WorldWideScience

Sample records for gcep

  1. Decadal climate prediction (project GCEP).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Haines, Keith; Hermanson, Leon; Liu, Chunlei; Putt, Debbie; Sutton, Rowan; Iwi, Alan; Smith, Doug

    2009-03-13

    Decadal prediction uses climate models forced by changing greenhouse gases, as in the International Panel for Climate Change, but unlike longer range predictions they also require initialization with observations of the current climate. In particular, the upper-ocean heat content and circulation have a critical influence. Decadal prediction is still in its infancy and there is an urgent need to understand the important processes that determine predictability on these timescales. We have taken the first Hadley Centre Decadal Prediction System (DePreSys) and implemented it on several NERC institute compute clusters in order to study a wider range of initial condition impacts on decadal forecasting, eventually including the state of the land and cryosphere. The eScience methods are used to manage submission and output from the many ensemble model runs required to assess predictive skill. Early results suggest initial condition skill may extend for several years, even over land areas, but this depends sensitively on the definition used to measure skill, and alternatives are presented. The Grid for Coupled Ensemble Prediction (GCEP) system will allow the UK academic community to contribute to international experiments being planned to explore decadal climate predictability.

  2. The Real Time Mass Evaluation System as a tool for the detection of undeclared cascade operation at GCEPs

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Delbeke, J.F.A.; Howell, J.; Eklund, G.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.; Peerani, P.; Janssens, W.

    2008-01-01

    Given the flexibility of current cascade designs a real time mass monitoring system is preferred for safeguarding Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. However, if such a system is to be installed in a GCEP it must not impinge on plant operation or be intrusive. Since load cells are already part of the

  3. The real time mass evaluation system as a tool for detection of undeclared cascade operation at GCEPs

    OpenAIRE

    Delbeke, J.F.A.; Howell, J.; Eklund, G.; Peerani, P.; Janssens, W.

    2008-01-01

    Given the flexibility of current cascade designs a real time mass monitoring system is preferred for safeguarding Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. However, if such a system is to be installed in a GCEP it must not impinge on plant operation or be intrusive. Since load cells are already part of the operational process and located outside the cascade hall their exploitation for safeguards purposes is an obvious development. The paper describes, through dynamic simulations, how transients would...

  4. Clean-out and Reuse of GCEP Facilities at Portsmouth

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franz, William; Hickman, Mark; Wiehle, Kristi

    2008-01-01

    PORTS began operations in 1956 to enrich uranium for both civilian and military use. It operated under Goodyear Atomic Corporation and Lockheed-Martin as a government-owned contractor-operated facility until the formation of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) as a government corporation in 1993. In 1998, USEC was privatized as a publicly traded corporation. USEC leases the Portsmouth and Paducah GDPs from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Enrichment operations were terminated at Portsmouth in 2001, although USEC continues to lease and maintain the Portsmouth GDP in Cold Shutdown and conduct some DOE projects there. LPP found that removal of old equipment to allow reuse of a facility can present unexpected challenges. Classified components create significant logistics issues. In this case, teamwork and attention to detail by USEC, LATA/Parallax, and DOE resulted in solutions and success. Lessons learnt: - Transportation logistics are particularly important when shipping waste streams with special requirements. - Investment in extra equipment yields tangible benefits where other resources (cleared drivers) are scarce. - An early start to providing specially qualified drivers, in this case providing security clearances, is essential. Availability is limited, and the time required to qualify new drivers may be lengthy. - A dedicated communications station, rather than reliance on existing resources (shift superintendent), is invaluable

  5. Field Trial of LANL On-Line Advanced Enrichment Monitor for UF6 GCEP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ianakiev, Kiril D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lombardi, Marcie [Los Alamos National Laboratory; MacArthur, Duncan W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Parker, Robert F. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Smith, Morag K. [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Keller, Clifford [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Friend, Peter [URENCO; Dunford, Andrew [URENCO

    2012-07-13

    The outline of this presentation is: (1) Technology basis of on-line enrichment monitoring; (2) Timescale of trial; (3) Description of installed equipment; (4) Photographs; (5) Results; (6) Possible further development; and (7) Conclusions. Summary of the good things about the Advanced Enrichment Monitor (AEM) performance is: (1) High accuracy - normally better than 1% relative, (2) Active system as accurate as passive system, (3) Fast and accurate detection of enrichment changes, (4) Physics is well understood, (5) Elegant method for capturing pressure signal, and (6) Data capture is automatic, low cost and fast. A couple of negative things are: (1) Some jumps in measured passive enrichment - of around +2% relative (due to clock errors?); and (2) Data handling and evaluation is off-line, expensive and very slow. Conclusions are: (1) LANL AEM is being tested on E23 plant at Capenhurst; (2) The trial is going very well; (3) AEM could detect production of HEU at potentially much lower cost than existing CEMO; (4) AEM can measure {sup 235}U assay accurately; (5) Active system using X-Ray source would avoid need for pressure measurement; (6) Substantial work lies ahead to go from current prototype to a production instrument.

  6. Minor isotope safeguards techniques (MIST): Analysis and visualization of gas centrifuge enrichment plant process data using the MSTAR model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shephard, Adam M.; Thomas, Benjamin R.; Coble, Jamie B.; Wood, Houston G.

    2018-05-01

    This paper presents a development related to the use of minor isotope safeguards techniques (MIST) and the MSTAR cascade model as it relates to the application of international nuclear safeguards at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The product of this paper is a derivation of the universal and dimensionless MSTAR cascade model. The new model can be used to calculate the minor uranium isotope concentrations in GCEP product and tails streams or to analyze, visualize, and interpret GCEP process data as part of MIST. Applications of the new model include the detection of undeclared feed and withdrawal streams at GCEPs when used in conjunction with UF6 sampling and/or other isotopic measurement techniques.

  7. Application of systems engineering techniques (reliability, availability, maintainability, and dollars) to the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boylan, J.G.; DeLozier, R.C.

    1982-01-01

    The systems engineering function for the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) covers system requirements definition, analyses, verification, technical reviews, and other system efforts necessary to assure good balance of performance, safety, cost, and scheduling. The systems engineering function will support the design, installation, start-up, and operational phases of GCEP. The principal objectives of the systems engineering function are to: assure that the system requirements of the GCEP process are adequately specified and documented and that due consideration and emphasis are given to all aspects of the project; provide system analyses of the designs as they progress to assure that system requirements are met and that GCEP interfaces are compatible; assist in the definition of programs for the necessary and sufficient verification of GCEP systems; and integrate reliability, maintainability, logistics, safety, producibility, and other related specialties into a total system effort. This paper addresses the GCEP reliability, availability, maintainability, and dollars (RAM dollars) analyses which are the primary systems engineering tools for the development and implementation of trade-off studies. These studies are basic to reaching cost-effective project decisions. The steps necessary to achieve optimum cost-effective design are shown

  8. Gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programme in the United States of America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gestson, D.K.

    1983-01-01

    The technology of uranium enrichment using the gas centrifuge is fully proven as a result of over twenty years of research. The high performance of the centrifuge has been confirmed, and its reliability established, through detailed evaluation of a series of centrifuge designs. The baseline centrifuge for the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) is now in commercial production by three qualified manufacturers. It will be ready for installation in GCEP on schedule. The GCEP construction is also on schedule, with two process buildings expected to start operation in 1988 and 1989. Development and demonstration of the Set IV advanced gas centrifuge is under way and it is expected to be ready for installation in Process Building 3 in early 1989. (author)

  9. The Global Climate and Energy Project at Stanford University: Fundamental Research Towards Future Energy Technologies

    Science.gov (United States)

    Milne, Jennifer L.; Sassoon, Richard E.; Hung, Emilie; Bosshard, Paolo; Benson, Sally M.

    The Global Climate and Energy Project (GCEP), at Stanford University, invests in research with the potential to lead to energy technologies with lower greenhouse gas emissions than current energy technologies. GCEP is sponsored by four international companies, ExxonMobil, GE, Schlumberger, and Toyota and supports research programs in academic institutions worldwide. Research falls into the broad areas of carbon based energy systems, renewables, electrochemistry, and the electric grid. Within these areas research efforts are underway that are aimed at achieving break-throughs and innovations that greatly improve efficiency, performance, functionality and cost of many potential energy technologies of the future including solar, batteries, fuel cells, biofuels, hydrogen storage and carbon capture and storage. This paper presents a summary of some of GCEP's activities over the past 7 years with current research areas of interest and potential research directions in the near future.

  10. Projected uranium measurement uncertainties for the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Younkin, J.M.

    1979-02-01

    An analysis was made of the uncertainties associated with the measurements of the declared uranium streams in the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP). The total uncertainty for the GCEP is projected to be from 54 to 108 kg 235 U/year out of a measured total of 200,000 kg 235 U/year. The systematic component of uncertainty of the UF 6 streams is the largest and the dominant contributor to the total uncertainty. A possible scheme for reducing the total uncertainty is given

  11. Hexapartite safeguards project team 3: material accounting and control questionnaire

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swindle, D.W. Jr.

    1981-01-01

    Information provided in this report reflects the current design and operating procedures for the GCEP. However, since the installation is currently under construction, facility design and operating procedures discussed in this report are subject to change. Where applicable, the responses are based on material control and accounting practices of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant's (GDP) operating contractor (Goodyear Atomic Corporation). These practices meet US Department of Energy (DOE) standards and are assumed to be the reference practices for the GCEP. This report covers data collection and record keeping actions of the operator

  12. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H.; Miller, Karen A.; Ianakiev, Kiril D.; Reimold, Benjamin A.; Ward, Steven L.; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235 U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  13. Detection of illicit HEU production in gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants using neutron counting techniques on product cylinders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Freeman, Corey R.; Geist, William H.

    2010-01-01

    Innovative and novel safeguards approaches are needed for nuclear energy to meet global energy needs without the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. Part of these efforts will include creating verification techniques that can monitor uranium enrichment facilities for illicit production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). Passive nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques will be critical in preventing illicit HEU production because NDA offers the possibility of continuous and unattended monitoring capabilities with limited impact on facility operations. Gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) are commonly used to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) for reactor fuel. In a GCEP, gaseous UF 6 spins at high velocities in centrifuges to separate the molecules containing 238 U from those containing the lighter 235 U. Unfortunately, the process for creating LEU is inherently the same as HEU, creating a proliferation concern. Insuring that GCEPs are producing declared enrichments poses many difficult challenges. In a GCEP, large cascade halls operating thousands of centrifuges work together to enrich the uranium which makes effective monitoring of the cascade hall economically prohibitive and invasive to plant operations. However, the enriched uranium exiting the cascade hall fills product cylinders where the UF 6 gas sublimes and condenses for easier storage and transportation. These product cylinders hold large quantities of enriched uranium, offering a strong signal for NDA measurement. Neutrons have a large penetrability through materials making their use advantageous compared to gamma techniques where the signal is easily attenuated. One proposed technique for detecting HEU production in a GCEP is using neutron coincidence counting at the product cylinder take off stations. This paper discusses findings from Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) code simulations that examine the feasibility of such a detector.

  14. Approach to IAEA material-balance verification at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gordon, D.M.; Sanborn, J.B.; Younkin, J.M.; DeVito, V.J.

    1983-01-01

    This paper describes a potential approach by which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) might verify the nuclear-material balance at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP). The strategy makes use of the attributes and variables measurement verification approach, whereby the IAEA would perform independent measurements on a randomly selected subset of the items comprising the U-235 flows and inventories at the plant. In addition, the MUF-D statistic is used as the test statistic for the detection of diversion. The paper includes descriptions of the potential verification activities, as well as calculations of: (1) attributes and variables sample sizes for the various strata, (2) standard deviations of the relevant test statistics, and (3) the detection sensitivity which the IAEA might achieve by this verification strategy at GCEP

  15. Long-term evaluation of fluoroelastomer O-rings in UF6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russell, R.G.; Otey, M.G.; Dippo, G.L.

    1986-01-01

    A major component in the gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) was fluoroelastomer O-rings, which were used to seal the uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) gas system. A program utilizing accelerated test conditions was used to help identify the best material out of four selected candidates and to predict the service life of these materials at GCEP conditions. The tests included accelerated temperatures, mechanical stress, and UF 6 exposure. Data were evaluated using the Newman--Keuls 1 ranking system to identify the best material and a zero-order reaction rate equation to help predict service life. This presentation includes a description of the test facility, the materials tested, the types of tests, objectives of the study, service life predictions, and conclusions. The O-rings are predicted to last approx. 30 years, and a high-molecular-weight polymer had the best performance ranking

  16. Over facility design description for the CPDF [Centrifuge Plant Demonstration Facility]: SDD-1 [System Design Description

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-04-01

    The Centrifuge Plant Demonstration Facility (CPDF) is an essential part of the continuing development of first-production-plant centrifuge technology that will integrate centrifuge machines into a process and enrichment plant design. The CPDF will provide facilities for testing and continued development of a unit cascade in direct support of the commercial Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP). The basic cascade-oriented equipment, feed, withdrawal, drive system, process piping, utility piping, and other auxiliary and support equipment will be tested in an operating configuration that represents, to the extent possible, GCEP arrangement and operating conditions. The objective will be to demonstrate procedures for production cascade installation, start-up, operation, and maintenance, and to provide proof of overall cascade and associated system design, construction, and operating and maintenance concepts. To the maximum possible extent, all equipment for the CPDF will be procured from commercial sources. Centrifuges will be procured from industry using government-supplied specifications and drawings. The existing Component Preparation Laboratory (CPL) located near the CPDF site will be used for centrifuge component receiving, inspection, assembly, and qualification testing of pre-production test machines. Later in the test program, samples of production machines planned for use in the GCEP will be tested in the CPDF

  17. FEMO, A FLOW AND ENRICHMENT MONITOR FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AT A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gunning, John E.; Laughter, Mark D.; March-Leuba, Jose A.

    2008-01-01

    A number of countries have received construction licenses or are contemplating the construction of large-capacity gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The capability to independently verify nuclear material flows is a key component of international safeguards approaches, and the IAEA does not currently have an approved method to continuously monitor the mass flow of 235U in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas streams. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating the development of a flow and enrichment monitor, or FEMO, based on an existing blend-down monitoring system (BDMS). The BDMS was designed to continuously monitor both 235U mass flow and enrichment of UF6 streams at the low pressures similar to those which exists at GCEPs. BDMSs have been installed at three sites-the first unit has operated successfully in an unattended environment for approximately 10 years. To be acceptable to GCEP operators, it is essential that the instrument be installed and maintained without interrupting operations. A means to continuously verify flow as is proposed by FEMO will likely be needed to monitor safeguards at large-capacity plants. This will enable the safeguards effectiveness that currently exists at smaller plants to be maintained at the larger facilities and also has the potential to reduce labor costs associated with inspections at current and future plants. This paper describes the FEMO design requirements, operating capabilities, and development work required before field demonstration.

  18. UF6 Density and Mass Flow Measurements for Enrichment Plants using Acoustic Techniques

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Good, Morris S.; Smith, Leon E.; Warren, Glen A.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep; Roy, Surajit; Moran, Traci L.; Denslow, Kayte M.; Longoni, Gianluca

    2017-09-01

    A key enabling capability for enrichment plant safeguards being considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is high-accuracy, noninvasive, unattended measurement of UF6 gas density and mass flow rate. Acoustic techniques are currently used to noninvasively monitor gas flow in industrial applications; however, the operating pressures at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are roughly two orders magnitude below the capabilities of commercial instrumentation. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is refining acoustic techniques for estimating density and mass flow rate of UF6 gas in scenarios typical of GCEPs, with the goal of achieving 1% measurement accuracy. Proof-of-concept laboratory measurements using a surrogate gas for UF6 have demonstrated signatures sensitive to gas density at low operating pressures such as 10–50 Torr, which were observed over the background acoustic interference. Current efforts involve developing a test bed for conducting acoustic measurements on flowing SF6 gas at representative flow rates and pressures to ascertain the viability of conducting gas flow measurements under these conditions. Density and flow measurements will be conducted to support the evaluation. If successful, the approach could enable an unattended, noninvasive approach to measure mass flow in unit header pipes of GCEPs.

  19. In-Born Radio Frequency Identification Devices for Safeguards Use at Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, R.; Rosenthal, M.

    2009-01-01

    Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector's efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the 'Option 4' safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted by Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo's paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/ or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented.

  20. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whitaker, Jr., James [ORNL; Garner, James R [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL; Lockwood, Dunbar [U.S. Department of Energy, NNSA; Gilligan, Kimberly V [ORNL; Younkin, James R [ORNL; Hooper, David A [ORNL; Henkel, James J [ORNL; Krichinsky, Alan M [ORNL

    2011-01-01

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  1. Contributions of co-curricular summer research programs to my professional growth

    Science.gov (United States)

    Moore, K. D.

    2014-12-01

    The co-curricular summer research program, in which I was involved over three summers as an undergraduate student, greatly benefited me. In this paper I will briefly describe the program and how the experience contributed to my value and growth. The U.S. Department of Energy operated the Global Change Education Program (GCEP), from 1999-2013, as an outreach to both undergraduate and graduate students. Its goals were to: provide students with hands-on research experience in a one-on-one setting with leaders in global change fields, encourage undergraduate students to enter graduate school, and increase the number of high quality U.S. scientists. I took part in GCEP as a Summer Undergraduate Research Experience (SURE) Fellow. Each Fellow was teamed with a scientist to conduct research over the summer. I spent one summer at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, WA working with Dr. William Shaw. The next two summers I spent working at Aerodyne Research, Inc. in Billerica, MA with Dr. Leah Williams. My experiences as a SURE Fellow have benefitted me in many ways. The research presentations, required of SURE Fellows, helped to improve my presentation skills. The GCEP workshops expanded the scope of my knowledge about global change impacts at all scales. I was involved in two large, collaborative field studies, which provided experiences and examples that have helped me lead my own field studies. I took part in well-functioning research teams, helping me see the value of open communication in collaborative work. My critical and analytical thinking abilities were continually honed. My problem solving skills were challenged in laboratory and field work. I worked with talented professionals and students that are now part of my professional network. My contributions resulted in being a coauthor on two peer-reviewed publications. I was able to experience research teams outside of academia, which included government and private sectors. The time spent as a SURE

  2. Systems approach used in the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rooks, W.A. Jr.

    1982-01-01

    A requirement exists for effective and efficient transfer of technical knowledge from the design engineering team to the production work force. Performance-Based Training (PBT) is a systematic approach to the design, development, and implementation of technical training. This approach has been successfully used by the US Armed Forces, industry, and other organizations. The advantages of the PBT approach are: cost-effectiveness (lowest life-cycle training cost), learning effectiveness, reduced implementation time, and ease of administration. The PBT process comprises five distinctive and rigorous phases: Analysis of Job Performance, Design of Instructional Strategy, Development of Training Materials and Instructional Media, Validation of Materials and Media, and Implementation of the Instructional Program. Examples from the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) are used to illustrate the application of PBT

  3. Systems approach used in the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rooks, W.A. Jr.

    1982-01-01

    A requirement exists for effective and efficient transfer of technical knowledge from the design engineering team to the production work force. Performance-Based Training (PBT) is a systematic approach to the design, development, and implementation of technical training. This approach has been successfully used by the US Armed Forces, industry, and other organizations. The advantages of the PBT approach are: cost-effectiveness (lowest life-cycle training cost), learning effectiveness, reduced implementation time, and ease of administration. The PBT process comprises five distinctive and rigorous phases: Analysis of Job Performance, Design of Instructional Strategy, Development of Training Materials and Instructional Media, Validation of Materials and Media, and Implementation of the Instructional Program. Examples from the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) are used to illustrate the application of PBT.

  4. Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanuch, C.; Whitaker, M.; Lockwood, D.; Boyer, B.

    2013-01-01

    This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF 6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

  5. Unattended Monitoring of HEU Production in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants using Automated Aerosol Collection and Laser-based Enrichment Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anheier, Norman C.; Bushaw, Bruce A.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear power is enjoying rapid growth as government energy policies and public demand shift toward low carbon energy production. Pivotal to the global nuclear power renaissance is the development and deployment of robust safeguards instrumentation that allows the limited resources of the IAEA to keep pace with the expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle. Undeclared production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) remains a primary proliferation concern for modern gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), due to their massive separative work unit (SWU) processing power and comparably short cascade equilibrium timescale. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing an unattended safeguards instrument, combining continuous aerosol particulate collection with uranium isotope assay, to provide timely detection of HEU production within a GCEP. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulates, followed by laser spectroscopy to characterize the uranium enrichment level. Our prior investigation demonstrated single-shot detection sensitivity approaching the femtogram range and relative isotope ratio uncertainty better than 10% using gadolinium as a surrogate for uranium. In this paper we present measurement results on standard samples containing traces of depleted, natural, and low enriched uranium, as well as measurements on aerodynamic size uranium particles mixed in background materials (e.g., dust, minerals, soils). Improvements and optimizations in the detection electronics, signal timing, calibration, and laser alignment have lead to significant improvements in detection sensitivity and enrichment accuracy, contributing to an overall reduction in the false alarm probability. The sample substrate media was also found to play a significant role in facilitating laser-induced vaporization and the production of energetic plasma conditions, resulting in ablation optimization and further improvements in the isotope abundance sensitivity.

  6. From the Lab to the real world : sources of error in UF6 gas enrichment monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lombardi, Marcie L.

    2012-01-01

    Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities is a serious concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards methods have changed over the years, most recently switching to an improved safeguards model that calls for new technologies to help keep up with the increasing size and complexity of today's gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). One of the primary goals of the IAEA is to detect the production of uranium at levels greater than those an enrichment facility may have declared. In order to accomplish this goal, new enrichment monitors need to be as accurate as possible. This dissertation will look at the Advanced Enrichment Monitor (AEM), a new enrichment monitor designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Specifically explored are various factors that could potentially contribute to errors in a final enrichment determination delivered by the AEM. There are many factors that can cause errors in the determination of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) gas enrichment, especially during the period when the enrichment is being measured in an operating GCEP. To measure enrichment using the AEM, a passive 186-keV (kiloelectronvolt) measurement is used to determine the 235 U content in the gas, and a transmission measurement or a gas pressure reading is used to determine the total uranium content. A transmission spectrum is generated using an x-ray tube and a 'notch' filter. In this dissertation, changes that could occur in the detection efficiency and the transmission errors that could result from variations in pipe-wall thickness will be explored. Additional factors that could contribute to errors in enrichment measurement will also be examined, including changes in the gas pressure, ambient and UF 6 temperature, instrumental errors, and the effects of uranium deposits on the inside of the pipe walls will be considered. The sensitivity of the enrichment calculation to these various parameters will then be evaluated. Previously, UF 6 gas enrichment

  7. From the Lab to the real world : sources of error in UF {sub 6} gas enrichment monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lombardi, Marcie L.

    2012-03-01

    Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities is a serious concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards methods have changed over the years, most recently switching to an improved safeguards model that calls for new technologies to help keep up with the increasing size and complexity of today’s gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). One of the primary goals of the IAEA is to detect the production of uranium at levels greater than those an enrichment facility may have declared. In order to accomplish this goal, new enrichment monitors need to be as accurate as possible. This dissertation will look at the Advanced Enrichment Monitor (AEM), a new enrichment monitor designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Specifically explored are various factors that could potentially contribute to errors in a final enrichment determination delivered by the AEM. There are many factors that can cause errors in the determination of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) gas enrichment, especially during the period when the enrichment is being measured in an operating GCEP. To measure enrichment using the AEM, a passive 186-keV (kiloelectronvolt) measurement is used to determine the {sup 235}U content in the gas, and a transmission measurement or a gas pressure reading is used to determine the total uranium content. A transmission spectrum is generated using an x-ray tube and a “notch” filter. In this dissertation, changes that could occur in the detection efficiency and the transmission errors that could result from variations in pipe-wall thickness will be explored. Additional factors that could contribute to errors in enrichment measurement will also be examined, including changes in the gas pressure, ambient and UF{sub 6} temperature, instrumental errors, and the effects of uranium deposits on the inside of the pipe walls will be considered. The sensitivity of the enrichment calculation to these various parameters will then be evaluated. Previously, UF

  8. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.

    2007-01-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique

  9. The Advanced Gas Centrifuge program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Riepe, R.

    1984-01-01

    Although the gas centrifuge process for uranium enrichment is often referred to as a ''new technology,'' it has been under development for approximately 25 years to bring it to its current state of deployment. Centrifuges are now being installed in a new gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) at Portsmouth, Ohio. The objective of this new plant was to provide additional U.S. uranium enrichment capacity at a production cost comparable to the U.S. diffusion process but requiring much less power per separative work unit (SWU) produced. The current, commercial scale centrifuge technology being installed meets that objective. The objective for new U.S. enrichment capacity has changed. The objective is not to provide more SWUs but to provide cheaper SWUs. The objective is to make the U.S. uranium enrichment enterprise competitive on the international market. Where the U.S. at one time supplied virtually all of the free world SWU demand, the U.S. market share has now dropped to approximately 35% of the foreign free world market. The Advanced Gas Centrifuge (AGC) program provides an avenue for making the U.S. the economically attractive, reliable enrichment supplier

  10. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOE, J.

    2007-01-01

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders

  11. Experimental determination of the thickness of aluminum cascade pipes in the presence of UF{sub 6} gas during enrichment measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lombardi, M.L., E-mail: lombardi@lanl.gov [Los Alamos National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1663, Los Alamos NM 87545 (United States); Favalli, A.; Goda, J.M.; Ianakiev, K.D.; MacArthur, D.W.; Moss, C.E. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1663, Los Alamos NM 87545 (United States)

    2012-04-21

    We present a method of determining the wall thickness of a pipe in a Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) when an empty pipe measurement is not feasible. Our method uses an X-ray tube for transmission measurements and a lanthanum bromide (LaBr{sub 3}) scintillation detector on the opposite side of the pipe. Two filters, molybdenum (K-edge 20.0 keV) and palladium (K-edge 24.35 keV) are used to transform the bremsstrahlung spectra produced by the X-ray tube into more useful, sharply peaked, spectra. The maximum energies of the peaks are determined by the K-edges of the filters. The attenuation properties of the uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) gas allow us to determine wall thickness by looking at the ratio of selected regions of interest (ROIs) of the Mo and Pd transmitted spectra. While the attenuation factor at these two transmission energies in the UF{sub 6} gas is nearly equal, attenuation in the aluminum pipe wall at these two energies differs by a factor of about 60. This difference allows measurement of attenuation in the pipe independent of attenuation in the UF{sub 6} gas. Feasibility studies were performed using analytical calculations, and filter thicknesses were optimized. In order to experimentally validate our attenuation measurement method, a UF{sub 6} source with variable enrichment and pipe thickness was built. We describe the experimental procedure used to verify our previous calculations and present recent results.

  12. A Radiation-Triggered Surveillance System for UF6 Cylinder Monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Curtis, Michael M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Myjak, Mitchell J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2016-09-23

    This report provides background information and representative scenarios for testing a prototype radiation-triggered surveillance system at an operating facility that handles uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders. The safeguards objective is to trigger cameras using radiation, or radiation and motion, rather than motion alone, to reduce significantly the number of image files generated by a motion-triggered system. The authors recommend the use of radiation-triggered surveillance at all facilities where cylinder paths are heavily traversed by personnel. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has begun using surveillance cameras in the feed and withdrawal areas of gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The cameras generate imagery using elapsed time or motion, but this creates problems in areas occupied 24/7 by personnel. Either motion-or-interval-based triggering generates thousands of review files over the course of a month. Since inspectors must review the files to verify operator material-flow-declarations, a plethora of files significantly extends the review process. The primary advantage of radiation-triggered surveillance is the opportunity to obtain full-time cylinder throughput verification versus what presently amounts to part-time verification. Cost savings should be substantial, as the IAEA presently uses frequent unannounced inspections to verify cylinder-throughput declarations. The use of radiation-triggered surveillance allows the IAEA to implement less frequent unannounced inspections for the purpose of flow verification, but its principal advantage is significantly shorter and more effective inspector video reviews.

  13. Improving accuracy and reliability of 186-keV measurements for unattended enrichment monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ianakiev, Kiril D.; Boyer, Brian D.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Moss, Cal E.; Goda, Joetta M.; Favalli, Andrea; Lombardi, Marcie; Paffet, Mark T.; Hill, Thomas R.; MacArthur, Duncan W.; Smith, Morag K.

    2010-01-01

    Improving the quality of safeguards measurements at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs), whilst reducing the inspection effort, is an important objective given the number of existing and new plants that need to be safeguarded. A useful tool in many safeguards approaches is the on-line monitoring of enrichment in process pipes. One aspect of this measurement is a simple, reliable and precise passive measurement of the 186-keV line from 235 U. (The other information required is the amount of gas in the pipe. This can be obtained by transmission measurements or pressure measurements). In this paper we describe our research efforts towards such a passive measurement system. The system includes redundant measurements of the 186-keV line from the gas and separately from the wall deposits. The design also includes measures to reduce the effect of the potentially important background. Such an approach would practically eliminate false alarms and can maintain the operation of the system even with a hardware malfunction in one of the channels. The work involves Monte Carlo modeling and the construction of a proof-of-principle prototype. We will carry out experimental tests with UF 6 gas in pipes with and without deposits in order to demonstrate the deposit correction.

  14. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.

    2009-01-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be

  15. Uranium enrichment plans and policies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwennesen, J.L.

    1981-01-01

    Significant progress has been made in US efforts to expand its enrichment capacity. The Cascade Improvement Program (CIP) and Cascade Upgrading Program (CUP) are now complete at Oak Ridge and Paducah and almost complete at Portsmouth. Considerable progress has also been made in constructing the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP), and physical construction of the first process building is well under way. Current plans are to have two process buildings on-line by 1989 with the remaining six buildings to be added sequentially as needed to meet demand. The status of DOE enrichment services contracts is essentially unchanged from that reported at last year's seminar. The OUEA latest forecast of nuclear power growth, however, is considerably lower than reported last year, although a leveling trend is becoming apparent. The Variable Tails Assay Option (VTAO) of the AFC contract was made available for the third time for FY 1983. The DOE inventories of natural uranium still remain high. The Department of Energy will dispose of this material by using it for Government programs and for enrichment plant operations. It appears that Government inventories of uranium are adequate through at least the mid-1990s. It remains DOE policy not to dispose of its natural uranium stocks through direct sales in the marketplace, except for very small quantities or if an emergency situation would exist and all reasonable attempts had been made, without success, to obtain natural uranium from commercial sources. Finally, with regard to DOE plans on future transaction tails assays, it still appears likely that the current 0.20 percent uranium-235 reference tails assay will be maintained until well into the 1990s, at which time it might be increased up to 0.25 percent uranium-235

  16. Advanced isotope separation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The Study Group briefly reviewed the technical status of the three Advanced Isotope Separation (AIS) processes. It also reviewed the evaluation work that has been carried out by DOE's Process Evaluation Board (PEB) and the Union Carbide Corporation-Nuclear Division (UCCND). The Study Group briefly reviewed a recent draft assessment made for DOE staff of the nonproliferation implications of the AIS technologies. The staff also very briefly summarized the status of GCEP and Advanced Centrifuge development. The Study Group concluded that: (1) there has not been sufficient progress to provide a firm scientific, technical or economic basis on which to select one of the three competing AIS processes for full-scale engineering development at this time; and (2) however, should budgetary restraints or other factors force such a selection, we believe that the evaluation process that is being carried out by the PEB provides the best basis available for making a decision. The Study Group recommended that: (1) any decisions on AIS processes should include a comparison with gas centrifuge processes, and should not be made independently from the plutonium isotope program; (2) in evaluating the various enrichment processes, all applicable costs (including R and D and sales overhead) and an appropriate discounting approach should be included in order to make comparisons on a private industry basis; (3) if the three AIS programs continue with limited resources, the work should be reoriented to focus only on the most pressing technical problems; and (4) if a decision is made to develop the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation process, the solid collector option should be pursued in parallel to alleviate the potential program impact of liquid collector thermal control problems

  17. On-Line Enrichment Monitor for UF{sub 6} Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ianakiev, K. D.; Boyer, B.; Favalli, A.; Goda, J. M.; Hill, T.; Keller, C.; Lombardi, M.; Paffett, M.; MacArthur, D. W.; McCluskey, C.; Moss, C. E.; Parker, R.; Smith, M. K.; Swinhoe, M. T. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos (United States)

    2012-06-15

    This paper is a continuation of the Advanced Enrichment Monitoring Technology for UF{sub 6} Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) work, presented in the 2010 IAEA Safeguards Symposium. Here we will present the system architecture for a planned side-by-side field trial test of passive (186-keV line spectroscopy and pressure-based correction for UF{sub 6} gas density) and active (186-keV line spectroscopy and transmission measurement based correction for UF{sub 6} gas density) enrichment monitoring systems in URENCO's enrichment plant in Capenhurst. Because the pressure and transmission measurements of UF{sub 6} are complementary, additional information on the importance of the presence of light gases and the UF{sub 6} gas temperature can be obtained by cross-correlation between simultaneous measurements of transmission, pressure and 186-keV intensity. We will discuss the calibration issues and performance in the context of accurate, on-line enrichment measurement. It is hoped that a simple and accurate on-line enrichment monitor can be built using the UF{sub 6} gas pressure provided by the Operator, based on online mass spectrometer calibration, assuming a negligible (a small fraction of percent) contribution of wall deposits. Unaccounted-for wall deposits present at the initial calibration will lead to unwanted sensitivity to changes in theUF{sub 6} gas pressure and thus to error in the enrichment results. Because the accumulated deposits in the cascade header pipe have been identified as an issue for Go/No Go measurements with the Cascade Header Enrichment Monitor (CHEM) and Continuous Enrichment Monitor (CEMO), it is important to explore their effect. Therefore we present the expected uncertainty on enrichment measurements obtained by propagating the errors introduced by deposits, gas density, etc. and will discuss the options for a deposit correction during initial calibration of an On-Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM).

  18. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R.; Morgan, James B.; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L.

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  19. ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING USING LOCATION SPECIFIC AIR MONITORING IN BULK HANDLING FACILITIES

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sexton, L.; Hanks, D.; Degange, J.; Brant, H.; Hall, G.; Cable-Dunlap, P.; Anderson, B.

    2011-06-07

    Since the introduction of safeguards strengthening measures approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (1992-1997), international nuclear safeguards inspectors have been able to utilize environmental sampling (ES) (e.g. deposited particulates, air, water, vegetation, sediments, soil and biota) in their safeguarding approaches at bulk uranium/plutonium handling facilities. Enhancements of environmental sampling techniques used by the IAEA in drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities will soon be able to take advantage of a recent step change improvement in the gathering and analysis of air samples at these facilities. Location specific air monitoring feasibility tests have been performed with excellent results in determining attribute and isotopic composition of chemical elements present in an actual test-bed sample. Isotopic analysis of collected particles from an Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) collection, was performed with the standard bulk sampling protocol used throughout the IAEA network of analytical laboratories (NWAL). The results yielded bulk isotopic values expected for the operations. Advanced designs of air monitoring instruments such as the ACE may be used in gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEP) to detect the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or enrichments not declared by a State. Researchers at Savannah River National Laboratory in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratory are developing the next generation of ES equipment for air grab and constant samples that could become an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. Location specific air monitoring to be used to establish a baseline environmental signature of a particular facility employed for comparison of consistencies in declared operations will be described in this paper. Implementation of air monitoring will be contrasted against the use of smear

  20. On Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) UF6 Tests for 1.5" Sch40 SS Pipe, Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    March-Leuba, José A. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Garner, Jim [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Younkin, Jim [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Simmons, Darrell W. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2016-01-01

    As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants while working within budgetary constraints. The “Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants” (GCEPs) developed by the IAEA Division of Concepts and Planning in June 2006, defines the three primary Safeguards objectives to be the timely detection of: 1) diversion of significant quantities of natural (NU), depleted (DU) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) from declared plant flow, 2) facility misuse to produce undeclared LEU product from undeclared feed, and 3) facility misuse to produce enrichments higher than the declared maximum, in particular, highly enriched uranium (HEU). The ability to continuously and independently (i.e. with a minimum of information from the facility operator) monitor not only the uranium mass balance but also the 235U mass balance in the facility could help support all three verification objectives described above. Two key capabilities required to achieve an independent and accurate material balance are 1) continuous, unattended monitoring of in-process UF6 and 2) monitoring of cylinders entering and leaving the facility. The continuous monitoring of in-process UF6 would rely on a combination of load-cell monitoring of the cylinders at the feed and withdrawal stations, online monitoring of gas enrichment, and a high-accuracy net weight measurement of the cylinder contents. The Online Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) is the instrument that would continuously measure the time-dependent relative uranium enrichment, E(t), in weight percent 235U, of the gas filling or being withdrawn from the cylinders. The OLEM design concept combines gamma-ray spectrometry using a collimated NaI(Tl) detector with gas pressure and temperature data to calculate the enrichment of the UF6

  1. Extending World Health Organization weight-for-age reference curves to older children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rodd, Celia; Metzger, Daniel L; Sharma, Atul

    2014-02-03

    charts is available at the CPEG web site (http://cpeg-gcep.net).

  2. Isotope Enrichment Detection by Laser Ablation - Laser Absorption Spectrometry: Automated Environmental Sampling and Laser-Based Analysis for HEU Detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anheier, Norman C.; Bushaw, Bruce A.

    2010-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear power, and consequently the uranium enrichment industry, requires the development of new safeguards technology to mitigate proliferation risks. Current enrichment monitoring instruments exist that provide only yes/no detection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) production. More accurate accountancy measurements are typically restricted to gamma-ray and weight measurements taken in cylinder storage yards. Analysis of environmental and cylinder content samples have much higher effectiveness, but this approach requires onsite sampling, shipping, and time-consuming laboratory analysis and reporting. Given that large modern gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) can quickly produce a significant quantity (SQ ) of HEU, these limitations in verification suggest the need for more timely detection of potential facility misuse. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing an unattended safeguards instrument concept, combining continuous aerosol particulate collection with uranium isotope assay, to provide timely analysis of enrichment levels within low enriched uranium facilities. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulate samples, followed by wavelength tuned laser diode spectroscopy to characterize the uranium isotopic ratio through subtle differences in atomic absorption wavelengths. Environmental sampling (ES) media from an integrated aerosol collector is introduced into a small, reduced pressure chamber, where a focused pulsed laser vaporizes material from a 10 to 20-(micro)m diameter spot of the surface of the sampling media. The plume of ejected material begins as high-temperature plasma that yields ions and atoms, as well as molecules and molecular ions. We concentrate on the plume of atomic vapor that remains after the plasma has expanded and then cooled by the surrounding cover gas. Tunable diode lasers are directed through this plume and each isotope is detected by monitoring absorbance

  3. CO2 exsolution - challenges and opportunities in subsurface flow management

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zuo, Lin; Benson, Sally

    2014-05-01

    for storage security. Falta et al. [2013] show that if carbonated brine migrates upwards and exsolution occurs, brine migration would be greatly reduced and limited by the presence of exsolved CO2 and the consequent low relatively permeability to brine. Similarly, if an exsolved CO2 phase were to evolve in seals, for example, after CO2 injection stops, the effect would be to reduce the permeability to brine and the CO2 would have very low mobility. This flow blocking effect is also studied with water/oil/CO2 [Zuo et al., 2013]. Experiments show that exsolved CO2 performs as a secondary residual phase in porous media that effectively blocks established water flow paths and deviates water to residual oil zones, thereby increasing recovery. Overall, our studies suggest that CO2 exsolution provides an opportunity for mobility control in subsurface processes. However, the lack of simulation capability that accounts for differences between gas injection and gas exsolution creates challenges for modeling and hence, designing studies to exploit the mobility reduction capabilities of CO2 exsolution. Using traditional drainage multiphase flow parameterization in simulations involving exsolution will lead to large errors in transport rates. Development of process dependent parameterizations of multiphase flow properties will be a key next step and will help to unlock the benefits from gas exsolution. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This work is funded by the Global Climate and Energy Project (GCEP) at Stanford University. This work was also supported by U.S. EPA, Science To Achieve Results (STAR) Program, Grant #: 834383, 2010-2012. REFERENCES Falta, R., L. Zuo and S.M. Benson (2013). Migration of exsolved CO2 following depressurization of saturated brines. Journal of Greenhouse Gas Science and Technology, 3(6), 503-515. Zuo, L., S.C.M. Krevor, R.W. Falta, and S.M. Benson (2012). An experimental study of CO2 exsolution and relative permeability measurements during CO2 saturated water