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Sample records for fuel disposal canister

  1. Design report of the canister for nuclear fuel disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.; Salo, J.P.

    1996-12-01

    The report provides a summary of the design of the canister for final disposal of nuclear fuel. The canister structure consists of a cylindrical massive nodular graphite cast iron insert covered by a 50 mm thick copper overlay. The capacity of the canister is 11 assemblies of BWR or VVER 440 fuel. The canister shall be tight with a high probability for about 100 000 years. The design basis of the canister is set, the performed analyses are summarised and the results are assessed and discussed in the report. (26 refs.)

  2. Design report of the disposal canister for twelve fuel assemblies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Raiko, H. [VTT Energy, Espoo (Finland); Salo, J.P. [Posiva Oy, Helsinki (Finland)

    1999-05-01

    The report provides a summary of the design of the canister for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The canister structure consists of a cylindrical massive nodular graphite cast iron insert covered by a 50 mm thick copper overlay. The capacity of the canister is 12 assemblies of BWR or VVER 440 fuel. The canister shall be tight with a high probability for about 100 000 years. The good and long lasting tightness requires: (1) The good initial tightness that is achieved by high quality requirements and extensive quality control, (2) The good corrosion resistance, which is obtained by the overpack of oxygen free copper, and (3) Mechanical strength of the canister, that is ensured by analyses (the following loads are considered: hydrostatic pressure, even and uneven swelling pressure of bentonite, thermal effects, and elevated hydrostatic pressure during glaciation. The allowed stresses and strains are set in such a way that reasonable engineering safety factors are obtained in all assessed design base loading cases). The canister shall limit the radiation dose rate outside the canister to minimise the radiolysis of the water in the vicinity of the canister. The canister insert shall keep the fuel assemblies in a subcritical configuration even if the void in the canister is filled with water due to postulated leakage. The design basis of the canister is set, the performed analyses are summarised and the results are assessed and discussed in the report. (orig.) 35 refs.

  3. Design report of the disposal canister for twelve fuel assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.; Salo, J.P.

    1999-05-01

    The report provides a summary of the design of the canister for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The canister structure consists of a cylindrical massive nodular graphite cast iron insert covered by a 50 mm thick copper overlay. The capacity of the canister is 12 assemblies of BWR or VVER 440 fuel. The canister shall be tight with a high probability for about 100 000 years. The good and long lasting tightness requires: (1) The good initial tightness that is achieved by high quality requirements and extensive quality control, (2) The good corrosion resistance, which is obtained by the overpack of oxygen free copper, and (3) Mechanical strength of the canister, that is ensured by analyses (the following loads are considered: hydrostatic pressure, even and uneven swelling pressure of bentonite, thermal effects, and elevated hydrostatic pressure during glaciation. The allowed stresses and strains are set in such a way that reasonable engineering safety factors are obtained in all assessed design base loading cases). The canister shall limit the radiation dose rate outside the canister to minimise the radiolysis of the water in the vicinity of the canister. The canister insert shall keep the fuel assemblies in a subcritical configuration even if the void in the canister is filled with water due to postulated leakage. The design basis of the canister is set, the performed analyses are summarised and the results are assessed and discussed in the report. (orig.)

  4. Criticality safety calculations for the nuclear waste disposal canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anttila, M.

    1996-12-01

    The criticality safety of the copper/iron canisters developed for the final disposal of the Finnish spent fuel has been studied with the MCNP4A code based on the Monte Carlo technique and with the fuel assembly burnup programs CASMO-HEX and CASMO-4. Two rather similar types of spent fuel disposal canisters have been studied. One canister type has been designed for hexagonal VVER-440 fuel assemblies used at the Loviisa nuclear power plant (IVO canister) and the other one for square BWR fuel bundles used at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (TVO canister). (10 refs.)

  5. Proposal of a SiC disposal canister for very deep borehole disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Heui-Joo; Lee, Minsoo; Lee, Jong-Youl; Kim, Kyungsu [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    In this paper authors proposed a silicon carbide, SiC, disposal canister for the DBD concept in Korea. A. Kerber et al. first proposed the SiC canister for a geological disposal of HLW, CANDU or HTR spent nuclear fuels. SiC has some drawbacks in welding or manufacturing a large canister. Thus, we designed a double layered disposal canister consisting of a stainless steel outer layer and a SiC inner layer. KAERI has been interested in developing a very deep borehole disposal (DBD) of HLW generated from pyroprocessing of PWR spent nuclear fuel and supported the relevant R and D with very limited its own budget. KAERI team reviewed the DBD concept proposed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and developed its own concept. The SNL concept was based on the steel disposal canister. The authors developed a new technology called cold spray coating method to manufacture a copper-cast iron disposal canister for a geological disposal of high level waste in Korea. With this method, 8 mm thin copper canister with 400 mm in diameter and 1200 mm in height was made. In general, they do not give any credit on the lifetime of a disposal canister in DBD concept unlike the geological disposal. In such case, the expensive copper canister should be replaced with another one. We designed a disposal canister using SiC for DBD. According to an experience in manufacturing a small size canister, the fabrication of a large-size one is a challenge. Also, welding of SiC canister is not easy. Several pathways are being paved to overcome it.

  6. Deep geological disposal system development; mechanical structural stability analysis of spent nuclear fuel disposal canister under the internal/external pressure variation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kwen, Y. J.; Kang, S. W.; Ha, Z. Y. [Hongik University, Seoul (Korea)

    2001-04-01

    This work constitutes a summary of the research and development work made for the design and dimensioning of the canister for nuclear fuel disposal. Since the spent nuclear fuel disposal emits high temperature heats and much radiation, its careful treatment is required. For that, a long term(usually 10,000 years) safe repository for spent fuel disposal should be securred. Usually this repository is expected to locate at a depth of 500m underground. The canister construction type introduced here is a solid structure with a cast iron insert and a corrosion resistant overpack, which is designed for spent nuclear fuel disposal in a deep repository in the crystalline bedrock, which entails an evenly distributed load of hydrostatic pressure from undergroundwater and high pressure from swelling of bentonite buffer. Hence, the canister must be designed to withstand these high pressure loads. Many design variables may affect the structural strength of the canister. In this study, among those variables array type of inner baskets and thicknesses of outer shell and lid and bottom are tried to be determined through the mechanical linear structural analysis, thicknesses of outer shell is determined through the nonlinear structural analysis, and the bentonite buffer analysis for the rock movement is conducted through the of nonlinear structural analysis Also the thermal stress effect is computed for the cast iron insert. The canister types studied here are one for PWR fuel and another for CANDU fuel. 23 refs., 60 figs., 23 tabs. (Author)

  7. Manufacture of disposal canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nolvi, L.

    2009-12-01

    The report summarizes the development work carried out in the manufacturing of disposal canister components, and present status, in readiness for manufacturing, of the components for use in assembly of spent nuclear fuel disposal canister. The disposal canister consist of two major components: the nodular graphite cast iron insert and overpack of oxygen-free copper. The manufacturing process for copper components begins with a cylindrical cast copper billet. Three different manufacturing processes i.e. pierce and draw, extrusion and forging are being developed, which produce a seamless copper tube or a tube with an integrated bottom. The pierce and draw process, Posiva's reference method, makes an integrated bottom possible and only the lid requires welding. Inserts for BWR-element are cast with 12 square channels and inserts for VVER 440-element with 12 round channels. Inserts for EPR-elements have four square channels. Casting of BWR insert type has been studied so far. Experience of casting inserts for PWR, which is similar to the EPR-type, has been got in co-operation with SKB. The report describes the processes being developed for manufacture of disposal canister components and some results of the manufacturing experiments are presented. Quality assurance and quality control in manufacture of canister component is described. (orig.)

  8. Tests for manufacturing technology of disposal canisters for nuclear spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.; Salonen, T.; Meuronen, I.; Lehto, K.

    1999-06-01

    The summary and status of the results of the manufacturing technology programmes concerning the disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel conducted by Posiva Oy are given in this report. Posiva has maintained a draft plan for a disposal canister design and an assessment of potential manufacturing technologies for about ten years in Finland. Now, during the year 1999, the first full scale demonstration canister is manufactured in Finland. The technology used for manufacturing of this prototype is developed by Posiva Oy mainly in co-operation with domestic industry. The main partner in developing the manufacturing technology for the copper shell has been Outokumpu Poricopper Oy, Pori, Finland, and the main partner in developing the technology for the iron insert of the canister has been Valmet Oyj Rautpohja Foundry, Jyvaeskylae, Finland. In both areas many subcontractors have been used, predominantly domestic engineering workshops, but also some foreign subcontractors, e.g. for EB-welding, who have had large enough welding equipment. This report describes the developing programmes for canister manufacturing, evaluates the results and presents some alternative methods, and tries to evaluate the pros and contras of them. In addition, the adequacy of the achieved technological know-how is assessed in respect of the required quality of the disposal canister. The following manufacturing technologies have been the concrete topics of the development programme: Electron beam welding technology development for thick-walled copper, Casting of massive copper billets, Hot rolling of thick-walled copper plates, Hot pressing and forging in lid manufacture, Extrusion and drawing of copper tubes, Bending of copper plates by roller or press, Machining of copper, Residual stress removal by heat treatment, Non-destructive testing, Long-term strength of EB-welds, Casting and machining of the iron insert of the canister The specialists from all the main developing partner companies have

  9. Preliminary design for spent fuel canister handling systems in a canister transfer and installation vehicle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wendelin, T.; Suikki, M.

    2008-12-01

    The report presents a spent fuel canister transfer and installation vehicle. The vehicle is used for carrying the fuel canister into a disposal tunnel and installing it into a deposition hole. The report outlines basic requirements and a design for canister handling equipment used in a canister transfer and installation vehicle, a description regarding the operation and maintenance of the equipment, as well as a cost estimate. Specific vehicles will be manufactured for all canister types in order to minimize the height of the disposal tunnels. This report is only focused on a transfer and installation vehicle for OL1-2 fuel canisters. Detailed designing and selection of final components have not yet been carried out. The report also describes the vehicle's requirements for the structures of a repository system, as well as actions in possible malfunction or fault situations. The spent fuel canister is brought from an encapsulation plant by a canister lift down to the repository level. The fuel canister is driven from the canister lift by an automated guided vehicle onto a canister hoist at a canister loading station. The canister transfer and installation vehicle is waiting for the canister with its radiation shield in an upright position above the canister hoist. The hoist carries the canister upward until the vehicle's own lifting means grab hold of the canister and raise it up into the vehicle's radiation shield. This is followed by turning the radiation shield to a transport position and by closing it in a radiation-proof manner against a rear radiation shield. The vehicle is driven along the central tunnel into the disposal tunnel and parked on top of the deposition hole. The vehicle's radiation shield is turned to the upright position and the canister is lowered with the vehicle's hydraulic winches into a bentonite-lined deposition hole. The radiation shield is turned back to the transport position and the vehicle can be driven out of the disposal tunnel

  10. Multi-purpose canisters as an alternative for storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hollaway, W.R.; Rozier, R.; Nitti, D.A.; Williams, J.R.

    1993-01-01

    A study was conducted to assess the feasibility of using multi-purpose canisters to handle spent nuclear fuel throughout the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System. Multi-purpose canisters would be sealed, metallic containers maintaining multiple spent fuel assemblies in a dry, inert environment and overpacked separately and uniquely for the various system elements of storage, transportation, and disposal. Using five implementation scenarios, the multi-purpose canister was evaluated with regard to several measures of effectiveness, including number of handlings, radiation exposure, cost, schedule and licensing considerations, and public perception. Advantages and disadvantages of the multi-purpose canister were identified relative to the current reference system within each scenario, and the scenarios were compared to determine the most effective method of implementation

  11. Design premises for canister for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.

    1998-09-01

    The purpose of this report is to establish the basic premises for designing canisters for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, the requirements for canister characteristics, and the design criteria, and to present alternative canister designs that satisfy these premises. The point of departure for canister design has been that the canister must be able to be used for both BWR and PWR fuel

  12. Spent fuel canister docking station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suikki, M.

    2006-01-01

    The working report for the spent fuel canister docking station presents a design for the operation and structure of the docking equipment located in the fuel handling cell for the spent fuel in the encapsulation plant. The report contains a description of the basic requirements for the docking station equipment and their implementation, the operation of the equipment, maintenance and a cost estimate. In the designing of the equipment all the problems related with the operation have been solved at the level of principle, nevertheless, detailed designing and the selection of final components have not yet been carried out. In case of defects and failures, solutions have been considered for postulated problems, and furthermore, the entire equipment was gone through by the means of systematic risk analysis (PFMEA). During the docking station designing we came across with needs to influence the structure of the actual disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel, too. Proposed changes for the structure of the steel lid fastening screw were included in the report. The report also contains a description of installation with the fuel handling cell structures. The purpose of the docking station for the fuel handling cell is to position and to seal the disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel into a penetration located on the cell floor and to provide suitable means for executing the loading of the disposal canister and the changing of atmosphere. The designed docking station consists of a docking ring, a covering hatch, a protective cone and an atmosphere-changing cap as well as the vacuum technology pertaining to the changing of atmosphere and the inert gas system. As far as the solutions are concerned, we have arrived at rather simple structures and most of the actuators of the system are situated outside of the actual fuel handling cell. When necessary, the equipment can also be used for the dismantling of a faulty disposal canister, cut from its upper end by machining. The

  13. Design premises for canister for spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Werme, L

    1998-09-01

    The purpose of this report is to establish the basic premises for designing canisters for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, the requirements for canister characteristics, and the design criteria, and to present alternative canister designs that satisfy these premises. The point of departure for canister design has been that the canister must be able to be used for both BWR and PWR fuel 43 refs, 4 figs, 6 tabs

  14. DISPOSABLE CANISTER WASTE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    R.J. Garrett

    2001-07-30

    The purpose of this calculation is to provide the bases for defining the preclosure limits on radioactive material releases from radioactive waste forms to be received in disposable canisters at the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) at Yucca Mountain. Specifically, this calculation will provide the basis for criteria to be included in a forthcoming revision of the Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD) that limits releases in terms of non-isotope-specific canister release dose-equivalent source terms. These criteria will be developed for the Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) standard canister, the Multicanister Overpack (MCO), the naval spent fuel canister, the High-Level Waste (HLW) canister, the plutonium can-in-canister, and the large Multipurpose Canister (MPC). The shippers of such canisters will be required to demonstrate that they meet these criteria before the canisters are accepted at the MGR. The Quality Assurance program is applicable to this calculation. The work reported in this document is part of the analysis of DSNF and is performed using procedure AP-3.124, Calculations. The work done for this analysis was evaluated according to procedure QAP-2-0, Control of Activities, which has been superseded by AP-2.21Q, Quality Determinations and Planning for Scientific, Engineering, and Regulatory Compliance Activities. This evaluation determined that such activities are subject to the requirements of DOE/RW/0333P, Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (DOE 2000). This work is also prepared in accordance with the development plan titled Design Basis Event Analyses on DOE SNF and Plutonium Can-In-Canister Waste Forms (CRWMS M&O 1999a) and Technical Work Plan For: Department of Energy Spent Nuclear Fuel Work Packages (CRWMS M&O 2000d). This calculation contains no electronic data applicable to any electronic data management system.

  15. The Swedish Concept for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel: Differences Between Vertical and Horizontal Waste Canister Emplacement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, D.G.; Hicks, T.W.

    2005-10-01

    The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) is preparing for the review of licence applications related to the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) refers to its proposals for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel as the KBS-3 concept. In the KBS-3 concept, SKB plans that, after 30 to 40 years of interim storage, spent fuel will be disposed of at a depth of about 500 m in crystalline bedrock, surrounded by a system of engineered barriers. The principle barrier to radionuclide release is a cylindrical copper canister. Within the copper canister, the spent fuel is supported by a cast iron insert. Outside the copper canister is a layer of bentonite clay, known as the buffer, which is designed to provide mechanical protection for the canisters and to limit the access of groundwater and corrosive substances to their surfaces. The bentonite buffer is also designed to sorb radionuclides released from the canisters, and to filter any colloids that may form within the waste. SKB is expected to base its forthcoming licence applications on a repository design in which the waste canisters are emplaced in vertical boreholes (KBS-3V). However, SKB has also indicated that it might be possible and, in some respects, beneficial to dispose of the waste canisters in horizontal tunnels (KBS-3H). There are many similarities between the KBS-3V and KBS-3H designs. There are, however, uncertainties associated with both of the designs and, when compared, both possess relative advantages and disadvantages. SKB has identified many of the key factors that will determine the evolution of a KBS-3H repository and has plans for research and development work in many of the areas where the differences between the KBS-3V and KBS-3H designs mean that they could be significant in terms of repository performance. With respect to the KBS-3H design, key technical issues are associated with: 1. The accuracy of deposition drift construction. 2. Water

  16. Canister design concepts for disposal of spent fuel and high level waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patel, R.; Punshon, C.; Nicholas, J.; Bastid, P.; Zhou, R.; Schneider, C.; Bagshaw, N.; Howse, D.; Hutchinson, E. [TWI Ltd, Cambridge, (United Kingdom); Asano, R. [Hitachi Zosen Corporation, Osaka (Japan); King, S. [Integrity Corrosion Consulting Ltd, Calgary, Alberta (Canada)

    2012-10-15

    As part of its long-term plans for development of a repository for spent fuel (SF) and high level waste (HLW), Nagra is exploring various options for the selection of materials and design concepts for disposal canisters. The selection of suitable canister options is driven by a series of requirements, one of the most important of which is providing a minimum 1000 year lifetime without breach of containment. One candidate material is carbon steel, because of its relatively low corrosion rate under repository conditions and because of the advanced state of overall technical maturity related to construction and fabrication. Other materials and design options are being pursued in parallel studies. The objective of the present study was to develop conceptual designs for carbon steel SF and HLW canisters along with supporting justification. The design process and outcomes result in design concepts that deal with all key aspects of canister fabrication, welding and inspection, short-term performance (handling and emplacement) and long-term performance (corrosion and structural behaviour after disposal). A further objective of the study is to use the design process to identify the future work that is required to develop detailed designs. The development of canister designs began with the elaboration of a number of design requirements that are derived from the need to satisfy the long-term safety requirements and the operational safety requirements (robustness needed for safe handling during emplacement and potential retrieval). It has been assumed based on radiation shielding calculations that the radiation dose rate at the canister surfaces will be at a level that prohibits manual handling, and therefore a hot cell and remote handling will be needed for filling the canisters and for final welding operations. The most important canister requirements were structured hierarchically and set in the context of an overall design methodology. Conceptual designs for SF canisters

  17. Canister design concepts for disposal of spent fuel and high level waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patel, R.; Punshon, C.; Nicholas, J.; Bastid, P.; Zhou, R.; Schneider, C.; Bagshaw, N.; Howse, D.; Hutchinson, E.; Asano, R.; King, S.

    2012-10-01

    As part of its long-term plans for development of a repository for spent fuel (SF) and high level waste (HLW), Nagra is exploring various options for the selection of materials and design concepts for disposal canisters. The selection of suitable canister options is driven by a series of requirements, one of the most important of which is providing a minimum 1000 year lifetime without breach of containment. One candidate material is carbon steel, because of its relatively low corrosion rate under repository conditions and because of the advanced state of overall technical maturity related to construction and fabrication. Other materials and design options are being pursued in parallel studies. The objective of the present study was to develop conceptual designs for carbon steel SF and HLW canisters along with supporting justification. The design process and outcomes result in design concepts that deal with all key aspects of canister fabrication, welding and inspection, short-term performance (handling and emplacement) and long-term performance (corrosion and structural behaviour after disposal). A further objective of the study is to use the design process to identify the future work that is required to develop detailed designs. The development of canister designs began with the elaboration of a number of design requirements that are derived from the need to satisfy the long-term safety requirements and the operational safety requirements (robustness needed for safe handling during emplacement and potential retrieval). It has been assumed based on radiation shielding calculations that the radiation dose rate at the canister surfaces will be at a level that prohibits manual handling, and therefore a hot cell and remote handling will be needed for filling the canisters and for final welding operations. The most important canister requirements were structured hierarchically and set in the context of an overall design methodology. Conceptual designs for SF canisters

  18. Preliminary Transportation, Aging and Disposal Canister System Performance Specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    C.A Kouts

    2006-01-01

    This document provides specifications for selected system components of the Transportation, Aging and Disposal (TAD) canister-based system. A list of system specified components and ancillary components are included in Section 1.2. The TAD canister, in conjunction with specialized overpacks will accomplish a number of functions in the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Some of these functions will be accomplished at purchaser sites where commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) is stored, and some will be performed within the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) transportation and disposal system. This document contains only those requirements unique to applications within Department of Energy's (DOE's) system. DOE recognizes that TAD canisters may have to perform similar functions at purchaser sites. Requirements to meet reactor functions, such as on-site dry storage, handling, and loading for transportation, are expected to be similar to commercially available canister-based systems. This document is intended to be referenced in the license application for the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). As such, the requirements cited herein are needed for TAD system use in OCRWM's disposal system. This document contains specifications for the TAD canister, transportation overpack and aging overpack. The remaining components and equipment that are unique to the OCRWM system or for similar purchaser applications will be supplied by others

  19. Copper canisters for nuclear high level waste disposal. Corrosion aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.; Sellin, P.; Kjellbert, N.

    1992-10-01

    A corrosion analysis of a thick-walled copper canister for spent fuel disposal is discussed. The analysis has shown that there are no rapid mechanisms that may lead to canister failure, indicating an anticipated corrosion service life of several millions years. If further analysis of the copper canister is considered, it should be concentrated on identifying and evaluating processes other than corrosion, which may have a potential for leading to canister failure. (au)

  20. Canisters for spent-fuel disposal: Design measures against localized corrosion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.O.; Oversby, V.M.

    2000-01-01

    Common to all high-level-waste disposal concepts is the encapsulation of the waste into metal canisters. The purpose of this waste canister is to isolate the radioactive waste from contact with its surroundings for a desired time period. The design service life ranges from hundreds to thousands of years depending on the disposal concept. After the isolation has been breached, other barriers in the disposal system will delay and attenuate the radioactive releases to acceptable levels. In a deep geologic repository, the waste package will be exposed to chemical attack and, depending on the type of repository, to mechanical stresses. Each of these factors will by itself or in combination inevitably lead to loss of confinement some time in the future. In the design of the Swedish waste canister, the corrosion resistance is provided by an outer shell of pure copper while an insert supplies the mechanical strength cast nodular iron. The close fit between the insert and the copper results in very small tensile stresses in the copper over very limited areas once the repository has been saturated. Measurements of stress corrosion crack growth show that annealed copper cannot maintain sufficiently high stress intensity factors for cracks to grow. For annealed copper, the stress intensity factor was limited to 25 MPa·m 1/2 because of extensive plastic deformation. For cold-worked copper, no crack growth could be observed for stress intensity factors 1/2 . Through the choices of canister material, canister, and repository design, and considering the expected chemical conditions, the risks for localized corrosion can be lowered to an acceptable level, if not eliminated altogether, and the releases from prematurely failed canisters can be kept well within acceptable dose levels

  1. Thermal and mechanical analyses of the spent nuclear fuel disposal canister and its barriers according to the design variable change

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Young Joo

    2006-03-01

    This work constitutes a summary of research and development made for design and dimensioning of the spent nuclear fuel disposal canister. Since the spent nuclear fuel disposal emits high temperature heats and much radiation, its careful treatment is required. For that, a long term (usually 10,000 years) safe repository for the spent nuclear fuel disposal should be secured. Usually this repository is expected to locate at a depth of 500m underground. Many various analyses should be performed to secure the structural safety of the canister. For past years, these analyses have been performed to develop the canister model (so-called DKC-1 model). The diameter of the designed KDC-1 canister model is D=102m. However, there still remain some structural evaluations to make sure the structural safety of the designed KDC-1 canister mode. The one is the structural safety evaluation of the canister for the falling accident in the repository while handling the canister. There may happen two typical falling accidents in the repository. The one is the falling accident of the canister in the borehole while depositing the canister into the borehole. In these falling accidents the collision impact force between the canister and the surface of the ground or the bottom of the borehole may cause the structural damage onto the canister. However, the canister should be designed to withstand this impact force. Hence, the structural analysis of the canister for this impact force is required to guarantee the structural safety of the canister for this falling accident. Therefore in this report, the structural analyses of the KDC-1 canister model of the diameter of 102cm for two types of falling accidents are carried out for the impact forces while the canister collides onto the surface of the ground or the bottom of the borehole. The nonlinear structural analyses are performed for the canister to get the accurate analysis results assuming the materials composing canister parts as elasto

  2. Impact Force Applied on the Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposal Canister that Accidentally Drops and Collides onto the Ground

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Young Joo

    2016-01-01

    In this paper, a mathematical methodology was theoretically studied to obtain the impact force caused by the collision between rigid bodies. This theoretical methodology was applied to compute the impact force applied on the spent nuclear fuel disposal canister that accidentally drops and collides onto the ground. From this study, the impact force required to ensure a structurally safe canister design was theoretically formulated. The main content of the theoretical study concerns the rigid body kinematics and equation of motion during collision between two rigid bodies. On the basis of this study, a general impact theory to compute the impact force caused by the collision between two bodies was developed. This general impact theory was applied to theoretically formulate the approximate mathematical solution of the impact force that affects the spent nuclear fuel disposal canister that accidentally falls to the ground. Simultaneously, a numerical analysis was performed using the computer code to compute the numerical solution of the impact force, and the numerical result was compared with the approximate mathematical solution

  3. Corrosion resistance of canisters for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mattsson, E.

    1979-01-01

    A group of Swedish scientists has evaluated from the corrosion point of view three alternative canister types for final disposal of waste from nuclear reactors in boreholes in rock 500 m below ground. Titanium canisters with a wall-thickness of 6 mm and 100 mm thick lead lining have been estimated to have a life of at least thousands of years, and probably tens of thousands of years. Copper canisters with 200-mm-thick walls would last for hundreds of thousands of years. The third type, α-alumina sintered under isostatic pressure, is a very promising canister material

  4. Summary of Preliminary Criticality Analysis for Peach Bottom Fuel in the DOE Standardized Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henrikson, D.J.

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program is developing a standardized set of canisters for DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF). These canisters will be used for DOE SNF handling, interim storage, transportation, and disposal in the national repository. Several fuels are being examined in conjunction with the DOE SNF canisters. This report summarizes the preliminary criticality safety analysis that addresses general fissile loading limits for Peach Bottom graphite fuel in the DOE SNF canister. The canister is considered both alone and inside the 5-HLW/DOE Long Spent Fuel Co-disposal Waste Package, and in intact and degraded conditions. Results are appropriate for a single DOE SNF canister. Specific facilities, equipment, canister internal structures, and scenarios for handling, storage, and transportation have not yet been defined and are not evaluated in this analysis. The analysis assumes that the DOE SNF canister is designed so that it maintains reasonable geometric integrity. Parameters important to the results are the canister outer diameter, inner diameter, and wall thickness. These parameters are assumed to have nominal dimensions of 45.7-cm (18.0-in.), 43.815-cm (17.25-in), and 0.953-cm (0.375-in.), respectively. Based on the analysis results, the recommended fissile loading for the DOE SNF canister is 13 Peach Bottom fuel elements if no internal steel is present, and 15 Peach Bottom fuel elements if credit is taken for internal steel

  5. Efficiency analyses of the CANDU spent fuel repository using modified disposal canisters for a deep geological disposal system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J.Y.; Cho, D.K.; Lee, M.S.; Kook, D.H.; Choi, H.J.; Choi, J.W.; Wang, L.M.

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► A reference disposal concept for spent nuclear fuels in Korea has been reviewed. ► To enhance the disposal efficiency, alternative disposal concepts were developed. ► Thermal analyses for alternative disposal concepts were performed. ► From the result of the analyses, the disposal efficiency of the concepts was reviewed. ► The most effective concept was suggested. - Abstract: Deep geological disposal concept is considered to be the most preferable for isolating high-level radioactive waste (HLW), including nuclear spent fuels, from the biosphere in a safe manner. The purpose of deep geological disposal of HLW is to isolate radioactive waste and to inhibit its release of for a long time, so that its toxicity does not affect the human beings and the biosphere. One of the most important requirements of HLW repository design for a deep geological disposal system is to keep the buffer temperature below 100 °C in order to maintain the integrity of the engineered barrier system. In this study, a reference disposal concept for spent nuclear fuels in Korea has been reviewed, and based on this concept, efficient alternative concepts that consider modified CANDU spent fuels disposal canister, were developed. To meet the thermal requirement of the disposal system, the spacing of the disposal tunnels and that of the disposal pits for each alternative concept, were drawn following heat transfer analyses. From the result of the thermal analyses, the disposal efficiency of the alternative concepts was reviewed and the most effective concept suggested. The results of these analyses can be used for a deep geological repository design and detailed analyses, based on exact site characteristics data, will reduce the uncertainty of the results.

  6. TVO-92 safety analysis of spent fuel disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vieno, T.; Hautojaervi, A.; Koskinen, L.; Nordman, H.

    1993-08-01

    The spent fuel from the TVO I and TVO II reactors at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is planned to be disposed in a repository constructed at a depth of about 500 meters in crystalline bedrock. Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) has carried out preliminary site investigations for spent fuel disposal between 1987 and 1992 at five areas in Finland (Olkiluoto, Kivetty, Romuvaara, Syyry and Veitsivaara). The Safety analysis of the disposal system is presented in the report. Spent fuel will be encapsulated in composite copper-steel canisters. The canister design (ACP canister) consists of an inner container of steel as a load-bearing element and an outer container of oxygen-free copper to provide a shield against corrosion. In the repository the canisters will be emplaced in vertical holes drilled in the floors of horizontal deposition tunnels. The annulus between the canister and the rock is filled with compacted bentonite. The results of the safety analysis attest that the planned disposal system fulfils the safety requirements. Suitable places for the repository can be found at each of the five investigation sites

  7. Disposal criticality analysis for aluminum-based DOE fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davis, J.W.; Gottlieb, P.

    1997-11-01

    This paper describes the disposal criticality analysis for canisters containing aluminum-based Department of Energy fuels from research reactors. Different canisters were designed for disposal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and medium enriched uranium (MEU) fuel. In addition to the standard criticality concerns in storage and transportation, such as flooding, the disposal criticality analysis must consider the degradation of the fuel and components within the waste package. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) U-Al fuel with 93.5% enriched uranium and Oak Ridge Research Reactor (ORR) U-Si-Al fuel with 21% enriched uranium are representative of the HEU and MEU fuel inventories, respectively. Conceptual canister designs with 64 MIT assemblies (16/layer, 4 layers) or 40 ORR assemblies (10/layer, 4 layers) were developed for these fuel types. Borated stainless steel plates were incorporated into a stainless steel internal basket structure within a 439 mm OD, 15 mm thick XM-19 canister shell. The Codisposal waste package contains 5 HLW canisters (represented by 5 Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters from the Savannah River Site) with the fuel canister placed in the center. It is concluded that without the presence of a fairly insoluble neutron absorber, the long-term action of infiltrating water can lead to a small, but significant, probability of criticality for both the HEU and MEU fuels. The use of 1.5kg of Gd distributed throughout the MIT fuel and the use of carbon steels for the structural basket or 1.1 kg of Gd distributed in the ORR fuel will reduce the probability of criticality to virtually zero for both fuels

  8. Mechanical failure of SKB spent fuel disposal canisters. Mathematical modelling and scoping calculations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takase, Hiroyasu; Benbow, S.; Grindrod, P.

    1998-10-01

    According to the current design of SKB, a copper overpack with a cast steel inner component will be used as the disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel. A recent study considered the case of a breach in the copper overpack, through which groundwater could enter the canister. It has pointed out that hydrogen gas generated by an anaerobic corrosion could cushion the system and reduce or eventually stop further infiltration of water into the breached canister, and thence the spent fuel. One potential pitfall in this previous study lies in the fact that it did not consider any processes which might violate the following assumptions which are essential for the gas 'cushioning': 1. Hydrogen gas accumulated in the annular gap in the canister forms a free gas phase which is stable indefinitely into future; 2. Elevated gas pressure in the canister prevents further supply of groundwater except for diffusion of vapour. In the current study we developed a set of mathematical models for the above problem and applied it to carry out an independent assessment of the long-term behaviour of the canister. A key aim in this study was to clarify whether there are any alternative processes which may affect the result obtained by the previous study by violating one of the assumptions listed above. For this purpose, a scenario development exercise was conducted. The result supported the concept described in the previous study. One exception is that possible intrusion of bentonite gel followed by its desaturation could leave paths both for the gas and water simultaneously without forming a gas cushion. This is summarised in the first part of the report. In the second part, development of mathematical models and their applications are described. The key results are: 1. The model describing behaviour of gas and pore water in the canister and the buffer material reproduced the main results of the previous study; 2. The model considering intrusion of the bentonite gel pointed out possibility

  9. Storage, transportation and disposal system for used nuclear fuel assemblies

    Science.gov (United States)

    Scaglione, John M.; Wagner, John C.

    2017-01-10

    An integrated storage, transportation and disposal system for used fuel assemblies is provided. The system includes a plurality of sealed canisters and a cask sized to receive the sealed canisters in side by side relationship. The plurality of sealed canisters include an internal basket structure to receive a plurality of used fuel assemblies. The internal basket structure includes a plurality of radiation-absorbing panels and a plurality of hemispherical ribs generally perpendicular to the canister sidewall. The sealed canisters are received within the cask for storage and transportation and are removed from the cask for disposal at a designated repository. The system of the present invention allows the handling of sealed canisters separately or collectively, while allowing storage and transportation of high burnup fuel and damaged fuel to the designated repository.

  10. Application of a cold spray technique to the fabrication of a copper canister for the geological disposal of CANDU spent fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Heui-Joo, E-mail: hjchoi@kaeri.re.k [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Radioactive Waste Management Technology Development, 150 Dukjin-dong, Yuseong, Daejon, 305-353 (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Minsoo; Lee, Jong Youl [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Radioactive Waste Management Technology Development, 150 Dukjin-dong, Yuseong, Daejon, 305-353 (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-10-15

    A new method was proposed for the manufacture of a copper-cast iron canister for the spent fuel disposal based on the cold spray coating technique. The thickness of a copper shell could be fabricated to be as thin as 10 mm with the new method. Around 6 tons of copper could be saved with a 10 mm thick canister compared with a 50 mm thick canister. The electrochemical properties of the cold sprayed copper layer and forged copper were measured through a polarization test. The two copper layers showed very similar electrochemical properties. The lifetime of a 10 mm copper canister was estimated with a mathematical model based on the mass transport of sulfide ions through the buffer. The results showed that the canister lifetime was more than 140,000 years under the Korean granite groundwater condition. The thermal analysis with a current pre-conceptual design of a CANDU spent fuel canister showed that the maximum temperature between the canister and the saturated buffer was below the thermal criteria, 100 {sup o}C. Finally, the mechanical stability of the copper canister was confirmed with a computer program, ABAQUS, under the rock movement scenario.

  11. Interim transfer canister for consolidating nuclear fuel rods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Formanek, F.J.

    1987-01-01

    This patent describes a canister for receiving and consolidating a group of uniformly spaced apart nuclear fuel rods, comprising: a rectangular, vertically oriented straight back panel; a pair of oppositely disposed side panels connected perpendicularly to the back panel, having a vertical straight upper portion and an inwardly tapered lower portion; a front panel opposite the back panel and connected to the side panels, having a straight vertical upper portion and inwardly tapered lower portion; whereby the back, side and front panels define a rectangular upper opening at the upper end of the canister and a generally rectangular lower opening at the other end, the lower opening having a cross-sectional area less than one-half that of the upper opening; parallel plate members spanning the canister from the front panel to the back panel, each plate spaced from the other the same uniform distance, the plates extending downwardly into the tapered portion of the canister while remaining spaced above the tapered sidewalls; first base means at the lower end of the canister, removably mounted and having an oblique orientation generally downward from the front panel to the back panel, for guiding the fuel rods to be inserted preferentially toward the lower portion of the back panel; and second base means removably mounted within the canister below first base means and oriented transversely to the longitudinal extent of the canister, for supporting the fuel rods when the first base means is removed from the canister

  12. Heat transfer analysis of the geologic disposal of spent fuel and high-level waste storage canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, G.K.

    1980-08-01

    Near-field temperatures resulting from the storage of high-level waste canisters and spent unreprocessed fuel assembly canisters in geologic formations were determined. Preliminary design of the repository was modeled for a heat transfer computer code, HEATING5, which used the Crank-Nicolson finite difference method to evaluate transient heat transfer. The heat transfer system was evaluated with several two- and three-dimensional models which transfer heat by a combination of conduction, natural convention, and radiation. Physical properties of the materials in the model were based upon experimental values for the various geologic formations. The effects of canister spacing, fuel age, and use of an overpack were studied for the analysis of the spent fuel canisters; salt, granite, and basalt were considered as the storage media for spent fuel canisters. The effects of canister diameter and use of an overpack were studied for the analysis of the high-level waste canisters; salt was considered as the only storage media for high-level waste canisters. Results of the studies on spent fuel assembly canisters showed that the canisters could be stored in salt formations with a maximum heat loading of 134 kw/acre without exceeding the temperature limits set for salt stability. The use of an overpack had little effect on the peak canister temperatures. When the total heat load per acre decreased, the peak temperatures reached in the geologic formations decreased; however, the time to reach the peak temperatures increased. Results of the studies on high-level waste canisters showed that an increased canister diameter will increase the canister interior temperatures considerably; at a constant areal heat loading, a 381 mm diameter canister reached almost a 50 0 C higher temperature than a 305 mm diameter canister. An overpacked canister caused almost a 30 0 C temperature rise in either case

  13. Canister Design for Deep Borehole Disposal of Nuclear Waste (CD-ROM)

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Hoag, Christopher I

    2006-01-01

    ...: 1 CD-ROM; 4 3/4 in.; 28.7 MB. ABSTRACT: The objective of this thesis was to design a canister for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other high-level waste in deep borehole repositories using currently available and proven oil, gas...

  14. Shaft shock absorber tests for a spent fuel canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kukkola, T.; Toermaelae, V.P.

    2005-06-01

    The disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel will be transferred by a lift to the repository, which is 500 m deep in the bedrock. Model tests were carried out with the objective to estimate weather feasible shock absorber can be developed against the design accident case where the canister should survive a free fall to the lift shaft. If the velocity of the canister is not controlled by air drag or by any other deceleration means, the impact velocity may reach ultimate speed of 100m/s. The canister would retain its integrity in impact on water when the bottom pit of the lift well is filled with groundwater. However, the canister would hit the pit bottom with high velocity since the water hardly slows down the canister. The impact to the bottom of the pit should be dampened mechanically. The tests demonstrated that 20 m high filling to the bottom pit of the lift well by Light Expanded Clay Aggregate (LECA), gives fair impact absorption to protect the fuel canister. Presence of ground water is not harmful for impact absorption system provided that the ceramic gravel is not floating too high from the pit bottom. Almost ideal impact absorption conditions are met if the water high level does not exceed two thirds of the height of the gravel. Shaping of the bottom head of the cylindrical canister does not give meaningful advantages to the impact absorption system. The flat nose bottom head of the fuel canister gives adequate deceleration properties. (orig.)

  15. Shaft shock absorber tests for a spent fuel canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kukkola, T.; Toermaelae, V.P.

    2003-01-01

    The holding canister for spent nuclear fuel will be transferred by a lift to the final disposal tunnels 500m deep in the bedrock. Model tests were carried out with an objective to estimate weather feasible shock absorbing properties can be met in a design accident case where the canister should survive a free fall due to e.g. sabotage. If the velocity of the canister is not controlled by air drag or any other deceleration means, the impact velocity may reach ultimate speed of 100m/s. The canister would retain its integrity when stricken by the surface penetration impact if the bottom pit of the lift well would be filled with groundwater. However the canister would hit the pit bottom with high velocity since the water hardly slows down the canister. The impact to the bottom of the pit should be dampened mechanically. The tests demonstrated that 20m high filling to the bottom pit of the lift well by ceramic gravel, trade mark LECA-sora, gives a fair impact absorption to protect the spent fuel canister. Presence of ground water is not harmful for impact absorption system provided that the ceramic gravel is not floating too high from the pit bottom. Almost ideal impact absorption conditions are met if the water high level does not exceed two thirds of the height of the gravel. Shaping of the bottom head of the cylindrical canister does not give meaningful advantages to the impact absorption system. The flat nose bottom head of the fuel canister gives adequate deceleration properties. (orig.)

  16. Alternative Concept to Enhance the Disposal Efficiency for CANDU Spent Fuel Disposal System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jong Youl; Cho, Dong Geun; Kook, Dong Hak; Lee, Min Soo; Choi, Heui Joo

    2011-01-01

    There are two types of nuclear reactors in Korea and they are PWR type and CANDU type. The safe management of the spent fuels from these reactors is very important factor to maintain the sustainable energy supply with nuclear power plant. In Korea, a reference disposal system for the spent fuels has been developed through a study on the direct disposal of the PWR and CANDU spent fuel. Recently, the research on the demonstration and the efficiency analyses of the disposal system has been performed to make the disposal system safer and more economic. PWR spent fuels which include a lot of reusable material can be considered being recycled and a study on the disposal of HLW from this recycling process is being performed. CANDU spent fuels are considered being disposed of directly in deep geological formation, since they have little reusable material. In this study, based on the Korean Reference spent fuel disposal System (KRS) which was to dispose of both PWR type and CANDU type, the more effective CANDU spent fuel disposal systems were developed. To do this, the disposal canister for CANDU spent fuels was modified to hold the storage basket for 60 bundles which is used in nuclear power plant. With these modified disposal canister concepts, the disposal concepts to meet the thermal requirement that the temperature of the buffer materials should not be over 100 .deg. C were developed. These disposal concepts were reviewed and analyzed in terms of disposal effective factors which were thermal effectiveness, U-density, disposal area, excavation volume, material volume etc. and the most effective concept was proposed. The results of this study will be used in the development of various wastes disposal system together with the HLW wastes from the PWR spent fuel recycling process.

  17. Cost estimate of Olkiluoto disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kukkola, T.; Saanio, T.

    2005-03-01

    The cost estimate covers the underground rock characterisation facility ONKALO, the investment and the operating costs of the above and underground facilities, the decommissioning of the encapsulation plant and the closure costs of the repository. The above ground facility is a once-investment; a re-investment takes place after 37 years operation. The repository is extended stepwise thus also the investment take place in stages. Annual operating costs are calculated with different operating efficiencies. The total investment costs of the disposal facility are estimated to be 503 M euro (Million Euros), the total operating costs are 1,923 M euro and the decommissioning and the closure costs are 116 M euro totaling 2,542 M euro. The investment costs of the above ground facility are 142 M euro, the operating costs are 1,678 M euro. The repository investment costs are 360 M euro and the operating costs are 245 M euro. The decommissioning costs are 7 M euro and the closure costs are 109 M euro. The costs are calculated by using the price level of December 2003. The cost estimate is based on a plan, where the spent fuel is encapsulated and the disposal canisters are disposed into the bedrock at a depth of about 420 meters in one storey. In the encapsulation process, the fuel assemblies are closed into composite canisters, in which the inner part of the canister is made of nodular cast iron and the outer wall of copper having a thickness of 50 mm. The inner canister is closed gas-tight by a bolted steel lid, and the electron beam welding method is used to close the outer copper lid. The encapsulation plant is independent and located above the deep repository spaces. The disposal canisters are transported to the repository by the lift. The disposal tunnels are constructed and closed in stages according the disposal canisters disposal. The operating time of the Loviisa nuclear power plant units is assumed to be 50 years and the operating time of the Olkiluoto nuclear power

  18. Performance Assessment and Sensitivity Analyses of Disposal of Plutonium as Can-in-Canister Ceramic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rainer Senger

    2001-01-01

    The purpose of this analysis is to examine whether there is a justification for using high-level waste (HLW) as a surrogate for plutonium disposal in can-in-canister ceramic in the total-system performance assessment (TSPA) model for the Site Recommendation (SR). In the TSPA-SR model, the immobilized plutonium waste form is not explicitly represented, but is implicitly represented as an equal number of canisters of HLW. There are about 50 metric tons of plutonium in the U. S. Department of Energy inventory of surplus fissile material that could be disposed. Approximately 17 tons of this material contain significant quantities of impurities and are considered unsuitable for mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel. This material has been designated for direct disposal by immobilization in a ceramic waste form and encapsulating this waste form in high-level waste (HLW). The remaining plutonium is suitable for incorporation into MOX fuel assemblies for commercial reactors (Shaw 1999, Section 2). In this analysis, two cases of immobilized plutonium disposal are analyzed, the 17-ton case and the 13-ton case (Shaw et al. 2001, Section 2.2). The MOX spent-fuel disposal is not analyzed in this report. In the TSPA-VA (CRWMS M and O 1998a, Appendix B, Section B-4), the calculated dose release from immobilized plutonium waste form (can-in-canister ceramic) did not exceed that from an equivalent amount of HLW glass. This indicates that the HLW could be used as a surrogate for the plutonium can-in-canister ceramic. Representation of can-in-canister ceramic as a surrogate is necessary to reduce the number of waste forms in the TSPA model. This reduction reduces the complexity and running time of the TSPA model and makes the analyses tractable. This document was developed under a Technical Work Plan (CRWMS M and O 2000a), and is compliant with that plan. The application of the Quality Assurance (QA) program to the development of that plan (CRWMS M and O 2000a) and of this Analysis is

  19. Assessment of a spent fuel disposal canister. Assessment studies for a copper canister with cast steel inner component

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bond, A.E.; Hoch, A.R.; Jones, G.D.; Tomczyk, A.J.; Wiggin, R.M.; Worraker, W.J.

    1997-05-01

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues in Sweden, is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will then be placed in vertical storage holes drilled in a series of caverns excavated from the granite bedrock at a depth of about 500 m. Each canister will be surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. In this report, a simple model of the behaviour of the canister subsequent to a first breach in its copper overpack is developed. This model is used to predict: -the ingress of water to the canister (as a function of the size and the shape of the initial defect, the buffer conductivity, the corrosion rate and the pressure inside the canister); -the build-up of corrosion products in the canister (as a function of the available water in the canister, the corrosion rate and the properties of the corrosion products); -the effect of corrosion on the structural integrity of the canister. A number of different scenarios for the location of the breach in the copper overpack are considered

  20. A review of materials and corrosion issues regarding canisters for disposal of spent fuel and high-level waste in Opalinus clay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Landolt, D.; Davenport, A.; Payer, J.; Shoesmith, D.

    2009-01-01

    The project 'Entsorgungsnachweis' presented by NAGRA to the Swiss Federal Government in December 2002 assessed the feasibility of disposal of spent fuel (SF), vitrified high level waste (HLW) from reprocessing and long-lived intermediate level waste in an Opalinus Clay repository site in Northern Switzerland. NAGRA proposed the use of carbon steel canisters for disposal of SF/HLW and it also put forward an alternative concept of copper canisters with cast iron insert. In its reply the Federal Government acknowledged that NAGRA had successfully demonstrated the technical feasibility of disposal of SF/HLW. However, some of its experts raised a number of questions related to the choice of steel as canister material. Among others, it was questioned whether hydrogen formed by corrosion of steel in contact with saturated bentonite might adversely affect the barrier function of the Opalinus clay. It was also recommended that alternative canister materials and/or design concepts should be evaluated. To deal with these concerns NAGRA convened an international group of experts, the Canister Materials Review Board (CMRB), who were to review the existing information on canister materials that could be suitable for the proposed repository environment. Based on present knowledge of materials science, the CMRB was to recommend to NAGRA the most suitable material(s) for meeting the performance requirements for SF/HLW canisters. Specifically, the CMRB was to consider corrosion, including hydrogen generation, and stress-assisted failure processes that could affect the integrity and projected life time of SF/HLW canisters or impede the functioning of geological barriers while keeping in mind the overall feasibility of manufacturing, sealing and inspecting the canisters. The CMRB was further asked to identify the needs and provide advice for further studies by NAGRA on the long term performance and safety of SF/HLW canisters in the Swiss repository concept. For the assessment of the

  1. Safety analysis of disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vieno, T.

    1994-04-01

    The spent fuel from the Olkiluoto NPP (TVO I and II) is planned to be disposed of in a repository to be constructed at a depth of about 500 meters in the crystalline bedrock. The thesis is dealing with the safety analysis of the disposal. The main topics presented in the thesis are: (1) The amount of radioactive properties of the spent fuel, (2) The canister design and the planned disposal concept, (3) The results of the preliminary site investigations, (4) Discussion of the multi-barrier principle, (5) The general principles and methodology of the TVO-92 safety analysis, (6) Groundwater flow analysis, (7) Durability and behaviour of the canister, (8) Biosphere analysis and reference scenario, and (9) The sensitivity and uncertainty analyses. (246 refs., 75 figs., 44 tabs.)

  2. Radiological consequences of accidents during disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a deep borehole

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grundfelt, Bertil [Kemakta Konsult AB, Stockholm (Sweden)

    2013-07-15

    In this report, an analysis of the radiological consequences of potential accidents during disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes is presented. The results presented should be seen as coarse estimates of possible radiological consequences of a canister being stuck in a borehole during disposal rather than being the results of a full safety analysis. In the concept for deep borehole disposal of spent nuclear fuel developed by Sandia National Laboratories, the fuel is assumed to be encapsulated in mild steel canisters and stacked between 3 and 5 km depth in boreholes that are cased with perforated mild steel casing tubes. The canisters are joined together by couplings to form strings of 40 canisters and lowered into the borehole. When a canister string has been emplaced in the borehole, a bridge plug is installed above the string and a 10 metres long concrete plug is cast on top of the bridge plug creating a floor for the disposal of the next sting. In total 10 canister strings, in all 400 canisters, are assumed to be disposed of at between 3 and 5 kilometres depth in one borehole. An analysis of potential accidents during the disposal operations shows that the potentially worst accident would be that a canister string is stuck above the disposal zone of a borehole and cannot be retrieved. In such a case, the borehole may have to be sealed in the best possible way and abandoned. The consequences of this could be that one or more leaking canisters are stuck in a borehole section with mobile groundwater. In the case of a leaking canister being stuck in a borehole section with mobile groundwater, the potential radiological consequences are likely to be dominated by the release of the so-called Instant Release Fraction (IRF) of the radionuclide inventory, i.e. the fraction of the radionuclides that as a consequence of the in-core conditions are present in the annulus between the fuel pellets and the cladding or on the grain boundaries of the UO{sub 2} matrix

  3. Radiological consequences of accidents during disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a deep borehole

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grundfelt, Bertil

    2013-07-01

    In this report, an analysis of the radiological consequences of potential accidents during disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes is presented. The results presented should be seen as coarse estimates of possible radiological consequences of a canister being stuck in a borehole during disposal rather than being the results of a full safety analysis. In the concept for deep borehole disposal of spent nuclear fuel developed by Sandia National Laboratories, the fuel is assumed to be encapsulated in mild steel canisters and stacked between 3 and 5 km depth in boreholes that are cased with perforated mild steel casing tubes. The canisters are joined together by couplings to form strings of 40 canisters and lowered into the borehole. When a canister string has been emplaced in the borehole, a bridge plug is installed above the string and a 10 metres long concrete plug is cast on top of the bridge plug creating a floor for the disposal of the next sting. In total 10 canister strings, in all 400 canisters, are assumed to be disposed of at between 3 and 5 kilometres depth in one borehole. An analysis of potential accidents during the disposal operations shows that the potentially worst accident would be that a canister string is stuck above the disposal zone of a borehole and cannot be retrieved. In such a case, the borehole may have to be sealed in the best possible way and abandoned. The consequences of this could be that one or more leaking canisters are stuck in a borehole section with mobile groundwater. In the case of a leaking canister being stuck in a borehole section with mobile groundwater, the potential radiological consequences are likely to be dominated by the release of the so-called Instant Release Fraction (IRF) of the radionuclide inventory, i.e. the fraction of the radionuclides that as a consequence of the in-core conditions are present in the annulus between the fuel pellets and the cladding or on the grain boundaries of the UO 2 matrix. The

  4. Criticality safety considerations in the geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gore, B.F.; McNair, G.W.; Heaberlin, S.W.

    1980-05-01

    Features of geologic disposal which hamper the demonstration that criticality cannot occur therein include possible changes of shape and form, intrusion of water as a neutron moderator, and selective leaching of spent fuel constituents. If the criticality safety of spent fuel disposal depends on burnup, independent measurements verifying the burnup should be performed prior to disposal. The status of nondestructive analysis method which might provide such verification is discussed. Calculations were performed to assess the potential for increasing the allowed size of a spent fuel disposal canister if potential water intrusion were limited by close-packing the enclosed rods. Several factors were identified which severely limited the potential of this application. The theoretical limit of hexagonal close-packing cannot be achieved due to fuel rod bowing. It is concluded that disposal canisters should be sized on the basis of assumed optimum moderation. Several topics for additional research were identified during this limited study

  5. Modeling of thermal evolution of near field area around single pit mode nuclear waste canister disposal in soft rocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bajpai, R.K.; Verma, A.K.; Maheshwar, Sachin

    2016-01-01

    Soft rocks like argillites/shales are under consideration worldwide as host rock for geological disposal of vitrified as well as spent fuel nuclear waste. The near field around disposed waste canister at 400-500m depth witnesses a complex heat field evolution due to varying thermal characteristics of rocks, coupling with hydraulic processes and varying intensity of heat flux from the canister. Smooth heat dissipation across the rock is desirable to avoid buildup of temperature beyond design limit (100 °C) and resultant micro fracturing due to thermal stresses in the rocks and intervening buffer clay layers. This also causes enhancement of hydraulic conductivity of the rocks, radionuclide transport and greater groundwater ingress towards the canister. Hence heat evolution modeling constitutes an important part of safety assessment of geological disposal facilities

  6. Production methods and costs of oxygen free copper canisters for nuclear waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aalto, H.; Rajainmaeki, H.; Laakso, L.

    1996-10-01

    The fabrication technology and costs of various manufacturing alternatives to make large copper canisters for disposal of spent nuclear fuel from reactors of Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) and Imatran Voima Oy (IVO) are discussed. The canister design is based on the Posiva's concept where solid insert structure is surrounded by the copper mantle. During recent years Outokumpu Copper Products and Posiva have continued their work on development of the copper canisters. Outokumpu Copper Products has also increased capability to manufacture these canisters. In the study the most potential manufacturing methods and their costs are discussed. The cost estimates are based on the assumption that Outokumpu will supply complete copper mantles. At the moment there are at least two commercially available production methods for copper cylinder manufacturing. These routes are based on either hot extrusion of the copper tube or hot rolling, bending and EB-welding of the tube. Trial fabrications has been carried out with both methods for the full size canisters. These trials of the canisters has shown that both the forming from rolled plate and the extrusion are possible methods for fabricating copper canisters on a full scale. (orig.) (26 refs.)

  7. Deep Borehole Disposal Concept: Development of Universal Canister Concept of Operations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rigali, Mark J. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Applied Systems Analysis and Research; Price, Laura L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Applied Systems Analysis and Research

    2016-08-01

    This report documents key elements of the conceptual design for deep borehole disposal of radioactive waste to support the development of a universal canister concept of operations. A universal canister is a canister that is designed to be able to store, transport, and dispose of radioactive waste without the canister having to be reopened to treat or repackage the waste. This report focuses on the conceptual design for disposal of radioactive waste contained in a universal canister in a deep borehole. The general deep borehole disposal concept consists of drilling a borehole into crystalline basement rock to a depth of about 5 km, emplacing WPs in the lower 2 km of the borehole, and sealing and plugging the upper 3 km. Research and development programs for deep borehole disposal have been ongoing for several years in the United States and the United Kingdom; these studies have shown that deep borehole disposal of radioactive waste could be safe, cost effective, and technically feasible. The design concepts described in this report are workable solutions based on expert judgment, and are intended to guide follow-on design activities. Both preclosure and postclosure safety were considered in the development of the reference design concept. The requirements and assumptions that form the basis for the deep borehole disposal concept include WP performance requirements, radiological protection requirements, surface handling and transport requirements, and emplacement requirements. The key features of the reference disposal concept include borehole drilling and construction concepts, WP designs, and waste handling and emplacement concepts. These features are supported by engineering analyses.

  8. Generic repository concept for RBMK-1500 spent nuclear fuel disposal in crystalline rocks in Lithuania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poskas, P.; Brazauskaite, A.; Narkunas, E.; Smaizys, A.; Sirvydas, A.

    2006-01-01

    During 2002-2005 investigations on possibilities to dispose of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Lithuania were performed with support of Swedish experts. Disposal concept for RBMK-1500 SNF in crystalline rocks in Lithuania is based on Swedish KBS-3 concept with SNF emplacement into the copper canister with cast iron insert. The bentonite and its mixture with crushed rock are also foreseen as buffer and backfill material. In this paper modelling results on thermal, criticality and other important disposal characteristics for RBMK-1500 SNF fuel emplaced in copper canisters are presented. Based on thermal calculations, the distances between the canisters and between the tunnels were justified. Criticality calculations for the canister with fresh fuel with 2.8 % 235 U enrichment demonstrated that effective neutron multiplication factor k eff values are less than allowable value of 0.95. Dose calculations have shown that total equivalent dose rate from the canister with 50 years stored RBMK-1500 SNF is rather high and is defined mainly by the γ radiation. (author)

  9. Disposal Of Spent Fuel In Salt Using Borehole Technology: BSK 3 Concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fopp, Stefan; Graf, Reinhold [GNS Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear-Service mbH, Hollestrasse 7A, D-45127 Essen (Germany); Filbert, Wolfgang [DBE TECHNOLOGY GmbH, Eschenstrasse 55, D-31224 Peine (Germany)

    2008-07-01

    The BSK 3 concept was developed for the direct disposal of spent fuel in rock salt. It is based on the conditioning of fuel assemblies and inserting fuel rods into a steel canister which can be placed in vertical boreholes. The BSK 3 canister is suitable for spent fuel rods from 3 PWR or 9 BWR fuel assemblies. The emplacement system developed for the handling and disposal of BSK 3 canisters comprises a transfer cask which provides appropriate shielding during the transport and emplacement process, a transport cart, and an emplacement device. Using the emplacement device the transfer cask will be positioned onto the top of the borehole lock. The presentation describes the development and the design of the transfer cask and the borehole lock. A technically feasible and safe design for the transfer cask and the borehole lock was found regarding the existing safety requirements for radiation shielding, heat dissipation and handling procedure. (authors)

  10. Remote controlled mover for disposal canister transfer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suikki, M.

    2013-10-01

    This working report is an update for an earlier automatic guided vehicle design (Pietikaeinen 2003). The short horizontal transfers of disposal canisters manufactured in the encapsulation process are conducted with remote controlled movers both in the encapsulation plant and in the underground areas at the canister loading station of the disposal facility. The canister mover is a remote controlled transfer vehicle mobile on wheels. The handling of canisters is conducted with the assistance of transport platforms (pallets). The very small automatic guided vehicle of the earlier design was replaced with a commercial type mover. The most important reasons for this being the increased loadbearing requirement and the simpler, proven technology of the vehicle. The larger size of the vehicle induced changes to the plant layouts and in the principles for dealing with fault conditions. The selected mover is a vehicle, which is normally operated from alongside. In this application, the vehicle steering technology must be remote controlled. In addition, the area utilization must be as efficient as possible. This is why the vehicle was downsized in its outer dimensions and supplemented with certain auxiliary equipment and structures. This enables both remote controlled operation and improves the vehicle in terms of its failure tolerance. Operation of the vehicle was subjected to a risk analysis (PFMEA) and to a separate additional calculation conserning possible canister toppling risks. The total cost estimate, without value added tax for manufacturing the system amounts to 730 000 euros. (orig.)

  11. Remote controlled mover for disposal canister transfer

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suikki, M. [Optimik Oy, Turku (Finland)

    2013-10-15

    This working report is an update for an earlier automatic guided vehicle design (Pietikaeinen 2003). The short horizontal transfers of disposal canisters manufactured in the encapsulation process are conducted with remote controlled movers both in the encapsulation plant and in the underground areas at the canister loading station of the disposal facility. The canister mover is a remote controlled transfer vehicle mobile on wheels. The handling of canisters is conducted with the assistance of transport platforms (pallets). The very small automatic guided vehicle of the earlier design was replaced with a commercial type mover. The most important reasons for this being the increased loadbearing requirement and the simpler, proven technology of the vehicle. The larger size of the vehicle induced changes to the plant layouts and in the principles for dealing with fault conditions. The selected mover is a vehicle, which is normally operated from alongside. In this application, the vehicle steering technology must be remote controlled. In addition, the area utilization must be as efficient as possible. This is why the vehicle was downsized in its outer dimensions and supplemented with certain auxiliary equipment and structures. This enables both remote controlled operation and improves the vehicle in terms of its failure tolerance. Operation of the vehicle was subjected to a risk analysis (PFMEA) and to a separate additional calculation conserning possible canister toppling risks. The total cost estimate, without value added tax for manufacturing the system amounts to 730 000 euros. (orig.)

  12. Drop of canistered spent fuel segments into a deep borehole and subsequent aerosol release

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bantle, S.; Herbe, H.; Miu, J.

    1991-09-01

    The source term of the released aerosols is estimated. First, the number of failing canisters is calculated for the case of an axial symmetric canister (POLLUX) pile, and then, for the case of a 'zig-zag' pile, as found in reality. The weight-specific energy acting on the fuel - a measure for the degree of fuel fractioning - is determined from the acceleration acting on the pin segments. In the borehole prevails a steady-state flow pattern which is stimulated by the heat of the disposed waste canister, and is also influenced by the ventilation of the drift above the borehole. Based on this stationary flow pattern flow velocities are calculated by means of fluid mechanical methods. Further investigations deal with the unsteady case which occurs during and immediately after the canister drop as well as with the wake behind the canister. The most relevant result is that under the considered boundary conditions no release form the borehole into the repository is to be expected. (orig./HP) [de

  13. Disposal of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blomeke, J.O.; Ferguson, D.E.; Croff, A.G.

    1978-01-01

    Based on preliminary analyses, spent fuel assemblies are an acceptable form for waste disposal. The following studies appear necessary to bring our knowledge of spent fuel as a final disposal form to a level comparable with that of the solidified wastes from reprocessing: 1. A complete systems analysis is needed of spent fuel disposition from reactor discharge to final isolation in a repository. 2. Since it appears desirable to encase the spent fuel assembly in a metal canister, candidate materials for this container need to be studied. 3. It is highly likely that some ''filler'' material will be needed between the fuel elements and the can. 4. Leachability, stability, and waste-rock interaction studies should be carried out on the fuels. The major disadvantages of spent fuel as a disposal form are the lower maximum heat loading, 60 kW/acre versus 150 kW/acre for high-level waste from a reprocessing plant; the greater long-term potential hazard due to the larger quantities of plutonium and uranium introduced into a repository; and the possibility of criticality in case the repository is breached. The major advantages are the lower cost and increased near-term safety resulting from eliminating reprocessing and the treatment and handling of the wastes therefrom

  14. Canister arrangement for storing radioactive waste

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lorenzo, D.K.; Van Cleve, J.E. Jr.

    1980-04-23

    The subject invention relates to a canister arrangement for jointly storing high level radioactive chemical waste and metallic waste resulting from the reprocessing of nuclear reactor fuel elements. A cylindrical steel canister is provided with an elongated centrally disposed billet of the metallic waste and the chemical waste in vitreous form is disposed in the annulus surrounding the billet.

  15. Performance Specification Shippinpark Pressurized Water Reactor Fuel Drying and Canister Inerting System for PWR Core 2 Blanket Fuel Assemblies Stored within Shippingport Spent Fuel Canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOHNSON, D.M.

    2000-01-01

    This specification establishes the performance requirements and basic design requirements imposed on the fuel drying and canister inerting system for Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Core 2 blanket fuel assemblies (BFAs) stored within Shippingport spent fuel (SSFCs) canisters (fuel drying and canister inerting system). This fuel drying and canister inerting system is a component of the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) Spent Nuclear Fuels Project at the Hanford Site. The fuel drying and canister inerting system provides for removing water and establishing an inert environment for Shippingport PWR Core 2 BFAs stored within SSFCs. A policy established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) states that new SNF facilities (this is interpreted to include structures, systems and components) shall achieve nuclear safety equivalence to comparable U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-licensed facilities. This will be accomplished in part by applying appropriate NRC requirements for comparable NRC-licensed facilities to the fuel drying and canister inerting system, in addition to applicable DOE regulations and orders

  16. Rates and mechanisms of radioactive release and retention inside a waste disposal canister - in Can Processes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oversby, V.M. (ed.) [and others

    2003-10-01

    Sweden and Finland are planning to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in a deep underground repository constructed in granitic rock. Each country is investigating candidate sites and developing the scientific and technical basis for assessing the safety of an eventual repository. An essential part of the safety assessment involves understanding the behaviour of the spent fuel after it is placed in the geologic environment. The fuel will be sealed inside a copper canister that contains a cast iron insert. The copper functions as a corrosion resistant barrier, while the cast iron insert fills much of the internal void space, adding strength to the canister and reducing the space available for water to accumulate inside the canister after the corrosion barrier is breached. The canisters will be surrounded by compressed bentonite, which will limit the access of water and dissolved species to the canister. Oxygen that is initially present when the disposal environment is sealed will be rapidly consumed by pyrite in the bentonite, bacterial species in the rock, and reduced inorganic materials in the rock. The copper canister will prevent access of water to the iron until it is corroded through, a process that is expected to take millions of years. After water contacts the iron, anaerobic corrosion of the insert will generate hydrogen gas and introduce Fe(II) ions into the water. The long-term environment for the fuel, therefore, is a highly reducing environment. The only possible source of oxidising agents is radiolysis of the water by radiation from the fuel. In the long-term, the radioactivity in the fuel is due to isotopes that decay by alpha decay; most of the activity from beta and gamma radiation will have decayed away. Spent fuel that is available for testing contains high levels of beta and gamma activity. Even when testing is done in the presence of hydrogen or actively corroding iron, the radiolysis due to beta and gamma radiation can introduce oxidising agents into

  17. Volumes, Masses, and Surface Areas for Shippingport LWBR Spent Nuclear Fuel in a DOE SNF Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    J.W. Davis

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this calculation is to estimate volumes, masses, and surface areas associated with (a) an empty Department of Energy (DOE) 18-inch diameter, 15-ft long spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canister, (b) an empty DOE 24-inch diameter, 15-ft long SNF canister, (c) Shippingport Light Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR) SNF, and (d) the internal basket structure for the 18-in. canister that has been designed specifically to accommodate Seed fuel from the Shippingport LWBR. Estimates of volumes, masses, and surface areas are needed as input to structural, thermal, geochemical, nuclear criticality, and radiation shielding calculations to ensure the viability of the proposed disposal configuration

  18. Multi-Pack Disposal Concepts for Spent Fuel (Revision 1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hardin, Ernest; Matteo, Edward N.; Hadgu, Teklu

    2016-01-01

    At the initiation of the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) R&D campaign, international geologic disposal programs and past work in the U.S. were surveyed to identify viable disposal concepts for crystalline, clay/shale, and salt host media. Concepts for disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) from reprocessing are relatively advanced in countries such as Finland, France, and Sweden. The UFD work quickly showed that these international concepts are all "enclosed,"whereby waste packages are emplaced in direct or close contact with natural or engineered materials . Alternative "open"modes (emplacement tunnels are kept open after emplacement for extended ventilation) have been limited to the Yucca Mountain License Application Design. Thermal analysis showed that if "enclosed"concepts are constrained by peak package/buffer temperature, that waste package capacity is limited to 4 PWR assemblies (or 9 BWR) in all media except salt. This information motivated separate studies: 1) extend the peak temperature tolerance of backfill materials, which is ongoing; and 2) develop small canisters (up to 4-PWR size) that can be grouped in larger multi-pack units for convenience of storage, transportation, and possibly disposal (should the disposal concept permit larger packages). A recent result from the second line of investigation is the Task Order 18 report: Generic Design for Small Standardized Transportation, Aging and Disposal Canister Systems. This report identifies disposal concepts for the small canisters (4-PWR size) drawing heavily on previous work, and for the multi-pack (16-PWR or 36-BWR).

  19. Multi-Pack Disposal Concepts for Spent Fuel (Revision 1)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hardin, Ernest [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Matteo, Edward N. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hadgu, Teklu [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2016-01-01

    At the initiation of the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) R&D campaign, international geologic disposal programs and past work in the U.S. were surveyed to identify viable disposal concepts for crystalline, clay/shale, and salt host media. Concepts for disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) from reprocessing are relatively advanced in countries such as Finland, France, and Sweden. The UFD work quickly showed that these international concepts are all “enclosed,” whereby waste packages are emplaced in direct or close contact with natural or engineered materials . Alternative “open” modes (emplacement tunnels are kept open after emplacement for extended ventilation) have been limited to the Yucca Mountain License Application Design. Thermal analysis showed that if “enclosed” concepts are constrained by peak package/buffer temperature, that waste package capacity is limited to 4 PWR assemblies (or 9 BWR) in all media except salt. This information motivated separate studies: 1) extend the peak temperature tolerance of backfill materials, which is ongoing; and 2) develop small canisters (up to 4-PWR size) that can be grouped in larger multi-pack units for convenience of storage, transportation, and possibly disposal (should the disposal concept permit larger packages). A recent result from the second line of investigation is the Task Order 18 report: Generic Design for Small Standardized Transportation, Aging and Disposal Canister Systems. This report identifies disposal concepts for the small canisters (4-PWR size) drawing heavily on previous work, and for the multi-pack (16-PWR or 36-BWR).

  20. Canisters and nonfuel components at commercial nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibbard, K.; Disbrow, J.

    1994-01-01

    This paper discusses detailed data on canisters and nonfuel components (NFC) at US commercial nuclear power reactors. A wide variety of NFC have been reported on the Form RW-859, open-quotes Nuclear Fuel Dataclose quotes survey. They may have been integral with an assembly, noncanistered in baskets, destined for disposal as low-level radioactive waste, or stored in canisters. Similarly, data on the family of canistered spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in storage pools was compiled. Approximately 85 percent of the 40,194 pieces of nonfuel assembly (NFA) hardware reported were integral with an assembly. This represents data submitted by 95 of the 107 reactors in 10 generic assembly classes. In addition, a total of 286 canisters have been reported as being in storage pools as of December 31, 1992. However, an additional 264 open baskets were also reported to contain miscellaneous SNF and nonfuel materials, garbage and debris. All of these 286 canisters meet the dimensional envelope requirements specified for disposal for open-quotes standard fuelclose quotes under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (10 CFR 961); most of the baskets do not

  1. Effect of canister size on costs of disposal of SRP high-level wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDonell, W.R.

    1982-01-01

    The current plan for managing the high-level nuclear wastes at the Savannah River Plant (SRP) calls for processing them into solid forms contained in stainless steel canisters for eventual disposal in a federal geologic repository. A new SRP facility called the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is being designed for the onsite waste processing operations. Preliminary evaluations indicate that costs of the overall disposal operation will depend significantly on the size of the canisters, which determines the number of waste forms to be processed. The objective of this study was to evaluate the effects of canister size on costs of DWPF process operations, including canister procurement, waste solidification, and interim storage, on offsite transport, and on repository costs of disposal, including provision of suitable waste packages

  2. Multi-pack Disposal Concepts for Spent Fuel (Rev. 0)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hadgu, Teklu [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hardin, Ernest [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Matteo, Edward N. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-12-01

    At the initiation of the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) R&D campaign, international geologic disposal programs and past work in the U.S. were surveyed to identify viable disposal concepts for crystalline, clay/shale, and salt host media (Hardin et al., 2012). Concepts for disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste (HLW) from reprocessing are relatively advanced in countries such as Finland, France, and Sweden. The UFD work quickly showed that these international concepts are all “enclosed,” whereby waste packages are emplaced in direct or close contact with natural or engineered materials . Alternative “open” modes (emplacement tunnels are kept open after emplacement for extended ventilation) have been limited to the Yucca Mountain License Application Design (CRWMS M&O, 1999). Thermal analysis showed that, if “enclosed” concepts are constrained by peak package/buffer temperature, waste package capacity is limited to 4 PWR assemblies (or 9-BWR) in all media except salt. This information motivated separate studies: 1) extend the peak temperature tolerance of backfill materials, which is ongoing; and 2) develop small canisters (up to 4-PWR size) that can be grouped in larger multi-pack units for convenience of storage, transportation, and possibly disposal (should the disposal concept permit larger packages). A recent result from the second line of investigation is the Task Order 18 report: Generic Design for Small Standardized Transportation, Aging and Disposal Canister Systems (EnergySolution, 2015). This report identifies disposal concepts for the small canisters (4-PWR size) drawing heavily on previous work, and for the multi-pack (16-PWR or 36-BWR).

  3. Final disposal of spent fuel in the Finnish bedrock

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-12-01

    Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) is preparing for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel from the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (TVO-I and TVO-II reactors). According to present estimates, a total of 1840 tU of spent fuel will be accumulated during the 40-year lifetime of the power plant. An interim storage facility for spent fuel (TVO-KPA Store) has operated at Olkiluoto since 1987. The spent fuel will be held in storage for several decades before it is shipped to the repository site. Both train and road transportation are possible. The spent fuel will be encapsulated in composite copper and steel canisters (ACP Canister) in a facility that will be build above the ground on the site where the repository is located. The repository will be constructed at the depth of several hundreds of meters in the bedrock. In 1987 five areas were selected for preliminary site investigations. The safety analysis (TVO-92) that was carried out shows that the proposed safety criteria would be met at each of the candidate sites. In future expected conditions there would never be significant releases of radioactive substances to the biosphere. The site investigations will be continued in the period 1993 to 2000. In parallel, a R and D programme will be devoted to the safety and technology of final disposal. The site for final disposal will be selected in the year 2000 with the aim of having the capability to start the disposal operations in 2020

  4. Development of ultrasonic immersion inspection technique for spent fuel canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schankula, J.J.

    1982-07-01

    This report summarizes ultrasonic nondestructive testing development for metal matrix supported spent fuel disposal canisters. The work has concentated in two areas: inspection for lack of bond at the shell/matrix interface and inspection for voids in the matrix. The capabilities and limitations of these techniques have been fully established. Unbonded areas as small as 4 mm in diameter and voids 6 mm in diameter, 25 mm deep in the matrix, can readily be detected

  5. The design analysis of ACP-canister for nuclear waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.

    1992-05-01

    The design basis, dimensioning and some manufacturing aspects of the Advanced Cold Process Canister (ACPC) for the nuclear waste disposal is summarized in the report. The strength of the canister has been evaluated in normal design load condition and in extreme high hydrostatic pressure load condition possibly caused by ice age (orig.)

  6. Development of geological disposal system for spent fuels and high-level radioactive wastes in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Heui Joo; Lee, Jong Youl; Choi, Jong Won

    2013-01-01

    Two different kinds of nuclear power plants produce a substantial amount of spent fuel annually in Korea. According to the current projection, it is expected that around 60,000 MtU of spent fuel will be produced from 36 PWR and APR reactors and 4 CANDU reactors by the end of 2089. In 2006, KAERI proposed a conceptual design of a geological disposal system (called KRS, Korean Reference disposal System for spent fuel) for PWR and CANDU spent fuel, as a product of a 4-year research project from 2003 to 2006. The major result of the research was that it was feasible to construct a direct disposal system for 20,000 MtU of PWR spent fuels and 16,000 MtU of CANDU spent fuel in the Korean peninsula. Recently, KAERI and MEST launched a project to develop an advanced fuel cycle based on the pyroprocessing of PWR spent fuel to reduce the amount of HLW and reuse the valuable fissile material in PWR spent fuel. Thus, KAERI has developed a geological disposal system for high-level waste from the pyroprocessing of PWR spent fuel since 2007. However, since no decision was made for the CANDU spent fuel, KAERI improved the disposal density of KRS by introducing several improved concepts for the disposal canister. In this paper, the geological disposal systems developed so far are briefly outlined. The amount and characteristics of spent fuel and HLW, 4 kinds of disposal canisters, the characteristics of a buffer with domestic Ca-bentonite, and the results of a thermal design of deposition holes and disposal tunnels are described. The different disposal systems are compared in terms of their disposal density.

  7. Feasibility study for a DOE research and production fuel multipurpose canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopez, D.A.; Abbott, D.G.

    1994-02-01

    This is a report of the feasibility of multipurpose canisters for transporting, storing, and sing of Department of Energy research and production spent nuclear fuel. Six representative Department of Energy fuel assemblies were selected, and preconceptual canister designs were developed to accommodate these assemblies. The study considered physical interface, structural adequacy, criticality safety, shielding capability, thermal performance of the canisters, and fuel storage site infrastructure. The external envelope of the canisters was designed to fit within the overpack casks for commercial canisters being developed for the Department of Energy Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. The budgetary cost of canisters to handle all fuel considered is estimated at $170.8M. One large conceptual boiling water reactor canister design, developed for the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, and two new canister designs can accommodate at least 85% of the volume of the Department of Energy fuel considered. Canister use minimizes public radiation exposure and is cost effective compared with bare fuel handling. Results suggest the need for additional study of issues affecting canister use and for conceptual design development of the three canisters

  8. Canister Cleaning System Final Design Report - Project A.2.A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FARWICK, C.C.

    2000-01-01

    Approximately 2,300 metric tons Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) are currently stored within two water filled pools, the 105 K East (KE) fuel storage basin and the 105 K West (KW) fuel storage basin, at the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The SNF Project is responsible for operation of the K Basins and for the materials within them. A subproject to the SNF Project is the Debris Removal Subproject, which is responsible for removal of empty canisters and lids from the basins. The Canister Cleaning System (CCS) is part of the Debris Removal Project. The CCS will be installed in the KW Basin and operated during the fuel removal activity. The KW Basin has approximately 3600 canisters that require removal from the basin. The CCS is being designed to ''clean'' empty fuel canisters and lids and package them for disposal to the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility complex. The system will interface with the KW Basin and be located in the Dummy Elevator Pit

  9. Choices of canisters and elements for the first fuel and canister sludge shipment from K East Basin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Makenas, B.J.

    1996-01-01

    The K East Basin contains open-top canisters with up to fourteen N Reactor fuel assemblies distributed between the two barrels of each canister. Each fuel assembly generally consists of inner and outer concentric elements fabricated from uranium metal with zirconium alloy cladding. The canisters also contain varying amounts of accumulated sludge. Retrieval of sample fuel elements and associated sludge for examination is scheduled to occur in the near future. The purpose of this document is to specify particular canisters and elements of interest as candidate sources of fuel and sludge to be shipped to laboratories

  10. Desludging of N Reactor fuel canisters: Analysis, Test, and data requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, A.B. Jr.

    1996-01-01

    The N Reactor fuel is currently stored in canisters in the K East (KE) and K West (KW) Basins. In KE, the canisters have open tops; in KW, the cans have sealed lids, but are vented to release gases. Corrosion products have formed on exposed uranium metal fuel, on carbon steel basin component surfaces, and on aluminum alloy canister surfaces. Much of the corrosion product is retained on the corroding surfaces; however, large inventories of particulates have been released. Some of the corrosion product particulates form sludge on the basin floors; some particulates are retained within the canisters. The floor sludge inventories are much greater in the KE Basin than in the KW Basin because KE Basin operated longer and its water chemistry was less controlled. Another important factor is the absence of lids on the KE canisters, allowing uranium corrosion products to escape and water-borne species, principally iron oxides, to settle in the canisters. The inventories of corrosion products, including those released as particulates inside the canisters, are only beginning to be characterized for the closed canisters in KW Basin. The dominant species in the KE floor sludge are oxides of aluminum, iron, and uranium. A large fraction of the aluminum and uranium floor sludge particulates may have been released during a major fuel segregation campaign in the 1980s, when fuel was emptied from 4990 canisters. Handling and jarring of the fuel and aluminum canisters seems likely to have released particulates from the heavily corroded surfaces. Four candidate methods are discussed for dealing with canister sludge emerged in the N Reactor fuel path forward: place fuel in multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) without desludging; drill holes in canisters and drain; drill holes in canisters and flush with water; and remove sludge and repackage the fuel

  11. Structural Integrity Evaluation for Damaged Fuel Canister of a Research Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oh, Jinho; Kwak, Jinsung; Lee, Sangjin; Lee, Jongmin; Ryu, Jeong-Soo

    2016-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to confirm the structural integrity of damaged fuel canister through the numerical simulation. The analysis results of canister including damaged fuel are evaluated with design limits of the ASME Sec. III NF Codes and Standards. The main function of canister is to store and protect the damaged fuel assembly generated from the operation of the research reactor. The canister is classified into safety class NNS (Non-nuclear Safety) and seismic category II. The shape of the canister is designed into commercialized circular tube due to economic benefit and easy manufacturing. The damaged fuel assembly is loaded in a dedicated canister by using special tool and supported by lower block in the canister. Then it is move into the damaged fuel storage rack under safeguards arrangements. The canister is securely supported at guide plate and base plate of rack. The structural integrity evaluation for the canister is performed by using response spectrum analysis. The analysis results show that the stress intensity of the canister under the seismic loads is within the ASME Code limits. Thus, the validity of the present design of the canister has been demonstrated

  12. Structural Integrity Evaluation for Damaged Fuel Canister of a Research Reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oh, Jinho; Kwak, Jinsung; Lee, Sangjin; Lee, Jongmin; Ryu, Jeong-Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The purpose of this document is to confirm the structural integrity of damaged fuel canister through the numerical simulation. The analysis results of canister including damaged fuel are evaluated with design limits of the ASME Sec. III NF Codes and Standards. The main function of canister is to store and protect the damaged fuel assembly generated from the operation of the research reactor. The canister is classified into safety class NNS (Non-nuclear Safety) and seismic category II. The shape of the canister is designed into commercialized circular tube due to economic benefit and easy manufacturing. The damaged fuel assembly is loaded in a dedicated canister by using special tool and supported by lower block in the canister. Then it is move into the damaged fuel storage rack under safeguards arrangements. The canister is securely supported at guide plate and base plate of rack. The structural integrity evaluation for the canister is performed by using response spectrum analysis. The analysis results show that the stress intensity of the canister under the seismic loads is within the ASME Code limits. Thus, the validity of the present design of the canister has been demonstrated.

  13. DEVELOPMENT OF GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL SYSTEMS FOR SPENT FUELS AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN KOREA

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    HEUI-JOO CHOI

    2013-02-01

    Full Text Available Two different kinds of nuclear power plants produce a substantial amount of spent fuel annually in Korea. According to the current projection, it is expected that around 60,000 MtU of spent fuel will be produced from 36 PWR and APR reactors and 4 CANDU reactors by the end of 2089. In 2006, KAERI proposed a conceptual design of a geological disposal system (called KRS, Korean Reference disposal System for spent fuel for PWR and CANDU spent fuel, as a product of a 4-year research project from 2003 to 2006. The major result of the research was that it was feasible to construct a direct disposal system for 20,000 MtU of PWR spent fuels and 16,000 MtU of CANDU spent fuel in the Korean peninsula. Recently, KAERI and MEST launched a project to develop an advanced fuel cycle based on the pyroprocessing of PWR spent fuel to reduce the amount of HLW and reuse the valuable fissile material in PWR spent fuel. Thus, KAERI has developed a geological disposal system for high-level waste from the pyroprocessing of PWR spent fuel since 2007. However, since no decision was made for the CANDU spent fuel, KAERI improved the disposal density of KRS by introducing several improved concepts for the disposal canister. In this paper, the geological disposal systems developed so far are briefly outlined. The amount and characteristics of spent fuel and HLW, 4 kinds of disposal canisters, the characteristics of a buffer with domestic Ca-bentonite, and the results of a thermal design of deposition holes and disposal tunnels are described. The different disposal systems are compared in terms of their disposal density.

  14. Human health considerations in the assessment of Canadian concept for the disposal of nuclear fuel wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baweja, A.S.; Tracy, B.L.; Ahier, B.; Bartlett, S.

    1996-01-01

    In 1978, AECL was mandated by the government of Ontario and the federal government to find a permanent disposal solution for spent nuclear fuels. Canada opted for disposal in plutonic rocks of the Canadian shield. The Canadian concept calls for disposal in crystalline rocks at a depth of 500 to 1000 m below the surface. The spent fuel would be contained in a canister, the canister would be emplaced in a vault containing clay-based buffer materials, and the cavity would be backfilled and sealed with natural materials. A Federal Environmental Assessment Review Panel was formed in 1992 to assess the concept for disposal of the spent fuel. In this paper a brief discussion of the human health impacts of the proposed concept is presented. Our assessment is based on the information provided by AECL, namely, the main EIS document, a summary and nine other supporting documents

  15. Inspection of disposal canisters components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitkaenen, J.

    2013-12-01

    This report presents the inspection techniques of disposal canister components. Manufacturing methods and a description of the defects related to different manufacturing methods are described briefly. The defect types form a basis for the design of non-destructive testing because the defect types, which occur in the inspected components, affect to choice of inspection methods. The canister components are to nodular cast iron insert, steel lid, lid screw, metal gasket, copper tube with integrated or separate bottom, and copper lid. The inspection of copper material is challenging due to the anisotropic properties of the material and local changes in the grain size of the copper material. The cast iron insert has some acoustical material property variation (attenuation, velocity changes, scattering properties), which make the ultrasonic inspection demanding from calibration point of view. Mainly three different methods are used for inspection. Ultrasonic testing technique is used for inspection of volume, eddy current technique, for copper components only, and visual testing technique are used for inspection of the surface and near surface area

  16. Thermohydraulic analysis of BWR and PWR spent fuel assemblies contained within square canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiles, L.E.; McCann, R.A.

    1981-09-01

    This report presents the results of several thermohydraulic simulations of spent fuel assembly/canister configurations performed in support of a program investigating the feasibility of storing spent nuclear fuel assemblies in canisters that would be stored in an air environment. Eleven thermohydraulic simulations were performed. Five simulations were performed using a single BWR fuel assembly/canister design. The various cases were defined by changing the canister spacing and the heat generation rate of the fuel assembly. For each simulation a steady-state thermohydraulic solution was achieved for the region inside the canister. Similarly, six simulations were performed for a single PWR fuel assembly/canister design. The square fuel rod arrays were contained in square canisters which would permit closer packing of the canisters in a storage facility. However, closer packing of the canisters would result in higher fuel temperatures which would possibly have an adverse impact on fuel integrity. Thus, the most important aspect of the analysis was to define the peak fuel assembly temperatures for each case. These results are presented along with various temperature profiles, heat flux distributions, and air velocity profiles within the canister. 48 figures, 4 tables

  17. Background information for NDT qualification of Finnish disposal canisters of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sarkimo, M.; Pitkaenen, J.

    2013-12-01

    This report presents a review to basic concepts, which are applied in the qualification of non-destructive testing (NDT) techniques. The qualification systems developed and used in some countries are briefly described in the beginning of the report. Anyway the report mainly discusses the qualification practices applied in the Finnish nuclear industry. The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in the YVL Guide 3.8 define the Finnish qualification approach applied for the in-service inspections. The principles presented in this document follow the views of the international organisations: Nuclear Regulator Working Group (NRWG) and European Network for Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ). For the practical qualification work a national guideline is established using so called SP-documents that include specific rules and instructions for execution of qualifications in accordance with YVL Guide 3.8 principles. Altogether the Finnish qualification system can be seen very well to follow the European (ENIQ) methodology. The report discusses several qualification terms and documents. Thus the normally necessary tasks and parts of a qualification are described. The qualification can be seen as a project that includes several tasks, which will be performed by different parties. Enough resources and time should be reserved for the planning and control of a qualification project to ensure its fluent progress. Some tasks are discussed in the report taking into account the situation in the qualification cases that are seen to be linked to the inspections of disposal canisters of spent fuel. (orig.)

  18. Background information for NDT qualification of Finnish disposal canisters of spent fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sarkimo, M. [VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo (Finland); Pitkaenen, J.

    2013-12-15

    This report presents a review to basic concepts, which are applied in the qualification of non-destructive testing (NDT) techniques. The qualification systems developed and used in some countries are briefly described in the beginning of the report. Anyway the report mainly discusses the qualification practices applied in the Finnish nuclear industry. The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in the YVL Guide 3.8 define the Finnish qualification approach applied for the in-service inspections. The principles presented in this document follow the views of the international organisations: Nuclear Regulator Working Group (NRWG) and European Network for Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ). For the practical qualification work a national guideline is established using so called SP-documents that include specific rules and instructions for execution of qualifications in accordance with YVL Guide 3.8 principles. Altogether the Finnish qualification system can be seen very well to follow the European (ENIQ) methodology. The report discusses several qualification terms and documents. Thus the normally necessary tasks and parts of a qualification are described. The qualification can be seen as a project that includes several tasks, which will be performed by different parties. Enough resources and time should be reserved for the planning and control of a qualification project to ensure its fluent progress. Some tasks are discussed in the report taking into account the situation in the qualification cases that are seen to be linked to the inspections of disposal canisters of spent fuel. (orig.)

  19. Fuel canister and blockage pin fabrication for SLSF Experiment P4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rhude, H.V.; Folkrod, J.R.; Noland, R.A.; Schaus, P.S.; Benecke, M.W.; Delucchi, T.A.

    1983-01-01

    As part of its fast breeder reactor safety research program, Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has conducted an experiment (SLSF Experiment P4) to determine the extent of fuel-failure propagation resulting from the release of molten fuel from one or more heat-generating fuel canisters. The test conditions consisted of 37 full-length FTR fuel pins operating at FTR rated core nominal peak fuel/reduced coolant conditions. Thirty-four of the the fuel pins were prototypical FTR mixed-oxide fuel pins. The other three fuel pins were fabricated with a mid-core section having an enlarged canister containing fully enriched UO 2 . Two of the canisters were cylindrical and one was fluted. The cylindrical canisters were designed to fail and release molten fuel into the 37-pin fuel cluster at near full power

  20. Interim report on safety assessment of spent fuel disposal TILA-96

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vieno, T.; Nordman, H. [VTT Energy, Espoo (Finland)

    1996-12-01

    The TILA-96 study, a continuation and update of the TVO-92 safety analysis for Finnish radioactive waste disposal, confirms that the planned system for spent fuel disposal fulfills the proposed safety criteria. Provided that no major disruptive event hits the repository, initially intact copper canisters preserve their integrity for millions of years and no significant amount of radioactive substances will ever escape from the repository. Impacts of potential canister failures have been analysed employing conservative assumptions, models and data. In the case of single canister failures, the results show that the margin to the proposed regulatory criteria is more than three orders of magnitude in the dose rate and more than four orders of magnitude in the release rates into the biosphere. Even in the extreme cases, where all 1500 canisters are assumed to be initially defective or to disappear simultaneously at 10 000 years in the worst possible location in the repository, all the proposed safety criteria would be passed. When realistic modelling and data are used in the consequence analyses, the results show negligible releases and doses. (refs.).

  1. Interim report on safety assessment of spent fuel disposal TILA-96

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vieno, T.; Nordman, H.

    1996-12-01

    The TILA-96 study, a continuation and update of the TVO-92 safety analysis for Finnish radioactive waste disposal, confirms that the planned system for spent fuel disposal fulfills the proposed safety criteria. Provided that no major disruptive event hits the repository, initially intact copper canisters preserve their integrity for millions of years and no significant amount of radioactive substances will ever escape from the repository. Impacts of potential canister failures have been analysed employing conservative assumptions, models and data. In the case of single canister failures, the results show that the margin to the proposed regulatory criteria is more than three orders of magnitude in the dose rate and more than four orders of magnitude in the release rates into the biosphere. Even in the extreme cases, where all 1500 canisters are assumed to be initially defective or to disappear simultaneously at 10 000 years in the worst possible location in the repository, all the proposed safety criteria would be passed. When realistic modelling and data are used in the consequence analyses, the results show negligible releases and doses. (refs.)

  2. Canister materials proposed for final disposal of high level nuclear waste - a review with respect to corrosion resistance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mattsson, E; Odoj, R; Merz, E [eds.

    1981-06-01

    Spent fuel from nuclear reactors has to be disposed of either after reprocessing or without such treatment. Due to toxic radiation the nuclear waste has to be isolated from the biosphere for 300-1000 years, or in extreme cases for more than 100,000 years. The nuclear waste will be enclosed in corrosion resistant canisters. These will be deposited in repositories in geological formations, such as granite, basalt, clay, bedded or domed salt, or the sediments beneath the deep ocean floor. There the canisters will be exposed to groundwater, brine or seawater at an elevated temperature. Species formed by radiolysis may affect the corrosivity of the agent. The corrosion resistance of candidate canister materials is evaluated by corrosion tests and by thermodynamic and mass transport calculations. Examination of ancient metal objects after long exposure in nature may give additional information. On the basis of the work carried out so far, the principal candidate canister materials are titanium materials, copper and high purity alumina.

  3. Physical properties of encapsulate spent fuel in canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    Spent fuel and high-level wastes will be permanently stored in a deep geological repository (AGP). Prior to this, they will be encapsulated in canisters. The present report is dedicated to the study of such canisters under the different physical demands that they may undergo, be those in operating or accident conditions. The physical demands of interest include mechanical demands, both static and dynamic, and thermal demands. Consideration is given to the complete file of the canister, from the time when it is empty and without lid to the final conditions expected in the repository. Thermal analyses of canisters containing spent fuel are often carried out in two dimensions, some times with hypotheses of axial symmetry and some times using a plane transverse section through the centre of the canister. The results obtained in both types of analyses are compared here to those of complete three-dimensional analyses. The latter generate more reliable information about the temperatures that may be experienced by the canister and its contents; they also allow calibrating the errors embodied in the two-dimensional calculations. (Author)

  4. A study of the operational logistics in the disposal plant for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sylvaenne, O.; Kaskinen, T.; Kuussaari, P.

    2003-02-01

    The final disposal plant for spent nuclear fuel comprises an encapsulation facility that will be built on the surface, other support activities above ground, and a repository that will be constructed deep in the bedrock. This report analyses the final repository operational logistics. The desktop research report is compiled of data taken from several existing planning reports covering the planning periods 1997-2002. The logistics specialised description of the final repository considers most areas in the daily operation of the facility. Among these are: Disposal tunnel excavation; construction and transports; Tunnel preparation for canisters; Reception of spent nuclear fuel transport casks; Encapsulation process; Preparation of bentonite blocks for canister holes, block laying; Final disposal of canisters; and Preparation of backfilling material and backfilling. The transport and handling volumes have certain cycles. Rock will be excavated during one contiguous period in 3 years, backfilling takes two weeks in a month and the deposition of canisters also two weeks. Thus the material flows vary greatly due to their cyclical nature. The transport and handling volumes are considerable, by far largest single item being excavated rock with about 5000 annual truck loads during the active excavation period, backfilling is about 1300 loads yearly at a steady pace. The report covers and summarises material flows, handling methods and equipment, buffering, storage and transports. It suggests some changes to operational procedures. Proposals have been made as to the location of the encapsulation facility and the methods of material transport. The logistical 'hot' issues, entry of the main transport ramp, rock field, rock crushing process, bentonite storage, bentonite brick production and backfiller production are all proposed to be located close to each other to minimise driving distance. It has also been proposed that the bentonite block buffer should rather be located at

  5. Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Can

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, Lars

    2006-10-01

    This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The report is written by, and for, experts in the relevant scientific fields. It should though be possible for a generalist in the area of long-term safety assessments of geologic nuclear waste repositories to comprehend the contents of the report. The report is an important part of the documentation of the SR-Can project and an essential reference within the project, providing a scientifically motivated plan for the handling of geosphere processes. It is, furthermore, foreseen that the report will be essential for reviewers scrutinising the handling of geosphere issues in the SR-Can assessment. Several types of fuel will be emplaced in the repository. For the reference case with 40 years of reactor operation, the fuel quantity from boiling water reactors, BWR fuel, is estimated at 7,000 tonnes, while the quantity from pressurized water reactors, PWR fuel, is estimated at about 2,300 tonnes. In addition, 23 tonnes of mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fuel of German origin from BWR and PWR reactors and 20 tonnes of fuel from the decommissioned heavy water reactor in Aagesta will be disposed of. To allow for future changes in the Swedish nuclear programme, the safety assessment assumes a total of 6,000 canister corresponding to 12,000 tonnes of fuel

  6. Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Can

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Werme, Lars (ed.)

    2006-10-15

    This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The report is written by, and for, experts in the relevant scientific fields. It should though be possible for a generalist in the area of long-term safety assessments of geologic nuclear waste repositories to comprehend the contents of the report. The report is an important part of the documentation of the SR-Can project and an essential reference within the project, providing a scientifically motivated plan for the handling of geosphere processes. It is, furthermore, foreseen that the report will be essential for reviewers scrutinising the handling of geosphere issues in the SR-Can assessment. Several types of fuel will be emplaced in the repository. For the reference case with 40 years of reactor operation, the fuel quantity from boiling water reactors, BWR fuel, is estimated at 7,000 tonnes, while the quantity from pressurized water reactors, PWR fuel, is estimated at about 2,300 tonnes. In addition, 23 tonnes of mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) fuel of German origin from BWR and PWR reactors and 20 tonnes of fuel from the decommissioned heavy water reactor in Aagesta will be disposed of. To allow for future changes in the Swedish nuclear programme, the safety assessment assumes a total of 6,000 canister corresponding to 12,000 tonnes of fuel.

  7. A welding system for spent fuel canister lid

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suikki, M.; Wendelin, T.

    2008-06-01

    The report presents a proposed welding system for spent fuel canister lids. The system is used for welding the copper lid to the copper overpack. The apparatus will be installed in the encapsulation plant. The report presents basic requirements for and implementation of the welding system, operation, service and maintenance of the equipment, as well as a cost estimate. Some aspects of the apparatus design are quite specified, but the actual detailed planning and final selection of components is not included. The report also describes actions for possible malfunction and fault conditions. Closing of the copper cylinder's lid is carried out by electron beam welding, which must be performed in vacuum. The welding system for spent fuel canister lid consists of two welding chambers, a canister docking system, an EB-welding machine with its accessories, a vacuum apparatus, as well as necessary auxiliary equipment. The system's equipment is housed in a welding room, an auxiliary system room, an operation control room, as well as mounted on the ceiling of a transfer corridor. One of the welding chambers is intended for carrying out test welding procedures and for calibration of welding parameters. The actual spent fuel canister lid welding chamber has a weldingready canister docked thereto in an airtight manner. The chamber is pumped for a vacuum, followed by closing the canister's copper lid and carrying out the lid welding process. The lid is brought into the chamber prior to docking the canister by means of a canister transfer trolley lifting gear. Lifting of the canister and rotating it during a welding process are also handled by means of the transfer trolley. The lid welding chamber houses equipment for the alignment and installation of the lid, as well as heating means for the top side of a copper overpack for ensuring a sufficient installation clearance between the lid and the overpack. The equipment not needed in the immediate vicinity of welding chambers, is

  8. Investigations of possibilities to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in Lithuania: a model case. Volume 2, Concept of Repository in Crystalline Rocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Motiejunas, S.; Poskas, P.

    2005-01-01

    The aim is to present the generic repository concept in crystalline rocks in Lithuania and cost assessment of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and long-lived intermediate level waste in this repository. Due to limited budget of this project the repository concept development for Lithuania was based mostly on the experience of foreign countries. In this Volume a review of the existing information on disposal concept in crystalline rocks from various countries is presented. Described repository concept for crystalline rocks in Lithuania covers repository layout, backfill, canister, construction materials and auxiliary buildings. Costs calculations for disposal of spent nuclear fuel and long-lived intermediate-level wastes from Ignalina NPP are presented too. Thermal, criticality and other important disposal evaluations for RBMK-1500 spent nuclear fuel emplaced in copper canister were performed and described

  9. Prototype spent-fuel canister design, analysis, and test

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leisher, W.B.; Eakes, R.G.; Duffey, T.A.

    1982-03-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was asked by the US Energy Research and Development Administration (now US Department of Energy) to design the spent fuel shipping cask system for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant (CRBRP). As a part of this task, a canister which holds liquid sodium and the spent fuel assembly was designed, analyzed, and tested. The canister body survived the regulatory Type-B 9.1-m (30-ft) drop test with no apparent leakage. However, the commercially available metal seal used in this design leaked after the tests. This report describes the design approach, analysis, and prototype canister testing. Recommended work for completing the design, when funding is available, is included

  10. Reference concepts for the final disposal of LWR spent fuel and other high activity wastes in Spain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Huertas, F.; Ulibarri, A.

    1993-01-01

    Studies over the last three years have been recently concluded with the selection of a reference repository concept for the final disposal of spent fuel and other high activity wastes in deep geological formations. Two non-site specific preliminary designs, at a conceptual level, have been developed; one considers granite as the host rock and the other rock salt formations. The Spanish General Radioactive Waste Program also considers clay as a potential host rock for HLW deep disposal; conceptualization for a deep repository in clay is in the initial phase of development. The salt repository concept contemplates the disposal of the HLW in self-shielding casks emplaced in the drifts of an underground facility, excavated at a depth of 850 m in a bedded salt formation. The Custos Type I(7) cask admits up to seven intact PWR fuel assemblies or 21 of BWR type. The final repository facilities are planned to accept a total of 20,000 fuel assemblies (PWR and BWR) and 50 vitrified waste canisters over a period of 25 years. The total space needed for the surface facilities amounts to 322,000 m 2 , including the rock salt dump. The space required for the underground facilities amounts to 1.2 km 2 , approximately. The granite repository concept contemplates the disposal of the HLW in carbon steel canisters, embedded in a 0.75 m thick buffer of swelling smectite clay, in the drifts of an underground facility, excavated at a depth of 55 m in granite. Each canister can host 3 PWR or 9 BWR fuel assemblies. For this concept the total number of canisters needed amounts to 4,860. The space required for the surface and underground facilities is similar to that of the salt concept. The technical principles and criteria used for the design are discussed, and a description of the repository concept is presented

  11. TMI-2 fuel canister interface requirements for INEL. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkins, D.E.; Martz, D.E.; Reno, H.W.

    1984-06-01

    This report focuses on fuel canister interface requirements at INEL which should be incorporated into the canister design criteria. The requirements will ensure compatibility with existing INEL structures and equipment to be used for receipt, unloading, and storage of fuel canisters. INEL can and does receive and store radioactive materials in many different forms, including reactor fuel. INEL requires detailed descriptions of canisters and casks. Therefore, requirements listed represent engineering design features which will simplify the handling and storage operations; consequently, they are not to be viewed as absolute or non-negotiable. However, the core acquisition contract was negotiated with certain storage assumptions which effect costs of storage. Deviations from those assumptions which significantly effect costs would require approval by DOE-Idaho. If some stated requirements are too restrictive, modifications based on sound engineering principles may be negotiated with INEL. 11 figures

  12. Emplacement technology for the direct disposal of spent fuel into deep vertical boreholes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bollingerfehr, W.; Filbert, W.; Wehrmann, J.

    2008-01-01

    In the early sixties it was decided to investigate salt formations on its suitability to host heat generating radioactive waste in Germany. In the reference repository concept consequently the emplacement of vitrified waste canisters in deep vertical boreholes inside a salt mine was considered whereas spent fuel should be disposed of in self shielding casks (type POLLUX) in horizontal drifts. The POLLUX casks, 65 t heavy carbon steel casks, will be laid down on the floor of a horizontal drift in one of the disposal zones to be constructed in the salt dome at the 870 m level. The space between casks and drift walls will be backfilled with crushed salt. The transport, the handling und the emplacement of POLLUX casks were subject of successfully performed demonstration and in situ tests in the nineties and resulted in an adjustment of the atomic law. The borehole disposal concept comprises the emplacement of unshielded canisters with vitrified HLW in boreholes with a diameter of 60 cm and a depth of up to 300 m. In order to facilitate the fast encapsulation of the waste canister by the host rock (rock salt), no lining of the boreholes is planned. With regard to harmonize and optimize the emplacement technology for both categories of packages (vitrified waste and spent fuel) alternatives were developed. In this context the borehole emplacement technique for consolidated spent fuel as already foreseen for high-level reprocessing waste was reconsidered. This review resulted in the design of a new disposal package, a fuel rod canister (type 'BSK 3'), and an appropriate modified transport and emplacement technology. This concept (called BSK 3-concept) provides the following optimization possibilities: (i) A new steel canister of the same diameter (43 cm) as the standardized HLW canisters applied for high-level waste and compacted technological waste from reprocessing abroad can be filled with fuel rods of 3 PWR or 9 BWR fuel assemblies. (II) The standardized canister

  13. Long-Term Dry Storage of High Burn-Up Spent Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Fuel in TAD (Transportation, Aging, and Disposal) Containers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2008-12-01

    A TAD canister, in conjunction with specially-designed over-packs can accomplish the functions of transportation, aging, and disposal (TAD) in the management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Industrial dry cask systems currently available for SNF are licensed for storage-only or for dual-purpose (i.e., storage and transportation). By extending the function to include the indefinite storage and perhaps, eventual geologic disposal, the TAD canister would have to be designed to enhance, among others, corrosion resistance, thermal stability, and criticality-safety control. This investigative paper introduces the use of these advanced iron-based, corrosion-resistant materials for SNF transportation, aging, and disposal.The objective of this investigative project is to explore the interest that KAERI would research and develop its specific SAM coating materials for the TAD canisters to satisfy the requirements of corrosion-resistance, thermal stability, and criticality-controls for long-term dry storage of high burn-up spent PWR fuel

  14. Thermal assessment of Shippingport pressurized water reactor blanket fuel assemblies within a multi-canister overpack within the canister storage building

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    HEARD, F.J.

    1999-01-01

    A series of analyses were performed to assess the thermal performance characteristics of the Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor Core 2 Blanket Fuel Assemblies as loaded within a Multi-Canister Overpack within the Canister Storage Building. A two-dimensional finite element was developed, with enough detail to model the individual fuel plates: including the fuel wafers, cladding, and flow channels

  15. Thermal assessment of Shippingport pressurized water reactor blanket fuel assemblies within a multi-canister overpack within the canister storage building

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    HEARD, F.J.

    1999-04-09

    A series of analyses were performed to assess the thermal performance characteristics of the Shippingport Pressurized Water Reactor Core 2 Blanket Fuel Assemblies as loaded within a Multi-Canister Overpack within the Canister Storage Building. A two-dimensional finite element was developed, with enough detail to model the individual fuel plates: including the fuel wafers, cladding, and flow channels.

  16. Corrosion resistance of metal materials for HLW canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furuya, Takashi; Muraoka, Susumu; Tashiro, Shingo

    1982-02-01

    In order to verify the materials as an important artificial barrier for canister of vitrified high-level waste from spent fuel reprocessing, data and reports were researched on corrosion resistance of the materials under conditions from glass form production to final disposal. Then, in this report, investigated subjects, improvement methods and future subjects are reviewed. It has become clear that there would be no problem on the inside and outside corrosion of the canister during glass production, but long term corrosion and radiation effect tests and the vitrification methods would be subjects in future on interim storage and final disposal conditions. (author)

  17. Shippingport Spent Fuel Canister (SSFC) Design Report Project W-518

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOHNSON, D.M.

    2000-01-01

    The SSFC Design Report Describes A spent fuel canister for Shippingport Core 2 blanket fuel assemblies. The design of the SSFC is a minor modification of the MCO. The modification is limited to the Shield Plug which remains unchanged with regard to interfaces with the canister shell. The performance characteristics remain those for the MCO, which bounds the payload of the SSFC

  18. Scoping calculations for canister-tunnel migration of corrodants, oxidants and radionuclides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shaw, W.; Worth, D.

    1992-03-01

    This report presents the mathematical models and results obtained for a set of scooping calculations which estimate the possible extent of the vertical migration of canister corrodants, oxidants (forming a redox front) and radionuclides between a copper canister containing spent nuclear fuel, and an overlying emplacement tunnel. The KBS-3 concept for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel is copper canisters, vertically emplaced in deposition holes bored in the floor of a tunnel, situated deep underground. The deposition holes are filled with a buffer of bentonite and the tunnel is backfilled with a mixture of sand and bentonite. (au)

  19. Impact of nuclear data uncertainty on safety calculations for spent nuclear fuel geological disposal

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Herrero J.J.

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available In the design of a spent nuclear fuel disposal system, one necessary condition is to show that the configuration remains subcritical at time of emplacement but also during long periods covering up to 1,000,000 years. In the context of criticality safety applying burn-up credit, k-eff eigenvalue calculations are affected by nuclear data uncertainty mainly in the burnup calculations simulating reactor operation and in the criticality calculation for the disposal canister loaded with the spent fuel assemblies. The impact of nuclear data uncertainty should be included in the k-eff value estimation to enforce safety. Estimations of the uncertainty in the discharge compositions from the CASMO5 burn-up calculation phase are employed in the final MCNP6 criticality computations for the intact canister configuration; in between, SERPENT2 is employed to get the spent fuel composition along the decay periods. In this paper, nuclear data uncertainty was propagated by Monte Carlo sampling in the burn-up, decay and criticality calculation phases and representative values for fuel operated in a Swiss PWR plant will be presented as an estimation of its impact.

  20. Storage and disposal of radioactive waste as glass in canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mendel, J.E.

    1978-12-01

    A review of the use of waste glass for the immobilization of high-level radioactive waste glass is presented. Typical properties of the canisters used to contain the glass, and the waste glass, are described. Those properties are used to project the stability of canisterized waste glass through interim storage, transportation, and geologic disposal

  1. CANISTER TRANSFER SYSTEM DESCRIPTION DOCUMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    B. Gorpani

    2000-01-01

    The Canister Transfer System receives transportation casks containing large and small disposable canisters, unloads the canisters from the casks, stores the canisters as required, loads them into disposal containers (DCs), and prepares the empty casks for re-shipment. Cask unloading begins with cask inspection, sampling, and lid bolt removal operations. The cask lids are removed and the canisters are unloaded. Small canisters are loaded directly into a DC, or are stored until enough canisters are available to fill a DC. Large canisters are loaded directly into a DC. Transportation casks and related components are decontaminated as required, and empty casks are prepared for re-shipment. One independent, remotely operated canister transfer line is provided in the Waste Handling Building System. The canister transfer line consists of a Cask Transport System, Cask Preparation System, Canister Handling System, Disposal Container Transport System, an off-normal canister handling cell with a transfer tunnel connecting the two cells, and Control and Tracking System. The Canister Transfer System operating sequence begins with moving transportation casks to the cask preparation area with the Cask Transport System. The Cask Preparation System prepares the cask for unloading and consists of cask preparation manipulator, cask inspection and sampling equipment, and decontamination equipment. The Canister Handling System unloads the canister(s) and places them into a DC. Handling equipment consists of a bridge crane hoist,; DC--loading manipulator, lifting fixtures, and small canister staging racks. Once the cask has been unloaded, the Cask Preparation System decontaminates the cask exterior and returns it to the Carrier/Cask Handling System via the Cask Transport System. After the; DC--is fully loaded, the Disposal Container Transport System moves the; DC--to the Disposal Container Handling System for welding. To handle off-normal canisters, a separate off-normal canister

  2. Canister Transfer System Description Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Canister Transfer System receives transportation casks containing large and small disposable canisters, unloads the canisters from the casks, stores the canisters as required, loads them into disposal containers (DCs), and prepares the empty casks for re-shipment. Cask unloading begins with cask inspection, sampling, and lid bolt removal operations. The cask lids are removed and the canisters are unloaded. Small canisters are loaded directly into a DC, or are stored until enough canisters are available to fill a DC. Large canisters are loaded directly into a DC. Transportation casks and related components are decontaminated as required, and empty casks are prepared for re-shipment. One independent, remotely operated canister transfer line is provided in the Waste Handling Building System. The canister transfer line consists of a Cask Transport System, Cask Preparation System, Canister Handling System, Disposal Container Transport System, an off-normal canister handling cell with a transfer tunnel connecting the two cells, and Control and Tracking System. The Canister Transfer System operating sequence begins with moving transportation casks to the cask preparation area with the Cask Transport System. The Cask Preparation System prepares the cask for unloading and consists of cask preparation manipulator, cask inspection and sampling equipment, and decontamination equipment. The Canister Handling System unloads the canister(s) and places them into a DC. Handling equipment consists of a bridge crane/hoist, DC loading manipulator, lifting fixtures, and small canister staging racks. Once the cask has been unloaded, the Cask Preparation System decontaminates the cask exterior and returns it to the Carrier/Cask Handling System via the Cask Transport System. After the DC is fully loaded, the Disposal Container Transport System moves the DC to the Disposal Container Handling System for welding. To handle off-normal canisters, a separate off-normal canister handling

  3. Uncanistered Spent Nuclear fuel Disposal Container System Description Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pettit, N. E.

    2001-01-01

    The Uncanistered Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Disposal Container System supports the confinement and isolation of waste within the Engineered Barrier System of the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). Disposal containers are loaded with intact uncanistered assemblies and/or individually canistered SNF assemblies and sealed in the surface waste handling facilities, transferred to the underground through the access drifts, and emplaced in emplacement drifts. The Uncanistered SNF Disposal Container provides long-term confinement of the commercial SNF placed inside, and withstands the loading, transfer, emplacement, and retrieval loads and environments. The Uncanistered SNF Disposal Container System provides containment of waste for a designated period of time, and limits radionuclide release. The disposal container maintains the waste in a designated configuration, withstands maximum handling and rockfall loads, limits the individual SNF assembly temperatures after emplacement, limits the introduction of moderator into the disposal container during the criticality control period, resists corrosion in the expected handling and repository environments, and provides containment of waste in the event of an accident

  4. Survey of waste package designs for disposal of high-level waste/spent fuel in selected foreign countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, K.J.; Lakey, L.T.; Silviera, D.J.

    1989-09-01

    This report presents the results of a survey of the waste package strategies for seven western countries with active nuclear power programs that are pursuing disposal of spent nuclear fuel or high-level wastes in deep geologic rock formations. Information, current as of January 1989, is given on the leading waste package concepts for Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. All but two of the countries surveyed (France and the UK) have developed design concepts for their repositories, but none of the countries has developed its final waste repository or package concept. Waste package concepts are under study in all the countries surveyed, except the UK. Most of the countries have not yet developed a reference concept and are considering several concepts. Most of the information presented in this report is for the current reference or leading concepts. All canisters for the wastes are cylindrical, and are made of metal (stainless steel, mild steel, titanium, or copper). The canister concepts have relatively thin walls, except those for spent fuel in Sweden and Germany. Diagrams are presented for the reference or leading concepts for canisters for the countries surveyed. The expected lifetimes of the conceptual canisters in their respective disposal environment are typically 500 to 1,000 years, with Sweden's copper canister expected to last as long as one million years. Overpack containers that would contain the canisters are being considered in some of the countries. All of the countries surveyed, except one (Germany) are currently planning to utilize a buffer material (typically bentonite) surrounding the disposal package in the repository. Most of the countries surveyed plan to limit the maximum temperature in the buffer material to about 100 degree C. 52 refs., 9 figs

  5. Source term for the bounding assessment of the Canadian nuclear fuel waste disposal concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flavelle, P.

    1996-02-01

    This is the second in a series to derive the bounds of the post-closure hazard of the Canadian nuclear fuel waste disposal concept, based on the premise that it is unnecessary to predict accurately the real hazard if the bounding hazard can be shown to be acceptable. In this report a reference used (Bruce A fuel, 865 GJ/kgU average burnup) is used to derive the source term for contaminant releases from the emplacement canisters. This requires development of a container failure function which defines the age of the fuel when the canister is perforated and flooded. The source term is expressed as the time-dependent fractional release rate from the used fuel or as the time-dependent contaminant concentrations in the canister porewater. It is derived as the superposition of an instant release, comprising the upper bound of the gap and grain boundary inventory in the used fuel, and the long-term dissolution of the used fuel matrix. Several dissolution models (stoichiometric dissolution/preferential leaching) under different conditions (matrix solubility limited/ unlimited; oxidizing/ reducing solubility limits; groundwater flow/ no flow) are evaluated and the one resulting in the highest release rate/ highest porewater concentration is adopted as the bounding case. Comparisons between the models are made on the basis of the potential ingestion hazard of the canister porewater, to account for differences in the hazard of different radionuclides. (author) 20 refs., 4 tabs., 9 figs

  6. Defense High Level Waste Disposal Container System Description Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pettit, N. E.

    2001-01-01

    The Defense High Level Waste Disposal Container System supports the confinement and isolation of waste within the Engineered Barrier System of the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). Disposal containers are loaded and sealed in the surface waste handling facilities, transferred to the underground through the accesses using a rail mounted transporter, and emplaced in emplacement drifts. The defense high level waste (HLW) disposal container provides long-term confinement of the commercial HLW and defense HLW (including immobilized plutonium waste forms [IPWF]) placed within disposable canisters, and withstands the loading, transfer, emplacement, and retrieval loads and environments. US Department of Energy (DOE)-owned spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in disposable canisters may also be placed in a defense HLW disposal container along with commercial HLW waste forms, which is known as co-disposal. The Defense High Level Waste Disposal Container System provides containment of waste for a designated period of time, and limits radionuclide release. The disposal container/waste package maintains the waste in a designated configuration, withstands maximum handling and rockfall loads, limits the individual canister temperatures after emplacement, resists corrosion in the expected handling and repository environments, and provides containment of waste in the event of an accident. Defense HLW disposal containers for HLW disposal will hold up to five HLW canisters. Defense HLW disposal containers for co-disposal will hold up to five HLW canisters arranged in a ring and one DOE SNF canister inserted in the center and/or one or more DOE SNF canisters displacing a HLW canister in the ring. Defense HLW disposal containers also will hold two Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) and two HLW canisters in one disposal container. The disposal container will include outer and inner cylinders, outer and inner cylinder lids, and may include a canister guide. An exterior label will provide a means by

  7. Critical review of welding technology for canisters for disposal of spent fuel and high level waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pike, S.; Allen, C.; Punshon, C.; Threadgill, P.; Gallegillo, M.; Holmes, B.; Nicholas, J.

    2010-03-01

    Nagra is the Swiss national cooperative for the disposal of radioactive waste and is responsible for final disposal of all types of waste produced in Switzerland, which are partitioned into two repository types, one for spent fuel (SF), vitrified high-level waste (HLW) and long-lived intermediate level waste and one for low and intermediate level waste. In the general licences applied for these repositories, documentation has to show that long-term safety can be ensured and that factors for the construction, operation, and closure of the facility have been considered. Nagra has commissioned TWI to carry out a critical review of welding technologies for the sealing of HLW and SF canisters made of carbon steel. In conjunction with a material selection report, the information gained will be used as a preliminary step to provide input to developing design concepts for the canisters. The features to be considered are: a) Suitability of techniques for thickness of weld required; b) Suitability for remote operation, maintenance and set-up; c) Welding speed, weld quality, tolerances and cost; d) Effect of welding process on parent materials properties including microstructure corrosion resistance, distortion and residual stress; e) Potential post-weld treatments to reduce residual stress and enhance corrosion resistance; f) Suitability of inspection techniques for the weld thickness required; g) Impact of welding techniques on the canister design and material selection; h) Critique of emerging technologies which may be suitable in the future. The review of potential welding technologies began with a feasibility study carried out by TWI experts, where the unsuitable processes were rejected. For the remaining processes attention was focused on previous applications for the material and thickness suggested, and especially on safety critical applications such as applied in the nuclear and pressure vessel industry. Once the relevant information was gathered each process was

  8. Disposal facility in Olkiluoto, description of above ground facilities in tunnel transport alternative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kukkola, T.

    2006-11-01

    The above ground facilities of the disposal plant on the Olkiluoto site are described in this report as they will be when the operation of the disposal facility starts in the year 2020. The disposal plant is visualised on the Olkiluoto site. Parallel construction of the deposition tunnels and disposal of the spent fuel canisters constitute the principal design basis of the disposal plant. The annual production of disposal canisters for spent fuel amounts to about 40. Production of 100 disposal canisters has been used as the capacity basis. Fuel from the Olkiluoto plant and from the Loviisa plant will be encapsulated in the same production line. The disposal plant will require an area of about 15 to 20 hectares above ground level. The total building volume of the above ground facilities is about 75000 m 3 . The purpose of the report is to provide the base for detailed design of the encapsulation plant and the repository spaces, as well as for coordination between the disposal plant and ONKALO. The dimensioning bases for the disposal plant are shown in the Tables at the end of the report. The report can also be used as a basis for comparison in deciding whether the fuel canisters are transported to the repository by a lift or a by vehicle along the access tunnel. (orig.)

  9. Disposal facility in olkiluoto, description of above ground facilities in lift transport alternative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kukkola, T.

    2006-11-01

    The above ground facilities of the disposal plant on the Olkiluoto site are described in this report as they will be when the operation of the disposal facility starts in the year 2020. The disposal plant is visualised on the Olkiluoto site. Parallel construction of the deposition tunnels and disposal of the spent fuel canisters constitute the principal design basis of the disposal plant. The annual production of disposal canisters for spent fuel amounts to about 40. Production of 100 disposal canisters has been used as the capacity basis. Fuel from the Olkiluoto plant and from the Loviisa plant will be encapsulated in the same production line. The disposal plant will require an area of about 15 to 20 hectares above ground level. The total building volume of the above ground facilities is about 75000 m 3 . The purpose of the report is to provide the base for detailed design of the encapsulation plant and the repository spaces, as well as for coordination between the disposal plant and ONKALO. The dimensioning bases for the disposal plant are shown in the Tables at the end of the report. The report can also be used as a basis for comparison in deciding whether the fuel canisters are transported to the repository by a lift or by a vehicle along the access tunnel. (orig.)

  10. Disposal of spent fuel from German nuclear power plants - paper work or technology?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Graf, R.; Filbert, W.

    2006-01-01

    The reference concept 'direct disposal of spent fuel' was developed as an alternative to spent fuel reprocessing and vitrified HLW disposal. The technical facilities necessary for the implementation of this reference concept - the so called POLLUX-concept, e.g. interim storages for casks containing spent fuel, a pilot conditioning facility, and a special cask 'POLLUX' for final disposal have been built. With view to a geological salt formation all handling procedures for the repository were tested aboveground in a test facility at a 1:1 scale. To optimise the concept all operational steps are reviewed for possible improvement. Most promising are a concept using canisters (BSK 3) instead of POLLUX casks, and the direct disposal of transport and storage casks (DIREGT-concept) which is the most recent one and has been designed for the direct disposal of large transport and storage casks. The final exploration of the pre-selected repository site is still pending, from the industries point of view due to political reasons only. The present paper describes the main concepts and their status as of today. (author)

  11. Materials for Consideration in Standardized Canister Design Activities.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bryan, Charles R.; Ilgen, Anastasia Gennadyevna; Enos, David George; Teich-McGoldrick, Stephanie; Hardin, Ernest

    2014-10-01

    This document identifies materials and material mitigation processes that might be used in new designs for standardized canisters for storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. It also addresses potential corrosion issues with existing dual-purpose canisters (DPCs) that could be addressed in new canister designs. The major potential corrosion risk during storage is stress corrosion cracking of the weld regions on the 304 SS/316 SS canister shell due to deliquescence of chloride salts on the surface. Two approaches are proposed to alleviate this potential risk. First, the existing canister materials (304 and 316 SS) could be used, but the welds mitigated to relieve residual stresses and/or sensitization. Alternatively, more corrosion-resistant steels such as super-austenitic or duplex stainless steels, could be used. Experimental testing is needed to verify that these alternatives would successfully reduce the risk of stress corrosion cracking during fuel storage. For disposal in a geologic repository, the canister will be enclosed in a corrosion-resistant or corrosion-allowance overpack that will provide barrier capability and mechanical strength. The canister shell will no longer have a barrier function and its containment integrity can be ignored. The basket and neutron absorbers within the canister have the important role of limiting the possibility of post-closure criticality. The time period for corrosion is much longer in the post-closure period, and one major unanswered question is whether the basket materials will corrode slowly enough to maintain structural integrity for at least 10,000 years. Whereas there is extensive literature on stainless steels, this evaluation recommends testing of 304 and 316 SS, and more corrosion-resistant steels such as super-austenitic, duplex, and super-duplex stainless steels, at repository-relevant physical and chemical conditions. Both general and localized corrosion testing methods would be used to

  12. Near-field performance of the advanced cold process canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.

    1990-09-01

    A near-field performance evaluation of an Advanced Cold Process Canister for spent fuel disposal has been performed jointly by TVO, Finland and SKB, Sweden. The canister consists of a steel canister as a load bearing element, with an outer corrosion shield of copper. The canister design was originally proposed by TVO. In the analysis, as well internal (ie corrosion processes from the inside of the canister) as external processes (mechanical and chemical) have been considered both prior to and after canister breach. Throughout the analysis, present day underground conditions has been assumed to persist during the service life of the canister. The major conclusions for the evaluation are: Internal processes cannot cause the canister breach under foreseen conditions, ie localized corrosion for the steel or copper canisters can be dismissed as a failure mechanism. The evaluation of the effects of processes outside the canister indicate that there is no rapid mechanism to endanger the integrity of the canister. Consequently the service life of the canister will be several million years. This factor will ensure the safety of the concept. (orig.)

  13. Mechanical analysis of cylindrical part of canisters for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikonen, K.

    2005-06-01

    This report describes mechanical analyses of cylindrical part of the VVER 440-, BWR and EPR-type canisters for spent nuclear fuel. The task was first to evaluate the stresses at maximum design pressure and further by increasing pressure load to determine the limit collapse load and corresponding safety factor. Maximum design pressure 44 MPa is a sum of the hydrostatic pressure 30 MPa caused by 3 km ice layer, 7 MPa caused by ground water pressure at the deepest disposal depth of 700 m and 7 MPa from bentonite swelling pressure. The analysis presented in this report concern the middle area of the canisters, where the cast iron insert is considered to be more critical than in the ends of the canister. For the model a piece from the middle area of the canister was separated by two planes perpendicular to the axis of the canister. This piece was studied first by two-dimensional plane strain model, where the planes are constrained and no elongation of the canister takes place. In the second model one of the planes was constrained and the other plane was allowed to displace in axial direction, which remains as a plane during deformation and to which axial pressure force is directed. This analysis, which corresponds better the real condition in the canister, was performed as threedimensional. The analyses gave however practically equal results due to plastic deformation. Thus the analysis can be done by two-dimensional plane strain model leading to same accuracy with less computation effort. Analyses were performed as large displacement and large strain analyses by the PASULA computing package, which has been developed at VTT for a variety of structural analysis and for heat conduction calculations. A special routine was developed for automatic mesh generation. Before the analysis of the VVER 440-, BWR- and EPR-type canisters the calculation methodology was validated with test results, which were received from pressure tests performed with a short BWR canister in Germany

  14. Groundwork for Universal Canister System Development

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Price, Laura L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Gross, Mike [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Prouty, Jeralyn L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Rigali, Mark J. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Craig, Brian [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Han, Zenghu [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Lee, John Hok [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Liu, Yung [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Pope, Ron [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Connolly, Kevin [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Feldman, Matt [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Jarrell, Josh [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Radulescu, Georgeta [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Scaglione, John [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Wells, Alan [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-09-01

    The mission of the United States Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management is to complete the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and go vernment - sponsored nuclear energy re search. S ome of the waste s that that must be managed have be en identified as good candidates for disposal in a deep borehole in crystalline rock (SNL 2014 a). In particular, wastes that can be disposed of in a small package are good candidates for this disposal concept. A canister - based system that can be used for handling these wastes during the disposition process (i.e., storage, transfers, transportation, and disposal) could facilitate the eventual disposal of these wastes. This report provides information for a program plan for developing specifications regarding a canister - based system that facilitates small waste form packaging and disposal and that is integrated with the overall efforts of the DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy Used Fuel Dis position Camp aign's Deep Borehole Field Test . Groundwork for Universal Ca nister System Development September 2015 ii W astes to be considered as candidates for the universal canister system include capsules containing cesium and strontium currently stored in pools at the Hanford Site, cesium to be processed using elutable or nonelutable resins at the Hanford Site, and calcine waste from Idaho National Laboratory. The initial emphasis will be on disposal of the cesium and strontium capsules in a deep borehole that has been drilled into crystalline rock. Specifications for a universal canister system are derived from operational, performance, and regulatory requirements for storage, transfers, transportation, and disposal of radioactive waste. Agreements between the Department of Energy and the States of Washington and Idaho, as well as the Deep Borehole Field Test plan provide schedule requirements for development of the universal canister system

  15. Production methods and costs of oxygen free copper canisters for nuclear waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajainmaeki, H.; Nieminen, M.; Laakso, L.

    1991-08-01

    The fabrication technology and costs of various manufacturing alternatives to make large copper canisters for spent fuel repository are discussed. The capsule design is based on the TVO's new advanced cold process concept where a steel canister is surrounded by the oxygen free copper canister. This study shows that already at present there exist several possible manufacturing routes, which result in consistently high quality canisters. Hot rolling, bending and EB-welding the seam is the best way to assure the small grain size which is preferable for the best inspectability of the final EB-welded seam of the lid. The same route turns out also to be the most economical

  16. Production methods and costs of oxygen free copper canisters for nuclear waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajainmaeki, H.; Nieminen, M.; Laakso, L.

    1991-06-01

    The fabrication technology and costs of various manufacturing alternatives to make large copper canisters for spent fuel repository are discussed. The capsule design is based on the TVO's new advanced cold process concept where a steel canister is surrounded by the oxygen free copper canister. This study shows that already at present there exist several possible manufacturing routes, which results in consistently high quality canisters. Hot rolling, bending and EB-welding the seam is the best way to assure the small grain size which is preferable for the best inspectability of the final EB-welded seam of the lid. The same route turns out also to be the most economical. (au)

  17. Choices of canisters and elements for the first fuel shipment from K West Basin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Makenas, B.J.

    1995-03-01

    Twenty-two canisters (10 prime and 12 backup candidates) in the K West Basin have been identified as containing fuel which, when examined, will satisfy the Data Quality Objectives for the first fuel shipment from this basin. These were chosen as meeting criteria such as containing relatively long fuel elements, locking bar integrity, and the availability of gas/liquid interface level measurements for associated canister gas traps. Two canisters were identified as having reported broken fuel on initial loading. Usage and interpretation of canister cesium concentration measurements have also been established and levels of maximum and minimum acceptable cesium concentration (from a data optimization point of view) for decapping have been determined although other operational cesium limits may also apply. Criteria for picking particular elements, once a canister is opened, are reviewed in this document. A pristine, a slightly damaged, and a badly damaged element are desired. The latter includes elements with end caps removed but does not include elements which have large amounts of swelling or split cladding that might interfere with handling tools. Finally, operational scenarios have been suggested to aid in the selections of canisters and elements in a way that utilizes anticipated canister gas sampling and leads to a correct and quick choice of elements which will supply the desired data

  18. Life cycle assessment of geological repositories for the final disposal of spent fuel in Finland and Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puhrer, A.; Bauer, C.

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents a Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) of the geological repositories for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland and Sweden. A separate LCA has been performed for the geological spent fuel repository in each country and the results have been compared. A further benchmark comparison has been made with the LCA of the Swiss geological repository for high-level waste and spent fuel. The life cycle inventory (LCI) product system boundaries include the spent fuel repository and encapsulation facility in each country. All materials, processes, consumed utilities and transport associated with the construction, operation and closure of the repositories for spent fuel are included in the LCI. The life cycle impact assessment (LCIA) is performed using two methods: IPCC 2007 Climate Change and ReCiPe. These assessment methods return results pertaining to global warming potential (GWP) as well as a number of environmental impact categories such as human toxicity and natural land transformation. Results indicate that the use of copper for disposal canister fabrication and bentonite for repository backfilling are the causes for most of the environmental impact of the spent fuel repositories in Finland and Sweden. Alternate, less bentonite-intensive backfilling scenarios may mitigate this impact. While the Swiss bentonite consumption is lower and no copper is used for canister fabrication, the Swiss electricity and fuel consumption associated with final disposal of high-level waste and spent fuel is significantly higher than in Finland or Sweden. Approximately 1 g CO 2 -eq is emitted due to the final disposal of spent fuel and HLW per kWh of nuclear generated electricity. This represents some 10% of the emissions due to the entire nuclear energy chain and is practically negligible in the context of GHG emissions of other energy technologies. (authors)

  19. Conceptual design study of a concrete canister spent-fuel storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lidfors, E.D.; Tabe, T.; Johnson, H.M.

    1979-01-01

    This report presents a conceptual design study for the interim storage of CANDU spent fuel in concrete canisters. The canisters will be concrete flasks, which contain fuel prepackaged in double steel containment, and will be cooled by natural air convection. This is one of the methods proposed as a potential alternative to water pool storage. A preliminary study of this concept was done by CAFS (Committee Assessing Fuel Storage), and WNRE (Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment) is currently conducting a development and demonstration program. This study of a central facility for the storage of all Canadian spent fuel arisings to the year 2000 was completed in 1975. A brief description of the facilities required and the operations involved, a summary of costs, a survey of the monitoring requirements and a prediction of the personnel exposures associated with this method of storing spent fuel are reported here. The estimated total cost of interim storage in cylindrical canisters at a central site is $6.02/kg U (1975 dollars). Approximately half of this cost is incurred in the shipment of fuel from the reactors to the storage facility. (author)

  20. Spent nuclear fuel canister storage building conceptual design report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swenson, C.E. [Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)

    1996-01-01

    This Conceptual Design Report provides the technical basis for the Spent Nuclear Fuels Project, Canister Storage Building, and as amended by letter (correspondence number 9555700, M.E. Witherspoon to E.B. Sellers, ``Technical Baseline and Updated Cost Estimate for the Canister Storage Building``, dated October 24, 1995), includes the project cost baseline and Criteria to be used as the basis for starting detailed design in fiscal year 1995.

  1. Spent nuclear fuel canister storage building conceptual design report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swenson, C.E.

    1996-01-01

    This Conceptual Design Report provides the technical basis for the Spent Nuclear Fuels Project, Canister Storage Building, and as amended by letter (correspondence number 9555700, M.E. Witherspoon to E.B. Sellers, ''Technical Baseline and Updated Cost Estimate for the Canister Storage Building'', dated October 24, 1995), includes the project cost baseline and Criteria to be used as the basis for starting detailed design in fiscal year 1995

  2. Disposability Assessment: Aluminum-Based Spent Nuclear Fuel Forms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vinson, D.W.

    1998-11-06

    This report provides a technical assessment of the Melt-Dilute and Direct Al-SNF forms in disposable canisters with respect to meeting the requirements for disposal in the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) and for interim dry storage in the Treatment and Storage Facility (TSF) at SRS.

  3. White Paper: Multi-purpose canister (MPC) for DOE-owned spent nuclear fuel (SNF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knecht, D.A.

    1994-04-01

    The paper examines the issue, What are the advantages, disadvantages, and other considerations for using the MPC concept as part of the strategy for interim storage and disposal of DOE-owned SNF? The paper is based in part on the results of an evaluation made for the DOE National Spent Fuel Program by the Waste Form Barrier/Canister Team, which is composed of knowledgeable DOE and DOE-contractor personnel. The paper reviews the MPC and DOE SNF status, provides criteria and other considerations applicable to the issue, and presents an evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations. The primary conclusion is that while most of DOE SNF is not currently sufficiently characterized to be sealed into an MPC, the advantages of standardized packages in handling, reduced radiation exposure, and improved human factors should be considered in DOE SNF program planning. While the design of MPCs for DOE SNF are likely premature at this time, the use of canisters should be considered which are consistent with interim storage options and the MPC design envelope

  4. The concrete canister program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohta, M.M.

    1978-02-01

    In the spring of 1974, WNRE began development and demonstration of a dry storage concept, called the concrete canister, as a possible alternative to storage of irradiated CANDU fuel in water pools. The canister is a thick-walled concrete monolith containing baskets of fuel in the dry state. The decay heat from the fuel is dissipated to the environment by natural heat transfer. Four canisters were designed and constructed. Two canisters containing electric heaters have been subjected to heat loads of 2.5 times the design, ramp heat-load cycling, and simulated weathering tests. The other two canisters were loaded with irradiated fuel, one containing fuel bundles of uniform decay heat and the other containing bundles of non-uniform decay heat in a non-symmetrical radial and axial array. The collected data were used to verify the analytical tools for prediction of effectiveness of heat transfer and radiation shielding and to verify the design of the basket and canisters. The demonstration canisters have shown that this concept is a viable alternative to water pools for the storage of irradiated CANDU fuel. (author)

  5. Preliminary conceptual designs for advanced packages for the geologic disposal of spent fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Westerman, R.E.

    1979-04-01

    The present study assumes that the spent fuel will be disposed of in mined repositories in continental geologic formations, and that the post-emplacement control of the radioactive species will be accomplished independently by both the natural barrier, i.e., the geosphere, and the engineered barrier system, i.e., the package components consisting of the stabilizer, the canister, and the overpack; and the barrier components external to the package consisting of the hole sleeve and the backfill medium. The present document provides an overview of the nature of the spent fuel waste; the general approach to waste containment, using the defense-in-depth philosophy; material options, both metallic and nonmetallic, for the components of the engineered barrier system; a set of strawman criteria to guide the development of package/engineered barrier systems; and four preliminary concepts representing differing approaches to the solution of the containment problem. These concepts use: a corrosion-resistant meta canister in a special backfill (2 barriers); a mild steel canister in a corrosion-resistant metallic or nonmetallic hole sleeve, surrounded by a special backfill (2 barriers); a corrosion-resistant canister and a corrosion-resistant overpack (or hole sleeve) in a special backfill (3 barriers); and a mild steel canister in a massive corrosion-resistant bore sleeve surrounded by a polymer layer and a special backfill (3 barriers). The lack of definitive performance requirements makes it impossible to evaluate these concepts on a functional basis at the present time.

  6. Corrosion experiments on stainless steels used in dry storage canisters of spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Adams, J.P.; Faw, E.M.; Anderson, P.A.

    1996-09-01

    Nonradioactive (cold) experiments have been set up in the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP)-1634, and radioactive (hot) experiments have been set up in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) at ICPP. The objective of these experiments is to provide information on the interactions (corrosion) between the spent nuclear fuel currently stored at the ICPP and the dry storage canisters and containment materials in which this spent fuel will be stored for the next several decades. This information will be used to help select canister materials that will retain structural integrity over this period within economic, criticality, and other constraints. The two purposes for Dual Purpose Canisters (DPCs) are for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and for shipment to a final geological repository. Information on how corrosion products, sediments, and degraded spent nuclear fuel may corrode DPCs will be required before the DPCs will be allowed to be shipped out of the State of Idaho. The information will also be required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to support the licensing of DPCs. Stainless steels 304L and 316L are the most likely materials for dry interim storage canisters. Welded stainless steel coupons are used to represent the canisters in both hot and cold experiments.

  7. Corrosion experiments on stainless steels used in dry storage canisters of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Adams, J.P.; Faw, E.M.; Anderson, P.A.

    1996-09-01

    Nonradioactive (cold) experiments have been set up in the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP)-1634, and radioactive (hot) experiments have been set up in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) at ICPP. The objective of these experiments is to provide information on the interactions (corrosion) between the spent nuclear fuel currently stored at the ICPP and the dry storage canisters and containment materials in which this spent fuel will be stored for the next several decades. This information will be used to help select canister materials that will retain structural integrity over this period within economic, criticality, and other constraints. The two purposes for Dual Purpose Canisters (DPCs) are for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and for shipment to a final geological repository. Information on how corrosion products, sediments, and degraded spent nuclear fuel may corrode DPCs will be required before the DPCs will be allowed to be shipped out of the State of Idaho. The information will also be required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to support the licensing of DPCs. Stainless steels 304L and 316L are the most likely materials for dry interim storage canisters. Welded stainless steel coupons are used to represent the canisters in both hot and cold experiments

  8. Thermal analysis of dry concrete canister storage system for CANDU spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryu, Yong Ho

    1992-02-01

    This paper presents the results of a thermal analysis of the concrete canisters for interim dry storage of spent, irradiated Canadian Deuterium Uranium(CANDU) fuel. The canisters are designed to contain 6-year-old fuel safely for periods of 50 years in stainless steel baskets sealed inside a steel-lined concrete shield. In order to assure fuel integrity during the storage, fuel rod temperature shall not exceed the temperature limit. The contents of thermal analysis include the following : 1) Steady state temperature distributions under the conservative ambient temperature and insolation load. 2) Transient temperature distributions under the changes in ambient temperature and insolation load. Accounting for the coupled heat transfer modes of conduction, convection, and radiation, the computer code HEATING5 was used to predict the thermal response of the canister storage system. As HEATING5 does not have the modeling capability to compute radiation heat transfer on a rod-to-rod basis, a separate calculating routine was developed and applied to predict temperature distribution in a fuel bundle. Thermal behavior of the canister is characterized by the large thermal mass of the concrete and radiative heat transfer within the basket. The calculated results for the worst case (steady state with maximum ambient temperature and design insolation load) indicated that the maximum temperature of the 6 year cooled fuel reached to 182.4 .deg. C, slightly above the temperature limit of 180 .deg. C. However,the thermal inertia of the thick concrete wall moderates the internal changes and prevents a rise in fuel temperature in response to ambient changes. The maximum extent of the transient zone was less than 75% of the concrete wall thickness for cyclic insolation changes. When transient nature of ambient temperature and insolation load are considered, the fuel temperature will be a function of the long term ambient temperature as opposed to daily extremes. The worst design

  9. Safety assessment of spent fuel disposal in Haestholmen, Kivetty, Olkiluoto and Romuvaara - TILA-99

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vieno, T.; Nordman, H. [VTT Energy (Finland)

    1999-03-01

    The spent fuel from the Finnish nuclear power plants is planned to be disposed of in copper-iron canisters emplaced in a KBS-3 type repository constructed at a depth of about 500 metres at one of the four candidate sites investigated. The disposal concept aims at long-term isolation of the spent fuel assemblies from the biosphere and even from the geosphere. The evaluation of the normal evolution of the disposal system accords with the conclusions of the previous Finnish, Swedish and Canadian safety assessments of similar disposal concepts. Subject to the influence of the expected, normal evolution of the repository, initially intact copper-iron canisters will most likely preserve their integrity for more than one million years at any of the candidate sites. Consequently, the best-estimate assessment is that there never will be any significant releases of radionuclides from the repository into the geosphere. Consequences of potential canister failures have been evaluated using conservative assumptions, models and data. The results show that at any of the sites a large number of canisters could be assumed to be initially defective or to `disappear` simultaneously after some time without that the proposed constraints for release rates into the biosphere or dose rates were exceeded. In most cases this conclusion is valid for all canisters failing simultaneously, even if rather pessimistic flow and transport data is used. In the sensitivity and `what if` analyses where very high flow rates of saline groundwater are assumed, highest release and dose rates are caused by weakly-sorbing cations Sr-90 and Ra-226. The most important differences between the sites are related to the coastal location and brackish/saline groundwater of Haestholmen and Olkiluoto, and on the other hand to the inland location and fresh groundwater of Kivetty and Romuvaara. Because of the ongoing postglacial land uplift at the coast of the Baltic Sea, Olkiluoto and Haestholmen, too, may become

  10. Safety assessment of spent fuel disposal in Haestholmen, Kivetty, Olkiluoto and Romuvaara - TILA-99

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vieno, T.; Nordman, H.

    1999-03-01

    The spent fuel from the Finnish nuclear power plants is planned to be disposed of in copper-iron canisters emplaced in a KBS-3 type repository constructed at a depth of about 500 metres at one of the four candidate sites investigated. The disposal concept aims at long-term isolation of the spent fuel assemblies from the biosphere and even from the geosphere. The evaluation of the normal evolution of the disposal system accords with the conclusions of the previous Finnish, Swedish and Canadian safety assessments of similar disposal concepts. Subject to the influence of the expected, normal evolution of the repository, initially intact copper-iron canisters will most likely preserve their integrity for more than one million years at any of the candidate sites. Consequently, the best-estimate assessment is that there never will be any significant releases of radionuclides from the repository into the geosphere. Consequences of potential canister failures have been evaluated using conservative assumptions, models and data. The results show that at any of the sites a large number of canisters could be assumed to be initially defective or to 'disappear' simultaneously after some time without that the proposed constraints for release rates into the biosphere or dose rates were exceeded. In most cases this conclusion is valid for all canisters failing simultaneously, even if rather pessimistic flow and transport data is used. In the sensitivity and 'what if' analyses where very high flow rates of saline groundwater are assumed, highest release and dose rates are caused by weakly-sorbing cations Sr-90 and Ra-226. The most important differences between the sites are related to the coastal location and brackish/saline groundwater of Haestholmen and Olkiluoto, and on the other hand to the inland location and fresh groundwater of Kivetty and Romuvaara. Because of the ongoing postglacial land uplift at the coast of the Baltic Sea, Olkiluoto and Haestholmen, too, may become

  11. Remote Welding, NDE and Repair of DOE Standardized Canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eric Larsen; Art Watkins; Timothy R. McJunkin; Dave Pace; Rodney Bitsoi

    2006-05-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) created the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program (NSNFP) to manage DOE’s spent nuclear fuel (SNF). One of the NSNFP’s tasks is to prepare spent nuclear fuel for storage, transportation, and disposal at the national repository. As part of this effort, the NSNFP developed a standardized canister for interim storage and transportation of SNF. These canisters will be built and sealed to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section III, Division 3 requirements. Packaging SNF usually is a three-step process: canister loading, closure welding, and closure weld verification. After loading SNF into the canisters, the canisters must be seal welded and the welds verified using a combination of visual, surface eddy current, and ultrasonic inspection or examination techniques. If unacceptable defects in the weld are detected, the defective sections of weld must be removed, re-welded, and re-inspected. Due to the high contamination and/or radiation fields involved with this process, all of these functions must be performed remotely in a hot cell. The prototype apparatus to perform these functions is a floor-mounted carousel that encircles the loaded canister; three stations perform the functions of welding, inspecting, and repairing the seal welds. A welding operator monitors and controls these functions remotely via a workstation located outside the hot cell. The discussion describes the hardware and software that have been developed and the results of testing that has been done to date.

  12. Analysis of probability of defects in the disposal canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmberg, J.-E.; Kuusela, P.

    2011-06-01

    This report presents a probability model for the reliability of the spent nuclear waste final disposal canister. Reliability means here that the welding of the canister lid has no critical defects from the long-term safety point of view. From the reliability point of view, both the reliability of the welding process (that no critical defects will be born) and the non-destructive testing (NDT) process (all critical defects will be detected) are equally important. In the probability model, critical defects in a weld were simplified into a few types. Also the possibility of human errors in the NDT process was taken into account in a simple manner. At this moment there is very little representative data to determine the reliability of welding and also the data on NDT is not well suited for the needs of this study. Therefore calculations presented here are based on expert judgements and on several assumptions that have not been verified yet. The Bayesian probability model shows the importance of the uncertainty in the estimation of the reliability parameters. The effect of uncertainty is that the probability distribution of the number of defective canisters becomes flat for larger numbers of canisters compared to the binomial probability distribution in case of known parameter values. In order to reduce the uncertainty, more information is needed from both the reliability of the welding and NDT processes. It would also be important to analyse the role of human factors in these processes since their role is not reflected in typical test data which is used to estimate 'normal process variation'.The reported model should be seen as a tool to quantify the roles of different methods and procedures in the weld inspection process. (orig.)

  13. Novel Emplacement Device for a Very Deep Borehole Disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Min Soo; Choi, Heui-joo; Lee, Jong Yul [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    There is a worldwide attempt of HLW disposal into a very deep borehole of around 3-5 km depth with the advancement of an underground excavation technology recently. As it goes into deeper underground, the rock becomes more uniform and flawless. And then the underground water circulation system at 3-5 km depth is almost disconnected with near groundwater circulation system. The canister integrity is less important in this very deep borehole disposal system unlike a general geologic disposal system at 500 m. In the deep borehole disposal procedures, one SNF (Spent Nuclear Fuel) assembly is stored in one disposal canister (D30-40cm, H4.7-5.0m), and approximately 10-40 disposal canisters are connected axially, which parade length can leach to around 200m in maximum. The connected canister parade is lowered through a very deep borehole (D40-50cm) by emplacement devices. Therefore the connections between canisters and canister to lowering joint are very important for the safe operation of it. The well-known connection method between canisters is Threaded Coupled Connection method, in which releasing of the connection is almost impossible after thread fastening in the borehole. The novel joint device suggested in this paper can accommodate a canister emplacement and retrieval in the borehole disposal process. The joint can be lowered by bound to a drilling pipe, or high tension cable along 3-5 km distance. This novel device can cope with an accidental event easily without any joint head change. When canisters are damaged or stuck on the borehole wall during their descending, the canisters in trouble can be retrieved simply by the control of a lifting speed.

  14. Disposal of spent fuel from German nuclear power plants - 16028

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Graf, Reinhold; Brammer, Klaus-Juergen; Filbert, Wolfgang; Bollingerfehr, Wilhelm

    2009-01-01

    The 'direct disposal of spent fuel' as a part of the current German reference concept was developed as an alternative to spent fuel reprocessing and vitrified HLW disposal. The technical facilities necessary for the implementation of this part of the reference concept, the so called POLLUX R concept, i.e. interim storage buildings for casks containing spent fuel, a pilot conditioning facility, and a special cask 'POLLUX' for final disposal have been built. With view to a geological salt formation all handling procedures for the direct disposal of spent fuel were tested aboveground in full-scale test facilities. To optimise the reference concept, all operational steps have been reviewed for possible improvements. The two additional concepts for the direct disposal of SF are the BSK 3 concept and the DIREGT concept. Both concepts rely on borehole emplacement technology, vertical boreholes for the BSK 3 concept und horizontal boreholes for the DIREGT concept. Supported by the EU and the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi), DBE TECHNOLOGY built an aboveground full-scale test facility to simulate all relevant handling procedures for the BSK 3 disposal concept. GNS (Company for Nuclear Service), representing the German utilities, provided the main components and its know-how concerning cask design and manufacturing. The test program was concluded recently after more than 1.000 emplacement operations had been performed successfully. The BSK 3 emplacement system in total comprises an emplacement device, a borehole lock, a transport cart, a transfer cask which will shuttle between the aboveground conditioning facility and the underground repository, and the BSK 3 canister itself, designed to contain the fuel rods of three PWR-fuel assemblies with a total of about 1.6 tHM. The BSK 3 concept simplifies the operation of the repository because the handling procedures and techniques can also be applied for the disposal of reprocessing residues. In addition

  15. Modelling studies for the assessment of the Advanced Cold Process Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henshaw, J.; Hoch, A.R.; Sharland, S.M.

    1991-01-01

    The Advanced Cold Process Canister (ACPC) is a new concept for the encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel for geological disposal. It consists of steel canister encased in a copper overpack. In this paper, modelling studies to assess the performance of the ACPC under repository conditions are presented. The production of nitric acid and ammonia through radiolysis of any water remaining inside the canister under fault conditions has been examined in this study. However, results suggest that only low levels are possible, and the risk of stress-corrosion cracking is considered small. The corrosion behavior subsequent to a breach in the outer canister was also considered. A model was constructed to predict the hydrogen gas production due to corrosion reactions, and evolution of the corrosion behavior

  16. Encapsulation and handling of spent nuclear fuel for final disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loennerberg, B.; Larker, H.; Ageskog, L.

    1983-05-01

    The handling and embedding of those metal parts which arrive to the encapsulation station with the fuel is described. For the encapsulation of fuel two alternatives are presented, both with copper canisters but with filling of lead and copper powder respectively. The sealing method in the first case is electron beam welding, in the second case hot isostatic pressing. This has given the headline of the two chapters describing the methods: Welded copper canister and Pressed copper canister. Chapter 1, Welded copper canister, presents the handling of the fuel when it arrives to the encapsulation station, where it is first placed in a buffer pool. From this pool the fuel is transferred to the encapsulation process and thereby separated from fuel boxes and boron glass rod bundles, which are transported together with the fuel. The encapsulation process comprises charging into a copper canister, filling with molten lead, electron beam welding of the lid and final inspection. The transport to and handling in the final repository are described up to the deposition and sealing in the deposition hole. Handling of fuel residues is treated in one of the sections. In chapter 2, Pressed copper canister, only those parts of the handling, which differ from chapter 1 are described. The hot isostatic pressing process is given in the first sections. The handling includes drying, charging into the canister, filling with copper powder, seal lid application and hot isostatic pressing before the final inspection and deposition. In the third chapter, BWR boxes in concrete moulds, the handling of the metal parts, separated from the fuel, are dealt with. After being lifted from the buffer pool they are inserted in a concrete mould, the mould is filled with concrete, covered with a lid and after hardening transferred to its own repository. The deposition in this repository is described. (author)

  17. Drying tests conducted on Three Mile Island fuel canisters containing simulated debris

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palmer, A.J.

    1995-01-01

    Drying tests were conducted on TMI-2 fuel canisters filled with simulated core debris. During these tests, canisters were dried by heating externally by a heating blanket while simultaneously purging the canisters' interior with hot, dry nitrogen. Canister drying was found to be dominated by moisture retention properties of a concrete filler material (LICON) used for geometry control. This material extends the drying process 10 days or more beyond what would be required were it not there. The LICON resides in a nonpurgeable chamber separate from the core debris, and because of this configuration, dew point measurements on the exhaust stream do not provide a good indication of the dew point in the canisters. If the canisters are not dried, but rather just dewatered, 140-240 lb of water (not including the LICON water of hydration) will remain in each canister, approximately 50-110 lb of which is pore water in the LICON and the remainder unbound water

  18. Shippingport Spent Fuel Canister System Description

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    JOHNSON, D.M.

    2000-01-01

    In 1978 and 1979, a total of 72 blanket fuel assemblies (BFAs), irradiated during the operating cycles of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station's Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Core 2 from April 1965 to February 1974, were transferred to the Hanford Site and stored in underwater storage racks in Cell 2R at the 221-T Canyon (T-Plant). The initial objective was to recover the produced plutonium in the BFAs, but this never occurred and the fuel assemblies have remained within the water storage pool to the present time. The Shippingport Spent Fuel Canister (SSFC) is a confinement system that provides safe transport functions (in conjunction with the TN-WHC cask) and storage for the BFAs at the Canister Storage Building (CSB). The current plan is for these BFAs to be retrieved from wet storage and loaded into SSFCs for dry storage. The sealed SSFCs containing BFAs will be vacuum dried, internally backfilled with helium, and leak tested to provide suitable confinement for the BFAs during transport and storage. Following completion of the drying and inerting process, the SSFCs are to be delivered to the CSB for closure welding and long-term interim storage. The CSB will provide safe handling and dry storage for the SSFCs containing the BFAs. The purpose of this document is to describe the SSFC system and interface equipment, including the technical basis for the system, design descriptions, and operations requirements. It is intended that this document will be periodically updated as more equipment design and performance specification information becomes available

  19. Defense High Level Waste Disposal Container System Description Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Defense High Level Waste Disposal Container System supports the confinement and isolation of waste within the Engineered Barrier System of the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR). Disposal containers are loaded and sealed in the surface waste handling facilities, transferred to the underground through the accesses using a rail mounted transporter, and emplaced in emplacement drifts. The defense high level waste (HLW) disposal container provides long-term confinement of the commercial HLW and defense HLW (including immobilized plutonium waste forms (IPWF)) placed within disposable canisters, and withstands the loading, transfer, emplacement, and retrieval loads and environments. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-owned spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in disposable canisters may also be placed in a defense HLW disposal container along with commercial HLW waste forms, which is known as 'co-disposal'. The Defense High Level Waste Disposal Container System provides containment of waste for a designated period of time, and limits radionuclide release. The disposal container/waste package maintains the waste in a designated configuration, withstands maximum handling and rockfall loads, limits the individual canister temperatures after emplacement, resists corrosion in the expected handling and repository environments, and provides containment of waste in the event of an accident. Defense HLW disposal containers for HLW disposal will hold up to five HLW canisters. Defense HLW disposal containers for co-disposal will hold up to five HLW canisters arranged in a ring and one DOE SNF canister in the ring. Defense HLW disposal containers also will hold two Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) and two HLW canisters in one disposal container. The disposal container will include outer and inner cylinders, outer and inner cylinder lids, and may include a canister guide. An exterior label will provide a means by which to identify the disposal container and its contents. Different materials

  20. A review of the possible effects of hydrogen on lifetime of carbon steel nuclear waste canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turnbull, A.

    2009-07-01

    In Switzerland, the National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste (Nagra) is responsible for developing an effective method for the safe disposal of vitrified high level waste (HLW) and spent fuel. One of the options for disposal canisters is thick-walled carbon steel. The canisters, which would have a diameter of about 1 m and a length of about 3 m (HLW) or about 5 m (spent fuel), will be embedded in horizontal tunnels and surrounded with bentonite clay. The regulatory requirement for the minimum canister lifetime is 1000 years but demonstration of a minimum lifetime of 10,000 years would be desirable. The pore-water to which the canister will be exposed is of marine origin with about 0.1-0.3 M Cl-. Since hydrogen is generated during the corrosion process, it is necessary to assess the probability of hydrogen assisted cracking modes and to make recommendations to eliminate that probability. To that aim, key reports detailing projections for the local environment and associated corrosion rate of the waste canister have been evaluated with the focus on the implication for the absorbed hydrogen concentration in the steel. Simple calculations of hydrogen diffusion and accumulation in the inner compartment of the sealed canister indicate that a pressure equivalent to that for gas pockets external to the canister (envisaged to be about 10 MPa) may be attained in the proposed exposure time, an important consideration since it is not possible to modify the internal surface of the closure weld. Current ideas on mechanisms of hydrogen assisted cracking are assessed from which it is concluded that the mechanistic understanding and associated models of hydrogen assisted cracking are insufficient to provide a framework for quantitative prediction for this application. The emphasis then was to identify threshold conditions for cracking and to evaluate the likelihood that these may be exceeded over the lifetime of the containment. Based on an analysis of data in the

  1. Analytical Evaluation of Preliminary Drop Tests Performed to Develop a Robust Design for the Standardized DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ware, A.G.; Morton, D.K.; Smith, N.L.; Snow, S.D.; Rahl, T.E.

    1999-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has developed a design concept for a set of standard canisters for the handling, interim storage, transportation, and disposal in the national repository, of DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The standardized DOE SNF canister has to be capable of handling virtually all of the DOE SNF in a variety of potential storage and transportation systems. It must also be acceptable to the repository, based on current and anticipated future requirements. This expected usage mandates a robust design. The canister design has four unique geometries, with lengths of approximately 10 feet or 15 feet, and an outside nominal diameter of 18 inches or 24 inches. The canister has been developed to withstand a drop from 30 feet onto a rigid (flat) surface, sustaining only minor damage - but no rupture - to the pressure (containment) boundary. The majority of the end drop-induced damage is confined to the skirt and lifting/stiffening ring components, which can be removed if de sired after an accidental drop. A canister, with its skirt and stiffening ring removed after an accidental drop, can continue to be used in service with appropriate operational steps being taken. Features of the design concept have been proven through drop testing and finite element analyses of smaller test specimens. Finite element analyses also validated the canister design for drops onto a rigid (flat) surface for a variety of canister orientations at impact, from vertical to 45 degrees off vertical. Actual 30-foot drop testing has also been performed to verify the final design, though limited to just two full-scale test canister drops. In each case, the analytical models accurately predicted the canister response

  2. Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. Description of the disposal system 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-12-01

    Description of the Disposal System sits within Posiva Oy's Safety Case 'TURVA-2012' report portfolio and has the objective presenting the initial state of the disposal system for the safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto, Finland. Disposal system is an entity composed of a repository system and surface environment. The repository system includes the spent nuclear fuel, canister, buffer, backfill, and closure components as well as the host rock. The repository system components have assigned safety functions (except for the spent nuclear fuel) and are subject to requirements. The initial state is presented for each component, and references to the main supporting reports are given to guide the reader for more details. Conditions for each component vary in time and space, due to the time of emplacement and due to the tolerances set for the compositions, geometries and other properties depending on the component. The disposal operation is foreseen to commence ∼ 2020. At the beginning of the postclosure period, around 2120, all the engineered components have been installed and the operation is finalised. The system evolution during the operational phase is discussed in detail in Performance Assessment. The initial state for the host rock is defined to be essentially equal to the baseline conditions prior to starting the construction of the underground characterisation facility ONKALO. For the surface environment, the initial state is the present conditions prevailing. For any other component of the disposal system, the initial state is defined as the state it has when the direct control over that specific part of the system ceases and only limited information can be made available on the subsequent development of conditions in that part of the system or its near field. (orig.)

  3. Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. Description of the disposal system 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-12-15

    Description of the Disposal System sits within Posiva Oy's Safety Case 'TURVA-2012' report portfolio and has the objective presenting the initial state of the disposal system for the safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto, Finland. Disposal system is an entity composed of a repository system and surface environment. The repository system includes the spent nuclear fuel, canister, buffer, backfill, and closure components as well as the host rock. The repository system components have assigned safety functions (except for the spent nuclear fuel) and are subject to requirements. The initial state is presented for each component, and references to the main supporting reports are given to guide the reader for more details. Conditions for each component vary in time and space, due to the time of emplacement and due to the tolerances set for the compositions, geometries and other properties depending on the component. The disposal operation is foreseen to commence {approx} 2020. At the beginning of the postclosure period, around 2120, all the engineered components have been installed and the operation is finalised. The system evolution during the operational phase is discussed in detail in Performance Assessment. The initial state for the host rock is defined to be essentially equal to the baseline conditions prior to starting the construction of the underground characterisation facility ONKALO. For the surface environment, the initial state is the present conditions prevailing. For any other component of the disposal system, the initial state is defined as the state it has when the direct control over that specific part of the system ceases and only limited information can be made available on the subsequent development of conditions in that part of the system or its near field. (orig.)

  4. Investigations of possibilities to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in Lithuania: a model case. Volume 3, Generic Safety Assessment of Repository in Crystalline Rocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Motiejunas, S.; Poskas, P.

    2005-01-01

    In this Volume a generic safety assessment of the repository for spent nuclear fuel in crystalline rock in Lithuania is presented. Modeling of safety relevant radionuclide release from the defected canister and their transport through the near field and far field was performed. Doses to humans due to released radionuclides in the well water were calculated and compared with the dose restrictions existing in Lithuania. For this stage of generic safety assessment only two scenarios were chosen: base scenario and canister defect scenario. KBS-3 concept developed by SKB for disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden was chosen as prototype for repository in crystalline basement in Lithuania. The KBS-3H design with horizontal canister emplacement is proposed as a reference design for Lithuania

  5. Unreviewed safety question evaluation of 100 K West fuel canister gas and liquid sampling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwardt, L.D.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide the basis for answers to an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) safety evaluation for the gas and liquid sampling activities associated with the fuel characterization program at the 100 K West (KW) fuel storage basin. The scope of this safety evaluation is limited to the movement of canisters between the main storage basin, weasel pit, and south loadout pit transfer channel (also known as the decapping station); gas and liquid sampling of fuel canisters in the weasel pit; mobile laboratory preliminary sample analysis in or near the 105 KW basin building; and the placement of sample containers in an approved shipping container. It was concluded that the activities and potential accident consequences associated with the gas and liquid sampling of 100 KW fuel canisters are bounded by the current safety basis documents and do not constitute an Unreviewed Safety Question

  6. Inspection of bottom and lid welds for disposal canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitkaenen, J.

    2010-09-01

    radiographic testing for this study. Other radiation sources cannot penetrate the wall thickness sufficiently. Defects detected in visual testing will be sized using eddy current testing. Special inspection techniques have been developed for sizing using low frequency (LF) eddy current testing. High frequency (HF) coils are used to evaluate the area of the surface defects. In the case of copper inspection, 30 kHz is considered a high frequency and 200 Hz a low frequency. The acceptance criteria define the defect detectability requirements of the inspection methods. The defect detectability of the methods is under further study to ascertain their viability. In the case of a single defect, the inaccuracy of the sizing method is less important. The significance of the inaccuracy in sizing is more pronounced when there are two or more defects in the corrosion path of the canister. The sizing capability will be studied and subsequently inspection techniques qualified on the basis of the recommendation of ENIQ (European Network for Inspection Qualification). This type of qualification is applied in Europe. In the USA, the qualification in nuclear applications is based on the performance demonstration part of ASME XI. All required information (input information, inspection procedures, technical justifications, etc.) will be gathered in order to prepare for the qualification. At the moment in the NDT reliability study the defect detectability is in focus as well the inaccuracy of sizing of indications. The precise sizing is the clearly more safety-based and industrial acceptance of canisters can be carried out. Sizing will be also verified by a limited metallographic study of detected indications. The work of technical justifications will be started. By qualifying the inspectors and inspection methods, the defined quality requirements for manufacturing disposal canisters for spent nuclear fuel will be met. (orig.)

  7. Data compilation report: Gas and liquid samples from K West Basin fuel storage canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trimble, D.J.

    1995-01-01

    Forty-one gas and liquid samples were taken from spent fuel storage canisters in the K West Basin during a March 1995 sampling campaign. (Spent fuel from the N Reactor is stored in sealed canisters at the bottom of the K West Basin.) A description of the sampling process, gamma energy analysis data, and quantitative gas mass spectroscopy data are documented. This documentation does not include data analysis

  8. Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Canister Storage Building Functions and Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KLEM, M.J.

    2000-01-01

    In 1998, a major change in the technical strategy for managing Multi Canister Overpacks (MCO) while stored within the Canister Storage Building (CSB) occurred. The technical strategy is documented in Baseline Change Request (BCR) No. SNF-98-006, Simplified SNF Project Baseline (MCO Sealing) (FDH 1998). This BCR deleted the hot conditioning process initially adopted for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNF Project) as documented in WHC-SD-SNF-SP-005, Integrated Process Strategy for K Basins Spent Nuclear Fuel (WHC 199.5). In summary, MCOs containing Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) from K Basins would be placed in interim storage following processing through the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) facility. With this change, the needs for the Hot Conditioning System (HCS) and inerting/pressure retaining capabilities of the CSB storage tubes and the MCO Handling Machine (MHM) were eliminated. Mechanical seals will be used on the MCOs prior to transport to the CSB. Covers will be welded on the MCOs for the final seal at the CSB. Approval of BCR No. SNF-98-006, imposed the need to review and update the CSB functions and requirements baseline documented herein including changing the document title to ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Canister Storage Building Functions and Requirements.'' This revision aligns the functions and requirements baseline with the CSB Simplified SNF Project Baseline (MCO Sealing). This document represents the Canister Storage Building (CSB) Subproject technical baseline. It establishes the functions and requirements baseline for the implementation of the CSB Subproject. The document is organized in eight sections. Sections 1.0 Introduction and 2.0 Overview provide brief introductions to the document and the CSB Subproject. Sections 3.0 Functions, 4.0 Requirements, 5.0 Architecture, and 6.0 Interfaces provide the data described by their titles. Section 7.0 Glossary lists the acronyms and defines the terms used in this document. Section 8.0 References lists the

  9. The prospective usage of the multi-purpose canister and impacts on the waste management and disposal system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLeod, N.B.

    1993-01-01

    The Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) is designed to be loaded with spent fuel and sealed at reactors and then serve the functions of transport, storage and disposal without reopening. It can be either self-shielded or unshielded, thus requiring compatible overpacks for transport, storage and disposal. The MPC is not a new concept but it may now be viable because of the particular characteristics at Yucca Mountain: larger MPCs are possible because of ramp access to the repository horizon, and the less difficult temperature limits because of in-drift emplacement, rather than borehole emplacement. This paper describes the advantages and disadvantages of adopting the MPC as the principal technology to be employed in the US program. Use of the MPC permits integration of the utility and DOE portions of the system as well as among the elements within the DOE portion. Paradoxically, the principal disadvantage of the MPC is a direct consequence of its merit as an integrating technology. Full integration includes disposability without reopening, and requires that disposability design decisions be made and implemented well in advance of when waste package licensing uncertainties are resolved. There is, therefore, a risk that MPCs loaded prior to waste package licensing will have to be opened. This risk is discussed in terms of probability and consequences and various alternatives for mitigating this risk are discussed

  10. 2D and 3D thermal simulations for storage systems with internal natural convection for canistered spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yaksh, M.; Wang, C.

    2004-01-01

    In the US, the number of nuclear plants expected to implement on-site dry storage is increasing each year. As reactors burn advanced fuel assemblies to higher burnups, the dry storage systems will be required to accommodate higher heat loads. This is due to the increasing capacity of the systems and the need to store higher burnup fuel with reasonable cooling periods (i.e., five to six years). As the storage systems heat rejection design must be passive, natural convection is an efficient means for rejection of heat from the spent fuel to the surface of the canister boundary. The design presented in this paper is a canistered system that employs conduction, radiation and convection to reject heat from the canister, which is stored in a vertical concrete cask. The canister containing the spent fuel in this design is a right circular stainless steel vessel capable of storing 37 PWR fuel assemblies with a total canister heat load of 40 kW. Accompanying any design effort is the use of a numerical methodology that can accurately predict the peak-clad temperatures of the fuel and the structural components of the system. The main challenge to any analysis employing internal natural convection may be perceived as a practical limitation due to the size of the model. Since canisters are typically cylindrical, a two-dimensional model can be used to represent the canister. The fuel basket structure, which maintains the configuration of the spent fuel, is an array of square tubes, and is non-axisymmetric. Flow up through the fuel region in the basket encounters a complex cross section due to the fuel assembly rod array (up to 17 x 17). The flow region of the heated gas down the outside of the basket in the annulus between the canister shell and the basket assembly (downcomer) is also an irregular shaped area. To confirm that a two-dimensional (2D) modelling methodology is appropriate, a benchmark using results from a thermal test is required. The thermal test focuses on the

  11. Physical properties of encapsulate spent fuel in canisters; Comportamiento fisico de las capsulas de almacenamiento

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    Spent fuel and high-level wastes will be permanently stored in a deep geological repository (AGP). Prior to this, they will be encapsulated in canisters. The present report is dedicated to the study of such canisters under the different physical demands that they may undergo, be those in operating or accident conditions. The physical demands of interest include mechanical demands, both static and dynamic, and thermal demands. Consideration is given to the complete file of the canister, from the time when it is empty and without lid to the final conditions expected in the repository. Thermal analyses of canisters containing spent fuel are often carried out in two dimensions, some times with hypotheses of axial symmetry and some times using a plane transverse section through the centre of the canister. The results obtained in both types of analyses are compared here to those of complete three-dimensional analyses. The latter generate more reliable information about the temperatures that may be experienced by the canister and its contents; they also allow calibrating the errors embodied in the two-dimensional calculations. (Author)

  12. Near-field performance of the advanced cold process canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, L.

    1991-12-01

    A near-field performance evaluation of an advanced cold process canister for spent fuel disposal has been performed jointly by TVO, Finland and SKB, Sweden. The canister consists of a steel canister as a load bearing element, with an outer corrosion shield of copper. In the analysis, as well internal (ie corrosion processes from the inside of the canister) as external processes (mechanical and chemical) have been considered both prior to and after canister breach. The major conclusions for the evaluation are: Internal processes cannot cause the canister breach under foreseen conditions, ie local-iced corrosion for the steel or copper canisters can be dismissed as a failure mechanism; The evaluation of the effects of processed outside the canister indicate that there is no rapid mechanism to endanger the integrity of the canister. Consequently the service life of the canister will be several million years. For completeness also evaluation of post-failure behaviour was carried out. Analyses were focussed on low probability phenomena from faults in canisters. Some items were identified where further research is justified in order to increase knowledge of the phenomena and thus strengthen the confidence of safety margins. However, it can be concluded that the risks of these scenarios can be judged to be acceptable. This is due to the fact that firstly, the probability of occurrence of most of these scenarios can be controlled to a large extent through technical measures. Secondly, these analyses indicated that the consequences would not be severe

  13. Treatment and final disposal of nuclear waste. Programme for encapsulation, deep geological disposal, and research, development and demonstration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-09-01

    Programs for RD and D concerning disposal of radioactive waste are presented. Main topics include: Design, testing and manufacture of canisters for the spent fuels; Design of equipment for deposition of waste canisters; Material and process for backfilling rock caverns; Evaluation of accuracy and validation of methods for safety analyses; Development of methods for defining scenarios for the safety analyses. 471 refs, 67 figs, 21 tabs

  14. Treatment and final disposal of nuclear waste. Programme for encapsulation, deep geological disposal, and research, development and demonstration

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    Programs for RD and D concerning disposal of radioactive waste are presented. Main topics include: Design, testing and manufacture of canisters for the spent fuels; Design of equipment for deposition of waste canisters; Material and process for backfilling rock caverns; Evaluation of accuracy and validation of methods for safety analyses; Development of methods for defining scenarios for the safety analyses. 471 refs, 67 figs, 21 tabs.

  15. Stress redistribution and void growth in butt-welded canisters for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Josefson, B.L.; Karlsson, L.; Haeggblad, H.Aa.

    1993-02-01

    The stress-redistribution in Cu-Fe canisters for spent nuclear fuel during waiting for deposition and after final deposition is calculated numerically. The constitutive equation modelling creep deformation during this time period employs values on materials parameters determined within the SKB-project on 'mechanical integrity of canisters for spent nuclear fuel'. The welding residual stresses are redistributed without lowering maximum values during the waiting period, a very low amount of void growth is predicted for this type of copper during the deposition period. This leads to an estimated very large rupture time

  16. Oxidative dissolution of spent fuel and release of nuclides from a copper/iron canister. Model developments and applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Longcheng Liu

    2001-12-01

    Three models have been developed and applied in the performance assessment of a final repository. They are based on accepted theories and experimental results for known and possible mechanisms that may dominate in the oxidative dissolution of spent fuel and the release of nuclides from a canister. Assuming that the canister is breached at an early stage after disposal, the three models describe three sub-systems in the near field of the repository, in which the governing processes and mechanisms are quite different. In the model for the oxidative dissolution of the fuel matrix, a set of kinetic descriptions is provided that describes the oxidative dissolution of the fuel matrix and the release of the embedded nuclides. In particular, the effect of autocatalytic reduction of hexavalent uranium by dissolved H{sub 2}, using UO{sub 2} (s) on the fuel pellets as a catalyst, is taken into account. The simulation results suggest that most of the radiolytic oxidants will be consumed by the oxidation of the fuel matrix, and that much less will be depleted by dissolved ferrous iron. Most of the radiolytically produced hexavalent uranium will be reduced by the autocatalytic reaction with H{sub 2} on the fuel surface. It will reprecipitate as UO{sub 2} (s) on the fuel surface, and thus very little net oxidation of the fuel will take place. In the reactive transport model, the interactions of multiple processes within a defective canister are described, in which numerous redox reactions take place as multiple species diffuse. The effect of corrosion of the cast iron insert of the canister and the reduction of dissolved hexavalent uranium by ferrous iron sorbed onto iron corrosion products and by dissolved H{sub 2} are particularly included. Scoping calculations suggest that corrosion of the iron insert will occur primarily under anaerobic conditions. The escaping oxidants from the fuel rods will migrate toward the iron insert. Much of these oxidants will, however, be consumed

  17. Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Project evaluation of multi-canister overpack venting and monitoring options during staging of K basins fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wiborg, J.C.

    1995-12-01

    This engineering study recommends whether multi-canister overpacks containing spent nuclear fuel from the Hanford K Basins should be staged in vented or a sealed, but ventable, condition during staging at the Canister Storage Building prior to hot vacuum conditioning and interim storage. The integrally related issues of MCO monitoring, end point criteria, and assessing the practicality of avoiding venting and Hot Vacuum Conditioning for a portion of the spent fuel are also considered.

  18. K West Basin canister survey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitner, A.L.

    1998-01-01

    A survey was conducted of the K West Basin to determine the distribution of canister types that contain the irradiated N Reactor fuel. An underwater camera was used to conduct the survey during June 1998, and the results were recorded on videotape. A full row-by-row survey of the entire basin was performed, with the distinction between aluminum and stainless steel Mark 1 canisters made by the presence or absence of steel rings on the canister trunions (aluminum canisters have the steel rings). The results of the survey are presented in tables and figures. Grid maps of the three bays show the canister lid ID number and the canister type in each location that contained fuel. The following abbreviations are used in the grid maps for canister type designation: IA = Mark 1 aluminum, IS = Mark 1 stainless steel, and 2 = Mark 2 stainless steel. An overall summary of the canister distribution survey is presented in Table 1. The total number of canisters found to contain fuel was 3842, with 20% being Mark 1 Al, 25% being Mark 1 SS, and 55% being Mark 2 SS. The aluminum canisters were predominantly located in the East and West bays of the basin

  19. Development and demonstration of prototype transportation equipment for emplacing HL vitrified waste canisters into small diameter bored horizontal disposal cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seidler, Wolf K.; Bosgiraud, Jean-Michel; Londe, Louis

    2008-01-01

    Over a period of 4 and years the National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (Andra), working with a variety of Contractors mostly specializing in nuclear orientated mechanical applications, successfully designed, fabricated and demonstrated 2 very different prototype high level waste transport systems. The first system, based on air cushion technology, was developed primarily for very heavy loads (17 to 45 tonnes). The results of this work are described in a separate presentation (Paper 21) at this Conference. The second system, developed by Andra within the framework of the ESDRED Project, generally referred to as the 'Pushing Robot System' for vitrified waste canisters, is the subject of this paper. The 'Pushing Robot System' is a part of the French national disposal concept that is described in Andra's 'Dossier 2005'. The latter is a public document that can be viewed on Andra's web site (www.andra.fr). The 'Pushing Robot System' system is designed for the deep geological disposal (in clay formations) of 'C' type vitrified waste canisters. In its entirety the system provides for the transport, emplacement and, if necessary, the retrieval of those canisters. Nothing in the design of the Andra emplacement equipment would preclude its utilization in horizontal openings in other types of geological settings. Over a period of some 8 years Andra has developed the 'Pushing Robot System' in 3 phases. Initially there was only the 'Conceptual Design' (Phase 1) which was incorporated in the Dossier 2005. This was followed by Phase 2 i.e. the design and fabrication of a simplified full scale prototype system henceforth referred to a P1, which includes a Pushing Robot, a Dummy Canister and a Test Bench. P1 details were also incorporated in the Dossier 2005. Finally, during Phase 3, a second more comprehensive full scale prototype system P2 has been designed and is being assembled and tested this month. This system includes a Transport Shuttle, a Transfer Shielding Cask, a

  20. Comparison of Tagging Technologies for Safeguards of Copper Canisters for Nuclear Spent Fuel.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Clementi, Chiara; Littmann, François; Capineri, Lorenzo

    2018-03-21

    Several countries are planning to store nuclear spent fuel in long term geological repositories, preserved by copper canisters with an iron insert. This new approach involves many challenging problems and one is to satisfy safeguards requirements: the Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of the fuel must be kept from the encapsulation plant up to the final repository. To date, no measurement system has been suggested for a unique identification and authentication. Following the list of the most important safeguards, safety and security requirements for copper canisters identification and authentication, a review of conventional tagging technologies and measurement systems for nuclear items is reported in this paper. The aim of this study is to verify to what extent each technology could be potentially used for keeping the CoK of copper canisters. Several tagging methods are briefly described and compared, discussing advantages and disadvantages.

  1. Spent nuclear fuel Canister Storage Building CDR Review Committee report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dana, W.P.

    1995-12-01

    The Canister Storage Building (CSB) is a subproject under the Spent Nuclear Fuels Major System Acquisition. This subproject is necessary to design and construct a facility capable of providing dry storage of repackaged spent fuels received from K Basins. The CSB project completed a Conceptual Design Report (CDR) implementing current project requirements. A Design Review Committee was established to review the CDR. This document is the final report summarizing that review

  2. Corrosion of canister materials for radioactive waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kienzler, Bernhard

    2017-01-01

    In the period between 1980 and 2004, corrosion studies on various metallic materials have been performed at the Research Center Karlsruhe. The objectives of these experimental studies addressed mainly the performance of canister materials for heat producing, high-level wastes and spent nuclear fuels for a repository in a German salt dome. Additional studies covered the performance of steels for packaging wastes with negligible heat production under conditions to be expected in rocksalt and in the Konrad iron ore mine. The results of the investigations have been published in journals and conference proceedings but also in ''grey literature''. This paper presents a summary of the results of corrosion experiments with fine-grained steels and nodular cast steel.

  3. HLW Disposal System Development

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, J. W.; Choi, H. J.; Lee, J. Y. (and others)

    2007-06-15

    A KRS is suggested through design requirement analysis of the buffer and the canister which are the constituent of disposal system engineered barrier and HLW management plans are proposed. In the aspect of radionuclide retention capacity, the thickness of the buffer is determined 0.5m, the shape to be disc and ring and the dry density to be 1.6 g/cm{sup 3}. The maximum temperature of the buffer is below 100 .deg. which meets the design requirement. And bentonite blocks with 5 wt% of graphite showed more than 1.0 W/mK of thermal conductivity without the addition of sand. The result of the thermal analysis for proposed double-layered buffer shows that decrease of 7 .deg. C in maximum temperature of the buffer. For the disposal canister, the copper for the outer shell material and cast iron for the inner structure material is recommended considering the results analyzed in terms of performance of the canisters and manufacturability and the geochemical properties of deep groundwater sampled from the research area with granite, salt water intrusion, and the heavy weight of the canister. The results of safety analysis for the canister shows that the criticality for the normal case including uncertainty is the value of 0.816 which meets subcritical condition. Considering nation's 'Basic Plan for Electric Power Demand and Supply' and based on the scenario of disposing CANDU spent fuels in the first phase, the disposal system that the repository will be excavated in eight phases with the construction of the Underground Research Laboratory (URL) beginning in 2020 and commissioning in 2040 until the closure of the repository is proposed. Since there is close correlation between domestic HLW management plans and front-end/back-end fuel cycle plans causing such a great sensitivity of international environment factor, items related to assuring the non-proliferation and observing the international standard are showed to be the influential factor and acceptability

  4. Vacuum Drying Tests for Storage of Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen, K.F.; Large, W.S.; Sindelar, R.L.

    1998-05-01

    A total inventory of up to approximately 32,000 aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel (Al SNF) assemblies are expected to be shipped to Savannah River Site (SRS) from domestic and foreign research reactors over the next several decades. Treatment technologies are being developed as alternatives to processing for the ultimate disposition of Al SNF in the geologic repository. One technology, called Direct/Co-disposal of Al SNF, would place the SNF into a canister ready for disposal in a waste package, with or without canisters containing high-level radioactive waste glass logs, in the repository. The Al SNF would be transferred from wet storage and would need to be dried in the Al SNF canister. The moisture content inside the Al SNF canister is limited to avoid excessive Al SNF corrosion and hydrogen buildup during interim storage before disposal. A vacuum drying process was proposed to dry the Al SNF in a canister. There are two major concerns for the vacuum drying process. One is water inside the canister could become frozen during the vacuum drying process and the other one is the detection of dryness inside the canister. To vacuum dry an irradiated fuel in a heavily shielded canister, it would be very difficult to open the lid to inspect the dryness during the vacuum drying operation. A vacuum drying test program using a mock SNF assembly was conducted to demonstrate feasibility of drying the Al SNF in a canister. These tests also served as a check-out of the drying apparatus for future tests in which irradiated fuel would be loaded into a canister under water followed by drying for storage

  5. Spent nuclear fuel project multi-canister overpack, additional NRC requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garvin, L.J.

    1998-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE), established in the K Basin Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Regulatory Policy, dated August 4, 1995 (hereafter referred to as the Policy), the requirement for new Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project facilities to achieve nuclear safety equivalency to comparable US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-licensed facilities. For activities other than during transport, when the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) is used and resides in the Canister Storage Building (CSB), Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) facility or Hot Conditioning System, additional NRC requirements will also apply to the MCO based on the safety functions it performs and its interfaces with the SNF Project facilities. An evaluation was performed in consideration of the MCO safety functions to identify any additional NRC requirements needed, in combination with the existing and applicable DOE requirements, to establish nuclear safety equivalency for the MCO. The background, basic safety issues and general comparison of NRC and DOE requirements for the SNF Project are presented in WHC-SD-SNF-DB-002

  6. Design of double containment canister cask storage system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asami, M.; Matsumoto, T.; Oohama, T.; Kuriyama, K.; Kawakami, K.

    2004-01-01

    Spent fuels discharged from Japanese LWR will be stored as recycled-fuel-resources in interim storage facilities. The concrete cask storage system is one of important forms for the spent fuel interim storage. In Japan, the interim storage facility will be located near the coast, therefore it is important to prevent SCC (Stress Corrosion Cracking) caused by sea salt particles and to assure the containment integrity of the canister which contains spent fuels. KEPCO, NFT and OCL have designed the double containment canister cask storage system that can assure the long-term containment integrity and monitor the containment performance without storage capacity decrease. Major features of the combined canister cask system are shown as follows: This system can survey containment integrity of dual canisters by monitoring the pressure of the gap between canisters. The primary canister has dual lids sealed by welding. The secondary canister has single lid tightened by bolts and sealed by metallic gaskets. The primary canister is contained in the transport cask during transportation, and the gap between the primary canister and the transport cask is filled with He gas. Under storage condition in the concrete cask, the primary canister is contained in the secondary canister, and the gap between these canisters is filled with helium gas. Hence this system can prevent the primary canister to contact sea salt particle in the air and from SCC. Decrease of cooling performance because of the double canister is compensated by fins fitted on the secondary canister surface. Then, this system can prevent the decrease of storage capacity determined by the fuel temperature limit. This system can assure that the primary canister will keep intact for long term storage. Therefore, in the case of pressure down of the gap between canisters, it can be considered that the secondary canister containment is damaged, and the primary canister will be transferred to another secondary canister at the

  7. Development of a Korean Reference disposal System(A-KRS) for the HLW from Advanced Fuel Cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Heui Joo; Choi, J. W.; Lee, J. Y.

    2010-04-01

    A database program for analyzing the characteristics of spent fuels was developed, and A-SOURCE program for characterizing the source term of HLW from advanced fuel cycles. A new technique for developing a copper canister by introducing a cold spray technique was developed, which could reduce the amount of copper. Also, to enhance the performance of A-KRS, two kinds of properties, thermal performance and iodine adsorption, were studied successfully. A complex geological disposal system which can accommodate all the HLW (CANDU and HANARO spent fuels, HLW from pyro-processing of PWR spent fuels, decommissioning wastes) was developed, and a conceptual design was carried out. Operational safety assessment system was constructed for the long-term management of A-KRS. Three representative accidental cases were analyzed, and the probabilistic safety assessment was adopted as a methodology for the safety evaluation of A-KRS operation. A national program was proposed to support the HLW national policy on the HLW management. A roadmap for HLW management was proposed based on the optimum timing of disposal

  8. Facility Description 2012. Summary report of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palomaeki, J.; Ristimaeki, L.

    2013-10-01

    The purpose of the facility description is to be a specific summary report of the scope of Posiva's nuclear facilities (encapsulation plant and disposal facility) in Olkiluoto. This facility description is based on the 2012 designs and completing Posiva working reports. The facility description depicts the nuclear facilities and their operation as the disposal of spent nuclear fuel starts in Olkiluoto in about 2020. According to the decisions-in-principle of the government, the spent nuclear fuel from Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants in operation and in future cumulative spent nuclear fuel from Loviisa 1 and 2, Olkiluoto 1, 2, 3 and 4 nuclear power plants, is permitted to be disposed of in Olkiluoto bedrock. The design of the disposal facility is based on the KBS-3V concept (vertical disposal). Long-term safety concept is based on the multi-barrier principle i.e. several release barriers, which ensure one another so that insufficiency in the performance of one barrier doesn't jeopardize long-term safety of the disposal. The release barriers are the following: canister, bentonite buffer and deposition tunnel backfill, and the host rock around the repository. The canisters are installed into the deposition holes, which are bored to the floor of the deposition tunnels. The canisters are enveloped with compacted bentonite blocks, which swell after absorbing water. The surrounding bedrock and the central and access tunnel backfill provide additional retardation, retention, and dilution. The nuclear facilities consist of an encapsulation plant and of underground final disposal facility including other aboveground buildings and surface structures serving the facility. The access tunnel and ventilation shafts to the underground disposal facility and some auxiliary rooms are constructed as a part of ONKALO underground rock characterization facility during years 2004-2014. The construction works needed for the repository start after obtaining the construction

  9. Corrosion resistance of a copper canister for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-04-01

    The report presents an evaluation of copper as canister material for spent nuclear fuel. The evaluation is made from the viewpoint of corrosion and applies to a concept of 1977. Supplementary corrosion studies have been performed. The report includes 9 appendices which deal with experimental data. (G.B.)

  10. Design of the disposal facility 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saanio, T.; Ikonen, A.; Keto, P.; Kirkkomaeki, T.; Kukkola, T.; Nieminen, J.; Raiko, H.

    2013-11-01

    The spent nuclear fuel accumulated from the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto in Eurajoki and in Haestholmen in Loviisa will be disposed of in Olkiluoto. A facility complex will be constructed at Olkiluoto, and it will include two nuclear waste facilities according to Government Degree 736/2008. The nuclear waste facilities are an encapsulation plant, constructed to encapsulate spent nuclear fuel and a disposal facility consisting of an underground repository and other underground rooms and above ground service spaces. The repository is planned to be excavated to a depth of 400 - 450 meters. Access routes to the disposal facility are an inclined access tunnel and vertical shafts. The encapsulated fuel is transferred to the disposal facility in the canister lift. The canisters are transferred from the technical rooms to the disposal area via central tunnel and deposited in the deposition holes which are bored in the floors of the deposition tunnels and are lined beforehand with compacted bentonite blocks. Two parallel central tunnels connect all the deposition tunnels and these central tunnels are inter-connected at regular intervals. The solution improves the fire safety of the underground rooms and allows flexible backfilling and closing of the deposition tunnels in stages during the operational phase of the repository. An underground rock characterization facility, ONKALO, is excavated at the disposal level. ONKALO is designed and constructed so that it can later serve as part of the repository. The goal is that the first part of the disposal facility will be constructed under the building permit phase in the 2010's and operations will start in the 2020's. The fuel from 4 operating reactors as well the fuel from the fifth nuclear power plant under construction, has been taken into account in designing the disposal facility. According to the information from TVO and Fortum, the amount of the spent nuclear fuel is 5,440 tU. The disposal facility is being excavated

  11. Corrosion of canister materials for radioactive waste disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kienzler, Bernhard [KIT Karlsruhe (Germany). Institut fuer Nukleare Entsorgung (INE)

    2017-08-15

    In the period between 1980 and 2004, corrosion studies on various metallic materials have been performed at the Research Center Karlsruhe. The objectives of these experimental studies addressed mainly the performance of canister materials for heat producing, high-level wastes and spent nuclear fuels for a repository in a German salt dome. Additional studies covered the performance of steels for packaging wastes with negligible heat production under conditions to be expected in rocksalt and in the Konrad iron ore mine. The results of the investigations have been published in journals and conference proceedings but also in ''grey literature''. This paper presents a summary of the results of corrosion experiments with fine-grained steels and nodular cast steel.

  12. Hazard categorization of 100 K West fuel canister gas and liquid sampling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwardt, L.D.

    1994-01-01

    This report documents the determination that the activities associated with the 100 K West fuel canister gas and liquid sampling are classified as Hazard Category Other (consequences are below criteria for Category 3)

  13. Stakeholder involvement in the evaluation of a multipurpose canister system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.R.; Kane, D.; Smith, T.B. Jr.

    1994-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), began evaluating a multipurpose canister (MPC) concept in October of 1992. This followed recommendations by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that DOE develop a nuclear waste management system that achieves system integration, standardization, and reduced fuel-handling operations. Industry organizations such as Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) had conducted earlier studies that concluded advantages to the nuclear waste management system may be offered by such a concept. The MPC concept involves a metal canister which would contain multiple spent nuclear fuel assemblies. The canister would be sealed at the nuclear power plant and would not be reopened. The MPC would then be placed inside separate casks or overpacks for storage, transportation, and disposal. An important factor in DOE's evaluation of the MPC concept was the involvement of external parties. This paper describes that involvement process for the OCRWM's MPC implementation program. External parties who have an interest or stake in the program are referred to as stakeholders

  14. Spent nuclear fuel disposal liability insurance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, D.W.

    1984-01-01

    This thesis examines the social efficiency of nuclear power when the risks of accidental releases of spent fuel radionuclides from a spent fuel disposal facility are considered. The analysis consists of two major parts. First, a theoretical economic model of the use of nuclear power including the risks associated with releases of radionuclides from a disposal facility is developed. Second, the costs of nuclear power, including the risks associated with a radionuclide release, are empirically compared to the costs of fossil fuel-fired generation of electricity. Under the provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the federally owned and operated spent nuclear fuel disposal facility is not required to maintain a reserve fund to cover damages from an accidental radionuclide release. Thus, the risks of a harmful radionuclide release are not included in the spent nuclear fuel disposal fee charged to the electric utilities. Since the electric utilities do not pay the full, social costs of spent fuel disposal, they use nuclear fuel in excess of the social optimum. An insurance mechanism is proposed to internalize the risks associated with spent fueled disposal. Under this proposal, the Federal government is required to insure the disposal facility against any liabilities arising from accidental releases of spent fuel radionuclides

  15. DESIGN ANALYSIS FOR THE DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL CONTAINER

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Radulesscu, G.; Tang, J.S.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of ''Design Analysis for the Defense High-Level Waste Disposal Container'' analysis is to technically define the defense high-level waste (DHLW) disposal container/waste package using the Waste Package Department's (WPD) design methods, as documented in ''Waste Package Design Methodology Report'' (CRWMS M andO [Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System Management and Operating Contractor] 2000a). The DHLW disposal container is intended for disposal of commercial high-level waste (HLW) and DHLW (including immobilized plutonium waste forms), placed within disposable canisters. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-managed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in disposable canisters may also be placed in a DHLW disposal container along with HLW forms. The objective of this analysis is to demonstrate that the DHLW disposal container/waste package satisfies the project requirements, as embodied in Defense High Level Waste Disposal Container System Description Document (SDD) (CRWMS M andO 1999a), and additional criteria, as identified in Waste Package Design Sensitivity Report (CRWMS M andQ 2000b, Table 4). The analysis briefly describes the analytical methods appropriate for the design of the DHLW disposal contained waste package, and summarizes the results of the calculations that illustrate the analytical methods. However, the analysis is limited to the calculations selected for the DHLW disposal container in support of the Site Recommendation (SR) (CRWMS M andO 2000b, Section 7). The scope of this analysis is restricted to the design of the codisposal waste package of the Savannah River Site (SRS) DHLW glass canisters and the Training, Research, Isotopes General Atomics (TRIGA) SNF loaded in a short 18-in.-outer diameter (OD) DOE standardized SNF canister. This waste package is representative of the waste packages that consist of the DHLW disposal container, the DHLW/HLW glass canisters, and the DOE-managed SNF in disposable canisters. The intended use of this

  16. DESIGN ANALYSIS FOR THE DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL CONTAINER

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    G. Radulesscu; J.S. Tang

    2000-06-07

    The purpose of ''Design Analysis for the Defense High-Level Waste Disposal Container'' analysis is to technically define the defense high-level waste (DHLW) disposal container/waste package using the Waste Package Department's (WPD) design methods, as documented in ''Waste Package Design Methodology Report'' (CRWMS M&O [Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System Management and Operating Contractor] 2000a). The DHLW disposal container is intended for disposal of commercial high-level waste (HLW) and DHLW (including immobilized plutonium waste forms), placed within disposable canisters. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-managed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in disposable canisters may also be placed in a DHLW disposal container along with HLW forms. The objective of this analysis is to demonstrate that the DHLW disposal container/waste package satisfies the project requirements, as embodied in Defense High Level Waste Disposal Container System Description Document (SDD) (CRWMS M&O 1999a), and additional criteria, as identified in Waste Package Design Sensitivity Report (CRWMS M&Q 2000b, Table 4). The analysis briefly describes the analytical methods appropriate for the design of the DHLW disposal contained waste package, and summarizes the results of the calculations that illustrate the analytical methods. However, the analysis is limited to the calculations selected for the DHLW disposal container in support of the Site Recommendation (SR) (CRWMS M&O 2000b, Section 7). The scope of this analysis is restricted to the design of the codisposal waste package of the Savannah River Site (SRS) DHLW glass canisters and the Training, Research, Isotopes General Atomics (TRIGA) SNF loaded in a short 18-in.-outer diameter (OD) DOE standardized SNF canister. This waste package is representative of the waste packages that consist of the DHLW disposal container, the DHLW/HLW glass canisters, and the DOE-managed SNF in disposable

  17. Technical note. A review of the mechanical integrity of the canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Segle, Peter

    2012-01-01

    Background: The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) reviews the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Company's (SKB) applications under the Act on Nuclear Activities (SFS 1984:3) for the construction and operation of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and for an encapsulation facility. As part of the review, SSM commissions consultants to carry out work in order to obtain information on specific issues. The results from the consultants' tasks are reported in SSM's Technical Note series. Objectives of the project: This project is part of SSM:s review of SKB:s license application for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The assignment concerns a review of the mechanical integrity of the canister. Summary by the author: An introductory review of SR-Site has been conducted with respect to the mechanical integrity of the canister. The review is focused on the copper canister and the nodular cast iron insert. Review results show that a number of loads and loading scenarios for the copper canister has not been analysed by SKB. The importance of sufficient creep ductility of the copper material and sufficient ductility and fracture toughness of the nodular cast iron material is pointed out in the review. A sensitivity study is suggested where the impact of these properties on the mechanical integrity of the canister is investigated. It is also suggested that potential damage mechanisms influencing these properties are further investigated. SKB's modelling of creep elongation at rupture under repository conditions is questioned. Needs for complementary information from SKB for the main review of SR-Site is listed. A list of review topics for SSM is also suggested

  18. Test manufacture of a canister insert

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.

    2004-11-01

    This report describes the insert-manufacturing test of a disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel that was made by Metso Paper Oy, Jyvaeskylae Foundry, in 2003 on contract for Posiva Oy. The test manufacture was a part of the co-operation development programme of encapsulation technology between SKB AB and Posiva Oy. Insert casting was specified according to the current manufacturing specifications of SKB. The canister insert was of BWR-type with integral bottom. This was the first trial manufacture of this type of insert in Finland and, in total, the second test manufacture of insert by Metso Paper. The result fulfilled all the requirements but the material mechanical properties and metallurgical structure of the cast material. The measured tensile strength, ultimate strength and elongation at rupture were lower than specified. The reason for this was revealed in the metallurgical investigation of the cast material. The nodulizing of the graphite was not occurred during the casting process according to the requirements. (orig.)

  19. Mechanical Integrity of Copper Canister Lid and Cylinder. Sensitivity study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karlsson, Marianne

    2002-08-01

    This report is part of a study of the mechanical integrity of canisters used for disposal of nuclear fuel waste. The overall objective is to determine and ensure the static and long-term strength of the copper canister lid and cylinder casing. The canisters used for disposal nuclear fuel waste of type BWR consists of an inner part (insert) of ductile cast iron and an outer part of copper. The copper canister is to provide a sealed barrier between the contents of the canister and the surroundings. The study in this report complements the finite element analyses performed in an earlier study. The analyses aim to evaluate the sensitivity of the canister to tolerances regarding the gap between the copper cylinder and the cast iron insert. Since great uncertainties regarding the material's long term creep properties prevail, analyses are also performed to evaluate the effect of different creep data on the resulting strain and stress state. The report analyses the mechanical response of the lid and flange of the copper canister when subjected to loads caused by pressure from swelling bentonite and from groundwater at a depth of 500 meter. The loads acting on the canister are somewhat uncertain and the cases investigated in this report are possible cases. Load cases analysed are: Pressure 15 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and 5 MPa uniformly distributed on cylinder; Pressure 5 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and 15 MPa uniformly distributed on cylinder; Pressure 20 MPa uniformly distributed on lid and cylinder; and Side pressures 10 MPa and 20 MPa uniformly distributed on part of the cylinder. Creep analyses are performed for two of the load cases. For all considered designs high principal stresses appear on the outside of the copper cylinder in the region from the weld down to the level of the lid lower edge. Altering the gap between lid and cylinder and/or between cylinder and insert only marginally affects the resulting stress state. Fitting the lid in the cylinder

  20. Mechanical Integrity of Canisters Using a Fracture Mechanics Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koyama, Tomofumi; Guoxiang Zhang; Lanru Jing [Royal Inst. of Technology, Stockholm (Sweden). Dept. of Land and Water Resources Engineering

    2006-07-15

    This report presents the methods and results of a research project about numerical modeling of mechanical integrity of cast-iron canisters for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden, using combined boundary element (BEM) and finite element (FEM) methods. The objectives of the project are: 1) to investigate the possibility of initiation and growth of fractures in the cast-iron canisters under the mechanical loading conditions defined in the premises of canister design by Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. (SKB); 2) to investigate the maximum bearing capacity of the cast iron canisters under uniformly distributed and gradually increasing boundary pressure until plastic failure. Achievement of the two objectives may provide some quantitative evidence for the mechanical integrity and overall safety of the cast-iron canisters that are needed for the final safety assessment of the geological repository of the radioactive waste repository in Sweden. The geometrical dimension, distribution and magnitudes of loads and Material properties of the canisters and possible fractures were provided by the latest investigations of SKB. The results of the BEM simulations, using the commercial code BEASY, indicate that under the currently defined loading conditions the possibility of initiation of new fractures or growth of existing fractures (defects) are very small, due to the reasons that: 1) the canisters are under mainly compressive stresses; 2) the induced tensile stress regions are too small in both dimension and magnitude to create new fractures or to induce growth of existing fractures, besides the fact that the toughness of the fractures in the cast iron canisters are much higher that the stress intensity factors in the fracture tips. The results of the FEM simulation show a approximately 75 MPa maximum pressure beyond which plastic collapse of the cast-iron canisters may occur, using an elastoplastic Material model. This figure is smaller compared

  1. Transport of multiassembly sealed canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinn, R.D.; Lehnert, R.A.; Rosa, J.M.

    1992-01-01

    A significant portion of the commercial spent nuclear fuel in dry storage in the US will be stored in multiassembly sealed canisters before the DOE begins accepting fuel from utilities in 1998. This paper reports that it is desirable from economic and ALARA perspectives to transfer these canisters directly from the plant to the MRS. To this end, it is necessary that the multiassembly sealed canisters, which have been licensed for storage under 10CFR72, be qualified for shipment within a suitable shipping cask under the rules of 10CFR71. Preliminary work performed to date indicates that it is feasible to license a current canister design for transportation, and work is proceeding on obtaining NRC approval

  2. Probabilistic analysis and material characterisation of canister insert for spent nuclear fuel. Summary report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, Claes-Goeran [Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co., Stockholm (Sweden); Andersson, Mats; Erixon, Bo [AaF Industriteknik, Stockholm (Sweden); Bjoerkegren, Lars-Erik [Swedish Foundry Association, Stockholm (Sweden); Dillstroem, Peter [DNV Technology, Stockholm (Sweden); Minnebo, Philip

    2005-11-15

    The KBS-3 canister for geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden consists of a ductile cast iron insert and a copper shielding. The canister should inhibit release of radionuclides for at least 100,000 years. The copper protects the canister from corrosion whereas the ductile cast iron insert provides the mechanical strength. In the repository the hydrostatic pressure from the groundwater and the swelling pressure from the surrounding bentonite, which in total results in a maximum pressure of 14 MPa, will load the canisters in compression. During the extreme time scales, ice ages are expected with a maximum ice thickness of 3,000 m resulting in an additional pressure of 30 MPa. The maximum design pressure for the KBS-3 canisters has therefore been set to be 44 MPa. A relatively large number of canisters have been manufactured as part of SKB's development programme. To verify the strength of the canisters at this stage of development SKB initiated a project in cooperation with the European commissions Joint Research Centre (JRC), Institute of Energy in Petten in the Netherlands, together with a number of other partners. Three inserts manufactured by different Swedish foundries were used in the project. A large statistical test programme was developed to determine statistical distributions of various material parameters and defect distributions. These data together with the results from stress and strain finite element analysis were subsequently used in probabilistic analysis to determine the probability for plastic collapse caused by high pressure or fracture by crack growth in regions with tensile stresses. The main conclusions from the probabilistic analysis are: 1. At the design pressure of 44 MPa, the probability of failure is insignificant ({approx}2x10{sup -9}). This is the case even though several conservative assumptions have been made. 2. The stresses in the insert caused by the outer pressure are mainly compressive. The regions with tensile

  3. Effect of Canister Movement on Water Turbidity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TRIMBLE, D.J.

    2000-01-01

    Requirements for evaluating the adherence characteristics of sludge on the fuel stored in the K East Basin and the effect of canister movement on basin water turbidity are documented in Briggs (1996). The results of the sludge adherence testing have been documented (Bergmann 1996). This report documents the results of the canister movement tests. The purpose of the canister movement tests was to characterize water turbidity under controlled canister movements (Briggs 1996). The tests were designed to evaluate methods for minimizing the plumes and controlling water turbidity during fuel movements leading to multi-canister overpack (MCO) loading. It was expected that the test data would provide qualitative visual information for use in the design of the fuel retrieval and water treatment systems. Video recordings of the tests were to be the only information collected

  4. Research on corrosion aspects of the advanced cold process canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blackwood, D.J.; Hoch, A.R.; Naish, C.C.; Rance, A.

    1994-01-01

    The Advanced Cold Process Canister (ACPC) is a waste canister being developed jointly by SKB and TVO for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. It comprises an outer copper canister, with a carbon steel canister inside. A concern regarding the use of the ACPC is that, in the unlikely event that the outer copper canister is penetrated, the anaerobic corrosion of the carbon steel container may result in the formation of hydrogen gas bubbles. These bubbles could disrupt the backfill, and thus increase water flow through the near field and the flux of radionuclides to the host geology. A number of factors that influence the rate at which hydrogen evolves as a result of the anaerobic corrosion of carbon steel in artificial granitic groundwaters have been investigated. A previously observed, time-dependent decline in the hydrogen evolution rate has been confirmed as being due to the production of magnetite film. Once the magnetite film is about 0.7-1.0 μm thick, the rate of hydrogen evolution reaches a steady state value. The pH and the ionic strength of the groundwater were both found to influence the long-term hydrogen evolution rate. The results of the experimental programme were used to update a model of the corrosion behaviour and hydrogen production from the Advanced Cold Process Canister. 36 figs, 5 tabs, 13 refs

  5. Examination of sludge from the Hanford K Basins fuel canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Makenas, B.J.

    1998-01-01

    Samples of sludges with a high uranium content have been retrieved from the fuel canisters in the Hanford K West and K East basins. The composition of these samples contrasts markedly with the previously reported content of sludge samples taken from the K East basin floor. Chemical composition, chemical reactivity, and particle size of sludge are summarized in this paper

  6. Deep Borehole Disposal as an Alternative Concept to Deep Geological Disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jongyoul; Lee, Minsoo; Choi, Heuijoo; Kim, Kyungsu [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    In this paper, the general concept and key technologies for deep borehole disposal of spent fuels or HLW, as an alternative method to the mined geological disposal method, were reviewed. After then an analysis on the distance between boreholes for the disposal of HLW was carried out. Based on the results, a disposal area were calculated approximately and compared with that of mined geological disposal. These results will be used as an input for the analyses of applicability for DBD in Korea. The disposal safety of this system has been demonstrated with underground research laboratory and some advanced countries such as Finland and Sweden are implementing their disposal project on commercial stage. However, if the spent fuels or the high-level radioactive wastes can be disposed of in the depth of 3-5 km and more stable rock formation, it has several advantages. Therefore, as an alternative disposal concept to the mined deep geological disposal concept (DGD), very deep borehole disposal (DBD) technology is under consideration in number of countries in terms of its outstanding safety and cost effectiveness. In this paper, the general concept of deep borehole disposal for spent fuels or high level radioactive wastes was reviewed. And the key technologies, such as drilling technology of large diameter borehole, packaging and emplacement technology, sealing technology and performance/safety analyses technologies, and their challenges in development of deep borehole disposal system were analyzed. Also, very preliminary deep borehole disposal concept including disposal canister concept was developed according to the nuclear environment in Korea.

  7. Deep Borehole Disposal as an Alternative Concept to Deep Geological Disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jongyoul; Lee, Minsoo; Choi, Heuijoo; Kim, Kyungsu

    2016-01-01

    In this paper, the general concept and key technologies for deep borehole disposal of spent fuels or HLW, as an alternative method to the mined geological disposal method, were reviewed. After then an analysis on the distance between boreholes for the disposal of HLW was carried out. Based on the results, a disposal area were calculated approximately and compared with that of mined geological disposal. These results will be used as an input for the analyses of applicability for DBD in Korea. The disposal safety of this system has been demonstrated with underground research laboratory and some advanced countries such as Finland and Sweden are implementing their disposal project on commercial stage. However, if the spent fuels or the high-level radioactive wastes can be disposed of in the depth of 3-5 km and more stable rock formation, it has several advantages. Therefore, as an alternative disposal concept to the mined deep geological disposal concept (DGD), very deep borehole disposal (DBD) technology is under consideration in number of countries in terms of its outstanding safety and cost effectiveness. In this paper, the general concept of deep borehole disposal for spent fuels or high level radioactive wastes was reviewed. And the key technologies, such as drilling technology of large diameter borehole, packaging and emplacement technology, sealing technology and performance/safety analyses technologies, and their challenges in development of deep borehole disposal system were analyzed. Also, very preliminary deep borehole disposal concept including disposal canister concept was developed according to the nuclear environment in Korea

  8. Engineered Barrier System - Mechanical Integrity of KBS-3 Spent Fuel Canisters. Report from a Workshop. Synthesis and extended abstracts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    2007-09-15

    SKI is preparing to review the license applications being developed by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) for a final repository for the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the year 2009. As part of its preparation, SKI is conducting a series of technical workshops on key aspects of the Engineered Barrier System (EBS). The workshop reported here mainly dealt with the mechanical integrity of KBS-3 spent fuel canisters. This included assessment and review of various loading conditions, structural integrity models and mechanical properties of the copper shell and the cast iron insert. Degradation mechanisms such as stress corrosion cracking and brittle creep fracture were also briefly addressed. Previous workshops have addressed the overall concept for long-term integrity of the EBS, the manufacturing, testing and QA of the EBS, the performance confirmation for the EBS, long-term stability of the buffer and the backfill, corrosion properties of copper canisters and the spent fuel dissolution and source term modelling. The goal of ongoing review work in connection of the workshop series is to achieve a comprehensive overview of all aspects of SKB's EBS and spent fuel work prior to the handling of the forthcoming license application. This report aims to summarise the issues discussed at the workshop and to extract the essential viewpoints that have been expressed. The report is not a comprehensive record of all the discussions at the workshop, and individual statements made by workshop participants should be regarded as personal opinions rather than SKI viewpoints. Results from the EBS workshops series will be used as one important basis in future review work. This reports includes in addition to the workshop synthesis, questions to SKB identified prior to the workshop, and extended abstracts for introductory presentations

  9. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: engineering for a disposal facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simmons, G.R.; Baumgartner, P.

    1994-01-01

    This report presents some general considerations for engineering a nuclear fuel waste disposal facility, alternative disposal-vault concepts and arrangements, and a conceptual design of a used-fuel disposal centre that was used to assess the technical feasibility, costs and potential effects of disposal. The general considerations and alternative disposal-vault arrangements are presented to show that options are available to allow the design to be adapted to actual site conditions. The conceptual design for a used-fuel disposal centre includes descriptions of the two major components of the disposal facility, the Used-Fuel Packaging Plant and the disposal vault; the ancillary facilities and services needed to carry out the operations are also identified. The development of the disposal facility, its operation, its decommissioning, and the reclamation of the site are discussed. The costs, labour requirements and schedules used to assess socioeconomic effects and that may be used to assess the cost burden of waste disposal to the consumer of nuclear energy are estimated. The Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program is funded jointly by AECL and Ontario Hydro under the auspices of the CANDU Owners Group. (author)

  10. SRL canister impact tests

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelker, J.W. Jr.

    1986-05-01

    The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is being constructed at the SRP for the containerization of high-level nuclear waste as a waste form for eventual permanent disposal. The waste will be incorporated in molten glass and solidified in Type 304L stainless steel canisters 2 feet in diameter x 9 feet 10 inches long. The canisters have a minimum wall thickness of 3/8 inch. Over a three-year period, nineteen drop-tests of nine canisters, filled with simulated waste glass, were made in support of the DWPF containerization program. Eight of the canister evaluation tests were of Type 304L stainless steel material and one was of commercially pure titanium. Three different length (9.44, 5.06, and 7.88 inch) nozzle configurations containing final closure upset welds were evaluated for the stainless steel canisters. All impact tests of the stainless steel canisters, which included bottom-, side-, and top-drops, were acceptable. The bottom-drop test of the titanium canister, which contained a final closure upset weld, was acceptable; however, the top-drop resulted in a breaching of the top head where it joins the nozzle. The final closure titanium upset weld was acceptable. The titanium canister wall thickness was 1/4 inch

  11. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PICKETT, W.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. Because this sub-project is still in the construction/start-up phase, all verification activities have not yet been performed (e.g., canister cover cap and welding fixture system verification, MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment verification, and As-built verification.). The verification activities identified in this report that still are to be performed will be added to the start-up punchlist and tracked to closure

  12. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    PICKETT, W.W.

    2000-09-22

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. Because this sub-project is still in the construction/start-up phase, all verification activities have not yet been performed (e.g., canister cover cap and welding fixture system verification, MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment verification, and As-built verification.). The verification activities identified in this report that still are to be performed will be added to the start-up punchlist and tracked to closure.

  13. An assessment of KW Basin radionuclide activity when opening SNF canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bergmann, D.W.; Mollerus, F.J.; Wray, J.L.

    1995-01-01

    N Reactor spent fuel is being stored in sealed canisters in the KW Basin. Some of the canisters contain damaged fuel elements. There is the potential for release of Cs 137, Kr 85, H3, and other fission products and transuranics (TRUs) when canisters are opened. Canister opening is required to select and transfer fuel elements to the 300 Area for examination as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Characterization program. This report estimates the amount of radionuclides that can be released from Mark II spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters in KW Basin when canisters are opened for SNF fuel sampling as part of the SNF Characterization Program. The report also assesses the dose consequences of the releases and steps that can be taken to reduce the impacts of these releases

  14. Feasibility of using a high-level waste canister as an engineered barrier in disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slate, S.C.; Pitman, S.G.; Nesbitt, J.F.; Partain, W.L.

    1982-08-01

    The objective of this report is to evaluate the feasibility of designing a process canister that could also serve as a barrier canister. To do this a general set of performance criteria is assumed and several metal alloys having a high probability of demonstrating high corrosion resistance under repository conditions are evaluated in a qualitative design assessment. This assessment encompasses canister manufacture, the glass-filling process, interim storage, transportation, and to a limited extent, disposal in a repository. A series of scoping tests were carried out on two titanium alloys and Inconel 625 to determine if the high temperature inherent in the glass-fill processing would seriously affect either the strength or corrosion resistance of these metals. This is a process-related concern unique to the barrier canister concept. The material properties were affected by the heat treatments which simulated both the joule-heated glass melter process (titanium alloys and Inconel 625) and the in-can melter (ICM) process (Inconel 625). However, changes in the material properties were generally within 20% of the original specimens. Accelerated corrosion testing of the heat treated coupons in a highly oxygenated brine showed basic corrosion resistance of titanium grade 12 and Inconel 625 to compare favorably with that of the untreated coupons. The titanium grade 2 coupons experienced severe corrosion pitting. These corrosion tests were of a scoping nature and suitable primarily for the detection of gross sensitivity to the heat treatment inherent in the glass-fill process. They are only suggstive of repository performance since the tests do not adequately model the wide range of repository conditions that could conceivably occur

  15. A reference container concept for spent fuel disposal: structural safety for dimensioning of the reference container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jongwon; Kwon, Sangki; Kang, Chulhyung; Kwon, Youngjoo

    2002-01-01

    This paper presents the mechanical and thermal stress analysis of a disposal canister to provide basic information for dimensioning the canister and configuration of the canister components. The structural stress analysis is carried out using a finite element analysis code, NISA, and focused on the structural strength of the canister against the expected external pressures due to the swelling of the bentonite buffer and the hydrostatic head, and the thermal load build up in the container

  16. High-level waste processing and disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crandall, J.L.; Krause, H.; Sombret, C.; Uematsu, K.

    1984-11-01

    Without reprocessing, spent LWR fuel itself is generally considered an acceptable waste form. With reprocessing, borosilicate glass canisters, have now gained general acceptance for waste immobilization. The current first choice for disposal is emplacement in an engineered structure in a mined cavern at a depth of 500-1000 meters. A variety of rock types are being investigated including basalt, clay, granite, salt, shale, and volcanic tuff. This paper gives specific coverage to the national high level waste disposal plans for France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United States. The French nuclear program assumes prompt reprocessing of its spent fuels, and France has already constructed the AVM. Two larger borosilicate glass plants are planned for a new French reprocessing plant at La Hague. France plans to hold the glass canisters in near-surface storage for a forty to sixty year cooling period and then to place them into a mined repository. The FRG and Japan also plan reprocessing for their LWR fuels. Both are currently having some fuel reprocessed by France, but both are also planning reprocessing plants which will include waste vitrification facilities. West Germany is now constructing the PAMELA Plant at Mol, Belgium to vitrify high level reprocessing wastes at the shutdown Eurochemic Plant. Japan is now operating a vitrification mockup test facility and plans a pilot plant facility at the Tokai reprocessing plant by 1990. Both countries have active geologic repository programs. The United State program assumes little LWR fuel reprocessing and is thus primarily aimed at direct disposal of spent fuel into mined repositories. However, the US have two borosilicate glass plants under construction to vitrify existing reprocessing wastes

  17. Welding of the lid and the bottom of the disposal canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meuronen, I.; Salonen, T.

    2010-10-01

    The seal welding of the lid and bottom of a copper disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel using ordinary electron beam welding (EBW) made in a vacuum and the results gained in the development work are presented in this report. As an alternative method, the friction stir welding (FSW) is also presented in an overview. Welding of copper is very challenging mainly due to the high thermal conductivity of the copper material. The EBW method is based on so-called deep penetration welding which does not use additional welding material. The convenience of the method is that the weld is the same material as the base material. When compared to other fusion welding methods, the material transitions in the material caused by EBW are slight. The EBW process typically has a high number of welding parameters but, in practice, only a few parameters are adjusted during copper welding to maintain weld quality and the stability of the process. The high vacuum required by the method prevents the material from oxidising but, on the other hand, it narrows the application of the method. The requirements presented for the weld and welding process can be divided in two classes. The first class contains the requirements intended to ensure the long-term safety of the canister. Corrosion resistance and adequate creep ductility are such requirements. The second class requirements correspond to welding process requirements for component manufacture, the components themselves and the other processes of the encapsulation plant. The welding process, including the personnel, equipment and process validation, shall also fulfil the special requirements concerning all nuclear plants in general. The quality assurance and control (QA/QC) for welding is presented as a separate section. The welding quality assurance contains the personnel, equipment and the welding process. For EBW process validation there are available norms and acceptation procedures. In these, the essential component is the

  18. SITE-94. CAMEO: A model of mass-transport limited general corrosion of copper canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Worgan, K.J.; Apted, M.J.

    1996-12-01

    This report describes the technical basis for the CAMEO code, which models the general, uniform corrosion of a copper canister either by transport of corrodants to the canister, or by transport of corrosion products away from the canister. According to the current Swedish concept for final disposal of spent nuclear fuels, extremely long containment times are achieved by thick (60-100 mm) copper canisters. Each canister is surrounded by a compacted bentonite buffer, located in a saturated, crystalline rock at a depth of around 500 m below ground level. Three diffusive transport-limited cases are identified for general, uniform corrosion of copper: General corrosion rate-limited by diffusive mass-transport of sulphide to the canister surface under reducing conditions; General corrosion rate-limited by diffusive mass-transport of oxygen to the canister surface under mildly oxidizing conditions; General corrosion rate-limited by diffusive mass-transport of copper chloride away from the canister surface under highly oxidizing conditions. The CAMEO code includes general corrosion models for each of the above three processes. CAMEO is based on the well-tested CALIBRE code previously developed as a finite-difference, mass-transfer analysis code for the SKI to evaluate long-term radionuclide release and transport in the near-field. A series of scoping calculations for the general, uniform corrosion of a reference copper canister are presented

  19. Acceptance of spent nuclear fuel in multiple element sealed canisters by the Federal Waste Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-03-01

    This report is one of a series of eight prepared by E.R. Johnson Associates, Inc. (JAI) under ORNL's contract with DOE's OCRWM Systems Integration Program and in support of the Annual Capacity Report (ACR) Issue Resolution Process. The report topics relate specifically to the list of high priority technical waste acceptance issues developed jointly by DOE and a utility-working group. JAI performed various analyses and studies on each topic to serve as starting points for further discussion and analysis leading eventually to finalizing the process by which DOE will accept spent fuel and waste into its waste management system. The eight reports are concerned with the conditions under which spent fuel and high level waste will be accepted in the following categories: (1) failed fuel; (2) consolidated fuel and associated structural parts; (3) non-fuel-assembly hardware; (4) fuel in metal storage casks; (5) fuel in multi-element sealed canisters; (6) inspection and testing requirements for wastes; (7) canister criteria; (8) spent fuel selection for delivery; and (9) defense and commercial high-level waste packages. 14 refs., 27 figs

  20. Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Werme, Lars; Lilja, Christina

    2010-12-01

    This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Site. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process reports in the assessment, is described in the SR-Site Main report /SKB 2011/

  1. Fuel and canister process report for the safety assessment SR-Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Werme, Lars; Lilja, Christina (eds.)

    2010-12-15

    This report documents fuel and canister processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS-3 repository. It forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Site. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process reports in the assessment, is described in the SR-Site Main report /SKB 2011/

  2. Evaluation of the heat transfer in a geological repository concept containing PWR, VHTR and hybrid ads-fission spent fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jonusan, Raoni A.S.; Pereira, Fernando; Velasquez, Carlos E.; Salome, Jean A.D.; Cardoso, Fabiano; Pereira, Claubia; Fortini, Angela, E-mail: claubia@nuclear.ufmg.br [Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil). Departamento de Engenharia Nuclear

    2017-11-01

    The investigation of the thermal behavior of spent fuel (SF) materials is essential to determining appropriate potential sites to accommodate geological repositories as well as the design of canisters, considering their potential risk to people health and of environmental contamination. This work presents studies of the temperature in a canister containing spent fuels discharged from Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), Very High-Temperature Reactor (VHTR) and Accelerator-Driven Subcritical Reactor System (ADS) reactor systems in a geological repository concept. The thermal analyses were performed with the software ANSYS, which is widely used to solve engineering problems through the Finite Element Method. The ANSYS Transient Thermal module was used. The spent nuclear fuels were set as heat sources using data of previous studies derived from decay heat curves. The studies were based on comparison of the mean temperature on a canister surface along the time under geological disposal conditions, for a same amount of each type of spent nuclear fuel evaluated. The results conclude that fuels from VHTR and ADS systems are inappropriate to be disposed in a standardized PWR canister, demanding new studies to determine the optimal amount of spent fuel and new internal canister geometries. It is also possible to conclude that the hypothetical situation of a single type of canister being used to accommodate different types of spent nuclear fuels is not technically feasible. (author)

  3. EB-welding of the copper canister for the nuclear waste disposal. Final report of the development programme 1994-1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aalto, H.

    1998-10-01

    During 1994-1997 Posiva Oy and Outokumpu Poricopper Oy had a joint project Development of EB-welding method for massive copper canister manufacturing. The project was part of the national technology program 'Weld 2000' and it was supported financially by Technology Development Centre (TEKES). The spent fuel from Finnish nuclear reactors is planned to be encapsulated in thick-walled copper canisters and placed deep into the bedrock. The thick copper layer of the canister provides a long time corrosion resistance and prevents deposited nuclear fuel from contact with water. The quality requirements of the copper components are high because of the designed long lifetime of the canister. The EB-welding technology has proved to be applicable method for the production of the copper canisters and the EB-welding technique is needed at least when the lids of the copper canister will be closed. There are a number of parameters in EB-welding which affect weldability. However, the effect of the welding parameters and their optimization has not been extensively studied in welding of thick copper sections using conventional high vacuum EB-welding. One aim of this development work was to extensively study effect of welding parameters on weld quality. The final objective was to minimise welding defects in the main weld and optimize slope out procedure in thick copper EB-welding. Welding of 50 mm thick copper sections was optimized using vertical and horizontal EB-welding techniques. As a result two full scale copper lids were welded to a short cylinder successfully. The resulting weld quality with optimised welding parameters was reasonable good. The optimised welding parameters for horizontal and vertical beam can be applied to the longitudinal body welds of the canister. The optimal slope out procedure for the lid closure needs some additional development work. In addition of extensive EB-welding program ultrasonic inspection and creep strength of the weld were studied. According

  4. EB-welding of the copper canister for the nuclear waste disposal. Final report of the development programme 1994-1997

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Aalto, H. [Outokumpu Oy Poricopper, Pori (Finland)

    1998-10-01

    During 1994-1997 Posiva Oy and Outokumpu Poricopper Oy had a joint project Development of EB-welding method for massive copper canister manufacturing. The project was part of the national technology program `Weld 2000` and it was supported financially by Technology Development Centre (TEKES). The spent fuel from Finnish nuclear reactors is planned to be encapsulated in thick-walled copper canisters and placed deep into the bedrock. The thick copper layer of the canister provides a long time corrosion resistance and prevents deposited nuclear fuel from contact with water. The quality requirements of the copper components are high because of the designed long lifetime of the canister. The EB-welding technology has proved to be applicable method for the production of the copper canisters and the EB-welding technique is needed at least when the lids of the copper canister will be closed. There are a number of parameters in EB-welding which affect weldability. However, the effect of the welding parameters and their optimization has not been extensively studied in welding of thick copper sections using conventional high vacuum EB-welding. One aim of this development work was to extensively study effect of welding parameters on weld quality. The final objective was to minimise welding defects in the main weld and optimize slope out procedure in thick copper EB-welding. Welding of 50 mm thick copper sections was optimized using vertical and horizontal EB-welding techniques. As a result two full scale copper lids were welded to a short cylinder successfully. The resulting weld quality with optimised welding parameters was reasonable good. The optimised welding parameters for horizontal and vertical beam can be applied to the longitudinal body welds of the canister. The optimal slope out procedure for the lid closure needs some additional development work. In addition of extensive EB-welding program ultrasonic inspection and creep strength of the weld were studied. According

  5. Safeguards for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the Olkiluoto site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.

    2003-05-01

    The final disposal of the nuclear material shall introduce new safeguards concerns which have not been addressed previously in IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel. The encapsulation plant to be built at the site will be the final opportunity for verification of spent fuel assemblies prior to their transfer to the geological repository. Moreover, additional safety and safeguards measures are considered for the underground repository. Integrated safeguards verification systems will also concentrate on environmental monitoring to observe unannounced activities related to possible diversion schemes at the repository site. The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formation will begin in Finland within 10 years. After the geological site investigations and according to legal decision made in 2001, the final repository of the spent nuclear fuel shall be located at the Olkiluoto site in Eurajoki. The next phase of site investigations contains the construction of an underground facility, called ONKALO, for rock characterisation purposes. The excavation of the ONKALO is scheduled to start in 2004. Later on, the ONKALO may form a part of the final repository. The plans to construct the underground facility for nuclear material signify that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline mapping of the site area, need to take prior to the excavation phase. In order to support the development and implementation of the regulatory control of the final disposal programme, STUK established an independent expert group, LOSKA. The group should support the STUK in the development of the technical safeguards requirements, in the implementation of the safeguards and in the evaluation of the plans of the facility operator. This publication includes four background reports produced by this group. The first of these 'NDA verification of spent fuel, monitoring of disposal canisters, interaction of the safeguards and safety issues in the final disposal' describes the new

  6. Disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    This report addresses the topic of the mined geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel from Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWR). Although some fuel processing options are identified, most of the information in this report relates to the isolation of spent fuel in the form it is removed from the reactor. The characteristics of the waste management system and research which relate to spent fuel isolation are discussed. The differences between spent fuel and processed HLW which impact the waste isolation system are defined and evaluated for the nature and extent of that impact. What is known and what needs to be determined about spent fuel as a waste form to design a viable waste isolation system is presented. Other waste forms and programs such as geologic exploration, site characterization and licensing which are generic to all waste forms are also discussed. R and D is being carried out to establish the technical information to develop the methods used for disposal of spent fuel. All evidence to date indicates that there is no reason, based on safety considerations, that spent fuel should not be disposed of as a waste

  7. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL NUMBER DENSITIES FOR MULTI-PURPOSE CANISTER CRITICALITY CALCULATIONS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D. A. Thomas

    1996-01-01

    The purpose of this analysis is to calculate the number densities for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to be used in criticality evaluations of the Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) waste packages. The objective of this analysis is to provide material number density information which will be referenced by future MPC criticality design analyses, such as for those supporting the Conceptual Design Report

  8. NDE to Manage Atmospheric SCC in Canisters for Dry Storage of Spent Fuel: An Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meyer, Ryan M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Pardini, Allan F. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Cuta, Judith M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Adkins, Harold E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Casella, Andrew M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Qiao, Hong [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Larche, Michael R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Diaz, Aaron A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Doctor, Steven R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2013-09-01

    This report documents efforts to assess representative horizontal (Transuclear NUHOMS®) and vertical (Holtec HI-STORM) storage systems for the implementation of non-destructive examination (NDE) methods or techniques to manage atmospheric stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in canisters for dry storage of used nuclear fuel. The assessment is conducted by assessing accessibility and deployment, environmental compatibility, and applicability of NDE methods. A recommendation of this assessment is to focus on bulk ultrasonic and eddy current techniques for direct canister monitoring of atmospheric SCC. This assessment also highlights canister regions that may be most vulnerable to atmospheric SCC to guide the use of bulk ultrasonic and eddy current examinations. An assessment of accessibility also identifies canister regions that are easiest and more difficult to access through the ventilation paths of the concrete shielding modules. A conceivable sampling strategy for canister inspections is to sample only the easiest to access portions of vulnerable regions. There are aspects to performing an NDE inspection of dry canister storage system (DCSS) canisters for atmospheric SCC that have not been addressed in previous performance studies. These aspects provide the basis for recommendations of future efforts to determine the capability and performance of eddy current and bulk ultrasonic examinations for atmospheric SCC in DCSS canisters. Finally, other important areas of investigation are identified including the development of instrumented surveillance specimens to identify when conditions are conducive for atmospheric SCC, characterization of atmospheric SCC morphology, and an assessment of air flow patterns over canister surfaces and their influence on chloride deposition.

  9. Status of the Multipurpose Canister (MPC) Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopper, J.P.

    1996-01-01

    The multipurpose canister (MPC) project represents a cornerstone of the current U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) program for handling spent nuclear fuel. The MPC and associated support equipment is being designed to accommodate the requirements for not only storage and transport but also for the specified disposal requirements of the mined geologic repository system. The phase 1 design effort for the MPC system, being performed by the Westinghouse team on behalf of TRW Environmental Safety Systems (TESS), the OCRWM management ampersand operating (M ampersand O) contractor, is on schedule for delivery of completed safety analysis reports (SARs) in April 1996

  10. Multi-purpose canister system evaluation: A systems engineering approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    This report summarizes Department of Energy (DOE) efforts to investigate various container systems for handling, transporting, storing, and disposing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies in the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS). The primary goal of DOE's investigations was to select a container technology that could handle the vast majority of commercial SNF at a reasonable cost, while ensuring the safety of the public and protecting the environment. Several alternative cask and canister concepts were evaluated for SNF assembly packaging to determine the most suitable concept. Of these alternatives, the multi-purpose canister (MPC) system was determined to be the most suitable. Based on the results of these evaluations, the decision was made to proceed with design and certification of the MPC system. A decision to fabricate and deploy MPCs will be made after further studies and preparation of an environmental impact statement

  11. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2001-05-15

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted in section 3

  12. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2000-11-03

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. The purpose of this revision is to document completion of verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those

  13. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2001-01-01

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted in section 3.1.5 and will be

  14. Design Verification Report Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Canister Storage Building (CSB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2000-01-01

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. The purpose of this revision is to document completion of verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed. Verification of future additions to the CSB related to the canister cover cap and welding fixture system and MCO Internal Gas Sampling equipment will be completed as appropriate for those components. The open items related to verification of those requirements are noted

  15. Chemical and mineralogical aspects of water-bentonite interaction in nuclear fuel disposal conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Melamed, A.; Pitkaenen, P.

    1996-01-01

    In the field of nuclear fuel disposal, bentonite has been selected as the principal sealing and buffer material for placement around waste canisters, forming both a mechanical and chemical barrier between the radioactive waste and the surrounding ground water. Ion exchange and mineral alteration processes were investigated in a laboratory study of the long-term interaction between compacted Na-bentonite (Volclay MX-80) and ground water solutions, conducted under simulated nuclear fuel disposal conditions. The possible alteration of montmorillonite into illite has been a major object of the mineralogical study. However, no analytical evidence was found, that would indicate the formation of this non-expandable clay type. Apparently, the change of montmorillonite from Na- to Ca-rich was found to be the major alteration process in bentonite. In the water, a concentration decrease in Ca, Mg, and K, and an increase in Na, HCO 3 and SO 4 were recorded. The amount of calcium ions available in the water was considered insufficient to account for the recorded formation of Ca-montmorillonite. It is therefore assumed that the accessory Ca-bearing minerals in bentonite provide the fundamental source of these cations, which exchange with sodium during the alteration process. (38 refs.)

  16. Test manufacture of the canister insert 135

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.

    2005-10-01

    This report describes the insert-manufacturing test of a disposal canister for spent nuclear fuel that was made by Metso Foundries Jyvaeskylae Oy, in June 2004 on contract for Posiva Oy. The test manufacture was a part of the co-operation development programme of encapsulation technology between SKB AB and Posiva Oy. Insert casting was specified according to the current manufacturing specifications of SKB. The canister insert was of BWR-type with integral bottom. This was the second trial manufacture of this type of insert in Finland and, in total, the third test manufacture of insert by Metso Foundries Jyvaeskylae Oy. The result fulfilled all the requirements but the material mechanical properties of the cast material. The measured ultimate strength and elongation at rupture were lower than specified in the upper part of the cast. The reason for this was revealed in the metallurgical investigation of the cast material. The cast contained slag (dross). Avoiding the dross formation will be the most demanding challenge of the forthcoming development of the cast procedure. (orig.)

  17. Spent nuclear fuel project product specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pajunen, A.L.

    1998-01-01

    Product specifications are limits and controls established for each significant parameter that potentially affects safety and/or quality of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) packaged for transport to dry storage. The product specifications in this document cover the spent fuel packaged in MultiCanister Overpacks (MCOs) to be transported throughout the SNF Project. The SNF includes N Reactor fuel and single-pass reactor fuel. The FRS removes the SNF from the storage canisters, cleans it, and places it into baskets. The MCO loading system places the baskets into MCO/Cask assembly packages. These packages are then transferred to the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility. After drying at the CVD Facility, the MCO cask packages are transferred to the Canister Storage Building (CSB), where the MCOs are removed from the casks, staged, inspected, sealed (by welding), and stored until a suitable permanent disposal option is implemented. The key criteria necessary to achieve these goals are documented in this specification

  18. Waste disposal package

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smith, M.J.

    1985-06-19

    This is a claim for a waste disposal package including an inner or primary canister for containing hazardous and/or radioactive wastes. The primary canister is encapsulated by an outer or secondary barrier formed of a porous ceramic material to control ingress of water to the canister and the release rate of wastes upon breach on the canister. 4 figs.

  19. Canister materials proposed for final disposal of high level nuclear waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mattson, E; Odoj, R; Merz, E [eds.

    1981-06-01

    The nuclear waste will be enclosed in corrosion resistant canisters. These will be deposited in repositories in geological formations, such as granite, basalt, clay, bedded or domed salt, or the sediments beneath the deep ocean floor. There the canisters will be exposed to groundwater, brine or seawater at an elevated temperature. Species formed by radiolysis may effect the corrosivity of the agent. The corrosion resistance of candidate canister materials is evaluated by corrosion tests and by thermodynamic and mass transport calculations. Examinations of ancient metal objects after long exposure in nature may give additional information. On the basis of the work carried out so far, the principal candidate canister materials are titanium materials, copper, and highpurity alumina.

  20. Corrosion studies on HGW-canister materials for marine disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, K.J.; Bland, I.D.; Marsh, G.P.

    1984-07-01

    A combination of mathematical modelling and experimental studies has been used to investigate and assess the long term corrosion behaviour of heat generating waste canister/ overpack materials under conditions relevant to deep ocean disposal. Preliminary operation of the model, using improved electrochemical kinetic data from the experimental programme, has indicated that the general corrosion rate of carbon steel at 90 deg C will be 57 μm yr -1 which is equivalent to a metal loss of 57 mm in 1000 years. This prediction compares favourably with the results from long term tests, which are also in progress, for plain and electron beam welded carbon steel specimens embedded in marine sediment at 90 deg C under active dissolution conditions. Tests with γ-radiation at a dose rate of 1.5 x 10 5 R h -1 have shown that the pH of seawater falls to 3.7 after 5000 hours exposure causing a significant increase in the corrosion rate of carbon steel from 50 to 80 μm yr -1 . Further work is in progress to investigate the mechanism of this acidification and whether it also occurs at the more realistic lower radiation dose rates. (author)

  1. Research of radioactive waste storage cask/canister materials, spent nuclear fuels and various radioactive waste forms and development of their assessment methods. Final report for Stage 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dobrev, D.; Balek, V.; Červinka, R.; Večerník, P.; Člupek, M.; Kouřil, M.; Novák, P.; Stoulil, J.; Silber, R.

    2013-08-01

    The main topics treated are: Research and development of methodologies for canister/cask material degradation assessment; Laboratory research of selected materials of canister/cask with radioactive waste; and Research and assessment of canister/cask materials in natural granite rocks. Two additional documents are appended: Corrosion rate determination for samples in compacted bentonite in anaerobic conditions (methodology), and Roll test for corrosion test in an occluded solution at the interface between a radioactive waste disposal canister and the bentonite cover. (P.A.)

  2. A Preliminary Assessment of a Deep Borehole disposal of Spent Fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Younmyoung; Jeon, Jongtae

    2014-01-01

    Deep borehole disposal (DBD) of such radioactive waste as spent nuclear fuels (SFs) and other waste forms has been investigating mainly at Sandia National Labs for the US DOE as an alternative option. DBD can give advantages over less deep geological disposal since the disposal of wastes at a great depth where a low degree of permeability in the potentially steady rock condition will be beneficial for nuclide movement. Groundwater in the deep basement rock can even have salinity and less chance to mix with groundwater above. The DBD concept is quite straightforward and even simple: Waste canisters are simply emplaced in the lower 2 km part of the borehole down to 5 km deep. Through this study, a conceptual DBD is assessed for a similar case as the US DOE's approach, in which 400 SF canisters are to be emplaced at a deep bottom between 3km and 5km depths, upon which an additional 1km-thick compacted bentonite is overbuffered, and the remaining upper part of the borehole is backfilled again with a mixture of crushed rock and bentonite. Then, the total 5km-deep borehole has three zones: a disposal zone at the bottom 2km, a buffer zone at the next 1km, and backfill zone at the rest top 2km, as illustrated conceptually in Fig. 1. To demonstrate the feasibility in view of long-term radiological safety, a rough model for a safety assessment of this conceptual deep borehole repository system, providing detailed models for nuclide transport in and around the geosphere and biosphere under normal nuclide release scenarios that can occur after a closure of the repository, has been developed using GoldSim. A simple preliminary result in terms of the dose exposure rate from a safety assessment of the DBD is also presented and compared to the case of direct disposal of SFs in a KBS-3V vertical type repository, carried out in previous studies. For different types and shapes of repositories at each different depth, direct comparison between a DBD and a KBS-3 type disposal of

  3. A Preliminary Assessment of a Deep Borehole disposal of Spent Fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Younmyoung; Jeon, Jongtae [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    Deep borehole disposal (DBD) of such radioactive waste as spent nuclear fuels (SFs) and other waste forms has been investigating mainly at Sandia National Labs for the US DOE as an alternative option. DBD can give advantages over less deep geological disposal since the disposal of wastes at a great depth where a low degree of permeability in the potentially steady rock condition will be beneficial for nuclide movement. Groundwater in the deep basement rock can even have salinity and less chance to mix with groundwater above. The DBD concept is quite straightforward and even simple: Waste canisters are simply emplaced in the lower 2 km part of the borehole down to 5 km deep. Through this study, a conceptual DBD is assessed for a similar case as the US DOE's approach, in which 400 SF canisters are to be emplaced at a deep bottom between 3km and 5km depths, upon which an additional 1km-thick compacted bentonite is overbuffered, and the remaining upper part of the borehole is backfilled again with a mixture of crushed rock and bentonite. Then, the total 5km-deep borehole has three zones: a disposal zone at the bottom 2km, a buffer zone at the next 1km, and backfill zone at the rest top 2km, as illustrated conceptually in Fig. 1. To demonstrate the feasibility in view of long-term radiological safety, a rough model for a safety assessment of this conceptual deep borehole repository system, providing detailed models for nuclide transport in and around the geosphere and biosphere under normal nuclide release scenarios that can occur after a closure of the repository, has been developed using GoldSim. A simple preliminary result in terms of the dose exposure rate from a safety assessment of the DBD is also presented and compared to the case of direct disposal of SFs in a KBS-3V vertical type repository, carried out in previous studies. For different types and shapes of repositories at each different depth, direct comparison between a DBD and a KBS-3 type disposal of

  4. Analysis for Eccentric Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Drops at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) (CSB-S-0073)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    TU, K.C.

    1999-10-08

    Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) will be routinely handled at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) during fuel movement operations in the SNF Project. This analysis was performed to investigate the potential for damage from an eccentric accidental drop onto the standard storage tube, overpack tube, service station, or sample/weld station. Appendix D was added to the FDNW document to include the peer Review Comment Record & transmittal record.

  5. Analysis for Eccentric Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Drops at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) (CSB-S-0073)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    TU, K.C.

    1999-01-01

    Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) will be routinely handled at the Canister Storage Building (CSB) during fuel movement operations in the SNF Project. This analysis was performed to investigate the potential for damage from an eccentric accidental drop onto the standard storage tube, overpack tube, service station, or sample/weld station. Appendix D was added to the FDNW document to include the peer Review Comment Record and transmittal record

  6. FPIN2 posttest analysis of cylindrical canisters in SLSF Experiment P4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hughes, T H; Kramer, J M

    1984-12-01

    Results demonstrate that the clad deformation is dominated by the expansion of the fuel when it melts. In our analysis we moved the end space volume and some of the fuel-clad radial gap volume to an artificial central hole. This approximation may affect the details in the early parts of the transient, but clearly did not affect the major cladding deformation. It is also clear that the accuracy of the value of the fuel expansion upon melting is significant as is the dimensional accuracy of the fuel and canisters. The major conclusions from the FPIN2 posttest analysis of the cylindrical canisters in SLSF Experiment P4 are: The maximum melt fractions in the two canisters were about 75%. Both canisters experienced about the same diametral strains of 12% prior to failure. These strains were almost entirely due to the additional volume that must be created inside the canisters to accommodate the expansion of fuel on melting. The mode of cladding failure was plastic instability by necking of the canister walls. The failure time of the 20% CW canister and the nonmechanical failure of the 10% CW canister are consistent with the FPIN2 calculations using the plastic instability failure criteria.

  7. Waste package designs for disposal of high-level waste in salt formations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Basham, S.J. Jr.; Carr, J.A.

    1984-01-01

    In the United States of America the selected method for disposal of radioactive waste is mined repositories located in suitable geohydrological settings. Currently four types of host rocks are under consideration: tuff, basalt, crystalline rock and salt. Development of waste package designs for incorporation in mined salt repositories is discussed. The three pertinent high-level waste forms are: spent fuel, as disassembled and close-packed fuel pins in a mild steel canister; commercial high-level waste (CHLW), as borosilicate glass in stainless-steel canisters; defence high-level waste (DHLW), as borosilicate glass in stainless-steel canisters. The canisters are production and handling items only. They have no planned long-term isolation function. Each waste form requires a different approach in package design. However, the general geometry and the materials of the three designs are identical. The selected waste package design is an overpack of low carbon steel with a welded closure. This container surrounds the waste forms. Studies to better define brine quantity and composition, radiation effects on the salt and brines, long-term corrosion behaviour of the low carbon steel, and the leaching behaviour of the spent fuel and borosilicate glass waste forms are continuing. (author)

  8. Canister transfer into repository in shaft alternative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raiko, H.; Kukkola, T.; Autio, J.

    2005-09-01

    In this report, a study of lift transportation of a massive canister for spent nuclear fuel is considered. The canister is transferred from ground level to repository, which lies in the depth of 400 to 500 m in the bedrock. The canister is a massive metal vessel, whose weight is 19 to 29 tons, and which is strongly irradiant (gamma and neutrons), and which contains 1.4 to 2.2 tons of very strongly radio-active material, the activity of the fuel should not be spread in the environment even during postulated accidents. The study observes that the lift alternative is possible to be built and through good design practices and good maintenance procedures its safety, reliability and usability can be kept on such high level that canister transport is estimated to be licensable. (orig.)

  9. Method of ground disposal of radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harashina, Heihachi.

    1991-01-01

    Rock bases are drilled to form a disposal hole, an overhanging hole and a burying hole each as a shaft. An appropriate number of canisters prepared by vitrification of high level radioactive wastes are charged in the disposal hole with a gap to the inner wall of the hole. Shock absorbers each made of bentonite are filled between each of the canisters and between the canister and the inner wall of the disposal hole, and the canisters are entirely covered with the layer of the shock absorbers. Further, plucking materials having water sealing property such as cement mortar are filled thereover. With such a constitution, in a case if water should intrude into the overhung portion, since the disposal hole is covered with the large flange portion in addition to the water sealing performance of the plucking, the shock absorbers and the canisters undergo no undesirable effects. Further, in a case if water should intrude to the disposal hole, the shock absorber layers are swollen by water absorption, to suppress the intrusion of water. (T.M.)

  10. Reduction of uranium in disposal conditions of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myllykylae, E.

    2008-02-01

    This literature study is a summary of publications, in which the reduction of uranium by iron has been investigated in anaerobic groundwater conditions or in aqueous solution in general. The basics of the reduction phenomena and the oxidation states, complexes and solubilities of uranium and iron in groundwaters are discussed as an introduction to the subject, as well as, the Finnish disposal concept of spent nuclear fuel. The spent fuel itself mainly (∼96 %) consists of a sparingly soluble uranium(IV) dioxide, UO 2 (s), which is stable phase in the anticipated reducing disposal conditions. If spent fuel gets in contact with groundwater, oxidizing conditions might be induced by the radiolysis of water, or by the intrusion of oxidizing glacial melting water. Under these conditions, the oxidation and dissolution of uranium dioxide to more soluble U(VI) species could occur. This could lead to the mobilization of uranium and other components of spent fuel matrix including fission products and transuranium elements. The reduction of uranium back to oxidation state U(IV) can be considered as a favourable immobilization mechanism in a long-term, leading to precipitation due to the low solubility of U(IV) species. The cast iron insert of the disposal canister and its anaerobic corrosion products are the most important reductants under disposal conditions, but dissolved ferrous iron may also function as reductant. Other iron sources in the buffer or near-field rock, are also considered as possible reductants. The reduction of uranium is a very challenging phenomenon to investigate. The experimental studies need e.g. well-controlled anoxic conditions and measurements of oxidation states. Reduction and other simultaneous phenomena are difficult to distinghuish. The groundwater conditions (pH, Eh and ions) influence on the prevailing complexes of U and Fe and on forming corrosion products of iron and, thus they determine also the redox chemistry. The partial reduction of

  11. Spent nuclear fuel retrieval system fuel handling development testing. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, D.R.; Meeuwsen, P.V.

    1997-09-01

    Fuel handling development testing was performed in support of the Fuel Retrieval System (FRS) Sub-Project, a subtask of the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. The FRS will be used to retrieve and repackage K-Basin Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) currently stored in old K-Plant storage basins. The FRS is required to retrieve full fuel canisters from the basin, clean the fuel elements inside the canister to remove excessive uranium corrosion products (or sludge), remove the contents from the canisters and sort the resulting debris, scrap, and fuel for repackaging. The fuel elements and scrap will be collected in fuel storage and scrap baskets in preparation for loading into a multi canister overpack (MCO), while the debris is loaded into a debris bin and disposed of as solid waste. This report describes fuel handling development testing performed from May 1, 1997 through the end of August 1997. Testing during this period was mainly focused on performance of a Schilling Robotic Systems' Conan manipulator used to simulate a custom designed version, labeled Konan, being fabricated for K-Basin deployment. In addition to the manipulator, the camera viewing system, process table layout, and fuel handling processes were evaluated. The Conan test manipulator was installed and fully functional for testing in early 1997. Formal testing began May 1. The purposes of fuel handling development testing were to provide proof of concept and criteria, optimize equipment layout, initialize the process definition, and identify special needs/tools and required design changes to support development of the performance specification. The test program was set up to accomplish these objectives through cold (non-radiological) development testing using simulated and prototype equipment

  12. TMI-2 fuel-recovery plant. Feasibility study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, D.L.

    1982-12-01

    This project is a feasibility study for constructing a TMI-2 core Fuel Recovery Plant at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). The primary objectives of the Fuel Recovery Plant (FRP) are to recover and account for the fuel and to process, isolate, and package the waste material from the TMI-2 core. This feasibility study is predicated on a baseline plant and covers its design, fabrication, installation, testing and operation. Alternative methods for the disposal of the TMI-2 core have also been considered, but not examined in detail for their feasibility. The FRP will receive TMI-2 fuel in canisters. The fuel will vary from core debris to intact fuel assemblies and include some core structural materials. The canister contents will be shredded and subsequently fed to a dissolver. Uranium, plutonium, fission products, and some core structural material will be dissolved. The uranium will be separated by solvent extraction and solidified by calcination. The plutonium will also be separated by solvent extraction and routed to the Plutonium Extraction Facility. The wastes will be packaged for further treatment, temporary storage or permanent disposal

  13. Thermal analyses of spent nuclear fuel repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikonen, K.

    2003-06-01

    This report contains the temperature dimensioning of the KBS-3V type 1- or 2-panel repository based on the rock properties measured from the Olkiluoto investigations. The report describes first the development of a calculation methodology for the thermal analysis of a repository for nuclear fuel. The disposed canisters produce residual heat due to decay (or disintegration) of radioactive products. The decay heat is conducted to surrounding rock mass. The methods were applied to determine the effect of different parameters on the highest canister temperature and to support the planning, dimensioning and operation of the repository. The thermal diffusivity of the rock is low and the heat released from the canisters is spread into the surrounding rock volume quite slowly causing thermal gradient in the rock close to canisters and the canister temperature is increased remarkably. The maximum temperature on the canister surface is limited to the design temperature of +100 deg C. However, due to uncertainties in thermal analysis parameters (like scattering in rock conductivity) the allowable calculated maximum canister temperature is set to 90 deg C causing a safety margin of 10 deg C. The allowable temperature is controlled by the spacing between adjacent canisters, adjacent tunnels and the distance between separate panels of the repository and the pre-cooling time affecting power of the canisters. Because of the fact that the disposal operation takes several decades, the moment of disposal of an individual canister in addition to the location has an influence on the maximum temperature in the canister. Also, a second disposal panel in the repository has a thermal interaction with the other panel. This interaction is expressed after a few decades at the strongest. It became apparent that the temperature of canister surfaces can be determined by analytic line heat source model much more efficiently than by numerical analysis, if the analytic model is first verified and

  14. Development of a facility for fabricating nuclear waste canisters from radioactively contaminated steel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Logan, J.A.; Larsen, M.M.

    1986-01-01

    This paper describes design of a facility and processes capable of using radioactively contaminated waste steel as the principal raw material for fabricating stainless steel canisters to be used for disposal of nuclear high-level waste. By such action, expenditure (i.e., permanent loss to society) of thousands of tons of uncontaminated chromium and nickel to fabricate such canisters can be avoided. Moreover, the cost and risks involved in disposing of large accumulations of radioactively contaminated steel as low-level radioactive waste (LLRW), that would otherwise be necessary, can also be avoided. The canister fabrication processes (involving centrifugal casting) described herein have been tested and proven for this application. The performance characteristics of stainless steel canisters so fabricated have been tested and agreed to by the organizations that have been involved in this development work (Battelle Memorial Institute, DuPont, EGandG and the Savannah River Laboratory) as equivalent to the performance characteristics of canisters fabricated of uncontaminated wrought stainless steel. It is estimated that the production cost for fabricating canisters by the methods described will not differ greatly from the production cost using uncontaminated wrought steel, and the other costs avoided by not having to dispose of the contaminated steel as LLRW could cause this method to produce the lowest ultimate overall costs

  15. Cost effects of Cu powder and bentonite on the disposal costs of an HLW repository in

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Sung Ki; Lee, Min Soo; Lee, Jong Youl; Choi, Heui Joo; Choi, Jong Won

    2008-01-01

    This paper provides the cost effect results of Cu powder and bentonite on the disposal cost for an HLW repository in Korea. In the cost analysis for both of these cost drivers, the price of Cu powder and the bentonite can affect the canister cost and the bentonite cost of the disposal holes as well as backfilling cost of the tunnels, respectively. Finally, we found that the unit cost of Cu and bentonite was the dominant cost drivers for the surface and underground facilities of an HLW repository. Therefore, an optimization of a canister and the layout of a disposal hole and disposal tunnels are essential to decrease the direct disposal cost of spent fuels. The disposal costs can be largely divided into two parts such as a surface facilities' cost and an underground facilities' cost. According to the KRS' cost analysis, the encapsulation material as well as the buffering and backfilling cost were the significant costs. Especially, a canister's cost was approximately estimated to be more than one fourth of the overall disposal costs. So it can be estimated that the unit cost of Cu powder is an important cost diver. Because the outer shell of the canister was made of Cu powder by a cold spray coating method. In addition, the unit cost of bentonite can also affect the buffering and the backfilling costs of the disposal holes and the disposal tunnels. But, these material costs will be highly expensive and unstable due to the modernization of the developing countries. So the studies for a material cost should be continued to identify the actual cost of an HLW repository

  16. Quality Assurance Program Plan for Project W-379: Spent Nuclear Fuels Canister Storage Building Projec

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duncan, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    This document describes the Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) for the Spent Nuclear Fuels (SNF) Canister Storage Building (CSB) Project. The purpose of this QAPP is to control project activities ensuring achievement of the project mission in a safe, consistent and reliable manner

  17. Enhanced Earthquake-Resistance on the High Level Radioactive Waste Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Youngchul; Yoon, Chanhoon; Lee, Jeaowan; Kim, Jinsup; Choi, Heuijoo

    2014-01-01

    In this paper, the earthquake-resistance type buffer was developed with the method protecting safely about the earthquake. The main parameter having an effect on the earthquake-resistant performance was analyzed and the earthquake-proof type buffer material was designed. The shear analysis model was developed and the performance of the earthquake-resistance buffer material was evaluated. The dynamic behavior of the radioactive waste disposal canister was analyzed in case the earthquake was generated. In the case, the disposal canister gets the serious damage. In this paper, the earthquake-resistance buffer material was developed in order to prevent this damage. By putting the buffer in which the density is small between the canister and buffer, the earthquake-resistant performance was improved about 80%

  18. Thermo-mechanical FE-analysis of butt-welding of a Cu-Fe canister for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Josefson, B.L.; Karlsson, L.; Lindgren, L.E.; Jonsson, M.

    1992-10-01

    In the Swedish nuclear waste program it has been proposed that spent nuclear fuel shall be placed in composite copper-steel canisters. These canisters will be placed in holes in tunnels located some 500 m underground in a rock storage. The canisters consists of two cylinders of 4850 mm length, one inner cylinder made of steel and one outer cylinder made of copper. The outer diameter of the canister is 880 mm and the wall thickness for each cylinder is 50 mm. At the storage, the steel cylinder, which contains the spent nuclear fuel, is placed inside the copper cylinder. Thereafter, a copper end is butt welded to the copper cylinder using electron beam welding. To obtain penetration through the thickness with this weld method a backing ring is placed at the inside of the copper cylinder. In the present paper, the temperature, strain and stress fields present during welding and after cooling after welding are calculated numerically using the FE-code NIKE-2D. The aim is to use the results of the present calculations to estimate the risk for creep fracture during the subsequent design life. A large strain formulation is employed for the calculation of transient and residual stresses in the canister based on the calculated history of the temperature field present in the canister during the welding process. The contact algorithm available in NIKE-2D is used to detect possible contact between the steel and copper cylinders during the welding. To simplify the numerical calculations and reduce the computational time, rotational symmetry is assumed. For large gap distances between the steel and copper cylinders the residual stress field is calculated to have a shape similar to that observed in butt welded pipes with maximum axial stress values at the yield stress level. For small gap distances the backing ring will come in contact with the steel cylinder which leads to large residual stresses in the backing ring. The maximum accumulated plastic strain in the weld metal and

  19. Encapsulation plant preliminary design, phase 2. Repository connected facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kukkola, T.

    2006-12-01

    The disposal facility of the spent nuclear fuel will be located in Olkiluoto. The encapsulation plant is a part of the disposal facility. In this report, an independent encapsulation plant is located above the underground repository. In the encapsulation plant, the spent fuel is received and treated for disposal. In the fuel handling cell, the spent fuel assemblies are unloaded from the spent fuel transport casks and loaded into the disposal canisters. The gas atmosphere of the disposal canister is changed, the bolted inner canister lid is closed, and the electron beam welding method is used to close the lid of the outer copper canister. The disposal canisters are cleaned and transferred into the buffer store after the machining and inspection of the copper lid welds. From the buffer store, the disposal canisters are transferred into the repository spaces by help of the canister lift. All needed stages of operation are to be performed safely without any activity releases or remarkable personnel doses. The bentonite block interim storage is associated with the encapsulation plant. The bentonite blocks are made from bentonite powder. The bentonite blocks are used as buffer material around the disposal canister in the deposition hole. The average production rate of the encapsulation plant is 40 canisters per year. The nominal maximum production capacity is 100 canisters per year in one shift operation. (orig.)

  20. Neutron interrogator assay system for the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant waste canisters and spent fuel: preliminary description and operating procedures manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Eccleston, G.; Close, D.A.; Speir, L.G.

    1978-05-01

    A neutron interrogation assay system is being designed for the measurement of waste canisters and spent fuel packages at the new Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to be operated by Allied Chemical Corp. The assay samples consist of both waste canisters from the fluorinel dissolution process and spent fuel assemblies. The assay system is a 252 Cf ''Shuffler'' that employs a cyclic sequence of fast-neutron interrogation with a 252 Cf source followed by delayed-neutron counting to determine the 235 U content

  1. Development of Copper Canister through Cold Sprayed Coating Method

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Min Soo; Choi, Jong Won; Choi, Heui Joo; Lee, Jong Youl; Jeong, Jong Tae; Kim, Sung Ki; Cho, Dong Keun

    2007-12-15

    General thickness of a copper canister is 5 cm for a underground disposal application. The lower limit of a thickness is determined by a forging technology. But many experts in this area agrees that the thickness 1 cm is enough at the underground disposal for the life time of 1,000,000 years. Thus new technology is suggested for the making 1 cm thickness copper canister, that is a cold spray coating method(CSC). In this report, the CSC is examined and the technical possibility for making copper canister is measured. The overview of CSC and its characteristics are discussed. Various copper particles for the CSC are analyzed and the formed coating layers are examined to find their porosity and uniformity. A Tafa copper particle and Chang-sung copper particle are selected for making 1 cm thick test specimen. Using the CSC specimens, tensile test and XRD analysis are performed. As a corrosion evaluation, a electrochemical test such as a polarization test is done, together with humid corrosion test and chloric acid immersion test. Through the corrosion tests, it is tried to confirm that the CSC is valuable method for making a copper canister. Consequently, it is confirmed that the CSC method is very usful for making 1 cm thick copper canister. the porosity of CSC layer is very low at 0.3 in case of Tafa copper layer. In corrosion tests, the CSC layers are very stable in active environments. It is hard to say that the difference of processing method but the purity of copper is important for the corrosion rate evaluation. The CSC method is very effective method for making 1 cm thick copper canister, It is hoped that the CSC method is applied in a HLW underground disposal system in the future.

  2. Development of Copper Canister through Cold Sprayed Coating Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Min Soo; Choi, Jong Won; Choi, Heui Joo; Lee, Jong Youl; Jeong, Jong Tae; Kim, Sung Ki; Cho, Dong Keun

    2007-12-01

    General thickness of a copper canister is 5 cm for a underground disposal application. The lower limit of a thickness is determined by a forging technology. But many experts in this area agrees that the thickness 1 cm is enough at the underground disposal for the life time of 1,000,000 years. Thus new technology is suggested for the making 1 cm thickness copper canister, that is a cold spray coating method(CSC). In this report, the CSC is examined and the technical possibility for making copper canister is measured. The overview of CSC and its characteristics are discussed. Various copper particles for the CSC are analyzed and the formed coating layers are examined to find their porosity and uniformity. A Tafa copper particle and Chang-sung copper particle are selected for making 1 cm thick test specimen. Using the CSC specimens, tensile test and XRD analysis are performed. As a corrosion evaluation, a electrochemical test such as a polarization test is done, together with humid corrosion test and chloric acid immersion test. Through the corrosion tests, it is tried to confirm that the CSC is valuable method for making a copper canister. Consequently, it is confirmed that the CSC method is very usful for making 1 cm thick copper canister. the porosity of CSC layer is very low at 0.3 in case of Tafa copper layer. In corrosion tests, the CSC layers are very stable in active environments. It is hard to say that the difference of processing method but the purity of copper is important for the corrosion rate evaluation. The CSC method is very effective method for making 1 cm thick copper canister, It is hoped that the CSC method is applied in a HLW underground disposal system in the future

  3. Hanford spent nuclear fuel project update

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williams, N.H.

    1997-08-19

    Twenty one hundred metric tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are currently stored in the Hanford Site K Basins near the Columbia River. The deteriorating conditions of the fuel and the basins provide engineering and management challenges to assure safe current and future storage. DE and S Hanford, Inc., part of the Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. lead team on the Project Hanford Management Contract, is constructing facilities and systems to move the fuel from current pool storage to a dry interim storage facility away from the Columbia River, and to treat and dispose of K Basins sludge, debris and water. The process starts in K Basins where fuel elements will be removed from existing canisters, washed, and separated from sludge and scrap fuel pieces. Fuel elements will be placed in baskets and loaded into Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) and into transportation casks. The MCO and cask will be transported to the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, where free water within the MCO will be removed under vacuum at slightly elevated temperatures. The MCOs will be sealed and transported via the transport cask to the Canister Storage Building.

  4. DESIGN VERIFICATION REPORT SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL (SNF) PROJECT CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING (CSB)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2003-01-01

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Revision 3 of this document incorporates MCO Cover Cap Assembly welding verification activities. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed

  5. Nuclear fuel waste disposal in Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dormuth, K.W.; Gillespie, P.A.

    1990-05-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has developed a concept for disposing of Canada's nuclear fuel waste and is submitting it for review under Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process. During this review, AECL intends to show that careful, controlled burial 500 to 1000 metres deep in plutonic rock of the Canadian Precambrian Shield is a safe and feasible way to dispose of Canada's nuclear fuel waste. The concept has been assessed without identifying or evaluating any particular site for disposal. AECL is now preparing a comprehensive report based on more than 10 years of research and development

  6. Nuclear fuel waste disposal in Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dormuth, K.W.; Gillespie, P.A.

    1990-05-01

    Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has developed a concept for disposing of Canada's nuclear fuel waste and is submitting it for review under the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process. During this review, AECL intends to show that careful, controlled burial 500 to 1000 metres deep in plutonic rock of the Canadian Precambrian Shield is a safe and feasible way to dispose of Canada's nuclear fuel waste. The concept has been assessed without identifying or evaluating any particular site for disposal. AECL is now preparing a comprehensive report based on more than 10 years of research and development

  7. Transporting existing VSC-24 canisters using a risk-based licensing approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Srinivasan, R.; Sisley, S.E.; Hopf, J.E. [BNFL Fuel Solutions, Campbell, CA (United States)

    2004-07-01

    The eventual disposition of the spent fuel assemblies loaded in canisters and casks currently designed and licensed only for on-site storage is an industry-wide issue. The canister-specific BUC evaluation approach developed by BFS can be used to license many of these storage canisters and casks for transportation. This will allow these storage canisters and casks to be transported intact to a long-term storage facility or repository, thereby minimizing fuel handling operations, impact on plant operations, and occupational exposure, as well as total infrastructure costs. Application of the proposed canister-specific BUC analysis approach to a preliminary evaluation of the 58 loaded MSBs demonstrates the benefits of this approach. The results of this preliminary evaluation show that a more rigorous analysis based on the known characteristics of the loaded spent fuel, rather than the design-basis fuel parameters, produces significantly lower maximum keff values and can be used to qualify many of the existing loaded storage canisters for transportation. Transportation certification for storage canisters having more reactive spent fuel payloads may require reliance on BUC approaches that are more aggressive than current NRC guidelines allow. Credit may be required for fission- product isotopes that do not have sufficient chemical assay data for benchmarking. In addition, reduced criticality safety margins may be required. For these more-aggressive BUC approaches, a risk assessment should be provided to support the NRC-approval basis. The risk assessment should evaluate the possibility and consequences of an accidental criticality event based upon inaccuracies in the characterization of the spent-fuel payloads.

  8. Transporting existing VSC-24 canisters using a risk-based licensing approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srinivasan, R.; Sisley, S.E.; Hopf, J.E.

    2004-01-01

    The eventual disposition of the spent fuel assemblies loaded in canisters and casks currently designed and licensed only for on-site storage is an industry-wide issue. The canister-specific BUC evaluation approach developed by BFS can be used to license many of these storage canisters and casks for transportation. This will allow these storage canisters and casks to be transported intact to a long-term storage facility or repository, thereby minimizing fuel handling operations, impact on plant operations, and occupational exposure, as well as total infrastructure costs. Application of the proposed canister-specific BUC analysis approach to a preliminary evaluation of the 58 loaded MSBs demonstrates the benefits of this approach. The results of this preliminary evaluation show that a more rigorous analysis based on the known characteristics of the loaded spent fuel, rather than the design-basis fuel parameters, produces significantly lower maximum keff values and can be used to qualify many of the existing loaded storage canisters for transportation. Transportation certification for storage canisters having more reactive spent fuel payloads may require reliance on BUC approaches that are more aggressive than current NRC guidelines allow. Credit may be required for fission- product isotopes that do not have sufficient chemical assay data for benchmarking. In addition, reduced criticality safety margins may be required. For these more-aggressive BUC approaches, a risk assessment should be provided to support the NRC-approval basis. The risk assessment should evaluate the possibility and consequences of an accidental criticality event based upon inaccuracies in the characterization of the spent-fuel payloads

  9. Nuclear fuel waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allan, C.J.

    1993-01-01

    The Canadian concept for nuclear fuel waste disposal is based on disposing of the waste in a vault excavated 500-1000 m deep in intrusive igneous rock of the Canadian Shield. The author believes that, if the concept is accepted following review by a federal environmental assessment panel (probably in 1995), then it is important that implementation should begin without delay. His reasons are listed under the following headings: Environmental leadership and reducing the burden on future generations; Fostering public confidence in nuclear energy; Forestalling inaction by default; Preserving the knowledge base. Although disposal of reprocessing waste is a possible future alternative option, it will still almost certainly include a requirement for geologic disposal

  10. Thermal Predictions of the Cooling of Waste Glass Canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donna Post Guillen

    2014-11-01

    Radioactive liquid waste from five decades of weapons production is slated for vitrification at the Hanford site. The waste will be mixed with glass forming additives and heated to a high temperature, then poured into canisters within a pour cave where the glass will cool and solidify into a stable waste form for disposal. Computer simulations were performed to predict the heat rejected from the canisters and the temperatures within the glass during cooling. Four different waste glass compositions with different thermophysical properties were evaluated. Canister centerline temperatures and the total amount of heat transfer from the canisters to the surrounding air are reported.

  11. Synthesis on the spent fuel long term evolution

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ferry, C.; Poinssot, Ch.; Lovera, P.; Poulesquen, A. [CEA Saclay, Dept. de Physico-Chimie (DEN/DPC), 91 - Gif sur Yvette (France); Broudic, V. [CEA Cadarache, Direction des Reacteurs Nucleaires (DRN), 13 - Saint Paul lez Durance (France); Cappelaere, Ch. [CEA Saclay, Dept. des Materiaux pour le Nucleaire(DMN), 91 - Gif-sur-Yvette (France); Desgranges, L. [CEA Cadarache, Direction des Reacteurs Nucleaires (DRN), 13 - Saint-Paul-lez-Durance (France); Garcia, Ph. [CEA Cadarache, Dept. d' Etudes des Combustibles (DEC), 13 - Saint Paul lez Durance (France); Jegou, Ch.; Roudil, D. [CEA Valrho, Dir. de l' Energie Nucleaire (DEN), 30 - Marcoule (France); Lovera, P.; Poulesquen, A. [CEA Saclay, Dept. de Physico-Chimie (DPC), 91 - Gif sur Yvette (France); Marimbeau, P. [CEA Cadarache, Dir. de l' Energie Nucleaire (DEN), 13 - Saint-Paul-lez-Durance (France); Gras, J.M.; Bouffioux, P. [Electricite de France (EDF), 75 - Paris (France)

    2005-07-01

    The French research on spent fuel long term evolution has been performed by CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique) since 1999 in the PRECCI project with the support of EDF (Electricite de France). These studies focused on the spent fuel behaviour under various conditions encountered in dry storage or in deep geological disposal. Three main types of conditions were discerned: - The evolution in a closed system which corresponds to the normal scenario in storage and to the first confinement phase in disposal; - The evolution in air which corresponds to an incidental loss of confinement during storage or to a rupture of the canister before the site re-saturation in geological disposal; - The evolution in water which corresponds to the normal scenario after the breaching of the canister in repository conditions. This document produced in the frame of the PRECCI project is an overview of the state of knowledge in 2004 concerning the long-term behavior of spent fuel under these various conditions. The state of the art was derived from the results obtained under the PRECCI project as well as from a review of the literature and of data acquired under the European project on Spent Fuel Stability under Repository Conditions. The main results issued from the French research are underlined. (authors)

  12. Synthesis on the spent fuel long term evolution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferry, C.; Poinssot, Ch.; Lovera, P.; Poulesquen, A.; Broudic, V.; Cappelaere, Ch.; Desgranges, L.; Garcia, Ph.; Jegou, Ch.; Roudil, D.; Lovera, P.; Poulesquen, A.; Marimbeau, P.; Gras, J.M.; Bouffioux, P.

    2005-01-01

    The French research on spent fuel long term evolution has been performed by CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique) since 1999 in the PRECCI project with the support of EDF (Electricite de France). These studies focused on the spent fuel behaviour under various conditions encountered in dry storage or in deep geological disposal. Three main types of conditions were discerned: - The evolution in a closed system which corresponds to the normal scenario in storage and to the first confinement phase in disposal; - The evolution in air which corresponds to an incidental loss of confinement during storage or to a rupture of the canister before the site re-saturation in geological disposal; - The evolution in water which corresponds to the normal scenario after the breaching of the canister in repository conditions. This document produced in the frame of the PRECCI project is an overview of the state of knowledge in 2004 concerning the long-term behavior of spent fuel under these various conditions. The state of the art was derived from the results obtained under the PRECCI project as well as from a review of the literature and of data acquired under the European project on Spent Fuel Stability under Repository Conditions. The main results issued from the French research are underlined. (authors)

  13. Life Prediction of Spent Fuel Storage Canister Material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ballinger, Ronald

    2018-04-16

    The original purpose of this project was to develop a probabilistic model for SCC-induced failure of spent fuel storage canisters, exposed to a salt-air environment in the temperature range 30-70°C for periods up to and exceeding 100 years. The nature of this degradation process, which involves multiple degradation mechanisms, combined with variable and uncertain environmental conditions dictates a probabilistic approach to life prediction. A final report for the original portion of the project was submitted earlier. However, residual stress measurements for as-welded and repair welds could not be performed within the original time of the project. As a result of this, a no-cost extension was granted in order to complete these tests. In this report, we report on the results of residual stress measurements.

  14. Evolution of repository and waste package designs for Yucca Mountain disposal system for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rechard, Rob P.; Voegele, Michael D.

    2014-01-01

    This paper summarizes the evolution of the engineered barrier design for the proposed Yucca Mountain disposal system. Initially, the underground facility used a fairly standard panel and drift layout excavated mostly by drilling and blasting. By 1993, the layout of the underground facility was changed to accommodate construction by a tunnel boring machine. Placement of the repository in unsaturated zone permitted an extended period without backfilling; placement of the waste package in an open drift permitted use of much larger, and thus hotter packages. Hence in 1994, the underground facility design switched from floor emplacement of waste in small, single walled stainless steel or nickel alloy containers to in-drift emplacement of waste in large, double-walled containers. By 2000, the outer layer was a high nickel alloy for corrosion resistance and the inner layer was stainless steel for structural strength. Use of large packages facilitated receipt and disposal of high volumes of spent nuclear fuel. In addition, in-drift package placement saved excavation costs. Options considered for in-drift emplacement included different heat loads and use of backfill. To avoid dripping on the package during the thermal period and the possibility of localized corrosion, titanium drip shields were added for the disposal drifts by 2000. In addition, a handling canister, sealed at the reactor to eliminate further handling of bare fuel assemblies, was evaluated and eventually adopted in 2006. Finally, staged development of the underground layout was adopted to more readily adjust to changes in waste forms and Congressional funding. - Highlights: • Progression of events associated with repository design to accommodate tunnel boring machine and in-drift waste package emplacement are discussed. • Change in container design from small, single-layered stainless steel vessel to large, two-layered nickel alloy vessel is discussed. • The addition of drip shield to limit the

  15. Safeguards considerations related to the use of multi-purpose canisters in the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, W.C.

    1995-01-01

    The US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for disposing of the nation's high-level radioactive waste. Currently, DOE is considering the use of Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs) to containerize commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to be handled by the system. To achieve its safeguards and security objectives, OCRWM plans to institute a US Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved safeguards program. Since the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) facility and a possible Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility may be subject to selection for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, the safeguards program for MPCs may not preclude compliance with the requirements of the IAEA's Annex D, Special Criteria for Difficult-to-Access Fuel Items. MPC safeguards are based on three principles: Verification, Material Control and Accounting, and Physical Protection

  16. Modelling of thermally driven groundwater flow in a facility for disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marsic, Nico; Grundfelt, Bertil [Kemakta Konsult AB, Stockholm (Sweden)

    2013-09-15

    In this report calculations are presented of buoyancy driven groundwater flow caused by the emission of residual heat from spent nuclear fuel deposited in deep boreholes from the ground surface in combination with the natural geothermal gradient. This work has been conducted within SKB's programme for evaluation of alternative methods for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The basic safety feature of disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes is that the groundwater at great depth has a higher salinity, and hence a higher density, than more superficial groundwater. The result of this is that the deep groundwater becomes virtually stagnant. The study comprises analyses of the effects of different inter-borehole distances as well as the effect of different permeabilities in the backfill and sealing materials in the borehole and of different shapes of the interface between fresh and saline groundwater. The study is an update of a previous study published in 2006. In the present study, the facility design proposed by Sandia National Laboratories has been studied. In this design, steel canisters containing two BWR elements or one PWR element are stacked on top of each other between 3 and 5 kilometres depth. In order to host all spent fuel from the current Swedish nuclear programme, about 80 such holes are needed. The model used in this study comprises nine boreholes spaced 100 metres alternatively 50 metres apart in a 3{Chi}3 matrix. In one set of calculations the salinity in the groundwater was assumed to increase from zero above 700 metres depth to 10% by weight at 1500 metres depth and below. In another set, a sharper salinity gradient was applied in which the salinity increased from 0 to 10% between 1400 and 1500 metres depth. A geothermal gradient of 16 deg C/km was applied. The heat output from the spent fuel was assumed to decrease by time in manner consistent with the radioactive decay in the fuel. When the inter-borehole distance decreased from

  17. Treatment and disposal of radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants. Program for encapsulation, deep geologic deposition and research, development and demonstration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-09-01

    Programs for RD and D concerning disposal of radioactive waste are presented. Main topics include: Design, testing and manufacture of canisters for the spent fuels; Design of equipment for deposition of waste canisters; Material and process for backfilling rock caverns; Evaluation of accuracy and validation of methods for safety analyses; Development of methods for defining scenarios for the safety analyses. 471 refs, 67 figs, 21 tabs

  18. Thermal dimensioning of spent fuel repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikonen, K.

    2009-09-01

    This report contains the temperature dimensioning of the KBS-3V type nuclear fuel repository in Olkiluoto for the BWR, VVER and EPR fuel canisters, which are disposed at vertical position in the horizontal tunnels in a rectangular geometry according to the preliminary Posiva plan. This report concerns only the temperature dimensioning of the repository and does not take into account the possible restrictions caused by the stresses induced in the rock. The maximum temperature on the canister-bentonite interface is limited to the design temperature of +100 deg C. However, due to uncertainties in thermal analysis parameters (like scattering in rock conductivity or in predicted decay power) the allowable calculated maximum canister temperature is set to 90 deg C causing a safety margin of 10 deg C. The allowable temperature is controlled by adjusting the space between adjacent canisters, adjacent tunnels and the pre-cooling time affecting on power of the canisters. The temperature of canister surfaces can be determined by superposing analytic line heat source models much more efficiently than by numerical analysis, if the analytic model is first calibrated by numerical analysis (by control volume method). This was done by comparing the surface temperatures of a single canister calculated numerically and analytically. For the Olkiluoto repository of one panel having 900 canisters of BWR, VVER and EPR spent fuel was analyzed. The analyses were performed with an initial canister power of 1 700 W, 1 370 W and 1 830 W, respectively. These decay heats are obtained when the pre-cooling times of the fuels are 32.9, 29.6 and 50.3 years (the burn-up values 40, 40 and 50 MWd/kgU, respectively). The analyses gave as a result the canister spacing (6.0-10.8 m), when the tunnel spacing was 25 m, 30 m or 40 m. On the edge areas of the panel with constant canister spacing the temperatures of the canisters are lower than in the middle area of the repository. Thus it is possible to pack

  19. State of the art of the welding method for sealing spent nuclear fuel canister made of copper. Part 1 - FSW

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Purhonen, T.

    2014-05-15

    The purpose of this report is to gather together comprehensive information concerning FSW as an optional welding method for welding the nuclear waste copper canister at the disposal facility. This report discusses the current situation, knowledge of the process and information concerning results of the development and research work related to welding thick copper and the special needs of the disposal environment. Most of the research work and development work has been done by Posiva's Swedish partner SKB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. SKB chose FSW as their reference welding method in 2005. FSW (friction stir welding) is a solid-state welding method, invented in 1991, in which frictional heat is generated between the tool and the weld metal, causing the metal to soften, normally without reaching the melting point, and allowing the tool to traverse the joint line. Friction stir welding can be used for joining many types of materials and material combinations, if the tool materials and designs can be found which operate at the forging temperature of the workpiece. The general requirements for the copper canister weld and base material are presented in Posiva's VAHA-system, which sets the most critical values or demands concerning the short- and long-term properties or other needs. The sections in this report are set out in a similar way as in the VAHA-system. Concerning the results from the research and development work, it can be said that FS weld material fulfils the values set by VAHA. The quality of the welds fulfils the set demands for intact weld material and the welding process is robust using an automatic control system. There still remains work concerning the acceptance procedure for the welding process and other open issues which are described in this report. (orig.)

  20. State of the art of the welding method for sealing spent nuclear fuel canister made of copper. Part 1 - FSW

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Purhonen, T.

    2014-05-01

    The purpose of this report is to gather together comprehensive information concerning FSW as an optional welding method for welding the nuclear waste copper canister at the disposal facility. This report discusses the current situation, knowledge of the process and information concerning results of the development and research work related to welding thick copper and the special needs of the disposal environment. Most of the research work and development work has been done by Posiva's Swedish partner SKB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. SKB chose FSW as their reference welding method in 2005. FSW (friction stir welding) is a solid-state welding method, invented in 1991, in which frictional heat is generated between the tool and the weld metal, causing the metal to soften, normally without reaching the melting point, and allowing the tool to traverse the joint line. Friction stir welding can be used for joining many types of materials and material combinations, if the tool materials and designs can be found which operate at the forging temperature of the workpiece. The general requirements for the copper canister weld and base material are presented in Posiva's VAHA-system, which sets the most critical values or demands concerning the short- and long-term properties or other needs. The sections in this report are set out in a similar way as in the VAHA-system. Concerning the results from the research and development work, it can be said that FS weld material fulfils the values set by VAHA. The quality of the welds fulfils the set demands for intact weld material and the welding process is robust using an automatic control system. There still remains work concerning the acceptance procedure for the welding process and other open issues which are described in this report. (orig.)

  1. DESIGN VERIFICATION REPORT SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL (SNF) PROJECT CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING (CSB)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BAZINET, G.D.

    2003-02-12

    The Sub-project W379, ''Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building (CSB),'' was established as part of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project. The primary mission of the CSB is to safely store spent nuclear fuel removed from the K Basins in dry storage until such time that it can be transferred to the national geological repository at Yucca Mountain Nevada. This sub-project was initiated in late 1994 by a series of studies and conceptual designs. These studies determined that the partially constructed storage building, originally built as part of the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) Project, could be redesigned to safely store the spent nuclear fuel. The scope of the CSB facility initially included a receiving station, a hot conditioning system, a storage vault, and a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) Handling Machine (MHM). Because of evolution of the project technical strategy, the hot conditioning system was deleted from the scope and MCO welding and sampling stations were added in its place. This report outlines the methods, procedures, and outputs developed by Project W379 to verify that the provided Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs): satisfy the design requirements and acceptance criteria; perform their intended function; ensure that failure modes and hazards have been addressed in the design; and ensure that the SSCs as installed will not adversely impact other SSCs. The original version of this document was prepared by Vista Engineering for the SNF Project. Revision 1 documented verification actions that were pending at the time the initial report was prepared. Revision 3 of this document incorporates MCO Cover Cap Assembly welding verification activities. Verification activities for the installed and operational SSCs have been completed.

  2. Disposal of Surplus Weapons Grade Plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alsaed, H.; Gottlieb, P.

    2000-01-01

    The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is responsible for disposing of inventories of surplus US weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium as well as providing, technical support for, and ultimate implementation of, efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian plutonium. On January 4, 2000, the Department of Energy issued a Record of Decision to dispose of up to 50 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium using two methods. Up to 17 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be immobilized in a ceramic form, placed in cans and embedded in large canisters containing high-level vitrified waste for ultimate disposal in a geologic repository. Approximately 33 metric tons of surplus plutonium will be used to fabricate MOX fuel (mixed oxide fuel, having less than 5% plutonium-239 as the primary fissile material in a uranium-235 carrier matrix). The MOX fuel will be used to produce electricity in existing domestic commercial nuclear reactors. This paper reports the major waste-package-related, long-term disposal impacts of the two waste forms that would be used to accomplish this mission. Particular emphasis is placed on the possibility of criticality. These results are taken from a summary report published earlier this year

  3. Spent fuel disposal problem in Bulgaria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Milanov, M; Stefanova, I [Bylgarska Akademiya na Naukite, Sofia (Bulgaria). Inst. za Yadrena Izsledvaniya i Yadrena Energetika

    1994-12-31

    The internationally agreed basic safety principles and criteria for spent fuel (SF) and high level waste (HLW) disposal are outlined. In the framework of these principles the specific problems of Bulgaria described in the `National Concept for Radioactive Waste Management and Disposal in Republic of Bulgaria` are discussed. The possible alternatives for spent fuel management are: (1) sending the spent fuel for disposal in other country; (2) once-through cycle and (3) closed fuel cycle. A mixed solution of the problem is implemented in Bulgaria. According to the agreement between Bulgaria and former Soviet Union a part of the spent fuel has been returned to Russia. The once-through and closed-fuel cycle are also considered. The projected cumulated amount of spent fuel is estimated for two cases: (1) the six units of Kozloduy NPP are in operation till the end of their lifetime (3300 tHM) and (2) low estimate (2700 tHM) - only units 5 and 6 are operated till the end of their lifetime. The reprocessing of the total amount of 3300 tHM will lead to the production of about 370 m{sup 3} vitrified high level wastes. Together with the HLW about 1850 m{sup 3} cladding hulls and 7800 m{sup 3} intermediate-level wastes will be generated, which should be disposed off in deep geological repository. The total production of radioactive waste in once-through cycle is 181 000 m{sup 3}, and in closed cycle - 190 000 m{sup 3}. Geological investigations are performed resulting in categorization of the territory of the country based on geological, geotechnical and hydrogeological conditions. This will facilitate the choice of the most suitable location for deep geological repository. 7 figs., 11 refs.

  4. Commercial radioactive waste management system feasibility with the universal canister concept. Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morissette, R.P.; Schneringer, P.E.; Lane, R.K.; Moore, R.L.; Young, K.A.

    1986-01-01

    A Program Research and Development Announcement (PRDA) was initiated by DOE to solicit from industry new and novel ideas for improvements in the nuclear waste management system. GA Technologies Inc. was contracted to study a system utilizing a universal canister which could be loaded at the reactor and used throughout the waste management system. The proposed canister was developed with the objective of meeting the mission requirements with maximum flexibility and at minimum cost. Canister criteria were selected from a thorough analysis of the spent fuel inventory, and canister concepts were evaluated along with the shipping and storage casks to determine the maximum payload. Engineering analyses were performed on various cask/canister combinations. One important criterion was the interchangeability of the canisters between truck and rail cask systems. A canister was selected which could hold three PWR intact fuel elements or up to eight consolidated PWR fuel elements. One canister could be shipped in an overweight truck cask or six in a rail cask. Economic analysis showed a cost savings of the reference system under consideration at that time

  5. Draft Geologic Disposal Requirements Basis for STAD Specification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ilgen, Anastasia G. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Bryan, Charles R. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Hardin, Ernest [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-03-25

    This document provides the basis for requirements in the current version of Performance Specification for Standardized Transportation, Aging, and Disposal Canister Systems, (FCRD-NFST-2014-0000579) that are driven by storage and geologic disposal considerations. Performance requirements for the Standardized Transportation, Aging, and Disposal (STAD) canister are given in Section 3.1 of that report. Here, the requirements are reviewed and the rationale for each provided. Note that, while FCRD-NFST-2014-0000579 provides performance specifications for other components of the STAD storage system (e.g. storage overpack, transfer and transportation casks, and others), these have no impact on the canister performance during disposal, and are not discussed here.

  6. Hanford K basins spent nuclear fuel project update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, N.H.; Hudson, F.G.

    1997-07-01

    Twenty one hundred metric tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are currently stored in the Hanford Site K Basins near the Columbia River. The deteriorating conditions of the fuel and the basins provide engineering and management challenges to assure safe current and future storage. DE and S Hanford, Inc., part of the Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. lead team on the Project Hanford Management Contract, is constructing facilities and systems to move the fuel from current pool storage to a dry interim storage facility away from the Columbia River, and to treat and dispose of K Basins sludge, debris and water. The process starts in K Basins where fuel elements will be removed from existing canisters, washed, and separated from sludge and scrap fuel pieces. Fuel elements will be placed in baskets and loaded into Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) and into transportation casks. The MCO and cask will be transported to the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, where free water within the MCO will be removed under vacuum at slightly elevated temperatures. The MCOs will be sealed and transported via the transport cask to the Canister Storage Building

  7. Pyroprocessing oxide spent nuclear fuels for efficient disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McPheeters, C.C.; Pierce, R.D.; Mulcahey, T.P.

    1994-01-01

    Pyrochemical processing as a means for conditioning spent nuclear fuels for disposal offers significant advantages over the direct disposal option. The advantages include reduction in high-level waste volume; conversion of most of the high-level waste to a low-level waste in which nearly all the transuranics (TRU) have been removed; and incorporation of the TRUs into a stable, highly radioactive waste form suitable for interim storage, ultimate destruction, or repository disposal. The lithium process has been under development at Argonne National Laboratory for use in pyrochemical conditioning of spent fuel for disposal. All of the process steps have been demonstrated in small-scale (0.5-kg simulated spent fuel) experiments. Engineering-scale (20-kg simulated spent fuel) demonstration of the process is underway, and small-scale experiments have been conducted with actual spent fuel from a light water reactor (LWR). The lithium process is simple, operates at relatively low temperatures, and can achieve high decontamination factors for the TRU elements. Ordinary materials, such as carbon steel, can be used for process containment

  8. Radioactive waste disposal package

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lampe, Robert F.

    1986-11-04

    A radioactive waste disposal package comprising a canister for containing vitrified radioactive waste material and a sealed outer shell encapsulating the canister. A solid block of filler material is supported in said shell and convertible into a liquid state for flow into the space between the canister and outer shell and subsequently hardened to form a solid, impervious layer occupying such space.

  9. Friction Stir Welding of Copper Canisters for Nuclear Waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kaellgren, Therese

    2005-07-01

    The Swedish model for final disposal of nuclear fuel waste is based on copper canisters as a corrosion barrier with an inner pressure holding insert of cast iron. One of the methods to seal the copper canister is to use the Friction Stir Welding (FSW), a method invented by The Welding Institute (TWI). This work has been focused on characterisation of the FSW joints, and modelling of the process, both analytically and numerically. The first simulations were based on Rosenthal's analytical medium plate model. The model is simple to use, but has limitations. Finite element models were developed, initially with a two-dimensional geometry. Due to the requirements of describing both the heat flow and the tool movement, three-dimensional models were developed. These models take into account heat transfer, material flow, and continuum mechanics. The geometries of the models are based on the simulation experiments carried out at TWI and at Swedish Nuclear Fuel Waste and Management Co (SKB). Temperature distribution, material flow and their effects on the thermal expansion were predicted for a full-scale canister and lid. The steady state solutions have been compared with temperature measurements, showing good agreement. Microstructure and hardness profiles have been investigated by optical microscope, Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM), Electron Back Scatter Diffraction (EBSD) and Rockwell hardness measurements. EBSD visualisation has been used to determine the grain size distribution and the appearance of twins and misorientation within grains. The orientation maps show a fine uniform equiaxed grain structure. The root of the weld exhibits the smallest grains and many annealing twins. This may be due to deformation after recrystallisation. The appearance of the nugget and the grain size depends on the position of the weld. A large difference can be seen both in hardness and grain size between the start of the weld and when the steady state is reached.

  10. The psychosocial consequences of spent fuel disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paavola, J.; Eraenen, L.

    1999-03-01

    In this report the potential psychosocial consequences of spent fuel disposal to inhabitants of a community are assessed on the basis of earlier research. In studying the situation, different interpretations and meanings given to nuclear power are considered. First, spent fuel disposal is studied as fear-arousing and consequently stressful situation. Psychosomatic effects of stress and coping strategies used by an individual are presented. Stress as a collective phenomenon and coping mechanisms available for a community are also assessed. Stress reactions caused by natural disasters and technological disasters are compared. Consequences of nuclear power plant accidents are reviewed, e.g. research done on the accident at Three Mile Island power plant. Reasons for the disorganising effect on a community caused by a technological disaster are compared to the altruistic community often seen after natural disasters. The potential reactions that a spent fuel disposal plant can arouse in inhabitants are evaluated. Both short-term and long-term reactions are evaluated as well as reactions under normal functioning, after an incident and as a consequence of an accident. Finally an evaluation of how the decision-making system and citizens' opportunity to influence the decision-making affect the experience of threat is expressed. As a conclusion we see that spent fuel disposal can arouse fear and stress in people. However, the level of the stress is probably low. The stress is at strongest at the time of the starting of the spent fuel disposal plant. With time people get used to the presence of the plant and the threat experienced gets smaller. (orig.)

  11. Canister disposition plan for the DWPF Startup Test Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harbour, J.R.; Payne, C.H.

    1990-01-01

    This report details the disposition of canisters and the canistered waste forms produced during the DWPF Startup Test Program. The six melter campaigns (DWPF Startup Tests FA-13, WP-14, WP-15, WP-16, WP-17, and FA-18) will produce 126 canistered waste forms. In addition, up to 20 additional canistered waste forms may be produced from glass poured during the transition between campaigns. In particular, this canister disposition plan (1) assigns (by alpha-numeric code) a specific canister to each location in the six campaign sequences, (2) describes the method of access for glass sampling on each canistered waste form, (3) describes the nature of the specific tests which will be carried out, (4) details which tests will be carried out on each canistered waste form, (5) provides the sequence of these tests for each canistered waste form, and (6) assigns a storage location for each canistered waste form. The tests are designed to provide evidence, as detailed in the Waste Form Compliance Plan (WCP 1 ), that the DWPF product will comply with the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS 2 ). The WAPS must be met before the canistered waste form is accepted by DOE for ultimate disposal at the Federal Repository. The results of these tests will be included in the Waste Form Qualification Report (WQR)

  12. Progress in the understanding of the long-term corrosion behaviour of copper canisters

    Science.gov (United States)

    King, Fraser; Lilja, Christina; Vähänen, Marjut

    2013-07-01

    Copper has been proposed as a canister material for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a deep geologic repository in a number of countries worldwide. Since it was first proposed for this purpose in 1978, a significant number of studies have been performed to assess the corrosion performance of copper under repository conditions. These studies are critically reviewed and the suitability of copper as a canister material for nuclear waste is re-assessed. Over the past 30-35 years there has been considerable progress in our understanding of the expected corrosion behaviour of copper canisters. Crucial to this progress has been the improvement in the understanding of the nature of the repository environment and how it will evolve over time. With this improved understanding, it has been possible to predict the evolution of the corrosion behaviour from the initial period of warm, aerobic conditions in the repository to the long-term phase of cool, anoxic conditions dominated by the presence of sulphide. An historical review of the treatment of the corrosion behaviour of copper canisters is presented, from the initial corrosion assessment in 1978, through a major review of the corrosion behaviour in 2001, through to the current level of understanding based on the results of on-going studies. Compared with the initial corrosion assessment, there has been considerable progress in the treatment of localised corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, and microbiologically influenced corrosion of the canisters. Progress in the mechanistic modelling of the evolution of the corrosion behaviour of the canister is also reviewed, as is the continuing debate about the thermodynamic stability of copper in pure water. The overall conclusion of this critical review is that copper is a suitable material for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and offers the prospect of containment of the waste for an extended period of time. The corrosion behaviour is influenced by the presence of the

  13. Utilization of Cs137 to generate a radiation barrier for weapons grade plutonium immobilized in borosilicate glass canisters. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.; Armantrout, G.A.; Collins, L.F.

    1995-01-01

    One of the ways recommended by a recent National Academy of Sciences study to dispose of excess weapons-grade plutonium is to encapsulate the plutonium in a glass in combination with high-level radioactive wastes (HLW) to generate an intense radiation dose rate field. The objective is to render the plutonium as difficult to access as the plutonium contained in existing US commercial spent light-water reactor (LWR) fuel until it can be disposed of in a permanent geological repository. A radiation dose rate from a sealed canister of 1,000 rem/h (10 Sv/h) at 1 meter for at least 30 years after fabrication was assumed in this paper to be a radiation dose comparable to spent LWR fuel. This can be achieved by encapsulating the plutonium in a borosilicate glass with an adequate amount of a single fission product in the HLWS, namely radioactive Cs 137 . One hundred thousand curies of Cs 137 will generate a dose rate of 1,000 rem/h (10 Sv/h) at 1 meter for at least 30 years when imbedded into canisters of the size proposed for the Savannah River Site's vitrified high-level wastes. The United States has a current inventory of 54 MCi of CS 137 that has been separated from defense HLWs and is in sealed capsules. This single curie inventory is sufficient to spike 50 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium if plutonium can be loaded at 5.5 wt% in glass, or 540 canisters. Additional CS 137 inventories exist in the United States' HLWs from past reprocessing operations, should additional curies be required. Using only one fission product, CS 137 , rather than the multiple chemical elements and compounds in HLWs to generate a high radiation dose rate from a glass canister greatly simplifies the processing engineering retirement for encapsulating plutonium in a borosilicate glass

  14. Nuclear fuel waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Merrett, G.J.; Gillespie, P.A.

    1983-07-01

    This report discusses events and processes that could adversely affect the long-term stability of a nuclear fuel waste disposal vault or the regions of the geosphere and the biosphere to which radionuclides might migrate from such a vault

  15. A study on the thermal design of the advanced multi purpose canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jun, Eun Ju; Chang, S. H.

    2004-01-01

    The storage, transportation and disposal of pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent fuel is an important issue in nuclear industry for safe and extended nuclear power plant operation. However, since wet-storage facilities almost reach to their capacity, dry-storage method, especially using a Multi Purpose Canister (MPC), has been highlighted because it gives better economic and safety point of view. In this study, an advanced design of MPC was proposed through an increase in storage capacity from 26 to 37 PWR fuel assemblies per MPC. Thermal analysis was also carried out by FLUENT 6 code to confirm the temperature criteria of the MPC. From the results, conceptual design of 37 PWR fuel assemblies can reduce the mass per fuel assembly ratio about 19 % compared to the 26 assemblies, and maximum temperature developed at the center of fuel assemblies shows within the range of design criteria. Based on the analysis, it is considered that the advanced MPC design well conforms to the safety requirement and it gives rise to economical gain because of reduction in mass per fuel assembly ratio

  16. Mechanical integrity of canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, Fred

    1992-12-01

    This document constitutes the final report from 'SKBs reference group for mechanical integrity of canisters for spent nuclear fuel'. A complete list of all reports initiated by the reference group can be found in the summary report in this document. The main task of the reference group has been to advice SKB regarding the choice (ranking of alternatives) of canister type for different types of storage. The choice should be based on requirements of impermeability for a given time period and identification of possible limiting mechanisms. The main conclusions from the work were: From mechanical point of view, low phosphorous oxygen free copper (Cu-OFP) is a preferred canisters material. It exhibits satisfactory ductility both during tensile and creep testing. The residual stresses in the canisters are of such a magnitude that the estimated time to creep rupture with the data obtained for the Cu-OFP material is essentially infinite. Based on the present knowledge of stress corrosion cracking of copper there appears to be a small risk for such to occur in the projected environment. This risk need some further study. Rock shear movements of the size of 10 cm should pose no direct threat to the integrity of the canisters. Considering mechanical integrity, the composite copper/steel canister is an advantageous alternative. The recommendations for further research included continued studies of the creep properties of copper and of stress corrosion cracking. However, the studies should focus more directly on the design and fabrication aspect of the canister

  17. Interaction between rock, bentonite buffer and canister. FEM calculations of some mechanical effects on the canister in different disposal concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boergesson, L.

    1992-07-01

    An important task of the buffer of highly compacted bentonite is to offer a mechanical protection to the canister. This role has been investigated by a number of finite element calculations using the complex elasto plastic material models for the bentonite that have been developed on the basis of laboratory tests and adapted to the code ABAQUS. The following main functions and scenarios have been investigated for some different canister types and repository concepts: - The effect of the water and swelling pressure, - The effect of a rock shear perpendicular to the canister axis, - The effect of creep in the copper after a rock shear displacement, - The thermomechanical effects when an initially saturated buffer is used

  18. Fuel corrosion processes under waste disposal conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shoesmith, D.W.

    2000-01-01

    The release of the majority of radionuclides from spent nuclear fuel under permanent disposal conditions will be controlled by the rate of dissolution of the UO 2 fuel matrix. In this manuscript the mechanism of the coupled anodic (fuel dissolution) and cathodic (oxidant reduction) reactions which constitute the overall fuel corrosion process is reviewed, and the many published observations on fuel corrosion under disposal conditions discussed. The primary emphasis is on summarizing the overall mechanistic behaviour and establishing the primary factors likely to control fuel corrosion. Included are discussions on the influence of various oxidants including radiolytic ones, pH, temperature, groundwater composition, and the formation of corrosion product deposits. The relevance of the data recorded on unirradiated UO 2 to the interpretation of spent fuel behaviour is included. Based on the review, the data used to develop fuel corrosion models under the conditions anticipated in Yucca Mountain (NV, USA) are evaluated

  19. Chemical stability of copper-canisters in deep repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahonen, L.

    1995-12-01

    The spent fuel from Finnish nuclear reactors is planned to be encapsulated in thick-walled copper-iron canisters and placed deep into the bedrock. The copper wall of the canister provides a long-time shield against corrosion, preventing the high-level nuclear fuel from contact with ground water. In the report, stability of metallic copper and its possible corrosion reactions in the conditions of deep bedrock are evaluated by means of thermo-dynamic calculations. (90 refs., 28 figs., 11 tabs.)

  20. Site-to-canister scale flow and transport in Haestholmen, Kivetty, Olkiluoto and Romuvaara

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poteri, A.; Laitinen, M. [VTT Energy, Espoo (Finland)

    1999-05-01

    Radioactive waste is originating from production of electricity in nuclear power plants. Most of the waste has only low or intermediate levels of radioactivity. However, the spent nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and it has to be isolated from the biosphere. The current nuclear waste management plan in Finland is based on direct disposal of the spent nuclear fuel deep underground. The only feasible mechanism for the radionuclides to escape from an underground repository is to be carried by the groundwater flow after the failure of waste containers. The scope of this study is to examine the groundwater flow situation and transport properties in the vicinity of the disposal canister and along the potential release paths from the repository into the biosphere. The results of this study are further applied in the site specific safety analysis of a spent fuel repository. Synthesis is made of the porous medium estimates of the groundwater flow in the regional and site scales and the detailed fracture network analysis of the flow in the canister scale. This synthesis includes estimation of the transport properties from the canister into the biosphere and flow rates around the deposition holes of the waste canisters. The modelling has been carried out for four different sites: Hastholmen, Kivetty, Olkiluoto and Romavaara. According to the simulations groundwater flow rate around the deposition holes is less than about 1 litre/a for about 75 % of the deposition holes. For about 5 % of the deposition holes the flow rates are a few litres per year or higher. The highest flow rates resulted at Hastholmen, in fresh water conditions 10 000 years after present, and at Kivetty. The transport resistances were calculated for the `worst` flow paths that might have impact on the safety of the repository. The total transport resistances from the repository into the biosphere along those flow paths varied between about 40 000 a/m and 5-10{sup 6} a/m. Most of the total transport

  1. Analysis of scenarios for the direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel disposal conditions as expected in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ashton, P.; Mehling, O.; Mohn, R.; Wingender, H.J.

    1990-01-01

    This report contains an investigation of aspects of the waste management of spent light water reactor fuel by direct disposal in a deep geological formation on land. The areas covered are: interim dry storage of spent fuel with three options of pre-conditioning; conditioning of spent fuel for final disposal in a salt dome repository; disposal of spent fuel (heat-generating waste) in a salt dome repository; disposal of medium and low-level radioactive wastes in the Konrad mine. Dose commitments, effluent discharges and potential incidents were not found to vary significantly for the various conditioning options/salt dome repository types. Due to uncertainty in the cost estimates, in particular the disposal cost estimates, the variation between the three conditioning options examined is not considered as being significant. The specific total costs for the direct disposal strategy are estimated to lie in the range ECU 600 to 700 per kg hm (basis 1988)

  2. SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL (SNF) PROJECT CANISTER STORAGE BUILDING (CSB) MULTI CANISTER OVERPACK (MCO) SAMPLING SYSTEM VALIDATION (OCRWM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BLACK, D.M.; KLEM, M.J.

    2003-01-01

    Approximately 400 Multi-canister overpacks (MCO) containing spent nuclear fuel are to be interim stored at the Canister Storage Building (CSB). Several MCOs (monitored MCOs) are designated to be gas sampled periodically at the CSB sampling/weld station (Bader 2002a). The monitoring program includes pressure, temperature and gas composition measurements of monitored MCOs during their first two years of interim storage at the CSB. The MCO sample cart (CART-001) is used at the sampling/weld station to measure the monitored MCO gas temperature and pressure, obtain gas samples for laboratory analysis and refill the monitored MCO with high purity helium as needed. The sample cart and support equipment were functionally and operationally tested and validated before sampling of the first monitored MCO (H-036). This report documents the results of validation testing using training MCO (TR-003) at the CSB. Another report (Bader 2002b) documents the sample results from gas sampling of the first monitored MCO (H-036). Validation testing of the MCO gas sampling system showed the equipment and procedure as originally constituted will satisfactorily sample the first monitored MCO. Subsequent system and procedural improvements will provide increased flexibility and reliability for future MCO gas sampling. The physical operation of the sampling equipment during testing provided evidence that theoretical correlation factors for extrapolating MCO gas composition from sample results are unnecessarily conservative. Empirically derived correlation factors showed adequate conservatism and support use of the sample system for ongoing monitored MCO sampling

  3. Design, production and initial state of the canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cederqvist, Lars; Johansson, Magnus; Leskinen, Nina; Ronneteg, Ulf

    2010-12-01

    The report is included in a set of Production reports, presenting how the KBS-3 repository is designed, produced and inspected. The set of reports is included in the safety report for the KBS-3 repository and repository facility.The report provides input on the initial state of the canisters to the assessment of the long-term safety, SR-Site. The initial state refers to the properties of the engineered barriers once they have been finally placed in the KBS-3 repository and will not be further handled within the repository facility. In addition, the report provides input to the operational safety report, SR-Operation, on how the canisters shall be handled and disposed. The report presents the design premises and reference design of the canister and verifies the conformity of the reference design to the design premises. The production methods and the ability to produce canisters according to the reference design are described. Finally, the initial state of the canisters and their conformity to the reference design and design premises are presented

  4. Design, production and initial state of the canister

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cederqvist, Lars; Johansson, Magnus; Leskinen, Nina; Ronneteg, Ulf

    2010-12-15

    The report is included in a set of Production reports, presenting how the KBS-3 repository is designed, produced and inspected. The set of reports is included in the safety report for the KBS-3 repository and repository facility.The report provides input on the initial state of the canisters to the assessment of the long-term safety, SR-Site. The initial state refers to the properties of the engineered barriers once they have been finally placed in the KBS-3 repository and will not be further handled within the repository facility. In addition, the report provides input to the operational safety report, SR-Operation, on how the canisters shall be handled and disposed. The report presents the design premises and reference design of the canister and verifies the conformity of the reference design to the design premises. The production methods and the ability to produce canisters according to the reference design are described. Finally, the initial state of the canisters and their conformity to the reference design and design premises are presented

  5. International safeguards concerns of Spent Fuel Disposal Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussions on the subjects of safeguarding large quantities of plutonium contained in spent fuels to be disposed of in geologic respositories. All the spent fuel disposal scenarios examined here pose a variety of safeguards problems, none of which are adequately addressed by the international safeguards community. The spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles in underground repositories would become an increasingly attractive target for diversion because of their plutonium content and decreasing radioactivity. Current design of the first geologic repository in the US will have the capacity to accommodate wastes equivalent to 70,000 Mt of uranium from commercial and defense fuel cycles. Of this, approximately 62,000 Mt uranium equivalent will be commerical spent fuel, containing over 500 Mt of plutonium. International safeguards commitments may require us to address the safeguards issues of disposing of such large quanities of plutonium in a geologic repository, which has the potential to become a plutonium mine in the future. This paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries and the DOE before geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality

  6. Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Idaho National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas Hill; Denzel L. Fillmore

    2005-10-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a large inventory of diverse types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This legacy derives from the history of the INL as the National Reactor Testing Station, and from its mission to recover HEU from SNF and to test and examine SNF after irradiation. The INL also has a large diversity of SNF storage facilities, some 50 years old. SNF at INL has many forms—from intact assemblies down to metallurgical mounts, and some fuel has been wet stored for over 40 years. SNF is stored bare or in metal cans under water, or dry in vaults, caissons or casks. Inspection shows varying corrosion and degradation of the SNF and its storage cans. SNF has been stored in 10 different facilities: 5 pools, one cask storage pad, one vault, two generations of caisson facilities, and one modular Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The pools range in age from 40 years old to the most modern in the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The near-term objective is to move SNF from older pools to interim dry storage, allowing shutdown and decommissioning of the older facilities. This move involves drying methods that are dependent on fuel type. The long-term objective is to have INL SNF in safe dry storage and ready to be shipped to the National Repository. The unique features of the INL SNF requires special treatments and packaging to meet the proposed repository acceptance criteria and SNF will be repackaged in standardized canisters for shipment and disposal in the National Repository. Disposal will use the standardized canisters that can be co-disposed with High Level Waste glass logs to limit the total fissile material in a repository waste package. The DOE standardized canister also simplifies the repository handling of the multitude of DOE SNF sizes and shapes.

  7. Effects of gaseous radioactive nuclides on the design and operation of repositories for spent LWR fuel in rock salt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jenks, G.H.

    1979-12-01

    Information relating to the identities and amounts of gaseous radionuclides present in spent LWR fuel and to their release from canistered spent fuel under plausible storage and disposal conditions was assembled, reviewed, and analyzed. Information was also reviewed and analyzed on several other subjects that relate to the integrity of the carbon steel canister in which the spent fuel is to be encapsulated and to the expected rates of transfer of gaseous radionuclides through crushed salt backfill within a disposal room in a reference repository in rock salt. The advantages and disadvantages were considered for several different canister-backfill materials, and recommendations were made regarding preferred materials. Other recommendations relate to encapsulation procedures and specifications and to needs for additional experimental studies. The objective of this work was to provide reference information, conclusions, and recommendations that could be used to establish design and operating conditions and procedures for a bedded salt repository for spent LWR fuel and that could also be used to help evaluate the safety of the repository. The results of this work will also generally apply to spent fuel repositories in domal salt. However, because the domal salt may have little or no brine inclusions within it, there may be little or no possibility that brine will migrate into open spaces around an emplaced canister. Addordingly, some of the concerns that result from the possible occurrence of brine migration in bedded salt may be of no importance in domal salt

  8. TMI-2 [Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station] fuel canister and core sample handling equipment used in INEL hot cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McConnell, J.W. Jr.; Shurtliff, W.T.; Lynch, R.J.; Croft, K.M.; Whitmill, L.J.; Allen, S.M.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes the specialized remote handling equipment developed and used at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to handle samples obtained from the core of the damaged Unit 2 reactor at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station (TM-2). Samples of the core were removed, placed in TMI-2 fuel canisters, and transported to the INEL. Those samples will be examined as part of the analysis of the TMI-2 accident. The equipment described herein was designed for removing sample materials from the fuel canisters, assisting with initial examination, and processing samples in preparation for detailed examinations. The more complex equipment used microprocessor remote controls with electric motor drives providing the required force and motion capabilities. The remaining components were unpowered and manipulator assisted

  9. Final Report - Spent Nuclear Fuel Retrieval System Manipulator System Cold Validation Testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D.R. Jackson; G.R. Kiebel

    1999-01-01

    Manipulator system cold validation testing (CVT) was performed in support of the Fuel Retrieval System (FRS) Sub-Project, a subtask of the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. The FRS will be used to retrieve and repackage K-Basin Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) currently stored in old K-Plant storage basins. The FRS is required to retrieve full fuel canisters from the basin; clean the fuel elements inside the canister to remove excessive uranium corrosion products (or sludge); remove the contents from the canisters; and sort the resulting debris, scrap, and fuel for repackaging. The fuel elements and scrap will be collected in fuel storage and scrap baskets in preparation for loading into a multi canister overpack (MCO), while the debris is loaded into a debris bin and disposed of as solid waste. The FRS is composed of three major subsystems. The Manipulator Subsystem provides remote handling of fuel, scrap, and debris; the In-Pool Equipment subsystem performs cleaning of fuel and provides a work surface for handling materials; and the Remote Viewing Subsystem provides for remote viewing of the work area by operators. There are two complete and identical FRS systems, one to be installed in the K-West basin and one to be installed in the K-East basin. Another partial system will be installed in a cold test facility to provide for operator training

  10. Final Report - Spent Nuclear Fuel Retrieval System Manipulator System Cold Validation Testing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    D.R. Jackson; G.R. Kiebel

    1999-08-24

    Manipulator system cold validation testing (CVT) was performed in support of the Fuel Retrieval System (FRS) Sub-Project, a subtask of the Spent Nuclear Fuel Project at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. The FRS will be used to retrieve and repackage K-Basin Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) currently stored in old K-Plant storage basins. The FRS is required to retrieve full fuel canisters from the basin; clean the fuel elements inside the canister to remove excessive uranium corrosion products (or sludge); remove the contents from the canisters; and sort the resulting debris, scrap, and fuel for repackaging. The fuel elements and scrap will be collected in fuel storage and scrap baskets in preparation for loading into a multi canister overpack (MCO), while the debris is loaded into a debris bin and disposed of as solid waste. The FRS is composed of three major subsystems. The Manipulator Subsystem provides remote handling of fuel, scrap, and debris; the In-Pool Equipment subsystem performs cleaning of fuel and provides a work surface for handling materials; and the Remote Viewing Subsystem provides for remote viewing of the work area by operators. There are two complete and identical FRS systems, one to be installed in the K-West basin and one to be installed in the K-East basin. Another partial system will be installed in a cold test facility to provide for operator training.

  11. INERT-MATRIX FUEL: ACTINIDE ''BURNING'' AND DIRECT DISPOSAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodney C. Ewing; Lumin Wang

    2002-01-01

    Excess actinides result from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons (Pu) and the reprocessing of commercial spent nuclear fuel (mainly 241 Am, 244 Cm and 237 Np). In Europe, Canada and Japan studies have determined much improved efficiencies for burnup of actinides using inert-matrix fuels. This innovative approach also considers the properties of the inert-matrix fuel as a nuclear waste form for direct disposal after one-cycle of burn-up. Direct disposal can considerably reduce cost, processing requirements, and radiation exposure to workers

  12. The back end of the fuel cycle and CANDU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allan, C.J.; Dormuth, K.W.

    2001-01-01

    CANDU reactor operators have benefited from several advantages of the CANDU system and from AECL's experience, with regard to spent fuel handling, storage and disposal. AECL has over 20 years experience in development and application of medium-term storage and research and development on the disposal of used fuel. As a result of AECL's experience, short-term and medium-term storage and the associated handling of spent CANDU fuel are well proven and economic, with an extremely high degree of public and environmental protection. In fact, both short-term (water-pool) and medium-term (dry canister) storage of CANDU fuel are comparable or lower in cost per unit of energy than for PWRs. Both pool storage and dry spent fuel storage are fully proven, with many years of successful, safe operating experience. AECL's extensive R and D on the permanent disposal of spent-fuel has resulted in a defined concept for Canadian fuel disposal in crystalline rock. This concept was recently confirmed as ''technically acceptable'' by an independent environmental review panel. Thus, the Canadian program represents an international demonstration of the feasibility and safety of geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste. Much of the technology behind the Canadian concept can be adapted to permanent land-based disposal strategies chosen by other countries. In addition, the Canadian development has established a baseline for CANDU fuel permanent disposal costs. Canadian and international work has shown that the cost of permanent CANDU fuel disposal is similar to the cost of LWR fuel disposal per unit of electricity produced. (author)

  13. Integrity of copper/steel canisters under crystalline bedrock repository conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowyer, W.H.; Sjoblom, R.; Trolle, M.

    1996-01-01

    In the Swedish nuclear waste disposal programme, the need to store the spent nuclear fuel safely for very long times has prompted a strategy which includes a long life canister. Technical as well as economical considerations related to design, choice of materials and manufacturing technology have lead to the selection of a reference design to be used for the continued development work. The canisters are cylindrical with a diameter close to 1 meter and a height of about 5 meters. In order to meet the need for an appropriate combination of mechanical strength, toughness, durability and corrosion resistance, the canisters comprise an inner vessel made of steel or cast iron to cope with mechanical stresses and an outer vessel made of almost pure copper to provide corrosion resistance. The Swedish nuclear industry has recently extended its development work to full-scale tests. Such experience is needed not least for the evaluation of the long-term integrity of the canister. This work has been closely followed by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) who have also carried out independent investigations and analyses. It should be emphasized that the findings relate to a canister which is under development and cannot, in general, be expected to be relevant for the fully developed canister. Significant results of the analyses include the identification of conceivable modes of canister failures. Such failures may be related to defects, segregation, limitations in inspectability, long term creep properties, adverse mechanical load situations, etc. It is assessed that the distribution functions of these failures might have their largest uncertainties at the tails extending to comparatively short times. Specific issues related to canister manufacture, scaling and non destructive testing which have been found to warrant further investigation are: defects in the copper ingot which may transfer to the rolled copper plate; the amount of work applied during the rolling or

  14. Conceptual designs of radioactive canister transporters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-02-01

    This report covers conceptual designs of transporters for the vertical, horizontal, and inclined installation of canisters containing spent-fuel elements, high-level waste, cladding waste, and intermediate-level waste (low-level waste is not discussed). Included in the discussion are cask concepts; transporter vehicle designs; concepts for mechanisms for handling and manipulating casks, canisters, and concrete plugs; transporter and repository operating cycles; shielding calculations; operator radiation dosages; radiation-resistant materials; and criteria for future design efforts

  15. Korean Reference HLW Disposal System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Heui Joo; Lee, J. Y.; Kim, S. S. (and others)

    2008-03-15

    This report outlines the results related to the development of Korean Reference Disposal System for High-level radioactive wastes. The research has been supported around for 10 years through a long-term research plan by MOST. The reference disposal method was selected via the first stage of the research during which the technical guidelines for the geological disposal of HLW were determined too. At the second stage of the research, the conceptual design of the reference disposal system was made. For this purpose the characteristics of the reference spent fuels from PWR and CANDU reactors were specified, and the material and specifications of the canisters were determined in term of structural analysis and manufacturing capability in Korea. Also, the mechanical and chemical characteristics of the domestic Ca-bentonite were analyzed in order to supply the basic design parameters of the buffer. Based on these parameters the thermal and mechanical analysis of the near-field was carried out. Thermal-Hydraulic-Mechanical behavior of the disposal system was analyzed. The reference disposal system was proposed through the second year research. At the final third stage of the research, the Korean Reference disposal System including the engineered barrier, surface facilities, and underground facilities was proposed through the performance analysis of the disposal system.

  16. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  17. Seabed disposal of high-level nuclear wastes: an alternative viewpoint

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glasby, G.P.

    1985-01-01

    Various comments on a published article on subseabed disposal of nuclear wastes are presented. These include the scale of the proposed operation, the technical problems of canister retrievability, the feasibility of the free-fall penetrometer disposal method, canister lifetime, the possible contravention of the 1972 London Dumping Convention and land-based geological repositories as an alternative method of disposal. (author)

  18. Disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dormuth, K.W.; Nuttall, K.

    1994-01-01

    In 1978, the governments of Canada and Ontario established the Nuclear Fuel Waste Management program. As of the time of the conference, the research performed by AECL was jointly funded by AECL and Ontario Hydro through the CANDU owners' group. Ontario Hydro have also done some of the research on disposal containers and vault seals. From 1978 to 1992, AECL's research and development on disposal cost about C$413 million, of which C$305 was from funds provided to AECL by the federal government, and C$77 million was from Ontario Hydro. The concept involves the construction of a waste vault 500 to 1000 metres deep in plutonic rock of the Canadian Precambrian Shield. Used fuel (or possibly solidified reprocessing waste) would be sealed into containers (of copper, titanium or special steel) and emplaced (probably in boreholes) in the vault floor, surrounded by sealing material (buffer). Disposal rooms might be excavated on more than one level. Eventually all excavated openings in the rock would be backfilled and sealed. Research is organized under the following headings: disposal container, waste form, vault seals, geosphere, surface environment, total system, assessment of environmental effects. A federal Environmental Assessment Panel is assessing the concept (holding public hearings for the purpose) and will eventually make recommendations to assist the governments of Canada and Ontario in deciding whether to accept the concept, and how to manage nuclear fuel waste. 16 refs., 1 tab., 3 figs

  19. Used fuel management system architecture and interface analyses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nutt, Mark [Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL (United States); Howard, Robert; Busch, Ingrid [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Carter, Joe; Delley, Alexcia [Savannah River National Laboratory, Aiken, SC (United States); Hardin, Ernest; Kalinina, Elena [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM (United States); Cotton, Thomas [Complex Systems LLC, Washington, DC (United States)

    2013-07-01

    between at-reactor used fuel management, consolidated storage facilities, and disposal facilities, along with the development of supporting logistics simulation tools, have been initiated to provide the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other stakeholders with information regarding the various alternatives for managing used nuclear fuel (UNF) generated by the current fleet of light water reactors operating in the United States. An important UNF management system interface consideration is the need for ultimate disposal of UNF assemblies contained in waste packages that are sized to be compatible with different geologic media. Thermal analyses indicate that waste package sizes for the geologic media under consideration by the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign may be significantly smaller than the canisters being used for on-site dry storage by the nuclear utilities. Therefore, at some point along the UNF disposition pathway, there could be a need to repackage fuel assemblies already loaded and being loaded into the dry storage canisters currently in use. The implications of where and when the packaging or repackaging of commercial UNF will occur are key questions being addressed in this evaluation. The analysis demonstrated that thermal considerations will have a major impact on the operation of the system and that acceptance priority, rates, and facility start dates have significant system implications. (authors)

  20. Used fuel management system architecture and interface analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nutt, Mark; Howard, Robert; Busch, Ingrid; Carter, Joe; Delley, Alexcia; Hardin, Ernest; Kalinina, Elena; Cotton, Thomas

    2013-01-01

    between at-reactor used fuel management, consolidated storage facilities, and disposal facilities, along with the development of supporting logistics simulation tools, have been initiated to provide the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other stakeholders with information regarding the various alternatives for managing used nuclear fuel (UNF) generated by the current fleet of light water reactors operating in the United States. An important UNF management system interface consideration is the need for ultimate disposal of UNF assemblies contained in waste packages that are sized to be compatible with different geologic media. Thermal analyses indicate that waste package sizes for the geologic media under consideration by the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign may be significantly smaller than the canisters being used for on-site dry storage by the nuclear utilities. Therefore, at some point along the UNF disposition pathway, there could be a need to repackage fuel assemblies already loaded and being loaded into the dry storage canisters currently in use. The implications of where and when the packaging or repackaging of commercial UNF will occur are key questions being addressed in this evaluation. The analysis demonstrated that thermal considerations will have a major impact on the operation of the system and that acceptance priority, rates, and facility start dates have significant system implications. (authors)

  1. Decontamination of stainless steel canisters that contain high-level waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bray, L.A.

    1987-01-01

    At the West Valley Nuclear Services Company (WVNSC) in West Valley, New York, high-level radioactive waste (HLW) will be vitrified into a borosilicate glass form and poured into large, stainless steel canisters. During the filling process, volatile fission products, principally 137 Cs, condense on the exterior of the canisters. The smearable contamination that remains on the canisters after they are filled and partially cooled must be removed from the canisters' exterior surfaces prior to their storage and ultimate shipment to a US Department of Energy (DOE) repository for disposal. A simple and effective method was developed for decontamination of HLW canisters. This method of chemical decontamination is applicable to a wide variety of contaminated equipment found in the nuclear industry. The process employs a reduction-oxidation system [Ce(III)/Ce(IV)] in nitric acid solution to chemically mill the surface of stainless steel, similar to the electropolishing process, but without the need for an applied electrical current. Contaminated canisters are simply immersed in the solution at controlled temperature and Ce(IV) concentration levels

  2. On the Impact of the Fuel Dissolution Rate Upon Near-Field Releases From Nuclear Waste Disposal

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    A Pereira

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available Calculations of the impact of the dissolution of spent nuclear fuel on the release from a damaged canister in a KBS-3 repository are presented. The dissolution of the fuel matrix is a complex process and the dissolution rate is known to be one of the most important parameters in performance assessment models of the near-field of a geological repository. A variability study has been made to estimate the uncertainties associated with the process of fuel dissolution. The model considered in this work is a 3D model of a KBS-3 copper canister. The nuclide used in the calculations is Cs-135. Our results confirm that the fuel degradation rate is an important parameter, however there are considerable uncertainties associated with the data and the conceptual models. Consequently, in the interests of safety one should reduce, as far as possible, the uncertainties coupled to fuel degradation.

  3. The role of the canister in a system for the final disposal of spent fuel or high-level waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papp, T.

    1986-01-01

    A final repository for radioactive waste must isolate the toxic substances or distribute their release over time or space to avoid causing harmful concentrations of radionuclides in the biosphere. The Swedish research has focused on a repository 500 m down in crystalline rock where the geochemical environment can give canisters a service life of the order of a million years. These evaluations are discussed and the safety effect of the canister is compared with that of other barriers available in a repository system. Our conclusions are that a combined protection effect of natural and man-made barriers can be achieved that substantially exceeds what could reasonably be required by society. An actual repository design can then be based on an optimization of the cost to reach a level of accepted safety with due regard for the safety margins and redundancy necessary for achieving public confidence. (author)

  4. Comparison of the waste management aspects of spent fuel disposal and reprocessing: post-disposal radiological impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mobbs, S.F.; Harvey, M.P.; Martin, J.S.; Mayall, A.; Jones, M.E.

    1991-01-01

    A joint project involving contractors from France, Germany and the UK was set up by the Commission of the European Communities to assess the implications of two waste management options: the direct disposal of spent fuel and reprocessing of that fuel. This report describes the calculation of the radiological impact on the public of the management and disposal of the wastes associated with these two options. Six waste streams were considered: discharge of liquid reprocessing effluents, discharge of gaseous reprocessing effluents, disposal of low-level solid wastes arising from reprocessing, disposal of intermediate-level solid wastes arising from reprocessing, disposal of vitrified high-level reprocessing wastes, and direct disposal of spent fuel. The results of the calculations are in the form of maximum annual doses and risks to individual members of the public, and collective doses to four population groups, integrated over six time periods. These results were designed for input into a computer model developed by another contractor, Yard Ltd, which combines costs and impacts in a multi-attribute hierarchy to give an overall measure of the impact of a given option

  5. Enhanced Thermal Management System for Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Canister with Hybrid Heat Pipes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yeong Shin; Bang, In Cheol

    2016-01-01

    Dry storage uses the gas or air as coolant within sealed canister with neutron shielding materials. Dry storage system for spent fuel is regarded as relatively safe and emits little radioactive waste for the storage, but it showed that the storage capacity and overall safety of dry cask needs to be enhanced for the dry storage cask for LWR in Korea. For safety enhancement of dry cask, previous studies of our group firstly suggested the passive cooling system with heat pipes for LWR spent fuel dry storage metal cask. As an extension, enhanced thermal management systems for the spent fuel dry storage cask for LWR was suggested with hybrid heat pipe concept, and their performances were analyzed in thermal-hydraulic viewpoint in this paper. In this paper, hybrid heat pipe concept for dry storage cask is suggested for thermal management to enhance safety margin. Although current design of dry cask satisfies the design criteria, it cannot be assured to have long term storage period and designed lifetime. Introducing hybrid heat pipe concept to dry storage cask designed without disrupting structural integrity, it can enhance the overall safety characteristics with adequate thermal management to reduce overall temperature as well as criticality control. To evaluate thermal performance of hybrid heat pipe according to its design, CFD simulation was conducted and previous and revised design of hybrid heat pipe was compared in terms of temperature inside canister

  6. Disposal of spent nuclear fuel from NPP Krsko

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mele, I.

    2004-01-01

    In order to get a clear view of the future liabilities of Slovenia and Croatia regarding the long term management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel produced by the NPP Krsko, an estimation of disposal cost for low and intermediate level waste (LILW) as well as for spent nuclear fuel is needed. This cost estimation represents the basis for defining the target value for the financial resources to be accrued by the two national decommissioning and waste disposal funds, as determined in the agreement between Slovenia and Croatia on the ownership and exploitation of the NPP Krsko from March 2003, and for specifying their financial strategies. The one and only record of the NPP Krsko spent fuel disposal costs was made in the NPP Krsko Decommissioning Plan from 1996 [1]. As a result of incomplete input data, the above SF disposal cost estimate does not incorporate all cost elements. A new cost estimation was required in the process of preparation of the Joint Decommissioning and Waste Management Programme according to the provisions of the above mentioned agreement between Slovenia and Croatia. The basic presumptions and reference scenario for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel on which the cost estimation is based, as well as the applied methodology and results of cost estimation, are presented in this paper. Alternatives to the reference scenario and open questions which need to be resolved before the relevant final decision is taken, are also briefly discussed. (author)

  7. Optimization of Deep Borehole Systems for HLW Disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Driscoll, Michael; Baglietto, Emilio; Buongiorno, Jacopo; Lester, Richard; Brady, Patrick; Arnold, B. W.

    2015-01-01

    This is the final report on a project to update and improve the conceptual design of deep boreholes for high level nuclear waste disposal. The effort was concentrated on application to intact US legacy LWR fuel assemblies, but conducted in a way in which straightforward extension to other waste forms, host rock types and countries was preserved. The reference fuel design version consists of a vertical borehole drilled into granitic bedrock, with the uppermost kilometer serving as a caprock zone containing a diverse and redundant series of plugs. There follows a one to two kilometer waste canister emplacement zone having a hole diameter of approximately 40-50 cm. Individual holes are spaced 200-300 m apart to form a repository field. The choice of verticality and the use of a graphite based mud as filler between the waste canisters and the borehole wall liner was strongly influenced by the expectation that retrievability would continue to be emphasized in US and worldwide repository regulatory criteria. An advanced version was scoped out using zinc alloy cast in place to fill void space inside a disposal canister and its encapsulated fuel assembly. This excludes water and greatly improves both crush resistance and thermal conductivity. However the simpler option of using a sand fill was found adequate and is recommended for near-term use. Thermal-hydraulic modeling of the low permeability and porosity host rock and its small (@@@ 1%) saline water content showed that vertical convection induced by the waste's decay heat should not transport nuclides from the emplacement zone up to the biosphere atop the caprock. First order economic analysis indicated that borehole repositories should be cost-competitive with shallower mined repositories. It is concluded that proceeding with plans to drill a demonstration borehole to confirm expectations, and to carry out priority experiments, such as retention and replenishment of in-hole water is in order.

  8. Optimization of Deep Borehole Systems for HLW Disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Driscoll, Michael [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Baglietto, Emilio [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Buongiorno, Jacopo [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Lester, Richard [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Brady, Patrick [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Arnold, B. W. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-09-09

    This is the final report on a project to update and improve the conceptual design of deep boreholes for high level nuclear waste disposal. The effort was concentrated on application to intact US legacy LWR fuel assemblies, but conducted in a way in which straightforward extension to other waste forms, host rock types and countries was preserved. The reference fuel design version consists of a vertical borehole drilled into granitic bedrock, with the uppermost kilometer serving as a caprock zone containing a diverse and redundant series of plugs. There follows a one to two kilometer waste canister emplacement zone having a hole diameter of approximately 40-50 cm. Individual holes are spaced 200-300 m apart to form a repository field. The choice of verticality and the use of a graphite based mud as filler between the waste canisters and the borehole wall liner was strongly influenced by the expectation that retrievability would continue to be emphasized in US and worldwide repository regulatory criteria. An advanced version was scoped out using zinc alloy cast in place to fill void space inside a disposal canister and its encapsulated fuel assembly. This excludes water and greatly improves both crush resistance and thermal conductivity. However the simpler option of using a sand fill was found adequate and is recommended for near-term use. Thermal-hydraulic modeling of the low permeability and porosity host rock and its small (≤ 1%) saline water content showed that vertical convection induced by the waste’s decay heat should not transport nuclides from the emplacement zone up to the biosphere atop the caprock. First order economic analysis indicated that borehole repositories should be cost-competitive with shallower mined repositories. It is concluded that proceeding with plans to drill a demonstration borehole to confirm expectations, and to carry out priority experiments, such as retention and replenishment of in-hole water is in order.

  9. Drop tests of the Three Mile Island knockout canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Aaron, W.S.; Shappert, L.B.; Childress, P.C.; Quinn, G.J.; Smith, J.V.

    1986-09-01

    A type of Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) defueling canister, called a ''knockout'' canister, was subjected to a series of drop tests at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Drop Test Facility. These tests were designed to confirm the structural integrity of internal fixed neutron poisons in support of a request for NRC licensing of this type of canister for the shipment of TMI-2 reactor fuel debris to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for the Core Examination R and D Program. Work conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory included (1) precise physical measurements of the internal poison rod configuration before assembly, (2) canister assembly and welding, (3) nondestructive examination (an initial hydrostatic pressure test and an x-ray profile of the internals before and after each drop test), (4) addition of a simulated fuel load, (5) instrumentation of the canister for each drop test, (6) fabrication of a cask simulation vessel with a developed and tested foam impact limiter, (7) use of refrigeration facilities to cool the canister to well below freezing prior to three of the drops, (8) recording the drop test with still, high-speed, and normal-speed photography, (9) recording the accelerometer measurements during impact, (10) disassembly and post-test examination with precise physical measurements, and (11) preparation of the final report

  10. Geotechnical engineering for ocean waste disposal. An introduction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee, Homa J.; Demars, Kenneth R.; Chaney, Ronald C.; ,

    1990-01-01

    As members of multidisciplinary teams, geotechnical engineers apply quantitative knowledge about the behavior of earth materials toward designing systems for disposing of wastes in the oceans and monitoring waste disposal sites. In dredge material disposal, geotechnical engineers assist in selecting disposal equipment, predict stable characteristics of dredge mounds, design mound caps, and predict erodibility of the material. In canister disposal, geotechnical engineers assist in specifying canister configurations, predict penetration depths into the seafloor, and predict and monitor canister performance following emplacement. With sewage outfalls, geotechnical engineers design foundation and anchor elements, estimate scour potential around the outfalls, and determine the stability of deposits made up of discharged material. With landfills, geotechnical engineers evaluate the stability and erodibility of margins and estimate settlement and cracking of the landfill mass. Geotechnical engineers also consider the influence that pollutants have on the engineering behavior of marine sediment and the extent to which changes in behavior affect the performance of structures founded on the sediment. In each of these roles, careful application of geotechnical engineering principles can contribute toward more efficient and environmentally safe waste disposal operations.

  11. Phenomenological description reference concept (Spent Fuel - Copper - Iron - Bentonite - Granite)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lehikoinen, J.; Nordman, H.

    2008-12-01

    This report gives a broad overview of the salient processes and associated time frames and uncertainties pertaining to the long-term normal evolution of the near-field of a deep repository of the KBS-3V type. By normal evolution, reference is made to the description of the evolution of a disposal system subject to the assumption that all the spent fuel canisters remain intact following emplacement and repository closure for at least the design corrosion lifetime of the canister overpack in the expected repository conditions. In this connection, the effects of future glaciations, canister manufacturing defects and small-scale tectonic activity are briefly touched upon. The roles of the different repository near-field barriers in providing safety are briefly noted. The description of the normal evolution of a KBS-3V-type repository near-field conditions external to the unbreached spent fuel canister has been realized in terms of processes rather than timescales. Separate chapters have been devoted to the thermal, hydraulic, mechanical and chemical/biological evolution of the repository system, with due attention to some of the couplings between them. (orig.)

  12. Canister storage building design basis accident analysis documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    KOPELIC, S.D.

    1999-02-25

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  13. Safeguarding of spent fuel conditioning and disposal in geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsstroem, H.; Richter, B.

    1997-01-01

    Disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formations, without reprocessing, is being considered in a number of States. Before disposal the fuel will be encapsulated in a tight and corrosion resistant container. The method chosen for disposal and the design of the repository will be determined by the geological conditions and the very strict requirements on long-term safety. From a safeguards perspective spent fuel disposal is a new issue. As the spent fuel still contains important amounts of material under safeguards and as it can not be considered practicably irrecoverable in the repository, the IAEA has been advised not to terminate safeguards, even after closure of the repository. This raises a number of new issues where there could be a potential conflict of interests between safety and safeguards demands, in particular in connection with the safety principle that burdens on future generations should be avoided. In this paper some of these issues are discussed based on the experience gained in Germany and Sweden about the design and future operation of encapsulation and disposal facilities. The most important issues are connected to the required level of safeguards for a closed repository, the differences in time scales for waste management and safeguards, the need for verification of the fissile content in the containers and the possibility of retrieving the fuel disposed of. (author)

  14. Corrosion resistance of copper canister weld material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gubner, Rolf; Andersson, Urban

    2007-03-01

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast iron insert fitted inside a copper canister. SKB has since several years developed manufacturing processes for the canister components using a network of manufacturers. For the encapsulation process SKB has built the Canister Laboratory to demonstrate and develop the encapsulation technique in full scale. The critical part of the encapsulation of spent fuel is the sealing of the canister which is done by welding the copper lid to the cylindrical part of the canister. Two welding techniques have been developed in parallel, Electron Beam Welding (EBW) and Friction Stir Welding (FSW). During the past two decades, SKB has developed the technology EBW at The Welding Institute (TWI) in Cambridge, UK. The development work at the Canister Laboratory began in 1999. In electron beam welding, a gun is used to generate the electron beam which is aimed at the joint. The beam heats up the material to the melting point allowing a fusion weld to be formed. The gun was developed by TWI and has a unique design for use at reduced pressure. The system has gone through a number of improvements under the last couple of years including implementation of a beam oscillation system. However, during fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow they will tend to concentrate impurities at the new grain boundaries that might pose adverse effects on the corrosion resistance of welds. As a new method for joining, SKB has been developing friction stir welding (FSW) for sealing copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel in cooperation with TWI since 1997. FSW was invented in 1991 at TWI and is a thermo

  15. Corrosion resistance of copper canister weld material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gubner, Rolf; Andersson, Urban [Corrosion and Metals Research Institute, Sto ckholm (Sweden)

    2007-03-15

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast iron insert fitted inside a copper canister. SKB has since several years developed manufacturing processes for the canister components using a network of manufacturers. For the encapsulation process SKB has built the Canister Laboratory to demonstrate and develop the encapsulation technique in full scale. The critical part of the encapsulation of spent fuel is the sealing of the canister which is done by welding the copper lid to the cylindrical part of the canister. Two welding techniques have been developed in parallel, Electron Beam Welding (EBW) and Friction Stir Welding (FSW). During the past two decades, SKB has developed the technology EBW at The Welding Institute (TWI) in Cambridge, UK. The development work at the Canister Laboratory began in 1999. In electron beam welding, a gun is used to generate the electron beam which is aimed at the joint. The beam heats up the material to the melting point allowing a fusion weld to be formed. The gun was developed by TWI and has a unique design for use at reduced pressure. The system has gone through a number of improvements under the last couple of years including implementation of a beam oscillation system. However, during fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow they will tend to concentrate impurities at the new grain boundaries that might pose adverse effects on the corrosion resistance of welds. As a new method for joining, SKB has been developing friction stir welding (FSW) for sealing copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel in cooperation with TWI since 1997. FSW was invented in 1991 at TWI and is a thermo

  16. Cost analysis for application of solidified waste fission product canisters in U.S. Army steam plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sande, W.E.; Bjorklund, W.J.; Brooks, N.A.

    1977-04-01

    The main objectives of the present study are to design steam plants using projected waste fission product canister characteristics, to analyze the overall impact and cost/benefit to the nuclear fuel cycle associated with these plants, and to develop plans for this application if the cost analysis so warrants it. The construction and operation of a steam plant fueled with waste fission product canisters would require the involvement and cooperation of various government agencies and private industry; thus the philosophies of these groups were studied. These philosophies are discussed, followed by a forecast of canister supply, canister characteristics, and strategies for Army canister use. Another section describes the safety and licensing of these steam plants since this affects design and capital costs. The discussion of steam plant design includes boiler concepts, boiler heat transfer, canister temperature distributions, steam plant size, and steam plant operation. Also, canister transportation is discussed since this influences operating costs. Details of economics of Army steam plants are provided including steam plant capital costs, operating costs, fuel reprocessor savings due to Army canister storage, and overall economics. Recommendations are made in the final section

  17. Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste: Investigating the Thermo-Hygro-Mechanical-Chemical (THMC) Coupled Processes at the Waste Canister- Bentonite Barrier Interface

    Science.gov (United States)

    Davies, C. W.; Davie, D. C.; Charles, D. A.

    2015-12-01

    Geological disposal of nuclear waste is being increasingly considered to deal with the growing volume of waste resulting from the nuclear legacy of numerous nations. Within the UK there is 650,000 cubic meters of waste safely stored and managed in near-surface interim facilities but with no conclusive permanent disposal route. A Geological Disposal Facility with incorporated Engineered Barrier Systems are currently being considered as a permanent waste management solution (Fig.1). This research focuses on the EBS bentonite buffer/waste canister interface, and experimentally replicates key environmental phases that would occur after canister emplacement. This progresses understanding of the temporal evolution of the EBS and the associated impact on its engineering, mineralogical and physicochemical state and considers any consequences for the EBS safety functions of containment and isolation. Correlation of engineering properties to the physicochemical state is the focus of this research. Changes to geotechnical properties such as Atterberg limits, swelling pressure and swelling kinetics are measured after laboratory exposure to THMC variables from interface and batch experiments. Factors affecting the barrier, post closure, include corrosion product interaction, precipitation of silica, near-field chemical environment, groundwater salinity and temperature. Results show that increasing groundwater salinity has a direct impact on the buffer, reducing swelling capacity and plasticity index by up to 80%. Similarly, thermal loading reduces swelling capacity by 23% and plasticity index by 5%. Bentonite/steel interaction studies show corrosion precipitates diffusing into compacted bentonite up to 3mm from the interface over a 4 month exposure (increasing with temperature), with reduction in swelling capacity in the affected zone, probably due to the development of poorly crystalline iron oxides. These results indicate that groundwater conditions, temperature and corrosion

  18. Used Fuel Management System Interface Analyses - 13578

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Howard, Robert; Busch, Ingrid [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, P.O. Box 2008, Bldg. 5700, MS-6170, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States); Nutt, Mark; Morris, Edgar; Puig, Francesc [Argonne National Laboratory (United States); Carter, Joe; Delley, Alexcia; Rodwell, Phillip [Savannah River National Laboratory (United States); Hardin, Ernest; Kalinina, Elena [Sandia National Laboratories (United States); Clark, Robert [U.S. Department of Energy (United States); Cotton, Thomas [Complex Systems Group (United States)

    2013-07-01

    Preliminary system-level analyses of the interfaces between at-reactor used fuel management, consolidated storage facilities, and disposal facilities, along with the development of supporting logistics simulation tools, have been initiated to provide the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other stakeholders with information regarding the various alternatives for managing used nuclear fuel (UNF) generated by the current fleet of light water reactors operating in the United States. An important UNF management system interface consideration is the need for ultimate disposal of UNF assemblies contained in waste packages that are sized to be compatible with different geologic media. Thermal analyses indicate that waste package sizes for the geologic media under consideration by the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign may be significantly smaller than the canisters being used for on-site dry storage by the nuclear utilities. Therefore, at some point along the UNF disposition pathway, there could be a need to repackage fuel assemblies already loaded and being loaded into the dry storage canisters currently in use. The implications of where and when the packaging or repackaging of commercial UNF will occur are key questions being addressed in this evaluation. The analysis demonstrated that thermal considerations will have a major impact on the operation of the system and that acceptance priority, rates, and facility start dates have significant system implications. (authors)

  19. Clay Generic Disposal System Model - Sensitivity Analysis for 32 PWR Assembly Canisters (+2 associated model files).

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Morris, Edgar [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

    2014-10-01

    The Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC), as part of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy’s (DOE-NE) Fuel Cycle Technology program (FCT) is investigating the disposal of high level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuela (SNF) in a variety of geologic media. The feasibility of disposing SNF and HLW in clay media has been investigated and has been shown to be promising [Ref. 1]. In addition the disposal of these wastes in clay media is being investigated in Belgium, France, and Switzerland. Thus, Argillaceous media is one of the environments being considered by UFDC. As identified by researchers at Sandia National Laboratory, potentially suitable formations that may exist in the U.S. include mudstone, clay, shale, and argillite formations [Ref. 1]. These formations encompass a broad range of material properties. In this report, reference to clay media is intended to cover the full range of material properties. This report presents the status of the development of a simulation model for evaluating the performance of generic clay media. The clay Generic Disposal System Model (GDSM) repository performance simulation tool has been developed with the flexibility to evaluate not only different properties, but different waste streams/forms and different repository designs and engineered barrier configurations/ materials that could be used to dispose of these wastes.

  20. SCFR Fuel Cycles and Their Impact on the Performance of High-Level Waste Disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kawasaki, Daisuke; Nogi, Naoyuki; Saito, Takumi [Department of Nuclear Engineering and Management, Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-8656 (Japan); Nagasaki, Shinya [Nuclear Professional School, Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, 2-22 Shirakata Shirane, Tokai, Ibaraki, 319-1188 (Japan)

    2009-06-15

    The concept of supercritical-pressure light water cooled fast reactor (SCFR) is developed and studied at the University of Tokyo. The impact of disposal of the waste generated in a fuel cycle with SCFR is also investigated in the project. It is of great interest how a fuel cycle with SCFR compares to the other fuel cycles from the back-end view point. With its various neutron spectrum, SCFR may be used to transmute both actinides and fission products. The objective of the present study is to evaluate and compare multiple fuel cycle designs in order to investigate the effects of SCFR and its transmutation capability upon the back-end risks. Three designs of fuel cycle are considered for evaluation in the present study. First, a simple fuel cycle with PWR and recycling is considered. The spent fuel from the PWR is reprocessed to recover uranium and plutonium, and the rest of the radioactive nuclides are vitrified and disposed of in a geologic repository. In the second design, the recovered uranium and plutonium in the reprocessing of PWR spent fuel is fabricated into a MOX fuel and irradiated in SCFR. The spent fuel from the SCFR is reprocessed to recover uranium and plutonium. In the third design, actinide elements are also separated from the PWR spent fuel and is loaded as the blanket fuel in SCFR core together with the MOX fuel fabricated from the recovered uranium and plutonium. In the same way as in the second design, the spent fuel from the SCFR is reprocessed to recover uranium and plutonium. In the second and the third designs, there are two streams of highly radioactive waste; one from the reprocessing (separation process) of the PWR spent fuel, and the other from the reprocessing of the SCFR spent fuel. Numerical codes Origen2.1 and SWAT is used for fuel irradiation calculation. The performance of the high-level radioactive waste repository is evaluated for each design of fuel cycle. It is assumed that the repository is located in a water-saturated geologic

  1. Waste disposal options report. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Russell, N.E.; McDonald, T.G.; Banaee, J.; Barnes, C.M.; Fish, L.W.; Losinski, S.J.; Peterson, H.K.; Sterbentz, J.W.; Wenzel, D.R.

    1998-02-01

    Volume 2 contains the following topical sections: estimates of feed and waste volumes, compositions, and properties; evaluation of radionuclide inventory for Zr calcine; evaluation of radionuclide inventory for Al calcine; determination of k eff for high level waste canisters in various configurations; review of ceramic silicone foam for radioactive waste disposal; epoxides for low-level radioactive waste disposal; evaluation of several neutralization cases in processing calcine and sodium-bearing waste; background information for EFEs, dose rates, watts/canister, and PE-curies; waste disposal options assumptions; update of radiation field definition and thermal generation rates for calcine process packages of various geometries-HKP-26-97; and standard criteria of candidate repositories and environmental regulations for the treatment and disposal of ICPP radioactive mixed wastes

  2. Waste disposal options report. Volume 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Russell, N.E.; McDonald, T.G.; Banaee, J.; Barnes, C.M.; Fish, L.W.; Losinski, S.J.; Peterson, H.K.; Sterbentz, J.W.; Wenzel, D.R.

    1998-02-01

    Volume 2 contains the following topical sections: estimates of feed and waste volumes, compositions, and properties; evaluation of radionuclide inventory for Zr calcine; evaluation of radionuclide inventory for Al calcine; determination of k{sub eff} for high level waste canisters in various configurations; review of ceramic silicone foam for radioactive waste disposal; epoxides for low-level radioactive waste disposal; evaluation of several neutralization cases in processing calcine and sodium-bearing waste; background information for EFEs, dose rates, watts/canister, and PE-curies; waste disposal options assumptions; update of radiation field definition and thermal generation rates for calcine process packages of various geometries-HKP-26-97; and standard criteria of candidate repositories and environmental regulations for the treatment and disposal of ICPP radioactive mixed wastes.

  3. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.; PIEPHO, M.G.

    2000-01-01

    This document provided the detailed accident analysis to support HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety Analysis Report, Annex A, ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report''. All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  4. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CROWE, R.D.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report

  5. Fuel removal, transport, and storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reno, H.W.

    1986-01-01

    The March 1979 accident at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station (TMI-2) which damaged the core of the reactor resulted in numerous scientific and technical challenges. Some of those challenges involve removing the core debris from the reactor, packaging it into canisters, loading canisters into a rail cask, and transporting the debris to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for storage, examination, and preparation for final disposal. This paper highlights how some challenges were resolved, including lessons learned and benefits derived therefrom. Key to some success at TMI was designing, testing, fabricating, and licensing two rail casks, which each provide double containment of the damaged fuel. 10 refs., 12 figs

  6. Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. Features, events and processes 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-12-15

    Features, Events and Processes sits within Posiva Oy's Safety Case 'TURVA-2012' portfolio and has the objective of presenting the main features, events and processes (FEPs) that are considered to be potentially significant for the long-term safety of the planned KBS-3V repository for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. The primary purpose of this report is to support Performance Assessment, Formulation of Radionuclide Release Scenarios, Assessment of the Radionuclide Release Scenarios for the Repository System and Biosphere Assessment by ensuring that the scenarios are comprehensive and take account of all significant FEPs. The main FEPs potentially affecting the disposal system are described for each relevant subsystem component or barrier (i.e. the spent nuclear fuel, the canister, the buffer and tunnel backfill, the auxiliary components, the geosphere and the surface environment). In addition, a small number of external FEPs that may potentially influence the evolution of the disposal system are described. The conceptual understanding and operation of each FEP is described, together with the main features (variables) of the disposal system that may affect its occurrence or significance. Olkiluoto-specific issues are considered when relevant. The main uncertainties (conceptual and parameter/data) associated with each FEP that may affect understanding are also documented. Indicative parameter values are provided, in some cases, to illustrate the magnitude or rate of a process, but it is not the intention of this report to provide the complete set of numerical values that are used in the quantitative safety assessment calculations. Many of the FEPs are interdependent and, therefore, the descriptions also identify the most important direct couplings between the FEPs. This information is used in the formulation of scenarios to ensure the conceptual models and calculational cases are both comprehensive and representative. (orig.)

  7. Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. Features, events and processes 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-12-15

    Features, Events and Processes sits within Posiva Oy's Safety Case 'TURVA-2012' portfolio and has the objective of presenting the main features, events and processes (FEPs) that are considered to be potentially significant for the long-term safety of the planned KBS-3V repository for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. The primary purpose of this report is to support Performance Assessment, Formulation of Radionuclide Release Scenarios, Assessment of the Radionuclide Release Scenarios for the Repository System and Biosphere Assessment by ensuring that the scenarios are comprehensive and take account of all significant FEPs. The main FEPs potentially affecting the disposal system are described for each relevant subsystem component or barrier (i.e. the spent nuclear fuel, the canister, the buffer and tunnel backfill, the auxiliary components, the geosphere and the surface environment). In addition, a small number of external FEPs that may potentially influence the evolution of the disposal system are described. The conceptual understanding and operation of each FEP is described, together with the main features (variables) of the disposal system that may affect its occurrence or significance. Olkiluoto-specific issues are considered when relevant. The main uncertainties (conceptual and parameter/data) associated with each FEP that may affect understanding are also documented. Indicative parameter values are provided, in some cases, to illustrate the magnitude or rate of a process, but it is not the intention of this report to provide the complete set of numerical values that are used in the quantitative safety assessment calculations. Many of the FEPs are interdependent and, therefore, the descriptions also identify the most important direct couplings between the FEPs. This information is used in the formulation of scenarios to ensure the conceptual models and calculational cases are both comprehensive and representative. (orig.)

  8. Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. Features, events and processes 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-12-01

    Features, Events and Processes sits within Posiva Oy's Safety Case 'TURVA-2012' portfolio and has the objective of presenting the main features, events and processes (FEPs) that are considered to be potentially significant for the long-term safety of the planned KBS-3V repository for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. The primary purpose of this report is to support Performance Assessment, Formulation of Radionuclide Release Scenarios, Assessment of the Radionuclide Release Scenarios for the Repository System and Biosphere Assessment by ensuring that the scenarios are comprehensive and take account of all significant FEPs. The main FEPs potentially affecting the disposal system are described for each relevant subsystem component or barrier (i.e. the spent nuclear fuel, the canister, the buffer and tunnel backfill, the auxiliary components, the geosphere and the surface environment). In addition, a small number of external FEPs that may potentially influence the evolution of the disposal system are described. The conceptual understanding and operation of each FEP is described, together with the main features (variables) of the disposal system that may affect its occurrence or significance. Olkiluoto-specific issues are considered when relevant. The main uncertainties (conceptual and parameter/data) associated with each FEP that may affect understanding are also documented. Indicative parameter values are provided, in some cases, to illustrate the magnitude or rate of a process, but it is not the intention of this report to provide the complete set of numerical values that are used in the quantitative safety assessment calculations. Many of the FEPs are interdependent and, therefore, the descriptions also identify the most important direct couplings between the FEPs. This information is used in the formulation of scenarios to ensure the conceptual models and calculational cases are both comprehensive and representative. (orig.)

  9. CFD Analysis on the Passive Heat Removal by Helium and Air in the Canister of Spent Fuel Dry Storage System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shin, Do Young; Jeong, Ui Ju; Kim, Sung Joong [Hanyang University, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    In the current commercial design, the canister of the dry storage system is mainly backfilled with helium gas. Helium gas shows very conductive behavior due to high thermal conductivity and small density change with temperature. However, other gases such as air, argon, or nitrogen are expected to show effective convective behavior. Thus these are also considered as candidates for the backfill gas to provide effective coolability. In this study, to compare the dominant cooling mechanism and effectiveness of cooling between helium gas and air, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis for the canister of spent fuel dry storage system with backfill gas of helium and air is carried out. In this study, CFD simulations for the helium and air backfilled gas for dry storage system canister were carried out using ANSYS FLUENT code. For the comparison work, two backfilled fluids were modeled with same initial and boundary conditions. The observed major difference can be summarized as follows. - The simulation results showed the difference in dominant heat removal mechanism. Conduction for helium, and convection for air considering Reynolds number distribution. - The temperature gradient inside the fuel assembly showed that in case of air, more effective heat mixing occurred compared to helium.

  10. Competitive effect of metallic canister and clay barrier on the sorption of Eu3+ under subcritical conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    El Mrabet, Said; Castro, Miguel A.; Orta, M. Mar; Pazos, M. Carolina; Alba, Maria D.; Astudillo, Julio; Rueda, Silvia; Hurtado, Santiago; Villa, Mara

    2012-01-01

    Document available in extended abstract form only. The disposal of high level radioactive wastes (HLW) such as spent fuel or reprocessing waste resulting from the operation and dismantling of nuclear reactors is one of the most problems facing the worlds because of its long half life and radionuclide migration to the biosphere. For long term performance assessment of radioactive waste disposal, knowledge concerning radionuclide retention processes on materials composing the engineered barrier (clay and container waste) is required. Steel waste containers and bentonite have been proposed as candidate materials for overpack and buffer respectively in most of the proposed repositories designs for nuclear waste disposal. This contribution aims to study the competitiveness of the bentonite and the metallic canister in the retention process of some kinds of radioactive waste such as 152 Eu. The europium was chosen because it is a toxic metal and usually taken as a simulator of the trivalent high level radioactive waste. In order to elucidate the mechanisms involved in the retention processes of europium by both bentonite and metallic canister, a cylindrical steel mini-reactor was designed and prepared from the same material as the steel reactor AISI-316L. The bentonite was then introduced and compacted within the mini-reactor forming a set mini-reactor- bentonite. The system mini-reactor -bentonite was then subjected to hydrothermal treatments at 300 deg. C for 4.5 days. The morphology and chemical composition of both steel and bentonite were analyzed by XRD and SEM. SEM and XRD results revealed that both the bentonite and the metallic canister were involved in sorption mechanism of europium by the formation of insoluble phases of europium silicates originated from the mixed solution of bentonite, Eu 3+ and canister. The pH-Redox potential (Eh) indicated that the interlayer cations of bentonite were replaced by Eu 3+ with higher acidity and Eh which means that the active

  11. Nuclear fuel waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    This film for a general audience deals with nuclear fuel waste management in Canada, where research is concentrating on land based geologic disposal of wastes rather than on reprocessing of fuel. The waste management programme is based on cooperation of the AECL, various universities and Ontario Hydro. Findings of research institutes in other countries are taken into account as well. The long-term effects of buried radioactive wastes on humans (ground water, food chain etc.) are carefully studied with the help of computer models. Animated sequences illustrate the behaviour of radionuclides and explain the idea of a multiple barrier system to minimize the danger of radiation hazards

  12. DOE requests waiver on double containment for HLW canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lobsenz, G.

    1994-01-01

    The Energy Department has asked the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to waive double containment requirements for vitrified high-level radioactive waste canisters, saying the additional protection is not necessary and too costly. NRC said it had received a petition from DOE contending that the vitrified waste canisters were durable enough without double containment to prevent any potential plutonium release during handling and shipping. DOE said testing had shown that the vitrified waste canisters were similar - even superior - in durability to spent reactor fuel shipments, which NRC specifically exempted from the double containment requirement

  13. The deep disposal repository - an alternative general arrangement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wolofsky, L.

    1996-01-01

    For the disposal of nuclear fuel waste in Canada the current proposal requires a repository at or below 500 m depth in Precambrian plutonic igneous rock in Ontario, consisting of numerous horizontal parallel tunnels arranged in one or more horizontal planes i.e. a room-and-pillar arrangement. The pillars are three times as wide as the tunnels, giving as extraction ratio of 25%. The tunnels are tentatively designed to be excavated by drill and blast, with a flat-arched roof, vertical side walls and a flat invert. The fuel containing canisters are to be surrounded by a low-permeability bentonite-based buffer in vertical holes drilled for the purpose in the invert

  14. Krypton-85 disposal program. Semiannual report, August 15, 1977--March 31, 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klett, R.D.

    1979-02-01

    The first 7.5 months of the Krypton-85 disposal program are summarized. Included are task definitions and initial progress in geologic disposal system studies, SURF compatibility, augmented heat dissipation, material qualification, exterior canister compatibility, ceramic liners for canisters, and geologic transport. Feasibility studies indicate that Kr-85 can be disposed of at SURF facility or in near-surface geologic repositories

  15. Debris Removal Project K West Canister Cleaning System Performance Specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    FARWICK, C.C.

    1999-01-01

    Approximately 2,300 metric tons Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) are currently stored within two water filled pools, the 105 K East (KE) fuel storage basin and the 105 K West (KW) fuel storage basin, at the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The SNF Project is responsible for operation of the K Basins and for the materials within them. A subproject to the SNF Project is the Debris Removal Subproject, which is responsible for removal of empty canisters and lids from the basins. Design criteria for a Canister Cleaning System to be installed in the KW Basin. This documents the requirements for design and installation of the system

  16. The Canadian program for management of spent fuel and high level wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnes, R.W.; Mayman, S.A.

    A brief history and description of the nuclear power program in Canada is given. Schedules and programs are described for storing spent fuel in station fuel bays, centralized water pool storage facilities, concrete canisters, convection vaults, and rock or salt formations. High-level wastes will be retrievable initially, therefore the focus is on storage in mined cavities. The methods developed for high-level waste storage/disposal will ideally be flexible enough to accommodate spent fuel. (E.C.B.)

  17. Treatment and disposal of radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants. Program for encapsulation, deep geologic deposition and research, development and demonstration; Kaernkraftavfallets behandling och slutfoervaring. Program foer inkapsling, geologisk djupfoervaring samt forskning, utveckling och demonstration

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    Programs for RD and D concerning disposal of radioactive waste are presented. Main topics include: Design, testing and manufacture of canisters for the spent fuels; Design of equipment for deposition of waste canisters; Material and process for backfilling rock caverns; Evaluation of accuracy and validation of methods for safety analyses; Development of methods for defining scenarios for the safety analyses. 471 refs, 67 figs, 21 tabs.

  18. Value Engineering Study for Closing Waste Packages Containing TAD Canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Colleen Shelton-Davis

    2005-11-01

    The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management announced their intention to have the commercial utilities package spent nuclear fuel in shielded, transportable, ageable, and disposable containers prior to shipment to the Yucca Mountain repository. This will change the conditions used as a basis for the design of the waste package closure system. The environment is now expected to be a low radiation, low contamination area. A value engineering study was completed to evaluate possible modifications to the existing closure system using the revised requirements. Four alternatives were identified and evaluated against a set of weighted criteria. The alternatives are (1) a radiation-hardened, remote automated system (the current baseline design); (2) a nonradiation-hardened, remote automated system (with personnel intervention if necessary); (3) a nonradiation-hardened, semi-automated system with personnel access for routine manual operations; and (4) a nonradiation-hardened, fully manual system with full-time personnel access. Based on the study, the recommended design is Alternative 2, a nonradiation-hardened, remote automated system. It is less expensive and less complex than the current baseline system, because nonradiation-hardened equipment can be used and some contamination control equipment is no longer needed. In addition, the inclusion of remote automation ensures throughput requirements are met, provides a more reliable process, and provides greater protection for employees from industrial accidents and radiation exposure than the semi-automated or manual systems. Other items addressed during the value engineering study as requested by OCRWM include a comparison to industry canister closure systems and corresponding lessons learned; consideration of closing a transportable, ageable, and disposable canister; and an estimate of the time required to perform a demonstration of the recommended closure system.

  19. Value Engineering Study for Closing Waste Packages Containing TAD Canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Colleen Shelton-Davis

    2005-01-01

    The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management announced their intention to have the commercial utilities package spent nuclear fuel in shielded, transportable, ageable, and disposable containers prior to shipment to the Yucca Mountain repository. This will change the conditions used as a basis for the design of the waste package closure system. The environment is now expected to be a low radiation, low contamination area. A value engineering study was completed to evaluate possible modifications to the existing closure system using the revised requirements. Four alternatives were identified and evaluated against a set of weighted criteria. The alternatives are (1) a radiation-hardened, remote automated system (the current baseline design); (2) a nonradiation-hardened, remote automated system (with personnel intervention if necessary); (3) a nonradiation-hardened, semi-automated system with personnel access for routine manual operations; and (4) a nonradiation-hardened, fully manual system with full-time personnel access. Based on the study, the recommended design is Alternative 2, a nonradiation-hardened, remote automated system. It is less expensive and less complex than the current baseline system, because nonradiation-hardened equipment can be used and some contamination control equipment is no longer needed. In addition, the inclusion of remote automation ensures throughput requirements are met, provides a more reliable process, and provides greater protection for employees from industrial accidents and radiation exposure than the semi-automated or manual systems. Other items addressed during the value engineering study as requested by OCRWM include a comparison to industry canister closure systems and corresponding lessons learned; consideration of closing a transportable, ageable, and disposable canister; and an estimate of the time required to perform a demonstration of the recommended closure system

  20. Report on the disposal of radioactive wastes and spent fuel elements from Baden-Wuerttemberg

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-04-01

    The report on the disposal of radioactive wastes and spent fuel elements from Baden- Wuerttemberg covers the following issues: legal framework for the nuclear disposal; producer of spent fuels and radioactive wastes in Baden- Report on the disposal of radioactive wastes and spent fuel elements from Baden- Wuerttemberg; low- and medium-level radioactive wastes (non heat generating radioactive wastes); spent fuels and radioactive wastes from waste processing (heat generating radioactive wastes); final disposal.

  1. Iron-nickel alloys as canister material for radioactive waste disposal in underground repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Apps, J.A.

    1982-01-01

    Canisters containing high-level radioactive waste must retain their integrity in an underground waste repository for at least one thousand years after burial (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1981). Since no direct means of verifying canister integrity is plausible over such a long period, indirect methods must be chosen. A persuasive approach is to examine the natural environment and find a suitable material which is thermodynamically compatible with the host rock under the environmental conditions with the host rock under the environmental conditions expected in a waste repository. Several candidates have been proposed, among them being iron-nickel alloys that are known to occur naturally in altered ultramafic rocks. The following review of stability relations among iron-nickel alloys below 350 0 C is the initial phase of a more detailed evaluation of these alloys as suitable canister materials

  2. Program for responsible and safe disposal of spent fuel elements and radioactive wastes (National disposal program)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The contribution covers the following topics: fundamentals of the disposal policy; amount of radioactive wastes and prognosis; disposal of radioactive wastes - spent fuel elements and wastes from waste processing, radioactive wastes with low heat production; legal framework of the nuclear waste disposal in Germany; public participation, cost and financing.

  3. HLW Canister and Can-In-Canister Drop Calculation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    H. Marr

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this calculation is to evaluate the structural response of the standard high-level waste (HLW) canister and the HLW canister containing the cans of immobilized plutonium (''can-in-canister'' throughout this document) to the drop event during the handling operation. The objective of the calculation is to provide the structure parameter information to support the canister design and the waste handling facility design. Finite element solution is performed using the commercially available ANSYS Version (V) 5.4 finite element code. Two-dimensional (2-D) axisymmetric and three-dimensional (3-D) finite element representations for the standard HLW canister and the can-in-canister are developed and analyzed using the dynamic solver

  4. The analysis of the RA reactor irradiated fuel cooling in the spent fuel pool; Analiza hladjenja ozracenog goriva u bazenu za odlaganje reaktora RA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vrhovac, M; Afgan, N; Spasojevic, D; Jovic, V [Institute of nuclear sciences Boris Kidric, Vinca, Beograd (Yugoslavia)

    1985-07-01

    According to the RA reactor exploitation plan the great quantity of the irradiated spent fuel will be disposed in the reactor spent fuel pool after each reactor campaign which will including the present spent fuel inventory increase the residual power level in the pool and will soon cause the pool capacity shortage. To enable the analysis of the irradiated fuel cooling the pool and characteristic spent fuel canister temperature distribution at the residual power maximum was done. The results obtained under the various spent fuel cooling conditions in the pit indicate the normal spent fuel thermal load even in the most inconvenient cooling conditions. (author)

  5. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Design Basis Accident Analysis Documentation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CROWE, R.D.

    1999-09-09

    This document provides the detailed accident analysis to support ''HNF-3553, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Final Safety, Analysis Report, Annex A,'' ''Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.'' All assumptions, parameters, and models used to provide the analysis of the design basis accidents are documented to support the conclusions in the Canister Storage Building Final Safety Analysis Report.

  6. Measurements of Fundamental Fluid Physics of SNF Storage Canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Condie, Keith Glenn; Mc Creery, Glenn Ernest; McEligot, Donald Marinus

    2001-09-01

    With the University of Idaho, Ohio State University and Clarksean Associates, this research program has the long-term goal to develop reliable predictive techniques for the energy, mass and momentum transfer plus chemical reactions in drying / passivation (surface oxidation) operations in the transfer and storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from wet to dry storage. Such techniques are needed to assist in design of future transfer and storage systems, prediction of the performance of existing and proposed systems and safety (re)evaluation of systems as necessary at later dates. Many fuel element geometries and configurations are accommodated in the storage of spent nuclear fuel. Consequently, there is no one generic fuel element / assembly, storage basket or canister and, therefore, no single generic fuel storage configuration. One can, however, identify generic flow phenomena or processes which may be present during drying or passivation in SNF canisters. The objective of the INEEL tasks was to obtain fundamental measurements of these flow processes in appropriate parameter ranges.

  7. Test plan for K Basin Sludge Canister and Floor Sampling Device

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meling, T.A.

    1995-01-01

    This document provides the test plan and procedure forms for conducting the functional and operational acceptance testing of the K Basin Sludge Canister and Floor Sampling Device(s). These samplers samples sludge off the floor of the 100K Basins and out of 100K fuel storage canisters

  8. Gas liquid sampling for closed canisters in KW Basin - test plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitkoff, C.C.

    1995-01-01

    Test procedures for the gas/liquid sampler. Characterization of the Spent Nuclear Fuel, SNF, sealed in canisters at KW-Basin is needed to determine the state of storing SNF wet. Samples of the liquid and the gas in the closed canisters will be taken to gain characterization information. Sampling equipment has been designed to retrieve gas and liquid from the closed canisters in KW basin. This plan is written to outline the test requirements for this developmental sampling equipment

  9. Cost Comparison for the Transfer of Select Calcined Waste Canisters to the Monitored Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, NV

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Michael B. Heiser; Clark B. Millet

    2005-01-01

    This report performs a life-cycle cost comparison of three proposed canister designs for the shipment and disposition of Idaho National Laboratory high-level calcined waste currently in storage at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center to the proposed national monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Concept A (2 x 10-ft) and Concept B (2 x 15-ft) canisters are comparable in design, but they differ in size and waste loading options and vary proportionally in weight. The Concept C (5.5 x 17.5-ft) canister (also called the ''super canister''), while similar in design to the other canisters, is considerably larger and heavier than Concept A and B canisters and has a greater wall thickness. This report includes estimating the unique life-cycle costs for the three canister designs. Unique life-cycle costs include elements such as canister purchase and filling at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, cask preparation and roundtrip consignment costs, final disposition in the monitored geologic repository (including canister off-loading and placement in the final waste disposal package for disposition), and cask purchase. Packaging of the calcine ''as-is'' would save $2.9 to $3.9 billion over direct vitrification disposal in the proposed national monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Using the larger Concept C canisters would use 0.75 mi less of tunnel space, cost $1.3 billion less than 10-ft canisters of Concept A, and would be complete in 6.2 years

  10. Review of geoscientific data of relevance to disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes in crystalline rock

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marsic, Nico; Grundfelt, Bertil

    2013-09-01

    In this report a compilation of recent geoscientific data of relevance to disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes in Sweden is presented. The goal of the study has been limited to identifying and briefly describing such geoscientific information of relevance to disposal in deep boreholes that was not available at the time when previous compilations were made. Hence, the study is not to be regarded as a general up-date of new geoscientific information. Disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes has been studied in Sweden since the second half of the 1980s. The currently studied concept has been proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the USA. In this concept the spent fuel elements are encapsulated in cylindrical steel canisters that are joined together in strings of 40 canisters and lowered into five kilometres deep boreholes. Ten such strings are stacked between three and five kilometres depth separated from each other by concrete plugs. The study started with a review of boreholes that have been reported after the previous reviews that were published in 1998 and 2004. A total of 12 boreholes of potential relevance were identified. Further study showed that only four out of these holes penetrated into crystalline rock. Two of these were deemed to be less relevant because they were drilled in areas with much higher geothermal gradient than in the parts of the Fennoscandian shield that realistically could host a Swedish deep borehole repository. Of the two remaining boreholes, only one, a geoscientific hole drilled at Outokumpu in Finland, is associated with a reasonably complete geoscientific data set. It is worth mentioning that a large part of this hole is drilled through meta sedimentary rock (mica schist) rather than granitic rock. The information collected and reviewed has been gathered under the headings hydraulic conditions, geothermal conditions, hydrogeochemical conditions, bacteriological activity and rock mechanical properties. Only

  11. Review of geoscientific data of relevance to disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes in crystalline rock

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marsic, Nico; Grundfelt, Bertil [Kemakta Konsult AB, Stockholm (Sweden)

    2013-09-15

    In this report a compilation of recent geoscientific data of relevance to disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes in Sweden is presented. The goal of the study has been limited to identifying and briefly describing such geoscientific information of relevance to disposal in deep boreholes that was not available at the time when previous compilations were made. Hence, the study is not to be regarded as a general up-date of new geoscientific information. Disposal of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes has been studied in Sweden since the second half of the 1980s. The currently studied concept has been proposed by Sandia National Laboratories in the USA. In this concept the spent fuel elements are encapsulated in cylindrical steel canisters that are joined together in strings of 40 canisters and lowered into five kilometres deep boreholes. Ten such strings are stacked between three and five kilometres depth separated from each other by concrete plugs. The study started with a review of boreholes that have been reported after the previous reviews that were published in 1998 and 2004. A total of 12 boreholes of potential relevance were identified. Further study showed that only four out of these holes penetrated into crystalline rock. Two of these were deemed to be less relevant because they were drilled in areas with much higher geothermal gradient than in the parts of the Fennoscandian shield that realistically could host a Swedish deep borehole repository. Of the two remaining boreholes, only one, a geoscientific hole drilled at Outokumpu in Finland, is associated with a reasonably complete geoscientific data set. It is worth mentioning that a large part of this hole is drilled through meta sedimentary rock (mica schist) rather than granitic rock. The information collected and reviewed has been gathered under the headings hydraulic conditions, geothermal conditions, hydrogeochemical conditions, bacteriological activity and rock mechanical properties. Only

  12. As-Built Verification Plan Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister Storage Building MCO Handling Machine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SWENSON, C.E.

    2000-01-01

    This as-built verification plan outlines the methodology and responsibilities that will be implemented during the as-built field verification activity for the Canister Storage Building (CSB) MCO HANDLING MACHINE (MHM). This as-built verification plan covers THE ELECTRICAL PORTION of the CONSTRUCTION PERFORMED BY POWER CITY UNDER CONTRACT TO MOWAT. The as-built verifications will be performed in accordance Administrative Procedure AP 6-012-00, Spent Nuclear Fuel Project As-Built Verification Plan Development Process, revision I. The results of the verification walkdown will be documented in a verification walkdown completion package, approved by the Design Authority (DA), and maintained in the CSB project files

  13. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: public involvement and social aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greber, M.A.; Frech, E.R.; Hillier, J.A.R.

    1994-01-01

    This report describes the activities undertaken to provide information to the public about the Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program as well as the opportunities for public involvement in the direction and development of the disposal concept through government inquiries and commissions and specific initiatives undertaken by AECL. Public viewpoints and the major issues identified by the public to be of particular concern and importance in evaluating the acceptability of the concept are described. In addition, how the issues have been addressed during the development of the disposal concept or how they could be addressed during implementation of the disposal concept are presented. There is also discussion of public perspectives of risk, the ethical aspects of nuclear fuel waste disposal, and public involvement in siting a nuclear fuel waste disposal facility. The Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program is funded jointly by AECL and Ontario Hydro under the auspices of the CANDU Owners Group. (author)

  14. Thermal analysis of the horizontal disposal for HLW

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhao Honggang

    2012-01-01

    The temperature on the canister surface is set to be not more than 100 in the repository, a criterion which dictates the dimension of the repository. The factors that affect the highest temperature on the canister surface include the initial power of the canister, the material thermal properties of the engineered barrier system (EBS), the gaps around the canister in the EBS, the initial ground temperature and thermal properties of the host rock, the repository layout, etc. The article examines the material thermal properties of the host rock and the EBS, the thermal conductivity properties of the different gaps in the EBS, the temperature evolution around the single canister by using the analysis method and the numerical method for horizontal disposal concept. The findings are as follows: 1) The most important and the most sensitive parameter is the initial disposal power of the canister; 2) The two key factors that affect the highest temperature on the canister surface are the material parameter's uncertainty and nature variability of the host rock and the EBS, and the gaps around the canister in the EBS; 3) The temperature offsets between the canister and bentonite is not more than 10, and the bigger the inner gaps, the bigger temperature offsets between the canister and bentonite; When the gap between the bentonite and the host rock is filled with water, the gap's temperature offsets is small, but it will be 1∼3 higher when the gaps between the bentonite and the host rock is filled with air. (author)

  15. Disposal of defense spent fuel and HLW from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ermold, L.F.; Loo, H.H.; Klingler, R.D.; Herzog, J.D.; Knecht, D.A.

    1992-12-01

    Acid high-level radioactive waste (HLW) resulting from fuel reprocessing at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) for the US Department of Energy (DOE) has been solidified to a calcine since 1963 and stored in stainless steel bins enclosed by concrete vaults. Several different types of unprocessed irradiated DOE-owned fuels are also in storage ate the ICPP. In April, 1992, DOE announced that spent fuel would no longer be reprocessed to recover enriched uranium and called for a shutdown of the reprocessing facilities at the ICPP. A new Spent Fuel and HLW Technology Development program was subsequently initiated to develop technologies for immobilizing ICPP spent fuels and HLW for disposal, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The Program elements include Systems Analysis, Graphite Fuel Disposal, Other Spent Fuel Disposal, Sodium-Bearing Liquid Waste Processing, Calcine Immobilization, and Metal Recycle/Waste Minimization. This paper presents an overview of the ICPP radioactive wastes and current spent fuels, with an emphasis on the description of HLW and spent fuels requiring repository disposal

  16. Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant: Preliminary description of waste form and canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitchell, D.E.

    1986-01-01

    In July 1985, the US Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management established the Waste Acceptance Process as the means by which defense high-level waste producers, such as the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant, will develop waste acceptance requirements with the candidate geologic repositories. A complete description of the Waste Acceptance Process is contained in the Preliminary Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant Waste Form Qualification Plan. The Waste Acceptance Process defines three documents that high-level waste producers must prepare as a part of the process of assuming that a high-level waste product will be acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository. These documents are the Description of Waste Form and Canister, Waste Compliance Plan, and Waste Qualification Report. This document is the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant Preliminary Description of Waste Form and Canister for disposal of Neutralized Current Acid Waste. The Waste Acceptance Specifications for the Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant have not yet been developed, therefore, this document has been structured to corresponds to the Waste Acceptance Preliminary Specifications for the Defense Waste Processing Facility High-Level Waste Form. Not all of the information required by these specifications is appropriate for inclusion in this Preliminary Description of Waste Form and Canister. Rather, this description is limited to information that describes the physical and chemical characteristics of the expected high-level waste form. The content of the document covers three major areas: waste form characteristics, canister characteristics, and canistered waste form characteristics. This information will be used by the candidate geologic repository projects as the basis for preliminary repository design activities and waste form testing. Periodic revisions are expected as the Waste Acceptance Process progresses

  17. State of the art of the welding method for sealing spent nuclear fuel canister made of copper. Part 2 - EBW

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salonen, T.

    2014-05-01

    This report consist the results of the development of the electron beam welding (EBW) method for sealing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) disposal canister. This report has been used as background material for selection of the sealing method for the SNF canister. Report contains the state of the art knowledge of the EBW method and research and development (R and D) results done by Posiva. Relevant R and D results of EB-welds done by SKB are also reviewed in this report. Requirements set for the welding and weld are present. These requirements are based on the long term safety and also some part of requirements are set by other processes like non-destructive testing (NDT) and manufacturing processes of components. Initial state of the weld is described in this report. Initial state has significant effect on the long term safety issues like corrosion resistance and creep ductility. Also short and long term mechanical properties as well as corrosion properties are described. Microstructure and residual stresses of the weld is represented in this report. Report consists also imperfections of the weld and statistical analysis of the evaluation of the probability of the largest defect size on the weld. Results of corrosion and creep tests of EB-welds are reviewed in this report. EBW process and machine are described. Preliminary designing of the EBW-machine has been done including component handling equipments. Preliminary welding procedure specification (pWPS) has drawn up and qualification of the personnel is described briefly. In-line process and quality control system including seam tracking system is implemented in modern EBW machine. Also NDT methods for inspection of the weld are described in this report. Concerning the results from the research and development work it can be concluded that EB welding method is suitable method for sealing SNF canister. Weld material fulfils requirements set by the long term safety. The welding system is robust and reliable and it is based

  18. Miniature Canister (MiniCan) Corrosion Experiment Progress Report 3 for 2008-2010

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smart, N.R.; Reddy, B.; Rance, A.P. (Serco (United Kingdom))

    2011-08-15

    To ensure the safe encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel rods for geological disposal, SKB of Sweden are considering using the Copper-Iron Canister, which consists of an outer copper canister and a cast iron insert. Over the years a programme of laboratory work has been carried out to investigate a range of corrosion issues associated with the canister, including the possibility of expansion of the outer copper canister as a result of the anaerobic corrosion of the cast iron insert. Previous experimental work using stacks of test specimens has not shown any evidence of corrosion-induced expansion. However, as a further step in developing an understanding of the likely performance of the canister in a repository environment, Serco has set up a series of experiments in SKB's Aespoe Hard Rock Laboratory (HRL) using inactive model canisters, in which leaks were deliberately introduced into the outer copper canister while surrounded by bentonite, with the aim of obtaining information about the internal corrosion evolution of the internal environment. The experiments use five small-scale model canisters (300 mm long x 150 mm diameter) that simulate the main features of the SKB canister design (hence the project name, 'MiniCan'). The main aim of the work is to examine how corrosion of the cast iron insert will evolve if a leak is present in the outer copper canister. This report describes the progress on the five experiments running at the Aespoe Hard Rock Laboratory and the data obtained from the start of the experiments in late 2006 up to Winter 2010. The full details of the design and installation of the experiments are given in a previous report and this report concentrates on summarising and interpreting the data obtained to date. This report follows two earlier progress reports presenting results up to December 2009. The current document (progress report 3) describes work up to December 2010. The current report presents the results of the water analyses

  19. Disposal of radioactive waste in Swedish crystalline rocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greis Dahlberg, Christina; Wikberg, Peter

    2015-01-01

    SKB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company is tasked with managing Swedish nuclear and radioactive waste. Crystalline rock is the obvious alternative for deep geological disposal in Sweden. SKB is, since 1988, operating a near surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate-level waste, SFR. The waste in SFR comprises operational and decommissioning waste from nuclear plants, industrial waste, research-related waste and medical waste. Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in an interim facility while waiting for a license to construct a deep geological repository. The Swedish long-lived low and intermediate-level waste consists mainly of BWR control rods, reactor internals and legacy waste from early research in the Swedish nuclear programs. The current plan is to dispose of this waste in a separate deep geological repository, SFL, sometimes after 2045. Understanding of the rock properties is the basis for the design of the repository concepts. Swedish crystalline rock is mechanical stable and suitable for underground constructions. The Spent Fuel Repository is planned at approximately 500 meters depth in the rock at the Forsmark site. The host rock will keep the spent fuel isolated from human and near-surface environment. The rock will also provide the stable chemical and hydraulic conditions that make it possible to select suitable technical barriers to support the containment provided by the rock. A very long lasting canister is necessary to avoid release and transport of radionuclides through water conducting fractures in the rock. A canister designed for the Swedish rock, consists of a tight, 5 cm thick corrosion barrier of copper and a load-bearing insert of cast iron. To restrict the water flow around the canister and by that prevent fast corrosion, a bentonite buffer will surround the canister. Secondary, the bentonite buffer will retard a potential release by its strong sorption of radionuclides. The SFR repository is situated in

  20. Disposal of radioactive waste in Swedish crystalline rocks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greis Dahlberg, Christina; Wikberg, Peter [Svensk Kaernbraenslehantering AB, Stockholm (Sweden)

    2015-07-01

    SKB, Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company is tasked with managing Swedish nuclear and radioactive waste. Crystalline rock is the obvious alternative for deep geological disposal in Sweden. SKB is, since 1988, operating a near surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate-level waste, SFR. The waste in SFR comprises operational and decommissioning waste from nuclear plants, industrial waste, research-related waste and medical waste. Spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in an interim facility while waiting for a license to construct a deep geological repository. The Swedish long-lived low and intermediate-level waste consists mainly of BWR control rods, reactor internals and legacy waste from early research in the Swedish nuclear programs. The current plan is to dispose of this waste in a separate deep geological repository, SFL, sometimes after 2045. Understanding of the rock properties is the basis for the design of the repository concepts. Swedish crystalline rock is mechanical stable and suitable for underground constructions. The Spent Fuel Repository is planned at approximately 500 meters depth in the rock at the Forsmark site. The host rock will keep the spent fuel isolated from human and near-surface environment. The rock will also provide the stable chemical and hydraulic conditions that make it possible to select suitable technical barriers to support the containment provided by the rock. A very long lasting canister is necessary to avoid release and transport of radionuclides through water conducting fractures in the rock. A canister designed for the Swedish rock, consists of a tight, 5 cm thick corrosion barrier of copper and a load-bearing insert of cast iron. To restrict the water flow around the canister and by that prevent fast corrosion, a bentonite buffer will surround the canister. Secondary, the bentonite buffer will retard a potential release by its strong sorption of radionuclides. The SFR repository is situated in

  1. Decision nearing on final disposal of spent fuel in Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vira, J.

    2000-01-01

    The programme for final disposal of spent fuel from Finnish nuclear power plants is entering into important phase: in the year 2000 the Finnish Government is expected to decide whether the proposal made by Posiva Oy on the spent fuel disposal is in line with the overall good of society. Associated with the decision is also Posiva's proposal on siting the disposal facility at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki municipality on the western coast of Finland. An important document underlying Posiva's application for this principle decision is the report of the environmental impact assessment, which was completed in 1999. Safety considerations play an important role in the application. New assessments have, therefore, been made on both the operational and long-term safety as well as on safety of spent fuel transportation. (author)

  2. Magnox fuel dry storage and direct disposal assessment of CEGB/SSEB reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-12-01

    This report assesses the Boards' presented work in response to Recommendations 17 and 18 of the Environment Committee's First Report (Jan 86). The Boards have made an extensive study of the dry store design and also considered direct disposal. Their basic conclusion that the financial advantage is with continued reprocessing is accepted with the comment that their storage and disposal costs may be on the high side. The Boards statements on drying wet-stored fuel and on improvement of the fuel's chemical stability are accepted. The Boards coverage of fuel after disposal is considered to be too brief; the assessment expresses a more pessimistic view than the Boards' of the acceptability of direct disposal. (author)

  3. Multi-purpose canister storage unit and transfer cask thermal analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montgomery, R.A.; Niemer, K.A.; Lindner, C.N.

    1997-01-01

    Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) generated at commercial nuclear power plants throughout the US is a concern because of continued delays in obtaining a safe, permanent disposal facility. Most utilities maintain their SNF in wet storage pools; however, after decades of use, many pools are filled to capacity. Unfortunately, DOE's proposed final repository at Yucca Mountain is at least 10 years from completion, and commercial power utilities have few options for SNF storage in the interim. The Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) system, sponsored by DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, is a viable solution to the interim storage problem. The system is designed for interim dry storage, transport, and ultimate disposal of commercial SNF. The MPC system consists of four separate components: an MPC, Transfer Cask, Storage Unit, and Transport Cask. The SNF assemblies are loaded and sealed inside the helium-filled steel MPC. Once sealed, the MPC is not reopened, eliminating the need to re-handle the individual spent fuel assemblies. The MPC is transferred, using the MPC Transfer Cask, into a cylindrical, reinforced-concrete Storage Unit for on-site dry storage. The MPC may be removed from the Storage Unit at any time and transferred into the MPC Transport Cask for transport to the final repository. This paper discusses the analytical approach used to evaluate the heat transfer characteristics of an MPC containing SNF assemblies in the MPC Transfer Cask and Storage Unit

  4. Some notes on the Timing of Geological Disposal of CANDU Spent Fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Heui Joo; Kook, Dong Hak; Choi, Jong Won

    2010-01-01

    CANDU spent fuel is to be disposed of at repository finally rather than recycled because of its low fissile nuclide concentration. But the difficult situation of finding a repository site can not help introducing a interim storage in the short term. It is required to find an optimum timing of geological disposal of CANDU spent fuels related to the interim storage operation period. The major factors for determining the disposal starting time are considered as safety, economics, and public acceptance. Safety factor is compared in terms of the decay heat and non-proliferation. Economics factor is compared from the point of the operation cost, and public acceptance factor is reviewed from the point of retrievability and inter-generation ethics. This paper recommended the best solution for the disposal starting time by analyzing the above factors. It is concluded that the optimum timing for the CANDU spent fuel disposal is around 2041 and that the sooner disposal time, the better from the point of technical and safety aspects.

  5. Mined Geologic Disposal System Requirements Document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-03-01

    This Mined Geologic Disposal System Requirements Document (MGDS-RD) describes the functions to be performed by, and the requirements for, a Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS) for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) (including SNF loaded in multi-purpose canisters (MPCs)) and commercial and defense high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in support of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS). The purpose of the MGDS-RD is to define the program-level requirements for the design of the Repository, the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF), and Surface Based Testing Facilities (SBTF). These requirements include design, operation, and decommissioning requirements to the extent they impact on the physical development of the MGDS. The document also presents an overall description of the MGDS, its functions (derived using the functional analysis documented by the Physical System Requirements (PSR) documents as a starting point), its segments as described in Section 3.1.3, and the requirements allocated to the segments. In addition, the program-level interfaces of the MGDS are identified. As such, the MGDS-RD provides the technical baseline for the design of the MGDS

  6. Gas and liquid sampling for closed canisters in K-West basins - functional design criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitkoff, C.C.

    1994-01-01

    The purpose of this document is to provide functions and requirements for the design and fabrication of equipment for sampling closed canisters in the K-West basin. The samples will be used to help determine the state of the fuel elements in closed canisters. The characterization information obtained will support evaluation and development of processes required for safe storage and disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) materials

  7. Safety of direct disposal of spent fuel and of disposal of reprocessing waste

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Besnus, F. [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire (IRSN), 92 - Fontenay-aux-Roses (France)

    2006-07-01

    In 2005, the French Agency for Radioactive waste management (ANDRA) established a report on the feasibility of the geological disposal of high level and intermediate level long lived radioactive waste, in a clay formation. The hypothesis of spent fuel direct disposal was also considered. By the end of 2005, IRSN performed a complete technical review of ANDRA's report, aiming at highlighting the salient safety issues that were to be addressed within a process that may possibly lead to the creation of a disposal facility for these wastes. The following publication presents the main conclusions of this technical review. (author)

  8. Safety of direct disposal of spent fuel and of disposal of reprocessing waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besnus, F.

    2006-01-01

    In 2005, the French Agency for Radioactive waste management (ANDRA) established a report on the feasibility of the geological disposal of high level and intermediate level long lived radioactive waste, in a clay formation. The hypothesis of spent fuel direct disposal was also considered. By the end of 2005, IRSN performed a complete technical review of ANDRA's report, aiming at highlighting the salient safety issues that were to be addressed within a process that may possibly lead to the creation of a disposal facility for these wastes. The following publication presents the main conclusions of this technical review. (author)

  9. Preliminary analyses of the deep geoenvironmental characteristics for the deep borehole disposal of high-level radioactive waste in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jong Youl; Lee, Min Soo; Choi, Heui Joo; Kim, Geon Young; Kim, Kyung Su [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-06-15

    Spent fuels from nuclear power plants, as well as high-level radioactive waste from the recycling of spent fuels, should be safely isolated from human environment for an extremely long time. Recently, meaningful studies on the development of deep borehole radioactive waste disposal system in 3-5 km depth have been carried out in USA and some countries in Europe, due to great advance in deep borehole drilling technology. In this paper, domestic deep geoenvironmental characteristics are preliminarily investigated to analyze the applicability of deep borehole disposal technology in Korea. To do this, state-of-the art technologies in USA and some countries in Europe are reviewed, and geological and geothermal data from the deep boreholes for geothermal usage are analyzed. Based on the results on the crystalline rock depth, the geothermal gradient and the spent fuel types generated in Korea, a preliminary deep borehole concept including disposal canister and sealing system, is suggested.

  10. Preliminary analyses of the deep geoenvironmental characteristics for the deep borehole disposal of high-level radioactive waste in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jong Youl; Lee, Min Soo; Choi, Heui Joo; Kim, Geon Young; Kim, Kyung Su

    2016-01-01

    Spent fuels from nuclear power plants, as well as high-level radioactive waste from the recycling of spent fuels, should be safely isolated from human environment for an extremely long time. Recently, meaningful studies on the development of deep borehole radioactive waste disposal system in 3-5 km depth have been carried out in USA and some countries in Europe, due to great advance in deep borehole drilling technology. In this paper, domestic deep geoenvironmental characteristics are preliminarily investigated to analyze the applicability of deep borehole disposal technology in Korea. To do this, state-of-the art technologies in USA and some countries in Europe are reviewed, and geological and geothermal data from the deep boreholes for geothermal usage are analyzed. Based on the results on the crystalline rock depth, the geothermal gradient and the spent fuel types generated in Korea, a preliminary deep borehole concept including disposal canister and sealing system, is suggested

  11. Back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. A comparison of the direct disposal and reprocessing options

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allan, C.J.; Baumgartner, P.

    1997-01-01

    Based on the need to address public concerns, the need to ensure long-term safety and an ethical concern for future generations, many countries are developing technology to dispose of nuclear fuel waste. The waste substances in used fuel can be disposed of either by directly disposing of the used fuel assemblies themselves, or by disposing of the long-lived waste from fuel reprocessing. The basic thesis of this paper is that the direct disposal of either used fuel or of the long-lived heat-generating and non-heat generating waste that arise from reprocessing is technically and economically feasible and that both options will meet the fundamental objectives of protecting human health and the environment. Decisions about whether, or when, to reprocess used fuel, or about whether to dispose of used fuel directly, are not fundamentally waste management issues. (author)

  12. Department of Energy report on fee for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-10-01

    Since the July 1978 publication of an estimated fee for storage and disposal, several changes have occurred in the parameters which impact the spent fuel fee. DOE has mounted a diversified program of geologic investigations that will include locating and characterizing a number of potential repository sites in a variety of different geologic environments with diverse rock types. As a result, the earliest operation date of a geologic repository is now forecast for 1997. Finally, expanded spent fuel storage capabilities at reactors have reduced the projected quantities of fuel to be stored and disposed of. The current estimates for storage and disposal are presented. This fee has been developed from DOE program information on spent fuel storage requirements, facility availability, facility cost estimates, and research and development programs. The discounted cash flow technique has used the most recent estimates of cost of borrowing by the Federal Government. This estimate has also been used in calculating the Federal charge for uranium enrichment services. A prepayment of a percentage of the storage portion of the fee is assumed to be required 5 years before spent fuel delivery. These funds and the anticipated $300 million in US Treasury borrowing authority should be sufficient to finance the acquisition of storage facilities. Similarly, a prepayment of a percentage of the disposal portion would be collected at the same time and would be used to offset disposal research and development expenditures. The balance of the storage and disposal fees will be collected upon spent fuel delivery. If disposal costs are different from what was estimated, there will be a final adjustment of the disposal portion of the fee when the spent fuel is shipped from the AFR for permanent disposal. Based on current spent fuel storage requirements, at least a 30 percent prepayment of the fee will be required

  13. Hanford K Basins spent nuclear fuels project update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hudson, F.G.

    1997-01-01

    Twenty one hundred metric tons of spent nuclear fuel are stored in two concrete pools on the Hanford Site, known as the K Basins, near the Columbia River. The deteriorating conditions of the fuel and the basins provide engineering and management challenges to assure safe current and future storage. DE and S Hanford, Inc., part of the Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. lead team on the Project Hanford Management Contract, is constructing facilities and systems to move the fuel from current wet pool storage to a dry interim storage facility away from the Columbia River, and to treat and dispose of K Basins sludge, debris and water. The process starts in the K Basins where fuel elements will be removed from existing canisters, washed, and separated from sludge and scrap fuel pieces. Fuel elements will be placed in baskets and loaded into Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) and into transportation casks. The MCO and cask will be transported into the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, where free water within the MCO will be removed under vacuum at slightly elevated temperatures. The MCOs will be sealed and transported via the transport cask to the Canister Storage Building (CSB) in the 200 Area for staging prior to hot conditioning. The conditioning step to remove chemically bound water is performed by holding the MCO at 300 C under vacuum. This step is necessary to prevent excessive pressure buildup during interim storage that could be caused by corrosion. After conditioning, MCOs will remain in the CSB for interim storage until a national repository is completed

  14. Hanford K Basins spent nuclear fuels project update

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hudson, F.G.

    1997-10-17

    Twenty one hundred metric tons of spent nuclear fuel are stored in two concrete pools on the Hanford Site, known as the K Basins, near the Columbia River. The deteriorating conditions of the fuel and the basins provide engineering and management challenges to assure safe current and future storage. DE and S Hanford, Inc., part of the Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. lead team on the Project Hanford Management Contract, is constructing facilities and systems to move the fuel from current wet pool storage to a dry interim storage facility away from the Columbia River, and to treat and dispose of K Basins sludge, debris and water. The process starts in the K Basins where fuel elements will be removed from existing canisters, washed, and separated from sludge and scrap fuel pieces. Fuel elements will be placed in baskets and loaded into Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCOs) and into transportation casks. The MCO and cask will be transported into the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, where free water within the MCO will be removed under vacuum at slightly elevated temperatures. The MCOs will be sealed and transported via the transport cask to the Canister Storage Building (CSB) in the 200 Area for staging prior to hot conditioning. The conditioning step to remove chemically bound water is performed by holding the MCO at 300 C under vacuum. This step is necessary to prevent excessive pressure buildup during interim storage that could be caused by corrosion. After conditioning, MCOs will remain in the CSB for interim storage until a national repository is completed.

  15. A disposal centre for irradiated nuclear fuel: conceptual design study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-09-01

    This report describes a conceptual design of a disposal centre for irradiated nuclear fuel. The surface facilities consist of plants for the preparation of steel cylinders containing irradiated nuclear fuel immobilized in lead, shaft headframe buildings, and all necessary support facilities. The undergound disposal vault is located on one level at a depth of 1000 metres. The cylinders containing the irradiated fuel are emplaced on a one-metre thick layer of backfill material and then completely covered with backfill. All surface and subsurface facilities are described, operations and schedules are summarized, and cost estimates and manpower requirements are given. (auth)

  16. Shielded Canister Transporter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eidem, G.G. Jr.; Fages, R.

    1993-01-01

    The Hanford Waste Vitrification Plant (HWVP) will produce canisters filled with high-level radioactive waste immobilized in borosilicate glass. This report discusses a Shielded Canister Transporter (SCT) which will provide the means for safe transportation and handling of the canisters from the Vitrification Building to the Canister Storage Building (CSB). The stainless steel canisters are 0.61 meters in diameter, 3.0 meters tall, and weigh approximately 2,135 kilograms, with a maximum exterior surface dose rate of 90,000 R/hr. The canisters are placed into storage tubes to a maximum of three tall (two for overpack canisters) with an impact limiter placed at the tube bottom and between each canister. A floor plug seals the top of the storage tube at the operating floor level of the CSB

  17. Corrosion studies on HGW-canister materials for marine disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, K.J.; Bland, I.D.; Smith, S.; Marsh, G.P.

    1986-03-01

    Results are presented from theoretical and experimental work undertaken to investigate and assess the general corrosion behaviour of carbon steel canister/overpacks for heat generating nuclear waste under marine disposal conditions. The mean general corrosion rates of carbon steels, determined experimentally by polarisation resistance measurements on specimens in on-going immersion tests, are between 65-124 μm yr -1 at 90 0 C and 5-25 μm yr -1 at 25 0 C and are tending to increase with time. Anomalously high corrosion rates are being indicated by similar tests at 50 0 C. It is not clear what reliance should be placed on the polarisation resistance results, however, and therefore no conclusion will be drawn until the tests are dismantled and inspected in the 1985/86 programme. Tests with γ-radiation on forged carbon steel specimens immersed in deaerated seawater at 90 0 C show that this causes an acceleration of corrosion rate at the three dose rates down to at least 300 R h -1 . Deep ocean sediment from GME also accelerates the corrosion rate of carbon steel in deaerated seawater both with and without γ-radiation. The effect diminishes with continued exposure and is thought to be due to the presence of either an additional so far unidentified oxidising agent or some component which reduces the corrosion protection afforded by the build up of a corrosion product layer. Acquisition of improved electrochemical kinetic data for the mathematical model is now complete, and the model has been run for temperatures of 25 and 90 0 C, where it predicts steady corrosion rates of 19.3 and 180 μm/yr. The model has shown that the rate of attack is not influenced greatly by the depth of sediment, and that the component of corrosion caused by radiation is of the order of 7 mm over 1000 years. (author)

  18. Development of the DWPF canister temporary shrink-fit seal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelker, J.W. Jr.

    1986-04-01

    The Defense Waste Processing Facility is being constructed at The Savannah River Plant for the containerization of high-level nuclear waste in a wasteform for eventual permanent disposal. The waste will be incorporated in molten glass and solidified in type 304L stainless steel canisters, 2-feet in diameter x 9-feet 10-inches long, containing a flanged 6-in.-diam pipe fill-nozzle. The canisters have a minimum wall thickness of 3/8 in. Utilizing the heat from the glass filling operation, a shrink-fit seal for a plug in the end of the canister fill nozzle was developed that: will withstand the radioactive environment; will prevent the spread of contamination, and will keep moisture and water from entering the canister during storage and decontamination of the canister by wet-frit blasting to remove smearable and oxide-film fixed radioactive nuclides; is removable and can be replaced by a new oversize plug in the event the seal fails the pressure decay leakage test ( -4 atm cc/sec helium); will keep the final weld closure clean and free of nuclear contamination; will withstand being pressed into the nozzle without exposing external contamination or completely breaking the seal; is reliable; and is easily installed. The seal consists of: a removable sleeve (with a tapered bore) which is shrink-fitted into the nozzle bore during canister fabrication; and a tapered plug which is placed into the sleeved nozzle after the canister is filled with radioactive molten glass. A leak-tight shrink-fit seal is formed between the nozzle, sleeve, and plug upon temperature equilibrium. The temporarily sealed canister is transferred from the Melt cell to the Decon cell, and the surface is decontaminated. Next it is transferred to the Weld/Test cell where the temporary seal is pressed down into the nozzle, revealing a clean cavity where the canister final closure weld is made

  19. The chemistry of nuclear fuel waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wiles, D.R.

    2002-01-01

    About one-fifth of the world's supply of energy is derived from nuclear fission. While this important source of power avoids the environmental and resource problems of most other fuels, and although nuclear accident statistics are much less alarming, no other peacetime technology has evoked such public disquiet and impassioned feeling. Central to dealing with these fears is the management and disposal of radioactive waste. An expert Canadian panel in 1977 recommended permanent disposal of wastes in deep geological formations, providing a basis for subsequent policies and research. In 1988, the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO) appointed a panel to assess the proposed disposal concepts and to recommend government policy. The panel in turn appointed a Scientific Review Group to examine the underlying science. Behind all these issues lay one central question: How well is the chemistry understood? This became the principal concern of Professor Donald Wiles, the senior nuclear chemist of the Scientific Review Group. In this book, Dr. Wiles carefully describes the nature of radioactivity and of nuclear power and discusses in detail the management of radioactive waste by the multi-barrier system, but also takes an unusual approach to assessing the risks. Using knowledge of the chemical properties of the various radionuclides in spent fuel, this book follows each of the important radionuclides as it travels through the many barriers placed in its path. It turns out that only two radionuclides are able to reach the biosphere, and they arrive at the earth's surface only after many thousands of years. A careful analysis of the critical points of the disposal plan emphasizes site rejection criteria and other stages at which particular care must be taken, demonstrating how dangers can be anticipated and putting to rest the fear of nuclear fuel waste and its geological burial

  20. Spent fuel disposal: is the underground the sole solution?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nachmilner, L.

    1997-01-01

    The following 4 major approaches to spent fuel disposal are discussed: permanent storage in an underground repository, reprocessing, partitioning and transmutation, and accelerator driven transmutation. It is concluded that underground disposal will remain the basic option for the near future, although pursuing the other methods is certainly worth while. (P.A.)

  1. Safeguards and security aspects of a potential Canadian used-fuel disposal facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.M.; Wuschke, D.; Baumgartner, P.

    1994-09-01

    Large quantities of highly radioactive used fuel have been produced by Canadian nuclear generating stations. Conceptual design and development is under way to assess a means of disposing of this used fuel within a vault located 500 to 1000 m deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. In parallel with this work, the safeguards and physical security measures that will be required for this used fuel during transportation, packaging, and containment in a disposal vault are being studied in Canada, in several other countries that have similar requirements and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canadian commitments and regulations applicable to used-fuel transportation and disposal are described. The experience gained from applying safeguards and physical security measures at similar facilities is considered together with the availability of equipment that might be used in applying these measures. Possible safeguards and physical security measures are outlined and considered. These measures are based on the conceptual design studies for a reference Used-Fuel Disposal Centre and associated transportation systems undertaken by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. These studies show that effective and practical safeguards, which meet present IAEA objectives, can be applied to the used fuel in transportation and at a disposal facility. They also show that physical security measures can be employed that have a high probability of preventing theft or sabotage. 27 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs., glossary, 2 appendices

  2. Safeguards and security aspects of a potential Canadian used-fuel disposal facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, R M; Wuschke, D; Baumgartner, P

    1994-09-01

    Large quantities of highly radioactive used fuel have been produced by Canadian nuclear generating stations. Conceptual design and development is under way to assess a means of disposing of this used fuel within a vault located 500 to 1000 m deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. In parallel with this work, the safeguards and physical security measures that will be required for this used fuel during transportation, packaging, and containment in a disposal vault are being studied in Canada, in several other countries that have similar requirements and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Canadian commitments and regulations applicable to used-fuel transportation and disposal are described. The experience gained from applying safeguards and physical security measures at similar facilities is considered together with the availability of equipment that might be used in applying these measures. Possible safeguards and physical security measures are outlined and considered. These measures are based on the conceptual design studies for a reference Used-Fuel Disposal Centre and associated transportation systems undertaken by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and Ontario Hydro. These studies show that effective and practical safeguards, which meet present IAEA objectives, can be applied to the used fuel in transportation and at a disposal facility. They also show that physical security measures can be employed that have a high probability of preventing theft or sabotage. 27 refs., 8 figs., 3 tabs., glossary, 2 appendices.

  3. An approach to criteria, design limits and monitoring in nuclear fuel waste disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simmons, G R; Baumgartner, P; Bird, G A; Davison, C C; Johnson, L H; Tamm, J A

    1994-12-01

    The Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program has been established to develop and demonstrate the technology for safe geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste. One objective of the program is to show that a disposal system (i.e., a disposal centre and associated transportation system) can be designed and that it would be safe. Therefore the disposal system must be shown to comply with safety requirements specified in guidelines, standards, codes and regulations. The components of the disposal system must also be shown to operate within the limits specified in their design. Compliance and performance of the disposal system would be assessed on a site-specific basis by comparing estimates of the anticipated performance of the system and its components with compliance or performance criteria. A monitoring program would be developed to consider the effects of the disposal system on the environment and would include three types of monitoring: baseline monitoring, compliance monitoring, and performance monitoring. This report presents an approach to establishing compliance and performance criteria, limits for use in disposal system component design, and the main elements of a monitoring program for a nuclear fuel waste disposal system. (author). 70 refs., 9 tabs., 13 figs.

  4. An approach to criteria, design limits and monitoring in nuclear fuel waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simmons, G.R.; Baumgartner, P.; Bird, G.A.; Davison, C.C.; Johnson, L.H.; Tamm, J.A.

    1994-12-01

    The Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program has been established to develop and demonstrate the technology for safe geological disposal of nuclear fuel waste. One objective of the program is to show that a disposal system (i.e., a disposal centre and associated transportation system) can be designed and that it would be safe. Therefore the disposal system must be shown to comply with safety requirements specified in guidelines, standards, codes and regulations. The components of the disposal system must also be shown to operate within the limits specified in their design. Compliance and performance of the disposal system would be assessed on a site-specific basis by comparing estimates of the anticipated performance of the system and its components with compliance or performance criteria. A monitoring program would be developed to consider the effects of the disposal system on the environment and would include three types of monitoring: baseline monitoring, compliance monitoring, and performance monitoring. This report presents an approach to establishing compliance and performance criteria, limits for use in disposal system component design, and the main elements of a monitoring program for a nuclear fuel waste disposal system. (author). 70 refs., 9 tabs., 13 figs

  5. Disposal of high-level waste from nuclear power plants in Denmark. Salt dome investigations. v.4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    The present report deals with construction, operation and sealing of disposal facilities for high-level waste in a salt dome. It is volume 4 of five volumes that together constitute the final report on the Danish utilities' salt dome investigations. The safety investigations were carried out for a deep-hole disposal facility located in the salt dome on Mors. In principle the results of the investigations also apply to a shaft/mine disposal facility. The facility is designed for the disposal of vitrified high-level waste in the shape of glass canisters. There is a low concentration of waste in each canister, approx. 10%. Furthermore, it was selected to place the waste in an intermediate storage for about 40 years prior to its final disposal. Consequently, heat generation in the waste at the time of final disposal will be modest, resulting in low temperature increase in the salt. As an example, the highest temperature increase will be approx. 40 deg. C. and it will occur at the edge of the hole five years after disposal has taken place. Prior to disposal, the glass canisters are encased in steel casks with 15 cm thick walls. Three canisters are placed in each cask, and 215 casks are stacked on top on one another in each deep-hole from a depth of 1200 m to 2500 m underground. The additional encasing is designed to protect the glass from dissolution should any brine reach the disposal facility. Furthermore, the steel cask protects the glass canisters against pressure from the wall of the hole. The technical design of the disposal facility gives it a considerable safety margin against unexpected events. The investigations proved Cretaceous strata to constitute an effective secondary barrier that would prevent radioactive matter from travelling from the underlying disposal facility to the biosphere. (BP)

  6. International safeguards relevant to geologic disposal of high-level wastes and spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1989-01-01

    Spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles placed in underground repositories have the potential to become attractive targets for diversion and/or theft because of their valuable material content and decreasing radioactivity. The first geologic repository in the US, as currently designed, will contain approximately 500 Mt of plutonium, 60,000 Mt of uranium and a host of other fissile and strategically important elements. This paper identifies some of the international safeguards issues relevant to the various proposed scenarios for disposing of the spent fuel. In the context of the US program for geologic disposal of spent fuels, this paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before the geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality. Based on US spent fuel discharges, an example is presented to illustrate the enormity of the problem of verifying spent fuel inventories. The geologic disposal scenario for high-level wastes originating from defense facilities produced a ''practicably irrecoverable'' waste form. Therefore, safeguards issues for geologic disposal of high-level waste now in the US are less pressing. 56 refs. , 2 figs

  7. Numerical Modelling of Mechanical Integrity of the Copper-Cast Iron Canister. A Literature Review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lanru Jing

    2004-04-01

    This review article presents a summary of the research works on the numerical modelling of the mechanical integrity of the composite copper-cast iron canisters for the final disposal of Swedish nuclear wastes, conducted by SKB and SKI since 1992. The objective of the review is to evaluate the outstanding issues existing today about the basic design concepts and premises, fundamental issues on processes, properties and parameters considered for the functions and requirements of canisters under the conditions of a deep geological repository. The focus is placed on the adequacy of numerical modelling approaches adopted in regards to the overall mechanical integrity of the canisters, especially the initial state of canisters regarding defects and the consequences of their evolution under external and internal loading mechanisms adopted in the design premises. The emphasis is the stress-strain behaviour and failure/strength, with creep and plasticity involved. Corrosion, although one of the major concerns in the field of canister safety, was not included

  8. Comparison of SRP high-level waste disposal costs for borosilicate glass and crystalline ceramic waste forms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDonell, W.R.

    1982-04-01

    An evaluation of costs for the immobilization and repository disposal of SRP high-level wastes indicates that the borosilicate glass waste form is less costly than the crystalline ceramic waste form. The wastes were assumed immobilized as glass with 28% waste loading in 10,300 reference 24-in.-diameter canisters or as crystalline ceramic with 65% waste loading in either 3400 24-in.-diameter canisters or 5900 18-in.-diameter canisters. After an interim period of onsite storage, the canisters would be transported to the federal repository for burial. Total costs in undiscounted 1981 dollars of the waste disposal operations, excluding salt processing for which costs are not yet well defined, were about $2500 million for the borosilicate glass form in reference 24-in.-diameter canisters, compared to about $2900 million for the crystalline ceramic form in 24-in.-diameter canisters and about $3100 million for the crystalline ceramic form in 18-in.-diameter canisters. No large differences in salt processing costs for the borosilicate glass and crystalline ceramic forms are expected. Discounting to present values, because of a projected 2-year delay in startup of the DWPF for the crystalline ceramic form, preserved the overall cost advantage of the borosilicate glass form. The waste immobilization operations for the glass form were much less costly than for the crystalline ceramic form. The waste disposal operations, in contrast, were less costly for the crystalline ceramic form, due to fewer canisters requiring disposal; however, this advantage was not sufficient to offset the higher development and processing costs of the crystalline ceramic form. Changes in proposed Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations to permit lower cost repository packages for defense high-level wastes would decrease the waste disposal costs of the more numerous borosilicate glass forms relative to the crystalline ceramic forms

  9. Spent nuclear fuel for disposal in the KBS-3 repository

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grahn, Per; Moren, Lena; Wiborgh, Maria

    2010-12-15

    The report is included in a set of Production reports, presenting how the KBS-3 repository is designed, produced and inspected. The set of reports is included in the safety report for the KBS-3 repository and repository facility. The report provides input to the assessment of the long-term safety, SR-Site as well as to the operational safety report, SR-Operation. The report presents the spent fuel to be deposited, and the requirements on the handling and selection of fuel assemblies for encapsulation that follows from that it shall be deposited in the KBS-3 repository. An overview of the handling and a simulation of the encapsulation and the resulting canisters to be deposited are presented. Finally, the initial state of the encapsulated spent nuclear fuel is given. The initial state comprises the radionuclide inventory and other data required for the assessment of the long-term safety

  10. Spent nuclear fuel for disposal in the KBS-3 repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grahn, Per; Moren, Lena; Wiborgh, Maria

    2010-12-01

    The report is included in a set of Production reports, presenting how the KBS-3 repository is designed, produced and inspected. The set of reports is included in the safety report for the KBS-3 repository and repository facility. The report provides input to the assessment of the long-term safety, SR-Site as well as to the operational safety report, SR-Operation. The report presents the spent fuel to be deposited, and the requirements on the handling and selection of fuel assemblies for encapsulation that follows from that it shall be deposited in the KBS-3 repository. An overview of the handling and a simulation of the encapsulation and the resulting canisters to be deposited are presented. Finally, the initial state of the encapsulated spent nuclear fuel is given. The initial state comprises the radionuclide inventory and other data required for the assessment of the long-term safety

  11. Grain boundary corrosion of copper canister material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fennell, P.A.H.; Graham, A.J.; Smart, N.R.; Sofield, C.J.

    2001-03-01

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues in Sweden is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will then be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast inner container fitted inside a corrosion-resistant copper canister. During fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow they will tend to concentrate impurities within the copper at the new grain boundaries. The work described in this report was undertaken to determine whether there is any possibility of enhanced corrosion at grain boundaries within the copper canister. The potential for grain boundary corrosion was investigated by exposing copper specimens, which had undergone different heat treatments and hence had different grain sizes, to aerated artificial bentonite-equilibrated groundwater with two concentrations of chloride, for increasing periods of time. The degree of grain boundary corrosion was determined by atomic force microscopy (AFM) and optical microscopy. AFM showed no increase in grain boundary 'ditching' for low chloride groundwater. In high chloride groundwater the surface was covered uniformly with a fine-grained oxide. No increases in oxide thickness were observed. No significant grain boundary attack was observed using optical microscopy either. The work suggests that in aerated artificial groundwaters containing chloride ions, grain boundary corrosion of copper is unlikely to adversely affect SKB's copper canisters

  12. Options for treating high-temperature gas-cooled reactor fuel for repository disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lotts, A.L.; Bond, W.D.; Forsberg, C.W.; Glass, R.W.; Harrington, F.E.; Micheals, G.E.; Notz, K.J.; Wymer, R.G.

    1992-02-01

    This report describes the options that can reasonably be considered for disposal of high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) fuel in a repository. The options include whole-block disposal, disposal with removal of graphite (either mechanically or by burning), and reprocessing of spent fuel to separate the fuel and fission products. The report summarizes what is known about the options without extensively projecting or analyzing actual performance of waste forms in a repository. The report also summarizes the processes involved in convert spent HTGR fuel into the various waste forms and projects relative schedules and costs for deployment of the various options. Fort St. Vrain Reactor fuel, which utilizes highly-enriched {sup 235}U (plus thorium) and is contained in a prismatic graphite block geometry, was used as the baseline for evaluation, but the major conclusions would not be significantly different for low- or medium-enriched {sup 235}U (without thorium) or for the German pebble-bed fuel. Future US HTGRs will be based on the Fort St. Vrain (FSV) fuel form. The whole block appears to be a satisfactory waste form for disposal in a repository and may perform better than light-water reactor (LWR) spent fuel. From the standpoint of process cost and schedule (not considering repository cost or value of fuel that might be recycled), the options are ranked as follows in order of increased cost and longer schedule to perform the option: (1) whole block, (2a) physical separation, (2b) chemical separation, and (3) complete chemical processing.

  13. Options for treating high-temperature gas-cooled reactor fuel for repository disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lotts, A.L.; Bond, W.D.; Forsberg, C.W.; Glass, R.W.; Harrington, F.E.; Micheals, G.E.; Notz, K.J.; Wymer, R.G.

    1992-02-01

    This report describes the options that can reasonably be considered for disposal of high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) fuel in a repository. The options include whole-block disposal, disposal with removal of graphite (either mechanically or by burning), and reprocessing of spent fuel to separate the fuel and fission products. The report summarizes what is known about the options without extensively projecting or analyzing actual performance of waste forms in a repository. The report also summarizes the processes involved in convert spent HTGR fuel into the various waste forms and projects relative schedules and costs for deployment of the various options. Fort St. Vrain Reactor fuel, which utilizes highly-enriched 235 U (plus thorium) and is contained in a prismatic graphite block geometry, was used as the baseline for evaluation, but the major conclusions would not be significantly different for low- or medium-enriched 235 U (without thorium) or for the German pebble-bed fuel. Future US HTGRs will be based on the Fort St. Vrain (FSV) fuel form. The whole block appears to be a satisfactory waste form for disposal in a repository and may perform better than light-water reactor (LWR) spent fuel. From the standpoint of process cost and schedule (not considering repository cost or value of fuel that might be recycled), the options are ranked as follows in order of increased cost and longer schedule to perform the option: (1) whole block, (2a) physical separation, (2b) chemical separation, and (3) complete chemical processing

  14. SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryan, Charles R.; Enos, David G.

    2015-01-01

    This progress report describes work being done at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to assess the localized corrosion performance of container/cask materials used in the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Of particular concern is stress corrosion cracking (SCC), by which a through-wall crack could potentially form in a canister outer wall over time intervals that are shorter than possible dry storage times. In order for SCC to occur, three criteria must be met. A corrosive environment must be present on the canister surface, the metal must susceptible to SCC, and sufficient tensile stress to support SCC must be present through the entire thickness of the canister wall. SNL is currently evaluating the potential for each of these criteria to be met.

  15. Drop tests of the Three Mile Island knockout canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Box, W.D.; Aaron, W.S.; Shappert, L.B.; Childress, P.C.; Quinn, G.J.; Smith, J.V.

    1987-01-01

    A type of Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) defueling canister, called a ''knockout'' canister, was subjected to a series of drop tests at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Drop Test Facility. These tests confirmed the structural integrity of internal fixed neutron poisons in support of a request for NRC licensing of this type of canister for the shipment of TMI-2 reactor fuel debris to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for the Core Examination R and D Program. This report presents the data generated and the results obtained from a series of four drop tests that included two drops with the test assembly in the vertical position and two drops with the assembly in the horizontal position

  16. SNF Interim Storage Canister Corrosion and Surface Environment Investigations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bryan, Charles R. [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Enos, David G. [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-09-01

    This progress report describes work being done at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to assess the localized corrosion performance of container/cask materials used in the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Of particular concern is stress corrosion cracking (SCC), by which a through-wall crack could potentially form in a canister outer wall over time intervals that are shorter than possible dry storage times. In order for SCC to occur, three criteria must be met. A corrosive environment must be present on the canister surface, the metal must susceptible to SCC, and sufficient tensile stress to support SCC must be present through the entire thickness of the canister wall. SNL is currently evaluating the potential for each of these criteria to be met.

  17. Gas and liquid sampling for closed canisters in KW Basin - Work Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitkoff, C.C.

    1995-01-01

    Work Plan for the design and fabrication of gas/liquid sampler for closed canister sampling in KW Basin. This document defines the tasks associated with the design, fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing equipment necessary for gas and liquid sampling of the Mark I and Mark II canisters in the K-West basin. The sampling of the gas space and the remaining liquid inside the closed canisters will be used to help understand any changes to the fuel elements and the canisters. Specifically, this work plan will define the scope of work and required task structure, list the technical requirements, describe design configuration control and verification methodologies, detail quality assurance requirements, and present a baseline estimate and schedule

  18. Management of radioactive fuel wastes: the Canadian disposal program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulton, J.

    1978-10-01

    This report describes the research and development program to verify and demonstrate the concepts for the safe, permanent disposal of radioactive fuel wastes from Canadian nuclear reactors. The program is concentrating on deep underground disposal in hard-rock formations. The nature of the radioactive wastes is described, and the options for storing, processing, packaging and disposing of them are outlined. The program to verify the proposed concept, select a suitable site and to build and operate a demonstration facility is described. (author)

  19. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-01-01

    This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the CHF and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility

  20. Quivers For Special Fuel Rods-Disposal Of Special Fuel Rods In CASTOR V Casks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bannani, Amin; Cebula, Wojciech; Buchmuller, Olga; Huggenberg, Roland; Helmut Kuhl

    2015-01-01

    While GNS casks of the CASTOR family are a suitable means to transfer fuel assemblies (FA) from the NPP to an interim dry storage site, Germanys phase-out of nuclear energy has triggered the demand for an additional solution to dispose of special fuel rods (SFR), normally remaining in the fuel pond until the final shutdown of the NPP. SFR are fuel rods that had to be removed from fuel assemblies mainly due to their special condition, e. g. damages in the cladding of the fuel rods which may have occurred during reactor operations. SFR are usually stored in the spent fuel pond after they are removed from the FA. The quiver for special fuel rods features a robust yet simple design, with a high mechanical stability, a reliable leak-tightness and large safety margins for future requirements on safety analysis. The quiver for special fuel rods can be easily adapted to a large variety of different damaged fuel rods and tailored to the specific need of the customer. The quiver for special fuel rods is adaptable e.g. in length and diameter for use in other types of transport and storage casks and is applicable in other countries as well. The overall concept presented here is a first of its kind solution for the disposal of SFRs via Castor V-casks. This provides an important precondition in achieving the status 'free from nuclear fuel' of the shut down German NPPs

  1. Quivers For Special Fuel Rods-Disposal Of Special Fuel Rods In CASTOR V Casks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bannani, Amin; Cebula, Wojciech; Buchmuller, Olga; Huggenberg, Roland [GNS, Essen (Germany); Helmut Kuhl [WTI, Julich (Germany)

    2015-05-15

    While GNS casks of the CASTOR family are a suitable means to transfer fuel assemblies (FA) from the NPP to an interim dry storage site, Germanys phase-out of nuclear energy has triggered the demand for an additional solution to dispose of special fuel rods (SFR), normally remaining in the fuel pond until the final shutdown of the NPP. SFR are fuel rods that had to be removed from fuel assemblies mainly due to their special condition, e. g. damages in the cladding of the fuel rods which may have occurred during reactor operations. SFR are usually stored in the spent fuel pond after they are removed from the FA. The quiver for special fuel rods features a robust yet simple design, with a high mechanical stability, a reliable leak-tightness and large safety margins for future requirements on safety analysis. The quiver for special fuel rods can be easily adapted to a large variety of different damaged fuel rods and tailored to the specific need of the customer. The quiver for special fuel rods is adaptable e.g. in length and diameter for use in other types of transport and storage casks and is applicable in other countries as well. The overall concept presented here is a first of its kind solution for the disposal of SFRs via Castor V-casks. This provides an important precondition in achieving the status 'free from nuclear fuel' of the shut down German NPPs.

  2. The geochemical environment of nuclear fuel waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gascoyne, M.

    1995-01-01

    The concept for disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste in a geologic environment on the Canadian Shield has recently been presented by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to governments, scientists, and the public, for review. An important part of this concept concerns the geochemical environment of a disposal vault and includes consideration of rock and groundwater compositions, geochemical interactions between rocks, groundwaters, and emplaced vault materials, and the influences and significance of anthropogenic and microbiological effects following closure of the vault. This paper summarizes the disposal concept and examines aspects of the geochemical environment. The presence of saline groundwaters and reducing conditions at proposed vault depths (500-1000 m) in the Canadian Shield has an important bearing on the stability of the used nuclear fuel, its container, and buffer and backfill materials. The potential for introduction of anthropogenic contaminants and microbes during site investigations and vault excavation, operation, and sealing is described with examples from AECL's research areas on the Shield and in their underground research laboratory in southeastern Manitoba. (author)

  3. SR-CAN - a safety assessment of a repository of spent nuclear fuel: canister performance and effects on the biosphere

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kautsky, U.; Kumblad, L.

    2004-01-01

    During the next few years the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. (SKB) performs site investigations at two sites in Sweden for a future repository of spent nuclear fuel. Parallel an encapsulation plant is planned to encapsulate the spent fuel in copper canisters according to the KBS-3 method. The purpose of the SR-CAN safety assessment is to show the performance of the canister isolations at different sites for a repository at 500 meters depth in crystalline rock. Moreover, SR-CAN provides an example how the site specific safety assessment of a deep repository will be made in year 2006-2008. To be able to calculate dose and risk for humans and the environment, new assessment methods were developed for the biosphere. These methods were based on a system ecological approach and used knowledge from landscape ecology to provide an integrated approach with hydrology and geology considering the discharges in a watershed and calculating consequences in terrestrial and aquatic (freshwater and marine) ecosystems. A range of methods and tools were developed in GIS and Matlab/Simulink to be able to model and understand the important processes in the landscape today and during the next few thousands of years. In this paper, an overview of the program and the novel methods are presented, as well as some examples from performance calculations from a watershed in the Forsmark area considering effects on humans and ecosystems. (author)

  4. Remote handling of canisters containing nuclear waste in glass at the Savannah River Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Callan, J.E.

    1986-01-01

    The Defense Waste Processing Facility is being constructed at the Savannah River Plant at a cost of $870 million to immobilize the defense high-level radioactive waste. This radioactive waste is being added to borosilicate glass for later disposal in a federal repository. The borosilicate glass is poured into stainless steel canisters for storage. These canisters must be handled remotely because of their high radioactivity, up to 5000 R/h. After the glass has been poured into the canister which will be temporarily sealed, it is transferred to a decontamination cell and decontaminated. The canister is then transferred to the weld cell where a permanent cap is welded into place. The canisters must then be transported from the processing building to a storage vault on the plant until the federal repository is available. A shielded canister transporter (SCT) has been designed and constructed for this purpose. The design of the SCT vehicle allows the safe transport of a highly radioactive canister containing borosilicate glass weighing 2300 kg with a radiation level up to 5000 R/h from one building to another. The design provides shielding for the operator in the cab of the vehicle to be below 0.5 rem/h. The SCT may also be used to load the final shipping cask when the federal repository is ready to receive the canisters

  5. The analysis of geological formations from Romania available for disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barariu, Gheorghe; Alecu, Catalin

    2003-01-01

    The majority of countries possessing nuclear power industry has not yet decided upon the option about closing the nuclear cycle. There are still in progress projects concerning the final disposal, while worldwide it is not foreseen the reprocessing of the whole amount of reusable fissionable materials. The annual worldwide production of used nuclear fuel continues to be about 10 500 - 11 000 tones of heavy metal. The difficulties in designing used fuel final disposal repositories led to the design of some interim storage facilities, providing a satisfactory safety level for biosphere. On the other hand, regardless of the selected option we respect to closing the nuclear cycle, a final repository must exists, either for the high level wastes resulted from reprocessing the used nuclear fuel or for the used fuel considered radioactive waste. Although, presently, in Romania, the nuclear fuel extracted from the reactor after its 'useful life' is declared as radioactive waste, it may contain a certain amount of fissionable material that could be used in other types of reactors. This possibility implies taking into account the concept regarding the recovery of fuel after a certain period of time, although, by definition, final disposal means prevention of this possibility. The harmonization of the Romanian legislation with that of the European Community and the adhering to the European Conventions, poses among other issues the problem of the final disposal of the used nuclear fuel. Starting from these major requirements the paper presents the main aspects of the Project 011/11.10.2001, entitled 'Researches for the selection and preliminary characterization of the host rock for the final disposal of the used nuclear fuel', part of The National Research Program: Medium, Energy and Resources. A complex analysis regarding the implications on the design of the Used Nuclear Fuel Final Disposal Repository in Romania was performed, the analysis of the available geological

  6. Performance of CASTORR HAW Cask Cold Trials for Loading, Transport and Storage of HAW canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmsmeier, Marco; Vossnacke, Andre

    2008-01-01

    On the basis of reprocessing contracts, concluded between the German Nuclear Utilities (GNUs) and the reprocessing companies in France (AREVA NC) and the UK (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority), GNS has the task to return the resulting residues to Germany. The high active waste (HAW) residuals from nuclear fuel reprocessing are vitrified and filled into steel cans, the HAW canisters. According to reprocessing contracts the equivalent number of HAW canisters to heavy metals delivered has to be returned to the country of origin and stored at an interim storage facility where applicable. The GNS' CASTOR R HAW casks are designed and licensed to fulfil the requirements for transport and long-term storage of HAW canisters. The new cask type CASTOR R HAW28M is capable of storing 28 HAW canisters with a maximum thermal power of 56 kW in total. Prior to the first active cask loading at a reprocessing facility it is required to demonstrate all important handling steps with the CASTOR R HAW28M cask according to a specific and approved sequence plan (MAP). These cold trials have to be carried out at the cask loading plant and at the reception area of an interim storage facility in Gorleben (TBL-G), witnessed by the licensing authorities and their independent experts. At transhipment stations GNS performs internal trials to demonstrate safe handling. A brand-new, empty CASTOR R HAW28M cask has been shipped from the GNS cask assembly facility in Muelheim to the TBL-G for cold trials. With this cask, GNS has to demonstrate the transhipment of casks at the Dannenberg transfer station from rail to road, transport to and reception at the TBL-G as well as incoming dose rate and contamination measurements and preparation for storage. After removal of all shock absorbers with a cask specific handling frame, tilting operation and assembly of the secondary lid with a pressure sensor, the helium leak tightness and 'Block-mass' tests have to be carried out as well. GNS long-term CASTOR R

  7. Summary of the Environmental Impact Statement on the concept for disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This is the Summary of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) on the concept for disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste. The proposed concept is a method for geological disposal, based on a system of natural and engineered barriers. The EIS provides information requested by the Environmental Assessment Panel reviewing the disposal concept and presents AECL's case for the acceptability of the concept. The introductory chapter of this Summary provides background information on several topics related to nuclear fuel waste, including current storage practices for used fuel, the need for eventual disposal of nuclear fuel waste, the options for disposal, and the reasons for Canada's focus on geological disposal. Chapter 2 describes the concept for disposal of nuclear fuel waste. Because the purpose of implementing the concept would he to protect human health and the natural environment far into the future, we discuss the long-term performance of a disposal system and present a case study of potential effects on human health and the natural environment after the closure of a disposal facility. The effects and social acceptability of disposal would depend greatly on how the concept was implemented. Chapter 3 describes AECL's proposed approach to concept implementation. We discuss how the public would be involved in implementation; activities that would be undertaken to protect human health, the natural environment, and the socio-economic environment; and a case study of the potential effects of disposal before the closure of a disposal facility. The last chapter presents AECL's Conclusion, based on more than 15 years of research and development, that implementation of the disposal concept represents a means by which Canada can safely dispose of its nuclear fuel waste. This chapter also presents AECL's recommendation that Canada progress toward disposal of its nuclear fuel waste by undertaking the first stage of concept

  8. Galvanic corrosion of copper-cast iron couples in relation to the Swedish radioactive waste canister concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smart, N.R.; Fennell, P.A.H.; Rance, A.P.; Werme, L.O.

    2004-01-01

    To ensure the safe encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel rods for geological disposal, SKB are considering using the Copper-Iron Canister, which consists of an outer copper canister and an inner cast iron container. The canister will be placed into boreholes in the bedrock of a geologic repository and surrounded by bentonite clay. In the unlikely event of the outer copper canister being breached, water could enter the annulus between the inner and outer canister and at points of contact between the two metals there would be a possibility of galvanic interactions. To study this effect, copper-cast iron galvanic couples were set up in a number of different environments representing possible conditions in the SKB repository. The tests investigated two artificial pore-waters and a bentonite slurry, under aerated and deaerated conditions, at 30 deg. C and 50 deg. C. The currents passing between the coupled electrodes and the potential of the couples were monitored for several months. In addition, some bimetallic crevice specimens based on the multi-crevice assembly (MCA) design were used to simulate the situation where the copper canister will be in direct contact with the cast iron inner vessel. The effect of growing an oxide film on the surface of the cast iron prior to coupling it with copper was also investigated. The electrochemical results are presented graphically in the form of electrode potentials and galvanic corrosion currents as a function of time. The galvanic currents in aerated conditions were much higher than in deaerated conditions. For example, at 30 deg. C, galvanic corrosion rates as low as 0.02 μm/year were observed for iron in groundwater after de-aeration, but of the order of 100 μm/year for the cast iron at 50 deg. C in the presence of oxygen. The galvanic currents were generally higher at 50 deg. C than at 30 deg. C. None of the MCA specimens exhibited any signs of crevice corrosion under deaerated conditions. It will be shown that in deaerated

  9. German Approach to Spent Fuel Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jussofie, A.; Graf, R.; Filbert, W.

    2010-01-01

    in the pilot conditioning facility. The conditioning mode was taken over for the subsequent BSK3 concept which varies in the canister for the fuel rods and the emplacement technology. To prove the principle feasibility of this concept aboveground demonstration tests have been performed by 2009. Investigations on a further concept intended for the direct disposal of spent fuel assemblies without conditioning have just begun. Conceptual differences may have an impact on the safeguards approach. With the end of the moratorium the political situation will change and further steps related to the final disposal of heat-generating waste could be decided. (author)

  10. Probabilistic analysis of canister inserts for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dillstroem, Peter

    2005-10-01

    In this study, probabilistic analysis of canister inserts for spent nuclear fuel has been performed. The main conclusions are: 1. For the baseline case, the probability of failure is insignificant (∼ 2x10 -9 ). This is the case even though several conservative assumptions have been made both in underlying deterministic analysis and in the probabilistic analysis. 2. The initiation event dominates (over the local collapse event) when the external pressure is below the baseline case (p = 44 MPa). The local collapse event dominates when the external pressure is above the baseline case. 3. The local collapse event is strongly dependent of the assumed external pressure. 4. The analysis of collapse only considers the first local collapse event, total collapse of the insert will occur at a much higher pressure. 5. The resulting probabilities are more dependent on the assumption regarding the eccentricity of the cassette than the assumption regarding outer corner radius of the profiles for steel section cassette. The results indicate that the maximum allowed eccentricity should not be larger than 5 mm. 6. The probability of initiation of crack growth is calculated using a defect distribution where one assumes the existence of one crack-like defect. A simple scaling argument can be applied to consider the number of defects through the thickness

  11. Remote automatic plasma arc-closure welding of a dry-storage canister for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprecace, R.P.; Blankenship, W.P.

    1982-01-01

    A carbon steel storage canister has been designed for the dry encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel assemblies or of logs of vitrified high level radioactive waste. The canister design is in conformance with the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, Division 1 for a Class 3 vessel. The canisters will be loaded and sealed as part of a completely remote process sequence to be performed in the hot bay of an experimental encapsulation facility at the Nevada Test Site. The final closure to be made is a full penetration butt weld between the canister body, a 12.75-in O.D. x 0.25-in wall pipe, and a mating semiellipsoidal closure lid. Due to a combination of design, application and facility constraints, the closure weld must be made in the 2G position (canister vertical). The plasma arc welding system is described, and the final welding procedure is described and discussed in detail. Several aspects and results of the procedure development activity, which are of both specific and general interest, are highlighted; these include: The critical welding torch features which must be exactly controlled to permit reproducible energy input to, and gas stream interaction with, the weld puddle. A comparison of results using automatic arc voltage control with those obtained using a mechanically fixed initial arc gap. The optimization of a keyhole initiation procedure. A comparison of results using an autogenous keyhole closure procedure with those obtained using a filler metal addition. The sensitivity of the welding process and procedure to variations in joint configuration and dimensions and to variations in base metal chemistry. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of the plasma arc process for this application are summarized from the current viewpoint, and the applicability of this process to other similar applications is briefly indicated

  12. Equipment for deployment of canisters with spent nuclear fuel and bentonite buffer in horizontal holes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henttonen, V.; Suikki, M.

    1992-08-01

    The study presents the predesign of equipment for the deployment of canisters in long horizontal holes. The canisters are placed in the centre of the hole and are surrounded by a bentonite buffer. In thE study the canisters are assumed to have a diameter of 1.6 m and a length of 5.9 m, including the hemispherical ends. Their total weight is 60 tonnes. The bentonite buffer after homogenization is 400 mm thick, making a total package diameter of 2.4 m. The deployment system consists of four wagons for handling The canisters and the bentonite blocks. To ensure safe emplacement, every part is installed separately in its final position. This also makes it possible to use small clearances between the canisters and the bentonite blocks and between the blocks and the rock wall. With small clearances, backfilling can be avoided. Another basic design idea is that the wagons are equipped with wheels, which are in direct contact with the rock walls. Thus, rails, which have to be removed as the deployment progresses, are unnecessary. To minimize the time taken for deploying one canister, the wagons are designed so that only three trips from the service area to the deposit area are needed. Due to the radiation in the vicinity of the canisters, the wagons have to be teleoperated

  13. Equipment for deployment of canisters with spent nuclear fuel and bentonite buffer in horisontal holes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henttonen, V.; Suikki, M.

    1992-06-01

    This study presents the predesign of equipment for the deployment of canisters in long horizontal holes. The canisters are placed in the centre of the hole and are surrounded by a bentonite buffer. In this study the canisters are assumed to have a diameter of 1.6 m and a length of 5.9 m, including the hemispherical ends. Their total weight is 60 tonnes. The bentonite buffer after homogenization is 400 mm thick, making a total package diameter of 2.4 m. The deployment system consists of four wagons for handling the canisters and the bentonite blocks. To ensure safe emplacement, every part is installed separately in its final position. This also makes it possible to use small clearances between the canisters and the bentonite blocks and between the blocks and the rock wall. With small clearances, backfilling can be avoided. Another basic design idea is that the wagons are equipped with wheels, which are in direct contact with the rock walls. Thus, rails, which have to be removed as the deployment progresses, are unnecessary. To minimize the time taken for deploying one canister, the wagons are designed so that only three trips from the service area to the deposit area are needed. Due to the radiation in the vicinity of the canisters, the wagons have to be teleoperated. (au)

  14. Miniature Canister (MiniCan) Corrosion experiment progress report 4 for 2008-2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smart, Nick; Reddy, Bharti; Rance, Andy

    2012-06-01

    To ensure the safe encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel rods for geological disposal, SKB of Sweden are considering using the Copper-Iron Canister, which consists of an outer copper canister and a cast iron insert. Over the years a programme of laboratory work has been carried out to investigate a range of corrosion issues associated with the canister, including the possibility of expansion of the outer copper canister as a result of the anaerobic corrosion of the cast iron insert. Previous experimental work using stacks of test specimens has not shown any evidence of corrosion-induced expansion. However, as a further step in developing an understanding of the likely performance of the canister in a repository environment, Serco has set up a series of experiments in SKB's Aespoe Hard Rock Laboratory (HRL) using inactive model canisters, in which leaks were deliberately introduced into the outer copper canister while surrounded by bentonite, with the aim of obtaining information about the internal corrosion evolution of the internal environment. The experiments use five small scale model canisters (300 mm long x 150 mm diameter) that simulate the main features of the SKB canister design (hence the project name, 'MiniCan'). The main aim of the work is to examine how corrosion of the cast iron insert will evolve if a leak is present in the outer copper canister. This report describes the progress on the five experiments running at the Aespoe Hard Rock Laboratory and the data obtained from the start of the experiments in late 2006 up to Winter 2011. The full details of the design and installation of the experiments are given in a previous report and this report concentrates on summarising and interpreting the data obtained to date. This report follows the earlier progress reports presenting results up to December 2010. The current document (progress report 4) describes work up to December 2011. The current report presents the results of the water analyses obtained in

  15. Miniature Canister (MiniCan) Corrosion experiment progress report 4 for 2008-2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smart, Nick; Reddy, Bharti; Rance, Andy [Serco, Hook (United Kingdom)

    2012-06-15

    To ensure the safe encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel rods for geological disposal, SKB of Sweden are considering using the Copper-Iron Canister, which consists of an outer copper canister and a cast iron insert. Over the years a programme of laboratory work has been carried out to investigate a range of corrosion issues associated with the canister, including the possibility of expansion of the outer copper canister as a result of the anaerobic corrosion of the cast iron insert. Previous experimental work using stacks of test specimens has not shown any evidence of corrosion-induced expansion. However, as a further step in developing an understanding of the likely performance of the canister in a repository environment, Serco has set up a series of experiments in SKB's Aespoe Hard Rock Laboratory (HRL) using inactive model canisters, in which leaks were deliberately introduced into the outer copper canister while surrounded by bentonite, with the aim of obtaining information about the internal corrosion evolution of the internal environment. The experiments use five small scale model canisters (300 mm long x 150 mm diameter) that simulate the main features of the SKB canister design (hence the project name, 'MiniCan'). The main aim of the work is to examine how corrosion of the cast iron insert will evolve if a leak is present in the outer copper canister. This report describes the progress on the five experiments running at the Aespoe Hard Rock Laboratory and the data obtained from the start of the experiments in late 2006 up to Winter 2011. The full details of the design and installation of the experiments are given in a previous report and this report concentrates on summarising and interpreting the data obtained to date. This report follows the earlier progress reports presenting results up to December 2010. The current document (progress report 4) describes work up to December 2011. The current report presents the results of the water analyses

  16. Iron oxide redox chemistry and nuclear fuel disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jobe, D.J.; Lemire, R.J.; Taylor, P.

    1997-04-01

    Solubility and stability data for iron (III) oxides and aqueous Fe(II) and Fe(III) species are reviewed, and selected values are used to calculate potential-pH diagrams for the iron system at temperatures of 25 and 100 deg C, chloride activities {C1 - } = 10 -2 and 1 mol/kg, total carbonate activity {C T } = 10 -3 mol/kg, and iron(III) oxide/oxyhydroxide solubility products (25 deg C values) K sp = {Fe 3+ }{OH - } 3 = 10 -38.5 , 10 -40 and 10 -42 . The temperatures and anion concentrations bracket the range of conditions expected in a Canadian nuclear fuel waste disposal vault. The three solubility products represent a conservative upper limit, a most probable value, and a minimum credible value, respectively, for the iron oxides likely to be important in controlling redox conditions in a disposal vault for CANDU nuclear reactor fuel. Only in the first of these three cases do the calculated redox potentials significantly exceed values under which oxidative dissolution of the fuel may occur. (author)

  17. The role of engineered barriers in spent fuel disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vokal, A.

    1997-01-01

    Engineered, i.e. man-made, barriers in underground spent fuel disposal include the waste form itself, the fuel cladding, the storage container, and the isolating system made of buffering, filling, and sealing materials. The parameters of and requirements for each of the components are highlighted, and the methodology of materials selection is discussed. (P.A.)

  18. Technical framework to facilitate foreign spent fuel storage and geologic disposal in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.; Halsey, W.G.; Cmith, C.F.

    2000-01-01

    The option of storage and eventual geologic disposal in Russia of spent fuel of US origin used in Taiwan provides a unique opportunity that can benefit many parties. Taiwan has a near term need for a spent fuel storage and geologic disposal solution, available financial resources, but limited prospect for a timely domestic solution. Russia has significant spent fuel storage and transportation management experience, candidate storage and repository sites, but limited financial resources available for their development. The US has interest in Taiwan energy security, national security and nonproliferation interests in Russian spent fuel storage and disposal and interest in the US origin fuel. While it is understood that such a project includes complex policy and international political issues as well as technical issues, the goal of this paper is to begin the discussion by presenting a technical path forward to establish the feasibility of this concept for Russia

  19. The disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste: engineered barriers alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, L.H.; Tait, J.C.; Shoesmith, D.W.; Crosthwaite, J.L.; Gray, M.N.

    1994-01-01

    The concept for disposal of Canada's nuclear fuel waste involves emplacing the waste in a vault excavated at a depth of 500 to 1000 m in plutonic rock of the Canadian Shield. The solid waste would be isolated from the biosphere by a multibarrier system consisting of engineered barriers, including long-lived containers and clay and cement-based sealing materials, and the natural barrier provided by the massive geological formation. The technical feasibility of this concept and its impact on the environment and human health are being documented in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which will be submitted for review under the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process. This report, one of nine EIS primary references, describes the various alternative designs and materials for engineered barriers that have been considered during the development of the Canadian disposal concept and summarizes engineered barrier concepts being evaluated in other countries. The basis for the selection of a reference engineered barrier system for the EIS is presented. This reference system involves placing used CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium) fuel bundles in titanium containers, which would then be emplaced in boreholes drilled in the floor of disposal rooms. Clay-based sealing materials would be used to fill both the space between the containers and the rock and the remaining excavations. In the section on waste forms, the properties of both used-fuel bundles and solidified high-level wastes, which would be produced by treating wastes resulting from the reprocessing of used fuel, are discussed. Methods of solidifying the wastes and the chemical durability of the solidified waste under disposal conditions are reviewed. Various alternative container designs are reviewed, ranging from preliminary conceptual designs to designs that have received extensive prototype testing. Results of structural performance, welding and inspection studies are also summarized. The corrosion of

  20. The psychosocial consequences of spent fuel disposal; Kaeytetyn ydinpolttoaineen loppusijoituksen psykososiaaliset vaikutukset

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Paavola, J.; Eraenen, L. [Helsinki Univ. (Finland). Dept. of Social Psychology

    1999-03-01

    In this report the potential psychosocial consequences of spent fuel disposal to inhabitants of a community are assessed on the basis of earlier research. In studying the situation, different interpretations and meanings given to nuclear power are considered. First, spent fuel disposal is studied as fear-arousing and consequently stressful situation. Psychosomatic effects of stress and coping strategies used by an individual are presented. Stress as a collective phenomenon and coping mechanisms available for a community are also assessed. Stress reactions caused by natural disasters and technological disasters are compared. Consequences of nuclear power plant accidents are reviewed, e.g. research done on the accident at Three Mile Island power plant. Reasons for the disorganising effect on a community caused by a technological disaster are compared to the altruistic community often seen after natural disasters. The potential reactions that a spent fuel disposal plant can arouse in inhabitants are evaluated. Both short-term and long-term reactions are evaluated as well as reactions under normal functioning, after an incident and as a consequence of an accident. Finally an evaluation of how the decision-making system and citizens` opportunity to influence the decision-making affect the experience of threat is expressed. As a conclusion we see that spent fuel disposal can arouse fear and stress in people. However, the level of the stress is probably low. The stress is at strongest at the time of the starting of the spent fuel disposal plant. With time people get used to the presence of the plant and the threat experienced gets smaller. (orig.) 63 refs.

  1. Inspection of copper canister for spent nuclear fuel by means of ultrasound. Copper characterization, FSW monitoring with acoustic emission and ultrasonic imaging

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stepinski, Tadeusz

    2009-08-01

    This report contains the research results concerning advanced ultrasound for the inspection of copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel obtained at Signals and Systems, Uppsala University in 2008. The first part of the report is concerned with aspects related to ultrasonic attenuation of copper material used for canisters. We present results of attenuation measurement performed for a number of samples taken from a real canister; two from the lid and four from different parts of canister wall. Ultrasonic attenuation of the material originating from canister lid is relatively low (less that 50 dB/m) and essentially frequency independent in the frequency range up to 5 MHz. However, for the material originating from the extruded canister part considerable variations of the attenuation are observed, which can reach even 200 dB/m at 3.5 MHz. In the second part of the report we present further development of the concept of the friction stir welding process monitoring by means of multiple sensors formed into a uniform circular array (UCA). After a brief introduction into modeling Lamb waves and UCA we focus on array processing techniques that enable estimating direction of arrival of multimodal Lamb waves. We consider two new techniques, the Capon beamformer and the broadband multiple signal classification technique (MUSIC). We present simulation results illustrating their performance. In the final part we present the phase shift migration algorithm for ultrasonic imaging of layered media using synthetic aperture concept. We start from explaining theory of the phase migration concept, which is followed by the results of experiments performed on copper blocks with drilled holes. We show that the proposed algorithm performs well for immersion inspection of metal objects and yields both improved spatial resolution and suppressed grain noise

  2. Inspection of copper canister for spent nuclear fuel by means of ultrasound. Copper characterization, FSW monitoring with acoustic emission and ultrasonic imaging

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stepinski, Tadeusz (ed.); Engholm, Marcus; Olofsson, Tomas (Uppsala Univ., Signals and Systems, Dept. of Technical Sciences, Uppsala (Sweden))

    2009-08-15

    This report contains the research results concerning advanced ultrasound for the inspection of copper canisters for spent nuclear fuel obtained at Signals and Systems, Uppsala University in 2008. The first part of the report is concerned with aspects related to ultrasonic attenuation of copper material used for canisters. We present results of attenuation measurement performed for a number of samples taken from a real canister; two from the lid and four from different parts of canister wall. Ultrasonic attenuation of the material originating from canister lid is relatively low (less that 50 dB/m) and essentially frequency independent in the frequency range up to 5 MHz. However, for the material originating from the extruded canister part considerable variations of the attenuation are observed, which can reach even 200 dB/m at 3.5 MHz. In the second part of the report we present further development of the concept of the friction stir welding process monitoring by means of multiple sensors formed into a uniform circular array (UCA). After a brief introduction into modeling Lamb waves and UCA we focus on array processing techniques that enable estimating direction of arrival of multimodal Lamb waves. We consider two new techniques, the Capon beamformer and the broadband multiple signal classification technique (MUSIC). We present simulation results illustrating their performance. In the final part we present the phase shift migration algorithm for ultrasonic imaging of layered media using synthetic aperture concept. We start from explaining theory of the phase migration concept, which is followed by the results of experiments performed on copper blocks with drilled holes. We show that the proposed algorithm performs well for immersion inspection of metal objects and yields both improved spatial resolution and suppressed grain noise

  3. Instant-release fractions for the assessment of used nuclear fuel disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garisto, N.C.; Vance, E.R.; Stroes-Gascoyne, S.; Johnson, L.H.

    1989-02-01

    Quantitative estimates of instant-release fractions for the potential release of radionuclides from used CANDU fuel in an underground disposal vault have been made in terms of probability- density functions, taking variability and uncertainty into account. The radionuclides included in this study are 129 I, 135 Cs, 79 Se, 126 Sn, 99 Tc, 14 C, and 3 H. The probability-density functions are based on experimental data on the short term release of radionuclides upon contact with groundwater, and on a knowledge of the solid-state chemistry of used fuel. They provide source terms for the environmental and safety assessment of used nuclear fuel disposal

  4. Sampling and analysis plan for sludge located in fuel storage canisters of the 105-K West basin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baker, R.B.

    1997-01-01

    This Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) provides direction for the first sampling of sludge from the K West Basin spent fuel canisters. The specially developed sampling equipment removes representative samples of sludge while maintaining the radioactive sample underwater in the basin pool (equipment is described in WHC-SD-SNF-SDD-004). Included are the basic background logic for sample selection, the overall laboratory analyses required and the laboratory reporting required. These are based on requirements put forth in the data quality objectives (WHC-SD-SNF-DQO-012) established for this sampling and characterization activity

  5. Spent nuclear fuel discharges from US reactors 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) administers the Nuclear Fuel Data Survey, Form RW-859. This form is used to collect data on fuel assemblies irradiated at commercial nuclear reactors operating in the United States, and the current inventories and storage capacities of those reactors. These data are important to the design and operation of the equipment and facilities that DOE will use for the future acceptance, transportation, and disposal of spent fuels. The data collected and presented identifies trends in burnup, enrichment, and spent nuclear fuel discharged form commercial light-water reactor as of December 31, 1993. The document covers not only spent nuclear fuel discharges; but also site capacities and inventories; canisters and nonfuel components; and assembly type characteristics

  6. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-04-07

    This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for

  7. Risk analysis methodology for unreprocessed spent fuel disposal in bedded salt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepping, R.E.; Chu, M.S.Y.; Cranwell, R.M.

    1982-01-01

    In accordance with the decision to defer the reprocessing of commercially generated spent fuel, we are investigating the implications on risk of direct disposal of spent fuel assemblies. To the extent possible, we are using the methodology developed at Sandia for the NRC to evaluate risks from the disposal of wastes from reprocessing of spent fuel. This allows direct comparison of the risks calculated for the two waste forms. A number of differences between the two waste forms with implications on risk have been identified and investigation of their effects has begun. Among these are the presence of gases and additional plutonium and uranium isotopes, the potential for differing leach behavior, and the difference in the decay heat source which determines the overall thermomechanical response of the host media. We have analyzed a number of scenarios for a hypothetical geologic repository that have been identified as important contributors to risk from the disposal of both reprocessed and unreprocessed spent fuel. For each scenario, we employ the Groundwater Transport, Pathways to Man, and Dosimetry and Health Effects models of the High Level Waste Methodology. Risks are compared for the reprocessed and unreprocessed spent fuel wastes and the effects of uncertainty in the parameters of the various models are compared

  8. Used Fuel Disposal in Crystalline Rocks. FY15 Progress Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wang, Yifeng [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-08-20

    The objective of the Crystalline Disposal R&D Work Package is to advance our understanding of long-term disposal of used fuel in crystalline rocks and to develop necessary experimental and computational capabilities to evaluate various disposal concepts in such media. Chapter headings are as follows: Fuel matrix degradation model and its integration with performance assessments, Investigation of thermal effects on the chemical behavior of clays, Investigation of uranium diffusion and retardation in bentonite, Long-term diffusion of U(VI) in bentonite: dependence on density, Sorption and desorption of plutonium by bentonite, Dissolution of plutonium intrinsic colloids in the presence of clay and as a function of temperature, Laboratory investigation of colloid-facilitated transport of cesium by bentonite colloids in a crystalline rock system, Development and demonstration of discrete fracture network model, Fracture continuum model and its comparison with discrete fracture network model.

  9. High-level waste canister envelope study: structural analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-11-01

    The structural integrity of waste canisters, fabricated from standard weight Type 304L stainless steel pipe, was analyzed for sizes ranging from 8 to 24 in. diameter and 10 to 16 feet long under normal, abnormal, and improbable life cycle loading conditions. The canisters are assumed to be filled with vitrified high-level nuclear waste, stored temporarily at a fuel reprocessing plant, and then transported for storage in an underground salt bed or other geologic storage. In each of the three impact conditions studies, the resulting impact force is far greater than the elastic limit capacity of the material. Recommendations are made for further study

  10. Horizontal modular dry irradiated fuel storage system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fischer, Larry E.; McInnes, Ian D.; Massey, John V.

    1988-01-01

    A horizontal, modular, dry, irradiated fuel storage system (10) includes a thin-walled canister (12) for containing irradiated fuel assemblies (20), which canister (12) can be positioned in a transfer cask (14) and transported in a horizontal manner from a fuel storage pool (18), to an intermediate-term storage facility. The storage system (10) includes a plurality of dry storage modules (26) which accept the canister (12) from the transfer cask (14) and provide for appropriate shielding about the canister (12). Each module (26) also provides for air cooling of the canister (12) to remove the decay heat of the irradiated fuel assemblies (20). The modules (26) can be interlocked so that each module (26) gains additional shielding from the next adjacent module (26). Hydraulic rams (30) are provided for inserting and removing the canisters (12) from the modules (26).

  11. Characterization of projected DWPF glasses heat treated to simulate canister centerline cooling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marra, S.L.; Jantzen, C.M.

    1992-05-01

    Liquid high-level nuclear waste will be immobilized at the Savannah River Site (SRS) by vitrification in borosilicate glass. The glass will be produced and poured into stainless steel canisters in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). Eventually these canistered waste forms will be sent to a geologic repository for final disposal. In order to assure acceptability by the repository, the Department of Energy has defined requirements which DWPF canistered waste forms must meet. These requirements are the Waste Acceptance Preliminary Specifications (WAPS). The WAPS require DWPF to identify the crystalline phases expected to be present in the final glass product. Knowledge of the thermal history of the borosilicate glass during filling and cooldown of the canister is necessary to determine the amount and type of crystalline phases present in the final glass product. Glass samples of seven projected DWPF compositions were cooled following the same temperature profile as that of glass at the centerline of the full-scale DWPF canister. The glasses were characterized by x-ray diffraction and scanning electron microscopy to identify the crystalline phases present The volume percents of each crystalline phase present were determined by quantitative x-ray diffraction. The Product Consistency Test (PCI) was used to determine the durability of the heat-treated glasses

  12. A design concept of underground facilities for the deep geologic disposal of spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jong Youl; Choi, Heui Joo; Choi, Jong Won; Hahn, Pil Soo

    2005-01-01

    Spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants can be disposed in the underground repository. In this paper, a concept of Korean Reference HLW disposal System (KRS-1) design is presented. Though no site for the underground repository has been specified in Korea, but a generic site with granitic rock is considered for reference spent fuel repository design. To implement the concept, design requirements such as spent fuel characteristics and capacity of the repository and design principles were established. Then, based on these requirements and principles, a concept of the disposal process, the facilities and the layout of the repository was developed

  13. SKB 91. Final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Importance of the bedrock for safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-05-01

    The safety of a deep repository for spent nuclear fuel has been assessed in this report. The spent fuel is assumed to be encapsulated in a copper canister and deposited at a depth of 600 m in the bedrock. The primary purpose has been to shed light on the importance of the geological features of the site for the safety of a final repository. The assessment shows that the encapsulated fuel will, in all likelihood, be kept isolated from the groundwater for millions of years. This is considerably longer than the more than 100 000 years that are required in order for the toxicity of the waste to have declined to a level equivalent to that of rich uranium ores. However, in order to be able to study the role of the rock as a barrier to the dispersal of radioactive materials, calculations have been carried out under the assumption that waste canisters leak. The results show that the safety of a carefully designed repository is only affected to a small extent by the ability of the rock to retain the escaping radionuclides. The primary role of the rock is to provide stable mechanical and chemical conditions in the repository over a long period of time so that the function of the engineered barriers is not jeopardized. (187 refs.) (au)

  14. Plan for safety case of spent fuel repository at Olkiluoto

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vieno, T.; Ikonen, A.T.K.

    2005-02-01

    Posiva aims to present the Safety Case supporting the construction license application of the spent fuel repository at Olkiluoto by 2012. An outline and preliminary assessments will be presented in 2009. Interim reporting and an update of the Safety Case plan will be presented in 2006, as required by the authorities. The KBS-3 disposal concept aims at long-term isolation and containment of spent fuel assemblies in durable copper-iron canisters emplaced in a repository to be constructed at a depth between 400 and 600 metres in crystalline bedrock. By 2012, studies on the KBS-3 disposal concept and site investigations at Olkiluoto will have been continued over about thirty years. The construction of an underground rock characterisation facility (called ONKALO) was started in June 2004. The investigations are carried out in close cooperation with the Swedish SKB developing and assessing the same disposal concept at candidate sites, resembling Olkiluoto, at the other side of the Baltic Sea. A safety case is the synthesis of evidence, analyses and arguments that quantify and substantiate the safety, and the level of expert confidence in the safety, of a planned repository. Posiva's Safety Case will be organised in a portfolio including ten main reports, which will be periodically updated according the overall schedule presented in the plan. The Site report describing the present state and past evolution of the Olkiluoto site, as well as the disturbances caused by the construction of ONKALO and the first stage of the repository, forms the geoscientific basis of the Safety Case. The engineering basis is provided by the reports on the Characteristics of spent fuel, Canister design, and Repository design. The Process report containing descriptions and analyses of features, events and processes potentially affecting the disposal system, and the report on the Evolution of site and repository form the scientific basis of the Safety Case. The latter report will describe and

  15. Methods of characterization of salt formations in view of spent fuel final disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diaconu, Daniela; Balan, Valeriu; Mirion, Ilie

    2002-01-01

    Deep disposal in geological formations of salt, granite and clay seems to be at present the most proper and commonly adopted solution for final disposal of high-level radioactive wastes and spent fuel. Disposing such wastes represents the top-priority issue of the European research community in the field of nuclear power. Although seemingly premature for Romanian power system, the interest for final disposal of spent fuel is justified by the long duration implied by the studies targeting this objective. At the same time these studies represent the Romanian nuclear research contribution in the frame of the efforts of integration within the European research field. Although Romania has not made so far a decision favoring a given geological formation for the final disposal of spent fuel resulting from Cernavoda NPP, the most generally taken into consideration appears the salt formation. The final decision will be made following the evaluation of its performances to spent fuel disposal based on the values of the specific parameters of the geological formation. In order to supply the data required as input parameters in the codes of evaluation of the geological formation performances, the INR Pitesti initiated a package of modern and complex methodologies for such determinations. The studies developed so far followed up the special phenomenon of salt convergence, a phenomenon characteristic for only this kind of rock, as well as the radionuclide migration. These studies allow a better understanding of these processes of upmost importance for disposal's safety. The methods and the experimental installation designed and realized at INR Pitesti aimed at determination of thermal expansion coefficient, thermal conductivity, specific heat, which are all parameters of high specific interest for high level radioactive waste or spent fuel disposal. The paper presents the results of these studies as well as the methodologies, the experimental installations and the findings

  16. Grain boundary corrosion of copper canister weld material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gubner, Rolf; Andersson, Urban; Linder, Mats; Nazarov, Andrej; Taxen, Claes

    2006-01-01

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues in Sweden is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will then be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast inner container fitted inside a corrosion-resistant copper canister. During fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow, they will tend to concentrate impurities within the copper at the new grain boundaries. The work described in this report was undertaken to determine whether there is any possibility of enhanced corrosion at grain boundaries within the copper canister, based on the recommendations of the report SKB-TR--01-09 (INIS ref. 32025363). Grain boundary corrosion of copper is not expected to be a problem for the copper canisters in a repository. However, as one step in the experimental verification it is necessary to study grain boundary corrosion of copper in an environment where it may occur. A literature study aimed to find one or several solutions that are aggressive with respect to grain boundary corrosion of copper. Copper specimens cut from welds of real copper canisters where exposed to aerated ammonium hydroxide solution for a period of 14 days at 80 degrees C and 10 bar pressure. The samples were investigated prior to exposure using the scanning Kelvin probe technique to characterize anodic and cathodic areas on the samples. The degree of corrosion was determined by optical microscopy. No grain boundary corrosion could be observed in the autoclave experiments, however, a higher rate of corrosion was observed for the weld material compared to the base material. The work suggests that grain boundary corrosion of copper weld material is most unlikely to adversely affect SKB's copper canisters under the conditions in the repository

  17. Grain boundary corrosion of copper canister weld material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gubner, Rolf; Andersson, Urban; Linder, Mats; Nazarov, Andrej; Taxen, Claes [Corrosion and Metals Research Inst. (KIMAB), Stockholm (Sweden)

    2006-01-15

    The proposed design for a final repository for spent fuel and other long-lived residues in Sweden is based on the multi-barrier principle. The waste will be encapsulated in sealed cylindrical canisters, which will then be placed in granite bedrock and surrounded by compacted bentonite clay. The canister design is based on a thick cast inner container fitted inside a corrosion-resistant copper canister. During fabrication of the outer copper canisters there will be some unavoidable grain growth in the welded areas. As grains grow, they will tend to concentrate impurities within the copper at the new grain boundaries. The work described in this report was undertaken to determine whether there is any possibility of enhanced corrosion at grain boundaries within the copper canister, based on the recommendations of the report SKB-TR--01-09 (INIS ref. 32025363). Grain boundary corrosion of copper is not expected to be a problem for the copper canisters in a repository. However, as one step in the experimental verification it is necessary to study grain boundary corrosion of copper in an environment where it may occur. A literature study aimed to find one or several solutions that are aggressive with respect to grain boundary corrosion of copper. Copper specimens cut from welds of real copper canisters where exposed to aerated ammonium hydroxide solution for a period of 14 days at 80 degrees C and 10 bar pressure. The samples were investigated prior to exposure using the scanning Kelvin probe technique to characterize anodic and cathodic areas on the samples. The degree of corrosion was determined by optical microscopy. No grain boundary corrosion could be observed in the autoclave experiments, however, a higher rate of corrosion was observed for the weld material compared to the base material. The work suggests that grain boundary corrosion of copper weld material is most unlikely to adversely affect SKB's copper canisters under the conditions in the repository.

  18. Canisters and nonfuel components at commercial nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibbard, K.; Thorpe, J.; Moore, R.S.

    1995-01-01

    The Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) collects data annually from commercial nuclear power reactors via the Nuclear Fuel Data survey, Form RW-859. Over the past three years, the survey has collected data on the quantities and types of nonfuel components and on the quantities and contents of canisters in storage at reactor sites. This paper focuses on the annual changes in the data, specific implications of these changes, and lessons that should be applied to future revisions of the study. The total number of canisters reported by utilities for each year from 1986 to 1993 is listed. Changes in the quantities of nonfuel components report by General Reactors from 1992 to 1993 are also provided. Comparisons of canister and nonfuel components components data from year to year and from reactor to reactor point out that survey questions on these topics have been interpreted differently by reactor personnel

  19. Monitoring methods for nuclear fuel waste disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cooper, R B; Barnard, J W; Bird, G A [and others

    1997-11-01

    This report examines a variety of monitoring activities that would likely be involved in a nuclear fuel waste disposal project, during the various stages of its implementation. These activities would include geosphere, environmental, vault performance, radiological, safeguards, security and community socioeconomic and health monitoring. Geosphere monitoring would begin in the siting stage and would continue at least until the closure stage. It would include monitoring of regional and local seismic activity, and monitoring of physical, chemical and microbiological properties of groundwater in rock and overburden around and in the vault. Environmental monitoring would also begin in the siting stage, focusing initially on baseline studies of plants, animals, soil and meteorology, and later concentrating on monitoring for changes from these benchmarks in subsequent stages. Sampling designs would be developed to detect changes in levels of contaminants in biota, water and air, soil and sediments at and around the disposal facility. Vault performance monitoring would include monitoring of stress and deformation in the rock hosting the disposal vault, with particular emphasis on fracture propagation and dilation in the zone of damaged rock surrounding excavations. A vault component test area would allow long-term observation of containers in an environment similar to the working vault, providing information on container corrosion mechanisms and rates, and the physical, chemical and thermal performance of the surrounding sealing materials and rock. During the operation stage, radiological monitoring would focus on protecting workers from radiation fields and loose contamination, which could be inhaled or ingested. Operational zones would be established to delineate specific hazards to workers, and movement of personnel and materials between zones would be monitored with radiation detectors. External exposures to radiation fields would be monitored with dosimeters worn by

  20. Design basis for the copper/steel canister. Stage three. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowyer, W.H.

    1997-02-01

    The development of the copper/iron canister proposed for the containment of high-level waste in the Swedish disposal programme has been studied from the points of view of choice of materials, manufacturing technology and Q A. This report describes the observations on progress which has been made between March 1995 and February 1996 and the results of further literature studies. A first trial canister has been produced by SKB using a fabricated steel liner and an extruded copper tubular, a second one using a fabricated tubular is at an advanced stage. A change from a fabricated steel inner canister to a proposed cast canister has been justified by a criticality argument but the technology for producing a cast canister is at present untried. It is considered that such a change will require a significant development programme. The microstructure achieved in the extruded copper tubular for the first canister is unacceptable. An improved microstructure may be achieved by extruding at a lower temperature but this remains to be demonstrated. Similar problems exist with plate used for the fabricated tubular but some more favourable structures have been achieved already by this route. Seam welding of the first tubular failed through a suspected material problem. The second fabricated tubular welded without difficulty. However it was necessary to constrain it during welding and it subsequently distorted during machining. There was some evidence of hot tearing close to the weld. The distortion problem may be overcome by a stress relieving anneal but this could cause further grain size problems. 19 refs

  1. Second interim assessment of the Canadian concept for nuclear fuel waste disposal. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gillespie, P.A.; Wuschke, D.M.; Guvanasen, V.M.; Mehta, K.K.; McConnell, D.B.; Tamm, J.A.; Lyon, R.B.

    1985-12-01

    The nuclear fuel waste disposal concept chosen for development and assessment in Canada involves the burial of corrosion-resistant containers of waste in a vault located deep in plutonic rock in the Canadian Shield. As the concept and the assessment tools are developed, periodic assessments are performed to permit evaluatin of the methodology and provide feedback to those developing the concept. The ultimate goal of these assessments is to predict what impact the disposal system would have if the concept were implemented. The second assessment was performed in 1984 and is documented in Second Interim Assessment of the Canadian Concept for Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal - Volumes 1 to 4. This volume, entitled Background, discusses Canadian nuclear fuel wastes and the desirable features of a waste disposal method. It outlines several disposal options being considered by a number of countries, including the option chosen for development and assessment in Canada. The reference disposal systems assumed for the second assessment are described, and the approach used for concept assessment is discussed briefly. 79 refs

  2. The final disposal facility of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prvakova, S.; Necas, V.

    2001-01-01

    Today the most serious problem in the area of nuclear power engineering is the management of spent nuclear fuel. Due to its very high radioactivity the nuclear waste must be isolated from the environment. The perspective solution of nuclear fuel cycle is the final disposal into geological formations. Today there is no disposal facility all over the world. There are only underground research laboratories in the well developed countries like the USA, France, Japan, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Belgium. From the economical point of view the most suitable appears to build a few international repositories. According to the political and social aspect each of the country prepare his own project of the deep repository. The status of those programmes in different countries is described. The development of methods for the long-term management of radioactive waste is necessity in all countries that have had nuclear programmes. (authors)

  3. Probabilistic analysis of canister inserts for spent nuclear fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dillstroem, Peter [Det Norske Veritas, Stockholm (Sweden)

    2005-10-01

    In this study, probabilistic analysis of canister inserts for spent nuclear fuel has been performed. The main conclusions are: 1. For the baseline case, the probability of failure is insignificant ({approx} 2x10{sup -9}). This is the case even though several conservative assumptions have been made both in underlying deterministic analysis and in the probabilistic analysis. 2. The initiation event dominates (over the local collapse event) when the external pressure is below the baseline case (p = 44 MPa). The local collapse event dominates when the external pressure is above the baseline case. 3. The local collapse event is strongly dependent of the assumed external pressure. 4. The analysis of collapse only considers the first local collapse event, total collapse of the insert will occur at a much higher pressure. 5. The resulting probabilities are more dependent on the assumption regarding the eccentricity of the cassette than the assumption regarding outer corner radius of the profiles for steel section cassette. The results indicate that the maximum allowed eccentricity should not be larger than 5 mm. 6. The probability of initiation of crack growth is calculated using a defect distribution where one assumes the existence of one crack-like defect. A simple scaling argument can be applied to consider the number of defects through the thickness.

  4. Evaluation of source term parameters for spent fuel disposal in foreign countries. (1) Instant release fraction from spent fuel matrices and composition materials for fuel assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nagata, Masanobu; Chikazawa, Takahiro; Kitamura, Akira; Tachi, Yukio; Akahori, Kuniaki

    2016-01-01

    Although spent nuclear fuel is planned to be disposed after reprocessing and vitrification of high-level radioactive waste (HLW), feasibility study on direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SF) has been started as one of the alternative disposal options to flexibly apply change of future energy situation in Japan. Radionuclide inventories and their release behavior after breaching spent fuel container should be assessed to confirm safety of the SF disposal. Especially, instant release fractions (IRFs), which are fractions of radionuclide released relatively faster than those released with congruent dissolution with SF and construction materials after breaching spent fuel container, may have an impact on safety assessment of the direct disposal of SF. However, detailed studies on evaluation / estimation of IRF have not been performed in Japan. Therefore, we investigated some foreign safety assessment reports on direct disposal of SF by focusing on IRF for the safety assessment of Japanese SF disposal system. As a result of comparison between the safety assessment reports in foreign countries, although some fundamental data have been referred to the reports in common, the final source term dataset was seen differences between countries in the result of taking into account the national circumstances (reactor types and burnups, etc.). We also found the difference of assignment of uncertainties among the investigated reports; a report selected pessimistic values and another report selected mean values and their deviations. It is expected that these findings are useful as fundamental information for the safety assessment of Japanese SF disposal system. (author)

  5. German concept and status of the disposal of spent fuel elements from German research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Komorowski, K.; Storch, S.; Thamm, G.

    1995-01-01

    Eight research reactors with a power ≥ 100 kW are currently being operated in the Federal Republic of Germany. These comprise three TRIGA-type reactors (power 100 kW to 250 kW), four swimming-pool reactors (power 1 MW to 10 MW) and one DIDO type reactor (power 23 MW). The German research reactors are used for neutron scattering for basic research in the field of solid state research, neutron metrology, for the fabrication of isotopes and for neutron activation analysis for medicine and biology, for investigating the influence of radiation on materials and for nuclear fuel behavior. It will be vital to continue current investigations in the future. Further operation of the German research reactors is therefore indispensable. Safe, regular disposal of the irradiated fuel elements arising now and in future operation is of primary importance. Furthermore, there are several plants with considerable quantities of spent fuel, the safe disposal of which is a matter of urgency. These include above all the VKTA facilities in Rossendorf and also the TRIGA reactors, where disposal will only be necessary upon decommissioning. The present paper report is concerned with the disposal of fuel from the German research reactors. It briefly deals with the situation in the USA since the end of 1988, describes interim solutions for current disposal requirements and then mainly concentrates on the German disposal concept currently being prepared. This concept initially envisages the long-term (25--50 years) dry interim storage of fuel elements in special containers in a central German interim store with subsequent direct final disposal without reprocessing of the irradiated fuel

  6. NDA techniques for spent fuel verification and radiation monitoring. Report on activities 6a and 6b of Task JNT C799 (SAGOR). Finnish support programme to the IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarvainen, M.; Levai, F.; Valentine, T.E.; Abhold, M.; Moran, B.

    1997-08-01

    A variety of NDA methods exist for measurement of spent fuel at various stages of the disposition process. Each of the methods has weaknesses and strengths that make them applicable to one or more stages in disposition. Both passive and active methods are, under favorable conditions, capable of providing either a mapping of an assembly to identify missing fuel pins or a measurement of the fissile content and some are capable of providing a mapping of a canister to identify missing assemblies or a measurement of the fissile content. However, a spent fuel measurement system capable of making routine partial defect tests of spent fuel assemblies is missing. The active NDA methods, in particular, the active neutron methods, hold the most promise for providing quantitative measurements on fuel assemblies and canisters. Application of NDA methods to shielded casks may not be practical or even possible due to the extent of radiation attenuation by the shielding materials, and none of these methods are considered to have potential for quantitative measurements once the spent fuel cask has been placed in a repository. The most practical approach to spent fuel verification is to confirm the characteristics of the spent fuel prior to loading in a canister or cask at the conditioning facility. Fissile material tracking systems in addition to containment and surveillance methods have the capability to assure continuity of the verified knowledge of the sample from loading of the canisters to final disposal and closing of the repository. (orig.)

  7. The offshore disposal of radioactive waste by drilled emplacement: A feasibility study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bury, M.R.C.

    1985-01-01

    This book is a report, based on a study by Taylor Woodrow Construction Limited, on the overall feasibility of the disposal of high-level radioactive waste in boreholes drilled deep into the ocean bed. The work comprises an engineering appraisal of the disposal process with a view to establishing technical and operational feasibility and providing overall cost information to enable an economic assessment to be made. Contents: Summary report; Reference criteria; Drilling operation; Transfer of radioactive waste, personnel and other supplies; Handling of radioactive waste on board; Lowering strings of canisters; Emplacement and backfilling of canisters; Preliminary design of marine platform; Retrieval of flasks or canisters lost or misplaced; Variations to the features of the lowering system; Logistics of the operation; Construction cost estimate; Operational costs; Appendix

  8. Multi-Canister overpack sealing configuration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SMITH, K.E.

    1998-01-01

    The Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) position regarding the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) sealing configuration is to initially rely on an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section III Subsection NB code compliant mechanical closure/sealing system to quickly and safely establish and maintain full confinement of radioactive materials prior to and during MCO fuel drying activities. Previous studies have shown the mechanical seal to be the preferred closure method, based on dose, cost, and schedule considerations. The cost and schedule impacts of redesigning the mechanical closure to a welded shield plug do not support changing the closure system. The SNF Project has determined that the combined mechanical/welded closure system meets or exceeds the regulatory requirements to provide redundant seals while accommodating key safety and schedule limitations that are unique to K Basins fuel removal effort

  9. Drop Calculations of HLW Canister and Pu Can-in-Canister

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sreten Mastilovic

    2001-01-01

    The objective of this calculation is to determine the structural response of the standard high-level waste (HLW) canister and the canister containing the cans of immobilized plutonium (Pu) (''can-in-canister'' [CIC] throughout this document) subjected to drop DBEs (design basis events) during the handling operation. The evaluated DBE in the former case is 7-m (23-ft) vertical (flat-bottom) drop. In the latter case, two 2-ft (0.61-m) corner (oblique) drops are evaluated in addition to the 7-m vertical drop. These Pu CIC calculations are performed at three different temperatures: room temperature (RT) (20 C), T = 200 F = 93.3 C , and T = 400 F = 204 C ; in addition to these the calculation characterized by the highest maximum stress intensity is performed at T = 750 F = 399 C as well. The scope of the HLW canister calculation is limited to reporting the calculation results in terms of: stress intensity and effective plastic strain in the canister, directional residual strains at the canister outer surface, and change of canister dimensions. The scope of Pu CIC calculation is limited to reporting the calculation results in terms of stress intensity, and effective plastic strain in the canister. The information provided by the sketches from Reference 26 (Attachments 5.3,5.5,5.8, and 5.9) is that of the potential CIC design considered in this calculation, and all obtained results are valid for this design only. This calculation is associated with the Plutonium Immobilization Project and is performed by the Waste Package Design Section in accordance with Reference 24. It should be noted that the 9-m vertical drop DBE, included in Reference 24, is not included in the objective of this calculation since it did not become a waste acceptance requirement. AP-3.124, ''Calculations'', is used to perform the calculation and develop the document

  10. Extending Spent Fuel Storage until Transport for Reprocessing or Disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carlsen, Brett; Chiguer, Mustapha; Grahn, Per; Sampson, Michele; Wolff, Dietmar; Bevilaqua, Arturo; Wasinger, Karl; Saegusa, Toshiari; Seelev, Igor

    2016-09-01

    Spent fuel (SF) must be stored until an end point such as reprocessing or geologic disposal is imple-mented. Selection and implementation of an end point for SF depends upon future funding, legisla-tion, licensing and other factors that cannot be predicted with certainty. Past presumptions related to the availability of an end point have often been wrong and resulted in missed opportunities for properly informing spent fuel management policies and strategies. For example, dry cask storage systems were originally conceived to free up needed space in reactor spent fuel pools and also to provide SFS of up to 20 years until reprocessing and/or deep geological disposal became available. Hundreds of dry cask storage systems are now employed throughout the world and will be relied upon well beyond the originally envisioned design life. Given present and projected rates for the use of nuclear power coupled with projections for SF repro-cessing and disposal capacities, one concludes that SF storage will be prolonged, potentially for several decades. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently considered 300 years of storage to be appropriate for the characterization and prediction of ageing effects and ageing management issues associated with extending SF storage and subsequent transport. This paper encourages addressing the uncertainty associated with the duration of SF storage by de-sign – rather than by default. It suggests ways that this uncertainty may be considered in design, li-censing, policy, and strategy decisions and proposes a framework for safely extending spent fuel storage until SF can be transported for reprocessing or disposal – regardless of how long that may be. The paper however is not intended to either encourage or facilitate needlessly extending spent fuel storage durations. Its intent is to ensure a design and safety basis with sufficient margin to accommodate the full range of potential future scenarios. Although the focus is primarily on

  11. International program to study subseabed disposal of high-level radioactive wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlin, E.M.; Hinga, K.R.; Knauss, J.A.

    1984-01-01

    This report provides an overview of the international program to study seabed disposal of nuclear wastes. Its purpose is to inform legislators, other policy makers, and the general public as to the history of the program, technological requirements necessary for feasibility assessment, legal questions involved, international coordination of research, national policies, and research and development activities. Each of these major aspects of the program is presented in a separate section. The objective of seabed burial, similar to its continental counterparts, is to contain and to isolate the wastes. The subseabed option should not be confuesed with past practices of ocean dumping which have introduced wastes into ocean waters. Seabed disposal refers to the emplacement of solidified high-level radioactive waste (with or without reprocessing) in certain geologically stable sediments of the deep ocean floor. Specially designed surface ships would transport waste canisters from a port facility to the disposal site. Canisters would be buried from a few tens to a few hundreds of meters below the surface of ocean bottom sediments, and hence would not be in contact with the overlying ocean water. The concept is a multi-barrier approach for disposal. Barriers, including waste form, canister, ad deep ocean sediments, will separate wastes from the ocean environment. High-level wastes (HLW) would be stabilized by conversion into a leach-resistant solid form such as glass. This solid would be placed inside a metallic canister or other type of package which represents a second barrier. The deep ocean sediments, a third barrier, are discussed in the Feasibility Assessment section. The waste form and canister would provide a barrier for several hundred years, and the sediments would be relied upon as a barrier for thousands of years. 62 references, 3 figures, 2 tables

  12. Status of US program for disposal of spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, R.I.

    1991-04-01

    In this paper, a brief history of the United States' program for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the legislative acts that have guided the program are discussed. The current plans and schedules for beginning acceptance of SNF from the nuclear utilities for disposal are described, and some of the development activities supporting the program are discussed. And finally, the viability of the SNF disposal fee presently paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund by the owners/generators of commercial SNF and high-level waste (HLW) is examined. 12 refs., 9 figs

  13. Expert System analysis of non-fuel assembly hardware and spent fuel disassembly hardware: Its generation and recommended disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williamson, D.A.

    1991-01-01

    Almost all of the effort being expended on radioactive waste disposal in the United States is being focused on the disposal of spent Nuclear Fuel, with little consideration for other areas that will have to be disposed of in the same facilities. one area of radioactive waste that has not been addressed adequately because it is considered a secondary part of the waste issue is the disposal of the various Non-Fuel Bearing Components of the reactor core. These hardware components fall somewhat arbitrarily into two categories: Non-Fuel Assembly (NFA) hardware and Spent Fuel Disassembly (SFD) hardware. This work provides a detailed examination of the generation and disposal of NFA hardware and SFD hardware by the nuclear utilities of the United States as it relates to the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program. All available sources of data on NFA and SFD hardware are analyzed with particular emphasis given to the Characteristics Data Base developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the characterization work performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratories and Rochester Gas ampersand Electric. An Expert System developed as a portion of this work is used to assist in the prediction of quantities of NFA hardware and SFD hardware that will be generated by the United States' utilities. Finally, the hardware waste management practices of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, and Japan are studied for possible application to the disposal of domestic hardware wastes. As a result of this work, a general classification scheme for NFA and SFD hardware was developed. Only NFA and SFD hardware constructed of zircaloy and experiencing a burnup of less than 70,000 MWD/MTIHM and PWR control rods constructed of stainless steel are considered Low-Level Waste. All other hardware is classified as Greater-ThanClass-C waste

  14. Ion migration in ocean sediments: subseafloor radioactive waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nuttall, H.E.; Ray, A.K.; Davis, E.J.

    1980-01-01

    In this study of seabed disposal, analytical ion transport models were developed and used to elucidate ion migration through ocean sediments and to study the escape of ions from the ocean floor into the water column. An unsteady state isothermal diffusion model was developed for the region far from the canister to examine the effects of ion diffusion, adsorption, radioactive decay, sediment thickness and canister position. Analytical solutions were derived to represent the transient concentration profiles within the sediment, ion flux and the ion discharge rate to the water column for two types of initial conditions: instantaneous dissolution of the canister and constant canister leakage. Generalized graphs showing ion migration and behavior are presented

  15. Draft report: Results of stainless steel canister corrosion studies and environmental sample investigations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bryan, Charles R. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States); Enos, David [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2014-09-01

    This progress report describes work being done at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to assess the localized corrosion performance of container/cask materials used in the interim storage of used nuclear fuel. The work involves both characterization of the potential physical and chemical environment on the surface of the storage canisters and how it might evolve through time, and testing to evaluate performance of the canister materials under anticipated storage conditions.

  16. Estimates of durability of TMI-2 core debris canisters and cask liners

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, A.B. Jr.; Lund, A.L.; Pednekar, S.P.

    1994-04-01

    Core debris from the Three Mile Island-2 (TMI-2) reactor is currently stored in stainless steel canisters. The need to maintain the integrity of the TMI-2 core debris containers through the period of extended storage and possibly into disposal prompted this assessment. In the assessment, corrosion-induced degradation was estimated for two materials: type 304L stainless steel (SS) canisters that contain the core debris, and type 1020 carbon steel (CS) liners in the concrete casks planned for containing the canisters from 2000 AD until the TMI-2 core debris is placed in a repository. Three environments were considered: air-saturated water (with 2 ppM Cl - ) at 20 degree C, and air at 20 degree C with two relative humidities (RHs), 10 and 40%. Corrosion mechanisms assessed included general corrosion (failure criterion: 50% loss of wall thickness) and localized attack (failure criterion: through-wall pinhole penetration). Estimation of carbon steel corrosion after 50 y also was requested

  17. Discount rate in the spent fuel storage and disposal fee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forster, J.D.; Cohen, S.

    1980-04-01

    After introducing the financial analyses, discount rates, and interest rates involved, the study discusses existing government guidelines for establishing charges for any service provided by the government to be paid by users of those services. Three current government user charges are analyzed including specifically their interest rate policies and how these charges provide precedent for the spent fuel acceptance and disposal fee: uranium enrichment services, the sale of electric power, and the delivery of experiments to orbit by the NASA Space Shuttle. The current DOE policy regarding this storage and disposal fee is stated and discussed. Features of this policy include: the full government cost is borne by users of the services provided; the fee is established and due in full at the time of spent fuel delivery; and the fee is adjusted when spent fuel is transferred from the AFR to the repository. Four evaluation criteria for use in analyzing the applications of discount rates in the spent fuel acceptance fee calculation are discussed. Three outstanding issues are discussed

  18. Radioactive waste management decommissioning spent fuel storage. V. 3. Waste transport, handling and disposal spent fuel storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    As part of the book entitled Radioactive waste management decommissioning spent fuel storage, vol. 3 dealts with waste transport, handling and disposal, spent fuel storage. Twelve articles are presented concerning the industrial aspects of nuclear waste management in France [fr

  19. Material streams in the fuel supply to and disposal of waste from nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Merz, E.

    1990-01-01

    The nuclear fuel cycle is characterized by specifically small, but complex material streams. The fresh fuel derived from natural uranium is fed into the cycle at the stage of fuel element fabrication, while at the end stage, waste from spent fuel element reprocessing, or non-reprocessible fuel elements, are taken out of the cycle and prepared for ultimate disposal. The alternative methods of waste management, reprocessing or direct ultimate disposal, are an issue of controversial debate with regard to their differences in terms of supply policy, economic and ecological aspects. (orig.) [de

  20. Assessment of alternative disposal concepts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Autio, J.; Saanio, T.; Tolppanen, P. [Saanio and Riekkola Consulting Engineers, Helsinki (Finland); Raiko, H.; Vieno, T. [VTT Energy, Espoo (Finland); Salo, J.P. [Posiva Oy, Helsinki (Finland)

    1996-12-01

    Four alternative repository designs for the disposal of spent nuclear in the Finnish crystalline bedrock were assessed in the study. The alternatives were: (1) the basic KBS-3 design in which copper canisters are emplaced in vertical deposition holes bored in the floors of horizontal tunnels, (2) the KBS-3-2C design with two canisters in a deposition hole, (3) Short Horizontal Holes (SHH) in the side walls of the tunnels, and (4) the Medium Long Holes (MLH) concept in which approximately 25 canisters are emplaced in a horizontal deposition hole about 200 metres in length bored between central and side tunnels. In all the alternatives considered, the thickness of the layer of compacted bentonite between copper canister and bedrock is 35 cm. Two different copper canister designs were also assessed. Technical feasibility and flexibility, post-closure safety and repository cost were assessed for each of the alternative canister and repository designs. On the basis of this assessment it is recommended that further development and studies should focus on the vacuum- or inert gas-filled cast insert type copper canister and the basic KBS-3 type repository design with a single canister in a vertical deposition hole. The KBS-3 design is robust and flexible and provides excellent post-closure safety. The transfer, emplacement and sealing operations are technically uncomplicated. The alternative options assessed do not offer any significant benefits in safety or cost over the basic design, but they are technically more complex and also in some respects more vulnerable to malfunction during the emplacement of canisters and buffer, as well as common mode failures. (60 refs.).

  1. Assessment of alternative disposal concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Autio, J.; Saanio, T.; Tolppanen, P.; Raiko, H.; Vieno, T.; Salo, J.P.

    1996-12-01

    Four alternative repository designs for the disposal of spent nuclear in the Finnish crystalline bedrock were assessed in the study. The alternatives were: (1) the basic KBS-3 design in which copper canisters are emplaced in vertical deposition holes bored in the floors of horizontal tunnels, (2) the KBS-3-2C design with two canisters in a deposition hole, (3) Short Horizontal Holes (SHH) in the side walls of the tunnels, and (4) the Medium Long Holes (MLH) concept in which approximately 25 canisters are emplaced in a horizontal deposition hole about 200 metres in length bored between central and side tunnels. In all the alternatives considered, the thickness of the layer of compacted bentonite between copper canister and bedrock is 35 cm. Two different copper canister designs were also assessed. Technical feasibility and flexibility, post-closure safety and repository cost were assessed for each of the alternative canister and repository designs. On the basis of this assessment it is recommended that further development and studies should focus on the vacuum- or inert gas-filled cast insert type copper canister and the basic KBS-3 type repository design with a single canister in a vertical deposition hole. The KBS-3 design is robust and flexible and provides excellent post-closure safety. The transfer, emplacement and sealing operations are technically uncomplicated. The alternative options assessed do not offer any significant benefits in safety or cost over the basic design, but they are technically more complex and also in some respects more vulnerable to malfunction during the emplacement of canisters and buffer, as well as common mode failures. (60 refs.)

  2. Analysis of economic impacts on waste management and disposal in different nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-09-01

    The costs for waste management and disposal have been estimated for the comparison of the seven reference fuel cycles selected by INFCE working group 7, covering the waste management of all steps in each fuel cycle: mining and milling, conversion and enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor operation, reprocessing or spent fuel packaging, and disposal in a geologic formation (salt or hard rock). Values for a large variety of parameters had to be assumed. The cost figures as broken down in detail in the report have been calculated for an electricity production of 50 Gigawatt-years per year. The sum totals amount to about 8 to 17 million US (as of January 1, 1978) per Gigawattyear electricity produced, depending on the fuel cycle and on the geologic host formation of the repository. No savings should be obtained for a larger capacity, but a capacity of 10 Gigawatt would entail figures 10 to 25% higher. This result has to be seen under the perspective of the sometimes conservative and arbitrary assumptions of WG 7 with respect to waste arisings and their disposal. Furthermore, as compared to the revenues for the electricity sold, the relative difference between the reference fuel cycles in costs of waste management and disposal does not appear to be significant, as they range only from 1 to 2% of the total electricity costs

  3. Preparing, Loading and Shipping Irradiated Metals in Canisters Classified as Remote-Handled (RH) Low-Level Waste (LLW) From Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to the Nevada Test Site (NTS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland, B.C.; Moore, T.D.

    2006-01-01

    Irradiated metals, classified as remote-handled low-level waste generated at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, were containerised in various sized canisters for long-term storage. The legacy waste canisters were placed in below-grade wells located at the 7827 Facility until a pathway for final disposal at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) could be identified and approved. Once the pathway was approved, WESKEM, LLC was selected by Bechtel Jacobs Company, LLC to prepare, load, and ship these canisters from ORNL to the NTS. This paper details some of the technical challenges encountered during the retrieval process and solutions implemented to ensure the waste was safely and efficiently over-packed and shipped for final disposal. The technical challenges detailed in this paper include: 1) how to best perform canister/lanyard pre-lift inspections since some canisters had not been moved in ∼10 years, so deterioration was a concern; 2) replacing or removing damaged canister lanyards; 3) correcting a mis-cut waste canister lanyard resulting in a shielded overpack lid not seating properly; 4) retrieving a stuck canister; and 5) developing a path forward after an overstrained lanyard failed causing a well shield plug to fall and come in contact with a waste canister. Several of these methods can serve as positive lessons learned for other projects encountering similar situations. (authors)

  4. Heat transfer enhancement for spent nuclear fuel assembly disposal packages using metallic void fillers: A prevention technique for solidification shrinkage-induced interfacial gaps

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Yongsoo, E-mail: yspark@alum.mit.edu; McKrell, Thomas J.; Driscoll, Michael J.

    2017-06-15

    This study considers replacing the externally accessible void spaces inside a disposal package containing a spent nuclear fuel assembly (SNFA) with high heat conducting metal to increase the effective thermal conductivity of the package and simplify the heat transfer mechanism inside the package by reducing it to a conduction dominant problem. The focus of the study is on preventing the gaps adjacent to the walls of the package components, produced by solidification shrinkage of poured liquid metal. We approached the problem by providing a temporary coating layer on the components to avoid direct build-up of thick metal oxides on their surface to promote metallic bonding at the interfaces under a non-inert environment. Laboratory scale experiments without SNFA were performed with Zn coated low carbon steel canisters and Zamak-3 void filler under two different filling temperature conditions – below and above the melting point of Zn (designated BMP and AMP respectively). Gap formation was successfully prevented in both cases while we confirmed an open gap in a control experiment, which used an uncoated canister. Minor growth of Al-Fe intermetallic phases was observed at the canister/filler interface of the sample produced under the BMP condition while their growth was significant and showed irregularly distributed morphology in the sample produced under the AMP condition, which has a potential to mitigate excessive residual stresses caused by shrinkage prevention. A procedure for the full-scale application was specified based on the results. - Highlights: •A void filling technique is introduced to enhance SNFA package heat transfer. •The technique is demonstrated via experiments using the Fe-Al-Zn system. •A procedure for the full scale application is proposed based on the results.

  5. Evaluation of Neutron Poison Materials for DOE SNF Disposal Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vinson, D.W.; Caskey, G.R. Jr.; Sindelar, R.L.

    1998-09-01

    Aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel (Al-SNF) from foreign and domestic research reactors is being consolidated at the Savannah River Site (SRS) for ultimate disposal in the Mined Geologic Disposal System (MGDS). Most of the aluminum-based fuel material contains highly enriched uranium (HEU) (more than 20 percent 235U), which challenges the preclusion of criticality events for disposal periods exceeding 10,000 years. Recent criticality analyses have shown that the addition of neutron absorbing materials (poisons) is needed in waste packages containing DOE SNF canisters fully loaded with Al-SNF under flooded and degraded configurations to demonstrate compliance with the requirement that Keff less than 0.95. Compatibility of poison matrix materials and the Al-SNF, including their relative degradation rate and solubility, are important to maintain criticality control. An assessment of the viability of poison and matrix materials has been conducted, and an experimental corrosion program has been initiated to provide data on degradation rates of poison and matrix materials and Al-SNF materials under repository relevant vapor and aqueous environments. Initial testing includes Al6061, Type 316L stainless steel, and A516Gr55 in synthesized J-13 water vapor at 50 degrees C, 100 degrees C, and 200 degrees C and in condensate water vapor at 100 degrees C. Preliminary results are presented herein

  6. 327 SNF fuel return to K-Basin quality process plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ham, J.E.

    1998-01-01

    The B and W Hanford Company's (BWHC) 327 Facility, in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site, contains Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) single fuel element canisters (SFEC) and fuel remnant canisters (FRC) which are to be returned to K-Basin. Seven shipments of up to six fuel canisters will be loaded into the CNS 1-13G Cask and transported to 105-KE

  7. Site-selection studies for final disposal of spent fuel in Finland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vuorela, P.; Aeikaes, T.

    1984-02-01

    In the management of waste by the Industrial Power Company Ltd. (TVO) preparations are being made for the final disposal of unprocessed spent fuel into the Finnish bedrock. The site selection program will advance in three phases. The final disposal site must be made at the latest by the end of the year 2000, in accordance with a decision laid down by the Finnish Government. In the first phase, 1983-85, the main object is to find homogeneous stable bedrock blocks surrounded by fracture zones located at a safe distance from the planned disposal area. The work usually starts with a regional structural analysis of mosaics of Landsat-1 winter and summer imagery. Next an assortment of different maps, which cover the whole country, is used. Technical methods for geological and hydrogeological site investigations are being developed during the very first phase of the studies, and a borehole 1000 meters deep will be made in southwestern Finland. Studies for the final disposal of spent fuel or high-level reprocessing waste have been made since 1974 in Finland. General suitability studies of the bedrock have been going on since 1977. The present results indicate that suitable investigation areas for the final disposal of highly active waste can be found in Finland

  8. Second interim assessment of the Canadian concept for nuclear fuel waste disposal. Volume 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wuschke, D.M.; Gillespie, P.A.; Main, D.E.

    1985-07-01

    The nuclear fuel waste disposal concept chosen for development and assessment in Canada involves the isolation of corrosion-resistant containers of waste in a vault located deep in plutonic rock. As the concept and the assessment tools are developed, periodic assessments are performed to permit evaluation of the methodology and provide feedback to those developing the concept. The ultimate goal of these assessments is to predict what impact the disposal system would have on man and the environment if the concept were implemented. The second assessment was performed in 1984 and is documented in the Second Interim assessment of the Canadian Concept for Nuclear Fuel Waste Disposal Volumes 1 to 4. This volume, entitled Summary, is a condensation of Volumes 2, 3 and 4. It briefly describes the Canadian nuclear fuel waste disposal concept, and the methods and results of the second interim pre-closure and post-closure assessments of that concept. 46 refs

  9. Corrosion of titanium and titanium alloys in spent fuel repository conditions - literature review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aho-Mantila, I.; Haenninen, H.; Aaltonen, P.; Taehtinen, S.

    1985-03-01

    The spent nuclear fuel is planned to be disposed in Finnish bedrock. The canister of spent fuel in waste repository is one barrier to the release of radionuclides. It is possible to choose a canister material with a known, measurable corrosion rate and to make it with thickness allowing corrosion to occur. The other possibility is to use a material which is nearly immune to general corrosion. In this second category there are titanium and titanium alloys which exhibit a very high degree of resistance to general corrosion. In this literature study the corrosion properties of unalloyed titanium, titanium alloyed with palladium and titanium alloyed with molybdenum and nickel are reviewed. The two titanium alloys own in addition to the excellent general corrosion properties outstanding properties against localized corrosion like pitting or crevice corrosion. Stress corrosion cracking and corrosion fatique of titanium seem not to be a problem in the repository conditions, but the possibilities of delayed cracking caused by hydrogen should be carefully appreciated. (author)

  10. Native copper as a natural analogue for copper canisters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marcos, N.

    1989-12-01

    This paper discusses the occurrence of native copper as found in geological formations as a stability analogue of copper canisters that are planned to be used for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the Finnish bedrock. A summary of several publications on native copper occurrences is presented. The present geochemical and geohydrological conditions in which copper is met with in its metallic state show that metallic copper is stable in a wide range of temperatures. At low temperatures native copper is found to be stable where groundwater has moderate pH (about 7), low Eh (< +100 mV), and low total dissolved solids, especially chloride. Microscopical and microanalytical studies were carried out on a dozen of rock samples containing native copper. The results reveal that the metal shows no significant alteration. Only the surface of copper grains is locally coated. In the oldest samples there exist small corrosion cracks; the age of the oldest samples is over 1,000 million years. A review of several Finnish groundwater studies suggests that there are places in Finland where the geohydrological conditions are favourable for native copper stability. (orig.)

  11. Dry Storage of Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel - 13321

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, T.M.; Dunsmuir, M.D.; Leduc, D.R.; Severynse, T.F.; Sindelar, R.L. [Savannah River National Laboratory (United States); Moore, E.N. [Moore Nuclear Energy, LLC (United States)

    2013-07-01

    Spent fuel from domestic and foreign research reactors is received and stored at the Savannah River Site's L Area Material Storage (L Basin) Facility. This DOE-owned fuel consists primarily of highly enriched uranium in metal, oxide or silicide form with aluminum cladding. Upon receipt, the fuel is unloaded and transferred to basin storage awaiting final disposition. Disposition alternatives include processing via the site's H Canyon facility for uranium recovery, or packaging and shipment of the spent fuel to a waste repository. A program has been developed to provide a phased approach for dry storage of the L Basin fuel. The initial phase of the dry storage program will demonstrate loading, drying, and storage of fuel in twelve instrumented canisters to assess fuel performance. After closure, the loaded canisters are transferred to pad-mounted concrete overpacks, similar to those used for dry storage of commercial fuel. Unlike commercial spent fuel, however, the DOE fuel has high enrichment, very low to high burnup, and low decay heat. The aluminum cladding presents unique challenges due to the presence of an oxide layer that forms on the cladding surface, and corrosion degradation resulting from prolonged wet storage. The removal of free and bound water is essential to the prevention of fuel corrosion and radiolytic generation of hydrogen. The demonstration will validate models predicting pressure, temperature, gas generation, and corrosion performance, provide an engineering scale demonstration of fuel handling, drying, leak testing, and canister backfill operations, and establish 'road-ready' storage of fuel that is suitable for offsite repository shipment or retrievable for onsite processing. Implementation of the Phase I demonstration can be completed within three years. Phases II and III, leading to the de-inventory of L Basin, would require an additional 750 canisters and 6-12 years to complete. Transfer of the fuel from basin storage

  12. Safety case for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto. Formulation of radionuclide release scenarios 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-04-01

    TURVA-2012 is Posiva's safety case in support of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) and application for a construction licence for a repository for disposal of spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto site in south-western Finland. This report presents the radionuclide release scenarios and the methodology followed in formulating them. The formulation of scenarios takes into account the regulatory framework, the knowledge acquired in the present safety case as well as in previous safety assessments, the safety functions of the barriers of the repository system and the uncertainties in the features, events, and processes (FEPs) that may affect the entire disposal system (i.e. repository system plus the surface environment) from the emplacement of the first canister until the far future. In the report Performance Assessment, the performance of the engineered and natural barriers has been assessed against the loads expected during the evolution of the repository system and the site. Uncertainties have been identified and these are taken into account in the formulation of radionuclide release scenarios. The uncertainties in the FEPs affecting the characteristics and evolution of the surface environment are taken into account in formulating the surface environment scenarios used ultimately for assessing radiation exposure. Formulating radionuclide release scenarios for the repository system links the reports Performance Assessment and Assessment of Radionuclide Release Scenarios for the Repository System. The formulation of radionuclide release scenarios for the surface environment brings together Biosphere Description and the surface environment FEPs and is the link to the assessment of the surface environment scenarios analysed in Biosphere Assessment. (orig.)

  13. NDA techniques for spent fuel verification and radiation monitoring. Report on activities 6a and 6b of Task JNT C799 (SAGOR). Finnish support programme to the IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tarvainen, M [Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, Helsinki (Finland); Levai, F [Technical Univ., Budabest (Hungary); Valentine, T E [Oak Ridge National Lab., TN (United States); Abhold, M [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Moran, B [USNRC, Washington, DC (United States)

    1997-08-01

    A variety of NDA methods exist for measurement of spent fuel at various stages of the disposition process. Each of the methods has weaknesses and strengths that make them applicable to one or more stages in disposition. Both passive and active methods are, under favorable conditions, capable of providing either a mapping of an assembly to identify missing fuel pins or a measurement of the fissile content and some are capable of providing a mapping of a canister to identify missing assemblies or a measurement of the fissile content. However, a spent fuel measurement system capable of making routine partial defect tests of spent fuel assemblies is missing. The active NDA methods, in particular, the active neutron methods, hold the most promise for providing quantitative measurements on fuel assemblies and canisters. Application of NDA methods to shielded casks may not be practical or even possible due to the extent of radiation attenuation by the shielding materials, and none of these methods are considered to have potential for quantitative measurements once the spent fuel cask has been placed in a repository. The most practical approach to spent fuel verification is to confirm the characteristics of the spent fuel prior to loading in a canister or cask at the conditioning facility. Fissile material tracking systems in addition to containment and surveillance methods have the capability to assure continuity of the verified knowledge of the sample from loading of the canisters to final disposal and closing of the repository. (orig.). 49 refs.

  14. Results of the German alternative fuel cycle evaluation and further efforts geared toward demonstration of direct disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papp, R.; Closs, K.D.

    1986-01-01

    In a comparative study initiated by the German Federal Ministry for Research and Technology which was carried out by Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center in the period from 1981 to 1985, direct disposal of spent fuel was contrasted to the traditional fuel cycle with reprocessing and recycle. The results of the study did not exhibit decisive advantages of direct disposal over fuel reprocessing. Due to this face and legal requirements of the German Atomic Energy Act, the cabinet concluded to continue to adhere to fuel reprocessing as the preferred version of ''Entsorgung''. But the door was left ajar for the direct disposal alternative that, under present atomic law, is permissible for fuel for which reprocessing is neither technically feasible nor economically justified. An ambitious program has been launched in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), geared to bring direct disposal to a point of technical maturity

  15. Multi Canister Overpack (MCO) Closure Welding Process Parameter Development and Qualification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CANNELL, G.R.

    2003-01-01

    One of the Department of Energy's (DOE) top priorities at the Hanford Site (southeastern Washington state), is the processing of more than 2,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) into large stainless steel containers called Multi-Canister Overpacks (MCO). Packaging into MCO's will assist in the safe and economic disposition of SNF and greatly reduce risk to the environment. Packaged fuel will be removed from close proximity to the Columbia River to a more suitable area of the site where it will be stored on an interim basis. Eventually, the fuel will be transferred to the federal geologic repository for long-term storage. One of the key elements in the SNF process is final closure of the MCO by welding. Fuel is loaded into the MCO (approximately 2 ft. in diameter and 13 ft. long) and a heavy shield plug inserted into the top, creating a mechanical seal. The plug contains several process ports for various operations, including vacuum drying and inert-gas backfilling of the packaged fuel. When fully processed, the Canister Cover Assembly (CCA) is placed over the shield plug and final closure made by welding. The following describes the effort to develop and qualify the root-pass technique associated with the MCO final closure weld

  16. Facts and issues of direct disposal of spent fuel; Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parks, P.B.

    1993-10-01

    This report reviews those facts and issues that affect the direct disposal of spent reactor fuels. It is intended as a resource document for those impacted by the current Department of Energy (DOE) guidance that calls for the cessation of fuel reprocessing. It is not intended as a study of the specific impacts (schedules and costs) to the Savannah River Site (SRS) alone. Commercial fuels, other low enriched fuels, highly enriched defense-production, research, and naval reactor fuels are included in this survey, except as prevented by rules on classification.

  17. Dry storage technologies: keys to choosing among metal casks, concrete shielded steel canister modules and vaults

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roland, V.; Solignac, Y.; Chiguer, M.; Guenon, Y.

    2003-01-01

    The current international trend towards expanding Spent Fuel Interim Dry Storage capabilities goes with an improvement of the performance of the proposed systems which have to accommodate Spent fuel Assemblies characterized by ever increasing burn-up, fissile isotopes contents, thermal releases, and total inventory. Due to heterogeneous worldwide reactor pools and specific local constraints the proposed solutions have also to cope with a wide fuel design variety. Moreover, the Spent fuel Assemblies stored temporarily for cooling may have to be transported either to reprocessing facilities or to interim storage facilities before direct disposal; it is the reason why the retrievability, including or not transportability of the proposed systems, is often specified by the Utilities for the design of their Storage systems and sometimes by law. This paper shows on examples developed within companies of AREVA Group the key parameters and elements that can direct toward the selection of a technology in a user specific context. Some of the constraints are ability to dry store at once a large number of spent fuel assemblies, readily available, on a given site. No urgent need for further move of the fuel is foreseen. Then clearly a Vault Type Storage system developed and implemented by SGN is an excellent solution: It combines passive safety with immediate large capacity, which allows quick amortization of fuel receiving equipment. In addition the versatile storage position can easily accept in the same facility different fuel types, and also intermediate and High Level Waste. This is the reason why a vault system is often a preferred solution for a long-term dry interim centralized storage, for a multiplicity of spent fuel. It can be also a choice solution when the ISFSI stands on a site that is dedicated permanently to many different nuclear activities.In most cases, the producers of spent fuel require a large capacity that is cumulated over many years, each reload at a

  18. Canister Storage Building (CSB) safety analysis report, phase 3: Safety analysis documentation supporting CSB construction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garvin, L.J.

    1997-01-01

    The US Department of Energy established the K Basins Spent Nuclear Fuel Project to address safety and environmental concerns associated with deteriorating spent nuclear fuel presently stored under water in the Hanford Site's K Basins, which are located near the Columbia River. Recommendations for a series of aggressive projects to construct and operate systems and facilities to manage the safe removal of K Basins fuel were made in WHC-EP-0830, Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Recommended Path Forward, and its subsequent update, WHC-SD-SNF-SP-005, Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Project Integrated Process Strategy for K Basins Fuel. The integrated process strategy recommendations include the following steps: Fuel preparation activities at the K Basins, including removing the fuel elements from their K Basin canisters, separating fuel particulate from fuel elements and fuel fragments greater than 0.6 cm (0.25 in.) in any dimension, removing excess sludge from the fuel and fuel fragments by means of flushing, as necessary, and packaging the fuel into multicanister overpacks (MCOs); Removal of free water by draining and vacuum drying at a cold vacuum drying facility ES-122; Dry shipment of fuel from the Cold Vacuum Drying to the Canister Storage Building (CSB), a new facility in the 200 East Area of the Hanford Site

  19. Health physics aspects in disposal of self powered neutron detectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deokar, D.V.; Tibrewala, S.K.; Singh, K.K.; Purohit, R.G.; Tripathi, R.M.

    2014-01-01

    Self Powered Neutron Detectors (SPNDs) are being used in reactor core for neutron flux measurement at Nuclear Power Plants. After their useful life, SPNDs are replaced and are disposed off in Tile holes. The Cobalt SPNDs having activity in the range of 35 to 160 TBq were encompassed in carbon steel canister. The canister having dose 25 to 50 Sv/h at 1 meter were transported in shielded flask for disposal in specially designed Tile hole at Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF) at Tarapur. To keep personal exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) the disposal operation was carried out remotely from a shielded cabin placed at a distance of 50 meter from the disposal site. During the disposal radiation measurements were carried out remotely by installing radiations monitors at a distance of 10 m, 25 m, and 50 m from the Tile hole. Estimations of radiation levels were carried out before jobs were taken up. Disposal of 70 numbers of Cobalt SPNDs was carried out by implementing ALARA. The decrease in collective dose is achieved due to improved operational practices, mock-up trials, effective monitoring program and safety compliance at various stages of operation

  20. Multi-Canister overpack pressure testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SMITH, K.E.

    1998-01-01

    The Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) shield plug closure assembly will be hydrostatically tested at the fabricator's shop to the 150 psig design test requirement in accordance with the ASME Code. Additionally, the MCO shell and collar will be hydrostatically tested at the fabricator's shop to the 450 psig design test requirement. Commercial practice has not required a pressure test of the closure weld after spent fuel is loaded in the containers. Based on this precedent and Code Case N-595-I, the MCO closure weld will not be pressure tested in the field

  1. The nuclear fuel cycle, From the uranium mine to waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-09-01

    Fuel is a material that can be burnt to provide heat. The most familiar fuels are wood, coal, natural gas and oil. By analogy, the uranium used in nuclear power plants is called 'nuclear fuel', because it gives off heat too, although, in this case, the heat is obtained through fission and not combustion. After being used in the reactor, spent nuclear fuel can be reprocessed to extract recyclable energy material, which is why we speak of the nuclear fuel cycle. This cycle includes all the following industrial operations: - uranium mining, - fuel fabrication, - use in the reactor, - reprocessing the fuel unloaded from the reactor, - waste treatment and disposal. 'The nuclear fuel cycle includes an array of industrial operations, from uranium mining to the disposal of radioactive waste'. Per unit or mass (e.g. per kilo), nuclear fuel supplies far more energy than a fossil fuel (coal or oil). When used in a pressurised water reactor, a kilo of uranium generates 10,000 times more energy than a kilo of coal or oil in a conventional power station. Also, the fuel will remain in the reactor for a long time (several years), unlike conventional fuels, which are burnt up quickly. Nuclear fuel also differs from others in that uranium has to undergo many processes between the time it is mined and the time it goes into the reactor. For the sake of simplicity, the following pages will only look at nuclear fuel used in pressurised water reactors (or PWRs), because nuclear power plants consisting of one or more PWRs are the most widely used around the world. (authors)

  2. Fire analyses in central and disposal tunnels by APROS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peltokorpi, L.; Kukkola, T.; Nieminen, J.

    2012-12-01

    The central tunnels and the disposal tunnels on the north-east disposal area are the target areas of the fire studies. Target is to maintain under pressure in the fire zone in case of a fire. In the central tunnels a fire of a drilling jumbo with moderate fire propagation is used as heat release rate. In the disposal tunnel the heat release rate of a canister transfer and installation vehicle fire received as a result of the pyrolysis analyze as well as an average heat release rate of a van fire are used. Inlet air is to be conducted to the back end of the fire zone and the exhaust is to be lead out from the beginning of the fire zone. The worst location of the fire is in the beginning of the fire zone just below of the exhaust air clap valve. The size of the fire zone does not have big impact on pressure. In all analyzed cases the fire zone remains too long time over pressurized. Inlet air flow of a 30 m 3 /s is too much. The rotation controlled booster blowers will solve the pressure problems of the fire zone in fire cases. The rotation is controlled by the fire zone pressure. The fire of the canister transfer and installation vehicle in the central tunnel will not cause problems. The disposal tunnel fire door should be kept open, if the canister transfer and installation vehicle or the bentonite blocks transfer and installation vehicle is driven into the disposal tunnel. If a fire is caught in the disposal tunnel then the fire zone in the central tunnel is to be closed and the pressure is controlled by the rotation controlled booster blowers. If a personnel car or a van is driven into the disposal tunnel, then fire door of the disposal is to be kept closed against fires in the central tunnel. (orig.)

  3. Test manufacturing of copper canisters with cast inserts. Assessment report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andersson, C.G

    1998-08-01

    The current design of canisters for the deep repository for spent nuclear fuel consists of an outer corrosion-protective copper casing in the form of a tubular section with lid and bottom and an inner pressure-resistant insert. The insert is designed to be manufactured by casting and inside are channels in which the fuel assemblies are to be placed. Over the last years, a number of full-scale manufacturing tests of all canister components have been carried out. The purpose has been to determine and develop the best manufacturing technique and to establish long-term contacts with the best suppliers of material and technology. Part of the work has involved the developing and implementing of a quality assurance system in accordance with ISO 9001, covering the whole chain from suppliers of material up to and including the delivery of assembled canisters. This report consists of a description of the design of the canister together with current drawings and complementary technical specifications stipulating, among other things, requirements placed on different materials. The different manufacturing methods that have been used are also described and commented on in both text and illustrations. For the manufacturing of copper tubes, the roll-forming of rolled plate to tube halves and longitudinal welding is a method that has been tested on a relatively large number of tubes by now, and that probably can be developed into a functioning production method. However, the very promising outcome of performed tests on seamless tube manufacturing, has resulted in a change in direction in tube manufacturing, focusing on continued testing of extrusion as well as pierce and draw processing in the immediate future. In connection with ongoing operations, new manufacturing tests of tubes with less material thickness will be carried out. Test manufacturing of cast inserts has resulted in the choice of nodular iron as material in the continued work. This improvement in design has resulted

  4. Test manufacturing of copper canisters with cast inserts. Assessment report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, C.G.

    1998-08-01

    The current design of canisters for the deep repository for spent nuclear fuel consists of an outer corrosion-protective copper casing in the form of a tubular section with lid and bottom and an inner pressure-resistant insert. The insert is designed to be manufactured by casting and inside are channels in which the fuel assemblies are to be placed. Over the last years, a number of full-scale manufacturing tests of all canister components have been carried out. The purpose has been to determine and develop the best manufacturing technique and to establish long-term contacts with the best suppliers of material and technology. Part of the work has involved the developing and implementing of a quality assurance system in accordance with ISO 9001, covering the whole chain from suppliers of material up to and including the delivery of assembled canisters. This report consists of a description of the design of the canister together with current drawings and complementary technical specifications stipulating, among other things, requirements placed on different materials. The different manufacturing methods that have been used are also described and commented on in both text and illustrations. For the manufacturing of copper tubes, the roll-forming of rolled plate to tube halves and longitudinal welding is a method that has been tested on a relatively large number of tubes by now, and that probably can be developed into a functioning production method. However, the very promising outcome of performed tests on seamless tube manufacturing, has resulted in a change in direction in tube manufacturing, focusing on continued testing of extrusion as well as pierce and draw processing in the immediate future. In connection with ongoing operations, new manufacturing tests of tubes with less material thickness will be carried out. Test manufacturing of cast inserts has resulted in the choice of nodular iron as material in the continued work. This improvement in design has resulted

  5. Status of nuclear fuel reprocessing, spent fuel storage, and high-level waste disposal. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission. Draft report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    An analysis of the current status of technologies and issues in the major portions of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle is presented. The discussion on nuclear fuel reprocessing covers the reprocessing requirement, reprocessing technology assessment, technology for operation of reprocessing plants, and approval of reprocessing plants. The chapter devoted to spent fuel storage covers the spent fuel storge problem, the legislative response, options for maintaining full core discharge capacity, prospective availability of alterntive storage options, and the outlook for California. The existence of a demonstrated, developed high-level waste disposal technology is reviewed. Recommendations for Federal programs on high-level waste disposal are made

  6. Conditioning of spent nuclear fuel for permanent disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laidler, J.J.

    1994-01-01

    A compact, efficient method for conditioning spent nuclear fuel is under development This method, known as pyrochemical processing, or open-quotes pyroprocessing,close quotes provides a separation of fission products from the actinide elements present in spent fuel and further separates pure uranium from the transuranic elements. The process can facilitate the timely and environmentally-sound treatment of the highly diverse collection of spent fuel currently in the inventory of the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The pyroprocess utilizes elevated-temperature processes to prepare spent fuel for fission product separation; that separation is accomplished by a molten salt electrorefining step that provides efficient (99.9%) separation of transuranics. The resultant waste forms from the pyroprocess are stable under envisioned repository environment conditions and highly leach-resistant. Treatment of any spent fuel type produces a set of common high-level waste forms, one a mineral and the other a metal alloy, that can be readily qualified for repository disposal and preclude the substantial costs that would be associated with the qualification of the numerous spent fuel types included in the DOE inventory

  7. Conditioning of spent nuclear fuel for permanent disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laidler, J.J.

    1994-01-01

    A compact, efficient method for conditioning spent nuclear fuel is under development. This method, known as pyrochemical processing, or pyroprocessing, provides a separation of fission products from the actinide elements present in spent fuel and further separates pure uranium from the transuranic elements. The process can facilitate the timely and environmentally-sound treatment of the highly diverse collection of spent fuel currently in the inventory of the US Department of Energy (DOE). The pyroprocess utilizes elevated-temperature processes to prepare spent fuel for fission product separation; that separation is accomplished by a molten salt electrorefining step that provides efficient (> 99.9%) separation of transuranics. The resultant waste forms from the pyroprocess are stable under envisioned repository environment conditions and highly leach-resistant. Treatment of any spent fuel type produces a set of common high-level waste forms, one a mineral and the other a metal alloy, that can be readily qualified for repository disposal and that avoid the substantial costs that would be associated with the qualification of the numerous spent fuel types included in the DOE inventory

  8. Final disposal of high levels waste and spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gelin, R.

    1984-05-01

    Foreign and international activities on the final disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel have been reviewed. A considerable research effort is devoted to development of acceptable disposal options. The different technical concepts presently under study are described in the report. Numerous studies have been made in many countries of the potential risks to future generations from radioactive wastes in underground disposal repositories. In the report the safety assessment studies and existing performance criteria for geological disposal are briefly discussed. The studies that are being made in Canada, the United States, France and Switzerland are the most interesting for Sweden as these countries also are considering disposal into crystalline rocks. The overall time-tables in different countries for realisation of the final disposal are rather similar. Normally actual large-scale disposal operations for high-level wastes are not foreseen until after year 2000. In the United States the Congress recently passed the important Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It gives a rather firm timetable for site-selection and construction of nuclear waste disposal facilities. According to this act the first repository for disposal of commercial high-level waste must be in operation not later than in January 1998. (Author)

  9. Advanced surveillance technologies for used fuel long-term storage and transportation - 59032

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsai, Hanchung; Liu, Yung Y.; Nutt, Mark; Shuler, James

    2012-01-01

    Utilities worldwide are using dry-cask storage systems to handle the ever-increasing number of discharged fuel assemblies from nuclear power plants. In the United States and possibly elsewhere, this trend will continue until an acceptable disposal path is established. The recent Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, specifically the events with the storage pools, may accelerate the drive to relocate more of the used fuel assemblies from pools into dry casks. Many of the newer cask systems incorporate dual-purpose (storage and transport) or multiple-purpose (storage, transport, and disposal) canister technologies. With the prospect looming for very long term storage - possibly over multiple decades - and deferred transport, condition- and performance-based aging management of cask structures and components is now a necessity that requires immediate attention. From the standpoint of consequences, one of the greatest concerns is the rupture of a substantial number of fuel rods that would affect fuel retrievability. Used fuel cladding may become susceptible to rupture due to radial-hydride-induced embrittlement caused by water-side corrosion during the reactor operation and subsequent drying/transfer process, through early stage of storage in a dry cask, especially for high burnup fuels. Radio frequency identification (RFID) is an automated data capture and remote-sensing technology ideally suited for monitoring sensitive assets on a long-term, continuous basis. One such system, called ARG-US, has been developed by Argonne National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy's Packaging Certification Program for tracking and monitoring drums containing sensitive nuclear and radioactive materials. The ARG-US RFID system is versatile and can be readily adapted for dry-cask monitoring applications. The current built-in sensor suite consists of seal, temperature, humidity, shock, and radiation sensors. With the universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter interface in

  10. Preliminary conceptual design of a geological disposal system for high-level wastes from the pyroprocessing of PWR spent fuels

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Heui-Joo, E-mail: hjchoi@kaeri.re.kr [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 1045 Daeduk-Daero, Yuseong, Daejon 305-353 (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Minsoo; Lee, Jong Youl [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 1045 Daeduk-Daero, Yuseong, Daejon 305-353 (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-08-15

    Highlights: > A geological disposal system consists of disposal overpacks, a buffer, and a deposition hole or a disposal tunnel for high-level wastes from a pyroprocessing of PWR spent fuels is proposed. The amount and characteristics of high-level wastes are analyzed based on the material balance of pyroprocessing. > Four kinds of deposition methods, two horizontal and two vertical, are proposed. Thermal design is carried out with ABAQUS program. The spacing between the disposal modules is determined for the peak temperature in buffer not to exceed 100 deg. C. > The effect of the double-layered buffer is compared with the traditional single-layered buffer in terms of disposal density. Also, the effect of cooling time (aging) is illustrated. > All the thermal calculations are represented by comparing the disposal area of PWR spent fuels with the same cooling time. - Abstract: The inventories of spent fuels are linearly dependent on the production of electricity generated by nuclear energy. Pyroprocessing of PWR spent fuels is one of promising technologies which can reduce the volume of spent fuels remarkably. The properties of high-level wastes from the pyroprocessing are totally different from those of spent fuels. A geological disposal system is proposed for the high-level wastes from pyroprocessing of spent fuels. The amount and characteristics of high-level wastes are analyzed based on the material balance of pyroprocessing. Around 665 kg of monazite ceramic wastes are expected from the pyroprocessing of 10 MtU of PWR spent fuels. Decay heat from monazite ceramic wastes is calculated using the ORIGEN-ARP program. Disposal modules consisting of storage cans, overpacks, and a deposition hole or a disposal tunnel are proposed. Four kinds of deposition methods are proposed. Thermal design is carried out with ABAQUS program and geological data obtained from the KAERI Underground Research Tunnel. Through the thermal analysis, the spacing between the disposal modules

  11. Interim report spent nuclear fuel retrieval system fuel handling development testing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ketner, G.L.; Meeuwsen, P.V.; Potter, J.D.; Smalley, J.T.; Baker, C.P.; Jaquish, W.R.

    1997-06-01

    Fuel handling development testing was performed in support of the Fuel Retrieval System (FRS) Sub-Project at the Hanford Site. The project will retrieve spent nuclear fuel, clean and remove fuel from canisters, repackage fuel into baskets, and load fuel into a multi-canister overpack (MCO) for vacuum drying and interim dry storage. The FRS is required to retrieve basin fuel canisters, clean fuel elements sufficiently of uranium corrosion products (or sludge), empty fuel from canisters, sort debris and scrap from whole elements, and repackage fuel in baskets in preparation for MCO loading. The purpose of fuel handling development testing was to examine the systems ability to accomplish mission activities, optimization of equipment layouts for initial process definition, identification of special needs/tools, verification of required design changes to support performance specification development, and validation of estimated activity times/throughput. The test program was set up to accomplish this purpose through cold development testing using simulated and prototype equipment; cold demonstration testing using vendor expertise and systems; and graphical computer modeling to confirm feasibility and throughput. To test the fuel handling process, a test mockup that represented the process table was fabricated and installed. The test mockup included a Schilling HV series manipulator that was prototypic of the Schilling Hydra manipulator. The process table mockup included the tipping station, sorting area, disassembly and inspection zones, fuel staging areas, and basket loading stations. The test results clearly indicate that the Schilling Hydra arm cannot effectively perform the fuel handling tasks required unless it is attached to some device that can impart vertical translation, azimuth rotation, and X-Y translation. Other test results indicate the importance of camera locations and capabilities, and of the jaw and end effector tool design. 5 refs., 35 figs., 3 tabs.

  12. Technical note 2. A review of the creep ductility of copper for nuclear waste canister application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pettersson, Kjell

    2011-03-01

    Background: The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) reviews the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Company's (SKB) applications under the Act on Nuclear Activities (SFS 1984:3) for the construction and operation of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and for an encapsulation facility. As part of the review, SSM commissions consultants to carry out work in order to obtain information on specific issues. The results from the consultants' tasks are reported in SSM's Technical Note series. Objectives of the project: This project is part of SSM:s review of SKB:s license application for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The assignment concerns review of creep mechanisms for copper material used as a corrosion barrier in canisters for nal disposal of nuclear fuel in Sweden. Summary by the author: SKB has presented insufficient evidence to justify their position that the OFP copper has an adequate creep ductility during long term storage. Their large body of experiments only serves to prove that the creep ductility is sufficient for much shorter time spans than the intended storage times. There is a clear need for a credible theory of creep brittleness of OFP copper which will permit extrapolations to long term storage. The theory presented by SKB does not in its present state permit credible extrapolations. Alternatively SKB needs to find an explanation to the effect of phosphorus on the creep ductility and that it ensures the absence of creep brittleness in OFP copper. It is interesting to note that SKB has presented experimental evidence that intergranular cracks can form in OFP material tested in cracked specimens. Perhaps it is possible to more systematically study formation and growth of intergranular cracks in specimens of OFP copper with cracks

  13. Comparative economics for DUCRETE spent fuel storage cask handling, transportation, and capital requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powell, F.P.

    1995-04-01

    This report summarizes economic differences between a DUCRETE spent nuclear fuel storage cask and a conventional concrete storage cask in the areas of handling, transportation, and capital requirements. The DUCRETE cask is under evaluation as a new technology that could substantially reduce the overall costs of spent fuel and depleted U disposal. DUCRETE incorporates depleted U in a Portland cement mixture and functions as the cask's primary radiation barrier. The cask system design includes insertion of the US DOE Multi-Purpose Canister inside the DUCRETE cask. The economic comparison is from the time a cask is loaded in a spent fuel pool until it is placed in the repository and includes the utility and overall US system perspectives

  14. Analysis of factors influencing the reliability of retrievable storage canisters for containment of solid high-level radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mecham, W.J.; Seefeldt, W.B.; Steindler, M.J.

    1976-08-01

    The reliability of stainless steel type 304L canisters for the containment of solidified high-level radioactive wastes in the glass and calcine forms was studied. A reference system, drawn largely from information furnished by Battelle Northwest Laboratories and Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company is described. Operations include filling the canister with the appropriate waste form, interim storage at a reprocessing plant, shipment in water to a Retrievable Surface Storage Facility (RSSF), interim storage at the RSSF, and shipment to a final disposal facility. The properties of stainless steel type 304L, fission product oxides, calcine, and glass were reviewed, and mechanisms of corrosion were identified and studied. The modes of corrosion important for reliability were stress-corrosion cracking, internal pressurization of the canister by residual impurities present, intergranular attack at the waste-canister interface, and potential local effects due to migration of fission products. The key role of temperature control throughout canister lifetime is considered together with interactive effects. Methods of ameliorating adverse effects and ensuring high reliability are identified and described. Conclusions and recommendations are presented

  15. Sustainable Solutions for Nuclear used Fuels Interim Storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arslan, Marc; Favet, Dominique; Issard, Herve; Le Jemtel, Amaury; Drevon, Caroline

    2014-01-01

    AREVA has a unique experience in providing sustainable solutions for used fuel management, fitted with the needs of different customers in the world and with regulation in different countries. These solutions entail both recycling and interim storage technologies. In a first part, we will describe the various types of solutions for Interim Storage of UNF that have been implemented around the world for interim storage at reactor or centralized Pad solution in canisters dry storage, vault type storages for dry storage, dry storage of transportation casks (dual purpose) pools for wet storage, The experience for all these different families of interim storages in which AREVA is involved is extensive and will be discussed with respect to the new challenges: increase of the duration of the interim storage (long term interim storage) increase of burn up of the fuels In a second part of the presentation, special recycling features will be presented. In that case, interim storage of the used fuels is ensured in pools. This provides in the long term good conditions for the behaviour of the fuel and its retrievability. With recycling, the final waste (Universal Canister of vitrified fission products and compacted hulls and end pieces): is stable and licensed in many countries for the final disposal (France, UK, Belgium, NL, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, upcoming: Spain, Australia, Italy). Presents neither safety criticality risks nor proliferation risks (AREVA conditioned HLW and LL-ILW are free of IAEA safeguard constraints thanks to AREVA process high recovery and purification yields). It can therefore be safely stored in interim storage for more than 100 years before final disposal. Some economic considerations will also be discussed. In particular, in the case of long term interim storage of used fuels, there are growing uncertainties regarding the future needs of repackaging and transportation, which can result in future cost overruns. Meanwhile, in the recycling policy

  16. Evaluation of DUSTRAN Software System for Modeling Chloride Deposition on Steel Canisters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tran, Tracy T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jensen, Philip J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Fritz, Brad G. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Rutz, Frederick C. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Devanathan, Ram [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2015-07-29

    The degradation of steel by stress corrosion cracking (SCC) when exposed to atmospheric conditions for decades is a significant challenge in the fossil fuel and nuclear industries. SCC can occur when corrosive contaminants such as chlorides are deposited on a susceptible material in a tensile stress state. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has identified chloride-induced SCC as a potential cause for concern in stainless steel used nuclear fuel (UNF) canisters in dry storage. The modeling of contaminant deposition is the first step in predictive multiscale modeling of SCC that is essential to develop mitigation strategies, prioritize inspection, and ensure the integrity and performance of canisters, pipelines, and structural materials. A multiscale simulation approach can be developed to determine the likelihood that a canister would undergo SCC in a certain period of time. This study investigates the potential of DUSTRAN, a dust dispersion modeling system developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, to model the deposition of chloride contaminants from sea salt aerosols on a steel canister. Results from DUSTRAN simulations run with historical meteorological data were compared against measured chloride data at a coastal site in Maine. DUSTRAN’s CALPUFF model tended to simulate concentrations higher than those measured; however, the closest estimations were within the same order of magnitude as the measured values. The decrease in discrepancies between measured and simulated values as the level of abstraction in wind speed decreased suggest that the model is very sensitive to wind speed. However, the influence of other parameters such as the distinction between open-ocean and surf-zone sources needs to be explored further. Deposition values predicted by the DUSTRAN system were not in agreement with concentration values and suggest that the deposition calculations may not fully represent physical processes. Overall, results indicate that with parameter

  17. K Basins fuel encapsulation and storage hazard categorization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Porten, D.R.

    1994-12-01

    This document establishes the initial hazard categorization for K-Basin fuel encapsulation and storage in the 100 K Area of the Hanford site. The Hazard Categorization for K-Basins addresses the potential for release of radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous material located in the K-Basins and their supporting facilities. The Hazard Categorization covers the hazards associated with normal K-Basin fuel storage and handling operations, fuel encapsulation, sludge encapsulation, and canister clean-up and disposal. The criteria categorizes a facility based on total curies per radionuclide located in the facility. Tables 5-3 and 5-4 display the results in section 5.0. In accordance with DOE-STD-1027 and the analysis provided in section 5.0, the K East Basin fuel encapsulation and storage activity and the K West Basin storage are classified as a open-quotes Category 2close quotes Facility

  18. Nuclear fuel waste disposal. Canada's consultative approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hillier, J.A.R.; Dixon, R.S.

    1993-01-01

    Over the past two decades, society has increasingly demanded more public participation and public input into decision-making by governments. Development of the Canadian concept for deep geological disposal of used nuclear fuel has proceeded in a manner that has taken account of the requirements for social acceptability as well as technical excellence. As the agency responsible for development of the disposal concept, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has devoted considerable effort to consultation with the various publics that have an interest in the concept. This evolutionary interactive and consultative process, which has been underway for some 14 years, has attempted to keep the public informed of the technical development of the concept and to invite feedback. This paper describes the major elements of this evolutionary process, which will continue throughout the concept assessment and review process currently in progress. (author)

  19. Nuclear fuel waste disposal. Canada's consultative approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hillier, J A.R.; Dixon, R S [AECL (Canada)

    1993-07-01

    Over the past two decades, society has increasingly demanded more public participation and public input into decision-making by governments. Development of the Canadian concept for deep geological disposal of used nuclear fuel has proceeded in a manner that has taken account of the requirements for social acceptability as well as technical excellence. As the agency responsible for development of the disposal concept, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has devoted considerable effort to consultation with the various publics that have an interest in the concept. This evolutionary interactive and consultative process, which has been underway for some 14 years, has attempted to keep the public informed of the technical development of the concept and to invite feedback. This paper describes the major elements of this evolutionary process, which will continue throughout the concept assessment and review process currently in progress. (author)

  20. Overview of the United States department of energy's used fuel disposition research and development campaign

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nutt, Mark [Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, IL (United States); Swift, Peter; MacKinnon, Robert; McMahon, Kevin; Sorenson, Ken [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM (United States); Birkholzer, Jens [Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA (United States); Boyle, William; Gunter, Timothy; Larson, Ned [U.S. Department of Energy, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The United States Department of Energy (US DOE) is conducting research and development (R and D) activities within the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC) to support storage, transportation, and disposal of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and wastes generated by existing and future nuclear fuel cycles. R and D activities are ongoing at nine national laboratories, and are divided into two major topical areas: (1) storage and transportation research, and (2) disposal research. Storage R and D focuses on closing technical gaps related to extended storage of UNF. For example, uncertainties remain regarding high-burnup nuclear fuel cladding performance following possible hydride reorientation and creep deformation, and also regarding long-term canister integrity. Transportation R and D focuses on ensuring transportability of UNF following extended storage, addressing data gaps regarding nuclear fuel integrity, retrievability, and demonstration of subcriticality. Disposal R and D focuses on identifying multiple viable geologic disposal options and addressing technical challenges for generic disposal concepts in various host media (e.g., mined repositories in salt, clay/shale, and granitic rocks, and deep borehole disposal in crystalline rock). R and D will transition to site-specific challenges as national policy advances. R and D goals at this stage are to increase confidence in the robustness of generic disposal concepts, to reduce generic sources of uncertainty that may impact the viability of disposal concepts, and to develop science and engineering tools that will support the selection, characterization, and ultimately licensing of a repository. The US DOE has also initiated activities that can be conducted within the constraints of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to facilitate the development of an interim storage facility and supporting transportation infrastructure. (authors)