changes in international relations and other changes in national priorities have profoundly affected the management of weapons-usable fissile materials within the United States (US). The nuclear weapon stockpile reductions agreed to by the US and Russia have reduced the national security requirements for these fissile materials. National policies outlined by the US President seek to prevent the accumulation of nuclear weapon stockpiles of plutonium (Pu) and HEU, and to ensure that these materials are subjected to the highest standards of safety, security and international accountability. The purpose of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage and Disposition Program Plan is to define and establish a planned approach for storage of all HEU and disposition of surplus HEU in support of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Material Disposition Program. Elements Of this Plan, which are specific to HEU storage and disposition, include program requirements, roles and responsibilities, program activities (action plans), milestone schedules, and deliverables

  3. Supply of low enriched (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1997-01-01

    Enriched uranium for research reactors in the form of LEU /= low enriched uranium at 19.75% U-235) and HEU (= highly enriched uranium at 90 to 93% U-235) was and is - due to its high U-235 enrichment - a political fuel other than enriched uranium for power reactors. The sufficient availability of LEU and HEU is a vital question for research reactors, especially in Europe, in order to perform their peaceful research reactor programs. In the past the USA were in the Western hemisphere sole supplier of LEU and HEU. Today the USA have de facto stopped the supply of LEU and HEU, for HEU mainly due to political reasons. This paper deals, among others, with the present availability of LEU and HEU for European research reactors and touches the following topics: - historical US supplies, - influence of the RERTR-program, - characteristics of LEU and HEU, - military HEU enters the civil market, -what is the supply situation for LEU and HEU today? - outlook for safe supplies of LEU and HEU. (author)

  4. Stationary and protable instruments for assay of HEU [highly enriched uranium] solids holdup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russo, P.A.; Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Stephens, M.M.; Brumfield, T.L.; Gunn, C.S.; Watson, D.R.

    1987-01-01

    Two NaI(Tl)-based instruments, one stationary and one portable, designed for automated assay of highly enriched uranium (HEU) solids holdup, are being evaluated at the scrap recovery facility of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. The stationary instrument, a continuous monitor of HEU within the filters of the chip burner exhaust system, measures the HEU deposits that accumulate erratically and rapidly during chip burner operation. The portable system was built to assay HEU in over 100 m of elevated piping used to transfer UO 3 , UO 2 , and UF 4 powder to, from, and between the fluid bed conversion furnances and the powder storage hoods. Both instruments use two detector heads. Both provide immediate automatic readout of accumulated HEU mass. The 186-keV 235 U gamma ray is the assay signature, and the 60-keV gamma ray from an 241 Am source attached to each detector is used to normalize the 186-keV rate. The measurement geometries were selected for compatibility with simple calibration models. The assay calibrations were calculated from these models and were verified and normalized with measurements of HEU standards built to match geometries of uniform accumulations on the surfaces of the process equipment. This instrumentation effort demonstrates that simple calibration models can often be applied to unique measurement geometries, minimizing the otherwise unreasonable requirements for calibration standards and allowing extension of the measurements to other process locations

  5. Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Pu from nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neff, T.L.

    1992-01-01

    Last year, as the Soviet Union began to crumble and the Bush-Gorbachev talks had advanced to consider the dismantling of actual warheads instead of mere delivery systems, Dr. Thomas L. Neff, a senior member of MIT's Center for International Studies, tinkered with the notion that one day soon the US could be buying Russian uranium from scrapped nuclear arms. He also considered the costly business of dismantlement and set to work on an ingenious proposal. The basic idea was simply to purchase the HEU from Russia using funds derived from savings in the US Department of Energy's enrichment enterprise. The proposal, now part of an umbrella agreement between the US and Russia announced in early September, promises large strategic benefits for the US in terms of both financing dismantlement (to the tune of $100 million annually), as well as political oversight for the operation itself. In the words of Dr. Neff, who made briefings to both governments on the proposal, open-quotes It's a budget-neutral, win-win solution.close quotes What follows is an illustrated, step-by-step analysis of the proposal, as well as a reprint of Dr. Neff's paper, Disposition of HEU and Pu from Nuclear Weapons, as presented to the Uranium Institute's annual symposium last month

  6. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) politics: An enigma wrapped up in a warhead and boxed in political chaos

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1993-01-01

    It could be fairly said that while the Cold War arose in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and hostility, it is ending with an equal amount of confusion and uncertainty. More than a year has passed since the US and Russia signed a tentative HEU agreement in August 1992. Many of the details have been worked out, but major questions remain. And they're not just on the Russian side. The fine points of President Clinton's overall nuclear policy are only now beginning to emerge. In his first major foreign policy address, before the United Nations in late September, Clinton called for a worldwide ban on the production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. open-quotes Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations,close quotes said Clinton before the UN. open-quotes We will press for an international agreement that would ban production of these materials for weapons forever.close quotes As the veil lifts from Clinton's nuclear policy, it appears the Administration realizes that Russia may have more HEU than originally thought. That possibility has been confirmed by Minatom Minister Mikhailov's disclosures to the NUKEM Market Report, which brought a greater degree of certainty to estimates that had been floating around for some time. When the Bush Administration signed the HEU pact, it apparently thought the 500 metric tons comprised most of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. Now that the number appears higher, Clinton may propose to accelerate and enlarge the HEU deal. He is due to summit with Yeltsin, if Yeltsin survives, next spring. The 500-metric-ton deal may only be the first step

  7. Research on the conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) nitrate by using the microwave denitration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bao Weimin; Song Chongli

    1998-08-01

    In order to simplify the denitration process by microwave heating, the uranyl nitrate is firstly denitrated and converted into UO 3 . The produced UO 3 was then further heated in the microwave field to transfer UO 3 to U 3 O 8 and to form a single product of U 3 O 8 . When the phase transfer from UO 3 to U 3 O 8 occurs, the temperature of the product increases 200∼300 degree C in two minutes. The phase-transfer temperature can be controlled by the input power of microwave. High quality U 3 O 8 can be obtained at a denitration temperature about 500 degree C. It contains no residual NO x and has a specific surface area great than 3 m 2 /g. The denitration temperature is measured with an IR-thermometer and checked with an optic fiber thermometer. The working curve and process parameter were studied in a microwave denitration unit for high enriched uranyl nitrate solution (90 g(U)/L, 4 mol/L HNO 3 and 1.2 L per batch)

  8. Verification experiment on the downblending of high enriched uranium (HEU) at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Digital video surveillance of the HEU feed stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martinez, R.L.; Tolk, K.; Whiting, N.; Castleberry, K.; Lenarduzzi, R.

    1998-01-01

    As part of a Safeguards Agreement between the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, was added to the list of facilities eligible for the application of IAEA safeguards. Currently, the facility is in the process of downblending excess inventory of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) from US defense related programs for commercial use. An agreement was reached between the US and the IAEA that would allow the IAEA to conduct an independent verification experiment at the Portsmouth facility, resulting in the confirmation that the HEU was in fact downblended. The experiment provided an opportunity for the DOE laboratories to recommend solutions/measures for new IAEA safeguards applications. One of the measures recommended by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and selected by the IAEA, was a digital video surveillance system for monitoring activity at the HEU feed stations. This paper describes the SNL implementation of the digital video system and its integration with the Load Cell Based Weighing System (LCBWS) from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The implementation was based on commercially available technology that also satisfied IAEA criteria for tamper protection and data authentication. The core of the Portsmouth digital video surveillance system was based on two Digital Camera Modules (DMC-14) from Neumann Consultants, Germany

  9. Feasibility and options for purchasing nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from the former Soviet Union (FSU)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    In response to a recent tasking from the National Security Council, this report seeks to analyze the possible options open to the US for purchasing, from the former Soviet Union (FSU) substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium recovered from the accelerated weapons retirements and dismantlements that will soon be taking place. The purpose of this paper is to identify and assess the implications of some of the options that now appear to be open to the United States, it being recognized that several issues might have to be addressed in further detail if the US Government, on its own, or acting with others seeks to negotiate any such purchases on an early basis. As an outgrowth of the dissolution of the Soviet Union three of the C.I.S. republics now possessing nuclear weapons, namely the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have stated that it is their goal, without undue delay, to become non-nuclear weapon states as defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of overriding US concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Third World, and the significant opportunity that the availability of such a large quantity of surplus weapons grade material might present in this regard, especially to a cash-starved FSU Republic. Additionally, the US, in its endeavor to drawdown its own arsenal, needs to assure itself that these materials are not being reconfigured into more modern weapons within the CIS in a manner which would be inconsistent with the stated intentions and publicized activities. The direct purchase of these valuable materials by the US government or by interested US private enterprises could alleviate these security concerns in a straightforward and very expeditious manner, while at the same time pumping vitally needed hard currency into the struggling CIS economy. Such a purchase would seem to be entirely consistent with the Congressional mandate indicated by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991

  10. 78 FR 72123 - Request To Amend a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-12-02

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... manufacture HEU targets in Belgium. National Nuclear Security Uranium (HEU) uranium France for irradiation in... 5.8 kg of U- 235 contained in 6.2 kg uranium to a new cumulative total of 12.615 kg of U-235...

  11. Active interrogation of highly enriched uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fairrow, Nannette Lea

    Safeguarding special nuclear material (SNM) in the Department of Energy Complex is vital to the national security of the United States. Active and passive nondestructive assays are used to confirm the presence of SNM in various configurations ranging from waste to nuclear weapons. Confirmation measurements for nuclear weapons are more challenging because the design complicates the detection of a distinct signal for highly enriched uranium. The emphasis of this dissertation was to investigate a new nondestructive assay technique that provides an independent and distinct signal to confirm the presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Once completed and tested this assay method could be applied to confirmation measurements of nuclear weapons. The new system uses a 14-MeV neutron source for interrogation and records the arrival time of neutrons between the pulses with a high efficiency detection system. The data is then analyzed by the Feynman reduced variance method. The analysis determined the amount of correlation in the data and provided a unique signature of correlated fission neutrons. Measurements of HEU spheres were conducted at Los Alamos with the new system. Then, Monte Carlo calculations were performed to verify hypothesis made about the behavior of the neutrons in the experiment. Comparisons of calculated counting rates by the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) were made with the experimental data to confirm that the measured response reflected the desired behavior of neutron interactions in the highly enriched uranium. In addition, MCNP calculations of the delayed neutron build-up were compared with the measured data. Based on the results obtained from this dissertation, this measurement method has the potential to be expanded to include mass determinations of highly enriched uranium. Although many safeguards techniques exist for measuring special nuclear material, the number of assays that can be used to confirm HEU in shielded systems is

  12. 78 FR 60928 - Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-02

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... manufacture HEU The Netherlands. National Nuclear Security Uranium uranium (17.1 targets in France... export from 9.4 kg of U-235 contained in 10.1 kg uranium to a new cumulative total of 17.1 kg of U-235...

  13. Use of highly enriched uranium at the FRM-II

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boening, K. [Forschungs-Neutronenquelle FRM-II, Technische Universitaet Muenchen, D-85747 Garching bei Muenchen (Germany)

    2002-07-01

    The new FRM-II research reactor in Munich, Germany, provides a high flux of thermal neutrons outside of the core at only 20 MW power. This is achieved by using a single compact, cylindrical fuel element with highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is cooled by light water and placed in the center of a large heavy water tank. The paper outlines the arguments which have led to this core concept and summarizes its performance. It also reports on alternative studies which have been performed for the case of low enriched uranium (LEU) and compares the data of the two concepts, with the conclusion that the FRM-II cannot be converted to LEU. A concept using medium enriched uranium (MEU) is described as well as plans to develop such a fuel element in the future. Finally, it is argued that the use of HEU fuel elements at the FRM-II does not - realistically -involve any risk of proliferation. (author)

  14. Disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium: Draft environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-10-01

    This document assesses the environmental impacts at four potential sites that may result from alternatives for the disposition of United States-origin weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) that has been or may be declared surplus to national defense or defense-related program needs. In addition to the no action alternative, it assesses four alternatives that would eliminate the weapons-usability of HEU by blending it with depleted uranium, natural uranium, or low-enriched uranium (LEU) to create low-enriched uranium, either as commercial reactor fuel feedstock or as low-level radioactive waste. The potential blending sites are DOE's Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; the Babcock ampersand Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; and the Nuclear Fuel Services Fuel Fabrication Plant in Erwin, Tennessee. Evaluations of impacts on site infrastructure, water resources, air quality and noise, socioeconomic resources, waste management, public and occupational health, and environmental justice for the potential blending sites are included in the assessment. The intersite transportation of nuclear and hazardous materials is also assessed. The preferred alternative is to blend down surplus HEU to LEU for maximum commercial use as reactor fuel feed which would likely be done at a combination of DOE and commercial sites

  15. Management of high enriched uranium for peaceful purposes: Status and trends

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-06-01

    Arms control agreements between some Nuclear Weapon States have led to the dismantling of many of the nuclear weapons in their military stockpiles, which in turn have produced stockpiles of excess weapons-grade high enriched uranium (HEU) from the dismantled weapons. Considering the proliferation potential of HEU, the management, control and disposition of this fissile material has become a primary focus of nuclear non-proliferation efforts worldwide. To lessen the proliferation threat of excess HEU stockpiles, the USA agreed to purchase several tonnes of excess Russian HEU down-blended to low enriched uranium (LEU). Proliferation concerns about HEU have also resulted in a global effort to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel and to minimize civilian use of HEU. This publication addresses HEU management declared excesses, non-proliferation programmes and options for the use of HEU stockpiles, including disposition programmes. Also addressed are the influence of LEU derived from surplus HEU on the global market for uranium, technical issues associated with utilization and the disposition of HEU

  16. Highly enriched uranium, a dangerous substance that should be eliminated

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schaper, Annette

    2013-07-01

    Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. While plutonium is radioactive and hazardous in handling, HEU is far less dangerous. Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect by technical means. Therefore, in comparison to plutonium, HEU is much easier to divert, smuggle and hide. Moreover, a crude nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed in a much simpler way than one made using plutonium. For these reasons, HEU is the material most wanted by terrorists. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for one explosive, but the quantities existing in the world add up to hundreds of tons. Due to the disarmament at the end of the Cold War, the NPT nuclear weapon states possess large quantities of HEU in excess of their needs for nuclear weapons. Therefore, these countries have not produced HEU for many years. Several international projects are working towards reducing the proliferation risks posed by HEU. The projects include the reduction of existing HEU by converting it to civilian reactor fuel that cannot be easily used for nuclear weapons. Other projects work towards reducing the number of countries and sites where HEU is stored by transferring it back to the countries of origin. And there are yet other projects which seek to minimize uses which would require new production of HEU. An international non-proliferation goal should be to eliminate all uses of HEU and thus to eliminate the need for any future production. Uses of HEU other than for nuclear weapons are as fuel in civilian research reactors, as base material for the production of special isotopes used in medical diagnostics, so-called medical targets and as fuel in military naval reactors. It is desirable to replace the HEU in all these applications with other materials and thus cease all HEU production forever. Use as fuel in civilian reactors has been greatly reduced during the last few decades. Within an international campaign, the Reduced Enrichment for

  17. Highly enriched uranium, a dangerous substance that should be eliminated

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schaper, Annette

    2013-01-01

    Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. While plutonium is radioactive and hazardous in handling, HEU is far less dangerous. Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect by technical means. Therefore, in comparison to plutonium, HEU is much easier to divert, smuggle and hide. Moreover, a crude nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed in a much simpler way than one made using plutonium. For these reasons, HEU is the material most wanted by terrorists. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for one explosive, but the quantities existing in the world add up to hundreds of tons. Due to the disarmament at the end of the Cold War, the NPT nuclear weapon states possess large quantities of HEU in excess of their needs for nuclear weapons. Therefore, these countries have not produced HEU for many years. Several international projects are working towards reducing the proliferation risks posed by HEU. The projects include the reduction of existing HEU by converting it to civilian reactor fuel that cannot be easily used for nuclear weapons. Other projects work towards reducing the number of countries and sites where HEU is stored by transferring it back to the countries of origin. And there are yet other projects which seek to minimize uses which would require new production of HEU. An international non-proliferation goal should be to eliminate all uses of HEU and thus to eliminate the need for any future production. Uses of HEU other than for nuclear weapons are as fuel in civilian research reactors, as base material for the production of special isotopes used in medical diagnostics, so-called medical targets and as fuel in military naval reactors. It is desirable to replace the HEU in all these applications with other materials and thus cease all HEU production forever. Use as fuel in civilian reactors has been greatly reduced during the last few decades. Within an international campaign, the Reduced Enrichment for

  18. Research reactor core conversion from the use of highly enriched uranium to the use of low enriched uranium fuels guidebook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-08-01

    In view of the proliferation concerns caused by the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and in anticipation that the supply of HEU to research and test reactors will be more restricted in the future, this document has been prepared to assist reactor operators in determining whether conversion to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel designs is technically feasible for their specific reactor, and to assist in making a smooth transition to the use of LEU fuel designs where appropriate

  19. Unallocated Off-Specification Highly Enriched Uranium: Recommendations for Disposition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bridges, D. N.; Boeke, S. G.; Tousley, D. R.; Bickford, W.; Goergen, C.; Williams, W.; Hassler, M.; Nelson, T.; Keck, R.; Arbital, J.

    2002-02-27

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made significant progress with regard to disposition planning for 174 metric tons (MTU) of surplus Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Approximately 55 MTU of this 174 MTU are ''offspec'' HEU. (''Off-spec'' signifies that the isotopic or chemical content of the material does not meet the American Society for Testing and Materials standards for commercial nuclear reactor fuel.) Approximately 33 of the 55 MTU have been allocated to off-spec commercial reactor fuel per an Interagency Agreement between DOE and the Tennessee Valley Authority (1). To determine disposition plans for the remaining {approx}22 MTU, the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) co-sponsored this technical study. This paper represents a synopsis of the formal technical report (NNSA/NN-0014). The {approx} 22 MTU of off-spec HEU inventory in this study were divided into two main groupings: one grouping with plutonium (Pu) contamination and one grouping without plutonium. This study identified and evaluated 26 potential paths for the disposition of this HEU using proven decision analysis tools. This selection process resulted in recommended and alternative disposition paths for each group of HEU. The evaluation and selection of these paths considered criteria such as technical maturity, programmatic issues, cost, schedule, and environment, safety and health compliance. The primary recommendations from the analysis are comprised of 7 different disposition paths. The study recommendations will serve as a technical basis for subsequent programmatic decisions as disposition of this HEU moves into the implementation phase.

  20. Candidate processes for diluting the 235U isotope in weapons-capable highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Snider, J.D.

    1996-02-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering its surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used to produce nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching uranium in the fissile 235 U isotope from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by diluting its concentration of the fissile 235 U isotope in a uranium blending process, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel

  1. Minimizing civilian use of highly enriched uranium - FRM II and global developments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Englert, Matthias [Oeko-Institut e.V., Darmstadt (Germany)

    2016-07-01

    The need to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civil nuclear applications is shrinking due to international efforts worldwide in the last three decades. Today low enriched uranium (LEU) that is not suitable for nuclear weapon purposes can be used instead in almost all civil applications. An overview of the current HEU use worldwide will be presented before focusing more on the use of HEU in research reactors and the conversion of existing reactors to LEU. Specifically interesting is the case of the German research reactor in Munich, the FRM-II. The reactor operates since ten years after intense national and international discussions over the use of weapon usable HEU to fuel the reactor. Since its construction the reactor is therefore obliged to convert to lower enrichment levels as soon as a suitable fuel becomes available. Despite huge international efforts to develop new fuels it is still not clear if and when the reactor can be converted.

  2. Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide upper level guidance for the program that will downblend surplus highly enriched uranium for use as commercial nuclear reactor fuel or low-level radioactive waste. The intent of this document is to outline the overall mission and program objectives. The document is also intended to provide a general basis for integration of disposition efforts among all applicable sites. This plan provides background information, establishes the scope of disposition activities, provides an approach to the mission and objectives, identifies programmatic assumptions, defines major roles, provides summary level schedules and milestones, and addresses budget requirements

  3. HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BLEND DOWN PROGRAM AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE PRESENT AND FUTURE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Magoulas, V; Charles Goergen, C; Ronald Oprea, R

    2008-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) entered into an Interagency Agreement to transfer approximately 40 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to TVA for conversion to fuel for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. Savannah River Site (SRS) inventories included a significant amount of this material, which resulted from processing spent fuel and surplus materials. The HEU is blended with natural uranium (NU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) with a 4.95% 235U isotopic content and shipped as solution to the TVA vendor. The HEU Blend Down Project provided the upgrades needed to achieve the product throughput and purity required and provided loading facilities. The first blending to low enriched uranium (LEU) took place in March 2003 with the initial shipment to the TVA vendor in July 2003. The SRS Shipments have continued on a regular schedule without any major issues for the past 5 years and are due to complete in September 2008. The HEU Blend program is now looking to continue its success by dispositioning an additional approximately 21 MTU of HEU material as part of the SRS Enriched Uranium Disposition Project

  4. Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

  5. Analysis of civilian processing programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

  6. TRANSPARENCY: Tracking Uranium under the U.S./Russian HEU Purchase Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benton, J B; Decman, D J; Leich, D A

    2005-01-01

    By the end of August, 2005, the Russia Federation delivered to the United States (U.S.) more than 7,000 metric tons (MT) of low enriched uranium (LEU) containing approximately 46 million SWU and 75,000 MT of natural uranium. This uranium was blended down from weapons-grade (nominally enriched to 90% 235 U) highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement that provides for the blend down of 500 MT HEU into LEU for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. The HEU Transparency Program, under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), monitored the conversion and blending of the more than 250 MT HEU used to produce this LEU. The HEU represents more than half of the 500 MT HEU scheduled to be blended down through the year 2013 and is equivalent to the elimination of more than 10,000 nuclear devices. The HEU Transparency Program has made considerable progress in its mission to develop and implement transparency measures necessary to assure that Russian HEU extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons is blended down into LEU for delivery to the United States. U.S. monitor observations include the inventory of inprocess containers, observation of plant operations, nondestructive assay measurements to determine 235 U enrichment, as well as the examination of Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) documents. During 2005, HEU Transparency Program personnel will conduct 24 Special Monitoring Visits (SMVs) to four Russian uranium processing plants, in addition to staffing a Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) at one Russian site

  7. Repository emplacement costs for Al-clad high enriched uranium spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDonell, W.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1994-01-01

    A range of strategies for treatment and packaging of Al-clad high-enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuels to prevent or delay the onset of criticality in a geologic repository was evaluated in terms of the number of canisters produced and associated repository costs incurred. The results indicated that strategies in which neutron poisons were added to consolidated forms of the U-Al alloy fuel generally produced the lowest number of canisters and associated repository costs. Chemical processing whereby the HEU was removed from the waste form was also a low cost option. The repository costs generally increased for isotopic dilution strategies, because of the substantial depleted uranium added. Chemical dissolution strategies without HEU removal were also penalized because of the inert constituents in the final waste glass form. Avoiding repository criticality by limiting the fissile mass content of each canister incurred the highest repository costs

  8. A programme for Euratom safeguards inspectors, used in the assay of high enriched (H.E.U.) and low enriched (L.E.U.) uranium fuel materials by active neutron interrogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vocino, V.; Farese, N.; Maucq, T.; Nebuloni, M.

    1991-01-01

    The programme AECC (Active Euratom Coincidence Counters) has been developed at the Joint Research Center, Ispra by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg and the Safety Technology Institute, Ispra for the acquisition, evaluation, management and storage of measurement data originating from active neutron interrogation of HEU and LEU fuel materials. The software accommodates the implementation of the NDA (Non Destructive Assay) procedures for the Active Well Coincidence Counters and Active Neutron Coincidence Counters deployed by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate, Luxembourg

  9. Research reactor preparations for the air shipment of highly enriched uranium from Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bolshinsky, I.; Allen, K.J.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.; Paunoiu, C.; Ciocanescu, M.

    2010-01-01

    In June 2009 two air shipments transported both unirradiated (fresh) and irradiated (spent) Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel from two research reactors in Romania to the Russian Federation (RF) for conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU). The Institute for Nuclear Research at Pitesti (SCN Pitesti) shipped 30.1 kg of HEU fresh fuel pellets to Dimitrovgrad, Russia and the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH) shipped 23.7 kilograms of HEU spent fuel assemblies from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to Ozersk, Russia. Both HEU shipments were coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) as part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), were managed in Romania by the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), and were conducted in cooperation with the Russian Federation State Corporation for Atomic Energy Rosatom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both shipments were transported by truck to and from respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at secure nuclear facilities in Russia until the material is converted into low enriched uranium. These shipments resulted in Romania becoming the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the research reactor preparations and license approvals that were necessary to safely and securely complete these air shipments of nuclear fuel. (author)

  10. Department of Energy, highly enriched uranium ES ampersand H vulnerability assessment, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory site assessment team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    In accordance with the February 22, 1996 directive issued by Secretary of Energy O'Leary on the Vulnerability Assessment of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory conducted an assessment of the site's HEU holdings and any associated vulnerabilities. The assessment was conducted between April 25 and May 24, 1996. The scope of this assessment, as defined in the Assessment Plan, included all HEU, and any spent fuel not evaluated in the Spent Fuel Vulnerability Assessment. Addressed in this assessment were all of the holdings at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) except any located at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) and the Naval Reactors Facility. Excluded from the assessment were those HEU holdings previously assessed in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory and Vulnerability Site Assessment Report and any HEU holdings evaluated in the Plutonium Vulnerability Assessment Report

  11. Use of Savannah River Site facilities for blend down of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bickford, W.E.; McKibben, J.M.

    1994-02-01

    Westinghouse Savannah River Company was asked to assess the use of existing Savannah River Site (SRS) facilities for the conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). The purpose was to eliminate the weapons potential for such material. Blending HEU with existing supplies of depleted uranium (DU) would produce material with less than 5% U-235 content for use in commercial nuclear reactors. The request indicated that as much as 500 to 1,000 MT of HEU would be available for conversion over a 20-year period. Existing facilities at the SRS are capable of producing LEU in the form of uranium trioxide (UO 3 ) powder, uranyl nitrate [UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ] solution, or metal. Additional processing, and additional facilities, would be required to convert the LEU to uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) or uranium hexafluoride (UF 3 ), the normal inputs for commercial fuel fabrication. This study's scope does not include the cost for new conversion facilities. However, the low estimated cost per kilogram of blending HEU to LEU in SRS facilities indicates that even with fees for any additional conversion to UO 2 or UF 6 , blend-down would still provide a product significantly below the spot market price for LEU from traditional enrichment services. The body of the report develops a number of possible facility/process combinations for SRS. The primary conclusion of this study is that SRS has facilities available that are capable of satisfying the goals of a national program to blend HEU to below 5% U-235. This preliminary assessment concludes that several facility/process options appear cost-effective. Finally, SRS is a secure DOE site with all requisite security and safeguard programs, personnel skills, nuclear criticality safety controls, accountability programs, and supporting infrastructure to handle large quantities of special nuclear materials (SNM)

  12. Highly Enriched Uranium Metal Cylinders Surrounded by Various Reflector Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bernard Jones; J. Blair Briggs; Leland Monteirth

    2007-01-01

    A series of experiments was performed at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in 1958 to determine critical masses of cylinders of Oralloy (Oy) reflected by a number of materials. The experiments were all performed on the Comet Universal Critical Assembly Machine, and consisted of discs of highly enriched uranium (93.3 wt.% 235U) reflected by half-inch and one-inch-thick cylindrical shells of various reflector materials. The experiments were performed by members of Group N-2, particularly K. W. Gallup, G. E. Hansen, H. C. Paxton, and R. H. White. This experiment was intended to ascertain critical masses for criticality safety purposes, as well as to compare neutron transport cross sections to those obtained from danger coefficient measurements with the Topsy Oralloy-Tuballoy reflected and Godiva unreflected critical assemblies. The reflector materials examined in this series of experiments are as follows: magnesium, titanium, aluminum, graphite, mild steel, nickel, copper, cobalt, molybdenum, natural uranium, tungsten, beryllium, aluminum oxide, molybdenum carbide, and polythene (polyethylene). Also included are two special configurations of composite beryllium and iron reflectors. Analyses were performed in which uncertainty associated with six different parameters was evaluated; namely, extrapolation to the uranium critical mass, uranium density, 235U enrichment, reflector density, reflector thickness, and reflector impurities. In addition to the idealizations made by the experimenters (removal of the platen and diaphragm), two simplifications were also made to the benchmark models that resulted in a small bias and additional uncertainty. First of all, since impurities in core and reflector materials are only estimated, they are not included in the benchmark models. Secondly, the room, support structure, and other possible surrounding equipment were not included in the model. Bias values that result from these two simplifications were determined and associated

  13. Civilian inventories of plutonium and highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albright, D.

    1987-01-01

    In the future, commercial laser isotope enrichment technologies, currently under development, could make it easier for national to produce highly enriched uranium secretly. The head of a US firm that is developing a laser enrichment process predicts that in twenty years, major utilities and small countries will have relatively small, on-site, laser-based uranium enrichment facilities. Although these plants will be designed for the production of low enriched uranium, they could be modified to produce highly enriched uranium, an option that raises the possibility of countries producing highly enriched uranium in small, easily hidden facilities. Against this background, most of this report describes the current and future quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the world, their forms, the facilities in which they are produced, stored, and used, and the extent to which they are transported. 5 figures, 10 tables

  14. Active neutron and gamma-ray imaging of highly enriched uranium for treaty verification.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamel, Michael C; Polack, J Kyle; Ruch, Marc L; Marcath, Matthew J; Clarke, Shaun D; Pozzi, Sara A

    2017-08-11

    The detection and characterization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) presents a large challenge in the non-proliferation field. HEU has a low neutron emission rate and most gamma rays are low energy and easily shielded. To address this challenge, an instrument known as the dual-particle imager (DPI) was used with a portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator to detect neutrons and gamma rays from induced fission in HEU. We evaluated system response using a 13.7-kg HEU sphere in several configurations with no moderation, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) moderation, and tungsten moderation. A hollow tungsten sphere was interrogated to evaluate the response to a possible hoax item. First, localization capabilities were demonstrated by reconstructing neutron and gamma-ray images. Once localized, additional properties such as fast neutron energy spectra and time-dependent neutron count rates were attributed to the items. For the interrogated configurations containing HEU, the reconstructed neutron spectra resembled Watt spectra, which gave confidence that the interrogated items were undergoing induced fission. The time-dependent neutron count rate was also compared for each configuration and shown to be dependent on the neutron multiplication of the item. This result showed that the DPI is a viable tool for localizing and confirming fissile mass and multiplication.

  15. Comparison Of A Neutron Kinetics Parameter For A Polyethylene Moderated Highly Enriched Uranium System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKenzie, IV, George Espy [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Goda, Joetta Marie [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Grove, Travis Justin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Sanchez, Rene Gerardo [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-04-17

    This paper examines the comparison of MCNP® code’s capability to calculate kinetics parameters effectively for a thermal system containing highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Rossi-α parameter was chosen for this examination because it is relatively easy to measure as well as easy to calculate using MCNP®’s kopts card. The Rossi-α also incorporates many other parameters of interest in nuclear kinetics most of which are more difficult to precisely measure. The comparison looks at two different nuclear data libraries for comparison to the experimental data. These libraries are ENDF/BVI (.66c) and ENDF/BVII (.80c).

  16. A confirmatory measurement technique for HEU [highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Goldman, A.; Russo, P.A.; Stovall, L.; Brumfield, T.L.; Gunn, C.S.; Watson, D.R.; Beedgen, R.

    1987-01-01

    Precise measurements of the special nuclear material (SNM) in an item can be used to confirm that the item has not been tampered with. These measurements do not require a highly accurate calibration, but they should be based on an attribute that is unique to the SNM. We describe an instrument that performs gamma-ray measurements at three energies: 185.7 keV, 1001 keV, and 2614 keV. This instrument collects data for 200 s from shipping containers (208-l barrels). These measurements help to distinguish the issue of material control - Has any material been diverted? - from the issue of measurement control - Is there a measurement bias?

  17. RUSSIAN-ORIGIN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENT FROM BULGARIA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kelly Cummins; Igor Bolshinsky; Ken Allen; Tihomir Apostolov; Ivaylo Dimitrov

    2009-07-01

    In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

  18. Russian-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment From Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cummins, Kelly; Bolshinsky, Igor; Allen, Ken; Apostolov, Tihomir; Dimitrov, Ivaylo

    2009-01-01

    In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

  19. Conversion of the University of Missouri-Rolla Reactor from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bolon, A.E.; Straka, M.; Freeman, D.W.

    1997-01-01

    The objectives of this project were to convert the UMR Reactor fuel from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and to ship the HEU fuel back to the Department of Energy Savannah River Site. The actual core conversion was completed in the summer of 1992. The HEU fuel was offloaded to an onsite storage pit where it remained until July, 1996. In July, 1996, the HEU fuel was shipped to the DOE Savannah River Site. The objectives of the project have been achieved. DOE provided the following funding for the project. Several papers were published regarding the conversion project and are listed in the Attachment. In retrospect, the conversion project required much more time and effort than originally thought. Several difficulties were encountered including the unavailability of a shipping cask for several years. The authors are grateful for the generous funding provided by DOE for this project but wish to point out that much of their efforts on the conversion project went unfunded

  20. Implementation of the United States-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement: Current Status and Prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    R.rutkowski, E; Armantrout, G; Mastal, E; Glaser, J; Benton, J

    2004-01-01

    The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) monitors and provides assurance that Russian weapons-grade HEU is processed into low enriched uranium (LEU) under the transparency provisions of the 1993 United States (U.S.)-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement. Meeting the Agreement's transparency provisions is not just a program requirement; it is a legal requirement. The HEU Purchase Agreement requires transparency measures to be established to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are met. The Transparency concept has evolved into a viable program that consists of complimentary elements that provide necessary assurances. The key elements include: (1) monitoring by technical experts; (2) independent measurements of enrichment and flow; (3) nuclear material accountability documents from Russian plants; and (4) comparison of transparency data with declared processing data. In the interest of protecting sensitive information, the monitoring is neither full time nor invasive. Thus, an element of trust is required regarding declared operations that are not observed. U.S. transparency monitoring data and independent instrument measurements are compared with plant accountability records and other declared processing data to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the 1993 Agreement are being met. Similarly, Russian monitoring of U. S. storage and fuel fabrication operations provides assurance to the Russians that the derived LEU is being used in accordance with the Agreement. The successful implementation of the Transparency program enables the receipt of Russian origin LEU into the United States. Implementation of the 1993 Agreement is proceeding on schedule, with the permanent elimination of over 8,700 warhead equivalents of HEU. The successful implementation of the Transparency program has taken place over the last 10 years and has provided the

  1. Conversion and Blending Facility Highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranium hexafluoride. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-05

    This report describes the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) which will have two missions: (1) convert surplus HEU materials to pure HEU UF{sub 6} and a (2) blend the pure HEU UF{sub 6} with diluent UF{sub 6} to produce LWR grade LEU-UF{sub 6}. The primary emphasis of this blending be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The chemical and isotopic concentrations of the blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. The blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry.

  2. Conversion and Blending Facility Highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranium hexafluoride. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This report describes the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) which will have two missions: (1) convert surplus HEU materials to pure HEU UF 6 and a (2) blend the pure HEU UF 6 with diluent UF 6 to produce LWR grade LEU-UF 6 . The primary emphasis of this blending be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The chemical and isotopic concentrations of the blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. The blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry

  3. Criticality of mixtures of plutonium and high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grolleau, E.; Lein, M.; Leka, G.; Maidou, B.; Klenov, P.

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents a criticality evaluation of moderated homogeneous plutonium-uranium mixtures. The fissile media studied are homogeneous mixtures of plutonium and high enriched uranium in two chemical forms: aqueous mixtures of metal and mixtures of nitrate solutions. The enrichment of uranium considered are 93.2wt.% 235 U and 100wt.% 235 U. The 240 Pu content in plutonium varies from 0wt.% 240 Pu to 12wt.% 240 Pu. The critical parameters (radii and masses of a 20 cm water reflected sphere) are calculated with the French criticality safety package CRISTAL V0. The comparison of the calculated critical parameters as a function of the moderator-to-fuel atomic ratio shows significant ranges in which high enriched uranium systems, as well as plutonium-uranium mixtures, are more reactive than plutonium systems. (author)

  4. Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as metal. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-05

    The mission of this Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will be to blend surplus HEU metal and alloy with depleted uranium metal to produce an LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

  5. Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as metal. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The mission of this Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will be to blend surplus HEU metal and alloy with depleted uranium metal to produce an LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal

  6. Nickel container of highly-enriched uranium bodies and sodium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zinn, W.H.

    1976-01-01

    A fuel element comprises highly enriched uranium bodies coated with a nonfissionable, corrosion resistant material. A plurality of these bodies are disposed in layers, with sodium filling the interstices therebetween. The entire assembly is enclosed in a fluid-tight container of nickel

  7. Return of 80% highly enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Sotic, O.; Subotic, K.; Hopwood, W. Jr; Moses, S.; Wander, T.; Smirnov, A.; Kanashov, B.; Eshcherkin, A.; Efarov, S.; Olivieri, C.; Loghin, N. E.

    2003-01-01

    The transport of almost 50 kg of highly enriched (80%) uranium (HEU), in the form of fresh TVR-S fuel elements, from the Vin a Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Yugoslavia, to the Russian Federation for uranium reprocessing was carried out in August 2002. This act was a contribution of the Government of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible actions of terrorists against nuclear material that potentially would be usable for the production of nuclear weapons. Basic aspects of this complex operation, carried out mainly by transport teams of the Vinca Institute and of the Institute for Safe Transport of Nuclear Materials from Dimitrovgrad, Russian Federation, are described in this paper. A team of IAEA safety inspectors and experts from the DOE, USA, for transport and non-proliferation, supported the whole operation. (author)

  8. Return of 80% highly enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Sotic, O.; Subotic, K.; Hopwood, W. Jr; Moses, S.; Wander, T.; Smirnov, A.; Kanashov, B.; Eshcherkin, A.; Efarov, S.; Olivieri, C.; Loghin, N. E.

    2003-01-01

    The transport of almost 50 kg of highly enriched (80%) uranium (HEU), in the form of fresh TVR-S fuel elements, from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Yugoslavia, to the Russian Federation for uranium reprocessing was carried out in August 2002. This act was a contribution of the Government of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible actions of terrorists against nuclear material that potentially would be usable for the production of nuclear weapons. Basic aspects of this complex operation, carried out mainly by transport teams of the Vinca Institute and of the Institute for Safe Transport of Nuclear Materials from Dimitrovgrad, Russian Federation, are described in this paper. A team of IAEA safety inspectors and experts from the DOE, USA, for transport and non-proliferation, supported the whole operation. (author)

  9. Automated instruments for in-line accounting of highly enriched uranium at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russo, P.A.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Sandford, E.L.; Stephens, M.M.; Brumfield, T.L.; Smith, S.E.; McCullough, E.E.; Jeter, I.W.; Bowers, G.L.

    1985-02-01

    Two automated nondestructive assay instruments developed at Los Alamos in support of nuclear materials accounting needs are currently operating in-line at the Oak Ridge Y-12 facility for recovery of highly enriched uranium (HEU). One instrument provides the HEU inventory in the secondary solvent extraction system, and the other monitors HEU concentration in the secondary intermediate evaporator. Both instruments were installed in December 1982. Operational evaluation of these instruments was a joint effort of Y-12 and Los Alamos personnel. This evaluation included comparison of the solvent extraction system inventories with direct measurements performed on the dumped solution components of the solvent extraction system and comparison of concentration assay results with the external assays of samples withdrawn from the process. The function and design of the instruments and detailed results of the operational evaluation are reported

  10. Validation of COG10 and ENDFB6R7 on the Auk Workstation for General Application to Highly Enriched Uranium Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Percher, Catherine G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2011-08-08

    The COG 10 code package1 on the Auk workstation is now validated with the ENBFB6R7 neutron cross section library for general application to highly enriched uranium (HEU) systems by comparison of the calculated keffective to the expected keffective of several relevant experimental benchmarks. This validation is supplemental to the installation and verification of COG 10 on the Auk workstation2.

  11. The NNSA global threat reduction initiative's efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staples, Parrish

    2010-01-01

    The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI is a key organization for supporting domestic and global efforts to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear applications. GTRI implements the following activities in order to achieve its threat reduction and HEU minimization objectives: Converting domestic and international civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU); Demonstrating the viability of medical isotope production technologies that do not use HEU; Removing or disposing excess nuclear and radiological materials from civilian sites worldwide; and Protecting high-priority nuclear and radiological materials worldwide from theft and sabotage. This paper provides a brief overview on the recent developments and priorities for GTRI program activities in 2010, with a particular focus on GTRI's efforts to demonstrate the viability of non-HEU based medical isotope production technologies. (author)

  12. Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as oxide. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-05

    This Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will have two missions: (1) convert HEU materials into pure HEU oxide and (2) blend the pure HEU oxide with depleted and natural uranium oxide to produce an LWR grade LEU product. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. To the extent practical, the chemical and isotopic concentrations of blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. Such blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry. Otherwise, blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

  13. Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. J. Allen; I. Bolshinsky; L. L. Biro; M. E. Budu; N. V. Zamfir; M. Dragusin

    2010-07-01

    Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world’s first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment.

  14. Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, K.J.; Bolshinsky, I.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.

    2010-01-01

    Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world's first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3. country under the RRRFR program and the 14. country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment. (authors)

  15. Technical basis in support of the conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) core from highly-enriched to low-enriched uranium - core neutron physics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stillman, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Feldman, E. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Foyto, L [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Kutikkad, K [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; McKibben, J C [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Peters, N. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Stevens, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

    2012-09-01

    This report contains the results of reactor design and performance for conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the MURR Facility. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support of the U. S. government.

  16. 77 FR 51579 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-24

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant.... Complex, July 30, 2012, August Uranium (93.35%). uranium-235 high-enriched 1, 2012, XSNM3726, 11006037. contained in 7.5 uranium in the kilograms uranium. form of broken metal to the Atomic Energy of Canada...

  17. Fast critical assembly safeguards: NDA methods for highly enriched uranium. Summary report, October 1978-September 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bellinger, F.O.; Winslow, G.H.

    1980-12-01

    Nondestructive assay (NDA) methods, principally passive gamma measurements and active neutron interrogation, have been studied for their safeguards effectiveness and programmatic impact as tools for making inventories of highly enriched uranium fast critical assembly fuel plates. It was concluded that no NDA method is the sole answer to the safeguards problem, that each of those emphasized here has its place in an integrated safeguards system, and that each has minimum facility impact. It was found that the 185-keV area, as determined with a NaI detector, was independent of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) plate irradiation history, though the random neutron driver methods used here did not permit accurate assay of irradiated plates. Containment procedures most effective for accurate assaying were considered, and a particular geometry is recommended for active interrogation by a random driver. A model, pertinent to that geometry, which relates the effects of multiplication and self-absorption, is described. Probabilities of failing to detect that plates are missing are examined

  18. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Return of Highly Enriched Uranium from Chile

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Messick, C.E.; Dickerson, S.L.; Greenberg, R.F. Jr. [U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington D.C. (United States); Andes, T.C. [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2011-07-01

    In March 2010, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI), in collaboration with the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN), completed a shipment of 18.2 kilograms of non-U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the United States. The HEU was in the form of 71 aluminium-clad material test reactor (MTR) fuel elements and was the first GTRI Gap Program shipment that included non-U.S. origin irradiated nuclear fuel. Although shipments of research reactor fuels are not unique, this shipment served as a cornerstone to the first Presidential Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in April 2010. Carrying out the shipment became critical when a severe earthquake struck Chile just one day before the shipment was to occur. As the fuel had already been packaged in casks and the ocean vessels were nearing the port, U.S. and Chilean officials decided that it was most imperative that the shipment continue as planned. After careful analysis of the situation, inspection of the transportation packages, roadways, and port services, the shipment team was able to make the shipment occur in a safe and secure manner. This paper describes the loading activities at both the RECH-1 and RECH-2 reactors as well as the transportation of the loaded casks to the port of departure. (author)

  19. Transformations of highly enriched uranium into metal or oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nollet, P.; Sarrat, P.

    1964-01-01

    The enriched uranium workshops in Cadarache have a double purpose on the one hand to convert uranium hexafluoride into metal or oxide, and on the other hand to recover the uranium contained in scrap materials produced in the different metallurgical transformations. The principles that have been adopted for the design and safety of these workshops are reported. The nuclear safety is based on the geometrical limitations of the processing vessels. To establish the processes and the technology of these workshops, many studies have been made since 1960, some of which have led to original achievements. The uranium hexafluoride of high isotopic enrichment is converted either by injection of the gas into ammonia or by an original process of direct hydrogen reduction to uranium tetrafluoride. The uranium contained m uranium-zirconium metal scrap can be recovered by combustion with hydrogen chloride followed treatment of the uranium chloride by fluorine in order to obtain the uranium in the hexafluoride state. Recovery of the uranium contained m various scrap materials is obtained by a conventional refining process combustion of metallic scrap, nitric acid dissolution of the oxide, solvent purification by tributyl phosphate, ammonium diuranate precipitation, calcining, reduction and hydro fluorination into uranium tetrafluoride, bomb reduction by calcium and slag treatment. Two separate workshops operate along these lines one takes care of the uranium with an isotopic enrichment of up to 3 p. 100, the other handles the high enrichments. The handling of each step of this process, bearing in mind the necessity for nuclear safety, has raised some special technological problems and has led to the conception of new apparatus, in particular the roasting furnace for metal turnings, the nitric acid dissolution unit, the continuous precipitator and ever safe filter and dryer for ammonium diuranate, the reduction and hydro fluorination furnace and the slag recovery apparatus These are

  20. 76 FR 72984 - Revised Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-28

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Revised Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium The application for a license to export high-enriched Uranium has been revised as noted below. Notice... fabricate fuel France. Security Complex; October 18, Uranium (93.35%). uranium (174.0 elements in France...

  1. Validation of NCSSHP for highly enriched uranium systems containing beryllium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krass, A.W.; Elliott, E.P.; Tollefson, D.A.

    1994-01-01

    This document describes the validation of KENO V.a using the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross section library for highly enriched uranium and beryllium neutronic systems, and is in accordance with ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983(R1988) requirements for calculational methods. The validation has been performed on a Hewlett Packard 9000/Series 700 Workstation at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Department using the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Software code package. Critical experiments from LA-2203, UCRL-4975, ORNL-2201, and ORNL/ENG-2 have been identified as having the constituents desired for this validation as well as sufficient experimental detail to allow accurate construction of KENO V.a calculational models. The results of these calculations establish the safety criteria to be employed in future calculational studies of these types of systems

  2. Calibration Tools for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Oxide and Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide with a Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mount, M; O'Connell, W; Cochran, C; Rinard, P

    2003-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has completed an extensive effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler (Canberra Model JCC-92) for accountability measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide and HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. Earlier papers described the PAN shuffler calibration over a range of item properties by standards measurements and an extensive series of detailed simulation calculations. With a single normalization factor, the simulations agree with the HEU oxide standards measurements to within ±1.2% at one standard deviation. Measurement errors on mixed U-Pu oxide samples are in the ±2% to ±10% range, or ±20 g for the smaller items. The purpose of this paper is to facilitate transfer of the LLNL procedure and calibration algorithms to external users who possess an identical, or equivalent, PAN shuffler. Steps include (1) measurement of HEU standards or working reference materials (WRMs); (2) MCNP simulation calculations for the standards or WRMs and a range of possible masses in the same containers; (3) a normalization of the calibration algorithms using the standard or WRM measurements to account for differences in the 252 Cf source strength, the delayed-neutron nuclear data, effects of the irradiation protocol, and detector efficiency; and (4) a verification of the simulation series trends against like LLNL results. Tools include EXCEL/Visual Basic programs which pre- and post-process the simulations, control the normalization, and embody the calibration algorithms

  3. 78 FR 16303 - Request To Amend a License To Export; High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-14

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License To Export; High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70 (b) ``Public Notice of Receipt of an Application,'' please take notice that the... Application No. Docket No. U.S. Department of Energy, High-Enriched Uranium 10 kilograms uranium To...

  4. Characterization of highly enriched uranium in a nuclear forensic exercise

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nascimento, Marcos R.L. do; Quinelato, Antonio L.; Silva, Nivaldo C. da, E-mail: pmarcos@cnen.gov.br [Laboratorio de Pocos de Caldas (LAPOC/CNEN-MG), Pocos de Caldas, MG (Brazil); Sarkis, Jorge E.S., E-mail: jesarkis@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN-SP), Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil)

    2011-07-01

    This paper presents the characterization of two metal samples of highly enriched uranium as a contribution of Pocos de Caldas Laboratory, LAPOC, a branch of Brazilian National Commission for Nuclear Energy, CNEN, to the Round Robin 3, R R3, coordinated by the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. A scenario was constructed in which two separate seizures of nuclear material occurred and forensics analysis was requested to help discern whether these incidents were related and whether these incidents exceeded country statutes. Laboratories were instructed to submit assessment reports in 24 hours, one week, and two month time frames. Besides preliminary evaluations for categorization of the material, our laboratory applied high resolution gamma spectrometry, optical emission spectrometry by inductively coupled plasma, and potentiometric titration for quantitative characterization of the samples. Concerning our technical reports answers for the three main forensics questions formulated by R R3, one of them was inconclusive, considering that LAPOC does not yet have all essential equipment for a fully satisfactory forensics nuclear analysis. (author)

  5. Characterization of highly enriched uranium in a nuclear forensic exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nascimento, Marcos R.L. do; Quinelato, Antonio L.; Silva, Nivaldo C. da; Sarkis, Jorge E.S.

    2011-01-01

    This paper presents the characterization of two metal samples of highly enriched uranium as a contribution of Pocos de Caldas Laboratory, LAPOC, a branch of Brazilian National Commission for Nuclear Energy, CNEN, to the Round Robin 3, R R3, coordinated by the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. A scenario was constructed in which two separate seizures of nuclear material occurred and forensics analysis was requested to help discern whether these incidents were related and whether these incidents exceeded country statutes. Laboratories were instructed to submit assessment reports in 24 hours, one week, and two month time frames. Besides preliminary evaluations for categorization of the material, our laboratory applied high resolution gamma spectrometry, optical emission spectrometry by inductively coupled plasma, and potentiometric titration for quantitative characterization of the samples. Concerning our technical reports answers for the three main forensics questions formulated by R R3, one of them was inconclusive, considering that LAPOC does not yet have all essential equipment for a fully satisfactory forensics nuclear analysis. (author)

  6. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of fuel cycle programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. Reference annual mass flows and inventories for a representative 1,400 Mwe Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel cycle have been investigated for three cases: the 100 percent uranium oxide UO 2 fuel loading once through cycle, and the 33 percent mixed oxide MOX loading configuration for a first and second plutonium recycle. The analysis addresses fuel cycle developments; plutonium and uranium inventory and flow balances; nuclear fuel processing operations; UO 2 once-through and MOX first and second recycles; and the economic incentives to draw-down the excess separated plutonium stores. The preliminary analysis explores several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium arisings and HEU, and the consequences of the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments

  7. Production, inventories and HEU in the world uranium market: Production's vital role

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Underhill, D.H.

    1997-01-01

    This paper analyses recent uranium supply and demand relationship and projects supply through 2010. The extremely depressed record low market prices have led to the ongoing annual inventory drawdown of over 25,000 t U resulting from the current 45% world production shortfall. The policy of the European Union and anti-dumping related activities in the USA are restricting imports of uranium from CIS producers to a majority of the world's nuclear utilities. These factors are reducing low priced uranium supply and forcing buyers to again obtain more of their requirements from producers. It discusses how the sale of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) produced from of 550 t High Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Russia and Ukraine could potentially supply about 15% of world requirements through 2010. However, legislation currently being developed by the US Congress may ration the sale of this material, extending the LEU supply well into the next century. Nuclear generation capacity and its uranium requirements are projected to grow at about 1.5% through 2010. Demand for new uranium purchases is however, increasing at the much higher rate of 25-30% over the next 10-15 years. This increasing demand in the face of decreasing supply is resulting in a market recovery in which the spot price for non-CIS produced uranium has risen over 25% since October 1994. Prices will continue to increase as the market equilibrium shifts from a balance with alternative excess low priced supply to an equilibrium between production and demand. 19 refs, 14 figs, 2 tabs

  8. 77 FR 73056 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-07

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... Complex. Uranium (93.2%). uranium-235 at CERCA AREVA Romans October 10, 2012 contained in 6.2 in France and to October 12, 2012 kilograms irradiate targets at XSNM3729 uranium. the BR-2 Research 11006053...

  9. 77 FR 73055 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-07

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant.... Security Complex. Uranium uranium-235 at CERCA AREVA October 10, 2012 (93.35%). contained in Romans in France October 12, 2012 10.1 kilograms and to irradiate XSNM3730 uranium. targets at the HFR 11006054...

  10. 78 FR 33448 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-04

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant.... Security Complex, May 13, Uranium (93.35%). uranium-235 at the National 2013, May 21, 2013, XSNM3745, contained in 7.5 Research Universal 11006098. kilograms reactor in Canada for uranium. ultimate use in...

  11. Conversion of highly enriched uranium in thorium-232 based oxide fuel for light water reactors: MOX-T fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vapirev, E I; Jordanov, T; Christoskov, I [Sofia Univ. (Bulgaria). Fizicheski Fakultet

    1994-12-31

    The idea of conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from warheads without mixing it with natural uranium as well as the utilization of plutonium as fuel component is discussed. A nuclear fuel which is a mixture of 4% {sup 235}U (HEU) as a fissile isotope and 96 % {sup 232}Th (ThO{sub 2}) as a non-fissile isotope in a mixed oxide with thorium fuel is proposed. It is assumed that plutonium can also be used in the proposed fuel in a mixture with {sup 235}U. The following advantages of the use of HEU in LWRs in mixed {sup 235}U - Th fuel are pointed out: (1) No generation of long-living plutonium and americium isotopes (in case of reprocessing the high level radioactive wastes will contain only fission fragments and uranium); (2) The high conversion ratio of Th extends the expected burnup by approximately 1/3 without higher initial enrichment (the same initial enrichment simplifies the problem for compensation of the excess reactivity in the beginning with burnable poison and boric acid); (3) The high conversion ratio of Th allows the fuel utilization with less initial enrichment (by approx. 1/3) for the same burnup; thus less excess reactivity has to be compensated after reloading; in case of fuel reprocessing all fissile materials ({sup 235}U + {sup 233}U) could be chemically extracted. Irrespectively to the optimistic expectations outlined, further work including data on optimal loading and reloading schemes, theoretical calculations of thermal properties of {sup 235}U + Th fuel rods, manufacturing of several test fuel assemblies and investigations of their operational behaviour in a reactor core is still needed. 1 fig., 7 refs.

  12. Conversion and Blending Facility highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium as uranyl nitrate hexahydrate. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-05

    This Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) will have two missions: (1) convert HEU materials to pure HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend pure HEU UNH with depleted and natural UNH to produce HEU UNH crystals. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. To the extent practical, the chemical and isotopic concentrations of blended LEU product will be held within the specifications required for LWR fuel. Such blended LEU product will be offered to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) to be sold as feed material to the commercial nuclear industry. Otherwise, blended LEU Will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

  13. The Impact of Climatological Conditions on Low Enriched Uranium Loading Station Operations for the HEU Blend Down Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, R.C.

    2002-01-01

    A computer model was developed using COREsim to perform a time motion study for the Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Loading Station operations. The project is to blend Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) with Natural Uranium (NU) to produce LEU to be shipped to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for further processing. To cope with a project cost reduction, the LEU Loading Station concept has changed from an enclosed building with air-conditioning to a partially enclosed building without air conditioning. The LEU Loading Station is within a radiological contaminated area; two pairs of coveralls and negative pressure respirator are required. As a result, inclement weather conditions, especially heat stress, will affect and impact the LEU loading operations. The purposes of the study are to determine the climatological impacts on LEU Loading operations, resources required for committed throughputs, and to find out the optimum process pathways for multi crews working simultaneously in the space-lim ited LEU Loading Station

  14. 75 FR 15743 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-30

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(c) ``Public notice of receipt of an application,'' please take notice that the...-Enriched 160.0 kilograms To fabricate fuel France. Complex, March 3, 2010. Uranium (93.35%). uranium (149...

  15. 75 FR 6223 - Application For a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-08

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application For a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(c) ``Public notice of receipt of an application,'' please take notice that the..., Uranium (93.35%). uranium (16.3 targets for December 28, 2009, XSNM3623, kilograms U-235). irradiation in...

  16. 77 FR 1956 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-12

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(b) ``Public Notice of Receipt of an Application,'' please take notice that the.... Security Complex. Uranium uranium (9.3 targets at December 21, 2011 (93.35%). kilograms U- CERCA AREVA...

  17. 75 FR 7525 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-19

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(c) ``Public notice of receipt of an application,'' please take notice that the..., February 2, Uranium (93.35%). uranium (87.3 elements in 2010, February 2, 2010, kilograms U-235). France...

  18. 78 FR 17942 - Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-25

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... Administration. Enriched Uranium contained in 99.7 Reactor in the be processed for March 6, 2013 (93.35%)) kilograms Czech Republic to medical isotope March 11, 2013 uranium) the list of production at the XSNM3622...

  19. Disposition of highly enriched uranium obtained from the Republic of Kazakhstan. Environmental assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-05-01

    This EA assesses the potential environmental impacts associated with DOE's proposal to transport 600 kg of Kazakhstand-origin HEU from Y-12 to a blending site (B ampersand W Lynchburg or NFS Erwin), transport low-enriched UF6 blending stock from a gaseous diffusion plant to GE Wilmington and U oxide blending stock to the blending site, blending the HEU and uranium oxide blending stock to produce LEU in the form of uranyl nitrate, and transport the uranyl nitrate from the blending site to USEC Portsmouth

  20. Accident Analyses for Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from Highly-Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stillman, J. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Feldman, E. E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Wilson, E. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Foyto, L. P. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Kutikkad, K. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; McKibben, J. C. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Peters, N. J. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Cowherd, W. M. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). College of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Program; Rickman, B. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). College of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Program

    2014-12-01

    This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the MURR Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering Program – College of Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support from the U. S. government. This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the MURR Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering Program – College of Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support from the U. S. government. In the framework of non-proliferation policies, the international community presently aims to minimize the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. In this geopolitical context most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have started a program of conversion to the use of LEU fuel. A new type of LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and molybdenum (U-Mo) is expected to allow the conversion of U.S. domestic high performance reactors like MURR. This report presents the results of a study of core behavior under a set of accident conditions for MURR cores fueled with HEU U-Alx dispersion fuel or LEU monolithic U-Mo alloy fuel with 10 wt% Mo

  1. Establishing a Cost Basis for Converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor from High Enriched to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Primm, Trent; Guida, Tracey

    2010-01-01

    Under the auspices of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program, the National Nuclear Security Administration/Department of Energy (NNSA/DOE) has, as a goal, to convert research reactors worldwide from weapons grade to non-weapons grade uranium. The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) is one of the candidates for conversion of fuel from high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). A well documented business model, including tasks, costs, and schedules was developed to plan the conversion of HFIR. Using Microsoft Project, a detailed outline of the conversion program was established and consists of LEU fuel design activities, a fresh fuel shipping cask, improvements to the HFIR reactor building, and spent fuel operations. Current-value costs total $76 million dollars, include over 100 subtasks, and will take over 10 years to complete. The model and schedule follows the path of the fuel from receipt from fuel fabricator to delivery to spent fuel storage and illustrates the duration, start, and completion dates of each subtask to be completed. Assumptions that form the basis of the cost estimate have significant impact on cost and schedule.

  2. A confirmatory measurement technique for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.

    1987-07-01

    This report describes a confirmatory measurement technique for measuring uranium items in their shipping containers. The measurement consists of a weight verification and the detection of three gamma rays. The weight can be determined very precisely, thus it severely constrains the options of the diverter who might want to imitate the gamma signal with a bogus item. The 185.7-keV gamma ray originates from 235 U, the 1001 keV originates from a daughter of 238 U, and the 2614 keV originates from a daughter of 232 U. These three gamma rays exhibit widely different attenuation properties, they correlate with enrichment and total uranium mass, and they rigorously discriminate against a likely diversion scenario (low-enriched uranium substitution). These four measured quantities, when combined, provide a signature that is very difficult to counterfeit

  3. Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Mixed Oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mount, M.; O'Connell, W.; Cochran, C.; Rinard, P.; Dearborn, D.; Endres, E.

    2002-01-01

    As a follow-on to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler for measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide, a method has been developed to extend the use of the PAN shuffler to the measurement of HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. This method uses the current LLNL HEU oxide calibration algorithms, appropriately corrected for the mixed U-Pu oxide assay time, and recently developed PuO 2 calibration algorithms to yield the mass of 235 U present via differences between the expected count rate for the PuO 2 and the measured count rate of the mixed U-Pu oxide. This paper describes the LLNL effort to use PAN shuffler measurements of units of certified reference material (CRM) 149 (uranium (93% Enriched) Oxide - U 3 O 8 Standard for Neutron Counting Measurements) and CRM 146 (uranium Isotopic Standard for Gamma Spectrometry Measurements) and a selected set of LLNL PuO 2 -bearing containers in consort with Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to each to (1) establish and validate a correction to the HEU calibration algorithm for the mixed U-Pu oxide assay time, (2) develop a PuO 2 calibration algorithm that includes the effect of PuO 2 density (2.4 g/cm 3 to 4.8 g/cm 3 ) and container size (8.57 cm to 9.88 cm inside diameter and 9.60 cm to 13.29 cm inside height) on the PAN shuffler response, and (3) develop and validate the method for establishing the mass of 235 U present in an unknown of mixed U-Pu oxide.

  4. Nickel container of highly-enriched uranium bodies and sodium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zinn, Walter H.

    1976-01-01

    A fuel element comprises highly a enriched uranium bodies coated with a nonfissionable, corrosion resistant material. A plurality of these bodies are disposed in layers, with sodium filling the interstices therebetween. The entire assembly is enclosed in a fluid-tight container of nickel.

  5. Nuclear threat initiative - Kazakhstan project on elimination of high-enriched uranium. 8 October 2005, Ust Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    Since its establishment in 2001, NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative) has made important contributions towards securing weapon-usable nuclear material and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, NTI pledged $1.15 million to the Agency?s Nuclear Security Fund, which has been used to achieve tangible nuclear security improvements: upgrades to physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear and radioactive material; urgently needed training in nuclear security for national officials; enhanced detection capabilities at border crossings; and improved national and international readiness for responding to terrorist acts. NTI has consistently sought to target its contributions to address areas of high priority. A primary point of focus has been to secure (and, where possible, eliminate) material that could be diverted for weapons purposes. In P roject Vinca , NTI committed $5 million in 2002 to help remove high enriched uranium fuel from a research reactor near Belgrade, for return to Russia. With support from Russia, the United States and NTI, seven transfers of fresh fuel back to Russia have been made since 2002 - a total of 112 kilograms of HEU. Current plans foresee further shipments of fresh HEU from another three countries in the next 15 months. The IAEA is also continuing to work on arrangements for the repatriation of spent research reactor fuel of Russian origin. In 2001, Sam Nunn and NTI president Charles Curtis approached the Kazakh Government to offer support for the safe transportation of the unused nuclear fuel from the shutdown BN-350 reactor - nearly 3000 kilograms - to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant JSC (UMP), where it could be dismantled and down-blended into LEU (NTI-Kazakhstan project). By the end of this year, 2897 kilograms of HEU - enough to produce dozens of nuclear bombs - will have been down-blended to LEU and placed in safe storage. Throughout the project, the IAEA has been implementing

  6. Source-driven noise analysis measurements with neptunium metal reflected by high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valentine, Timothy E.; Mattingly, John K.

    2003-01-01

    Subcritical noise analysis measurements have been performed with neptunium ( 237 Np) sphere reflected by highly enriched uranium. These measurements were performed at the Los Alamos Critical Experiment Facility in December 2002 to provide an estimate of the subcriticality of 237 Np reflected by various amounts of high-enriched uranium. This paper provides a description of the measurements and presents some preliminary results of the analysis of the measurements. The measured and calculated spectral ratios differ by 15% whereas the 'interpreted' and calculated k eff values differ by approximately 1%. (author)

  7. Preliminary Accident Analyses for Conversion of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) from Highly Enriched to Low Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dunn, Floyd E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Olson, Arne P. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Wilson, Erik H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Sun, Kaichao S. [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Newton, Jr., Thomas H. [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Hu, Lin-wen [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States)

    2013-09-30

    The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR-II) is a research reactor in Cambridge, Massachusetts designed primarily for experiments using neutron beam and in-core irradiation facilities. It delivers a neutron flux comparable to current LWR power reactors in a compact 6 MW core using Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel. In the framework of its non-proliferation policies, the international community presently aims to minimize the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. In this geopolitical context most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have started a program of conversion to the use of LEU fuel. A new type of LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and molybdenum (U-Mo) is expected to allow the conversion of U.S. domestic high performance reactors like MITR. This report presents the preliminary accident analyses for MITR cores fueled with LEU monolithic U-Mo alloy fuel with 10 wt% Mo. Preliminary results demonstrate adequate performance, including thermal margin to expected safety limits, for the LEU accident scenarios analyzed.

  8. Isotopic analysis of uranium hexafluoride highly enriched in U-235

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaussy, L.; Boyer, R.

    1968-01-01

    Isotopic analysis of uranium in the form of the hexafluoride by mass-spectrometry gives gross results which are not very accurate. Using a linear interpolation method applied to two standards it is possible to correct for this inaccuracy as long as the isotopic concentrations are less than about 10 per cent in U-235. Above this level, the interpolations formula overestimates the results, especially if the enrichment of the analyzed samples is higher than 1.3 with respect to the standards. A formula is proposed for correcting the interpolation equation and for the extending its field of application to high values of the enrichment (≅2) and of the concentration. It is shown that by using this correction the results obtained have an accuracy which depends practically only on that of the standards, taking into account the dispersion in the measurements. (authors) [fr

  9. Use of highly enriched uranium in the material testing reactor BR2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beeckmans de West-Meerbeeck, A.

    1979-05-01

    In the material testing reactor BR2, the use of highly enriched uranium is determined by the consideration of the fast, epithermal and thermal neutron flux effectively available for the experimental devices. The choice of the core configuration is defined by combining the localisation of the experimental devices and of fuel elements of various burnup, such as to satisfy the irradiation conditions of the experimental load, compatible with an economic use of the fuel elements and safe operation of the reactor. Taking into account the present manufacturing technology for MTR fuels (37 Wt % uranium density in the fuel meat) the highly enriched uranium cannot be avoided; if higher concentration of uranium could be realised by some new manufacturing technology, the 235 U density of fuel elements at elimination should be kept at the required level and the enrichment could be reduced accordingly

  10. Use of highly enriched uranium in the material testing reactor BR2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beeckmans de West-Meerbeeck, A.

    1979-05-01

    In the material testing reactor BR2, the use of highly enriched uranium is determined by the consideration of the fast, epithermal and thermal neutron flux effectively available for the experimental devices. The choice of the core configuration is defined by combining the localisation of the experimental devices and of fuel elements of various burnup, such as to satisfy the irradiation conditions of the experimental load, compatible with an economic use of the fuel elements and safe operation of the reactor. Taking into account the present manufacturing technology for MTR fuels (37 Wt % uranium density in the fuel meat) the highly enriched uranium cannot be avoided: if higher concentration of uranium could be realised by some new manufacturing technology, the 235 U density of fuel elements at elimination should be kept at the required level and the enrichment could be reduced accordingly. (author)

  11. Transport of high enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to the Russian federation

    OpenAIRE

    Pešić Milan P.; Šotić Obrad; Hopwood William H.Jr

    2002-01-01

    This paper presents the relevant data related to the recent shipment (August 2002) of fresh highly enriched uranium fuel elements from Yugoslavia back to the Russian Federation for uranium down blending. In this way, Yugoslavia gave its contribution to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program and to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible terrorist actions against nuclear material potentially usable for the production of nuclear weapons.

  12. Transport of high enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to the Russian federation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pešić Milan P.

    2002-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper presents the relevant data related to the recent shipment (August 2002 of fresh highly enriched uranium fuel elements from Yugoslavia back to the Russian Federation for uranium down blending. In this way, Yugoslavia gave its contribution to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR Program and to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible terrorist actions against nuclear material potentially usable for the production of nuclear weapons.

  13. Accident Analyses for Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from Highly-Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stillman, J. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Feldman, E. E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Jaluvka, D. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Wilson, E. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Foyto, L. P. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); Kutikkad, K. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); McKibben, J. C. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); Peters, N. J. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States)

    2017-02-01

    This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members in the Research and Test Reactor Department at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the MURR Facility. MURR LEU conversion is part of an overall effort to develop and qualify high-density fuel within the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor Conversion (USHPRR) program conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3).

  14. Compact reaction cell for homogenizing and down-blending highly enriched uranium metal

    Science.gov (United States)

    McLean, W. II; Miller, P.E.; Horton, J.A.

    1995-05-02

    The invention is a specialized reaction cell for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide. In a preferred form, the reaction cell comprises a reaction chamber with increasing diameter along its length (e.g. a cylindrical chamber having a diameter of about 2 inches in a lower portion and having a diameter of from about 4 to about 12 inches in an upper portion). Such dimensions are important to achieve the necessary conversion while at the same time affording criticality control and transportability of the cell and product. The reaction chamber further comprises an upper port and a lower port, the lower port allowing for the entry of reactant gases into the reaction chamber, the upper port allowing for the exit of gases from the reaction chamber. A diffuser plate is attached to the lower port of the reaction chamber and serves to shape the flow of gas into the reaction chamber. The reaction cell further comprises means for introducing gases into the reaction chamber and a heating means capable of heating the contents of the reaction chamber. The present invention also relates to a method for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide in the reaction cell of the present invention. The invention is useful for down-blending highly enriched uranium metal by the simultaneous conversion of highly enriched uranium metal and natural or depleted uranium metal to uranium oxide within the reaction cell. 4 figs.

  15. Compact reaction cell for homogenizing and down-blanding highly enriched uranium metal

    Science.gov (United States)

    McLean, II, William; Miller, Philip E.; Horton, James A.

    1995-01-01

    The invention is a specialized reaction cell for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide. In a preferred form, the reaction cell comprises a reaction chamber with increasing diameter along its length (e.g. a cylindrical chamber having a diameter of about 2 inches in a lower portion and having a diameter of from about 4 to about 12 inches in an upper portion). Such dimensions are important to achieve the necessary conversion while at the same time affording criticality control and transportability of the cell and product. The reaction chamber further comprises an upper port and a lower port, the lower port allowing for the entry of reactant gasses into the reaction chamber, the upper port allowing for the exit of gasses from the reaction chamber. A diffuser plate is attached to the lower port of the reaction chamber and serves to shape the flow of gas into the reaction chamber. The reaction cell further comprises means for introducing gasses into the reaction chamber and a heating means capable of heating the contents of the reaction chamber. The present invention also relates to a method for converting uranium metal to uranium oxide in the reaction cell of the present invention. The invention is useful for down-blending highly enriched uranium metal by the simultaneous conversion of highly enriched uranium metal and natural or depleted uranium metal to uranium oxide within the reaction cell.

  16. Getting the plutonium disposition job done: the concept of a joint-venture disposition enterprise financed by additional sales of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.

    1996-01-01

    The paper gives an outline of a concept which has the potential to provide both substantial financing needed for disposition of plutonium from excess nuclear weapons and the long-term management structure required to implement this effort. The three most important issues were underlined. First, it is urgent to modernize security and accounting systems for all weapon-usable nuclear materials, particularly from former Soviet Union. Second, excess plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) must be brought under international monitoring to ensure irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction. Third, quick move should be done towards actual disposition of excess plutonium and HEU. Technology already exists, but the key issues are how to get finance and manage this operation, particularly given its immense scope and controversial nature. An international joint venture 'Enterprise for nuclear Security' that would build and operate plutonium disposition facilities under stringent non-proliferation controls, financed through additional sales of HEU is a potentially promising approach to addressing the most difficult issues facing the disposition problem

  17. Licensing considerations in converting NRC-licensed non-power reactors from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carter, R.E.

    1985-01-01

    During the mid-1970s, there was increasing concern with the possibility that highly enriched uranium (HEU), widely used in non-power reactors around the world, might be diverted from its intended peaceful uses. In 1982 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a policy statement that was intended to conform with the perceived international thinking, and that addressed the two relevant areas in which NRC has statutory responsibility, namely, export of special nuclear materials for non-USA non-power reactors, and the licensing of USA-based non-power reactors not owned by the Federal government. To further address the second area, NRC issued a proposed rule for public comment that would require all NRC-licensed non-power reactors using HEU to convert to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, unless they could demonstrate a unique purpose. Currently the NRC staff is revising the proposed rule. An underlying principle guiding the staff is that as long as a change in enrichment does not lead to safety-related reactor modifications, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question, the licensee could convert the core without prior NRC approval. At the time of writing this paper, a regulatory method of achieving this principle has not been finalized. (author)

  18. Licensing considerations in converting NRC-licensed non-power reactors from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carter, R E

    1985-07-01

    During the mid-1970s, there was increasing concern with the possibility that highly enriched uranium (HEU), widely used in non-power reactors around the world, might be diverted from its intended peaceful uses. In 1982 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a policy statement that was intended to conform with the perceived international thinking, and that addressed the two relevant areas in which NRC has statutory responsibility, namely, export of special nuclear materials for non-USA non-power reactors, and the licensing of USA-based non-power reactors not owned by the Federal government. To further address the second area, NRC issued a proposed rule for public comment that would require all NRC-licensed non-power reactors using HEU to convert to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, unless they could demonstrate a unique purpose. Currently the NRC staff is revising the proposed rule. An underlying principle guiding the staff is that as long as a change in enrichment does not lead to safety-related reactor modifications, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question, the licensee could convert the core without prior NRC approval. At the time of writing this paper, a regulatory method of achieving this principle has not been finalized. (author)

  19. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 16 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2008 [es

  20. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009 [es

  1. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2011 [es

  2. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006 [es

  3. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2012 [es

  4. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010 [es

  5. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010 [fr

  6. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006

  7. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2011

  8. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009

  9. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010

  10. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 16 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2008

  11. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2012

  12. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009

  13. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2012 [fr

  14. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006 [fr

  15. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009 [fr

  16. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2011 [fr

  17. Highly Enriched Uranium Metal Annuli and Cylinders with Polyethylene Reflectors and/or Internal Polyethylene Moderator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler Sumner; J. Blair Briggs; Leland Montierth

    2007-01-01

    A variety of critical experiments were constructed of enriched uranium metal during the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility in support of criticality safety operations at the Y-12 Plant. The purposes of these experiments included the evaluation of storage, casting, and handling limits for the Y-12 Plant and providing data for verification of calculation methods and cross-sections for nuclear criticality safety applications. These included solid cylinders of various diameters, annuli of various inner and outer diameters, two and three interacting cylinders of various diameters, and graphite and polyethylene reflected cylinders and annuli. Of the hundreds of delayed critical experiments, experiments of uranium metal annuli with and without polyethylene reflectors and with the central void region either empty or filled with polyethylene were evaluated under ICSBEP Identifier HEU-MET-FAST-076. The outer diameter of the uranium annuli varied from 9 to 15 inches in two-inch increments. In addition, there were uranium metal cylinders with diameters varying from 7 to 15 inches with complete reflection and reflection on one flat surface to simulate floor reflection. Most of the experiments were performed between February 1964 and April 1964. Five partially reflected (reflected on the top only) experiments were assembled in November 1967, but are judged by the evaluators not to be of benchmark quality. Twenty-four of the twenty-five experiments have been determined to have fast spectra. The only exception has a mixed spectrum. Analyses were performed in which uncertainty associated with five different parameters associated with the uranium parts and three associated with the polyethylene parts was evaluated. Included were uranium mass, height, diameter, isotopic content, and impurity content and polyethylene mass, diameter, and impurity content. There were additional uncertainties associated with assembly alignment, support structure, and the value

  18. The Complete Burning of Weapons Grade Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium with (Laser Inertial Fusion-Fission Energy) LIFE Engine

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Farmer, J C; Diaz de la Rubia, T; Moses, E

    2008-12-23

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) project, a laser-based Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) experiment designed to achieve thermonuclear fusion ignition and burn in the laboratory, is under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and will be completed in April of 2009. Experiments designed to accomplish the NIF's goal will commence in late FY2010 utilizing laser energies of 1 to 1.3 MJ. Fusion yields of the order of 10 to 20 MJ are expected soon thereafter. Laser initiated fusion-fission (LIFE) engines have now been designed to produce nuclear power from natural or depleted uranium without isotopic enrichment, and from spent nuclear fuel from light water reactors without chemical separation into weapons-attractive actinide streams. A point-source of high-energy neutrons produced by laser-generated, thermonuclear fusion within a target is used to achieve ultra-deep burn-up of the fertile or fissile fuel in a sub-critical fission blanket. Fertile fuels including depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NatU), spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and thorium (Th) can be used. Fissile fuels such as low-enrichment uranium (LEU), excess weapons plutonium (WG-Pu), and excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be used as well. Based upon preliminary analyses, it is believed that LIFE could help meet worldwide electricity needs in a safe and sustainable manner, while drastically shrinking the nation's and world's stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and excess weapons materials. LIFE takes advantage of the significant advances in laser-based inertial confinement fusion that are taking place at the NIF at LLNL where it is expected that thermonuclear ignition will be achieved in the 2010-2011 timeframe. Starting from as little as 300 to 500 MW of fusion power, a single LIFE engine will be able to generate 2000 to 3000 MWt in steady state for periods of years to decades, depending on the nuclear fuel and engine configuration. Because the fission

  19. NUCLEAR ISOTOPIC DILUTION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BY DRY BLENDING VIA THE RM-2 MILL TECHNOLOGY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajamani, Raj K.; Latchireddi, Sanjeeva; Devrani, Vikas; Sethi, Harappan; Henry, Roger; Chipman, Nate

    2003-01-01

    DOE has initiated numerous activities to focus on identifying material management strategies to disposition various excess fissile materials. In particular the INEEL has stored 1,700 Kg of offspec HEU at INTEC in CPP-651 vault facility. Currently, the proposed strategies for dispositioning are (a) aqueous dissolution and down blending to LEU via facilities at SRS followed by shipment of the liquid LEU to NFS for fabrication into LWR fuel for the TVA reactors and (b) dilution of the HEU to 0.9% for discard as a waste stream that would no longer have a criticality or proliferation risk without being processed through some type of enrichment system. Dispositioning this inventory as a waste stream via aqueous processing at SRS has been determined to be too costly. Thus, dry blending is the only proposed disposal process for the uranium oxide materials in the CPP-651 vault. Isotopic dilution of HEU to typically less than 20% by dry blending is the key to solving the dispositioning issue (i.e., proliferation) posed by HEU stored at INEEL. RM-2 mill is a technology developed and successfully tested for producing ultra-fine particles by dry grinding. Grinding action in RM-2 mill produces a two million-fold increase in the number of particles being blended in a centrifugal field. In a previous study, the concept of achieving complete and adequate blending and mixing (i.e., no methods were identified to easily separate and concentrate one titanium compound from the other) in remarkably short processing times was successfully tested with surrogate materials (titanium dioxide and titanium mono-oxide) with different particle sizes, hardness and densities. In the current project, the RM-2 milling technology was thoroughly tested with mixtures of natural uranium oxide (NU) and depleted uranium oxide (DU) stock to prove its performance. The effects of mill operating and design variables on the blending of NU/DU oxides were evaluated. First, NU and DU both made of the same oxide

  20. A feasibility study concerning the conversion of the TR-2 reactor from using highly enriched uranium to light enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aldemir, T.; Turgut, H.M.; Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, L.J.

    1983-01-01

    A study has been made of the feasibility of converting the 5-MW TR-2 reactor at CNAEM to use fuel with uranium enrichment of 3 O 8 -Al fuel meat with a uranium density in the range 2.3 to 3.0 g/cm 3 in the fuel meat with meat thickness varying between 0.9 and 1.00 mm, the number of plates in the LEU element being reduced from 23 in the HEU element to 19 to 20 to maintain adequate cooling. Fuels within this density range are expected to be commercially available within the next two years. From the results of the study it appears to be feasible to safely operate the TR-2 reactor using LEU fuel without increased fuel cycle costs or decreased performance using U 2 O 8 fuels with densities in the 2.3 to 3.0 gU/cm 3 range. (author)

  1. Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium. Options for an Action Agenda in Co-operation with the Russian Federation. Report submitted to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arbman, Gunnar; Calogero, Francesco; Martellini, Maurizio; Bremer Maerli, Morten; Nikitin, Alexander; Prawitz, Jan

    2004-04-01

    This study is of an exploratory nature. It provides preliminary assessments of issues of relevance for HEU elimination in Russia including: (a) technical issues concerning the HEU down-blending; uranium transparency and verification requirements; description of current Russian HEU locations; the HEU down-blending capacities, and the HEU logistics, and (b) various political and financial requirements and considerations. For future, practical project measures to be put in place, further investigations that deal with HEU logistics and handling are needed. Such studies - that obviously should include and engage key Russian actors - are possible, if they take legitimate Russian security and sensitivity concerns into consideration. Interestingly, there is a growing perception in Russia that large stocks of HEU are not required and that they could, in fact, constitute a source of danger

  2. Update on Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium Oxide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mount, M.; O'Connell, W.; Cochran, C.; Rinard, P.; Dearborn, D.; Endres, E.

    2002-01-01

    In October of 1999, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) began an effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron (PAN) drum shuffler for measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide. A single unit of certified reference material (CRM) 149 (Uranium (93% Enriched) Oxide - U 3 O 8 Standard for Neutron Counting Measurements) was used to (1) develop a mass calibration curve for HEU oxide in the nominal range of 393 g to 3144 g 235 U, and (2) perform a detailed axial and radial mapping of the detector response over a wide region of the PAN shuffler counting chamber. Results from these efforts were reported at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 4lSt Annual Meeting in July 2000. This paper describes subsequent efforts by LLNL to use a unit of CRM 146 (Uranium Isotopic Standard for Gamma Spectrometry Measurements) in consort with Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to CRM 149 and CRM 146 units and a selected set of containers with CRM 149-equivalent U 3 O 8 to (1) extend the low range of the reported mass calibration curve to 10 g 235 U, (2) evaluate the effect of U 3 O 8 density (2.4 g/cm 3 to 4.8 g/cm 3 ) and container size (5.24 cm to 12.17 cm inside diameter and 6.35 cm to 17.72 cm inside height) on the PAN shuffler response, and (3) develop mass calibration curves for U 3 O 8 enriched to 20.1 wt% 235 U and 52.5 wt% 235 U.

  3. Validation of the Monte Carlo Criticality Program KENO V. a for highly-enriched uranium systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Knight, J.R.

    1984-11-01

    A series of calculations based on critical experiments have been performed using the KENO V.a Monte Carlo Criticality Program for the purpose of validating KENO V.a for use in evaluating Y-12 Plant criticality problems. The experiments were reflected and unreflected systems of single units and arrays containing highly enriched uranium metal or uranium compounds. Various geometrical shapes were used in the experiments. The SCALE control module CSAS25 with the 27-group ENDF/B-4 cross-section library was used to perform the calculations. Some of the experiments were also calculated using the 16-group Hansen-Roach Library. Results are presented in a series of tables and discussed. Results show that the criteria established for the safe application of the KENO IV program may also be used for KENO V.a results.

  4. ZPR-3 Assembly 11: A cylindrical sssembly of highly enriched uranium and depleted uranium with an average 235U enrichment of 12 atom % and a depleted uranium reflector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lell, R.M.; McKnight, R.D.; Tsiboulia, A.; Rozhikhin, Y.

    2010-01-01

    Specificationsa and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3 Assembly 11 began in early January 1958, and the Assembly 11 program ended in late January 1958. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates and depleted uranium plates loaded into stainless steel drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of two columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, six columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) depleted uranium plates and one column of 1.0 in.-wide (25.4 mm) depleted uranium plates. The length of each column was 10 in. (254.0 mm) in each half of the core. The axial blanket consisted of 12 in. (304.8 mm) of depleted uranium behind the core. The thickness of the depleted uranium radial blanket was approximately 14 in. (355.6 mm), and the length of the radial blanket in each half of the matrix was 22 in. (558.8 mm). The assembly geometry approximated a right circular cylinder as closely as the square matrix tubes allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/11, the reference critical configuration was loading 10 which was critical on January 21, 1958. Subsequent loadings were very similar but less clean for criticality because there were modifications made to accommodate reactor physics measurements other than criticality. Accordingly, ZPR-3/11 loading 10 was selected as the only configuration for this benchmark. As documented below, it was determined to be acceptable as a criticality safety benchmark experiment. A very accurate transformation to a simplified model is needed to make any ZPR assembly a practical criticality-safety benchmark. There is simply too much geometric detail in an exact (as-built) model of a ZPR assembly, even a clean core such as ZPR-3/11 loading 10. The transformation must reduce the detail to a practical level without masking any of the important features of the critical

  5. 31 CFR 540.317 - Uranium feed; natural uranium feed.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium feed; natural uranium feed... (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.317 Uranium feed; natural uranium feed. The...

  6. ADS with HEU in the Vinca Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Sobolevsky, N.

    2000-01-01

    The 'Conceptual design of ADS' is a new project proposed in the Vin.a Institute for the next three years. In this paper, an option in the project - an idea of high-enriched uranium (HEU) - H 2 O low-flux ADS is shown. Preliminary results of design study and calculations of the beam-target interaction and neutronics of proposed sub-critical system are given. (author)

  7. The Pajarito Monitor: a high-sensitivity monitoring system for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Coop, K.; Garcia, C.; Martinez, J.

    1984-01-01

    The Pajarito Monitor for Special Nuclear Material is a high-sensitivity gamma-ray monitoring system for detecting small quantities of highly enriched uranium transported by pedestrians or motor vehicles. The monitor consists of two components: a walk-through personnel monitor and a vehicle monitor. The personnel monitor has a plastic-scintillator detector portal, a microwave occupancy monitor, and a microprocessor control unit that measures the radiation intensity during background and monitoring periods to detect transient diversion signals. The vehicle monitor examines stationary motor vehicles while the vehicle's occupants pass through the personnel portal to exchange their badges. The vehicle monitor has four groups of large plastic scintillators that scan the vehicle from above and below. Its microprocessor control unit measures separate radiation intensities in each detector group. Vehicle occupancy is sensed by a highway traffic detection system. Each monitor's controller is responsible for detecting diversion as well as serving as a calibration and trouble-shooting aid. Diversion signals are detected by a sequential probability ratio hypothesis test that minimizes the monitoring time in the vehicle monitor and adapts itself well to variations in individual passage speed in the personnel monitor. Designed to be highly sensitive to diverted enriched uranium, the monitoring system also exhibits exceptional sensitivity for plutonium

  8. Measurement of highly enriched uranium metal buttons with the high-level neutron coincidence counter operating in the active mode

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foley, J.E.

    1980-10-01

    The portable High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter is used in the active mode with the addition of AmLi neutron sources to assay the 235 U content of highly enriched metal pieces or buttons. It is concluded that the portable instrument is a practical instrument for assaying uranium metal buttons with masses in the range 1.5 to 4 kg

  9. 31 CFR 540.309 - Natural uranium.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Natural uranium. 540.309 Section 540... FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.309 Natural uranium. The term natural uranium means uranium found in...

  10. Conversion of the RB reactor neutrons by highly enriched uranium fuel and lithium deuteride

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strugar, P.; Sotic, O.; Ninkovic, M.; Pesic, M.; Altiparmakov, D.

    1981-01-01

    A thermal-to-fast-neutron converter has been constructed at the RB reactor. The material used for the conversion of thermal neutrons is highly enriched uranium fuel of Soviet production applied in Yugoslav heavy water experimental reactors RA and RB. Calculations and preliminary measurements show that the spectrum of converted neutrons only slightly differs from that of fission neutrons. The basic characteristics of converted neutrons can be expressed by the neutron radiation dose of 800 rad (8 Gy) for 1 h of reactor operation at a power level of 1 kW. This dose is approximately 10 times higher than the neutron dose at the same place without converter. At the same time, thermal neutron and gamma radiation doses are negligible. The constructed neutron converter offers wide possibilities for applications in reactor and nuclear physics and similar disciplines, where neutron spectra of high energies are required, as well as in the domain of neutron dosimetry and biological irradiations in homogeneous fields of larger dimensions. The possibility of converting thermal reactor neutrons with energies of about 14 MeV with the aid of lithium deuteride from natural lithium has been considered too. (author)

  11. Verification of nuclear material balances: General theory and application to a highly enriched uranium fabrication plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Beedgen, R.; Neu, H.

    1980-08-01

    In the theoretical part it is shown that under the assumption, that in case of diversion the operator falsifies all data by a class specific amount, it is optimal in the sense of the probability of detection to use the difference MUF-D as the test statistics. However, as there are arguments for keeping the two tests separately, and furthermore, as it is not clear that the combined test statistics is optimal for any diversion strategy, the overall guaranteed probability of detection for the bivariate test is determined. A numerical example is given applying the theoretical part. Using the material balance data of a Highly Enriched Uranium fabrication plant the variances of MUF, D (no diversion) and MUF-D are calculated with the help of the standard deviations of operator and inspector measurements. The two inventories of the material balance are stratified. The samples sizes of the strata and the total inspection effort for data verification are determined by game theoretical methods (attribute sampling). On the basis of these results the overall detection probability of the combined system (data verification and material accountancy) is determined both for the MUF-D test and the bivariate (D,MUF) test as a function of the goal quantity. The results of both tests are evaluated for different diversion strategies. (orig./HP) [de

  12. HEU Transparency Implementation Program and its Radiation Safety Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Radev, R

    2002-01-01

    In February 1993, the Governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) signed a bilateral Agreement for the U.S. purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from 500 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons. The HEU Purchase Agreement serves important national security and nonproliferation policy imperatives for both countries since its implementation reduces the quantity of surplus Russian HEU that could be stolen and diverted for weapons use. In return, Russia receives much needed U.S. dollars over a 20-year delivery period. In 2001, Russia received over half a billion US dollars from the purchase of the LEU blended from 30 MT HEU. As part of this Agreement, transparency rights were agreed upon that provide confidence to both governments that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are being fulfilled. While the U.S. Department of State, in concert with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible negotiating transparency rights associated with this nuclear material, the NNSA is responsible for implementing those rights. These rights allow U.S. and R.F., personnel (called ''monitors'') to visit the processing facilities and observe the steps for processing the HEU into fuel for nuclear reactors. In this fashion, the processing of HEU to LEU is made ''transparent.'' For DOE, there are three transparency objectives: (1) that the HEU is extracted from nuclear weapons, (2) that this same HEU is oxidized, and (3) that the HEU is blended into LEU. For MINATOM, the transparency objective is: (1) that the LEU is fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors: The transparency is based on visits by designated transparency monitors (100 preapproved U.S. and Russian monitors) with specific rights to monitor and to access storage and processing areas to provide confidence that the nonproliferation goals

  13. Communication received from France concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 12 October 2004, from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2003. The Government of France has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2003. In light of the request expressed by the Government of France in its Note Verbale of 28 November 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the enclosures of the Note Verbale of 12 October 2004 are attached for the information of all Member States

  14. Communication received from Germany concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 18 April 2005 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2004. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2004. In light of the request expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany in its Note Verbale of 1 December 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the enclosures of the letter of 18 April 2005 are attached for the information of all Member States

  15. Communication received from France concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 2 September 2003, from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2002. The Government of France has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high-enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2002. In light of the request expressed by the Government of France in its Note Verbale of 28 November 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the enclosures of the Note Verbale of 2 September 2003 are attached for the information of all Member States

  16. ZPR-3 Assembly 6F : A spherical assembly of highly enriched uranium, depleted uranium, aluminum and steel with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 47 atom %.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D; Schaefer, R. W.; Nuclear Engineering Division

    2010-09-30

    Assembly 6F (ZPR-3/6F), the final phase of the Assembly 6 program, simulated a spherical core with a thick depleted uranium reflector. ZPR-3/6F was designed as a fast reactor physics benchmark experiment with an average core {sup 235}U enrichment of approximately 47 at.%. Approximately 81.4% of the total fissions in this assembly occur above 100 keV, approximately 18.6% occur below 100 keV, and essentially none below 0.625 eV - thus the classification as a 'fast' assembly. This assembly is Fast Reactor Benchmark No. 7 in the Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specifications and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3/6F began in late December 1956, and the experimental measurements were performed in January 1957. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates, depleted uranium plates, perforated aluminum plates and stainless steel plates loaded into aluminum drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of three columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, three columns of 0.125 in.-wide depleted uranium plates, nine columns of 0.125 in.-wide perforated aluminum plates and one column of stainless steel plates. The maximum length of each column of core material in a drawer was 9 in. (228.6 mm). Because of the goal to produce an approximately spherical core, core fuel and diluent column lengths generally varied between adjacent drawers and frequently within an individual drawer. The axial reflector consisted of depleted uranium plates and blocks loaded in the available space in the front (core) drawers, with the remainder loaded into back drawers behind the front drawers. The radial reflector consisted of blocks of depleted uranium loaded directly into the matrix tubes. The assembly geometry approximated a reflected sphere as closely as the square matrix tubes, the drawers and the

  17. Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Oxides within DOE-STD-3013-2000 Containers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mount, M E; O'Connell, W J

    2005-01-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) uses the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler (Canberra Model JCC-92) for accountability measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide and HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. In June 2002, at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management, LLNL reported on an extensive effort to calibrate this shuffler, based on standards measurements and extensive simulations, for HEU oxides and mixed U-Pu oxides in thin-walled primary and secondary containers. In August 2002, LLNL began to also use DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers for HEU oxide and mixed U-Pu oxide. These DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers are comprised of a stainless steel convenience can enclosed in welded stainless steel primary and secondary containers. Compared to the double thin-walled containers, the DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers have substantially thicker walls, and the density of materials in these containers was found to extend over a greater range (1.35 g/cm 3 to 4.62 g/cm 3 ) than foreseen for the double thin-walled containers. Further, the DOE-STD-3013-2000 Standard allows for oxides containing at least 30 wt% Pu plus U whereas the calibration algorithms for thin-walled containers were derived for virtually pure HEU or mixed U-Pu oxides. An initial series of Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to given quantities of HEU oxide and mixed U-Pu oxide in DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers was generated and compared with the response predicted by the calibration algorithms for thin-walled containers. Results showed a decrease on the order of 10% in the count rate, and hence a decrease in the calculated U mass for measured unknowns, with some varying trends versus U mass. Therefore a decision was made to develop a calibration algorithm for the PAN shuffler unique to the DOE-STD-3013-2000 container. This paper describes that effort and selected unknown item measurement results

  18. Communication received from France concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Voluntary statement on highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale, dated 12 September 2001, from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France has made available statements of the stocks of highly enriched uranium held by it as of 31 December 1999 and 31 December 2000. With reference to the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the Permanent Mission of France has also conveyed in its note verbale that 'Concerned to promote transparency in the management of highly enriched uranium used for peaceful nuclear activities, the Government of the French Republic has decided to publish, on a voluntary basis, information on the highly enriched uranium it holds for civil purposes'. In the light of the request expressed by the Government of France in its note verbale of 28 November 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), and the request in its note verbale of 12 September 2001, the texts of the enclosures of the note verbale of 12 September 2001 are attached for the information of all Member States

  19. Validation of KENO V.a for highly enriched uranium systems with hydrogen and/or carbon moderation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elliott, E.P.; Vornehm, R.G.; Dodds, H.L. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    This paper describes the validation in accordance with ANSI/ANS-8.1-1983(R1988) of KENO V.a using the 27-group ENDF/B-IV cross-section library for systems containing highly-enriched uranium, carbon, and hydrogen and for systems containing highly-enriched uranium and carbon with high carbon to uranium (C/U) atomic ratios. The validation has been performed for two separate computational platforms: an IBM 3090 mainframe and an HP 9000 Model 730 workstation, both using the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant Nuclear Criticality Safety Software (NCSS) code package. Critical experiments performed at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility, in support of the Rover reactor program, and at the Pajarito site at Los Alamos National Laboratory were identified as having the constituents desired for this validation as well as sufficient experimental detail to allow accurate construction of KENO V.a calculational models. Calculated values of k eff for the Rover experiments, which contain uranium, carbon, and hydrogen, are between 1.0012 ± 0.0026 and 1.0245 ± 0.0023. Calculation of the Los Alamos experiments, which contain uranium and carbon at high C/U ratios, yields values of k eff between 0.9746 ± 0.0028 and 0.9983 ± 0.0027. Safety criteria can be established using this data for both types of systems

  20. 252Cf-source-driven noise analysis measurements for characterization of concrete highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage vaults

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valentine, T.E.; Mihalczo, J.T.

    1993-01-01

    The 252 Cf-source-driven noise analysis method has been used in measurements for subcritical configurations of fissile systems for a variety of applications. Measurements of 25 fissile systems have been performed with a wide variety of materials and configurations. This method has been applied to measurements for (1) initial fuel loading of reactors, (2) quality assurance of reactor fuel elements, (3) fuel preparation facilities, (4) fuel processing facilities, (5) fuel storage facilities, (6) zero-power testing of reactors, and (7) verification of calculational methods for assemblies with the neutron k 252 Cf source and commercially available detectors was feasible and to determine if the measurement could characterize the ability of the concrete to isolate the fissile material

  1. From high enriched to low enriched uranium fuel in research reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Van Den Berghe, S.; Leenaers, A.; Koonen, E.; Moons, F.; Sannen, L. [Nuclear Materials Science Institute, SCK.CEN, Boeretang 200, B-2400 Mol (Belgium)

    2010-07-01

    Since the 1970's, global efforts have been going on to replace the high-enriched (>90% {sup 235}U), low-density UAlx research reactor fuel with high-density, low enriched (<20% {sup 235}U) replacements. This search is driven by the attempt to reduce the civil use of high-enriched material because of proliferation risks and terrorist threats. American initiatives, such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program have triggered the development of reliable low-enriched fuel types for these reactors, which can replace the high enriched ones without loss of performance. Most success has presently been obtained with U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} dispersion fuel, which is currently used in many research reactors in the world. However, efforts to search for a replacement with even higher density, which will also allow the conversion of some high flux research reactors that currently cannot change to U{sub 3}Si{sub 2} (eg. BR2 in Belgium), have continued and are for the moment mainly directed towards the U(Mo) alloy fuel (7-10 w% Mo). This paper provides an overview of the past efforts and presents the current status of the U(Mo) development. (authors)

  2. From high enriched to low enriched uranium fuel in research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van Den Berghe, S.; Leenaers, A.; Koonen, E.; Moons, F.; Sannen, L.

    2010-01-01

    Since the 1970's, global efforts have been going on to replace the high-enriched (>90% 235 U), low-density UAlx research reactor fuel with high-density, low enriched ( 235 U) replacements. This search is driven by the attempt to reduce the civil use of high-enriched material because of proliferation risks and terrorist threats. American initiatives, such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program have triggered the development of reliable low-enriched fuel types for these reactors, which can replace the high enriched ones without loss of performance. Most success has presently been obtained with U 3 Si 2 dispersion fuel, which is currently used in many research reactors in the world. However, efforts to search for a replacement with even higher density, which will also allow the conversion of some high flux research reactors that currently cannot change to U 3 Si 2 (eg. BR2 in Belgium), have continued and are for the moment mainly directed towards the U(Mo) alloy fuel (7-10 w% Mo). This paper provides an overview of the past efforts and presents the current status of the U(Mo) development. (authors)

  3. 31 CFR 540.315 - Uranium-235 (U235).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium-235 (U235). 540.315 Section... FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.315 Uranium-235 (U235). The term uranium-235 or U235 means the fissile...

  4. Validation of the Monte Carlo Criticality Program KENO V.a for highly-enriched uranium systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knight, J.R.

    1984-11-01

    A series of calculations based on critical experiments have been performed using the KENO V.a Monte Carlo Criticality Program for the purpose of validating KENO V.a for use in evaluating Y-12 Plant criticality problems. The experiments were reflected and unreflected systems of single units and arrays containing highly enriched uranium metal or uranium compounds. Various geometrical shapes were used in the experiments. The SCALE control module CSAS25 with the 27-group ENDF/B-4 cross-section library was used to perform the calculations. Some of the experiments were also calculated using the 16-group Hansen-Roach Library. Results are presented in a series of tables and discussed. Results show that the criteria established for the safe application of the KENO IV program may also be used for KENO V.a results

  5. An integrated video- and weight-monitoring system for the surveillance of highly enriched uranium blend down operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lenarduzzi, R.; Castleberry, K.; Whitaker, M.; Martinez, R.

    1998-01-01

    An integrated video-surveillance and weight-monitoring system has been designed and constructed for tracking the blending down of weapons-grade uranium by the US Department of Energy. The instrumentation is being used by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its task of tracking and verifying the blended material at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Portsmouth, Ohio. The weight instrumentation developed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory monitors and records the weight of cylinders of the highly enriched uranium as their contents are fed into the blending facility while the video equipment provided by Sandia National Laboratory records periodic and event triggered images of the blending area. A secure data network between the scales, cameras, and computers insures data integrity and eliminates the possibility of tampering. The details of the weight monitoring instrumentation, video- and weight-system interaction, and the secure data network is discussed

  6. U.S. Non-proliferation policy and programs regarding use of high-enriched uranium in research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, R.A.

    1993-01-01

    Uranium enriched to 90-93%, supplied by the U.S., is now used in 141 research and test reactors in 35 countries around the world with a cumulative power of 1714 mw. Since of the order of 3 kg of 235 U is involved annually in fuel fabrication, fresh fuel transport and storage, reactor operation, and spent fuel cooling and return per megawatt of research reactor power, it is estimated that more than 5000 kg of very high-enriched uranium is handled each year to operate these reactors. Recent U.S. assessments have led to the tentative conclusion that in only approximately 11 of these reactors, generally those of highest power or power density, is the use of 90-93% enriched uranium currently a technical necessity. Universal use of the best state-of-the-art fuel technology would permit an estimated 90 of these reactors to use 20% enriched fuel, and estimated 40 others to use 45% enriched fuel, without significant performance degradation. If advanced research reactor fuel development programs currently under way in the U.S. and elsewhere are successful, it may, in fact, be possible to operate virtually all of these reactors on less than 20% enriched uranium in the longer term. The physical and economic practicality of these developmental fuels must, of course, await future assessments

  7. HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU UNH for commercial use

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form that is more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UNH blending HEU disposition option. Process requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste/emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed.

  8. A simple method for rapidly processing HEU from weapons returns

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McLean, W. II; Miller, P.E.

    1994-01-01

    A method based on the use of a high temperature fluidized bed for rapidly oxidizing, homogenizing and down-blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons is presented. This technology directly addresses many of the most important issues that inhibit progress in international commerce in HEU; viz., transaction verification, materials accountability, transportation and environmental safety. The equipment used to carry out the oxidation and blending is simple, inexpensive and highly portable. Mobile facilities to be used for point-of-sale blending and analysis of the product material are presented along with a phased implementation plan that addresses the conversion of HEU derived from domestic weapons and related waste streams as well as material from possible foreign sources such as South Africa or the former Soviet Union.

  9. 2011 Annual Health Physics Report for the HEU transparency Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Radev, R.

    2012-01-01

    During the 2008 calendar year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided health physics support for the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program for external and internal radiation protection. They also provided technical expertise related to BDMS radioactive sources and Russian radiation safety regulatory compliance. For the calendar year 2008, there were 158 person-trips that required dose monitoring of the U.S. monitors. Of the 158 person-trips, 148 person-trips were SMVs and 10 person-trips were Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) trips. There were 6 monitoring visits by TMO monitors to facilities other than UEIE and 8 to UEIE itself. There were three monitoring visits (source changes) that were back-to-back with a total of 24 monitors. LLNL's Hazard Control Department laboratories provided the dosimetry services for the HEU Transparency monitors. In 2008, the HEU Transparency activities in Russia were conducted in a radiologically safe manner for the HEU Transparency monitors in accordance with the expectations of the HEU Transparency staff, NNSA and DOE. The HEU Transparency now has thirteen years of successful experience in developing and providing health and safety support in meeting its technical objectives.

  10. 2009 Annual Health Physics Report for the HEU Transparency Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Radev, R.

    2010-01-01

    During the 2009 calendar year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided health physics support for the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program for external and internal radiation protection. LLNL also provided technical expertise related to BDMS radioactive sources and Russian radiation safety regulatory compliance. For the calendar year 2009, there were 159 person-trips that required dose monitoring of the U.S. monitors. Of the 159 person-trips, 149 person-trips were SMVs and 10 person-trips were Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) trips. There were 4 monitoring visits by TMO monitors to facilities other than UEIE and 10 to UEIE itself. LLNL's Hazard Control Department laboratories provided the dosimetry services for the HEU Transparency monitors. In 2009, the HEU Transparency activities in Russia were conducted in a radiologically safe manner for the HEU Transparency monitors in accordance with the expectations of the HEU Transparency staff, NNSA and DOE. The HEU Transparency Program now has over fifteen years of successful experience in developing and providing health and safety support in meeting its technical objectives.

  11. Passive Time Coincidence Measurements with HEU and DU Metal Castings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McConchie, Seth M.; Hausladen, Paul; Mihalczo, John T.; Wright, Michael C.; Archer, Daniel E.

    2008-01-01

    A Department of Energy sponsored Oak Ridge National Laboratory/Y-12 National Security Complex program of passive time coincidence measurements has been initiated at Y-12 to evaluate the ability to determine the presence of high enriched uranium (HEU) and distinguish it from depleted uranium (DU). This program uses the Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS) without an active interrogation source. Previous passive NMIS measurements with Pu metal and Pu oxide have been successful in determining the Pu mass, assuming a known 240Pu content. The spontaneous fission of uranium metal is considerably lower than Pu and measurements of this type have been performed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This work presents results of measurements of HEU and DU metal castings using moderated 3He detectors.

  12. NARCISS critical stand experiments for studying the nuclear safety in accident water immersion of highly enriched uranium dioxide fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Glushkov, E.S.; Bubelev, V.G.

    2005-01-01

    A brief description of the Topaz-2 SNPS designed under scientific supervision of RRC KI in Russia, and of the NARCISS critical facility, is given. At the NARCISS critical facility, neutronic peculiarities and nuclear safety issues of the Topaz-2 system reactor were studied experimentally. This work is devoted to a detailed description of experiments on investigation of criticality safety in accident water immersion og highly enriched uranium dioxide fuel elements, performed at the NARCISS facility. The experiments were carried out at water-moderated critical assemblies with varying height, number, and spacing of fuel elements. The results obtained in the critical experiments, computational models of the investigated critical configurations, and comparison of the computational and experimental results are given [ru

  13. Conversion of highly enriched uranium in thorium-232 based oxide fuel for light water reactors: MOX-T fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vapirev, E; Jordanov, T; Khristoskov, I [Sofia Univ. (Bulgaria). Fizicheski Fakultet

    1996-12-31

    The possibility of using highly enriched uranium available from military inventories for production of mixed oxide fuel (MOX) has been proposed. The fuel is based on U-235 dioxide as fissile isotope and Th-232 dioxide as a non-fissile isotope. It is shown that although the fuel conversion coefficient to U-233 is expected to be less than 1, the proposed fuel has several important advantages resulting in cost reduction of the nuclear fuel cycle. The expected properties of MOX fuel (cross-sections, generated chains, delayed neutrons) are estimated. Due to fuel generation the initial enrichment is expected to be 1% less for production of the same energy. In contrast to traditional fuel no long living actinides are generated which reduces the disposal and reprocessing cost. 7 refs.

  14. Neutronic performance of a 14 MW TRIGA reactor: LEU vs HEU fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Cornella, R.J.

    1983-01-01

    A primary objective of the US Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program is to develop means for replacing, wherever possible, currently used highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel ( 235 U enrichment > 90%) with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel ( 235 U enrichment < 20%) without significantly degrading the performance of research and test reactors. The General Atomic Company has developed a low-enriched but high uranium content Er-U-ZrH/sub 1.6/ fuel to enable the conversion of TRIGA reactors (and others) from HEU to LEU. One possible application is to the water-moderated 14 MW TRIGA Steady State Reactor (SSR) at the Romanian Institute for Nuclear Power Reactors. The work reported here was undertaken for the purpose of comparing the neutronic performance of the SSR for HEU fuel with that for LEU fuel. In order to make these relative comparisons as valid as possible, identical methods and models were used for the neutronic calculations

  15. Neutronic analysis of the conversion of HEU to LEU fuel for a 5-MW MTR core

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pazirandeh, A.; Bartsch, G.

    1987-01-01

    In recent years, due to cessation of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel supply, practical steps have been taken to substitute HEU fuel in almost all research reactors by medium-enriched uranium or low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. In this study, a neutronic calculation of a 5-MW research reactor core fueled with HEU (93% 235 U) is presented. In order to assess the performance of the core with the LEU ( 235 U loadings were examined. The core consists of 22 standard fuel elements (SFEs) and 6 control fuel elements (CFEs). Each fuel elements has 18 curved plates of which two end plates are dummies. Initial 235 U content is 195 g 235 U/SFE and 9.7 g 235 U/CFE or /PFE. In all calculations the permitted changes to the fuel elements are (a) 18 active plates per SFE, (b) fuel plates assumed to be flat, and (c) 8 or 9 active plates per CFE

  16. ZPR-3 Assembly 11 : A cylindrical sssembly of highly enriched uranium and depleted uranium with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 12 atom % and a depleted uranium reflector.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D.; Tsiboulia, A.; Rozhikhin, Y.; National Security; Inst. of Physics and Power Engineering

    2010-09-30

    Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specificationsa and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3 Assembly 11 began in early January 1958, and the Assembly 11 program ended in late January 1958. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates and depleted uranium plates loaded into stainless steel drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of two columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, six columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) depleted uranium plates and one column of 1.0 in.-wide (25.4 mm) depleted uranium plates. The length of each column was 10 in. (254.0 mm) in each half of the core. The axial blanket consisted of 12 in. (304.8 mm) of depleted uranium behind the core. The thickness of the depleted uranium radial blanket was approximately 14 in. (355.6 mm), and the length of the radial blanket in each half of the matrix was 22 in. (558.8 mm). The assembly geometry approximated a right circular cylinder as closely as the square matrix tubes allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/11, the reference critical configuration was loading 10 which was critical on January 21, 1958. Subsequent loadings were very similar but less clean for criticality because there were modifications made to accommodate reactor physics measurements other than criticality. Accordingly, ZPR-3/11 loading 10 was selected as the only configuration for this benchmark. As documented below, it was determined to be acceptable as a criticality safety benchmark experiment. A very accurate transformation to a simplified model is needed to make any ZPR assembly a practical criticality-safety benchmark. There is simply too much geometric detail in an exact (as-built) model of a ZPR assembly, even a clean core such as ZPR-3/11 loading 10. The transformation must reduce the detail to a practical level without masking any of

  17. Communication received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 17 July 2003, from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of the United Kingdom, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its national holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2002. The Government of the United Kingdom has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU), and of civil depleted, natural and low enriched uranium (DNLEU) in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, as of 31 December 2002. 3. In the light of the requests expressed by the Government of the United Kingdom in its Note Verbale of 1 December 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998) and in its Note Verbale of 17 July 2003, the Note Verbale of 17 July 2003 and the enclosures thereto are attached for the information of all Member States

  18. 31 CFR 540.308 - Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). 540.308... OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.308 Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). The term low enriched...

  19. Critical experiments simulating accidental water immersion of highly enriched uranium dioxide fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ponomarev-Stepnoi, N.N.; Glushkov, L.S.

    2003-01-01

    The paper focuses on experimental analysis of nuclear criticality safety at accidental water immersion of fuel elements of the Russian TOPAZ-2 space nuclear power system reactor. The structure of water-moderated heterogeneous critical assemblies at the NARCISS facility is described in detail, including sizes, compositions, densities of materials of the main assembly components for various core configurations. Critical parameters of the assemblies measured for varying number of fuel elements, height of fuel material in fuel elements and their arrangement in the water moderator with a uniform or variable spacing are presented. It has been found from the experiments that at accidental water immersion of fuel elements involved, the minimum critical mass equal to approximately 20 kg of uranium dioxide is achieved at 31-37 fuel elements. The paper gives an example of a physical model of the water-moderated heterogeneous critical assembly with a detailed characterization of its main components that can be used for calculations using different neutronic codes, including Monte Carlo ones. (author)

  20. Communication received from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning its national holdings of civil high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the note verbale and its attachment dated 1 July 1998 received by the Director General of the IAEA from the Permanent Mission to the IAEA of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, making available information on its national holdings of civil high enriched uranium as of 31 December 1997

  1. Multilateral nonproliferation cooperation: US - Led effort to remove HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuels from the Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shelton, Thomas A.; Viebrock, James M.; Riedy, Alexander W.; Moses, Stanley D.; Bird, Helen M.

    1998-01-01

    This paper presents the efforts led by United States for removing HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuel from dhe Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland. These efforts are resulted from a plan approved by the United States Government, in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Georgia Governments to rapidly retrieve and transport circa 4.3 kilograms of enriched uranium. This material consisted largely of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and a small amount of low enriched uranium (LEU) fresh fuel, as well as about 800 grams of HEU/LEU-based spent fuel from a shutdown IR T-M research reactor on the outskirts of Table's, Georgia. The technical team lead by DOE consisted of HEU handling, packaging and transportation experts from the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant, managed and operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, and fuel handling and transportation experts from Nac International in Norcross, Georgia, United States

  2. Measurements of the HEU and LEU in-core spectra at the Ford Nuclear Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wehe, D K [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); King, J S; Lee, J C; Martin, W R [Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

    1985-07-01

    The Ford Nuclear Reactor (FNR) at the University of Michigan has been serving as the test site for a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel whole-core demonstration. As part of the experimental program, the differential neutron spectrum has been measured in a high-enriched uranium (HEU) core and an LEU core. The HEU and LEU spectra were determined by unfolding the measured activities of foils that were irradiated in the reactor. When the HEU and LEU spectra are compared from meV to 10 MeV, significant differences between the two spectra are apparent below 10 eV. These are probably caused by the additional {sup 238}U resonance absorption in the LEU fuel. No measurable difference occurs in the shape of the spectra above MeV. (author)

  3. HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Metal blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Blending HEU (highly enriched uranium) with less-enriched uranium to form LEU has been proposed as a disposition option. Five technologies are being assessed for blending HEU. This document provides data to be used in environmental impact analysis for the HEU-LEU disposition option that uses metal blending with an oxide waste product. It is divided into: mission and assumptions, conversion and blending facility descriptions, process descriptions and requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards discussion, and intersite transportation.

  4. HEU to LEU conversion experience at the UMass-Lowell research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, John R.; Bobek, Leo M.

    2005-01-01

    The UMass-Lowell Research Reactor (UMLRR) operated safely with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for over 25 years. Having reached the end of core lifetime and due to proliferation concerns, the reactor was recently converted to low-enriched uranium silicide (LEU) fuel. The actual process for converting the UMLRR from HEU to LEU fuel covered a period of over 15 years. The conversion effort - from the initial conceptual design studies in the late 1980s to the final offsite shipment of the spent HEU fuel in August 2004 - was a unique experience for the faculty and staff of a small university research reactor. This paper gives a historical view of the process and it highlights several key milestones along the road to successful completion of this project. (author)

  5. HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Metal blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-09-01

    US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Blending HEU (highly enriched uranium) with less-enriched uranium to form LEU has been proposed as a disposition option. Five technologies are being assessed for blending HEU. This document provides data to be used in environmental impact analysis for the HEU-LEU disposition option that uses metal blending with an oxide waste product. It is divided into: mission and assumptions, conversion and blending facility descriptions, process descriptions and requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards discussion, and intersite transportation

  6. Comparison of HEU and LEU neutron spectra in irradiation facilities at the Oregon State TRIGA® Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schickler, R.A.; Marcum, W.R.; Reese, S.R.

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • The Oregon State TRIGA ® Reactor neutron spectra is characterized herein. • Neutron spectra between highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium cores are compared. • Discussion is given as to differences between HEU and LEU core spectra results and impact on experiments. -- Abstract: In 2008, the Oregon State TRIGA ® Reactor (OSTR) was converted from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel lifetime improvement plan (FLIP) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort was driven and supported by the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The basis behind the RERTR program's ongoing conversion effort is to reduce the nuclear proliferation risk of civilian research and test reactors. The original intent of the HEU FLIP fuel was to provide fuel to research reactors that could be utilized for many years before a necessary refueling cycle. As a research reactor, the OSTR provides irradiation facilities for a variety of applications, such as activation analysis, fission-track dating, commercial isotope production, neutron radiography, prompt gamma characterization, and many others. In order to accurately perform these research functions, several studies had been conducted on the HEU FLIP fuel core to characterize the neutron spectra in various experimental facilities of the OSTR (Tiyapun, 1997; Ashbaker, 2005). As useful as these analyses were, they are no longer valid due to the change in fuel composition and the resulting alteration of core performance characteristics. Additionally, the core configuration (fuel reconfiguration) was altered between the HEU and LEU cores. This study characterizes the neutron spectra in various experimental facilities within and around the current LEU core. It also compares the spectra to that which was yielded in the HEU core through use of Monte Carlo n-Particle 5 (MCNP5) and experimental adjustment via a least-squares technique. The quantification of

  7. Communication received from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 22 September 2003, from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2002. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2002. 3. In light of the request expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany in its Note Verbale of 1 December 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the Note Verbale of 22 September 2003 and the enclosures thereto are attached for the information of all Member States

  8. Communication received from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium. Statements on the management of plutonium and of high enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale, dated 17 September 2004, from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2003. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2003. In light of the request expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany in its Note Verbale of 1 December 1997 concerning its policies regarding the management of plutonium (INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998), the Note Verbale of 17 September 2004 and the enclosures thereto are attached for the information of all Member States

  9. Replacement of highly enriched uranium by medium or low-enriched uranium in fuels for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwartz, J.P.

    To exclude the possibility of an explosive use of the uranium obtained from an elementary chemical process, one needs to use a fuel less enriched than 20 weight percent in U 235 . This goal can be reached by two ways: 1. The low density fuels, i.e. U or U 3 O 8 /Al fuels. One has to increase their U content from 1.3 g U/cm 3 presently qualified under normal operation conditions. Several manufacturers such as CERCA in France developed these fuels with a near-term objective of about 2 g U/cm 3 and a long-term objective of 3 g U/cm 3 . 2. The high density fuels. They are the UO 2 Caramel plate type fuels now under consideration, and U 3 Si and UMo as a long-term potential

  10. Fuel depletion analyses for the HEU core of GHARR-1: Part II: Fission product inventory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anim-Sampong, S.; Akaho, E.H.K.; Boadu, H.O.; Intsiful, J.D.K.; Osae, S.

    1999-01-01

    The fission product isotopic inventories have been estimated for a 90.2% highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel lattice cell of the Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) using the WIMSD/4 transport lattice code. The results indicate a gradual decrease in the Xe 135 inventory, and saturation trend for Sm 149 , Cs 134 and Cs 135 inventories as the fuel is depleted to 10,000 MWd/tU. (author)

  11. HEU core conversion of Russian production reactors: a major threat to the international RERTR regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuperman, Alan J.; Leventhal, Paul L.

    1998-01-01

    This paper calls the attention for the major threat to the International Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, represented by the HEU core conversion of russian production reactors. This program aims to reduce and eventually eliminate international civilian commerce in nuclear weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium , and thereby significantly lower risks of the material being stolen or diverted by terrorist or states for producing nuclear weapons

  12. Transformations of highly enriched uranium into metal or oxide; Etudes des procedes de transformation des composes d'uranium a fort enrichissement isotopique

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nollet, P; Sarrat, P [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Fontenay-aux-Roses (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1964-07-01

    The enriched uranium workshops in Cadarache have a double purpose on the one hand to convert uranium hexafluoride into metal or oxide, and on the other hand to recover the uranium contained in scrap materials produced in the different metallurgical transformations. The principles that have been adopted for the design and safety of these workshops are reported. The nuclear safety is based on the geometrical limitations of the processing vessels. To establish the processes and the technology of these workshops, many studies have been made since 1960, some of which have led to original achievements. The uranium hexafluoride of high isotopic enrichment is converted either by injection of the gas into ammonia or by an original process of direct hydrogen reduction to uranium tetrafluoride. The uranium contained m uranium-zirconium metal scrap can be recovered by combustion with hydrogen chloride followed treatment of the uranium chloride by fluorine in order to obtain the uranium in the hexafluoride state. Recovery of the uranium contained m various scrap materials is obtained by a conventional refining process combustion of metallic scrap, nitric acid dissolution of the oxide, solvent purification by tributyl phosphate, ammonium diuranate precipitation, calcining, reduction and hydro fluorination into uranium tetrafluoride, bomb reduction by calcium and slag treatment. Two separate workshops operate along these lines one takes care of the uranium with an isotopic enrichment of up to 3 p. 100, the other handles the high enrichments. The handling of each step of this process, bearing in mind the necessity for nuclear safety, has raised some special technological problems and has led to the conception of new apparatus, in particular the roasting furnace for metal turnings, the nitric acid dissolution unit, the continuous precipitator and ever safe filter and dryer for ammonium diuranate, the reduction and hydro fluorination furnace and the slag recovery apparatus These are

  13. A level-playing field for medical isotope production - How to phase-out reliance on HEU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuperman, A.J.

    1999-01-01

    Two decades ago, civilian commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use as targets in the production of medical isotopes was considered a relatively minor security concern for three reasons. First, the number of producers was small. Second, the amount of HEU involved was small. Third, the amount of HEU was dwarfed by the quantities of HEU in civilian commerce as fuel for nuclear research and test reactors. Now, however, all three variables have changed. First, as the use of medical isotopes has expanded rapidly, production programs are proliferating. Second, as the result of such new producers and the expansion of existing production facilities, the amounts of HEU involved are growing. Third, as the RERTR program has facilitated the phase-out of HEU as fuel in most research and test reactors, the quantities of HEU for isotope production have come to represent a significant percentage of global commerce in this weapons-usable material. Medical isotope producers in several states are cooperating with the RERTR program to convert to low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets within the next few years, and one already relies on LEU for isotope production. However, the three biggest isotope producers - in Canada and the European Union - continue to rely on HEU, creating a double-standard that endangers the goal of the RERTR program. Each of these three producers has expressed economic concerns about being put at a competitive disadvantage if it alone converts. This paper proposes forging a firmer international consensus that all present and future isotope producers should convert to LEU, and calls for codifying such a commitment in a statement of intent to be prepared by producers over the next year. With such a level playing field, no producer would need fear being put at a competitive disadvantage by conversion, or being stigmatized by pressure groups for continued reliance on HEU. The phase-out of all HEU commerce for isotope production could be achieved within about

  14. Overview of Russian HEU transparency issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kempf, C.R.; Bieniawski, A.

    1993-01-01

    The U.S. has signed an agreement with the Russian Federation for the purchase of 500 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) taken from dismantled nuclear weapons. The HEU will be blended down to low-enriched uranium and will be transported to the U.S. to be used by fuel fabricators to make fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Both the U.S. and Russia have been preparing to institute transparency measures to provide assurance that nonproliferation and arms control objectives specified in the agreement are met. This paper provides background information on the original agreement and on subsequent negotiations with the Russians, as well as discussion of technical aspects of developing transparency measures suited to the facilities and processes which are expected to be involved. Transparency has been defined as those agreed-upon measures which build confidence that arms control and non-proliferation objectives shared by the parties are met. Transparency is a departure from exhaustive, detailed arms control verification regimes of past agreements, which were based on a presumption of detecting transgressions as opposed to confirming compliance

  15. Communication received from the Governor of Norway to the Agency concerning the International Symposium of Minimisation of Highly Enriched Uranium in the Civilian Nuclear Sector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Director General has received a communication from the Governor of Norway, attaching the Chair's Summary of the discussions held during the International Symposium of Minimisation of Highly Enriched Uranium in the Civilian Nuclear Sector which was held in Oslo from 17 to 20 June 2006 as well as the summary from the technical workshop of the Symposium. The communication and, as requested therein, the attached two summaries, are herewith circulated for the information of Member States

  16. Performance of an active well coincidence counter for HEU samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrari, Francesca; Peerani, Paolo

    2010-01-01

    Neutron coincidence counting is the reference NDA technique used in nuclear safeguards to measure the mass of nuclear material in samples. For high-enriched uranium (HEU) samples active neutron interrogation is generally performed and the most common device used by nuclear inspectors is the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC). Within her master thesis at the Polytechnic of Milan, the first author performed an intensive study on the characteristics and performances of the AWCC in order to assess the 235 U mass in HEU oxide samples at the PERLA laboratory of JRC. The work has been summarised in this paper that starts with the optimisation of the use of AWCC for nuclear safeguards, describing the calibration procedure, reporting results of a series of verification measurements, summarising the performances that can be obtained with this instruments during inspections at fuel production plants and concluding with the discussion of uncertainties related to these measurements.

  17. Los Alamos National Laboratory Support for Commercial U.S. Production of 99Mo without the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dale, Gregory E. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-03-04

    There is currently a serious shortage of 99Mo, from which to generate the medically significant isotope 99mTc. Most of the world's supply comes from the fission of highly enriched uranium targets--this is a proliferation concern. This document focuses on the technology involved in two alternative methods: electron accelerator production of 99Mo from the 100Mo(γ,n)99Mo reaction and production of 99Mo as a fission product in a subcritical, DT accelerator-driven low enriched uranium salt solution.

  18. Comparison of the FRM-II HEU design with an alternative LEU design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mo, S.C.; Hanan, N.A.; Matos, J.E.

    2004-01-01

    The FRM-II reactor design of the Technical University of Munich has a compact core that utilizes fuel plates containing highly-enriched uranium (HEU, 93%). This paper presents an alternative core design utilizing low-enriched uranium (LEU, 3 that provides nearly the same neutron flux for experiments as the HEU design, but has a less favourable fuel cycle economy. If an LEU fuel with a uranium density of 6.0 - 6.5 g/cm 3 . were developed, the alternative design would provide the same neutron flux and use the same number of cores per year as the HEU design. The results of this study show that there are attractive possibilities for using LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in the FRM-II. Further optimization of the LEU design and near-term availability of LEU fuel with a uranium density greater than 4.8 g/cm 3 would enhance the performance of the LEU core. The REKIR Program is ready to exchange information with the Technical University of Munich to resolve any differences that may exist and to identify design modifications that would optimize reactor performance utilizing LEU fuel. (author)

  19. HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than is the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This report provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate blending option to produce oxide for disposal. This the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) alternative will have two missions (1) convert HEU materials into HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend the HEU uranyl nitrate with depleted and natural assay uranyl nitrate to produce an oxide that can be stored until an acceptable disposal approach is available. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

  20. HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-09-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than is the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This report provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate blending option to produce oxide for disposal. This the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) alternative will have two missions (1) convert HEU materials into HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend the HEU uranyl nitrate with depleted and natural assay uranyl nitrate to produce an oxide that can be stored until an acceptable disposal approach is available. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal

  1. The Supply of Medical Radioisotopes. Policy Options for Ensuring Long-term Supply Security of Molybdenum-99 and/or Technetium-99m Produced Without Highly Enriched Uranium Targets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Westmacott, Chad; Cameron, Ron

    2012-01-01

    Following the shortages of the key medical radioisotopes, molybdenum-99 ( 99 Mo) and its daughter technetium-99m (' 99m Tc), the OECD-Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) created the High-level Group on the Security of Supply of Medical Radioisotopes (HLG-MR). Since 2009, this group has identified the reasons for the isotope shortages and developed a policy approach to address the challenges to a long-term secure supply of these important medical isotopes. On top of the ongoing concerns related to long-term reliability, all current long-term major 99 Mo-producing nations have agreed to convert to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets for the production of 99 Mo. This decision was made based on important nonproliferation reasons; however, the conversion will have potential impacts on the global supply chain - both in terms of costs and available capacity. Recognising that conversion is important and will occur, and also recognising the need to ensure a long-term secure supply of 99 Mo/' 99m Tc, the NEA, along with stakeholders, examined potential policy options that could be used by to ensure a reliable supply of 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc produced without highly enriched uranium (HEU), consistent with the time frames and policies of the HLG-MR. This discussion paper provides the various policy options available to governments to encourage a reliable supply of 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc produced without HEU. The examination of these options was done through the lens of ensuring a reliable supply, consistent with the time frames and policies of the HLG-MR. The options described in this document are meant to meet this objective by taking one of three general actions: - Making the option of purchasing or producing non-HEU-based 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc more attractive. - Making the option of purchasing or producing HEU-based 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc less attractive. - Limiting access to HEU-based 99 Mo and/or ' 99m Tc. This paper presents the options in each category and provides some views

  2. Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    2004-01-01

    Since the RERTR-Meeting in Newport/USA in 1990 recommended in several papers to the research reactor community to agree upon a worldwide unified technical specification for low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) in order to facilitate supplies of LEU and HEU to fabricators for acceptance and for fabrication of fresh fuel elements. This target for unified and simplified specification has only been partially reached due to different interests of the fabricators because they want to receive the uranium as pure as possible. As a result of various investigations, however, it became clear that both LEU and HEU received from the United States since the late fifties had different qualities which we have to deal with today due to the availability of stocks. We are now one step forward to know more precisely the properties of LEU and HEU we have received in the past. This uranium was never virgin and we have to cope with this situation. Therefore in my present paper I have concentrated on the documentation of analytical work performed on samples of LEU and HEU received in the past. I propose furthermore a frame of unified specifications for so-called virgin LEU and HEU including uranium from a Zero-experiment. In addition I am giving a recommendation for specifications of LEU obtained by blending of reprocessed HEU. Finally I am touching the question of secure supplies of fresh LEU. (author)

  3. Implementation of the United States/Russian HEU Agreement: Current Status and Prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rutkowski, E

    2003-01-01

    During Calendar Year (CY) 2002, the Russian Federation (R.F.) delivered low enriched uranium (LEU) from the conversion and processing of 30 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade (90% 235 U assay) uranium. Through July 2003, the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) will have monitored the conversion of over 190 MT HEU into LEU. This total represents about 38 percent of the projected 500 MT HEU scheduled to be blended down through the year 2013 and is equivalent to the destruction of 7,600 nuclear devices. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) HEU-TIP monitors the processing of this HEU at four Russian uranium-processing plants. During CY 2002, United States (U.S.) personnel monitored this process for a total of 194 monitor-weeks by staffing a Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) located in Novouralsk, and through a series of five-day Special Monitoring Visits (SMV) to the four plants. U.S. monitor observations include the inventory of in-process containers, the observation of operations and non-destructive assay measurements (NDA) to determine 235 U enrichment, as well as the examination and validation of Russian Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) documents. In addition, the U.S. designed Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) installed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) in January 1999 monitored all HEU blended at that facility, which is about 50 percent of the HEU blended into LEU during CY 2002. Recently we installed a BDMS at the Electrochemical Plant (ECP) in Zelenogorsk and plans are underway to install a BDMS at the Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE) in Seversk in late 2004. On a very positive note, interpersonal interactions between U.S. and Russian technical experts continues to expand and have proven to be an important element of the transparency regime. On the tenth anniversary of the HEU Purchase Agreement, the Ministry of the R.F. for Atomic Energy (Minatom) also saluted the

  4. Experiments and Simulations of the Use of Time-Correlated Thermal Neutron Counting to Determine the Multiplication of an Assembly of Highly Enriched Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David L. Chichester; Mathew T. Kinlaw; Scott M. Watson; Jeffrey M. Kalter; Eric C. Miller; William A. Noonan

    2014-11-01

    A series of experiments and numerical simulations using thermal-neutron time-correlated measurements has been performed to determine the neutron multiplication, M, of assemblies of highly enriched uranium available at Idaho National Laboratory. The experiments used up to 14.4 kg of highly-enriched uranium, including bare assemblies and assemblies reflected with high-density polyethylene, carbon steel, and tungsten. A small 252Cf source was used to initiate fission chains within the assembly. Both the experiments and the simulations used 6-channel and 8-channel detector systems, each consisting of 3He proportional counters moderated with polyethylene; data was recorded in list mode for analysis. 'True' multiplication values for each assembly were empirically derived using basic neutron production and loss values determined through simulation. A total of one-hundred and sixteen separate measurements were performed using fifty-seven unique measurement scenarios, the multiplication varied from 1.75 to 10.90. This paper presents the results of these comparisons and discusses differences among the various cases.

  5. Development of uranium metal targets for 99Mo production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiencek, T.C.; Hofman, G.L.

    1993-10-01

    A substantial amount of high enriched uranium (HEU) is used for the production of medical-grade 99 Mo. Promising methods of producing irradiation targets are being developed and may lead to the reduction or elimination of this HEU use. To substitute low enriched uranium (LEU) for HEU in the production of 99 Mo, the target material may be changed to uranium metal foil. Methods of fabrication are being developed to simplify assembly and disassembly of the targets. Removal of the uranium foil after irradiation without dissolution of the cladding is a primary goal in order to reduce the amount of liquid radioactive waste material produced in the process. Proof-of-concept targets have been fabricated. Destructive testing indicates that acceptable contact between the uranium foil and the cladding can be achieved. Thermal annealing tests, which simulate the cladding/uranium diffusion conditions during irradiation, are underway. Plans are being made to irradiate test targets

  6. On the importance of ending the use of HEU in the nuclear fuel cycle: An updated assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glaser, Alexander; Hippel, Frank von

    2002-01-01

    The events of September 2001 have created a renewed urgency with regard to the disposition and future use and management of nuclear-weapons-usable materials. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) has received particular attention because it is relatively easy to use in a nuclear weapon and therefore an obvious candidate for diversion or theft by state or nonstate actors. The role of the RERTR program in this context and its contribution to global security can hardly be overemphasized. This article reviews existing or proposed activities to reduce the threat posed by HEU, how these activities are linked to the RERTR program, and outlines the most urgent steps to be taken to approach the ultimate objective of eliminating non-weapons HEU inventories in the world. (author)

  7. HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UF6 blending alternative to produce LEU UF6 for commercial use

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-09-01

    US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials; the nuclear material will be converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed; blending as UF 6 to produce a UF 6 product for commercial use is one of them. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UF 6 blending HEU disposition option. Resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed

  8. Why does the need of HEU for high flux research reactors remain?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glaeser, W.

    1991-01-01

    It has shown that high performance high flux reactors need an ongoing supply of highly enriched uranium. The new fuel materials in their highly enriched version offer prospective for advanced and better neutron sources vital for the future of neutron research. This is another very attractive result of the RERTR programme. One-sided restriction would only provide marginal or no values for research. If we adopt the sometimes expressed views that high enriched RERTR developed fuel should only be made available when unique benefits to mankind could be obtained, then certainly basic research at the forefront belongs to this category. HEU would only pose theoretical difficulties, if it would remain under proper safeguards and obviously this is the way to be pursued. (orig.)

  9. Heat-transfer analysis of the existing HEU and proposed LEU cores of Pakistan research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, L.A.; Nabbi, R.

    1987-02-01

    In connection with conversion of Pakistan Research Reactor (PARR) from the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel, steady-state thermal hydraulic analysis of both existing HEU and proposed LEU cores has been carried out. Keeping in mind the possibility of power upgrading, the performance of proposed LEU core, under 10 MW operating conditions, has also been evaluated. Computer code HEATHYD has been used for this purpose. In order to verify the reliability of the code, IAEA benchmark 2 MW reactor was analyzed. The cooling parameters evaluated include: coolant velocity, critical velocity, pressure drop, temperature distribution in the core, heat fluxes at onset of nucleate boiling, flow instability and burnout and corresponding safety margins. From the results of the study it can be concluded that the conversion of the core to LEU fuel will result in higher safety margins, as compared to existing HEU core, mainly because the increased number of fuel plates in the proposed design will reduce the average heat flux significantly. Anyhow upgrading of the reactor power to 10 MW will need the flow rate to be adjusted between 850 to 900 m 3 /hr, to achieve reasonable safety margins, at least, comparable with the existing HEU core. (orig.)

  10. HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Oxide blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for commercial use

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the oxide blending HEU disposition option. This option provides for a yearly HEU throughput of 1 0 metric tons (MT) of uranium metal with an average U235 assay of 50% blended with 165 MT of natural assay triuranium octoxide (U{sub 3} O{sub 8}) per year to produce 177 MT of 4% U235 assay U{sub 3} O{sub 8}, for LWR fuel. Since HEU exists in a variety of forms and not necessarily in the form to be blended, worst case scenarios for preprocessing prior to blending will be assumed for HEU feed streams.

  11. HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Oxide blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for commercial use

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-09-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the oxide blending HEU disposition option. This option provides for a yearly HEU throughput of 1 0 metric tons (MT) of uranium metal with an average U235 assay of 50% blended with 165 MT of natural assay triuranium octoxide (U 3 O 8 ) per year to produce 177 MT of 4% U235 assay U 3 O 8 , for LWR fuel. Since HEU exists in a variety of forms and not necessarily in the form to be blended, worst case scenarios for preprocessing prior to blending will be assumed for HEU feed streams

  12. Production of Fission Product 99Mo using High-Enriched Uranium Plates in Polish Nuclear Research Reactor MARIA: Technology and Neutronic Analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jaroszewicz Janusz

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available The main objective of 235U irradiation is to obtain the 99mTc isotope, which is widely used in the domain of medical diagnostics. The decisive factor determining its availability, despite its short lifetime, is a reaction of radioactive decay of 99Mo into 99mTc. One of the possible sources of molybdenum can be achieved in course of the 235U fission reaction. The paper presents activities and the calculation results obtained upon the feasibility study on irradiation of 235U targets for production of 99Mo in the MARIA research reactor. Neutronic calculations and analyses were performed to estimate the fission products activity for uranium plates irradiated in the reactor. Results of dummy targets irradiation as well as irradiation uranium plates have been presented. The new technology obtaining 99Mo is based on irradiation of high-enriched uranium plates in standard reactor fuel channel and calculation of the current fission power generation. Measurements of temperatures and the coolant flow in the molybdenum installation carried out in reactor SAREMA system give online information about the current fission power generated in uranium targets. The corrective factors were taken into account as the heat generation from gamma radiation from neighbouring fuel elements as well as heat exchange between channels and the reactor pool. The factors were determined by calibration measurements conducted with aluminium mock-up of uranium plates. Calculations of fuel channel by means of REBUS code with fine mesh structure and libraries calculated by means of WIMS-ANL code were performed.

  13. Uranium management activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, D.; Marshall, E.; Sideris, T.; Vasa-Sideris, S.

    2001-01-01

    One of the missions of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Office (ORO) has been the management of the Department's uranium materials. This mission has been accomplished through successful integration of ORO's uranium activities with the rest of the DOE complex. Beginning in the 1980's, several of the facilities in that complex have been shut down and are in the decommissioning process. With the end of the Cold War, the shutdown of many other facilities is planned. As a result, inventories of uranium need to be removed from the Department facilities. These inventories include highly enriched uranium (HEU), low enriched uranium (LEU), normal uranium (NU), and depleted uranium (DU). The uranium materials exist in different chemical forms, including metals, oxides, solutions, and gases. Much of the uranium in these inventories is not needed to support national priorities and programs. (author)

  14. Criticality safety of storage barrels for enriched uranium fresh fuel at the RB research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M. P.

    1997-01-01

    Study on criticality safety of fresh low and high enriched uranium (LEU and HEU) fuel elements in the storage/transport barrels at the RB research reactor is carried out by using the well-known MCNP computer code. It is shown that studied arrays of tightly closed fuel barrels, each entirely loaded with 100 fresh (HEU or LEU) fuel slugs, are far away from criticality, even in cases of an unexpected flooding by light water.(author)

  15. Monte Carlo calculational design of an NDA instrument for the assay of waste products from high enriched uranium spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eccleston, G.W.; Schrandt, R.G.; MacDonald, J.L.; Cverna, F.H.

    1979-01-01

    The Monte Carlo design of the waste assay region of a dual assay system, to be installed at the Fluorinal and Storage Facility, is described. The instrument will be used by the facility operator to assay high-enriched spent fuel packages and waste solids produced from dissolution of the fuels. The fissile content discharged in the waste is expected to vary between 0 and 400 g of 235 U. Material accountability measurements of the waste must be obtained in the presence of large neutron (0.5 x 10 6 n/s) and gamma (50,000 R/hr) backgrounds. The assay system employs fast-neutron irradiation of the sample, using a 5 mg 252 Cf source, followed by delayed neutron counting after the source is transferred to storage. Calculations indicate a +-4-g (2 sigma) assay for a waste canister containing 300 g of 235 U is achievable with an end-of-life (1 mg) 252 Cf source and a background rate of 0.5 x 10 6 n/s

  16. Determination of Dancoff correction thermal utilization and thermal disadvantage factors of HEU and LEU cores of an MNSR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ofori, Y. T.

    2013-07-01

    Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1), an MNSR (Miniature Neutron Source Reactor) is to be converted from HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) to LEU (Low Enriched Uranium) fuel, along with all current MNSRs in various other countries. The purpose of the conversion is to minimize the use of HEU for non-proliferation of high-grade nuclear fuel. In this research work, a comparative study has been performed for the determination of the Dancoff, thermal utilization and thermal disadvantage factors of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and potential low enriched uranium (LEU) cores of GHARR-1. A one group transport theory and collision probability based methodologies was used to develop mathematical formulations for thermal utilization factor and thermal disadvantage factor assuming isotropic scattering. This methodology was implemented in a FORTRAN 95 based computer program THERMCALC, which uses Bessell and BesselK as subroutines developed to calculate the modified Bessel functions I n and K n respectively using the polynomial approximation method. Furthermore, a Dancoff correction factor of 0.1519 thermal utilization factor of 0.9767 and a thermal disadvantage factor of 1.894 were obtained for the 90.2% highly enriched Uranium core of GHARR-1. The results compare favorably with literature. Thus THERMCALC can be used as a reliable tool for the calculation of Dancoff, thermal utilization and disadvantage factors of MNSR cores. Other potential LEU cores; UO 2 (with different fuel meat densities and enrichments) and U 3 Si 2 have also been analysed. UO 2 with 12.6% of Uranium-235 was chosen as the most potential LEU core for the GHARR-1. (au)

  17. Safety analysis report for packaging, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, model DC-1 package with HEU oxide contents. Change pages for Rev.1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-01-18

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant for the Model DC-1 package with highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide contents has been prepared in accordance with governing regulations form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation and orders from the Department of energy. The fundamental safety requirements addressed by these regulations and orders pertain to the containment of radioactive material, radiation shielding, and nuclear subcriticality. This report demonstrates how these requirements are met.

  18. Safety analysis report for packaging, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, model DC-1 package with HEU oxide contents. Change pages for Rev.1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant for the Model DC-1 package with highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide contents has been prepared in accordance with governing regulations form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation and orders from the Department of energy. The fundamental safety requirements addressed by these regulations and orders pertain to the containment of radioactive material, radiation shielding, and nuclear subcriticality. This report demonstrates how these requirements are met

  19. Alternative dispositioning methods for HEU spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krupa, J.F.; McKibben, J.M.; Parks, P.B.; DuPont, M.E.

    1995-01-01

    The United States has a strong policy on prevention of the international spread of nuclear weapons. This policy was announced in Presidential Directive PDD-13 and summarized in a White House press release September 27, 1993. Two cornerstones of this policy are: seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly- enriched uranium or plutonium; propose hor-ellipsis prohibiting the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside international safeguards. The Department of Energy is currently struggling to devise techniques that safely and efficiently dispose of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) while satisfying national non-proliferation policies. SRS plans and proposals for disposing of their SNF are safe and cost effective, and fully satisfy non-proliferation objectives

  20. ORSPHERE: CRITICAL, BARE, HEU(93.2)-METAL SPHERE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Margaret A. Marshall

    2013-09-01

    In the early 1970’s Dr. John T. Mihalczo (team leader), J.J. Lynn, and J.R. Taylor performed experiments at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) with highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal (called Oak Ridge Alloy or ORALLOY) in an attempt to recreate GODIVA I results with greater accuracy than those performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1950’s (HEU-MET-FAST-001). The purpose of the Oak Ridge ORALLOY Sphere (ORSphere) experiments was to estimate the unreflected and unmoderated critical mass of an idealized sphere of uranium metal corrected to a density, purity, and enrichment such that it could be compared with the GODIVA I experiments. “The very accurate description of this sphere, as assembled, establishes it as an ideal benchmark for calculational methods and cross-section data files.” (Reference 1) While performing the ORSphere experiments care was taken to accurately document component dimensions (±0. 0001 in. for non-spherical parts), masses (±0.01 g), and material data The experiment was also set up to minimize the amount of structural material in the sphere proximity. A three part sphere was initially assembled with an average radius of 3.4665 in. and was then machined down to an average radius of 3.4420 in. (3.4425 in. nominal). These two spherical configurations were evaluated and judged to be acceptable benchmark experiments; however, the two experiments are highly correlated.

  1. Operation of automated NDA instruments for in-line HEU accounting at Y-12

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russo, P.A.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Sandford, E.L.; Jeter, I.W.; McCullough, E.; Bowers, G.L.

    1983-01-01

    Two automated nondestructive assay instruments developed at Los Alamos in support of nuclear materials accounting needs are currently operating in-line at the Y-12 Plant for recovery of highly enriched uranium. One instrument provides the HEU inventory in the secondary solvent extraction system, and the other monitors HEU concentration in the secondary intermediate evaporator. Both instruments were installed in December 1982. Operational evaluation of these instruments has been a joint effort of Y-12 and Los Alamos. This has included comparison of the solvent extraction system inventories with direct measurement performed on the dumped solution components of the solvent extraction system, as well as comparisons of concentration assay results with the external assays of samples withdrawn from the process. The function, design, and preliminary results of the operational evaluation are reported

  2. Coordination Between the HEU Transparency Program and the Material Protection, Control and Accountability Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glaser, J.; Hernandez, J.; Dougherty, D.; Bieniawski, A.; Cahalane, P.; Mastal, E.

    2000-01-01

    DOE sponsored programs such as Material Protection Control and Accountability (MPC and A) and implementation of the Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program send US personnel into Russian nuclear facilities and receive Russian representatives from these programs. While there is overlap in the Russian nuclear facilities visited by these two programs, there had not been any formal mechanism to share information between them. Recently, an MPC and A/HEU Working Group was developed to facilitate the sharing of appropriate information and to address concerns expressed by Minatom and Russian facility personnel such as US visit scheduling conflicts. This paper discusses the goals of the Working Group and ways it has helped to allow the programs to work more efficiently with the Russian facilities

  3. HEU Holdup Measurements on 321-M A-Lathe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dewberry, R.A.

    2002-01-01

    The Analytical Development Section of SRTC was requested by the Facilities Disposition Division (FDD) of the Savannah River Site to determine the holdup of enriched uranium in the 321-M facility as part of an overall deactivation project of the facility. The 321-M facility was used to fabricate enriched uranium fuel assemblies, lithium-aluminum target tubes, neptunium assemblies, and miscellaneous components for the production reactors. The results of the holdup assays are essential for determining compliance with the solid waste Waste Acceptance Criteria, Material Control and Accountability, and to meet criticality safety controls. Three measurement systems were used to determine highly enriched uranium (HEU) holdup. This report covers holdup measurements on the A-Lathe that was used to machine uranium-aluminum-alloy (U-Al). Our results indicated that the lathe contained more than the limits stated in the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) for the solid waste E-Area Vaults. Thus the lathe was decontaminated three times and assayed four times in order to bring the amounts of uranium to an acceptable content. This report will discuss the methodology, Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) measurements, and results of the U-235 holdup on the lathe

  4. Department of Energy HEU ES and H vulnerability assessment, Savannah River Site, Site Assessment Team report. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geddes, R.L.; Barone, A.; Shook, H.E. Varner, C.E.; Rollins, R.

    1996-01-01

    This report fulfills the directive issued by the Secretary of Energy on February 22, 1996 to complete a comprehensive assessment of potential vulnerabilities associated with the management of highly enriched uranium (HEU) throughout the DOE complex. In a subsequent letter instruction, the DOE-SR Field Office formally directed WSRC to conduct an assessment of the HEU materials at SRS. The term ''ES and H vulnerabilities'' is defined for the purpose of this assessment to mean conditions or weaknesses that could lead to unnecessary or increased exposure of workers or the public to radiation or to HEU-associated chemical hazards, or to the release of radioactive materials to the environment. The assessment will identify and prioritize ES and H vulnerabilities, and will serve as an information base for identifying corrective actions for the safe management of HEU. Primary facilities that hold HEU at SRS are H-Canyon, K-Reactor assembly area, K, L, and P-Reactor disassembly basins, and the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF)

  5. Technology for down-blending weapons grade uranium into commercial reactor-usable uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arbital, J.G.; Snider, J.D.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used in nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching the uranium isotope 235 U from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by permanently diluting the concentration of the 235 U isotope, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope re-enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended, low-enriched uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel. The DOE has evaluated three candidate processes for down blending surplus HEU. These candidate processes are: (1) uranium hexafluoride blending; (2) molten uranium metal blending; and (3) uranyl nitrate solution blending. This paper describes each of these candidate processes. It also compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each process with respect to: (1) the various forms and compounds of HEU comprising the surplus inventory, (2) the use of down-blended product as commercial reactor fuel, or (3) its disposal as waste

  6. HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UF{sub 6} blending alternative to produce LEU UF{sub 6} for commercial use

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials; the nuclear material will be converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed; blending as UF{sub 6} to produce a UF{sub 6} product for commercial use is one of them. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UF{sub 6} blending HEU disposition option. Resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed.

  7. Irradiation tests of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Suripto, A.; Nasution, H.; Lufti-Amin, D.; Gogo, A.

    1996-01-01

    Most of the world's supply of 99 mTc for medical purposes is currently produced from the decay of 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high-enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) metal foils for the HEU UO 2 used in current target designs will allow equivalent 99 Mo yields with little change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal for uranium alloy and aluminide in other target designs will also allow the conversion of HEU to LEU. Several uranium-metal-foil targets have been fabricated at ANL and irradiated to prototypic burnup in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor. Postirradiation examination of the initial test indicated that design modifications were required to allow the irradiated foil to be removed for chemical processing. The latest test has shown good irradiation behavior, satisfactory dismantling and foil removal when the U-foil is separated from its containment by metallic, fission-recoil absorbing barriers. (author)

  8. Irradiation tests of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Suripto, A.; Nasution, H.; Lufti-Amin, D.; Gogo, A.

    1996-01-01

    Most of the world's supply of 99m Tc for medical purposes is currently produced form the decay of 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high-enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) metal foils for the HEU UO 2 used in current target designs will allow equivalent 99 Mo yields with little change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal for uranium alloy and aluminide in other target designs will also allow the conversion of HEU to LEU. Several uranium-metal-foil targets have been fabricated at ANL and irradiated to prototypic burnup in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor. Postirradiation examination of the initial test indicated that design modifications were required to allow the irradiated foil to be removed for chemical processing. The latest test has shown good irradiation behavior, satisfactory dismantling and foil removal when the U-foil is separated from its containment by metallic, fission-recoil absorbing barriers

  9. Detection of illicit HEU production in gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants using neutron counting techniques on product cylinders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Freeman, Corey R.; Geist, William H.

    2010-01-01

    Innovative and novel safeguards approaches are needed for nuclear energy to meet global energy needs without the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. Part of these efforts will include creating verification techniques that can monitor uranium enrichment facilities for illicit production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Passive nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques will be critical in preventing illicit HEU production because NDA offers the possibility of continuous and unattended monitoring capabilities with limited impact on facility operations. Gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) are commonly used to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) for reactor fuel. In a GCEP, gaseous UF 6 spins at high velocities in centrifuges to separate the molecules containing 238 U from those containing the lighter 235 U. Unfortunately, the process for creating LEU is inherently the same as HEU, creating a proliferation concern. Insuring that GCEPs are producing declared enrichments poses many difficult challenges. In a GCEP, large cascade halls operating thousands of centrifuges work together to enrich the uranium which makes effective monitoring of the cascade hall economically prohibitive and invasive to plant operations. However, the enriched uranium exiting the cascade hall fills product cylinders where the UF 6 gas sublimes and condenses for easier storage and transportation. These product cylinders hold large quantities of enriched uranium, offering a strong signal for NDA measurement. Neutrons have a large penetrability through materials making their use advantageous compared to gamma techniques where the signal is easily attenuated. One proposed technique for detecting HEU production in a GCEP is using neutron coincidence counting at the product cylinder take off stations. This paper discusses findings from Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) code simulations that examine the feasibility of such a detector.

  10. Ion-induced gammas for photofission interrogation of HEU.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Doyle, Barney Lee (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM); Antolak, Arlyn J.; Morse, Daniel H.; Provencio, Paula Polyak (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM)

    2006-03-01

    High-energy photons and neutrons can be used to actively interrogate for heavily shielded special nuclear material (SNM), such as HEU (highly enriched uranium), by detecting prompt and/or delayed induced fission signatures. In this work, we explore the underlying physics for a new type of photon source that generates high fluxes of mono-energetic gamma-rays from low-energy (<500 keV) proton-induced nuclear reactions. The characteristic energies (4- to 18-MeV) of the gamma-rays coincide with the peak of the photonuclear cross section. The source could be designed to produce gamma-rays of certain selected energies, thereby improving the probability of detecting shielded HEU or providing a capability to determine enrichment inside sealed containers. The fundamental physics of such an interrogation source were studied in this LDRD through scaled ion accelerator experiments and radiation transport modeling. The data were used to assess gamma and neutron yields, background, and photofission-induced signal levels from several (p,{gamma}) target materials under consideration.

  11. Comparison of HEU and LEU neutron spectra in irradiation facilities at the Oregon State TRIGA{sup ®} Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schickler, R.A., E-mail: robert.schickler@oregonstate.edu; Marcum, W.R., E-mail: wade.marcum@oregonstate.edu; Reese, S.R.

    2013-09-15

    Highlights: • The Oregon State TRIGA{sup ®} Reactor neutron spectra is characterized herein. • Neutron spectra between highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium cores are compared. • Discussion is given as to differences between HEU and LEU core spectra results and impact on experiments. -- Abstract: In 2008, the Oregon State TRIGA{sup ®} Reactor (OSTR) was converted from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel lifetime improvement plan (FLIP) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort was driven and supported by the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The basis behind the RERTR program's ongoing conversion effort is to reduce the nuclear proliferation risk of civilian research and test reactors. The original intent of the HEU FLIP fuel was to provide fuel to research reactors that could be utilized for many years before a necessary refueling cycle. As a research reactor, the OSTR provides irradiation facilities for a variety of applications, such as activation analysis, fission-track dating, commercial isotope production, neutron radiography, prompt gamma characterization, and many others. In order to accurately perform these research functions, several studies had been conducted on the HEU FLIP fuel core to characterize the neutron spectra in various experimental facilities of the OSTR (Tiyapun, 1997; Ashbaker, 2005). As useful as these analyses were, they are no longer valid due to the change in fuel composition and the resulting alteration of core performance characteristics. Additionally, the core configuration (fuel reconfiguration) was altered between the HEU and LEU cores. This study characterizes the neutron spectra in various experimental facilities within and around the current LEU core. It also compares the spectra to that which was yielded in the HEU core through use of Monte Carlo n-Particle 5 (MCNP5) and experimental adjustment via a least

  12. Continuing investigations for technology assessment of 99Mo production from LEU [low enriched uranium] targets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vandegrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Marshall, S.L.; Vissers, D.R.; Matos, J.E.

    1987-01-01

    Currently much of the world's supply of 99m Tc for medical purposes is produced from 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). This paper presents the results of our continuing studies on the effects of substituting low enriched uranium (LEU) for HEU in targets for the production of fission product 99 Mo. Improvements in the electrodeposition of thin films of uranium metal continue to increase the appeal for the substitution of LEU metal for HEU oxide films in cylindrical targets. The process is effective for targets fabricated from stainless steel or zircaloy. Included is a cost estimate for setting up the necessary equipment to electrodeposit uranium metal on cylindrical targets. Further investigations on the effect of LEU substitution on processing of these targets are also reported. Substitution of uranium silicides for the uranium-aluminium alloy or uranium aluminide dispersed fuel used in current target designs will allow the substitution of LEU for HEU in these targets with equivalent 99 Mo-yield per target and no change in target geometries. However, this substitution will require modifications in current processing steps due to 1) the insolubility of uranium silicides in alkaline solutions and 2) the presence of significant quantities of silicate in solution. Results to date suggest that substitution of LEU for HEU can be achieved. (Author)

  13. Isotopic analysis of uranium hexafluoride highly enriched in U-235; Analyse isotopique de l'hexafluorure d'uranium fortement enrichi en U 235

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chaussy, L; Boyer, R [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Pierrelatte (France). Centre d' Etudes Nucleaires

    1968-07-01

    Isotopic analysis of uranium in the form of the hexafluoride by mass-spectrometry gives gross results which are not very accurate. Using a linear interpolation method applied to two standards it is possible to correct for this inaccuracy as long as the isotopic concentrations are less than about 10 per cent in U-235. Above this level, the interpolations formula overestimates the results, especially if the enrichment of the analyzed samples is higher than 1.3 with respect to the standards. A formula is proposed for correcting the interpolation equation and for the extending its field of application to high values of the enrichment ({approx_equal}2) and of the concentration. It is shown that by using this correction the results obtained have an accuracy which depends practically only on that of the standards, taking into account the dispersion in the measurements. (authors) [French] L'analyse isotopique de l'uranium sous forme d'hexafluorure, par spectrometrie de masse, fournit des resultats bruts entaches d'inexactitude. Une methode d'interpolation lineaire entre deux etalons permet de corriger cette inexactitude, tant que les concentrations isotopiques sont inferieures a 10 pour cent en U-235 environ. Au-dessus de cette valeur, la formule d'interpolation surestime les resultats, notamment si l'enrichissement des echantillons analyses par rapport aux etalons est superieur a 1,3. On propose une formule de correction de l'equation d'interpolation qui etend son domaine d'application jusqu'a des valeurs elevees d'enrichissement ({approx_equal}2) et de concentration. On montre experimentalement que par cette correction, les resultats atteignent, a la precision des mesures, une exactitude qui ne depend pratiquement plus que de celles des etalons. (auteurs)

  14. RERTR end-game: A win-win framework. Phasing out remaining global HEU commerce by conditionally and temporarily renewing U.S. exports of HEU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuperman, Alan J.; Leventhal, Paul L.

    1997-01-01

    The RERTR program stands on the brink of fulfilling its historic mission. However, a series of missteps and misunderstandings have recently raised the risk that defeat will be snatched from the jaws of victory. Perhaps the most serious threat to the RERTR regime is posed by France's pending import of 625 kilograms of bomb-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia, intended primarily to fuel its high-flux research reactor at the Institute Laue-Langevin in Grenoble, as well as its Orphee research reactor. As the first export of HEU from Russia to a facility outside the former Soviet bloc, this precedential transaction would establish Russia as a new global supplier of bomb-grade uranium, potentially setting the stage for a rise in international HEU commerce, rather than its phase-out as envisioned under the RERTR program. Apparently, France turned to Russia for supply of the fuel because the United States was perceived as unable or unwilling to continue supplying such fuel in the wake of the U.S. Energy Policy Act of 1992, which, pursuant to its so-called Schumer Amendment, places sharp restrictions on HEU exports. Unexplained delays in Russia's shipment of this material to France provide a fortuitous window of opportunity in which efforts can and should be made by France and the United States to resolve present differences in a manner beneficial to each, as well as in the interest of global security. This paper proposes an arrangement under which the United States would renew exports of HEU to France, in exchange for pledges from France enabling the export to comply with the principles and objectives of the RERTR program as embodied in U.S. law. In so doing, the arrangement would obviate the need for Russian HEU export, thereby avoiding its dangerous precedent. By enabling high quality scientific research to continue, while simultaneously helping to fulfill the RERTR program's original goal, such an arrangement would truly be a 'win-win' solution. (author)

  15. A disposition strategy for highly enriched, aluminum-based fuel from research and test reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKibben, J.M.; Gould, T.H.; McDonell, W.R.; Bickford, W.E.

    1994-01-01

    The strategy proposed in this paper offers the Department of Energy an approach for disposing of aluminum-based, highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuels from foreign and domestic research reactors. The proposal is technically, socially, and economically sound. If implemented, it would advance US non-proliferation goals while also disposing of the spent fuel's waste by timely and proven methods using existing technologies and facilities at SRS without prolonged and controversial storage of the spent fuel. The fuel would be processed through 221-H. The radioactive fission products (waste) would be treated along with existing SRS high level waste by vitrifying it as borosilicate glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for disposal in the national geological repository. The HEU would be isotopically diluted, during processing, to low-enriched uranium (LEU) which can not be used to make weapons, thus eliminating proliferation concerns. The LEU can be sold to fabricators of either research reactor fuel or commercial power fuel. This proposed processing-LEU recycle approach has several important advantages over other alternatives, including: Lowest capital investment; lowest net total cost; quickest route to acceptable waste form and final geologic disposal; and likely lowest safety, health, and environmental impacts

  16. HEU age determination by the activity ratio {sup 227}Th/{sup 235}U

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Li, Junjie; Zeng, Lina; Wu, Jian; Zheng, Chun; Li, Jiansheng, E-mail: lastljj@hotmail.com

    2014-02-15

    It is important to measure the age of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) assembly for authentication of the material in the frame of arms control inspections. A new non-destructive gamma spectrometric method for HEU age-dating is reported. This method relies on measuring the daughter/parent activity ratio {sup 227}Th/{sup 235}U by high-resolution gamma spectrometry. Only a narrow gamma range of energy of uranium from 230 keV to 242 keV will be used for analysis. The relative efficiency of every characteristic gamma ray changes in a small range because it has a near energy, which makes the results more accurate in theory. It provides a quick and reliable method for HEU age determination. Several gamma spectra of the same HEU assembly have been measured with different conditions (gain settings, distance and measurement time). When a branching ratio of 12.6% was chosen for the 235.96 keV line of {sup 227}Th, we obtained the activity ratios of (5.61 ± 0.40) × 10{sup −4}, (5.17 ± 0.39) × 10{sup −4}, (5.26 ± 0.39) × 10{sup −4}, (5.10 ± 0.35) × 10{sup −4}, (5.50 ± 0.44) × 10{sup −4} and (5.47 ± 0.42) × 10{sup −4}, respectively. These ratios correspond to ages of 52.2 ± 2.4 years, 49.7 ± 2.3 years, 50.1 ± 2.3 years, 49.3 ± 2.2 years, 51.6 ± 2.5 years and 51.5 ± 2.4 years, respectively, which are consistent with the known age of this material and the results of the U–Bi method.

  17. Technical investigation of a pyrophoric event involving corrosion products from HEU ZPPR fuel plates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Totemeier, T. C.

    2000-01-01

    A pyrophoric event recently occurred which involved corrosion products collected from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel plates used in the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR). This paper summarizes the event and its background, and presents the results of an investigation into its source and mechanism. The investigation focused on characterization of corrosion product samples similar to those involved in the event using thermo-gravimetric analysis (TGA). Burning curve TGA tests were performed to measure the ignition temperature and hydride fractions of corrosion products in several different conditions to assess the effects of passivation treatment and long-term storage on chemical reactivity. The hydride fraction and ignition temperature of the corrosion products were found to be strongly dependent on the corrosion extent of the source metal. The results indicate that the energy source for the event was a considerable quantity of uranium hydride present in the corrosion products, but the specific ignition mechanism could not be identified

  18. Transition from HEU to LEU fuel in Romania's 14-MW TRIGA reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    The 14-MW TRIGA steady state reactor (SSR) located in Pitesti, Romania, first went critical in the fall of 1979. Initially, the core configuration for full power operation used 29 fuel clusters each containing a 5 x 5 square array of HEU U (10 wt% - ZrH - Er 2.8 wt%) fuel-moderator rods (1.295 cm o.d.) clad in Incoloy. With a total inventory of 35 HEU fuel clusters, burnup, considerations required a gradual expansion of the core from 29 to 32 and finally to 35 clusters before the reactor was shut down because of insufficient excess reactivity. At this time each of the original 29 fuel clusters had an average 235 U burnup in the range from 50 to 62%. Because of the U.S. policy regarding the export of highly enriched uranium, fresh HEU TRIGA replacement fuel is not available. After a number of safety-related measurements, the SSR is expected to resume full power operation in the near future using a mixed core containing five LEU TRIGA clusters of the same geometry as the original fuel but with fuel-moderator rods containing 45 wt% U (19.7% 235 U enrichment) and 1.1 wt% Er. Rods for 14 additional LEU fuel clusters will be fabricated by General Atomics. In support of the SSR mixed core operation numerous neutronic calculations have been performed. This paper presents some of the results of those calculations. (author)

  19. Sealing of process valves for the HEU downblending verification experiment at Portsmouth

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baldwin, G.T.; Bartberger, J.C.; Jenkins, C.D.; Perlinski, A.W.; Schoeneman, J.L.; Gordon, D.M.; Whiting, N.E.; Bonner, T.N.; Castle, J.M.

    1998-01-01

    At the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio, USA, excess inventory of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from US defense programs is being diluted to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for commercial use. The conversion is subject to a Verification Experiment overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Verification Experiment is making use of monitoring technologies developed and installed by several DOE laboratories. One of the measures is a system for sealing valves in the process piping, which secures the path followed by uranium hexafluoride gas (UF 6 ) from cylinders at the feed stations to the blend point, where the HEU is diluted with LEU. The Authenticated Item Monitoring System (AIMS) was the alternative proposed by Sandia National Laboratories that was selected by the IAEA. Approximately 30 valves were sealed by the IAEA using AIMS fiber-optic seals (AFOS). The seals employ single-core plastic fiber rated to 125 C to withstand the high-temperature conditions of the heated piping enclosures at Portsmouth. Each AFOS broadcasts authenticated seal status and state-of-health messages via a tamper-protected radio-frequency transmitter mounted outside of the heated enclosure. The messages are received by two collection stations, operated redundantly

  20. Disposition Options for Uranium-233

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beahm, E.C.; Dole, L.R.; Forsberg, C.W.; Icenhour, A.S.; Storch, S.N.

    1999-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program (MD), in support of the U.S. arms-control and nonproliferation policies, has initiated a program to disposition surplus weapons-usable fissile material by making it inaccessible and unattractive for use in nuclear weapons. Weapons-usable fissile materials include plutonium, high-enriched uranium (HEU), and uranium-233 (sup 233)U. In support of this program, Oak Ridge National Laboratory led DOE's contractor efforts to identify and characterize options for the long-term storage and disposal of excess (sup 233)U. Five storage and 17 disposal options were identified and are described herein

  1. Performance and economic penalties of some LEU [low enriched uranium] conversion options for the Australian Reactor HIFAR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCulloch, D.B.; Robinson, G.S.

    1987-01-01

    Performance calculations for the conversion of HIFAR to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel have been extended to a wide range of 235 U loadings per fuel element. Using a simple approximate algorithm for the likely costs of LEU compared with highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements, the increases in annual fuelling costs for LEU compared with HEU fuel are examined for a range of conversion options involving different performance penalties. No significant operational/safety problems were found for any of the options canvassed. (Author)

  2. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Alemania en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2011-07-27

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 29 de abril de 2011, de la Mision Permanente de la Republica Federal de Alemania ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Alemania, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/5491 de 22 de junio de 1998 y en adelante denominadas las 'directrices'), y de conformidad con los anexos B y C de las directrices, presenta las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2010. El Gobierno de la Republica Federal de Alemania tambien ha presentado un estado de sus existencias anuales de uranio muy enriquecido (UME) de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2010.

  3. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Alemania en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-09-04

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una nota verbal, de fecha 3 de julio de 2007, de la Mision Permanente de la Republica Federal de Alemania ante el OIEA, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Alemania, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/549 de 16 de marzo de 1998 y en adelante denominadas 'las Directrices') y de conformidad con los Anexos B y C de las Directrices, ha presentado las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, al 31 de diciembre de 2006. El Gobierno de la Republica Federal de Alemania tambien ha presentado una declaracion relativa a las cifras anuales de sus existencias de uranio muy enriquecido (UME) de uso civil, al 31 de diciembre de 2006.

  4. Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium; Comunicacion recibida de Alemania en relacion con sus politicas referentes a la gestion del plutonio. Declaraciones sobre la gestion del plutonio y del uranio muy enriquecido

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2009-11-02

    The Director General has received a letter dated 16 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2008 [Spanish] El Director General ha recibido una carta de fecha 16 de junio de 2009 dirigida al OIEA por la Mision Permanente de la Republica Federal de Alemania, en cuyos anexos el Gobierno de Alemania, en cumplimiento de su compromiso contraido en virtud de las Directrices para la gestion del plutonio (transcritas en el documento INFCIRC/5491 de 16 de marzo de 1998 y en adelante denominadas 'Directrices') y, de conformidad con los Anexos B y C de las Directrices, ha presentado las cifras anuales de sus existencias de plutonio no irradiado de uso civil y las cantidades estimadas de plutonio contenido en el combustible gastado de reactores de uso civil, al 31 de diciembre de 2008. El Gobierno de la Republica Federal de Alemania tambien ha presentado una declaracion relativa a las cifras anuales de sus existencias de uranio muy enriquecido (UME) de uso civil, a 31 de diciembre de 2008.

  5. Orsphere: Physics Measurments For Bare, HEU(93.2)-Metal Sphere

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marshall, Margaret A. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Bess, John D. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Briggs, J. Blair [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); White, Christine E. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Dyrda, James P. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Tancock, Nigel P. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Mihalczo, John [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-03-01

    In the early 1970s Dr. John T. Mihalczo (team leader), J.J. Lynn, and J.R. Taylor performed experiments at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) with highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal (called Oak Ridge Alloy or ORALLOY) in an attempt to recreate GODIVA I results with greater accuracy than those performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1950s (HEU-MET-FAST-001). The purpose of the Oak Ridge ORALLOY Sphere (ORSphere) experiments was to estimate the unreflected and unmoderated critical mass of an idealized sphere of uranium metal corrected to a density, purity, and enrichment such that it could be compared with the GODIVA I experiments. “The very accurate description of this sphere, as assembled, establishes it as an ideal benchmark for calculational methods and cross-section data files” (Reference 1). While performing the ORSphere experiments care was taken to accurately document component dimensions (±0.0001 inches), masses (±0.01 g), and material data. The experiment was also set up to minimize the amount of structural material in the sphere proximity. Two, correlated spheres were evaluated and judged to be acceptable as criticality benchmark experiments. This evaluation is given in HEU-MET-FAST-100. The second, smaller sphere was used for additional reactor physics measurements. Worth measurements (Reference 1, 2, 3 and 4), the delayed neutron fraction (Reference 3, 4 and 5) and surface material worth coefficient (Reference 1 and 2) are all measured and judged to be acceptable as benchmark data. The prompt neutron decay (Reference 6), relative fission density (Reference 7) and relative neutron importance (Reference 7) were measured, but are not evaluated. Information for the evaluation was compiled from References 1 through 7, the experimental logbooks 8 and 9 ; additional drawings and notes provided by the experimenter; and communication with the lead experimenter, John T. Mihalczo.

  6. The Mailbox Computer System for the IAEA verification experiment on HEU downblending at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aronson, A.L.; Gordon, D.M.

    2000-01-01

    IN APRIL 1996, THE UNITED STATES (US) ADDED THE PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT TO THE LIST OF FACILITIES ELIGIBLE FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS. AT THAT TIME, THE US PROPOSED THAT THE IAEA CARRY OUT A ''VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT'' AT THE PLANT WITH RESPECT TO DOOWNBLENDING OF ABOUT 13 METRIC TONS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IN THE FORM OF URANIUM HEXAFLUROIDE (UF6). DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1997 THROUGH JULY 1998, THE IAEA CARRIED OUT THE REQUESTED VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT. THE VERIFICATION APPROACH USED FOR THIS EXPERIMENT INCLUDED, AMONG OTHER MEASURES, THE ENTRY OF PROCESS-OPERATIONAL DATA BY THE FACILITY OPERATOR ON A NEAR-REAL-TIME BASIS INTO A ''MAILBOX'' COMPUTER LOCATED WITHIN A TAMPER-INDICATING ENCLOSURE SEALED BY THE IAEA

  7. Benchmark criticality experiments for fast fission configuration with high enriched nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sikorin, S.N.; Mandzik, S.G.; Polazau, S.A.; Hryharovich, T.K.; Damarad, Y.V.; Palahina, Y.A.

    2014-01-01

    Benchmark criticality experiments of fast heterogeneous configuration with high enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel were performed using the 'Giacint' critical assembly of the Joint Institute for Power and Nuclear Research - Sosny (JIPNR-Sosny) of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. The critical assembly core comprised fuel assemblies without a casing for the 34.8 mm wrench. Fuel assemblies contain 19 fuel rods of two types. The first type is metal uranium fuel rods with 90% enrichment by U-235; the second one is dioxide uranium fuel rods with 36% enrichment by U-235. The total fuel rods length is 620 mm, and the active fuel length is 500 mm. The outer fuel rods diameter is 7 mm, the wall is 0.2 mm thick, and the fuel material diameter is 6.4 mm. The clad material is stainless steel. The side radial reflector: the inner layer of beryllium, and the outer layer of stainless steel. The top and bottom axial reflectors are of stainless steel. The analysis of the experimental results obtained from these benchmark experiments by developing detailed calculation models and performing simulations for the different experiments is presented. The sensitivity of the obtained results for the material specifications and the modeling details were examined. The analyses used the MCNP and MCU computer programs. This paper presents the experimental and analytical results. (authors)

  8. Conversion of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute nuclear reactor to low enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newton, T.H. Jr.

    1991-01-01

    The Training Reactor was converted to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) aluminide fuel in 1988 and 1989. Tests on the Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) core and LEU cores were performed and comparisons made. The testing consisted of critical loading, thermal neutron flux distribution, excess reactivity, regulating blade reactivity worth, and temperature coefficient of reactivity measurement. Comparisons between the LEU and HEU showed that the critical loading configurations were somewhat different with the HEU core consisting of 24 elements and the LEU core consisting of 21 1/3 elements with excess reactivities of 0.24% ΔK/K for the HEU and 0.16% for the LEU. Thermal neutron flux distributions showed similar trends in both the LEU and HEU cores. The regulating blade worth showed a larger LEU value due to thermal peaking in the blade region and temperature coefficients showed a more negative LEU value due to Doppler broadening. Low induced activity of the HEU fuel permitted shipment to the Westinghouse Savannah River Facility using DOT-6M type B containers on 8 August, 1989. (orig.)

  9. DESIGN STUDY FOR A LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM CORE FOR THE HIGH FLUX ISOTOPE REACTOR, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2010

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jolly, Brian C [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL; Renfro, David G [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Pinkston, Daniel [ORNL

    2011-02-01

    This report documents progress made during FY 2010 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. With axial and radial grading of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current level. Studies are reported of support to a thermal hydraulic test loop design, the implementation of finite element, thermal hydraulic analysis capability, and infrastructure tasks at HFIR to upgrade the facility for operation at 100 MW. A discussion of difficulties with preparing a fuel specification for the uranium-molybdenum alloy is provided. Continuing development in the definition of the fuel fabrication process is described.

  10. The Y-12 National Security Complex Foreign Research Reactor Uranium Supply Production

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nelson, T. [Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation Programs, B and W Y-12, L.L.C., Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States); Keller, A.P. [Disposition and Supply Programs, B and W Y-12, L.L.C., Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

    2011-07-01

    The Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Uranium Supply Program at the Y-12 National Security Complex supports the nonproliferation objectives of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) HEU Disposition, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), and the United States (U.S.) FRR Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Programs. The FRR Supply Program supports the important U.S. government nuclear nonproliferation commitment to serve as a reliable and cost-effective uranium supplier for those foreign research reactors that are converting or have converted to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel under the RERTR Program. The NNSA Y-12 Site Office maintains the prime contracts with foreign government agencies for the supply of LEU for their research reactors. The LEU is produced by down blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that has been declared surplus to the U.S. national defense needs. The down blending and sale of the LEU supports the Surplus HEU Disposition Program Record of Decision to make the HEU non-weapons usable and to recover the economic value of the uranium to the extent feasible. In addition to uranium metal feedstock for fuel fabrication, Y-12 can produce LEU in different forms to support new fuel development or target fabrication for medical isotope production. With production improvements and efficient delivery preparations, Y-12 continues to successfully support the global research reactor community. (author)

  11. Unattended Monitoring of HEU Production in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants using Automated Aerosol Collection and Laser-based Enrichment Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anheier, Norman C.; Bushaw, Bruce A.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear power is enjoying rapid growth as government energy policies and public demand shift toward low carbon energy production. Pivotal to the global nuclear power renaissance is the development and deployment of robust safeguards instrumentation that allows the limited resources of the IAEA to keep pace with the expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle. Undeclared production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) remains a primary proliferation concern for modern gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), due to their massive separative work unit (SWU) processing power and comparably short cascade equilibrium timescale. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing an unattended safeguards instrument, combining continuous aerosol particulate collection with uranium isotope assay, to provide timely detection of HEU production within a GCEP. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulates, followed by laser spectroscopy to characterize the uranium enrichment level. Our prior investigation demonstrated single-shot detection sensitivity approaching the femtogram range and relative isotope ratio uncertainty better than 10% using gadolinium as a surrogate for uranium. In this paper we present measurement results on standard samples containing traces of depleted, natural, and low enriched uranium, as well as measurements on aerodynamic size uranium particles mixed in background materials (e.g., dust, minerals, soils). Improvements and optimizations in the detection electronics, signal timing, calibration, and laser alignment have lead to significant improvements in detection sensitivity and enrichment accuracy, contributing to an overall reduction in the false alarm probability. The sample substrate media was also found to play a significant role in facilitating laser-induced vaporization and the production of energetic plasma conditions, resulting in ablation optimization and further improvements in the isotope abundance sensitivity.

  12. Development of dissolution process for metal foil target containing low enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srinivasan, B.; Hutter, J.C.; Johnson, G.K.; Vandegrift, G.F.

    1994-01-01

    About six times more low enriched uranium (LEU) metal is needed to produce the same quantity of 99 Mo as from a high enriched uranium (HEU) oxide target, under similar conditions of neutron irradiation. In view of this, the post-irradiation processing procedures of the LEU target are likely to be different from the Cintichem process procedures now in use for the HEU target. The authors have begun a systematic study to develop modified procedures for LEU target dissolution and 99 Mo separation. The dissolution studies include determination of the dissolution rate, chemical state of uranium in the solution, and the heat evolved in the dissolution reaction. From these results the authors conclude that a mixture of nitric and sulfuric acid is a suitable dissolver solution, albeit at higher concentration of nitric acid than in use for the HEU targets. Also, the dissolver vessel now in use for HEU targets is inadequate for the LEU target, since higher temperature and higher pressure will be encountered in the dissolution of LEU targets. The desire is to keep the modifications to the Cintichem process to a minimum, so that the switch from HEU to LEU can be achieved easily

  13. Energy–angle correlation of neutrons and gamma-rays emitted from an HEU source

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miloshevsky, G., E-mail: gennady@purdue.edu; Hassanein, A.

    2014-06-01

    Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) yield very unique fission signatures, namely correlated neutrons and gamma-rays. A major challenge is not only to detect, but also to rapidly identify and recognize SNM with certainty. Accounting for particle multiplicity and correlations is one of standard ways to detect SNM. However, many parameter data such as joint distributions of energy, angle, lifetime, and multiplicity of neutrons and gamma-rays can lead to better recognition of SNM signatures in the background radiation noise. These joint distributions are not well understood. The Monte Carlo simulations of the transport of neutrons and gamma-rays produced from spontaneous and interrogation-induced fission of SNM are carried out using the developed MONSOL computer code. The energy spectra of neutrons and gamma-rays from a bare Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) source are investigated. The energy spectrum of gamma-rays shows spectral lines by which HEU isotopes can be identified, while those of neutrons do not show any characteristic lines. The joint probability density function (JPDF) of the energy–angle association of neutrons and gamma-rays is constructed. Marginal probability density functions (MPDFs) of energy and angle are derived from JPDF. A probabilistic model is developed for the analysis of JPDF and MPDFs. This probabilistic model is used to evaluate mean values, standard deviations, covariance and correlation between the energy and angle of neutrons and gamma-rays emitted from the HEU source. For both neutrons and gamma-rays, it is found that the energy–angle variables are only weakly correlated.

  14. IAEA Mission Sees High Commitment to Safety at Ghana's Research Reactor After HEU to LEU Fuel Conversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2018-01-01

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said the operator of Ghana’s research reactor has demonstrated a high commitment to safety following the conversion of the reactor core to use low enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel instead of high enriched uranium (HEU). The team also made recommendations for further safety enhancements. The Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) team concluded a five-day mission today to assess the safety of the GHARR-1 research reactor, originally commissioned in 1994. The 30 kW reactor, operated by the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) at the National Nuclear Research Institute in the capital Accra, is used primarily for trace element analysis for industrial or agricultural purposes, research, education and training. In 2017, the reactor core was converted in a joint effort by Ghana, the United States and China, with assistance from the IAEA. The IAEA supported the operation to eliminate proliferation risks associated with HEU, while maintaining important scientific research. The team made recommendations for improvements to the GAEC, including: • Completing the revision of reactor safety and operating documents to reflect the results of the commissioning of the reactor after the core fuel conversion. • Enhancing the training and qualification programme for operating personnel. • Improving the capability for monitoring operational safety parameters under all conditions. • Strengthening radiation protection by establishing an effective radiation monitoring of workplace. The GAEC said it will request a follow-up INSARR mission by 2020.

  15. The SLOWPOKE-2 reactor with low enrichment uranium oxide fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Townes, B.M.; Hilborn, J.W.

    1985-06-01

    A SLOWPOKE-2 reactor core contains less than 1 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the proliferation risk is very low. However, to overcome proliferation concerns a new low enrichment uranium (LEU) fuelled reactor core has been designed. This core contains approximately 180 fuel elements based on the Zircaloy-4 clad UOsub(2) CANDU fuel element, but with a smaller outside diameter. The physics characteristics of this new reactor core ensure the inherent safety of the reactor under all conceivable conditions and thus the basic SLOWPOKE safety philosophy which permits unattended operation is not affected

  16. Continuing investigations for technology assessment of 99Mo production from LEU [low enriched Uranium] targets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vandergrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Marshall, S.L.; Vissers, D.R.; Matos, J.E.

    1987-01-01

    Currently much of the world's supply of /sup 99m/Tc for medical purposes is produced from 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). The need for /sup 99m/Tc is continuing to grow, especially in developing countries, where needs and national priorities call for internal production of 99 Mo. This paper presents the results of our continuing studies on the effects of substituting low enriched Uranium (LEU) for HEU in targets for the production of fission product 99 Mo. Improvements in the electrodeposition of thin films of uranium metal are reported. These improvements continue to increase the appeal for the substitution of LEU metal for HEU oxide films in cylindrical targets. The process is effective for targets fabricated from stainless steel or hastaloy. A cost estimate for setting up the necessary equipment to electrodeposit uranium metal on cylindrical targets is reported. Further investigations on the effect of LEU substitution on processing of these targets are also reported. Substitution of uranium silicides for the uranium-aluminum alloy or uranium aluminide dispersed fuel used in other current target designs will allow the substitution of LEU for HEU in these targets with equivalent 99 Mo-yield per target and no change in target geometries. However, this substitution will require modifications in current processing steps due to (1) the insolubility of uranium silicides in alkaline solutions and (2) the presence of significant quantities of silicate in solution. Results to date suggest that both concerns can be handled and that substitution of LEU for HEU can be achieved

  17. Design Study for a Low-Enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2008

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Primm, Trent [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Jolly, Brian C [ORNL

    2009-03-01

    This report documents progress made during FY 2008 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. With axial and radial grading of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in reactor performance from the current level. Results of selected benchmark studies imply that calculations of LEU performance are accurate. Scoping experiments with various manufacturing methods for forming the LEU alloy profile are presented.

  18. Loading and initial start-up testing of the low-enrichment uranium core for the Ohio State University research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Talnagi, J.W.

    1989-01-01

    Conversion of the Ohio State University Research Reactor (OSURR) from high-enrichment uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enrichment uranium (LEU) fuel elements was begun in August 1985, with funding provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the university. Conversion of the OSURR from HEU to LEU fuel was successfully completed. The reactor is operational at 10-kW steady-state thermal power. Measurements of selected core parameters have been made and compared with predicted values and previous values for the HEU core. In general, measured results agree well with predicted performance, and minor changes have been detected in certain core parameters as a result of the change to LEU fuel. Future plans include additional core testing and a possible increase in operating power

  19. Uranium silicide activities at Babcock and Wilcox

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noel, W.W.; Freim, J.B.

    1983-01-01

    Babcock and Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (NNFD) in conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is actively involved in the Reduced Enrichment Research Test Reactor (RERTR) Program to produce low enriched fuel elements for research reactors. B and W and ANL have undertaken a joint effort in which NNFD will fabricate two low enriched uranium (LEU), Oak Ridge Reactor (ORR) elements with uranium silicide fuel furnished by ANL. These elements are being fabricated for irradiation testing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Concurrently with this program, NNFD is developing and implementing the uranium silicide and uranium aluminide fuel fabrication technology. NNFD is fabricating the uranium silicide ORR elements in a two-phase program, Development and Production. To summarize: 1. Full size fuel plates can be made with U 3 SiAl but the fabricator must prevent oxidation of the compact prior to hot roll bonding; 2. Providing the ANL U 3 Si x irradiation results are successful, NNFD plans to provide two ORR elements during February 1983; 3. NNFD is developing and implementing U 3 Si x and UAI x fuel fabrication technology to be operational in 1983; 4. NNFD can supply U 3 O 8 high enriched uranium (HEU) or low enriched uranium (LEU) research reactor elements; 5. NNFD is capable of providing high quality, cost competitive LEU or HEU research reactor elements to meet the needs of the customer

  20. Subcritical Neutron Multiplication Measurements of HEU Using Delayed Neutrons as the Driving Source

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hollas, C.L.; Goulding, C.A.; Myers, W.L.

    1999-01-01

    A new method for the determination of the multiplication of highly enriched uranium systems is presented. The method uses delayed neutrons to drive the HEU system. These delayed neutrons are from fission events induced by a pulsed 14-MeV neutron source. Between pulses, neutrons are detected within a medium efficiency neutron detector using 3 He ionization tubes within polyethylene enclosures. The neutron detection times are recorded relative to the initiation of the 14-MeV neutron pulse, and subsequently analyzed with the Feynman reduced variance method to extract singles, doubles and triples neutron counting rates. Measurements have been made on a set of nested hollow spheres of 93% enriched uranium, with mass values from 3.86 kg to 21.48 kg. The singles, doubles and triples counting rates for each uranium system are compared to calculations from point kinetics models of neutron multiplicity to assign multiplication values. These multiplication values are compared to those from MC NP K-Code calculations

  1. Critical review of uranium resources and production capability to 2020

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-08-01

    This report was prepared to assess the changing uranium supply and demand situation as well as the adequacy of uranium resources and the production capability to supply uranium concentrate to meet reactor demand through 2020. Uranium production has been meeting only 50 to 60 percent of the world requirements with the balance met from sale of excess inventory offered on the market at low prices. It is generally agreed by most specialists that the end of the excess inventory is approaching. With inventory no longer able to meet the production shortfall it is necessary to significantly expand uranium production to fill an increasing share of demand. Non-production supplies of uranium, such as the blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) warheads to produce low enriched reactor fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel, are also expected to grow in importance as a fuel source. This analysis addresses three major concerns as follows: adequacy of resources to meet projected demand; adequacy of production capability to produce the uranium; and market prices to sustain production to fill demand. This analysis indicates uranium mine production to be the primary supply providing about 76 to 78 percent of cumulative needs through 2020. Alternative sources supplying the balance, in order of relative importance are: (1) low enriched uranium (LEU) blended from 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) Russian weapons, plus initial US Department of Energy (US DOE) stockpile sales (11 to 13%); (2) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (6%) and; (3) utility and Russian stockpiles. Further this report gives uranium production profiles by countries: CIS producers (Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) and other producers (Australia, Canada, China, Gabon, Mongolia, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, United States of America)

  2. Technical problems in case of utilizing uranium of medium enrichment for a research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanda, Keiji; Shibata, Shun-ichi

    1979-01-01

    Usually, highly enriched uranium of 90 - 93% is used for research reactors, but the US government proposed the strong policy to use low enriched uranium of the uranium of medium enrichment in unavoidable case from the viewpoint of the resistance to nuclear proliferation in November, 1977. This policy is naturally applied to Japan also. The export of highly enriched uranium will be permitted only when the President approves it after the technical and economical evaluations by the government. The Kyoto University high flux reactor has the features which are not seen in other research reactors, such as medical irradiation, and it is hard to attain the objectives of researches unless HEU is used. The application for the export of HEU was accepted in February, 1978. The nuclear characteristics of the KUHFR when medium or low enriched uranium is used, the criticality experiment in the KUCA using the uranium of medium enrichment, and the burning test on the uranium fuel plates of medium enrichment are described. The research project to lower the degree of enrichment in the fuel for research and test reactors is expected to be continued down to less than 20%. The MEU of 45% enrichment will be actually used in 1983. (Kako, I.)

  3. Shipment of VINCA Institute's HEU fresh fuel to Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, Milan; Sotic, Obrad

    2002-01-01

    This paper shows, for the first time, the basic data related to the recent shipment of the fresh HEU fuel elements from Yugoslavia back to Russia for uranium down blending. In this way, Yugoslavia gives its contribution to the RERTR program and to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible terrorist action against nuclear material potentially usable for production of nuclear weapons. (author)

  4. Foreign research reactor uranium supply program: The Y-12 national security complex process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, T.; Eddy, B.G.

    2010-01-01

    The Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Uranium Supply Program at the Y-12 National Security Complex supports the nonproliferation objectives of the HEU Disposition Program, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, and the United States FRR Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program. The Y-12 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 Site Office maintains the prime contracts with foreign governments for the supply of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) for their research reactors. The LEU is produced by down blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that has been declared surplus to the U.S. national defense needs. The down blending and sale of the LEU supports the Surplus HEU Disposition Program Record of Decision to make the HEU non-weapons usable and to recover the economic value of the uranium to the extent feasible. This program supports the important U.S. government and nuclear nonproliferation commitment to serve as a reliable and cost-effective uranium supplier for those foreign research reactors that are converting or have converted to LEU fuel under the guidance of the NNSA RERTR Program. In conjunction with the FRR SNF Acceptance Program which supports the global nonproliferation efforts to disposition U.S.-origin HEU, the Y-12 FRR Uranium Supply Program can provide the LEU for the replacement fuel fabrication. In addition to feedstock for fuel fabrication, Y-12 supplies LEU for target fabrication for medical isotope production. The Y-12 process uses supply forecasting tools, production improvements and efficient delivery preparations to successfully support the global research reactor community

  5. Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Y-12 National Security Complex, Model ES-3100 Package with Bulk HEU Contents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anderson, James [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Goins, Monty [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Paul, Pran [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wilkinson, Alan [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wilson, David [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-09-03

    This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) presents the results of the safety analysis prepared in support of the Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) request for licensing of the Model ES-3100 package with bulk highly enriched uranium (HEU) contents and issuance of a Type B(U) Fissile Material Certificate of Compliance. This SARP, published in the format specified in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 7.9 and using information provided in UCID-21218 and NRC Regulatory Guide 7.10, demonstrates that the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) ES-3100 package with bulk HEU contents meets the established NRC regulations for packaging, preparation for shipment, and transportation of radioactive materials given in Title 10, Part 71, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [10 CFR 71] as well as U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for packaging and shipment of hazardous materials given in Title 49 CFR. To protect the health and safety of the public, shipments of adioactive materials are made in packaging that is designed, fabricated, assembled, tested, procured, used, maintained, and repaired in accordance with the provisions cited above. Safety requirements addressed by the regulations that must be met when transporting radioactive materials are containment of radioactive materials, radiation shielding, and assurance of nuclear subcriticality.

  6. Long Range Active Detection of HEU Based on Thermal Neutron Multiplication

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Forman L.; Dioszegi I.; Salwen, C.; and Vanier, P.E.

    2010-05-24

    We report on the results of measurements of proton irradiation on a series of targets at Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL) Alternate Gradient Synchrotron Facility (AGS), in collaboration with LANL and SNL. We examined the prompt radiation environment in the tunnel for the DTRA-sponsored series (E 972), which investigated the penetration of air and subsequent target interaction of 4 GeV proton pulses. Measurements were made by means of an organic scintillator with a 500 MHz bandwidth system. We found that irradiation of a depleted uranium (DU) target resulted in a large gamma-ray signal in the 100-500 µsec time region after the proton flash when the DU was surrounded by polyethylene, but little signal was generated if it was surrounded by boron-loaded polyethylene. Subsequent Monte Carlo (MCNPX) calculations indicated that the source of the signal was consistent with thermal neutron capture in DU. The MCNPX calculations also indicated that if one were to perform the same experiment with a highly enriched uranium (HEU) target there would be a distinctive fast neutron yield in this 100-500 µsec time region from thermal neutron-induced fission. The fast neutrons can be recorded by the same direct current system and differentiated from gamma ray pulses in organic scintillator by pulse shape discrimination.

  7. Report of the Working Party on the conversion of HIFAR to low enrichment uranium fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-06-01

    This report states the effect on research reactor operations and applications of international and national political decisions relating to fuel enrichment. Technical work done in Australia and overseas to establish parameters for conversion of research reactors from High Enrichment Uranium (HEU) to Low Enrichment Uranium (LEU) have been considered in developing a strategy for HIFAR. The requirements of the research groups, isotope production group and reactor operating staff have been considered. For HIFAR to continue to provide the required facilities in support of the national need, it is concluded these should be no reduction of neutron flux

  8. Characterization of Uranium-Bearing Material by Passive Non-Destructive Gamma Spectrometry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lakosi, L.; Zsigrai, J.; Nguyen, C.T.

    2009-01-01

    Characterization of nuclear materials is equally important in nuclear safeguards (inventory verification) and in nuclear security (revealing illicit trafficking). Analysis of materials is a key issue in both fields. Natural (NU), depleted (DU), low-enriched (LEU), and high-enriched uranium (HEU) samples were analysed by high resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS). Isotopic composition and total U-content of reactor fuel pellets and powder were determined. A unique HRGS method was developed for the first time for determining the production date of the material of unknown origin. Identifying reprocessed uranium proved to be possible by HRGS as well.

  9. Converting targets and processes for fission-product molybdenum-99 from high- to low-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vandegrift, G.F.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Aase, S.

    1999-01-01

    Most of the world's supply of 99 Mo is produced by the fissioning of 235 U in high-enriched uranium targets (HEU, generally 93% 235 U). To reduce nuclear-proliferation concerns, the U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor Program is working to convert the current HEU targets to low-enriched uranium (LEU, 235 U). Switching to LEU targets also requires modifying the separation processes. Current HEU processes can be classified into two main groups based on whether the irradiated target is dissolved in acid or base. Our program has been working on both fronts, with development of targets for acid-side processes being the furthest along. However, using an LEU metal foil target may allow the facile replacement of HEU for both acid and basic dissolution processes. Demonstration of the irradiation and 99 Mo separation processes for the LEU metal-foil targets is being done in cooperation with researchers at the Indonesian PUSPIPTEK facility. We are also developing LEU UO 2 /Al dispersion plates as substitutes for HEU UA1 x /A1 dispersion plates for base-side processes. Results show that conversion to LEU is technically feasible; working with producers is essential to lowering any economic penalty associated with conversion. (author)

  10. Safeguards considerations for uranium enrichment facilities, as applied to gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-03-01

    The goals and objectives of IAEA safeguards as they are understood by the authors based on published documents are reviewed. These goals are then used to derive safeguards concerns, diversion strategies, and potential safeguards measures for four base cases, the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a diffusion plant, the diversion of low enriched uranium (LEU) at a diffusion plant, the diversion of HEU at a gas centrifuge plant, and the diversion of LEU at a gas centrifuge plant. Tables of estimated capabilities are given for each case, under the assumption that the inspector would have access: to the cascade perimeter at or after the start of operations, to the cascade perimeter throughout construction and operation, to the cascade perimeter during operation plus a one-time access to the cascade itself, to the cascade during construction but only its perimeter during operation, or to the cascade itself during construction and operation

  11. Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, Hans; Laucht, Juergen

    1996-01-01

    Since the RERTR meeting in 1990 at Newport/USA, NUKEM recommended that the research reactor community agree upon a worldwide unified technical specification for low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) since there existed numerous specifications both from suppliers/fabricators and research reactors. The target recommended by NUKEM is to arrive at a worldwide unified standard specification in order to facilitate supplies of LEU and HEU to fabricators for fabrication of research reactor fuel elements. In our paper presented at the RERTR meeting at Paris in September 1995, we pointed out that LEU and HEU supplied by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in the past was never 'virgin' material, i.e., it was mixed with reprocessed uranium. Our recommendation was to include this fact in the proposed unified specification. Since the RERTR meeting in 1995 progress on a unified standard specification has been made and we would like to provide more specific information about that in this paper. Furthermore, we will deal with the question whether there is a secure supply of LEU for converted research reactors. We list current and potential suppliers of LEU, noting however, that the DOE has for a number of years been unable to supply any LEU due to production problems. The future availability of LEU of U.S. origin is, of course, essential for those research reactor operators which have converted their reactors from HEU to LEU and which are intending to return spent fuel of U.S. origin to the U.S.A. (author)

  12. Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF 6 ) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ''transparency),'' and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed

  13. Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-01-01

    The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

  14. Conversion of research and test reactors to low enriched uranium fuel: technical overview and program status

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roglans-Ribas, J.

    2008-01-01

    Many of the nuclear research and test reactors worldwide operate with high enriched uranium fuel. In response to worries over the potential use of HEU from research reactors in nuclear weapons, the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a program - the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) - in 1978 to develop the technology necessary to reduce the use of HEU fuel by converting research reactors to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The Reactor Conversion program is currently under the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). 55 of the 129 reactors included in the scope have been already converted to LEU fuel or have shutdown prior to conversion. The major technical activities of the Conversion Program include: (1) the development of advanced LEU fuels; (2) conversion analysis and conversion support; and (3) technology development for the production of Molybdenum-99 (Mo 99 ) with LEU targets. The paper provides an overview of the status of the program, the technical challenges and accomplishments, and the role of international collaborations in the accomplishment of the Conversion Program objectives. Nuclear research and test reactors worldwide have been in operation for over 60 years. Many of these facilities operate with high enriched uranium fuel. In response to increased worries over the potential use of HEU from research reactors in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a program - the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) - in 1978 to develop the technology necessary to reduce the use of HEU fuel in research reactors by converting them to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The reactor conversion program was initially focused on U.S.-supplied reactors, but in the early 1990s it expanded and began to collaborate with Russian institutes with the objective of converting Russian supplied reactors to the use of LEU fuel.

  15. The development of uranium foil farication technology utilizing twin roll method for Mo-99 irradiation target

    CERN Document Server

    Kim, C K; Park, H D

    2002-01-01

    MDS Nordion in Canada, occupying about 75% of global supply of Mo-99 isotope, has provided the irradiation target of Mo-99 using the rod-type UAl sub x alloys with HEU(High Enrichment Uranium). ANL (Argonne National Laboratory) through co-operation with BATAN in Indonesia, leading RERTR (Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors) program substantially for nuclear non-proliferation, has designed and fabricated the annular cylinder of uranium targets, and successfully performed irradiation test, in order to develop the fabrication technology of fission Mo-99 using LEU(Low Enrichment Uranium). As the uranium foils could be fabricated in laboratory scale, not in commercialized scale by hot rolling method due to significant problems in foil quality, productivity and economic efficiency, attention has shifted to the development of new technology. Under these circumstances, the invention of uranium foil fabrication technology utilizing twin-roll casting method in KAERI is found to be able to fabricate LEU or...

  16. Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Design with Two-Dimensional Grading for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL

    2011-05-01

    An engineering design study of the conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel is ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The computational models developed during fiscal year 2010 to search for an LEU fuel design that would meet the requirements for the conversion and the results obtained with these models are documented and discussed in this report. Estimates of relevant reactor performance parameters for the LEU fuel core are presented and compared with the corresponding data for the currently operating HEU fuel core. The results obtained indicate that the LEU fuel design would maintain the current performance of the HFIR with respect to the neutron flux to the central target region, reflector, and beam tube locations under the assumption that the operating power for the reactor fueled with LEU can be increased from the current value of 85 MW to 100 MW.

  17. Operational experience in the production of 131Molybdenum and 99Iodine with high and low uranium enrichment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bravo, C.; Cristini, Pablo R..; Novello, A.; Bronca, M.; Cestau, Daniel; Centurion, R.; Bavaro, R.; Cestau, J.; Gualda, E.; Bronca, P.; Carranza, Eduardo C.

    2009-01-01

    In 1992, in an effort to curtail use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), hoping to alleviate nuclear security concerns, United States passed the Schumer amendment to the Energy Policy Act. This legislation conditioned U.S. export of HEU to foreign companies, understanding that these companies would switch as soon as possible to Lowly Enriched Uranium (LEU). This paper describes 99 Mo production flow chart, characteristics of process cells, shielding, systems of manipulation at distance, cell ventilation system and the method for personal dose monitoring. Production evolution for the span of years 1998 to 2007 is given by indicators, keeping in mind enrichment proportion change. Evolution shown on the indicators is directly related to the application of Safety Culture concepts adopted by personnel. (author)

  18. Conversion and standardization of university reactor fuels using low-enrichment uranium - Options and costs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, D.R.; Matos, J.E.; Young, H.H.

    1985-01-01

    The highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel used in twenty United States university reactors can be viewed as contributing to the risk of theft or diversion of weapons-useable material. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a policy statement expressing its concern and has published a proposed rule on limiting the use of HEU in NRC-licensed non-power reactors. The fuel options, functional impacts, licensing, and scheduling of conversion and standardization of these reactor fuels to use of low-enrichment uranium (LEU) have been assessed. The university reactors span a wide range in form and function, from medium-power intense neutron sources where HEU fuel may be required, to low-power training and research facilities where HEU fuel is unnecessary. Conversion provides an opportunity to standardize university reactor fuels and improve reactor utilization in some cases. The entire program is estimated to cost about $10 million and to last about five years. Planning for conversion and standardization is facilitated by the U.S. Department of Energy. (author)

  19. Conversion and standardization of university reactor fuels using low-enrichment uranium - options and costs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, D.R.; Matos, J.E.; Young, H.H.

    1985-01-01

    The highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel used in twenty United States university reactors can be viewed as contributing to the risk of theft or diversion of weapons-useable material. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a policy statement expressing its concern and has published a proposed rule on limiting the use of HEU in NRC-licensed non-power reactors. The fuel options, functional impacts, licensing, and scheduling of conversion and standardization of these reactor fuels to use of low-enrichment uranium (LEU) have been assessed. The university reactors span a wide range in form and function, from medium-power intense neutron sources where HEU fuel may be required, to low-power training and research facilities where HEU fuel is unnecessary. Conversion provides an opportunity to standardize university reactor fuels and improve reactor utilization in some cases. The entire program is estimated to cost about $10 million and to last about five years. Planning for conversion and standardization is facilitated by the US Department of Energy. 20 refs., 1 tab

  20. Cooperative efforts for the removal of high-enriched fresh fuel from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopwood, W.; Moses, S.; Pesic, M.; Sotic, O.; Wander, T.

    2003-01-01

    In August 2002, the inventory of high-enriched uranium (HEU) fresh fuel at the Vinca Institute in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, was repackaged and shipped to the Russian Federation (R.F.), its country of origin under the former Soviet Union. Several thousand small fuel elements were repackaged by the Vinca Institute into approved shipping containers provided by the RF and loaded onto the approved ground transportation vehicle. The transportation from the Vinca Institute to the Belgrade Airport was done under the planning and protection of Yugoslavian and Serbian military and police organizations, with technical oversight being provided by the Vinca staff that escorted the convoy. Under constant security protection, the Russian crew loaded the fuel containers onto the cargo plane, and later it departed for an airport near Dimitrovgrad, Russia. In addition to the domestic control and accounting provided during this operation, this inventory was under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and its inspectors appropriately confirmed, sealed and documented the inventory. The United States (U.S.) observers were also present, and appropriate data were collected because of nonproliferation interests and contractual support for all phases of the operation. Since this event, the Vinca staff has generated several papers describing the technical background and detailed activities of this operation. This paper describes the removal from the U.S. observers perspectives and recognizes the significant cooperation among the supporting countries and the achievements of the organizations directly involved. (author)

  1. Isotope Enrichment Detection by Laser Ablation - Laser Absorption Spectrometry: Automated Environmental Sampling and Laser-Based Analysis for HEU Detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anheier, Norman C.; Bushaw, Bruce A.

    2010-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear power, and consequently the uranium enrichment industry, requires the development of new safeguards technology to mitigate proliferation risks. Current enrichment monitoring instruments exist that provide only yes/no detection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) production. More accurate accountancy measurements are typically restricted to gamma-ray and weight measurements taken in cylinder storage yards. Analysis of environmental and cylinder content samples have much higher effectiveness, but this approach requires onsite sampling, shipping, and time-consuming laboratory analysis and reporting. Given that large modern gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) can quickly produce a significant quantity (SQ ) of HEU, these limitations in verification suggest the need for more timely detection of potential facility misuse. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing an unattended safeguards instrument concept, combining continuous aerosol particulate collection with uranium isotope assay, to provide timely analysis of enrichment levels within low enriched uranium facilities. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulate samples, followed by wavelength tuned laser diode spectroscopy to characterize the uranium isotopic ratio through subtle differences in atomic absorption wavelengths. Environmental sampling (ES) media from an integrated aerosol collector is introduced into a small, reduced pressure chamber, where a focused pulsed laser vaporizes material from a 10 to 20-(micro)m diameter spot of the surface of the sampling media. The plume of ejected material begins as high-temperature plasma that yields ions and atoms, as well as molecules and molecular ions. We concentrate on the plume of atomic vapor that remains after the plasma has expanded and then cooled by the surrounding cover gas. Tunable diode lasers are directed through this plume and each isotope is detected by monitoring absorbance

  2. HEU and Leu FueL Shielding Comparative Study Applied for Spent Fuel Transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Margeanu, C.A.; Margeanu, S.; Barbos, D.

    2009-01-01

    INR Pitesti owns and operates a TRIGA dual-core Research Reactor for material testing, power reactor fuel and nuclear safety studies. The dual core concept involves the operation of a 14 MW TRIGA steady-state, high flux research and material testing reactor at one end of a large pool, and the independent operation of an annular-core pulsing reactor (TRIGA-ACPR) at the other end of the pool. The steady-state reactor is mostly used for long term testing of power reactor fuel components (pellets, pins, subassemblies and fuel assemblies) followed by post-irradiation examination. Following the general trend to replace the He fuel type (High Enriched Uranium) by Leu fuel type (Low Enriched Uranium), in the light of international agreements between IAEA and the states using He fuel in their nuclear reactors, Inr Past's have been accomplished the TRIGA research reactor core full conversion on May 2006. The He fuel repatriation in US in the frame of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Return Programme effectively started in 1999, the final stage being achieved in summer of 2008. Taking into account for the possible impact on the human and environment, in all activities associated to nuclear fuel cycle, the spent fuel or radioactive waste characteristics must be well known. Shielding calculations basic tasks consist in radiation doses calculation, in order to prevent any risks both for personnel protection and impact on the environment during the spent fuel manipulation, transport and storage. The paper is a comparative study of Leu and He fuel utilization effects for the shielding analysis during spent fuel transport. A comparison against the measured data for He spent fuel, available from the last stage of the spent fuel repatriation, is presented. All the geometrical and material data related on the spent fuel shipping cask were considered according to the Nac-Lt Cask approved model. The shielding analysis estimates radiation doses to shipping cask wall surface

  3. High enrichment to low enrichment core's conversion. Technical securities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abbate, P.; Madariaga, M.R.

    1990-01-01

    This work presents the fulfillment of the technical securities subscribed by INVAP S.E. for the conversion of a high enriched uranium core. The reactor (of 5 thermal Mw), built in the 50's and 60's, is of the 'swimming pool' type, with light water and fuel elements of the curve plates MTR type, enriched at 93.15 %. These are neutronic and thermohydraulic securities. (Author) [es

  4. Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion Activities for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Renfro, David G [ORNL; Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Griffin, Frederick P [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL

    2012-03-01

    This report describes progress made during FY11 in ORNL activities to support converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum (UMo) alloy. With both radial and axial contouring of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current levels achieved with HEU fuel. Studies are continuing to demonstrate that the fuel thermal safety margins can be preserved following conversion. Studies are also continuing to update other aspects of the reactor steady state operation and accident response for the effects of fuel conversion. Technical input has been provided to Oregon State University in support of their hydraulic testing program. The HFIR conversion schedule was revised and provided to the GTRI program. In addition to HFIR conversion activities, technical support was provided directly to the Fuel Fabrication Capability program manager.

  5. Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion Activities for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Renfro, David G.; Cook, David Howard; Freels, James D.; Griffin, Frederick P.; Ilas, Germina; Sease, John D.; Chandler, David

    2012-01-01

    This report describes progress made during FY11 in ORNL activities to support converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum (UMo) alloy. With both radial and axial contouring of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current levels achieved with HEU fuel. Studies are continuing to demonstrate that the fuel thermal safety margins can be preserved following conversion. Studies are also continuing to update other aspects of the reactor steady state operation and accident response for the effects of fuel conversion. Technical input has been provided to Oregon State University in support of their hydraulic testing program. The HFIR conversion schedule was revised and provided to the GTRI program. In addition to HFIR conversion activities, technical support was provided directly to the Fuel Fabrication Capability program manager.

  6. Neutronic calculations for the conversion of the University of Florida Training Reactor from HEU to LEU fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dugan, E T; Diaz, N J [Department of Nuclear Engineering Sciences, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL (United States); Kniedler, G S [Reactor Analysis Group, TVA, Chattanooga, TN (United States)

    1983-09-01

    The University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) is located on the University of Florida campus in Gainesville, Florida. The reactor is the Argonaut type, heterogeneous in design and currently fueled with 93% enriched, uranium-aluminum alloy MTR plate-type fuel. Investigations are being performed to examine te feasibility of replacing the highly-enriched fuel of the current UFTR with 4.8% enriched, cylindrical pin SPERT fuel. The SPERT fuel is stainless steel clad and contains uranium dioxide (UO{sub 2}) pellets. On a broad spectrum, training reactor conversion from high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU) fueled facilities has been a continuing concern in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and significant work has been done in this area by the Argonne RERTR Program. The International Atomic Energy Agency cites three reasons for reactor conversion to low-enriched uranium. The main reason is the desire to reduce the proliferation potential of research reactor fuels. The second is to increase the assurance of continued fuel availability in the face of probable restrictions on the supply of highly-enriched uranium. The third reason is the possible reduction in requirements for physical security measures during fabrication, transportation, storage and use. This same IAEA report points out that the three reasons stated for the conversion of the fuel of research reactors are interrelated and cannot be considered individually. The concerns of the Nuclear Engineering Sciences Department at the University of Florida relating to the HEU fuel of the UFTR coincide with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The primary reason for going to low-enriched pin-type fuel is the concern with proliferation provoked by the highly-enriched plate fuel which has led to tighter security of nuclear facilities such as the UFTR. A second reason for changing to the pin-type fuel is because of difficulties that are being encountered in the supply of

  7. Neutronic calculations for the conversion of the University of Florida Training Reactor from HEU to LEU fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dugan, E.T.; Diaz, N.J.; Kniedler, G.S.

    1983-01-01

    The University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) is located on the University of Florida campus in Gainesville, Florida. The reactor is the Argonaut type, heterogeneous in design and currently fueled with 93% enriched, uranium-aluminum alloy MTR plate-type fuel. Investigations are being performed to examine te feasibility of replacing the highly-enriched fuel of the current UFTR with 4.8% enriched, cylindrical pin SPERT fuel. The SPERT fuel is stainless steel clad and contains uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) pellets. On a broad spectrum, training reactor conversion from high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU) fueled facilities has been a continuing concern in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and significant work has been done in this area by the Argonne RERTR Program. The International Atomic Energy Agency cites three reasons for reactor conversion to low-enriched uranium. The main reason is the desire to reduce the proliferation potential of research reactor fuels. The second is to increase the assurance of continued fuel availability in the face of probable restrictions on the supply of highly-enriched uranium. The third reason is the possible reduction in requirements for physical security measures during fabrication, transportation, storage and use. This same IAEA report points out that the three reasons stated for the conversion of the fuel of research reactors are interrelated and cannot be considered individually. The concerns of the Nuclear Engineering Sciences Department at the University of Florida relating to the HEU fuel of the UFTR coincide with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The primary reason for going to low-enriched pin-type fuel is the concern with proliferation provoked by the highly-enriched plate fuel which has led to tighter security of nuclear facilities such as the UFTR. A second reason for changing to the pin-type fuel is because of difficulties that are being encountered in the supply of the

  8. Calculation of mixed HEU-LEU cores for the HOR research reactor with the scale code system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leege, P.F.A. de; Gibcus, H.P.M.; Hoogenboom, J.E.; Vries, J.W. de

    1997-01-01

    The HOR reactor of Interfaculty Reactor Institute (IRI), Delft, The Netherlands, will be converted to use low enriched fuel (LEU) assemblies. As there are still many usable high enriched (HEU) fuel assemblies present, there will be a considerable reactor operation time with mixed cores with both HEU and LEU fuel assemblies. At IRI a comprehensive reactor physics code system and evaluated nuclear data is implemented for detailed core calculations. One of the backbones of the IRI code system is the well-known SCALE code system package. Full core calculations are performed with the diffusion theory code BOLD VENTURE, the nodal code SILWER, and the Monte Carlo code KENO Va. Results are displayed of a strategy from a HEU core to a mixed HEU-LEU core and eventually a LEU core. (author)

  9. HEU Measurements of Holdup and Recovered Residue in the Deactivation and Decommissioning Activities of the 321-M Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    DEWBERRY, RAYMOND; SALAYMEH, SALEEM R.; CASELLA, VITO R.; MOORE, FRANK S.

    2005-03-11

    This paper contains a summary of the holdup and material control and accountability (MC&A) assays conducted for the determination of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of Building 321-M at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The 321-M facility was the Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facility at SRS and was used to fabricate HEU fuel assemblies, lithium-aluminum target tubes, neptunium assemblies, and miscellaneous components for the SRS production reactors. The facility operated for more than 35 years. During this time thousands of uranium-aluminum-alloy (U-Al) production reactor fuel tubes were produced. After the facility ceased operations in 1995, all of the easily accessible U-Al was removed from the building, and only residual amounts remained. The bulk of this residue was located in the equipment that generated and handled small U-Al particles and in the exhaust systems for this equipment (e.g., Chip compactor, casting furnaces, log saw, lathes A & B, cyclone separator, Freon{trademark} cart, riser crusher, ...etc). The D&D project is likely to represent an important example for D&D activities across SRS and across the Department of Energy weapons complex. The Savannah River National Laboratory was tasked to conduct holdup assays to quantify the amount of HEU on all components removed from the facility prior to placing in solid waste containers. The U-235 holdup in any single component of process equipment must not exceed 50 g in order to meet the container limit. This limit was imposed to meet criticality requirements of the low level solid waste storage vaults. Thus the holdup measurements were used as guidance to determine if further decontamination of equipment was needed to ensure that the quantity of U-235 did not exceed the 50 g limit and to ensure that the waste met the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) of the solid waste storage vaults. Since HEU is an accountable nuclear material, the holdup assays and assays of recovered

  10. Comment on the contribution of S.C. Mo, N.A. Hanan and J.E. Matos: 'Comparison of the FRM-II HEU design with an alternative LEU design'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boening, K.

    2004-01-01

    The results of the reference paper, which came to our attention for the first time during this RERTR Meeting, are more or less consistent with neutronic data we have obtained earlier within the FRM-II project (i.e. with own calculations and extrapolations). However, a realistic comparison of the HEU design of the FR.M-II (HEU = highly enriched uranium, 93 % U-235) with an alternative LEU design (LEU = low enriched uranium, 20 % U-235) is only possible on the basis of identical assumptions on the input parameters and has to consider more than neutronic data only. Serious scientists and experts should not confuse the politicians with academic studies touching some aspects of the full story only. The comparison has shown that the performance and reliability of the FRM-II design, which uses HEU fuel, is so advantageous that it can not - not even approximately - be met by an alternative design using LEU fuel. A change of the FRM-II design from HEU to LEU fuel with the results as shown above - i.e. less performance, higher costs, more nuclear waste and higher risk potential, and all of this with a delay of at least 5 years this could never be justified. If a future development of more advanced fuels should allow us to achieve our scientific goals at the conditions as identified above also with uranium of reduced enrichment - there would be no objection to a corresponding later conversion. Activities to realize a new neutron source in Germany go back to the late 70's with the project of a new middle flux beam reactor (MSR), which was abandoned shortly later in favour of an ambitious new spallation neutron source (SNQ). After this project also having been terminated around 1985 because of too high costs and technological risks, the hopes of the German community of neutron scientists focussed on the FRM-II. If non-technical pressure would damage this project this would equally provide irreversible damage to the large and still prospering field of neutron research in Germany

  11. High enrichment to low enrichment core's conversion. Accidents analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abbate, P.; Rubio, R.; Doval, A.; Lovotti, O.

    1990-01-01

    This work analyzes the different accidents that may occur in the reactor's facility after the 20% high-enriched uranium core's conversion. The reactor (of 5 thermal Mw), built in the 50's and 60's, is of the 'swimming pool' type, with light water and fuel elements of the curve plates MTR type, enriched at 93.15 %. This analysis includes: a) accidents by reactivity insertion; b) accidents by coolant loss; c) analysis by flow loss and d) fission products release. (Author) [es

  12. Loss-of-Flow and Loss-of-Pressure Simulations of the BR2 Research Reactor with HEU and LEU Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Licht, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Bergeron, A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Dionne, B. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Sikik, E. [Belgian Nuclear Research Center (SCK-CEN), Mol (Belgium); Van den Branden, G. [Belgian Nuclear Research Center (SCK-CEN), Mol (Belgium); Koonen, E. [Belgian Nuclear Research Center (SCK-CEN), Mol (Belgium)

    2016-01-01

    Belgian Reactor 2 (BR2) is a research and test reactor located in Mol, Belgium and is primarily used for radioisotope production and materials testing. The Materials Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is supporting the conversion of the BR2 reactor from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel. The reactor core of BR2 is located inside a pressure vessel that contains 79 channels in a hyperboloid configuration. The core configuration is highly variable as each channel can contain a fuel assembly, a control or regulating rod, an experimental device, or a beryllium or aluminum plug. Because of this variability, a representative core configuration, based on current reactor use, has been defined for the fuel conversion analyses. The code RELAP5/Mod 3.3 was used to perform the transient thermal-hydraulic safety analyses of the BR2 reactor to support reactor conversion. The input model has been modernized relative to that historically used at BR2 taking into account the best modeling practices developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and BR2 engineers.

  13. An Effort to Improve Uranium Foil Target Fabrication Technology by Single Roll Method

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sim, Moon Soo; Lee, Jong Hyeon [Chungnam National University, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Chang Kyu [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-05-15

    Technetium-99({sup 99m}Tc) is the most commonly used radioisotope in nuclear medicine for diagnostic procedures. It is produced from the decay of its parent Mo-99, which is sent to the hospital or clinic in the form of a generator. Recently, all of the major providers of Mo-99 have used high-enrichment uranium (HEU) as a target material in a research and test reactor. As a part of a nonproliferation effort, the RERTR program has investigated the production of the fission isotope Mo-99 using low-enrichment uranium(LEU) instead of HEU since 1993, a parent nuclide of {sup 99m}Tc , which is a major isotope for a medical diagnosis. As uranium foils have been produced by the conventional method on a laboratory scale by a repetitive hot-rolling method with significant problems in foil quality, productivity and economic efficiency, attention has shifted to the planar flow casting(PFC) method. In KAERI, many experiments are performed using depleted uranium(DU).

  14. Uses for Uranium-233: What Should Be Kept for Future Needs?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsberg, C.W.; Lewis, L.C.

    1999-01-01

    Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been evaluating what fissile materials to keep for potential uses and what fissile materials to declare excess. There are three major fissile materials: high-enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and uranium-233 ( 233 U). Both HEU and plutonium were produced in large quantities for use in nuclear weapons and for reactor fuel. Uranium-233 was investigated for use in nuclear weapons and as a reactor fuel; however, it was never deployed in nuclear weapons or used commercially as a nuclear fuel. Uranium-233 has limited current uses, but it could have several future uses. Because of (1) the cost of storing 233 U and (2) arms control considerations, the U.S. government must decide how much of the existing 233 U inventory should be kept for future use and how much should be disposed of as waste. The objective of this report is to provide technical and economic input to make a use-or-dispose decision

  15. Price of military uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klimenko, A.V.

    1998-01-01

    The theoretical results about optimum strategy of use of military uranium confirmed by systems approach accounts are received. The numerical value of the system approach price of the highly enriched military uranium also is given

  16. Design Study for a Low-enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2007

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Primm, Trent [ORNL; Ellis, Ronald James [ORNL; Gehin, Jess C [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL

    2007-11-01

    This report documents progress made during fiscal year 2007 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium fuel (LEU). Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. A high volume fraction U/Mo-in-Al fuel could attain the same neutron flux performance as with the current, HEU fuel but materials considerations appear to preclude production and irradiation of such a fuel. A diffusion barrier would be required if Al is to be retained as the interstitial medium and the additional volume required for this barrier would degrade performance. Attaining the high volume fraction (55 wt. %) of U/Mo assumed in the computational study while maintaining the current fuel plate acceptance level at the fuel manufacturer is unlikely, i.e. no increase in the percentage of plates rejected for non-compliance with the fuel specification. Substitution of a zirconium alloy for Al would significantly increase the weight of the fuel element, the cost of the fuel element, and introduce an as-yet untried manufacturing process. A monolithic U-10Mo foil is the choice of LEU fuel for HFIR. Preliminary calculations indicate that with a modest increase in reactor power, the flux performance of the reactor can be maintained at the current level. A linearly-graded, radial fuel thickness profile is preferred to the arched profile currently used in HEU fuel because the LEU fuel media is a metal alloy foil rather than a powder. Developments in analysis capability and nuclear data processing techniques are underway with the goal of verifying the preliminary calculations of LEU flux performance. A conceptual study of the operational cost of an LEU fuel fabrication facility yielded the conclusion that the annual fuel cost to the HFIR would increase significantly from the current, HEU fuel cycle. Though manufacturing can be accomplished with existing technology

  17. The University of Missouri Research Reactor HEU to LEU conversion project status

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKibben, James C; Kutikkad, Kiratadas; Foyto, Leslie P; Peters, Nickie J; Solbrekken, Gary L; Kennedy, John [University of Missouri Research Reactor, Missouri (United States); Stillman, John A; Feldman, Earl E; Tzanos, Constantine P; Stevens, John G [Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois (United States)

    2012-03-15

    The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) is one of five U.S. high performance research and test reactors that are actively collaborating with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to find a suitable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel replacement for the currently required highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. A conversion feasibility study based on U-10Mo monolithic LEU fuel was completed in 2009. It was concluded that the proposed LEU fuel assembly design, in conjunction with an increase in power level from 10 to 12 MWth, will (1) maintain safety margins during operation, (2) allow operating fuel cycle lengths to be maintained for efficient and effective use of the facility, and (3) preserve an acceptable level and spectrum of key neutron fluxes to meet the scientific mission of the facility. The MURR and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) team is continuing to work toward realization of the conversion. The 'Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Methodologies and Scenarios for LEU Conversion of MURR' was completed in June 2011. This report documents design parameter values critical to the Fuel Development (FD), Fuel Fabrication Capability (FFC) and Hydromechanical Fuel Test Facility (HMFTF) projects. The report also provides a preliminary evaluation of safety analysis techniques and data that will be needed to complete the fuel conversion Safety Analysis Report (SAR), especially those related to the U-10Mo monolithic LEU fuel. Specific studies are underway to validate the proposed path to an LEU fuel conversion. Coupled fluid-structure simulations and experiments are being conducted to understand the hydrodynamic plate deformation risk for 0.965 mm (38 mil) thick fuel plates. Methodologies that were recently developed to answer the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Request for Additional Information (RAI) regarding the MURR 2006 relicensing submittal will be used in the LEU conversion effort. Transition LEU fuel elements that will have a minimal impact on

  18. Nuclear characteristics evaluation for Kyoto University Research Reactor with low-enriched uranium core

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nakajima, Ken; Unesaki, Hironobu [Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute, Kumatori-cho Sennan-gun Osaka (Japan)

    2008-07-01

    A project to convert the fuel of Kyoto University Research Reactor (KUR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) is in progress as a part of RERTR program. Prior to the operation of LEU core, the nuclear characteristics of the core have been evaluated to confirm the safety operation. In the evaluation, nuclear parameters, such as the excess reactivity, shut down margin control rod worth, reactivity coefficients, were calculated, and they were compared with the safety limits. The results of evaluation show that the LEU core is able to satisfy the safety requirements for operation, i.e. all the parameters satisfy the safety limits. Consequently, it was confirmed that the LEU fuel core has the proper nuclear characteristics for the safety operation. (authors)

  19. Preliminary investigations for technology assessment of 99Mo production from LEU [low enriched uranium] targets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vandegrift, G.F.; Chaiko, D.J.; Heinrich, R.R.; Kucera, E.T.; Jensen, K.J.; Poa, D.S.; Varma, R.; Vissers, D.R.

    1986-11-01

    This paper presents the results of preliminary studies on the effects of substituting low enriched uranium (LEU) for highly enriched uranium (HEU) in targets for the production of fission product 99 Mo. Issues that were addressed are: (1) purity and yield of the 99 Mo//sup 99m/Tc product, (2) fabrication of LEU targets and related concerns, and (3) radioactive waste. Laboratory experimentation was part of the efforts for issues (1) and (2); thus far, radioactive waste disposal has only been addressed in a paper study. Although the reported results are still preliminary, there is reason to be optimistic about the feasibility of utilizing LEU targets for 99 Mo production. 37 refs., 1 fig., 5 tabs

  20. Moderator configuration options for a low-enriched uranium fueled Kilowatt-class Space Nuclear Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, Jeffrey C.; Mencarini, Leonardo de Holanda; Guimaraes, Lamartine N. F.

    2015-01-01

    The Brazilian Air Force, through its Institute for Advanced Studies (Instituto de Estudos Avancados, IEAv/DCTA), and the Colorado School of Mines (CSM) are studying the feasibility of a space nuclear reactor with a power of 1-5 kW e and fueled with Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU). This type of nuclear reactor would be attractive to signatory countries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or commercial interests. A LEU-fueled space reactor would avoid the security concerns inherent with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel. As an initial step, the HEU-fueled Kilowatt Reactor Using Stirling Technology (KRUSTY) designed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory serves as a basis for a similar reactor fueled with LEU fuel. Using the computational code MCNP6 to predict the reactor neutronics performance, the size of the resulting reactor fueled with 19.75 wt% enriched uranium-10 wt% molybdenum alloy fuel is adjusted to match the excess reactivity of KRUSTY. Then, zirconium hydride moderator is added to the core to reduce the size of the reactor. This work presents the preliminary results of the computational modeling, with special emphasis on the comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous moderator systems, in terms of the core diameter required to meet a specific multiplication factor (k eff = 1.035). This comparison illustrates the impact of moderator configuration on the size and performance of a LEU-fueled kilowatt-class space nuclear reactor. (author)

  1. Moderator configuration options for a low-enriched uranium fueled Kilowatt-class Space Nuclear Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    King, Jeffrey C., E-mail: kingjc@mines.edu [Nuclear Science and Engineering Program, Colorado School of Mines (CSM), Golden, CO (United States); Mencarini, Leonardo de Holanda; Guimaraes, Lamartine N. F., E-mail: guimaraes@ieav.cta.br, E-mail: mencarini@ieav.cta.br [Instituto de Estudos Avancados (IEAV), Sao Jose dos Campos, SP (Brazil). Divisao de Energia Nuclear

    2015-07-01

    The Brazilian Air Force, through its Institute for Advanced Studies (Instituto de Estudos Avancados, IEAv/DCTA), and the Colorado School of Mines (CSM) are studying the feasibility of a space nuclear reactor with a power of 1-5 kW{sub e} and fueled with Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU). This type of nuclear reactor would be attractive to signatory countries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or commercial interests. A LEU-fueled space reactor would avoid the security concerns inherent with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel. As an initial step, the HEU-fueled Kilowatt Reactor Using Stirling Technology (KRUSTY) designed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory serves as a basis for a similar reactor fueled with LEU fuel. Using the computational code MCNP6 to predict the reactor neutronics performance, the size of the resulting reactor fueled with 19.75 wt% enriched uranium-10 wt% molybdenum alloy fuel is adjusted to match the excess reactivity of KRUSTY. Then, zirconium hydride moderator is added to the core to reduce the size of the reactor. This work presents the preliminary results of the computational modeling, with special emphasis on the comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous moderator systems, in terms of the core diameter required to meet a specific multiplication factor (k{sub eff} = 1.035). This comparison illustrates the impact of moderator configuration on the size and performance of a LEU-fueled kilowatt-class space nuclear reactor. (author)

  2. Comparison of thermohydraulic and nuclear aspects in a standard HEU core and a typical LEU core for the HFR Petten. A case study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pruimboom, H.; Tas, A.

    1985-01-01

    Within the framework of the RERTR program various HEU-LEU core calculations have been performed by ANL in a cooperative effort with ECN and JRC Petten. The main purpose of this work has been to gain competence in analysing HEU-LEU core conversion for high power Materials Testing Reactors and to assist in a possible HEU-LEU conversion of the HFR Petten. For reference purposes the present HFR standard core (HEU) in the 'old' vessel geometry was calculated at first. As a next step the new vessel geometry and the increased fuel weights were taken into account. Subsequently various LEU HFR core options have been analysed. Main parameters in the LEU study were the uranium loading in the meat, the fuel type, the thickness of the meat, the number of fuel plates per element and the type of burnable poison applied. Though the study has not yet been completed, one of its striking preliminary results concerns the increased power peaking in the LEU fuel elements as compared with the HEU situation. A preliminary analysis of the thermal characteristics of a typical LEU core as compared with a standard HEU core has been made and is presented in the paper. A short survey of the various HEU and LEU calculations is given. The thermal safety analysis procedure for the HFR, as based on the flow instability criterion, is clarified. Finally, the thermal comparison HEU versus LEU and the resulting conclusions are presented. (author)

  3. A comparative and predictive study of the annual fuel cycle costs for HEU and LEU fuels in the High Flux Reactor, Petten, 1985-1993

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moss, R L; May, P

    1985-07-01

    The internationally agreed constraint on availability of supply of HEU fuels to Research and Test Reactors has necessitated that a cost analysis be carried out to determine the financial effect of converting the core of the HFR from HEU to LEU fuels. A computer program, written at Petten and based on information extracted from studies in Europe and the USA, identifies the major cost variables to be manufacturing, uranium, reprocessing and transport costs. Comparison between HEU and LEU cores have been carried out and includes the effects of inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. Conversion of the HFR core to LEU fuels is shown to be financially disadvantageous. (author)

  4. A comparative and predictive study of the annual fuel cycle costs for HEU and LEU fuels in the High Flux Reactor, Petten, 1985-1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moss, R.L.; May, P.

    1985-01-01

    The internationally agreed constraint on availability of supply of HEU fuels to Research and Test Reactors has necessitated that a cost analysis be carried out to determine the financial effect of converting the core of the HFR from HEU to LEU fuels. A computer program, written at Petten and based on information extracted from studies in Europe and the USA, identifies the major cost variables to be manufacturing, uranium, reprocessing and transport costs. Comparison between HEU and LEU cores have been carried out and includes the effects of inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. Conversion of the HFR core to LEU fuels is shown to be financially disadvantageous. (author)

  5. Effect of molybdenum addition on metastability of cubic γ-uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sinha, V.P.; Hegde, P.V.; Prasad, G.J.; Dey, G.K.; Kamath, H.S.

    2010-01-01

    Over the years U 3 Si 2 compound dispersed in aluminium matrix has been used successfully as the potential low enriched uranium (LEU 235 ) base dispersion fuel for use in new research and test reactors and also for converting high enriched uranium (HEU > 85%U 235 ) cores to LEU for most of the existing research and test reactors world over, though maximum 4.8 g U cm -3 density is achievable with U 3 Si 2 -Al dispersion fuel. To achieve a uranium density of 8.0-9.0 g U cm -3 in dispersion fuel with aluminium as matrix material, it is required to use γ-stabilized uranium metal powders. At Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), R and D efforts are on to develop these high density uranium base alloys. This paper describes the alloying behaviour of uranium with varying amount of molybdenum. The U-Mo alloys with different molybdenum content have been prepared by using an induction melting furnace with uranium and molybdenum metal pellets as starting materials. U-Mo alloys with different molybdenum content were characterized by X-ray diffraction (XRD) for phase identification and lattice parameter measurements. The optical microstructure of different U-Mo alloy composition has also been discussed in this paper. Quantitative image analysis was also carried out to determine the amount of various phases in each composition.

  6. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamdoun, N.A.

    2007-01-01

    The article includes a historical preface about uranium, discovery of portability of sequential fission of uranium, uranium existence, basic raw materials, secondary raw materials, uranium's physical and chemical properties, uranium extraction, nuclear fuel cycle, logistics and estimation of the amount of uranium reserves, producing countries of concentrated uranium oxides and percentage of the world's total production, civilian and military uses of uranium. The use of depleted uranium in the Gulf War, the Balkans and Iraq has caused political and environmental effects which are complex, raising problems and questions about the effects that nuclear compounds left on human health and environment.

  7. Impact of the use of low or medium enriched uranium on the masses of space nuclear reactor power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-12-01

    The design process for determining the mass increase for the substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for high-enriched uranium (HEU) in space nuclear reactor systems is an optimization process which must simultaneously consider several variables. This process becomes more complex whenever the reactor core operates on an in-core thermionic power conversion, in which the fissioning of the nuclear fuel is used to directly heat thermionic emitters, with the subsequent elimination of external power conversion equipment. The increased complexity of the optimization process for this type of system is reflected in the work reported herein, where considerably more information has been developed for the moderated in-core thermionic reactors

  8. CONCEPTUAL PROCESS DESCRIPTION FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM-MOLYBDENUM FUEL

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Daniel M. Wachs; Curtis R. Clark; Randall J. Dunavant

    2008-02-01

    The National Nuclear Security Agency Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is tasked with minimizing the use of high-enriched uranium (HEU) worldwide. A key component of that effort is the conversion of research reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. The GTRI Convert Fuel Development program, previously known as the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program was initiated in 1978 by the United States Department of Energy to develop the nuclear fuels necessary to enable these conversions. The program cooperates with the research reactors’ operators to achieve this goal of HEU to LEU conversion without reduction in reactor performance. The programmatic mandate is to complete the conversion of all civilian domestic research reactors by 2014. These reactors include the five domestic high-performance research reactors (HPRR), namely: the High Flux Isotope Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory, the National Bureau of Standards Reactor at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Missouri University Research Reactor at the University of Missouri–Columbia, and the MIT Reactor-II at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Characteristics for each of the HPRRs are given in Appendix A. The GTRI Convert Fuel Development program is currently engaged in the development of a novel nuclear fuel that will enable these conversions. The fuel design is based on a monolithic fuel meat (made from a uranium-molybdenum alloy) clad in Al-6061 that has shown excellent performance in irradiation testing. The unique aspects of the fuel design, however, necessitate the development and implementation of new fabrication techniques and, thus, establishment of the infrastructure to ensure adequate fuel fabrication capability. A conceptual fabrication process description and rough estimates of the total facility throughput are described in this document as a basis for

  9. Derived enriched uranium market

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rutkowski, E.

    1996-01-01

    The potential impact on the uranium market of highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapons dismantling in the Russian Federation and the USA is analyzed. Uranium supply, conversion, and enrichment factors are outlined for each country; inventories are also listed. The enrichment component and conversion components are expected to cause little disruption to uranium markets. The uranium component of Russian derived enriched uranium hexafluoride is unresolved; US legislation places constraints on its introduction into the US market

  10. 31 CFR 540.305 - HEU Agreements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false HEU Agreements. 540.305 Section 540.305 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF... Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning the Transfer of Source Material to the Russian Federation signed at...

  11. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.

    2007-01-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique

  12. Preliminary investigations on the use of uranium silicide targets for fission Mo-99 production

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cols, H.; Cristini, P.; Marques, R.

    1997-08-01

    The National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) of Argentine Republic owns and operates an installation for production of molybdenum-99 from fission products since 1985, and, since 1991, covers the whole national demand of this nuclide, carrying out a program of weekly productions, achieving an average activity of 13 terabecquerel per week. At present they are finishing an enlargement of the production plant that will allow an increase in the volume of production to about one hundred of terabecquerel. Irradiation targets are uranium/aluminium alloy with 90% enriched uranium with aluminium cladding. In view of international trends held at present for replacing high enrichment uranium (HEU) for enrichment values lower than 20 % (LEU), since 1990 the authors are in contact with the RERTR program, beginning with tests to adapt their separation process to new irradiation target conditions. Uranium silicide (U{sub 3}Si{sub 2}) was chosen as the testing material, because it has an uranium mass per volume unit, so that it allows to reduce enrichment to a value of 20%. CNEA has the technology for manufacturing miniplates of uranium silicide for their purposes. In this way, equivalent amounts of Molybdenum-99 could be obtained with no substantial changes in target parameters and irradiation conditions established for the current process with Al/U alloy. This paper shows results achieved on the use of this new target.

  13. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cuney, M.; Pagel, M.; Leroy, J.

    1992-01-01

    First, this book presents the physico-chemical properties of Uranium and the consequences which can be deduced from the study of numerous geological process. The authors describe natural distribution of Uranium at different scales and on different supports, and main Uranium minerals. A great place in the book is assigned to description and classification of uranium deposits. The book gives also notions on prospection and exploitation of uranium deposits. Historical aspects of Uranium economical development (Uranium resources, production, supply and demand, operating costs) are given in the last chapter. 7 refs., 17 figs

  14. Criticality safety concerns of uranium deposits in cascade equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Plaster, M.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Paducah and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants enrich uranium in the 235 U isotope by diffusing gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) through a porous barrier. The UF 6 gaseous diffusion cascade utilized several thousand open-quotes stagesclose quotes of barrier to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU). Historically, Portsmouth has enriched the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant's product (typically 1.8 wt% 235 U) as well as natural enrichment feed stock up to 97 wt%. Due to the chemical reactivity of UF 6 , particularly with water, the formation of solid uranium deposits occur at a gaseous diffusion plant. Much of the equipment operates below atmospheric pressure, and deposits are formed when atmospheric air enters the cascade. Deposits may also be formed from UF 6 reactions with oil, UF 6 reactions with the metallic surfaces of equipment, and desublimation of UF 6 . The major deposits form as a result of moist air in leakage due to failure of compressor casing flanges, blow-off plates, seals, expansion joint convolutions, and instrument lines. This report describes criticality concerns and deposit disposition

  15. Challenges dealing with depleted uranium in Germany - Reuse or disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moeller, Kai D.

    2007-01-01

    possibility could be the use of depleted uranium for the blending of High enriched Uranium (HEU) or with Plutonium to MOX-elements. (authors)

  16. What the difference to use LEU and HEU fuel elements separately or together in a research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaya, S.; Uestuen, G.

    2005-01-01

    Concerning of nuclear material safety, most of the research reactors are advised to shift from HEU (high enriched-%93 U-235) to LEU (low enriched-%20 U-235) fuel elements. When LEU and HEU fuel elements are to be used together in a research reactor, some design and safety problems are encountered. According to use of the reactor, some research reactors such as MTR type may not show any considerable difference for HEU or LEU fuel elements, but the efficiency of radioisotope production generated by thermal neutron interaction may decrease about twenty-thirty percent when LEU fuel elements are used. Here, fine mesh-sized 3D neutronic analysis of TR-2 research reactor is presented to indicate the arising problem when LEU end HEU fuel elements are used together in a research reactor. Partial thermohydraulic analysis of the reactor is also given to show the betterness of the LEU fuel element design. However, there might be some points that should be noticed for safer operation of plate type fuelled research reactors. (author)

  17. HEU benchmark calculations and LEU preliminary calculations for IRR-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caner, M.; Shapira, M.; Bettan, M.; Nagler, A.; Gilat, J.

    2004-01-01

    We performed neutronics calculations for the Soreq Research Reactor, IRR-1. The calculations were done for the purpose of upgrading and benchmarking our codes and methods. The codes used were mainly WIMS-D/4 for cell calculations and the three dimensional diffusion code CITATION for full core calculations. The experimental flux was obtained by gold wire activation methods and compared with our calculated flux profile. The IRR-1 is loaded with highly enriched uranium fuel assemblies, of the plate type. In the framework of preparation for conversion to low enrichment fuel, additional calculations were done assuming the presence of LEU fresh fuel. In these preliminary calculations we investigated the effect on the criticality and flux distributions of the increase of U-238 loading, and the corresponding uranium density.(author)

  18. PWR fuel of high enrichment with erbia and enriched gadolinia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bejmer, Klaes-Håkan; Malm, Christian

    2011-01-01

    Today standard PWR fuel is licensed for operation up to 65-70 MWd/kgU, which in most cases corresponds to an enrichment of more than 5 w/o "2"3"5U. Due to criticality safety reason of storage and transportation, only fuel up to 5 w/o "2"3"5U enrichment is so far used. New fuel storage installations and transportation casks are necessary investments before the reactivity level of the fresh fuel can be significantly increased. These investments and corresponding licensing work takes time, and in the meantime a solution that requires burnable poisons in all pellets of the fresh high-enriched fuel might be used. By using very small amounts of burnable absorber in every pellet the initial reactivity can be reduced to today's levels. This study presents core calculations with fuel assemblies enriched to almost 6 w/o "2"3"5U mixed with a small amount of erbia. Some of the assemblies also contain gadolinia. The results are compared to a reference case containing assemblies with 4.95 w/o "2"3"5U without erbia, utilizing only gadolinia as burnable poison. The comparison shows that the number of fresh fuel assemblies can be reduced by 21% (which increases the batch burnup by 24%) by utilizing the erbia fuel concept. However, increased cost of uranium due to higher enrichment is not fully compensated for by the cost gain due to the reduction of the number assemblies. Hence, the fuel cycle cost becomes slightly higher for the high enrichment erbia case than for the reference case. (author)

  19. The conversion of NRU from HEU to LEU fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sears, D.F.; Atfield, M.D.; Kennedy, I.C.

    1990-01-01

    The program at Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories (CRNL) to develop and test low-enriched uranium fuel (LEU, 3 Si, USiAl, USi Al and U 3 Si 2 (U-3.96 wt% Si; U-3.5 wt% Si-1.5 wt% AL; U-3.2 wt%; Si-3 wt% Al; U-7.3 wt% Si, respectively). Fuel elements were fabricated with uranium loadings suitable for NRU, 3.15 gU/cm 3 , and for NRX, 4.5 gU/cm 3 , and were irradiated under normal fuel-operating conditions. Eight experimental irradiations involving 100 mini-elements and 84 full-length elements (7X12-element rods) were completed to qualify the LEU fuel and the fabrication technology. Post irradiation examinations confirmed that the performance of the LEU fuel, and that of a medium enrichment uranium (MEU, 45% U-235) alloy fuel tested as a back-up, was comparable to the HEU fuel. The uranium silicide dispersion fuel swelling was approximately linear up to burnups exceeding NRU's design terminal burnup (80 at%). NRU was partially converted to LEU fuel when the first 31 prototype fuel rods manufactured with industrial scale production equipment were installed in the reactor. The rods were loaded in NRU at a fuelling rate of about two rods per week over the period 1988 September to December. This partial LEU core (one third of a full NRU core) has allowed the reactor engineers and physicists to evaluate the bulk effects of the LEU conversion on NRU operations. As expected, the irradiation is proceeding without incident

  20. Finding of no significant impact: Interim storage of enriched uranium above the maximum historical level at the Y-12 Plant Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-0929, September, 1994). The EA evaluates the environmental effects of transportation, prestorage processing, and interim storage of bounding quantities of enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant over a ten-year period. The State of Tennessee and the public participated in public meetings and workshops which were held after a predecisional draft EA was released in February 1994, and after the revised pre-approval EA was issued in September 1994. Comments provided by the State and public have been carefully considered by the Department. As a result of this public process, the Department has determined that the Y-12 Plant-would store no more than 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and no more than 6 metric tons of low enriched uranium (LEU). The bounding storage quantities analyzed in the pre-approval EA are 500 metric tons of HEU and 7,105.9 metric tons of LEU. Based on-the analyses in the EA, as revised by the attachment to the Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), DOE has determined that interim storage of 500 metric tons of HEU and 6 metric tons of LEU at the Y-12 Plant does not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. Therefore, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is not required and the Department is issuing this FONSI

  1. Assessment of the effectiveness of personal visual observation as a safeguards measure in a uranium enrichment facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohno, Fubito; Okamoto, Tsuyoshi; Yokochi, Akira; Nidaira, Kazuo

    2003-01-01

    In a centrifuge enrichment facility, a cascade that produces low enriched uranium is composed of a large number of UF 6 gas centrifuges interconnected with pipes. It is possible to divert the cascade to the illegal production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by changing the piping arrangement within the cascade. If integrated type centrifuges that contain a few tens of advanced centrifuges are introduced into the facility, the number of pipes will greatly decrease. The smaller the number of pipes, the less the labor required to change the piping arrangement. Because personal visual observation by an inspector is considered as one of measures against changing the piping arrangement, its effectiveness is assessed in this study. First, a model centrifuge enrichment facility that has a capacity of 2,400 ton-SWU/y is designed. In this model facility, integrated type centrifuges that contain advanced centrifuges are installed. Second, the diversion path analysis is carried out for the model facility under the assumption that a facility operator's goal is to produce 75 kg of HEU with 20% enrichment in a month. The analysis shows that, in our assumed diversion path, changes of the piping arrangement can be certainly detected by personal visual observation of a part of pipes connected with integrated type centrifuges that compose the cascade diverted to the HEU production. Finally, inspections in a cascade area are modeled as two-person noncooperative games between the inspector and the facility operator. As a result, it is found that all the cascades in the model facility will be investigated if the inspector can devote the inspection effort of 0.83 man-day per month to personal visual observation in the cascade area. Therefore, it is suggested that personal visual observation of the piping arrangement is worth carrying out in a uranium enrichment facility where integrated type centrifuges that contain advanced centrifuges are installed. (author)

  2. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    The article briefly discusses the Australian government policy and the attitude of political party factions towards the mining and exporting of the uranium resources in Australia. Australia has a third of the Western World's low-cost uranium resources

  3. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poty, B.; Cuney, M.; Bruneton, P.; Virlogeux, D.; Capus, G.

    2010-01-01

    With the worldwide revival of nuclear energy comes the question of uranium reserves. For more than 20 years, nuclear energy has been neglected and uranium prospecting has been practically abandoned. Therefore, present day production covers only 70% of needs and stocks are decreasing. Production is to double by 2030 which represents a huge industrial challenge. The FBR-type reactors technology, which allows to consume the whole uranium content of the fuel, is developing in several countries and will ensure the long-term development of nuclear fission. However, the implementation of these reactors (the generation 4) will be progressive during the second half of the 21. century. For this reason an active search for uranium ores will be necessary during the whole 21. century to ensure the fueling of light water reactors which are huge uranium consumers. This dossier covers all the aspects of natural uranium production: mineralogy, geochemistry, types of deposits, world distribution of deposits with a particular attention given to French deposits, the exploitation of which is abandoned today. Finally, exploitation, ore processing and the economical aspects are presented. Contents: 1 - the uranium element and its minerals: from uranium discovery to its industrial utilization, the main uranium minerals (minerals with tetravalent uranium, minerals with hexavalent uranium); 2 - uranium in the Earth's crust and its geochemical properties: distribution (in sedimentary rocks, in magmatic rocks, in metamorphic rocks, in soils and vegetation), geochemistry (uranium solubility and valence in magmas, uranium speciation in aqueous solution, solubility of the main uranium minerals in aqueous solution, uranium mobilization and precipitation); 3 - geology of the main types of uranium deposits: economical criteria for a deposit, structural diversity of deposits, classification, world distribution of deposits, distribution of deposits with time, superficial deposits, uranium

  4. Preliminary Assessment of the Impact on Reactor Vessel dpa Rates Due to Installation of a Proposed Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Core in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Daily, Charles R. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-10-01

    An assessment of the impact on the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) reactor vessel (RV) displacements-per-atom (dpa) rates due to operations with the proposed low enriched uranium (LEU) core described by Ilas and Primm has been performed and is presented herein. The analyses documented herein support the conclusion that conversion of HFIR to low-enriched uranium (LEU) core operations using the LEU core design of Ilas and Primm will have no negative impact on HFIR RV dpa rates. Since its inception, HFIR has been operated with highly enriched uranium (HEU) cores. As part of an effort sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), conversion to LEU cores is being considered for future HFIR operations. The HFIR LEU configurations analyzed are consistent with the LEU core models used by Ilas and Primm and the HEU balance-of-plant models used by Risner and Blakeman in the latest analyses performed to support the HFIR materials surveillance program. The Risner and Blakeman analyses, as well as the studies documented herein, are the first to apply the hybrid transport methods available in the Automated Variance reduction Generator (ADVANTG) code to HFIR RV dpa rate calculations. These calculations have been performed on the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Institutional Cluster (OIC) with version 1.60 of the Monte Carlo N-Particle 5 (MCNP5) computer code.

  5. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mackay, G.A.

    1978-01-01

    The author discusses the contribution made by various energy sources in the production of electricity. Estimates are made of the future nuclear contribution, the future demand for uranium and future sales of Australian uranium. Nuclear power growth in the United States, Japan and Western Europe is discussed. The present status of the six major Australian uranium deposits (Ranger, Jabiluka, Nabarlek, Koongarra, Yeelerrie and Beverley) is given. Australian legislation relevant to the uranium mining industry is also outlined

  6. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The development, prospecting, research, processing and marketing of South Africa's uranium industry and the national policies surrounding this industry form the headlines of this work. The geology of South Africa's uranium occurences and their positions, the processes used in the extraction of South Africa's uranium and the utilisation of uranium for power production as represented by the Koeberg nuclear power station near Cape Town are included in this publication

  7. Comparison of the FRM-II HEU design with an alternative LEU design. Attachment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanan, N.A.; Mo, S.C.; Smith, R.S.; Matos, J.E.

    2004-01-01

    After presentation of the foregoing paper by Dr. Nelson Hanan of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) proposing an alternative LEU core with one fuel ring and a power level of 33 MW, a presentation was made by Dr. Klaus Boning of the Technical University of Munich comparing the FRM-II HEU design with an LEU design by Tlm that had two fuel rings and a power level of 40 MW. Dr. Boning raised the following issues concerning the use of LEU fuel in FRM-H reactor designs: (1) qualification of HEU and LEU silicide fuels, (2) gamma heating in the heavy water reflector, (3) the radiological consequences of hypothetical accidents, and (4) cost and schedule. These issues are addressed in this Attachment. In his presentation, Dr. Hanan mentioned that ANL was also investigating other LEU designs. This work led to a second alternative LEU design that has the same neutron flux performance (8 x 10 14 n/cm 2 /s peak neutron flux in the reflector) and the same fuel lifetime (50 full power days) as the HEU design, but uses LEU silicide fuel with a uranium density of only 4.5 g/cm 3 . This design was achieved by using a fuel plate that has a fuel meat thickness of 0.76 mm, a cladding thickness of 0.38 mm, and a water channel gap of 2.2 mm. A comparison is shown of the main characteristics of this second alternative LEU design with those of the FRM-II HEU design. The ANL core again has one fuel ring with the same dimensions. With this LEU design, a two stage process is no longer necessary because LEU silicide fuel with a uranium density of 4.5 g/cm 3 is fully qualified, licensable, and available now for use in a high flux reactor such as the FRM-II

  8. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, E.D.J.

    1974-01-01

    A discussion is given of uranium as an energy source in The Australian economy. Figures and predictions are presented on the world supply-demand position and also figures are given on the added value that can be achieved by the processing of uranium. Conclusions are drawn about Australia's future policy with regard to uranium (R.L.)

  9. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toens, P.D.

    1981-03-01

    The geological setting of uranium resources in the world can be divided in two basic categories of resources and are defined as reasonably assured resources, estimated additional resources and speculative resources. Tables are given to illustrate these definitions. The increasing world production of uranium despite the cutback in the nuclear industry and the uranium requirements of the future concluded these lecture notes

  10. Proceedings of the international meeting on research and test reactor core conversions from HEU to LEU fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Travelli, A.

    1983-09-01

    Conversion of research and test reactor cores from the use of high enrichment uranium to the use of low enrichment uranium depends on the cooperation of many research organizations, reactor operators, and government agencies. At a technical level, it involves almost all aspects of the fuel cycle, including fuel development, testing, shipping and reprocessing; experiment performance; economics; and safety and licensing aspects. The reactors involved and the conversion activities are distributed among approximately 25 countries, making this a subject which is best dealt with on an international basis. To foster direct communication in this area, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program, at the Argonne National Laboratory, sponsored this meeting as the fifth of a series which began in 1978. The previous meetings were held at Argonne (International Meeting of Research Reactor Fuel Designers, Developers, and Fabricators, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, U.S.A., November 910, 1978), at Saclay (IAEA Consultants' Meeting on Research Reactor Core Conversions from HEU to LEU, Centre d'etudes Nucleaires de Saclay, Saclay, France, December 12-14, 1979), at Argonne (International Meeting on Development, Fabrication and Application of Reduced Enrichment Fuels for Research and Test Reactors, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, U.S.A., November 12-14, 1980) and at Juelich (Seminar on Research Reactor Operation and Use, Juelich Nuclear Research Center, Juelich, F.R.G., September 48, 1981). Proceedings from the two most recent previous meetings were published as ANL/RERTR/TM-3 (CONF-801144) and IAEA-SR-77. The spirit of this meeting differs slightly from that of the previous meetings. The advances which have been made and the growing maturity of the effort have caused a gradual shift of emphasis away from those topics which dominated the floor during the first meetings, such as fuel and methods development, and towards topics which concern more

  11. Proceedings of the international meeting on research and test reactor core conversions from HEU to LEU fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Travelli, A [Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL (United States)

    1983-09-01

    Conversion of research and test reactor cores from the use of high enrichment uranium to the use of low enrichment uranium depends on the cooperation of many research organizations, reactor operators, and government agencies. At a technical level, it involves almost all aspects of the fuel cycle, including fuel development, testing, shipping and reprocessing; experiment performance; economics; and safety and licensing aspects. The reactors involved and the conversion activities are distributed among approximately 25 countries, making this a subject which is best dealt with on an international basis. To foster direct communication in this area, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program, at the Argonne National Laboratory, sponsored this meeting as the fifth of a series which began in 1978. The previous meetings were held at Argonne (International Meeting of Research Reactor Fuel Designers, Developers, and Fabricators, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, U.S.A., November 910, 1978), at Saclay (IAEA Consultants' Meeting on Research Reactor Core Conversions from HEU to LEU, Centre d'etudes Nucleaires de Saclay, Saclay, France, December 12-14, 1979), at Argonne (International Meeting on Development, Fabrication and Application of Reduced Enrichment Fuels for Research and Test Reactors, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, U.S.A., November 12-14, 1980) and at Juelich (Seminar on Research Reactor Operation and Use, Juelich Nuclear Research Center, Juelich, F.R.G., September 48, 1981). Proceedings from the two most recent previous meetings were published as ANL/RERTR/TM-3 (CONF-801144) and IAEA-SR-77. The spirit of this meeting differs slightly from that of the previous meetings. The advances which have been made and the growing maturity of the effort have caused a gradual shift of emphasis away from those topics which dominated the floor during the first meetings, such as fuel and methods development, and towards topics which concern more

  12. Uranium conversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliver, Lena; Peterson, Jenny; Wilhelmsen, Katarina

    2006-03-01

    FOI, has performed a study on uranium conversion processes that are of importance in the production of different uranium compounds in the nuclear industry. The same conversion processes are of interest both when production of nuclear fuel and production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are considered. Countries that have nuclear weapons ambitions, with the intention to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, need some degree of uranium conversion capability depending on the uranium feed material available. This report describes the processes that are needed from uranium mining and milling to the different conversion processes for converting uranium ore concentrate to uranium hexafluoride. Uranium hexafluoride is the uranium compound used in most enrichment facilities. The processes needed to produce uranium dioxide for use in nuclear fuel and the processes needed to convert different uranium compounds to uranium metal - the form of uranium that is used in a nuclear weapon - are also presented. The production of uranium ore concentrate from uranium ore is included since uranium ore concentrate is the feed material required for a uranium conversion facility. Both the chemistry and principles or the different uranium conversion processes and the equipment needed in the processes are described. Since most of the equipment that is used in a uranium conversion facility is similar to that used in conventional chemical industry, it is difficult to determine if certain equipment is considered for uranium conversion or not. However, the chemical conversion processes where UF 6 and UF 4 are present require equipment that is made of corrosion resistant material

  13. Feasibility of Low Enriched Uranium Fuel for Space Nuclear Propulsion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Venneri, Paolo; Kim, Yonghee [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-05-15

    The purpose of this initial study is to create a baseline with which to perform further analysis and to build a solid understanding of the neutronic characteristics of a solid core for the nuclear thermal rocket. Once consistency with work done at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is established, this paper will provide a study of other fuel types, such as low and medium-enriched uranium fuels. This paper will examine how the implementation of each fuel type affects the multiplication factor of the reactor, and will then explore different possibilities for alterations needed to accommodate their successful usage. The reactor core analysis was done using the MCNP5 code. While this study has not shown that the SNRE can be easily retrofitted for low-enriched U fuel, it has made a detailed study of the SNRE, and identified the difficulties of the implementation of low-enriched fuels in small nuclear rockets. These difficulties are the need for additional moderation and fuel mass in order to achieve a critical mass. Neither of these is insurmountable. Future work includes finding the best method by which to increase the internal moderation of the reactor balanced with appropriate sizing to prevent neutron leakage. Both of these are currently being studied. This paper will present a study of the Small Nuclear Rocket Engine (SNRE) and the feasibility of using low enriched Uranium (LEU) instead of the traditional high enriched Uranium (HEU) fuels.

  14. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whillans, R.T.

    1981-01-01

    Events in the Canadian uranium industry during 1980 are reviewed. Mine and mill expansions and exploration activity are described, as well as changes in governmental policy. Although demand for uranium is weak at the moment, the industry feels optimistic about the future. (LL)

  15. Study on usage of low enriched uranium Russian type fuel elements for design of an experimental ADS research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.P.

    2005-01-01

    Conceptual design of an accelerator driven sub-critical experimental research reactor (ADSRR) was initiated in 1999 at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Serbia and Montenegro. Initial results of neutronic analyses of the proposed ADSRR-H were carried out by Monte Carlo based codes and available high-enriched uranium dioxide (HEU) dispersed Russian type TVR-S fuel elements (FE) placed in a lead matrix. Beam of charged particles (proton or deuteron) would be extracted from the high-energy channel H5B of the VINCY cyclotron of the TESLA Accelerator Installation. In 2002, the Vinca Institute has, in compliance with the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, returned fresh HEU TVR-S type FEs back to the Russian Federation. Since usage of HEU FEs in research reactors is not further recommended, a new study of an ADSRR-L conceptual design has initiated in Vinca Institute in last two years, based on assumed availability of low-enriched uranium (LEU) dispersed type TVR-S FEs. Initial results of numerical simulations of this new ADSRR-L, published for the first time in this paper, shows that such a small low neutron flux system can be used as an experimental - 'demonstration' - ADS with neutron characteristics similar to proposed well-known lead moderated and cooled power sub-critical ADS with intermediate neutron spectrum. Neutron spectrum characteristics of the ADSRR-L are compared to ones of the ADSRR-H with the same mass (7.7 g) of 235 U nuclide per TVR-S FE. (author)

  16. Uranium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, R M

    1976-01-01

    Evidence of expanding markets, improved prices and the short supply of uranium became abundantly clear in 1975, providing the much needed impetus for widespread activity in all phases of uranium operations. Exploration activity that had been at low levels in recent years in Canada was evident in most provinces as well as the Northwest Territories. All producers were in the process of expanding their uranium-producing facilities. Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) by year-end had authorized the export of over 73,000 tons of U/sub 3/0/sub 8/ all since September 1974, when the federal government announced its new uranium export guidelines. World production, which had been in the order of 25,000 tons of U/sub 3/0/sub 8/ annually, was expected to reach about 28,000 tons in 1975, principally from increased output in the United States.

  17. Nuclear and radiological safety in the substitution process of the fuel HEU to LEU 30/20 in the Reactor TRIGA Mark III of the ININ

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hernandez G, J.

    2012-10-01

    Inside the safety initiative in the international ambit, with the purpose of reducing the risks associated with the use of high enrichment nuclear fuels (HEU) for different proposes to the peaceful uses of the nuclear energy, Mexico contributes by means of the substitution of the high enrichment fuel HEU for low enrichment fuel LEU 30/20 in the TRIGA Mark III Reactor, belonging to Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares (ININ). The conversion process was carried out by means of the following activities: analysis of the proposed core, reception and inspection of the fuel LEU 30/20, the discharge of the fuels of the mixed reactor core, shipment of the fuels HEU fresh and irradiated to the origin country, reload activities with the fuels LEU 30/20 and parameters measurement of the core operation. In order to maintaining the personnel's integrity and infrastructure associated to the Reactor, during the whole process the measurements of nuclear and radiological safety were controlled to detail, in execution with the license requirements of the installation. This work describes the covering activities and radiological inspections more relevant, as well as the measurements of radiological control implemented with base in the estimate of the equivalent dose of the substitution process. (Author)

  18. Experiments with HEU (93.14 wt.%) metal annuli with internal graphite cylinder

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liu, Xiaobo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Bess, John D. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Wehmann, Udo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Mihalczo, John T. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-04-01

    A variety of critical experiments were constructed of enriched uranium metal (oralloy ) during the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) in support of criticality safety operations at the Y-12 Plant. The purposes of these experiments included the evaluation of storage, casting, and handling limits for the Y-12 Plant and providing data for verification of calculation methods and cross-sections for nuclear criticality safety applications. These included solid cylinders of various diameters, annuli of various inner and outer diameters, two and three interacting cylinders of various diameters, and graphite and polyethylene reflected cylinders and annuli. Of the hundreds of delayed critical experiments, only three experimental configurations are described here. They are internal graphite reflected metal uranium assemblies with three different diameter HEU annuli (15-9 inches, 15-7 inches and 13-7 inches). These experiments can be found in Reference 1 and in their associated logbook

  19. Radioactive Waste Issues related to Production of Fission-based Mo-99 by using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hassan, Muhmood ul; Ryu, Ho Jin [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    In order to produce fission-based Mo-99 from research reactors, two types of targets are being used and they are highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets with {sup 235}U enrichment more than 90wt% of {sup 235}U and low enriched uranium (LEU) targets with {sup 235}U enrichment less than 20wt% of {sup 235}U. It is worth noting that medium enriched uranium i.e. 36wt% of {sup 235}U as being used in South Africa is also regarded as non-LEU from a nuclear security point of view. In order to cope with the proliferation issues, international nuclear security policy is promoting the use of LEU targets in order to minimize the civilian use of HEU. It is noteworthy that Mo-99 yield of the LEU target is less than 20% of the HEU target, which requires approximately five times more LEU targets to be irradiated and consequently results in increased volume of waste. The waste generated from fission Mo-99 production can be mainly due to: target fabrication, assembling of target, irradiation in reactor and processing of irradiated targets. During the fission of U-235 in a reactor, a large number of radionuclides with different chemical and physical properties are formed. The waste produced from these practices may be a combination of low level waste (LLW) and intermediate level waste (ILW) comprised of all three types, i.e., solid, liquid and gas. Handling and treatment of the generated waste are dependent on its form and activity. In case of the large production facility, waste storage facility should be constructed in order to limit the radiation exposures of the workers and the environment. In this study, we discuss and compare mainly the radioactive waste generated by alkaline digestion of both HEU and LEU targets to assist in planning and deciding the choice of the technology with better arrangements for proper handling and disposal of generated waste. With the use of the LEU targets in Mo-99 production facility, significant increase in liquid and solid waste has been expected.

  20. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perkin, D.J.

    1982-01-01

    Developments in the Australian uranium industry during 1980 are reviewed. Mine production increased markedly to 1841 t U 3 O 8 because of output from the new concentrator at Nabarlek and 1131 t of U 3 O 8 were exported at a nominal value of $37.19/lb. Several new contracts were signed for the sale of yellowcake from Ranger and Nabarlek Mines. Other developments include the decision by the joint venturers in the Olympic Dam Project to sink an exploration shaft and the release of an environmental impact statement for the Honeymoon deposit. Uranium exploration expenditure increased in 1980 and additions were made to Australia's demonstrated economic uranium resources. A world review is included

  1. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gabelman, J.W.; Chenoweth, W.L.; Ingerson, E.

    1981-01-01

    The uranium production industry is well into its third recession during the nuclear era (since 1945). Exploration is drastically curtailed, and many staffs are being reduced. Historical market price production trends are discussed. A total of 3.07 million acres of land was acquired for exploration; drastic decrease. Surface drilling footage was reduced sharply; an estimated 250 drill rigs were used by the uranium industry during 1980. Land acquisition costs increased 8%. The domestic reserve changes are detailed by cause: exploration, re-evaluation, or production. Two significant discoveries of deposits were made in Mohave County, Arizona. Uranium production during 1980 was 21,850 short tons U 3 O 8 ; an increase of 17% from 1979. Domestic and foreign exploration highlights were given. Major producing areas for the US are San Juan basin, Wyoming basins, Texas coastal plain, Paradox basin, northeastern Washington, Henry Mountains, Utah, central Colorado, and the McDermitt caldera in Nevada and Oregon. 3 figures, 8 tables

  2. Concrete reflected cylinders of highly enriched solutions of uranyl nitrate ICSBEP Benchmark: A re-evaluation by means of MCNPX using ENDF/B-VI cross section library

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cruzate, J.A.; Carelli, J.L.

    2011-01-01

    This work presents a theoretical re-evaluation of a set of original experiments included in the 2009 issue of the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments, as “Concrete Reflected Cylinders of Highly Enriched Solutions of Uranyl Nitrate” (identification number: HEU-SOL-THERM- 002) [4]. The present evaluation has been made according to benchmark specifications [4], and added data taken out of the original published report [3], but applying a different approach, resulting in a more realistic calculation model. In addition, calculations have been made using the latest version of MCNPX Monte Carlo code, combined with an updated set of cross section data, the continuous-energy ENDF/B-VI library. This has resulted in a comprehensive model for the given experimental situation. Uncertainties analysis has been made based on the evaluation of experimental data presented in the HEU-SOLTHERM-002 report. Resulting calculations with the present improved physical model have been able to reproduce the criticality of configurations within 0.5%, in good agreement with experimental data. Results obtained in the analysis of uncertainties are in general agreement with those at HEU-SOL-THERM-002 benchmark document. Qualitative results from analyses made in the present work can be extended to similar fissile systems: well moderated units of 235 U solutions, reflected with concrete from all directions. Results have confirmed that neutron absorbers, even as impurities, must be taken into account in calculations if at least approximate proportions were known. (authors)

  3. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    Recent decisions by the Australian Government will ensure a significant expansion of the uranium industry. Development at Roxby Downs may proceed and Ranger may fulfil two new contracts but the decision specifies that apart from Roxby Downs, no new mines should be approved. The ACTU maintains an anti-uranium policy but reaction to the decision from the trade union movement has been muted. The Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC) has been asked by the Government to conduct an inquiry into a number of issues relating to Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle. The inquiry will examine in particular Australia's nuclear safeguards arrangements and the adequacy of existing waste management technology. In two additional decisions the Government has dissociated itself from a study into the feasibility of establishing an enrichment operation and has abolished the Uranium Advisory Council. Although Australian reserves account for 20% of the total in the Western World, Australia accounts for a relatively minor proportion of the world's uranium production

  4. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    The French Government has decided to freeze a substantial part of its nuclear power programme. Work has been halted on 18 reactors. This power programme is discussed, as well as the effect it has on the supply of uranium by South Africa

  5. Fuel cycle cost study with HEU and LEU fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matos, J.E.; Freese, K.E.

    1984-01-01

    Fuel cycle costs are compared for a range of 235 U loadings with HEU and LEU fuels using the IAEA generic 10 MW reactor as an example. If LEU silicide fuels are successfully demonstrated and licensed, the results indicate that total fuel cycle costs can be about the same or lower than those with the HEU fuels that are currently used in most research reactors

  6. A fuel cycle cost study with HEU and LEU fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matos, J.E.; Freese, K.E.

    1985-01-01

    Fuel cycle costs are compared for a range of 235 U loadings with HEU and LEU fuels using the IAEA generic 10 MW reactor as an example. If LEU silicide fuels are successfully demonstrated and licensed, the results indicate that total fuel cycle costs can be about the same or lower than those with the HEU fuels that are currently used in most research reactors. (author)

  7. A fuel cycle cost study with HEU and LEU fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matos, J E; Freese, K E [Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL (United States)

    1985-07-01

    Fuel cycle costs are compared for a range of {sup 235}U loadings with HEU and LEU fuels using the IAEA generic 10 MW reactor as an example. If LEU silicide fuels are successfully demonstrated and licensed, the results indicate that total fuel cycle costs can be about the same or lower than those with the HEU fuels that are currently used in most research reactors. (author)

  8. Feasibility of Uranium Concentration Measurements for H Canyon Tank 16.7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lascola, R.J.

    2003-01-01

    Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) evaluated the feasibility of using the H Canyon on-line diode array spectrophotometer to measure uranium concentrations in Tank 16.7. On-line measurements will allow an increase in highly enriched uranium (HEU) production by removing delays associated with off-line measurements. The instrument must be able to measure uranium at concentrations below 1.0 g/L with an uncertainty no greater than 0.3 g/L. SRTC determined that the system has a limit of quantitation of 0.15 g/L. At concentrations of 0.5 and 1.0 g/L, the spectrometer uncertainty is 0.10 g/L. No design changes, such as an increase in flow cell path length, are required to obtain this performance. Expected levels of iron in Tank 16.7 solutions will not interfere with the measurement. The CHEMCHEK method should not be used for confirmatory analysis, as it contributes excessively to the overall uncertainty of the measurement. SRTC expects that the spectrophotometer will meet the measurement requirements for Tank 16.7

  9. U.S. uranium supply to the research and test reactor community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parker, Elaine M.

    2002-01-01

    From the 1950s through the early 1990s, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was the primary supplier of low enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to research and test reactors worldwide. The formerly called Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was put into operational stand down in 1994 due to inadequate safety documentation. This paper will discuss the re-start of the Y-12 Plant and its current capabilities. Additionally, the paper will address recent changes within the DOE, with the creation of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). It will show how the change to NNSA and an organizational re-alignment has improved efficiencies. NNSA is committed to operate its sales program so that it is complementary to, and in support of, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) and Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRR SNF) Return Programs. The NNSA is committed to provide an assurance of competitively-priced, high-quality uranium supply to the research and test reactor community under long-term contracts. This paper will discuss some of NNSA's recent successes in long-term contracting and meeting deliveries. (author)

  10. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.

    2009-01-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be

  11. HEU to LEU fuel conversion. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mulder, R.U.

    1994-10-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a ruling, effective March 27, 1986, that all U.S. non-power reactors convert from HEU fuel to LEU fuel. A Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program was conducted by the Department of Energy at Argonne National Laboratory to coordinate the development of the high density LEU fuel and assist in the development of Safety Analysis Reports for the smaller non-power reactors. Several meetings were held at Argonne in 1987 with the non-power reactor community to discuss the conversion and to set up a conversion schedule for university reactors. EG&G at Idaho was assigned the coordination of the fuel element redesigns. The fuel elements were manufactured by the Babcock & Wilcox Company in Lynchburg, Virginia. The University of Virginia was awarded a grant by the DOE Idaho Operations Office in 1988 to perform safety analysis studies for the LEU conversion for its 2 MW UVAR and 100 Watt CAVALIER reactors. The University subsequently decided to shut down the CAVALIER reactor. A preliminary SAR on the UVAR, along with Technical Specification changes, was submitted to the NRC in November, 1990. An updated SAR was approved by the NRC in January, 1991. In September, 1992, representatives from the fuel manufacturer (B&W) and the fuel designer (EG&G, Idaho) came to the UVAR facility to observe trial fittings of new 22 plate LEU mock fuel elements. B&W fabricated two non-fuel bearing elements, a regular 22 plate element and a control rod element. The elements were checked against the drawings and test fitted in the UVAR grid plate. The dimensions were acceptable and the elements fit in the grid plate with no problems. The staff made several suggestions for minor construction changes to the end pieces on the elements, which were incorporated into the final design of the actual fuel elements. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

  12. HEU to LEU fuel conversion. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mulder, R.U.

    1994-10-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a ruling, effective March 27, 1986, that all U.S. non-power reactors convert from HEU fuel to LEU fuel. A Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program was conducted by the Department of Energy at Argonne National Laboratory to coordinate the development of the high density LEU fuel and assist in the development of Safety Analysis Reports for the smaller non-power reactors. Several meetings were held at Argonne in 1987 with the non-power reactor community to discuss the conversion and to set up a conversion schedule for university reactors. EG ampersand G at Idaho was assigned the coordination of the fuel element redesigns. The fuel elements were manufactured by the Babcock ampersand Wilcox Company in Lynchburg, Virginia. The University of Virginia was awarded a grant by the DOE Idaho Operations Office in 1988 to perform safety analysis studies for the LEU conversion for its 2 MW UVAR and 100 Watt CAVALIER reactors. The University subsequently decided to shut down the CAVALIER reactor. A preliminary SAR on the UVAR, along with Technical Specification changes, was submitted to the NRC in November, 1990. An updated SAR was approved by the NRC in January, 1991. In September, 1992, representatives from the fuel manufacturer (B ampersand W) and the fuel designer (EG ampersand G, Idaho) came to the UVAR facility to observe trial fittings of new 22 plate LEU mock fuel elements. B ampersand W fabricated two non-fuel bearing elements, a regular 22 plate element and a control rod element. The elements were checked against the drawings and test fitted in the UVAR grid plate. The dimensions were acceptable and the elements fit in the grid plate with no problems. The staff made several suggestions for minor construction changes to the end pieces on the elements, which were incorporated into the final design of the actual fuel elements. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology

  13. HEU/LEU-conversion of BER II successfully finished

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, K.; Fischer, C.-O.; Krohn, H.

    2000-01-01

    The BER II (Berliner Experimental Reactor) research reactor is a swimming pool type reactor located in Berlin, Germany. The reactor operates with a thermal power of 10 MW and is primarily used to produce neutrons for neutron scattering experiments. The conversion from HEU- to LEU-fuel elements began in August, 1997. At the last RERTR Meeting 1999 in Budapest, Hungary, Hahn-Meitner-Institut (HMI) presented a 'Status Report' on the conversion of 10 HEU/LEU mixed cores. In February 2000, HMI finished the HEU/LEU-conversion. Hereby, the first pure LEU-standard-core went into operation. Our second LEU-core just ends its operation at the end of July. The third LEU-core will be built up in the beginning of August. The average burn-up rate was improved from 50 - 55% (HEU) to 60 - 65% (LEU). Therefore, only 14 elements/year are now used instead of 28/year. The following report describes our first steps in building pure LEU-cores from mixed HEU/LEU-cores, as well as our initial experience using the pure LEU-cores. (author)

  14. Fluxes at experiment facilities in HEU and LEU designs for the FRM-II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanan, N. A.

    1998-01-01

    An Alternative LEU Design for the FRM-II proposed by the RERTR Program at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has a compact core consisting of a single fuel element that uses LEU silicide fuel with a uranium density of 4.5 g/cm 3 and has a power level of 32 MW. Both the HEU design by the Technical University of Munich (TUM) and the alternative LEU design by ANL have the same fuel lifetime(50 days) and the same neutron flux performance (8 x 10 14 n/cm 2 -s in the reflector). LEU silicide fuel with 4.5 g/cm 3 has been thoroughly tested and is fully-qualified, licensable, and available now for use in a high flux reactor such as the FRM-II. Several issues that were raised by TUM have been addressed in Refs. 1-3. The conclusions of these analyses are summarized below. This paper addresses four additional issues that have been raised in several forums, including Ref 4: heat generation in the cold neutron source (CNS), the gamma and fast neutron fluxes which are components of the reactor noise in neutron scattering experiments in the experiment hall of the reactor, a fuel cycle length difference, and the reactivity worth of the beam tubes and other experiment facilities. The results show that: (a) for the same thermal neutron flux, the neutron and gamma heating in the CNS is smaller in the LEU design than in the HEU design, and cold neutron fluxes as good or better than those of the HEU design can be obtained with the LEU design; (b) the gamma and fast neutron components of the reactor noise in the experiment hall are about the same in both designs; (c) the fuel cycle length is 50 days for both designs; and (d) the absolute value of the reactivity worth of the beam tubes and other experiment facilities is smaller in the LEU design, allowing its fuel cycle length to be increased to 53 or 54 days. Based on the excellent results for the Alternative LEU Design that were obtained in all analyses, the RERTR Program reiterates its conclusion that there are no major technical

  15. Standard specification for uranium metal enriched to more than 15 % and less Than 20 % 235U

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    2000-01-01

    1.1 This specification covers nuclear grade uranium metal that has either been processed through an enrichment plant, or has been produced by the blending of highly enriched uranium with other uranium, to obtain uranium of any 235U concentration below 20 % (and greater than 15 %) and that is intended for research reactor fuel fabrication. The scope of this specification includes specifications for enriched uranium metal derived from commercial natural uranium, recovered uranium, or highly enriched uranium. Commercial natural uranium, recovered uranium and highly enriched uranium are defined in Section 3. The objectives of this specification are to define the impurity and uranium isotope limits for commercial grade enriched uranium metal. 1.2 This specification is intended to provide the nuclear industry with a standard for enriched uranium metal which is to be used in the production of research reactor fuel. In addition to this specification, the parties concerned may agree to other appropriate conditions. ...

  16. Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Battey, G.C.; McKay, A.D.

    1988-01-01

    Production for 1986 was 4899 t U 3 O 8 (4154 t U), 30% greater than in 1985, mainly because of a 39% increase in production at Ranger. Exports for 1986 were 4166 t U 3 O 8 at an average f.o.b. unit value of $40.57/lb U 3 O 8 . Private exploration expenditure for uranium in Australia during the 1985-86 fiscal year was $50.2 million. Plans were announced to increase the nominal capacity of the processing plant at Ranger from 3000 t/year U 3 O 8 to 4500 t and later to 6000 t/year. Construction and initial mine development at Olympic Dam began in March. Production is planned for mid 1988 at an annual rate of 2000 t U 3 O 8 , 30 000 t Cu, and 90 000 oz (2800 kg) Au. The first long-term sales agreement was concluded in September 1986. At the Manyingee deposit, testing of the alkaline solution mining method was completed, and the treatment plant was dismantled. Spot market prices (in US$/lb U 3 O 8 ) quoted by Nuexco were generally stable. From January-October the exchange value fluctuated from US$17.00-US$17.25; for November and December it was US$16.75. Australia's Reasonably Assured Resources of uranium recoverable at less than US$80/kg U at December 1986 were estimated as 462 000 t U, 3000 t U less than in 1985. This represents 30% of the total low-cost RAR in the WOCA (World Outside the Centrally Planned Economy Areas) countries. Australia also has 257 000 t U in the low-cost Estimated Additional Resources Category I, 29% of the WOCA countries' total resources in this category

  17. Radiological consequence analysis with HEU and LEU fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woodruff, W.L.; Warinner, D.K.; Matos, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    A model for estimating the radiological consequences from a hypothetical accident in HEU and LEU fueled research and test reactors is presented. Simple hand calculations based on fission product yield table inventories and non-site specific dispersion data may be adequate in many cases. However, more detailed inventories and site specific data on meteorological conditions and release rates and heights can result in substantial reductions in the dose estimates. LEU fuel gives essentially the same doses as HEU fuel. The plutonium buildup in the LEU fuel does not significantly increase the radiological consequences. The dose to the thyroid is the limiting dose. 10 references, 3 figures, 7 tables.

  18. Radiological consequence analysis with HEU and LEU fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woodruff, W.L.; Warinner, D.K.; Matos, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    A model for estimating the radiological consequences from a hypothetical accident in HEU and LEU fueled research and test reactors is presented. Simple hand calculations based on fission product yield table inventories and non-site specific dispersion data may be adequate in many cases. However, more detailed inventories and site specific data on meteorological conditions and release rates and heights can result in substantial reductions in the dose estimates. LEU fuel gives essentially the same doses as HEU fuel. The plutonium buildup in the LEU fuel does not significantly increase the radiological consequences. The dose to the thyroid is the limiting dose. 10 references, 3 figures, 7 tables

  19. A radiological consequence analysis with HEU and LEU fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woodruff, W.L.; Warinner, D.K.; Matos, J.E.

    1985-01-01

    A model for estimating the radiological consequences from a hypothetical accident in HEU and LEU fueled research and test reactors is presented. Simple hand calculations based on fission product yield table inventories and nonsite specific dispersion data may be adequate in many cases. However, more detailed inventories and site specific data on meteorological conditions and release rates and heights can result in substantial reductions in the dose estimates. LEU fuel gives essentially the same doses as HEU fuel. The plutonium buildup in the LEU fuel does not significantly increase the radiological consequences. The dose to the thyroid is the limiting dose. (author)

  20. A mixed core conversion study with HEU and LEU fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matos, J.E.; Freese, K.E.

    1985-01-01

    The results of a mixed core study are presented for gradual replacement of HEU fuel with LEU fuel using the IAEA generic 10 MW reactor as an example. The key parameters show that the transition can be accomplished safely and economically. (author)

  1. Mixed core conversion study with HEU and LEU fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matos, J.E.; Freese, K.E.

    1984-01-01

    The results of a mixed core study are presented for gradual replacement of HEU fuel with LEU fuel using the IAEA generic 10 MW reactor as an example. The key parameters show that the transition can be accomplished safely and economically

  2. Uranium conversion; Urankonvertering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oliver, Lena; Peterson, Jenny; Wilhelmsen, Katarina [Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Stockholm (Sweden)

    2006-03-15

    FOI, has performed a study on uranium conversion processes that are of importance in the production of different uranium compounds in the nuclear industry. The same conversion processes are of interest both when production of nuclear fuel and production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are considered. Countries that have nuclear weapons ambitions, with the intention to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes, need some degree of uranium conversion capability depending on the uranium feed material available. This report describes the processes that are needed from uranium mining and milling to the different conversion processes for converting uranium ore concentrate to uranium hexafluoride. Uranium hexafluoride is the uranium compound used in most enrichment facilities. The processes needed to produce uranium dioxide for use in nuclear fuel and the processes needed to convert different uranium compounds to uranium metal - the form of uranium that is used in a nuclear weapon - are also presented. The production of uranium ore concentrate from uranium ore is included since uranium ore concentrate is the feed material required for a uranium conversion facility. Both the chemistry and principles or the different uranium conversion processes and the equipment needed in the processes are described. Since most of the equipment that is used in a uranium conversion facility is similar to that used in conventional chemical industry, it is difficult to determine if certain equipment is considered for uranium conversion or not. However, the chemical conversion processes where UF{sub 6} and UF{sub 4} are present require equipment that is made of corrosion resistant material.

  3. Model for absorption-modified multiplication effects in the assay of HEU-containing powders in a random driver

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Winslow, G.H.

    1981-01-01

    A model has been developed which describes the enhancement of the response, in a random driver, of a ''stack'' of highly enriched uranium of arbitrary height over the integral of the response of infinitessimal layers that would be produced solely by the interrogating sources which are external to the stack. It has been suggested that this method of modeling should also be applicable to powders. This paper is a report on the form the model takes for that application. 4 refs

  4. The Supply of Medical Radioisotopes. Market impacts of converting to low-enriched uranium targets for medical isotope production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Westmacott, Chad; Cameron, Ron

    2012-01-01

    The reliable supply of molybdenum-99 ( 99 Mo) and its decay product, technetium-99m ( 99m Tc), is a vital component of modern medical diagnostic practices. At present, most of the global production of 99 Mo is from highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets. However, all major 99 Mo-producing countries have recently agreed to convert to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets to advance important non-proliferation goals, a decision that will have implications for the global supply chain of 99 Mo/ 99m Tc and the long-term supply reliability of these medical isotopes. This study provides the findings and analysis from an extensive examination of the 99 Mo/ 99m Tc supply chain by the OECD/NEA High-level Group on the Security of Supply of Medical Radioisotopes (HLG-MR). It presents a comprehensive evaluation of the potential impacts of converting to the use of LEU targets for 99 Mo production on the global 99 Mo/ 99m Tc market in terms of costs and available production capacity, and the corresponding implications for long-term supply reliability. In this context, the study also briefly discusses the need for policy action by governments in their efforts to ensure a stable and secure long-term supply of 99 Mo/ 99m Tc

  5. Industrial plants for production of highly enriched nitrogen-15

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krell, E.; Jonas, C.

    1977-01-01

    A discussion is presented of the present stage of development of large-scale enrichment of 15 N. The most important processes utilized to separate nitrogen isotopes, namely chemical exchange in the NO/NO 2 /HNO 3 system and low-temperature distillation of NO at -151 0 C, are compared, especially with respect to their economics and use of energy. As examples, chemical exchange plants in the GDR are discussed, and the research activities necessary to optimize the process, especially to solve aerodynamic, hydrodynamic, interface and processing problems, are reviewed. Good results were obtained by the choice of an optimum location and the design of a plant for pre-enrichment to 10 at.% 15 N and an automatically operating two-section cascade for the high enrichment of 15 N to more than 99 at.%. The chemical industry has taken over operation of the plant with the consequence that the raw materials are all available without additional transport. All by-products (nitrous gases and sulphuric acid) are returned for use elsewhere within the industry. The technology of the plant has been chosen so that the quantity of highly enriched product can be varied within a wide range. The final product is used to synthesize more than 250 different 15 N-labelled compounds which are also produced on an industrial scale. (author)

  6. Remediation of uranium impacted sediments in a watercourse

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shephard, Eugene; Walter, Nelson; Downey, Heath [AMEC, Inc., Portland, Maine (United States); Collopy, Peter [AMEC, Inc., San Diego, California (United States); Conant, John [ABB, Inc., Windsor, Connecticut (United States)

    2013-07-01

    In 2009, remediation was initiated for a non-operational fuel cycle facility previously used for government contract work located in Windsor, Connecticut, USA. Radiological contaminants consisted primarily of high enriched uranium (HEU). Other radionuclides encountered in relatively minor amounts in certain areas of the clean-up included Co-60, Cs- 137, Ra-226, Th-232 and low enriched uranium (LEU).Between 2009 and the spring of 2011, remediation efforts were focused on demolition of contaminated buildings and removal of contaminated soil. In the late spring of 2011, the last phase of remediation commenced involving the removal of contaminated sediments from portions of a 1,200 meter long gaining stream. Planning and preparation for remediation of the stream began in 2009 with submittal of permit applications to undertake construction activities in a wetland area. The permitting process was lengthy and involved securing permits from multiple agencies. However, early and frequent communication with stakeholders played an integral role in efficiently obtaining the permit approvals. Frequent communication with stakeholders throughout the planning and remediation process also proved to be a key factor in timely completion of the project. The remediation of the stream involved the use of temporary bladder berms to divert surface water flow, water diversion piping, a sediment vacuum removal system, excavation of sediments using small front-end loaders, sediment dewatering, and waste packaging, transportation and disposal. Many safeguards were employed to protect several species of concern in the work area, water management during project activities, challenges encountered during the project, methods of Final Status Survey, and stream restoration. (authors)

  7. 2011 Progress Report on HEU Minimization Activities in Argentina

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bonini, A.; Cristini, P.; Lio, L. De; Dell' Occhio, L.; Gil, D.; Gonzalez, A.G.; Gonzalez, R.; Varela, C. Komar; Lopez, M.; Novara, O.; Taboada, H. [Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica, Av. Del Libertador 8250 (1429) Buenos Aires (Argentina)

    2011-07-01

    After the core conversion of the RA-6 reactor finished in March 2008, an extension of the original CNEA-NNSA DoE contract was signed to enhance the final national HEU inventories minimization. Before this process, CNEA reserved a small inventory of HEU for R and D uses in fission chambers, neutronic probes and standards. This minimization comprises that all fresh and irradiated HEU remnant inventories coming from fuels and Mo99 irradiation targets fabrication and irradiated HEU-oxides retained in production filters and solutions will be recovered, down-blended into LEU and purified or dispose as waste whenever its recovery would not be advisable due to cost-benefit consideration. CNEA has a R and D program to develop the fabrication technology of both dispersed U-Mo (Al-Si matrix and Al cladding) and monolithic (Zry-4 cladding) miniplates to support the qualification activities of the RERTR program. Some monolithic 58% enrichment and LEU 8%Mo and U10%Mo miniplates and plates were and are being delivered to INL-DoE to be irradiated in the ATR reactor core. CNEA, a worldwide leader on LEU technology for fission radioisotope production is providing Brazil with 1/3 of the national requirements on Mo99 by weekly deliveries. Australia has started the fission radioisotope production through several batches by week, based on CNEA's LEU technology provided by INVAP SE. CNEA is also committed to improve the diffusion of LEU target and radiochemical technology for radioisotope production and target and process optimization. Future plans include: 1. Plans to recover and purify the LEU based inventories in Mo99 production filters, once the HEU to LEU campaign is over. 2. Fabrication and delivering to INL to be irradiated in the ATR core of U-8%Mo and U-10%Mo monolithic miniplates and development and fabrication of LEU very high density monolithic and dispersed U-Mo fuel plates with Zr cladding for the FUTURE-MONO experiment in the frame of the RERTR program. 3

  8. Critical analysis of the management of waste system originated at the uranium mining and processing. A case study of the Concentrated Unit of Uranium - INB

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Araujo, Valeska Peres de

    2005-01-01

    The uranium world market faced a depreciation of this commodity during the last decades. Recently, decreases in the secondary supply (represented by highly enriched uranium - HEU - stocks detained by the former Soviet Union) turned out the market dependent upon primary supply again. In order to cope with this changing demands and market conditions, new uranium mining/milling projects must start operation, or at least, former uranium production plants must be improved. Environmental questions have been and certainly will continue to be a determinant factor concerning the operational feasibility of these facilities. Mining/milling activities have the potential to cause risks to the human health and to the environment. In case of uranium projects, radiological impacts shall also be taken into consideration. Amongst the most relevant environmental aspects associated with the operation of a uranium project, generated wastes are usually of major concern and deserve appropriate management strategies. As a result the objective of the present work was to examine the waste management system of the Brazilian uranium production unity located at the municipality of Caetite, northeast region of the country. An open pit mine and a milling facility compose this unit. The extraction method employed is acid heap leach (using H 2 SO 4 ). It could be assessed that the overall conceptual management strategy is in agreement with the practices adopted worldwide. Atmospheric impacts, caused by the emissions of radon and aerosols must be investigated in more details. Mathematical simulation revealed that no significant impact in groundwater is expected due to mobilization and transport of radionuclides from the milling wastes. However, the impacts of drainage water, accumulated in the open pit, into groundwater cannot be discarded yet. Screening techniques were applied to assess the potential contribution of the leached ore piles as a 226 Ra source of pollution. Our results did not allow

  9. Studies of mixed HEU-LEU-MTR cores using 3D models

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haenggi, P.; Lehmann, E.; Hammer, J.; Christen, R. [Paul Scherrer Institute, Villigen (Switzerland)

    1997-08-01

    Several different core loadings were assembled at the SAPHIR research reactor in Switzerland combining the available types of MTR-type fuel elements, consisting mainly of both HEU and LEU fuel. Bearing in mind the well known problems which can occur in such configurations (especially power peaking), investigations have been carried out for each new loading with a 2D neutron transport code (BOXER). The axial effects were approximated by a global buckling value and therefore the radial effects could be studied in considerably detail. Some of the results were reported at earlier RERTR meetings and were compared to those obtained by other methods and with experimental values. For the explicit study of the third dimension of the core, another code (SILWER), which has been developed in PSI for LWR power plant cores, has been selected. With the help of an adapted model for the MTR-core of SAPHIR, several important questions have been addressed. Among other aspects, the estimation of the axial contribution to the hot channel factors, the influence of the control rod position and of the Xe-poisoning on the power distribution were studied. Special attention was given to a core position where a new element was assumed placed near a empty, water filled position. The comparison of elements of low and high enrichments at this position was made in terms of the induced power peaks, with explicit consideration of axial effects. The program SILWER has proven to be applicable to MTR-cores for the investigation of axial effects. For routine use as for the support of reactor operation, this 3D code is a good supplement to the standard 2D model.

  10. Microstructural evolution of a uranium-10 wt.% molybdenum alloy for nuclear reactor fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clarke, A.J.; Clarke, K.D.; McCabe, R.J.; Necker, C.T.; Papin, P.A.; Field, R.D.; Kelly, A.M.; Tucker, T.J.; Forsyth, R.T.; Dickerson, P.O.; Foley, J.C.; Swenson, H.; Aikin, R.M.; Dombrowski, D.E.

    2015-01-01

    Low-enriched uranium-10 wt.% molybdenum (LEU-10wt.%Mo) is of interest for the fabrication of monolithic fuels to replace highly-enriched uranium (HEU) dispersion fuels in high performance research and test reactors around the world. In this work, depleted uranium-10 wt.%Mo (DU-10wt.%Mo) is used to simulate the solidification and microstructural evolution of LEU-10wt.%Mo. Electron backscatter diffraction (EBSD) and complementary electron probe microanalysis (EPMA) reveal significant microsegregation present in the metastable γ-phase after solidification. Homogenization is performed at 800 and 1000 °C for times ranging from 1 to 32 h to explore the time–temperature combinations that will reduce the extent of microsegregation, as regions of higher and lower Mo content may influence local mechanical properties and provide preferred regions for γ-phase decomposition. We show for the first time that EBSD can be used to qualitatively assess microstructural evolution in DU-10wt.%Mo after homogenization treatments. Complementary EPMA is used to quantitatively confirm this finding. Homogenization at 1000 °C for 2–4 h may the regions that contain 8 wt.% Mo or lower, whereas homogenization at 1000 °C for longer than 8 h effectively saturates Mo chemical homogeneity, but results in substantial grain growth. The appropriate homogenization time will depend upon additional microstructural considerations, such as grain growth and intended subsequent processing. Higher carbon LEU-10wt.%Mo generally contains more inclusions within the grains and at grain boundaries after solidification. The effect of these inclusions on microstructural evolution (e.g. grain growth) during homogenization and as potential γ-phase decomposition nucleation sites is unclear, but likely requires additional study.

  11. Microstructural evolution of a uranium-10 wt.% molybdenum alloy for nuclear reactor fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Clarke, A.J., E-mail: aclarke@lanl.gov; Clarke, K.D.; McCabe, R.J.; Necker, C.T.; Papin, P.A.; Field, R.D.; Kelly, A.M.; Tucker, T.J.; Forsyth, R.T.; Dickerson, P.O.; Foley, J.C.; Swenson, H.; Aikin, R.M.; Dombrowski, D.E.

    2015-10-15

    Low-enriched uranium-10 wt.% molybdenum (LEU-10wt.%Mo) is of interest for the fabrication of monolithic fuels to replace highly-enriched uranium (HEU) dispersion fuels in high performance research and test reactors around the world. In this work, depleted uranium-10 wt.%Mo (DU-10wt.%Mo) is used to simulate the solidification and microstructural evolution of LEU-10wt.%Mo. Electron backscatter diffraction (EBSD) and complementary electron probe microanalysis (EPMA) reveal significant microsegregation present in the metastable γ-phase after solidification. Homogenization is performed at 800 and 1000 °C for times ranging from 1 to 32 h to explore the time–temperature combinations that will reduce the extent of microsegregation, as regions of higher and lower Mo content may influence local mechanical properties and provide preferred regions for γ-phase decomposition. We show for the first time that EBSD can be used to qualitatively assess microstructural evolution in DU-10wt.%Mo after homogenization treatments. Complementary EPMA is used to quantitatively confirm this finding. Homogenization at 1000 °C for 2–4 h may the regions that contain 8 wt.% Mo or lower, whereas homogenization at 1000 °C for longer than 8 h effectively saturates Mo chemical homogeneity, but results in substantial grain growth. The appropriate homogenization time will depend upon additional microstructural considerations, such as grain growth and intended subsequent processing. Higher carbon LEU-10wt.%Mo generally contains more inclusions within the grains and at grain boundaries after solidification. The effect of these inclusions on microstructural evolution (e.g. grain growth) during homogenization and as potential γ-phase decomposition nucleation sites is unclear, but likely requires additional study.

  12. Discussion on prospecting potential for rich uranium deposits in Xiazhuang uranium ore-field, northern Guangdong

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu Lieqin; Tan Zhengzhong

    2004-01-01

    Based on analyzing the prospecting potential for uranium deposits in Xiazhuang uranium ore field this paper discusses the prospecting for rich uranium deposits and prospecting potential in the region. Research achievements indicate: that the Xiazhuang ore-field is an ore-concentrated area where uranium has been highly enriched, and possesses good prospecting potential and perspective, becoming one of the most important prospecting areas for locating rich uranium deposits in northern Guangdong; that the 'intersection type', the alkaline metasomatic fractured rock type and the vein-group type uranium deposits are main targets and the prospecting direction for future uranium prospecting in this region

  13. Status of HEU-LEU conversion of FRJ-2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Damm, G.; Nabbi, R.

    2002-01-01

    The operator of the German FRJ-2 research reactor, 'Research Center Juelich', has participated from the beginning in the RERTR programme and made comprehensive contributions to the test and use of LEU fuel for HEU-LEU-conversion measures. The originally planned time scale for the conversion of FRJ-2 was significantly delayed because of a change of the manufacturer of the LEU fuel elements and a 4 years shutdown of the reactor for refurbishment purposes. In the meantime the new LEU fuel elements are qualified and tested in the reactor. In the moment calculations for the safety report are made and it is planned to apply for the license of FRJ-2 operation with LEU fuel at the beginning of 2003. In order to get most reliable results a sophisticated computational method based on a MCNP model coupled with the depletion code BURN was developed for reactor physical calculations, core conversion studies and fuel element performance analysis and applied to the mixed and LEU core. The licensing schedule and results of latest calculations for the conversion study will be presented. The simulations shows that the thermal flux in the LEU core is about 19% resulting in a lower burnup rate. But in the reflector area around the core and in the center of the cold n source the neutron flux reduction remains limited to 6%. Due to a harder neutron spectrum in the LEU core the kinetic and safety related parameters are slightly reduced. Using the ORIGEN code it could be shown that the increase of the total fission products inventory amounts to about 6% compared to a HEU core. As a consequence of the high amount of U-238, the amount of U-235 in the LEU core has to be about 27% higher than in the HEU core but the U-235 burnup is approx. 5% lower due to the contribution of fissile plutonium. (author)

  14. Managing military uranium and plutonium in the United States and the former Soviet Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.; Holdren, J.P.

    1997-01-01

    Effective approaches to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)--the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons--are fundamental to controlling nuclear proliferation and providing the basis for deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ongoing dismantlement of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons are creating unprecedented stresses on the systems for managing these materials, as well as unprecedented opportunities for cooperation to improve these systems. In this article, the authors summarize the technical background to this situation, and the current and prospective security challenges posed by military stockpiles of these materials in the US and Russia. They then review the programs in place to address these challenges, the progress of these programs to date, and the work remaining to be done, in five areas: (a) preventing theft and smuggling of nuclear warheads and fissile materials; (b) building a regime of monitored reductions in nuclear warhead and fissile material stockpiles; (c) ending further production of excess fissile materials; (d) reducing stockpiles of excess fissile materials; and (e) avoiding economic collapse in the nuclear cities where substantial fractions of these materials and their guardians reside. 128 refs., 1 fig., 3 tabs

  15. Fuel conversion of JRR-4 from HEU to LEU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ichikawa, Hiroki; Nakajima, Teruo

    1997-01-01

    Japanese JRR-4 (Japan Research Reactor No.4) is a pool type, light water moderated and cooled, ETR type fuel reactor used for Shielding experiments, isotope production, neutron activation analyses, Si doping, reactor students training. It acieved first criticality on January 28, 1965 with maximum thermal power 3.5MW. The standard core consistes of 20 Fuel elements, 7 control rods 5 Irradiation holes, neutron source, graphite reflectors. Available thermal flux is 7x1013 n/cm2/s. Within the RERTR program plans are made for core conversion from HEU to LEU

  16. Nuclear criticality assessment of LEU and HEU fuel element storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pond, R.B.; Matos, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    Criticality aspects of storing LEU (20%) and HEU (93%) fuel elements have been evaluated as a function of 235 U loading, element geometry, and fuel type. Silicide, oxide, and aluminide fuel types have been evaluated ranging in 235 U loading from 180 to 620 g per element and from 16 to 23 plates per element. Storage geometry considerations have been evaluated for fuel element separations ranging from closely packed formations to spacings of several centimeters between elements. Data are presented in a form in which interpolations may be made to estimate the eigenvalue of any fuel element storage configuration that is within the range of the data. (author)

  17. A detailed neutronics comparison of the university of Florida training reactor (UFTR) current HEU and proposed LEU cores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dionne, B.; Haghighat, A.; Yi, C.; Smith, R.; Ghita, G.; Manalo, K.; Sjoden, G.; Huh, J.; Baciak, J.; Mock, T.; Wenner, M.; Matos, J.; Stillman, J.

    2006-01-01

    For over 35 years, the UFTR highly-enriched core has been safely operated. As part of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program, the core is currently being converted to low-enriched uranium fuel. The analyses presented in this paper were performed to verify that, from a neutronic perspective, a proposed low-enriched core can be operated as safely and as effectively as the highly-enriched core. Detailed Monte Carlo criticality calculations are performed to determine: i) Excess reactivity for different core configurations, ii) Individual integral blade worth and shutdown margin, iii) Reactivity coefficients and kinetic parameters, and iv) Flux profiles and core six-factor formula parameters. (authors)

  18. Ewing's sarcoma precursors are highly enriched in embryonic osteochondrogenic progenitors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tanaka, Miwa; Yamazaki, Yukari; Kanno, Yohei; Igarashi, Katsuhide; Aisaki, Ken-ichi; Kanno, Jun; Nakamura, Takuro

    2014-07-01

    Ewing's sarcoma is a highly malignant bone tumor found in children and adolescents, and the origin of this malignancy is not well understood. Here, we introduced a Ewing's sarcoma-associated genetic fusion of the genes encoding the RNA-binding protein EWS and the transcription factor ETS (EWS-ETS) into a fraction of cells enriched for osteochondrogenic progenitors derived from the embryonic superficial zone (eSZ) of long bones collected from late gestational murine embryos. EWS-ETS fusions efficiently induced Ewing's sarcoma-like small round cell sarcoma formation by these cells. Analysis of the eSZ revealed a fraction of a precursor cells that express growth/differentiation factor 5 (Gdf5), the transcription factor Erg, and parathyroid hormone-like hormone (Pthlh), and selection of the Pthlh-positive fraction alone further enhanced EWS-ETS-dependent tumor induction. Genes downstream of the EWS-ETS fusion protein were quite transcriptionally active in eSZ cells, especially in regions in which the chromatin structure of the ETS-responsive locus was open. Inhibition of β-catenin, poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase 1 (PARP1), or enhancer of zeste homolog 2 (EZH2) suppressed cell growth in a murine model of Ewing's sarcoma, suggesting the utility of the current system as a preclinical model. These results indicate that eSZ cells are highly enriched in precursors to Ewing's sarcoma and provide clues to the histogenesis of Ewing's sarcoma in bone.

  19. Foreign research reactor irradiated nuclear fuel inventories containing HEU and LEU of United States origin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matos, J.E.

    1994-12-01

    This report provides estimates of foreign research reactor inventories of aluminum-based and TRIGA irradiated nuclear fuel elements containing highly enriched and low enriched uranium of United States origin that are anticipated in January 1996, January 2001, and January 2006. These fuels from 104 research reactors in 41 countries are the same aluminum-based and TRIGA fuels that were eligible for receipt under the Department of Energy's Offsite Fuels Policy that was in effect in 1988. All fuel inventory and reactor data that were available as of December 1, 1994, have been included in the estimates of approximately 14,300 irradiated fuel elements in January 1996, 18,800 in January 2001, and 22,700 in January 2006

  20. Development and application of a safeguards system in a fabrication plant for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cuypers, M.; Stricht, E. van der

    1979-01-01

    This paper gives a general view of the safeguards activities performed at the Nukem Fabrication plant (Hanau, Federal Republic of Germany) during the last seven years. The main safeguards-relevant features of the plant are given and discussed. The importance is stressed of a good working relationship between the three principal partners, viz. the operator, the safeguards authority and the latter's technical support service. The definition, implementation and improvement of safeguards equipment and activities are outlined. The paper describes the internal organization established by the operator to fulfil his responsibilities, the safeguards philosophy, the Non-Destructive Assay equipment permanently installed by Euratom Safeguards, the results obtained, and the evaluation of the material balances. Conclusions are drawn (and specific comments made throughout the paper) from the experience gained over this period of seven years. (author)

  1. Nuclear criticality safety for warehousing of 55-gal drums containing highly enriched uranium metal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robinson, R.C.; Dodds, H.L.

    1989-01-01

    Subcritical data for six separate arrays of 55-gal 17H steel shipping/storage containers is calculated and used to determine safe storage limits for U(97.5)-metal in a warehouse environment at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. Results are presented for three different forms of fissile material: 97.5 wt% 235 U enriched metal (ρ 0 = 18.76 g/cm 3 ) cylinders, metal spheres, and low density (ρ = 0.25 ρ 0 ) metal cylinders

  2. Direct-scanning alpha spectrometer for americium and plutonium contamination on highly-enriched uranium surfaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, W.C.; Martinez, H.E.; Abeyta, C.L.; Morgan, A.N.; Nelson, T.O.

    1997-01-01

    Trace Pu 239 and Am 241 contamination on a surface whose alpha count is dominated by U 235 and U 234 decay has been successfully quantified by counting swipes in external alpha spectroscopy chambers. The swipe process, however, is labor intensive and subject to uncertainties in the swiping process as well as degraded spectral resolution due to the presence of the swipe material. A multichannel instrument for automated in situ measurements of interior and exterior contamination has been developed which incorporates a rotary table, 13 fixed ion-implanted silicon detectors, and spectroscopy electronics. Custom software was written to allow alpha spectrometer to function as a virtual instrument in the LabView environment. This system gives improved speed and resolution as well as a complete log of the location of areas of high surface contamination, a feature not practical to obtain by other methods, and one which opens the possibility of long term studies such as Pu outgrowth evaluation employing the instrument. The authors present performance data as well as system integration, calibration, control, and dynamic geometric efficiency calculations related to the design of this and next generation systems

  3. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996. World inventories, capabilities and policies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albright, D.; Berkhout, F.; Walker, W.

    1997-01-01

    This book provides an updated authoritative survey of the quantities of fissile material produced for nuclear weapons and in the civilian fuel cycle. The control of fissile materials and associated technologies are at the core of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The authors demonstrate that despite technical, political and economic difficulties, a fully effective material control regime is feasible. The main steps towards realisation of such a regime are identified. (UK)

  4. Forensic analysis of a smuggled HEU sample interdicted in Bulgaria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemeyer, S.; Hutcheon, I.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: A sample of HEU was seized in Rousse, Bulgaria on May 29, 1999, at a border crossing between Bulgaria and Romania. A search of the suspect's vehicle uncovered a lead canister hidden in the car trunk. The initial examination of the contents by Bulgarian scientists indicated that the sample was indeed HEU, and subsequently arrangements were made for a U.S. team of nuclear forensics scientists from several national laboratories to conduct a thorough examination. This report gives a summary of the results. The HEU sample was contained in a glass ampoule that was embedded in a yellow wax, and in turn the wax filled the inside of the cylindrical lead container. A broad set of techniques was used to examine both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. Our general experimental approach has been previously described at meetings of the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG), but this case represents the application of the most diverse set of nuclear forensic measurements for an actual seized sample. Analysis of the HEU itself included particle characterization, stoichiometry, impurity elements, residual nuclides, age-dating, and U and Pu isotopics. Measurements by XRD, SEM, and TEM show that sample is mostly U3O8, with minor amounts of two other phases. The powder is extremely fine-grained (160 nm mean) and quite uniform in size. Most grains (95%) are equidimensional, with the remainder rod-or plate-shaped. The U is 72.7% U-235 with a high U-236 abundance of 12.1%. The sample is reprocessed, reactor-irradiated material. The original U enrichment was 90% and the irradiation burned up about 50% of the initial U-235. Pu is present at a very low-level (3 ppb); the Pu-239 abundance is 82% with 240/239=0.12. Three fission products were detected at low levels, giving unambiguous evidence of fuel recycling. The total impurity content is about 600 ppmw (mostly S, Cl, Fe, and Br), which we interpret as indicating a batch processing operation because the

  5. A comparison between thorium-uranium and low enrichment uranium cycles in the high temperature reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cerles, J M

    1973-03-15

    In a previous report, it was shown that the Uranium cycle could be used as well with multi-hole block (GGA type) as with tubular elements. Now, in a F.S.V. geometry, a comparison is made between Thorium cycle and Uranium cycle. This comparison will be concerned with the physical properties of the materials, the needs of natural Uranium, the fissile material inventory and, at last, an attempt of economical considerations. In this report the cycle will be characterizd by the fertile material. So, we write ''Thorium cycle'' for Highly Enriched Uranium - Thorium cycle and ''Uranium cycle'' for low Enrichment Uranium cycle.

  6. Time-correlated neutron analysis of a multiplying HEU source

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, E.C.; Kalter, J.M.; Lavelle, C.M.; Watson, S.M.; Kinlaw, M.T.; Chichester, D.L.; Noonan, W.A.

    2015-01-01

    The ability to quickly identify and characterize special nuclear material remains a national security challenge. In counter-proliferation applications, identifying the neutron multiplication of a sample can be a good indication of the level of threat. Currently neutron multiplicity measurements are performed with moderated 3 He proportional counters. These systems rely on the detection of thermalized neutrons, a process which obscures both energy and time information from the source. Fast neutron detectors, such as liquid scintillators, have the ability to detect events on nanosecond time scales, providing more information on the temporal structure of the arriving signal, and provide an alternative method for extracting information from the source. To explore this possibility, a series of measurements were performed on the Idaho National Laboratory's MARVEL assembly, a configurable HEU source. The source assembly was measured in a variety of different HEU configurations and with different reflectors, covering a range of neutron multiplications from 2 to 8. The data was collected with liquid scintillator detectors and digitized for offline analysis. A gap based approach for identifying the bursts of detected neutrons associated with the same fission chain was used. Using this approach, we are able to study various statistical properties of individual fission chains. One of these properties is the distribution of neutron arrival times within a given burst. We have observed two interesting empirical trends. First, this distribution exhibits a weak, but definite, dependence on source multiplication. Second, there are distinctive differences in the distribution depending on the presence and type of reflector. Both of these phenomena might prove to be useful when assessing an unknown source. The physical origins of these phenomena can be illuminated with help of MCNPX-PoliMi simulations

  7. Time-correlated neutron analysis of a multiplying HEU source

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, E.C., E-mail: Eric.Miller@jhuapl.edu [Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD (United States); Kalter, J.M.; Lavelle, C.M. [Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD (United States); Watson, S.M.; Kinlaw, M.T.; Chichester, D.L. [Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Noonan, W.A. [Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD (United States)

    2015-06-01

    The ability to quickly identify and characterize special nuclear material remains a national security challenge. In counter-proliferation applications, identifying the neutron multiplication of a sample can be a good indication of the level of threat. Currently neutron multiplicity measurements are performed with moderated {sup 3}He proportional counters. These systems rely on the detection of thermalized neutrons, a process which obscures both energy and time information from the source. Fast neutron detectors, such as liquid scintillators, have the ability to detect events on nanosecond time scales, providing more information on the temporal structure of the arriving signal, and provide an alternative method for extracting information from the source. To explore this possibility, a series of measurements were performed on the Idaho National Laboratory's MARVEL assembly, a configurable HEU source. The source assembly was measured in a variety of different HEU configurations and with different reflectors, covering a range of neutron multiplications from 2 to 8. The data was collected with liquid scintillator detectors and digitized for offline analysis. A gap based approach for identifying the bursts of detected neutrons associated with the same fission chain was used. Using this approach, we are able to study various statistical properties of individual fission chains. One of these properties is the distribution of neutron arrival times within a given burst. We have observed two interesting empirical trends. First, this distribution exhibits a weak, but definite, dependence on source multiplication. Second, there are distinctive differences in the distribution depending on the presence and type of reflector. Both of these phenomena might prove to be useful when assessing an unknown source. The physical origins of these phenomena can be illuminated with help of MCNPX-PoliMi simulations.

  8. Time-correlated neutron analysis of a multiplying HEU source

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, E. C.; Kalter, J. M.; Lavelle, C. M.; Watson, S. M.; Kinlaw, M. T.; Chichester, D. L.; Noonan, W. A.

    2015-06-01

    The ability to quickly identify and characterize special nuclear material remains a national security challenge. In counter-proliferation applications, identifying the neutron multiplication of a sample can be a good indication of the level of threat. Currently neutron multiplicity measurements are performed with moderated 3He proportional counters. These systems rely on the detection of thermalized neutrons, a process which obscures both energy and time information from the source. Fast neutron detectors, such as liquid scintillators, have the ability to detect events on nanosecond time scales, providing more information on the temporal structure of the arriving signal, and provide an alternative method for extracting information from the source. To explore this possibility, a series of measurements were performed on the Idaho National Laboratory's MARVEL assembly, a configurable HEU source. The source assembly was measured in a variety of different HEU configurations and with different reflectors, covering a range of neutron multiplications from 2 to 8. The data was collected with liquid scintillator detectors and digitized for offline analysis. A gap based approach for identifying the bursts of detected neutrons associated with the same fission chain was used. Using this approach, we are able to study various statistical properties of individual fission chains. One of these properties is the distribution of neutron arrival times within a given burst. We have observed two interesting empirical trends. First, this distribution exhibits a weak, but definite, dependence on source multiplication. Second, there are distinctive differences in the distribution depending on the presence and type of reflector. Both of these phenomena might prove to be useful when assessing an unknown source. The physical origins of these phenomena can be illuminated with help of MCNPX-PoliMi simulations.

  9. The calculation of the MEU-HEU coupled core in the KUCA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hayashi, M.; Shiroya, S.; Kanda, K.; Shibata, T.

    1984-01-01

    The KUCA has a plan for critical experiments of the MEU-HEU coupled core in 1984. The neutronics calculation has been performed for the MEU-HEU coupled core in the KUCA. The GGC-4 and THERMOS were used to generate the four-group constants and the 2D-FEM-KUR, based on the finite-element method, was used for the diffusion calculation. The calculations with four-group constants agreed with experiments within 1.8% for the both single-cores with the MEU and the HEU. (author)

  10. Critical review of uranium resources and production capability to 2020

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Underhill, D.H.

    2002-01-01

    Even with a modest forecast of nuclear power growth for the next 25 years, it is expected that the world uranium requirements will increase. This analysis indicates uranium mine production will continue to be the primary supply of requirements through 2020. Secondary supplies, such as low enriched uranium blended from highly enriched uranium, reprocessing of spent fuel would have to make-up the remaining balance, although the contribution of US and Russian strategic stockpiles is not well known at this time. (author)

  11. Turkey's regulatory plans for high enriched to low enriched conversion of TR-2 reactor core

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guelol Oezdere, Oya

    2003-01-01

    Turkey is a developing country and has three nuclear facilities two of which are research reactors and one pilot fuel production plant. One of the two research reactors is TR-2 which is located in Cekmece site in Istanbul. TR-2 Reactor's core is composed of both high enriched and low enriched fuel and from high enriched to low enriched core conversion project will take place in year 2005. This paper presents the plans for drafting regulations on the safety analysis report updates for high enriched to low enriched core conversion of TR-2 reactor, the present regulatory structure of Turkey and licensing activities of nuclear facilities. (author)

  12. Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Directly Disposing Highly Enriched Spent Nuclear Fuel in Unsaturated Tuff - I: Nuclear Criticality Constraints

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rechard, Rob P.; Sanchez, Lawrence C.; Trellue, Holly R.

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents the mass, concentration, and volume required for a critical event to occur in homogeneous mixtures of fissile material and various other geologic materials. The fissile material considered is primarily highly enriched uranium spent fuel; however, 239 Pu is considered in some cases. The non-fissile materials examined are those found in the proposed repository area at Yucca Mountain, Nevada: volcanic tuff, iron rust, concrete, and naturally occurring water. For 235 U, the minimum critical solid concentration for tuff was 5 kg/m 3 (similar to sandstone), and in goethite, 45 kg/m 3 . The critical mass of uranium was sensitive to a number of factors, such as moisture content and fissile enrichment, but had a minimum, assuming almost 100% saturation and >20% enrichment, of 18 kg in tuff as Soddyite (or 9.5 kg as UO 2 ) and 7 kg in goethite. For 239 Pu, the minimum critical solid concentration for tuff was 3 kg/m 3 (similar to sandstone); in goethite, 20 kg/m 3 . The critical mass of plutonium was also sensitive to a number of factors, but had a minimum, assuming 100% saturation and 80-90% enrichment, of 5 kg in tuff and 6 kg in goethite

  13. Expert's statement on the research reactor Munich II (FRM-II); Gutachterliche Stellungnahme zum Forschungsreaktor Muenchen II (FRM-II)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liebert, Wolfgang; Friess, Friederike; Gufler, Klaus; Arnold, Nikolaus [Univ. fuer Bodenkultur (BOKU), Wien (Austria). Inst. fuer Sicherheits- und Risikowissenschaften (ISR)

    2017-12-15

    The Expert's statement on the research reactor FRM-II covers the following issues: The situation in Germany with respect to HEU (highly enriched uranium) fuel elements, the proliferation problems related to HEU fuel and the generated high-level radioactive wastes, possible safety hazards of an interim storage of HEU containing wastes, for instance in the interim storage facility Ahaus, possible safety hazards of final disposal of HEU containing radioactive wastes, possibilities to avoid the use of HEU fuel in order to prevent further production of these wastes, requirement of processing spent HEU containing fuel elements for final disposal.

  14. United States and Russian Cooperation on Issues of Nuclear Nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2005-06-01

    Reactors ( RERTR ) This project works with Russia to facilitate conversion of its research and test reactors from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel...reactor fuel purchase, accelerated RERTR activities, and accelerated Material Conversion and Consolidation implementation. 89 j. Fissile Materials

  15. Choice and utilization of slightly enriched uranium fuel for high performance research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cerles, J.M.; Schwartz, J.P.

    1978-01-01

    Problems relating to the replacement of highly enriched (90% or 93% U 235 ) uranium fuel: by moderately enriched (20% or 40% in U 235 ) metallic uranium fuel and slightly enriched (3% or 8% in U 235 ) uranium oxide fuel are discussed

  16. 78 FR 37925 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Disposition of Russian Highly Enriched...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-24

    ... judicial process, thereby jeopardizing the full implementation of the HEU Agreements to the detriment of U... attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process with respect to such...

  17. Comparative Analysis of the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor with HEU Fuel Using SRAC and MCNP5

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Giang Phan

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Neutronics analysis has been performed for the 500 kW Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor loaded with highly enriched uranium fuel using the SRAC code system. The effective multiplication factors, keff, were analyzed for the core at criticality conditions and in two cases corresponding to the complete withdrawal and the full insertion of control rods. MCNP5 calculations were also conducted and compared to that obtained with the SRAC code. The results show that the difference of the keff values between the codes is within 55 pcm. Compared to the criticality conditions established in the experiments, the maximum differences of the keff values obtained from the SRAC and MCNP5 calculations are 119 pcm and 64 pcm, respectively. The radial and axial power peaking factors are 1.334 and 1.710, respectively, in the case of no control rod insertion. At the criticality condition these values become 1.445 and 1.832 when the control rods are partially inserted. Compared to MCNP5 calculations, the deviation of the relative power densities is less than 4% at the fuel bundles in the middle of the core, while the maximum deviation is about 7% appearing at some peripheral bundles. This agreement indicates the verification of the analysis models.

  18. Critical analysis of the management of waste system originated at the uranium mining and processing. A case study of the Concentrated Unit of Uranium - INB; Analise critica do sistema de gerenciamento de rejeitos provenientes de mineracao e beneficiamento de uranio. Um estudo de caso da Unidade de Concentrado de Uranio/INB

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Araujo, Valeska Peres de

    2005-07-01

    The uranium world market faced a depreciation of this commodity during the last decades. Recently, decreases in the secondary supply (represented by highly enriched uranium - HEU - stocks detained by the former Soviet Union) turned out the market dependent upon primary supply again. In order to cope with this changing demands and market conditions, new uranium mining/milling projects must start operation, or at least, former uranium production plants must be improved. Environmental questions have been and certainly will continue to be a determinant factor concerning the operational feasibility of these facilities. Mining/milling activities have the potential to cause risks to the human health and to the environment. In case of uranium projects, radiological impacts shall also be taken into consideration. Amongst the most relevant environmental aspects associated with the operation of a uranium project, generated wastes are usually of major concern and deserve appropriate management strategies. As a result the objective of the present work was to examine the waste management system of the Brazilian uranium production unity located at the municipality of Caetite, northeast region of the country. An open pit mine and a milling facility compose this unit. The extraction method employed is acid heap leach (using H{sub 2}SO{sub 4}). It could be assessed that the overall conceptual management strategy is in agreement with the practices adopted worldwide. Atmospheric impacts, caused by the emissions of radon and aerosols must be investigated in more details. Mathematical simulation revealed that no significant impact in groundwater is expected due to mobilization and transport of radionuclides from the milling wastes. However, the impacts of drainage water, accumulated in the open pit, into groundwater cannot be discarded yet. Screening techniques were applied to assess the potential contribution of the leached ore piles as a {sup 226}Ra source of pollution. Our results

  19. Uranium age determination - Separation and analysis of 230Th and 231Pa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgenstern, A.; Apostolidis, C.; Mayer, K.; Wallenius, M.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In recent years several incidents involving illicit trafficking and smuggling of nuclear material, radioactive sources and radioactively contaminated materials have raised growing public concern about criminal acts involving nuclear materials. Consequently, research efforts in nuclear forensic science have been intensified in order to develop and improve methods for the identification of the nature and origin of seized materials. Information obtained from the analysis of unknown nuclear materials is of key importance in order to aide authorities that are in charge of developing fast and appropriate response action. For the identification of nuclear materials various sample characteristics are of relevance, including isotopic composition, the content of chemical impurities, material properties and the date of production. Information on the production date, respectively the 'age' of nuclear materials, will also be of key importance in other fields of nuclear science, i.e. for the verification of a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in order to distinguish freshly produced materials from 'old' excess weapons materials. The age of nuclear materials may also be of relevance under a strengthened safeguards regime to reveal clandestine production of weapons usable materials, i.e. the separation of plutonium or production of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The age dating of plutonium samples has been described in detail for bulk samples as well as for particles. In this work we focused on the age determination of uranium materials of different uranium enrichment. The radioactive decay of the uranium isotopes provides a chronometer that is inherent to the material, in particular the mother/daughter pairs 234 U/ 230 Th and 235 U/ 231 Pa can be advantageously used. Due to the relatively long half-lives of 234 U (2.46·10 5 years) and 235 U (7.04·10 8 years) only minute amounts of daughter nuclides are growing in, therefore both separation of Th and Pa from

  20. Profileration-proof uranium/plutonium and thorium/uranium fuel cycles. Safeguards and non-profileration. 2. rev. ed.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kessler, G.

    2017-07-01

    test reactors or future <20% U-235 enriched uranium fuel of light-water-reactors operating in the U/Th fuel cycle to high enriched uranium (HEU) which could be misused to design nuclear weapons. A technical solution for this proliferation danger of <20% U-235 enriched uranium is the admixture of about 0.1% of the isotope U-232. It is shown that during re-enrichment in gas ultra-centrifuges this U-232 admixture is enriched to 11% while the U-235 is enriched to 72%.This leads to a number of technical consequences which make such high enriched uranium proliferation-proof. Similarly the U-233/U-235 fuel of future light-water-reactors operating in the U/Th fuel cycle can become proliferation-proof against re-enrichment in a cascade of gas ultracentrifuges as this fuel produces a certain contamination by U-232 from nuclear reactions of neutrons with Th-232 during its burnup in the reactor core.

  1. Highly enriched Betaproteobacteria growing anaerobically with p-xylene and nitrate

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Rotaru, Amelia-Elena; Probian, Christina; Wilkes, Heinz

    2010-01-01

    The identity of the microorganisms capable of anaerobic p-xylene degradation under denitrifying conditions is hitherto unknown. Here, we report highly enriched cultures of freshwater denitrifying bacteria that grow anaerobically with p-xylene as the sole organic carbon source and electron donor. ...

  2. Stable isotope ratio measurements on highly enriched water samples by means of laser spectrometry

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Trigt, R; Kerstel, E.R.T.; Visser, GH; Meijer, H.A.J.

    2001-01-01

    We demonstrate the feasibility of using laser spectrometry (LS) to analyze isotopically highly enriched water samples (i.e., delta H-2 less than or equal to 15000 parts per thousand, delta O-18 less than or equal to 1200 parts per thousand), as often used in the biomedical doubly labeled water (DLW)

  3. History of the use of uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miettinen, J.K.

    1989-01-01

    Uranium was found 200 years ago, though the first use for it - in colouring glass yellow, orange or green - was only found 40 years later. When its radioactivity was discovered in 1896, interest in research into uranium increased and for a brief period it was used for improving the ductility of steel. The isolation of radium from uranium ore in 1904 caused a boom for uranium mining for radium. It found use in healing skin cancer, for various 'health' preparations like radon-containing water, and for making self-luminous paints. The discovery of fission 50 years ago increased the use of uranium into large industrial-scale applications. For fission weapons highly enriched U-235 and Pu-239 were needed. Today the main use is for uranium enriched to about 3 per cent U-235 for light water power reactors. Other important uses are for submarines, icebreakers and satellites

  4. Foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel inventories containing HEU and LEU of US-origin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matos, J.E.

    1995-01-01

    This paper provides estimates of the quantities and types of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing HEU and LEU of US-origin that are anticipated during the period beginning in January 1996 and extending for 10-15 years

  5. A simple gamma spectrometry method for evaluating the burnup of MTR-type HEU fuel elements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Makmal, T. [The Unit of Nuclear Engineering, Ben-Gurion University of The Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105 (Israel); Nuclear Physics and Engineering Division, Soreq Nuclear Research Center, Yavne 81800 (Israel); Aviv, O. [Radiation Safety Division, Soreq Nuclear Research Center, Yavne 81800 (Israel); Gilad, E., E-mail: gilade@bgu.ac.il [The Unit of Nuclear Engineering, Ben-Gurion University of The Negev, Beer-Sheva 84105 (Israel)

    2016-10-21

    A simple method for the evaluation of the burnup of a materials testing reactor (MTR) fuel element by gamma spectrometry is presented. The method was applied to a highly enriched uranium MTR nuclear fuel element that was irradiated in a 5 MW pool-type research reactor for a total period of 34 years. The experimental approach is based on in-situ measurements of the MTR fuel element in the reactor pool by a portable high-purity germanium detector located in a gamma cell. To corroborate the method, analytical calculations (based on the irradiation history of the fuel element) and computer simulations using a dedicated fuel cycle burnup code ORIGEN2 were performed. The burnup of the MTR fuel element was found to be 52.4±8.8%, which is in good agreement with the analytical calculations and the computer simulations. The method presented here is suitable for research reactors with either a regular or an irregular irradiation regime and for reactors with limited infrastructure and/or resources. In addition, its simplicity and the enhanced safety it confers may render this method suitable for IAEA inspectors in fuel element burnup assessments during on-site inspections. - Highlights: • Simple, inexpensive, safe and flexible experimental setup that can be quickly deployed. • Experimental results are thoroughly corroborated against ORIGEN2 burnup code. • Experimental uncertainty of 9% and 5% deviation between measurements and simulations. • Very high burnup MTR fuel element is examined, with 60% depletion of {sup 235}U. • Impact of highly irregular irradiation regime on burnup evaluation is studied.

  6. High-uranium-loaded U3O8--Al fuel element development program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, M.M.

    1978-01-01

    The High-Uranium-Loaded U 3 O 8 --Al Fuel Development Program supports Argonne National Laboratory efforts to develop high-uranium-density research and test reactor fuel to accommodate use of low-uranium enrichment. The goal is to fuel most research and test reactors with uranium of less than 20% enrichment for the purpose of lowering the potential for diversion of highly-enriched material for nonpeaceful usages

  7. Remote Handling Devices for Disposition of Enriched Uranium Reactor Fuel Using Melt-Dilute Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heckendorn, F.M.

    2001-01-01

    Remote handling equipment is required to achieve the processing of highly radioactive, post reactor, fuel for the melt-dilute process, which will convert high enrichment uranium fuel elements into lower enrichment forms for subsequent disposal. The melt-dilute process combines highly radioactive enriched uranium fuel elements with deleted uranium and aluminum for inductive melting and inductive stirring steps that produce a stable aluminum/uranium ingot of low enrichment

  8. Criticality safety evaluation for the Advanced Test Reactor enhanced low enriched uranium fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montierth, Leland M.

    2016-01-01

    The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) convert program is developing a high uranium density fuel based on a low enriched uranium (LEU) uranium-molybdenum alloy. Testing of prototypic GTRI fuel elements is necessary to demonstrate integrated fuel performance behavior and scale-up of fabrication techniques. GTRI Enhanced LEU Fuel (ELF) elements based on the ATR-Standard Size elements (all plates fueled) are to be fabricated for testing in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). While a specific ELF element design will eventually be provided for detailed analyses and in-core testing, this criticality safety evaluation (CSE) is intended to evaluate a hypothetical ELF element design for criticality safety purposes. Existing criticality analyses have analyzed Standard (HEU) ATR elements from which controls have been derived. This CSE documents analysis that determines the reactivity of the hypothetical ELF fuel elements relative to HEU ATR elements and whether the existing HEU ATR element controls bound the ELF element. The initial calculations presented in this CSE analyzed the original ELF design, now referred to as Mod 0.1. In addition, as part of a fuel meat thickness optimization effort for reactor performance, other designs have been evaluated. As of early 2014 the most current conceptual designs are Mk1A and Mk1B, that were previously referred to as conceptual designs Mod 0.10 and Mod 0.11, respectively. Revision 1 evaluates the reactivity of the ATR HEU Mark IV elements for a comparison with the Mark VII elements.

  9. Criticality safety evaluation for the Advanced Test Reactor enhanced low enriched uranium fuel elements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Montierth, Leland M. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2016-07-19

    The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) convert program is developing a high uranium density fuel based on a low enriched uranium (LEU) uranium-molybdenum alloy. Testing of prototypic GTRI fuel elements is necessary to demonstrate integrated fuel performance behavior and scale-up of fabrication techniques. GTRI Enhanced LEU Fuel (ELF) elements based on the ATR-Standard Size elements (all plates fueled) are to be fabricated for testing in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). While a specific ELF element design will eventually be provided for detailed analyses and in-core testing, this criticality safety evaluation (CSE) is intended to evaluate a hypothetical ELF element design for criticality safety purposes. Existing criticality analyses have analyzed Standard (HEU) ATR elements from which controls have been derived. This CSE documents analysis that determines the reactivity of the hypothetical ELF fuel elements relative to HEU ATR elements and whether the existing HEU ATR element controls bound the ELF element. The initial calculations presented in this CSE analyzed the original ELF design, now referred to as Mod 0.1. In addition, as part of a fuel meat thickness optimization effort for reactor performance, other designs have been evaluated. As of early 2014 the most current conceptual designs are Mk1A and Mk1B, that were previously referred to as conceptual designs Mod 0.10 and Mod 0.11, respectively. Revision 1 evaluates the reactivity of the ATR HEU Mark IV elements for a comparison with the Mark VII elements.

  10. 76 FR 30326 - Proposed Subsequent Arrangement

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-25

    ... content of 28.276 kg (24.541 ekg) of U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) (26.342 kg U-235) and 0.0048 g of plutonium contained in three HEU driver fuels that have been irradiated in the YAYOI nuclear... three HEU driver fuels from the core of YAYOI to be cut and de-cladded in the reactor room into...

  11. Detection of uranium enrichment activities using environmental monitoring techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Belew, W.L.; Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

    1993-01-01

    Uranium enrichment processes have the capability of producing weapons-grade material in the form of highly enriched uranium. Thus, detection of undeclared uranium enrichment activities is an international safeguards concern. The uranium separation technologies currently in use employ UF 6 gas as a separation medium, and trace quantities of enriched uranium are inevitably released to the environment from these facilities. The isotopic content of uranium in the vegetation, soil, and water near the plant site will be altered by these releases and can provide a signature for detecting the presence of enriched uranium activities. This paper discusses environmental sampling and analytical procedures that have been used for the detection of uranium enrichment facilities and possible safeguards applications of these techniques

  12. The main conditions ensured problemless implementation of 235U high enriched fuel in Kozloduy NPP (Bulgaria) - WWER-1000 Units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dobrevski, I.; Zaharieva, N.; Minkova, K.; Michaylov, G.; Penev, P.; Gerchev, N.

    2009-01-01

    The collected water chemistry and radiochemistry data during the operation of the Kozloduy NPP Unit 5 for the period 2006-2009 (12-th, 13-th 14-th and 15-th fuel cycles) undoubtedly indicate for WWER-1000 Units (whose specific features are: Steam generators with austenitic stainless steel 08Cr18N10T tubing; Steam generators are with horizontal straight tubing and Fuel elements cladding material is Zr-1%Nb (Zr1Nb) alloy), that one realistic way for problemless implementation of 235 U high enriched fuel have been found. The main feature characteristics of this way are: Implementation of solid neutron burnable absorbers together with the dissolved in coolant neutron absorber - natural boric acid; Application of fuel cladding materials with enough corrosion resistance by the specific fuel cladding environment created by presence of SNB; Keeping of suitable coolant water chemistry which ensures low corrosion rates of core- and out-of-core- materials and limits in core (cladding) depositions and restricts out-of-core radioactivity buildup. The realization of this way in WWER-1000 Units in Kozloduy NPP was practically carried out through: 1) Implementation of Russian fuel assemblies TVSA which have as fuel cladding material E-110 alloy (Zr1Nb) with enough high corrosion resistance by presence of sub-cooled nucleate boiling (SNB) and use burnable absorber (Gd) integrated in the uranium-gadolinium (U-Gd 2 O 3 ) fuel (fuel rod with 5.0% Gd 2 O 3 ); 2) Development and implementation of water chemistry primary circuit guidelines, which require the relation between boric acid concentration and total alkalising agent concentrations to ensure coolant pH 300 = 7.0 - 7.2 values during the whole operation period. The above mentioned conditions by the passing of WWER-1000 Units in NPP Kozloduy to uranium fuel with 4.4% 235 U (TVSA fuel assemblies) practically ensured avoidance of the creation of the necessary conditions for AOA onset. The operational experience (2006-2009) of the

  13. Chapter 1. General information about uranium. 1.10. Uranium application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khakimov, N.; Nazarov, Kh.M.; Mirsaidov, I.U.

    2011-01-01

    Full text: Metallic uranium or its compounds are used as nuclear fuel in nuclear reactors. A natural or low-enriched admixture of uranium isotopes is applied in stationery reactors of nuclear power plants, and products of a high enrichment degree are used in nuclear power plants or in reactors that operates with fast neutrons. 235 U is a source of nuclear energy in nuclear weapons. Depleted uranium is used as armour-piercing core in bombshells. 238 U serves as a source of secondary nuclear fuel - plutonium. (author)

  14. Chapter 1. General information about uranium. 1.10. Uranium application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khakimov, N.; Nazarov, Kh.M.; Mirsaidov, I.U.

    2012-01-01

    Full text: Metallic uranium or its compounds are used as nuclear fuel in nuclear reactors. A natural or low-enriched admixture of uranium isotopes is applied in stationery reactors of nuclear power plants, and products of a high enrichment degree are used in nuclear power plants or in reactors that operates with fast neutrons. 235 U is a source of nuclear energy in nuclear weapons. Depleted uranium is used as armour-piercing core in bombshells. 238 U serves as a source of secondary nuclear fuel - plutonium.

  15. A comparison of the radiological consequences of a HEU and LEU fueled research reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kollas, J.G.

    1985-01-01

    An analysis of the design basis accident radiological consequences of the HEU and LEU fueled Greek Research Reactor is presented. Doses and individual cancer risk from exposure to the passing radioactive cloud are estimated up to a distance of 20 km from the reactor site. Collective exposure and latent health effects are estimated for the total Athens area of 3081000 inhabitants. The results indicate that the plutonium isotopes buildup in the LEU fuel does not increase appreciably the consequences in respect to the HEU fueled reactor. The plutonium impact concerns mainly bone effects and secondly lung and whole body effects. The contribution to the limiting thyroid dose and the corresponding thyroid effects is insignificant. (author)

  16. Ohio State University Nuclear Reactor Laboratory HEU fuel shipment summary. Final

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    In November 1988, OSURR converted from HEU fuel to LEU fuel. As a result they needed to get rid of their HEU fuel by shipping it to Savannah River. The players in the fuel shipping game are: OSURR as the keeper of the fuel; DOE as the owner of fuel and shipper of record; Tri-State Motor Transit Co. for transporting the cask; Muth Brothers as the rigger responsible for getting the cask on and off the truck and in and out of the building; Hoffman LaRoche/Cintichem as the owner of the cask; Savannah River as the receiver of the fuel; and the NRC for approval of the Security Plan, QA Plan, etc. This report gives a chronological history of the events from February 1989 to June 1, 1995, the actual day of shipment. The cask was received at Savannah River on June 2, 1995

  17. Fuel element burnup determination in HEU-LEU mixed TRIGA research reactor core

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zagar, Tomaz; Ravnik, Matjaz

    2000-01-01

    This paper presents the results of a burnup calculations and burnup measurements for TRIGA FLIP HEU fuel elements and standard TRIGA LEU fuel elements used simultaneously in small TRIGA Mark II research reactor in Ljubljana, Slovenija. The fuel element burnup for approximately 15 years of operation was calculated with two different in house computer codes TRIGAP and TRIGLAV (both codes are available at OECD NEA Data Bank). The calculation is performed in one-dimensional radial geometry in TRIGAP and in two-dimensional (r,φ) geometry in TRIGLAV. Inter-comparison of results shows important influence of in-core water gaps, irradiation channels and mixed rings on burnup calculation accuracy. Burnup of 5 HEU and 27 LEU fuel elements was also measured with reactivity method. Measured and calculated burnup values are inter-compared for these elements (author)

  18. A Very High Uranium Density Fission Mo Target Suitable for LEU Using atomization Technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, C. K.; Kim, K. H.; Lee, Y. S.; Ryu, H. J.; Woo, Y. M.; Jang, S. J.; Park, J. M.; Choi, S. J. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-05-15

    Currently HEU minimization efforts in fission Mo production are underway in connection with the global threat reduction policy. In order to convert HEU to LEU for the fission Mo target, higher uranium density material could be applied. The uranium aluminide targets used world widely for commercial {sup 99}Mo production are limited to 3.0 g-U/cc in uranium density of the target meat. A consideration of high uranium density using the uranium metal particles dispersion plate target is taken into account. The irradiation burnup of the fission Mo target are as low as 8 at.% and the irradiation period is shorter than 7 days. Pure uranium material has higher thermal conductivity than uranium compounds or alloys. It is considered that the degradation by irradiation would be almost negligible. In this study, using the computer code of the PLATE developed by ANL the irradiation behavior was estimated. Some considerations were taken into account to improve the irradiation performance further. It has been known that some alloying elements of Si, Cr, Fe, and Mo are beneficial for reducing the swelling by grain refinement. In the RERTR program recently the interaction problem could be solved by adding a small amount of Si to the aluminum matrix phase. The fabrication process and the separation process for the proposed atomized uranium particles dispersion target were reviewed

  19. Progress in the neutronic core conversion (HEU-LEU) analysis of Ghana research reactor-1.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anim-Sampong, S.; Maakuu, B. T.; Akaho, E. H. K.; Andam, A.; Liaw, J. J. R.; Matos, J. E.; Nuclear Engineering Division; Ghana Atomic Energy Commission; Kwame Nkrumah Univ. of Science and Technology

    2006-01-01

    The Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) is a commercial version of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) and has operated at different power levels since its commissioning in March 1995. As required for all nuclear reactors, neutronic and thermal hydraulic analysis are being performed for the HEU-LEU core conversion studies of the Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) facility, which is a commercial version of the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR). Stochastic Monte Carlo particle transport methods and tools (MCNP4c/MCNP5) were used to fine-tune a previously developed 3-D MCNP model of the GHARR-1 facility and perform neutronic analysis of the 90.2% HEU reference and candidate LEU (UO{sub 2}, U{sub 3}Si{sub 2}, U-9Mo) fresh cores with varying enrichments from 12.6%-19.75%. In this paper, the results of the progress made in the Monte Carlo neutronic analysis of the HEU reference and candidate LEU fuels are presented. In particular, a comparative performance assessment of the LEU with respect to neutron flux variations in the fission chamber and experimental irradiation channels are highlighted.

  20. Conversion and start up of Tehran Research Reactor with LEU fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zaker, M.

    2004-01-01

    The MW Tehran Research Reactor, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel has been converted to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel using U 3 0 8 -Al with less than 20% enriched uranium. Measured value of excess reactivity, control rod worth and other parameters indicate good agreement with computational predictions. (author)

  1. Depleted uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huffer, E.; Nifenecker, H.

    2001-02-01

    This document deals with the physical, chemical and radiological properties of the depleted uranium. What is the depleted uranium? Why do the military use depleted uranium and what are the risk for the health? (A.L.B.)

  2. Preliminary Evaluation of Alternate Designs for HFIR Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Renfro, David [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Cook, David [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jain, Prashant [ORNL; Valentine, Jennifer [ORNL

    2014-10-30

    Engineering design studies of the feasibility of conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel are ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as part of an effort sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)/Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The fuel type selected by the program for the conversion of the five high-power research reactors in the U.S. that still use HEU fuel is a new U-Mo monolithic fuel. Studies by ORNL have previously indicated that HFIR can be successfully converted using the new fuel provided (1) the reactor power can be increased from 85 MW to 100 MW and (2) the fuel can be fabricated to a specific reference design. Fabrication techniques for the new fuel are under development by the program but are still immature, especially for the “complex” aspects of the HFIR fuel design. In FY 2012, the program underwent a major shift in focus to emphasize developing and qualifying processes for the fabrication of reliable and affordable LEU fuel. In support of this new focus and in an effort to ensure that the HFIR fuel design is as suitable for reliable fabrication as possible, ORNL undertook the present study to propose and evaluate several alternative design features. These features include (1) eliminating the fuel zone axial contouring in the previous reference design by substituting a permanent neutron absorber in the lower unfueled region of all of the fuel plates, (2) relocating the burnable neutron absorber from the fuel plates of the inner fuel element to the side plates of the inner fuel element (the fuel plates of the outer fuel element do not contain a burnable absorber), (3) relocating the fuel zone inside the fuel plate to be centered on the centerline of the depth of the plate, and (4) reshaping the radial contour of the relocated fuel zone to be symmetric about this centerline. The

  3. Preliminary Evaluation of Alternate Designs for HFIR Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Renfro, David G [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jain, Prashant K [ORNL; Valentine, Jennifer R [ORNL

    2014-11-01

    Engineering design studies of the feasibility of conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel are ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as part of an effort sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)/Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The fuel type selected by the program for the conversion of the five high-power research reactors in the U.S. that still use HEU fuel is a new U-Mo monolithic fuel. Studies by ORNL have previously indicated that HFIR can be successfully converted using the new fuel provided (1) the reactor power can be increased from 85 MW to 100 MW and (2) the fuel can be fabricated to a specific reference design. Fabrication techniques for the new fuel are under development by the program but are still immature, especially for the complex aspects of the HFIR fuel design. In FY 2012, the program underwent a major shift in focus to emphasize developing and qualifying processes for the fabrication of reliable and affordable LEU fuel. In support of this new focus and in an effort to ensure that the HFIR fuel design is as suitable for reliable fabrication as possible, ORNL undertook the present study to propose and evaluate several alternative design features. These features include (1) eliminating the fuel zone axial contouring in the previous reference design by substituting a permanent neutron absorber in the lower unfueled region of all of the fuel plates, (2) relocating the burnable neutron absorber from the fuel plates of the inner fuel element to the side plates of the inner fuel element (the fuel plates of the outer fuel element do not contain a burnable absorber), (3) relocating the fuel zone inside the fuel plate to be centered on the centerline of the depth of the plate, and (4) reshaping the radial contour of the relocated fuel zone to be symmetric about this centerline. The present

  4. Conceptual Process for the Manufacture of Low-Enriched Uranium/Molybdenum Fuel for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sease, J.D.; Primm, R.T. III; Miller, J.H.

    2007-01-01

    The U.S. nonproliferation policy 'to minimize, and to the extent possible, eliminate the use of HEU in civil nuclear programs throughout the world' has resulted in the conversion (or scheduled conversion) of many of the U.S. research reactors from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). A foil fuel appears to offer the best option for using a LEU fuel in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) without degrading the performance of the reactor. The purpose of this document is to outline a proposed conceptual fabrication process flow sheet for a new, foil-type, 19.75%-enriched fuel for HFIR. The preparation of the flow sheet allows a better understanding of the costs of infrastructure modifications, operating costs, and implementation schedule issues associated with the fabrication of LEU fuel for HFIR. Preparation of a reference flow sheet is one of the first planning steps needed in the development of a new manufacturing capacity for low enriched fuels for U.S. research and test reactors. The flow sheet can be used to develop a work breakdown structure (WBS), a critical path schedule, and identify development needs. The reference flow sheet presented in this report is specifically for production of LEU foil fuel for the HFIR. The need for an overall reference flow sheet for production of fuel for all High Performance Research Reactors (HPRR) has been identified by the national program office. This report could provide a starting point for the development of such a reference flow sheet for a foil-based fuel for all HPRRs. The reference flow sheet presented is based on processes currently being developed by the national program for the LEU foil fuel when available, processes used historically in the manufacture of other nuclear fuels and materials, and processes used in other manufacturing industries producing a product configuration similar to the form required in manufacturing a foil fuel. The processes in the reference flow sheet are within the

  5. Conceptual Process for the Manufacture of Low-Enriched Uranium/Molybdenum Fuel for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sease, J.D.; Primm, R.T. III; Miller, J.H.

    2007-09-30

    The U.S. nonproliferation policy 'to minimize, and to the extent possible, eliminate the use of HEU in civil nuclear programs throughout the world' has resulted in the conversion (or scheduled conversion) of many of the U.S. research reactors from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). A foil fuel appears to offer the best option for using a LEU fuel in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) without degrading the performance of the reactor. The purpose of this document is to outline a proposed conceptual fabrication process flow sheet for a new, foil-type, 19.75%-enriched fuel for HFIR. The preparation of the flow sheet allows a better understanding of the costs of infrastructure modifications, operating costs, and implementation schedule issues associated with the fabrication of LEU fuel for HFIR. Preparation of a reference flow sheet is one of the first planning steps needed in the development of a new manufacturing capacity for low enriched fuels for U.S. research and test reactors. The flow sheet can be used to develop a work breakdown structure (WBS), a critical path schedule, and identify development needs. The reference flow sheet presented in this report is specifically for production of LEU foil fuel for the HFIR. The need for an overall reference flow sheet for production of fuel for all High Performance Research Reactors (HPRR) has been identified by the national program office. This report could provide a starting point for the development of such a reference flow sheet for a foil-based fuel for all HPRRs. The reference flow sheet presented is based on processes currently being developed by the national program for the LEU foil fuel when available, processes used historically in the manufacture of other nuclear fuels and materials, and processes used in other manufacturing industries producing a product configuration similar to the form required in manufacturing a foil fuel. The processes in the reference flow sheet are

  6. Past and present supply of enriched uranium for research reactors in the European Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    2002-01-01

    In the last decade research reactor operators have focused mainly on the issues of disposal of spent research reactor fuel and the development of high density fuels. The safe supply of fresh uranium did not receive as much attention. This is surprising since the United States - who was the main supplier for LEU and HEU since the late 1950's - stopped supplying non-US research reactors with enriched uranium a decade ago. The reason for this stop of supply is described in this paper. This paper explains how research reactors in the E U continued to operate during the last decade, in spite of the fact that their primary supply source had not provided LEU and HEU over the same period. (author)

  7. A re-evaluation of physical protection standards for irradiated HEU fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lyman, Edwin; Kuperman, Alan

    2002-01-01

    In the post-September 11 era, it is essential to reconsider all the assumptions upon which the physical protection systems of the past were based and determine whether these assumptions are still appropriate in light of the current terrorist threat. For instance, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission definition of a 'formula quantity' of special nuclear material is derived from the belief that a terrorist plot to carry out multiple coordinated attacks on different facilities with the goal of acquiring enough SNM for a nuclear weapon is incredible. This assumption has clearly been proven wrong by the September 11 attacks. Another standard that needs to be revisited is the 'self-protection' threshold that determines whether or not an item containing SNM is considered to be 'irradiated' for physical protection purposes. The current value of this threshold, 1 Sv/hr unshielded at 1 meter, is of questionable value as a deterrent to determined terrorists who would be willing to sustain long-term injury as long as they could accomplish their near-term goals. A more credible threshold would be set at a level that would have a high likelihood of disabling the perpetrators before they could complete their mission. Most irradiated nonpower reactor fuels would be unable to meet such a standard. This raises serious questions about the adequacy of the level of physical protection applied today to the large inventories of irradiated HEU fuels now scattered in storage sites around the world. The absence of a coherent global policy for dealing with these materials has created a situation rife with vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit. The international community, now seized with concern about unused stockpiles of unirradiated HEU fuels around the world, also needs to appreciate the dangers posed by lightly irradiated spent fuels as well. A U.S. proposal to import Russian HEU for supplying U.S. nonpower reactors will only prolong this situation This paper will review policy

  8. The role of secondary uranium supplies through 2013 and beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lohrey, Klaus; Aul, Friedel; Kwasny, Rolf

    2010-01-01

    This article examines 4 dimensions of secondary supply: - The Western World's past reliance on secondary supply as a supplement to primary production,- The availability of secondary supplies from now until 2013 and - above all - continued availability of secondary supplies after the HEU deal's expiration in 2013,- Russia's requirements for secondary supply beyond 2013; and - The global requirement for secondary supplies post-2013. Historically, uranium production has seen 3 major phases. Industrial-scale uranium mining started long before the material was needed to fuel commercial nuclear power plants. The first phase, called ''Procurement of Weapons Uranium,'' extended from the 1950s into the early-1960s. Between 1975 and 1980 there was a second huge wave of primary uranium production. The mines' annual output doubled, driven by very ambitious plans for the construction of additional NPPs, further fuelled by the oil crisis of 1973. Throughout the third phase, which started in the mid 1980s, the Western World's natural uranium production remained significantly below the actual reactor demand. This was - and still is - a unique situation within the world's commodities markets. Secondary supplies have recently covered between 30 and 40% of the worldwide nuclear fuel demand. Since the bulk of the secondary supplies can be made available and fabricated into reactor fuel at costs which are below the current prices of fresh uranium, secondary supplies are widely given preference over fresh uranium. But what about the worldwide secondary supplies' role in the years to come, particularly after the expiration of the US-Russian HEU-LEU Agreement in 2013? (orig.)

  9. Russian RERTR program as a part of Joint US DOE-RF MINATOM collaboration on elimination of the threat connected to the use of HEU in research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arkhangelsky, N.

    2002-01-01

    The Russian RERTR Program started at the end of 70's, the final goal of the program is to eliminate supplies of HEU in fuel elements and assemblies for foreign research reactors that were designed according to Russian projects. Basic directions of the work include: completion of the development of the fuel elements and assemblies on a basis of uranium dioxide; development of the fuel on a basis of U-Mo alloy; and development of pin type fuel elements. Fuel assemblies of WWR-M2 type with LEU were developed and qualified for using in foreign research reactors that use such type of fuel assemblies. These assemblies are ready for the supplying several operating foreign research reactors. There are more than 20 sites in Eastern European countries, former Soviet republics and another countries that have big amount of Russian origin HEU in fresh and spent fuel. The problem of the shipment of SNF from sites of research reactors is also very important for domestic Russian research reactors. More than ten years from its beginning the Russian RERTR program developed practically independently from the international RERTR program and only at the begin of 90's the Russian specialists started to contact with foreign scientists and the exchange of the scientific information has become more intensive. In September 1994, representatives of Minatom and DOE signed a protocol of intent to reduce an enrichment of uranium in research reactors. The main aspects of collaboration involve: Several domestic Russian research reactors such as WWR-M, IR-8 and others were investigated from the point of view of possibility of reducing of enrichment; financial support of the program from US DOE which is insufficient. The important part of international collaboration is the import of Russian origin spent and fresh fuel of research reactors to Russia. In August 2002 an impressive result of the Russian-American collaboration with support of IAEA and with the help and assistance of Yugoslavian side was

  10. Uranium exploration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Voto, R.H.

    1984-01-01

    This paper is a review of the methodology and technology that are currently being used in varying degrees in uranium exploration activities worldwide. Since uranium is ubiquitous and occurs in trace amounts (0.2 to 5 ppm) in virtually all rocks of the crust of the earth, exploration for uranium is essentially the search of geologic environments in which geologic processes have produced unusual concentrations of uranium. Since the level of concentration of uranium of economic interest is dependent on the present and future price of uranium, it is appropriate here to review briefly the economic realities of uranium-fueled power generation. (author)

  11. Uranium as Raw Material for Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lelek, V.

    2006-01-01

    There is lot of information bringing our attention to the problem of limited raw material resources. Fortunately uranium for nuclear energy is very concentrated source and that is why its transport brings no problems and could be realized from anywhere. Second question is if overall resources are available for current nuclear energy development. Data documenting reasons for nowadays price growth are presenting and it is clearly shown that the most probable explanation is that there is gap in new uranium mines preparation and the lot of smaller mines were closed in the period of low uranium prices. Conclusion is that there is at least for the first half of this century even for thermal reactors enough uranium. Situation could be changed if there will massive production of liquid fuel using hydrogen, produced through nuclear heating. Public information about former military uranium resources are also included. Contemporary about one half of US nuclear power-stations is using high enriched uranium diluted with natural uranium - it is expected to continue this way up to 2012. Uranium is complicated market (Authors)

  12. The status of HEU to LEU core conversion activities at the Jamaica SLOWPOKE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Preston, J.; Grant, C., E-mail: john.preston@uwimona.edu.jm [Univ. of the West Indies, Mona Campus, International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, Mona (Jamaica)

    2012-12-15

    The SLOWPOKE reactor in Jamaica has been operated by the International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, University of the West Indies since 1984, mainly for the purpose of Neutron Activation Analysis. The HEU core with current utilization has another 14 years of operation, before the addition of a large beryllium annulus would be required to further extend the life-time by 15 years. However, in keeping with the spirit of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, the decision was taken in 2003 to convert the core from HEU to LEU, in line with those at the Ecole Polytechnic and RMC SLOWPOKE facilities. This paper reports on the current status of the conversion activities, including key fuel manufacture and regulatory issues, which have seen substantial progress during the last year. A timetable for the complete process is given, and provided that the fuel fabrication can be completed in the estimated 18 months, the core conversion should be accomplished by the end of 2014. (author)

  13. The status of HEU and LEU core conversion activities at the Jamaica SLOWPOKE

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Preston, J.; Grant, C., E-mail: john.preston@uwimona.edu.jm [Univ. of the West Indies, Mona Campus, International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, Kingston (Jamaica)

    2013-07-01

    The SLOWPOKE reactor in Jamaica has been operated by the International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences, University of the West Indies since 1984, mainly for the purpose of Neutron Activation Analysis. The HEU core with current utilization has another 14 years of operation, before the addition of a large beryllium annulus would be required to further extend the life-time by 15 years. However, in keeping with the spirit of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, the decision was taken in 2003 to convert the core from HEU to LEU, inline with those at the Ecole Polytechnic and RMC SLOWPOKE facilities. This paper reports on the current status of the conversion activities, including key fuel manufacture and regulatory issues, which have seen substantial progress during the last year. A timetable for the complete process is given, and provided that the fuel fabrication can be completed in the estimated 18 months, the core conversion should be accomplished by the end of 2014. (author)

  14. Knowledge Transfer and Culture Exchange between HEU and TAMU through a Summer School on Nuclear Power Engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gao, P.; Zhang, Z.; Kurwitz, R. C.; Shao, L.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: Since 2012, Harbin Engineering University (HEU) and Texas A&M University (TAMU) hold an annual Summer School on Nuclear Engineering. By now, the activity has been held four times. Each year, 15–20 students are selected from their respective institutions and paired with a counterpart to form partners. They study lectures in the first week at HEU and tour three nuclear power plants (NPP) in the second week, visit the NPP simulators, and learn the nuclear safety culture. This activity expands the scale of international nuclear educational exchange, provide a platform for the students from different countries to communicate and exchange insights into their respective culture. (author

  15. Gas phase adsorption technology for nitrogen isotope separation and its feasibility for highly enriched nitrogen gas production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Inoue, Masaki; Asaga, Takeo

    2000-04-01

    Highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas is favorable to reduce radioactive carbon-14 production in reactor. The cost of highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas in mass production is one of the most important subject in nitride fuel option in 'Feasibility Study for FBR and Related Fuel Cycle'. In this work gas phase adsorption technology was verified to be applicable for nitrogen isotope separation and feasible to produce highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas in commercial. Nitrogen isotopes were separated while ammonia gas flows through sodium-A type zeolite column using pressure swing adsorption process. The isotopic ratio of eight samples were measured by high resolution mass spectrometry and Fourier transform microwave spectroscopy. Gas phase adsorption technology was verified to be applicable for nitrogen isotope separation, since the isotopic ratio of nitrogen-15 and nitrogen-14 in samples were more than six times as high as in natural. The cost of highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas in mass production were estimated by the factor method. It revealed that highly enriched nitrogen-15 gas could be supplied in a few hundred yen per gram in mass production. (author)

  16. Development of LEU targets for 99Mo production and their chemical processing status 1989

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vandegrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Chamberlain, D.B.; Hoh, J.C.; Streets, E.W.; Vogler, S.; Thresh, H.R.; Domagala, R.F.; Wiencek, T.C.; Matos, J.E.

    1991-01-01

    Most of the world's supply of Tc-99m for medical purposes is currently produced from Mo-99 derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low enriched uranium (LEU) silicide fuel for the HEU alloy and aluminide fuels used in current target designs will allow equivalent Mo-99 yields with no change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal will also allow the substitution of LEU for HEU. Efforts performed in 1989 focused on (1) fabrication of a uranium metal target by Hot Isostatic Pressing uranium metal foil to zirconium, (2) experimental investigation of the dissolution step for U 3 Si 2 targets, allowing us to present a conceptual design for the dissolution process and equipment, and (3) investigation of the procedures used to reclaim irradiated uranium from Mo-production targets, allowing us to further analyze the waste and by-product problems associated with the substitution of LEU for HEU. (orig.)

  17. Direct dating of fossils by the helium-uranium method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schaeffer, O.A.

    1967-01-01

    The He-U method has been found to be applicable to the dating of fossil carbonates. This method furnishes a new dating technique particularly applicable to the Pleistocene and the Tertiary periods, especially the Late Tertiary, for which other methods of age dating either fail or are difficult to correlate with the fossil record. The method has been checked for possible losses of helium and uranium from or to the surroundings. It has been found that, while a calcite lattice does not appear to retain helium, if the lattice is aragonite there is good evidence that helium leakage is not a problem. This is true at least for times up to 20 m. y. For corals where the uranium is apparently uniformly distributed within the lattice as a trace element, the uranium does not exchange or undergo concentration changes. As a result aragonite corals yield reliable He-U ages. On the other hand, the uranium in mollusc fossils is apparently mainly in the grain boundaries and is not always a tight system as far as uranium exchange or concentration changes are concerned. To obtain a reliable age for a mollusc one needs additional evidence to ensure lack of changes in uranium concentration. If the measurement of U and He is combined with 238 U, 234 U and 230 Th determinations, it appears that many mollusc shells will also be datable by the method. The resulting evidence for secular equilibrium in the 238 U chain is good evidence for a closed system as far as U concentration changes are concerned. (author)

  18. Health and safety considerations for U.S. monitors in the Russian transparency program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boggs, C. J.

    1998-01-01

    In 1993 the US and the Russian Federation signed an agreement allowing the US to purchase highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia over a 20-year period. This Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement permits the purchase of 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons in the form of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use as power reactor fuel in the US. Under the HEU Agreement, the US and Russia are cooperating in a ''Transparency Program'' to ensure that arms control and nonproliferation objectives are being met. The Transparency Program measures, which are a departure from traditional, intrusive measures of verification, include sending individuals from the US to Russia to monitor the processing of the HEU

  19. Low enrichment of uranium in the light of the nuclear weapon problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barstad, G.

    1979-09-01

    A difficult problem in the immediate future will be to direct civil nuclear technology in such a way that the ability to produce nuclear weapons by additional countries is prevented. There are two main problems. First, enrichment plants can be used to produce high enriched uranium, which can be used in nuclear weapons, as well as low enriched reactor fuel. Second, plutonium produced during reactor operation can be used as nuclear weapon material, as well as for nuclear fuel. The problem discussed here is particularly the development of an enrichment process which is economic for low enriched reactor fuel, but which may not easily be adapted to produce high enriched uranium. (JIW)

  20. Current status and future prospects of uranium resources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuronuma, Chosuke

    1997-01-01

    Uranium is contained in various things in natural world, for example, 3 ppm in granite and 3x10 -3 ppm in seawater. Uranium exists in the state of tetra, penta and hexa-valence in nature, and in oxidizing environment, it exists as uranyl radical of hexa-valence, forms soluble complexes, and easily moves with water. In reducing environment, it becomes insoluble state of tetra-valence and precipitates. This property of uranium is deeply related to the way of forming the deposit, and it is explained. The uranium resources of the recovery cost being 80 dollars per kg U or less are 2,120,000 t, and 60% of the total exists in Australia, Kazakstan and Canada. The cumulative production of uranium in the world from 1945 to 1995 was 1,810,000 t. Of the total production, 875,000 t was used for civil purpose, and 750,000 t was used for military purpose. The uranium deposits in Canada are very high quality, and produce 1/3 of the world uranium production. There are the inventories of 150,000-200,000 t U. The diversion of military high enriched uranium to civil purpose is reported. The state of uranium market, the prospect of demand and supply of uranium, and the exploration and development of uranium resources are described. (K.I.)

  1. Consideration of critically when directly disposing highly enriched spent nuclear fuel in unsaturated tuff: Bounding estimates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rechard, R.P.; Tierney, M.S.; Sanchez, L.C.; Martell, M.-A.

    1996-05-01

    This report presents one of 2 approaches (bounding calculations) which were used in a 1994 study to examine the possibility of a criticality in a repository. Bounding probabilities, although rough, point to the difficulty of creating conditions under which a critical mass could be assembled (container corrosion, separation of neutron absorbers from fissile material, collapse or precipitation of fissile material) and how significant the geochemical and hydrologic phenomena are. The study could not conceive of a mechanism consistent with conditions under which an atomic explosion could occur. Should a criticality occur in or near a container in the future, boundary consequence calculations showed that fissions from one critical event ( 20 fissions, if similar to aqueous and metal accidents and experiments) are quite small compared to the amount of fissions represented by the spent fuel itself. If it is assumed that the containers necessary to hold the highly enriched spent fuel went critical once per day for 1 million years, creating an energy release of about 10 20 fissions, the number of fissions equals about 10 28 , which corresponds to only 1% of the fission inventory in a repository containing 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal, the expected size for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada

  2. Consideration of critically when directly disposing highly enriched spent nuclear fuel in unsaturated tuff: Bounding estimates

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rechard, R.P.; Tierney, M.S.; Sanchez, L.C.; Martell, M.-A.

    1996-05-01

    This report presents one of 2 approaches (bounding calculations) which were used in a 1994 study to examine the possibility of a criticality in a repository. Bounding probabilities, although rough, point to the difficulty of creating conditions under which a critical mass could be assembled (container corrosion, separation of neutron absorbers from fissile material, collapse or precipitation of fissile material) and how significant the geochemical and hydrologic phenomena are. The study could not conceive of a mechanism consistent with conditions under which an atomic explosion could occur. Should a criticality occur in or near a container in the future, boundary consequence calculations showed that fissions from one critical event (<10{sup 20} fissions, if similar to aqueous and metal accidents and experiments) are quite small compared to the amount of fissions represented by the spent fuel itself. If it is assumed that the containers necessary to hold the highly enriched spent fuel went critical once per day for 1 million years, creating an energy release of about 10{sup 20} fissions, the number of fissions equals about 10{sup 28}, which corresponds to only 1% of the fission inventory in a repository containing 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal, the expected size for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.

  3. Calculational study of benchmark critical experiments on high-enriched uranyl nitrate solution systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, I.; Rothe, R.E.

    1978-01-01

    Criticality calculations on minimally reflected, concrete-reflected, and plastic-reflected single tanks and on arrays of cylinders reflected by concrete and plastic have been performed using the KENO-IV code with 16-group Hansen-Roach neutron cross sections. The fissile material was high-enriched (93.17% 235 U) uranyl nitrate [UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ] solution. Calculated results are compared with those from a benchmark critical experiments program to provide the best possible verification of the calculational technique. The calculated k/sub eff/'s underestimate the critical condition by an average of 1.28% for the minimally reflected single tanks, 1.09% for the concrete-reflected single tanks, 0.60% for the plastic-reflected single tanks, 0.75% for the concrete-reflected arrays of cylinders, and 0.51% for the plastic-reflected arrays of cylinders. More than half of the present comparisons were within 1% of the experimental values, and the worst calculational and experimental discrepancy was 2.3% in k/sub eff/ for the KENO calculations

  4. Benchmarking of HEU mental annuli critical assemblies with internally reflected graphite cylinder

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xiaobo Liu

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Three experimental configurations of critical assemblies, performed in 1963 at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiment Facility, which are assembled using three different diameter HEU annuli (15-9 inches, 15-7 inches and 13-7 inches metal annuli with internally reflected graphite cylinder are evaluated and benchmarked. The experimental uncertainties which are 0.00057, 0.00058 and 0.00057 respectively, and biases to the benchmark models which are − 0.00286, − 0.00242 and − 0.00168 respectively, were determined, and the experimental benchmark keff results were obtained for both detailed and simplified models. The calculation results for both detailed and simplified models using MCNP6-1.0 and ENDF/B-VII.1 agree well to the benchmark experimental results within difference less than 0.2%. The benchmarking results were accepted for the inclusion of ICSBEP Handbook.

  5. Evaluation of remote monitoring at the Oak Ridge HEU storage vault -- First thoughts and final application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sheely, K.B.; Whitaker, J.M.

    1996-01-01

    Remote monitoring provides a more timely and comprehensive way to meet national and international requirements for monitoring nuclear material inventories. Unattended monitoring technologies could be used to meet national needs for nuclear material safety, protection, control and accountability. Unattended systems possessing a remote data transmission capability could be used to meet international requirements for nuclear material safeguards and transparency. Even though more enhancements are required to improve system reliability, remote monitoring''s future potential seems great. The key questions are: (1) how will remote monitoring systems be used (configuration and operation); (2) how effective will the system be (vs. current activities); and (3) how much will it cost. This paper provides preliminary answers to these questions based on the experience gained from a joint IAEA-United States Support Program (USSP) task to evaluate remote monitoring at the Oak Ridge HEU Storage vault. This paper also draws on experience gained from US involvement in other remote monitoring projects

  6. IRT‑Sofia, HEU to LEU conversion: regulatory approval tasks solution overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitev, Mladen; Belousov, Sergey; Dimitrov, Dobromir

    2014-01-01

    The HEU to LEU conversion of the IRT–Sofia research reactor of the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences was jointly studied with the Argonne National Laboratory as a part of the RERTR Programme. The main purpose of the collaboration consisted in accomplishment of safety analyses and preparation of documents used for regulatory approval tasks solution. The main steps and results which are fundamental for the preparation of IRT–Sofia Safety Analyses Report including Operating Limits and Conditions are presented in this paper. The documents prepared by INRNE in accordance with the European nuclear safety requirements and IAEA recommendations were submitted for approval to the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Agency at the end of 2010. Key words: research reactor, safety analyses report, Nuclear Regulatory Agency

  7. Benchmark calculations on nuclear characteristics of JRR-4 HEU core by SRAC code system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arigane, Kenji

    1987-04-01

    The reduced enrichment program for the JRR-4 has been progressing based on JAERI's RERTR (Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor) program. The SRAC (JAERI Thermal Reactor Standard Code System for Reactor Design and Analysis) is used for the neutronic design of the JRR-4 LEU Core. This report describes the benchmark calculations on the neutronic characteristics of the JRR-4 HEU Core in order to validate the calculation method. The benchmark calculations were performed on the various kind of neutronic characteristics such as excess reactivity, criticality, control rod worth, thermal neutron flux distribution, void coefficient, temperature coefficient, mass coefficient, kinetic parameters and poisoning effect by Xe-135 build up. As the result, it was confirmed that these calculated values are in satisfactory agreement with the measured values. Therefore, the calculational method by the SRAC was validated. (author)

  8. Neutron spectra in two beam ports of a TRIGA Mark III reactor with HEU fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vega C, H. R.; Hernandez D, V. M.; Paredes G, L.; Aguilar, F.

    2012-10-01

    Before to change the HEU for Leu fuel of the ININ's TRIGA Mark III nuclear reactor the neutron spectra were measured in two beam ports using 5 and 10 W. Measurements were carried out in a tangential and a radial beam port using a Bonner sphere spectrometer. It was found that neutron spectra are different in the beam ports, in radial beam port the amplitude of thermal and fast neutrons are approximately the same while, in the tangential beam port thermal neutron peak is dominant. In the radial beam port the fluence-to-ambient dose equivalent factors are 131±11 and 124±10 p Sv-cm 2 for 5 and 10 W respectively while in the tangential beam port the fluence-to-ambient dose equivalent factor is 55±4 p Sv-cm 2 for 10 W. (Author)

  9. Documentation Experiences for Jamaican SLOWPOKE-2 Conversion from HEU to LEU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warner, T.-A.; Dennis, H.; Antoine, J.

    2015-01-01

    The Jamaican SLOWPOKE–2 (JM–1) is a 20 kW research reactor manufactured by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and has been operating since March 1984, in the department of the International Centre for Environmental and Nuclear Sciences (ICENS), at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus in Kingston, Jamaica. The pool type reactor has been primarily used for Neutron Activation Analysis in environmental, agricultural, geochemical, health-related studies and mineral exploration. The University, assisted by the IAEA under the GTRI/RERTR program, is currently in the process of converting from HEU to LEU. Extensive documentation on policies, general requirements, elements of the conversion quality assurance (QA) system and conversion QA administrative procedures is required for the conversion. The core conversion activities are being carried out in accordance with current international standards and regulatory guidelines of the newly established Jamaican Radiation Safety Authority (RSA) with agreement between the RSA and IAEA or DOE related to Nuclear Safety and Control. The documentation structure has taken into consideration nuclear safety and licensing, LEU fuel design and conversion analysis, LEU fuel procurement and fabrication, removal of HEU fuel and reactor maintenance and conversion and commissioning, with the conversion QA manual at the apex of the structure. To a large extent, the documentation format will adhere to that of the IAEA applicable regulatory standards and guidance documents. The major challenge of the conversion activities, it is envisioned, will come from the absence of any previous regulatory framework in Jamaica; however, a timeline for the process, which includes training and equipping of regulators, will guide operation. (author)

  10. Assuaging Nuclear Energy Risks: The Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myers, Astasia

    2011-01-01

    The recent nuclear renaissance has motivated many countries, especially developing nations, to plan and build nuclear power reactors. However, domestic low enriched uranium demands may trigger nations to construct indigenous enrichment facilities, which could be redirected to fabricate high enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The potential advantages of establishing multinational uranium enrichment sites are numerous including increased low enrichment uranium access with decreased nuclear proliferation risks. While multinational nuclear initiatives have been discussed, Russia is the first nation to actualize this concept with their Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). This paper provides an overview of the historical and modern context of the multinational nuclear fuel cycle as well as the evolution of Russia's IUEC, which exemplifies how international fuel cycle cooperation is an alternative to domestic facilities.

  11. Production of Mo-99 using low-enriched uranium silicide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hutter, J.C.; Srinivasan, B.; Vicek, M.; Vandegrift, G.F.

    1994-01-01

    Over the last several years, uranium silicide fuels have been under development as low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets for Mo-99. The use of LEU silicide is aimed at replacing the UAl x alloy in the highly-enriched uranium dissolution process. A process to recover Mo-99 from low-enriched uranium silicide is being developed at Argonne National Laboratory. The uranium silicide is dissolved in alkaline hydrogen peroxide. Experiments performed to determine the optimum dissolution procedure are discussed, and the results of dissolving a portion of a high-burnup (>40%) U 3 Si 2 miniplate are presented. Future work related to Mo-99 separation and waste disposal are also discussed

  12. Prompt Neutron Lifetime for the NBSR Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hanson, A.L.; Diamond, D.

    2012-06-24

    In preparation for the proposed conversion of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) research reactor (NBSR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, certain point kinetics parameters must be calculated. We report here values of the prompt neutron lifetime that have been calculated using three independent methods. All three sets of calculations demonstrate that the prompt neutron lifetime is shorter for the LEU fuel when compared to the HEU fuel and longer for the equilibrium end-of-cycle (EOC) condition when compared to the equilibrium startup (SU) condition for both the HEU and LEU fuels.

  13. Using low-enriched uranium in research reactors: The RERTR program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Travelli, A.

    1994-01-01

    The goal of the RERTR program is to minimize and eventually eliminate use of highway enriched uranium (HEU) in research and test reactors. The program has been very successful, and has developed low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel materials and designs which can be used effectively in approximately 90 percent of the research and test reactors which used HEU when the program began. This progress would not have been possible without active international cooperation among fuel developers, commercial vendors, and reactor operators. The new tasks which the RERTR program is undertaking at this time include development of new and better fuels that will allow use of LEU fuels in all research and test reactors; cooperation with Russian laboratories, which will make it possible to minimize and eventually eliminate use of HEU in research reactors throughout the world, irrespective of its origin; and development of an LEU-based process for the production of 99 Mo. Continuation and intensification of international cooperation are essential to the achievement of the ultimate goals of the RERTR program

  14. Research and Development of Multiphysics Models in Support of the Conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bodey, Isaac T.; Curtis, Franklin G.; Arimilli, Rao V.; Ekici, Kivanc; Freels, James D.

    2015-01-01

    The findings presented in this report are results of a five year effort led by the RRD Division of the ORNL, which is focused on research and development toward the conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). This report focuses on the tasks accomplished by the University of Tennessee Knoxville (UTK) team from the Department of Mechanical, Aerospace, and Biomedical Engineering (MABE) that provided expert support in multiphysics modeling of complex problems associated with the LEU conversion of the HFIR reactor. The COMSOL software was used as the main computational modeling tool, whereas Solidworks was also used in support of computer-aided-design (CAD) modeling of the proposed LEU fuel design. The UTK research has been governed by a statement of work (SOW), which was updated annually to clearly define the specific tasks reported herein. Ph.D. student Isaac T. Bodey has focused on heat transfer and fluid flow modeling issues and has been aided by his major professor Dr. Rao V. Arimilli. Ph.D. student Franklin G. Curtis has been focusing on modeling the fluid-structure interaction (FSI) phenomena caused by the mechanical forces acting on the fuel plates, which in turn affect the fluid flow in between the fuel plates, and ultimately the heat transfer, is also affected by the FSI changes. Franklin Curtis has been aided by his major professor Dr. Kivanc Ekici. M.Sc. student Adam R. Travis has focused two major areas of research: (1) on accurate CAD modeling of the proposed LEU plate design, and (2) reduction of the model complexity and dimensionality through interdimensional coupling of the fluid flow and heat transfer for the HFIR plate geometry. Adam Travis is also aided by his major professor, Dr. Kivanc Ekici. We must note that the UTK team, and particularly the graduate students, have been in very close collaboration with Dr. James D. Freels (ORNL technical monitor and mentor) and have

  15. Research and Development of Multiphysics Models in Support of the Conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bodey, Isaac T. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Curtis, Franklin G. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Arimilli, Rao V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Ekici, Kivanc [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Freels, James D. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-11-01

    The findings presented in this report are results of a five year effort led by the RRD Division of the ORNL, which is focused on research and development toward the conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) fuel from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). This report focuses on the tasks accomplished by the University of Tennessee Knoxville (UTK) team from the Department of Mechanical, Aerospace, and Biomedical Engineering (MABE) that provided expert support in multiphysics modeling of complex problems associated with the LEU conversion of the HFIR reactor. The COMSOL software was used as the main computational modeling tool, whereas Solidworks was also used in support of computer-aided-design (CAD) modeling of the proposed LEU fuel design. The UTK research has been governed by a statement of work (SOW), which was updated annually to clearly define the specific tasks reported herein. Ph.D. student Isaac T. Bodey has focused on heat transfer and fluid flow modeling issues and has been aided by his major professor Dr. Rao V. Arimilli. Ph.D. student Franklin G. Curtis has been focusing on modeling the fluid-structure interaction (FSI) phenomena caused by the mechanical forces acting on the fuel plates, which in turn affect the fluid flow in between the fuel plates, and ultimately the heat transfer, is also affected by the FSI changes. Franklin Curtis has been aided by his major professor Dr. Kivanc Ekici. M.Sc. student Adam R. Travis has focused two major areas of research: (1) on accurate CAD modeling of the proposed LEU plate design, and (2) reduction of the model complexity and dimensionality through interdimensional coupling of the fluid flow and heat transfer for the HFIR plate geometry. Adam Travis is also aided by his major professor, Dr. Kivanc Ekici. We must note that the UTK team, and particularly the graduate students, have been in very close collaboration with Dr. James D. Freels (ORNL technical monitor and mentor) and have

  16. Czechoslovak uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pluskal, O.

    1992-01-01

    Data and knowledge related to the prospecting, mining, processing and export of uranium ores in Czechoslovakia are presented. In the years between 1945 and January 1, 1991, 98,461.1 t of uranium were extracted. In the period 1965-1990 the uranium industry was subsidized from the state budget to a total of 38.5 billion CSK. The subsidies were put into extraction, investments and geologic prospecting; the latter was at first, ie. till 1960 financed by the former USSR, later on the two parties shared costs on a 1:1 basis. Since 1981 the prospecting has been entirely financed from the Czechoslovak state budget. On Czechoslovak territory uranium has been extracted from deposits which may be classified as vein-type deposits, deposits in uranium-bearing sandstones and deposits connected with weathering processes. The future of mining, however, is almost exclusively being connected with deposits in uranium-bearing sandstones. A brief description and characteristic is given of all uranium deposits on Czechoslovak territory, and the organization of uranium mining in Czechoslovakia is described as is the approach used in the world to evaluate uranium deposits; uranium prices and actual resources are also given. (Z.S.) 3 figs

  17. Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mueller, H. [NUKEM GmbH, Alzenau (Germany)

    1997-08-01

    Since the RERTR-meeting In Newport/USA in 1990 the author delivered a series of papers in connection with the fuel cycle for research reactors dealing with its front-end. In these papers the author underlined the need for unified specifications for enriched uranium metal suitable for the production of fuel elements and made proposals with regard to the re-use of in Europe reprocessed highly enriched uranium. With regard to the fuel cycle of research reactors the research reactor community was since 1989 more concentrating on the problems of its back-end since the USA stopped the acceptance of spent research reactor fuel on December 31, 1988. Now, since it is apparent that these back-end problem have been solved by AEA`s ability to reprocess and the preparedness of the USA to again accept physically spent research reactor fuel the author is focusing with this paper again on the front-end of the fuel cycle on the question whether there is at all a safe supply of low and high enriched uranium for research reactors in the future.

  18. Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1997-01-01

    Since the RERTR-meeting In Newport/USA in 1990 the author delivered a series of papers in connection with the fuel cycle for research reactors dealing with its front-end. In these papers the author underlined the need for unified specifications for enriched uranium metal suitable for the production of fuel elements and made proposals with regard to the re-use of in Europe reprocessed highly enriched uranium. With regard to the fuel cycle of research reactors the research reactor community was since 1989 more concentrating on the problems of its back-end since the USA stopped the acceptance of spent research reactor fuel on December 31, 1988. Now, since it is apparent that these back-end problem have been solved by AEA's ability to reprocess and the preparedness of the USA to again accept physically spent research reactor fuel the author is focusing with this paper again on the front-end of the fuel cycle on the question whether there is at all a safe supply of low and high enriched uranium for research reactors in the future

  19. How the radiologic and nuclear medical communities can improve nuclear security.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kahn, Laura H; von Hippel, Frank

    2007-04-01

    Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is used to manufacture technetium-99m, the most widely used medical radioisotope in the world. Highly enriched uranium is also used to make nuclear bombs; 50 kg of HEU is enough to make a Hiroshima-type bomb. It is generally agreed that this technology is within the reach of a terrorist group; the main obstacle is acquiring HEU. Currently, as a legacy of the US and Soviet Atoms for Peace Program, there are civilian users of HEU in 40 countries, and about 1,000 kg are still being shipped each year. Unfortunately, the major international manufacturers of technetium-99m have been refusing to convert their production facilities to use low-enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb. Only 1% to 2% of the HEU is consumed in the process of producing technetium-99m. The remainder is accumulating in radioactive waste storage facilities. The radiologic and nuclear medical communities could make a tremendous contribution to a safer world by supporting the replacement of HEU with LEU in the production of technetium-99m. Low-enriched uranium is just as cost effective as HEU for the manufacture of technetium-99m and does not contribute to the risk for nuclear terrorism.

  20. Feasibility of Producing Molybdenum-99 on a Small Scale Using Fission of Low Enriched Uranium or Neutron Activation of Natural Molybdenum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication documents the work performed within the IAEA coordinated research project (CRP) on Developing Techniques for Small Scale Indigenous Molybdenum-99 Production Using LEU Fission or Neutron Activation. The project allowed participating institutions to receive training and information on aspects necessary for starting production of molybdenum-99 ( 99 Mo) on a small scale, that is, to become national level producers of this medical isotope. Stable production of 99Mo is one of the most pressing issues facing the nuclear community at present, because the medical isotope technetium-99m ( 99m Tc), which decays from 99 Mo, is one of the most widely used radionuclides in diagnostic imaging and treatment around the world. In the past five years, there have been widespread shortages of 99 Mo owing to the limited number of producers, many of which use ageing facilities. To assist in stabilizing the production of 99Mo, and to promote the use of production methods that do not rely on the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), the IAEA initiated the abovementioned CRP on small scale 99Mo production using low enriched uranium (LEU) fission or neutron activation methods. The intention was to enable participating institutions to gain the knowledge necessary to become national level producers of 99Mo in the event of further global shortages. Some of the institutions that participated in the CRP have continued their work on 99 Mo production, and are enlisting the assistance of other CRP members and the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme to set up a small scale production capability. In total, the CRP was active for six years, and concluded in December 2011. During the CRP, fourteen IAEA Member States took part; four research coordination meetings were held, and four workshops were held on operational aspects of 99 Mo production, LEU target fabrication and waste management. Most participants carried out work related to the entire production process, from target

  1. How is uranium supply affecting enrichment?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steve Kidd

    2007-01-01

    As a result of the enlivened uranium market, momentum has in turn picked up in the enrichment sector. What are the consequences of higher uranium prices? There is, of course, a link between uranium and enrichment supply to the extent that they are at least partial substitutes. On the enrichment supply side, the most obvious feature is the gradual replacement of the old gas diffusion facilities of Usec in the USA and EURODIF in France with more modern and economical centrifuge plants. Assuming Usec can overcome the financing and technical issues surrounding its plans, the last gas diffusion capacity should disappear around 2015 and the entire enrichment market should then be using centrifuges. On the commercial side, the key anticipated developments are mostly in Russia. Although there should still continue to be substantial quantities of surplus Russian HEU available for down blending in the period beyond 2013, it is now reasonable to expect that it will be mostly consumed by internal needs, to fuel Russian-origin reactors both at home and in export markets such as China and India. Finally, as a key sensitive area for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the enrichment sector is likely to be a central point of the new international arrangements which must be developed to support a buoyant nuclear sector throughout this century.

  2. Uranium ores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poty, B.; Roux, J.

    1998-01-01

    The processing of uranium ores for uranium extraction and concentration is not much different than the processing of other metallic ores. However, thanks to its radioactive property, the prospecting of uranium ores can be performed using geophysical methods. Surface and sub-surface detection methods are a combination of radioactive measurement methods (radium, radon etc..) and classical mining and petroleum prospecting methods. Worldwide uranium prospecting has been more or less active during the last 50 years, but the rise of raw material and energy prices between 1970 and 1980 has incited several countries to develop their nuclear industry in order to diversify their resources and improve their energy independence. The result is a considerable increase of nuclear fuels demand between 1980 and 1990. This paper describes successively: the uranium prospecting methods (direct, indirect and methodology), the uranium deposits (economical definition, uranium ores, and deposits), the exploitation of uranium ores (use of radioactivity, radioprotection, effluents), the worldwide uranium resources (definition of the different categories and present day state of worldwide resources). (J.S.)

  3. Uranium market

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rubini, L.A.; Asem, M.A.D.

    1990-01-01

    The historical development of the uranium market is present in two periods: The initial period 1947-1970 and from 1970 onwards, with the establishment of a commercial market. The world uranium requirements are derived from the corresponding forecast of nuclear generating capacity, with, particular emphasis to the brazilian requirements. The forecast of uranium production until the year 2000 is presented considering existing inventories and the already committed demand. The balance between production and requirements is analysed. Finally the types of contracts currently being used and the development of uranium prices in the world market are considered. (author)

  4. Uranium enrichment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    This report looks at the following issues: How much Soviet uranium ore and enriched uranium are imported into the United States and what is the extent to which utilities flag swap to disguise these purchases? What are the U.S.S.R.'s enriched uranium trading practices? To what extent are utilities required to return used fuel to the Soviet Union as part of the enriched uranium sales agreement? Why have U.S. utilities ended their contracts to buy enrichment services from DOE?

  5. Neutronic calculations in core conversion of the IAN-R1 research reactor from MTR HEU to TRIGA LEU fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sarta Fuentes, Jose A.; Castiblanco, L.A.

    2003-01-01

    With cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), neutronic calculations were carried out for conversion of the Ian-R1 Reactor from MTR-HEU fuel to TRIGA-LEU fuel. In order to establish a staff for neutronic calculation at the Instituto de Cancan's Nucleares y Energia s Alternatives (INEA) a program was established. This program included training, acquisition of hardware, software and calculation for the core with MTR-HEU fuel , enriched nominally to 93% and calculation for several arrangements with the TRIGA-LEU fuel, enriched to 19.7%. The results were verified and compared with several groups of calculation at the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares (ININ) in Mexico, and General Atomics (GA) in United States. As a result of this program, several technical reports have been wrote. (author)

  6. Irradiation performance of HTGR fuel rods in HFIR experiments HRB-11 and -12

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Homan, F.J.; Tiegs, T.N.; Kania, M.J.; Long, E.L. Jr.; Thoms, K.R.; Robbins, J.M.; Wagner, P.

    1980-06-01

    Capsules HRB-11 and -12 were irradiated in support of development of weak-acid-resin-derived recycle fuel for the high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel cycle for the HTGR. Fissil fuel particles with initial oxygen-to-metal ratios between 1.0 and 1.7 performed acceptably to full burnup for HEU fuel. Particles with ratios below 1.0 showed excessive chemical interaction between rare earth fission products and the SiC layer

  7. The gas centrifuge, uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, A.

    1988-01-01

    The author considers the consequences for controlling nuclear proliferation of the emergence of the gas centrifuge method for enriching uranium and succeeds in the difficult and delicate task of saying enough about gas centrifuge techniques for readers to judge, what may be involved in fully embracing gas centrifuge enrichment within the constraints of an anti-proliferation strategy, whilst at the same time saying nothing that could be construed as encouraging an interest in the gas centrifuge route to highly enriched uranium where none had before existed. (author)

  8. Developments in uranium resources, production, demand and the environment. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    activities as well as its participation in secondary supply sources such as commercialization of weapons grade uranium. Uranium supply from the developing countries could be increasingly important in satisfying worldwide reactor requirements over time. At the same time, it represents only one segment of total supply, which also includes production from developed countries plus secondary supply including inventory draw down, HEU, MOX, reprocessed uranium and re-enrichment of tails. A model developed by the IAEA is presented that provides for long term forecasting of uranium requirements for given sets of parameters including nuclear power projections and fuel cycle strategies. A companion presentation reviews the relationship between options at the backend of the nuclear fuel cycle and uranium market prices. These relationships impact the economics and therefore the availability of secondary supply

  9. An Analysis of the HEU-MET-FAST-035 Problem Using CENTRM and SCALE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hollenbach, D.F.; Jordan, W.C.

    1999-01-01

    An U/Fe benchmark, designated as HEU-MET-FAST-035, has been approved for inclusion in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments. The SCALE code and cross sections performed poorly in calculating this critical experiment. Deficiencies in both the ENDF/B-V representation of the resonance region for Fe and in the Nordheim integral treatment when applied to Fe were identified. The combination of these deficiencies led to an almost 10% over-prediction of k(eff). Problems involving a large percentage of Fe and intermediate-energy spectrums present special cross-section processing difficulties for SCALE. In ENDF/B-V, resonance data for Fe only go to 400 keV, although resonances are present well above 1 MeV. Significant resonance data are stored as file 3 data instead of as resonance parameters. The Nordheim Integral Treatment used in NITAWL to process cross sections assume: resonances are widely spaced and all relevant information is contained in the resonance parameters (file 3 data is not processed). These limitations and assumptions result in poor solutions for this class of problems

  10. Uranium mining

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lange, G.

    1975-01-01

    The winning of uranium ore is the first stage of the fuel cycle. The whole complex of questions to be considered when evaluating the profitability of an ore mine is shortly outlined, and the possible mining techniques are described. Some data on uranium mining in the western world are also given. (RB) [de

  11. White Paper – Use of LEU for a Space Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poston, David Irvin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Mcclure, Patrick Ray [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-08-11

    Historically space reactors flown or designed for the U.S. and Russia used Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for fuel. HEU almost always produces a small and lighter reactor. Since mass increases launch costs or decreases science payloads, HEU was the natural choice. However in today’s environment, the proliferation of HEU has become a major concern for the U.S. government and hence a policy issue. In addition, launch costs are being reduced as the space community moves toward commercial launch vehicles. HEU also carries a heavy security cost to process, test, transport and launch. Together these issues have called for a re-investigation into space reactors the use Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel.

  12. Development of Nitride Coating Using Atomic Layer Deposition for Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Powder

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bhattacharya, Sumit

    High-performance research reactors require fuel that operates at high specific power and can withstand high fission density, but at relatively low temperatures. The design of the research reactor fuels is done for efficient heat emission, and consists of assemblies of thin-plates cladding made from aluminum alloy. The low-enriched fuels (LEU) were developed for replacing high-enriched fuels (HEU) for these reactors necessitates a significantly increased uranium density in the fuel to counterbalance the decrease in enrichment. One of the most promising new fuel candidate is U-Mo alloy, in a U-Mo/Al dispersion fuel form, due to its high uranium loading as well as excellent irradiation resistance performance, is being developed extensively to convert from HEU fuel to LEU fuel for high-performance research reactors. However, the formation of an interaction layer (IL) between U-Mo particles and the Al matrix, and the associated pore formation, under high heat flux and high burnup conditions, degrade the irradiation performance of the U-Mo/Al dispersion fuel. From the recent tests results accumulated from the surface engineering of low enriched uranium fuel (SELENIUM) and MIR reactor displayed that a surface barrier coating like physical vapor deposited (PVD) zirconium nitride (ZrN) can significantly reduce the interaction layer. The barrier coating performed well at low burn up but above a fluence rate of 5x 1021 ions/cm2 the swelling reappeared due to formation interaction layer. With this result in mind the objective of this research was to develop an ultrathin ZrN coating over particulate uranium-molybdenum nuclear fuel using a modified savannah 200 atomic layer deposition (ALD) system. This is done in support of the US Department of Energy's (DOE) effort to slow down the interaction at fluence rate and reach higher burn up for high power research reactor. The low-pressure Savannah 200 ALD system is modified to be designed as a batch powder coating system using the

  13. Correlation function measurement of uranium casting driven by tagged DT neutrons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Jiansheng; Ye Cenming; Xie Wenxiong; Huang Po; Zeng Liheng; Jin Yu; Xie Qilin; Zhang Yi

    2013-01-01

    Background: In the nuclear disarmament process, the measurement and verification of uranium casting in sealed container are important to process control and treaty implementation. It is a difficult and hot problem to verify uranium casting in a sealed metal container, due to the weak intensity of neutron and gamma rays of uranium. Purpose: We want to measure the correlation functions of different casting in uranium casting verifications. Methods: Two BC501 scintillation detectors are placed outside the tagged neutron cone and in opposite position. The α detector forms the first channel pulse signal, while the two BC501 scintillation detectors form the second and third channel pulse signals. Those three pulsed time series are recorded by high speed acquisition system. The correlation functions between these signals are calculated by the time series. Results: Putting the two BC501 detectors into the tagged neutron cone, the time of flight for the 14 MeV neutron is measured. The FWHM in TOF spectrum is 2.0 ns. Putting the two BC501 detectors outside the tagged neutron cone, the correlation functions measured by high speed acquisition system and MCA are consistent. The spontaneous neutron decay constants of the castings are measured by γ rays. The decay constant of 6.5 kg Pb component is 184 μs -1 . The decay constants of 4 kg and 15 kg HEU casting are 210 μs -1 and 128 μs -1 , respectively. The correlation functions C 12 (τ), C 13 (τ) and C 23 (τ) are acquired. In C 12 (C), the γ ray peak coming from the inelastic reaction of 14-MeV neutrons with the casting is 5.0 ns before the neutron peak of fission chain. This time difference can estimate the casting position in container. The integrations of the C 12 (τ), C 13 (τ) and C 23 (τ) increase with the casting mass. The C 23 (τ) values of Pb component and DU casting are far less than the values of HEU casting. The C 23 (τ) integration of Pb component is 3.0% comparing with 15-kg HEU casting, while the

  14. Uranium enrichment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    GAO was asked to address several questions concerning a number of proposed uranium enrichment bills introduced during the 100th Congress. The bill would have restructured the Department of Energy's uranium enrichment program as a government corporation to allow it to compete more effectively in the domestic and international markets. Some of GAO's findings discussed are: uranium market experts believe and existing market models show that the proposed DOE purchase of a $750 million of uranium from domestic producers may not significantly increase production because of large producer-held inventories; excess uranium enrichment production capacity exists throughout the world; therefore, foreign producers are expected to compete heavily in the United States throughout the 1990s as utilities' contracts with DOE expire; and according to a 1988 agreement between DOE's Offices of Nuclear Energy and Defense Programs, enrichment decommissioning costs, estimated to total $3.6 billion for planning purposes, will be shared by the commercial enrichment program and the government

  15. Uranium resources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    This is a press release issued by the OECD on 9th March 1976. It is stated that the steep increases in demand for uranium foreseen in and beyond the 1980's, with doubling times of the order of six to seven years, will inevitably create formidable problems for the industry. Further substantial efforts will be needed in prospecting for new uranium reserves. Information is given in tabular or graphical form on the following: reasonably assured resources, country by country; uranium production capacities, country by country; world nuclear power growth; world annual uranium requirements; world annual separative requirements; world annual light water reactor fuel reprocessing requirements; distribution of reactor types (LWR, SGHWR, AGR, HWR, HJR, GG, FBR); and world fuel cycle capital requirements. The information is based on the latest report on Uranium Resources Production and Demand, jointly issued by the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. (U.K.)

  16. Uranium supply and demand

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Spriggs, M J

    1976-01-01

    Papers were presented on the pattern of uranium production in South Africa; Australian uranium--will it ever become available; North American uranium resources, policies, prospects, and pricing; economic and political environment of the uranium mining industry; alternative sources of uranium supply; whither North American demand for uranium; and uranium demand and security of supply--a consumer's point of view. (LK)

  17. Analysis of uranium supply to 2050

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Underhill, D.H.

    2002-01-01

    The 1999 uranium mine production was about 55% of the 61 500 tonnes uranium (t U) used by the nuclear industry, with the balance met by secondary supply. Based on a recent WEC-IIASA study which defines a wide range of possible future levels of nuclear electricity generation, it is estimated that by 2050 annual uranium requirements could increase to 177 000 and 283 000 t U respectively, in the mid and high cases, or fall to 52 000 t U in the low case. Cumulative requirements to 2050 for the low, mid and high cases are, respectively 3.39, 5.35 and 7.58 million t U. A new IAEA analysis describes how known uranium resources (RAR and EAR-1) plus undiscovered resources (EAR-II and SR), supplemented by secondary supplies, could be utilized to supply reactors to 2050. Secondary supplies include: existing inventories, blended down warhead material (LEU blended from HEU), MOX, Repu, and re-enrichment of tails. The methodology of this analysis estimates the amounts and annual deliveries of the secondary supply, plus non-market supply. The balance of demand is met from Market Based Production (MBP) or: 'Uranium produced at or below market price to satisfy requirements not met by other supply sources'. The analysis then evaluates the production role for 125 uranium deposits, which supply MBP considering individual deposit resources, production cost and capability, and timing. Production costs are classified from low ( $130/kgU). Annual supply and demand balancing is used to allocate the resources on an individual deposit basis, assuming use of the next lowest available cost production. Secondary supplies will continue to supplement mine production to about 2025, but their relative importance will decrease over the period. An analysis of the benefit of lowering the enrichment tails assay from 0.30% 235 U to 0.15% 235 U, when economically justified is also discussed. The report also discusses projected production cost trends to 2025 under the mid and high cases. The final

  18. Uranium, depleted uranium, biological effects; Uranium, uranium appauvri, effets biologiques

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    Physicists, chemists and biologists at the CEA are developing scientific programs on the properties and uses of ionizing radiation. Since the CEA was created in 1945, a great deal of research has been carried out on the properties of natural, enriched and depleted uranium in cooperation with university laboratories and CNRS. There is a great deal of available data about uranium; thousands of analyses have been published in international reviews over more than 40 years. This presentation on uranium is a very brief summary of all these studies. (author)

  19. Uranium toxicology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferreyra, Mariana D.; Suarez Mendez, Sebastian

    1997-01-01

    In this paper are presented the methods and procedures optimized by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) for the determination of: natural uranium mass, activity of enriched uranium in samples of: urine, mucus, filters, filter heads, rinsing waters and Pu in urine, adopted and in some cases adapted, by the Environmental Monitoring and Internal Dosimetry Laboratory. The analyzed material corresponded to biological and environmental samples belonging to the staff professionally exposed that work in plants of the nuclear fuel cycle. For a better comprehension of the activities of this laboratory, it is included a brief description of the uranium radiochemical toxicity and the limits internationally fixed to preserve the workers health

  20. Core physics analysis in support of the FNR HEU-LEU demonstration experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Losey, David C.; Brown, Forrest B.; Martin, William R.; Lee, John C.

    1983-01-01

    A core neutronics analysis has been undertaken to assess the impact of low-enrichment fuel on the performance and utilization of the FNR As part of this analytic effort a computer code system has been assembled which will be of general use in analyzing research reactors with MTR-type fuel. The code system has been extensively tested and verified in calculations for the present high enrichment core. The analysis presented here compares the high-and-low enrichment fuels in batch and equilibrium core configurations which model the actual FNR operating conditions. The two fuels are compared for cycle length, fuel burnup, and flux and power distributions, as well as for the reactivity effects which are important in assessing the impact of LEU fuel on reactor shutdown margin. (author)

  1. Core physics analysis in support of the FNR HEU-LEU demonstration experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Losey, David C; Brown, Forrest B; Martin, William R; Lee, John C [Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Michigan (United States)

    1983-08-01

    A core neutronics analysis has been undertaken to assess the impact of low-enrichment fuel on the performance and utilization of the FNR As part of this analytic effort a computer code system has been assembled which will be of general use in analyzing research reactors with MTR-type fuel. The code system has been extensively tested and verified in calculations for the present high enrichment core. The analysis presented here compares the high-and-low enrichment fuels in batch and equilibrium core configurations which model the actual FNR operating conditions. The two fuels are compared for cycle length, fuel burnup, and flux and power distributions, as well as for the reactivity effects which are important in assessing the impact of LEU fuel on reactor shutdown margin. (author)

  2. Enriched-uranium feed costs for the High-Temperature Gas-Cooled reactor: trends and comparison with other reactor concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, W.E.

    1976-04-01

    This report discusses each of the components that affect the unit cost for enriched uranium; that is, ore costs, U 3 O 8 to UF 6 conversion cost, costs for enriching services, and changes in transaction tails assay. Historical trends and announced changes are included. Unit costs for highly enriched uranium (93.15 percent 235 U) and for low-enrichment uranium (3.0, 3.2, and 3.5 percent 235 U) are displayed as a function of changes in the above components and compared. It is demonstrated that the trends in these cost components will probably result in significantly less cost increase for highly enriched uranium than for low-enrichment uranium--hence favoring the High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor

  3. Analysis on possible North Korea's uranium stock by using open source information

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jung Hyun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-10-15

    The gas centrifuge plant in Yongbyon is the only revealed uranium enrichment plant in North Korea. Yongbyon enrichment plant is believed producing only LEU below 5 percent uranium 235 for use as fuel in the LWR, as they said. But the plant could be easily converted to producing HEU for nuclear weapons. In this paper, we estimated the enrichment capability of the Yongbyon plant based on the known characteristics of its centrifuges and cascades. And then we developed the four possible uranium enrichment scenarios, to examine the future options that North Korea may use to enhance its enrichment capability. Finally, we suggested several key measures to stop North Korea from pursing its nuclear ambitions.

  4. Rossing uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1979-01-01

    In this article the geology of the deposits of the Rossing uranium mine in Namibia is discussed. The planning of the open-pit mining, the blasting, drilling, handling and the equipment used for these processes are described

  5. Uranium, depleted uranium, biological effects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    Physicists, chemists and biologists at the CEA are developing scientific programs on the properties and uses of ionizing radiation. Since the CEA was created in 1945, a great deal of research has been carried out on the properties of natural, enriched and depleted uranium in cooperation with university laboratories and CNRS. There is a great deal of available data about uranium; thousands of analyses have been published in international reviews over more than 40 years. This presentation on uranium is a very brief summary of all these studies. (author)

  6. Uranium loans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    When NUEXCO was organized in 1968, its founders conceived of a business based on uranium loans. The concept was relatively straightforward; those who found themselves with excess supplies of uranium would deposit those excesses in NUEXCO's open-quotes bank,close quotes and those who found themselves temporarily short of uranium could borrow from the bank. The borrower would pay interest based on the quantity of uranium borrowed and the duration of the loan, and the bank would collect the interest, deduct its service fee for arranging the loan, and pay the balance to those whose deposits were borrowed. In fact, the original plan was to call the firm Nuclear Bank Corporation, until it was discovered that using the word open-quotes Bankclose quotes in the name would subject the firm to various US banking regulations. Thus, Nuclear Bank Corporation became Nuclear Exchange Corporation, which was later shortened to NUEXCO. Neither the nuclear fuel market nor NUEXCO's business developed quite as its founders had anticipated. From almost the very beginning, the brokerage of uranium purchases and sales became a more significant activity for NUEXCO than arranging uranium loans. Nevertheless, loan transactions have played an important role in the international nuclear fuel market, requiring the development of special knowledge and commercial techniques

  7. Uranium isotope separation from 1941 to the present

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maier-Komor, Peter

    2010-01-01

    Uranium isotope separation was the key development for the preparation of highly enriched isotopes in general and thus became the seed for target development and preparation for nuclear and applied physics. In 1941 (year of birth of the author) large-scale development for uranium isotope separation was started after the US authorities were warned that NAZI Germany had started its program for enrichment of uranium and might have confiscated all uranium and uranium mines in their sphere of influence. Within the framework of the Manhattan Projects the first electromagnetic mass separators (Calutrons) were installed and further developed for high throughput. The military aim of the Navy Department was to develop nuclear propulsion for submarines with practically unlimited range. Parallel to this the army worked on the development of the atomic bomb. Also in 1941 plutonium was discovered and the production of 239 Pu was included into the atomic bomb program. 235 U enrichment starting with natural uranium was performed in two steps with different techniques of mass separation in Oak Ridge. The first step was gas diffusion which was limited to low enrichment. The second step for high enrichment was performed with electromagnetic mass spectrometers (Calutrons). The theory for the much more effective enrichment with centrifugal separation was developed also during the Second World War, but technical problems e.g. development of high speed ball and needle bearings could not be solved before the end of the war. Spying accelerated the development of uranium separation in the Soviet Union, but also later in China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. In this paper, the physical and chemical procedures are outlined which lead to the success of the project. Some security aspects and Non-Proliferation measures are discussed.

  8. Uranium isotope separation from 1941 to the present

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maier-Komor, Peter, E-mail: Peter@Maier-Komor.d [Retired from Physik-Department E12, Technische Universitaet Muenchen, D-85747 Garching (Germany)

    2010-02-11

    Uranium isotope separation was the key development for the preparation of highly enriched isotopes in general and thus became the seed for target development and preparation for nuclear and applied physics. In 1941 (year of birth of the author) large-scale development for uranium isotope separation was started after the US authorities were warned that NAZI Germany had started its program for enrichment of uranium and might have confiscated all uranium and uranium mines in their sphere of influence. Within the framework of the Manhattan Projects the first electromagnetic mass separators (Calutrons) were installed and further developed for high throughput. The military aim of the Navy Department was to develop nuclear propulsion for submarines with practically unlimited range. Parallel to this the army worked on the development of the atomic bomb. Also in 1941 plutonium was discovered and the production of {sup 239}Pu was included into the atomic bomb program. {sup 235}U enrichment starting with natural uranium was performed in two steps with different techniques of mass separation in Oak Ridge. The first step was gas diffusion which was limited to low enrichment. The second step for high enrichment was performed with electromagnetic mass spectrometers (Calutrons). The theory for the much more effective enrichment with centrifugal separation was developed also during the Second World War, but technical problems e.g. development of high speed ball and needle bearings could not be solved before the end of the war. Spying accelerated the development of uranium separation in the Soviet Union, but also later in China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. In this paper, the physical and chemical procedures are outlined which lead to the success of the project. Some security aspects and Non-Proliferation measures are discussed.

  9. Uranium isotope separation from 1941 to the present

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maier-Komor, Peter

    2010-02-01

    Uranium isotope separation was the key development for the preparation of highly enriched isotopes in general and thus became the seed for target development and preparation for nuclear and applied physics. In 1941 (year of birth of the author) large-scale development for uranium isotope separation was started after the US authorities were warned that NAZI Germany had started its program for enrichment of uranium and might have confiscated all uranium and uranium mines in their sphere of influence. Within the framework of the Manhattan Projects the first electromagnetic mass separators (Calutrons) were installed and further developed for high throughput. The military aim of the Navy Department was to develop nuclear propulsion for submarines with practically unlimited range. Parallel to this the army worked on the development of the atomic bomb. Also in 1941 plutonium was discovered and the production of 239Pu was included into the atomic bomb program. 235U enrichment starting with natural uranium was performed in two steps with different techniques of mass separation in Oak Ridge. The first step was gas diffusion which was limited to low enrichment. The second step for high enrichment was performed with electromagnetic mass spectrometers (Calutrons). The theory for the much more effective enrichment with centrifugal separation was developed also during the Second World War, but technical problems e.g. development of high speed ball and needle bearings could not be solved before the end of the war. Spying accelerated the development of uranium separation in the Soviet Union, but also later in China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. In this paper, the physical and chemical procedures are outlined which lead to the success of the project. Some security aspects and Non-Proliferation measures are discussed.

  10. Simulation of uranium aluminide dissolution in a continuous aluminum dissolver system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, D.R.; Farman, R.F.; Christian, J.D.

    1990-01-01

    This paper reports on the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) which recovers highly-enriched uranium (uranium that contains at least 20 atom percent 235 U) from spent nuclear reactor fuel by dissolution of the fuel elements and extraction of the uranium from the aqueous dissolver product. Because the uranium is highly-enriched, consideration must be given to whether a critical mass can form at any stage of the process. In particular, suspended 235 U-containing particles are of special concern, due to their high density (6.8 g/cm 3 ) and due to the fact that they can settle into geometrically unfavorable configurations when not adequately mixed. A portion of the spent fuel is aluminum-alloy-clad uranium aluminide (UAl 3 ) particles, which dissolve more slowly than the cladding. As the aluminum alloy cladding dissolves in mercury-catalyzed nitric acid, UAl 3 is released. Under standard operating conditions, the UAl 3 dissolves rapidly enough to preclude the possibility of forming a critical mass anywhere in the system. However, postulated worst-case abnormal operating conditions retard uranium aluminide dissolution, and thus require evaluation. To establish safety limits for operating parameters, a computerized simulation model of uranium aluminide dissolution in the aluminum fuel dissolver system was developed

  11. Uranium mass and neutron multiplication factor estimates from time-correlation coincidence counts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xie, Wenxiong [China Academy of Engineering Physics, Center for Strategic Studies, Beijing 100088 (China); Li, Jiansheng [China Academy of Engineering Physics, Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry, Mianyang 621900 (China); Zhu, Jianyu [China Academy of Engineering Physics, Center for Strategic Studies, Beijing 100088 (China)

    2015-10-11

    Time-correlation coincidence counts of neutrons are an important means to measure attributes of nuclear material. The main deficiency in the analysis is that an attribute of an unknown component can only be assessed by comparing it with similar known components. There is a lack of a universal method of measurement suitable for the different attributes of the components. This paper presents a new method that uses universal relations to estimate the mass and neutron multiplication factor of any uranium component with known enrichment. Based on numerical simulations and analyses of 64 highly enriched uranium components with different thicknesses and average radii, the relations between mass, multiplication and coincidence spectral features have been obtained by linear regression analysis. To examine the validity of the method in estimating the mass of uranium components with different sizes, shapes, enrichment, and shielding, the features of time-correlation coincidence-count spectra for other objects with similar attributes are simulated. Most of the masses and multiplications for these objects could also be derived by the formulation. Experimental measurements of highly enriched uranium castings have also been used to verify the formulation. The results show that for a well-designed time-dependent coincidence-count measuring system of a uranium attribute, there are a set of relations dependent on the uranium enrichment by which the mass and multiplication of the measured uranium components of any shape and size can be estimated from the features of the source-detector coincidence-count spectrum.

  12. Uranium extraction from gold-uranium ores

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laskorin, B.N.; Golynko, Z.Sh.

    1981-01-01

    The process of uranium extraction from gold-uranium ores in the South Africa is considered. Flowsheets of reprocessing gold-uranium conglomerates, pile processing and uranium extraction from the ores are presented. Continuous counter flow ion-exchange process of uranium extraction using strong-active or weak-active resins is noted to be the most perspective and economical one. The ion-exchange uranium separation with the succeeding extraction is also the perspective one.

  13. Uranium mining

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Full text: The economic and environmental sustainability of uranium mining has been analysed by Monash University researcher Dr Gavin Mudd in a paper that challenges the perception that uranium mining is an 'infinite quality source' that provides solutions to the world's demand for energy. Dr Mudd says information on the uranium industry touted by politicians and mining companies is not necessarily inaccurate, but it does not tell the whole story, being often just an average snapshot of the costs of uranium mining today without reflecting the escalating costs associated with the process in years to come. 'From a sustainability perspective, it is critical to evaluate accurately the true lifecycle costs of all forms of electricity production, especially with respect to greenhouse emissions, ' he says. 'For nuclear power, a significant proportion of greenhouse emissions are derived from the fuel supply, including uranium mining, milling, enrichment and fuel manufacture.' Dr Mudd found that financial and environmental costs escalate dramatically as the uranium ore is used. The deeper the mining process required to extract the ore, the higher the cost for mining companies, the greater the impact on the environment and the more resources needed to obtain the product. I t is clear that there is a strong sensitivity of energy and water consumption and greenhouse emissions to ore grade, and that ore grades are likely to continue to decline gradually in the medium to long term. These issues are critical to the current debate over nuclear power and greenhouse emissions, especially with respect to ascribing sustainability to such activities as uranium mining and milling. For example, mining at Roxby Downs is responsible for the emission of over one million tonnes of greenhouse gases per year and this could increase to four million tonnes if the mine is expanded.'

  14. The high temperature reactor and its fuel cycle options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-07-01

    The status of the HTR system in the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the consecutive steps and the probable cost of further development are presented. The considerations are based on a recycling Th/highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel cycle which has been chosen as the main line of the German HTR R and D efforts. Alternative fuel cycles such as medium-enriched uranium (MEU) and low-enriched uranium (LEU) are discussed as well

  15. Optimization and Validation of the Developed Uranium Isotopic Analysis Code

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, J. H.; Kang, M. Y.; Kim, Jinhyeong; Choi, H. D. [Seoul National Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    γ-ray spectroscopy is a representative non-destructive assay for nuclear material, and less time-consuming and less expensive than the destructive analysis method. The destructive technique is more precise than NDA technique, however, there is some correction algorithm which can improve the performance of γ-spectroscopy. For this reason, an analysis code for uranium isotopic analysis is developed by Applied Nuclear Physics Group in Seoul National University. Overlapped γ- and x-ray peaks in the 89-101 keV X{sub α}-region are fitted with Gaussian and Lorentzian distribution peak functions, tail and background functions. In this study, optimizations for the full-energy peak efficiency calibration and fitting parameters of peak tail and background are performed, and validated with 24 hour acquisition of CRM uranium samples. The optimization of peak tail and background parameters are performed with the validation by using CRM uranium samples. The analysis performance is improved in HEU samples, but more optimization of fitting parameters is required in LEU sample analysis. In the future, the optimization research about the fitting parameters with various type of uranium samples will be performed. {sup 234}U isotopic analysis algorithms and correction algorithms (coincidence effect, self-attenuation effect) will be developed.

  16. Uranium enrichment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rae, H.K.; Melvin, J.G.

    1988-06-01

    Canada is the world's largest producer and exporter of uranium, most of which is enriched elsewhere for use as fuel in LWRs. The feasibility of a Canadian uranium-enrichment enterprise is therefore a perennial question. Recent developments in uranium-enrichment technology, and their likely impacts on separative work supply and demand, suggest an opportunity window for Canadian entry into this international market. The Canadian opportunity results from three particular impacts of the new technologies: 1) the bulk of the world's uranium-enrichment capacity is in gaseous diffusion plants which, because of their large requirements for electricity (more than 2000 kW·h per SWU), are vulnerable to competition from the new processes; 2) the decline in enrichment costs increases the economic incentive for the use of slightly-enriched uranium (SEU) fuel in CANDU reactors, thus creating a potential Canadian market; and 3) the new processes allow economic operation on a much smaller scale, which drastically reduces the investment required for market entry and is comparable with the potential Canadian SEU requirement. The opportunity is not open-ended. By the end of the century the enrichment supply industry will have adapted to the new processes and long-term customer/supplier relationships will have been established. In order to seize the opportunity, Canada must become a credible supplier during this century

  17. Operational report, Advantages of gradual introducing of highly enriched fuel into the RA reactor core from economic aspect and users needs; Radni izvestaj, Prednost postupka parcijalnog uvodjenja visokoobogacenog goriva u reaktor RA sa aspekta ekonomicnosti i potreba korisnika

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martinc, R et al. [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1976-10-14

    The possibility of increasing the neutron flux in the RA reactor was considered for a number of years. The possibilities of reactor reconstruction are not realistic and they should be disregarded. The possibility that remains is to achieve higher neutron flux by improving the fueling scheme and above all by introducing highly enriched fuel into the reactor core. Decision to purchase highly enriched fuel was quicker due to the fact that the 2% enriched uranium fuel is not fabricated any more. There are two procedures for exchanging the fuel in the reactor core: a) removal of partially spent 2% enriched fuel and formation of the core with fresh highly enriched fuel; b) gradually introducing the new fuel into the existing RA reactor core according to a special transfer regime. This report includes some comparative analyses of these two procedures from both economic point of view and the needs of users, as well as some technical conditions. These results are in favour of gradual introducing of new fuel into the reactor core. relevant direct savings amount to 3 000 000 dinars. Some of the most important advantages cannot be estimated in this way. This report does not cover the safety analyses results which are presented in a series of other papers. [Serbo-Croat] Vec vise godina razmatra se mogucnost za povecanje neutronskog fluksa u reaktoru RA. Mogucnosti za rekonstrukciju reaktora RA u tom smislu su minimalne i realno ih treba odbaciti. Prema tome preostaje da se povecanje neutronskog fluksa postigne usavrsavanjem seme izmene goriva, a pre svega uvodjenjem goriva sa visokim stepenom obogacenja u reaktor RA. Donosenje odluke o nabavci visokoobogacenog goriva i njegovom uvodjenju u reaktor ubrzano je i cinjenicom da se staro 2% obogaceno uransko gorivo vise ne proizvodi. Postoje dva postupka za prevodjenje reaktora na ovo gorivo: a) Uklanjanjem poluistrosenog 2% obogacenog goriva iz reaktora i formiranjem jezgra iskljucivo od svezeg visokoobogacenog goriva, b

  18. Analyses for inserting fresh LEU fuel assemblies instead of fresh HEU fuel assemblies in the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor in Vietnam

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanan, N. A.; Deen, J.R.; Matos, J.E.

    2005-01-01

    Analyses were performed by the RERTR Program to replace 36 burned HEU (36%) fuel assemblies in the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor in Vietnam with either 36 fresh fuel assemblies currently on-hand at the reactor or with LEU fuel assemblies to be procured. The study concludes that the current HEU (36%) WWR-M2 fuel assemblies can be replaced with LEU WWR-M2 fuel assemblies that are fully-qualified and have been commercially available since 2001 from the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant in Russia. The current reactor configuration using re-shuffled HEU fuel began in June 2004 and is expected to allow normal operation until around August 2006. If 36 HEU assemblies each with 40.2 g 235 U are inserted without fuel shuffling over the next five operating cycles, the core could operate for an additional 10 years until June 2016. Alternatively, inserting 36 LEU fuel assemblies each containing 49.7 g 235 U without fuel shuffling over five operating cycles would allow normal operation for about 14 years from August 2006 until October 2020. The main reason for the longer service life of the LEU fuel is that its 235 U content is higher than the 235 U content needed simply to match the service life of the HEU fuel. Fast neutron fluxes in the experiment regions would be very nearly the same in both the HEU and LEU cores. Thermal neutron fluxes in the experiment regions would be lower by 1-5%, depending on the experiment type and location. (author)

  19. Uranium update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steane, R.

    1997-01-01

    This paper is about the current uranium mining situation, especially that in Saskatchewan. Canada has a unique advantage with the Saskatchewan uranium deposits. Making the most of this opportunity is important to Canada. The following is reviewed: project development and the time and capital it takes to bring a new project into production; the supply and demand situation to show where the future production fits into the world market; and our foreign competition and how we have to be careful not to lose our opportunity. (author)

  20. Development of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.

    1997-01-01

    The Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program has continued its effort in the past 3 yr to develop use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to produce the fission product 99 Mo. This work comprises both target and chemical processing development and demonstration. Two major target systems are now being used to produce 99 Mo with highly enriched uranium-one employing research reactor fuel technology (either uranium-aluminum alloy or uranium aluminide-aluminum dispersion) and the other using a thin deposit of UO 2 on the inside of a stainless steel (SST) tube. This paper summarizes progress in irradiation testing of targets based on LEU uranium metal foils. Several targets of this type have been irradiated in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor operating at 22.5 MW

  1. Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [es

  2. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [es

  3. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [es

  4. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [es

  5. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 June 2012 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011 [es

  6. Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

  7. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 June 2012 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011 [fr

  8. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 21 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008

  9. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [fr

  10. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

  11. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 31 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012

  12. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009

  13. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010

  14. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006

  15. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [es

  16. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 24 August 2010 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009 [fr

  17. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The Director General has received a note verbale dated 16 September 2011 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010 [fr

  18. Communication Received from France Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 17 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of France, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006 [fr

  19. Communication Received from France Concerning Its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 May 2013 from the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Switzerland, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as 'Guidelines') and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for its holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012 [fr

  20. Machining of uranium and uranium alloys

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris, T.O.

    1981-01-01

    Uranium and uranium alloys can be readily machined by conventional methods in the standard machine shop when proper safety and operating techniques are used. Material properties that affect machining processes and recommended machining parameters are discussed. Safety procedures and precautions necessary in machining uranium and uranium alloys are also covered. 30 figures