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Sample records for handled wipp canisters

  1. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J.F. Beesley

    2005-04-21

    The purpose of this facility description document (FDD) is to establish requirements and associated bases that drive the design of the Canister Handling Facility (CHF), which will allow the design effort to proceed to license application. This FDD will be revised at strategic points as the design matures. This FDD identifies the requirements and describes the facility design, as it currently exists, with emphasis on attributes of the design provided to meet the requirements. This FDD is an engineering tool for design control; accordingly, the primary audience and users are design engineers. This FDD is part of an iterative design process. It leads the design process with regard to the flowdown of upper tier requirements onto the facility. Knowledge of these requirements is essential in performing the design process. The FDD follows the design with regard to the description of the facility. The description provided in this FDD reflects the current results of the design process.

  2. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beesley. J.F.

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this facility description document (FDD) is to establish requirements and associated bases that drive the design of the Canister Handling Facility (CHF), which will allow the design effort to proceed to license application. This FDD will be revised at strategic points as the design matures. This FDD identifies the requirements and describes the facility design, as it currently exists, with emphasis on attributes of the design provided to meet the requirements. This FDD is an engineering tool for design control; accordingly, the primary audience and users are design engineers. This FDD is part of an iterative design process. It leads the design process with regard to the flowdown of upper tier requirements onto the facility. Knowledge of these requirements is essential in performing the design process. The FDD follows the design with regard to the description of the facility. The description provided in this FDD reflects the current results of the design process

  3. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-04-07

    This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for

  4. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-01-01

    This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the CHF and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility

  5. Preliminary design for spent fuel canister handling systems in a canister transfer and installation vehicle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wendelin, T.; Suikki, M.

    2008-12-01

    The report presents a spent fuel canister transfer and installation vehicle. The vehicle is used for carrying the fuel canister into a disposal tunnel and installing it into a deposition hole. The report outlines basic requirements and a design for canister handling equipment used in a canister transfer and installation vehicle, a description regarding the operation and maintenance of the equipment, as well as a cost estimate. Specific vehicles will be manufactured for all canister types in order to minimize the height of the disposal tunnels. This report is only focused on a transfer and installation vehicle for OL1-2 fuel canisters. Detailed designing and selection of final components have not yet been carried out. The report also describes the vehicle's requirements for the structures of a repository system, as well as actions in possible malfunction or fault situations. The spent fuel canister is brought from an encapsulation plant by a canister lift down to the repository level. The fuel canister is driven from the canister lift by an automated guided vehicle onto a canister hoist at a canister loading station. The canister transfer and installation vehicle is waiting for the canister with its radiation shield in an upright position above the canister hoist. The hoist carries the canister upward until the vehicle's own lifting means grab hold of the canister and raise it up into the vehicle's radiation shield. This is followed by turning the radiation shield to a transport position and by closing it in a radiation-proof manner against a rear radiation shield. The vehicle is driven along the central tunnel into the disposal tunnel and parked on top of the deposition hole. The vehicle's radiation shield is turned to the upright position and the canister is lowered with the vehicle's hydraulic winches into a bentonite-lined deposition hole. The radiation shield is turned back to the transport position and the vehicle can be driven out of the disposal tunnel

  6. The remote handling of canisters containing nuclear waste in glass at the Savannah River Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Callan, J.E.

    1986-01-01

    The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is a complete production area being constructed at the Savannah River Plant for the immobilization of nuclear waste in glass. The remote handling of canisters filled with nuclear waste in glass is an essential part of the process of the DWPF at the Savannah River Plant. The canisters are filled with nuclear waste containing up to 235,000 curies of radioactivity. Handling and movement of these canisters must be accomplished remotely since they radiate up to 5000 R/h. Within the Vitrification Building during filling, cleaning, and sealing, canisters are moved using standard cranes and trolleys and a specially designed grapple. During transportation to the Glass Waste Storage Building, a one-of-a-kind, specially designed Shielded Canister Transporter (SCT) is used. 8 figs

  7. Remote handling of canisters containing nuclear waste in glass at the Savannah River Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Callan, J.E.

    1986-01-01

    The Defense Waste Processing Facility is being constructed at the Savannah River Plant at a cost of $870 million to immobilize the defense high-level radioactive waste. This radioactive waste is being added to borosilicate glass for later disposal in a federal repository. The borosilicate glass is poured into stainless steel canisters for storage. These canisters must be handled remotely because of their high radioactivity, up to 5000 R/h. After the glass has been poured into the canister which will be temporarily sealed, it is transferred to a decontamination cell and decontaminated. The canister is then transferred to the weld cell where a permanent cap is welded into place. The canisters must then be transported from the processing building to a storage vault on the plant until the federal repository is available. A shielded canister transporter (SCT) has been designed and constructed for this purpose. The design of the SCT vehicle allows the safe transport of a highly radioactive canister containing borosilicate glass weighing 2300 kg with a radiation level up to 5000 R/h from one building to another. The design provides shielding for the operator in the cab of the vehicle to be below 0.5 rem/h. The SCT may also be used to load the final shipping cask when the federal repository is ready to receive the canisters

  8. Thermal studies of the canister staging pit in a hypothetical Yucca Mountain canister handling facility using computational fluid dynamics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soltani, Mehdi; Barringer, Chris; Bues, Timothy T. de

    2007-01-01

    The proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste storage site will contain facilities for preparing the radioactive waste canisters for burial. A previous facility design considered was the Canister Handling Facility Staging Pit. This design is no longer used, but its thermal evaluation is typical of such facilities. Structural concrete can be adversely affected by the heat from radioactive decay. Consequently, facilities must have heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems for cooling. Concrete temperatures are a function of conductive, convective and radiative heat transfer. The prediction of concrete temperatures under such complex conditions can only be adequately handled by computational fluid dynamics (CFD). The objective of the CFD analysis was to predict concrete temperatures under normal and off-normal conditions. Normal operation assumed steady state conditions with constant HVAC flow and temperatures. However, off-normal operation was an unsteady scenario which assumed a total HVAC failure for a period of 30 days. This scenario was particularly complex in that the concrete temperatures would gradually rise, and air flows would be buoyancy driven. The CFD analysis concluded that concrete wall temperatures would be at or below the maximum temperature limits in both the normal and off-normal scenarios. While this analysis was specific to a facility design that is no longer used, it demonstrates that such facilities are reasonably expected to have satisfactory thermal performance. (author)

  9. Potential problems from shipment of high-curie content contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste to WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.; Channell, J.K.

    1983-08-01

    There are about 1000 drums of contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) wastes containing more than 100 Ci/drum of Pu-238 that are stored at the Savannah River Plant and at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Studies performed at DOE laboratories have shown that large quantities of gases are generated in stored drums containing 100 Ci of 238 Pu. Concentrations of hydrogen gas in the void space of the drums are often found to be high enough to be explosive. None of the analyses in the DOE WIPP Final Environmental Impact Statement, Safety Analysis Report, and Preliminary Transportation Analysis have considered the possibility that the generation of hydrogen gas by radiolysis may create an explosive or flammable hazard that could increase the frequency and severity of accidental releases of radionuclides during transportation or handling. These high 238 Pu concentration containers would also increase the estimated doses received by individuals and populations from transportation, WIPP site operations, and human intrusion scenarios even if the possibility of gas-enhanced releases is ignored. The WIPP Project Office has evaluated this effect on WIPP site operations and is suggesting a maximum limit of 140 239 Pu equivalent curies (P-Ci) per drum so that postulated accidental off-site doses will not be larger than those listed in the FEIS. The TRUPACT container, which is being designed for the transportation of CH-TRU wastes to WIPP, does not appear to meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations requiring double containment for the transportation of plutonium in quantities >20 Ci. A 20 alpha Ci/shipment limit would require about 200,000 shipments for the 4 million curies of alpha emitters slated for WIPP

  10. Analysis of Welding Joint on Handling High Level Waste-Glass Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herlan Martono; Aisyah; Wati

    2007-01-01

    The analysis of welding joint of stainless steel austenitic AISI 304 for canister material has been studied. At the handling of waste-glass canister from melter below to interim storage, there is a step of welding of canister lid. Welding quality must be kept in a good condition, in order there is no gas out pass welding pores and canister be able to lift by crane. Two part of stainless steel plate in dimension (200 x 125 x 3) mm was jointed by welding. Welding was conducted by TIG machine with protection gas is argon. Electric current were conducted for welding were 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, and 140 A. Welded plates were cut with dimension according to JIS 3121 standard for tensile strength test. Hardness test in welding zone, HAZ, and plate were conducted by Vickers. Analysis of microstructure by optic microscope. The increasing of electric current at the welding, increasing of tensile strength of welding yields. The best quality welding yields using electric current was 110 A. At the welding with electric current more than 110 A, the electric current influence towards plate quality, so that decreasing of stainless steel plate quality and breaking at the plate. Tensile strength of stainless steel plate welding yields in requirement conditions according to application in canister transportation is 0.24 kg/mm 2 . (author)

  11. Structural performance of a multipurpose canister shell for HLNW under normal handling conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladkany, S.G.; Rajagopalan, R.

    1994-01-01

    A Multipurpose Canister (MPC) is analyzed for critical stresses that occur during normal handling conditions and accidental scenarios. Linear and Non-linear Finite Element Analysis is performed and the stresses at various critical locations in the MPC and its weldments are studied extensively. Progressive failure analysis of the MPC's groove and fillet welds, is presented. The structural response of the MPC to dynamic lifting loads, to loads resulting from an accidental slippage of a crane cable carrying the MPC, and from the impact between two canisters, is evaluated. Nonlinear structural analysis is used in the evaluation of the local buckling and the ultimate failure phenomena in the shell when the steel is in the strain hardening state during impact. Results make a case for increasing the thickness of the shell and all the welds

  12. As-Built Verification Plan Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building MCO Handling Machine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SWENSON, C.E.

    2000-01-01

    This as-built verification plan outlines the methodology and responsibilities that will be implemented during the as-built field verification activity for the Canister Storage Building (CSB) MCO HANDLING MACHINE (MHM). This as-built verification plan covers THE ELECTRICAL PORTION of the CONSTRUCTION PERFORMED BY POWER CITY UNDER CONTRACT TO MOWAT. The as-built verifications will be performed in accordance Administrative Procedure AP 6-012-00, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project As-Built Verification Plan Development Process, revision I. The results of the verification walkdown will be documented in a verification walkdown completion package, approved by the Design Authority (DA), and maintained in the CSB project files

  13. Rustler Formation in the waste handling and exhaust shafts, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holt, R.M.; Powers, D.W.

    1987-01-01

    The Permian Rustler Formation was recently examined in detail in two shafts at the WIPP site: the waste handling shaft (waste shaft) and the exhaust shaft. Fresh exposures of the Rustler in the shafts exhibited abundant primary sedimentary structures. The abundance of primary sedimentary structures observed in the shafts is unequaled in previously described sections. Data are reported here in their stratigraphic context as an initial basis for evaluation of depositional environments of the Rustler and reevaluating the role of dissolution in the formation of the Rustler. 10 refs

  14. Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine - Independent Review of Seismic Structural Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SWENSON, C.E.

    2000-01-01

    The following separate reports and correspondence pertains to the independent review of the seismic analysis. The original analysis was performed by GEC-Alsthom Engineering Systems Limited (GEC-ESL) under subcontract to Foster-Wheeler Environmental Corporation (FWEC) who was the prime integration contractor to the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project for the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). The original analysis was performed to the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) response spectra using 5% damping as required in specification, HNF-S-0468 for the 90% Design Report in June 1997. The independent review was performed by Fluor-Daniel (Irvine) under a separate task from their scope as Architect-Engineer of the Canister Storage Building (CSB) in 1997. The comments were issued in April 1998. Later in 1997, the response spectra of the Canister Storage Building (CSB) was revised according to a new soil-structure interaction analysis and accordingly revised the response spectra for the MHM and utilized 7% damping in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOG-1, ''Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder).'' The analysis was re-performed to check critical areas but because manufacturing was underway, designs were not altered unless necessary. FWEC responded to SNF Project correspondence on the review comments in two separate letters enclosed. The dispositions were reviewed and accepted. Attached are supplier source surveillance reports on the procedures and process by the engineering group performing the analysis and structural design. All calculation and analysis results are contained in the MHM Final Design Report which is part of the Vendor Information File 50100. Subsequent to the MHM supplier engineering analysis, there was a separate analyses for nuclear safety accident concerns that used the electronic input data files provided by FWEC/GEC-ESL and are contained in document SNF-6248

  15. FEMA and RAM Analysis for the Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SWENSON, C.E.

    2000-01-01

    The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and the Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability Analysis performed for the Multi-Canister Overpack Handling Machine (MHM) has shown that the current design provides for a safe system, but the reliability of the system (primarily due to the complexity of the interlocks and permissive controls) is relatively low. No specific failure modes were identified where significant consequences to the public occurred, or where significant impact to nearby workers should be expected. The overall reliability calculation for the MHM shows a 98.1 percent probability of operating for eight hours without failure, and an availability of the MHM of 90 percent. The majority of the reliability issues are found in the interlocks and controls. The availability of appropriate spare parts and maintenance personnel, coupled with well written operating procedures, will play a more important role in successful mission completion for the MHM than other less complicated systems

  16. Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine Independent Review of Seismic Structural Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    SWENSON, C.E.

    2000-09-22

    The following separate reports and correspondence pertains to the independent review of the seismic analysis. The original analysis was performed by GEC-Alsthom Engineering Systems Limited (GEC-ESL) under subcontract to Foster-Wheeler Environmental Corporation (FWEC) who was the prime integration contractor to the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project for the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). The original analysis was performed to the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) response spectra using 5% damping as required in specification, HNF-S-0468 for the 90% Design Report in June 1997. The independent review was performed by Fluor-Daniel (Irvine) under a separate task from their scope as Architect-Engineer of the Canister Storage Building (CSB) in 1997. The comments were issued in April 1998. Later in 1997, the response spectra of the Canister Storage Building (CSB) was revised according to a new soil-structure interaction analysis and accordingly revised the response spectra for the MHM and utilized 7% damping in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOG-1, ''Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder).'' The analysis was re-performed to check critical areas but because manufacturing was underway, designs were not altered unless necessary. FWEC responded to SNF Project correspondence on the review comments in two separate letters enclosed. The dispositions were reviewed and accepted. Attached are supplier source surveillance reports on the procedures and process by the engineering group performing the analysis and structural design. All calculation and analysis results are contained in the MHM Final Design Report which is part of the Vendor Information File 50100. Subsequent to the MHM supplier engineering analysis, there was a separate analyses for nuclear safety accident concerns that used the electronic input data files provided by FWEC/GEC-ESL and are contained in

  17. TMI-2 [Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station] fuel canister and core sample handling equipment used in INEL hot cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McConnell, J.W. Jr.; Shurtliff, W.T.; Lynch, R.J.; Croft, K.M.; Whitmill, L.J.; Allen, S.M.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes the specialized remote handling equipment developed and used at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to handle samples obtained from the core of the damaged Unit 2 reactor at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station (TM-2). Samples of the core were removed, placed in TMI-2 fuel canisters, and transported to the INEL. Those samples will be examined as part of the analysis of the TMI-2 accident. The equipment described herein was designed for removing sample materials from the fuel canisters, assisting with initial examination, and processing samples in preparation for detailed examinations. The more complex equipment used microprocessor remote controls with electric motor drives providing the required force and motion capabilities. The remaining components were unpowered and manipulator assisted

  18. Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine Trolley Seismic Uplift Constraint Design Loads

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SWENSON, C.E.

    2000-01-01

    The MCO Handling Machine (MHM) trolley moves along the top of the MHM bridge girders on east-west oriented rails. To prevent trolley wheel uplift during a seismic event, passive uplift constraints are provided as shown in Figure 1-1. North-south trolley wheel movement is prevented by flanges on the trolley wheels. When the MHM is positioned over a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) storage tube, east-west seismic restraints are activated to prevent trolley movement during MCO handling. The active seismic constraints consist of a plunger, which is inserted into slots positioned along the tracks as shown in Figure 1-1. When the MHM trolley is moving between storage tube positions, the active seismic restraints are not engaged. The MHM has been designed and analyzed in accordance with ASME NOG-1-1995. The ALSTHOM seismic analysis (Reference 3) reported seismic uplift restraint loading and EDERER performed corresponding structural calculations. The ALSTHOM and EDERER calculations were performed with the east-west seismic restraints activated and the uplift restraints experiencing only vertical loading. In support of development of the CSB Safety Analysis Report (SAR), an evaluation of the MHM seismic response was requested for the case where the east-west trolley restraints are not engaged. For this case, the associated trolley movements would result in east-west lateral loads on the uplift constraints due to friction, as shown in Figure 1-2. During preliminary evaluations, questions were raised as to whether the EDERER calculations considered the latest ALSTHOM seismic analysis loads (See NCR No. 00-SNFP-0008, Reference 5). Further evaluation led to the conclusion that the EDERER calculations used appropriate vertical loading, but the uplift restraints would need to be re-analyzed and modified to account for lateral loading. The disposition of NCR 00-SNFP-0008 will track the redesign and modification effort. The purpose of this calculation is to establish bounding seismic

  19. On the road to WIPP: Or remote packaging of transuranic waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ledbetter, J.M.; Field, L.R.

    1994-01-01

    At the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Hot Cell facility, highly productive programs in reactor research spanning three decades have generated appreciable quantities of legacy waste. Hot cell capability had become virtually useless due to the storage of this waste. As a result of concentrated efforts by LANL staff, in cooperation with Westinghouse Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a solution was arrived at that allowed the facility to become productive once again. Equipment has been designed and fabricated to remotely handle 55-gal. waste drums, load waste canisters, perform canister weld closure, leak test welds, grapple the waste canister and transport the canister to an interim storage site. It is our contention that the technology and acquired equipment produced from this effort should be used to further benefit other DOE sites

  20. Evaluation of Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine Uplift Restraint for a Seismic Event During Repositioning Operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SWENSON, C.E.

    2000-01-01

    Insertion of the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) assemblies into the Canister Storage Building (CSB) storage tubes involves the use of the MCO Handling Machine (MHM). During MCO storage tube insertion operations, inadvertent movement of the MHM is prevented by engaging seismic restraints (''active restraints'') located adjacent to both the bridge and trolley wheels. During MHM repositioning operations, the active restraints are not engaged. When the active seismic restraints are not engaged, the only functioning seismic restraints are non-engageable (''passive'') wheel uplift restraints which function only if the wheel uplift is sufficient to close the nominal 0.5-inch gap at the uplift restraint interface. The MHM was designed and analyzed in accordance with ASME NOG-1-1995. The ALSTHOM seismic analysis reported seismic loads on the MHM uplift restraints and EDERER performed corresponding structural calculations to demonstrate structural adequacy of the seismic uplift restraint hardware. The ALSTHOM and EDERER calculations were performed for a parked MHM with the active seismic restraints engaged, resulting in uplift restraint loading only in the vertical direction. In support of development of the CSB Safety Analysis Report (SAR), an evaluation of the MHM seismic response was requested for the case where the active seismic restraints are not engaged. If a seismic event occurs during MHM repositioning operations, a moving contact at a seismic uplift restraint would introduce a friction load on the restraint in the direction of the movement. These potential horizontal friction loads on the uplift restraints were not included in the existing restraint hardware design calculations. One of the purposes of the current evaluation is to address the structural adequacy of the MHM seismic uplift restraints with the addition of the horizontal friction associated with MHM repositioning movements

  1. Shielded Canister Transporter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eidem, G.G. Jr.; Fages, R.

    1993-01-01

    The Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) will produce canisters filled with high-level radioactive waste immobilized in borosilicate glass. This report discusses a Shielded Canister Transporter (SCT) which will provide the means for safe transportation and handling of the canisters from the Vitrification Building to the Canister Storage Building (CSB). The stainless steel canisters are 0.61 meters in diameter, 3.0 meters tall, and weigh approximately 2,135 kilograms, with a maximum exterior surface dose rate of 90,000 R/hr. The canisters are placed into storage tubes to a maximum of three tall (two for overpack canisters) with an impact limiter placed at the tube bottom and between each canister. A floor plug seals the top of the storage tube at the operating floor level of the CSB

  2. CANISTER TRANSFER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    B. Gorpani

    2000-01-01

    The Canister Transfer System receives transportation casks containing large and small disposable canisters, unloads the canisters from the casks, stores the canisters as required, loads them into disposal containers (DCs), and prepares the empty casks for re-shipment. Cask unloading begins with cask inspection, sampling, and lid bolt removal operations. The cask lids are removed and the canisters are unloaded. Small canisters are loaded directly into a DC, or are stored until enough canisters are available to fill a DC. Large canisters are loaded directly into a DC. Transportation casks and related components are decontaminated as required, and empty casks are prepared for re-shipment. One independent, remotely operated canister transfer line is provided in the Waste Handling Building System. The canister transfer line consists of a Cask Transport System, Cask Preparation System, Canister Handling System, Disposal Container Transport System, an off-normal canister handling cell with a transfer tunnel connecting the two cells, and Control and Tracking System. The Canister Transfer System operating sequence begins with moving transportation casks to the cask preparation area with the Cask Transport System. The Cask Preparation System prepares the cask for unloading and consists of cask preparation manipulator, cask inspection and sampling equipment, and decontamination equipment. The Canister Handling System unloads the canister(s) and places them into a DC. Handling equipment consists of a bridge crane hoist,; DC--loading manipulator, lifting fixtures, and small canister staging racks. Once the cask has been unloaded, the Cask Preparation System decontaminates the cask exterior and returns it to the Carrier/Cask Handling System via the Cask Transport System. After the; DC--is fully loaded, the Disposal Container Transport System moves the; DC--to the Disposal Container Handling System for welding. To handle off-normal canisters, a separate off-normal canister

  3. Canister Transfer System Description Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Canister Transfer System receives transportation casks containing large and small disposable canisters, unloads the canisters from the casks, stores the canisters as required, loads them into disposal containers (DCs), and prepares the empty casks for re-shipment. Cask unloading begins with cask inspection, sampling, and lid bolt removal operations. The cask lids are removed and the canisters are unloaded. Small canisters are loaded directly into a DC, or are stored until enough canisters are available to fill a DC. Large canisters are loaded directly into a DC. Transportation casks and related components are decontaminated as required, and empty casks are prepared for re-shipment. One independent, remotely operated canister transfer line is provided in the Waste Handling Building System. The canister transfer line consists of a Cask Transport System, Cask Preparation System, Canister Handling System, Disposal Container Transport System, an off-normal canister handling cell with a transfer tunnel connecting the two cells, and Control and Tracking System. The Canister Transfer System operating sequence begins with moving transportation casks to the cask preparation area with the Cask Transport System. The Cask Preparation System prepares the cask for unloading and consists of cask preparation manipulator, cask inspection and sampling equipment, and decontamination equipment. The Canister Handling System unloads the canister(s) and places them into a DC. Handling equipment consists of a bridge crane/hoist, DC loading manipulator, lifting fixtures, and small canister staging racks. Once the cask has been unloaded, the Cask Preparation System decontaminates the cask exterior and returns it to the Carrier/Cask Handling System via the Cask Transport System. After the DC is fully loaded, the Disposal Container Transport System moves the DC to the Disposal Container Handling System for welding. To handle off-normal canisters, a separate off-normal canister handling

  4. Determination of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) management and institutional requirements documents for contact-handled (CH) critical systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    This document lists the critical requirements documents applicable to the receipt of contact-handled waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. It also describes the processes used to determine the applicability of each document. This analysis is based on the applicable documents that were in effect in the February 1988 time frame. 2 refs

  5. 9+ years of disposal experience at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rempe, Norbert T.; Nelson, Roger A.

    2008-01-01

    With almost a decade of operating experience, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) has established an enviable record by clearly demonstrating that a deep geologic repository for unconditioned radioactive waste in rock salt can be operated safely and in compliance with very complex regulations. WIPP has disposed of contact-handled transuranic (TRU) waste since 1999 and remote-handled TRU waste since 2007. Emplacement methods range from directly stacking unshielded 0.21-4.5 m 3 containers inside disposal rooms to remotely inserting highly radioactive 0.89 m 3 canisters into horizontally drilled holes (shield plugs placed in front of canisters protect workers inside active disposal rooms). More than 100 000 waste containers have been emplaced, and one-third of WIPP's authorized repository capacity of 175,000 m 3 has already been consumed. Principal surface operations are conducted in the waste handling building, which is divided into CH and RH waste handling areas. Four vertical shafts extend from the surface to the disposal horizon, 655 m below the surface in a 1000 m thick sequence of Permian bedded salt. The waste disposal area of about 0.5 km 2 is divided into ten panels, each consisting of seven rooms. Vertical closure (creep) rates in disposal rooms range up to 10 cm per year. While one panel is being filled with waste, the next one is being mined. Mined salt is raised to the surface in the salt shaft, and waste is lowered down the waste shaft. Both of these shafts also serve as principal access for personnel and materials. Underground ventilation is divided into separate flow paths, allowing simultaneous mining and disposal. A filter building near the exhaust shaft provides the capability to filter the exhaust air (in reduced ventilation mode) through HEPA filters before release to the atmosphere. WIPP operations have not exposed employees or the public to radiation doses beyond natural background variability. They consistently meet or exceed regulatory

  6. Preparing, Loading and Shipping Irradiated Metals in Canisters Classified as Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) From Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to the Nevada Test Site (NTS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland, B.C.; Moore, T.D.

    2006-01-01

    Irradiated metals, classified as remote-handled low-level waste generated at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, were containerised in various sized canisters for long-term storage. The legacy waste canisters were placed in below-grade wells located at the 7827 Facility until a pathway for final disposal at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) could be identified and approved. Once the pathway was approved, WESKEM, LLC was selected by Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC to prepare, load, and ship these canisters from ORNL to the NTS. This paper details some of the technical challenges encountered during the retrieval process and solutions implemented to ensure the waste was safely and efficiently over-packed and shipped for final disposal. The technical challenges detailed in this paper include: 1) how to best perform canister/lanyard pre-lift inspections since some canisters had not been moved in ∼10 years, so deterioration was a concern; 2) replacing or removing damaged canister lanyards; 3) correcting a mis-cut waste canister lanyard resulting in a shielded overpack lid not seating properly; 4) retrieving a stuck canister; and 5) developing a path forward after an overstrained lanyard failed causing a well shield plug to fall and come in contact with a waste canister. Several of these methods can serve as positive lessons learned for other projects encountering similar situations. (authors)

  7. Simulation of Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine Impact with Cask and MCO During Insertion into the Transfer Pit (FDT-137)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2000-04-13

    The K-Basin Cask and Transportation System will be used for safely packaging and transporting approximately 2,100 metric tons of unprocessed, spent nuclear fuel from the 105 K East and K West Basins to the 200 E Area Canister Storage Building (CSB). Portions of the system will also be used for drying the spent fuel under cold vacuum conditions prior to placement in interim storage. The spent nuclear fuel is currently stored underwater in the two K-Basins. The K-Basins loadout pit is the area selected for loading spent nuclear fuel into the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) which in turn is located within the transportation cask. This Cask/MCO unit is secured.in the pit with a pail load out structure whose primary function is lo suspend and support the Cask/MCO unit at.the desired elevations and to protect the unit from the contaminated K-Basin water. The fuel elements will be placed in special baskets and stacked in the MCO that have been previously placed in the cask. The casks will be removed from the K Basin load out areas and taken to the cold vacuum drying station. Then the cask will be prepared for transportation to the CSB. The shipments will occur exclusively on the Hanford Site between K-Basins and the CSB. Travel will be by road with one cask per trailer. At the CSB receiving area the cask will be removed from the trailer. A gantry crane will then move the cask over to the transfer pit and load the cask into the transfer pit. From the transfer pit the MCO will be removed from the cask by the MCO Handling Machine (MHM). The MHM will move the MCO from the transfer pit to a canister storage tube in the CSB. MCOs will be piled two high in each canister Storage tube.

  8. Simulation of Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine Impact with Cask and MCO During Insertion into the Transfer Pit (FDT-137)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2000-01-01

    The K-Basin Cask and Transportation System will be used for safely packaging and transporting approximately 2,100 metric tons of unprocessed, spent nuclear fuel from the 105 K East and K West Basins to the 200 E Area Canister Storage Building (CSB). Portions of the system will also be used for drying the spent fuel under cold vacuum conditions prior to placement in interim storage. The spent nuclear fuel is currently stored underwater in the two K-Basins. The K-Basins loadout pit is the area selected for loading spent nuclear fuel into the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) which in turn is located within the transportation cask. This Cask/MCO unit is secured.in the pit with a pail load out structure whose primary function is lo suspend and support the Cask/MCO unit at.the desired elevations and to protect the unit from the contaminated K-Basin water. The fuel elements will be placed in special baskets and stacked in the MCO that have been previously placed in the cask. The casks will be removed from the K Basin load out areas and taken to the cold vacuum drying station. Then the cask will be prepared for transportation to the CSB. The shipments will occur exclusively on the Hanford Site between K-Basins and the CSB. Travel will be by road with one cask per trailer. At the CSB receiving area the cask will be removed from the trailer. A gantry crane will then move the cask over to the transfer pit and load the cask into the transfer pit. From the transfer pit the MCO will be removed from the cask by the MCO Handling Machine (MHM). The MHM will move the MCO from the transfer pit to a canister storage tube in the CSB. MCOs will be piled two high in each canister Storage tube

  9. HLW Canister and Can-In-Canister Drop Calculation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    H. Marr

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this calculation is to evaluate the structural response of the standard high-level waste (HLW) canister and the HLW canister containing the cans of immobilized plutonium (''can-in-canister'' throughout this document) to the drop event during the handling operation. The objective of the calculation is to provide the structure parameter information to support the canister design and the waste handling facility design. Finite element solution is performed using the commercially available ANSYS Version (V) 5.4 finite element code. Two-dimensional (2-D) axisymmetric and three-dimensional (3-D) finite element representations for the standard HLW canister and the can-in-canister are developed and analyzed using the dynamic solver

  10. Evaluation of the suitability of the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.; Channell, J.K.; Chaturvedi, L.; Little, M.S.; Rehfeldt, K.; Spiegler, P.

    1983-05-01

    Determination of the suitability of the site for WIPP is only the first major phase in the evaluation of the radiological impact of the repository on the public health and safety. The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) will continue to independently review the design of the facility, the operational procedures, the criteria for packaging and shipment of the waste, the plans, procedures and results of the WIPP experiments, emergency preparedness, adherence to EPA and pertinent NRC regulations, and other important features of the project. EEG has concluded from existing evidence that the Los Medanos site for the WIPP project has been characterized in sufficient detail to warrant confidence in the validation of the site for the permanent emplacement of approximately 6 million cubic feet of defense transuranic waste. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the maximum surface dose rate for the unshielded remote-handled transuranic waste canisters will be 100 rem/hr with a maximum radionuclide concentration of 23 Ci/liter. The Site and Preliminary Design Validation program, through the drilling of two shafts to the selected repository level at 2160 ft below the surface and excavation of about 9000 ft of tunnels, has confirmed the interpretations made about the subsurface geological conditions at the site. For an assessment of the potential radiation effects of the nuclear waste repository on the public health and safety, it is necessary to understand the regional geological and hydrological setting. Much work has been done to understand these conditions and to address several specific issues which have arisen as a result of such studies. However, it is almost inevitable that some questions remain unanswered at a given time in the decision-making process. EEG has identified work which still needs to be done at the Los Medanos site in order to improve confidence in the worst case scenario models of possible breaches of the repository

  11. WIPP Pecos Management Reports

    Science.gov (United States)

    These reviews and evaluations compiled by Pecos Management Services, Inc. encompass the current and future WIPP activities in the program areas of TRU waste characterization, transportation, and disposal.

  12. WIPP: why are we waiting?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barker, K.

    1991-01-01

    Rooms cut into salt almost half a mile below the state of New Mexico could become the United States' first underground repository for defence generated transuranic waste. The Department of Energy (DoE) was hoping to ship the first waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) this August, but the $800 million project has faced bureaucratic delays and a definite date has yet to be set. The state of New Mexico established the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) to perform an independent technical evaluation of the project with respect to potential radiation exposure for people or environmental degradation in the area around the WIPP site. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has two objectives: to perform scientific investigations into the behaviour of salt rock and its interactions with transuranic and mixed waste under a variety of conditions; and to demonstrate that transuranic waste can be safely handled, transported and stored in a geologic repository. The EEG is unhappy about proposed in-repository tests to assess the long term performance of WIPP. (author)

  13. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum J. Support equipment in the high level waste facility of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rieb, M.J.; Foley, R.S.

    1977-04-01

    The Aerojet Manufacturing Company (AMCO) received a contract in November 1976 to provide consulting services in assisting Holmes and Narver, Incorporated with the conceptual designs, cost estimates, and schedules of equipment used to handle waste casks, to decontaminate waste canisters and to overpack damaged or highly contaminated waste canisters for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Also, the layout of the hot cell in which canister handling, overpack and decontamination takes place was to be reviewed along with the time and motion study of the cell operations. This report has been prepared to present the results of the efforts and contains all technical and planning data developed during the program. The contents of this report are presented in three sections: (1) comments on the existing design criteria, equipment conceptual designs, hot cell design and time and motion studies of projected hot cell activities; (2) design descriptions of the equipment concepts and justification for varying from the existing concept (if a variation occurred). Drawings of each concept are provided in Appendix A. These design descriptions and drawings were used as the basis for the cost estimates; and (3) schedule projections and cost estimates for the equipment described in Section 2. Detail cost estimate backup data is provided in Appendix B

  14. Quarter-scale modeling of room convergence effects on CH [contact-handled] TRU drum waste emplacements using WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant] reference design geometries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VandeKraats, J.

    1987-11-01

    This study investigates the effect of horizontal room convergence on CH waste packages emplaced in the WIPP Reference Design geometry (rooms 13 feet high by 33 feet wide, with minus 3/8 inch screened backfill emplaced over and around the waste packages) as a function of time. Based on two tests, predictions were made with regard to full-scale 6-packs emplaced in the Reference Design geometry. These are that load will be transmitted completely through the stack within the first five years after waste emplacement and all drums in all 6-packs will be affected; that virtually all drums will show some deformation eight years after emplacement; that some drums may breach before the eighth year after emplacement has elapsed; and that based on criteria developed during testing, it is predicted that 1% of the drums emplaced will be breached after 8 years and, after 15 years, approximately 12% of the drums are predicted to be breached. 8 refs., 41 figs., 3 tabs

  15. WIPP fire hazards and risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    The purpose of this analysis was to conduct a fire hazards risk analysis of the Transuranic (TRU) contact-handled waste receipt, emplacement, and disposal activities at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The technical bases and safety envelope for these operations are defined in the approved WIPP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Although the safety documentation for the initial phase of the Test Program, the dry bin scale tests, has not yet been approved by the Department of Energy (DOE), reviews of the draft to date, including those by the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety (ACNFS), have concluded that the dry bin scale tests present no significant risks in excess of those estimated in the approved WIPP FSAR. It is the opinion of the authors and reviewers of this analysis, based on sound engineering judgment and knowledge of the WIPP operations, that a Fire Hazards and Risk Analysis specific to the dry bin scale test program is not warranted prior to first waste receipt. This conclusion is further supported by the risk analysis presented in this document which demonstrates the level of risk to WIPP operations posed by fire to be extremely low. 15 refs., 41 figs., 48 tabs

  16. WIPP/SRL Program - characterization of samples for burial in WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holtzscheiter, R.C.; Wicks, G.G.

    1984-01-01

    The laboratory studies described in this report characterize the performance and homogeneity of waste glass from a 2-ft-dia glass slice taken from a full-scale 2 ft by 10 ft canister filled with glass at TNX. The leaching performance of glass samples extracted from the slice was determined as a function of radial position and will be used in support of existing programs. The waste glass produced at TNX and used for the burial tests in WIPP was very homogeneous. The extent of glass leaching in brine (using standard MCC-1 leach tests and based on boron extraction) was 15X less than that of leaching in deionized water

  17. WIPP Status and Plans - 2013 - 13379

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nelson, R.A.; Franco, J. [U.S. Department of Energy, PO Box 3090, Carlsbad, NM 88220 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    An up-to-date look at the many aspects of America's only deep geologic long-lived radioactive waste repository is presented in this paper. WIPP's mission includes coordination of all Department of Energy (DOE) sites to prepare, package and characterize defense transuranic waste for final shipment and emplacement in WIPP. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is completing its 14. year of operations. Five of the ten planned disposal panels have been filled and sealed from ventilation, with about half of the legislated volume capacity consumed. About 11,000 shipments have been made successfully, traveling more than 40 million kilometers across the nation's highways. A fleet of new Type B shipping packages, the TRUPACT-III, has been added to the transportation capability, with an ongoing campaign to de-inventory large waste items from the Savannah River Site, while minimizing size reduction and repackaging. A new shipping and emplacement method for remote handled waste in shielded containers has been approved for disposal, and will significantly improve operational efficiency. Remote handled waste packaged in these shielded containers will be shipped, handled and emplaced as contact handled waste. Also described is a new criticality control over-pack container, which will improve efficiency when shipping high fissile-content waste streams consisting of Special Nuclear Material declared as waste from nuclear weapons sites. The paper describes the importance of the infrastructure at WIPP to ensure disposal site availability for defense transuranic waste sites across the weapons complex. With the facility reaching its original design lifetime, there are many infrastructure maintenance and improvements being planned and performed. (authors)

  18. Defense Remote Handled Transuranic Waste Cost/Schedule Optimization Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierce, G.D.; Wolaver, R.W.; Carson, P.H.

    1986-11-01

    The purpose of this study is to provide the DOE information with which it can establish the most efficient program for the long management and disposal, in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), of remote handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste. To fulfill this purpose, a comprehensive review of waste characteristics, existing and projected waste inventories, processing and transportation options, and WIPP requirements was made. Cost differences between waste management alternatives were analyzed and compared to an established baseline. The result of this study is an information package that DOE can use as the basis for policy decisions. As part of this study, a comprehensive list of alternatives for each element of the baseline was developed and reviewed with the sites. The principle conclusions of the study follow. A single processing facility for RH TRU waste is both necessary and sufficient. The RH TRU processing facility should be located at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Shielding of RH TRU to contact handled levels is not an economic alternative in general, but is an acceptable alternative for specific waste streams. Compaction is only cost effective at the ORNL processing facility, with a possible exception at Hanford for small compaction of paint cans of newly generated glovebox waste. It is more cost effective to ship certified waste to WIPP in 55-gal drums than in canisters, assuming a suitable drum cask becomes available. Some waste forms cannot be packaged in drums, a canister/shielded cask capability is also required. To achieve the desired disposal rate, the ORNL processing facility must be operational by 1996. Implementing the conclusions of this study can save approximately $110 million, compared to the baseline, in facility, transportation, and interim storage costs through the year 2013. 10 figs., 28 tabs

  19. WIPP's Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Renewal Application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Most, W.A.; Kehrman, R.F.

    2009-01-01

    Hazardous waste permits issued by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) have a maximum term of 10-years from the permit's effective date. The permit condition in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) governing renewal applications, directs the Permittees to submit a permit application 180 days prior to expiration of the Permit. On October 27, 1999, the Secretary of the NMED issued to the United States Department of Energy (DOE), the owner and operator of WIPP, and to Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS), the Management and Operating Contractor and the cooperator of WIPP, a HWFP to manage, store, and dispose hazardous waste at WIPP. The DOE and WTS are collectively known as the Permittees. The HWFP is effective for a fixed term not to exceed ten years from the effective date of the Permit. The Permittees may renew the HWFP by submitting a new permit application at least 180 calendar days before the expiration date, of the HWFP. The Permittees are not proposing any substantial changes in the Renewal Application. First, the Permittees are seeking the authority to dispose of Contact-Handled and Remote-Handled TRU mixed waste in Panel 8. Panels 4 through 7 have been approved in the WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit as it currently exists. No other change to the facility or to the manner in which hazardous waste is characterized, managed, stored, or disposed is being requested. Second, the Permittees also seek to include the Mine Ventilation Rate Monitoring Plan, as Attachment Q in the HWFP. This Plan has existed as a separate document since May 2000. The NMED has requested that the Plan be submitted as part of the Renewal Application. The Permittees have been operating to the Mine Ventilation Rate Monitoring Plan since the Plan was submitted. Third, some information submitted in the original WIPP RCRA Part B Application has been updated, such as demographic information. The Permittees will submit this information in the

  20. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) conceptual design report. Part I: executive summary. Part II: facilities and system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-06-01

    The pilot plant is developed for ERDA low-level contact-handled transuranic waste, ERDA remote-handled intermediate-level transuranic waste, and for high-level waste experiments. All wastes placed in the WIPP arrive at the site processed and packaged; no waste processing is done at the WIPP. All wastes placed into the WIPP are retrievable. The proposed site for WIPP lies 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico. This document includes the executive summary and a detailed description of the facilities and systems

  1. WIPP documentation plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Plung, D.L.; Montgomery, T.T.; Glasstetter, S.R.

    1986-01-01

    In support of the programs at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the Publications and Procedures Section developed a documentation plan that provides an integrated document hierarchy; further, this plan affords several unique features: 1) the format for procedures minimizes the writing responsibilities of the technical staff and maximizes use of the writing and editing staff; 2) review cycles have been structured to expedite the processing of documents; and 3) the numbers of documents needed to support the program have been appreciably reduced

  2. Technical issues for WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, T.O.

    1979-01-01

    Emplacement of wastes in the WIPP will include experiments on various waste types which will provide essential data on waste-rock interaction and repository response. These experiments will include evolution of the synergistic effects of both heat production, radiation, and actual waste forms. While these studies will provide essential data on the validity of waste isolation in bedded salt, they will be preceded by a broad-based experimental program which will resolve many of the current technical issues providing not only an assessment of the safety of performing such experiments but also the technical basis for assurance that the appropriate experiments are performed. Data and predictive modeling techniques, which are currently available, can bound the consequences associated with these technical issues. Predictions of the impact on public safety based on these analyses indicate that safe waste disposal in WIPP salt beds is achievable; however, a major use of WIPP will be to conduct realistic experiments with HLW forms to address some of the unresolved details of these waste/salt interactions

  3. Conceptual designs of radioactive canister transporters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-02-01

    This report covers conceptual designs of transporters for the vertical, horizontal, and inclined installation of canisters containing spent-fuel elements, high-level waste, cladding waste, and intermediate-level waste (low-level waste is not discussed). Included in the discussion are cask concepts; transporter vehicle designs; concepts for mechanisms for handling and manipulating casks, canisters, and concrete plugs; transporter and repository operating cycles; shielding calculations; operator radiation dosages; radiation-resistant materials; and criteria for future design efforts

  4. HVAC fault tree analysis for WIPP integrated risk assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirby, P.; Iacovino, J.

    1990-01-01

    In order to evaluate the public health risk from operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) due to potential radioactive releases, a probabilistic risk assessment of waste handling operations was conducted. One major aspect of this risk assessment involved fault tree analysis of the plant heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, which comprise the final barrier between waste handling operations and the environment. 1 refs., 1 tab

  5. Spent fuel canister docking station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suikki, M.

    2006-01-01

    The working report for the spent fuel canister docking station presents a design for the operation and structure of the docking equipment located in the fuel handling cell for the spent fuel in the encapsulation plant. The report contains a description of the basic requirements for the docking station equipment and their implementation, the operation of the equipment, maintenance and a cost estimate. In the designing of the equipment all the problems related with the operation have been solved at the level of principle, nevertheless, detailed designing and the selection of final components have not yet been carried out. In case of defects and failures, solutions have been considered for postulated problems, and furthermore, the entire equipment was gone through by the means of systematic risk analysis (PFMEA). During the docking station designing we came across with needs to influence the structure of the actual disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel, too. Proposed changes for the structure of the steel lid fastening screw were included in the report. The report also contains a description of installation with the fuel handling cell structures. The purpose of the docking station for the fuel handling cell is to position and to seal the disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel into a penetration located on the cell floor and to provide suitable means for executing the loading of the disposal canister and the changing of atmosphere. The designed docking station consists of a docking ring, a covering hatch, a protective cone and an atmosphere-changing cap as well as the vacuum technology pertaining to the changing of atmosphere and the inert gas system. As far as the solutions are concerned, we have arrived at rather simple structures and most of the actuators of the system are situated outside of the actual fuel handling cell. When necessary, the equipment can also be used for the dismantling of a faulty disposal canister, cut from its upper end by machining. The

  6. WIPP operations planning: an overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miskimin, P.A.; Cossel, S.C.; Plung, D.L.

    1985-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the first-of-a-kind facility for emplacement of radioactive waste in a geologic repository. The concern for safe and efficient operations - coupled with the domestic and international significance of this project - necessitates that WIPP be a ''model plant.'' To develop WIPP as a model plant, a unique planning methodology was employed to identify, evaluate, incorporate, and implement these elements that together will form the best possible overall operation. The resulting improvements in communication among project participants and the smooth transition being made from construction are equally attributable to the methodology employed and the operating program plan developed. 1 fig

  7. Sandia WIPP calibration traceability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schuhen, M.D. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Dean, T.A. [RE/SPEC, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    This report summarizes the work performed to establish calibration traceability for the instrumentation used by Sandia National Laboratories at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) during testing from 1980-1985. Identifying the calibration traceability is an important part of establishing a pedigree for the data and is part of the qualification of existing data. In general, the requirement states that the calibration of Measuring and Test equipment must have a valid relationship to nationally recognized standards or the basis for the calibration must be documented. Sandia recognized that just establishing calibration traceability would not necessarily mean that all QA requirements were met during the certification of test instrumentation. To address this concern, the assessment was expanded to include various activities.

  8. Sandia WIPP calibration traceability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schuhen, M.D.; Dean, T.A.

    1996-05-01

    This report summarizes the work performed to establish calibration traceability for the instrumentation used by Sandia National Laboratories at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) during testing from 1980-1985. Identifying the calibration traceability is an important part of establishing a pedigree for the data and is part of the qualification of existing data. In general, the requirement states that the calibration of Measuring and Test equipment must have a valid relationship to nationally recognized standards or the basis for the calibration must be documented. Sandia recognized that just establishing calibration traceability would not necessarily mean that all QA requirements were met during the certification of test instrumentation. To address this concern, the assessment was expanded to include various activities

  9. WIPP radiation dosimetry program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu, C.F.

    1991-01-01

    Radiation dosimetry is the process by which various measurement results and procedures are applied to quantify the radiation exposure of an individual. Accurate and precise determination of radiation dose is a key factor to the success of a radiation protection program. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a Department of Energy (DOE) facility designed for permanent repository of transuranic wastes in a 2000-foot-thick salt bed 2150 feet underground, has established a dosimetry program developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 5480.11, ''Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers''; ANSI/ASME NQA-1, ''Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities''; DOE Order 5484.1, ''Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Information Reporting Requirements''; and other applicable regulations

  10. WIPP Project Records Management Handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Records Management Handbook provides the WIPP Project Records Management personnel with a tool to use to fulfill the requirements of the WIPP Records Program and direct their actions in the important area of records management. The handbook describes the various project areas involved in records management, and how they function. The handbook provides the requirements for Record Coordinators and Master Record Center (MRC) personnel to follow in the normal course of file management, records scheduling, records turnover, records disposition, and records retrieval. More importantly, the handbook provides a single reference which encompasses the procedures set fourth in DOE Order 1324.2A, ''Records Disposition'' ASME NQA-1, ''Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities'' and DOE-AL 5700.6B, ''General Operations Quality Assurance.'' These documents dictate how an efficient system of records management will be achieved on the WIPP Project

  11. WIPP and the local communities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krenz, D.L.; Sankey, C.A.

    1986-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is located 26 miles southeast of Carlsbad, New Mexico in southeastern New Mexico. Other neighboring communities include Lovington, Hobbs and Loving, New Mexico. In March 1983, the Site and Preliminary Design Validation (SPDV) phase of the project was completed. Full scale facility construction began in July of that year. Overall site construction is scheduled to be complete in December 1986. Construction completion will be followed by pre-operational and safety check-out in 1987, prior to receiving the first nuclear waste which is targeted for receipt on or after October 1988. WIPP has had a significant impact on the local communities. Many local people have been hired by the Department of Energy (DOE), Westinghouse Electric, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers contractors, as well as associated sub-contractors. As of December 31, 1985, 64% of the 643 people working at WIPP were hired from an 80-mile or less radius of the WIPP site. The majority of local residents support WIPP. As declining potash and mining industries negatively impacted the economic condition of Southeastern New Mexico, WIPP brought jobs and new business opportunities to the area

  12. SRL canister impact tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelker, J.W. Jr.

    1986-05-01

    The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is being constructed at the SRP for the containerization of high-level nuclear waste as a waste form for eventual permanent disposal. The waste will be incorporated in molten glass and solidified in Type 304L stainless steel canisters 2 feet in diameter x 9 feet 10 inches long. The canisters have a minimum wall thickness of 3/8 inch. Over a three-year period, nineteen drop-tests of nine canisters, filled with simulated waste glass, were made in support of the DWPF containerization program. Eight of the canister evaluation tests were of Type 304L stainless steel material and one was of commercially pure titanium. Three different length (9.44, 5.06, and 7.88 inch) nozzle configurations containing final closure upset welds were evaluated for the stainless steel canisters. All impact tests of the stainless steel canisters, which included bottom-, side-, and top-drops, were acceptable. The bottom-drop test of the titanium canister, which contained a final closure upset weld, was acceptable; however, the top-drop resulted in a breaching of the top head where it joins the nozzle. The final closure titanium upset weld was acceptable. The titanium canister wall thickness was 1/4 inch

  13. Assessment of allowable transuranic activity levels for WIPP wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-12-01

    This study provides a technical evaluation for the establishment of an upper limit on the transuranic content of waste packages to be received. To accomplish this, the predicted radiological performance of WIPP is compared to the radiological performance requirements applicable to WIPP. These performance requirements include radiation protection standards for both routine facility operations and credible operational accidents. These requirements are discussed in Chapter 2.0. From the margin between predicted performance and the performance requirements, the maximum allowable transuranic content of waste packages can then be inferred. Within the resulting compliance envelope, a waste acceptance criterion can be established that delineates the allowable level of transuranic radioactivity content for contact handled (CH) and remote handled (RH) waste packages. 13 refs., 8 tabs

  14. Mechanical integrity of canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, Fred

    1992-12-01

    This document constitutes the final report from 'SKBs reference group for mechanical integrity of canisters for spent nuclear fuel'. A complete list of all reports initiated by the reference group can be found in the summary report in this document. The main task of the reference group has been to advice SKB regarding the choice (ranking of alternatives) of canister type for different types of storage. The choice should be based on requirements of impermeability for a given time period and identification of possible limiting mechanisms. The main conclusions from the work were: From mechanical point of view, low phosphorous oxygen free copper (Cu-OFP) is a preferred canisters material. It exhibits satisfactory ductility both during tensile and creep testing. The residual stresses in the canisters are of such a magnitude that the estimated time to creep rupture with the data obtained for the Cu-OFP material is essentially infinite. Based on the present knowledge of stress corrosion cracking of copper there appears to be a small risk for such to occur in the projected environment. This risk need some further study. Rock shear movements of the size of 10 cm should pose no direct threat to the integrity of the canisters. Considering mechanical integrity, the composite copper/steel canister is an advantageous alternative. The recommendations for further research included continued studies of the creep properties of copper and of stress corrosion cracking. However, the studies should focus more directly on the design and fabrication aspect of the canister

  15. The concrete canister program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohta, M.M.

    1978-02-01

    In the spring of 1974, WNRE began development and demonstration of a dry storage concept, called the concrete canister, as a possible alternative to storage of irradiated CANDU fuel in water pools. The canister is a thick-walled concrete monolith containing baskets of fuel in the dry state. The decay heat from the fuel is dissipated to the environment by natural heat transfer. Four canisters were designed and constructed. Two canisters containing electric heaters have been subjected to heat loads of 2.5 times the design, ramp heat-load cycling, and simulated weathering tests. The other two canisters were loaded with irradiated fuel, one containing fuel bundles of uniform decay heat and the other containing bundles of non-uniform decay heat in a non-symmetrical radial and axial array. The collected data were used to verify the analytical tools for prediction of effectiveness of heat transfer and radiation shielding and to verify the design of the basket and canisters. The demonstration canisters have shown that this concept is a viable alternative to water pools for the storage of irradiated CANDU fuel. (author)

  16. WIPP waste package testing on simulated DHLW: emplacement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.

    1984-01-01

    Several series of simulated (nonradioactive) defense high-level waste (DHLW) package tests have been emplaced in the WIPP, a research and development facility authorized to demonstrate the safe disposal of defense-related wastes. The primary purpose of these 3-to-7 year duration tests is to evaluate the in situ materials performance of waste package barriers (canisters, overpacks, backfills, and nonradioactive DHLW glass waste form) for possible future application to a licensed waste repository in salt. This paper describes all test materials, instrumentation, and emplacement and testing techniques, and discusses progress of the various tests. These tests are intended to provide information on materials behavior (i.e., corrosion, metallurgical and geochemical alterations, waste form durability, surface interactions, etc.), as well as comparison between several waste package designs, fabrications details, and actual costs. These experiments involve 18 full-size simulated DHLW packages (approximately 3.0 m x 0.6 m diameter) emplaced in vertical boreholes in the salt drift floor. Six of the test packages contain internal electrical heaters (470 W/canister), and were emplace under approximately reference DHLW repository conditions. Twelve other simulated DHLW packages were emplaced under accelerated-aging or overtest conditions, including the artificial introduction of brine, and a thermal loading approximately three to four times higher than reference. Eight of these 12 test packages contain 1500 W/canister electrical heaters; the other four are filled with DHLW glass. 9 refs., 1 fig

  17. 2002 WIPP Environmental Monitoring Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2002-09-30

    DOE Order 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program, requires each DOE | facility to prepare an environmental management plan (EMP). This document is | prepared for WIPP in accordance with the guidance contained in DOE Order 5400.1; DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment; applicable sections of Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance (DOE/EH-0173T; DOE, 1991); and the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 834, ''Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment'' (draft). Many sections of DOE Order 5400.1 have been replaced by DOE Order 231.1, which is the driver for the annual Site Environmental Report (SER) and the guidance source for preparing many environmental program documents. The WIPP Project is operated by Westinghouse TRU Solutions (WTS) for the DOE. This plan defines the extent and scope of WIPP's effluent and environmental | monitoring programs during the facility's operational life and also discusses WIPP's quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) program as it relates to environmental monitoring. In addition, this plan provides a comprehensive description of environmental activities at WIPP including: A summary of environmental programs, including the status of environmental monitoring activities A description of the WIPP Project and its mission A description of the local environment, including demographics An overview of the methodology used to assess radiological consequences to the public, including brief discussions of potential exposure pathways, routine and accidental releases, and their consequences Responses to the requirements described in the Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance.

  18. Second benchmark problem for WIPP structural computations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krieg, R.D.; Morgan, H.S.; Hunter, T.O.

    1980-12-01

    This report describes the second benchmark problem for comparison of the structural codes used in the WIPP project. The first benchmark problem consisted of heated and unheated drifts at a depth of 790 m, whereas this problem considers a shallower level (650 m) more typical of the repository horizon. But more important, the first problem considered a homogeneous salt configuration, whereas this problem considers a configuration with 27 distinct geologic layers, including 10 clay layers - 4 of which are to be modeled as possible slip planes. The inclusion of layering introduces complications in structural and thermal calculations that were not present in the first benchmark problem. These additional complications will be handled differently by the various codes used to compute drift closure rates. This second benchmark problem will assess these codes by evaluating the treatment of these complications

  19. Remote controlled mover for disposal canister transfer

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suikki, M. [Optimik Oy, Turku (Finland)

    2013-10-15

    This working report is an update for an earlier automatic guided vehicle design (Pietikaeinen 2003). The short horizontal transfers of disposal canisters manufactured in the encapsulation process are conducted with remote controlled movers both in the encapsulation plant and in the underground areas at the canister loading station of the disposal facility. The canister mover is a remote controlled transfer vehicle mobile on wheels. The handling of canisters is conducted with the assistance of transport platforms (pallets). The very small automatic guided vehicle of the earlier design was replaced with a commercial type mover. The most important reasons for this being the increased loadbearing requirement and the simpler, proven technology of the vehicle. The larger size of the vehicle induced changes to the plant layouts and in the principles for dealing with fault conditions. The selected mover is a vehicle, which is normally operated from alongside. In this application, the vehicle steering technology must be remote controlled. In addition, the area utilization must be as efficient as possible. This is why the vehicle was downsized in its outer dimensions and supplemented with certain auxiliary equipment and structures. This enables both remote controlled operation and improves the vehicle in terms of its failure tolerance. Operation of the vehicle was subjected to a risk analysis (PFMEA) and to a separate additional calculation conserning possible canister toppling risks. The total cost estimate, without value added tax for manufacturing the system amounts to 730 000 euros. (orig.)

  20. Remote controlled mover for disposal canister transfer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suikki, M.

    2013-10-01

    This working report is an update for an earlier automatic guided vehicle design (Pietikaeinen 2003). The short horizontal transfers of disposal canisters manufactured in the encapsulation process are conducted with remote controlled movers both in the encapsulation plant and in the underground areas at the canister loading station of the disposal facility. The canister mover is a remote controlled transfer vehicle mobile on wheels. The handling of canisters is conducted with the assistance of transport platforms (pallets). The very small automatic guided vehicle of the earlier design was replaced with a commercial type mover. The most important reasons for this being the increased loadbearing requirement and the simpler, proven technology of the vehicle. The larger size of the vehicle induced changes to the plant layouts and in the principles for dealing with fault conditions. The selected mover is a vehicle, which is normally operated from alongside. In this application, the vehicle steering technology must be remote controlled. In addition, the area utilization must be as efficient as possible. This is why the vehicle was downsized in its outer dimensions and supplemented with certain auxiliary equipment and structures. This enables both remote controlled operation and improves the vehicle in terms of its failure tolerance. Operation of the vehicle was subjected to a risk analysis (PFMEA) and to a separate additional calculation conserning possible canister toppling risks. The total cost estimate, without value added tax for manufacturing the system amounts to 730 000 euros. (orig.)

  1. WIPP facility representative program plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This plan describes the Department of Energy (DOE), Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) facility representative (FR) program at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). It provides the following information: (1) FR and support organization authorities and responsibilities; (2) FR program requirements; and (3) FR training and qualification requirements

  2. Drop Calculations of HLW Canister and Pu Can-in-Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sreten Mastilovic

    2001-01-01

    The objective of this calculation is to determine the structural response of the standard high-level waste (HLW) canister and the canister containing the cans of immobilized plutonium (Pu) (''can-in-canister'' [CIC] throughout this document) subjected to drop DBEs (design basis events) during the handling operation. The evaluated DBE in the former case is 7-m (23-ft) vertical (flat-bottom) drop. In the latter case, two 2-ft (0.61-m) corner (oblique) drops are evaluated in addition to the 7-m vertical drop. These Pu CIC calculations are performed at three different temperatures: room temperature (RT) (20 C), T = 200 F = 93.3 C , and T = 400 F = 204 C ; in addition to these the calculation characterized by the highest maximum stress intensity is performed at T = 750 F = 399 C as well. The scope of the HLW canister calculation is limited to reporting the calculation results in terms of: stress intensity and effective plastic strain in the canister, directional residual strains at the canister outer surface, and change of canister dimensions. The scope of Pu CIC calculation is limited to reporting the calculation results in terms of stress intensity, and effective plastic strain in the canister. The information provided by the sketches from Reference 26 (Attachments 5.3,5.5,5.8, and 5.9) is that of the potential CIC design considered in this calculation, and all obtained results are valid for this design only. This calculation is associated with the Plutonium Immobilization Project and is performed by the Waste Package Design Section in accordance with Reference 24. It should be noted that the 9-m vertical drop DBE, included in Reference 24, is not included in the objective of this calculation since it did not become a waste acceptance requirement. AP-3.124, ''Calculations'', is used to perform the calculation and develop the document

  3. WIPP 2004 Site Environmental Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The mission of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is to safely and permanently dispose of transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste generated by the production of nuclear weapons and other activities related to the national defense of the United States (U.S.). In 2004, 8,839 cubic meters (m3) of TRU waste were emplaced at WIPP. From the first receipt of waste in March 1999 through the end of 2004, 25,809 m3 of TRU waste had been emplaced at WIPP. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS) are dedicated to maintaining high quality management of WIPP environmental resources. DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program; DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment, require that the environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and the environment. This Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental Report (SER) summarizes environmental data from 2004 that characterize environmental management performance and demonstrate compliance with applicable federal and state regulations. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, and Guidance for the Preparation of DOE Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs) for Calendar Year 2004 (DOE, 2005). The order and the guidance require that DOE facilities submit an annual SER to the DOE Headquarters Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) further requires that the SER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

  4. WIPP 2004 Site Environmental Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2005-09-30

    The mission of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is to safely and permanently dispose of transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste generated by the production of nuclear weapons and other activities related to the national defense of the United States (U.S.). In 2004, 8,839 cubic meters (m3) of TRU waste were emplaced at WIPP. From the first receipt of waste in March 1999 through the end of 2004, 25,809 m3 of TRU waste had been emplaced at WIPP. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and Washington TRU Solutions LLC (WTS) are dedicated to maintaining high quality management of WIPP environmental resources. DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program; DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting; and DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment, require that the environment at and near DOE facilities be monitored to ensure the safety and health of the public and the environment. This Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 2004 Site Environmental Report (SER) summarizes environmental data from 2004 that characterize environmental management performance and demonstrate compliance with applicable federal and state regulations. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE Order 231.1A, and Guidance for the Preparation of DOE Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs) for Calendar Year 2004 (DOE, 2005). The order and the guidance require that DOE facilities submit an annual SER to the DOE Headquarters Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health. The WIPP Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (HWFP) further requires that the SER be provided to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED).

  5. Manufacture of disposal canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nolvi, L.

    2009-12-01

    The report summarizes the development work carried out in the manufacturing of disposal canister components, and present status, in readiness for manufacturing, of the components for use in assembly of spent nuclear fuel disposal canister. The disposal canister consist of two major components: the nodular graphite cast iron insert and overpack of oxygen-free copper. The manufacturing process for copper components begins with a cylindrical cast copper billet. Three different manufacturing processes i.e. pierce and draw, extrusion and forging are being developed, which produce a seamless copper tube or a tube with an integrated bottom. The pierce and draw process, Posiva's reference method, makes an integrated bottom possible and only the lid requires welding. Inserts for BWR-element are cast with 12 square channels and inserts for VVER 440-element with 12 round channels. Inserts for EPR-elements have four square channels. Casting of BWR insert type has been studied so far. Experience of casting inserts for PWR, which is similar to the EPR-type, has been got in co-operation with SKB. The report describes the processes being developed for manufacture of disposal canister components and some results of the manufacturing experiments are presented. Quality assurance and quality control in manufacture of canister component is described. (orig.)

  6. Grouts and concretes for the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wakeley, L.D.

    1990-01-01

    The Structures Laboratory of the U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station has conducted research on cement-based composites for the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) since 1977, in cooperation with Sandia National Laboratories. Field testing requirements guided initial development of grouts. Concurrent and later laboratory studies explored the chemical stability and probable durability of these mixtures. Beginning in 1985, a series of small-scale seal performance tests at the WIPP prompted development of an expansive salt-saturated concrete. Important lessons learned from this ongoing work include: (1) carefully tailored mixtures can tolerate phase changes involving Ca, Al, and SO 4 , without loss of structural integrity; (2) handling and placement properties are probably more crucial to the mixtures than is exact phase composition; and (3) for the environment of a geologic repository, demonstrated chemical durability will be the best indicator of long-term performance

  7. Los Alamos National Laboratory Develops ''Quick to WIPP'' Strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, R.; Allen, G.; Kosiewicz, S.; Martin, B.; LANL; Nunz, J.; Biedscheid, J.; Sellmer, T.; Willis, J.; Orban, J.; Liekhus, K.; Djordjevic, S.

    2003-01-01

    The Cerro Grande forest fire in May of 2000 and the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 precipitated concerns of the vulnerability of legacy contact-handled (CH), high-wattage transuranic (TRU) waste stored at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). An analysis of the 9,100 cubic meters of stored CH-TRU waste revealed that 400 cubic meters or 4.5% of the inventory represented 61% of the risk. The analysis further showed that this 400 cubic meters was contained in only 2,000 drums. These facts and the question ''How can the disposition of this waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) be accelerated?'' formed the genesis of LANL's Quick to WIPP initiative

  8. DOE requests waiver on double containment for HLW canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lobsenz, G.

    1994-01-01

    The Energy Department has asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to waive double containment requirements for vitrified high-level radioactive waste canisters, saying the additional protection is not necessary and too costly. NRC said it had received a petition from DOE contending that the vitrified waste canisters were durable enough without double containment to prevent any potential plutonium release during handling and shipping. DOE said testing had shown that the vitrified waste canisters were similar - even superior - in durability to spent reactor fuel shipments, which NRC specifically exempted from the double containment requirement

  9. Unresolved issues for the disposal of remote-handled transuranic waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, M.K.; Neill, R.H.

    1994-09-01

    The purpose of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is to dispose of 176,000 cubic meters of transuranic (TRU) waste generated by the defense activities of the US Government. The envisioned inventory contains approximately 6 million cubic feet of contact-handled transuranic (CH TRU) waste and 250,000 cubic feet of remote handled transuranic (RH TRU) waste. CH TRU emits less than 0.2 rem/hr at the container surface. Of the 250,000 cubic feet of RH TRU waste, 5% by volume can emit up to 1,000 rem/hr at the container surface. The remainder of RH TRU waste must emit less than 100 rem/hr. These are major unresolved problems with the intended disposal of RH TRU waste in the WIPP. (1) The WIPP design requires the canisters of RH TRU waste to be emplaced in the walls (ribs) of each repository room. Each room will then be filled with drums of CH TRU waste. However, the RH TRU waste will not be available for shipment and disposal until after several rooms have already been filled with drums of CH TRU waste. RH TRU disposal capacity will be loss for each room that is first filled with CH TRU waste. (2) Complete RH TRU waste characterization data will not be available for performance assessment because the facilities needed for waste handling, waste treatment, waste packaging, and waste characterization do not yet exist. (3) The DOE does not have a transportation cask for RH TRU waste certified by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). These issues are discussed along with possible solutions and consequences from these solutions. 46 refs

  10. Analysis for Eccentric Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Drops at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) (CSB-S-0073)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    TU, K.C.

    1999-10-08

    Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) will be routinely handled at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) during fuel movement operations in the SNF Project. This analysis was performed to investigate the potential for damage from an eccentric accidental drop onto the standard storage tube, overpack tube, service station, or sample/weld station. Appendix D was added to the FDNW document to include the peer Review Comment Record & transmittal record.

  11. Analysis for Eccentric Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Drops at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) (CSB-S-0073)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TU, K.C.

    1999-01-01

    Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) will be routinely handled at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) during fuel movement operations in the SNF Project. This analysis was performed to investigate the potential for damage from an eccentric accidental drop onto the standard storage tube, overpack tube, service station, or sample/weld station. Appendix D was added to the FDNW document to include the peer Review Comment Record and transmittal record

  12. Feasibility study for a DOE research and production fuel multipurpose canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopez, D.A.; Abbott, D.G.

    1994-02-01

    This is a report of the feasibility of multipurpose canisters for transporting, storing, and sing of Department of Energy research and production spent nuclear fuel. Six representative Department of Energy fuel assemblies were selected, and preconceptual canister designs were developed to accommodate these assemblies. The study considered physical interface, structural adequacy, criticality safety, shielding capability, thermal performance of the canisters, and fuel storage site infrastructure. The external envelope of the canisters was designed to fit within the overpack casks for commercial canisters being developed for the Department of Energy Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. The budgetary cost of canisters to handle all fuel considered is estimated at $170.8M. One large conceptual boiling water reactor canister design, developed for the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, and two new canister designs can accommodate at least 85% of the volume of the Department of Energy fuel considered. Canister use minimizes public radiation exposure and is cost effective compared with bare fuel handling. Results suggest the need for additional study of issues affecting canister use and for conceptual design development of the three canisters

  13. A Film Canister Colorimeter.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gordon, James; James, Alan; Harman, Stephanie; Weiss, Kristen

    2002-01-01

    A low-cost, low-tech colorimeter was constructed from a film canister. The student-constructed colorimeter was used to show the Beer-Lambert relationship between absorbance and concentration and to calculate the value of the molar absorptivity for permanganate at the wavelength emission maximum for an LED. Makes comparisons between this instrument…

  14. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum M. Computer system and data processing requirements for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Young, R.

    1977-06-01

    Data-processing requirements for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) dictate a computing system that can provide a wide spectrum of data-processing needs on a 24-hour-day basis over an indeterminate time. A computer system is defined as a computer or computers complete with all peripheral equipment and extensive software and communications capabilities, including an operating system, compilers, assemblers, loaders, etc., all applicable to real-world problems. The computing system must be extremely reliable and easily expandable in both hardware and software to provide for future capabilities with a minimum impact on the existing applications software and operating system. The computer manufacturer or WIPP operating contractor must provide continuous on-site computer maintenance (maintain an adequate inventory of spare components and parts to guarantee a minimum mean-time-to-repair of any portion of the computer system). The computer operating system or monitor must process a wide mix of application programs and languages, yet be readily changeable to obtain maximum computer usage. The WIPP computing system must handle three general types of data processing requirements: batch, interactive, and real-time. These are discussed. Data bases, data collection systems, scientific and business systems, building and facilities, remote terminals and locations, and cables are also discussed

  15. MCC-15: waste/canister accident testing and analysis method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slate, S.C.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Scott, P.A.

    1985-02-01

    The Materials Characterization Center (MCC) at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) is developing standard tests to characterize the performance of nuclear waste forms under normal and accident conditions. As part of this effort, the MCC is developing MCC-15, Waste/Canister Accident Testing and Analysis. MCC-15 is used to test canisters containing simulated waste forms to provide data on the effects of accidental impacts on the waste form particle size and on canister integrity. The data is used to support the design of transportation and handling equipment and to demonstrate compliance with repository waste acceptance specifications. This paper reviews the requirements that led to the development of MCC-15, describes the test method itself, and presents some early results from tests on canisters representative of those proposed for the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). 13 references, 6 figures

  16. TMI-2 fuel canister interface requirements for INEL. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkins, D.E.; Martz, D.E.; Reno, H.W.

    1984-06-01

    This report focuses on fuel canister interface requirements at INEL which should be incorporated into the canister design criteria. The requirements will ensure compatibility with existing INEL structures and equipment to be used for receipt, unloading, and storage of fuel canisters. INEL can and does receive and store radioactive materials in many different forms, including reactor fuel. INEL requires detailed descriptions of canisters and casks. Therefore, requirements listed represent engineering design features which will simplify the handling and storage operations; consequently, they are not to be viewed as absolute or non-negotiable. However, the core acquisition contract was negotiated with certain storage assumptions which effect costs of storage. Deviations from those assumptions which significantly effect costs would require approval by DOE-Idaho. If some stated requirements are too restrictive, modifications based on sound engineering principles may be negotiated with INEL. 11 figures

  17. Successes and Experiences of the WIPP Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chu, Margaret S.Y.; Weart, Wendell D.

    2000-01-01

    In May 1998, the US Environmental Agency (EPA) certified the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as being in compliance with all of the applicable regulations governing the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and transuranic radioactive waste. The WIPP, a transuranic waste repository, is the first deep geologic repository in the US to have successfully demonstrated regulatory compliance with long-term radioactive waste disposal regulations and be certified to receive wastes. Many lessons were learned throughout the 25-year history of the WIPP--from site selection to the ultimate successful certification. The experiences and lessons learned from the WIPP may be of general interest to other repository programs in the world. The lessons learned include all facets of a repository program: programmatic, managerial, regulatory, technical, and social. This paper addresses critical issues that arose during the 25 years of WIPP history and how they influenced the program

  18. Status report, canister fabrication

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, Claes-Goeran; Eriksson, Peter; Westman, Marika [Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co., Stockholm (Sweden); Emilsson, Goeran [CSM Materialteknik AB, Linkoeping (Sweden)

    2004-06-01

    The report gives an account of the development of material and fabrication technology for copper canisters with cast inserts during the period from 2000 until the start of 2004. The engineering design of the canister and the choice of materials in the constituent components described in previous status reports have not been significantly changed. In the reference canister, the thickness of the copper shell is 50 mm. Fabrication of individual components with a thinner copper thickness is done for the purpose of gaining experience and evaluating fabrication and inspection methods for such canisters. As a part of the development of cast inserts, computer simulations of the casting processes and techniques used at the foundries have been performed for the purpose of optimizing the material properties. These properties have been evaluated by extensive tensile testing and metallographic inspection of test material taken from discs cut at different points along the length of the inserts. The testing results exhibit a relatively large spread. Low elongation values in certain tensile test specimens are due to the presence of poorly formed graphite, porosities, slag or other casting defects. It is concluded in the report that it will not be possible to avoid some presence of observed defects in castings of this size. In the deep repository, the inserts will be exposed to compressive loading and the observed defects are not critical for strength. An analysis of the strength of the inserts and formulation of relevant material requirements must be based on a statistical approach with probabilistic calculations. This work has been initiated and will be concluded during 2004. An initial verifying compression test of a canister in an isostatic press has indicated considerable overstrength in the structure. Seamless copper tubes are fabricated by means of three methods: extrusion, pierce and draw processing, and forging. It can be concluded that extrusion tests have revealed a

  19. Status report, canister fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, Claes-Goeran; Eriksson, Peter; Westman, Marika; Emilsson, Goeran

    2004-06-01

    The report gives an account of the development of material and fabrication technology for copper canisters with cast inserts during the period from 2000 until the start of 2004. The engineering design of the canister and the choice of materials in the constituent components described in previous status reports have not been significantly changed. In the reference canister, the thickness of the copper shell is 50 mm. Fabrication of individual components with a thinner copper thickness is done for the purpose of gaining experience and evaluating fabrication and inspection methods for such canisters. As a part of the development of cast inserts, computer simulations of the casting processes and techniques used at the foundries have been performed for the purpose of optimizing the material properties. These properties have been evaluated by extensive tensile testing and metallographic inspection of test material taken from discs cut at different points along the length of the inserts. The testing results exhibit a relatively large spread. Low elongation values in certain tensile test specimens are due to the presence of poorly formed graphite, porosities, slag or other casting defects. It is concluded in the report that it will not be possible to avoid some presence of observed defects in castings of this size. In the deep repository, the inserts will be exposed to compressive loading and the observed defects are not critical for strength. An analysis of the strength of the inserts and formulation of relevant material requirements must be based on a statistical approach with probabilistic calculations. This work has been initiated and will be concluded during 2004. An initial verifying compression test of a canister in an isostatic press has indicated considerable overstrength in the structure. Seamless copper tubes are fabricated by means of three methods: extrusion, pierce and draw processing, and forging. It can be concluded that extrusion tests have revealed a

  20. Groundwork for Universal Canister System Development

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Price, Laura L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Gross, Mike [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Prouty, Jeralyn L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rigali, Mark J. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Craig, Brian [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Han, Zenghu [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Lee, John Hok [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Liu, Yung [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Pope, Ron [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Connolly, Kevin [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Feldman, Matt [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Jarrell, Josh [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Radulescu, Georgeta [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Scaglione, John [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wells, Alan [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-09-01

    The mission of the United States Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management is to complete the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and go vernment - sponsored nuclear energy re search. S ome of the waste s that that must be managed have be en identified as good candidates for disposal in a deep borehole in crystalline rock (SNL 2014 a). In particular, wastes that can be disposed of in a small package are good candidates for this disposal concept. A canister - based system that can be used for handling these wastes during the disposition process (i.e., storage, transfers, transportation, and disposal) could facilitate the eventual disposal of these wastes. This report provides information for a program plan for developing specifications regarding a canister - based system that facilitates small waste form packaging and disposal and that is integrated with the overall efforts of the DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy Used Fuel Dis position Camp aign's Deep Borehole Field Test . Groundwork for Universal Ca nister System Development September 2015 ii W astes to be considered as candidates for the universal canister system include capsules containing cesium and strontium currently stored in pools at the Hanford Site, cesium to be processed using elutable or nonelutable resins at the Hanford Site, and calcine waste from Idaho National Laboratory. The initial emphasis will be on disposal of the cesium and strontium capsules in a deep borehole that has been drilled into crystalline rock. Specifications for a universal canister system are derived from operational, performance, and regulatory requirements for storage, transfers, transportation, and disposal of radioactive waste. Agreements between the Department of Energy and the States of Washington and Idaho, as well as the Deep Borehole Field Test plan provide schedule requirements for development of the universal canister system

  1. K West Basin canister survey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitner, A.L.

    1998-01-01

    A survey was conducted of the K West Basin to determine the distribution of canister types that contain the irradiated N Reactor fuel. An underwater camera was used to conduct the survey during June 1998, and the results were recorded on videotape. A full row-by-row survey of the entire basin was performed, with the distinction between aluminum and stainless steel Mark 1 canisters made by the presence or absence of steel rings on the canister trunions (aluminum canisters have the steel rings). The results of the survey are presented in tables and figures. Grid maps of the three bays show the canister lid ID number and the canister type in each location that contained fuel. The following abbreviations are used in the grid maps for canister type designation: IA = Mark 1 aluminum, IS = Mark 1 stainless steel, and 2 = Mark 2 stainless steel. An overall summary of the canister distribution survey is presented in Table 1. The total number of canisters found to contain fuel was 3842, with 20% being Mark 1 Al, 25% being Mark 1 SS, and 55% being Mark 2 SS. The aluminum canisters were predominantly located in the East and West bays of the basin

  2. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) fact sheet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    Pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended (42 USC 6901, et seq.), and the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (Section 74-4-1 et seq., NMSA 1978), Permit is issued to the owner and operator of the US DOE, WIPP site (hereafter called the Permittee(s)) to operate a hazardous waste storage facility consisting of a container storage unit (Waste Handling Building) and two Subpart X miscellaneous below-ground storage units (Bin Scale Test Rooms 1 and 3), all are located at the above location. The Permittee must comply with all terms and conditions of this Permit. This Permit consists of the conditions contained herein, including the attachments. Applicable regulations cited are the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, as amended 1992 (HWMR-7), the regulations that are in effect on the date of permit issuance. This Permit shall become effective upon issuance by the Secretary of the New Mexico Environment Department and shall be in effect for a period of ten (10) years from issuance. This Permit is also based on the assumption that all information contained in the Permit application and the administrative record is accurate and that the activity will be conducted as specified in the application and the administrative record. The Permit application consists of Revision 3, as well as associated attachments and clarifying information submitted on January 25, 1993, and May 17, 1993

  3. Shipment and Disposal of Solidified Organic Waste (Waste Type IV) to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D'Amico, E. L; Edmiston, D. R.; O'Leary, G. A.; Rivera, M. A.; Steward, D. M.

    2006-01-01

    In April of 2005, the last shipment of transuranic (TRU) waste from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site to the WIPP was completed. With the completion of this shipment, all transuranic waste generated and stored at Rocky Flats was successfully removed from the site and shipped to and disposed of at the WIPP. Some of the last waste to be shipped and disposed of at the WIPP was waste consisting of solidified organic liquids that is identified as Waste Type IV in the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (CH-TRAMPAC) document. Waste Type IV waste typically has a composition, and associated characteristics, that make it significantly more difficult to ship and dispose of than other Waste Types, especially with respect to gas generation. This paper provides an overview of the experience gained at Rocky Flats for management, transportation and disposal of Type IV waste at WIPP, particularly with respect to gas generation testing. (authors)

  4. Certification document for newly generated contact-handled transuranic waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Setaro, J.

    1984-01-01

    The US Department of Energy has requested that all national laboratories handling defense waste develop and augment a program whereby all newly generated contact-handled transuranic (TRU) waste be contained, stored, and then shipped to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in accordance with the requirements set forth in WIPP-DOE-114. The program described in this report delineates how Oak Ridge National Laboratory intends to comply with these requirements and lists the procedures used by each generator to ensure that their TRU wastes are certifiable for shipment to WIPP

  5. Desludging of N Reactor fuel canisters: Analysis, Test, and data requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, A.B. Jr.

    1996-01-01

    The N Reactor fuel is currently stored in canisters in the K East (KE) and K West (KW) Basins. In KE, the canisters have open tops; in KW, the cans have sealed lids, but are vented to release gases. Corrosion products have formed on exposed uranium metal fuel, on carbon steel basin component surfaces, and on aluminum alloy canister surfaces. Much of the corrosion product is retained on the corroding surfaces; however, large inventories of particulates have been released. Some of the corrosion product particulates form sludge on the basin floors; some particulates are retained within the canisters. The floor sludge inventories are much greater in the KE Basin than in the KW Basin because KE Basin operated longer and its water chemistry was less controlled. Another important factor is the absence of lids on the KE canisters, allowing uranium corrosion products to escape and water-borne species, principally iron oxides, to settle in the canisters. The inventories of corrosion products, including those released as particulates inside the canisters, are only beginning to be characterized for the closed canisters in KW Basin. The dominant species in the KE floor sludge are oxides of aluminum, iron, and uranium. A large fraction of the aluminum and uranium floor sludge particulates may have been released during a major fuel segregation campaign in the 1980s, when fuel was emptied from 4990 canisters. Handling and jarring of the fuel and aluminum canisters seems likely to have released particulates from the heavily corroded surfaces. Four candidate methods are discussed for dealing with canister sludge emerged in the N Reactor fuel path forward: place fuel in multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) without desludging; drill holes in canisters and drain; drill holes in canisters and flush with water; and remove sludge and repackage the fuel

  6. Status of the Multipurpose Canister (MPC) Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopper, J.P.

    1996-01-01

    The multipurpose canister (MPC) project represents a cornerstone of the current U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) program for handling spent nuclear fuel. The MPC and associated support equipment is being designed to accommodate the requirements for not only storage and transport but also for the specified disposal requirements of the mined geologic repository system. The phase 1 design effort for the MPC system, being performed by the Westinghouse team on behalf of TRW Environmental Safety Systems (TESS), the OCRWM management ampersand operating (M ampersand O) contractor, is on schedule for delivery of completed safety analysis reports (SARs) in April 1996

  7. Design, production and initial state of the canister

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cederqvist, Lars; Johansson, Magnus; Leskinen, Nina; Ronneteg, Ulf

    2010-12-15

    The report is included in a set of Production reports, presenting how the KBS-3 repository is designed, produced and inspected. The set of reports is included in the safety report for the KBS-3 repository and repository facility.The report provides input on the initial state of the canisters to the assessment of the long-term safety, SR-Site. The initial state refers to the properties of the engineered barriers once they have been finally placed in the KBS-3 repository and will not be further handled within the repository facility. In addition, the report provides input to the operational safety report, SR-Operation, on how the canisters shall be handled and disposed. The report presents the design premises and reference design of the canister and verifies the conformity of the reference design to the design premises. The production methods and the ability to produce canisters according to the reference design are described. Finally, the initial state of the canisters and their conformity to the reference design and design premises are presented

  8. Design, production and initial state of the canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cederqvist, Lars; Johansson, Magnus; Leskinen, Nina; Ronneteg, Ulf

    2010-12-01

    The report is included in a set of Production reports, presenting how the KBS-3 repository is designed, produced and inspected. The set of reports is included in the safety report for the KBS-3 repository and repository facility.The report provides input on the initial state of the canisters to the assessment of the long-term safety, SR-Site. The initial state refers to the properties of the engineered barriers once they have been finally placed in the KBS-3 repository and will not be further handled within the repository facility. In addition, the report provides input to the operational safety report, SR-Operation, on how the canisters shall be handled and disposed. The report presents the design premises and reference design of the canister and verifies the conformity of the reference design to the design premises. The production methods and the ability to produce canisters according to the reference design are described. Finally, the initial state of the canisters and their conformity to the reference design and design premises are presented

  9. WIPP performance assessment: impacts of human intrusion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, D.R.; Hunter, R.L.; Bertram-Howery, S.G.; Lappin, A.R.

    1989-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico is a research and development facility that may become the USA's first and only mined geologic repository for transuranic waste. Human intrusion into the WIPP repository after closure has been shown by preliminary sensitivity analyses and calculations of consequences to be an important, and perhaps the most important, factor in long-term repository performance

  10. DISPOSABLE CANISTER WASTE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R.J. Garrett

    2001-07-30

    The purpose of this calculation is to provide the bases for defining the preclosure limits on radioactive material releases from radioactive waste forms to be received in disposable canisters at the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) at Yucca Mountain. Specifically, this calculation will provide the basis for criteria to be included in a forthcoming revision of the Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD) that limits releases in terms of non-isotope-specific canister release dose-equivalent source terms. These criteria will be developed for the Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) standard canister, the Multicanister Overpack (MCO), the naval spent fuel canister, the High-Level Waste (HLW) canister, the plutonium can-in-canister, and the large Multipurpose Canister (MPC). The shippers of such canisters will be required to demonstrate that they meet these criteria before the canisters are accepted at the MGR. The Quality Assurance program is applicable to this calculation. The work reported in this document is part of the analysis of DSNF and is performed using procedure AP-3.124, Calculations. The work done for this analysis was evaluated according to procedure QAP-2-0, Control of Activities, which has been superseded by AP-2.21Q, Quality Determinations and Planning for Scientific, Engineering, and Regulatory Compliance Activities. This evaluation determined that such activities are subject to the requirements of DOE/RW/0333P, Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (DOE 2000). This work is also prepared in accordance with the development plan titled Design Basis Event Analyses on DOE SNF and Plutonium Can-In-Canister Waste Forms (CRWMS M&O 1999a) and Technical Work Plan For: Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel Work Packages (CRWMS M&O 2000d). This calculation contains no electronic data applicable to any electronic data management system.

  11. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 11 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    Seismic reflection data from petroleum industry sources showed anomalous reflectors in the Castile Formation over a small area about 3 miles north of the center of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. Additional corroborative seismic reflection data were collected as part of WIPP investigations, and WIPP 11 was drilled to investigate the anomaly. WIPP 11 was drilled near the northwest corner of Section 9, T.22.S., R.31E. it penetrated, in descending order, sand dune deposits and the Gatuna Formation (29'), Santa Rosa Sandstone (132'), Dewey Lake Red Beds (502'), Rustler Formation (288'), Salado Formation (1379'), and most of the Castile Formation (1240'). Beds within the lower part of the Salado, and the upper anhydrite of the Castile, are thinner than normal; these beds are displaced upward structurally by the upper Castile halite which is highly thickened (about 968'). The lowest halite is thin (51') and the basal anhydrite was not completely penetrated. Subsequent seismic and borehole data has shown WIPP 11 to be in a structural complex now identified as the disturbed zone. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level waste, though there are no plans at this time to dispose of high level waste or spent fuel at WIPP

  12. Basic data report for deepening of drillhole WIPP 13 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-10-01

    WIPP 13 is a borehole drilled in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, in section 17, T22S,R31E, in order to investigate a subsurface seismic disturbed zone. The first 1035 ft of the borehole were drilled in July and August 1978. The deepening of WIPP 13 was performed in 1979 between August and October. This report documents the deepening of WIPP 13 to 3861.8 ft. Only rocks of the Permian, Salado and Castile Formations were penetrated in the deepening. Cores were obtained for some portions of the hole and cuttings were collected from some of the sections which were not cored (see Table 1). A suite of geophysical logs was run to provide information on lithology, structure and geochemistry. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level wastes

  13. 76 FR 33277 - Proposed Approval of the Central Characterization Project's Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-08

    ... disposal of TRU radioactive waste. As defined by the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) of 1992 (Pub. L. 102... certification of the WIPP's compliance with disposal regulations for TRU radioactive waste [63 Federal Register... radioactive remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste characterization program implemented by the Central...

  14. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Part B Permit Application [for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)]. Volume 4, Chapter D, Appendix D1 (beginning), Revision 3

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lappin, A. R.

    1993-03-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which is designed for receipt, handling, storage, and permanent isolation of defense-generated transuranic wastes, is being excavated at a depth of approximately 655 m in bedded halites of the Permian Salado Formation of southeastern New Mexico. Site-characterization activities at the present WIPP site began in 1976. Full construction of the facility began in 1983, after completion of ``Site and Preliminary Design Validation`` (SPDV) activities and reporting. Site-characterization activities since 1983 have had the objectives of updating or refining the overall conceptual model of the geologic, hydrologic, and structural behavior of the WIPP site and providing data adequate for use in WIPP performance assessment. This report has four main objectives: 1. Summarize the results of WIPP site-characterization studies carried out since the spring of 1983 as a result of specific agreements between the US Department of Energy and the State of New Mexico. 2. Summarize the results and status of site-characterization and facility-characterization studies carried out since 1983, but not specifically included in mandated agreements. 3. Compile the results of WIPP site-characterization studies into an internally consistent conceptual model for the geologic, hydrologic, geochemical, and structural behavior of the WIPP site. This model includes some consideration of the effects of the WIPP facility and shafts on the local characteristics of the Salado and Rustler Formations. 4. Discuss the present limitations and/or uncertainties in the conceptual geologic model of the WIPP site and facility. The objectives of this report are limited in scope, and do not include determination of whether or not the WIPP Project will comply with repository-performance criteria developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (40CFR191).

  15. WIPP startup: Overcoming unprecedented challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, Arlen E.

    1992-01-01

    Since its authorization by the U.S. Congress in Public Law 96-164, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Program has achieved significant progress. Subsequent to a Record of Decision based on the October 1980 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), the scientific and engineering challenge of constructing a 100-acre mined repository to demonstrate the safe and environmentally sound disposal of defense program generated transuranic waste became reality. Since initial conception, however, a complex program has evolved. Demonstration of compliance with the requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) disposal Standards defined in 10 CFR 191, Subpart B (yet to be repromulgated), became prerequisites to a disposal decision. On June 13, 1990, based on a supplement to the 1980 FEIS, the decision was made to redefine the program to include a formal test phase. This decision required an addendum to the Final Safety Analysis Report to assure commitment to safety considerations, an intensive operational readiness review effort, and the need for a No-Migration Determination for the Environmental Protection Agency. In addition to meeting the technical challenges, the need to satisfy a broad spectrum of oversight groups (some directly funded by the Department of Energy) was required. With the decision making process publicly displayed on the Secretary of Energy's Decision Plan, the unprecedented challenges of the WIPP Program were painstakingly met, one by one, in an accountable and visible manner. (author)

  16. Summary of Preliminary Criticality Analysis for Peach Bottom Fuel in the DOE Standardized Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henrikson, D.J.

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program is developing a standardized set of canisters for DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF). These canisters will be used for DOE SNF handling, interim storage, transportation, and disposal in the national repository. Several fuels are being examined in conjunction with the DOE SNF canisters. This report summarizes the preliminary criticality safety analysis that addresses general fissile loading limits for Peach Bottom graphite fuel in the DOE SNF canister. The canister is considered both alone and inside the 5-HLW/DOE Long Spent Fuel Co-disposal Waste Package, and in intact and degraded conditions. Results are appropriate for a single DOE SNF canister. Specific facilities, equipment, canister internal structures, and scenarios for handling, storage, and transportation have not yet been defined and are not evaluated in this analysis. The analysis assumes that the DOE SNF canister is designed so that it maintains reasonable geometric integrity. Parameters important to the results are the canister outer diameter, inner diameter, and wall thickness. These parameters are assumed to have nominal dimensions of 45.7-cm (18.0-in.), 43.815-cm (17.25-in), and 0.953-cm (0.375-in.), respectively. Based on the analysis results, the recommended fissile loading for the DOE SNF canister is 13 Peach Bottom fuel elements if no internal steel is present, and 15 Peach Bottom fuel elements if credit is taken for internal steel

  17. An HVAC [heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning] fault-tree analysis for WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant] integrated risk assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirby, P.N.; Iacovino, J.M.

    1990-01-01

    In order to evaluate the public health risk of potential radioactive releases from operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a probabilistic risk assessment of waste-handling operations was conducted. One major aspect of this risk assessment involved fault-tree analysis of the plant heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems, which constitute the final barrier between waste-handling operations and the environment. The WIPP site is designed to receive and store two types of waste: contact-handled transuranic (CH TRU) wastes to be shipped in 208-ell drums and remote-handled (RH) TRU wastes to be shipped in shielded casks. The identification of accident sequences for CH waste operations revealed no identified accidents that could release significant radioactive particulates to the environment without a failure in the HVAC systems. When the HVAC fault-tree results were combined with other critical system fault trees and the analysis of waste-handling accident sequences, the approximation of the overall WIPP plant risk due to airborne releases was determined to be 2.6 x 10 -7 fatalities per year for the population within a 50-mile radius of the WIPP site. This risk was demonstrated to be well below the risk of fatality from other voluntary and involuntary activities for the population within the vicinity of the WIPP

  18. The WIPP Water Quality Sampling Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uhland, D.; Morse, J.G.; Colton, D.

    1986-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a Department of Energy facility, will be used for the underground disposal of wastes. The Water Quality Sampling Program (WQSP) is designed to obtain representative and reproducible water samples to depict accurate water composition data for characterization and monitoring programs in the vicinity of the WIPP. The WQSP is designed to input data into four major programs for the WIPP project: Geochemical Site Characterization, Radiological Baseline, Environmental Baseline, and Performance Assessment. The water-bearing units of interest are the Culebra and Magneta Dolomite Members of the Rustler Formation, units in the Dewey Lake Redbeds, and the Bell Canyon Formation. At least two chemically distinct types of water occur in the Culebra, one being a sodium/potassium chloride water and the other being a calcium/magnesium sulfate water. Water from the Culebra wells to the south of the WIPP site is distinctly fresher and tends to be of the calcium/magnesium sulfate type. Water in the Culebra in the north and around the WIPP site is distinctly fresher and tends to be of the sodium/potassium chloride type and is much higher in total dissolved solids. The program, which is currently 1 year old, will continue throughout the life of the facility as part of the Environmental Monitoring Program

  19. WIPP Recertification - An Environmental Evaluation Group Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, L. E.; Silva, M. K.

    2003-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a repository for defense transuranic (TRU) waste, was built and is operated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA) required initial certification of compliance of the WIPP by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In addition, a recertification decision is required by the LWA every five years, dated from the initial receipt of TRU waste. The first TRU waste shipment arrived at the WIPP on March 26, 1999, and therefore the first recertification application is due from DOE to EPA by March 25, 2004. The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) provides technical oversight of the WIPP project on behalf of the State of New Mexico. The EEG considers the first recertification as a precedent setting event. Therefore, the EEG began the identification of recertification issues immediately following the initial certification decision. These issues have evolved since that time, based on discussions with the DOE and EEG's understanding of DOE's ongoing research. Performance assessment is required by the EPA certification and its results are needed to determine whether the facility remains in compliance at the time of the recertification application. The DOE must submit periodic change reports to the EPA which summarize activities and conditions that differ from the compliance application. Also, the EPA may request additional information from the DOE that may pertain to continued compliance. These changes and new information must be considered for recertification performance assessment

  20. Pretest characterization of WIPP experimental waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, J.; Davis, H.

    1991-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is an underground repository designed for the storage and disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes from US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities across the country. The Performance Assessment (PA) studies for WIPP address compliance of the repository with applicable regulations, and include full-scale experiments to be performed at the WIPP site. These experiments are the bin-scale and alcove tests to be conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Prior to conducting these experiments, the waste to be used in these tests needs to be characterized to provide data on the initial conditions for these experiments. This characterization is referred to as the Pretest Characterization of WIPP Experimental Waste, and is also expected to provide input to other programmatic efforts related to waste characterization. The purpose of this paper is to describe the pretest waste characterization activities currently in progress for the WIPP bin-scale waste, and to discuss the program plan and specific analytical protocols being developed for this characterization. The relationship between different programs and documents related to waste characterization efforts is also highlighted in this paper

  1. Transport of multiassembly sealed canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinn, R.D.; Lehnert, R.A.; Rosa, J.M.

    1992-01-01

    A significant portion of the commercial spent nuclear fuel in dry storage in the US will be stored in multiassembly sealed canisters before the DOE begins accepting fuel from utilities in 1998. This paper reports that it is desirable from economic and ALARA perspectives to transfer these canisters directly from the plant to the MRS. To this end, it is necessary that the multiassembly sealed canisters, which have been licensed for storage under 10CFR72, be qualified for shipment within a suitable shipping cask under the rules of 10CFR71. Preliminary work performed to date indicates that it is feasible to license a current canister design for transportation, and work is proceeding on obtaining NRC approval

  2. Preliminary Transportation, Aging and Disposal Canister System Performance Specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    C.A Kouts

    2006-01-01

    This document provides specifications for selected system components of the Transportation, Aging and Disposal (TAD) canister-based system. A list of system specified components and ancillary components are included in Section 1.2. The TAD canister, in conjunction with specialized overpacks will accomplish a number of functions in the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Some of these functions will be accomplished at purchaser sites where commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) is stored, and some will be performed within the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) transportation and disposal system. This document contains only those requirements unique to applications within Department of Energy's (DOE's) system. DOE recognizes that TAD canisters may have to perform similar functions at purchaser sites. Requirements to meet reactor functions, such as on-site dry storage, handling, and loading for transportation, are expected to be similar to commercially available canister-based systems. This document is intended to be referenced in the license application for the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). As such, the requirements cited herein are needed for TAD system use in OCRWM's disposal system. This document contains specifications for the TAD canister, transportation overpack and aging overpack. The remaining components and equipment that are unique to the OCRWM system or for similar purchaser applications will be supplied by others

  3. Remote-handled transuranic waste study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-10-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was developed by the US Department of Energy (DOE) as a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of transuranic (TRU) radioactive wastes generated from the Nation's defense activities. The WIPP disposal inventory will include up to 250,000 cubic feet of TRU wastes classified as remote handled (RH). The remaining inventory will include contact-handled (CH) TRU wastes, which characteristically have less specific activity (radioactivity per unit volume) than the RH-TRU wastes. The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA), Public Law 102-579, requires a study of the effect of RH-TRU waste on long-term performance. This RH-TRU Waste Study has been conducted to satisfy the requirements defined by the LWA and is considered by the DOE to be a prudent exercise in the compliance certification process of the WIPP repository. The objectives of this study include: conducting an evaluation of the impacts of RH-TRU wastes on the performance assessment (PA) of the repository to determine the effects of Rh-TRU waste as a part of the total WIPP disposal inventory; and conducting a comparison of CH-TRU and RH-TRU wastes to assess the differences and similarities for such issues as gas generation, flammability and explosiveness, solubility, and brine and geochemical interactions. This study was conducted using the data, models, computer codes, and information generated in support of long-term compliance programs, including the WIPP PA. The study is limited in scope to post-closure repository performance and includes an analysis of the issues associated with RH-TRU wastes subsequent to emplacement of these wastes at WIPP in consideration of the current baseline design. 41 refs

  4. Assessment of Contaminated Brine Fate and Transport in MB139 at WIPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kuhlman, Kristopher L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Applied Systems Analysis and Research Dept.; Malama, Bwalya [Sandia National Lab., Carlsbad, NM (United States). Performance Assessment Dept.

    2014-07-01

    Following the radionuclide release event of February 14, 2014 at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), actinide contamination has been found on the walls and floor in Panel 7 as a result of a release in Room 7 of Panel 7. It has been proposed to decontaminate Panel 7 at the WIPP by washing contaminated surfaces in the underground with fresh water. A cost-effective cleanup of this contamination would allow for a timely return to waste disposal operations at WIPP. It is expected that the fresh water used to decontaminate Panel 7 will flow as contaminated brine down into the porosity of the materials under the floor – the run-of-mine (ROM) salt above Marker Bed 139 (MB139) and MB139 itself – where its fate will be controlled by the hydraulic and transport properties of MB139. Due to the structural dip of MB139, it is unlikely that this brine would migrate northward towards the Waste-Handling Shaft sump. A few strategically placed shallow small-diameter observation boreholes straddling MB139 would allow for monitoring the flow and fate of this brine after decontamination. Additionally, given that flow through the compacted ROM salt floor and in MB139 would occur under unsaturated (or two-phase) conditions, there is a need to measure the unsaturated flow properties of crushed WIPP salt and salt from the disturbed rock zone (DRZ).

  5. The WIPP journey to waste receipt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnes, G.J.; Whatley, M.E.

    1997-01-01

    In the early 1970s the federal government selected an area in southeastern New Mexico containing large underground salt beds as potentially suitable for radioactive waste disposal. An extensive site characterization program was initiated by the federal government. This site became the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, better known as WIPP. It is now 1997, over two decades after the initial selection of the New Mexico site as a potential radioactive waste repository. Numerous scientific studies, construction activities, and environmental compliance documents have been completed. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has addressed all relevant issues regarding the safety of WIPP and its ability to isolate radioactive waste from the accessible environment. Throughout the last two decades up to the present time, DOE has negotiated through a political, regulatory, and legal maze with regard to WIPP. New regulations have been issued, litigation initiated, and public involvement brought to the forefront of the DOE decision-making process. All of these factors combined to bring WIPP to its present status--at the final stages of working through the licensing requirements for receipt of transuranic (TRU) waste for disposal. Throughout its history, the DOE has stayed true to Congress' mandates regarding WIPP. Steps taken have been necessary to demonstrate to Congress, the State of New Mexico, and the public in general, that the nation's first radioactive waste repository will be safe and environmentally sound. DOE's compliance demonstrations are presently under consideration by the cognizant regulatory agencies and DOE is closer than ever to waste receipt. This paper explores the DOE's journey towards implementing a permanent disposal solution for defense-related TRU waste, including major Congressional mandates and other factors that contributed to program changes regarding the WIPP project

  6. Preoperational checkout of the remote-handled transuranic waste handling at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-09-01

    This plan describes the preoperational checkout for handling Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Wastes from their receipt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to their emplacement underground. This plan identifies the handling operations to be performed, personnel groups responsible for executing these operations, and required equipment items. In addition, this plan describes the quality assurance that will be exercised throughout the checkout, and finally, it establishes criteria by which to measure the success of the checkout. 7 refs., 5 figs

  7. Multi-purpose canisters as an alternative for storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hollaway, W.R.; Rozier, R.; Nitti, D.A.; Williams, J.R.

    1993-01-01

    A study was conducted to assess the feasibility of using multi-purpose canisters to handle spent nuclear fuel throughout the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System. Multi-purpose canisters would be sealed, metallic containers maintaining multiple spent fuel assemblies in a dry, inert environment and overpacked separately and uniquely for the various system elements of storage, transportation, and disposal. Using five implementation scenarios, the multi-purpose canister was evaluated with regard to several measures of effectiveness, including number of handlings, radiation exposure, cost, schedule and licensing considerations, and public perception. Advantages and disadvantages of the multi-purpose canister were identified relative to the current reference system within each scenario, and the scenarios were compared to determine the most effective method of implementation

  8. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum C. Cost worksheets for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-04-01

    The cost worksheets for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are presented. A summary cost estimate, cost estimate for surface facilities, and cost estimate for shafts and underground facilities are included

  9. Multi-purpose canister system evaluation: A systems engineering approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    This report summarizes Department of Energy (DOE) efforts to investigate various container systems for handling, transporting, storing, and disposing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies in the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS). The primary goal of DOE's investigations was to select a container technology that could handle the vast majority of commercial SNF at a reasonable cost, while ensuring the safety of the public and protecting the environment. Several alternative cask and canister concepts were evaluated for SNF assembly packaging to determine the most suitable concept. Of these alternatives, the multi-purpose canister (MPC) system was determined to be the most suitable. Based on the results of these evaluations, the decision was made to proceed with design and certification of the MPC system. A decision to fabricate and deploy MPCs will be made after further studies and preparation of an environmental impact statement

  10. A welding system for spent fuel canister lid

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suikki, M.; Wendelin, T.

    2008-06-01

    The report presents a proposed welding system for spent fuel canister lids. The system is used for welding the copper lid to the copper overpack. The apparatus will be installed in the encapsulation plant. The report presents basic requirements for and implementation of the welding system, operation, service and maintenance of the equipment, as well as a cost estimate. Some aspects of the apparatus design are quite specified, but the actual detailed planning and final selection of components is not included. The report also describes actions for possible malfunction and fault conditions. Closing of the copper cylinder's lid is carried out by electron beam welding, which must be performed in vacuum. The welding system for spent fuel canister lid consists of two welding chambers, a canister docking system, an EB-welding machine with its accessories, a vacuum apparatus, as well as necessary auxiliary equipment. The system's equipment is housed in a welding room, an auxiliary system room, an operation control room, as well as mounted on the ceiling of a transfer corridor. One of the welding chambers is intended for carrying out test welding procedures and for calibration of welding parameters. The actual spent fuel canister lid welding chamber has a weldingready canister docked thereto in an airtight manner. The chamber is pumped for a vacuum, followed by closing the canister's copper lid and carrying out the lid welding process. The lid is brought into the chamber prior to docking the canister by means of a canister transfer trolley lifting gear. Lifting of the canister and rotating it during a welding process are also handled by means of the transfer trolley. The lid welding chamber houses equipment for the alignment and installation of the lid, as well as heating means for the top side of a copper overpack for ensuring a sufficient installation clearance between the lid and the overpack. The equipment not needed in the immediate vicinity of welding chambers, is

  11. Plutonium Immobilization Project - Can-In-Canister Hardware Development/Selection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2001-01-01

    This paper covers the design, development and testing of the magazines (cylinders containing cans of plutonium-ceramic pucks) and the rack that holds them in place inside the waste glass canister. Several magazine and rack concepts were evaluated to produce a design that gives the optimal balance between resistance to thermal degradation and facilitation of remote handling. This paper also reviews the effort to develop a jointed robotic arm that can remotely load seven magazines into defined locations inside a stationary canister working only through the 4 inch (102mm) diameter canister throat

  12. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 12 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-10-01

    WIPP 12 is a borehole drilled in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, to investigate the stratigraphy, structure and lithology in the WIPP area. WIPP 12 was drilled in section 17, T22S,R31E, between November 9 and December 7, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 2785.8 ft. It encountered from top to bottom, 16.2 ft of sand, 3 ft of Mescalero Caliche and 9.6 ft of the Gatuna Formation, all of Quaternary age; 138.2 ft of the Triassic Santa Rosa Formation, 483 ft of the Dewey Lake Red Beds, 326 ft of the Rustler Formation, 1771.5 ft of the Salado Formation, and 48.3 ft of the Castile Formation, all of Permian age. Cores or cuttings were obtained for the entire hole. A suite of geophysical logs, including neutron gamma and density curves, was run to the full depth of WIPP 12. The borehole demonstrated that the elevation of the top of the Castile is about 160' above the same horizon in ERDA 9. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level wastes

  13. WIPP site and vicinity geological field trip

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaturvedi, L.

    1980-10-01

    The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) is conducting an assessment of the radiological health risks to people from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). As a part of this work, EEG is making an effort to improve the understanding of those geological issues concerning the WIPP site which may affect the radiological consequences of the proposed repository. One of the important geological issues to be resolved is the timing and the nature of the dissolution processes which may have affected the WIPP site. EEG organized a two-day conference of geological scientists, titled Geotechnical Considerations for Radiological Hazard Assessment of WIPP on January 17-18, 1980. During this conference, it was realized that a field trip to the site would further clarify the different views on the geological processes active at the site. The field trip of June 16-18, 1980 was organized for this purpose. This report provides a summary of the field trip activities along with the participants post field trip comments. Important field stops are briefly described, followed by a more detailed discussion of critical geological issues. The report concludes with EEG's summary and recommendations to the US Department of Energy for further information needed to more adequately resolve concerns for the geologic and hydrologic integrity of the site

  14. In situ testing of titanium and mild steel nuclear waste containers at the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.

    1990-01-01

    An overview of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in situ tests on the corrosion of titanium and mild steel for high level waste containers is presented. The tests at Sandia have moved out of the laboratory into a test underground facility in order to evaluate the performance of the waste package material. The tests are being performed under both near-reference and accelerated salt repository conditions. Some containers are filled with high level waste glass (non-radioactive); others contain electric heaters. Backfill material is either bentonite/sand or crushed salt. In other tests metals and glasses are exposed directly to brine. The tests are designed to study the corrosion and metallurgy of the canister and overpack materials; the feasibility and performance of backfill materials; and near-field effects such as brine migration

  15. Contamination control aspects of attaching waste drums to the WIPP Waste Characterization Chamber

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rubick, L.M.; Burke, L.L.

    1998-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory West (ANL-W) is verifying the characterization and repackaging of contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) mixed waste in support of the Waste Isolation Pilot Program (WIPP) project located in Carlsbad, New Mexico. The WIPP Waste Characterization Chamber (WCC) was designed to allow opening of transuranic waste drums for this process. The WCC became operational in March of 1994 and has characterized approximately 240 drums of transuranic waste. The waste drums are internally contaminated with high levels of transuranic radionuclides. Attaching and detaching drums to the glove box posed serious contamination control problems. Prior to characterizing waste, several drum attachment techniques and materials were evaluated. An inexpensive HEPA filter molded into the bagging material helps with venting during detachment. The current techniques and procedures used to attach and detach transuranic waste drums to the WCC are described

  16. Inorganic analyses of volatilized and condensed species within prototypic Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canistered waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jantzen, C.M.

    1992-01-01

    The high-level radioactive waste currently stored in carbon steel tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS) will be immobilized in a borosilicate glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). The canistered waste will be sent to a geologic repository for final disposal. The Waste Acceptance Preliminary Specifications (WAPS) require the identification of any inorganic phases that may be present in the canister that may lead to internal corrosion of the canister or that could potentially adversely affect normal canister handling. During vitrification, volatilization of mixed (Na, K, Cs)Cl, (Na, K, Cs) 2 SO 4 , (Na, K, Cs)BF 4 , (Na, K) 2 B 4 O 7 and (Na,K)CrO 4 species from glass melt condensed in the melter off-gas and in the cyclone separator in the canister pour spout vacuum line. A full-scale DWPF prototypic canister filled during Campaign 10 of the SRS Scale Glass Melter was sectioned and examined. Mixed (NaK)CI, (NaK) 2 SO 4 , (NaK) borates, and a (Na,K) fluoride phase (either NaF or Na 2 BF 4 ) were identified on the interior canister walls, neck, and shoulder above the melt pour surface. Similar deposits were found on the glass melt surface and on glass fracture surfaces. Chromates were not found. Spinel crystals were found associated with the glass pour surface. Reference amounts of the halides and sulfates were found retained in the glass and the glass chemistry, including the distribution of the halides and sulfates, was homogeneous. In all cases where rust was observed, heavy metals (Zn, Ti, Sn) from the cutting blade/fluid were present indicating that the rust was a reaction product of the cutting fluid with glass and heat sensitized canister or with carbon-steel contamination on canister interior. Only minimal water vapor is present so that internal corrosion of the canister, will not occur

  17. The WIPP research and development test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, L.D.

    1985-01-01

    The WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) is a DOE RandD Facility for the purpose of developing the technology needed for the safe disposal of the United States defense-related radioactive waste. The in-situ test program is defined for the thermal-structural interactions, plugging and sealing, and waste package interactions in a salt environment. An integrated series of large-scale underground tests address the issues of both systems and long-term isolation performance of a repository

  18. Preliminary safety assessment of the WIPP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balestri, R.J.; Torres, B.W.; Pahwa, S.B.; Brannen, J.P.

    1979-01-01

    This paper summarizes the efforts to perform a safety assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility being proposed for southeastern New Mexico. This preliminary safety assessment is limited to a consequence assessment in terms of the dose to a maximally exposed individual as a result of introducing the radionuclides into the biosphere. The extremely low doses to the organs as a result of the liquid breach scenarios are contrasted with the background radiation

  19. WIPP site and vicinity geological field trip

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaturvedi, L.

    1980-10-01

    The Environmental Evaluation Group is conducting an assessment of the radiological health risks to people from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. As a part of this work, EEG is making an effort to improve the understanding of those geological issues concerning the WIPP site which may affect the radiological consequences of the proposed repository. One of the important geological issues to be resolved is the timing and the nature of the dissolution processes which may have affected the WIPP site. EEG organized a two-day conference of geological scientists, on January 17-18, 1980. On the basis of the January conference and the June field trip, EEG has formed the following conclusions: (1) it has not been clearly established that the site or the surrounding area has been attacked by deep dissolution to render it unsuitable for the nuclear waste pilot repository; (2) the existence of an isolated breccia pipe at the site unaccompanied by a deep dissolution wedge, is a very remote possibility; (3) more specific information about the origin and the nature of the brine reservoirs is needed. An important question that should be resolved is whether each encounter with artesian brine represents a separate pocket or whether these occurrences are interconnected; (4) Anderson has postulated a major tectonic fault or a fracture system at the Basin margin along the San Simon Swale; (5) the area in the northern part of the WIPP site, identified from geophysical and bore hole data as the disturbed zone, should be further investigated to cleary understand the nature and significance of this structural anomaly; and (6) a major drawback encountered during the discussions of geological issues related to the WIPP site is the absence of published material that brings together all the known information related to a particular issue

  20. The WIPP transportation system: Demonstrated readiness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, T.R.; Spooner, R.

    1991-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed an integrated transportation system to transport transuranic (TRU) waste from ten widely-dispersed generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The system consists of a Type B container, a specially- designed trailer, a lightweight tractor, the DOE ''TRANSCOM'' vehicle tracking system, and uniquely qualified and highly-trained drivers. In June of 1989, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed the transportation system and concluded that: ''The system proposed for transportation of TRU waste to WIPP is safer than that employed for any other hazardous material in the United States today and will reduce risk to very low levels'' (emphasis added). The next challenge facing the DOE was demonstrating that this system was ready to transport the TRU waste to the WIPP site efficiently and in the safest manner possible. Not only did the DOE feel that is was necessary to convince itself that the system was safe, but also representatives of the 20 states through which it would travel

  1. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) startup plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-03-01

    To allow the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to transition from a Major System Acquisition to an operating demonstration facility, the Acquisition Executive and the Energy System Acquisition Advisory Board (ESAAB) must concur in the facility's readiness to receive waste. This action, designated in DOE Order 4700.1 as Key Decision Four, concludes with the Chairman of the ESAAB issuing a Record of Decision. Since the meeting leading to the Record of Decision is scheduled for August 1988, plans must be made to ensure all activities contributing to that decision are completed in a clear and well-coordinated process. To support that effort, this Start-Up Plan was prepared to identify and track key events necessary to verify WIPP's readiness to receive waste; this provides a management/scheduling/tracking tool for the DOE WIPP Project Office (WPO) and a tracking mechanism for the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE-AL) and for DOE Headquarters (DOE-HQ); and describe the process to ensure readiness is documented by providing relevant data and reports to the cognizant decision makers. The methods by which these two purposes are achieved are discussed in further detail in the remainder of this plan

  2. The WIPP transportation system: Demonstrated readiness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, T.R.; Spooner, R.

    1991-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed an integrated transportation system to transport transuranic (TRU) waste from ten widely-dispersed generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The system consists of a Type B container, a specially-designed trailer, a lightweight tractor, the DOE ''TRANSCOM'' vehicle tracing system, and uniquely qualified and highly-trained drivers. In June of 1989, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed the transportation system and concluded that: ''The system proposed for transportation of TRU waste to WIPP is safer than that employed for any other hazardous material in the United States today and will reduce risk to very low levels.'' The next challenge facing the DOE was demonstrating that this system was ready to transport the TRU waste to the WIPP site in the safest manner possible. Not only did the DOE feel that it was necessary to convince itself that the system was safe, but also representatives of the 23 states through which it traveled

  3. Equipment for deployment of canisters with spent nuclear fuel and bentonite buffer in horizontal holes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henttonen, V.; Suikki, M.

    1992-08-01

    The study presents the predesign of equipment for the deployment of canisters in long horizontal holes. The canisters are placed in the centre of the hole and are surrounded by a bentonite buffer. In thE study the canisters are assumed to have a diameter of 1.6 m and a length of 5.9 m, including the hemispherical ends. Their total weight is 60 tonnes. The bentonite buffer after homogenization is 400 mm thick, making a total package diameter of 2.4 m. The deployment system consists of four wagons for handling The canisters and the bentonite blocks. To ensure safe emplacement, every part is installed separately in its final position. This also makes it possible to use small clearances between the canisters and the bentonite blocks and between the blocks and the rock wall. With small clearances, backfilling can be avoided. Another basic design idea is that the wagons are equipped with wheels, which are in direct contact with the rock walls. Thus, rails, which have to be removed as the deployment progresses, are unnecessary. To minimize the time taken for deploying one canister, the wagons are designed so that only three trips from the service area to the deposit area are needed. Due to the radiation in the vicinity of the canisters, the wagons have to be teleoperated

  4. Choices of canisters and elements for the first fuel shipment from K West Basin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Makenas, B.J.

    1995-03-01

    Twenty-two canisters (10 prime and 12 backup candidates) in the K West Basin have been identified as containing fuel which, when examined, will satisfy the Data Quality Objectives for the first fuel shipment from this basin. These were chosen as meeting criteria such as containing relatively long fuel elements, locking bar integrity, and the availability of gas/liquid interface level measurements for associated canister gas traps. Two canisters were identified as having reported broken fuel on initial loading. Usage and interpretation of canister cesium concentration measurements have also been established and levels of maximum and minimum acceptable cesium concentration (from a data optimization point of view) for decapping have been determined although other operational cesium limits may also apply. Criteria for picking particular elements, once a canister is opened, are reviewed in this document. A pristine, a slightly damaged, and a badly damaged element are desired. The latter includes elements with end caps removed but does not include elements which have large amounts of swelling or split cladding that might interfere with handling tools. Finally, operational scenarios have been suggested to aid in the selections of canisters and elements in a way that utilizes anticipated canister gas sampling and leads to a correct and quick choice of elements which will supply the desired data

  5. Equipment for deployment of canisters with spent nuclear fuel and bentonite buffer in horisontal holes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henttonen, V.; Suikki, M.

    1992-06-01

    This study presents the predesign of equipment for the deployment of canisters in long horizontal holes. The canisters are placed in the centre of the hole and are surrounded by a bentonite buffer. In this study the canisters are assumed to have a diameter of 1.6 m and a length of 5.9 m, including the hemispherical ends. Their total weight is 60 tonnes. The bentonite buffer after homogenization is 400 mm thick, making a total package diameter of 2.4 m. The deployment system consists of four wagons for handling the canisters and the bentonite blocks. To ensure safe emplacement, every part is installed separately in its final position. This also makes it possible to use small clearances between the canisters and the bentonite blocks and between the blocks and the rock wall. With small clearances, backfilling can be avoided. Another basic design idea is that the wagons are equipped with wheels, which are in direct contact with the rock walls. Thus, rails, which have to be removed as the deployment progresses, are unnecessary. To minimize the time taken for deploying one canister, the wagons are designed so that only three trips from the service area to the deposit area are needed. Due to the radiation in the vicinity of the canisters, the wagons have to be teleoperated. (au)

  6. Thermal and mechanical analyses of the spent nuclear fuel disposal canister and its barriers according to the design variable change

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Young Joo

    2006-03-01

    This work constitutes a summary of research and development made for design and dimensioning of the spent nuclear fuel disposal canister. Since the spent nuclear fuel disposal emits high temperature heats and much radiation, its careful treatment is required. For that, a long term (usually 10,000 years) safe repository for the spent nuclear fuel disposal should be secured. Usually this repository is expected to locate at a depth of 500m underground. Many various analyses should be performed to secure the structural safety of the canister. For past years, these analyses have been performed to develop the canister model (so-called DKC-1 model). The diameter of the designed KDC-1 canister model is D=102m. However, there still remain some structural evaluations to make sure the structural safety of the designed KDC-1 canister mode. The one is the structural safety evaluation of the canister for the falling accident in the repository while handling the canister. There may happen two typical falling accidents in the repository. The one is the falling accident of the canister in the borehole while depositing the canister into the borehole. In these falling accidents the collision impact force between the canister and the surface of the ground or the bottom of the borehole may cause the structural damage onto the canister. However, the canister should be designed to withstand this impact force. Hence, the structural analysis of the canister for this impact force is required to guarantee the structural safety of the canister for this falling accident. Therefore in this report, the structural analyses of the KDC-1 canister model of the diameter of 102cm for two types of falling accidents are carried out for the impact forces while the canister collides onto the surface of the ground or the bottom of the borehole. The nonlinear structural analyses are performed for the canister to get the accurate analysis results assuming the materials composing canister parts as elasto

  7. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 32 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-11-01

    WIPP 32 is an exploratory borehole drilled to examine the subsurface at a small topographic high in Nash Draw. The borehole is located in east-central Eddy County, New Mexico, in NE 1/4 SE 1/4 Sec. 33, T.22S., R.29E. and was drilled in August, 1979. The hole was drilled to a depth of 390 feet, and encountered, from top to bottom, the Rustler Formation (166') and the upper Salado Formation (224'). Core was taken from 4 to 353 feet. Geophysical logs were run the full length of the hole to measure formation properties. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  8. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum L. Mine safety code review for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-06-01

    An initial review of New Mexico and Federal mining standards and regulations has been made to determine their applicability to the WIPP conceptual design. These standards and regulations are reviewed point by point and the enclosed listing includes comments and recommendations for those which will affect the design and/or eventual operations of WIPP. The majority of the standards, both federal and state, are standard safe mining practices. Those standards are listed which are thought should be emphasized for development of the design; also those that would increase the hazard risk by strict compliance. Because the WIPP facility is different in many respects from mines for which the regulations were intended, strict compliance in some respects would provide an increased hazard, while in other instances the regulations are less strict than is desirable. These are noted in the attached review

  9. Evaluation of a molybdenum assay canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshizumi, T.T.; Keener, S.J.

    1988-01-01

    The performance characteristics of a commercial molybdenum assay canister were evaluated. The geometrical variation of the technetium-99m (/sup 99m/Tc) activity reading was studied as a function of the elution volume for the standard vials. It was found that the /sup 99m/Tc canister activity reading was ∼ 5% lower than that of the standard method. This is due to attenuation by the canister wall. However, the effect of the geometric variation on the clinical dose preparation was found to be insignificant. The molybdenum-99 ( 99 Mo) contamination level was compared by two methods: (1) the commercial canister and (2) the standard assay kit. The 99 Mo contamination measurements with the canister indicated consistently lower readings than those with the standard 99 Mo assay kit. The authors conclude that the canister may be used in the clinical settings. However, the user must be aware of the problems and the limitations associated with this canister

  10. Shippingport Spent Fuel Canister System Description

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOHNSON, D.M.

    2000-01-01

    In 1978 and 1979, a total of 72 blanket fuel assemblies (BFAs), irradiated during the operating cycles of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station's Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Core 2 from April 1965 to February 1974, were transferred to the Hanford Site and stored in underwater storage racks in Cell 2R at the 221-T Canyon (T-Plant). The initial objective was to recover the produced plutonium in the BFAs, but this never occurred and the fuel assemblies have remained within the water storage pool to the present time. The Shippingport Spent Fuel Canister (SSFC) is a confinement system that provides safe transport functions (in conjunction with the TN-WHC cask) and storage for the BFAs at the Canister Storage Building (CSB). The current plan is for these BFAs to be retrieved from wet storage and loaded into SSFCs for dry storage. The sealed SSFCs containing BFAs will be vacuum dried, internally backfilled with helium, and leak tested to provide suitable confinement for the BFAs during transport and storage. Following completion of the drying and inerting process, the SSFCs are to be delivered to the CSB for closure welding and long-term interim storage. The CSB will provide safe handling and dry storage for the SSFCs containing the BFAs. The purpose of this document is to describe the SSFC system and interface equipment, including the technical basis for the system, design descriptions, and operations requirements. It is intended that this document will be periodically updated as more equipment design and performance specification information becomes available

  11. High-level waste canister storage final design, installation, and testing. Topical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Connors, B.J.; Meigs, R.A.; Pezzimenti, D.M.; Vlad, P.M.

    1998-04-01

    This report is a description of the West Valley Demonstration Project's radioactive waste storage facility, the Chemical Process Cell (CPC). This facility is currently being used to temporarily store vitrified waste in stainless steel canisters. These canisters are stacked two-high in a seismically designed rack system within the cell. Approximately 300 canisters will be produced during the Project's vitrification campaign which began in June 1996. Following the completion of waste vitrification and solidification, these canisters will be transferred via rail or truck to a federal repository (when available) for permanent storage. All operations in the CPC are conducted remotely using various handling systems and equipment. Areas adjacent to or surrounding the cell provide capabilities for viewing, ventilation, and equipment/component access

  12. High-level waste canister storage final design, installation, and testing. Topical report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Connors, B.J.; Meigs, R.A.; Pezzimenti, D.M.; Vlad, P.M.

    1998-04-01

    This report is a description of the West Valley Demonstration Project`s radioactive waste storage facility, the Chemical Process Cell (CPC). This facility is currently being used to temporarily store vitrified waste in stainless steel canisters. These canisters are stacked two-high in a seismically designed rack system within the cell. Approximately 300 canisters will be produced during the Project`s vitrification campaign which began in June 1996. Following the completion of waste vitrification and solidification, these canisters will be transferred via rail or truck to a federal repository (when available) for permanent storage. All operations in the CPC are conducted remotely using various handling systems and equipment. Areas adjacent to or surrounding the cell provide capabilities for viewing, ventilation, and equipment/component access.

  13. Canister design concepts for disposal of spent fuel and high level waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patel, R.; Punshon, C.; Nicholas, J.; Bastid, P.; Zhou, R.; Schneider, C.; Bagshaw, N.; Howse, D.; Hutchinson, E. [TWI Ltd, Cambridge, (United Kingdom); Asano, R. [Hitachi Zosen Corporation, Osaka (Japan); King, S. [Integrity Corrosion Consulting Ltd, Calgary, Alberta (Canada)

    2012-10-15

    As part of its long-term plans for development of a repository for spent fuel (SF) and high level waste (HLW), Nagra is exploring various options for the selection of materials and design concepts for disposal canisters. The selection of suitable canister options is driven by a series of requirements, one of the most important of which is providing a minimum 1000 year lifetime without breach of containment. One candidate material is carbon steel, because of its relatively low corrosion rate under repository conditions and because of the advanced state of overall technical maturity related to construction and fabrication. Other materials and design options are being pursued in parallel studies. The objective of the present study was to develop conceptual designs for carbon steel SF and HLW canisters along with supporting justification. The design process and outcomes result in design concepts that deal with all key aspects of canister fabrication, welding and inspection, short-term performance (handling and emplacement) and long-term performance (corrosion and structural behaviour after disposal). A further objective of the study is to use the design process to identify the future work that is required to develop detailed designs. The development of canister designs began with the elaboration of a number of design requirements that are derived from the need to satisfy the long-term safety requirements and the operational safety requirements (robustness needed for safe handling during emplacement and potential retrieval). It has been assumed based on radiation shielding calculations that the radiation dose rate at the canister surfaces will be at a level that prohibits manual handling, and therefore a hot cell and remote handling will be needed for filling the canisters and for final welding operations. The most important canister requirements were structured hierarchically and set in the context of an overall design methodology. Conceptual designs for SF canisters

  14. Canister design concepts for disposal of spent fuel and high level waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patel, R.; Punshon, C.; Nicholas, J.; Bastid, P.; Zhou, R.; Schneider, C.; Bagshaw, N.; Howse, D.; Hutchinson, E.; Asano, R.; King, S.

    2012-10-01

    As part of its long-term plans for development of a repository for spent fuel (SF) and high level waste (HLW), Nagra is exploring various options for the selection of materials and design concepts for disposal canisters. The selection of suitable canister options is driven by a series of requirements, one of the most important of which is providing a minimum 1000 year lifetime without breach of containment. One candidate material is carbon steel, because of its relatively low corrosion rate under repository conditions and because of the advanced state of overall technical maturity related to construction and fabrication. Other materials and design options are being pursued in parallel studies. The objective of the present study was to develop conceptual designs for carbon steel SF and HLW canisters along with supporting justification. The design process and outcomes result in design concepts that deal with all key aspects of canister fabrication, welding and inspection, short-term performance (handling and emplacement) and long-term performance (corrosion and structural behaviour after disposal). A further objective of the study is to use the design process to identify the future work that is required to develop detailed designs. The development of canister designs began with the elaboration of a number of design requirements that are derived from the need to satisfy the long-term safety requirements and the operational safety requirements (robustness needed for safe handling during emplacement and potential retrieval). It has been assumed based on radiation shielding calculations that the radiation dose rate at the canister surfaces will be at a level that prohibits manual handling, and therefore a hot cell and remote handling will be needed for filling the canisters and for final welding operations. The most important canister requirements were structured hierarchically and set in the context of an overall design methodology. Conceptual designs for SF canisters

  15. Position paper on flammability concerns associated with TRU waste destined for WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-04-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), in southeastern New Mexico,is an underground repository, designed for the safe geologic disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes generated from defense-related activities of the US Department of Energy (DOE). The WIPP storage rooms are mined in a bedded salt (halite) formation, and are located 2150 feet below the surface. After the disposal of waste in the storage rooms, closure of the repository is expected to occur by creep (plastic flow) of the salt formation, with the waste being permanently isolated from the surrounding environment. This paper has evaluated the issue of flammability concerns associated with TRU waste to be shipped to WIPP, including a review of possible scenarios that can potentially contribute to the flammability. The paper discusses existing regulations that address potential flammability concerns, presents an analysis of previous flammability-related incidents at DOE sites with respect to the current regulations, and finally, examines the degree of assurance these regulations provide in safeguarding against flammability concerns during transportation and waste handling. 50 refs., 7 figs., 7 tabs

  16. Basic data report for Drillhole WIPP 28 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-08-01

    WIPP 28 was drilled in Nash Draw (NE 1/4, sec. 18, T.21S., R.31E.) in Eddy County, New Mexico, to determine subsurface stratigraphy and examine dissolution features above undisturbed salt in the Salado Formation. Determination of dissolution rates will refine previous estimates and provide short-term (geologically) rates for WIPP risk assessments. The borehole encountered, from top to bottom, Mescalero caliche (12 ft with fill material for pad), Dewey Lake Red Beds (203 ft), Rustler Formation (316 ft), and the upper 270 ft of the Salado Formation. A dissolution residue, 58 ft thick, is at the top of the Salado Formation overlying halite-rich beds. In addition to obtaining nearly continuous core from the surface to total depth (801 ft), geophysical logs were taken to measure acoustic velocities, density, radioactivity, and formation resistivity. An interpretive report on dissolution in Nash Draw will be based on combined borehole basin data, surface mapping, and laboratory analyses of Nash Draw rocks and fluids. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes and to then be converted to a repository. The WIPP will also provide research facilities for interactions between high-level waste and salt

  17. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 19 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    WIPP 19 is an exploratory borehole whose objective was to determine the nature of the near-surface formations after seismic information indicated a possible fault. The borehole is located in section 20, T.22S., R.31E., in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, and was drilled between April 6 and May 4, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 1038.2 feet and encountered, from top to bottom, surficial Holocene deposits (7', including artificial fill for drill pad), the Mescalero caliche (7'), the Santa Rosa Sandstone (82'), the Dewey Lake Red Beds (494'), the Rustler Formation (315'), and the upper portion of the Salado Formation (143'). Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals. A suite of geophysical logs was run to measure acoustic velocities, density, and radioactivity. On the basis of comparison with other geologic sections drilled in the area, the WIPP 19 section is a normal stratigraphic sequence and it does not show structural disruption. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  18. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum A. Design calculations for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-04-01

    The design calculations for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are presented. The following categories are discussed: general nuclear calculations; radwaste calculations; structural calculations; mechanical calculations; civil calculations; electrical calculations; TRU waste surface facility time and motion analysis; shaft sinking procedures; hoist time and motion studies; mining system analysis; mine ventilation calculations; mine structural analysis; and miscellaneous underground calculations

  19. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 21 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    WIPP 21 is an exploratory borehole whose objective is to determine the nature of the near-surface formations after seismic information indicated a possible fault. The borehole is located in section 20, T.22S., R.31E., in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, and was drilled between May 24 and 26, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 1046 feet and encountered, from top to bottom, surficial Holocene deposits (6', including artificial fill for drill pad), the Mescalero caliche (6'), the Santa Rosa Sandstone (34'), the Dewey Lake Red Beds (487'), the Rustler Formation (308'), and the upper portion of the Salado Formation (178'). Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals. A suite of goephysical logs was run to measure acoustic velocities, density, and radioactivity. On the basis of comparison with other geologic sections drilled in the area, the WIPP 21 section is a normal stratigraphic sequence and it does not show structural disruption. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  20. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 18 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    WIPP 18 is an exploratory borehole whose objective is to determine the nature of the near-surface formations after seismic information indicated a possible fault. The borehole is located in section 20, T.22S., R.31E., in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, and was drilled between March 14 and 30, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 1060 feet and encountered, from top to bottom, surficial Holocene deposits (5', including artificial fill for drill pad), the Mescalero caliche (4'), the Santa Rosa Sandstone (129'), the Dewey Lake Red Beds (475'), the Rustler Formation (315'), and the upper portion of the Salado Formation (132'). Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals. A suite of geophysical logs was run to measure acoustic velocities, density, and radioactivity. On the basis of comparison with other geologic sections drilled in the area, the WIPP 18 section is a normal stratigraphic sequence and it does not show structural disruption. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  1. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 25 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-09-01

    WIPP 25 was drilled on the eastern edge of Nash Draw (SW 1/4, Sec. 15, T22S, R30E) in Eddy County, New Mexico, to determine subsurface stratigraphy and examine dissolution features above undisturbed salt in the Salado Formation. Determination of dissolution rates will refine previous estimates and provide short-term (geologically) rates for WIPP risk assessments. The borehole encountered, from top to bottom, Pleistocene sediments (17 ft with fill material for pad), Dewey Lake Red Beds (215 ft, Rustler Formation (333 ft, and 90 ft of the upper Salado Formation. A dissolution residue, 37 ft thick, is at the top of the Salado Formation overlying halite-rich beds. In addition to obtaining nearly continuous core from the surface to total depth (655 ft, geophysical logs were taken to measure acoustic velocities, density, radioactivity, and formation resistivity. An interpretive report on dissolution in Nash Draw will be based on combined borehole basin data, surface mapping, and laboratory analyses of Nash Draw rocks and fluids. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes and to then be converted to a repository. The WIPP will also provide research facilities for interactions between high-level waste and salt

  2. Basic data report for Drillhole WIPP 22 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-03-01

    WIPP 22 is an exploratory borehole whose objective is to determine the nature of the near-surface formations after seismic information indicated a possible fault. The borehole is located in section 20, T.22S., R.31E., in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, and was drilled between March 14 and 30, 1978. The hole was drilled to a depth of 1448 feet and encountered, from top to bottom, surficial Holocene deposits (6', including artificial fill for drill pad), the Mescalero caliche (7'), the Santa Rosa Sandstone (68'), the Dewey Lake Red Beds (492'), the Rustler Formation (311'), and the upper portion of the Salado Formation (565'). Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals. A suite of geophysical logs was run to measure acoustic velocities, density, and radioactivity. On the basis of comparison with other geologic sections drilled in the area, the WIPP 22 section is a normal stratigraphic sequence and it does not show structural disruption. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes. The WIPP will also provide facilities to research interactions between high-level waste and salt

  3. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 26 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-08-01

    WIPP 26 was drilled in Nash Draw (SE 1/4 NE 1/4, sec. 29, T22S, R30E) in Eddy County, New Mexico, to determine subsurface stratigraphy and examine dissolution features above undisturbed salt in the Salado Formation. Determination of dissolution rates will refine previous estimates and provide short-term (geologically) rates for WIPP risk assessments. The borehole encountered, from top to bottom, surficial deposits (10 ft with full materials for pad), Rustler Formation (299 ft), and the upper 194 ft of the Salado Formation. A dissolution residue, 11 ft thick, is at the top of the Salado Formation overlying halite-rich beds. In addition to obtaining nearly continuous core from the surface to total depth (503 ft), geophysical logs were taken to measure acoustic velocities, density, radioactivity, and formation resistivity. An interpretive report on dissolution in Nash Draw will be based on combined borehole basin data, surface mapping, and laboratory analyses of Nash Draw rocks and fluids. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic defense wastes and to then be converted to a repository. The WIPP will also provide research facilities for interactions between high-level waste and salt

  4. Management of remote-handled defense transuranic wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebra, M.A.; Pierce, G.D.; Carson, P.H.

    1988-01-01

    Transuranic (TRU) wastes generated by defense-related activities are scheduled for emplacement at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico beginning in October 1988. After five years of operation as a research and development facility, the WIPP may be designated as a permanent repository for these wastes, if it has been demonstrated that this deep, geologically stable formation is a safe disposal option. Defense TRU wastes are currently stored at various Department of Energy (DOE) sites across the nation. Approximately 2% by volume of currently stored TRU wastes are defined, on the basis of dose rates, as remote-handled (RH). RH wastes continue to be generated at various locations operated by DOE contractors. They require special handling and processing prior to and during emplacement in the WIPP. This paper describes the strategy for managing defense RH TRU wastes

  5. WIPP: construction and progress on a successful nuclear waste repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooper, W.R.; Sankey, C.A.

    1985-01-01

    The Department of Energy is constructing the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Southeastern New Mexico. The facility will retrievably store transuranic waste from defense activities of the United States and conduct experiments with Defense high-level waste which will be retrieved at the end of the experiments. This paper describes the progress and the present status of activities at WIPP. 4 refs

  6. WIPP Magnesium Oxide (MgO) - Planned Change Request

    Science.gov (United States)

    On April 10, 2006, the DOE submitted a planned change request pertaining to the amount of MgO emplaced in the WIPP repository. MgO is an engineered barrier that DOE included as part of the original WIPP Certification Decision.

  7. Status of Closure Welding Technology of Canister for Transportation and Storage of High Level Radioactive Material and Waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, H. J.; Bang, K. S.; Seo, K. S.; Seo, C. S.

    2010-10-01

    Closure seal welding is one of the key technologies in fabricating and handling the canister which is used for transportation and storage of high radioactive material and waste. Simple industrial fabrication processes are used before filling the radioactive waste into the canister. But, automatic and remote processes should be used after filling the radioactive material because the thickness of canister is not sufficient to shield the high radiation from filled material or waste. In order to simplify the welding process the closure structure of canister and the sealing method are investigated and developed properly. Two types of radioactive materials such as vitrified waste and compacted solid waste are produced in nuclear industry. Because the filling method of two types of waste is different, the shapes of closure and opening of canister and welding method is also different. The canister shape and sealing method should be standardized to standardize the handling facilities and inspection process such as leak test after closure welding. In order to improve the productivity of disposal and compatibility of the canister, the structure and shape of canister should be standardized considering the type of waste. Two kind of welding process such as arc welding and resistance welding are reported and used in the field. In the arc welding process GTAW and PAW are considered proper processes for closure welding. The closure seal welding process can be selected by considering material of canister, thickness of body, productivity, and applicable codes and rules. Because the storage time of nuclear waste in canister is very long, at least 20 years, the long-time corrosion at the weld should be estimated including mechanical integrity. Recently, the mitigation of residual stress around weld region, which causes stress corrosion cracking, is also interesting research issue

  8. Achieving WIPP certification for software. A white paper

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, S.D.; Adams, K.; Twitchell, K.E.

    1998-07-01

    The NMT-1 and NMT-3 organizations within the Chemical and Metallurgical Research (CMR) facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is working to achieve Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) certification to enable them to transport their TRU waste to WIPP. In particular, the NMT-1 management is requesting support from the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) to assist them in making the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) software WIPP certifiable. Thus, LIMS must be compliant with the recognized software quality assurance (SQA) requirements stated within the QAPD. Since the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) has achieved WIPP certification, INEEL personnel can provide valuable assistance to LANL by sharing lessons learned and recommendations. Thus, this white paper delineates the particular software quality assurance requirements required for WIPP certification

  9. Design premises for canister for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.

    1998-09-01

    The purpose of this report is to establish the basic premises for designing canisters for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, the requirements for canister characteristics, and the design criteria, and to present alternative canister designs that satisfy these premises. The point of departure for canister design has been that the canister must be able to be used for both BWR and PWR fuel

  10. Stakeholder involvement in the evaluation of a multipurpose canister system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.R.; Kane, D.; Smith, T.B. Jr.

    1994-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), began evaluating a multipurpose canister (MPC) concept in October of 1992. This followed recommendations by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that DOE develop a nuclear waste management system that achieves system integration, standardization, and reduced fuel-handling operations. Industry organizations such as Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) had conducted earlier studies that concluded advantages to the nuclear waste management system may be offered by such a concept. The MPC concept involves a metal canister which would contain multiple spent nuclear fuel assemblies. The canister would be sealed at the nuclear power plant and would not be reopened. The MPC would then be placed inside separate casks or overpacks for storage, transportation, and disposal. An important factor in DOE's evaluation of the MPC concept was the involvement of external parties. This paper describes that involvement process for the OCRWM's MPC implementation program. External parties who have an interest or stake in the program are referred to as stakeholders

  11. Science to compliance: The WIPP success story

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howarth, S.M.; Chu, M.S.; Shephard, L.E.

    1997-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeast New Mexico has been studied as a transuranic waste repository for the past 23 years. During this time, an extensive site characterization, design, construction, and experimental program was completed to provide in-depth understanding of the dominant processes that are most likely to influence the containment of radionuclides for 10,000 years. The success of the program, however, is defined by the regulator in the context of compliance with performance criteria, rather than by the in-depth technical understanding typical of most scientific programs. The WIPP project was successful in making a transformation from science to compliance by refocusing and redirecting programmatic efforts toward the singular goal of meeting regulatory compliance requirements while accelerating the submittal of the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) by two months from the April 1994 Disposal Decision Plan (DDP) date of December 1996, and by reducing projected characterization costs by more than 40%. This experience is unparalleled within the radioactive waste management community and has contributed to numerous lessons learned from which the entire community can benefit

  12. Monitored Retrievable Storage/Multi-Purpose Canister analysis: Simulation and economics of automation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, P.C.; Stringer, J.B.

    1994-01-01

    Robotic automation is examined as a possible alternative to manual spent nuclear fuel, transport cask and Multi-Purpose canister (MPC) handling at a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility. Automation of key operational aspects for the MRS/MPC system are analyzed to determine equipment requirements, through-put times and equipment costs is described. The economic and radiation dose impacts resulting from this automation are compared to manual handling methods

  13. Inspection of disposal canisters components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitkaenen, J.

    2013-12-01

    This report presents the inspection techniques of disposal canister components. Manufacturing methods and a description of the defects related to different manufacturing methods are described briefly. The defect types form a basis for the design of non-destructive testing because the defect types, which occur in the inspected components, affect to choice of inspection methods. The canister components are to nodular cast iron insert, steel lid, lid screw, metal gasket, copper tube with integrated or separate bottom, and copper lid. The inspection of copper material is challenging due to the anisotropic properties of the material and local changes in the grain size of the copper material. The cast iron insert has some acoustical material property variation (attenuation, velocity changes, scattering properties), which make the ultrasonic inspection demanding from calibration point of view. Mainly three different methods are used for inspection. Ultrasonic testing technique is used for inspection of volume, eddy current technique, for copper components only, and visual testing technique are used for inspection of the surface and near surface area

  14. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Canister Storage Building Functions and Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KLEM, M.J.

    2000-01-01

    In 1998, a major change in the technical strategy for managing Multi Canister Overpacks (MCO) while stored within the Canister Storage Building (CSB) occurred. The technical strategy is documented in Baseline Change Request (BCR) No. SNF-98-006, Simplified SNF Project Baseline (MCO Sealing) (FDH 1998). This BCR deleted the hot conditioning process initially adopted for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNF Project) as documented in WHC-SD-SNF-SP-005, Integrated Process Strategy for K Basins Spent Nuclear Fuel (WHC 199.5). In summary, MCOs containing Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) from K Basins would be placed in interim storage following processing through the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) facility. With this change, the needs for the Hot Conditioning System (HCS) and inerting/pressure retaining capabilities of the CSB storage tubes and the MCO Handling Machine (MHM) were eliminated. Mechanical seals will be used on the MCOs prior to transport to the CSB. Covers will be welded on the MCOs for the final seal at the CSB. Approval of BCR No. SNF-98-006, imposed the need to review and update the CSB functions and requirements baseline documented herein including changing the document title to ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Canister Storage Building Functions and Requirements.'' This revision aligns the functions and requirements baseline with the CSB Simplified SNF Project Baseline (MCO Sealing). This document represents the Canister Storage Building (CSB) Subproject technical baseline. It establishes the functions and requirements baseline for the implementation of the CSB Subproject. The document is organized in eight sections. Sections 1.0 Introduction and 2.0 Overview provide brief introductions to the document and the CSB Subproject. Sections 3.0 Functions, 4.0 Requirements, 5.0 Architecture, and 6.0 Interfaces provide the data described by their titles. Section 7.0 Glossary lists the acronyms and defines the terms used in this document. Section 8.0 References lists the

  15. WIPP shaft seal system parameters recommended to support compliance calculations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hurtado, L.D.; Knowles, M.K. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Kelley, V.A.; Jones, T.L.; Ogintz, J.B. [INTERA Inc., Austin, TX (United States); Pfeifle, T.W. [RE/SPEC, Inc., Rapid City, SD (United States)

    1997-12-01

    The US Department of Energy plans to dispose of transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which is sited in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP disposal facility is located approximately 2,150 feet (650 m) below surface in the bedded halite of the Salado Formation. Prior to initiation of disposal activities, the Department of Energy must demonstrate that the WIPP will comply with all regulatory requirements. Applicable regulations require that contaminant releases from the WIPP remain below specified levels for a period of 10,000 years. To demonstrate that the WIPP will comply with these regulations, the Department of Energy has requested that Sandia National Laboratories develop and implement a comprehensive performance assessment of the WIPP repository for the regulatory period. This document presents the conceptual model of the shaft sealing system to be implemented in performance assessment calculations conducted in support of the Compliance Certification Application for the WIPP. The model was developed for use in repository-scale calculations and includes the seal system geometry and materials to be used in grid development as well as all parameters needed to describe the seal materials. These calculations predict the hydrologic behavior of the system. Hence conceptual model development is limited to those processes that could impact the fluid flow through the seal system.

  16. WIPP shaft seal system parameters recommended to support compliance calculations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurtado, L.D.; Knowles, M.K.; Kelley, V.A.; Jones, T.L.; Ogintz, J.B.; Pfeifle, T.W.

    1997-12-01

    The US Department of Energy plans to dispose of transuranic waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which is sited in southeastern New Mexico. The WIPP disposal facility is located approximately 2,150 feet (650 m) below surface in the bedded halite of the Salado Formation. Prior to initiation of disposal activities, the Department of Energy must demonstrate that the WIPP will comply with all regulatory requirements. Applicable regulations require that contaminant releases from the WIPP remain below specified levels for a period of 10,000 years. To demonstrate that the WIPP will comply with these regulations, the Department of Energy has requested that Sandia National Laboratories develop and implement a comprehensive performance assessment of the WIPP repository for the regulatory period. This document presents the conceptual model of the shaft sealing system to be implemented in performance assessment calculations conducted in support of the Compliance Certification Application for the WIPP. The model was developed for use in repository-scale calculations and includes the seal system geometry and materials to be used in grid development as well as all parameters needed to describe the seal materials. These calculations predict the hydrologic behavior of the system. Hence conceptual model development is limited to those processes that could impact the fluid flow through the seal system

  17. Canister arrangement for storing radioactive waste

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lorenzo, D.K.; Van Cleve, J.E. Jr.

    1980-04-23

    The subject invention relates to a canister arrangement for jointly storing high level radioactive chemical waste and metallic waste resulting from the reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuel elements. A cylindrical steel canister is provided with an elongated centrally disposed billet of the metallic waste and the chemical waste in vitreous form is disposed in the annulus surrounding the billet.

  18. Waste canister for storage of nuclear wastes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Duffy, James B.

    1977-01-01

    A waste canister for storage of nuclear wastes in the form of a solidified glass includes fins supported from the center with the tips of the fins spaced away from the wall to conduct heat away from the center without producing unacceptable hot spots in the canister wall.

  19. Waste canister for storage of nuclear wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duffy, J.B.

    1977-01-01

    A waste canister for storage of nuclear wastes in the form of a solidified glass includes fins supported from the center with the tips of the fins spaced away from the wall to conduct heat away from the center without producing unacceptable hot spots in the canister wall. 4 claims, 4 figures

  20. Effect of Canister Movement on Water Turbidity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TRIMBLE, D.J.

    2000-01-01

    Requirements for evaluating the adherence characteristics of sludge on the fuel stored in the K East Basin and the effect of canister movement on basin water turbidity are documented in Briggs (1996). The results of the sludge adherence testing have been documented (Bergmann 1996). This report documents the results of the canister movement tests. The purpose of the canister movement tests was to characterize water turbidity under controlled canister movements (Briggs 1996). The tests were designed to evaluate methods for minimizing the plumes and controlling water turbidity during fuel movements leading to multi-canister overpack (MCO) loading. It was expected that the test data would provide qualitative visual information for use in the design of the fuel retrieval and water treatment systems. Video recordings of the tests were to be the only information collected

  1. Geotechnical Perspectives on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Francke, Chris T.; Hansen, Frank D.; Knowles, M. Kathyn; Patchet, Stanley J.; Rempe, Norbert T.

    1999-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is the first nuclear waste repository certified by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Success in regulatory compliance resulted from an excellent natural setting for such a repository, a facility with multiple, redundant safety systems, and from a rigorous, transparent scientific and technical evaluation. The WIPP story, which has evolved over the past 25 years, has generated a library of publications and analyses. Details of the multifaceted program are contained in the cited references. Selected geotechnical highlights prove the eminent suitability of the WIPP to serve its congressionally mandated purpose

  2. Analytical Evaluation of Preliminary Drop Tests Performed to Develop a Robust Design for the Standardized DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ware, A.G.; Morton, D.K.; Smith, N.L.; Snow, S.D.; Rahl, T.E.

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed a design concept for a set of standard canisters for the handling, interim storage, transportation, and disposal in the national repository, of DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The standardized DOE SNF canister has to be capable of handling virtually all of the DOE SNF in a variety of potential storage and transportation systems. It must also be acceptable to the repository, based on current and anticipated future requirements. This expected usage mandates a robust design. The canister design has four unique geometries, with lengths of approximately 10 feet or 15 feet, and an outside nominal diameter of 18 inches or 24 inches. The canister has been developed to withstand a drop from 30 feet onto a rigid (flat) surface, sustaining only minor damage - but no rupture - to the pressure (containment) boundary. The majority of the end drop-induced damage is confined to the skirt and lifting/stiffening ring components, which can be removed if de sired after an accidental drop. A canister, with its skirt and stiffening ring removed after an accidental drop, can continue to be used in service with appropriate operational steps being taken. Features of the design concept have been proven through drop testing and finite element analyses of smaller test specimens. Finite element analyses also validated the canister design for drops onto a rigid (flat) surface for a variety of canister orientations at impact, from vertical to 45 degrees off vertical. Actual 30-foot drop testing has also been performed to verify the final design, though limited to just two full-scale test canister drops. In each case, the analytical models accurately predicted the canister response

  3. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 13 (Waste isolation pilot plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-10-01

    The borehole WIPP-13 was drilled in the SW 1/4 section 17, T22S, R31E of eastern Eddy County during July and August, 1978, to investigate the nature of a resistivity anomaly. The stratigraphic section was normal, consisting of 13 feet of Quaternary deposits (including artificial fill for drill pad), 53 feet of the Triassic Santa Rosa Sandstone, 451 feet of Dewey Lake Red Beds, 269 feet of the Rustler Formation and 179 feet of the upper member of the Salado Formation. Consecutive cores were taken from 570 to 595, 656 to 729, and 827 to 878 feet. Cuttings were collected at 10-foot intervals throughout the rest of the hole. Geophysical logs were run to aid in interpretation of the stratigraphy. The WIPP is to demonstrate (through limited operations) disposal technology for transuranic (TRU) defense wastes. Eventual conversion of the facility to a repository for TRU defense wastes is anticipated. The WIPP will also provide research facilities for interactions between high-level waste and salt

  4. Basic data report for Drillhole WIPP 14 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-08-01

    Borehole WIPP 14 is an exploratory well drilled in eastern Eddy County, New Mexico, in section 9, T22S,R31E. The borehole was drilled to a depth of 1000.0 ft measured from ground level. It penetrated, from top to bottom, 15.4 ft of Quaternary sands, 125.6 ft of the Triassic Santa Rosa Sandstone, and in the Permian strata, 497.7 ft of the Dewey Lake Red Beds, 312.9 ft of the Rustler Formation and 48.4 ft of the Upper Salado Formation. Seven hundred feet of the well were cored, at consecutive and nonconsecutive 10-ft intervals to a depth of 925.5 ft. Cuttings were collected where core was not taken. Density, gamma ray neutron and caliper logs were run the full depth of the hole. The WIPP is a demonstration facility for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from defense programs. The WIPP will also provide a research facility to investigate the interactions between bedded salt and high level wastes

  5. Review of the draft supplement to the WIPP environmental impact statement DOE/EIS-0026-S-2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.; Channell, J.K.; Spiegler, P.; Chaturvedi, L.

    1997-04-01

    New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group's (EEG) review of the WIPP Disposal Phase Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS-II) concentrated on the radiological aspects of the Proposed Action, including transportation. The alternatives were reviewed in less detail. Some calculations were checked, mostly for the Proposed Action. Because of time constraints, there was little review of Hazardous Chemicals, Economics, or other Environmental Assessments. SEIS-II was written as a pre-decision document with the Alternatives all plausible and eligible to be selected. Also, the inventory of TRU waste for disposal went well beyond that portion of TRU waste that has been historically considered to be the WIPP inventory. This broadened scope is probably appropriate for an EIS but it is confusing to the reviewer who is aware of the statutory limits of wastes that are allowed to come to WIPP at the present time. EEG has attempted to keep the broadened scope of SEIS-II in mind during their review. The more important issues discussed within are: alternatives; related documents; transportation; questionable assumptions; use of the 75th percentile values; family farm scenario and inhalation doses; modification of BRAGFLO volumes; emplacement of remotely handled TRU wastes; conversion error; and remotely handled TRU casks

  6. Transportation considerations related to waste forms and canisters for Defense TRU wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, K.J.; Andrews, W.B.; Schreiber, A.M.; Rosenthal, L.J.; Odle, C.J.

    1981-09-01

    This report identifies and discusses the considerations imposed by transportation on waste forms and canisters for contact-handled, solid transuranic wastes from the US Department of Energy (DOE) activities. The report reviews (1) the existing raw waste forms and potential immobilized waste forms, (2) the existing and potential future DOE waste canisters and shipping containers, (3) regulations and regulatory trends for transporting commercial transuranic wastes on the ISA, (4) truck and rail carrier requirements and preferences for transporting the wastes, and (5) current and proposed Type B external packagings for transporting wastes

  7. Encapsulation and handling of spent nuclear fuel for final disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loennerberg, B.; Larker, H.; Ageskog, L.

    1983-05-01

    The handling and embedding of those metal parts which arrive to the encapsulation station with the fuel is described. For the encapsulation of fuel two alternatives are presented, both with copper canisters but with filling of lead and copper powder respectively. The sealing method in the first case is electron beam welding, in the second case hot isostatic pressing. This has given the headline of the two chapters describing the methods: Welded copper canister and Pressed copper canister. Chapter 1, Welded copper canister, presents the handling of the fuel when it arrives to the encapsulation station, where it is first placed in a buffer pool. From this pool the fuel is transferred to the encapsulation process and thereby separated from fuel boxes and boron glass rod bundles, which are transported together with the fuel. The encapsulation process comprises charging into a copper canister, filling with molten lead, electron beam welding of the lid and final inspection. The transport to and handling in the final repository are described up to the deposition and sealing in the deposition hole. Handling of fuel residues is treated in one of the sections. In chapter 2, Pressed copper canister, only those parts of the handling, which differ from chapter 1 are described. The hot isostatic pressing process is given in the first sections. The handling includes drying, charging into the canister, filling with copper powder, seal lid application and hot isostatic pressing before the final inspection and deposition. In the third chapter, BWR boxes in concrete moulds, the handling of the metal parts, separated from the fuel, are dealt with. After being lifted from the buffer pool they are inserted in a concrete mould, the mould is filled with concrete, covered with a lid and after hardening transferred to its own repository. The deposition in this repository is described. (author)

  8. The WIPP transportation system: Dedicated to safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, T.; McFadden, M.

    1993-01-01

    When developing a transportation system to transport transuranic (TRU) waste from ten widely-dispersed generator sites, the Department of Energy (DOE) recognized and addressed many challenges. Shipments of waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) were to cover a twenty-five year period and utilize routes covering over twelve thousand miles in twenty-three states. Enhancing public safety by maximizing the payload, thus reducing the number of shipments, was the primary objective. To preclude the requirement for overweight permits, the DOE started with a total shipment weight limit of 80,000 pounds and developed an integrated transportation system consisting of a Type ''B'' package to transport the material, a lightweight tractor and trailer, stringent driver requirements, and a shipment tracking system referred to as ''TRANSCOM''

  9. Radionuclide transport in sandstones with WIPP brine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weed, H.C.; Bazan, F.; Fontanilla, J.; Garrison, J.; Rego, J.; Winslow, A.M.

    1981-02-01

    Retardation factors (R) have been measured for the transport of 3 H, /sup 95m/Tc, and 85 Sr in WIPP brine using St. Peter, Berea, Kayenta, and San Felipe sandstone cores. If tritium is assumed to have R=1, /sup 95m/Tc has R=1.0 to 1.3 and therefore is essentially not retarded. Strontium-85 has R = 1.0 to 1.3 on St. Peter, Berea, and Kayenta, but R=3 on San Felipe. This is attributed to sorption on the matrix material of San Felipe, which has 45 volume % matrix compared with 1 to 10 volume % for the others. Retardation factors (R/sub s/) for 85 Sr calculated from static sorption measurements are unity for all the sandstones. Therefore, the static and transport results for 85 Sr disagree in the case of San Felipe, but agree for St. Peter, Berea, and Kayenta

  10. Second reference calculation for the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Branstetter, L.J.

    1985-03-01

    Results of the second reference calculation for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project using the dynamic relaxation finite element code SANCHO are presented. This reference calculation is intended to predict the response of a typical panel of excavated rooms designed for storage of nonheat-producing nuclear waste. Results are presented that include relevant deformations, relative clay seam displacements, and stress and strain profiles. This calculation is a particular solution obtained by a computer code, which has proven analytic capabilities when compared with other structural finite element codes. It is hoped that the results presented here will be useful in providing scoping values for defining experiments and for developing instrumentation. It is also hoped that the calculation will be useful as part of an exercise in developing a methodology for performing important design calculations by more than one analyst using more than one computer code, and for defining internal Quality Assurance (QA) procedures for such calculations. 27 refs., 15 figs

  11. WIPP/SRL in-situ tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mamsey, W.G.

    1990-01-01

    The Materials Interface Interactions Test (MIIT) is the only in-situ program involving the burial of simulated high-level waste forms operating in the United States. Fifteen glass and waste form compositions and their proposed package materials, supplied by 7 countries, are interred in salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. A joint effort between Sandia National Laboratories and Savannah River Laboratory, MIIT is the largest international cooperative in-situ venture yet undertaken. The objective of the current study is to document the waste form compositions used in the MIIT program and then to examine compositional correlations based on structural considerations, bonding energies, and surface layer formation. These correlations show important similarities between the many different waste glass compositions studied world wide and suggest that these glasses would be expected to perform well and in a similar manner

  12. WIPP R and D in situ test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, L.D.

    1987-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a Department of Energy (DOE) RandD Facility for the purpose of developing the technology needed for the safe disposal of the United States' defense-related radioactive waste. The in situ test program focus is to provide the models and data to demonstrate the facility performance for isolation of waste at WIPP. The program is defined for the WIPP sealing system, thermal-structural interactions and waste package performance. A number of integrated large-scale underground tests have been operational since 1983 and are ongoing. The tests address the issues of both systems design and long-term isolation performance of the WIPP repository

  13. WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant] test phase plan: Performance assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing the disposition of transuranic (TRU) wastes resulting from nuclear weapons production activities of the United States. These wastes are currently stored nationwide at several of the DOE's waste generating/storage sites. The goal is to eliminate interim waste storage and achieve environmentally and institutionally acceptable permanent disposal of these TRU wastes. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico is being considered as a disposal facility for these TRU wastes. This document describes the first of the following two major programs planned for the Test Phase of WIPP: Performance Assessment -- determination of the long-term performance of the WIPP disposal system in accordance with the requirements of the EPA Standard; and Operations Demonstration -- evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the DOE TRU waste management system's ability to emplace design throughput quantities of TRU waste in the WIPP underground facility. 120 refs., 19 figs., 8 tabs

  14. Environmental Impact Statement: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): Executive summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-10-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the environmental impact statement for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the WIPP was published by the US Department of Energy (DOE) in April 1979. This document was reviewed and commented on by members of the general public, private organizations, and governmental agencies. The Final Environmental Impact Statement was subsequently published in October, 1980. This summary is designed to assist decision-maker and interested individuals in reviewing the material presented in the environmental impact statement for the WIPP project. To make this material widely available, this summary is published in both Spanish and English. Additional, more detailed information concerning the environmental and safety consequences of the WIPP project is available in the Final Environmental Impact Statement. Written comments and public hearing comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement are available for review. 27 refs., 4 figs., 7 tabs

  15. Environmental monitoring and cooperative resource management at the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    This poster session by the Environmental Monitoring Section of the US DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is to demonstrate that the DOE is committed to sound environmental management. This WIPP poster session demonstrates radiological as well as nonradiological environmental monitoring activities conducted routinely at the WIPP. And how data collected prior to the WIPP being operational is used to establish a preoperational baseline for environmental studies in which the samples collected during the operational phase will be compared. Cooperative Resource Management is a relatively new concept for governments agencies. It allows two or more agencies the ability to jointly share in funding a program or project and yet both agencies can benefit from the outcome. These programs are usually a biological type study. The WIPP cooperative agreement between the US BLM, DOE and its contractors is to continue the ongoing documentation of the diversity of the Chihuahuan desert

  16. Conclusions regarding geotechnical acceptability of the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weart, W.D.

    1983-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) was authorized by Congress in 1980 as an unlicensed research and development (R and D) facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes arising from the defense activities and programs of the United States. WIPP is now being constructed in southeast New Mexico, using salt beds about 655 m below the surface of the ground. Construction of the full WIPP facility will not commence until a preliminary underground excavation phase, called Site and Preliminary Design Validation (SPDV), is satisfactorily concluded in the summer of 1983. This SPDV program permits confirmation of subsurface geology, in drifts at planned facility depth that extend for 1555 m in a north-south direction, and in the two vertical shafts that provide access to these drifts. The subsurface studies are nearing completion, and it is therefore appropriate to draw conclusions regarding the geotechnical acceptability of the WIPP site. Four geotechnical elements are discussed: dissolution, deformation, hydrologic regime, and natural resources

  17. Test Plan: WIPP bin-scale CH TRU waste tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.

    1990-08-01

    This WIPP Bin-Scale CH TRU Waste Test program described herein will provide relevant composition and kinetic rate data on gas generation and consumption resulting from TRU waste degradation, as impacted by synergistic interactions due to multiple degradation modes, waste form preparation, long-term repository environmental effects, engineered barrier materials, and, possibly, engineered modifications to be developed. Similar data on waste-brine leachate compositions and potentially hazardous volatile organic compounds released by the wastes will also be provided. The quantitative data output from these tests and associated technical expertise are required by the WIPP Performance Assessment (PA) program studies, and for the scientific benefit of the overall WIPP project. This Test Plan describes the necessary scientific and technical aspects, justifications, and rational for successfully initiating and conducting the WIPP Bin-Scale CH TRU Waste Test program. This Test Plan is the controlling scientific design definition and overall requirements document for this WIPP in situ test, as defined by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), scientific advisor to the US Department of Energy, WIPP Project Office (DOE/WPO). 55 refs., 16 figs., 19 tabs

  18. Transporting existing VSC-24 canisters using a risk-based licensing approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srinivasan, R.; Sisley, S.E.; Hopf, J.E.

    2004-01-01

    The eventual disposition of the spent fuel assemblies loaded in canisters and casks currently designed and licensed only for on-site storage is an industry-wide issue. The canister-specific BUC evaluation approach developed by BFS can be used to license many of these storage canisters and casks for transportation. This will allow these storage canisters and casks to be transported intact to a long-term storage facility or repository, thereby minimizing fuel handling operations, impact on plant operations, and occupational exposure, as well as total infrastructure costs. Application of the proposed canister-specific BUC analysis approach to a preliminary evaluation of the 58 loaded MSBs demonstrates the benefits of this approach. The results of this preliminary evaluation show that a more rigorous analysis based on the known characteristics of the loaded spent fuel, rather than the design-basis fuel parameters, produces significantly lower maximum keff values and can be used to qualify many of the existing loaded storage canisters for transportation. Transportation certification for storage canisters having more reactive spent fuel payloads may require reliance on BUC approaches that are more aggressive than current NRC guidelines allow. Credit may be required for fission- product isotopes that do not have sufficient chemical assay data for benchmarking. In addition, reduced criticality safety margins may be required. For these more-aggressive BUC approaches, a risk assessment should be provided to support the NRC-approval basis. The risk assessment should evaluate the possibility and consequences of an accidental criticality event based upon inaccuracies in the characterization of the spent-fuel payloads

  19. Transporting existing VSC-24 canisters using a risk-based licensing approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Srinivasan, R.; Sisley, S.E.; Hopf, J.E. [BNFL Fuel Solutions, Campbell, CA (United States)

    2004-07-01

    The eventual disposition of the spent fuel assemblies loaded in canisters and casks currently designed and licensed only for on-site storage is an industry-wide issue. The canister-specific BUC evaluation approach developed by BFS can be used to license many of these storage canisters and casks for transportation. This will allow these storage canisters and casks to be transported intact to a long-term storage facility or repository, thereby minimizing fuel handling operations, impact on plant operations, and occupational exposure, as well as total infrastructure costs. Application of the proposed canister-specific BUC analysis approach to a preliminary evaluation of the 58 loaded MSBs demonstrates the benefits of this approach. The results of this preliminary evaluation show that a more rigorous analysis based on the known characteristics of the loaded spent fuel, rather than the design-basis fuel parameters, produces significantly lower maximum keff values and can be used to qualify many of the existing loaded storage canisters for transportation. Transportation certification for storage canisters having more reactive spent fuel payloads may require reliance on BUC approaches that are more aggressive than current NRC guidelines allow. Credit may be required for fission- product isotopes that do not have sufficient chemical assay data for benchmarking. In addition, reduced criticality safety margins may be required. For these more-aggressive BUC approaches, a risk assessment should be provided to support the NRC-approval basis. The risk assessment should evaluate the possibility and consequences of an accidental criticality event based upon inaccuracies in the characterization of the spent-fuel payloads.

  20. System for handling and storing radioactive waste

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anderson, John K.; Lindemann, Paul E.

    1984-01-01

    A system and method for handling and storing spent reactor fuel and other solid radioactive waste, including canisters to contain the elements of solid waste, storage racks to hold a plurality of such canisters, storage bays to store these racks in isolation by means of shielded doors in the bays. This system also includes means for remotely positioning the racks in the bays and an access tunnel within which the remotely operated means is located to position a rack in a selected bay. The modular type of these bays will facilitate the construction of additional bays and access tunnel extension.

  1. Canister storage building natural phenomena design loads

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tallman, A.M.

    1996-02-01

    This document presents natural phenomena hazard (NPH) loads for use in the design and construction of the Canister Storage Building (CSB), which will be located in the 200 East Area of the Hanford Site

  2. Canister transfer into repository in shaft alternative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.; Kukkola, T.; Autio, J.

    2005-09-01

    In this report, a study of lift transportation of a massive canister for spent nuclear fuel is considered. The canister is transferred from ground level to repository, which lies in the depth of 400 to 500 m in the bedrock. The canister is a massive metal vessel, whose weight is 19 to 29 tons, and which is strongly irradiant (gamma and neutrons), and which contains 1.4 to 2.2 tons of very strongly radio-active material, the activity of the fuel should not be spread in the environment even during postulated accidents. The study observes that the lift alternative is possible to be built and through good design practices and good maintenance procedures its safety, reliability and usability can be kept on such high level that canister transport is estimated to be licensable. (orig.)

  3. Design premises for canister for spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Werme, L

    1998-09-01

    The purpose of this report is to establish the basic premises for designing canisters for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, the requirements for canister characteristics, and the design criteria, and to present alternative canister designs that satisfy these premises. The point of departure for canister design has been that the canister must be able to be used for both BWR and PWR fuel 43 refs, 4 figs, 6 tabs

  4. Grain boundary corrosion of copper canister material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fennell, P.A.H.; Graham, A.J.; Smart, N.R.; Sofield, C.J.

    2001-03-01

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues in Sweden is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will then be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast inner container fitted inside a corrosion-resistant copper canister. During fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow they will tend to concentrate impurities within the copper at the new grain boundaries. The work described in this report was undertaken to determine whether there is any possibility of enhanced corrosion at grain boundaries within the copper canister. The potential for grain boundary corrosion was investigated by exposing copper specimens, which had undergone different heat treatments and hence had different grain sizes, to aerated artificial bentonite-equilibrated groundwater with two concentrations of chloride, for increasing periods of time. The degree of grain boundary corrosion was determined by atomic force microscopy (AFM) and optical microscopy. AFM showed no increase in grain boundary 'ditching' for low chloride groundwater. In high chloride groundwater the surface was covered uniformly with a fine-grained oxide. No increases in oxide thickness were observed. No significant grain boundary attack was observed using optical microscopy either. The work suggests that in aerated artificial groundwaters containing chloride ions, grain boundary corrosion of copper is unlikely to adversely affect SKB's copper canisters

  5. Am/Cm canister temperature evaluation in CIM5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baich, M.A.

    2000-01-01

    To facilitate the evaluation of alternate canister designs, 2 canisters were outfitted with thermocouples at elevations of 1/2, 3 1/2, and 6 1/2 inches from the canister bottom. The canisters were fabricated from two inch diameter schedule 10 and two inch diameter schedule 40 stainless steel pipe. Each canister was filled with approximately 2 kilograms of 49 wt percent lanthanide (Ln) loaded 25SrABS glass during 5 inch Cylindrical Induction Melter (CIM5) runs for TTR Tasks 3.03 and 4.03. Melter temperature, total mass of glass poured, and the glass pour rates were almost identical in both runs. The schedule 40 canister has a slightly smaller ID compared to the schedule 10 canister and therefore filled to a level of 9.5 inches compared to 8.0 inches for the schedule 40 canister. The schedule 40 canister had an empty mass of 1906 grams compared to 919 grams for the schedule 10 canister. The schedule 10 canister was found to have a higher maximum surface temperature by about 50--100 C (depending on height) during the glass pour compared to the schedule 40 canister. The additional thermal mass of the schedule 40 canister accounts for this difference. Once filled with glass, each of the canisters cooled at about the same rate, taking about an hour to cool below a maximum surface temperature of 200 C. No significant deformation of the either of the canisters was visually observed

  6. Post-test evaluations of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - Savannah River simulated defense HLW canisters and waste form

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.; Sorensen, N.R.; Harbour, J.R.; Ferrara, D.M.

    1993-01-01

    Eighteen nonradioactive defense high-level waste (DHLW) canisters were emplaced in and subjected to accelerated overtest thermal conditions for about three years at the bedded salt Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility. Post-test laboratory corrosion results of several stainless steel 304L waste canisters, cast steel overpacks, and associated instruments ranged from negligible to moderate. We found appreciable surface corrosion and corrosion products on the cast steel overpacks. Pieces of both 304L and 316 stainless steel test apparatus underwent extensive stress-corrosion cracking failure and nonuniform attack. One of the retrieved test packages contained nonradioactive glass waste form from the Savannah River Site. We conducted post-test analyses of this glass to determine the degree of resultant glass fracturing, and whether any respirable fines were present. Linear glass fracture density ranged from about 1 to 8 fractures intersecting every 5 cm (2 inch) segment along a diameter line of the canister cross-section. Glass fines between 1 and 10 microns in diameter were detected, but were not quantified

  7. Characterization of mixed CH-TRU waste for the WIPP Experimental Test Program conducted at ANL-W

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dwight, C.C.; McClellan, G.C.; Guay, K.P. [Argonne National Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Courtney, J.C. [Louisiana State Univ., Baton Rouge, LA (United States); Duff, M.J. [Consolidated Technical Services, Inc., Walkersville, MD (United States)

    1992-02-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is participating in the Department of Energy`s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Experimental Test Program by characterizing and repackaging mixed contact-handled transuranic waste. Characterization activities include gas sampling the waste containers, visually examining the waste contents, categorizing the contents according to their gas generation potentials, and weighing the contents. The waste is repackaged from 0.21m{sup 3} (55 gallon) drums into instrumented steel test bins which can hold up to six drum-equivalents in volume. Eventually the loaded test bins will be shipped to WIPP where they will be evaluated during a five-year test program. Three test bins of inorganic solids (primarily glass) were prepared between March and September 1991 and are ready for shipment to WIPP. The characterization activities confirmed process knowledge of the waste and verified the nondestructive examinations; the gas sample analyses showed the target constituents to be within allowable regulatory limits. A new waste characterization chamber is being developed at ANL-W which will improve worker safety, decrease the potential for contamination spread, and increase the waste characterization throughput. The new facility is expected to begin operations by Fall 1992. A comprehensive summary of the project is contained herein.

  8. Characterization of mixed CH-TRU waste for the WIPP Experimental Test Program conducted at ANL-W

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dwight, C.C.; McClellan, G.C.; Guay, K.P. (Argonne National Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)); Courtney, J.C. (Louisiana State Univ., Baton Rouge, LA (United States)); Duff, M.J. (Consolidated Technical Services, Inc., Walkersville, MD (United States))

    1992-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is participating in the Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Experimental Test Program by characterizing and repackaging mixed contact-handled transuranic waste. Characterization activities include gas sampling the waste containers, visually examining the waste contents, categorizing the contents according to their gas generation potentials, and weighing the contents. The waste is repackaged from 0.21m{sup 3} (55 gallon) drums into instrumented steel test bins which can hold up to six drum-equivalents in volume. Eventually the loaded test bins will be shipped to WIPP where they will be evaluated during a five-year test program. Three test bins of inorganic solids (primarily glass) were prepared between March and September 1991 and are ready for shipment to WIPP. The characterization activities confirmed process knowledge of the waste and verified the nondestructive examinations; the gas sample analyses showed the target constituents to be within allowable regulatory limits. A new waste characterization chamber is being developed at ANL-W which will improve worker safety, decrease the potential for contamination spread, and increase the waste characterization throughput. The new facility is expected to begin operations by Fall 1992. A comprehensive summary of the project is contained herein.

  9. Characterization of mixed CH-TRU waste for the WIPP Experimental Test Program conducted at ANL-W

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwight, C.C.; McClellan, G.C.; Guay, K.P.; Courtney, J.C.; Duff, M.J.

    1992-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is participating in the Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Experimental Test Program by characterizing and repackaging mixed contact-handled transuranic waste. Characterization activities include gas sampling the waste containers, visually examining the waste contents, categorizing the contents according to their gas generation potentials, and weighing the contents. The waste is repackaged from 0.21m 3 (55 gallon) drums into instrumented steel test bins which can hold up to six drum-equivalents in volume. Eventually the loaded test bins will be shipped to WIPP where they will be evaluated during a five-year test program. Three test bins of inorganic solids (primarily glass) were prepared between March and September 1991 and are ready for shipment to WIPP. The characterization activities confirmed process knowledge of the waste and verified the nondestructive examinations; the gas sample analyses showed the target constituents to be within allowable regulatory limits. A new waste characterization chamber is being developed at ANL-W which will improve worker safety, decrease the potential for contamination spread, and increase the waste characterization throughput. The new facility is expected to begin operations by Fall 1992. A comprehensive summary of the project is contained herein

  10. The WIPP institutional program for states' involvement in WIPP transportation planning, and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leonard, R.

    1991-01-01

    The Supplemental Stipulated Agreement of 1982 between the state of New Mexico and the Department of Energy (DOE) committed the DOE to emergency response training in New Mexico. In 1988, the state of New Mexico and the DOE entered into a two-year agreement providing $203,017 for financial assistance and $67,000 for equipment to enhance the state's emergency response capability. In 1990, this agreement was extended for an additional two years providing $226,088 for financial assistance and $39,000 for emergency response equipment. Also, in 1988 an agreement between the Western Governors' Association and the United States Department of Transportation provided $1.0 million to seven western states (Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming) to identify and implement programs to help ensure the safe transportation of transuranic waste from western points of origin to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). As part of this process, the Western Governors' Association and the seven states prepared the Report to Congress, Transport of Transuranic Wastes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: State Concerns and Proposed Solutions. In July 1990, a five-year cooperative agreement between the Western Governors' Association and the DOE was signed providing $1.515 million in funding to seven states along the Hanford/WIPP route. This continued the work started under the Department of Transportation's cooperative agreement

  11. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 15 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-11-01

    WIPP 15 is a borehole drilled in Marformation.h, 1978, in section 18, T.23S., R. 35E. of south-central Lea County. The purpose of WIPP 15 was to examine fill in San Simon Sink in order to extract climatic information and to attempt to date the collapse of the sink. The borehole was cored to total depth (810.5 feet) and encountered, from top to bottom, Quaternary calcareous clay, marl and sand, the claystones and siltstones of the Triassic Santa Rosa Formation. Neutron and gamma ray geophysical logs were run to measure density and radioactivity. The sink was about 547 feet of Quaternary fill indicating subsidence and deposition. Diatomaceous beds exposed on the sink margin yielded samples dated by 14 C at 20,570 +- 540 years BP and greater than 32,000 years BP; these beds are believed stratigraphically equivalent to ditomaceous beds at 153 to 266 feet depth in the core. Aquatic fauna and flora from the upper 98 feet of core indicate a pluvial period (probably Tohokan) followed by an arid or very arid time before the present climate was established. Aquifer pump tests performed in the Quaternary sands and clays show transmissivities to be as high as 600 feet squared per day. As the water quality was good, the borehole was released to the lessee as a potential water well

  12. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 15 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant-WIPP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1981-11-01

    WIPP 15 is a borehole drilled in Marformation.h, 1978, in section 18, T.23S., R. 35E. of south-central Lea County. The purpose of WIPP 15 was to examine fill in San Simon Sink in order to extract climatic information and to attempt to date the collapse of the sink. The borehole was cored to total depth (810.5 feet) and encountered, from top to bottom, Quaternary calcareous clay, marl and sand, the claystones and siltstones of the Triassic Santa Rosa Formation. Neutron and gamma ray geophysical logs were run to measure density and radioactivity. The sink was about 547 feet of Quaternary fill indicating subsidence and deposition. Diatomaceous beds exposed on the sink margin yielded samples dated by /sup 14/C at 20,570 +- 540 years BP and greater than 32,000 years BP; these beds are believed stratigraphically equivalent to ditomaceous beds at 153 to 266 feet depth in the core. Aquatic fauna and flora from the upper 98 feet of core indicate a pluvial period (probably Tohokan) followed by an arid or very arid time before the present climate was established. Aquifer pump tests performed in the Quaternary sands and clays show transmissivities to be as high as 600 feet squared per day. As the water quality was good, the borehole was released to the lessee as a potential water well.

  13. Concentration of uranium in the drinking and surface water around the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khaing, H.; Lemons, B.G.; Thakur, P.

    2016-01-01

    Activity concentration of uranium isotopes ( 238 U, 234 U and 235 U) were analyzed in drinking and surface water samples collected in the vicinity of the WIPP site using alpha spectroscopy. The purpose of this study was to investigate the changes in uranium concentrations (if any) in the vicinity of the WIPP site and whether the February 14, 2014 radiation release event at the WIPP had any detectable impact on the water bodies around the WIPP. (author)

  14. Resource conservation and recovery act draft hazardous waste facility permit: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-08-01

    Volume IV contains the following attachments for Module IV: VOC monitoring plan for bin-room tests (Appendix D12); bin emission control and VOC monitoring system drawings; bin scale test room ventilation drawings; WIPP supplementary roof support system, underground storage area, room 1, panel 1, DOE/WIPP 91-057; and WIPP supplementary roof support system, room 1, panel 1, geotechnical field data analysis bi-annual report, DOE/WIPP 92-024

  15. Drop Testing Representative Multi-Canister Overpacks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Snow, Spencer D. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Morton, Dana K. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-06-01

    The objective of the work reported herein was to determine the ability of the Multi- Canister Overpack (MCO) canister design to maintain its containment boundary after an accidental drop event. Two test MCO canisters were assembled at Hanford, prepared for testing at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), drop tested at Sandia National Laboratories, and evaluated back at the INEEL. In addition to the actual testing efforts, finite element plastic analysis techniques were used to make both pre-test and post-test predictions of the test MCOs structural deformations. The completed effort has demonstrated that the canister design is capable of maintaining a 50 psig pressure boundary after drop testing. Based on helium leak testing methods, one test MCO was determined to have a leakage rate not greater than 1x10-5 std cc/sec (prior internal helium presence prevented a more rigorous test) and the remaining test MCO had a measured leakage rate less than 1x10-7 std cc/sec (i.e., a leaktight containment) after the drop test. The effort has also demonstrated the capability of finite element methods using plastic analysis techniques to accurately predict the structural deformations of canisters subjected to an accidental drop event.

  16. WIPP - Pre-Licensing and Operations: Developer and Regulator Perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peake, Tom; Patterson, R.

    2014-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a disposal system for defense-related transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste. Developed by the Department of Energy (DOE), WIPP is located in Southeastern New Mexico: radioactive waste is disposed of 2,150 feet underground in an ancient layer of salt with a total capacity of 6.2 million cubic feet of waste. Congress authorized the development and construction of WIPP in 1980 for the express purpose of providing a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the defense activities and programs of the United States. This paper makes a historical review of the site development, site operations (waste disposal operations started in 1999), communications between US EPA and DOE, the chronology of pre-licensing and pre-operations, the operational phase and the regulatory challenges, and the lessons learned after 12 years of operations

  17. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) integrated project management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olona, D.; Sala, D.

    1993-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a research and development project of the Department of Energy (DOE), tasked with the mission of demonstrating the safe disposal of transuranic (TRU) radioactive wastes. This unique project was authorized by Congress in 1979 in response to the national need for long-term, safe methods for disposing of radioactive by-products from our national defense programs. The WIPP was originally established in December of 1979, by Public Law 96-164, DOE National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1980. Since the inception of the WIPP Project, work has continued to prepare the facility to receive TRU wastes. Studies continue to be conducted to demonstrate the safety of the WIPP facility in accordance with federal and state laws, state agreements, environmental regulations, and DOE Orders. The objectives of implementing an integrated project management system are to assure compliance with all regulatory and federal regulations, identify areas of concern, provide justification for funding, provide a management tool for control of program workscope, and establish a project baseline from which accountability and performance will be assessed. Program management and project controls are essential for the success of the WIPP Project. The WIPP has developed an integrated project management system to establish the process for the control of the program which has an expected total dollar value of $2B over the ten-year period from 1990-2000. The implementation of this project management system was motivated by the regulatory requirements of the project, the highly public environment in which the project takes place, limited funding and resources, and the dynamic nature of the project. Specific areas to be addressed in this paper include strategic planning, project organization, planning and scheduling, fiscal planning, and project monitoring and reporting

  18. Status and Growth of Underground Science at WIPP

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rempe, Norbert T.

    2008-10-01

    The science community is increasingly taking advantage of research opportunities in the government-owned Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), 655m underground near Carlsbad, NM. Discoveries so far include viable bacteria, cellulose, and DNA in 250 million-year old salt, preserved in an ultra-low background-radiation setting. Supplementing the overburden's shielding against cosmic radiation, terrestrial background from the host formation is less than five percent that of average crustal rock. In the past, WIPP accommodated development and testing of neutral current detectors for the Sudbury Neutrino Observatory and dark matter research, and it currently hosts two experiments pursuing neutrino-less double-beta decay. That scientists can listen to whispers from the universe in proximity to megacuries of radioactive waste lends, of course, credibility to the argument that WIPP itself is very safe. Almost a century of regional petroleum and potash extraction history and more than three decades of WIPP studies have generated a comprehensive body of knowledge on geology, mining technology, rock mechanics, geochemistry, and other disciplines relevant to underground science. Existing infrastructure is being used and can be expanded to fit experimental needs. WIPP's exemplary safety and regulatory compliance culture, low excavating and operating cost, and the high probability of the repository operating at least another 40 years make its available underground space attractive for future research and development. Recent proposals include low-photon energy counting to study internal dose received decades ago, investigations into ultra-low radiation dose response in cell cultures and laboratory animals (e.g., hormesis vs. linear no-threshold) and detectors for dark matter, solar and supernova neutrinos, and proton decay. Additional proposals compatible with WIPP's primary mission are welcome.

  19. Friction welded closures of waste canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klein, R.F.

    1987-01-01

    Liquid radioactive waste presently stored in underground tanks is to undergo a vitrifying process which will immobilize it into a solid form. This solid waste will be contained in a stainless steel canister. The canister opening requires a positive-seal weld, the properties and thickness of which must be at least equal to those of the canister material. All studies and tests performed in the work discussed in this paper have the inertia friction welding concept to be highly feasible in this application. This paper describes the decision to investigate the inertia friction welding process, the inertia friction welding process itself, and a proposed equipment design concept. This system would provide a positive, reliable, inspectable, and full-thickness seal weld while utilizing easily maintainable equipment. This high-quality weld can be achieved even in highly contaminated hot cell

  20. Chemical compatibility of DWPF canistered waste forms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harbour, J.R.

    1993-01-01

    The Waste Acceptance Preliminary Specifications (WAPS) require that the contents of the canistered waste form are compatible with one another and the stainless steel canister. The canistered waste form is a closed system comprised of a stainless steel vessel containing waste glass, air, and condensate. This system will experience a radiation field and an elevated temperature due to radionuclide decay. This report discusses possible chemical reactions, radiation interactions, and corrosive reactions within this system both under normal storage conditions and after exposure to temperatures up to the normal glass transition temperature, which for DWPF waste glass will be between 440 and 460 degrees C. Specific conclusions regarding reactions and corrosion are provided. This document is based on the assumption that the period of interim storage prior to packaging at the federal repository may be as long as 50 years

  1. Corrosion resistance of copper canister weld material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gubner, Rolf; Andersson, Urban

    2007-03-01

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast iron insert fitted inside a copper canister. SKB has since several years developed manufacturing processes for the canister components using a network of manufacturers. For the encapsulation process SKB has built the Canister Laboratory to demonstrate and develop the encapsulation technique in full scale. The critical part of the encapsulation of spent fuel is the sealing of the canister which is done by welding the copper lid to the cylindrical part of the canister. Two welding techniques have been developed in parallel, Electron Beam Welding (EBW) and Friction Stir Welding (FSW). During the past two decades, SKB has developed the technology EBW at The Welding Institute (TWI) in Cambridge, UK. The development work at the Canister Laboratory began in 1999. In electron beam welding, a gun is used to generate the electron beam which is aimed at the joint. The beam heats up the material to the melting point allowing a fusion weld to be formed. The gun was developed by TWI and has a unique design for use at reduced pressure. The system has gone through a number of improvements under the last couple of years including implementation of a beam oscillation system. However, during fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow they will tend to concentrate impurities at the new grain boundaries that might pose adverse effects on the corrosion resistance of welds. As a new method for joining, SKB has been developing friction stir welding (FSW) for sealing copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel in cooperation with TWI since 1997. FSW was invented in 1991 at TWI and is a thermo

  2. Corrosion resistance of copper canister weld material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gubner, Rolf; Andersson, Urban [Corrosion and Metals Research Institute, Sto ckholm (Sweden)

    2007-03-15

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast iron insert fitted inside a copper canister. SKB has since several years developed manufacturing processes for the canister components using a network of manufacturers. For the encapsulation process SKB has built the Canister Laboratory to demonstrate and develop the encapsulation technique in full scale. The critical part of the encapsulation of spent fuel is the sealing of the canister which is done by welding the copper lid to the cylindrical part of the canister. Two welding techniques have been developed in parallel, Electron Beam Welding (EBW) and Friction Stir Welding (FSW). During the past two decades, SKB has developed the technology EBW at The Welding Institute (TWI) in Cambridge, UK. The development work at the Canister Laboratory began in 1999. In electron beam welding, a gun is used to generate the electron beam which is aimed at the joint. The beam heats up the material to the melting point allowing a fusion weld to be formed. The gun was developed by TWI and has a unique design for use at reduced pressure. The system has gone through a number of improvements under the last couple of years including implementation of a beam oscillation system. However, during fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow they will tend to concentrate impurities at the new grain boundaries that might pose adverse effects on the corrosion resistance of welds. As a new method for joining, SKB has been developing friction stir welding (FSW) for sealing copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel in cooperation with TWI since 1997. FSW was invented in 1991 at TWI and is a thermo

  3. Deep Borehole Disposal Concept: Development of Universal Canister Concept of Operations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rigali, Mark J. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Applied Systems Analysis and Research; Price, Laura L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Applied Systems Analysis and Research

    2016-08-01

    This report documents key elements of the conceptual design for deep borehole disposal of radioactive waste to support the development of a universal canister concept of operations. A universal canister is a canister that is designed to be able to store, transport, and dispose of radioactive waste without the canister having to be reopened to treat or repackage the waste. This report focuses on the conceptual design for disposal of radioactive waste contained in a universal canister in a deep borehole. The general deep borehole disposal concept consists of drilling a borehole into crystalline basement rock to a depth of about 5 km, emplacing WPs in the lower 2 km of the borehole, and sealing and plugging the upper 3 km. Research and development programs for deep borehole disposal have been ongoing for several years in the United States and the United Kingdom; these studies have shown that deep borehole disposal of radioactive waste could be safe, cost effective, and technically feasible. The design concepts described in this report are workable solutions based on expert judgment, and are intended to guide follow-on design activities. Both preclosure and postclosure safety were considered in the development of the reference design concept. The requirements and assumptions that form the basis for the deep borehole disposal concept include WP performance requirements, radiological protection requirements, surface handling and transport requirements, and emplacement requirements. The key features of the reference disposal concept include borehole drilling and construction concepts, WP designs, and waste handling and emplacement concepts. These features are supported by engineering analyses.

  4. In-Situ Testing and Performance Assessment of a Redesigned WIPP Panel Closure - 13192

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Klein, Thomas [URS-Professional Solutions, 4021 National Parks Highway Carlsbad, NM 88220 (United States); Patterson, Russell [Department of Energy-Carlsbad Field Office, 4021 National Parks Highway Carlsbad, NM 88220 (United States); Camphouse, Chris; Herrick, Courtney; Kirchner, Thomas; Malama, Bwalya; Zeitler, Todd [Sandia National Laboratories-Carlsbad, 4100 National Parks Highway Carlsbad, NM 88220 (United States); Kicker, Dwayne [SM Stoller Corporation-Carlsbad, 4100 National Parks Highway Carlsbad, NM (United States)

    2013-07-01

    There are two primary regulatory requirements for Panel Closures at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the nation's only deep geologic repository for defense related Transuranic (TRU) and Mixed TRU waste. The Federal requirement is through 40 CFR 191 and 194, promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The state requirement is regulated through the authority of the Secretary of the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) under the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA), New Mexico Statutes Annotated (NMSA) 1978, chap. 74-4-1 through 74-4-14, in accordance with the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (HWMR), 20.4.1 New Mexico Annotated Code (NMAC). The state regulations are implemented for the operational period of waste emplacement plus 30 years whereas the federal requirements are implemented from the operational period through 10,000 years. The 10,000 year federal requirement is related to the adequate representation of the panel closures in determining long-term performance of the repository. In Condition 1 of the Final Certification Rulemaking for 40 CFR Part 194, the EPA required a specific design for the panel closure system. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) has requested, through the Planned Change Request (PCR) process, that the EPA modify Condition 1 via its rulemaking process. The DOE has also requested, through the Permit Modification Request (PMR) process, that the NMED modify the approved panel closure system specified in Permit Attachment G1. The WIPP facility is carved out of a bedded salt formation 655 meters below the surface of southeast New Mexico. Condition 1 of the Final Certification Rulemaking specifies that the waste panels be closed using Option D which is a combination of a Salado mass concrete (SMC) monolith and an isolation/explosion block wall. The Option D design was also accepted as the panel closure of choice by the NMED. After twelve years of waste handling

  5. Monitored retrievable storage and multi-purpose canister robotic applications: Feasibility, dose savings and cost analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, P.C.

    1995-01-01

    Robotic automation is examined as a possible alternative to manual spent nuclear fuel, transport cask and Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) handling at a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility, and as an alternative to current MPC closure and welding methods at commercial nuclear reactor sites. Automation of key operational aspects is analyzed to determine equipment requirements, through-put times and equipment costs. The economic analysis approach is described, and economic and radiation dose impacts resulting from this automation are compared to manual handling methods. (author). 5 refs, 5 figs, 3 tabs

  6. Copper canisters for nuclear high level waste disposal. Corrosion aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.; Sellin, P.; Kjellbert, N.

    1992-10-01

    A corrosion analysis of a thick-walled copper canister for spent fuel disposal is discussed. The analysis has shown that there are no rapid mechanisms that may lead to canister failure, indicating an anticipated corrosion service life of several millions years. If further analysis of the copper canister is considered, it should be concentrated on identifying and evaluating processes other than corrosion, which may have a potential for leading to canister failure. (au)

  7. Plutonium Immobilization Project - Can-In-Canister Hardware Development/Selection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2001-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) is a program funded by the U.S. Department of Energy to develop technology to disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. This program introduces the ''Can-in-Canister'' (CIC) technology that immobilizes the plutonium by encapsulating it in ceramic forms (or pucks) and ultimately surrounding it with high-level waste glass to provide a deterrent to recovery. Since there are significant radiation, contamination and security concerns, the project team is developing unique technologies to remotely perform plutonium immobilization tasks. This paper covers the design, development and testing of the magazines (cylinders containing cans of ceramic pucks) and the rack that holds them in place inside the waste glass canister. Several magazine and rack concepts were evaluated to produce a design that gives the optimal balance between resistance to thermal degradation and facilitation of remote handling. This paper also reviews the effort to develop a jointed arm robot that can remotely load seven magazines into defined locations inside a stationary canister working only through the 4 inch (102 mm) diameter canister throat

  8. Plutonium Immobilization Project - Can-In-Canister Hardware Development/Selection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, L.

    2001-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Project (PIP) is a program funded by the U.S. Department of Energy to develop technology to disposition excess weapons grade plutonium. This program introduces the ''Can-in-Canister'' (CIC) technology that immobilizes the plutonium by encapsulating it in ceramic forms (or pucks) and ultimately surrounding it with high-level waste glass to provide a deterrent to recovery. Since there are significant radiation, contamination and security concerns, the project team is developing unique technologies to remotely perform plutonium immobilization tasks. This paper covers the design, development and testing of the magazines (cylinders containing cans of ceramic pucks) and the rack that holds them in place inside the waste glass canister. Several magazine and rack concepts were evaluated to produce a design that gives the optimal balance between resistance to thermal degradation and facilitation of remote handling. This paper also reviews the effort to develop a join ted arm robot that can remotely load seven magazines into defined locations inside a stationary canister working only through the 4 inch (102 mm) diameter canister throat

  9. Site evaluation for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, L.R.

    1979-01-01

    Preliminary site selection activities for the WIPP are complete now; these consisted primarily of national and regional studies over the past fifteen years, and resulted in selection of the WIPP study area for geological characterization. The work of geological characterization should be considered to have begun with the drilling of ERDA 9 at the center of the WIPP study area and the initiation of seismic reflection work on the site. That geological characterization, which is primarily oriented to provide specific data concerning the present geology of the site, was virtually complete in December, 1978, when the Geological Characterization Report was submitted to the Department of Energy; much basic information has been gathered indicating no major technical problems with the site as it is now understood. Studies of long-term processes which might affect a repository or have an effect on safety analyses will now be the major geotechnical activity for the WIPP site evaluation team, some of these activities are already underway. These studies will deal with the age of significant features and the rates and processes which produce those features. The information so gained will be useful in increasing the confidence in evaluation of the safety of a repository

  10. Evaluation of the proposed WIPP site in southeast New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weart, W.D.

    1979-01-01

    Five years of earth science characterization of the proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site provide a high level of assurance that the area is satisfactory for development of a geologic repository. Ecological investigations and socioeconomic studies have indicated only relatively benign impacts will occur from construction, operation and long-term aspects of the repository

  11. WIPP: Lessons learned for state/DOE consultation and cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.

    1986-01-01

    WIPP is intended to be a repository for permanent disposal of 6,200,000 cu ft of transuranic waste generated from the nation's defense programs. The waste is not fixed, up to 1% can be respirable and it is stored in conventional 17-C Type A Carbon steel drums with a design life of 20 years. (Storage began in 1970). The waste form is not fused in an insoluble glass matrix and there is no commitment by DOE for getters. The question arises of the need and desirability to perform experiments with high level wastes at WIPP. The original purpose in the Oct 1980 WIPP FIES stated ''...the experiments are not so much concerned with the WIPP itself, as they are with planning future high level waste repositories. They are to answer technical questions about the disposal of high level waste in bedded salt and to provide a valid demonstration of the concepts involved.'' The purpose of this paper is to provide information for RH TRU disposal and to generate scientific knowledge that may be helpful to others and not to demonstrate high level waste disposal

  12. Evaluation of the proposed WIPP site in southeast New Mexico

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Weart, W.D.

    1979-01-01

    Five years of earth science characterization of the proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site provide a high level of assurance that the area is satisfactory for development of a geologic repository. Ecological investigations and socioeconomic studies have indicated only relatively benign impacts will occur from construction, operation and long-term aspects of the repository.

  13. The legal, regulatory and safety basis for opening WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dials, G.E.

    1997-01-01

    Current laws in the United States of America direct the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to site, design, operate, and decommission a deep geological repository for safe disposal of transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. In 1993, the DOE established the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) to integrate the nation's management of TRUW and to open the WIPP site for safe disposal of TRUW in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The CAO submitted the final Compliance Certification Application (CCA) in 1996, and is on schedule to open WIPP in November 1997, about three years earlier than scheduled before the establishment of the CAO. The performance assessment (PA) embodied in the CCA demonstrates that WIPP meets the EPA's regulatory requirements for radioactive releases for the 10,000 year regulatory period in both the undisturbed and disturbed (human intrusion) scenarios. Detailed planning, compliance-based research and development (R and D), teamwork among project participants and early and open iterative interactions with the regulators, oversight groups and other interested parties in the certification/permitting process are key components of the progress in the safe disposal of long-lived radioactive wastes. (author)

  14. Near-field performance of the advanced cold process canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.

    1990-09-01

    A near-field performance evaluation of an Advanced Cold Process Canister for spent fuel disposal has been performed jointly by TVO, Finland and SKB, Sweden. The canister consists of a steel canister as a load bearing element, with an outer corrosion shield of copper. The canister design was originally proposed by TVO. In the analysis, as well internal (ie corrosion processes from the inside of the canister) as external processes (mechanical and chemical) have been considered both prior to and after canister breach. Throughout the analysis, present day underground conditions has been assumed to persist during the service life of the canister. The major conclusions for the evaluation are: Internal processes cannot cause the canister breach under foreseen conditions, ie localized corrosion for the steel or copper canisters can be dismissed as a failure mechanism. The evaluation of the effects of processes outside the canister indicate that there is no rapid mechanism to endanger the integrity of the canister. Consequently the service life of the canister will be several million years. This factor will ensure the safety of the concept. (orig.)

  15. Studies of waste-canister compatibility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCoy, H.E.

    1983-01-01

    Compatibility studies were conducted between 7 waste forms and 15 potential canister structural materials. The waste forms were Al-Si and Pb-Sn matrix alloys, FUETAP, glass, Synroc D, and waste particles coated with carbon or carbon plus silicon carbide. The canister materials included carbon steel (bare and with chromium or nickel coatings), copper, Monel, Cu-35% Ni, titanium (grades 2 and 12), several Inconels, aluminum alloy 5052, and two stainless steels. Tests of either 6888 or 8821 h were conducted at 100 and 300 0 C, which bracket the low and high limits expected during storage. Glass and FUETAP evolved sulfur, which reacted preferentially with copper, nickel, and alloys of these metals. The Pb-Sn matrix alloy stuck to all samples and the carbon-coated particles to most samples at 300 0 C, but the extent of chemical reaction was not determined. Testing for 0.5 h at 800 0 C was included because it is representative of a transportation accident and is required of casks containing nuclear materials. During these tests (1) glass and FUETAP evolved sulfur, (2) FUETAP evolved large amounts of gas, (3) Synroc stuck to titanium alloys, (4) glass was molten, and (5) both matrix alloys were molten with considerable chemical interactions with many of the canister samples. If this test condition were imposed on waste canisters, it would be design limiting in many waste storage concepts

  16. Plutonium Immobilization Project - Robotic canister loading

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamilton, R.L.

    2000-01-01

    The Plutonium Immobilization Program (PIP) is a joint venture between the Savannah River Site (SRS), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). When operational in 2008, the PIP will fulfill the nation's nonproliferation commitment by placing surplus weapons-grade plutonium in a permanently stable ceramic form and making it unattractive for reuse. Since there are significant radiation and security concerns, the program team is developing novel and unique technology to remotely perform plutonium immobilization tasks. The remote task covered in this paper employs a jointed arm robot to load seven 3.5 inch diameter, 135-pound cylinders (magazines) through the 4 inch diameter neck of a stainless steel canister. Working through the narrow canister neck, the robot secures the magazines into a specially designed rack pre-installed in the canister. To provide the deterrent effect, the canisters are filled with a mixture of high-level waste and glass at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF)

  17. Techniques for freeing deposited canisters. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kalbantner, P.; Sjoeblom, R.

    2000-06-01

    Four different techniques for removal of the bentonite buffer around a deposited canister have been identified, studied and evaluated: mechanical, hydrodynamical, thermal, and electrical techniques. Different techniques to determine the position of the canister in the buffer have also been studied: mechanical, electromagnetic, thermal and acoustic techniques. The mechanical techniques studied are full-face boring, milling and core-drilling. It is expected that the bentonite can be machined relatively easily. It is assessed that cooling by means of flushing water over the outer surfaces of the tools is not feasible in view of the tendency of bentonite to form a gel. The mechanical techniques are characterized by the potential of damaging the canister, a high degree of complexity, and high requirements of energy/power input. The generated byproduct is solid and cannot be removed by means of flushing. Removal is assessed to be simplest in conjunction with full-face boring and most difficult when coredrilling is applied. The hydrodynamical techniques comprise high-pressure hydrodynamic techniques, where pressures above and below 100 bar, and low pressure hydrodynamical techniques (< 10 bar) are separated. At pressures above 100 bar, a water jet with a diameter of approximately a millimetre cuts through the material. If desired, sand can be added to the jet. At pressures below 100 bar the jet has a diameter of one or a few centimetres. The liquid contains a few percent of salt, which is essential for the efficiency of the process. The flushing is important not only because it removes the modified bentonite but also because it frees previously unaffected bentonite and thereby makes it accessible to chemical modification. All of the hydrodynamical techniques are applicable for freeing the end surface as well as the mantle surface. The degree of complexity and the requirement on energy/power decrease with a decrease in pressure. A significant potential for damaging the

  18. Decontamination of high-level waste canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nesbitt, J.F.; Slate, S.C.; Fetrow, L.K.

    1980-12-01

    This report presents evaluations of several methods for the in-process decontamination of metallic canisters containing any one of a number of solidified high-level waste (HLW) forms. The use of steam-water, steam, abrasive blasting, electropolishing, liquid honing, vibratory finishing and soaking have been tested or evaluated as potential techniques to decontaminate the outer surfaces of HLW canisters. Either these techniques have been tested or available literature has been examined to assess their applicability to the decontamination of HLW canisters. Electropolishing has been found to be the most thorough method to remove radionuclides and other foreign material that may be deposited on or in the outer surface of a canister during any of the HLW processes. Steam or steam-water spraying techniques may be adequate for some applications but fail to remove all contaminated forms that could be present in some of the HLW processes. Liquid honing and abrasive blasting remove contamination and foreign material very quickly and effectively from small areas and components although these blasting techniques tend to disperse the material removed from the cleaned surfaces. Vibratory finishing is very capable of removing the bulk of contamination and foreign matter from a variety of materials. However, special vibratory finishing equipment would have to be designed and adapted for a remote process. Soaking techniques take long periods of time and may not remove all of the smearable contamination. If soaking involves pickling baths that use corrosive agents, these agents may cause erosion of grain boundaries that results in rough surfaces

  19. Technical developments in the WIPP program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weart, W.D.

    1980-01-01

    More than five years of site specific studies have led to the conclusion that radioactive wastes can be safely isolated in the bedded salt of the Delaware Basin in southeast New Mexico. Aspects of particular concern for site integrity, such as regional or local dissolution processes and salt deformation have been thoroughly evaluated and are not believed to present hazards to the repository. Hydrology of the site area has been shown to possess many desirable features with respect to transport of radioisotopes to the bioshpere in the event of a repository breach. Natural resources, potash and hydrocarbons, are present in the area of the site but can be exploited with appropriate precautions. Safety analyses have considered the consequences of their possible attraction to future man. Repository behavior and interactions between waste and the host rock have been studied in the laboratory, in field tests and by calculational methods. In particular, such issues as brine migration and canister corrosion may be shown to have little detrimental impact if modest and practical engineering measures are adopted. Calculations indicate salt deformation and room closure rates may be great enough that a salt repository must be carefully designed in order to assure ready retrieval of emplaced waste over long periods of time. Safety assessment calculations have been performed to determine the consequences of assumed repository failure scenarios. Even the most dire credible (but improbable) natural failure scenarios prove to be benign in their consequences to man. Direct penetration by unknowing, future man could result in significant exposures to the specific individuals involved but would not cause significant population effects

  20. Design of double containment canister cask storage system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asami, M.; Matsumoto, T.; Oohama, T.; Kuriyama, K.; Kawakami, K.

    2004-01-01

    Spent fuels discharged from Japanese LWR will be stored as recycled-fuel-resources in interim storage facilities. The concrete cask storage system is one of important forms for the spent fuel interim storage. In Japan, the interim storage facility will be located near the coast, therefore it is important to prevent SCC (Stress Corrosion Cracking) caused by sea salt particles and to assure the containment integrity of the canister which contains spent fuels. KEPCO, NFT and OCL have designed the double containment canister cask storage system that can assure the long-term containment integrity and monitor the containment performance without storage capacity decrease. Major features of the combined canister cask system are shown as follows: This system can survey containment integrity of dual canisters by monitoring the pressure of the gap between canisters. The primary canister has dual lids sealed by welding. The secondary canister has single lid tightened by bolts and sealed by metallic gaskets. The primary canister is contained in the transport cask during transportation, and the gap between the primary canister and the transport cask is filled with He gas. Under storage condition in the concrete cask, the primary canister is contained in the secondary canister, and the gap between these canisters is filled with helium gas. Hence this system can prevent the primary canister to contact sea salt particle in the air and from SCC. Decrease of cooling performance because of the double canister is compensated by fins fitted on the secondary canister surface. Then, this system can prevent the decrease of storage capacity determined by the fuel temperature limit. This system can assure that the primary canister will keep intact for long term storage. Therefore, in the case of pressure down of the gap between canisters, it can be considered that the secondary canister containment is damaged, and the primary canister will be transferred to another secondary canister at the

  1. Hydraulic Characterization Activities in Support of the Shaft-Seals Fluid-Flow Modeling Integration into the WIPP EPA Compliance Certification Application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knowles, M.K.; Hurtado, L.D.; Dale, Tim

    1997-12-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a planned geologic repository for permanent disposal of transuranic waste generated by the U.S. Department of Energy. Disposal regions consist of panels and drifts mined from the bedded salt of the Salado Formation at a depth of approximately 650 m below the surface. This lithology is part of the 225 million year old Delaware Basin, and is geographically located in southeastern New Mexico. Four shafts service the facility needs for air intake, exhaust, waste handling, and salt handling. As the science advisor for the project, Sandia National Laboratories developed the WIPP shaft sealing system design. This design is a fundamental component of the application process for facility licensing, and has been found acceptable by stakeholders and regulatory agencies. The seal system design is founded on results obtained from laboratory and field experiments, numerical modeling, and engineering judgment. This paper describes a field test program to characterize the fluid flow properties in the WIPP shafts at representative seal locations. This work was conducted by Duke Engineering and Services under contract to Sandia National Laboratories in support of the seal system design

  2. Design report of the canister for nuclear fuel disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.; Salo, J.P.

    1996-12-01

    The report provides a summary of the design of the canister for final disposal of nuclear fuel. The canister structure consists of a cylindrical massive nodular graphite cast iron insert covered by a 50 mm thick copper overlay. The capacity of the canister is 11 assemblies of BWR or VVER 440 fuel. The canister shall be tight with a high probability for about 100 000 years. The design basis of the canister is set, the performed analyses are summarised and the results are assessed and discussed in the report. (26 refs.)

  3. Criticality safety calculations for the nuclear waste disposal canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anttila, M.

    1996-12-01

    The criticality safety of the copper/iron canisters developed for the final disposal of the Finnish spent fuel has been studied with the MCNP4A code based on the Monte Carlo technique and with the fuel assembly burnup programs CASMO-HEX and CASMO-4. Two rather similar types of spent fuel disposal canisters have been studied. One canister type has been designed for hexagonal VVER-440 fuel assemblies used at the Loviisa nuclear power plant (IVO canister) and the other one for square BWR fuel bundles used at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (TVO canister). (10 refs.)

  4. Canister disposition plan for the DWPF Startup Test Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harbour, J.R.; Payne, C.H.

    1990-01-01

    This report details the disposition of canisters and the canistered waste forms produced during the DWPF Startup Test Program. The six melter campaigns (DWPF Startup Tests FA-13, WP-14, WP-15, WP-16, WP-17, and FA-18) will produce 126 canistered waste forms. In addition, up to 20 additional canistered waste forms may be produced from glass poured during the transition between campaigns. In particular, this canister disposition plan (1) assigns (by alpha-numeric code) a specific canister to each location in the six campaign sequences, (2) describes the method of access for glass sampling on each canistered waste form, (3) describes the nature of the specific tests which will be carried out, (4) details which tests will be carried out on each canistered waste form, (5) provides the sequence of these tests for each canistered waste form, and (6) assigns a storage location for each canistered waste form. The tests are designed to provide evidence, as detailed in the Waste Form Compliance Plan (WCP 1 ), that the DWPF product will comply with the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS 2 ). The WAPS must be met before the canistered waste form is accepted by DOE for ultimate disposal at the Federal Repository. The results of these tests will be included in the Waste Form Qualification Report (WQR)

  5. Near-field performance of the advanced cold process canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.

    1991-12-01

    A near-field performance evaluation of an advanced cold process canister for spent fuel disposal has been performed jointly by TVO, Finland and SKB, Sweden. The canister consists of a steel canister as a load bearing element, with an outer corrosion shield of copper. In the analysis, as well internal (ie corrosion processes from the inside of the canister) as external processes (mechanical and chemical) have been considered both prior to and after canister breach. The major conclusions for the evaluation are: Internal processes cannot cause the canister breach under foreseen conditions, ie local-iced corrosion for the steel or copper canisters can be dismissed as a failure mechanism; The evaluation of the effects of processed outside the canister indicate that there is no rapid mechanism to endanger the integrity of the canister. Consequently the service life of the canister will be several million years. For completeness also evaluation of post-failure behaviour was carried out. Analyses were focussed on low probability phenomena from faults in canisters. Some items were identified where further research is justified in order to increase knowledge of the phenomena and thus strengthen the confidence of safety margins. However, it can be concluded that the risks of these scenarios can be judged to be acceptable. This is due to the fact that firstly, the probability of occurrence of most of these scenarios can be controlled to a large extent through technical measures. Secondly, these analyses indicated that the consequences would not be severe

  6. Design report of the disposal canister for twelve fuel assemblies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Raiko, H. [VTT Energy, Espoo (Finland); Salo, J.P. [Posiva Oy, Helsinki (Finland)

    1999-05-01

    The report provides a summary of the design of the canister for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The canister structure consists of a cylindrical massive nodular graphite cast iron insert covered by a 50 mm thick copper overlay. The capacity of the canister is 12 assemblies of BWR or VVER 440 fuel. The canister shall be tight with a high probability for about 100 000 years. The good and long lasting tightness requires: (1) The good initial tightness that is achieved by high quality requirements and extensive quality control, (2) The good corrosion resistance, which is obtained by the overpack of oxygen free copper, and (3) Mechanical strength of the canister, that is ensured by analyses (the following loads are considered: hydrostatic pressure, even and uneven swelling pressure of bentonite, thermal effects, and elevated hydrostatic pressure during glaciation. The allowed stresses and strains are set in such a way that reasonable engineering safety factors are obtained in all assessed design base loading cases). The canister shall limit the radiation dose rate outside the canister to minimise the radiolysis of the water in the vicinity of the canister. The canister insert shall keep the fuel assemblies in a subcritical configuration even if the void in the canister is filled with water due to postulated leakage. The design basis of the canister is set, the performed analyses are summarised and the results are assessed and discussed in the report. (orig.) 35 refs.

  7. Design report of the disposal canister for twelve fuel assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.; Salo, J.P.

    1999-05-01

    The report provides a summary of the design of the canister for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The canister structure consists of a cylindrical massive nodular graphite cast iron insert covered by a 50 mm thick copper overlay. The capacity of the canister is 12 assemblies of BWR or VVER 440 fuel. The canister shall be tight with a high probability for about 100 000 years. The good and long lasting tightness requires: (1) The good initial tightness that is achieved by high quality requirements and extensive quality control, (2) The good corrosion resistance, which is obtained by the overpack of oxygen free copper, and (3) Mechanical strength of the canister, that is ensured by analyses (the following loads are considered: hydrostatic pressure, even and uneven swelling pressure of bentonite, thermal effects, and elevated hydrostatic pressure during glaciation. The allowed stresses and strains are set in such a way that reasonable engineering safety factors are obtained in all assessed design base loading cases). The canister shall limit the radiation dose rate outside the canister to minimise the radiolysis of the water in the vicinity of the canister. The canister insert shall keep the fuel assemblies in a subcritical configuration even if the void in the canister is filled with water due to postulated leakage. The design basis of the canister is set, the performed analyses are summarised and the results are assessed and discussed in the report. (orig.)

  8. Reliability in sealing of canister for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ronneteg, Ulf; Cederqvist, Lars; Ryden, Haakan; Oeberg, Tomas; Mueller, Christina

    2006-06-01

    obtained with NDT. The predicted maximum discontinuity size in connection with the welding of 4,500 canisters at the present stage of development of the process was conservatively determined to be less than one centimetre. All factors considered, the predicted minimum copper coverage for a 5 cm thick canister is 4 cm. Acceptance criteria for permitted settings in the welding process in a future sealing system are proposed, as is the use of statistical process control based on nondestructive testing as an independent inspection system. Furthermore, principles for handling of process non conformances are presented

  9. Reliability in sealing of canister for spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ronneteg, Ulf [Bodycote Materials Testing AB, Nykoeping (Sweden); Cederqvist, Lars; Ryden, Haakan [Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co., Stockholm (Sweden); Oeberg, Tomas [Tomas Oeberg Konsult AB, Karlskrona (Sweden); Mueller, Christina [Federal Inst. for Materials Research and Testing, Berlin (Germany)

    2006-06-15

    obtained with NDT. The predicted maximum discontinuity size in connection with the welding of 4,500 canisters at the present stage of development of the process was conservatively determined to be less than one centimetre. All factors considered, the predicted minimum copper coverage for a 5 cm thick canister is 4 cm. Acceptance criteria for permitted settings in the welding process in a future sealing system are proposed, as is the use of statistical process control based on nondestructive testing as an independent inspection system. Furthermore, principles for handling of process non conformances are presented.

  10. An Assessment of Using Vibrational Compaction of Calcined HLW and LLW in DWPF Canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yi, Yun-Bo; Amme, Robert C.; Shayer, Zeev

    2008-01-01

    both of them) of applying the vibrational forces? 2) What is best mode of operation: first fill the canister with calcined waste and then vibrate it and refill it again, or apply vibrational forces during the filling process. By optimum or best we mean less creation of stress/strain forces during the volume reduction vibration process. Lessons learnt: This preliminary study shows that; 1) The maximum stress concentration always occurs in the canister wall, however its location varies and depends on the loading condition, and vibration process. 2) The proposed vibrational process would not cause any damages to the granulated calcined waste. 3) The first natural frequency of the longitudinal vibration of the canister is around 400 Hz, which is far away from the applied vibrational frequencies and from possibility of resonance phenomena that may cause damage to the canister 4) The relationship between the maximum internal stress and the frequency of the applied load is not parabolic. 5) The mechanical properties of the granulated calcined nuclear waste have small impact on the internal stress of the canister. Finally, the calculated data suggested that applying vibrational forces will keep the entire canister whole without any indication of development defects, and will have significant economical benefits of handling HLW and LLW in calcined forms, from waste manipulation, storage and transportation

  11. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) research and development program: in situ testing plan, March 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matalucci, R.V.; Christensen, C.L.; Hunter, T.O.; Molecke, M.A.; Munson, D.E.

    1982-12-01

    The WIPP in southeast New Mexico is being developed as an R and D facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive defense wastes in bedded salt. The tests are done first without radioactive materials and then with transuranic (TRU) waste and Defense High-Level Waste (DHLW). The thermal/structural itneraction experiments include (a) geomechanical evaluations of access drifts, vertical shafts, and isothermal TRU disposal rooms during the Site and Preliminary Validation Program, (b) tests that represent the reference DHLW room configuraton (5.5 m x 5.5 m) and areal thermal loading of 12 W/m 2 , (c) an overtest of the DHLW congfiguration heated to about four times the reference thermal loading; (d) geomechanical evaluations of various room widths up to 9.1 m, variable pillar widths, and a long-drift intersection, (e) an 11-m-dia axisymmetric heated pillar test, and (f) miscellaneous tests to determine stress field and clay seam sliding resistance. The plugging and sealing experiments include (a) salt permeability tests, (b) tests to determine effects of size and scale on behavior of plugs and to determine backfill material behavior and emplacement techniques, and (c) a plug test matrix to evaluate candidate sealing materials. Waste package interaction experiments include (a) simulated-waste package tests that use several design options and engineered barrier materials under reference and accelerated DHLW environments, (b) confirmatory brine migration tests, (c) TRU drum durability tests in dry and wet conditions, (d) options for radiation-source tests using cesium capsules, and (e) actual DHLW tests using up to 40 canisters for technical demonstrations and for addressing concerns of wasteform chemistry, leaching, and near-field radionuclide migration

  12. Decontamination processes for waste glass canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rankin, W.N.

    1981-06-01

    The process which will be used to decontaminate waste glass canisters at the Savannah River Plant consists of: decontamination (slurry blasting); rinse (high-pressure water); and spot decontamination (high-pressure water plus slurry). No additional waste will be produced by this process because glass frit used in decontamination will be mixed with the radioactive waste and fed into the glass melter. Decontamination of waste glass canisters with chemical and abrasive blasting techniques was investigated. The ability of a chemical technique with HNO 3 -HF and H 2 C 2 O 4 to remove baked-on contamination was demonstrated. A correlation between oxide removal and decontamination was observed. Oxide removal and, thus, decontamination by abrasive blasting techniques with glass frit as the abrasive was proposed and demonstrated

  13. SOURCE TERMS FOR HLW GLASS CANISTERS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    J.S. Tang

    2000-01-01

    This calculation is prepared by the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) Waste Package Design Section. The objective of this calculation is to determine the source terms that include radionuclide inventory, decay heat, and radiation sources due to gamma rays and neutrons for the high-level radioactive waste (HLW) from the, West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP), Savannah River Site (SRS), Hanford Site (HS), and Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). This calculation also determines the source terms of the canister containing the SRS HLW glass and immobilized plutonium. The scope of this calculation is limited to source terms for a time period out to one million years. The results of this calculation may be used to carry out performance assessment of the potential repository and to evaluate radiation environments surrounding the waste packages (WPs). This calculation was performed in accordance with the Development Plan ''Source Terms for HLW Glass Canisters'' (Ref. 7.24)

  14. Decontamination processes for waste glass canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rankin, W.N.

    1982-01-01

    A Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is currently being designed to convert Savannah River Plant liquid, high-level radioactive waste into a solid form, such as borosilicate glass. To prevent the spread of radioactivity, the outside of the canisters of waste glass must have very low levels of smearable radioactive contamination before they are removed from the DWPF. Several techniques were considered for canister decontamination: high-pressure water spray, electropolishing, chemical dissolution, and abrasive blasting. An abrasive blasting technique using a glass frit slurry has been selected for use in the DWPF. No additional equipment is needed to process waste generated from decontamination. Frit used as the abrasive will be mixed with the waste and fed to the glass melter. In contrast, chemical and electrochemical techniques require more space in the DWPF, and produce large amounts of contaminated by-products, which are difficult to immobilize by vitrification

  15. Decontamination processes for waste glass canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rankin, W.N.

    1981-01-01

    The process which will be used to decontaminate waste glass canisters at the Savannah River Plant consists of: decontamination (slurry blasting); rinse (high-pressure water); and spot decontamination (high-pressure water plus slurry). No additional waste will be produced by this process because glass frit used in decontamination will be mixed with the radioactive waste and fed into the glass melter. Decontamination of waste glass canisters with chemical and abrasive blasting techniques was investigated. The ability of a chemical technique with HNO 3 -HF and H 2 C 2 O 4 to remove baked-on contamination was demonstrated. A correlation between oxide removal and decontamination was observed. Oxide removal and, thus, decontamination by abrasive blasting techniques with glass frit as the abrasive was proposed and demonstrated

  16. Multi-purpose canister project overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.

    1995-01-01

    In this presentation, the author lists the approved and proposed dry storage technologies. He discusses the compatibility of dry storage systems with waste management systems. Historical aspects, recent history, key features of the program approach, benefits, specifications, acquisition and potential utility use of the multi-purpose canister (MPC) are covered. The MPCs provide standardization in the waste management system and a cost savings to utilities and government. MPC will be developed to the same level as existing dry storage systems

  17. Canister storage building hazard analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krahn, D.E.; Garvin, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Canister Storage Building (CSB) hazard analysis to support the final CSB safety analysis report (SAR) and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Report, and implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Report

  18. Technical basis for external dosimetry at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bradley, E.W.; Wu, C.F.; Goff, T.E.

    1993-01-01

    The WIPP External Dosimetry Program, administered by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Waste Isolation Division, for the US Department of Energy (DOE), provides external dosimetry support services for operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Site. These operations include the receipt, experimentation with, storage, and disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes. This document describes the technical basis for the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program. The purposes of this document are to: (1) provide assurance that the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program is in compliance with all regulatory requirements, (2) provide assurance that the WIPP External Radiation Dosimetry Program is derived from a sound technical base, (3) serve as a technical reference for radiation protection personnel, and (4) aid in identifying and planning for future needs. The external radiation exposure fields are those that are documented in the WIPP Final Safety Analysis Report

  19. Constitutive representation of damage development and healing in WIPP salt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chan, K.S.; Bodner, S.R.; Fossum, A.F.; Munson, D.E.

    1994-01-01

    There has been considerable interest in characterizing and modeling the constitutive behavior of rock salt with particular reference to long-term creep and creep failure. The interest is motivated by the projected use of excavated rooms in salt rock formations as repositories for nuclear waste. It is presumed that closure of those rooms by creep ultimately would encapsulate the waste material, resulting in its effective isolation. A continuum mechanics approach for treating damage healing is formulated as part of a constitutive model for describing coupled creep, fracture, and healing in rock salt. Formulation of the healing term is, described and the constitutive model is evaluated against experimental data of rock salt from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. The results indicate that healing anistropy in WIPP salt can be modeled with an appropriate power-conjugate equivalent stress, kinetic equation, and evolution equation for damage healing

  20. New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group - experience in reviewing WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neill, R.H.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of the New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group is to conduct an independent evaluation of the potential radiation exposure to people from WIPP--a radioactive waste facility intended to permanently dispose transuranic radioactive waste generated from the nation's nuclear weapons program. The concept of a State review of a proposed radioactive waste facility has been endorsed by both Federal and State legislative and executive agencies, and the experiences and interactions of the past four years to solve problems of this first-of-a-kind radioactive waste facility has led to many innovations in conflict resolution. The multidisciplinary Group's position is neither pro nor anti-WIPP and results are published and given broad dissemination to insure technical and public scrutiny of its work

  1. Comparative study of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) transportation alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-02-01

    WIPP transportation studies in the Final Supplement Environmental Impact Statement for WIPP are the baseline for this report. In an attempt to present the most current analysis, this study incorporates the most relevant data available. The following three transportation options are evaluated for the Disposal Phase, which is assumed to be 20 years: Truck shipments, consisting of a tractor and trailer, with three TRUPACT-IIs or one RH-72B; Regular commercial train shipments consisting of up to three railcars carrying up to 18 TRUPACT-IIs or up to six RH-72Bs; Dedicated train shipments consisting of a locomotive, an idle car, railcars carrying 18 TRUPACT-IIs or six RH-72Bs, another idle car, and a caboose or passenger car with an emergency response specialist. No other cargo is carried. This report includes: A consideration of occupational and public risks and exposures, and other environmental impacts; A consideration of emergency response capabilities; and An extimation of comparative costs

  2. Weatherization Innovation Pilot Program (WIPP): Technical Assistance Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hollander, A.

    2014-09-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) Weatherization and Intergovernmental Programs Office (WIPO) launched the Weatherization Innovation Pilot Program (WIPP) to accelerate innovations in whole-house weatherization and advance DOE's goal of increasing the energy efficiency and health and safety of low-income residences without the utilization of additional taxpayer funding. Sixteen WIPP grantees were awarded a total of $30 million in Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) funds in September 2010. These projects focused on: including nontraditional partners in weatherization service delivery; leveraging significant non-federal funding; and improving the effectiveness of low-income weatherization through the use of new materials, technologies, behavior-change models, and processes.

  3. Comparative study of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) transportation alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-02-01

    WIPP transportation studies in the Final Supplement Environmental Impact Statement for WIPP are the baseline for this report. In an attempt to present the most current analysis, this study incorporates the most relevant data available. The following three transportation options are evaluated for the Disposal Phase, which is assumed to be 20 years: Truck shipments, consisting of a tractor and trailer, with three TRUPACT-IIs or one RH-72B; Regular commercial train shipments consisting of up to three railcars carrying up to 18 TRUPACT-IIs or up to six RH-72Bs; Dedicated train shipments consisting of a locomotive, an idle car, railcars carrying 18 TRUPACT-IIs or six RH-72Bs, another idle car, and a caboose or passenger car with an emergency response specialist. No other cargo is carried. This report includes: A consideration of occupational and public risks and exposures, and other environmental impacts; A consideration of emergency response capabilities; and An extimation of comparative costs.

  4. Test plan: Potash Core Test. WIPP experimental program borehole plugging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, C.L.

    1979-09-01

    The Potash Core Test will utilize a WIPP emplaced plug to obtain samples of an in-situ cured plug of known mix constituents for bench scale testing. An earlier effort involved recovery at the salt horizon of Plug 217, a 17 year old plug in a potash exploration hole for bond testing, but the lack of particulars in the emplacement precluded significant determination of plug performance

  5. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant contact-handled transuranic waste preoperational checkout: Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-07-01

    This report documents the results of the WIPP CH TRU Preoperational Checkout which was completed between June 8 and June 14, 1988 during which period, a total of 10 TRUPACT shipping containers were processed from site receipt through emplacement of the simulated waste packages in the underground storage area. Since the design of WIPP includes provisions to unload an internally contaminated TRUPACT, in the controlled environment of the Overpack and Repair Room, one TRUPACT was partially processed through this sequence of operations to verify this portion of the waste handling process as part of the checkout. The successful completion of the CH TRU Preoperational Checkout confirmed the acceptability of WIPP operating procedures, personnel, equipment, and techniques. Extrapolation of time-line data using a computer simulation model of the waste handling process has confirmed that WIPP operations can achieve the design throughput capability of 500,000 ft 3 /year, if required, using two waste handling shifts. The single shift throughput capability of 273,000 ft 3 /year exceeds the anticipated operating receival rate of about 230,000 ft 3 /year. At the 230,000 ft 3 /year rate, the combined CH TRU annual operator dose and the average individual dose (based on minimum crew size) is projected to be 13.7 rem and 0.7 rem, respectively. 6 refs., 27 figs., 3 tabs

  6. Permeability of WIPP Salt During Damage Evolution and Healing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BODNER, SOL R.; CHAN, KWAI S.; MUNSON, DARRELL E.

    1999-01-01

    The presence of damage in the form of microcracks can increase the permeability of salt. In this paper, an analytical formulation of the permeability of damaged rock salt is presented for both initially intact and porous conditions. The analysis shows that permeability is related to the connected (i.e., gas accessible) volumetric strain and porosity according to two different power-laws, which may be summed to give the overall behavior of a porous salt with damage. This relationship was incorporated into a constitutive model, known as the Multimechanism Deformation Coupled Fracture (MDCF) model, which has been formulated to describe the inelastic flow behavior of rock salt due to coupled creep, damage, and healing. The extended model was used to calculate the permeability of rock salt from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site under conditions where damage evolved with stress over a time period. Permeability changes resulting from both damage development under deviatoric stresses and damage healing under hydrostatic pressures were considered. The calculated results were compared against experimental data from the literature, which indicated that permeability in damaged intact WIPP salt depends on the magnitude of the gas accessible volumetric strain and not on the total volumetric strain. Consequently, the permeability of WIPP salt is significantly affected by the kinetics of crack closure, but shows little dependence on the kinetics of crack removal by sintering

  7. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site gravity survey and interpretation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barrows, L.J.; Fett, J.D.

    1983-04-01

    A portion of the WIPP site has been extensively surveyed with high-precision gravity. The main survey (in T22S, R31E) covered a rectangular area 2 by 4-1/3 mi encompassing all of WIPP site Zone II and part of the disturbed zone to the north of the site. Stations were at 293-ft intervals along 13 north-south lines 880 ft apart. The data are considered accurate to within a few hundredths of a milligal. Long-wavelength gravity anomalies correlate well with seismic time structures on horizons below the Castile Formation. Both the gravity anomalies and the seismic time structures are interpreted as resulting from related density and velocity variations within the Ochoan Series. Shorter wavelength negative gravity anomalies are interpreted as resulting from bulk density alteration in the vicinity of karst conduits. The WIPP gravity survey was unable to resolve low-amplitude, long-wavelength anomalies that should result from the geologic structures within the disturbed zone. It did indicate the degree and character of karst development within the surveyed area

  8. Actinide Solubility and Speciation in the WIPP [PowerPoint

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reed, Donald T. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-11-02

    The presentation begins with the role and need for nuclear repositories (overall concept, international updates (Sweden, Finland, France, China), US approach and current status), then moves on to the WIPP TRU repository concept (design, current status--safety incidents of February 5 and 14, 2014, path forward), and finally considers the WIPP safety case: dissolved actinide concentrations (overall approach, oxidation state distribution and redox control, solubility of actinides, colloidal contribution and microbial effects). The following conclusions are set forth: (1) International programs are moving forward, but at a very slow and somewhat sporadic pace. (2) In the United States, the Salt repository concept, from the perspective of the long-term safety case, remains a viable option for nuclear waste management despite the current operational issues/concerns. (3) Current model/PA prediction (WIPP example) are built on redundant conservatisms. These conservatisms are being addressed in the ongoing and future research to fill existing data gaps--redox control of plutonium by Fe(0, II), thorium (analog) solubility studies in simulated brine, contribution of intrinsic and biocolloids to the mobile concentration, and clarification of microbial ecology and effects.

  9. WIPP: a perspective from ten years of operating success - 16189

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gregory, Phillip C.

    2009-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located 35 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico, USA is the first and, to the author's knowledge, only facility in the world for the permanent disposal of defense related transuranic (TRU) waste. Soon after plutonium was first synthesized in 1940 by a team of scientists at the University of California Berkeley Laboratory, the need to find a permanent repository for plutonium contaminated waste was recognized due to the more than 24,000 year half-life of Plutonium-239 ( 239 Pu). In 1957 the National Academy of Sciences published a report recommending deep geological burial in bedded salt as a possible solution. However, more than 50 years passed before the solution was achieved when in 1999 WIPP received the first shipment of TRU waste from Los Alamos National Laboratory. Ten years later, more than 7,600 shipments of TRU waste have been disposed of in rooms mined in an ancient salt bed more than 2,000 feet underground. This paper provides a brief history of WIPP with an overview of the technical, regulatory, and political hurdles that had to be overcome before the idea of a permanent disposal facility became reality. The paper focuses primarily on the safe, uneventful transportation program that has moved 100,000- plus containers of TRU waste from various U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) generator and/or storage sites across the Unites States to southeastern New Mexico. (author)

  10. Actinide Solubility and Speciation in the WIPP [PowerPoint

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reed, Donald T.

    2015-01-01

    The presentation begins with the role and need for nuclear repositories (overall concept, international updates (Sweden, Finland, France, China), US approach and current status), then moves on to the WIPP TRU repository concept (design, current status--safety incidents of February 5 and 14, 2014, path forward), and finally considers the WIPP safety case: dissolved actinide concentrations (overall approach, oxidation state distribution and redox control, solubility of actinides, colloidal contribution and microbial effects). The following conclusions are set forth: (1) International programs are moving forward, but at a very slow and somewhat sporadic pace. (2) In the United States, the Salt repository concept, from the perspective of the long-term safety case, remains a viable option for nuclear waste management despite the current operational issues/concerns. (3) Current model/PA prediction (WIPP example) are built on redundant conservatisms. These conservatisms are being addressed in the ongoing and future research to fill existing data gaps--redox control of plutonium by Fe(0, II), thorium (analog) solubility studies in simulated brine, contribution of intrinsic and biocolloids to the mobile concentration, and clarification of microbial ecology and effects.

  11. A coupled mechanical/hydrologic model for WIPP shaft seals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehgartner, B.

    1991-06-01

    Effective sealing of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) shafts will be required to isolate defense-generated transuranic wastes from the accessible environment. Shafts penetrate water-bearing hard rock formations before entering a massive creeping-salt formation (Salado) where the WIPP is located. Short and long-term seals are planned for the shafts. Short-term seals, a composite of concrete and bentonite, will primarily be located in the hard rock formations separating the water-bearing zones from the Salado Formation. These seals will limit water flow to the underlying long-term seals in the Salado. The long-term seals will consist of lengthly segments of initially unsaturated crushed salt. Creep closure of the shaft will consolidate unsaturated crushed salt, thereby reducing its permeability. However, water passing through the upper short-term seals and brine inherent to the salt host rock itself will eventually saturate the crushed salt and consolidation could be inhibited. Before saturating, portions of the crushed salt in the shafts are expected to consolidate to a permeability equivalent to the salt host rock, thereby effectively isolating the waste from the overlying water-bearing formations. A phenomenological model is developed for the coupled mechanical/hydrologic behavior of sealed WIPP shafts. The model couples creep closure of the shaft, crushed salt consolidation, and the associated reduction in permeability with Darcy's law for saturated fluid flow to predict the overall permeability of the shaft seal system with time. 17 refs., 6 figs., 1 tab

  12. WIPP gets thumbs up; Ward Valley time runs out

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1996-01-01

    Legislation passed in late September clears the way for the Department of Energy to begin shipment of national defense transuranic (TRU) radioactive waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, NM, as early as November 1997. On September 23, President Clinton signed the Fiscal Year 1997 Defense Authorization Bill, which contained amendments to the 1992 WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. The implementation of the law will help the DOE in its cleanup sites nationwide, and will enhance public health and safety by providing for the disposal of the waste in a 2150-ft underground salt formation, far away from population centers. Key components of the legislation include the following: (1) The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will continue as primary regulator of WIPP. (2) The EPA will have one year to review the Compliance Certification Application, which the DOE was to submit by October 31, 1996. Upon EPA certification (expected in October 1997), the DOE will begin shipping transuranic waste in November 1997. (3) A six-month waiting period for waste shipments has been removed (previously, the DOE was required to wait 180 days after the Energy Secretary's decision to begin disposal operations). (4) New Mexico will receive $20 million immediately, and annually for 14 years, with the funds to be used for infrastructure and road improvements in the state

  13. The WIPP transportation system -- ''Safer than any other''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, T.R.; Spooner, R.

    1991-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed an integrated transportation system to transport transuranic (TRU) waste from ten widely dispersed generator sites to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The system consists of a Type B container, a specially designed trailer, a lightweight tractor, the DOE TRANSCOM satellite-based vehicle tracking system, and uniquely qualified and highly trained drivers. The DOE has demonstrated that this system is ready to transport the TRU waste to the WIPP site efficiently and safely. Since the system was put in place in November 1988, it has been repeatedly upgraded and enhanced to incorporate additional safety measures. In June of 1989, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) reviewed the transportation system and concluded that ''the system proposed for transportation of TRU waste to WIPP is safer than that employed for any other hazardous material in the United States today and will reduce risk to very low levels'' (emphasis added). The NAS conclusion was made before the DOE implemented the Enhanced Driver Training Course for carrier drivers. The challenge facing the DOE was to examine the transportation system objectively and determine what additional improvements could be made to further enhance safety

  14. Stress corrosion cracking of copper canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, Fraser; Newman, Roger

    2010-12-01

    A critical review is presented of the possibility of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of copper canisters in a deep geological repository in the Fennoscandian Shield. Each of the four main mechanisms proposed for the SCC of pure copper are reviewed and the required conditions for cracking compared with the expected environmental and mechanical loading conditions within the repository. Other possible mechanisms are also considered, as are recent studies specifically directed towards the SCC of copper canisters. The aim of the review is to determine if and when during the evolution of the repository environment copper canisters might be susceptible to SCC. Mechanisms that require a degree of oxidation or dissolution are only possible whilst oxidant is present in the repository and then only if other environmental and mechanical loading conditions are satisfied. These constraints are found to limit the period during which the canisters could be susceptible to cracking via film rupture (slip dissolution) or tarnish rupture mechanisms to the first few years after deposition of the canisters, at which time there will be insufficient SCC agent (ammonia, acetate, or nitrite) to support cracking. During the anaerobic phase, the supply of sulphide ions to the free surface will be transport limited by diffusion through the highly compacted bentonite. Therefore, no HS. will enter the crack and cracking by either of these mechanisms during the long term anaerobic phase is not feasible. Cracking via the film-induced cleavage mechanism requires a surface film of specific properties, most often associated with a nano porous structure. Slow rates of dissolution characteristic of processes in the repository will tend to coarsen any nano porous layer. Under some circumstances, a cuprous oxide film could support film-induced cleavage, but there is no evidence that this mechanism would operate in the presence of sulphide during the long-term anaerobic period because copper sulphide

  15. Stress corrosion cracking of copper canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    King, Fraser (Integrity Corrosion Consulting Limited (Canada)); Newman, Roger (Univ. of Toronto (Canada))

    2010-12-15

    A critical review is presented of the possibility of stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of copper canisters in a deep geological repository in the Fennoscandian Shield. Each of the four main mechanisms proposed for the SCC of pure copper are reviewed and the required conditions for cracking compared with the expected environmental and mechanical loading conditions within the repository. Other possible mechanisms are also considered, as are recent studies specifically directed towards the SCC of copper canisters. The aim of the review is to determine if and when during the evolution of the repository environment copper canisters might be susceptible to SCC. Mechanisms that require a degree of oxidation or dissolution are only possible whilst oxidant is present in the repository and then only if other environmental and mechanical loading conditions are satisfied. These constraints are found to limit the period during which the canisters could be susceptible to cracking via film rupture (slip dissolution) or tarnish rupture mechanisms to the first few years after deposition of the canisters, at which time there will be insufficient SCC agent (ammonia, acetate, or nitrite) to support cracking. During the anaerobic phase, the supply of sulphide ions to the free surface will be transport limited by diffusion through the highly compacted bentonite. Therefore, no HS. will enter the crack and cracking by either of these mechanisms during the long term anaerobic phase is not feasible. Cracking via the film-induced cleavage mechanism requires a surface film of specific properties, most often associated with a nano porous structure. Slow rates of dissolution characteristic of processes in the repository will tend to coarsen any nano porous layer. Under some circumstances, a cuprous oxide film could support film-induced cleavage, but there is no evidence that this mechanism would operate in the presence of sulphide during the long-term anaerobic period because copper sulphide

  16. Design support document for the K Basins Vertical Fuel Handling Tools

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bridges, A.E.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the design support information for the Vertical Fuel Handling Tools, developed for the removal of N Reactor fuel elements from their storage canisters in the K Basins storage pool and insertion into the Single Fuel Element Can for subsequent shipment to a Hot Cell for examination. Examination of these N Reactor fuel elements is part of the overall characterization effort. These new hand tools are required since previous fuel movement has involved grasping the fuel in a horizontal position. These tools are required to lift an element vertically from the storage canister. Additionally, a Mark II storage canister Lip Seal Protector was designed and fabricated for use during fuel retrieval. This device was required to prevent damage to the canister lip should a fuel element accidentally be dropped during its retrieval, using the handling tools. Supporting documentation for this device is included in this document

  17. Handling of multiassembly sealed baskets between reactor storage and a remote handling facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Massey, J.V.; Kessler, J.H.; McSherry, A.J.

    1989-06-01

    The storage of multiple fuel assemblies in sealed (welded) dry storage baskets is gaining increasing use to augment at-reactor fuel storage capacity. Since this increasing use will place a significant number of such baskets on reactor sites, some initial downstream planning for their future handling scenarios for retrieving multi-assembly sealed baskets (MSBs) from onsite storage and transferring and shipping the fuel (and/or the baskets) to a federally operated remote handling facility (RHF). Numerous options or at-reactor and away-from-reactor handling were investigated. Materials handling flowsheets were developed along with conceptual designs for the equipment and tools required to handle and open the MSBs. The handling options were evaluated and compared to a reference case, fuel handling sequence (i.e., fuel assemblies are taken from the fuel pool, shipped to a receiving and handling facility and placed into interim storage). The main parameters analyzed are throughout, radiation dose burden and cost. In addition to evaluating the handling of MSBs, this work also evaluated handling consolidated fuel canisters (CFCs). In summary, the handling of MSBs and CFCs in the store, ship and bury fuel cycle was found to be feasible and, under some conditions, to offer significant benefits in terms of throughput, cost and safety. 14 refs., 20 figs., 24 tabs

  18. WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII,Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a). This work plan describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility's's Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit. The scope of work for the RFI Work Plan or SAP is being developed by the Permittees. The final content of the RFI Work Plan or SAP will be coordinated with the NMED for submittal on May 24, 2000. Specific project-related planning information will be included in the RFI Work Plan or SAP. The SWMU program at WIPP began in 1994 under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory authority. NMED subsequently received regulatory authority from EPA. A

  19. WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2000-02-25

    This Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII,Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a). This work plan describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility’s Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to NMED’s guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit. The scope of work for the RFI Work Plan or SAP is being developed by the Permittees. The final content of the RFI Work Plan or SAP will be coordinated with the NMED for submittal on May 24, 2000. Specific project-related planning information will be included in the RFI Work Plan or SAP. The SWMU program at WIPP began in 1994 under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory authority. NMED subsequently received regulatory authority from EPA

  20. Leveraging Radioactive Waste Disposal at WIPP for Science

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rempe, N. T.

    2008-12-01

    Salt mines are radiologically much quieter than other underground environments because of ultra-low concentrations of natural radionuclides (U, Th, and K) in the host rock; therefore, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a government-owned, 655m deep geologic repository that disposes of radioactive waste in thick salt near Carlsbad, New Mexico, has for the last 15 years hosted highly radiation-sensitive experiments. Incidentally, Nature started her own low background experiment 250ma ago, preserving viable bacteria, cellulose, and DNA in WIPP salt. The Department of Energy continues to make areas of the WIPP underground available for experiments, freely offering its infrastructure and access to this unique environment. Even before WIPP started disposing of waste in 1999, the Room-Q alcove (25m x 10m x 4m) housed a succession of small experiments. They included development and calibration of neutral-current detectors by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for the Sudbury Neutrino Observatory, a proof-of-concept by Ohio State University of a flavor-sensitive neutrino detector for supernovae, and research by LANL on small solid- state dark matter detectors. Two currently active experiments support the search for neutrino-less double beta decay as a tool to better define the nature and mass of the neutrino. That these delicate experiments are conducted in close vicinity to, but not at all affected by, megacuries of radioactive waste reinforces the safety argument for the repository. Since 2003, the Majorana collaboration is developing and testing various detector designs inside a custom- built clean room in the Room-Q alcove. Already low natural background readings are reduced further by segmenting the germanium detectors, which spatially and temporally discriminates background radiation. The collaboration also demonstrated safe copper electro-forming underground, which minimizes cosmogenic background in detector assemblies. The largest currently used experimental

  1. Fracturing of simulated high-level waste glass in canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peters, R.D.; Slate, S.C.

    1981-09-01

    Waste-glass castings generated from engineering-scale developmental processes at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory are generally found to have significant levels of cracks. The causes and extent of fracturing in full-scale canisters of waste glass as a result of cooling and accidental impact are discussed. Although the effects of cracking on waste-form performance in a repository are not well understood, cracks in waste forms can potentially increase leaching surface area. If cracks are minimized or absent in the waste-glass canisters, the potential for radionuclide release from the canister package can be reduced. Additional work on the effects of cracks on leaching of glass is needed. In addition to investigating the extent of fracturing of glass in waste-glass canisters, methods to reduce cracking by controlling cooling conditions were explored. Overall, the study shows that the extent of glass cracking in full-scale, passively-cooled, continuous melting-produced canisters is strongly dependent on the cooling rate. This observation agrees with results of previously reported Pacific Northwest Laboratory experiments on bench-scale annealed canisters. Thus, the cause of cracking is principally bulk thermal stresses. Fracture damage resulting from shearing at the glass/metal interface also contributes to cracking, more so in stainless steel canisters than in carbon steel canisters. This effect can be reduced or eliminated with a graphite coating applied to the inside of the canister. Thermal fracturing can be controlled by using a fixed amount of insulation for filling and cooling of canisters. In order to maintain production rates, a small amount of additional facility space is needed to accomodate slow-cooling canisters. Alternatively, faster cooling can be achieved using the multi-staged approach. Additional development is needed before this approach can be used on full-scale (60-cm) canisters

  2. Can-in-canister cold demonstration in DWPF (U)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuehn, N.H.

    1996-07-01

    The Department of Energy Fissile Materials Disposition Program is evaluating a number of options for disposition of weapons-usable plutonium surplus to national defense needs. One of the immobilization options is the Can-In-Canister approach. In this option small cans of a plutonium glass, which contains a neutron absorber, are placed on a support structure in a large Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister. The top is then welded onto the canister. This canister is filled with High Level Waste (HLW) glass at the DWPF. The HLW glass provides the radiation source for proliferation resistance. These canisters are to be placed in a Federal Repository. To provide information on the technical feasibility of this option prior to the Record of Decision on plutonium disposition, the Department of Energy Fissile Materials Disposition Program funded a demonstration in the DWPF. This demonstration was conducted before the start of radioactive operations. Two test canisters containing cans of surrogate (non- radioactive) plutonium glass were successfully filled with simulated HLW glass at the DWPF using standard pouring procedures. One canister had twenty cans of surrogate plutonium glass. The other had eight cans of surrogate plutonium glass. After the canisters were filled, the contents of the canisters were examined to provide data on the effect of the rack and cans on the filling of the DWPF canister, the effect of the pour on the surrogate plutonium glass and the effect of the rack and cans on the simulated HLW glass. There was no deformation of the support racks during the pour. The simulated HLW glass filled all the regions around the rack and cans and the regions between the cans and the wall of the canister. This report discusses the design of the racks and cans, the modification of the DWPF canisters to accommodate the rack and cans, the conditions during the pours and the results of the post pour analysis

  3. Further assessment studies of the Advanced Cold Process Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henshaw, J.; Hoch, A.; Sharland, S.M.

    1990-08-01

    A preliminary assessment of the performance of the Advanced Cold Process Canister (ACPC) was carried out recently by Marsh. The aim of the study presented in this report is to re-examine the validity of some of the assumptions made, and re-evaluate the canister performance as appropriate. Two areas were highlighted in the preliminary study as requiring more detailed quantitative evaluation. 1) Assessment of the risk of internal stress-corrosion cracking induced by irradiation of moist air inside the canister if, under fault conditions, significant water was carried into the canister before sealing. 2) Evaluation of the corrosion behaviour subsequent to first breach of outer container. (author)

  4. Shaft shock absorber tests for a spent fuel canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kukkola, T.; Toermaelae, V.P.

    2005-06-01

    The disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel will be transferred by a lift to the repository, which is 500 m deep in the bedrock. Model tests were carried out with the objective to estimate weather feasible shock absorber can be developed against the design accident case where the canister should survive a free fall to the lift shaft. If the velocity of the canister is not controlled by air drag or by any other deceleration means, the impact velocity may reach ultimate speed of 100m/s. The canister would retain its integrity in impact on water when the bottom pit of the lift well is filled with groundwater. However, the canister would hit the pit bottom with high velocity since the water hardly slows down the canister. The impact to the bottom of the pit should be dampened mechanically. The tests demonstrated that 20 m high filling to the bottom pit of the lift well by Light Expanded Clay Aggregate (LECA), gives fair impact absorption to protect the fuel canister. Presence of ground water is not harmful for impact absorption system provided that the ceramic gravel is not floating too high from the pit bottom. Almost ideal impact absorption conditions are met if the water high level does not exceed two thirds of the height of the gravel. Shaping of the bottom head of the cylindrical canister does not give meaningful advantages to the impact absorption system. The flat nose bottom head of the fuel canister gives adequate deceleration properties. (orig.)

  5. Thermal Predictions of the Cooling of Waste Glass Canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donna Post Guillen

    2014-11-01

    Radioactive liquid waste from five decades of weapons production is slated for vitrification at the Hanford site. The waste will be mixed with glass forming additives and heated to a high temperature, then poured into canisters within a pour cave where the glass will cool and solidify into a stable waste form for disposal. Computer simulations were performed to predict the heat rejected from the canisters and the temperatures within the glass during cooling. Four different waste glass compositions with different thermophysical properties were evaluated. Canister centerline temperatures and the total amount of heat transfer from the canisters to the surrounding air are reported.

  6. Origin of the brines near WIPP from the drill holes ERDA-6 and WIPP-12 based on stable isotope concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spiegler, P.; Updegraff, D.

    1983-03-01

    Pathways which might alter the isotopic compositions of deuterium and oxygen-18 meteoric water, seawaters, and in hydration waters in gypsum to the isotopic compositions of brines encountered at ERDA-6 and WIPP-12 are discussed. Present geologic conditions do not favor the alteration of the isotopic compositions of waters that exist near the WIPP site to those of the brines by these pathways. It is concluded that the brines encountered at ERDA-6 and WIPP-12 are probably derived from ancient ocean waters that have been isotopically enriched in oxygen-18 by exchange interaction with rock. The dehydration of gypsum as a process of origin of these brines cannot be ruled out

  7. Canister storage building trade study. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swenson, C.E. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)

    1995-05-01

    This study was performed to evaluate the impact of several technical issues related to the usage of the Canister Storage Building (CSB) to safely stage and store N-Reactor spent fuel currently located at K-Basin 100KW and 100KE. Each technical issue formed the basis for an individual trade study used to develop the ROM cost and schedule estimates. The study used concept 2D from the Fluor prepared ``Staging and Storage Facility (SSF) Feasibility Report`` as the basis for development of the individual trade studies.

  8. Canister storage building trade study. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swenson, C.E.

    1995-05-01

    This study was performed to evaluate the impact of several technical issues related to the usage of the Canister Storage Building (CSB) to safely stage and store N-Reactor spent fuel currently located at K-Basin 100KW and 100KE. Each technical issue formed the basis for an individual trade study used to develop the ROM cost and schedule estimates. The study used concept 2D from the Fluor prepared ''Staging and Storage Facility (SSF) Feasibility Report'' as the basis for development of the individual trade studies

  9. Pitting corrosion on a copper canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hermansson, H.P.; Beverskog, B.

    1996-02-01

    It is demonstrated that normal pitting can occur during oxidizing conditions in the repository. It is also concluded that a new theory for pitting corrosion has to be developed, as the present theory is not in accordance with all practical and experimental observations. A special variant of pitting, based on the growth of sulfide whiskers, is suggested to occur during reducing conditions. However, such a mechanism needs to be demonstrated experimentally. A simple calculational model of canister corrosion was developed based on the results of this study. 69 refs, 3 figs

  10. Multi-Canister overpack pressure testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SMITH, K.E.

    1998-01-01

    The Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) shield plug closure assembly will be hydrostatically tested at the fabricator's shop to the 150 psig design test requirement in accordance with the ASME Code. Additionally, the MCO shell and collar will be hydrostatically tested at the fabricator's shop to the 450 psig design test requirement. Commercial practice has not required a pressure test of the closure weld after spent fuel is loaded in the containers. Based on this precedent and Code Case N-595-I, the MCO closure weld will not be pressure tested in the field

  11. Canister storage building hazard analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    POWERS, T.B.

    1999-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used in conducting the Canister Storage Building (CSB) hazard analysis to support the CSB final safety analysis report (FSAR) and documents the results. The hazard analysis was performed in accordance with the DOE-STD-3009-94, ''Preparation Guide for US. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports'', and meets the intent of HNF-PRO-704, ''Hazard and Accident Analysis Process''. This hazard analysis implements the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports''

  12. Comments on 'SKB RD and D-Programme 98'. Focused on canister integrity and corrosion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowyer, W.H.; Hermansson, H.P.

    1999-04-01

    level of metallurgical support is required. We disagree that suitable full size canisters have already been created and that production technology is available for both canisters at full size. We also disagree that the long time durability is ascertained. i. a. it is easy to find corrosion mechanisms and handling procedures for the canister system that have to be demonstrated not to be harmful. We feel that there are many areas, which need further evaluation but are granted too little space in the programme. This is valid for i.a. effects of non-uniform loading and creep, welding, quality control, effects of radiolysis and corrosion properties. We also consider that more information should be provided on the detail and timing of the development plan for the trial fabrication programme of the canister, the canister test programme, determination of quality standards and development of non destructive testing procedures. We also feel that insufficient emphasis has been placed on the further development on alternatives to high power electron beam welding, non-destructive testing and over all handling. Copper will be exposed for both general and different kinds of localised corrosion in the repository. The complex mechanical, chemical and microbial environment with high pressures varying in time and location and with oxygen, chloride, sulphur and carbon bearing compounds present will cause different types of attacks that are going to prevail during different time periods. The procedures of production, handling and treatment of the canister throughout the processes of filling, transportation and deposition are crucial for its later, corrosion related integrity throughout the storage period in the repository. There is a risk that due to systematically induced faults, many canisters may have later corrosion related problems. The QA system should be developed to cover all steps of canister handling. We feel a large uncertainty when expressions like 'known corrosion processes

  13. Fracture toughness properties of candidate canister materials for spent fuel storage by concrete cask

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arai, Taku; Mayuzumi, Masami; Libin, Niu; Takaku, Hiroshi

    2005-01-01

    It is very significant to clarify the fracture toughness properties of candidate canister materials to ensure the structural integrity against the accidents during handling in the storage facility. Fracture toughness tests on the CT specimens cut from base metal, heat affected zone (HAZ) and weld metal in the 2 types of weld joints made by candidate canister materials (SUS329J4L duplex stainless steel and YUS270 super stainless steel) were conducted under various test temperature between 233K and 473K. Stable ductile crack extensions were observed in all of the specimens. The fracture toughness J Q of the base metal and the HAZ of SUS329L4L showed the smallest value at 233K, and increased with temperature, then reached to the largest value at 298K. At the higher temperature, the value of J Q decreased slightly with temperature. While, the value of J Q in the weld metal increased with temperature. The value of J Q of YUS270 increased with temperature. The values of J Q for weld metal in both of the materials were not greater than those in base metal and HAZ at each test temperature. The values of J Q in weld metal of both materials at 213K and 473K were greater than applied J derived from postulated semi-elliptical surface flaw and maximum allowable stress in JSME design coed. This result suggested that these materials have enough toughness for use as the canister material. (author)

  14. Resource conservation and recovery act draft hazardous waste facility permit: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Attachments: Volume 4 of 4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-08-01

    Volume IV contains the following attachments for Module IV: VOC monitoring plan for bin-room tests (Appendix D12); bin emission control and VOC monitoring system drawings; bin scale test room ventilation drawings; WIPP supplementary roof support system, underground storage area, room 1, panel 1, DOE/WIPP 91-057; and WIPP supplementary roof support system, room 1, panel 1, geotechnical field data analysis bi-annual report, DOE/WIPP 92-024.

  15. Handling encapsulated spent fuel in a geologic repository environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballou, L.B.

    1983-02-01

    In support of the Spent Fuel Test-Climate at the U.S. Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site, a spent-fuel canister handling system has been designed, deployed, and operated successfully during the past five years. This system transports encapsulated commercial spent-fuel assemblies between the packaging facility and the test site (approx. 100 km), transfers the canisters 420 m vertically to and from a geologic storage drift, and emplaces or retrieves the canisters from the storage holes in the floor of the drift. The spent-fuel canisters are maintained in a fully shielded configuration at all times during the handling cycle, permitting manned access at any time for response to any abnormal conditions. All normal operations are conducted by remote control, thus assuring as low as reasonably achievable exposures to operators; specifically, we have had no measurable exposure during 30 canister transfer operations. While not intended to be prototypical of repository handling operations, the system embodies a number of concepts, now demonstrated to be safe, reliable, and economical, which may be very useful in evaluating full-scale repository handling alternatives in the future. Among the potentially significant concepts are: Use of an integral shielding plug to minimize radiation streaming at all transfer interfaces. Hydraulically actuated transfer cask jacking and rotation features to reduce excavation headroom requirements. Use of a dedicated small diameter (0.5 m) drilled shaft for transfer between the surface and repository workings. A wire-line hoisting system with positive emergency braking device which travels with the load. Remotely activated grapples - three used in the system - which are insensitive to load orientation. Rail-mounted underground transfer vehicle operated with no personnel underground

  16. Choices of canisters and elements for the first fuel and canister sludge shipment from K East Basin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Makenas, B.J.

    1996-01-01

    The K East Basin contains open-top canisters with up to fourteen N Reactor fuel assemblies distributed between the two barrels of each canister. Each fuel assembly generally consists of inner and outer concentric elements fabricated from uranium metal with zirconium alloy cladding. The canisters also contain varying amounts of accumulated sludge. Retrieval of sample fuel elements and associated sludge for examination is scheduled to occur in the near future. The purpose of this document is to specify particular canisters and elements of interest as candidate sources of fuel and sludge to be shipped to laboratories

  17. Resource conservation and recovery act draft hazardous waste facility permit: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-08-01

    Volume I contains the following attachments for Module II: waste analysis plan; quality assurance program plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Experiment Waste Characterization Program(QAPP); WIPP Characterization Sampling and Analysis Guidance Manual (Plan)(SAP); and no migration Determination Requirement Summary (NMD)

  18. Test manufacture of the canister insert 135

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.

    2005-10-01

    This report describes the insert-manufacturing test of a disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel that was made by Metso Foundries Jyvaeskylae Oy, in June 2004 on contract for Posiva Oy. The test manufacture was a part of the co-operation development programme of encapsulation technology between SKB AB and Posiva Oy. Insert casting was specified according to the current manufacturing specifications of SKB. The canister insert was of BWR-type with integral bottom. This was the second trial manufacture of this type of insert in Finland and, in total, the third test manufacture of insert by Metso Foundries Jyvaeskylae Oy. The result fulfilled all the requirements but the material mechanical properties of the cast material. The measured ultimate strength and elongation at rupture were lower than specified in the upper part of the cast. The reason for this was revealed in the metallurgical investigation of the cast material. The cast contained slag (dross). Avoiding the dross formation will be the most demanding challenge of the forthcoming development of the cast procedure. (orig.)

  19. Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Topical Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LORENZ, B.D.

    2000-01-01

    In February 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) approved the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project's ''Path Forward'' recommendation for resolution of the safety and environmental concerns associated with the deteriorating SNF stored in the Hanford Site's K Basins (Hansen 1995). The recommendation included an aggressive series of projects to design, construct, and operate systems and facilitates to permit the safe retrieval, packaging, transport, conditions, and interim storage of the K Basins' SNF. The facilities are the Cold VAcuum Drying Facility (CVDF) in the 100 K Area of the Hanford Site and the Canister Storage building (CSB) in the 200 East Area. The K Basins' SNF is to be cleaned, repackaged in multi-canister overpacks (MCOs), removed from the K Basins, and transported to the CVDF for initial drying. The MCOs would then be moved to the CSB and weld sealed (Loscoe 1996) for interim storage (about 40 years). One of the major tasks associated with the initial Path Forward activities is the development and maintenance of the safety documentation. In addition to meeting the construction needs for new structures, the safety documentation for each must be generated

  20. Design analysis report for the canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, Heikki; Sandstroem, Rolf; Ryden, Haakan; Johansson, Magnus

    2010-04-01

    The mechanical strength of the canister (BWR and PWR types) has been studied. The loading processes are taken from the design premises report and some of them, especially the uneven bentonite swelling cases, are further developed in this study and in its references. The canister geometry is described in detail including the manufacturing tolerances of the dimensions. The canister material properties are summarised and the wide material testing programmes and model developments are referenced. The combination of various load cases are rationalised and the conservative combinations are defined. Also the probabilities of various load cases and combinations are assessed for setting reasonable safety margins. The safety margins are used according to ASME Code principles for safety class 1 components. The governing load cases are analysed with 2D- or global 3D-finite-element models including large deformation and non-linear material modelling and, in some cases, also creep. The integrity assessments are partly made from the stress and strain results using global models and partly from fracture resistance analyses using the sub-modelling technique. The sub-model analyses utilize the deformations from the global analyses as constraints on the sub-model boundaries and more detailed finite-element meshes are defined with defects included in the models together with elastic-plastic material models. The J-integral is used as the fracture parameter for the postulated defects. The allowable defect sizes are determined using the measured fracture resistance curves of the insert iron as a reference with respective safety factors according to the ASME Pressure Vessel Code requirements. Based on the BWR canister analyses, the following conclusions can be drawn. The 45 MPa isostatic pressure load case shows very robust and distinct results in that the risk for local collapse is vanishingly small. The probabilistic analysis of plastic collapse only considers the initial local collapse

  1. Test manufacture of a canister insert

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.

    2004-11-01

    This report describes the insert-manufacturing test of a disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel that was made by Metso Paper Oy, Jyvaeskylae Foundry, in 2003 on contract for Posiva Oy. The test manufacture was a part of the co-operation development programme of encapsulation technology between SKB AB and Posiva Oy. Insert casting was specified according to the current manufacturing specifications of SKB. The canister insert was of BWR-type with integral bottom. This was the first trial manufacture of this type of insert in Finland and, in total, the second test manufacture of insert by Metso Paper. The result fulfilled all the requirements but the material mechanical properties and metallurgical structure of the cast material. The measured tensile strength, ultimate strength and elongation at rupture were lower than specified. The reason for this was revealed in the metallurgical investigation of the cast material. The nodulizing of the graphite was not occurred during the casting process according to the requirements. (orig.)

  2. Evaluation of proposed panel closure modifications at WIPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Allen, Lawrence E.; Silva, Matthew K.; Channell, James K.; Abel, John F.; Morgan, Dudley R.

    2001-12-31

    A key component in the design of the WIPP repository is the installation of concrete structures as panel seals in the intake and exhaust drifts after a panel has been filled with waste containers. As noted in the EPA final rule, the panel seal closure system is intended to block brine flow between the waste panels at the WIPP. On April 17, 2001, the DOE proposed seven modifications to the EPA concerning the design of the panel closure system. EPA approval of these modifications is necessary since the details of the panel design are specified in EPA’s final rule as a condition for WIPP certification. However, the EPA has not determined whether a rulemaking would be required for these proposed design modifications. On September 4, 2001, the DOE withdrew the request, noting that it would be resubmitted on a future date. The Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) contracted with two engineers, Dr. John Abel and Dr. Rusty Morgan, to evaluate the proposed modifications. The EEG has accepted the conclusions and recommendations from these two experts: 1) replacement of Salado Mass Concrete with a generic salt-based concrete; 2) replacement of the explosion wall with a construction wall; 3) replacement of freshwater grouting with salt-based grouting; 4) option to allow surface or underground mixing; and 5) option to allow up to one year for completion of closure. The proposed modification to allow local carbonate river rock as aggregate is acceptable pending demonstration that no problems will exist in the resulting concrete. The proposed modification to give the contractor discretion in removal of steel forms is not supported. Instead, several recommendations are made to specifically reduce the number of forms left, thereby reducing potential migration pathways.

  3. A regional water balance for the WIPP site and surrounding area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, R.L.

    1987-01-01

    A water balance or budget is developed as an accounting of the components of a closed hydrologic system. In the WIPP study area, water-budget techniques have previously been used to compute leakage from Lake Avalon and from potash refinery spoil ponds. A general expression for a closed hydrologic system is presented. In a developed area like the WIPP region, the water budget must include many usage factors, such as municipal or industrial pumpage. In the WIPP water-budget study area, inflows are precipitation, surface- and ground-water inflow, and the artificial addition of surface and ground water. Outflows are surface runoff, evaporation and transpiration, and ground-water outflow. Changes in storage in the WIPP region have also been documented. The WIPP water balance described here is based on a combination of long-term averages and figures for 1980. 12 refs., 5 figs., 1 tab

  4. Environmental monitoring at the WIPP site CY 1976

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brewer, L.W.; Metcalf, J.H.

    1977-08-01

    Measurements made in the WIPP study area indicate background exposure levels of 8-9 μR/hr. These measured data are in good agreement with calculated exposure rates (7.5-9.6 μrad/hr). Airborne gross beta concentrations, which were low (0.02 pCi/m 3 ), confirmed the presence of global fallout from the Chinese nuclear tests conducted in the atmosphere during the fall. The air-quality measurements, except for a few unexplained excursions, were less than State and/or Federal air-quality standards

  5. WIPP air-intake shaft disturbed-rock zone study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dale, T.; Hurtado, L.D.

    1996-01-01

    The disturbed-rock zone surrounding the air-intake shaft at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site was investigated to determine the extent and the permeability of the disturbed-rock zone as a function of radial distance from the 6.1 m diameter shaft, at different elevations within the Salado. Gas- and brine-permeability tests were performed in the bedded halite of the Salado formation at two levels within the air-intake shaft. The gas- and brine-permeability test results demonstrated that the radial distance to an undisturbed formation permeability of 1 x 10 -21 m 2 was less than 3.0 m

  6. Designing a database for performance assessment: Lessons learned from WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martell, M.A.; Schenker, A.

    1997-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Compliance Certification Application (CCA) Performance Assessment (PA) used a relational database that was originally designed only to supply the input parameters required for implementation of the PA codes. Reviewers used the database as a point of entry to audit quality assurance measures for control, traceability, and retrievability of input information used for analysis, and output/work products. During these audits it became apparent that modifications to the architecture and scope of the database would benefit the EPA regulator and other stakeholders when reviewing the recertification application. This paper contains a discussion of the WPP PA CCA database and lessons learned for designing a database

  7. Final Report: Part 1. In-Place Filter Testing Instrument for Nuclear Material Containers. Part 2. Canister Filter Test Standards for Aerosol Capture Rates.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, Austin Douglas [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Runnels, Joel T. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Moore, Murray E. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Reeves, Kirk Patrick [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-11-02

    A portable instrument has been developed to assess the functionality of filter sand o-rings on nuclear material storage canisters, without requiring removal of the canister lid. Additionally, a set of fifteen filter standards were procured for verifying aerosol leakage and pressure drop measurements in the Los Alamos Filter Test System. The US Department of Energy uses several thousand canisters for storing nuclear material in different chemical and physical forms. Specialized filters are installed into canister lids to allow gases to escape, and to maintain an internal ambient pressure while containing radioactive contaminants. Diagnosing the condition of container filters and canister integrity is important to ensure worker and public safety and for determining the handling requirements of legacy apparatus. This report describes the In-Place-Filter-Tester, the Instrument Development Plan and the Instrument Operating Method that were developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to determine the “as found” condition of unopened storage canisters. The Instrument Operating Method provides instructions for future evaluations of as-found canisters packaged with nuclear material. Customized stainless steel canister interfaces were developed for pressure-port access and to apply a suction clamping force for the interface. These are compatible with selected Hagan-style and SAVY-4000 storage canisters that were purchased from NFT (Nuclear Filter Technology, Golden, CO). Two instruments were developed for this effort: an initial Los Alamos POC (Proof-of-Concept) unit and the final Los Alamos IPFT system. The Los Alamos POC was used to create the Instrument Development Plan: (1) to determine the air flow and pressure characteristics associated with canister filter clogging, and (2) to test simulated configurations that mimicked canister leakage paths. The canister leakage scenarios included quantifying: (A) air leakage due to foreign material (i.e. dust and hair

  8. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  9. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-02-25

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  10. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  11. Interim transfer canister for consolidating nuclear fuel rods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Formanek, F.J.

    1987-01-01

    This patent describes a canister for receiving and consolidating a group of uniformly spaced apart nuclear fuel rods, comprising: a rectangular, vertically oriented straight back panel; a pair of oppositely disposed side panels connected perpendicularly to the back panel, having a vertical straight upper portion and an inwardly tapered lower portion; a front panel opposite the back panel and connected to the side panels, having a straight vertical upper portion and inwardly tapered lower portion; whereby the back, side and front panels define a rectangular upper opening at the upper end of the canister and a generally rectangular lower opening at the other end, the lower opening having a cross-sectional area less than one-half that of the upper opening; parallel plate members spanning the canister from the front panel to the back panel, each plate spaced from the other the same uniform distance, the plates extending downwardly into the tapered portion of the canister while remaining spaced above the tapered sidewalls; first base means at the lower end of the canister, removably mounted and having an oblique orientation generally downward from the front panel to the back panel, for guiding the fuel rods to be inserted preferentially toward the lower portion of the back panel; and second base means removably mounted within the canister below first base means and oriented transversely to the longitudinal extent of the canister, for supporting the fuel rods when the first base means is removed from the canister

  12. BRIC-100VC Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC)-100VC

    Science.gov (United States)

    Richards, Stephanie E.; Levine, Howard G. (Compiler); Romero, Vergel

    2016-01-01

    The Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC) is an anodized-aluminum cylinder used to provide passive stowage for investigations of the effects of space flight on small specimens. The BRIC 100 mm petri dish vacuum containment unit (BRIC-100VC) has supported Dugesia japonica (flatworm) within spring under normal atmospheric conditions for 29 days in space and Hemerocallis lilioasphodelus L. (daylily) somatic embryo development within a 5% CO2 gaseous environment for 4.5 months in space. BRIC-100VC is a completely sealed, anodized-aluminum cylinder (Fig. 1) providing containment and structural support of the experimental specimens. The top and bottom lids of the canister include rapid disconnect valves for filling the canister with selected gases. These specialized valves allow for specific atmospheric containment within the canister, providing a gaseous environment defined by the investigator. Additionally, the top lid has been designed with a toggle latch and O-ring assembly allowing for prompt sealing and removal of the lid. The outside dimensions of the BRIC-100VC canisters are 16.0 cm (height) x 11.4 cm (outside diameter). The lower portion of the canister has been equipped with sufficient storage space for passive temperature and relative humidity data loggers. The BRIC- 100VC canister has been optimized to accommodate standard 100 mm laboratory petri dishes or 50 mL conical tubes. Depending on storage orientation, up to 6 or 9 canisters have been flown within an International Space Station (ISS) stowage locker.

  13. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.; PIEPHO, M.G.

    2000-01-01

    This document provided the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report''. All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  14. Design basis for the copper/steel canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowyer, W.H.

    1996-02-01

    The development of the copper/iron canister which has been proposed by SKB for the containment of high level nuclear waste has been studied from the point of view of choice of materials, manufacturing technology and quality assurance. This report describes the observations on progress which have been made between March 1995 and Feb 1996 and the result of further literature studies. A first trial canister has been produced using a fabricated steel liner and an extruded copper tubular, a second one using a fabricated tubular is at an advanced stage. A change from a fabricated steel inner canister to a proposed cast canister has been justified by a criticality argument but the technology for producing a cast canister is at present untried. The microstructure achieved in the extruded copper tubular for the first canister is unacceptable. Similar problems exist with plate used for the fabricated tubular, but some more favourable structures have been achieved already by this route. Seam welding of the first tubular failed through a suspected material problem. The second fabricated tubular welded without difficulty. Welding of lids and bottoms to the copper canister is problematical.There is as yet no satisfactory non destructive test procedures for the parent metal or the welds in the copper canister material, partly due to the coarse grain size which arise in the proposed material processed by the proposed routes. Further studies are also required on crevice corrosion, galvanic attack and stress corrosion cracking in the copper 50 ppm phosphorus alloy. 28 refs

  15. Shippingport Spent Fuel Canister (SSFC) Design Report Project W-518

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOHNSON, D.M.

    2000-01-01

    The SSFC Design Report Describes A spent fuel canister for Shippingport Core 2 blanket fuel assemblies. The design of the SSFC is a minor modification of the MCO. The modification is limited to the Shield Plug which remains unchanged with regard to interfaces with the canister shell. The performance characteristics remain those for the MCO, which bounds the payload of the SSFC

  16. Evaluation of canister weld flaw depth for concrete storage cask

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moon, Tae Chul; Cho, Chun Hyung [Korea Radioactive Waste Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Jung, Sung Hun; Lee, Young Oh; Jung, In Su [Korea Nuclear Engineering and Service Corp, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-03-15

    Domestically developed concrete storage casks include an internal canister to maintain the confinement integrity of radioactive materials. In this study, we analyzed the depth of flaws caused by loads that propagate canister weld cracks under normal, off-normal and accident conditions, and evaluated the maximum allowable weld flaw depth needed to secure the structural integrity of the canister weld and to reduce the welding time of the internal canister lid of the concrete storage cask. Structural analyses for normal, off-normal and accident conditions were performed using the general-purpose finite element analysis program ABAQUS; the allowable flaw depth was assessed according to ASME B and PV Code Section XI. Evaluation results revealed an allowable canister weld flaw depth of 18.75 mm for the concrete storage cask, which satisfies the critical flaw depth recommended in NUREG-1536.

  17. Strategy for investigation of fluid migration in evaporites (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lambert, S.J.; Shefelbine, H.C.

    1980-03-01

    The proposed strategy for WIPP project investigations of fluid migration in evaporites focuses upon a quantitative evaluation of each of several processes. Potential short- and long-term problems arising from fluid migration are complication of waste retrieval and mobilization of waste nuclides. The strategy will attempt to determine the degree to which these potentials are realized with respect to five hypothetical types of waste-rock interactions: movement of waste containers, migration of nuclides, formation of radioactive brine pocket, radiolytic generation of gas, and degradation of waste container. Of eight identified processes whose combinations could lead to the five types of interactions, only five are to be quantitatively investigated by the studies of fluid migration per se: presence of fluids, fluid mobilization toward heat-producing and contact-handled waste, encounter of fluids with influence of waste form, reversal of direction of fluid mobilization, and entrainment of nuclides in fluids. Methods of investigation entail an iterative combination of laboratory experimentation and mathematical modeling

  18. Assessment of a spent fuel disposal canister. Assessment studies for a copper canister with cast steel inner component

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bond, A.E.; Hoch, A.R.; Jones, G.D.; Tomczyk, A.J.; Wiggin, R.M.; Worraker, W.J.

    1997-05-01

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues in Sweden, is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will then be placed in vertical storage holes drilled in a series of caverns excavated from the granite bedrock at a depth of about 500 m. Each canister will be surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. In this report, a simple model of the behaviour of the canister subsequent to a first breach in its copper overpack is developed. This model is used to predict: -the ingress of water to the canister (as a function of the size and the shape of the initial defect, the buffer conductivity, the corrosion rate and the pressure inside the canister); -the build-up of corrosion products in the canister (as a function of the available water in the canister, the corrosion rate and the properties of the corrosion products); -the effect of corrosion on the structural integrity of the canister. A number of different scenarios for the location of the breach in the copper overpack are considered

  19. Performance of CASTORR HAW Cask Cold Trials for Loading, Transport and Storage of HAW canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmsmeier, Marco; Vossnacke, Andre

    2008-01-01

    On the basis of reprocessing contracts, concluded between the German Nuclear Utilities (GNUs) and the reprocessing companies in France (AREVA NC) and the UK (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority), GNS has the task to return the resulting residues to Germany. The high active waste (HAW) residuals from nuclear fuel reprocessing are vitrified and filled into steel cans, the HAW canisters. According to reprocessing contracts the equivalent number of HAW canisters to heavy metals delivered has to be returned to the country of origin and stored at an interim storage facility where applicable. The GNS' CASTOR R HAW casks are designed and licensed to fulfil the requirements for transport and long-term storage of HAW canisters. The new cask type CASTOR R HAW28M is capable of storing 28 HAW canisters with a maximum thermal power of 56 kW in total. Prior to the first active cask loading at a reprocessing facility it is required to demonstrate all important handling steps with the CASTOR R HAW28M cask according to a specific and approved sequence plan (MAP). These cold trials have to be carried out at the cask loading plant and at the reception area of an interim storage facility in Gorleben (TBL-G), witnessed by the licensing authorities and their independent experts. At transhipment stations GNS performs internal trials to demonstrate safe handling. A brand-new, empty CASTOR R HAW28M cask has been shipped from the GNS cask assembly facility in Muelheim to the TBL-G for cold trials. With this cask, GNS has to demonstrate the transhipment of casks at the Dannenberg transfer station from rail to road, transport to and reception at the TBL-G as well as incoming dose rate and contamination measurements and preparation for storage. After removal of all shock absorbers with a cask specific handling frame, tilting operation and assembly of the secondary lid with a pressure sensor, the helium leak tightness and 'Block-mass' tests have to be carried out as well. GNS long-term CASTOR R

  20. COMSOL Multiphysics Model for HLW Canister Filling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kesterson, M. R. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

    2016-04-11

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is building a Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford Site in Washington to remediate 55 million gallons of radioactive waste that is being temporarily stored in 177 underground tanks. Efforts are being made to increase the loading of Hanford tank wastes in glass while meeting melter lifetime expectancies and process, regulatory, and product quality requirements. Wastes containing high concentrations of Al2O3 and Na2O can contribute to nepheline (generally NaAlSiO4) crystallization, which can sharply reduce the chemical durability of high level waste (HLW) glass. Nepheline crystallization can occur during slow cooling of the glass within the stainless steel canister. The purpose of this work was to develop a model that can be used to predict temperatures of the glass in a WTP HLW canister during filling and cooling. The intent of the model is to support scoping work in the laboratory. It is not intended to provide precise predictions of temperature profiles, but rather to provide a simplified representation of glass cooling profiles within a full scale, WTP HLW canister under various glass pouring rates. These data will be used to support laboratory studies for an improved understanding of the mechanisms of nepheline crystallization. The model was created using COMSOL Multiphysics, a commercially available software. The model results were compared to available experimental data, TRR-PLT-080, and were found to yield sufficient results for the scoping nature of the study. The simulated temperatures were within 60 ºC for the centerline, 0.0762m (3 inch) from centerline, and 0.2286m (9 inch) from centerline thermocouples once the thermocouples were covered with glass. The temperature difference between the experimental and simulated values reduced to 40 ºC, 4 hours after the thermocouple was covered, and down to 20 ºC, 6 hours after the thermocouple was covered

  1. General aspects of the mechanical integrity of canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saario, Timo

    2007-01-01

    This paper attempts to introduce a new point of view to the mechanical integrity of the canisters, 'mechanical integrity evolutionary path'. The mechanical integrity evolutionary path is a description of development of the critical parameters involved in the prevailing degradation modes as a function of time. The degradation mechanisms considered are: mechanical overload; creep; and stress corrosion cracking. For each degradation mechanism one may consider two different states; initial state; critical state. The initial state considered will be different for different degradation mechanisms. For example stress corrosion cracking (SCC), which involves electrochemical steps is not possible without a surface covering aqueous phase. Thus, potentially, the initial state for SCC is that existing after saturation. On the other hand, the initial state for a possible mechanical overload can be different in different periods during the mechanical integrity evolutionary path. During the handling and transport stages the initial state is 'ex works', while during a glaciation the initial state has been altered due to creep, corrosion and possible SCC processes. The canister will go through mechanical overload during saturation and bentonite swelling phases and it will deform to fit the form of the insert. The initial state for this period is 'ex works', with e.g. manufacturing defects. The insert is designed to bear the load after closing the gap. In the 'ex works' state directionality of the mechanical properties has been raised lately as a new issue worth checking. Within the projected evolutionary path two events have been especially considered; seismic events and glaciation. A glacier 2 km thick would increase the hydrostatic pressure with 20 MPa if there were a mechanism transmitting the load into the aqueous phase. Remembering what makes ice skating possible such a mechanism seems plausible. For mechanical overload the critical state is relatively straightforward to

  2. General aspects of the mechanical integrity of canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Saario, Timo [VTT Materials and Building (Finland)

    2007-09-15

    This paper attempts to introduce a new point of view to the mechanical integrity of the canisters, 'mechanical integrity evolutionary path'. The mechanical integrity evolutionary path is a description of development of the critical parameters involved in the prevailing degradation modes as a function of time. The degradation mechanisms considered are: mechanical overload; creep; and stress corrosion cracking. For each degradation mechanism one may consider two different states; initial state; critical state. The initial state considered will be different for different degradation mechanisms. For example stress corrosion cracking (SCC), which involves electrochemical steps is not possible without a surface covering aqueous phase. Thus, potentially, the initial state for SCC is that existing after saturation. On the other hand, the initial state for a possible mechanical overload can be different in different periods during the mechanical integrity evolutionary path. During the handling and transport stages the initial state is 'ex works', while during a glaciation the initial state has been altered due to creep, corrosion and possible SCC processes. The canister will go through mechanical overload during saturation and bentonite swelling phases and it will deform to fit the form of the insert. The initial state for this period is 'ex works', with e.g. manufacturing defects. The insert is designed to bear the load after closing the gap. In the 'ex works' state directionality of the mechanical properties has been raised lately as a new issue worth checking. Within the projected evolutionary path two events have been especially considered; seismic events and glaciation. A glacier 2 km thick would increase the hydrostatic pressure with 20 MPa if there were a mechanism transmitting the load into the aqueous phase. Remembering what makes ice skating possible such a mechanism seems plausible. For mechanical overload the critical

  3. WIPP Benchmark calculations with the large strain SPECTROM codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Callahan, G.D.; DeVries, K.L.

    1995-08-01

    This report provides calculational results from the updated Lagrangian structural finite-element programs SPECTROM-32 and SPECTROM-333 for the purpose of qualifying these codes to perform analyses of structural situations in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Results are presented for the Second WIPP Benchmark (Benchmark II) Problems and for a simplified heated room problem used in a parallel design calculation study. The Benchmark II problems consist of an isothermal room problem and a heated room problem. The stratigraphy involves 27 distinct geologic layers including ten clay seams of which four are modeled as frictionless sliding interfaces. The analyses of the Benchmark II problems consider a 10-year simulation period. The evaluation of nine structural codes used in the Benchmark II problems shows that inclusion of finite-strain effects is not as significant as observed for the simplified heated room problem, and a variety of finite-strain and small-strain formulations produced similar results. The simplified heated room problem provides stratigraphic complexity equivalent to the Benchmark II problems but neglects sliding along the clay seams. The simplified heated problem does, however, provide a calculational check case where the small strain-formulation produced room closures about 20 percent greater than those obtained using finite-strain formulations. A discussion is given of each of the solved problems, and the computational results are compared with available published results. In general, the results of the two SPECTROM large strain codes compare favorably with results from other codes used to solve the problems

  4. WIPP Salado hydrology program data report No. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saulnier, G.J. Jr.; Domski, P.S.; Palmer, J.B.; Roberts, R.M.; Stensrud, W.A.; Jensen, A.L.

    1991-05-01

    WIPP Salado Hydrology Program Data Report number-sign 1 presents hydrologic data collected during permeability tests of the Salado Formation performed from August 1988 through December 1989. Analysis and interpretation of the test data are presented in a separate report. The report presents the results of the drilling and testing of six boreholes drilled from the WIPP underground facility 655 m below ground surface in the Salado Formation. Permeability tests were conducted using multipacker test tools with inflatable packers to isolate borehole intervals to allow formation pore-pressure buildup and subsequent pulse-withdrawal tests. Test data include pressures and temperatures in brine-filled, packer-isolated test intervals and borehole-closure and axial test-tool-movement measurements. Permeability tests were performed after installing multipacker test tools in test boreholes, inflating the packers, and allowing pressures to build up in the isolated intervals. Pulse-withdrawal tests were performed after buildup pressures approached the apparent formation pore pressure. Pulse injections were sometimes performed to increase the fluid pressures in isolated intervals. Compliance tests were conducted in lengths of steel and stainless-steel casing to evaluate the mechanical performance of the multipacker test tools. The stainless-steel compliance-test chamber was installed with externally mounted thermocouples in a downward-angled borehole in Experimental Room 4. Compliance tests included leak tests and simulated pulse-injection and pulse-withdrawal sequences. 9 refs., 143 figs., 2 tabs

  5. PASS: a component of Desk Top PA for the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, M.B.; Wilmot, R.D.; Galson, D.A.; Swift, P.N.; Fewell, M.E.

    1998-01-01

    There is a growing recognition internationally of the need to demonstrate comprehensiveness in order to build confidence in performance assessments (PAs) for radioactive waste disposal projects. This has resulted in a number of methodologies being developed to formalize the process of defining and documenting the decision basis that underlies a PA. Such methodologies include process influence diagrams and the rock engineering system (RES) matrix. However, these methodologies focus mainly on the conceptualization of the disposal system and do not provide a ready framework to document the decisions behind the model development and parameterization of the PA system. The Performance Assessment Support System (PASS) is a flexible electronic tool designed to increase the transparency and traceability of decision making in the entire PA process. An application of PASS has been developed for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) where it forms an important component of Desk Top PA, a PC-based PA computational environment under development at Sandia National Laboratories to document, plan, and support management decisions and to assess performance for the WIPP recertification process. This desk-top PA environment is also aimed at providing scientifically-based decision support for assessing the performance of nuclear and hazardous waste management and environmental clean-up systems

  6. Effects of clay-seam behavior on WIPP repository design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stone, C.M.; Krieg, R.D.; Branstetter, L.J.

    1981-07-01

    The geology at the southeastern New Mexico WIPP site consists of bedded layers of rock salt, anhydrite, polyhalite, mixtures of those materials, and thin clay seams. In spite of their very small (0.005 m to 0.05 m) thickness, clay seams are important to structural characterization of the WIPP stratigraphy since slip might possibly take place across them. Results of a study to determine the effects of clay seam frictional slip on the closure of a well-defined drift configuration are described. A Mohr-Coulomb dry friction model was used to model the active clay seams. The main thrust of the study was to determine the effects of friction coefficient variability on drift closure. Results show that the drift closure varies by a factor of 3.0 over the range of friction coefficients studied. The maximum slip observed along any clay seam was 0.12 m. For values of μ > .7, virtually no slip occurs along any clay seam

  7. WIPP Compliance Certification Application calculations parameters. Part 1: Parameter development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howarth, S.M.

    1997-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeast New Mexico has been studied as a transuranic waste repository for the past 23 years. During this time, an extensive site characterization, design, construction, and experimental program was completed, which provided in-depth understanding of the dominant processes that are most likely to influence the containment of radionuclides for 10,000 years. Nearly 1,500 parameters were developed using information gathered from this program; the parameters were input to numerical models for WIPP Compliance Certification Application (CCA) Performance Assessment (PA) calculations. The CCA probabilistic codes frequently require input values that define a statistical distribution for each parameter. Developing parameter distributions begins with the assignment of an appropriate distribution type, which is dependent on the type, magnitude, and volume of data or information available. The development of the parameter distribution values may require interpretation or statistical analysis of raw data, combining raw data with literature values, scaling of lab or field data to fit code grid mesh sizes, or other transformation. Parameter development and documentation of the development process were very complicated, especially for those parameters based on empirical data; they required the integration of information from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) code sponsors, parameter task leaders (PTLs), performance assessment analysts (PAAs), and experimental principal investigators (PIs). This paper, Part 1 of two parts, contains a discussion of the parameter development process, roles and responsibilities, and lessons learned. Part 2 will discuss parameter documentation, traceability and retrievability, and lessons learned from related audits and reviews

  8. Nuclear waste repository transparency technology test bed demonstrations at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Betsill J, David; Elkins, Ned Z.; Wu, Chuan-Fu; Mewhinney, James D.; Aamodt, Paul

    2000-01-01

    Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, has stated that one of the nuclear waste legacy issues is ''The challenge of managing the fuel cycle's back end and assuring the safe use of nuclear power.'' Waste management (i.e., the back end) is a domestic and international issue that must be addressed. A key tool in gaining acceptance of nuclear waste repository technologies is transparency. Transparency provides information to outside parties for independent assessment of safety, security, and legitimate use of materials. Transparency is a combination of technologies and processes that apply to all elements of the development, operation, and closure of a repository system. A test bed for nuclear repository transparency technologies has been proposed to develop a broad-based set of concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle. WIPP is the world's first complete geologic repository system for nuclear materials at the back end of the cycle. While it is understood that WIPP does not currently require this type of transparency, this repository has been proposed as realistic demonstration site to generate and test ideas, methods, and technologies about what transparency may entail at the back end of the nuclear materials cycle, and which could be applicable to other international repository developments. An integrated set of transparency demonstrations was developed and deployed during the summer, and fall of 1999 as a proof-of-concept of the repository transparency technology concept. These demonstrations also provided valuable experience and insight into the implementation of future transparency technology development and application. These demonstrations included: Container Monitoring Rocky Flats to WIPP; Underground Container Monitoring; Real-Time Radiation and Environmental Monitoring; Integrated level of confidence in the system and information provided. As the world's only operating deep geologic

  9. Multi-Canister overpack sealing configuration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SMITH, K.E.

    1998-01-01

    The Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) position regarding the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) sealing configuration is to initially rely on an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section III Subsection NB code compliant mechanical closure/sealing system to quickly and safely establish and maintain full confinement of radioactive materials prior to and during MCO fuel drying activities. Previous studies have shown the mechanical seal to be the preferred closure method, based on dose, cost, and schedule considerations. The cost and schedule impacts of redesigning the mechanical closure to a welded shield plug do not support changing the closure system. The SNF Project has determined that the combined mechanical/welded closure system meets or exceeds the regulatory requirements to provide redundant seals while accommodating key safety and schedule limitations that are unique to K Basins fuel removal effort

  10. Multi-Canister overpack internal HEPA filters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SMITH, K.E.

    1998-01-01

    The rationale for locating a filter assembly inside each Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) rather than include the filter in the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) process piping system was to eliminate the potential for contamination to the operators, processing equipment, and the MCO. The internal HEPA filters provide essential protection to facility workers from alpha contamination, both external skin contamination and potential internal depositions. Filters installed in the CVD process piping cannot mitigate potential contamination when breaking the process piping connections. Experience with K-Basin material has shown that even an extremely small release can result in personnel contamination and costly schedule disruptions to perform equipment and facility decontamination. Incorporating the filter function internal to the MCO rather than external is consistent with ALARA requirements of 10 CFR 835. Based on the above, the SNF Project position is to retain the internal HEPA filters in the MCO design

  11. Prospects for regional groundwater contamination due to karst landforms in Mescalero caliche at the WIPP site near Carlsbad, New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, R.H.

    1987-01-01

    Plutonium from nuclear weapons production will be permanently buried in Permian salt beds at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in the Nash Draw watershed. Overlying the salt beds are cavernous Rustler dolomite aquifers, the most likely flow paths for contaminated water from WIPP to the biosphere. Overlying the Rustler are sandstones, siltstones, Mescalero caliche, and windblown sand. The WIPP site contains thousands of closed topographic depressions. If some are karst features, the ability of WIPP to isolate nuclear waste cannot be demonstrated. A water balance and geochemical analysis of the Nash Draw watershed and nearby brine springs were undertaken to determine: (1) which Rustler aquifers discharge where, and in what quantities; (2) the rates of evapotranspiration and natural groundwater recharge; (3) the most likely discharge point for contaminated water from WIPP. Laguna Grande, a natural salt lake in Nash Draw, is the outlet for the Rustler dolomite aquifers and for plutonium contaminations from WIPP. The recharge time for the Rustler may be only 6 to 8 years. WIPP is unsuitable for nuclear waste isolation because: (1) Rustler groundwater flow paths and travel times are inherently unpredictable; (2) caliche and sandstones allow rainwater recharge of the Rustler; (3) pressurized brine underneath WIPP can carry dissolved waste up the WIPP shafts to the Rustler; (4) geologic barriers between the brine and WIPP are unreliable; and (5) WIPP is vulnerable to human intrusion

  12. Radon measurements with charcoal canisters temperature and humidity considerations

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Živanović Miloš Z.

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Radon testing by using open-faced charcoal canisters is a cheap and fast screening method. Many laboratories perform the sampling and measurements according to the United States Environmental Protection Agency method - EPA 520. According to this method, no corrections for temperature are applied and corrections for humidity are based on canister mass gain. The EPA method is practiced in the Vinča Institute of Nuclear Sciences with recycled canisters. In the course of measurements, it was established that the mass gain of the recycled canisters differs from mass gain measured by Environmental Protection Agency in an active atmosphere. In order to quantify and correct these discrepancies, in the laboratory, canisters were exposed for periods of 3 and 4 days between February 2015 and December 2015. Temperature and humidity were monitored continuously and mass gain measured. No significant correlation between mass gain and temperature was found. Based on Environmental Protection Agency calibration data, functional dependence of mass gain on humidity was determined, yielding Environmental Protection Agency mass gain curves. The results of mass gain measurements of recycled canisters were plotted against these curves and a discrepancy confirmed. After correcting the independent variable in the curve equation and calculating the corrected mass gain for recycled canisters, the agreement between measured mass gain and Environmental Protection Agency mass gain curves was attained. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. III43009: New Technologies for Monitoring and Protection of Environment from Harmful Chemical Substances and Radiation Impact

  13. Development of the DWPF canister temporary shrink-fit seal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelker, J.W. Jr.

    1986-04-01

    The Defense Waste Processing Facility is being constructed at The Savannah River Plant for the containerization of high-level nuclear waste in a wasteform for eventual permanent disposal. The waste will be incorporated in molten glass and solidified in type 304L stainless steel canisters, 2-feet in diameter x 9-feet 10-inches long, containing a flanged 6-in.-diam pipe fill-nozzle. The canisters have a minimum wall thickness of 3/8 in. Utilizing the heat from the glass filling operation, a shrink-fit seal for a plug in the end of the canister fill nozzle was developed that: will withstand the radioactive environment; will prevent the spread of contamination, and will keep moisture and water from entering the canister during storage and decontamination of the canister by wet-frit blasting to remove smearable and oxide-film fixed radioactive nuclides; is removable and can be replaced by a new oversize plug in the event the seal fails the pressure decay leakage test ( -4 atm cc/sec helium); will keep the final weld closure clean and free of nuclear contamination; will withstand being pressed into the nozzle without exposing external contamination or completely breaking the seal; is reliable; and is easily installed. The seal consists of: a removable sleeve (with a tapered bore) which is shrink-fitted into the nozzle bore during canister fabrication; and a tapered plug which is placed into the sleeved nozzle after the canister is filled with radioactive molten glass. A leak-tight shrink-fit seal is formed between the nozzle, sleeve, and plug upon temperature equilibrium. The temporarily sealed canister is transferred from the Melt cell to the Decon cell, and the surface is decontaminated. Next it is transferred to the Weld/Test cell where the temporary seal is pressed down into the nozzle, revealing a clean cavity where the canister final closure weld is made

  14. Shaft shock absorber tests for a spent fuel canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kukkola, T.; Toermaelae, V.P.

    2003-01-01

    The holding canister for spent nuclear fuel will be transferred by a lift to the final disposal tunnels 500m deep in the bedrock. Model tests were carried out with an objective to estimate weather feasible shock absorbing properties can be met in a design accident case where the canister should survive a free fall due to e.g. sabotage. If the velocity of the canister is not controlled by air drag or any other deceleration means, the impact velocity may reach ultimate speed of 100m/s. The canister would retain its integrity when stricken by the surface penetration impact if the bottom pit of the lift well would be filled with groundwater. However the canister would hit the pit bottom with high velocity since the water hardly slows down the canister. The impact to the bottom of the pit should be dampened mechanically. The tests demonstrated that 20m high filling to the bottom pit of the lift well by ceramic gravel, trade mark LECA-sora, gives a fair impact absorption to protect the spent fuel canister. Presence of ground water is not harmful for impact absorption system provided that the ceramic gravel is not floating too high from the pit bottom. Almost ideal impact absorption conditions are met if the water high level does not exceed two thirds of the height of the gravel. Shaping of the bottom head of the cylindrical canister does not give meaningful advantages to the impact absorption system. The flat nose bottom head of the fuel canister gives adequate deceleration properties. (orig.)

  15. End-Effector Development for the PIP Puck Handling Robot

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fowley, M.D.

    2001-01-01

    It has been decided that excess, weapons-grade plutonium shall be immobilized to prevent nuclear proliferation. The method of immobilization is to encapsulate the plutonium in a ceramic puck, roughly the size of a hockey puck, using a sintering process. This method has been officially identified as the Plutonium Immobilization Process (PIP). A Can-in-Canister storage method will be used to further immobilize the plutonium. The Can-in-Canister method uses the existing design of a Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canister to house the plutonium pucks. the process begins with several pucks being stacked in a stainless steel can. Several of the stainless steel cans are stacked in a cage-like magazine. Several of the magazines are then placed in a DWPF canister. The DWPF canister is then filled with molten glass containing high-level, radioactive waste from the DWPF vitrification process. The Can-in-Canister method makes reclamation of plutonium from the pucks technically difficult and highly undesirable. The mechanical requirements of the Can-in-Canister process, in conjunction with the amount of time required to immobilize the vast quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will expose personnel to unnecessarily high levels of radiation if the processes were completed manually, in glove boxes. Therefore, automated equipment is designed into the process to reduce or eliminate personnel exposure. Robots are used whenever the automated handling operations become complicated. There are two such operations in the initial stages of the Can-in-Canister process, which required a six-axis robot. The first operation is a press unloading process. The second operation is a tray transfer process. To successfully accomplish the operational tasks described in the two operations, the end-effector of the robot must be versatile, lightweight, and rugged. As a result of these demands, an extensive development process was undertaken to design the optimum end-effector for these puck-handling

  16. Mechanical Modeling of a WIPP Drum Under Pressure

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Jeffrey A. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2014-11-25

    Mechanical modeling was undertaken to support the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) technical assessment team (TAT) investigating the February 14th 2014 event where there was a radiological release at the WIPP. The initial goal of the modeling was to examine if a mechanical model could inform the team about the event. The intention was to have a model that could test scenarios with respect to the rate of pressurization. It was expected that the deformation and failure (inability of the drum to contain any pressure) would vary according to the pressurization rate. As the work progressed there was also interest in using the mechanical analysis of the drum to investigate what would happen if a drum pressurized when it was located under a standard waste package. Specifically, would the deformation be detectable from camera views within the room. A finite element model of a WIPP 55-gallon drum was developed that used all hex elements. Analyses were conducted using the explicit transient dynamics module of Sierra/SM to explore potential pressurization scenarios of the drum. Theses analysis show similar deformation patterns to documented pressurization tests of drums in the literature. The calculated failure pressures from previous tests documented in the literature vary from as little as 16 psi to 320 psi. In addition, previous testing documented in the literature shows drums bulging but not failing at pressures ranging from 69 to 138 psi. The analyses performed for this study found the drums failing at pressures ranging from 35 psi to 75 psi. When the drums are pressurized quickly (in 0.01 seconds) there is significant deformation to the lid. At lower pressurization rates the deformation of the lid is considerably less, yet the lids will still open from the pressure. The analyses demonstrate the influence of pressurization rate on deformation and opening pressure of the drums. Analyses conducted with a substantial mass on top of the closed drum demonstrate that the

  17. Design analysis report for the canister

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Raiko, Heikki (VTT (Finland)); Sandstroem, Rolf (Materials Science and Engineering, Royal Inst. of Technology, Stockholm (Sweden)); Ryden, Haakan; Johansson, Magnus (Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co., Stockholm (Sweden))

    2010-04-15

    The mechanical strength of the canister (BWR and PWR types) has been studied. The loading processes are taken from the design premises report and some of them, especially the uneven bentonite swelling cases, are further developed in this study and in its references. The canister geometry is described in detail including the manufacturing tolerances of the dimensions. The canister material properties are summarised and the wide material testing programmes and model developments are referenced. The combination of various load cases are rationalised and the conservative combinations are defined. Also the probabilities of various load cases and combinations are assessed for setting reasonable safety margins. The safety margins are used according to ASME Code principles for safety class 1 components. The governing load cases are analysed with 2D- or global 3D-finite-element models including large deformation and non-linear material modelling and, in some cases, also creep. The integrity assessments are partly made from the stress and strain results using global models and partly from fracture resistance analyses using the sub-modelling technique. The sub-model analyses utilize the deformations from the global analyses as constraints on the sub-model boundaries and more detailed finite-element meshes are defined with defects included in the models together with elastic-plastic material models. The J-integral is used as the fracture parameter for the postulated defects. The allowable defect sizes are determined using the measured fracture resistance curves of the insert iron as a reference with respective safety factors according to the ASME Pressure Vessel Code requirements. Based on the BWR canister analyses, the following conclusions can be drawn. The 45 MPa isostatic pressure load case shows very robust and distinct results in that the risk for local collapse is vanishingly small. The probabilistic analysis of plastic collapse only considers the initial local collapse

  18. Handling of final storage of unreprocessed spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    In this report the various facilities incorporated in the proposed handling chain for spent fuel from the power stations to the final repository are discribed. Thus the geological conditions which are essential for a final repository is discussed as well as the buffer and canister materials and how they contribute towards a long-term isolation of the spent fuel. Furthermore one chapter deals with leaching of the deposited fuel in the event that the canister is penetrated as well as the transport mechanisms which determine the migration of the radioactive substances through the buffer material. The dispersal processes in the geosphere and the biosphere are also described together with the transfer mechanisms to the ecological systems as well as radiation doses. Finally a summary is given of the safety analysis of the proposed method for the handling and final storage of the spent fuel. (E.R.)

  19. Zero-Headspace Coal-Core Gas Desorption Canister, Revised Desorption Data Analysis Spreadsheets and a Dry Canister Heating System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barker, Charles E.; Dallegge, Todd A.

    2005-01-01

    Coal desorption techniques typically use the U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) canister-desorption method as described by Diamond and Levine (1981), Close and Erwin (1989), Ryan and Dawson (1993), McLennan and others (1994), Mavor and Nelson (1997) and Diamond and Schatzel (1998). However, the coal desorption canister designs historically used with this method have an inherent flaw that allows a significant gas-filled headspace bubble to remain in the canister that later has to be compensated for by correcting the measured desorbed gas volume with a mathematical headspace volume correction (McLennan and others, 1994; Mavor and Nelson, 1997).

  20. The Brine Sampling and Evaluation Program (PSEP) at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deal, D.E.; Roggenthen, W.M.

    1989-01-01

    The Permian salt beds of the WIPP facility are virtually dry. The amount of water present in the rocks exposed in the excavations that is free to migrate under pressure gradients was estimated by heating salt samples to 95 degrees C and measuring weight loss. Clear balite contains about 0.22 weight percent water and the more argillaceous units average about 0.75 percent. Measurements made since 1984 as part of the Brine Sampling and Evaluation Program (BSEP) indicate that small amounts of this brine can migrate into the excavations and does accumulate in the underground environment. Brine seepage into drillholes monitored since thy were drilled show that brine seepage decreases with time and that many have dried up entirely. Weeping of brine from the walls of the repository excavations also decreases after two or more years. Chemical analyses of brines shows that they are sodium-chloride saturated and magnesium-rich

  1. QA lessons learned for parameter control from the WIPP Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richards, R.R.

    1998-01-01

    This paper provides a summary of lessons learned from experiences on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WJPP) Project in implementation of quality assurance controls surrounding inputs for performance assessment analysis. Since the performance assessment (PA) process is inherent in compliance determination for any waste repository, these lessons-learned are intended to be useful to investigators, analysts, and Quality Assurance (QA) practitioners working on high level waste disposal projects. On the WIPP Project, PA analyses for regulatory-compliance determination utilized several inter-related computer programs (codes) that mathematically modeled phenomena such as radionuclide release, retardation, and transport. The input information for those codes are the parameters that are the subject of this paper. Parameters were maintained in a computer database, which was then queried electronically by the PA codes whenever input was needed as the analyses were run

  2. Thermal dimensioning of the deep repository. Influence of canister spacing, canister power, rock thermal properties and nearfield design on the maximum canister surface temperature

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoekmark, Harald; Faelth, Billy

    2003-12-01

    The report addresses the problem of the minimum spacing required between neighbouring canisters in the deep repository. That spacing is calculated for a number of assumptions regarding the conditions that govern the temperature in the nearfield and at the surfaces of the canisters. The spacing criterion is that the temperature at the canister surfaces must not exceed 100 deg C .The results are given in the form of nomographic charts, such that it is in principle possible to determine the spacing as soon as site data, i.e. the initial undisturbed rock temperature and the host rock heat transport properties, are available. Results of canister spacing calculations are given for the KBS-3V concept as well as for the KBS-3H concept. A combination of numerical and analytical methods is used for the KBS-3H calculations, while the KBS-3V calculations are purely analytical. Both methods are described in detail. Open gaps are assigned equivalent heat conductivities, calculated such that the conduction across the gaps will include also the heat transferred by radiation. The equivalent heat conductivities are based on the emissivities of the different gap surfaces. For the canister copper surface, the emissivity is determined by back-calculation of temperatures measured in the Prototype experiment at Aespoe HRL. The size of the different gaps and the emissivity values are of great importance for the results and will be investigated further in the future

  3. WIPP Waste Characterization: Implementing Regulatory Requirements in the Real World

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooper Wayman, J.D.; Goldstein, J.D.

    1999-01-01

    It is imperative to ensure compliance of the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) with applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In particular, compliance with the waste characterization requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and its implementing regulation found at 40 CFR Parts 262,264 and 265 for hazardous and mixed wastes, as well as those of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, and the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, as amended, and their implementing regulations found at 40 CFR Parts 191 and 194 for non-mixed radioactive wastes, are often difficult to ensure at the operational level. For example, where a regulation may limit a waste to a certain concentration, this concentration may be difficult to measure. For example, does the definition of transuranic waste (TRU) as 100 nCi/grain of alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes per gram of waste mean that the radioassay of a waste must show a reading of 100 plus the sampling and measurement error for the waste to be a TRU waste? Although the use of acceptable knowledge to characterize waste is authorized by statute, regulation and DOE Orders, its implementation is similarly beset with difficulty. When is a document or documents sufficient to constitute acceptable knowledge? What standard can be used to determine if knowledge is acceptable for waste characterization purposes? The inherent conflict between waste characterization regulatory requirements and their implementation in the real world, and the resolution of this conflict, will be discussed

  4. WIPP Facility Work Plan for Solid Waste Management Units

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2001-02-25

    This 2001 Facility Work Plan (FWP) has been prepared as required by Module VII, Section VII.M.1 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, NM4890139088-TSDF (the Permit); (NMED, 1999a), and incorporates comments from the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) received on December 6, 2000 (NMED, 2000a). This February 2001 FWP describes the programmatic facility-wide approach to future investigations at Solid Waste Management Units (SWMUs) and Areas of Concern (AOCs) specified in the Permit. The permittees are evaluating data from previous investigations of the SWMUs and AOCs against the newest guidance proposed by the NMED. Based on these data, the permittees expect that no further sampling will be required and that a request for No Further Action (NFA) at the SWMUs and AOCs will be submitted to the NMED. This FWP addresses the current Permit requirements. It uses the results of previous investigations performed at WIPP and expands the investigations as required by the Permit. As an alternative to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) specified in Module VII of the Permit, current NMED guidance identifies an Accelerated Corrective Action Approach (ACAA) that may be used for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). This accelerated approach is used to replace the standard RFI Work Plan and Report sequence with a more flexible decision-making approach. The ACAA process allows a Facility to exit the schedule of compliance contained in the Facility’s Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) permit module and proceed on an accelerated time frame. Thus, the ACAA process can be entered either before or after an RFI Work Plan. According to the NMED's guidance, a facility can prepare an RFI Work Plan or Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) for any SWMU or AOC (NMED, 1998). Based on this guidance, a SAP constitutes an acceptable alternative to the RFI Work Plan specified in the Permit.

  5. Multi-canister overpack operations and maintenance manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PIERCE, S.R.

    1999-01-01

    This manual provides general operating and maintenance instructions for the Multi-Canister Overpack. Procedure outlines included are conceptual in nature and will be modified, expanded, and refined during preparation of detailed operating procedures

  6. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Part B permit application [for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)]. Volume 4, Revision 1.0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1991-12-31

    The US Department of Energy is currently constructing the Waste Isolation Pilot near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The full-scale pilot plant will demonstrate the feasibility of the safe disposal of defense-related nuclear waste in a bedded salt formation at a depth of 2160 feet below the surface. WIPP will provide for the permanent storage of 25,000 cu ft of remote-handled (RH) transuranic waste and 6,000,000 cu ft of contact-handled (CH) transuranic waste. This paper covers the major mechanical/structural design considerations for the waste hoist and its hoist tower structure. The design of the hoist system and safety features incorporates state-of-the-art technology developed in the hoist and mining industry to ensure safe operation for transporting nuclear waste underground. Also included are design specifications for VOC-10 monitoring system.

  7. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CROWE, R.D.

    1999-09-09

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  8. Spent nuclear fuel canister storage building conceptual design report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swenson, C.E. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)

    1996-01-01

    This Conceptual Design Report provides the technical basis for the Spent Nuclear Fuels Project, Canister Storage Building, and as amended by letter (correspondence number 9555700, M.E. Witherspoon to E.B. Sellers, ``Technical Baseline and Updated Cost Estimate for the Canister Storage Building``, dated October 24, 1995), includes the project cost baseline and Criteria to be used as the basis for starting detailed design in fiscal year 1995.

  9. Grain boundary corrosion of copper canister weld material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gubner, Rolf; Andersson, Urban; Linder, Mats; Nazarov, Andrej; Taxen, Claes

    2006-01-01

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues in Sweden is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will then be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast inner container fitted inside a corrosion-resistant copper canister. During fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow, they will tend to concentrate impurities within the copper at the new grain boundaries. The work described in this report was undertaken to determine whether there is any possibility of enhanced corrosion at grain boundaries within the copper canister, based on the recommendations of the report SKB-TR--01-09 (INIS ref. 32025363). Grain boundary corrosion of copper is not expected to be a problem for the copper canisters in a repository. However, as one step in the experimental verification it is necessary to study grain boundary corrosion of copper in an environment where it may occur. A literature study aimed to find one or several solutions that are aggressive with respect to grain boundary corrosion of copper. Copper specimens cut from welds of real copper canisters where exposed to aerated ammonium hydroxide solution for a period of 14 days at 80 degrees C and 10 bar pressure. The samples were investigated prior to exposure using the scanning Kelvin probe technique to characterize anodic and cathodic areas on the samples. The degree of corrosion was determined by optical microscopy. No grain boundary corrosion could be observed in the autoclave experiments, however, a higher rate of corrosion was observed for the weld material compared to the base material. The work suggests that grain boundary corrosion of copper weld material is most unlikely to adversely affect SKB's copper canisters under the conditions in the repository

  10. Spent nuclear fuel canister storage building conceptual design report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swenson, C.E.

    1996-01-01

    This Conceptual Design Report provides the technical basis for the Spent Nuclear Fuels Project, Canister Storage Building, and as amended by letter (correspondence number 9555700, M.E. Witherspoon to E.B. Sellers, ''Technical Baseline and Updated Cost Estimate for the Canister Storage Building'', dated October 24, 1995), includes the project cost baseline and Criteria to be used as the basis for starting detailed design in fiscal year 1995

  11. Characterization of materials for waste-canister compatibility studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCoy, H.E.; Mack, J.E.

    1981-10-01

    Sample materials of 7 waste forms and 15 potential canister materials were procured for compatibility tests. These materials were characterized before being placed in test, and the results are the main topic of this report. A test capsule was designed for the tests in which disks of a single waste form were contacted with duplicate samples of canister materials. The capsules are undergoing short-term tests at 800 0 C and long-term tests at 100 and 300 0 C

  12. Grain boundary corrosion of copper canister weld material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gubner, Rolf; Andersson, Urban; Linder, Mats; Nazarov, Andrej; Taxen, Claes [Corrosion and Metals Research Inst. (KIMAB), Stockholm (Sweden)

    2006-01-15

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues in Sweden is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will then be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast inner container fitted inside a corrosion-resistant copper canister. During fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow, they will tend to concentrate impurities within the copper at the new grain boundaries. The work described in this report was undertaken to determine whether there is any possibility of enhanced corrosion at grain boundaries within the copper canister, based on the recommendations of the report SKB-TR--01-09 (INIS ref. 32025363). Grain boundary corrosion of copper is not expected to be a problem for the copper canisters in a repository. However, as one step in the experimental verification it is necessary to study grain boundary corrosion of copper in an environment where it may occur. A literature study aimed to find one or several solutions that are aggressive with respect to grain boundary corrosion of copper. Copper specimens cut from welds of real copper canisters where exposed to aerated ammonium hydroxide solution for a period of 14 days at 80 degrees C and 10 bar pressure. The samples were investigated prior to exposure using the scanning Kelvin probe technique to characterize anodic and cathodic areas on the samples. The degree of corrosion was determined by optical microscopy. No grain boundary corrosion could be observed in the autoclave experiments, however, a higher rate of corrosion was observed for the weld material compared to the base material. The work suggests that grain boundary corrosion of copper weld material is most unlikely to adversely affect SKB's copper canisters under the conditions in the repository.

  13. Mineralogy in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility stratigraphic horizon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, C.L.

    1985-09-01

    Forty-six samples were selected for this study from two cores, one extending 50 ft up through the roof of the WIPP facility and the other penetrating 50 ft below the facility floor. These samples, selected from approximately every other foot of core length, represent the major lithologies present in the immediate vicinity of the WIPP facility horizon: ''clean'' halite, polyhalitic halite, argillaceous halite, and mixed polyhalitic-argillaceous halite. Samples were analyzed for non-NaCl mineralogy by determining weight percents of water- and EDTA-insoluble residues, which were then identified by x-ray diffraction. In general, WIPP halite contains at most 5 wt % non-NaCl residue. The major mineral constituents are quartz, magnesite, anhydrite, gypsum, polyhalite, and clays. Results of this study confirm that, in previous descriptions of WIPP core, trace mineral quantities have been visually overestimated by approximately an order of magnitude. 9 refs., 5 figs., 5 tabs

  14. Environmental management assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), Carlsbad, New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    This document contains the results of the Environmental Management Assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). This Assessment was conducted by EH-24 from July 19 through July 30, 1993 to advise the Secretary of Energy of the adequacy of management systems established at WIPP to ensure the protection of the environment and compliance with Federal, state, and DOE environmental requirements. The mission of WIPP is to demonstrate the safe disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste. During this assessment, activities and records were reviewed and interviews were conducted with personnel from the management and operating contractors. This assessment revealed that WIPP's environmental safety and health programs are satisfactory, and that all levels of the Waste Isolation Division (WID) management and staff consistently exhibit a high level of commitment to achieve environmental excellence

  15. Geotechnical evaluation of the proposed WIPP site in southeast New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weart, W.D.

    1978-10-01

    The Department of Energy is proposing to demonstrate the acceptability of geologic disposal of radioactive waste by locating a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in the salt beds 26 miles east of Carlsbad, New Mexico. The WIPP will serve as a permanent repository for defense generated transuranic contaminated waste and will also be used as a facility in which experiments and demonstrations with all radioactive waste types can be conducted. The present area being proposed for the WIPP is the second such location in the Delaware Basin for which new site data have been developed; the first site proved geologically unacceptable. Ecologic and socioeconomic aspects have been investigated and extensive geophysical, geological and hydrologic studies have been conducted to allow an evaluation of site acceptability. Geotechnical aspects of site characterization are examined. These studies are now sufficiently complete that the site can be recommended for further development of the WIPP

  16. Effects of microbial processes on gas generation under expected WIPP repository conditions: Annual report through 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Francis, A.J.; Gillow, J.B.

    1993-09-01

    Microbial processes involved in gas generation from degradation of the organic constituents of transuranic waste under conditions expected at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) repository are being investigated at Brookhaven National Laboratory. These laboratory studies are part of the Sandia National Laboratories -- WIPP Gas Generation Program. Gas generation due to microbial degradation of representative cellulosic waste was investigated in short-term ( 6 months) experiments by incubating representative paper (filter paper, paper towels, and tissue) in WIPP brine under initially aerobic (air) and anaerobic (nitrogen) conditions. Samples from the WIPP surficial environment and underground workings harbor gas-producing halophilic microorganisms, the activities of which were studied in short-term experiments. The microorganisms metabolized a variety of organic compounds including cellulose under aerobic, anaerobic, and denitrifying conditions. In long-term experiments, the effects of added nutrients (trace amounts of ammonium nitrate, phosphate, and yeast extract), no nutrients, and nutrients plus excess nitrate on gas production from cellulose degradation

  17. Performance assessment in support of compliance certification application for the WIPP project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jow, H.N.; Anderson, D.R.; Marietta, M.; Helton, J.; Basabilvazo, G.

    1998-03-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is being developed by the US Department of Energy for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste. A Compliance Certification Application (CCA) of the WIPP (1) for such disposal was submitted to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in October, 1996, and is currently under review, with a decision anticipated in late 1997. An important component of the CCA is a performance assessment (PA) for the WIPP carried out by Sandia National Laboratories. The final outcome of the PA is a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) for radionuclide releases from the WIPP to the accessible environment and an assessment of the confidence with which this CCDF can be estimated. This paper describes the computational process used to develop the CCDF. The results of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis are also presented

  18. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum G. Accident analysis for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shefelbine, H.C.; Metcalf, J.H.

    1977-06-01

    The types of accidents or risks pertinent to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are presented. Design features addressing these risks are discussed. Also discussed are design features that protect the public

  19. Use of Performance Assessment in Support of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Programmatic Activity Planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BASABILVAZO, GEORGE; JOW, HONG-NIAN; LARSON, KURT W.; MARIETTA, MELVIN G.

    1999-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is being developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the geologic (deep underground) disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste. A Compliance Certification Application (CCA) of the WIPP for such disposal was submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in October 1996, and was approved by EPA in May 1998. In June 1998, two separate, but related, lawsuits were filed, one against DOE and one against EPA. On March 22, 1999, the court ruled in favor of DOE, and on March 26, 1999, DOE formally began disposal operations at the WIPP for non-mixed (non-hazardous) TRU waste. Before the WIPP can begin receiving mixed (hazardous) TRU waste, a permit from the State of New Mexico for hazardous waste disposal needs to be issued. It is anticipated that the State of New Mexico will issue a hazardous waste permit by November 1999. It is further anticipated that the EPA lawsuit will be resolved by July 1999. Congress (Public Law 102-579, Section 8(f)) requires the WIPP project to be recertified by the EPA at least as frequently as once every five years from the first receipt of TRU waste at the WIPP site. As part of the DOE's WIPP project recertification strategy, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has used systems analysis and performance assessment to prioritize its scientific and engineering research activities. Two 1998 analyses, the near-field systems analysis and the annual sensitivity analysis, are discussed here. Independently, the two analyses arrived at similar conclusions regarding important scientific activities associated with the WIPP. The use of these techniques for the recent funding allocations at SNL's WIPP project had several beneficial effects. It increased the level of acceptance among project scientists that management had fairly and credibly compared alternatives when making prioritization decisions. It improved the ability of SNL and its project sponsor, the Carlsbad Area Office of the DOE, to

  20. QA/QC For Radon Concentration Measurement With Charcoal Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pantelic, G.; Zivanovic, M.; Rajacic, M.; Krneta Nikolic, J.; Todorovic, D.

    2015-01-01

    The primary concern of any measuring of radon or radon progeny must be the quality of the results. A good quality assurance program, when properly designed and diligently followed, ensures that laboratory staff will be able to produce the type and quality of measurement results which is needed and expected. Active charcoal detectors are used for testing the concentration of radon in dwellings. The method of measurement is based on radon adsorption on coal and measurement of gamma radiation of radon daughters. Upon closing the detectors, the measurement was carried out after achieving the equilibrium between radon and its daughters (at least 3 hours) using NaI or HPGe detector. Radon concentrations as well as measurement uncertainties were calculated according to US EPA protocol 520/5-87-005. Detectors used for the measurements were calibrated by 226Ra standard of known activity in the same geometry. Standard and background canisters are used for QA and QC, as well as for the calibration of the measurement equipment. Standard canister is a sealed canister with the same matrix and geometry as the canisters used for measurements, but with the known activity of radon. Background canister is a regular radon measurement canister, which has never been exposed. The detector background and detector efficiency are measured to ascertain whether they are within the warning and acceptance limits. (author).

  1. Drop tests of the Three Mile Island knockout canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Aaron, W.S.; Shappert, L.B.; Childress, P.C.; Quinn, G.J.; Smith, J.V.

    1986-09-01

    A type of Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) defueling canister, called a ''knockout'' canister, was subjected to a series of drop tests at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Drop Test Facility. These tests were designed to confirm the structural integrity of internal fixed neutron poisons in support of a request for NRC licensing of this type of canister for the shipment of TMI-2 reactor fuel debris to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for the Core Examination R and D Program. Work conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory included (1) precise physical measurements of the internal poison rod configuration before assembly, (2) canister assembly and welding, (3) nondestructive examination (an initial hydrostatic pressure test and an x-ray profile of the internals before and after each drop test), (4) addition of a simulated fuel load, (5) instrumentation of the canister for each drop test, (6) fabrication of a cask simulation vessel with a developed and tested foam impact limiter, (7) use of refrigeration facilities to cool the canister to well below freezing prior to three of the drops, (8) recording the drop test with still, high-speed, and normal-speed photography, (9) recording the accelerometer measurements during impact, (10) disassembly and post-test examination with precise physical measurements, and (11) preparation of the final report

  2. Research on corrosion aspects of the advanced cold process canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blackwood, D.J.; Hoch, A.R.; Naish, C.C.; Rance, A.

    1994-01-01

    The Advanced Cold Process Canister (ACPC) is a waste canister being developed jointly by SKB and TVO for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. It comprises an outer copper canister, with a carbon steel canister inside. A concern regarding the use of the ACPC is that, in the unlikely event that the outer copper canister is penetrated, the anaerobic corrosion of the carbon steel container may result in the formation of hydrogen gas bubbles. These bubbles could disrupt the backfill, and thus increase water flow through the near field and the flux of radionuclides to the host geology. A number of factors that influence the rate at which hydrogen evolves as a result of the anaerobic corrosion of carbon steel in artificial granitic groundwaters have been investigated. A previously observed, time-dependent decline in the hydrogen evolution rate has been confirmed as being due to the production of magnetite film. Once the magnetite film is about 0.7-1.0 μm thick, the rate of hydrogen evolution reaches a steady state value. The pH and the ionic strength of the groundwater were both found to influence the long-term hydrogen evolution rate. The results of the experimental programme were used to update a model of the corrosion behaviour and hydrogen production from the Advanced Cold Process Canister. 36 figs, 5 tabs, 13 refs

  3. Physical properties of encapsulate spent fuel in canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Spent fuel and high-level wastes will be permanently stored in a deep geological repository (AGP). Prior to this, they will be encapsulated in canisters. The present report is dedicated to the study of such canisters under the different physical demands that they may undergo, be those in operating or accident conditions. The physical demands of interest include mechanical demands, both static and dynamic, and thermal demands. Consideration is given to the complete file of the canister, from the time when it is empty and without lid to the final conditions expected in the repository. Thermal analyses of canisters containing spent fuel are often carried out in two dimensions, some times with hypotheses of axial symmetry and some times using a plane transverse section through the centre of the canister. The results obtained in both types of analyses are compared here to those of complete three-dimensional analyses. The latter generate more reliable information about the temperatures that may be experienced by the canister and its contents; they also allow calibrating the errors embodied in the two-dimensional calculations. (Author)

  4. Remote Welding, NDE and Repair of DOE Standardized Canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eric Larsen; Art Watkins; Timothy R. McJunkin; Dave Pace; Rodney Bitsoi

    2006-05-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) created the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) to manage DOE’s spent nuclear fuel (SNF). One of the NSNFP’s tasks is to prepare spent nuclear fuel for storage, transportation, and disposal at the national repository. As part of this effort, the NSNFP developed a standardized canister for interim storage and transportation of SNF. These canisters will be built and sealed to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section III, Division 3 requirements. Packaging SNF usually is a three-step process: canister loading, closure welding, and closure weld verification. After loading SNF into the canisters, the canisters must be seal welded and the welds verified using a combination of visual, surface eddy current, and ultrasonic inspection or examination techniques. If unacceptable defects in the weld are detected, the defective sections of weld must be removed, re-welded, and re-inspected. Due to the high contamination and/or radiation fields involved with this process, all of these functions must be performed remotely in a hot cell. The prototype apparatus to perform these functions is a floor-mounted carousel that encircles the loaded canister; three stations perform the functions of welding, inspecting, and repairing the seal welds. A welding operator monitors and controls these functions remotely via a workstation located outside the hot cell. The discussion describes the hardware and software that have been developed and the results of testing that has been done to date.

  5. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part B permit application [for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This volume contains Appendix D2, engineering design basis reports. Contents include: Design considerations for the waste hoist of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP); A site-specific study of wind and tornado probabilities at the WIPP Site in southeast New Mexico; Seismic evaluation report of underground facilities; and calculations for analysis of wind loads and tornado loads for WHB, seismic calculations, calculations for VOC-10 monitoring system, and for shaft at station A

  6. Conceptual design for remote handling methods using the HIP process in the Calcine Immobilization Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berry, S.M.; Cox, C.G.; Hoover, M.A.

    1994-03-01

    This report recommends the remote conceptual design philosophy for calcine immobilization using the hot isostatic press (HIP) process. Areas of remote handling operations discussed in this report include: (1) introducing the process can into the front end of the HIP process, (2) filling and compacting the calcine/frit mixture into the process can, (3) evacuating and sealing the process can, (4) non-destructive testing of the seal on the process can, (5) decontamination of the process can, (6) HIP furnace loading and unloading the process can for the HIPing operation, (7) loading an overpack canister with processed HIP cans, (8) sealing the canister, with associated non-destructive examination (NDE) and decontamination, and (9) handling canisters for interim storage at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) located on the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) site

  7. Recent developments in the conceptual geologic and hydrologic understanding of the WIPP site, Southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lappin, A.R.

    1987-01-01

    Hydrologic and geochemical characterization of the WIPP site has progressed significantly since the 1980 WIPP Final Environmental Impact Statement. In 1980, the entire Rustler Formation was modeled as a single hydrologic unit, assumed to be isotropic, single-porosity, and completely confined. Variability within the Rustler was evaluated only on the basis of testing at individual wells. In the 1983 WIPP Site and Preliminary Design Validation effort, the Salado Formation, in which the WIPP facility is being constructed, was assumed to be anhydrous, except for fluid inclusions and mineralogically bound water. Recent hydrologic and tracer testing at the WIPP indicates: 1) The local importance of dual-porosity behavior in hydraulic response and transport in parts of the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation; 2) the presence of distinct high- and low-transmissivity regions within the Culebra; and 3) the possible importance of vertical fluid flow within the Rustler. Recent analyses indicate that fluids encountered in the WIPP facility and in experimental brine-migration studies are grain-boundary fluids, chemically distinct from fluid inclusions. Fluid-inclination compositions appear to have been determined shortly after the halite deposition. Because of the times required for diagenetic reactions controlling their compositions, the grain-boundary fluids within the Salado probably have a residence time of several million years

  8. Actinide chemistry research supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): FY94 results

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Novak, C.F. [ed.

    1995-08-01

    This document contains six reports on actinide chemistry research supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These reports, completed in FY94, are relevant to the estimation of the potential dissolved actinide concentrations in WIPP brines under repository breach scenarios. Estimates of potential dissolved actinide concentrations are necessary for WIPP performance assessment calculations. The specific topics covered within this document are: the complexation of oxalate with Th(IV) and U(VI); the stability of Pu(VI) in one WIPP-specific brine environment both with and without carbonate present; the solubility of Nd(III) in a WIPP Salado brine surrogate as a function of hydrogen ion concentration; the steady-state dissolved plutonium concentrations in a synthetic WIPP Culebra brine surrogate; the development of a model for Nd(III) solubility and speciation in dilute to concentrated sodium carbonate and sodium bicarbonate solutions; and the development of a model for Np(V) solubility and speciation in dilute to concentrated sodium Perchlorate, sodium carbonate, and sodium chloride media.

  9. Actinide chemistry research supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): FY94 results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Novak, C.F.

    1995-08-01

    This document contains six reports on actinide chemistry research supporting the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These reports, completed in FY94, are relevant to the estimation of the potential dissolved actinide concentrations in WIPP brines under repository breach scenarios. Estimates of potential dissolved actinide concentrations are necessary for WIPP performance assessment calculations. The specific topics covered within this document are: the complexation of oxalate with Th(IV) and U(VI); the stability of Pu(VI) in one WIPP-specific brine environment both with and without carbonate present; the solubility of Nd(III) in a WIPP Salado brine surrogate as a function of hydrogen ion concentration; the steady-state dissolved plutonium concentrations in a synthetic WIPP Culebra brine surrogate; the development of a model for Nd(III) solubility and speciation in dilute to concentrated sodium carbonate and sodium bicarbonate solutions; and the development of a model for Np(V) solubility and speciation in dilute to concentrated sodium Perchlorate, sodium carbonate, and sodium chloride media

  10. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PICKETT, W.W.

    2000-09-22

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. Because this sub-project is still in the construction/start-up phase, all verification activities have not yet been performed (e.g., canister cover cap and welding fixture system verification, MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment verification, and As-built verification.). The verification activities identified in this report that still are to be performed will be added to the start-up punchlist and tracked to closure.

  11. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PICKETT, W.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. Because this sub-project is still in the construction/start-up phase, all verification activities have not yet been performed (e.g., canister cover cap and welding fixture system verification, MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment verification, and As-built verification.). The verification activities identified in this report that still are to be performed will be added to the start-up punchlist and tracked to closure

  12. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2001-05-15

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted in section 3

  13. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2001-01-01

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted in section 3.1.5 and will be

  14. Status Report on the Microbial Characterization of Halite and Groundwater Samples from the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swanson, Juliet S.; Reed, Donald T.; Ams, David A.; Norden, Diana; Simmons, Karen A.

    2012-01-01

    This report summarizes the progress made in the ongoing task of characterizing the microbial community structures within the WIPP repository and in surrounding groundwaters. Through cultivation and DNA-based identification, the potential activity of these organisms is being inferred, thus leading to a better understanding of their impact on WIPP performance. Members of the three biological domains - Bacteria, Archaea, and Eukarya (in this case, Fungi) - that are associated with WIPP halite have been identified. Thus far, their activity has been limited to aerobic respiration; anaerobic incubations are underway. WIPP halite constitutes the near-field microbial environment. We expect that microbial activity in this setting will proceed from aerobic respiration, through nitrate reduction to focus on sulfate reduction. This is also the current WIPP performance assessment (PA) position. Sulfate reduction can occur at extremely high ionic strengths, and sulfate is available in WIPP brines and in the anhydrite interbeds. The role of methanogenesis in the WIPP remains unclear, due to both energetic constraints imposed by a high-salt environment and substrate selectivity, and it is no longer considered in PA. Archaea identified in WIPP halite thus far fall exclusively within the family Halobacteriaceae. These include Halobacterium noricense, cultivated from both low- and high-salt media, and a Halorubrum-like species. The former has also been detected in other salt mines worldwide; the latter likely constitutes a new species. Little is known of its function, but it was prevalent in experiments investigating the biodegradation of organic complexing agents in WIPP brines. Bacterial signatures associated with WIPP halite include members of the phylum Proteobacteria - Halomonas, Pelomonas, Limnobacter, and Chromohalobacter - but only the latter has been isolated. Also detected and cultivated were Salinicoccus and Nesterenkonia spp. Fungi were also isolated from halite. Although

  15. Status Report on the Microbial Characterization of Halite and Groundwater Samples from the WIPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swanson, Juliet S. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Reed, Donald T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ams, David A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Norden, Diana [Ohio State University; Simmons, Karen A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-07-10

    This report summarizes the progress made in the ongoing task of characterizing the microbial community structures within the WIPP repository and in surrounding groundwaters. Through cultivation and DNA-based identification, the potential activity of these organisms is being inferred, thus leading to a better understanding of their impact on WIPP performance. Members of the three biological domains - Bacteria, Archaea, and Eukarya (in this case, Fungi) - that are associated with WIPP halite have been identified. Thus far, their activity has been limited to aerobic respiration; anaerobic incubations are underway. WIPP halite constitutes the near-field microbial environment. We expect that microbial activity in this setting will proceed from aerobic respiration, through nitrate reduction to focus on sulfate reduction. This is also the current WIPP performance assessment (PA) position. Sulfate reduction can occur at extremely high ionic strengths, and sulfate is available in WIPP brines and in the anhydrite interbeds. The role of methanogenesis in the WIPP remains unclear, due to both energetic constraints imposed by a high-salt environment and substrate selectivity, and it is no longer considered in PA. Archaea identified in WIPP halite thus far fall exclusively within the family Halobacteriaceae. These include Halobacterium noricense, cultivated from both low- and high-salt media, and a Halorubrum-like species. The former has also been detected in other salt mines worldwide; the latter likely constitutes a new species. Little is known of its function, but it was prevalent in experiments investigating the biodegradation of organic complexing agents in WIPP brines. Bacterial signatures associated with WIPP halite include members of the phylum Proteobacteria - Halomonas, Pelomonas, Limnobacter, and Chromohalobacter - but only the latter has been isolated. Also detected and cultivated were Salinicoccus and Nesterenkonia spp. Fungi were also isolated from halite. Although

  16. Tritium Packages and 17th RH Canister Categories of Transuranic Waste Stored Below Ground within Area G

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hargis, Kenneth Marshall [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-03-01

    A large wildfire called the Las Conchas Fire burned large areas near Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 2011 and heightened public concern and news media attention over transuranic (TRU) waste stored at LANL’s Technical Area 54 (TA-54) Area G waste management facility. The removal of TRU waste from Area G had been placed at a lower priority in budget decisions for environmental cleanup at LANL because TRU waste removal is not included in the March 2005 Compliance Order on Consent (Reference 1) that is the primary regulatory driver for environmental cleanup at LANL. The Consent Order is a settlement agreement between LANL and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) that contains specific requirements and schedules for cleaning up historical contamination at the LANL site. After the Las Conchas Fire, discussions were held by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) with the NMED on accelerating TRU waste removal from LANL and disposing it at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). This report summarizes available information on the origin, configuration, and composition of the waste containers within the Tritium Packages and 17th RH Canister categories; their physical and radiological characteristics; the results of the radioassays; and potential issues in retrieval and processing of the waste containers.

  17. White Paper: Multi-purpose canister (MPC) for DOE-owned spent nuclear fuel (SNF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knecht, D.A.

    1994-04-01

    The paper examines the issue, What are the advantages, disadvantages, and other considerations for using the MPC concept as part of the strategy for interim storage and disposal of DOE-owned SNF? The paper is based in part on the results of an evaluation made for the DOE National Spent Fuel Program by the Waste Form Barrier/Canister Team, which is composed of knowledgeable DOE and DOE-contractor personnel. The paper reviews the MPC and DOE SNF status, provides criteria and other considerations applicable to the issue, and presents an evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations. The primary conclusion is that while most of DOE SNF is not currently sufficiently characterized to be sealed into an MPC, the advantages of standardized packages in handling, reduced radiation exposure, and improved human factors should be considered in DOE SNF program planning. While the design of MPCs for DOE SNF are likely premature at this time, the use of canisters should be considered which are consistent with interim storage options and the MPC design envelope

  18. Mechanical Integrity of Canisters Using a Fracture Mechanics Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koyama, Tomofumi; Guoxiang Zhang; Lanru Jing [Royal Inst. of Technology, Stockholm (Sweden). Dept. of Land and Water Resources Engineering

    2006-07-15

    This report presents the methods and results of a research project about numerical modeling of mechanical integrity of cast-iron canisters for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden, using combined boundary element (BEM) and finite element (FEM) methods. The objectives of the project are: 1) to investigate the possibility of initiation and growth of fractures in the cast-iron canisters under the mechanical loading conditions defined in the premises of canister design by Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. (SKB); 2) to investigate the maximum bearing capacity of the cast iron canisters under uniformly distributed and gradually increasing boundary pressure until plastic failure. Achievement of the two objectives may provide some quantitative evidence for the mechanical integrity and overall safety of the cast-iron canisters that are needed for the final safety assessment of the geological repository of the radioactive waste repository in Sweden. The geometrical dimension, distribution and magnitudes of loads and Material properties of the canisters and possible fractures were provided by the latest investigations of SKB. The results of the BEM simulations, using the commercial code BEASY, indicate that under the currently defined loading conditions the possibility of initiation of new fractures or growth of existing fractures (defects) are very small, due to the reasons that: 1) the canisters are under mainly compressive stresses; 2) the induced tensile stress regions are too small in both dimension and magnitude to create new fractures or to induce growth of existing fractures, besides the fact that the toughness of the fractures in the cast iron canisters are much higher that the stress intensity factors in the fracture tips. The results of the FEM simulation show a approximately 75 MPa maximum pressure beyond which plastic collapse of the cast-iron canisters may occur, using an elastoplastic Material model. This figure is smaller compared

  19. Demonstration of remotely operated TRU waste size reduction and material handling equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Looper, M.G.; Charlesworth, D.L.

    1988-01-01

    The Savannah River Laboratory (SRL) is developing remote size reduction and material handling equipment to prepare 238 Pu contaminated waste for permanent disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. The waste is generated at the Savannah River Plant (SRP) from normal operation and decommissioning activity and is retrievably stored onsite. A Transuranic Waste Facility for preparing, size-reducing, and packaging this waste for disposal is scheduled for completion in 1995. A cold test facility for demonstrating the size reduction and material handling equipment was built, and testing began in January 1987. 9 figs., 1 tab

  20. Burst Test Qualification Analysis of DWPF Canister-Plug Weld

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, N.K.; Gong, Chung.

    1995-02-01

    The DWPF canister closure system uses resistance welding for sealing the canister nozzle and plug to ensure leak tightness. The welding group at SRTC is using the burst test to qualify this seal weld in lieu of the shear test in ASME B ampersand PV Code, Section IX, paragraph QW-196. The burst test is considered simpler and more appropriate than the shear test for this application. Although the geometry, loading and boundary conditions are quite different in the two tests, structural analyses show similarity in the failure mode of the shear test in paragraph QW-196 and the burst test on the DWPF canister nozzle Non-linear structural analyses are performed using finite element techniques to study the failure mode of the two tests. Actual test geometry and realistic stress strain data for the 304L stainless steel and the weld material are used in the analyses. The finite element models are loaded until failure strains are reached. The failure modes in both tests are shear at the failure points. Based on these observations, it is concluded that the use of a burst test in lieu of the shear test for qualifying the canister-plug weld is acceptable. The burst test analysis for the canister-plug also yields the burst pressures which compare favorably with the actual pressure found during burst tests. Thus, the analysis also provides an estimate of the safety margins in the design of these vessels

  1. Canisters and nonfuel components at commercial nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibbard, K.; Disbrow, J.

    1994-01-01

    This paper discusses detailed data on canisters and nonfuel components (NFC) at US commercial nuclear power reactors. A wide variety of NFC have been reported on the Form RW-859, open-quotes Nuclear Fuel Dataclose quotes survey. They may have been integral with an assembly, noncanistered in baskets, destined for disposal as low-level radioactive waste, or stored in canisters. Similarly, data on the family of canistered spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in storage pools was compiled. Approximately 85 percent of the 40,194 pieces of nonfuel assembly (NFA) hardware reported were integral with an assembly. This represents data submitted by 95 of the 107 reactors in 10 generic assembly classes. In addition, a total of 286 canisters have been reported as being in storage pools as of December 31, 1992. However, an additional 264 open baskets were also reported to contain miscellaneous SNF and nonfuel materials, garbage and debris. All of these 286 canisters meet the dimensional envelope requirements specified for disposal for open-quotes standard fuelclose quotes under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (10 CFR 961); most of the baskets do not

  2. Comments on 'SKB RD and D-Programme 98'. Focused on canister integrity and corrosion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bowyer, W.H. [Meadow End Farm, Farnham (United Kingdom); Hermansson, H.P. [Studsvik Material AB, Nykoeping (Sweden)

    1999-04-01

    SKB and that a higher level of metallurgical support is required. We disagree that suitable full size canisters have already been created and that production technology is available for both canisters at full size. We also disagree that the long time durability is ascertained. i. a. it is easy to find corrosion mechanisms and handling procedures for the canister system that have to be demonstrated not to be harmful. We feel that there are many areas, which need further evaluation but are granted too little space in the programme. This is valid for i.a. effects of non-uniform loading and creep, welding, quality control, effects of radiolysis and corrosion properties. We also consider that more information should be provided on the detail and timing of the development plan for the trial fabrication programme of the canister, the canister test programme, determination of quality standards and development of non destructive testing procedures. We also feel that insufficient emphasis has been placed on the further development on alternatives to high power electron beam welding, non-destructive testing and over all handling. Copper will be exposed for both general and different kinds of localised corrosion in the repository. The complex mechanical, chemical and microbial environment with high pressures varying in time and location and with oxygen, chloride, sulphur and carbon bearing compounds present will cause different types of attacks that are going to prevail during different time periods. The procedures of production, handling and treatment of the canister throughout the processes of filling, transportation and deposition are crucial for its later, corrosion related integrity throughout the storage period in the repository. There is a risk that due to systematically induced faults, many canisters may have later corrosion related problems. The QA system should be developed to cover all steps of canister handling. We feel a large uncertainty when expressions like &apos

  3. Performance in the WIPP nondestructive assay performance demonstration program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marcinkiewicz, C.J. [Consolidated Technical Services, Inc., Frederick, MD (United States); Connolly, M.J.; Becker, G.K. [Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company, Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    1997-11-01

    Measurement facilities performing nondestructive assay (NDA) of wastes intended for disposal at the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are required to demonstrate their ability to meet specific Quality Assurance Objectives (QAOs). This demonstration is performed, in part, by participation in the NDA Performance Demonstration Program (PDP). The PDP is funded and managed by the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO) of DOE and is conducted by the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. It tests the characteristics of precision, system bias and/or total uncertainty through the measurement of variable, blind combinations of simulated waste drums and certified radioactive standards. Each facility must successfully participate in the PDP using each different type of measurement system planned for use in waste characterization. The first cycle of the PDP using each different type of measurement system planned for use in waste characterization. The first cycle of the PDP was completed in July 1996 and the second is scheduled for completion by December 1996. Seven sites reported data in cycle 1 for 11 different measurement systems. This paper describes the design and operation of the PDP and provides the performance data from cycle 1. It also describes the preliminary results from cycle 2 and updates the status and future plans for the NDA PDP. 4 refs., 9 figs., 11 tabs.

  4. Geomechanical applications for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matalucci, R.V.; Hunter, T.O.

    1981-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a research and development facility in bedded salt addressing the technical issues associated with the demonstration of disposal of radioactive waste from the defense programs of the USA. The geomechanical program includes laboratory experimentation, constitutive model and computer code development, and in-situ experimentation. Various material models, including creep for salt, and techniques for predicting room response under thermal and mechanical loads have been developed and are being applied to experiment and facility designs. A Benchmark II study has been conducted to compare the capabilities of nine structural codes to predict response of underground configuration under ambient temperature and with a thermal load of 7.5 W/m 2 . Parametric studies are being conducted to evaluate optimum room configurations. A series of in situ experiments is the next step towards validating models and predictive techniques. These experiments will be conducted in a facility in southeastern New Mexico mined at a depth of 659 m

  5. Laboratory creep and mechanical tests on salt data report (1975-1996): Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) thermal/structural interactions program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mellegard, K.D. [RE/SPEC Inc., Rapid City, SD (United States); Munson, D.E. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1997-02-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a facility located in a bedded salt formation in Carlsbad, New Mexico, is being used by the U.S. Department of Energy to demonstrate the technology for safe handling and disposal of transuranic wastes produced by defense activities in the United States. In support of that demonstration, mechanical tests on salt were conducted in the laboratory to characterize material behavior at the stresses and temperatures expected for a nuclear waste repository. Many of those laboratory test programs have been carried out in the RE/SPEC Inc. rock mechanics laboratory in Rapid City, South Dakota; the first program being authorized in 1975 followed by additional testing programs that continue to the present. All of the WIPP laboratory data generated on salt at RE/SPEC Inc. over the last 20 years is presented in this data report. A variety of test procedures were used in performance of the work including quasi-static triaxial compression tests, constant stress (creep) tests, damage recovery tests, and multiaxial creep tests. The detailed data is presented in individual plots for each specimen tested. Typically, the controlled test conditions applied to each specimen are presented in a plot followed by additional plots of the measured specimen response. Extensive tables are included to summarize the tests that were performed. Both the tables and the plots contain cross-references to the technical reports where the data were originally reported. Also included are general descriptions of laboratory facilities, equipment, and procedures used to perform the work.

  6. Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Can

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, Lars

    2006-10-01

    This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The report is written by, and for, experts in the relevant scientific fields. It should though be possible for a generalist in the area of long-term safety assessments of geologic nuclear waste repositories to comprehend the contents of the report. The report is an important part of the documentation of the SR-Can project and an essential reference within the project, providing a scientifically motivated plan for the handling of geosphere processes. It is, furthermore, foreseen that the report will be essential for reviewers scrutinising the handling of geosphere issues in the SR-Can assessment. Several types of fuel will be emplaced in the repository. For the reference case with 40 years of reactor operation, the fuel quantity from boiling water reactors, BWR fuel, is estimated at 7,000 tonnes, while the quantity from pressurized water reactors, PWR fuel, is estimated at about 2,300 tonnes. In addition, 23 tonnes of mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fuel of German origin from BWR and PWR reactors and 20 tonnes of fuel from the decommissioned heavy water reactor in Aagesta will be disposed of. To allow for future changes in the Swedish nuclear programme, the safety assessment assumes a total of 6,000 canister corresponding to 12,000 tonnes of fuel

  7. Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Can

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Werme, Lars (ed.)

    2006-10-15

    This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The report is written by, and for, experts in the relevant scientific fields. It should though be possible for a generalist in the area of long-term safety assessments of geologic nuclear waste repositories to comprehend the contents of the report. The report is an important part of the documentation of the SR-Can project and an essential reference within the project, providing a scientifically motivated plan for the handling of geosphere processes. It is, furthermore, foreseen that the report will be essential for reviewers scrutinising the handling of geosphere issues in the SR-Can assessment. Several types of fuel will be emplaced in the repository. For the reference case with 40 years of reactor operation, the fuel quantity from boiling water reactors, BWR fuel, is estimated at 7,000 tonnes, while the quantity from pressurized water reactors, PWR fuel, is estimated at about 2,300 tonnes. In addition, 23 tonnes of mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fuel of German origin from BWR and PWR reactors and 20 tonnes of fuel from the decommissioned heavy water reactor in Aagesta will be disposed of. To allow for future changes in the Swedish nuclear programme, the safety assessment assumes a total of 6,000 canister corresponding to 12,000 tonnes of fuel.

  8. SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryan, Charles R.; Enos, David G.

    2015-01-01

    This progress report describes work being done at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to assess the localized corrosion performance of container/cask materials used in the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Of particular concern is stress corrosion cracking (SCC), by which a through-wall crack could potentially form in a canister outer wall over time intervals that are shorter than possible dry storage times. In order for SCC to occur, three criteria must be met. A corrosive environment must be present on the canister surface, the metal must susceptible to SCC, and sufficient tensile stress to support SCC must be present through the entire thickness of the canister wall. SNL is currently evaluating the potential for each of these criteria to be met.

  9. Electropolishing decontamination system for high-level waste canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larson, D.E.; Berger, D.N.; Allen, R.P.; Bryan, G.H.; Place, B.G.

    1988-10-01

    As part of a US Department of Energy (DOE) project agreement with the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT) in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The Nuclear Waste Treatment Program at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) is preparing 30 radioactive canisters containing borosilicate glass for use in high-level waste repository related tests at the Asse Salt Mine. After filling, the canisters will be welded closed and decontaminated in preparation for shipping to the FRG. Electropolishing was selected as the primary decontamination approach, and an electropolishing system with associated canister inspection equipment has been designed and fabricated for installation in a large hot cell. This remote electropolishing system, which is currently undergoing preliminary testing, is described in this report. 3 refs., 3 figs., 1 tab

  10. Drop tests of the Three Mile Island knockout canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Aaron, W.S.; Shappert, L.B.; Childress, P.C.; Quinn, G.J.; Smith, J.V.

    1987-01-01

    A type of Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) defueling canister, called a ''knockout'' canister, was subjected to a series of drop tests at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Drop Test Facility. These tests confirmed the structural integrity of internal fixed neutron poisons in support of a request for NRC licensing of this type of canister for the shipment of TMI-2 reactor fuel debris to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for the Core Examination R and D Program. This report presents the data generated and the results obtained from a series of four drop tests that included two drops with the test assembly in the vertical position and two drops with the assembly in the horizontal position

  11. Development of cold sprayed Cu coating for canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyung Jun; Kang, Yoon Ha

    2010-01-01

    Cold sprayed Cu deposition was studied for the application of outer part of canister for high level nuclear waste. Five commercially available pure Cu powders were analyzed and sprayed by high pressure cold spray system. Electrochemical corrosion test using potentiostat in 3.5% NaCl solution was conducted as well as microstructural analysis including hardness and oxygen content measurements. Overall evaluation of corrosion performance of cold sprayed Cu deposition is inferior to forged and extruded Cu plates, but some of Cu depositions are comparable to Cu plates. The simulated corrosion test in 200m underground cave is still in progress. The effect of cold spray process parameters was also studied and the results show that the type of nozzle is the most important other than powder feed rate, spray distance, and scan speed. 1/10 scale miniature of canister was manufactured confirming that the production of full scale canister is possible

  12. Prototype spent-fuel canister design, analysis, and test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leisher, W.B.; Eakes, R.G.; Duffey, T.A.

    1982-03-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was asked by the US Energy Research and Development Administration (now US Department of Energy) to design the spent fuel shipping cask system for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP). As a part of this task, a canister which holds liquid sodium and the spent fuel assembly was designed, analyzed, and tested. The canister body survived the regulatory Type-B 9.1-m (30-ft) drop test with no apparent leakage. However, the commercially available metal seal used in this design leaked after the tests. This report describes the design approach, analysis, and prototype canister testing. Recommended work for completing the design, when funding is available, is included

  13. High-level radioactive waste glass and storage canister design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slate, S.C.; Ross, W.A.

    1979-01-01

    Management of high-level radioactive wastes is a primary concern in nuclear operations today. The main objective in managing these wastes is to convert them into a solid, durable form which is then isolated from man. A description is given of the design and evaluation of this waste form. The waste form has two main components: the solidified waste and the storage canister. The solid waste form discussed in this study is glass. Waste glasses have been designed to be inert to water attack, physically rugged, low in volatility, and stable over time. Two glass-making processes are under development at PNL. The storage canister is being designed to provide high-integrity containment for solidified wastes from processing to terminal storage. An outline is given of the steps in canister design: material selection, stress and thermal analyses, quality verification, and postfill processing. Examples are given of results obtained from actual nonradioactive demonstration tests. 14 refs

  14. Test plan for the Sample Transfer Canister system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, B.D.

    1998-01-01

    The Sample Transfer Canister will be used by the Waste Receiving and Processing Facility (WRAP) for the transport of small quantity liquid samples that meet the definition of a limited quantity radioactive material, and may also be corrosive and/or flammable. These samples will be packaged and shipped in accordance with the US Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation 49 CFR 173.4, ''Exceptions for small quantities.'' The Sample Transfer Canister is of a ''French Can'' design, intended to be mated with a glove box for loading/unloading. Transport will typically take place north of the Wye Barricade between WRAP and the 222-S Laboratory. The Sample Transfer Canister will be shipped in an insulated ice chest, but the ice chest will not be a part of the small quantity package during prototype testing

  15. Waste canister closure welding using the inertia friction welding process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klein, R.F.; Siemens, D.H.; Kuruzar, D.L.

    1986-02-01

    Liquid radioactive waste presently stored in underground tanks is to undergo a vitrifying process which will immobilize it in a solid form. This solid waste will be contained in a stainless steel canister. The canister opening requires a positive seal weld, the properties and thickness of which are at least equal to those of the canister material. This paper describes the inertia friction welding process and a proposed equipment design concept that will provide a positive, reliable, inspectable, and full thickness seal weld while providing easily maintainable equipment, even though the weld is made in a highly contaminated hot cell. All studies and tests performed have shown the concept to be highly feasible. 2 refs., 6 figs

  16. SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bryan, Charles R. [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Enos, David G. [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-09-01

    This progress report describes work being done at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to assess the localized corrosion performance of container/cask materials used in the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Of particular concern is stress corrosion cracking (SCC), by which a through-wall crack could potentially form in a canister outer wall over time intervals that are shorter than possible dry storage times. In order for SCC to occur, three criteria must be met. A corrosive environment must be present on the canister surface, the metal must susceptible to SCC, and sufficient tensile stress to support SCC must be present through the entire thickness of the canister wall. SNL is currently evaluating the potential for each of these criteria to be met.

  17. Canisters and nonfuel components at commercial nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibbard, K.; Thorpe, J.; Moore, R.S.

    1995-01-01

    The Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) collects data annually from commercial nuclear power reactors via the Nuclear Fuel Data survey, Form RW-859. Over the past three years, the survey has collected data on the quantities and types of nonfuel components and on the quantities and contents of canisters in storage at reactor sites. This paper focuses on the annual changes in the data, specific implications of these changes, and lessons that should be applied to future revisions of the study. The total number of canisters reported by utilities for each year from 1986 to 1993 is listed. Changes in the quantities of nonfuel components report by General Reactors from 1992 to 1993 are also provided. Comparisons of canister and nonfuel components components data from year to year and from reactor to reactor point out that survey questions on these topics have been interpreted differently by reactor personnel

  18. Development of Copper Canister through Cold Sprayed Coating Method

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Min Soo; Choi, Jong Won; Choi, Heui Joo; Lee, Jong Youl; Jeong, Jong Tae; Kim, Sung Ki; Cho, Dong Keun

    2007-12-15

    General thickness of a copper canister is 5 cm for a underground disposal application. The lower limit of a thickness is determined by a forging technology. But many experts in this area agrees that the thickness 1 cm is enough at the underground disposal for the life time of 1,000,000 years. Thus new technology is suggested for the making 1 cm thickness copper canister, that is a cold spray coating method(CSC). In this report, the CSC is examined and the technical possibility for making copper canister is measured. The overview of CSC and its characteristics are discussed. Various copper particles for the CSC are analyzed and the formed coating layers are examined to find their porosity and uniformity. A Tafa copper particle and Chang-sung copper particle are selected for making 1 cm thick test specimen. Using the CSC specimens, tensile test and XRD analysis are performed. As a corrosion evaluation, a electrochemical test such as a polarization test is done, together with humid corrosion test and chloric acid immersion test. Through the corrosion tests, it is tried to confirm that the CSC is valuable method for making a copper canister. Consequently, it is confirmed that the CSC method is very usful for making 1 cm thick copper canister. the porosity of CSC layer is very low at 0.3 in case of Tafa copper layer. In corrosion tests, the CSC layers are very stable in active environments. It is hard to say that the difference of processing method but the purity of copper is important for the corrosion rate evaluation. The CSC method is very effective method for making 1 cm thick copper canister, It is hoped that the CSC method is applied in a HLW underground disposal system in the future.

  19. Development of Copper Canister through Cold Sprayed Coating Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Min Soo; Choi, Jong Won; Choi, Heui Joo; Lee, Jong Youl; Jeong, Jong Tae; Kim, Sung Ki; Cho, Dong Keun

    2007-12-01

    General thickness of a copper canister is 5 cm for a underground disposal application. The lower limit of a thickness is determined by a forging technology. But many experts in this area agrees that the thickness 1 cm is enough at the underground disposal for the life time of 1,000,000 years. Thus new technology is suggested for the making 1 cm thickness copper canister, that is a cold spray coating method(CSC). In this report, the CSC is examined and the technical possibility for making copper canister is measured. The overview of CSC and its characteristics are discussed. Various copper particles for the CSC are analyzed and the formed coating layers are examined to find their porosity and uniformity. A Tafa copper particle and Chang-sung copper particle are selected for making 1 cm thick test specimen. Using the CSC specimens, tensile test and XRD analysis are performed. As a corrosion evaluation, a electrochemical test such as a polarization test is done, together with humid corrosion test and chloric acid immersion test. Through the corrosion tests, it is tried to confirm that the CSC is valuable method for making a copper canister. Consequently, it is confirmed that the CSC method is very usful for making 1 cm thick copper canister. the porosity of CSC layer is very low at 0.3 in case of Tafa copper layer. In corrosion tests, the CSC layers are very stable in active environments. It is hard to say that the difference of processing method but the purity of copper is important for the corrosion rate evaluation. The CSC method is very effective method for making 1 cm thick copper canister, It is hoped that the CSC method is applied in a HLW underground disposal system in the future

  20. The Wipp Disposal Decision Plan: the Successful Road Map for Transparent and Credible Decision-Making

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eriksson, Leif G.

    2001-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) deep geological repository for long-lived, transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW) opened on the 26th of March 1999. Beginning on the 4th of April 1994, the United States Department of Energy (DOE), implemented the WIPP Disposal Decision Plan (DDP), which embodied the five-year vision and intents of the then DOE Manager of the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO), presently the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO). The successful design and implementation of the DDP ensured good science, enhanced regulator and stake holder (affected and interested parties) interactions and acceptance of programmatic decisions, which resulted in the certification of the WIPP TRUW repository by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the 18th of May 1998, almost three years earlier than projected in November 1993. The present paper contains three sections: A concise background information on the CBFO's TRUW disposal program, incl. the legal framework, current status, and author-envisioned challenges and solutions; A description of the main components and attributes of the WIPP DDP. A summary of the lessons learned during and after the 1994 through 1998 implementation of the WIPP DDP

  1. History of geophysical studies at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borns, D.J.

    1997-01-01

    A variety of geophysical methods including the spectrum of seismic, electrical, electromagnetic and potential field techniques have supported characterization, monitoring and experimental studies at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The geophysical studies have provided significant understanding of the nature of site deformation, tectonics and stability. Geophysical methods have delineated possible brine reservoirs beneath the underground facility and have defined the disturbed rock zone that forms around underground excavations. The role of geophysics in the WIPP project has evolved with the project. The early uses were for site characterization to satisfy site selection criteria or factors. As the regulatory framework for WIPP grew since 1980, the geophysics program supported experimental and field programs such as Salado hydrogeology and underground room systems and excavations. In summary, the major types of issues that geophysical studies addressed for WIPP are: Site Characterization; Castile Brine Reservoirs; Rustler/Dewey Lake Hydrogeology; Salado Hydrogeology; and Excavation Effects. The nature of geophysics programs for WIPP has been to support investigation rather than being the principal investigation itself. The geophysics program has been used to define conceptual models (e.g., the Disturbed Rock Zone-DRZ) or to test conceptual models (e.g., high transmissivity zones in the Rustler Formation). The geophysics program primarily supported larger characterization and experimental programs. Funding was not available for the complete documentation and interpretation. Therefore, a great deal of the geophysics survey information resides in contractor reports

  2. Preliminary identification of interfaces for certification and transfer of TRU waste to WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitty, W.J.; Ostenak, C.A.; Pillay, K.K.S.

    1982-02-01

    This study complements the national program to certify that newly generated and stored, unclassified defense transuranic (TRU) wastes meet the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Acceptance Criteria. The objectives of this study were to identify (1) the existing organizational structure at each of the major waste-generating and shipping sites and (2) the necessary interfaces between the waste shippers and WIPP. The interface investigations considered existing waste management organizations at the shipping sites and the proposed WIPP organization. An effort was made to identify the potential waste-certifying authorities and the lines of communication within these organizations. The long-range goal of this effort is to develop practicable interfaces between waste shippers and WIPP to enable the continued generation, interim storage, and eventual shipment of certified TRU wastes to WIPP. Some specific needs identified in this study include: organizational responsibility for certification procedures and quality assurance (QA) program; simple QA procedures; and specification and standardization of reporting forms and procedures, waste containers, and container labeling, color coding, and code location

  3. The Wipp Disposal Decision Plan: the Successful Road Map for Transparent and Credible Decision-Making

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eriksson, Leif G. [GRAM, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) deep geological repository for long-lived, transuranic radioactive waste (TRUW) opened on the 26th of March 1999. Beginning on the 4th of April 1994, the United States Department of Energy (DOE), implemented the WIPP Disposal Decision Plan (DDP), which embodied the five-year vision and intents of the then DOE Manager of the Carlsbad Area Office (CAO), presently the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO). The successful design and implementation of the DDP ensured good science, enhanced regulator and stake holder (affected and interested parties) interactions and acceptance of programmatic decisions, which resulted in the certification of the WIPP TRUW repository by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the 18th of May 1998, almost three years earlier than projected in November 1993. The present paper contains three sections: A concise background information on the CBFO's TRUW disposal program, incl. the legal framework, current status, and author-envisioned challenges and solutions; A description of the main components and attributes of the WIPP DDP. A summary of the lessons learned during and after the 1994 through 1998 implementation of the WIPP DDP.

  4. Implications of the presence of petroleum resources on the integrity of the WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, M.K.

    1994-06-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a facility of the US Department of Energy (DOE), designed and constructed for the permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU) defense waste. The WIPP is surrounded by reserves of potash, crude oil, and natural gas. These are attractive targets for exploratory drilling which could disrupt the integrity of the transuranic waste repository. The performance assessment calculations published to date have identified future drilling for oil and gas reserves as an event that may disrupt the repository and may release radionuclides in excess of the standards. Therefore, the probability of inadvertent human intrusion into the repository by drilling and its impact on the integrity of the repository must be carefully assessed. This report evaluates: (1) the studies funded by the DOE to examine the crude oil potential in the immediate vicinity of the WIPP; (2) the use of an elicitation exercise to predict future drilling rates for use in the calculation of the repository performance; and (3) the observed limitations of institutional controls. This report identifies the following issues that remain to be resolved: (1) the limited performance of blowout preventers after drilling into high pressure zones immediately adjacent to the WIPP Site Boundary; (2) reported problems with waterflooding operations in southeastern New Mexico; (3) reported water level rises in several wells completed in the Rustler Formation, south of the WIPP Site, possibly due to oil and gas wells or leaking injection wells; and (4) reports of inadequate well abandonment practices on BLM leases and the continued absence of enforceable regulations

  5. Criticality safety for TMI-2 canister storage at INEL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, R.R.; Briggs, J.B.; Ayers, A.L. Jr.

    1986-01-01

    Canisters containing Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) core debris will be researched, stored, and prepared for final disposition at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). The canisters will be placed into storage modules and assembled into a storage rack, which will be located in the Test Area North (TAN) storage pool. Criticality safety calculations were made (a) to ensure that the storage rack is safe for both normal and accident conditions and (b) to determine the effects of degradation of construction materials (Boraflex and polyethylene) on criticality safety

  6. Evaluation of the Frequencies for Canister Inspections for SCC

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stockman, Christine [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Bryan, Charles R. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2016-02-02

    This report fulfills the M3 milestone M3FT-15SN0802042, “Evaluate the Frequencies for Canister Inspections for SCC” under Work Package FT-15SN080204, “ST Field Demonstration Support – SNL”. It reviews the current state of knowledge on the potential for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of dry storage canisters and evaluates the implications of this state of knowledge on the establishment of an SCC inspection frequency. Models for the prediction of SCC by the Japanese Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), the United States (U.S.) Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) are summarized, and their limitations discussed.

  7. Chemical stability of copper-canisters in deep repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahonen, L.

    1995-12-01

    The spent fuel from Finnish nuclear reactors is planned to be encapsulated in thick-walled copper-iron canisters and placed deep into the bedrock. The copper wall of the canister provides a long-time shield against corrosion, preventing the high-level nuclear fuel from contact with ground water. In the report, stability of metallic copper and its possible corrosion reactions in the conditions of deep bedrock are evaluated by means of thermo-dynamic calculations. (90 refs., 28 figs., 11 tabs.)

  8. High-level waste canister envelope study: structural analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-11-01

    The structural integrity of waste canisters, fabricated from standard weight Type 304L stainless steel pipe, was analyzed for sizes ranging from 8 to 24 in. diameter and 10 to 16 feet long under normal, abnormal, and improbable life cycle loading conditions. The canisters are assumed to be filled with vitrified high-level nuclear waste, stored temporarily at a fuel reprocessing plant, and then transported for storage in an underground salt bed or other geologic storage. In each of the three impact conditions studies, the resulting impact force is far greater than the elastic limit capacity of the material. Recommendations are made for further study

  9. Debris Removal Project K West Canister Cleaning System Performance Specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FARWICK, C.C.

    1999-01-01

    Approximately 2,300 metric tons Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) are currently stored within two water filled pools, the 105 K East (KE) fuel storage basin and the 105 K West (KW) fuel storage basin, at the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The SNF Project is responsible for operation of the K Basins and for the materials within them. A subproject to the SNF Project is the Debris Removal Subproject, which is responsible for removal of empty canisters and lids from the basins. Design criteria for a Canister Cleaning System to be installed in the KW Basin. This documents the requirements for design and installation of the system

  10. Corrosion resistance of metal materials for HLW canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furuya, Takashi; Muraoka, Susumu; Tashiro, Shingo

    1982-02-01

    In order to verify the materials as an important artificial barrier for canister of vitrified high-level waste from spent fuel reprocessing, data and reports were researched on corrosion resistance of the materials under conditions from glass form production to final disposal. Then, in this report, investigated subjects, improvement methods and future subjects are reviewed. It has become clear that there would be no problem on the inside and outside corrosion of the canister during glass production, but long term corrosion and radiation effect tests and the vitrification methods would be subjects in future on interim storage and final disposal conditions. (author)

  11. Materials for Consideration in Standardized Canister Design Activities.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bryan, Charles R.; Ilgen, Anastasia Gennadyevna; Enos, David George; Teich-McGoldrick, Stephanie; Hardin, Ernest

    2014-10-01

    This document identifies materials and material mitigation processes that might be used in new designs for standardized canisters for storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. It also addresses potential corrosion issues with existing dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) that could be addressed in new canister designs. The major potential corrosion risk during storage is stress corrosion cracking of the weld regions on the 304 SS/316 SS canister shell due to deliquescence of chloride salts on the surface. Two approaches are proposed to alleviate this potential risk. First, the existing canister materials (304 and 316 SS) could be used, but the welds mitigated to relieve residual stresses and/or sensitization. Alternatively, more corrosion-resistant steels such as super-austenitic or duplex stainless steels, could be used. Experimental testing is needed to verify that these alternatives would successfully reduce the risk of stress corrosion cracking during fuel storage. For disposal in a geologic repository, the canister will be enclosed in a corrosion-resistant or corrosion-allowance overpack that will provide barrier capability and mechanical strength. The canister shell will no longer have a barrier function and its containment integrity can be ignored. The basket and neutron absorbers within the canister have the important role of limiting the possibility of post-closure criticality. The time period for corrosion is much longer in the post-closure period, and one major unanswered question is whether the basket materials will corrode slowly enough to maintain structural integrity for at least 10,000 years. Whereas there is extensive literature on stainless steels, this evaluation recommends testing of 304 and 316 SS, and more corrosion-resistant steels such as super-austenitic, duplex, and super-duplex stainless steels, at repository-relevant physical and chemical conditions. Both general and localized corrosion testing methods would be used to

  12. Mechanical Integrity of Copper Canister Lid and Cylinder. Sensitivity study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karlsson, Marianne

    2002-08-01

    This report is part of a study of the mechanical integrity of canisters used for disposal of nuclear fuel waste. The overall objective is to determine and ensure the static and long-term strength of the copper canister lid and cylinder casing. The canisters used for disposal nuclear fuel waste of type BWR consists of an inner part (insert) of ductile cast iron and an outer part of copper. The copper canister is to provide a sealed barrier between the contents of the canister and the surroundings. The study in this report complements the finite element analyses performed in an earlier study. The analyses aim to evaluate the sensitivity of the canister to tolerances regarding the gap between the copper cylinder and the cast iron insert. Since great uncertainties regarding the material's long term creep properties prevail, analyses are also performed to evaluate the effect of different creep data on the resulting strain and stress state. The report analyses the mechanical response of the lid and flange of the copper canister when subjected to loads caused by pressure from swelling bentonite and from groundwater at a depth of 500 meter. The loads acting on the canister are somewhat uncertain and the cases investigated in this report are possible cases. Load cases analysed are: Pressure 15 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and 5 MPa uniformly distributed on cylinder; Pressure 5 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and 15 MPa uniformly distributed on cylinder; Pressure 20 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and cylinder; and Side pressures 10 MPa and 20 MPa uniformly distributed on part of the cylinder. Creep analyses are performed for two of the load cases. For all considered designs high principal stresses appear on the outside of the copper cylinder in the region from the weld down to the level of the lid lower edge. Altering the gap between lid and cylinder and/or between cylinder and insert only marginally affects the resulting stress state. Fitting the lid in the cylinder

  13. Work plan for development of K-Basin fuel handling tools

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bridges, A.E.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the engineering work plan for the development of handling tools for the removal of N-Reactor fuel elements from their storage canisters in the K-Basins storage pool and insertion into the Single Fuel Element Cans for subsequent shipment to a Hot Cell for examination. Examination of these N-Reactor fuel elements is part of the overall characterization effort. New hand tools are required since previous fuel movement has involved grasping the fuel in a horizontal position. These tools are required to lift an element from the storage canister

  14. Interaction between rock, bentonite buffer and canister. FEM calculations of some mechanical effects on the canister in different disposal concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boergesson, L.

    1992-07-01

    An important task of the buffer of highly compacted bentonite is to offer a mechanical protection to the canister. This role has been investigated by a number of finite element calculations using the complex elasto plastic material models for the bentonite that have been developed on the basis of laboratory tests and adapted to the code ABAQUS. The following main functions and scenarios have been investigated for some different canister types and repository concepts: - The effect of the water and swelling pressure, - The effect of a rock shear perpendicular to the canister axis, - The effect of creep in the copper after a rock shear displacement, - The thermomechanical effects when an initially saturated buffer is used

  15. DOE responses to the State of New Mexico's comments on ''summary of the results of the evaluation of the WIPP site and preliminary design validation program'' (WIPP-DOE-161)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    During the 60-day period provided for comments on the ''Summary of the Results of the Evaluation of the WIPP Site and Preliminary Design Validation Program'' (WIPP-DOE-161), written submittals and hearing testimony from about 133 individuals, 7 citizens groups and 6 state agencies were received by the Department of Energy (DOE). Approximately 25% of the public comment submittals were positive statements supporting the WIPP, with the remaining 75% reflecting concern with one or more aspects of the project. A portion of the state's comment package (submitted by the Governor of New Mexico) contained concerns relevant to WIPP which were unrelated to site suitability. Supportive comments formed the majority of the submittals from the New Mexico Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) which ''...is charged with the responsibility of evaluating the suitability of the site for carrying out the mission of WIPP by analyzing all the reports and other information which form the background to the DOE evaluation of the site''

  16. Development of remote handling techniques for the HLLW solidification plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tosha, Yoshitsugu; Iwata, Toshio; Inada, Eiichi; Nagaki, Hiroshi; Yamamoto, Masao

    1982-01-01

    To develop the techniques for the remote maintenance of the equipment in a HLLW (high-level liquid waste) solidification plant, the mock-up test facility (MTF) has been designed and constructed. Before its construction, the specific mock-up equipment was manufactured and tested. The results of the test and the outline of the MTF are described. As the mock-up equipment, a denitrater-concentrator, a ceramic melter and a canister handling equipment were selected. Remote operation was performed according to the maintenance program, and the evaluation of the component was conducted on the easiness of operation, performance, and the suitability to remote handling equipment. As a result of the test, four important elements were identified; they were guides, lifting fixtures, remote handling bolts, and remote pipe connectors. Many improvements of these elements were achieved, and reflected in the design of the MTF. The MTF is a steel-framed and slate-covered building (25 mL x 20 mW x 27 mH) with five storys of test bases. It contains the following four main systems: pretreatment and off-gas treatment system, glass melting system, canister handling system and secondary waste liquid recovery system. Further development of the remote maintenance techniques is expected through the test in the MTF. (Aoki, K.)

  17. Analysis of Waste Isolation Pilot Plan (WIPP) Underground and MGO Samples by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Young, J. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Ajo, H. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Brown, L. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Coleman, C. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Crump, S. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Diprete, C. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Diprete, D. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Ekechukwu, A. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Gregory, C. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Jones, M. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); Missimer, D. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); O' Rourke, P. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States); White, T. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States)

    2014-12-31

    Analysis of the recent WIPP samples are summarized in this report; WIPP Cam Filters 4, 6, 9 (3, 7, 11 were analyzed with FAS-118 in a separate campaign); WIPP Drum Lip R16 C4; WIPP Standard Waste Box R15 C5; WIPP MgO R16 C2; WIPP MgO R16 C4; WIPP MgO R16 C6; LANL swipes of parent drum; LANL parent drum debris; LANL parent drum; IAEA Swipe; Unused “undeployed” Swheat; Unused “undeployed” MgO; and Masselin cloth “smears”. Analysis showed that the MgO samples were very pure with low carbonate and water content. Other samples showed the expected dominant presence of Mg, Na and Pb. Parent drum debris sample was mildly acidic. Interpretation of results is not provided in this document, but rather to present and preserve the analytical work that was performed. The WIPP Technical Analysis Team is responsible for result interpretation which will be written separately.

  18. Plans for Managing Hanford Remote Handled Transuranic (TRU) Waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MCKENNEY, D.E.

    2001-01-01

    The current Hanford Site baseline and life-cycle waste forecast predicts that approximately 1,000 cubic meters of remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU) waste will be generated by waste management and environmental restoration activities at Hanford. These 1,000 cubic meters, comprised of both transuranic and mixed transuranic (TRUM) waste, represent a significant portion of the total estimated inventory of RH-TRU to be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). A systems engineering approach is being followed to develop a disposition plan for each RH-TRU/TRUM waste stream at Hanford. A number of significant decision-making efforts are underway to develop and finalize these disposition plans, including: development and approval of a RH-TRU/TRUM Waste Project Management Plan, revision of the Hanford Waste Management Strategic Plan, the Hanford Site Options Study (''Vision 2012''), the Canyon Disposal Initiative Record-of-Decision, and the Hanford Site Solid (Radioactive and Hazardous) Waste Program Environmental Impact Statement (SW-EIS). Disposition plans may include variations of several options, including (1) sending most RH-TRU/TRUM wastes to WIPP, (2) deferrals of waste disposal decisions in the interest of both efficiency and integration with other planned decision dates and (3) disposition of some materials in place consistent with Department of Energy Orders and the regulations in the interest of safety, risk minimization, and cost. Although finalization of disposition paths must await completion of the aforementioned decision documents, significant activities in support of RH-TRU/TRUM waste disposition are proceeding, including Hanford participation in development of the RH TRU WIPP waste acceptance criteria, preparation of T Plant for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel sludge, sharing of technology information and development activities in cooperation with the Mixed Waste Focus Area, RH-TRU technology demonstrations and deployments, and

  19. Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to summarize the waste acceptance criteria applicable to the transportation, storage, and disposal of contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These criteria serve as the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) primary directive for ensuring that CH-TRU waste is managed and disposed of in a manner that protects human health and safety and the environment.The authorization basis of WIPP for the disposal of CH-TRU waste includes the U.S.Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear EnergyAuthorization Act of 1980 (reference 1) and the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA;reference 2). Included in this document are the requirements and associated criteriaimposed by these acts and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA,reference 3), as amended, on the CH-TRU waste destined for disposal at WIPP.|The DOE TRU waste sites must certify CH-TRU waste payload containers to thecontact-handled waste acceptance criteria (CH-WAC) identified in this document. Asshown in figure 1.0, the flow-down of applicable requirements to the CH-WAC istraceable to several higher-tier documents, including the WIPP operational safetyrequirements derived from the WIPP CH Documented Safety Analysis (CH-DSA;reference 4), the transportation requirements for CH-TRU wastes derived from theTransuranic Package Transporter-Model II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT Certificates ofCompliance (references 5 and 5a), the WIPP LWA (reference 2), the WIPP HazardousWaste Facility Permit (reference 6), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) Compliance Certification Decision and approval for PCB disposal (references 7,34, 35, 36, and 37). The solid arrows shown in figure 1.0 represent the flow-down of allapplicable payload container-based requirements. The two dotted arrows shown infigure 1.0 represent the flow-down of summary level requirements only; i.e., the sitesmust reference the regulatory source

  20. Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-12-29

    The purpose of this document is to summarize the waste acceptance criteria applicable to the transportation, storage, and disposal of contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). These criteria serve as the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) primary directive for ensuring that CH-TRU waste is managed and disposed of in a manner that protects human health and safety and the environment.The authorization basis of WIPP for the disposal of CH-TRU waste includes the U.S.Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear EnergyAuthorization Act of 1980 (reference 1) and the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act (LWA;reference 2). Included in this document are the requirements and associated criteriaimposed by these acts and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA,reference 3), as amended, on the CH-TRU waste destined for disposal at WIPP.|The DOE TRU waste sites must certify CH-TRU waste payload containers to thecontact-handled waste acceptance criteria (CH-WAC) identified in this document. Asshown in figure 1.0, the flow-down of applicable requirements to the CH-WAC istraceable to several higher-tier documents, including the WIPP operational safetyrequirements derived from the WIPP CH Documented Safety Analysis (CH-DSA;reference 4), the transportation requirements for CH-TRU wastes derived from theTransuranic Package Transporter-Model II (TRUPACT-II) and HalfPACT Certificates ofCompliance (references 5 and 5a), the WIPP LWA (reference 2), the WIPP HazardousWaste Facility Permit (reference 6), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) Compliance Certification Decision and approval for PCB disposal (references 7,34, 35, 36, and 37). The solid arrows shown in figure 1.0 represent the flow-down of allapplicable payload container-based requirements. The two dotted arrows shown infigure 1.0 represent the flow-down of summary level requirements only; i.e., the sitesmust reference the regulatory source

  1. Salt impact studies at WIPP effects of surface storage of salt on microbial activity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, A.L.

    1988-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) currently under construction in southeastern New Mexico is a research and development facility to demonstrate the safe disposal of transuranic waste in a deep geological formation (bedded salt). The Ecological Monitoring Program at WIPP is designed to detect and measure changes in the local ecosystem which may be the result of WIPP construction activities. The primary factor which may affect the system prior to waste emplacement is windblown salt from discrete stockpiles. Both vegetation and soil microbial processes should reflect changes in soil chemistry due to salt importation. Control and experimental (potentially affected) plots have been established at the site, and several parameters are measured quarterly in each plot as part of the soil microbial sampling subprogram. This subprogram was designed to monitor a portion of the biological community which can be affected by changes in the chemical properties at the soil surface

  2. Modification of the ventilation system at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, S.C.

    1987-01-01

    The WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) Project near Carlsbad, New Mexico, is a research and development project sponsored by the US Department of Energy, designed to demonstrate the safe disposal of radioactive waste. A mine (repository) is being developed 2,150 feet below the surface in a thick salt bed, which will serve as the disposal medium. The underground ventilation system for the WIPP project was originally designed based on a fixed project scope. The design criteria and ventilation requirements were developed for the performance of various activities as then envisioned towards the achievement of this goal. However, in light of new information and actual site-specific experience at WIPP leading to a clearer definition of the scope-related programs and activities, it was realized that the existing ventilation system may need to be modified

  3. An evaluation of the proposed tests with radioactive waste at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chaturvedi, L.; Silva, M.

    1992-01-01

    This paper discusses the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) a planned repository for permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU) radiative waste that has resulted from the defense activities of the U.S. Government over the past 50 years. Only the waste that is currently stored in an easily retrievable mode at ten U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories around the country will be shipped to WIPP. The waste consists of various kinds of trash including paper, rubber, rags and metal that is contaminated with radionuclides with very long half-lives. The decision to dispose of the waste permanently will be made based on projections of the behavior of the waste and the repository of 10,000 years or more. DOE has proposed shipping a limited amount of waste to WIPP for a five year Test Phase to demonstrating compliance with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Standard for long-term isolation

  4. Rationale for the H-19 and H-11 tracer tests at the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beauheim, R.L.; Meigs, L.C.; Davies, P.B.

    1996-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a repository for transuranic wastes constructed in bedded Permian-age halite in the Delaware Basin, a sedimentary basin in southeastern New Mexico, USA. A drilling scenario has been identified during performance assessment (PA) that could lead to the release of radionuclides to the Culebra Dolomite Member of the Rustler Formation, the most transmissive water-saturated unit above the repository horizon. Were this to occur, the radionuclides would need to be largely contained within the Culebra (or neighboring strata) within the WIPP-site boundary through the period lasting for 10,000 years after repository closure for WIPP to remain in compliance with applicable regulations on allowable releases. Thus, processes affecting transport of radionuclides within the Culebra are of importance to PA

  5. Cookoff Modeling of a WIPP waste drum (68660)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hobbs, Michael L. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2014-11-24

    A waste drum located 2150 feet underground may have been the root cause of a radiation leak on February 14, 2014. Information provided to the WIPP Technical Assessment Team (TAT) was used to describe the approximate content of the drum, which included an organic cat litter (Swheat Scoop®, or Swheat) composed of 100% wheat products. The drum also contained various nitrate salts, oxalic acid, and a nitric acid solution that was neutralized with triethanolamine (TEA). CTH-TIGER was used with the approximate drum contents to specify the products for an exothermic reaction for the drum. If an inorganic adsorbent such as zeolite had been used in lieu of the kitty litter, the overall reaction would have been endothermic. Dilution with a zeolite adsorbent might be a useful method to remediate drums containing organic kitty litter. SIERRA THERMAL was used to calculate the pressurization and ignition of the drum. A baseline simulation of drum 68660 was performed by assuming a background heat source of 0.5-10 W of unknown origin. The 0.5 W source could be representative of heat generated by radioactive decay. The drum ignited after about 70 days. Gas generation at ignition was predicted to be 300-500 psig with a sealed drum (no vent). At ignition, the wall temperature increases modestly by about 1°C, demonstrating that heating would not be apparent prior to ignition. The ignition location was predicted to be about 0.43 meters above the bottom center portion of the drum. At ignition only 3-5 kg (out of 71.6 kg total) has been converted into gas, indicating that most of the material remained available for post-ignition reaction.

  6. Assessment of near-surface dissolution at and near the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bachman, G.O.

    1985-07-01

    The area at and near the WIPP site was examined for evidence of karst development on the geomorphic surface encompassing the site. Certain surficial depressions of initial concern were identified as blowouts in sand dune fields (shallow features unrelated to karstification). An ancient stream system active more than 500,000 yr ago contained more water than any system since. During that time (Gatuna, Middle Pleistocene), many karst features such as Clayton Basin and Nash Draw began to form in the region. Halite was probably dissolved from parts of the Rustler Formation at that time. Dissolution of halite and gypsum from intervals encountered in Borehole WIPP-33 west of the WIPP site occurred during later Pleistocene time (i.e., <450,000 yr ago). However, there is no evidence of active near-surface dissolution within a belt to the east of WIPP-33 in the vicinity of the WIPP shaft. 26 refs., 11 figs., 1 tab

  7. Performance of CASTOR{sup R} HAW Cask Cold Trials for Loading, Transport and Storage of HAW canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wilmsmeier, Marco; Vossnacke, Andre [GNS Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear-Service mbH, Hollestrasse 7A, D-45127 Essen (Germany)

    2008-07-01

    On the basis of reprocessing contracts, concluded between the German Nuclear Utilities (GNUs) and the reprocessing companies in France (AREVA NC) and the UK (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority), GNS has the task to return the resulting residues to Germany. The high active waste (HAW) residuals from nuclear fuel reprocessing are vitrified and filled into steel cans, the HAW canisters. According to reprocessing contracts the equivalent number of HAW canisters to heavy metals delivered has to be returned to the country of origin and stored at an interim storage facility where applicable. The GNS' CASTOR{sup R} HAW casks are designed and licensed to fulfil the requirements for transport and long-term storage of HAW canisters. The new cask type CASTOR{sup R} HAW28M is capable of storing 28 HAW canisters with a maximum thermal power of 56 kW in total. Prior to the first active cask loading at a reprocessing facility it is required to demonstrate all important handling steps with the CASTOR{sup R} HAW28M cask according to a specific and approved sequence plan (MAP). These cold trials have to be carried out at the cask loading plant and at the reception area of an interim storage facility in Gorleben (TBL-G), witnessed by the licensing authorities and their independent experts. At transhipment stations GNS performs internal trials to demonstrate safe handling. A brand-new, empty CASTOR{sup R} HAW28M cask has been shipped from the GNS cask assembly facility in Muelheim to the TBL-G for cold trials. With this cask, GNS has to demonstrate the transhipment of casks at the Dannenberg transfer station from rail to road, transport to and reception at the TBL-G as well as incoming dose rate and contamination measurements and preparation for storage. After removal of all shock absorbers with a cask specific handling frame, tilting operation and assembly of the secondary lid with a pressure sensor, the helium leak tightness and 'Block-mass' tests have to be carried out

  8. Hanford to WIPP - What a Trip: The Road from Hanford is now Open

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FRENCH, M.S.

    2001-01-01

    The road leading from Hanford's Waste Receiving and Processing (WRAP) Facility to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WJPP) in New Mexico developed a few bumps and detours over the past year, but it has now been successfully traversed. There were challenges obtaining Carlsbad Area Office and New Mexico Department of Ecology certification of the Hanford characterization program. After months of work, when initial certification appeared imminent, the issuance of the WIPP Hazardous Waste Permit changed the Waste Analysis Plan (WAP) required for characterizing waste for acceptance at WIPP. After a ceremony dedicating the ''Washington'' room at WIPP, the inaugural shipment from WRAP to WIPP was scheduled for June 2000. This first shipment was planned based on shipping a number of containers that had been characterized before the issuance of the WIPP Mixed Waste Permit. However, the New Mexico Department of Ecology initially declined to accept the characterization data generated before the permit was issued, necessitating revision to the planned shipment. Because of the difficulties inherent in scheduling the TRUPACT-II transport and coordination with all of the states through which the shipment would pass, it was decided to proceed with the first shipment in early July with only the drums that had been characterized after Hanford compliance with the new WIPP WAP requirements had been certified. Following the initial shipment, previously certified containers were recertified using a process approved through negotiation with the New Mexico Environment Department, and additional full shipments have been successfully completed. This paper will present an overview of the challenges overcome and lessons learned in obtaining certification, coordination with the involved states, and eventual successful1 implementation of a routine shipping program

  9. Storage and disposal of radioactive waste as glass in canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mendel, J.E.

    1978-12-01

    A review of the use of waste glass for the immobilization of high-level radioactive waste glass is presented. Typical properties of the canisters used to contain the glass, and the waste glass, are described. Those properties are used to project the stability of canisterized waste glass through interim storage, transportation, and geologic disposal

  10. OCRWM Bulletin: Westinghouse begins designing multi-purpose canister

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    This publication consists of two parts: OCRWM (Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management) Bulletin; and Of Mountains & Science which has articles on the Yucca Mountain project. The OCRWM provides information about OCRWM activities and in this issue has articles on multi-purpose canister design, and transportation cask trailer.

  11. OCRWM Bulletin: Westinghouse begins designing multi-purpose canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This publication consists of two parts: OCRWM (Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management) Bulletin; and Of Mountains ampersand Science which has articles on the Yucca Mountain project. The OCRWM provides information about OCRWM activities and in this issue has articles on multi-purpose canister design, and transportation cask trailer

  12. Examination of sludge from the Hanford K Basins fuel canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Makenas, B.J.

    1998-01-01

    Samples of sludges with a high uranium content have been retrieved from the fuel canisters in the Hanford K West and K East basins. The composition of these samples contrasts markedly with the previously reported content of sludge samples taken from the K East basin floor. Chemical composition, chemical reactivity, and particle size of sludge are summarized in this paper

  13. High level waste canister emplacement and retrieval concepts study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-09-01

    Several concepts are described for the interim (20 to 30 years) storage of canisters containing high level waste, cladding waste, and intermediate level-TRU wastes. It includes requirements, ground rules and assumptions for the entire storage pilot plant. Concepts are generally evaluated and the most promising are selected for additional work. Follow-on recommendations are made

  14. Canister Cleaning System Final Design Report - Project A.2.A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FARWICK, C.C.

    2000-01-01

    Approximately 2,300 metric tons Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) are currently stored within two water filled pools, the 105 K East (KE) fuel storage basin and the 105 K West (KW) fuel storage basin, at the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The SNF Project is responsible for operation of the K Basins and for the materials within them. A subproject to the SNF Project is the Debris Removal Subproject, which is responsible for removal of empty canisters and lids from the basins. The Canister Cleaning System (CCS) is part of the Debris Removal Project. The CCS will be installed in the KW Basin and operated during the fuel removal activity. The KW Basin has approximately 3600 canisters that require removal from the basin. The CCS is being designed to ''clean'' empty fuel canisters and lids and package them for disposal to the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility complex. The system will interface with the KW Basin and be located in the Dummy Elevator Pit

  15. Effects of glacial meltwater on corrosion of copper canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahonen, L.; Vieno, T.

    1994-08-01

    The composition of glacial meltwater and its reactions in the bedrock are examined. The evidences that there are or should be from past intrusions of glacial meltwater and oxygen deep in the bedrock are also considered. The study is concluded with an evaluation of the potential effects of oxygenated meltwater on the corrosion of copper canisters. (46 refs., 3 figs., 2 tabs.)

  16. Corrosion resistance of a copper canister for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-04-01

    The report presents an evaluation of copper as canister material for spent nuclear fuel. The evaluation is made from the viewpoint of corrosion and applies to a concept of 1977. Supplementary corrosion studies have been performed. The report includes 9 appendices which deal with experimental data. (G.B.)

  17. Chemical durability of copper canisters under crystalline bedrock repository conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sjoeblom, R.; Hermansson, H.P.; Amcoff, Oe.

    1995-01-01

    In the Swedish waste management programme, the copper canister is expected to provide containment of the radionuclides for a very long time, perhaps million of years. The purpose of the present paper is to analyze prerequisites for assessments of corrosion lifetimes for copper canisters. The analysis is based on compilations of literature from the following areas: chemical literature on copper and copper corrosion, mineralogical literature with emphasis on the stability of copper in near surface environments, and chemical and mineralogical literature with emphasis on the stabilities and thermodynamics of species and phases that may exist in a repository environment. Three main types of situations are identified: (1) under oxidizing and low chloride conditions, passivating oxide type of layers may form on the copper surface; (2) under oxidizing and high chloride conditions, the species formed may all be dissolved; and (3) under reducing conditions, non-passivating sulfide type layers may form on the copper surface. Considerable variability and uncertainty exists regarding the chemical environment for the canister, especially in certain scenarios. Thus, the mechanisms for corrosion can be expected to differ greatly for different situations. The lifetime of a thick-walled copper canister subjected to general corrosion appears to be long for most reasonable chemistries. Localized corrosion may appear for types (1) and (3) above but the mechanisms are widely different in character. The penetration caused by localized corrosion can be expected to be very sensitive to details in the chemistry. 20 refs, 3 figs, 1 tab

  18. WIPP Regulatory Compliance Strategy and Management Plan for demonstrating compliance to long-term disposal standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-05-01

    The primary purpose of this document is to provide a strategy by which the WIPP will demonstrate its ability to perform as a deep geologic repository. The document communicates the DOE's understanding of the regulations related to long-term repository performance; and provides the most efficient strategy that intergrates WIPP Project elements, ensures the sufficiency of information, and provides flexibility for changes in the TRU waste generation system to facilitate the disposal of defense-generated TRU wastes. In addition, this document forms a focal point between the DOE and its various external regulators as well as other stakeholders for the purpose of arriving at compliance decisions that consider all relevant input

  19. WIPP conceptual design report. Addendum F. HVAC systems energy analysis for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-04-01

    This report presents the results of a technical and economic analysis of alternative methods of meeting the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning requirements of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facilities proposed to be constructed in southeastern New Mexico. This report analyzes a total of ten WIPP structures to determine the most energy and economic efficient means of providing heating, ventilating, and air conditioning services. Additional analyses were performed to determine the merits of centralized versus dispersed refrigeration and heating facilities, and of performing supplemental domestic hot water heating with solar panels

  20. The development of a Martian atmospheric Sample collection canister

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kulczycki, E.; Galey, C.; Kennedy, B.; Budney, C.; Bame, D.; Van Schilfgaarde, R.; Aisen, N.; Townsend, J.; Younse, P.; Piacentine, J.

    The collection of an atmospheric sample from Mars would provide significant insight to the understanding of the elemental composition and sub-surface out-gassing rates of noble gases. A team of engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), California Institute of Technology have developed an atmospheric sample collection canister for Martian application. The engineering strategy has two basic elements: first, to collect two separately sealed 50 cubic centimeter unpressurized atmospheric samples with minimal sensing and actuation in a self contained pressure vessel; and second, to package this atmospheric sample canister in such a way that it can be easily integrated into the orbiting sample capsule for collection and return to Earth. Sample collection and integrity are demonstrated by emulating the atmospheric collection portion of the Mars Sample Return mission on a compressed timeline. The test results achieved by varying the pressure inside of a thermal vacuum chamber while opening and closing the valve on the sample canister at Mars ambient pressure. A commercial off-the-shelf medical grade micro-valve is utilized in the first iteration of this design to enable rapid testing of the system. The valve has been independently leak tested at JPL to quantify and separate the leak rates associated with the canister. The results are factored in to an overall system design that quantifies mass, power, and sensing requirements for a Martian atmospheric Sample Collection (MASC) canister as outlined in the Mars Sample Return mission profile. Qualitative results include the selection of materials to minimize sample contamination, preliminary science requirements, priorities in sample composition, flight valve selection criteria, a storyboard from sample collection to loading in the orbiting sample capsule, and contributions to maintaining “ Earth” clean exterior surfaces on the orbiting sample capsule.

  1. Defects which might occur in the copper-iron canister classified according to their likely effect on canister integrity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowyer, W.H.

    2000-06-01

    Earlier studies identified the material and manufacturing defects that might occur in serially produced canisters to the SKB reference design. This study has considered the defects, which were identified in the earlier works and classified them in terms of their importance to the durability of the canister in service. It has depended on, observations made by the writer over a seven-year involvement with SKI, literature studies and consultation with experts. For ease of reference each section of the report contains a table which includes information on defects taken from the earlier work plus the classification arising from this work. A study has been conducted to identify the material and manufacturing defects that might occur in serially produced canisters to the SKB reference design. The study has depended on cooperation of contractors engaged by SKB to participate in the development program, SKB staff, observations made by the writer over a five-year involvement with SKI, literature studies and consultation with experts. The candidate manufacturing procedures have been described inasmuch as it has been necessary to do so to make the points related to defects. Where possible, the cause of defects, their likely effects on manufacturing procedures or on durability of the canister and the methods available for their detection are given. For ease of reference each section of the report contains a table which summarises the information in it and, in the final section of the report, all the tables are presented en-bloc

  2. Structural Integrity Evaluation for Damaged Fuel Canister of a Research Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, Jinho; Kwak, Jinsung; Lee, Sangjin; Lee, Jongmin; Ryu, Jeong-Soo

    2016-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to confirm the structural integrity of damaged fuel canister through the numerical simulation. The analysis results of canister including damaged fuel are evaluated with design limits of the ASME Sec. III NF Codes and Standards. The main function of canister is to store and protect the damaged fuel assembly generated from the operation of the research reactor. The canister is classified into safety class NNS (Non-nuclear Safety) and seismic category II. The shape of the canister is designed into commercialized circular tube due to economic benefit and easy manufacturing. The damaged fuel assembly is loaded in a dedicated canister by using special tool and supported by lower block in the canister. Then it is move into the damaged fuel storage rack under safeguards arrangements. The canister is securely supported at guide plate and base plate of rack. The structural integrity evaluation for the canister is performed by using response spectrum analysis. The analysis results show that the stress intensity of the canister under the seismic loads is within the ASME Code limits. Thus, the validity of the present design of the canister has been demonstrated

  3. Structural Integrity Evaluation for Damaged Fuel Canister of a Research Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oh, Jinho; Kwak, Jinsung; Lee, Sangjin; Lee, Jongmin; Ryu, Jeong-Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The purpose of this document is to confirm the structural integrity of damaged fuel canister through the numerical simulation. The analysis results of canister including damaged fuel are evaluated with design limits of the ASME Sec. III NF Codes and Standards. The main function of canister is to store and protect the damaged fuel assembly generated from the operation of the research reactor. The canister is classified into safety class NNS (Non-nuclear Safety) and seismic category II. The shape of the canister is designed into commercialized circular tube due to economic benefit and easy manufacturing. The damaged fuel assembly is loaded in a dedicated canister by using special tool and supported by lower block in the canister. Then it is move into the damaged fuel storage rack under safeguards arrangements. The canister is securely supported at guide plate and base plate of rack. The structural integrity evaluation for the canister is performed by using response spectrum analysis. The analysis results show that the stress intensity of the canister under the seismic loads is within the ASME Code limits. Thus, the validity of the present design of the canister has been demonstrated.

  4. Drying tests conducted on Three Mile Island fuel canisters containing simulated debris

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palmer, A.J.

    1995-01-01

    Drying tests were conducted on TMI-2 fuel canisters filled with simulated core debris. During these tests, canisters were dried by heating externally by a heating blanket while simultaneously purging the canisters' interior with hot, dry nitrogen. Canister drying was found to be dominated by moisture retention properties of a concrete filler material (LICON) used for geometry control. This material extends the drying process 10 days or more beyond what would be required were it not there. The LICON resides in a nonpurgeable chamber separate from the core debris, and because of this configuration, dew point measurements on the exhaust stream do not provide a good indication of the dew point in the canisters. If the canisters are not dried, but rather just dewatered, 140-240 lb of water (not including the LICON water of hydration) will remain in each canister, approximately 50-110 lb of which is pore water in the LICON and the remainder unbound water

  5. Structural assessment of a space station solar dynamic heat receiver thermal energy storage canister

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thompson, R. L.; Kerslake, T. W.; Tong, M. T.

    1988-01-01

    The structural performance of a space station thermal energy storage (TES) canister subject to orbital solar flux variation and engine cold start up operating conditions was assessed. The impact of working fluid temperature and salt-void distribution on the canister structure are assessed. Both analytical and experimental studies were conducted to determine the temperature distribution of the canister. Subsequent finite element structural analyses of the canister were performed using both analytically and experimentally obtained temperatures. The Arrhenius creep law was incorporated into the procedure, using secondary creep data for the canister material, Haynes 188 alloy. The predicted cyclic creep strain accumulations at the hot spot were used to assess the structural performance of the canister. In addition, the structural performance of the canister based on the analytically determined temperature was compared with that based on the experimentally measured temperature data.

  6. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2000-11-03

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. The purpose of this revision is to document completion of verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those

  7. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2000-01-01

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. The purpose of this revision is to document completion of verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted

  8. Compilation of historical radiological data collected in the vicinity of the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bradshaw, P.L.; Louderbough, E.T.

    1987-01-01

    The Radiological Baseline Program (RBP) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) has been implemented to characterize the radiological conditions at the site prior to receipt of radioactive wastes. Because southeastern New Mexico was the site of an underground nuclear test in 1961, various sampling programs have intermittently monitored background and elevated radiation levels in the vicinity of the WIPP. In addition, radiological characterization of the site region was performed during the 1970's in support of the WIPP Environmental Impact Statement. The historical data are drawn primarily from monitoring activities of the US Public Health Service (PHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), US Geological Survey (USGS) and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (SNLA). Information on air and water quality, meat, milk, biota and vegetation is included in the report. This survey is intended to provide a source of reference for historical data on radiological conditions in the vicinity of the WIPP site prior to the establishment of a systematic Radiological Baseline Program. 31 refs., 1 fig

  9. EVALUATION OF RISKS AND WASTE CHARACTERIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TRANSURANIC WASTE EMPLACED IN WIPP DURING 1999

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Channell, J.K.; Walker, B.A.

    2000-01-01

    Specifically this report: 1. Compares requirements of the WAP that are pertinent from a technical viewpoint with the WIPP pre-Permit waste characterization program, 2. Presents the results of a risk analysis of the currently emplaced wastes. Expected and bounding risks from routine operations and possible accidents are evaluated; and 3. Provides conclusions and recommendations

  10. Construction quality assurance program plan for the WIPP project, Carlsbad, NM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-05-01

    The purpose of this plan is to describe the Quality Assurance (QA) Program to be established and implemented by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project Office (WPO) and by the Major Project Participants: the Architect-Engineer (Bechtel), the Construction Manager (US Army Corps of Engineers), the Scientific Advisor (Sandia National Laboratory), and the Management and Operating Contractor (Westinghouse Electric Corporation). This plan addresses the construction, including site evaluation, design, and turnover phases of WIPP. Other work in progress during the same period is controlled by DOE documents applicable to that work effort. The prime responsibility for ensuring the quality of construction rests with the DOE WIPP Project Office and is implemented through the combined efforts of the Construction Manager, the Construction Contractors, the Management and Operating Contractor, and the Architect-Engineer. Inspection and burden of proof of acceptability rests with the Construction Contractor as defined by the technical provisions of the contract and as otherwise specified by the DOE WIPP Project Office on an individual work-package basis. To the maximum extent possible, acceptance of work will be based upon first-hand witnessing by the Construction Manager and other representatives of the DOE organization

  11. Summary of research and development activities in support of waste acceptance criteria for WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunter, T.O.

    1979-11-01

    The development of waste acceptance criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is summarized. Specifications for acceptable waste forms are included. Nine program areas are discussed. They are: TRU characterization, HLW interactions, thermal/structural interactions, nuclide migration, permeability, brine migration, borehole plugging, operation/design support, and instrumentation development. Recommendations are included

  12. The development of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) project's public affairs program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walter, L.H.

    1988-01-01

    The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) offers a perspective on the value of designing flexibility into a public affairs program to enable it to grow with and complement a project's evolution from construction through to operations. This paper discusses how the WIPP public affairs program progressed through several stages to its present scope. During the WIPP construction phase, the public affairs program laid a foundation for Project acceptance in the community. A speaker's bureau, a visitors program, and various community outreach and support programs emphasized the educational and socioeconomic benefits of having this controversial project in Carlsbad. Then, in this past year as the project entered a preoperational status, the public affairs program emphasis shifted to broaden the positive image that had been created locally. In this stage, the program promoted the project's positive elements with the various state agencies, government officials, and federal organizations involved in our country's radioactive waste management and transportation program. Currently, an even broader, more aggressive public affairs program is planned. During this stage public affairs will be engaged in a comprehensive institutional and outreach program, explaining and supporting WIPP's mission in each of the communities and agencies affected by the operation of the country's first geologic repository

  13. DESIGN VERIFICATION REPORT SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL (SNF) PROJECT CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING (CSB)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2003-02-12

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Revision 3 of this document incorporates MCO Cover Cap Assembly welding verification activities. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed.

  14. DESIGN VERIFICATION REPORT SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL (SNF) PROJECT CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING (CSB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2003-01-01

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Revision 3 of this document incorporates MCO Cover Cap Assembly welding verification activities. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed

  15. Seismic reflection data report: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, Southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hern, J.L.; Powers, D.W.; Barrows, L.J.

    1978-12-01

    Three seismic reflection (Vibroseis) surveys conducted from 1976 through 1978 by Sandia Laboratories to support investigations for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are described. Volume I describes the purpose, field parameters, and data processing parameters. Volume II contains uninterpreted processed lines and shotpoint maps. Data interpretations will be the subject of the subsequent reports. The data collected during these three surveys total 77 line miles; 72 line miles of this are on or very near the WIPP site. The first of the surveys (1976 SAN) covered 25 line miles and was conducted similarly to previous petroleum industry surveys in the area. 1976 SAN supplemented existing petroleum industry data. The two subsequent surveys (1977 X and 1978 Y) used shorter geophone spacings (110'), higher signal frequencies (up to 100 Hz), and higher data sampling rates (2 ms.) to better define the shallow zone (less than 4000') of primary interest. 1977 X contained 47 line miles on or near the WIPP site and over several structural features northwest of the site. 1978 Y contains 5 line miles over a one square mile area near the center of the WIPP site. These data show increasing discrimination of shallow reflectors as data collection parameters were modified. Data tables of recording and processing parameters are included. A fourth Vibroseis survey was conducted at the WIPP site in 1978 by Grant Geophysical Company for Bechtel; the data are not in final form and are not included. Petroleum industry data and an inconclusive weight-drop survey, conducted in 1976, are also not included in this report

  16. History of geophysical studies at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), southeastern New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borns, D.J.

    1997-01-01

    A variety of geophysical methods including the spectrum of seismic, electrical, electromagnetic and potential field techniques have used support characterization, monitoring and experimental studies at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The geophysical studies have provided significant understanding of the nature of site deformation, tectonics and stability. Geophysical methods have delineated possible brine reservoirs beneath the underground facility and have defined the disturbed rock zone that forms around underground excavations. The role of geophysics in the WIPP project has evolved with the project. The early uses were for site characterization to satisfy site selection criteria or factors. As the regulatory framework for WIPP grew since 1980, the geophysics program was focused on support of experimental and field programs such as Salado hydrogeology and underground room systems and excavations. In summary, the major types of issues that geophysical studies addressed for WIPP are: Issue 1: Site Characterization; Issue 2: Castile Brine Reservoirs; Issue 3: Rustler /Dewey Lake Hydrogeology; Issue 4: Salado Hydrogeology; and Issue 5: Excavation Effects. The nature of geophysics program for WIPP has been to support investigation rather than being the principal investigation itself. The geophysics program has been used to define conceptual models (e.g., the Disturbed Rock Zone-DRZ) or to test conceptual models (e.g., high transmissivity zones in the Rustler Formation). An effect of being a support program is that as new project priorities arose the funding for the geophysics program was limited and withdrawn. An outcome is that much of the geophysics survey information resides in contractor reports since final interpretation reports were not funded

  17. Safety evaluation for the inner canister closure station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glasscock, J.R.

    1987-01-01

    The Inner Canister Closure Station (ICCS), built by Remote Technology Corporation, will be operability tested. The ICCS is used to remotely leak test Inner Canister Closures (ICC's) and replace ICC's that are not water tight. After operability testing, the ICCS will be inspected and sent to the 717-F mock-up shop for remotability demonstration and dimensional checks, then installed in the Vitrification Building, 221-S. An analysis of potential safety hazards, equipment safety features, and procedural controls indicates that the ICCS can be operated without undue hazard to employees or to the public. A safety inspection and a new equipment inspection will be held before operation to verify that the ICCS meets Savannah River Site safety requirements. 4 refs., 6 figs

  18. Test design requirements: Canister-scale heater test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schauer, M.I.; Craig, P.A.; Stickney, R.G.

    1986-03-01

    This document establishes the Test Design Requirements for the design of a canister scale heater test to be performed in the Exploratory Shaft test facility. The purpose of the test is to obtain thermomechanical rock mass response data for use in validation of the numerical models. The canister scale heater test is a full scale simulation of a high-level nuclear waste container in a prototypic emplacement borehole. Electric heaters are used to simulate the heat loads expected in an actual waste container. This document presents an overview of the test including objectives and justification for the test. A description of the test as it is presently envisioned is included. Discussions on Quality Assurance and Safety are also included in the document. 12 refs., 1 fig

  19. Sediment mechanical response due to emplacement of a waste canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karnes, C.H.; Dawson, P.R.; Silva, A.J.; Brown, W.T.

    1980-01-01

    Preliminary studies have been conducted to determine the interaction between a waste canister and seabed sediment during and after emplacement. Empirical and approximate methods for determining the depth reached by a freefall penetrator indicate that a boosted penetrator emplacement method may be necessary. Hole closure is necessary, but has not been verified because calculations and laboratory experiments show sensitivity to boundary conditions which control the degree of dynamic hole closure. Laboratory studies show that closure will take place by creep deformation but closure times in seabed environments are uncertain. For assumed thermomechanical properties of sediments, it is shown that a heat generating waste canister will probably not move a significant distancce during the heat generation period

  20. Theoretical predictions for glass flow into an evacuated canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Routt, K.R.; Crow, K.R.

    1983-01-01

    Radioactive waste currently stored at the Savannah River Plant in liquid form is to be immobilized by incorporating it into a borosilicate glass. The glass melter for this process will consist of a refractory lined, steel vessel operated at a glass temperature of 1150 0 C. At the end of a two-year projected melter lifetime, the glass inside the melter is to be drained prior to disposition of the melter vessel. One proposed technique for accomplishing this drainage is by sucking the glass into an evacuated canister. The theoretical bases for design of an evacuated canister for draining a glass melter have been developed and tested. The theoretical equations governing transient and steady-state flow were substantiated with both a silicone glass simulant and molten glass

  1. Decontamination of Savannah River Plant waste glass canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rankin, W.N.

    1982-01-01

    A Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is currently being designed to convert Savannah River Plant (SRP) liquid, high-level radioactive waste into a solid form, such as borosilicate glass. The outside of the canisters of waste glass must have very low levels of smearable radioactive contamination before they are removed from the DWPF to prevent the spread of radioactivity. Several techniques were considered for canister decontamination: high-pressure water spray, electropolishing, chemical dissolution, and abrasive blasting. An abrasive blasting technique using a glass frit slurry has been selected for use in the DWPF. No additional equipment is needed to process waste generated from decontamination. Frit used as the abrasive will be mixed with the waste and fed to the glass melter. In contrast, chemical and electrochemical techniques require more space in the DWPF, and produce large amounts of contaminated byproducts which are difficult to immobilize by vitrification

  2. Settlement of Canisters with smectite clay envelopes in deposition holes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pusch, R.

    1986-12-01

    Settlement of canisters containing radioactive waste and being surrounded by dense smectite clay is caused by the stresses and heat induced in the clay. Consolidation by water expulsion of the clay underlying a model canister with 5 cm diameter and 30 cm length would theoretically account for a maximum finite settlement of about 70 my m in a few weeks, while shear-induced creep would yield a settlement of only a few microns in the same time period. These predictions were checked by running a laboratory test in which a dead load of 80 kg was applied to a small cylindrical copper canister embedded in Na bentonite. The settlement, which increased in proportion to log time, turned out to be about 6 my m in the first 2.5 months. After the first loading period at room temperature, heating to 50 degrees C and, after a 4 months long 'room temperature' period, to 70 degrees C took place. This cycling gave strong, instant settlement and upheaval because of the different thermal expansion of the interacting components of the system. After the development of constant temperature conditions in the entire system and completion of the consolidation or expansion that followed from the thermo-mechanical interactions, the settlement proceeded at a rather high rate at 70 degrees C, still following a log time creep law, but with somewhat stronger retardation. At room temperature, i.e. in the post-heating periods, the settlement seemed to cease, on the other hand. The conclusion from the study is that the canister movements under isothermal conditions were in accordance with the log t-type creep settlement that was predicted in theoretical grounds. Pre-heating and low stresses may account for extraordinary retardation of the settlement. (author)

  3. Spent nuclear fuel Canister Storage Building CDR Review Committee report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dana, W.P.

    1995-12-01

    The Canister Storage Building (CSB) is a subproject under the Spent Nuclear Fuels Major System Acquisition. This subproject is necessary to design and construct a facility capable of providing dry storage of repackaged spent fuels received from K Basins. The CSB project completed a Conceptual Design Report (CDR) implementing current project requirements. A Design Review Committee was established to review the CDR. This document is the final report summarizing that review

  4. BRIC-60: Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC)-60

    Science.gov (United States)

    Richards, Stephanie E. (Compiler); Levine, Howard G.; Romero, Vergel

    2016-01-01

    The Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC) is an anodized-aluminum cylinder used to provide passive stowage for investigations evaluating the effects of space flight on small organisms. Specimens flown in the BRIC 60 mm petri dish (BRIC-60) hardware include Lycoperscion esculentum (tomato), Arabidopsis thaliana (thale cress), Glycine max (soybean) seedlings, Physarum polycephalum (slime mold) cells, Pothetria dispar (gypsy moth) eggs and Ceratodon purpureus (moss).

  5. Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC) - Light Emitting Diode (LED)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levine, Howard G.; Caron, Allison

    2016-01-01

    The Biological Research in Canisters - LED (BRIC-LED) is a biological research system that is being designed to complement the capabilities of the existing BRIC-Petri Dish Fixation Unit (PDFU) for the Space Life and Physical Sciences (SLPS) Program. A diverse range of organisms can be supported, including plant seedlings, callus cultures, Caenorhabditis elegans, microbes, and others. In the event of a launch scrub, the entire assembly can be replaced with an identical back-up unit containing freshly loaded specimens.

  6. Development of ultrasonic immersion inspection technique for spent fuel canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schankula, J.J.

    1982-07-01

    This report summarizes ultrasonic nondestructive testing development for metal matrix supported spent fuel disposal canisters. The work has concentated in two areas: inspection for lack of bond at the shell/matrix interface and inspection for voids in the matrix. The capabilities and limitations of these techniques have been fully established. Unbonded areas as small as 4 mm in diameter and voids 6 mm in diameter, 25 mm deep in the matrix, can readily be detected

  7. Analysis of probability of defects in the disposal canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmberg, J.-E.; Kuusela, P.

    2011-06-01

    This report presents a probability model for the reliability of the spent nuclear waste final disposal canister. Reliability means here that the welding of the canister lid has no critical defects from the long-term safety point of view. From the reliability point of view, both the reliability of the welding process (that no critical defects will be born) and the non-destructive testing (NDT) process (all critical defects will be detected) are equally important. In the probability model, critical defects in a weld were simplified into a few types. Also the possibility of human errors in the NDT process was taken into account in a simple manner. At this moment there is very little representative data to determine the reliability of welding and also the data on NDT is not well suited for the needs of this study. Therefore calculations presented here are based on expert judgements and on several assumptions that have not been verified yet. The Bayesian probability model shows the importance of the uncertainty in the estimation of the reliability parameters. The effect of uncertainty is that the probability distribution of the number of defective canisters becomes flat for larger numbers of canisters compared to the binomial probability distribution in case of known parameter values. In order to reduce the uncertainty, more information is needed from both the reliability of the welding and NDT processes. It would also be important to analyse the role of human factors in these processes since their role is not reflected in typical test data which is used to estimate 'normal process variation'.The reported model should be seen as a tool to quantify the roles of different methods and procedures in the weld inspection process. (orig.)

  8. MIIT: International in-situ testing of nuclear waste glasses-performance of SRS simulated waste glass after 5 years of burial at the waste isolation pilot plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wicks, G.G.; Lodding, A.R.; Macedo, P.B.; Clark, D.E.

    1993-01-01

    In July of 1986, the first in-situ test involving burial of simulated high-level waste [HLW] forms conducted in the United States was started. This program, called the Materials Interface Interactions Test or MIIT, comprises the largest, most cooperative field-testing venture in the international waste management community. Included in the study are over 900 waste form samples comprising 15 different systems supplied by seven nations. Also included are about 300 potential canister or overpack metal samples along with more than 500 geologic and backfill specimens. There are almost 2000 relevant interactions that characterize this effort which has been conducted in the bedded salt site at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The MIIT program represents a joint effort managed by the Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) in Aiken, S.C., and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, N.M.. and sponsored by the US Department of Energy. Involved in MIIT are participants from national and federal laboratories, universities, and representatives from laboratories in France, Germany, Canada, Belgium, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In July of 1991, the experimental portion of the 5-year MIIT study was completed on schedule. During this time interval, many in-situ measurements were performed, thousands of brine analyses conducted, and hundreds of waste glass and package components exhumed and evaluated after 6 mo., 1 yr., 2 yr. and 5 yr. burial periods. Although analyses are still in progress, the performance of SRS waste glass based on all data currently available has been seen to be excellent thus far. Initial analyses and assessment of Savannah River (SR) waste glass after burial in WIPP at 90 degrees C for 5 years is presented

  9. Canister displacement in KBS-3V. A theoretical study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boergesson, Lennart; Hernelind, Jan

    2006-02-01

    The vertical displacement of the canister in the KBS-3V concept has been studied in a number of consolidation and creep calculations using the FE-program ABAQUS. The creep model used for the calculations is based on Singh-Mitchell's creep theory, which has been adapted to and verified for the buffer material MX-80 in earlier tests. A porous elastic model with Drucker-Prager plasticity has been used for the consolidation calculations. For simplicity the buffer has been assumed to be water saturated from start. In one set of calculations only the consolidation and creep in the buffer without considering the interaction with the backfill was studied. In the other set of calculations the interaction with the backfill was included for a backfill consisting of an in situ compacted mixture of 30% bentonite and 70% crushed rock. The motivation to also study the behaviour of the buffer alone was that the final choice of backfill material and backfilling technique is not made yet so that set of calculations simulates a backfill that has identical properties with the buffer. The two cases represent two extreme cases, one with a backfill that has a low stiffness and the lowest allowable swelling pressure and one that has the highest possible swelling pressure and stiffness. The base cases in the calculations correspond to the final average density at saturation of 2,000 kg/m 3 with the expected swelling pressure of 7 MPa in a buffer. In order to study the sensitivity of the system to loss in bentonite mass and swelling pressure seven additional calculations were done with reduced swelling pressure down to 80 kPa corresponding to a density at water saturation of about 1,500 kg/m 3 . The calculations included two stages, where the first stage models the swelling and consolidation that takes place in order for the buffer to reach force equilibrium. This stage takes place during the saturation phase and the subsequent consolidation/swelling phase. The second stage models the

  10. Canister displacement in KBS-3V. A theoretical study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boergesson, Lennart [Clay Technology AB, Lund (Sweden); Hernelind, Jan [FEMTech AB, Vaesteraas (Sweden)

    2006-02-15

    The vertical displacement of the canister in the KBS-3V concept has been studied in a number of consolidation and creep calculations using the FE-program ABAQUS. The creep model used for the calculations is based on Singh-Mitchell's creep theory, which has been adapted to and verified for the buffer material MX-80 in earlier tests. A porous elastic model with Drucker-Prager plasticity has been used for the consolidation calculations. For simplicity the buffer has been assumed to be water saturated from start. In one set of calculations only the consolidation and creep in the buffer without considering the interaction with the backfill was studied. In the other set of calculations the interaction with the backfill was included for a backfill consisting of an in situ compacted mixture of 30% bentonite and 70% crushed rock. The motivation to also study the behaviour of the buffer alone was that the final choice of backfill material and backfilling technique is not made yet so that set of calculations simulates a backfill that has identical properties with the buffer. The two cases represent two extreme cases, one with a backfill that has a low stiffness and the lowest allowable swelling pressure and one that has the highest possible swelling pressure and stiffness. The base cases in the calculations correspond to the final average density at saturation of 2,000 kg/m{sup 3} with the expected swelling pressure of 7 MPa in a buffer. In order to study the sensitivity of the system to loss in bentonite mass and swelling pressure seven additional calculations were done with reduced swelling pressure down to 80 kPa corresponding to a density at water saturation of about 1,500 kg/m{sup 3}. The calculations included two stages, where the first stage models the swelling and consolidation that takes place in order for the buffer to reach force equilibrium. This stage takes place during the saturation phase and the subsequent consolidation/swelling phase. The second stage

  11. Final Report: Characterization of Canister Mockup Weld Residual Stresses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Enos, David; Bryan, Charles R.

    2016-01-01

    Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of interim storage containers has been indicated as a high priority data gap by the Department of Energy (DOE) (Hanson et al., 2012), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI, 2011), the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB, 2010a), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 2012a, 2012b). Uncertainties exist in terms of the environmental conditions that prevail on the surface of the storage containers, the stress state within the container walls associated both with weldments as well as within the base metal itself, and the electrochemical properties of the storage containers themselves. The goal of the work described in this document is to determine the stress states that exists at various locations within a typical storage canister by evaluating the properties of a full-diameter cylindrical mockup of an interim storage canister. This mockup has been produced using the same manufacturing procedures as the majority of the fielded spent nuclear fuel interim storage canisters. This document describes the design and procurement of the mockup and the characterization of the stress state associated with various portions of the container. It also describes the cutting of the mockup into sections for further analyses, and a discussion of the potential impact of the results from the stress characterization effort.

  12. Final Report: Characterization of Canister Mockup Weld Residual Stresses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Enos, David [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Bryan, Charles R. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2016-12-01

    Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of interim storage containers has been indicated as a high priority data gap by the Department of Energy (DOE) (Hanson et al., 2012), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI, 2011), the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB, 2010a), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 2012a, 2012b). Uncertainties exist in terms of the environmental conditions that prevail on the surface of the storage containers, the stress state within the container walls associated both with weldments as well as within the base metal itself, and the electrochemical properties of the storage containers themselves. The goal of the work described in this document is to determine the stress states that exists at various locations within a typical storage canister by evaluating the properties of a full-diameter cylindrical mockup of an interim storage canister. This mockup has been produced using the same manufacturing procedures as the majority of the fielded spent nuclear fuel interim storage canisters. This document describes the design and procurement of the mockup and the characterization of the stress state associated with various portions of the container. It also describes the cutting of the mockup into sections for further analyses, and a discussion of the potential impact of the results from the stress characterization effort.

  13. Thermal assessment of Shippingport pressurized water reactor blanket fuel assemblies within a multi-canister overpack within the canister storage building

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HEARD, F.J.

    1999-01-01

    A series of analyses were performed to assess the thermal performance characteristics of the Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor Core 2 Blanket Fuel Assemblies as loaded within a Multi-Canister Overpack within the Canister Storage Building. A two-dimensional finite element was developed, with enough detail to model the individual fuel plates: including the fuel wafers, cladding, and flow channels

  14. Thermal assessment of Shippingport pressurized water reactor blanket fuel assemblies within a multi-canister overpack within the canister storage building

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    HEARD, F.J.

    1999-04-09

    A series of analyses were performed to assess the thermal performance characteristics of the Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor Core 2 Blanket Fuel Assemblies as loaded within a Multi-Canister Overpack within the Canister Storage Building. A two-dimensional finite element was developed, with enough detail to model the individual fuel plates: including the fuel wafers, cladding, and flow channels.

  15. Results from simulated contact-handled transuranic waste experiments at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molecke, M.A.; Sorensen, N.R.; Krumhansl, J.L.

    1993-01-01

    We conducted in situ experiments with nonradioactive, contact-handled transuranic (CH TRU) waste drums at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility for about four years. We performed these tests in two rooms in rock salt, at WIPP, with drums surrounded by crushed salt or 70 wt % salt/30 wt % bentonite clay backfills, or partially submerged in a NaCl brine pool. Air and brine temperatures were maintained at ∼40C. These full-scale (210-L drum) experiments provided in situ data on: backfill material moisture-sorption and physical properties in the presence of brine; waste container corrosion adequacy; and, migration of chemical tracers (nonradioactive actinide and fission product simulants) in the near-field vicinity, all as a function of time. Individual drums, backfill, and brine samples were removed periodically for laboratory evaluations. Waste container testing in the presence of brine and brine-moistened backfill materials served as a severe overtest of long-term conditions that could be anticipated in an actual salt waste repository. We also obtained relevant operational-test emplacement and retrieval experience. All test results are intended to support both the acceptance of actual TRU wastes at the WIPP and performance assessment data needs. We provide an overview and technical data summary focusing on the WIPP CH TRU envirorunental overtests involving 174 waste drums in the presence of backfill materials and the brine pool, with posttest laboratory materials analyses of backfill sorbed-moisture content, CH TRU drum corrosion, tracer migration, and associated test observations

  16. User's manual for remote-handled transuranic waste container welding and inspection fixture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hauptmann, J.P.

    1985-09-01

    Rockwell Hanford Operations (Rockwell) has designed built, and tested a prototype remotely operated welding and inspection fixture to be used in making the closure weld on the remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU) waste container. The RH-TRU waste container has an average TRU concentration in excess of 100 nCi/gm, and a surface radiation dose rate in excess of 200 mrem/h, but not exceeding 100 rem/h. The RH-TRU waste container is to be used by defense waste generator sites in the United States for final packaging of RH-TRU wastes and is compatible with the requirements of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and the WIPP handling system. Standard and stacked RH-TRU container designs are available. The standard container is 26 in. in dia. by 121 in. high; the stacked containers are 26 in. in dia. by 61.25 in. high. After loading, two stacked containers are fitted and welded together to form the identical measurements of the standard 121-in. container. The prototype RH-TRU waste container welding and inspection fixture was intended for test and evaluation only, and not for installation in an operating facility. The final RH-TRU waste container welding and inspection fixture drawings (see appendix) incorporate several changes made following operational testing of the original fixture. These modifications are identified in this manual. However, not all modifications have been functionally tested. The purpose of this manual is to aid waste generator sites in designing a remotely operated welding and inspection fixture that will conform to their own requirements. Modifications to the Rockwell design must be evaluated for structural and WIPP handling requirements. This manual also provides design philosophy, component vendor information, and cost estimates

  17. Thermohydraulic analysis of BWR and PWR spent fuel assemblies contained within square canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiles, L.E.; McCann, R.A.

    1981-09-01

    This report presents the results of several thermohydraulic simulations of spent fuel assembly/canister configurations performed in support of a program investigating the feasibility of storing spent nuclear fuel assemblies in canisters that would be stored in an air environment. Eleven thermohydraulic simulations were performed. Five simulations were performed using a single BWR fuel assembly/canister design. The various cases were defined by changing the canister spacing and the heat generation rate of the fuel assembly. For each simulation a steady-state thermohydraulic solution was achieved for the region inside the canister. Similarly, six simulations were performed for a single PWR fuel assembly/canister design. The square fuel rod arrays were contained in square canisters which would permit closer packing of the canisters in a storage facility. However, closer packing of the canisters would result in higher fuel temperatures which would possibly have an adverse impact on fuel integrity. Thus, the most important aspect of the analysis was to define the peak fuel assembly temperatures for each case. These results are presented along with various temperature profiles, heat flux distributions, and air velocity profiles within the canister. 48 figures, 4 tables

  18. Waste Handling Shaft concrete liner degradation conclusions and recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-10-01

    The primary function of the Waste Handling Shaft (WHS) at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is to permit the transfer of radioactive waste from the surface waste handling building to the underground storage area. It also serves as an intake shaft for small volumes of air during normal storage operations and as an emergency escape route. Part of the construction was the placement of a concrete liner and steel reinforced key in 1984. During a routine shaft inspection in May 1990, some degradation of the WHS concrete liner was observed between the depths of 800 and 900 feet below the ground surface. Detailed investigations of the liner had been carried out by Sandia National Laboratories and by Westinghouse Electric Corporation Waste Isolation Division (WID) through Lankard Materials Laboratory. Observations, reports, and data support the conclusion that the concrete degradation, resulting from attack by chemically aggressive brine, is a localized phenomena. It is the opinion of the WID that the degradation is not considered an immediate or near term concern; this is supported by technical experts. WID recommendations have been made which, when implemented, will ensure an extended liner life. Based on the current assessment of available data and the proposed shaft liner monitoring program described in this report, it is reasonable to assume that the operational life of the concrete shaft liner can safely support the 25-year life of the WIPP. Analysis of data indicates that degradation of the shaft's concrete liner is attributed to chemically aggressive brine seeping through construction joints and shrinkage cracks from behind the liner in and around the 834-foot depth. Chemical and mechanical components of concrete degradation have been identified. Chemical attack is comprised of several stages of concrete alteration. The other component, mechanical degradation, results from the expansive forces of crystals forming in the concrete pore space

  19. Test manufacturing of copper canisters with cast inserts. Assessment report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, C.G

    1998-08-01

    The current design of canisters for the deep repository for spent nuclear fuel consists of an outer corrosion-protective copper casing in the form of a tubular section with lid and bottom and an inner pressure-resistant insert. The insert is designed to be manufactured by casting and inside are channels in which the fuel assemblies are to be placed. Over the last years, a number of full-scale manufacturing tests of all canister components have been carried out. The purpose has been to determine and develop the best manufacturing technique and to establish long-term contacts with the best suppliers of material and technology. Part of the work has involved the developing and implementing of a quality assurance system in accordance with ISO 9001, covering the whole chain from suppliers of material up to and including the delivery of assembled canisters. This report consists of a description of the design of the canister together with current drawings and complementary technical specifications stipulating, among other things, requirements placed on different materials. The different manufacturing methods that have been used are also described and commented on in both text and illustrations. For the manufacturing of copper tubes, the roll-forming of rolled plate to tube halves and longitudinal welding is a method that has been tested on a relatively large number of tubes by now, and that probably can be developed into a functioning production method. However, the very promising outcome of performed tests on seamless tube manufacturing, has resulted in a change in direction in tube manufacturing, focusing on continued testing of extrusion as well as pierce and draw processing in the immediate future. In connection with ongoing operations, new manufacturing tests of tubes with less material thickness will be carried out. Test manufacturing of cast inserts has resulted in the choice of nodular iron as material in the continued work. This improvement in design has resulted

  20. Test manufacturing of copper canisters with cast inserts. Assessment report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, C.G.

    1998-08-01

    The current design of canisters for the deep repository for spent nuclear fuel consists of an outer corrosion-protective copper casing in the form of a tubular section with lid and bottom and an inner pressure-resistant insert. The insert is designed to be manufactured by casting and inside are channels in which the fuel assemblies are to be placed. Over the last years, a number of full-scale manufacturing tests of all canister components have been carried out. The purpose has been to determine and develop the best manufacturing technique and to establish long-term contacts with the best suppliers of material and technology. Part of the work has involved the developing and implementing of a quality assurance system in accordance with ISO 9001, covering the whole chain from suppliers of material up to and including the delivery of assembled canisters. This report consists of a description of the design of the canister together with current drawings and complementary technical specifications stipulating, among other things, requirements placed on different materials. The different manufacturing methods that have been used are also described and commented on in both text and illustrations. For the manufacturing of copper tubes, the roll-forming of rolled plate to tube halves and longitudinal welding is a method that has been tested on a relatively large number of tubes by now, and that probably can be developed into a functioning production method. However, the very promising outcome of performed tests on seamless tube manufacturing, has resulted in a change in direction in tube manufacturing, focusing on continued testing of extrusion as well as pierce and draw processing in the immediate future. In connection with ongoing operations, new manufacturing tests of tubes with less material thickness will be carried out. Test manufacturing of cast inserts has resulted in the choice of nodular iron as material in the continued work. This improvement in design has resulted

  1. Kinetic modelling of bentonite-canister interaction. Long-term predictions of copper canister corrosion under oxic and anoxic conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wersin, P.; Spahiu, K.; Bruno, J.

    1994-09-01

    A new modelling approach for canister corrosion which emphasises chemical processes and diffusion at the bentonite-canister interface is presented. From the geochemical boundary conditions corrosion rates for both an anoxic case and an oxic case are derived and uncertainties thereof are estimated via sensitivity analyses. Time scales of corrosion are assessed by including calculations of the evolution of redox potential in the near field and pitting corrosion. This indicates realistic corrosion depths in the range of 10 -7 and 4*10 -5 mm/yr, respectively for anoxic and oxic corrosion. Taking conservative estimates, depths are increased by a factor of about 200 for both cases. From these predictions it is suggested that copper canister corrosion does not constitute a problem for repository safety, although certain factors such as temperature and radiolysis have not been explicitly included. The possible effect of bacterial processes on corrosion should be further investigated as it might enhance locally the described redox process. 35 refs, 11 figs, 6 tabs

  2. Kinetic modelling of bentonite-canister interaction. Long-term predictions of copper canister corrosion under oxic and anoxic conditions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wersin, P; Spahiu, K; Bruno, J [MBT Tecnologia Ambiental, Cerdanyola (Spain)

    1994-09-01

    A new modelling approach for canister corrosion which emphasises chemical processes and diffusion at the bentonite-canister interface is presented. From the geochemical boundary conditions corrosion rates for both an anoxic case and an oxic case are derived and uncertainties thereof are estimated via sensitivity analyses. Time scales of corrosion are assessed by including calculations of the evolution of redox potential in the near field and pitting corrosion. This indicates realistic corrosion depths in the range of 10{sup -7} and 4*10{sup -5} mm/yr, respectively for anoxic and oxic corrosion. Taking conservative estimates, depths are increased by a factor of about 200 for both cases. From these predictions it is suggested that copper canister corrosion does not constitute a problem for repository safety, although certain factors such as temperature and radiolysis have not been explicitly included. The possible effect of bacterial processes on corrosion should be further investigated as it might enhance locally the described redox process. 35 refs, 11 figs, 6 tabs.

  3. Thermo-hydro-mechanical mode of canister retrieval test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zandarin, M.T.; Olivella, S.; Gens', A.; Alonso, E.E.

    2010-01-01

    Document available in extended abstract form only. The Canister Retrieval Tests (CRT) is a full scale in situ experiment performed by SKB at Aespoe Laboratory. The experiment involves placing a canister equipped with electrical heaters inside of a deposition hole bored in Aespoe diorite. The deposition hole is 8.55 metres deep and has a diameter of 1.76 metres. The space between canister and the hole is filled with a MX-80 bentonite buffer. The bentonite buffer was installed in form of blocks and rings of bentonite. At the top of the canister bentonite bricks occupy the volume between the canister top surface and the bottom surface of the plug. Due to the bentonite ring size there are two gaps; once between canister and buffer which was left empty and another one between buffer and rock that was filled with bentonite pellets. The top of the hole was sealed with a retaining plug composed of concrete and a steel plate. The plug was secured against heave caused by the swelling clay with nine cables anchored in the rock. An artificial pressurised saturation system was used because the supply of water from the rock was judged to be insufficient for saturating the buffer in a feasible time. A large number of instruments were installed to monitor the test as follows: - Canister - temperature and strain. - Rock mass - temperature and stress. - Retaining system - force and displacement. - Buffer - temperature, relative humidity, pore pressure and total pressure. After dismantling the tests the final dry density and water content of bentonite and pellets were measured. The comprehensive record of the Thermo-Hydro-Mechanical (THM) processes in the buffer give the possibility to investigate theoretical formulations and models, since the results of THM analyses can be checked against experimental data. As part of the European project THERESA, a 2-D axisymmetric model simulation of CRT bas been carried out. Some of the main objectives of this simulation are the study of the

  4. An assessment of KW Basin radionuclide activity when opening SNF canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bergmann, D.W.; Mollerus, F.J.; Wray, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    N Reactor spent fuel is being stored in sealed canisters in the KW Basin. Some of the canisters contain damaged fuel elements. There is the potential for release of Cs 137, Kr 85, H3, and other fission products and transuranics (TRUs) when canisters are opened. Canister opening is required to select and transfer fuel elements to the 300 Area for examination as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Characterization program. This report estimates the amount of radionuclides that can be released from Mark II spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters in KW Basin when canisters are opened for SNF fuel sampling as part of the SNF Characterization Program. The report also assesses the dose consequences of the releases and steps that can be taken to reduce the impacts of these releases

  5. Effect of HNO3-cerium(IV) decontamination on stainless steel canister materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Westerman, R.E.; Mackey, D.B.

    1991-01-01

    Stainless steel canisters will be filled with vitrified radioactive waste at the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP), West Valley, NY. After they are filled, the sealed canisters will be decontaminated by immersion in a HNO 3 -Ce(IV) solution, which will remove the oxide film and a small amount of metal from the surface of the canisters. Studies were undertaken in support of waste form qualification activities to determine the effect of this decontamination treatment on the legibility of the weld-bead canister identification label, and to determine whether this decontamination treatment could induce stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) in the AISI 304L stainless steel (SS) canister material. Neither the label legibility nor the canister integrity with regard to SCC were found to be prejudiced by the simulated decontamination treatment

  6. A methodology of uncertainty/sensitivity analysis for PA of HLW repository learned from 1996 WIPP performance assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Y. M.; Kim, S. K.; Hwang, Y. S.; Kang, C. H.

    2002-01-01

    The WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) is a mined repository constructed by the US DOE for the permanent disposal of transuranic (TRU) wastes generated by activities related to defence of the US since 1970. Its historical disposal operation began in March 1999 following receipt of a final permit from the State of NM after a positive certification decision for the WIPP was issued by the EPA in 1998, as the first licensed facility in the US for the deep geologic disposal of radioactive wastes. The CCA (Compliance Certification Application) for the WIPP that the DOE submitted to the EPA in 1966 was supported by an extensive Performance Assessment (PA) carried out by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), with so-called 1996 PA. Even though such PA methodologies could be greatly different from the way we consider for HLW disposal in Korea largely due to quite different geologic formations in which repository are likely to be located, a review on lots of works done through the WIPP PA studies could be the most important lessons that we can learn from in view of current situation in Korea where an initial phase of conceptual studies on HLW disposal has been just started. The objective of this work is an overview of the methodology used in the recent WIPP PA to support the US DOE WIPP CCA ans a proposal for Korean case

  7. Assessment of the potential for karst in the Rustler Formation at the WIPP site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lorenz, John Clay

    2006-01-01

    This report is an independent assessment of the potential for karst dissolution in evaporitic strata of the Rustler Formation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. Review of the available data suggests that the Rustler strata thicken and thin across the area in depositional patterns related to lateral variations in sedimentary accommodation space and normal facies changes. Most of the evidence that has been offered for the presence of karst in the subsurface has been used out of context, and the different pieces are not mutually supporting. Outside of Nash Draw, definitive evidence for the development of karst in the Rustler Formation near the WIPP site is limited to the horizon of the Magenta Member in drillhole WIPP-33. Most of the other evidence cited by the proponents of karst is more easily interpreted as primary sedimentary structures and the localized dissolution of evaporitic strata adjacent to the Magenta and Culebra water-bearing units. Some of the cited evidence is invalid, an inherited baggage from studies made prior to the widespread knowledge of modern evaporite depositional environments and prior to the existence of definitive exposures of the Rustler Formation in the WIPP shafts. Some of the evidence is spurious, has been taken out of context, or is misquoted. Lateral lithologic variations from halite to mudstone within the Rustler Formation under the WIPP site have been taken as evidence for the dissolution of halite such as that seen in Nash Draw, but are more rationally explained as sedimentary facies changes. Extrapolation of the known karst features in Nash Draw eastward to the WIPP site, where conditions are and have been significantly different for half a million years, is unwarranted. The volumes of insoluble material that would remain after dissolution of halite would be significantly less than the observed bed thicknesses, thus dissolution is an unlikely explanation for the lateral variations from halite to mudstone and siltstone

  8. Assessment of the potential for karst in the Rustler Formation at the WIPP site.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lorenz, John Clay

    2006-01-01

    This report is an independent assessment of the potential for karst dissolution in evaporitic strata of the Rustler Formation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site. Review of the available data suggests that the Rustler strata thicken and thin across the area in depositional patterns related to lateral variations in sedimentary accommodation space and normal facies changes. Most of the evidence that has been offered for the presence of karst in the subsurface has been used out of context, and the different pieces are not mutually supporting. Outside of Nash Draw, definitive evidence for the development of karst in the Rustler Formation near the WIPP site is limited to the horizon of the Magenta Member in drillhole WIPP-33. Most of the other evidence cited by the proponents of karst is more easily interpreted as primary sedimentary structures and the localized dissolution of evaporitic strata adjacent to the Magenta and Culebra water-bearing units. Some of the cited evidence is invalid, an inherited baggage from studies made prior to the widespread knowledge of modern evaporite depositional environments and prior to the existence of definitive exposures of the Rustler Formation in the WIPP shafts. Some of the evidence is spurious, has been taken out of context, or is misquoted. Lateral lithologic variations from halite to mudstone within the Rustler Formation under the WIPP site have been taken as evidence for the dissolution of halite such as that seen in Nash Draw, but are more rationally explained as sedimentary facies changes. Extrapolation of the known karst features in Nash Draw eastward to the WIPP site, where conditions are and have been significantly different for half a million years, is unwarranted. The volumes of insoluble material that would remain after dissolution of halite would be significantly less than the observed bed thicknesses, thus dissolution is an unlikely explanation for the lateral variations from halite to mudstone and siltstone

  9. Spent nuclear fuel retrieval system fuel handling development testing. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, D.R.; Meeuwsen, P.V.

    1997-09-01

    Fuel handling development testing was performed in support of the Fuel Retrieval System (FRS) Sub-Project, a subtask of the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. The FRS will be used to retrieve and repackage K-Basin Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) currently stored in old K-Plant storage basins. The FRS is required to retrieve full fuel canisters from the basin, clean the fuel elements inside the canister to remove excessive uranium corrosion products (or sludge), remove the contents from the canisters and sort the resulting debris, scrap, and fuel for repackaging. The fuel elements and scrap will be collected in fuel storage and scrap baskets in preparation for loading into a multi canister overpack (MCO), while the debris is loaded into a debris bin and disposed of as solid waste. This report describes fuel handling development testing performed from May 1, 1997 through the end of August 1997. Testing during this period was mainly focused on performance of a Schilling Robotic Systems' Conan manipulator used to simulate a custom designed version, labeled Konan, being fabricated for K-Basin deployment. In addition to the manipulator, the camera viewing system, process table layout, and fuel handling processes were evaluated. The Conan test manipulator was installed and fully functional for testing in early 1997. Formal testing began May 1. The purposes of fuel handling development testing were to provide proof of concept and criteria, optimize equipment layout, initialize the process definition, and identify special needs/tools and required design changes to support development of the performance specification. The test program was set up to accomplish these objectives through cold (non-radiological) development testing using simulated and prototype equipment

  10. Interim report spent nuclear fuel retrieval system fuel handling development testing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ketner, G.L.; Meeuwsen, P.V.; Potter, J.D.; Smalley, J.T.; Baker, C.P.; Jaquish, W.R.

    1997-06-01

    Fuel handling development testing was performed in support of the Fuel Retrieval System (FRS) Sub-Project at the Hanford Site. The project will retrieve spent nuclear fuel, clean and remove fuel from canisters, repackage fuel into baskets, and load fuel into a multi-canister overpack (MCO) for vacuum drying and interim dry storage. The FRS is required to retrieve basin fuel canisters, clean fuel elements sufficiently of uranium corrosion products (or sludge), empty fuel from canisters, sort debris and scrap from whole elements, and repackage fuel in baskets in preparation for MCO loading. The purpose of fuel handling development testing was to examine the systems ability to accomplish mission activities, optimization of equipment layouts for initial process definition, identification of special needs/tools, verification of required design changes to support performance specification development, and validation of estimated activity times/throughput. The test program was set up to accomplish this purpose through cold development testing using simulated and prototype equipment; cold demonstration testing using vendor expertise and systems; and graphical computer modeling to confirm feasibility and throughput. To test the fuel handling process, a test mockup that represented the process table was fabricated and installed. The test mockup included a Schilling HV series manipulator that was prototypic of the Schilling Hydra manipulator. The process table mockup included the tipping station, sorting area, disassembly and inspection zones, fuel staging areas, and basket loading stations. The test results clearly indicate that the Schilling Hydra arm cannot effectively perform the fuel handling tasks required unless it is attached to some device that can impart vertical translation, azimuth rotation, and X-Y translation. Other test results indicate the importance of camera locations and capabilities, and of the jaw and end effector tool design. 5 refs., 35 figs., 3 tabs.

  11. Proposal of a SiC disposal canister for very deep borehole disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Heui-Joo; Lee, Minsoo; Lee, Jong-Youl; Kim, Kyungsu [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    In this paper authors proposed a silicon carbide, SiC, disposal canister for the DBD concept in Korea. A. Kerber et al. first proposed the SiC canister for a geological disposal of HLW, CANDU or HTR spent nuclear fuels. SiC has some drawbacks in welding or manufacturing a large canister. Thus, we designed a double layered disposal canister consisting of a stainless steel outer layer and a SiC inner layer. KAERI has been interested in developing a very deep borehole disposal (DBD) of HLW generated from pyroprocessing of PWR spent nuclear fuel and supported the relevant R and D with very limited its own budget. KAERI team reviewed the DBD concept proposed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and developed its own concept. The SNL concept was based on the steel disposal canister. The authors developed a new technology called cold spray coating method to manufacture a copper-cast iron disposal canister for a geological disposal of high level waste in Korea. With this method, 8 mm thin copper canister with 400 mm in diameter and 1200 mm in height was made. In general, they do not give any credit on the lifetime of a disposal canister in DBD concept unlike the geological disposal. In such case, the expensive copper canister should be replaced with another one. We designed a disposal canister using SiC for DBD. According to an experience in manufacturing a small size canister, the fabrication of a large-size one is a challenge. Also, welding of SiC canister is not easy. Several pathways are being paved to overcome it.

  12. Gas liquid sampling for closed canisters in KW Basin - test plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitkoff, C.C.

    1995-01-01

    Test procedures for the gas/liquid sampler. Characterization of the Spent Nuclear Fuel, SNF, sealed in canisters at KW-Basin is needed to determine the state of storing SNF wet. Samples of the liquid and the gas in the closed canisters will be taken to gain characterization information. Sampling equipment has been designed to retrieve gas and liquid from the closed canisters in KW basin. This plan is written to outline the test requirements for this developmental sampling equipment

  13. Nuclear fuel handling apparatus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andrea, C.; Dupen, C.F.G.; Noyes, R.C.

    1977-01-01

    A fuel handling machine for a liquid metal cooled nuclear reactor in which a retractable handling tube and gripper are lowered into the reactor to withdraw a spent fuel assembly into the handling tube. The handling tube containing the fuel assembly immersed in liquid sodium is then withdrawn completely from the reactor into the outer barrel of the handling machine. The machine is then used to transport the spent fuel assembly directly to a remotely located decay tank. The fuel handling machine includes a decay heat removal system which continuously removes heat from the interior of the handling tube and which is capable of operating at its full cooling capacity at all times. The handling tube is supported in the machine from an articulated joint which enables it to readily align itself with the correct position in the core. An emergency sodium supply is carried directly by the machine to provide make up in the event of a loss of sodium from the handling tube during transport to the decay tank. 5 claims, 32 drawing figures

  14. NDE to Manage Atmospheric SCC in Canisters for Dry Storage of Spent Fuel: An Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meyer, Ryan M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Pardini, Allan F. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Cuta, Judith M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Adkins, Harold E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Casella, Andrew M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Qiao, Hong [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Larche, Michael R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Diaz, Aaron A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doctor, Steven R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2013-09-01

    This report documents efforts to assess representative horizontal (Transuclear NUHOMS®) and vertical (Holtec HI-STORM) storage systems for the implementation of non-destructive examination (NDE) methods or techniques to manage atmospheric stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in canisters for dry storage of used nuclear fuel. The assessment is conducted by assessing accessibility and deployment, environmental compatibility, and applicability of NDE methods. A recommendation of this assessment is to focus on bulk ultrasonic and eddy current techniques for direct canister monitoring of atmospheric SCC. This assessment also highlights canister regions that may be most vulnerable to atmospheric SCC to guide the use of bulk ultrasonic and eddy current examinations. An assessment of accessibility also identifies canister regions that are easiest and more difficult to access through the ventilation paths of the concrete shielding modules. A conceivable sampling strategy for canister inspections is to sample only the easiest to access portions of vulnerable regions. There are aspects to performing an NDE inspection of dry canister storage system (DCSS) canisters for atmospheric SCC that have not been addressed in previous performance studies. These aspects provide the basis for recommendations of future efforts to determine the capability and performance of eddy current and bulk ultrasonic examinations for atmospheric SCC in DCSS canisters. Finally, other important areas of investigation are identified including the development of instrumented surveillance specimens to identify when conditions are conducive for atmospheric SCC, characterization of atmospheric SCC morphology, and an assessment of air flow patterns over canister surfaces and their influence on chloride deposition.

  15. Corrosion resistance of canisters for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattsson, E.

    1979-01-01

    A group of Swedish scientists has evaluated from the corrosion point of view three alternative canister types for final disposal of waste from nuclear reactors in boreholes in rock 500 m below ground. Titanium canisters with a wall-thickness of 6 mm and 100 mm thick lead lining have been estimated to have a life of at least thousands of years, and probably tens of thousands of years. Copper canisters with 200-mm-thick walls would last for hundreds of thousands of years. The third type, α-alumina sintered under isostatic pressure, is a very promising canister material

  16. Mechanical design of the storage tubes in the HWVP canister storage building

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Divona, C.J.; Fages, R.; Janicek, G.P.; Mullally, J.A.

    1993-01-01

    Canisters of high-level waste from the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) will be stored in an adjacent facility, the Canister Storage Building (CSB). The canisters are stored vertically in an array of tubes within the shielded vault area of the CSB. This paper describes the mechanical design of the storage tubes, the shield floor plugs that confine the waste within the tubes and the impact absorber system used to assure that the canisters are not breached in the event of an accidental drop. Installation and testing of the components is also discussed

  17. SITE-94. CAMEO: A model of mass-transport limited general corrosion of copper canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Worgan, K.J.; Apted, M.J.

    1996-12-01

    This report describes the technical basis for the CAMEO code, which models the general, uniform corrosion of a copper canister either by transport of corrodants to the canister, or by transport of corrosion products away from the canister. According to the current Swedish concept for final disposal of spent nuclear fuels, extremely long containment times are achieved by thick (60-100 mm) copper canisters. Each canister is surrounded by a compacted bentonite buffer, located in a saturated, crystalline rock at a depth of around 500 m below ground level. Three diffusive transport-limited cases are identified for general, uniform corrosion of copper: General corrosion rate-limited by diffusive mass-transport of sulphide to the canister surface under reducing conditions; General corrosion rate-limited by diffusive mass-transport of oxygen to the canister surface under mildly oxidizing conditions; General corrosion rate-limited by diffusive mass-transport of copper chloride away from the canister surface under highly oxidizing conditions. The CAMEO code includes general corrosion models for each of the above three processes. CAMEO is based on the well-tested CALIBRE code previously developed as a finite-difference, mass-transfer analysis code for the SKI to evaluate long-term radionuclide release and transport in the near-field. A series of scoping calculations for the general, uniform corrosion of a reference copper canister are presented

  18. Production methods and costs of oxygen free copper canisters for nuclear waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajainmaeki, H.; Nieminen, M.; Laakso, L.

    1991-08-01

    The fabrication technology and costs of various manufacturing alternatives to make large copper canisters for spent fuel repository are discussed. The capsule design is based on the TVO's new advanced cold process concept where a steel canister is surrounded by the oxygen free copper canister. This study shows that already at present there exist several possible manufacturing routes, which result in consistently high quality canisters. Hot rolling, bending and EB-welding the seam is the best way to assure the small grain size which is preferable for the best inspectability of the final EB-welded seam of the lid. The same route turns out also to be the most economical

  19. Production methods and costs of oxygen free copper canisters for nuclear waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajainmaeki, H.; Nieminen, M.; Laakso, L.

    1991-06-01

    The fabrication technology and costs of various manufacturing alternatives to make large copper canisters for spent fuel repository are discussed. The capsule design is based on the TVO's new advanced cold process concept where a steel canister is surrounded by the oxygen free copper canister. This study shows that already at present there exist several possible manufacturing routes, which results in consistently high quality canisters. Hot rolling, bending and EB-welding the seam is the best way to assure the small grain size which is preferable for the best inspectability of the final EB-welded seam of the lid. The same route turns out also to be the most economical. (au)

  20. The integrated in situ testing program for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matalucci, R.V.

    1987-03-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is developing the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Project in southeastern New Mexico as a research and development (R and D) facility for examining the response of bedded (layered) salt to the emplacement of radioactive wastes generated from defense programs. The WIPP Experimental Program consists of a technology development program, including laboratory testing and theoretical analysis activities, and an in situ testing program that is being done 659 m underground at the project site. This experimental program addresses three major technical areas that concern (1) thermal/structural interactions, (2) plugging and sealing, and (3) waste package performance. To ensure that the technical issues involved in these areas are investigated with appropriate emphasis and timing, an in situ testing plan was developed to integrate the many activities and tasks associated with the technical issues of waste disposal. 5 refs., 4 figs

  1. Comparison between disign criteria and observed structural performance of underground openings at WIPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cook, R.F.; Francke, C.

    1989-01-01

    This paper discusses the observed structural performance of the underground excavations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in relation to design criteria. The criteria were established at an early stage of the project to define the functional and structural requirements that were to be addressed in the design of the facility. For the underground structural response, the criteria defined the requirements for the shaft and shaft liner design, mine design, waste emplacement, retrievability and instrumentation. The observed structural performance of the underground is determined by the field data that have been collected since excavations were started at the WIPP site. The observations include field measurements of rock and water conditions, as well as maintenance records. The data provide input to design confirmation, performance assessment and form the basis for the design of new underground structures. For this paper, the field data have been compared with the design criteria applicable to ground control to demonstrate that the requirements of the design are met

  2. Certifying the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant: Lessons Learned from the WIPP Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, D.R.; Chu, Margaret S.Y.; Froehlich, Gary K.; Howard, Bryan A.; Howarth, Susan M.; Larson, Kurt W.; Pickering, Susan Y.; Swift, Peter N.

    1999-01-01

    In May 1998, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) certified the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as being in compliance with applicable long-term regulations governing the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level, and transuranic radioactive wastes. The WIPP is the first deep geologic repository in the US to have successfully demonstrated regulatory compliance with long-term radioactive waste disposal requirements. The first disposal of TRU waste at WIPP occurred on March 26, 1999. Many of the lessons learned during the WIPP Project's transition from site characterization and experimental research to the preparation of a successful application may be of general interest to other repository programs. During a four-year period (1992 to 1996), the WIPP team [including the DOE Carlsbad Area Office (CAO), the science advisor to CAO, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the management and operating contractor of the WIPP site, Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WID)] met its aggressive schedule for submitting the application without compromising the integrity of the scientific basis for the long-term safety of the repository. Strong leadership of the CAO-SNL-WID team was essential. Within SNL, a mature and robust performance assessment (PA) allowed prioritization of remaining scientific activities with respect to their impact on regulatory compliance. Early and frequent dialog with EPA staff expedited the review process after the application was submitted. Questions that faced SNL are familiar to geoscientists working in site evaluation projects. What data should be gathered during site characterization? How can we know when data are sufficient? How can we know when our understanding of the disposal system is sufficient to support our conceptual models? What constitutes adequate ''validation'' of conceptual models for processes that act over geologic time? How should we use peer review and expert judgment? Other

  3. Analysis report for WIPP colloid model constraints and performance assessment parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mariner, Paul E.; Sassani, David Carl

    2014-03-01

    An analysis of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) colloid model constraints and parameter values was performed. The focus of this work was primarily on intrinsic colloids, mineral fragment colloids, and humic substance colloids, with a lesser focus on microbial colloids. Comments by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerning intrinsic Th(IV) colloids and Mg-Cl-OH mineral fragment colloids were addressed in detail, assumptions and data used to constrain colloid model calculations were evaluated, and inconsistencies between data and model parameter values were identified. This work resulted in a list of specific conclusions regarding model integrity, model conservatism, and opportunities for improvement related to each of the four colloid types included in the WIPP performance assessment.

  4. Plutonium interaction with a bacterial strain isolated from the waste isolation pilot plant (WIPP) environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strietelmeier, B.A.; Kraus, S.M.; Leonard, P.A.; Triay, I.R.

    1996-01-01

    This work was conducted as part of a series of experiments to determine the association and interaction of various actinides with bacteria isolated from the WIPP site. The majority of bacteria that exist at the site are expected to be halophiles, or extreme halophiles, due to the high concentration of salt minerals at the location. Experiments were conducted to determine the toxicity of plutonium-n-239, neptunium-237 and americium-243 to several species of these halophiles and the results were reported elsewhere. As an extension of these experiments, we report an investigation of the type of association that occurs between 239 Pu and the isolate WIPP-1A, isolated by staff at Brookhaven National Laboratory, when grown in a high-salt, defined medium. Using scanning electron microscopy (SEM) techniques, we demonstrate a surface association of the 239 Pu with the bacterial cells

  5. Performance Demonstration Program Plan for the WIPP Experimental-Waste Characterization Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-02-01

    The Performance Demonstration Program is designed to ensure that compliance with the Quality Assurance Objective, identified in the Quality Assurance Program Plan for the WIPP Experimental-Waste Characterization Program (QAPP), is achieved. This Program Plan is intended for use by the WPO to assess the laboratory support provided for the characterization of WIPP TRU waste by the storage/generator sites. Phase 0 of the Performance Demonstration Program encompasses the analysis of headspace gas samples for inorganic and organic components. The WPO will ensure the implementation of this plan by designating an independent organization to coordinate and provide technical oversight for the program (Program Coordinator). Initial program support, regarding the technical oversight and coordination functions, shall be provided by the USEPA-ORP. This plan identifies the criteria that will be used for the evaluation of laboratory performance, the responsibilities of the Program Coordinator, and the responsibilities of the participating laboratories. 5 tabs

  6. Comparative analysis of nine structural codes used in the second WIPP benchmark problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, H.S.; Krieg, R.D.; Matalucci, R.V.

    1981-11-01

    In the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Benchmark II study, various computer codes were compared on the basis of their capabilities for calculating the response of hypothetical drift configurations for nuclear waste experiments and storage demonstration. The codes used by participants in the study were ANSALT, DAPROK, JAC, REM, SANCHO, SPECTROM, STEALTH, and two different implementations of MARC. Errors were found in the preliminary results, and several calculations were revised. Revised solutions were in reasonable agreement except for the REM solution. The Benchmark II study allowed significant advances in understanding the relative behavior of computer codes available for WIPP calculations. The study also pointed out the possible need for performing critical design calculations with more than one code. Lastly, it indicated the magnitude of the code-to-code spread in results which is to be expected even when a model has been explicitly defined

  7. Basic data report for drillhole WIPP 27 (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-10-01

    WIPP 27 was drilled in Eddy County, New Mexico (NM 1/4 sec. 21, T21S, R30E) to investigate evaporite dissolution features and to determine the stratigraphy of surface and near-surface formations. The borehole encountered, from top to bottom, 79 feet of Quaternary deposits, 73 feet of the Rustler Formation, and 171 feet of the upper portion of the Salado Formation. Consecutive cores were obtained for the entire depth of WIPP 27. Geophysical logs measure acoustic velocities, density, radioactivity, and formation resistivity. An interpretive report on dissolution in Nash Draw will be based on combined borehole data, surface mapping and laboratory analyses of Nash Draw rocks and fluids

  8. The influence of salt aerosol on alpha radiation detection by WIPP continuous air monitors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bartlett, W.T.; Walker, B.A. [Environmental Evaluation Group, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1997-08-01

    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) alpha continuous air monitor (CAM) performance was evaluated to determine if CAMs could detect accidental releases of transuranic radioactivity from the underground repository. Anomalous alpha spectra and poor background subtraction were observed and attributed to salt deposits on the CAM sampling filters. Microscopic examination of salt laden sampling filters revealed that aerosol particles were forming dendritic structures on the surface of the sampling filters. Alpha CAM detection efficiency decreased exponentially as salt deposits increased on the sampling filters, suggesting that sampling-filter salt was performing like a fibrous filter rather than a membrane filter. Aerosol particles appeared to penetrate the sampling-filter salt deposits and alpha particle energy was reduced. These findings indicate that alpha CAMs may not be able to detect acute releases of radioactivity, and consequently CAMs are not used as part of the WIPP dynamic confinement system. 12 refs., 12 figs., 1 tab.

  9. Mechanical Integrity of Copper Canister Lid and Cylinder

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karlsson, Marianne

    2002-01-01

    This report compiles finite element analyses performed to ensure the structural integrity of canisters used for storing of nuclear fuel waste of type BWR. The report comprises analyses performed on the canister lid and cylinder casing in order to determine static and long-term strength of the structure. The report analyses the mechanical response of the lid and flange of the copper canister when subjected to loads caused by pressure from swelling bentonite and from ground water at a depth of 500 meter. The loads acting on the canister are somewhat uncertain and the cases investigated in this report are possible cases. Load cases analysed are: Pressure 15 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and 5 MPa uniformly distributed on cylinder; Pressure 5 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and 15 MPa uniformly distributed on cylinder; Pressure 20 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and cylinder; Side pressures 10 MPa and 20 MPa uniformly distributed on part of the cylinder. Creep analyses are also performed in order to estimate the stresses that will arise when the canister is placed in the repository. The analyses in this report are recreated from the original analyses but the models differ in geometry. Also, there is no information in the original reports on material data, time-independent as well as creep data, and analysis procedure. The data used in the recreated analyses are based on information from References 2, 3, 6 and 7. The results presented in this report are based on the supplementary analyses. These results differ from the original results. Most likely this is due to differences in model geometry. The original results are appended to the report and are summarised for comparison with results from the supplementary analyses. Otherwise, these results are not further discussed. For all load cases, high tensile stresses are found in the lid fillet between the planar part and the flange. High tensile stresses are also found in the weld surface and on the outer side of the

  10. Test plan for K-Basin fuel handling tools

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bridges, A.E.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide the test plan and procedures for the acceptance testing of the handling tools enveloped for the removal of an N-Reactor fuel element from its storage canister in the K-Basins storage pool and insertion into the Single fuel Element Can for subsequent shipment to a Hot Cell for examination. Examination of these N-Reactor fuel elements is part of the overall characterization effort. New hand tools were required since previous fuel movement has involved grasping the fuel in a horizontal position. The 305 Building Cold Test Facility will be used to conduct the acceptance testing of the Fuel Handling Tools. Upon completion of this acceptance testing and any subsequent training of operators, the tools will be transferred to the 105 KW Basin for installation and use

  11. Summary of 1988 WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant] Facility horizon gas flow measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stormont, J.C.

    1990-11-01

    Numerous gas flow measurements have been made at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Facility horizon during 1988. All tests have been pressure decay or constant pressure tests from single boreholes drilled from the underground excavations. The test fluid has been nitrogen. The data have been interpreted as permeabilities and porosities by means of a transient numerical solution method. A closed-form steady-state approximation provides a reasonable order-of-magnitude permeability estimate. The effective resolution of the measurement system is less than 10 -20 m 2 . Results indicate that beyond 1 to 5 m from an excavation, the gas flow is very small and the corresponding permeability is below the system resolution. Within the first meter of an excavation, the interpreted permeabilities can be 5 orders of magnitude greater than the undisturbed or far-field permeability. The interpreted permeabilities in the region between the undisturbed region and the first meter from an excavation are in the range of 10 -16 to 10 -20 m 2 . Measurable gas flow occurs to a greater depth into the roof above WIPP excavations of different sizes and ages than into the ribs and floor. The gas flows into the formation surrounding the smallest excavation tested are consistently lower than those at similar locations surrounding larger excavations of comparable age. Gas flow measured in the interbed layers near the WIPP excavations is highly variable. Generally, immediately above and below excavations, relatively large gas flow is measured in the interbed layers. These results are consistent with previous measurements and indicate a limited disturbed zone surrounding WIPP excavations. 31 refs., 99 figs., 5 tabs

  12. Joint state of Colorado-US Department of Energy WIPP Shipment Exercise Program: TRANSAX '90

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    In July 1990, the United States Secretary of Energy requested the DOE conduct a transportation emergency exercise before the end of CY 1990. The tasking was subsequently directed to the Director of DOE's Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM) to plan and conduct an exercise, based on a Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) shipment scenario. The state of Colorado was asked to participate. Colorado, in turn, invited the DOE to integrate the exercise into its own series of WIPP-related tabletop and field exercises for which the state had already begun planning. The result was a joint USDOE/Colorado full-scale (orientation) exercise called Transportation Accident Exercise 1990 (TRANSAX '90). The state of Colorado's exercise program was a follow-on to previously conducted classroom training. The program would serve to identify and resolve outstanding issues concerning inspections of the WIPP shipment transporter as it entered and passed through the state on the designated Interstate 25 transportation corridor; criteria for movement under various adverse weather and road conditions; and emergency response to accidents occurring in an urban or rural environment. The USDOE designed its participation in the exercise program to test selected aspects of the DOE Emergency Management System relating to response to and management of DOE off-site transportation emergencies involving assistance to state and local emergency response personnel. While a number of issues remain under study for ultimate resolution, others have been resolved and will become the basis for emergency operations plans, SOPs, mutual aid agreements, and checklist upgrades. Concurrently, the concentrated efforts at local, state, and federal levels in dealing with WIPP- related activities during this exercise program development have given renewed impetus to all parties as the beginning of actual shipments draws nearer. Three tabletop scenarios are discussed in this report

  13. Investigation and modelling of friction stir welded copper canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kaellgren, Therese

    2010-02-15

    This work has been focused on characterisation of FSW joints, and modelling of the process, both analytically and numerically. The Swedish model for final deposit of nuclear fuel waste is based on copper canisters as a corrosion barrier with an inner pressure holding insert of cast iron. Friction Stir Welding (FSW) is the method to seal the copper canister, a technique invented by The Welding Institute (TWI). The first simulations were based on Rosenthal's analytical medium plate model. The model is simple to use, but has limitations. Finite element models (FEM) were developed, initially with a two-dimensional geometry. Due to the requirements of describing both the heat flow and the tool movement, three-dimensional models were developed. These models take into account heat transfer, material flow, and continuum mechanics. The geometries of the models are based on the simulation experiments carried out at TWI and at Swedish Nuclear Fuel Waste and Management Co (SKB). Temperature distribution, material flow and their effects on the thermal expansion were predicted for a full-scale canister and lid. The steady state solutions have been compared with temperature measurements, showing good agreement. In order to understand the material flow during welding a marker technique is used, which involves inserting dissimilar material into the weld zone before joining. Different materials are tested showing that brass rods are the most suitable material in these welds. After welding, the weld line is sliced, etched and examined by optical microscope. To understand the material flow further, and in the future predict the flow, a FEM is developed. This model and the etched samples are compared showing similar features. Furthermore, by using this model the area that is recrystallised can be predicted. The predicted area and the grain size and hardness profile agree well

  14. Friction Stir Welding of Copper Canisters for Nuclear Waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kaellgren, Therese

    2005-07-01

    The Swedish model for final disposal of nuclear fuel waste is based on copper canisters as a corrosion barrier with an inner pressure holding insert of cast iron. One of the methods to seal the copper canister is to use the Friction Stir Welding (FSW), a method invented by The Welding Institute (TWI). This work has been focused on characterisation of the FSW joints, and modelling of the process, both analytically and numerically. The first simulations were based on Rosenthal's analytical medium plate model. The model is simple to use, but has limitations. Finite element models were developed, initially with a two-dimensional geometry. Due to the requirements of describing both the heat flow and the tool movement, three-dimensional models were developed. These models take into account heat transfer, material flow, and continuum mechanics. The geometries of the models are based on the simulation experiments carried out at TWI and at Swedish Nuclear Fuel Waste and Management Co (SKB). Temperature distribution, material flow and their effects on the thermal expansion were predicted for a full-scale canister and lid. The steady state solutions have been compared with temperature measurements, showing good agreement. Microstructure and hardness profiles have been investigated by optical microscope, Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM), Electron Back Scatter Diffraction (EBSD) and Rockwell hardness measurements. EBSD visualisation has been used to determine the grain size distribution and the appearance of twins and misorientation within grains. The orientation maps show a fine uniform equiaxed grain structure. The root of the weld exhibits the smallest grains and many annealing twins. This may be due to deformation after recrystallisation. The appearance of the nugget and the grain size depends on the position of the weld. A large difference can be seen both in hardness and grain size between the start of the weld and when the steady state is reached.

  15. The influence of salt aerosol on alpha radiation detection by WIPP continuous air monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bartlett, W.T.; Walker, B.A.

    1996-01-01

    Alpha continuous air monitors (CAMs) will be used at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to measure airborne transuranic radioactivity that might be present in air exhaust or in work-place areas. WIPP CAMs are important to health and safety because they are used to alert workers to airborne radioactivity, to actuate air-effluent filtration systems, and to detect airborne radioactivity so that the radioactivity can be confined in a limited area. In 1993, the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) reported that CAM operational performance was affected by salt aerosol, and subsequently, the WIPP CAM design and usage were modified. In this report, operational data and current theories on aerosol collection were reviewed to determine CAM quantitative performance limitations. Since 1993, the overall CAM performance appears to have improved, but anomalous alpha spectra are present when sampling-filter salt deposits are at normal to high levels. This report shows that sampling-filter salt deposits directly affect radon-thoron daughter alpha spectra and overall monitor efficiency. Previously it was assumed that aerosol was mechanically collected on the surface of CAM sampling filters, but this review suggests that electrostatic and other particle collection mechanisms are more important than previously thought. The mechanism of sampling-filter particle collection is critical to measurement of acute releases of radioactivity. 41 refs

  16. Hydraulic fracturing tests in anhydrite interbeds in the WIPP, Marker Beds 139 and 140

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Howard, C L [RE/SPEC Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Wawersik, W. R.; Carlson, L. V.; Henfling, J. A.; Borns, D. J.; Beauheim, R. L.; Roberts, R. M.

    1997-05-01

    Hydraulic fracturing tests were integrated with hydrologic tests to est