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Sample records for gcep

  1. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Reimold, Benjamin A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ward, Steven L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Howell, John [GLASGOW UNIV.

    2010-09-13

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  2. 77 FR 17095 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Global Climate...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-03-23

    ... Climate and Energy Project Notice is hereby given that, on February 17, 2012, pursuant to Section 6(a) of...''), Global Climate and Energy Project (``GCEP'') has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership, nature...

  3. Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian David [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Erpenbeck, Heather H [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Karen A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Swinhoe, Martyn T [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Ianakiev, Kiril [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Marlow, Johnna B [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-04-05

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

  4. In-Born Radio Frequency Identification Devices for Safeguards Use at Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ward,R.; Rosenthal,M.

    2009-07-12

    Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector"s efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the "Option 4" safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted by Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo’s paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/ or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented.

  5. Benchmark Gamma Spectroscopy Measurements of Uranium Hexafluoride in Aluminmum Pipe with a Sodium Iodide Detector

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    March-Leuba, Jose A [ORNL; Uckan, Taner [ORNL; Gunning, John E [ORNL; Brukiewa, Patrick D [ORNL; Upadhyaya, Belle R [ORNL; Revis, Stephen M [ORNL

    2010-01-01

    The expected increased demand in fuel for nuclear power plants, combined with the fact that a significant portion of the current supply from the blend down of weapons-source material will soon be coming to an end, has led to the need for new sources of enriched uranium for nuclear fuel. As a result, a number of countries have announced plans, or are currently building, gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) to supply this material. GCEPs have the potential to produce uranium at enrichments above the level necessary for nuclear fuel purposes-enrichments that make the uranium potentially usable for nuclear weapons. As a result, there is a critical need to monitor these facilities to ensure that nuclear material is not inappropriately enriched or diverted for unintended use. Significant advances have been made in instrument capability since the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring methods were developed. In numerous cases, advances have been made in other fields that have the potential, with modest development, to be applied in safeguards applications at enrichment facilities. A particular example of one of these advances is the flow and enrichment monitor (FEMO). (See Gunning, J. E. et al., 'FEMO: A Flow and Enrichment Monitor for Verifying Compliance with International Safeguards Requirements at a Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facility,' Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Facility Operations - Safeguards Interface. Portland, Oregon, March 30-April 4th, 2008.) The FEMO is a conceptual instrument capable of continuously measuring, unattended, the enrichment and mass flow of {sup 235}U in pipes at a GCEP, and consequently increase the probability that the potential production of HEU and/or diversion of fissile material will be detected. The FEMO requires no piping penetrations and can be installed on pipes containing the flow of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) at a GCEP. This FEMO consists of separate parts, a flow

  6. Contributions of co-curricular summer research programs to my professional growth

    Science.gov (United States)

    Moore, K. D.

    2014-12-01

    The co-curricular summer research program, in which I was involved over three summers as an undergraduate student, greatly benefited me. In this paper I will briefly describe the program and how the experience contributed to my value and growth. The U.S. Department of Energy operated the Global Change Education Program (GCEP), from 1999-2013, as an outreach to both undergraduate and graduate students. Its goals were to: provide students with hands-on research experience in a one-on-one setting with leaders in global change fields, encourage undergraduate students to enter graduate school, and increase the number of high quality U.S. scientists. I took part in GCEP as a Summer Undergraduate Research Experience (SURE) Fellow. Each Fellow was teamed with a scientist to conduct research over the summer. I spent one summer at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, WA working with Dr. William Shaw. The next two summers I spent working at Aerodyne Research, Inc. in Billerica, MA with Dr. Leah Williams. My experiences as a SURE Fellow have benefitted me in many ways. The research presentations, required of SURE Fellows, helped to improve my presentation skills. The GCEP workshops expanded the scope of my knowledge about global change impacts at all scales. I was involved in two large, collaborative field studies, which provided experiences and examples that have helped me lead my own field studies. I took part in well-functioning research teams, helping me see the value of open communication in collaborative work. My critical and analytical thinking abilities were continually honed. My problem solving skills were challenged in laboratory and field work. I worked with talented professionals and students that are now part of my professional network. My contributions resulted in being a coauthor on two peer-reviewed publications. I was able to experience research teams outside of academia, which included government and private sectors. The time spent as a SURE

  7. Systems approach used in the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rooks, W.A. Jr.

    1982-01-01

    A requirement exists for effective and efficient transfer of technical knowledge from the design engineering team to the production work force. Performance-Based Training (PBT) is a systematic approach to the design, development, and implementation of technical training. This approach has been successfully used by the US Armed Forces, industry, and other organizations. The advantages of the PBT approach are: cost-effectiveness (lowest life-cycle training cost), learning effectiveness, reduced implementation time, and ease of administration. The PBT process comprises five distinctive and rigorous phases: Analysis of Job Performance, Design of Instructional Strategy, Development of Training Materials and Instructional Media, Validation of Materials and Media, and Implementation of the Instructional Program. Examples from the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) are used to illustrate the application of PBT.

  8. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL

    2009-04-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be

  9. Application of Condition-Based Monitoring Techniques for Remote Monitoring of a Simulated Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hooper, David A [ORNL; Henkel, James J [ORNL; Whitaker, Michael [ORNL

    2012-01-01

    This paper presents research into the adaptation of monitoring techniques from maintainability and reliability (M&R) engineering for remote unattended monitoring of gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) for international safeguards. Two categories of techniques are discussed: the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) for diagnostic monitoring, and sequential Monte Carlo (SMC or, more commonly, particle filtering ) for prognostic monitoring. Development and testing of the application of condition-based monitoring (CBM) techniques was performed on the Oak Ridge Mock Feed and Withdrawal (F&W) facility as a proof of principle. CBM techniques have been extensively developed for M&R assessment of physical processes, such as manufacturing and power plants. These techniques are normally used to locate and diagnose the effects of mechanical degradation of equipment to aid in planning of maintenance and repair cycles. In a safeguards environment, however, the goal is not to identify mechanical deterioration, but to detect and diagnose (and potentially predict) attempts to circumvent normal, declared facility operations, such as through protracted diversion of enriched material. The CBM techniques are first explained from the traditional perspective of maintenance and reliability engineering. The adaptation of CBM techniques to inspector monitoring is then discussed, focusing on the unique challenges of decision-based effects rather than equipment degradation effects. These techniques are then applied to the Oak Ridge Mock F&W facility a water-based physical simulation of a material feed and withdrawal process used at enrichment plants that is used to develop and test online monitoring techniques for fully information-driven safeguards of GCEPs. Advantages and limitations of the CBM approach to online monitoring are discussed, as well as the potential challenges of adapting CBM concepts to safeguards applications.

  10. Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Garner, James R [ORNL; Whitaker, J Michael [ORNL

    2015-01-01

    In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

  11. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL

    2007-11-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique

  12. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL

    2007-11-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique

  13. From the Lab to the real world : sources of error in UF {sub 6} gas enrichment monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lombardi, Marcie L.

    2012-03-01

    Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities is a serious concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards methods have changed over the years, most recently switching to an improved safeguards model that calls for new technologies to help keep up with the increasing size and complexity of today’s gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). One of the primary goals of the IAEA is to detect the production of uranium at levels greater than those an enrichment facility may have declared. In order to accomplish this goal, new enrichment monitors need to be as accurate as possible. This dissertation will look at the Advanced Enrichment Monitor (AEM), a new enrichment monitor designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Specifically explored are various factors that could potentially contribute to errors in a final enrichment determination delivered by the AEM. There are many factors that can cause errors in the determination of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) gas enrichment, especially during the period when the enrichment is being measured in an operating GCEP. To measure enrichment using the AEM, a passive 186-keV (kiloelectronvolt) measurement is used to determine the {sup 235}U content in the gas, and a transmission measurement or a gas pressure reading is used to determine the total uranium content. A transmission spectrum is generated using an x-ray tube and a “notch” filter. In this dissertation, changes that could occur in the detection efficiency and the transmission errors that could result from variations in pipe-wall thickness will be explored. Additional factors that could contribute to errors in enrichment measurement will also be examined, including changes in the gas pressure, ambient and UF{sub 6} temperature, instrumental errors, and the effects of uranium deposits on the inside of the pipe walls will be considered. The sensitivity of the enrichment calculation to these various parameters will then be evaluated. Previously, UF

  14. Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laughter, Mark D [ORNL

    2009-04-01

    It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be

  15. A Radiation-Triggered Surveillance System for UF6 Cylinder Monitoring

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Curtis, Michael M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Myjak, Mitchell J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2016-09-23

    This report provides background information and representative scenarios for testing a prototype radiation-triggered surveillance system at an operating facility that handles uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders. The safeguards objective is to trigger cameras using radiation, or radiation and motion, rather than motion alone, to reduce significantly the number of image files generated by a motion-triggered system. The authors recommend the use of radiation-triggered surveillance at all facilities where cylinder paths are heavily traversed by personnel. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has begun using surveillance cameras in the feed and withdrawal areas of gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The cameras generate imagery using elapsed time or motion, but this creates problems in areas occupied 24/7 by personnel. Either motion-or-interval-based triggering generates thousands of review files over the course of a month. Since inspectors must review the files to verify operator material-flow-declarations, a plethora of files significantly extends the review process. The primary advantage of radiation-triggered surveillance is the opportunity to obtain full-time cylinder throughput verification versus what presently amounts to part-time verification. Cost savings should be substantial, as the IAEA presently uses frequent unannounced inspections to verify cylinder-throughput declarations. The use of radiation-triggered surveillance allows the IAEA to implement less frequent unannounced inspections for the purpose of flow verification, but its principal advantage is significantly shorter and more effective inspector video reviews.

  16. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  17. Fine Mapping QTLs Affecting Milk Production Traits on BTA6 in Chinese Holstein with SNP Markers

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    LIU Rui; SUN Dong-xiao; WANG Ya-chun; YU Ying; ZHANG Yi; CHEN Hui-yong; ZHANG Qin; ZHANG Sheng-li; ZHANG Yuan

    2013-01-01

    Our previous studies demonstrated that the region around markers BMS470 and BMS1242 on BTA6 showed a linkage to 305-d milk yield and composition traits in the Chinese Holstein population. We herein focused on such narrow region to fine map milk production QTLs with 15 SNPs across 25 Mb with each SNP in 1 Mb within most regions in a Chinese Holstein population with daughter design. 1 449 Holstein cows and 11 sires were genotyped for such SNPs by using TaqMan probe and RFLP assays. Multipoint linkage analysis across family revealed a QTL affecting milk yield between PPARGC1A C4075T and SLC34A2 T1713C. Meanwhile, within family analysis found three milk yield QTLs (two in CR T60984131G-CEP135 C501T and one in PDLIM5 A106C-OPN T3907, a fat yield QTL in UGDH T1670C-CR T60984131G region, and two protein yield QTLs in TBC1D1 G501C-UGDH T1670C and PPARGC1A C4075T-SLC34A2 T1713C, respectively. Associations between aforementioned significant SNP markers and milk production traits were further implemented. We found significant associations of PPARGC1A C4075T, SLC34A2 T1713C with milk yield (P<0.05, P<0.01, P<0.01), UGDH T1670C, and CR T60984131G with fat yield (P<0.01, P<0.01), and PPARGC1A C4075T, SLC34A2 T1713C, UGDH T1670C and OPN T3907 with protein yield (P<0.01, P<0.01, P<0.01, P<0.01). Our findings implied that QTLs affecting milk production traits on BTA6 were pleictropism or multigenic effect and PPARGC1A and OPN may be the causal mutations behind milk production QTLs on BTA6 in the Chinese Holstein population.

  18. On Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) UF6 Tests for 1.5" Sch40 SS Pipe, Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    March-Leuba, José A. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Garner, Jim [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Younkin, Jim [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Simmons, Darrell W. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2016-01-01

    As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants while working within budgetary constraints. The “Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants” (GCEPs) developed by the IAEA Division of Concepts and Planning in June 2006, defines the three primary Safeguards objectives to be the timely detection of: 1) diversion of significant quantities of natural (NU), depleted (DU) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) from declared plant flow, 2) facility misuse to produce undeclared LEU product from undeclared feed, and 3) facility misuse to produce enrichments higher than the declared maximum, in particular, highly enriched uranium (HEU). The ability to continuously and independently (i.e. with a minimum of information from the facility operator) monitor not only the uranium mass balance but also the 235U mass balance in the facility could help support all three verification objectives described above. Two key capabilities required to achieve an independent and accurate material balance are 1) continuous, unattended monitoring of in-process UF6 and 2) monitoring of cylinders entering and leaving the facility. The continuous monitoring of in-process UF6 would rely on a combination of load-cell monitoring of the cylinders at the feed and withdrawal stations, online monitoring of gas enrichment, and a high-accuracy net weight measurement of the cylinder contents. The Online Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) is the instrument that would continuously measure the time-dependent relative uranium enrichment, E(t), in weight percent 235U, of the gas filling or being withdrawn from the cylinders. The OLEM design concept combines gamma-ray spectrometry using a collimated NaI(Tl) detector with gas pressure and temperature data to calculate the enrichment of the UF6

  19. CO2 exsolution - challenges and opportunities in subsurface flow management

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zuo, Lin; Benson, Sally

    2014-05-01

    for storage security. Falta et al. [2013] show that if carbonated brine migrates upwards and exsolution occurs, brine migration would be greatly reduced and limited by the presence of exsolved CO2 and the consequent low relatively permeability to brine. Similarly, if an exsolved CO2 phase were to evolve in seals, for example, after CO2 injection stops, the effect would be to reduce the permeability to brine and the CO2 would have very low mobility. This flow blocking effect is also studied with water/oil/CO2 [Zuo et al., 2013]. Experiments show that exsolved CO2 performs as a secondary residual phase in porous media that effectively blocks established water flow paths and deviates water to residual oil zones, thereby increasing recovery. Overall, our studies suggest that CO2 exsolution provides an opportunity for mobility control in subsurface processes. However, the lack of simulation capability that accounts for differences between gas injection and gas exsolution creates challenges for modeling and hence, designing studies to exploit the mobility reduction capabilities of CO2 exsolution. Using traditional drainage multiphase flow parameterization in simulations involving exsolution will lead to large errors in transport rates. Development of process dependent parameterizations of multiphase flow properties will be a key next step and will help to unlock the benefits from gas exsolution. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This work is funded by the Global Climate and Energy Project (GCEP) at Stanford University. This work was also supported by U.S. EPA, Science To Achieve Results (STAR) Program, Grant #: 834383, 2010-2012. REFERENCES Falta, R., L. Zuo and S.M. Benson (2013). Migration of exsolved CO2 following depressurization of saturated brines. Journal of Greenhouse Gas Science and Technology, 3(6), 503-515. Zuo, L., S.C.M. Krevor, R.W. Falta, and S.M. Benson (2012). An experimental study of CO2 exsolution and relative permeability measurements during CO2 saturated water