Radiation Safety of Gamma, Electron and X Ray Irradiation Facilities. Specific Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements of the BSS with regard to irradiation facilities. This Safety Guide provides specific, practical recommendations on the safe design and operation of gamma, electron and X ray irradiators for use by operating organizations and the designers of these facilities, and by regulatory bodies. SCOPE. The facilities considered in this publication include five types of irradiator, whether operated on a commercial basis or for research and development purposes. This publication is concerned with radiation safety issues and not with the uses of irradiators, nor does it cover the irradiation of product or its quality management. The five types of irradiator are: - Panoramic dry source storage irradiators; - Underwater irradiators, in which both the source and the product being irradiated are under water; - Panoramic wet source storage irradiators; - Electron beam irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the irradiation process; - X ray irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the irradiation process. Consideration of non-radiation-related risks and of the benefits resulting from the operation of irradiators is outside the scope of this Safety Guide. The practices of radiotherapy and radiography are also outside the scope of this Safety Guide. Category I gamma irradiators (i.e. 'self-shielded' irradiators) are outside the scope of this Safety Guide

Training of nuclear facility personnel: boon or boondoggle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Remick, F.J.

1975-01-01

The training of nuclear facility personnel has been a requirement of the reactor licensing process for over two decades. However, the training of nuclear facility personnel remains a combination of boon and boondoggle. The opportunity to develop elite, well trained, professionally aggressive reactor operation staffs is not being realized to its full potential. Improvements in the selection of personnel, training programs, operational tools and professional pride can result in improved plant operation and contribute to improved plant capacity factors. Industry, regulatory agencies, professional societies and universities can do much to improve standards and quality of the training of nuclear facility personnel and to improve the professional level of plant operation

Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rule, Keith [PPPL

2014-05-01

The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

Radiological safety assessment of a reference INTOR facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khan, T.A.; Stasko, R.R.; Watts, R.T.; Shaw, G.; Morrison, C.A.; Russell, S.; Kempe, T.; Zimmerman, R.

1985-03-01

This report consists of a number of separate studies all of which were performed in support of INTOR Critical Issue D: Tritium Containment and Personnel Access vs Remote Maintenance. The common thread running through these studies is the radiological safety element in the design and operation of the INTOR facility. The intent is to help establish a firm basis for comparisons between a reactor cell maintenance option which requires personnel access, and one which involves completely remote maintenance

Safety analysis of the existing 850 Firing Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.

1986-01-01

A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 850 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives, which was classified as a moderate hazard per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

Safety analysis of the existing 851 Firing Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.

1986-01-01

A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 851 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but two of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exceptions were the linear accelerator and explosives, which were classified as moderate hazards per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

The Patient Safety Attitudes among the Operating Room Personnel

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cherdsak Iramaneerat

2016-07-01

Full Text Available Background: The first step in cultivating the culture of safety in the operating room is the assessment of safety culture among operating room personnel. Objective: To assess the patient safety culture of operating room personnel at the Department of Surgery, Faculty of Medicine Siriraj Hospital, and compare attitudes among different groups of personnel, and compare them with the international standards. Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional survey of safety attitudes among 396 operating room personnel, using a short form of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ. The SAQ employed 30 items to assess safety culture in six dimensions: teamwork climate, safety climate, stress recognition, perception of hospital management, working conditions, and job satisfaction. The subscore of each dimension was calculated and converted to a scale score with a full score of 100, where higher scores indicated better safety attitudes. Results: The response rate was 66.4%. The overall safety culture score of the operating room personnel was 65.02, higher than an international average (61.80. Operating room personnel at Siriraj Hospital had safety attitudes in teamwork climate, safety climate, and stress recognition lower than the international average, but had safety attitudes in the perception of hospital management, working conditions, and job satisfaction higher than the international average. Conclusion: The safety culture attitudes of operating room personnel at the Department of Surgery, Siriraj Hospital were comparable to international standards. The safety dimensions that Siriraj Hospital operating room should try to improve were teamwork climate, safety climate, and stress recognition.

Personnel neutron dosimetry at Department of Energy facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brackenbush, L.W.; Endres, G.W.R.; Selby, J.M.; Vallario, E.J.

1980-08-01

This study assesses the state of personnel neutron dosimetry at DOE facilities. A survey of the personnel dosimetry systems in use at major DOE facilities was conducted, a literature search was made to determine recent advances in neutron dosimetry, and several dosimetry experts were interviewed. It was concluded that personnel neutron dosimeters do not meet current needs and that serious problems exist now and will increase in the future if neutron quality factors are increased and/or dose limits are lowered

Criticality safety and facility design considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waltz, W.R.

1991-06-01

Operations with fissile material introduce the risk of a criticality accident that may be lethal to nearby personnel. In addition, concerns over criticality safety can result in substantial delays and shutdown of facility operations. For these reasons, it is clear that the prevention of a nuclear criticality accident should play a major role in the design of a nuclear facility. The emphasis of this report will be placed on engineering design considerations in the prevention of criticality. The discussion will not include other important aspects, such as the physics of calculating limits nor criticality alarm systems

Radiation safety and regulatory aspects in Medical Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Banerjee, Sharmila

2017-01-01

Radiation safety and regulatory aspect of medical facilities are relevant in the context where radiation is used in providing healthcare to human patients. These include facilities, which carry out radiological procedures in diagnostic radiology, including dentistry, image-guided interventional procedures, nuclear medicine, and radiation therapy. The safety regulations provide recommendations and guidance on meeting the requirements for the safe use of radiation in medicine. The different safety aspects which come under its purview are the personnel involved in medical facilities where radiological procedures are performed which include the medical practitioners, radiation technologists, medical physicists, radiopharmacists, radiation protection and over and above all the patients. Regulatory aspects cover the guidelines provided by ethics committees, which regulate the administration of radioactive formulation in human patients. Nuclear medicine is a modality that utilizes radiopharmaceuticals either for diagnosis of physiological disorders related to anatomy, physiology and patho-physiology and for diagnosis and treatment of cancer

Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Volume 2, Guidance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in Vol. 1 of this Standard. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While Vol. 1 is generally applicable in that requirements there apply to a wide range of fusion facilities, this volume is concerned mainly with large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This volume is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment

Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cerruti, S.J.

1997-01-01

These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S ampersand H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules

Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cerruti, S.J.

1997-01-14

These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S & H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules.

Innovative Approaches to Enhance Safety and Radiation Protection on a PET RI/RF Producing Facility for Occupationally Exposed Personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avila-Sobarzo, M.J.; Tenreiro, C.; Sadeghi, M.

2011-01-01

The explosive demand for positron emission tomography (PET) and, recently introduced, fusion technology (PET/CT and soon commercially available PET/MRI) as non-invasive diagnostic tools of choice for clinical imaging, results on a world wide PET centers and PET RI/RF production facilities remarkably increment . A charged particle accelerator when operated for PET radionuclides production produces ionizing radiation. The multi curies radionuclides from the accelerator and the radiopharmaceuticals synthesized are ionizing radiations emitters open sources. Therefore, the probability of unexpected radiation exposure is always present along full production line, from target loading for irradiation to final dose dispensing.Improving safety working conditions requires permanent radiological risks assessment associated with the production process for accelerator operators, radio chemist and hot cell assistants as well as other occupationally exposed personnel.In this work we present some of the experimental improvements added to our Cyclone 18/9 operation and routinely 18 FDG production process to improve personnel radioprotection. These approaches apply for professionals working on other accelerator field such as non-destructive analytical and tracer technicians at research and industrial levels with charged particle accelerators

76 FR 14590 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safety of Facilities, Infrastructure, and...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-03-17

... makes it unlikely that a small business could afford to sustain the infrastructure required to perform...-AG73 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safety of Facilities, Infrastructure, and... facilities, infrastructure, and equipment that are intended for use by military or civilian personnel of the...

Radiation protection and safety guide no. GRPB-G-1: qualification and certification of radiation protection personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schandorf, C.; Darko, O.; Yeboah, J.; Osei, E.K.; Asiamah, S.D.

1995-01-01

A number of accidents with radiation sources are invariably due to human factors. The achievement and maintenance of proficiency in protection and safety in working with radiation devices is a necessary prerequisite. This guide specifies the national scheme and minimum requirements for qualification and certification of radiation protection personnel. The objective is to ensure adequate level of skilled personnel by continuous upgrading of knowledge and skill of personnel. The following sectors are covered by this guide: medicine, industry, research and training, nuclear facility operations, miscellaneous activities

Design of Safety Parameter Monitoring Function in a Research Reactor Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Park, Jaekwan; Suh, Yongsuk [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-05-15

The primary purpose of the safety parameter monitoring system (SPDS) is to help operating personnel in the control room make quick assessments of the plant safety status. Thus, the basic function of the SPDS is a provision of a continuous indication of plant parameters or derived variables representative of the safety status of the plant. NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 provides details of the functional criteria for the SPDS, as one of the action plan requirements from TMI accident. The system provides various functions as follows: · Alerting based on safety function decision logics, · Success path analysis to achieve the integrity of the safety functions, · 3 layer display architecture - safety function, success path display for each safety function, system summary and equipment details for each safety function, · Integration with computer-based procedure. According to a Notice of the NSSC No. 2012-31, a research reactor facility generating more than 2 MW of power should also be furnished with the SPDS for emergency preparedness. Generally, a research reactor is a small size facility, and its number of instrumentations is fewer than that of NPPs. In particular, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions from an economic perspective. Therefore, a safety parameter display system optimized for a research reactor facility must be proposed. This paper provides the requirement analysis results and proposes the design of safety parameter monitoring function for a research reactor. The safety parameter monitoring function supporting control room personnel during emergency conditions should be designed in a research reactor facility. The facility size and number of signals are smaller than that of the power plants. Also, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions of nuclear power plants from an economic perspective. Thus, a safety parameter display system optimized to a research reactor must be proposed. First, we found important design items

Design of Safety Parameter Monitoring Function in a Research Reactor Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Jaekwan; Suh, Yongsuk

2014-01-01

The primary purpose of the safety parameter monitoring system (SPDS) is to help operating personnel in the control room make quick assessments of the plant safety status. Thus, the basic function of the SPDS is a provision of a continuous indication of plant parameters or derived variables representative of the safety status of the plant. NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 provides details of the functional criteria for the SPDS, as one of the action plan requirements from TMI accident. The system provides various functions as follows: · Alerting based on safety function decision logics, · Success path analysis to achieve the integrity of the safety functions, · 3 layer display architecture - safety function, success path display for each safety function, system summary and equipment details for each safety function, · Integration with computer-based procedure. According to a Notice of the NSSC No. 2012-31, a research reactor facility generating more than 2 MW of power should also be furnished with the SPDS for emergency preparedness. Generally, a research reactor is a small size facility, and its number of instrumentations is fewer than that of NPPs. In particular, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions from an economic perspective. Therefore, a safety parameter display system optimized for a research reactor facility must be proposed. This paper provides the requirement analysis results and proposes the design of safety parameter monitoring function for a research reactor. The safety parameter monitoring function supporting control room personnel during emergency conditions should be designed in a research reactor facility. The facility size and number of signals are smaller than that of the power plants. Also, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions of nuclear power plants from an economic perspective. Thus, a safety parameter display system optimized to a research reactor must be proposed. First, we found important design items

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Armstrong, D.L.

1994-08-01

This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Armstrong, D.L.

1994-08-01

This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

The operating organization and the recruitment, training and qualification of personnel for research reactors. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the requirements on the operating organization and on personnel for research reactors. It covers the typical operating organization for research reactor facilities; the recruitment process and qualification in terms of education, training and experience; programmes for initial and continuing training; the authorization process for those individuals having an immediate bearing on safety; and the processes for their requalification and reauthorization

9 CFR 590.560 - Health and hygiene of personnel.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 9 Animals and Animal Products 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Health and hygiene of personnel. 590.560 Section 590.560 Animals and Animal Products FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF..., Processing, and Facility Requirements § 590.560 Health and hygiene of personnel. (a) Personnel facilities...

NIF conventional facilities construction health and safety plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benjamin, D W

1998-01-01

The purpose of this Plan is to outline the minimum health and safety requirements to which all participating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and non-LLNL employees (excluding National Ignition Facility [NIF] specific contractors and subcontractors covered under the construction subcontract packages (e.g., CSP-9)-see Construction Safety Program for the National Ignition Facility [CSP] Section I.B. ''NIF Construction Contractors and Subcontractors'' for specifics) shall adhere to for preventing job-related injuries and illnesses during Conventional Facilities construction activities at the NIF Project. For the purpose of this Plan, the term ''LLNL and non-LLNL employees'' includes LLNL employees, LLNL Plant Operations staff and their contractors, supplemental labor, contract labor, labor-only contractors, vendors, DOE representatives, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, and others such as visitors, students, consultants etc., performing on-site work or services in support of the NIF Project. Based upon an activity level determination explained in Section 1.2.18, in this document, these organizations or individuals may be required by site management to prepare their own NIF site-specific safety plan. LLNL employees will normally not be expected to prepare a site-specific safety plan. This Plan also outlines job-specific exposures and construction site safety activities with which LLNL and non-LLNL employees shall comply

Obtaining laser safety at a synchrotron radiation user facility: The Advanced Light Source

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barat, K.

1996-01-01

The Advanced Light Source (ALS) is a US national facility for scientific research and development located at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California. The ALS delivers the world's brightest synchrotron radiation in the far ultraviolet and soft X-ray regions of the spectrum. As a user facility it is available to researchers from industry, academia, and laboratories from around the world. Subsequently, a wide range of safety concerns become involved. This article relates not only to synchrotron facilities but to any user facility. A growing number of US centers are attracting organizations and individuals to use the equipment on site, for a fee. This includes synchrotron radiation and/or free electron facilities, specialty research centers, and laser job shops. Personnel coming to such a facility bring with them a broad spectrum of safety cultures. Upon entering, the guests must accommodate to the host facility safety procedures. This article describes a successful method to deal with that responsibility

Training and certification of personnel who perform in-place filter tests at nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

First, M.W.

1977-01-01

Preoperational testing and periodic retesting of high efficiency filtration systems installed at nuclear facilities are well-accepted safety procedures and are a requirement of regulatory agencies. In-Place Filter Testing Workshops, conducted periodically by the Harvard Air Cleaning Laboratory, provide the only available organized instructional programs for training testing personnel and supervisors. The curriculum, of one week duration, consists of approximately equal parts devoted to classroom theory and to 'hands-on' practice in the Laboratory. The current curriculum will be outlined for purposes of discussion. Many testing personnel who have had no formal instruction in this technology are actively engaged in this activity. Therefore, steps are underway to organize a certifying body and to introduce certification as an essential qualifying step for personnel engaged in this activity. Current progress toward certification requirements and examination procedures will be reviewed for purposes of discussion

Hanford surplus facilities hazards identification document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Egge, R.G.

1997-01-01

This document provides general safety information needed by personnel who enter and work in surplus facilities managed by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. The purpose of the document is to enhance access control of surplus facilities, educate personnel on the potential hazards associated with these facilities prior to entry, and ensure that safety precautions are taken while in the facility

10 CFR 26.125 - Licensee testing facility personnel.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Licensee testing facility personnel. 26.125 Section 26.125 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS Licensee Testing Facilities § 26.125... reports, if any; results of tests that establish employee competency for the position he or she holds...

Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S.

1995-05-01

This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities

Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S. [George Washington Univ., Washington, DC (United States). School of Engineering and Applied Science; Delicate, W.S. [KEVRIC Co., Inc., Silver Spring, MD (United States)

1995-05-01

This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities.

Improving human performance in maintenance personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gonzalez Anez, Francisco; Agueero Agueero, Jorge

2010-01-01

The continuous evolution and improvement of safety-related processes has included the analysis, design and development of training plans for the qualification of maintenance nuclear power plant personnel. In this respect, the international references in this area recommend the establishment of systematic qualification programmes for personnel performing functions or carrying out safety related tasks. Maintenance personnel qualification processes have improved significantly, and training plans have been designed and developed based on Systematic Approach to Training methodology to each job position. These improvements have been clearly reflected in recent training programmes with new training material and training facilities focused not only on developing technical knowledge and skills but also on improving attitudes and safety culture. The objectives of maintenance training facilities such as laboratories, mock-ups real an virtual, hydraulic loops, field simulators and other training material to be used in the maintenance training centre are to cover training necessities for initial and continuous qualification. Evidently, all these improvements made in the qualification of plant personnel should be extended to include supplemental personnel (external or contracted) performing safety-related tasks. The supplemental personnel constitute a very spread group, covering the performance of multiple activities entailing different levels of responsibility. Some of these activities are performed permanently at the plant, while others are occasional or sporadic. In order to establish qualification requirements for these supplemental workers, it is recommended to establish a rigorous analysis of job positions and tasks. The objective will be to identify the qualification requirements to assure competence and safety. (authors)

Uranium Production Safety Assessment Team. UPSAT. An international peer review service for uranium production facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

The IAEA Uranium Production Safety Assessment Team (UPSAT) programme is designed to assist Member States to improve the safe operation of uranium production facilities. This programme facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experience between team members and industry personnel. An UPSAT mission is an international expert review, conducted outside of any regulatory framework. The programme is implemented in the spirit of voluntary co-operation to contribute to the enhancement of operational safety and practices where it is most effective, at the facility itself. An UPSAT review supplements other facility and regulatory efforts which may have the same objective

Safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific reference include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The safety objective, concepts and safety principles; 3. Legal framework and regulatory supervision; 4. The management system and verification of safety; 5. Siting of the facility; 6. Design of the facility; 7. Construction of the facility; 8. Commissioning of the facility; 9. Operation of the facility; 10. Decommissioning of the facility; Appendix I: Requirements specific to uranium fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix II: Requirements specific to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix III: Requirements specific to conversion facilities and enrichment facilities

Design an optimum safety policy for personnel safety management - A system dynamic approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Balaji, P.

2014-01-01

Personnel safety management (PSM) ensures that employee's work conditions are healthy and safe by various proactive and reactive approaches. Nowadays it is a complex phenomenon because of increasing dynamic nature of organisations which results in an increase of accidents. An important part of accident prevention is to understand the existing system properly and make safety strategies for that system. System dynamics modelling appears to be an appropriate methodology to explore and make strategy for PSM. Many system dynamics models of industrial systems have been built entirely for specific host firms. This thesis illustrates an alternative approach. The generic system dynamics model of Personnel safety management was developed and tested in a host firm. The model was undergone various structural, behavioural and policy tests. The utility and effectiveness of model was further explored through modelling a safety scenario. In order to create effective safety policy under resource constraint, DOE (Design of experiment) was used. DOE uses classic designs, namely, fractional factorials and central composite designs. It used to make second order regression equation which serve as an objective function. That function was optimized under budget constraint and optimum value used for safety policy which shown greatest improvement in overall PSM. The outcome of this research indicates that personnel safety management model has the capability for acting as instruction tool to improve understanding of safety management and also as an aid to policy making

Design an optimum safety policy for personnel safety management - A system dynamic approach

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Balaji, P. [The Glocal University, Mirzapur Pole, Delhi- Yamuntori Highway, Saharanpur 2470001 (India)

2014-10-06

Personnel safety management (PSM) ensures that employee's work conditions are healthy and safe by various proactive and reactive approaches. Nowadays it is a complex phenomenon because of increasing dynamic nature of organisations which results in an increase of accidents. An important part of accident prevention is to understand the existing system properly and make safety strategies for that system. System dynamics modelling appears to be an appropriate methodology to explore and make strategy for PSM. Many system dynamics models of industrial systems have been built entirely for specific host firms. This thesis illustrates an alternative approach. The generic system dynamics model of Personnel safety management was developed and tested in a host firm. The model was undergone various structural, behavioural and policy tests. The utility and effectiveness of model was further explored through modelling a safety scenario. In order to create effective safety policy under resource constraint, DOE (Design of experiment) was used. DOE uses classic designs, namely, fractional factorials and central composite designs. It used to make second order regression equation which serve as an objective function. That function was optimized under budget constraint and optimum value used for safety policy which shown greatest improvement in overall PSM. The outcome of this research indicates that personnel safety management model has the capability for acting as instruction tool to improve understanding of safety management and also as an aid to policy making.

Design an optimum safety policy for personnel safety management - A system dynamic approach

Science.gov (United States)

Balaji, P.

2014-10-01

Personnel safety management (PSM) ensures that employee's work conditions are healthy and safe by various proactive and reactive approaches. Nowadays it is a complex phenomenon because of increasing dynamic nature of organisations which results in an increase of accidents. An important part of accident prevention is to understand the existing system properly and make safety strategies for that system. System dynamics modelling appears to be an appropriate methodology to explore and make strategy for PSM. Many system dynamics models of industrial systems have been built entirely for specific host firms. This thesis illustrates an alternative approach. The generic system dynamics model of Personnel safety management was developed and tested in a host firm. The model was undergone various structural, behavioural and policy tests. The utility and effectiveness of model was further explored through modelling a safety scenario. In order to create effective safety policy under resource constraint, DOE (Design of experiment) was used. DOE uses classic designs, namely, fractional factorials and central composite designs. It used to make second order regression equation which serve as an objective function. That function was optimized under budget constraint and optimum value used for safety policy which shown greatest improvement in overall PSM. The outcome of this research indicates that personnel safety management model has the capability for acting as instruction tool to improve understanding of safety management and also as an aid to policy making.

Decree of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission No. 191/1989 on procedures, terms and conditions for examining special professional qualification and competence of selected nuclear facility personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The procedures, terms and conditions for examining special professional competence of selected nuclear facility personnel are specified, including conditions for professional training and for issuing licenses qualifying the personnel for their work. Nuclear safety-related jobs at nuclear facilities are listed. Professional licenses with a two-year term of validity are granted by the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Agency (CSAEC) to candidates who have passed examination before the State Examination Commission. Personnel training may only be performed by bodies authorized for that by the CSAEC. The Decree entered into force on 1 January 1990. (J.B.)

Compressed Gas Safety for Experimental Fusion Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee C. Cadwallader

2004-09-01

Experimental fusion facilities present a variety of hazards to the operators and staff. There are unique or specialized hazards, including magnetic fields, cryogens, radio frequency emissions, and vacuum reservoirs. There are also more general industrial hazards, such as a wide variety of electrical power, pressurized air, and cooling water systems in use, there are crane and hoist loads, working at height, and handling compressed gas cylinders. This paper outlines the projectile hazard assoicated with compressed gas cylinders and mthods of treatment to provide for compressed gas safety. This information should be of interest to personnel at both magnetic and inertial fusion experiments.

Analysis of Critical Characteristics for Safety Graded Personnel Computers in the KNICS Architecture

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Hyun Chul; Lee, Dong Young

2009-01-01

Critical characteristics analysis of a safety related item is to identify characteristics to be verified to replace an original item with the dedicated item. It is sure that the dedicated item meeting critical characteristics would perform its intended safety function instead of the specified item. KNICS project developed two safety systems: IDiPS RPS (Reactor Protection System) and IDiPS ESF-CCS (Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System). Two safety systems of IDiPS are equipped with personnel computers, so-called COMs (Cabinet Operator Modules), in their cabinets. The personnel computers, COMs, are responsible for safety system monitoring, testing, and maintaining. Even though two safety systems are safety critical system, the personnel computers of two systems, i.e. COMs, are not graded as safety-graded items. Regulation requirements are expected to be strengthened, and the functions of the personnel computer may be enhanced to include safety-related functions and safety functions, it would be necessary that the grade of the personnel computers is adjusted to a higher level, the safety grade. To try to upgrade a non safety system, i.e. COMs, to a safety system, its safety functions and requirements, i.e. critical characteristics, must be identified and verified. This paper describes the process of the identification of critical characteristics and the results of analysis

The Fast Flux Test Facility built on safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

No other high-tech industry has grown as fast as the nuclear industry. The information available to the general public has not kept pace with the rapid growth of nuclear data---its growth has outpaced its media image and the safety of nuclear facilities has become a highly debated issue. This book is an attempt to bridge the gap between the high-tech information of the nuclear industry and its understanding by the general public. It explains the three levels of defense at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) and why these levels provide an acceptable margin to protect the general public and on-site personnel, while achieving FFTF's mission to provide research and development for the US Department of Energy

Safety assessment and surveillance of decommissioning operations at DOE's nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cowgill, M.G.; Prochnow, D.; Worthington, P.R.

1995-01-01

A description is provided of a systematic approach currently being developed and deployed at the Department of Energy to obtain assurance that post-operational activities at nuclear facilities will be conducted in a safe manner. Using this approach, personnel will have available a formalized set of safety principles and associated question sets to assist them in the conducting of safety assessments and surveillance. Information gathered through this means will also be analyzed to determine if there are any generic complex-wide strengths or deficiencies associated with decommissioning activities and to which attention should be drawn

Ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities located in large cities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ryazantsev, E.P.; Kolyadin, V.I.; Bylkin, B.K.; Zverkov, Yu.A.

2002-01-01

The problems of ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities and other facilities representing a radiation hazard (hereinafter referred to as 'nuclear facilities') which are located in large cities are considered in the light of the experience with the 'Kurchatov Institute' Russian Research Centre. The accumulation of substantial quantities of spent nuclear fuel and radwaste at the Centre was an inevitable consequence of the military and civilian nuclear research programmes which started there in 1943. A comprehensive programme has been developed for reducing the impact of ionizing radiation on the Centre's personnel, the population living near the Centre and the local environment. The authors describe the basic elements of a programme for decommissioning reactor facilities and eliminating spent fuel and radwaste storage sites and also describe how the programme is progressing. (author)

The application of integrated safety management principles to the Tritium Extraction Facility project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hickman, M.O.; Viviano, R.R.

2000-01-01

The DOE has developed a program that is accomplishing a heightened safety posture across the complex. The Integrated Safety Management (ISM) System (ISMS) program utilizes five core functions and seven guiding principles as the basis for implementation. The core functions define the work scope, analyze the hazards, develop and implement hazard controls, perform the work, and provide feedback for improvement. The guiding principles include line management responsibility, clear roles and responsibilities, competence per responsibilities, identification of safety standards/requirements, tailored hazard control, balanced priorities, and operations authorization. There exists an unspecified eighth principle, that is, worker involvement. A program requiring the direct involvement of the employees who are actually performing the work has been shown to be quite an effective method of communicating safety requirements, controlling work in a safe manner, and reducing safety violations and injuries. The Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) projects, a component of the DOE's Commercial Light Water Reactor Tritium Production program, has taken the ISM principles and core functions and applied them to the project's design. The task of the design team is to design a facility and systems that will meet the production requirements of the DOE tritium mission as well as a design that minimizes the workers' exposure to adverse safety situations and hazards/hazardous materials. During the development of the preliminary design for the TEF, design teams consisted of not only designers but also personnel who had operational experience in the existing tritium and personnel who had operational experience in the existing tritium and personnel who had specialized experience from across the DOE complex. This design team reviewed multiple documents associated with the TEF operation in order to identify and document the hazards associated with the tritium process. These documents include hazards

Decree of the State Office for Nuclear Safety No. 146/1997 of 18 June 1997 specifying activities which have an immediate impact on nuclear safety, and activities which are particularly important with respect to radiation protection, requirements for qualification and professional training, procedures for examining special professional competence and for granting certificates to selected personnel, and the scope and structure of documentation to be approved for permitting the training of selected personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

The Decree specifies requirements in the following fields: (a) activities which have an immediate impact on nuclear safety and activities which are particularly important with respect to radiation protection; (b) requirements for the qualification of selected personnel; (c) requirements for professional training of selected personnel of nuclear facilities and selected personnel handling ionizing radiation sources who are to gain special professional competence; (d) examination commission; (e) examination of special professional competence of selected personnel of nuclear facilities and selected personnel handling ionizing radiation sources; (f) granting permission to perform activities of selected personnel; and (g) scope and structure of documentation required to permit professional training of selected personnel of nuclear facilities and selected personnel handling ionizing radiation sources. (P.A.)

Status of safety at Areva group facilities. 2007 annual report; Areva, etat de surete des installations nucleaires. Rapport annuel 2007

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2007-07-01

This report describes the status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the facilities of the AREVA group and gives information on radiation protection in the service operations, as observed through the inspection programs and analyses carried out by the General Inspectorate in 2007. Having been submitted to the group's Supervisory Board, this report is sent to the bodies representing the personnel. Content: 1 - A look back at 2007 by the AREVA General Inspector: Visible progress in 2007, Implementation of the Nuclear Safety Charter, Notable events; 2 - Status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the nuclear facilities and service operations: Personnel radiation protection, Event tracking, Service operations, Criticality control, Radioactive waste and effluent management; 3 - Performance improvement actions; 4 - Description of the General Inspectorate; 5 - Glossary.

[RADIATION SAFETY DURING REMEDIATION OF THE "SEVRAO" FACILITIES].

Science.gov (United States)

Shandala, N K; Kiselev, S M; Titov, A V; Simakov, A V; Seregin, V A; Kryuchkov, V P; Bogdanova, L S; Grachev, M I

2015-01-01

Within a framework of national program on elimination of nuclear legacy, State Corporation "Rosatom" is working on rehabilitation at the temporary waste storage facility at Andreeva Bay (Northwest Center for radioactive waste "SEVRAO"--the branch of "RosRAO"), located in the North-West of Russia. In the article there is presented an analysis of the current state of supervision for radiation safety of personnel and population in the context of readiness of the regulator to the implementation of an effective oversight of radiation safety in the process of radiation-hazardous work. Presented in the article results of radiation-hygienic monitoring are an informative indicator of the effectiveness of realized rehabilitation measures and characterize the radiation environment in the surveillance zone as a normal, without the tendency to its deterioration.

Considerations in the safety assessment of sealed nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-06-01

This report is a part of the International Atomic Energy Agency's radioactive waste management programme, whose objective is to provide assistance to Member States in developing guidance for identifying safe alternatives for isolating radioactive waste from man and his environment. This report attempts to integrate information from the previous reports on decommissioning of nuclear facilities, mitigation of accidents at such facilities, and performance assessment of disposal systems to provide useful advice and qualitative guidance to those responsible for performance and safety assessments of sealed nuclear facilities by giving an overview of possible approaches and techniques for such assessments. In this context, the establishment of requirements and rules governing the radiological safety of personnel, the general public, and the environment for sealing and post-sealing activities will enable the choice of the most appropriated approach and help to promote consistency in both decommissioning and waste management standards. The near-field effects discussed in this document include gas generation, interactions of the groundwater and the residual water with other components of the system, thermal, thermo-mechanical, radiation effects and chemical and geochemical reactions. 59 refs, figs and tabs

Review of the nuclear safety exercises carried out in French industrial facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kissel, Ph.P.; Renard, C.; Meramedjian, H.N.

1977-01-01

For several years the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA) has been organizing nuclear safety exercises in most nuclear industrial facilities, especially in fuel element fabrication plants, many of which are classified as basic nuclear facilities. The subject and extent of each exercise are decided by mutual agreement between the management of the facility and the CEA officials in charge of Assistance in Protection and Nuclear Safety (APSN). The authors deal with such subjects as criticality accidents (evacuation of facilities, regrouping of personnel, rescue operations etc.) and fire involving large quantities of radioactive material (protection of the environment by spraying water on fumes laden with radioactive aerosols etc.). During these exercises use is made of the resources available with the safety services of the facility, one or more mobile nuclear action teams of the CEA and the appropriate resources within the competence of public authorities, e.g. Civil Defence, the fire brigades, the Gendarmerie etc. Each exercise is followed by a meeting which gives an opportunity for constructive criticism and for the adoption of measures best suited for solving problems which invariably arise, such as choice of methods and resources, co-ordination of their simultaneous or gradual application and so on. (author)

Health and safety plan for the Isotopes Facilities Deactivation Project at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-08-01

This HASP describes the process for identifying the requirements, written safety documentation, and procedures for protecting personnel involved in the Isotopes Facilities Deactivation Project. Objective of this project is to place 19 former isotope production facilities at ORNL in a safe condition in anticipation of an extended period of minimum surveillance and maintenance

PLC-based search and secure interlock system for the personnel safety in folded tandem ion accelerator

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Padmakumar, Sapna; Subramanyum, N.B.V.; Bhatt, Jignesh P.; Ware, Shailaja V.; Kansara, M.J.; Gupta, S.K.; Singh, P.

2006-01-01

Safety of the personnel is one of the key issues addressed in any accelerator project. The FOTIA facility at BARC is capable of operating under standard operation conditions without any radiation hazard. Even then for a safe and reliable operation of FOTIA a PLC (Programmable logic controller) based interlock system has been implemented. This interlocking system is compact, modular, flexible, robust and easy for troubleshooting. These advantages led to the popularity of PLC rather than using a relay-based system. This paper highlights the salient features of the search and secure interlock for the personal safety of FOTIA. (author)

Radiation safety program in a high dose rate brachytherapy facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, L.V.; Hermoso, T.M.; Solis, R.C.

2001-01-01

The use of remote afterloading equipment has been developed to improve radiation safety in the delivery of treatment in brachytherapy. Several accidents, however, have been reported involving high dose-rate brachytherapy system. These events, together with the desire to address the concerns of radiation workers, and the anticipated adoption of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation (IAEA, 1996), led to the development of the radiation safety program at the Department of Radiotherapy, Jose R. Reyes Memorial Medical Center and at the Division of Radiation Oncology, St. Luke's Medical Center. The radiation safety program covers five major aspects: quality control/quality assurance, radiation monitoring, preventive maintenance, administrative measures and quality audit. Measures for evaluation of effectiveness of the program include decreased unnecessary exposures of patients and staff, improved accuracy in treatment delivery and increased department efficiency due to the development of staff vigilance and decreased anxiety. The success in the implementation required the participation and cooperation of all the personnel involved in the procedures and strong management support. This paper will discuss the radiation safety program for a high dose rate brachytherapy facility developed at these two institutes which may serve as a guideline for other hospitals intending to install a similar facility. (author)

Safety and regulatory aspects of front end facilities of nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khan, Kirity Bhushan; Jha, S.K.; Bhasin, Vivek; Behere, P.G.

2017-01-01

Nuclear Fuels Group of BARC consists of various divisions with diverse activities but impeccable safety records. This has been made possible with strict safety culture among trained personnel across all divisions. The major activities of this group encompass the front end fuel fabrication facilities for thermal and fast reactors and post irradiation examination of fuel and structural materials. The group has been responsible for delivering departmental targets, as and when required, fulfilling all safety and security requirements. The present article covers the safety and regulatory aspects of this group with special emphasis on group safety management by the administrative/organizational control, the procedure followed for regulatory review and control which are carried out and the laid down procedures for identifying, classifying and reporting of safety related incidents. (author)

Personnel Risks in Ensuring Safety of Medical Activity

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

O. L. Zadvornaya

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Purpose: modern strategies of management of the organization require the formation of special management approaches based on the analysis of the mechanisms and processes of the organization of medical activities related to possible risks in activity of medical personnel. Based on international experience and own research the authors have identified features of a system of management of personnel risk in medical activities, examined approaches showing the sequence and contents of the main practical activities of the formation, maintenance and development of the system of management of personnel risks. Emphasized is the need for further research and implementation of the system of management of personnel risk in health care organizations. Study and assessment of personnel risks affecting the security of medical activities aimed at the development of the system of personnel risk management, development of a system of identification and monitoring of HR risk indicators with a purpose to improve institutional management and increase efficiency of activity of medical organizations. Methods: in the present study, the following methods were used: systemic approach, content analysis, methods of social diagnosis (questionnaires, interviews, comparative analysis, method of expert evaluations, method of statistical processing of information. Results: approaches to predict the occurrence and development of personnel risks have been reviewed and proposed. Conclusions and Relevance: patient safety is a global issue affecting countries at all levels of development. Each year, the WHO identifies a number of systemic and technical aspects and trends in the field of patient safety related to actions of medical workers. Existing imbalances in the staffing of the health system of the Russian Federation increase the probability of potential risks in medical practice. The personnel policy of healthcare of the Russian Federation requires further improvement and

NPP safety and personnel training. XII International conference. Abstracts. Volume 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The XII International conference NPP Safety and Personnel Training took place in Obninsk, October 4-7 2011. The problems of personnel training for nuclear industry are discussed. The innovation nuclear systems and fuel cycle are considered. The much attention has been given to NPP radiation safety and radioecology issues. The recent high-speed computation and simulation methods used in reactor technology are presented [ru

Educating personnel for nuclear technology in Czechoslovakia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Otcenasek, P.

1980-01-01

The basic preconditions are discussed of educating personnel for nuclear power and nuclear technology in Czechoslovakia. In educating specialists, the high societal significance of nuclear power and the need to obtain qualified personnel for safeguarding safety and reliability of nuclear facilities operation should primarily be borne in mind. The system of training applies not only to operating and maintenance personnel of nuclear power plants but also to fuel and power generation, transport, engineering, building industry, health care, education and other personnel. (J.B.)

Radioactive wastes. Safety of storage facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Devillers, Ch.

2001-01-01

A radioactive waste storage facility is designed in a way that ensures the isolation of wastes with respect to the biosphere. This function comprises the damping of the gamma and neutron radiations from the wastes, and the confinement of the radionuclides content of the wastes. The safety approach is based on two time scales: the safety of the insulation system during the main phase of radioactive decay, and the assessment of the radiological risks following this phase. The safety of a surface storage facility is based on a three-barrier concept (container, storage structures, site). The confidence in the safety of the facility is based on the quality assurance of the barriers and on their surveillance and maintenance. The safety of a deep repository will be based on the site quality, on the design and construction of structures and on the quality of the safety demonstration. This article deals with the safety approach and principles of storage facilities: 1 - recall of the different types of storage facilities; 2 - different phases of the life of a storage facility and regulatory steps; 3 - safety and radiation protection goals (time scales, radiation protection goals); 4 - safety approach and principles of storage facilities: safety of the isolation system (confinement system, safety analysis, scenarios, radiological consequences, safety principles), assessment of the radiation risks after the main phase of decay; 5 - safety of surface storage facilities: safety analysis of the confinement system of the Aube plant (barriers, scenarios, modeling, efficiency), evaluation of radiological risks after the main phase of decay; experience feedback of the Manche plant; variants of surface storage facilities in France and abroad (very low activity wastes, mine wastes, short living wastes with low and average activity); 6 - safety of deep geological disposal facilities: legal framework of the French research; international context; safety analysis of the confinement system

Radiation safety program in high dose rate brachytherapy facility at INHS Asvini

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kirti Tyagi

2014-01-01

Full Text Available Brachytherapy concerns primarily the use of radioactive sealed sources which are inserted into catheters or applicators and placed directly into tissue either inside or very close to the target volume. The use of radiation in treatment of patients involves both benefits and risks. It has been reported that early radiation workers had developed radiation induced cancers. These incidents lead to continuous work for the improvement of radiation safety of patients and personnel The use of remote afterloading equipment has been developed to improve radiation safety in the delivery of treatment in brachytherapy. The widespread adoption of high dose rate brachytherapy needs appropriate quality assurance measures to minimize the risks to both patients and medical staff. The radiation safety program covers five major aspects: quality control, quality assurance, radiation monitoring, preventive maintenance, administrative measures and quality audit. This paper will discuss the radiation safety program developedfor a high dose rate brachytherapy facility at our centre which may serve as a guideline for other centres intending to install a similar facility.

Radiological and the other safety aspects in the operation of electron beam facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Loterina, Roel Alamares

2003-01-01

The radiological safety aspects of the operation of an electron beam facility in general and the 3 MeV ALURTRON electron beam facility of the Malaysian Institute of Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) in particular were reviewed and evaluated. Evaluation was made based on existing records as well as actual monitoring around facility. Area monitoring results using TLDs are within permissible levels. The maximum reading of 7.29 mSv measured in year 2000 is very low as compared to the annual dose limit of 50 mSv/year. In general, the shielding for the installation is adequate and no significant radiation leakage were detected based on radiation survey results. However, measured radiation levels with a maximum of 1.9 mSv/h at the sampling ports easily exceed the limit of 25μSv/h. The facility is equipped with safety features, such as interlocked system, adequate shielding, engineered safety design of irradiation and accelerator rooms, and accessories such as conveyor system and product handling system. Warning lights and signals are adequately installed around the facility. Other identified hazards that may affect the operator, workers, and personnel were also evaluated based on previous records of monitoring. The ozone concentration levels with a maximum reading of 0.05 ppm measured in the environment of the facility are within the threshold limit value of 0.1 ppm. The measured noise levels at all locations around facility are generally below the maximum permissible level of 80dB. The ALURTRON has achieved a minimum safety requirement to warrant its full operation without relying on administrative controls and procedures to ensure safety in operation. (Auth.)

49 CFR 193.2511 - Personnel safety.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED) PIPELINE SAFETY LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FACILITIES... or a means of escape. (c) Each LNG plant must be equipped with suitable first-aid material, the...

340 Waste Handling Facility interim safety basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bendixsen, R.B.

1995-01-01

This document establishes the interim safety basis (ISB) for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility). An ISB is a documented safety basis that provides a justification for the continued operation of the facility until an upgraded final safety analysis report is prepared that complies with US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The ISB for the 340 Facility documents the current design and operation of the facility. The 340 Facility ISB (ISB-003) is based on a facility walkdown and review of the design and operation of the facility, as described in the existing safety documentation. The safety documents reviewed, to develop ISB-003, include the following: OSD-SW-153-0001, Operating Specification Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1990); OSR-SW-152-00003, Operating Limits for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1989); SD-RE-SAP-013, Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Railroad Liquid Waste Tank Cars (Mercado 1993); SD-WM-TM-001, Safety Assessment Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (Berneski 1994a); SD-WM-SEL-016, 340 Facility Safety Equipment List (Berneski 1992); and 340 Complex Fire Hazard Analysis, Draft (Hughes Assoc. Inc. 1994)

'Defense-in-Depth' Laser Safety and the National Ignition Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

King, J.J.

2010-01-01

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the largest and most energetic laser in the world contained in a complex the size of a football stadium. From the initial laser pulse, provided by telecommunication style infrared nanoJoule pulsed lasers, to the final 192 laser beams (1.8 Mega Joules total energy in the ultraviolet) converging on a target the size of a pencil eraser, laser safety is of paramount concern. In addition to this, there are numerous high-powered (Class 3B and 4) diagnostic lasers in use that can potentially send their laser radiation travelling throughout the facility. With individual beam paths of up to 1500 meters and a workforce of more than one thousand, the potential for exposure is significant. Simple laser safety practices utilized in typical laser labs just don't apply. To mitigate these hazards, NIF incorporates a multi layered approach to laser safety or 'Defense in Depth.' Most typical high-powered laser operations are contained and controlled within a single room using relatively simplistic controls to protect both the worker and the public. Laser workers are trained, use a standard operating procedure, and are required to wear Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) such as Laser Protective Eyewear (LPE) if the system is not fully enclosed. Non-workers are protected by means of posting the room with a warning sign and a flashing light. In the best of cases, a Safety Interlock System (SIS) will be employed which will 'safe' the laser in the case of unauthorized access. This type of laser operation is relatively easy to employ and manage. As the operation becomes more complex, higher levels of control are required to ensure personnel safety. Examples requiring enhanced controls are outdoor and multi-room laser operations. At the NIF there are 192 beam lines and numerous other Class 4 diagnostic lasers that can potentially deliver their hazardous energy to locations far from the laser source. This presents a serious and complex potential

Hanford surplus facilities hazards identification document. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Egge, R.G.

1996-02-01

This document provides general safety information needed by personnel who enter and work in surplus facilities managed by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI). The purpose of the document is to enhance access control of surplus facilities, educate personnel on the potential hazards associated with these facilities prior to entry, and ensure that safety precautions are taken while in the facility. Questions concerning the currency of this information should be directed to the building administrator (as listed in BHI-FS-01, Field Support Administration, Section 1.1, ''Access Control for ERC Surplus Facilities'')

The aspect of personnel metal attitude in the production safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joyosukarto, Priyanto M.

2002-01-01

The occurrence of an accident could always be traced to component/system failures and/or human error. The two factors are closely related to competency of the personnel's involved, in which mental attitude is a decisive factor. Furthermore mental attitude could be viewed as an element of Safety (S) Culture. Consequently, S. Culture could might created or at lea ts, be enhanced by the introduction of appropriate values, norms, as well as attitudes. The ABC and TBC of safety norm have been discussed briefly. Whereas mental attitude has been defined and discussed in detail and graded into six levels, namely: attending, responding, complying, accepting, preferring, and integrating. To assure highest level of safety, personnel must achieve integrating level of attitude, in the sense that he would merely do an action on the basis of safety values and/or norms prevailing in the system, not due to external pressure. Furthermore, considering the work as a physical and an emotional activity resulting in stress and strain on the body, Karate exercises have been promoted as an alternative for enhancing mental attitude by means of reducing personnel vulnerability to strain and stress. This method is accomplished by exploiting Roux's Low of conditioning effect and by implementation of an in-depth understanding on the spiritual aspect of Karate. It is concluded that in the field of production safety, there is a positive correlation between Karate, mental attitude, competence, performance, quality, and safety

Safety Features of Material and Personnel Movement Devices. Module SH-25. Safety and Health.

Science.gov (United States)

Center for Occupational Research and Development, Inc., Waco, TX.

This student module on safety features of material and personnel movement devices is one of 50 modules concerned with job safety and health. This module covers safe conditions and operating practices for conveyors, elevators, escalators, moving walks, manlifts, forklifts, and motorized hand trucks. Following the introduction, 10 objectives (each…

Issues of improving quality of training personnel for nuclear power facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jacko, J.

1987-01-01

The basic stages are characterized of the development of a standard system of personnel training for the start-up, operation and maintenance of nuclear power facilities. The experience is analyzed gained by the Branch Training Centre of the Nuclear Power Plant Research Institute. Suggestions are submitted for improving the quality of personnel training based on Czechoslovak and foreign experiences. (author). 3 refs

Quality assurance for external personnel monitoring in nuclear industrial facilities, CNNC

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Yansheng; Dai Jun; Li Taosheng

1993-01-01

More than 6000 personnel are currently being monitored for occupational exposure in CNNC, China. Personnel monitoring is one of the important items of radiation protection. The data of individual dose are not only indispensable for radiation safety assessment but also the basis for radiation protection measures to be taken. Possibly, it could provide basic information for epidemiological studies, optimization procedure of radiation protection (risk/benefit analyses) and medical or legal purposes. Obviously, personnel monitoring and its quality assurance are very significant

Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF 6 ; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.? read more The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are

Study on personnel qualification for non-destructive tests in the field of reactor safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Trusch, K.; Wuestenberg, H.

1977-01-01

The training system for non-destructive testing is described, and the available and necessary personnel is analyzed; the personnel required for reactor safety problems is treated separately. On this basis, the subjects discussed in the study - available personnel, personnel requirements, training, training requirements, and suggestions for realisation - are treated in a general manner to begin with and afterwards with a view to specific problems of reactor safety. The methods employed are adapted to this situation. To obtain the necessary empirical data, questionnaires were set up and distributed, and experts in selected business companies and institutions were interviewed who work in the field of reactor safety or do same training in non-destructive testing. (orig.) [de

Relation of management, supervision, and personnel practices to nuclear power plant safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Layton, W.L.; Turnage, J.J.

1980-01-01

The knowledge base of industrial/organization psychology suggests three major areas of research with important implications for nuclear power plant safety. These areas are: Management and Supervision: Personnel Selection, Training and Placement; and Organizational Climate. Evidence drawn from several Three Mile Island investigations confirms that organizational structure of plants and supervisory practices, the selection and training of personnel, and organizational climate are important factors. Difficulties in decision making and coordination of personnel are pinpointed. Deficiencies in training are highlighted and the climate of working atmosphere is discussed. These matters are related to nuclear power plant safety. Future research directions are presented

Reports and operational engineering: An independent safety assessment of Department of Energy nuclear reactor facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rochman, A.; Washburn, B.W.

1981-02-01

The Nuclear Facilities Personnel Qualification and Training (NFPQT) Committee, established via an October 24, 1979 memorandum from the Department of Energy (DOE) Under Secretary, was instructed to review the ''Kemeny Commission'' recommendations and to identify possible implications for DOE's nuclear facilities. As a result of this review, the Committee recommended that DOE carry out assessments in seven categories. The assessments would address specific topics identified for each category as delineated in the NFPQT ''Guidelines for Assessing the Safe Operation of DOE-Owned Reactors,'' dated May 7, 1980. The Committee recognized that similar assessments had been ongoing in the DOE program and safety overview organizations since the Three Mile Island nuclear accident and it was the Committee's intent to use the results of those ongoing assessments as an input to their evaluations. This information would be supplemented by additional studies consisting of the subject-related documents used at each reactor facility studied, and an on-site review of these reactor facilities by professional personnel within the Department of Energy, its operating contractors and independent consultants. 1 tab

Unique safety manual for experimental personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Busick, D.D.; Warren, G.J.

1979-01-01

Within a few months of the discovery of x-rays the first radiation injuries were reported (ta71). During the past thirty years both the number and complexity of x-ray analytical units have increased markedly. The world-wide number of incidents leading to severe injury has also increased. For analytical x-ray machines the need for engineered and administrative safeguards has long been recognized. At Stanford Synchrotron Radiation Laboratory (SSRL) the personnel protection system has been carefully designed to maximize safety and minimize experimental interference. However, all possible experimental configurations cannot be anticipated and some interference is to be expected. There are means by which safeguards can be substituted as long as these substitutions do not degrade the existing degree of safety. any substitutions must be evaluated by the Radiation Safety Committee, the SSRL staff and Operational Health Physics. Some studies have indicated that between fifty and ninety percent of serious radiation accidents are directly related to human errors, i.e., ignoring administrative proccedures, by-passing engineered safeguards or by inadequate training. Lindell has estimated the annual probability of serious injury to be about 1:100 per macchine. No matter what the real probability of serious injury is the personnel protection system should reduce this risk to a value that approaches zero. It is hoped that this manual will bring into sharper focus some of the more serious results of unnecessary risk taking. We also hope that it will convey the very real necessity for safeguards which may at times appear to be arbitrary and unnecessary impediments to experimental purposes

Programmable controllers replace relays in MFTF-B personnel-safety interlocks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Branum, J.D.

1981-01-01

This paper describes a new approach for implementing personnel safety interlocks logic using industrial-type programmable controllers. The logic for all personnel safety interlocks except those totally internal to a subsystem is implemented in two non-redundant controllers. A high degree of fail-safe reliability is achieved by augmenting the protective features intrinsic to each controller with those provided by a small amount of external support hardware. The controllers are interfaced to the host computer system via fiber optic data links to enable display of interlock and overall system status on the control room graphic displays. When fully implemented, the controllers will perform the equivalent of over 2000 discreet relay functions

Safety culture assessment among laboratory personnel of a petrochemical company

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

M. Shekari

2014-05-01

.Conclusion: Strong and positive safety culture among laboratory personnel would prevent incidence of many occupational accidents. In another word, it would help organizations to facilitate access to higher standards.

Current personnel dosimetry practices at DOE facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fix, J.J.

1981-05-01

Only three parameters were included in the personnel occupational exposure records by all facilities. These are employee name, social security number, and whole body dose. Approximate percentages of some other parameters included in the record systems are sex (50%), birthdate (90%), occupation (26%), previous employer radiation exposure (74%), etc. Statistical analysis of the data for such parameters as sex versus dose distribution, age versus dose distribution, cumulative lifetime dose, etc. was apparently seldom done. Less than 50% of the facilities reported having formal documentation for either the dosimeter, records system, or reader. Slightly greater than 50% of facilities reported having routine procedures in place. These are considered maximum percentages because some respondents considered computer codes as formal documentation. The repository receives data from DOE facilities regarding the (a) distribution of annual whole body doses, (b) significant internal depositions, and (c) individual doses upon termination. It is expected that numerous differences exist in the dose data submitted by the different facilities. Areas of significant differences would likely include the determination of non-measurable doses, the methods used to determine previous employer radiation dose, the methods of determining cumulative radiation dose, and assessment of internal doses. Undoubtedly, the accuracy of the different dosimetry systems, especially at low doses, is very important to the credibility of data summaries (e.g., man-rem) provided by the repository

Nuclear materials facility safety initiative

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peddicord, K.L.; Nelson, P.; Roundhill, M.; Jardine, L.J.; Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M.; Khromov, V.V.; Kruchkov, E.; Bolyatko, V.; Kazanskij, Yu.; Vorobeva, I.; Lash, T.R.; Newton, D.; Harris, B.

2000-01-01

Safety in any facility in the nuclear fuel cycle is a fundamental goal. However, it is recognized that, for example, should an accident occur in either the U.S. or Russia, the results could seriously delay joint activities to store and disposition weapons fissile materials in both countries. To address this, plans are underway jointly to develop a nuclear materials facility safety initiative. The focus of the initiative would be to share expertise which would lead in improvements in safety and safe practices in the nuclear fuel cycle.The program has two components. The first is a lab-to-lab initiative. The second involves university-to-university collaboration.The lab-to-lab and university-to-university programs will contribute to increased safety in facilities dealing with nuclear materials and related processes. These programs will support important bilateral initiatives, develop the next generation of scientists and engineers which will deal with these challenges, and foster the development of a safety culture

340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

VAIL, T.S.

1999-04-01

This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people.

340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

VAIL, T.S.

1999-01-01

This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people

Maintenance of reactor safety and control computers at a large government facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brady, H.G.

1985-01-01

In 1950 the US Government contracted the Du Pont Company to design, build, and operate the Savannah River Plant (SRP). At the time, it was the largest construction project ever undertaken by man. It is still the largest of the Department of Energy facilities. In the nearly 35 years that have elapsed, Du Pont has met its commitments to the US Government and set world safety records in the construction and operation of nuclear facilities. Contributing factors in achieving production goals and setting the safety records are a staff of highly qualified personnel, a well maintained plant, and sound maintenance programs. There have been many ''first ever'' achievements at SRP. These ''firsts'' include: (1) computer control of a nuclear rector, and (2) use of computer systems as safety circuits. This presentation discusses the maintenance program provided for these computer systems and all digital systems at SRP. An in-house computer maintenance program that was started in 1966 with five persons has grown to a staff of 40 with investments in computer hardware increasing from $4 million in 1970 to more than $60 million in this decade. 4 figs

Probabilistic safety assessment for food irradiation facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Solanki, R.B.; Prasad, M.; Sonawane, A.U.; Gupta, S.K.

2012-01-01

Highlights: ► Different considerations are required in PSA for Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities. ► We carried out PSA for food irradiation facility as a part of safety evaluation. ► The results indicate that the fatal exposure risk is below the ‘acceptable risk’. ► Adequate operator training and observing good safety culture would reduce the risk. - Abstract: Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is widely used for safety evaluation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) worldwide. The approaches and methodologies are matured and general consensus exists on using these approaches in PSA applications. However, PSA applications for safety evaluation for non-reactor facilities are limited. Due to differences in the processes in nuclear reactor facilities and non-reactor facilities, the considerations are different in application of PSA to these facilities. The food irradiation facilities utilize gamma irradiation sources, X-ray machines and electron accelerators for the purpose of radiation processing of variety of food items. This is categorized as Non-Reactor Nuclear Facility. In this paper, the application of PSA to safety evaluation of food irradiation facility is presented considering the ‘fatality due to radiation overexposure’ as a risk measure. The results indicate that the frequency of the fatal exposure is below the numerical acceptance guidance for the risk to the individual. Further, it is found that the overall risk to the over exposure can be reduced by providing the adequate operator training and observing good safety culture.

Helicopter Operations and Personnel Safety (Helirescue Manual). Fourth Edition.

Science.gov (United States)

Dalle-Molle, John

The illustrated manual includes information on various aspects of helicopter rescue missions, including mission management roles for key personnel, safety rules around helicopters, requests for helicopter support, sample military air support forms, selection of landing zones, helicopter evacuations, rescuer delivery, passenger unloading, crash…

Preliminary design of safety and interlock system for indian test facility of diagnostic neutral beam

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tyagi, Himanshu; Soni, Jignesh; Yadav, Ratnakar; Bandyopadhyay, Mainak; Rotti, Chandramouli; Gahlaut, Agrajit; Joshi, Jaydeep; Parmar, Deepak; Bansal, Gourab; Pandya, Kaushal; Chakraborty, Arun

2016-01-01

Highlights: • Indian Test Facility being built to characterize DNB for ITER delivery. • Interlock system required to safeguard the investment incurred in building the facility and protecting ITER deliverable components. • Interlock levels upto 3IL-3 identified. • Safety instrumented system for occupational safety being designed. Safety I&C functions of SIL-2 identified. • The systems are based on ITER PIS and PSS design guidelines. - Abstract: Indian Test Facility (INTF) is being built in Institute For Plasma Research to characterize Diagnostic Neutral Beam in co-operation with ITER Organization. INTF is a complex system which consists of several plant systems like beam source, gas feed, vacuum, cryogenics, high voltage power supplies, high power RF generators, mechanical systems and diagnostics systems. Out of these, several INTF components are ITER deliverable, that is, beam source, beam line components and power supplies. To ensure successful operation of INTF involving integrated operation of all the constituent plant systems a matured Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS) is required. The INTF DACS is based on CODAC platform following on PCDH (Plant Control Design Handbook) guidelines. The experimental phases involve application of HV power supplies (100 KV) and High RF power (∼800 KW) which will produce energetic beam of maximum power 6MW within the facility for longer durations. Hence the entire facility will be exposed tohigh heat fluxes and RF radiations. To ensure investment protection and to provide occupational safety for working personnel a matured Safety and Interlock system is required for INTF. The Safety and Interlock systems are high-reliability I&C systems devoted completely to the specific functions. These systems will be separate from the conventional DACS of INTF which will handle the conventional control and acquisition functions. Both, the Safety and Interlock systems are based on IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 standards as

Preliminary design of safety and interlock system for indian test facility of diagnostic neutral beam

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tyagi, Himanshu, E-mail: htyagi@iter-india.org [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Soni, Jignesh [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Yadav, Ratnakar; Bandyopadhyay, Mainak; Rotti, Chandramouli [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Gahlaut, Agrajit [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Joshi, Jaydeep; Parmar, Deepak [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Bansal, Gourab; Pandya, Kaushal; Chakraborty, Arun [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India)

2016-11-15

Highlights: • Indian Test Facility being built to characterize DNB for ITER delivery. • Interlock system required to safeguard the investment incurred in building the facility and protecting ITER deliverable components. • Interlock levels upto 3IL-3 identified. • Safety instrumented system for occupational safety being designed. Safety I&C functions of SIL-2 identified. • The systems are based on ITER PIS and PSS design guidelines. - Abstract: Indian Test Facility (INTF) is being built in Institute For Plasma Research to characterize Diagnostic Neutral Beam in co-operation with ITER Organization. INTF is a complex system which consists of several plant systems like beam source, gas feed, vacuum, cryogenics, high voltage power supplies, high power RF generators, mechanical systems and diagnostics systems. Out of these, several INTF components are ITER deliverable, that is, beam source, beam line components and power supplies. To ensure successful operation of INTF involving integrated operation of all the constituent plant systems a matured Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS) is required. The INTF DACS is based on CODAC platform following on PCDH (Plant Control Design Handbook) guidelines. The experimental phases involve application of HV power supplies (100 KV) and High RF power (∼800 KW) which will produce energetic beam of maximum power 6MW within the facility for longer durations. Hence the entire facility will be exposed tohigh heat fluxes and RF radiations. To ensure investment protection and to provide occupational safety for working personnel a matured Safety and Interlock system is required for INTF. The Safety and Interlock systems are high-reliability I&C systems devoted completely to the specific functions. These systems will be separate from the conventional DACS of INTF which will handle the conventional control and acquisition functions. Both, the Safety and Interlock systems are based on IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 standards as

Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-05-01

This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved

Radiological safety assessment of transporting radioactive waste to the Gyeongju disposal facility in Korea

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeong, Jong Tae; Baik, Min Hoon; Kang, Mun Ja; Ahn, Hong Joo; Hwang, Doo Seong; Hong, Dae Seok; Jeong, Yong Hwan; Kim, Kyung Su [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-12-15

A radiological safety assessment study was performed for the transportation of low level radioactive wastes which are temporarily stored in Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Daejeon, Korea. We considered two kinds of wastes: (1) operation wastes generated from the routine operation of facilities; and (2) decommissioning wastes generated from the decommissioning of a research reactor in KAERI. The important part of the radiological safety assessment is related to the exposure dose assessment for the incident-free (normal) transportation of wastes, i.e., the radiation exposure of transport personnel, radiation workers for loading and unloading of radioactive waste drums, and the general public. The effective doses were estimated based on the detailed information on the transportation plan and on the radiological characteristics of waste packages. We also estimated radiological risks and the effective doses for the general public resulting from accidents such as an impact and a fire caused by the impact during the transportation. According to the results, the effective doses for transport personnel, radiation workers, and the general public are far below the regulatory limits. Therefore, we can secure safety from the viewpoint of radiological safety for all situations during the transportation of radioactive wastes which have been stored temporarily in KAERI.

Radiological Safety Assessment of Transporting Radioactive Wastes to the Gyeongju Disposal Facility in Korea

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jongtae Jeong

2016-12-01

Full Text Available A radiological safety assessment study was performed for the transportation of low level radioactive wastes which are temporarily stored in Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI, Daejeon, Korea. We considered two kinds of wastes: (1 operation wastes generated from the routine operation of facilities; and (2 decommissioning wastes generated from the decommissioning of a research reactor in KAERI. The important part of the radiological safety assessment is related to the exposure dose assessment for the incident-free (normal transportation of wastes, i.e., the radiation exposure of transport personnel, radiation workers for loading and unloading of radioactive waste drums, and the general public. The effective doses were estimated based on the detailed information on the transportation plan and on the radiological characteristics of waste packages. We also estimated radiological risks and the effective doses for the general public resulting from accidents such as an impact and a fire caused by the impact during the transportation. According to the results, the effective doses for transport personnel, radiation workers, and the general public are far below the regulatory limits. Therefore, we can secure safety from the viewpoint of radiological safety for all situations during the transportation of radioactive wastes which have been stored temporarily in KAERI.

Efficacy and safety of intravenous fentanyl administered by ambulance personnel

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Friesgaard, Kristian Dahl; Nikolajsen, Lone; Giebner, Matthias

2016-01-01

BACKGROUND: Management of pain in the pre-hospital setting is often inadequate. In 2011, ambulance personnel were authorized to administer intravenous fentanyl in the Central Denmark Region. The aim of this study was to evaluate the efficacy and safety of intravenous fentanyl administered...... by ambulance personnel. METHODS: Pre-hospital medical charts from 2348 adults treated with intravenous fentanyl by ambulance personnel during a 6-month period were reviewed. The primary outcome was the change in pain intensity on a numeric rating scale (NRS) from before fentanyl treatment to hospital arrival...... patients (1.3%) and hypotension observed in 71 patients (3.0%). CONCLUSION: Intravenous fentanyl caused clinically meaningful pain reduction in most patients and was safe in the hands of ambulance personnel. Many patients had moderate to severe pain at hospital arrival. As the protocol allowed higher doses...

H.R. 3521: Nuclear Facilities Occupational Safety Improvement Act of 1989. Introduced in the House of Representatives, One Hundredth First Congress, First Session, October 25, 1989

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1989-01-01

Bill H.R.3521 was introduced in the House of Representatives of the United States on October 25, 1989. The purpose of this Act and the amendments made by this Act are to improve and enforce standards for employee health and safety at Department of Energy nuclear facilities. Congress finds that worker health and safety at Department of Energy nuclear facilities could be made substantially safer by applying standards developed by experts in the field of occupational health and safety. A section-by-section analysis makes up most of the report with emphasis on the following: application of OSHA to DOE nuclear facilities; cooperation with inspections and investigations; transfer and allocation of appropriations and personnel; worker training requirements; performance of NIOSH functions at DOE nuclear facilities; medical examinations of employees; and labor-management health and safety committees at DOE nuclear facilities

Requirements of on-site facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burchardt, H.

1977-01-01

1) Requirements of on-site facilities: a) brief description of supplying the site with electricity and water; communication facilities, b) necessary facilities for containment and pipeline installation, c) necessary facilities for storage, safety, accommodation of personnel, housing; workshops; 2) Site management: a) Organisation schedules for 'turn-key-jobs' and 'single commission', b) Duties of the supervisory staff. (orig.) [de

Regulatory inspection of BARC facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rajdeep; Jayarajan, K.

2017-01-01

Nuclear and radiation facilities are sited, constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned, in conformity with the current safety standards and codes. Regulatory bodies follow different means to ensure compliance of the standards for the safety of the personnel, the public and the environment. Regulatory Inspection (RI) is one of the important measures employed by regulatory bodies to obtain the safety status of a facility or project and to verify the fulfilment of the conditions stipulated in the consent

Upgrading safety systems of industrial irradiation facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gomes, R.S.; Gomes, J.D.R.L.; Costa, E.L.C.; Costa, M.L.L.; Thomé, Z.D.

2017-01-01

The first industrial irradiation facility in operation in Brazil was designed in the 70s. Nowadays, twelve commercial and research facilities are in operation and two already decommissioned. Minor modifications and upgrades, as sensors replacement, have been introduced in these facilities, in order to reduce the technological gap in the control and safety systems. The safety systems are designed in agreement with the codes and standards at the time. Since then, new standards, codes and recommendations, as well as lessons learned from accidents, have been issued by various international committees or regulatory bodies. The rapid advance of the industry makes the safety equipment used in the original construction become obsolete. The decreasing demand for these older products means that they are no longer produced, which can make it impossible or costly to obtain spare parts and the expansion of legacy systems to include new features. This work aims to evaluate existing safety systems at Brazilian irradiation facilities, mainly the oldest facilities, taking into account the recommended IAEA's design requirements. Irrespective of the fact that during its operational period no event with victims have been recorded in Brazilian facilities, and that the regulatory inspections do not present any serious deviations regarding the safety procedures, it is necessary an assessment of safety system with the purpose of bringing their systems to 'the state of the art', avoiding their rapid obsolescence. This study has also taken into account the knowledge, concepts and solutions developed to upgrading safety system in irradiation facilities throughout the world. (author)

Upgrading safety systems of industrial irradiation facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gomes, R.S.; Gomes, J.D.R.L.; Costa, E.L.C.; Costa, M.L.L., E-mail: rogeriog@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: jlopes@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: evaldo@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: mara@cnen.gov.br [Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Diretoria de Radioproteção e Segurança Nuclear; Thomé, Z.D., E-mail: zielithome@gmail.com [Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Seção de Engenharia Nuclear

2017-07-01

The first industrial irradiation facility in operation in Brazil was designed in the 70s. Nowadays, twelve commercial and research facilities are in operation and two already decommissioned. Minor modifications and upgrades, as sensors replacement, have been introduced in these facilities, in order to reduce the technological gap in the control and safety systems. The safety systems are designed in agreement with the codes and standards at the time. Since then, new standards, codes and recommendations, as well as lessons learned from accidents, have been issued by various international committees or regulatory bodies. The rapid advance of the industry makes the safety equipment used in the original construction become obsolete. The decreasing demand for these older products means that they are no longer produced, which can make it impossible or costly to obtain spare parts and the expansion of legacy systems to include new features. This work aims to evaluate existing safety systems at Brazilian irradiation facilities, mainly the oldest facilities, taking into account the recommended IAEA's design requirements. Irrespective of the fact that during its operational period no event with victims have been recorded in Brazilian facilities, and that the regulatory inspections do not present any serious deviations regarding the safety procedures, it is necessary an assessment of safety system with the purpose of bringing their systems to 'the state of the art', avoiding their rapid obsolescence. This study has also taken into account the knowledge, concepts and solutions developed to upgrading safety system in irradiation facilities throughout the world. (author)

Safety Analysis (SA) of the decontamination facility, Building 419, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.

1980-01-01

This safety analysis was performed for the Manager, Plant Services at LLNL and fulfills the requirements of DOE Order 5481.1. The analysis was based on field inspections, document review, computer calculations, and extensive input from Waste Management personnel. It was concluded that the maximum quantities of radioactive materials that safety procedures allow to be handled in this building do not pose undue risks on- or off-site even in postulated severe accidents. Risk from the various hazards at this facility vary from low to moderate as specified in DOE Order 5481.1. Recommendations are made for improvements that will reduce risks even further

41 CFR 101-39.102-1 - Records, facilities, personnel, and appropriations.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

..., TRANSPORTATION, AND MOTOR VEHICLES 39-INTERAGENCY FLEET MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 39.1-Establishment, Modification, and Discontinuance of Interagency Fleet Management Systems § 101-39.102-1 Records, facilities, personnel, and appropriations. (a) If GSA decides to establish a fleet management system, GSA, with the assistance of the...

An independent safety assessment of Department of Energy nuclear reactor facilities: Safety overview and management function

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Booth, M.; Brodsky, R.S.; Frankhouser, W.L.

1981-02-01

The Under Secretary of Energy established the Nuclear Facilities Personnel Qualification and Training (NFPQT) Committee in October, 1979, in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear accident, to assess the adequacy of training of personnel at DOE nuclear facilities. Subsequently, in February, 1980, the charge to this Committee was modified to assess all implications of the Kemeny Commission report on TMI with regard to DOE nuclear reactors, excluding those in the Division of Naval Reactors. The modified charge was also limited, for the time being, to reactor facilities instead of all nuclear facilities. This report describes the portion of the revised assessment activities that was assigned to the Assessment Support Team

Evaluating the effectiveness of training for nuclear facility personnel. Proceedings of the specialists' meeting

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2003-07-01

One of the essential requirements for safe and reliable nuclear power plant operation and maintenance is the availability of competent personnel. The systematic approach to training (SAT) is recognized world-wide as the international best practice for attaining and maintaining the qualification and competence of nuclear power plant personnel. Many countries have applied and are now implementing or enhancing the use of SAT in their training systems, as demonstrated by the results of the IAEA World Survey on Nuclear Power Plant Personnel Training published in the beginning of 1999. Among the major challenges of human resource professionals is the need to measure the effectiveness of their training programs. Most training programs in the nuclear industry are effective because they are meeting legitimate needs and are conducted by competent, professional staff. Unfortunately, the extent of the impact of teaming is usually unknown or vague at best. Measurement and evaluation processes and procedures are usually inadequate or need further development and refinement. The IAEA has already been addressing the NPP personnel teaming problem during the last several years. Nevertheless, the scope of the problem is widening and new solutions are being developed. Therefore, the IAEA has decided to invite teaming professionals to a Specialists' Meeting to learn about and discuss NPP personnel training trends. The topic of this meeting, evaluating the effectiveness of training for nuclear facility personnel, was selected by the IAEA International Working Group on Training and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel. A Specialists' Meeting on Evaluating the Effectiveness of Training for Nuclear Facility Personnel, organized in co-operation with EXITECH Corporation, the US DOE was attended by participants from 12 countries presenting 21 papers.

Evaluating the effectiveness of training for nuclear facility personnel. Proceedings of the specialists' meeting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

One of the essential requirements for safe and reliable nuclear power plant operation and maintenance is the availability of competent personnel. The systematic approach to training (SAT) is recognized world-wide as the international best practice for attaining and maintaining the qualification and competence of nuclear power plant personnel. Many countries have applied and are now implementing or enhancing the use of SAT in their training systems, as demonstrated by the results of the IAEA World Survey on Nuclear Power Plant Personnel Training published in the beginning of 1999. Among the major challenges of human resource professionals is the need to measure the effectiveness of their training programs. Most training programs in the nuclear industry are effective because they are meeting legitimate needs and are conducted by competent, professional staff. Unfortunately, the extent of the impact of teaming is usually unknown or vague at best. Measurement and evaluation processes and procedures are usually inadequate or need further development and refinement. The IAEA has already been addressing the NPP personnel teaming problem during the last several years. Nevertheless, the scope of the problem is widening and new solutions are being developed. Therefore, the IAEA has decided to invite teaming professionals to a Specialists' Meeting to learn about and discuss NPP personnel training trends. The topic of this meeting, evaluating the effectiveness of training for nuclear facility personnel, was selected by the IAEA International Working Group on Training and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel. A Specialists' Meeting on Evaluating the Effectiveness of Training for Nuclear Facility Personnel, organized in co-operation with EXITECH Corporation, the US DOE was attended by participants from 12 countries presenting 21 papers

AREVA General Inspectorate Annual Report 2013 - Status of safety in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oursel, Luc; Riou, Jean

2014-06-01

discipline. As in the previous year, the quality of relationship with the French nuclear safety regulator (ASN) and the management of the criticality risk were identified as areas for vigilance, as well as safety skills and resources, and sufficient managerial presence in the field. Other highlights of 2013 were the simplification of the group's legal structure, the continued roll-out of the new INB order, and the close attention paid to the conditions for implementing subcontracted work. Content: 1 - Context; 2 - Lessons learned from inspections; 3 - Radiological monitoring of personnel; 4 - Environmental monitoring; 5 - Operating experience from events; 6 - Crosscutting processes: Safety management, Safety of facilities, Operational safety; 7 - Areas for improvement and outlook; 8 - Glossary

H.R. 2098: This Act may be cited as the Nuclear Facilities Occupational Safety Improvement Act of 1991, introduced in the US House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, April 25, 1991

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1991-01-01

Worker health and safety at Department of Energy nuclear facilities could be made substantially safer by applying standards developed by experts in the field of occupational health and safety. This bill was introduced into the US House of Representatives on April 25, 1991 to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to improve and enforce standards for employee health and safety at Department of Energy nuclear facilities. Individual sections address the following: application of OSHA to DOE nuclear facilities; cooperation with inspections and investigations; transfer and allocation of appropriations and personnel; worker training requirements; performance of NIOSH functions at DOE nuclear facilities; medical examinations of employees at DOE nuclear facilities; and labor-management health and safety committees at Doe nuclear facilities

Facilities and procedures used for the performance testing of DOE personnel dosimetry systems

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Roberson, P.L.; Fox, R.A.; Hogan, R.T.; Holbrook, K.L.; Hooker, C.D.; Yoder, R.C.

1983-04-01

Radiological calibration facilities for personnel dosimeter testing were developed at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide a capability for evaluating the performance of DOE personnel dosimetry systems. This report includes the testing methodology used. The informational presented here meets requirements specified in draft ANSI N13.11 for the testing laboratory. The capabilities of these facilities include sealed source irradiations for /sup 137/Cs, several beta-particle emitters, /sup 252/Cf, and machine-generated x-ray beams. The x-ray beam capabilities include filtered techniques maintained by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) and K-fluorescent techniques. The calibration techniques, dosimeter irradiation procedures, and dose-equivalent calculation methods follow techniques specified by draft ANSI N13.11 where appropriate.

Facilities and procedures used for the performance testing of DOE personnel-dosimetry systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roberson, P.L.; Fox, R.A.; Hogan, R.T.; Holbrook, K.L.; Hooker, C.D.; Yoder, R.C.

1983-04-01

Radiological calibration facilities for personnel dosimeter testing were developed at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide a capability for evaluating the performance of DOE personnel dosimetry systems. This report includes the testing methodology used. The informational presented here meets requirements specified in draft ANSI N13.11 for the testing laboratory. The capabilities of these facilities include sealed source irradiations for 137 Cs, several beta-particle emitters, 252 Cf, and machine-generated x-ray beams. The x-ray beam capabilities include filtered techniques maintained by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) and K-fluorescent techniques. The calibration techniques, dosimeter irradiation procedures, and dose-equivalent calculation methods follow techniques specified by draft ANSI N13.11 where appropriate

IAEA safety requirements for safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities and activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jones, G.

2013-01-01

The IAEA's Statute authorises the Agency to establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property. In that respect, the IAEA has established a Safety Fundamentals publication which contains ten safety principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. A number of these principles require safety assessments to be carried out as a means of evaluating compliance with safety requirements for all nuclear facilities and activities and to determine the measures that need to be taken to ensure safety. The safety assessments are required to be carried out and documented by the organisation responsible for operating the facility or conducting the activity, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorisation process. In addition to the principles of the Safety Fundamentals, the IAEA establishes requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment and which are governed by the principles in the Safety Fundamentals. The IAEA's Safety Requirements publication 'Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities', establishes the safety requirements that need to be fulfilled in conducting and maintaining safety assessments for the lifetime of facilities and activities, with specific attention to defence in depth and the requirement for a graded approach to the application of these safety requirements across the wide range of fuel cycle facilities and activities. Requirements for independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the operating organisation, including the requirement for the safety assessment to be periodically reviewed and updated are also covered. For many fuel cycle facilities and activities, environmental impact assessments and non-radiological risk assessments will be required. The

Development of a methodology for safety classification on a non-reactor nuclear facility illustrated using an specific example

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheuermann, F.; Lehradt, O.; Traichel, A.

2015-01-01

To realize the safety of personnel and environment systems and components of nuclear facilities are classified according to their potential danger into safety classes. Based on this classification different demands on the manufacturing quality result. The objective of this work is to present the standardized method developed by NUKEM Technologies Engineering Services for the categorization into the safety classes restricted to Non-reactor nuclear facilities (NRNF). Exemplary the methodology is used on the complex Russian normative system (four safety classes). For NRNF only the lower two safety classes are relevant. The classification into the lowest safety class 4 is accordingly if the maximum resulting dose following from clean-up actions in case of incidents/accidents remains below 20 mSv and the volume activity restrictions of set in NRB-99/2009 are met. The methodology is illustrated using an example. In short the methodology consists of: - Determination of the working time to remove consequences of incidents, - Calculation of the dose resulting from direct radiation and due to inhalation during these works. The application of this methodology avoids over-conservative approaches. As a result some previously higher classified equipment can be classified into the lower safety class.

A graded approach to safety documentation at processing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cowen, M.L.

1992-01-01

Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) has over 40 major Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) in preparation for non-reactor facilities. These facilities include nuclear material production facilities, waste management facilities, support laboratories and environmental remediation facilities. The SARs for these various projects encompass hazard levels from High to Low, and mission times from startup, through operation, to shutdown. All of these efforts are competing for scarce resources, and therefore some mechanism is required for balancing the documentation requirements. Three of the key variables useful for the decision making process are Depth of Safety Analysis, Urgency of Safety Analysis, and Resource Availability. This report discusses safety documentation at processing facilities

Technical qualification requirements and training programs for radiation protection personnel at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Copenhaver, E.D.; Houser, B.S.; Butler, H.M. Jr.; Bogard, J.S.; Fair, M.F.; Haynes, C.E.; Parzyck, D.C.

1986-04-01

This document deals with the policies and practices of the Environmental and Occupational Safety Division (EOSD) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in regard to the selection, training, qualification, and requalification of radiation protection staff assigned to reactor and nonreactor nuclear facilities. Included are personnel at facilities that: (1) operate reactors or particle accelerators; (2) produce, process, or store radioactive liquid or solid waste; (3) conduct separations operations; (4) engage in research with radioactive materials and radiation sources; and (5) conduct irradiated materials inspection, fuel fabrication, deconamination, or recovery operations. The EOSD personnel also have environmental surveillance and operational and industrial safety responsibilities related to the total Laboratory

Enforcement or incentives ? : promoting safety belt use among military personnel in the Netherlands.

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hagenzieker, M.P.

1991-01-01

During a nationwide campaign to promote safety belt use among military personnel, a field study was conducted at 12 different military bases in the netherlands. Amount of enforcement, type of publicity, and incentive strategies were varied among military bases. Observations of safety belt use among

Success in behaviour-based safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wieneke, R E [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NMT Division, Los Alamos, NM (United States); Balkey, J J; Kleinsteuber, J F [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NMT Division, Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2001-07-01

Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Plutonium Facility is responsible for a wide variety of actinide processing operations in support of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) stockpile stewardship of the nation's nuclear arsenal. Both engineered and administrative controls are used to mitigate hazards inherent in these activities. Nuclear facilities have engineered safety systems that are extensively evaluated and documented, and are monitored regularly for operability and performance. Personnel undergo comprehensive training, including annual recertification of their operations. They must thoroughly understand the hazards involved in their work and the controls that are in place to mitigate those hazards. A series of hazard-control plans and work instructions are used to define and authorize the work that is done. Primary hazards associated with chemicals and radioactive materials are well controlled with minimal risk to the workforce and public. The majority of injuries are physical or ergonomic in nature. In an effort to increase safety awareness and to decrease accidents and incidents, a program focusing on the identification and elimination of unsafe behaviours was initiated. Workers are trained on how to conduct safety observations and given guidance on specific behaviours to note. Observations are structured to have minimal impact upon workload and are shared by the entire workforce. This program has effectively decreased a low accident rate and will make long-term sustainability possible. (author)

Success in behaviour-based safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wieneke, R.E.; Balkey, J.J.; Kleinsteuber, J.F.

2001-01-01

Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL's) Plutonium Facility is responsible for a wide variety of actinide processing operations in support of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) stockpile stewardship of the nation's nuclear arsenal. Both engineered and administrative controls are used to mitigate hazards inherent in these activities. Nuclear facilities have engineered safety systems that are extensively evaluated and documented, and are monitored regularly for operability and performance. Personnel undergo comprehensive training, including annual recertification of their operations. They must thoroughly understand the hazards involved in their work and the controls that are in place to mitigate those hazards. A series of hazard-control plans and work instructions are used to define and authorize the work that is done. Primary hazards associated with chemicals and radioactive materials are well controlled with minimal risk to the workforce and public. The majority of injuries are physical or ergonomic in nature. In an effort to increase safety awareness and to decrease accidents and incidents, a program focusing on the identification and elimination of unsafe behaviours was initiated. Workers are trained on how to conduct safety observations and given guidance on specific behaviours to note. Observations are structured to have minimal impact upon workload and are shared by the entire workforce. This program has effectively decreased a low accident rate and will make long-term sustainability possible. (author)

ORNL calibrations facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Berger, C.D.; Gupton, E.D.; Lane, B.H.; Miller, J.H.; Nichols, S.W.

1982-08-01

The ORNL Calibrations Facility is operated by the Instrumentation Group of the Industrial Safety and Applied Health Physics Division. Its primary purpose is to maintain radiation calibration standards for calibration of ORNL health physics instruments and personnel dosimeters. This report includes a discussion of the radioactive sources and ancillary equipment in use and a step-by-step procedure for calibration of those survey instruments and personnel dosimeters in routine use at ORNL

Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

MITCHELL,GERRY W.; LONGLEY,SUSAN W.; PHILBIN,JEFFREY S.; MAHN,JEFFREY A.; BERRY,DONALD T.; SCHWERS,NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK,THOMAS E.; NAEGELI,ROBERT E.

2000-11-01

This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MITCHELL, GERRY W.; LONGLEY, SUSAN W.; PHILBIN, JEFFREY S.; MAHN, JEFFREY A.; BERRY, DONALD T.; SCHWERS, NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK, THOMAS E.; NAEGELI, ROBERT E.

2000-01-01

This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus isolates from surfaces and personnel at a hospital laundry facility.

Science.gov (United States)

Michael, K E; No, D; Roberts, M C

2016-09-01

Examine a clinical laundry facility for the presence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) on environmental surfaces and among personnel. Nasal and face samples along with surface samples were collected four times in 2015. MRSA isolates were confirmed using standardized biochemical assays and molecular characterization. MRSA was identified in 33/120 (28%) samples from the dirty and 3/120 (3%) samples from the clean environmental areas. MRSA isolates included: (dirty) ST5 SCCmec type II, ST8 SCCmec type IV, ST231 SCCmec type II, ST239 SCCmec type III, ST239 SCCmec type IV, ST256 SCCmec type IV and (clean) ST5 SCCmec type II and ST8 SCCmec type IV. Five different employees were MRSA positive, 4/8 (50%) from the dirty: and 1/15 (6·7%) from the clean, but there was a 10-fold higher MRSA carriage 6/22 (27%) dirty vs 1/38 (2·6%) clean when all 50 human samples were combined. MRSA prevalence was significantly higher (28 vs 3%) in dirty vs clean areas within the laundry facility suggesting a greater risk for personnel on the dirty side. This is the first report of isolation and characterization of MRSA from surfaces and personnel from a clinical laundry facility. © 2016 The Society for Applied Microbiology.

DRY TRANSFER FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

C.E. Sanders

2005-01-01

This design calculation updates the previous criticality evaluation for the fuel handling, transfer, and staging operations to be performed in the Dry Transfer Facility (DTF) including the remediation area. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that operations performed in the DTF and RF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Dry Transfer Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173737], p. 3-8). A description of the changes is as follows: (1) Update the supporting calculations for the various Category 1 and 2 event sequences as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 171429], Section 7). (2) Update the criticality safety calculations for the DTF staging racks and the remediation pool to reflect the current design. This design calculation focuses on commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies, i.e., pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) owned SNF is evaluated in depth in the ''Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173284]) and is also applicable to DTF operations. Further, the design and safety analyses of the naval SNF canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. Also, note that the results for the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) Site specific Cask (MSC) calculations are limited to the

Radiation safety training for accelerator facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Trinoskey, P.A.

1997-02-01

In November 1992, a working group was formed within the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) accelerator facilities to develop a generic safety training program to meet the basic requirements for individuals working in accelerator facilities. This training, by necessity, includes sections for inserting facility-specific information. The resulting course materials were issued by DOE as a handbook under its technical standards in 1996. Because experimenters may be at a facility for only a short time and often at odd times during the day, the working group felt that computer-based training would be useful. To that end, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) together have developed a computer-based safety training program for accelerator facilities. This interactive course not only enables trainees to receive facility- specific information, but time the training to their schedule and tailor it to their level of expertise

Radiological and environmental safety in front-end fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Puranik, V.D.

2011-01-01

The front end nuclear fuel cycle comprises of mining and processing of beach mineral sands along the southern coast of Kerala, Tamilnadu and Orissa, mining and processing of uranium ore in Singhbhum-East in Jharkhand and refining and fuel fabrication at Hyderabad. The Health Physics Units (HPUs)/Environmental Survey Laboratories (ESLs) set up at each site from inception of operation to carry out regular in-plant, personnel monitoring and environmental surveillance to ensure safe working conditions, evaluate radiation exposure of workers, ensure compliance with statutory norms, help in keeping the environmental releases well within the limits and advise appropriate control measures. This paper describes the occupational and environmental radiological safety measures associated with the operations of front end of nuclear fuel cycle. Radiological monitoring in these facilities is important to ensure safe working environment, protection of workers against exposure to radiation and comply with regulatory limits of exposure. The radiation exposure of workers in different units of the front end nuclear fuels cycle facilities operated by IREL, UCIL and NFC and environmental monitoring results are summarised in this paper

Higher operational safety of nuclear power plants by evaluating the behaviour of operating personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mertins, M.; Glasner, P.

1990-01-01

In the GDR power reactors have been operated since 1966. Since that time operational experiences of 73 cumulative reactor years have been collected. The behaviour of operating personnel is an essential factor to guarantee the safety of operation of the nuclear power plant. Therefore a continuous analysis of the behaviour of operating personnel has been introduced at the GDR nuclear power plants. In the paper the overall system of the selection, preparation and control of the behaviour of nuclear power plant operating personnel is presented. The methods concerned are based on recording all errors of operating personnel and on analyzing them in order to find out the reasons. The aim of the analysis of reasons is to reduce the number of errors. By a feedback of experiences the nuclear safety of the nuclear power plant can be increased. All data necessary for the evaluation of errors are recorded and evaluated by a computer program. This method is explained thoroughly in the paper. Selected results of error analysis are presented. It is explained how the activities of the personnel are made safer by means of this analysis. Comparisons with other methods are made. (author). 3 refs, 4 figs

Personnel reliability impact on petrochemical facilities monitoring system's failure skipping probability

Science.gov (United States)

Kostyukov, V. N.; Naumenko, A. P.

2017-08-01

The paper dwells upon urgent issues of evaluating impact of actions conducted by complex technological systems operators on their safe operation considering application of condition monitoring systems for elements and sub-systems of petrochemical production facilities. The main task for the research is to distinguish factors and criteria of monitoring system properties description, which would allow to evaluate impact of errors made by personnel on operation of real-time condition monitoring and diagnostic systems for machinery of petrochemical facilities, and find and objective criteria for monitoring system class, considering a human factor. On the basis of real-time condition monitoring concepts of sudden failure skipping risk, static and dynamic error, monitoring systems, one may solve a task of evaluation of impact that personnel's qualification has on monitoring system operation in terms of error in personnel or operators' actions while receiving information from monitoring systems and operating a technological system. Operator is considered as a part of the technological system. Although, personnel's behavior is usually a combination of the following parameters: input signal - information perceiving, reaction - decision making, response - decision implementing. Based on several researches on behavior of nuclear powers station operators in USA, Italy and other countries, as well as on researches conducted by Russian scientists, required data on operator's reliability were selected for analysis of operator's behavior at technological facilities diagnostics and monitoring systems. The calculations revealed that for the monitoring system selected as an example, the failure skipping risk for the set values of static (less than 0.01) and dynamic (less than 0.001) errors considering all related factors of data on reliability of information perception, decision-making, and reaction fulfilled is 0.037, in case when all the facilities and error probability are under

Safety guide data on radiation shielding in a reprocessing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sekiguchi, Noboru; Naito, Yoshitaka

1986-04-01

In a reprocessing facility, various radiation sources are handled and have many geometrical conditions. To aim drawing up a safety guidebook on radiation shielding in order to evaluate shielding safety in a reprocessing facility with high reliability and reasonableness, JAERI trusted investigation on safety evaluation techniques of radiation shielding in a reprocessing facility to Nuclear Safety Research Association. This report is the collection of investigation results, and describes concept of shielding safety design principle, radiation sources in reprocessing facility and estimation of its strength, techniques of shielding calculations, and definite examples of shielding calculation in reprocessing facility. (author)

Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) Site-Specific Health and Safety Plan, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Flynn, N.C. Bechtel Jacobs

2008-04-21

The Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC) policy is to provide a safe and healthy workplace for all employees and subcontractors. The implementation of this policy requires that operations of the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF), located one-half mile west of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex, be guided by an overall plan and consistent proactive approach to environment, safety and health (ES&H) issues. The BJC governing document for worker safety and health, BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', describes the key elements of the BJC Safety and Industrial Hygiene (IH) programs, which includes the requirement for development and implementation of a site-specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) where required by regulation (refer also to BJC-EH-1012, 'Development and Approval of Safety and Health Plans'). BJC/OR-1745, 'Worker Safety and Health Program', implements the requirements for worker protection contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 851. The EMWMF site-specific HASP requirements identifies safe operating procedures, work controls, personal protective equipment, roles and responsibilities, potential site hazards and control measures, site access requirements, frequency and types of monitoring, site work areas, decontamination procedures, and outlines emergency response actions. This HASP will be available on site for use by all workers, management and supervisors, oversight personnel and visitors. All EMWMF assigned personnel will be briefed on the contents of this HASP and will be required to follow the procedures and protocols as specified. The policies and procedures referenced in this HASP apply to all EMWMF operations activities. In addition the HASP establishes ES&H criteria for the day-to-day activities to prevent or minimize any adverse effect on the environment and personnel safety and health and to meet standards that define acceptable

ESRD QIP - National Healthcare Safety Network Healthcare Personnel Influenza Vaccination - Payment Year 2018

Data.gov (United States)

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services — This dataset includes facility details, measure score, and the state and national average measure scores for the NHSN healthcare personnel influenza vaccination...

Decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance to regulatory bodies and operating organizations on planning and provision for the safe management of the decommissioning of non-reactor nuclear fuel cycle facilities. While the basic safety considerations for the decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are similar to those for nuclear power plants, there are important differences, notably in the design and operating parameters for the facilities, the type of radioactive material and the support systems available. It is the objective of this Safety Guide to provide guidance for the shutdown and eventual decommissioning of such facilities, their individual characteristics being taken into account

Control development of radiation protection and safety on personnel eye lens of interventional radiology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Titik Kartika; Ishak

2013-01-01

The review on radiation protection and safety to the lens of personnel especially in interventional radiology activities has been carried out. The use of radiation in interventional radiology installations provide significant exposure to the lens of the eye, especially personnel. The results of the latest various surveys and researches on the effects of low dose radiation to the eye lens indicates that the eye lens dose threshold is less than the preconceived values. Based on these facts, recently, ICRP and IAEA provides recommendations regarding the reduction of the value of the eye lens dose limit for personnel. BAPETEN have adopted the value of the eye lens dose limit in the development of new regulations on radiation protection and safety. However, the application of this provision has various challenges that BAPETEN provide 3 (three) years transitional period. These challenges include the problem of monitoring the eye lens dose, the eye lens protective equipment which is not adequate, the lack of understanding of personnel related to the risk of low radiation to the eye lens, as well as the proper procedures to mitigate those risks. BAPETEN as a regulatory agency is expected to provide solutions to the problems faced by the stake holders. Therefore, to answer the challenge, it is necessary to develop better monitoring of radiation protection and safety. (author)

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

WEISS, E.V.

2000-12-15

Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste.

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

WEISS, E.V.

2000-01-01

Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste

Facility design, installation and operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fleischmann, A.W.

1985-01-01

Problems that may arise when considering the design, construction and use of a facility that could contain up to tens of petabecquerel of either cobalt-60 or caesium-137 are examined. The safe operation of an irradiation facility depends on an appreciation of the in built safety systems, adequate training of personnel and the existence of an emergency system

In-pile experiments and test facilities proposed for fast reactor safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grolmes, M.A.; Avery, R.; Goldman, A.J.; Fauske, H.K.; Marchaterre, J.F.; Rose, D.; Wright, A.E.

1976-01-01

The role of in-pile experiments in support of the resolution of fast breeder reactor safety and licensing issues has been re-examined, with emphasis on key safety issues. Experiment needs have been related to the specific characteristics of these safety issues and to realistic requirements for additional test facility capabilities which can be achieved and utilized within the next ten years. It is found that those safety issues related to the energetics of core disruptive accidents have the largest impact on new facility requirements. However, utilization of existing facilities with modifications can provide for a continuing increase in experiment capability and experiment results on a timely bases. Emphasis has been placed upon maximum utilization of existing facilities and minimum requirements for new facilities. This evaluation has concluded that a new Safety Test Facility, STF, along with major modifications to the EBR II facility, improvement in TREAT capabilities, the existing Sodium Loop Safety Facility and corresponding Support Facilities provide the essential elements of the Safety Research Experiment Facilities (SAREF) required for resolution of key issues

Report of the State Office for Nuclear Safety on state supervision of nuclear safety of nuclear facilities and radiation protection in 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-05-01

The legislative basis of the authority of the State Office for Nuclear Safety as the Czech national regulatory body is outlined, its organizational scheme is presented, and the responsibilities of the various departments are highlighted. The operation of major Czech nuclear facilities, including the Dukovany NPP which is in operation and the Temelin NPP which is under construction, is described with respect to nuclear safety. Since the Office's responsibilities also cover radiation protection in the Czech Republic, a survey of ionizing radiation sources and their supervision is given. Other topics include, among other things, nuclear material transport, the state system for nuclear materials accountancy and control, central registries for radiation protection, nuclear waste management, the National Radiation Monitoring Network, personnel qualification and training, emergency planning, legislative activities, international cooperation, and public information. (P.A.)

Design aspects of radiological safety in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patkulkar, D.S.; Purohit, R.G.; Tripathi, R.M.

2014-01-01

In order to keep operational performance of a nuclear facility high and to keep occupational and public exposure ALARA, radiological safety provisions must be reviewed at the time of facility design. Deficiency in design culminates in deteriorated system performance and non adherence to safety standards and could sometimes result in radiological incident. Important radiological aspects relevant to safety were compiled based on operating experiences, design deficiencies brought out from past nuclear incidents, experience gained during maintenance, participation in design review of upcoming nuclear facilities and radiological emergency preparedness

Task Force Report, Safety of Personnel in LHC underground areas following the accident of 19th September 2008

CERN Document Server

Delille, B; Inigo-Golfin, J; Lindell, G; Roy, G; Tavian, L; Thomas, E; Trant, R; Völlinger, C

2009-01-01

In January 2009, the Task Force on Safety of Personnel in the LHC underground areas following the accident in sector 3-4 of 19th September 2008 (Safety Task Force) received from the CERN Director General the mandate to investigate the impact of the accident of 19th September 2008 on the safety of personnel working in the LHC underground areas. This mandate includes the elaboration of preventive and/or corrective measures, if deemed necessary. This report gives the conclusions and recommendations of the Safety Task Force which have been reviewed by an external advisory committee of safety experts.

Nuclear criticality safety program at the Fuel Cycle Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lell, R.M.; Fujita, E.K.; Tracy, D.B.; Klann, R.T.; Imel, G.R.; Benedict, R.W.; Rigg, R.H.

1994-01-01

The Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) is designed to demonstrate the feasibility of a novel commercial-scale remote pyrometallurgical process for metallic fuels from liquid metal-cooled reactors and to show closure of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) fuel cycle. Requirements for nuclear criticality safety impose the most restrictive of the various constraints on the operation of FCF. The upper limits on batch sizes and other important process parameters are determined principally by criticality safety considerations. To maintain an efficient operation within appropriate safety limits, it is necessary to formulate a nuclear criticality safety program that integrates equipment design, process development, process modeling, conduct of operations, a measurement program, adequate material control procedures, and nuclear criticality analysis. The nuclear criticality safety program for FCF reflects this integration, ensuring that the facility can be operated efficiently without compromising safety. The experience gained from the conduct of this program in the Fuel cycle Facility will be used to design and safely operate IFR facilities on a commercial scale. The key features of the nuclear criticality safety program are described. The relationship of these features to normal facility operation is also described

Supervision of the safety culture in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-11-01

This brochure issued by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI reports on safety culture aspects in nuclear facilities and ENSI’s activities as a supervisory instance. ENSI is the independent supervisory authority for the nuclear sector in Switzerland. A definition of safety culture is presented and the development of the concepts used in its monitoring are discussed. The main attributes of a good safety culture are discussed. Further, the conceptual basics and principles of such monitoring are looked at and the methods used for the supervision of safety culture in nuclear facilities are described

78 FR 48029 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

Science.gov (United States)

2013-08-07

... Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security By the authority vested in me as President by the... at reducing the safety risks and security risks associated with hazardous chemicals. However... to further improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators...

Augmented reality for improved safety

CERN Multimedia

Stefania Pandolfi

2016-01-01

Sometimes, CERN experts have to operate in low visibility conditions or in the presence of possible hazards. Minimising the duration of the operation and reducing the risk of errors is therefore crucial to ensuring the safety of personnel. The EDUSAFE project integrates different technologies to create a wearable personnel safety system based on augmented reality.    The EDUSAFE integrated safety system uses a camera mounted on the helmet to monitor the working area.  In its everyday operation of machines and facilities, CERN adopts a whole set of measures and safety equipment to ensure the safety of its personnel, including personal wearable safety devices and access control systems. However, sometimes, scheduled and emergency maintenance work needs to be done in zones with potential cryogenic hazards, in the presence of radioactive equipment or simply in demanding conditions where visibility is low and moving around is difficult. The EDUSAFE Marie Curie Innovative&...

Operational accidents and radiation exposures at DOE facilities. Fiscal year 1978

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

Comprehensive safety programs are maintained at DOE facilities in order to protect both personnel and property from accidents. To ensure compliance with safety standards and regulations and maximize effectiveness of the safety programs, an extensive inspection and appraisal program is conducted at the contractor and field office levels by both DOE field and Headquarters safety personnel. When accidents do occur, investigations are conducted to identify causes and determine managerial or safety actions needed to prevent similar occurrences. DOE safety requirements include the reporting of personnel injury, property and motor vehicle losses on a quarterly basis, and radiation doses on an annual basis. The radiation dose data for CY 1978 are presented and reviewed in this report. All other data in this report are for FY 1978

ACP Facility Safety Surveillance System Installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

You, Gil Sung; Kook, D. H.; Choung, W. M.; Ku, J. H.; Cho, I. J.; You, G. S.; Kwon, K. C.; Lee, W. K.; Lee, E. P.

2006-10-01

The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process is under development for effective management of spent fuel by converting UO 2 into U-metal. For demonstration of this process, α-γ type new hotcell was built in the IMEF basement. All facilities which treat radioactive materials must manage CCTV system which is under control of Health Physics department. Three main points (including hotcell rear door area) have each camera, but operators who are in charge of facility management need to check the safety of the facility immediately through the network in his office. This needs introduce additional network cameras installation and this new surveillance system is expected to update the whole safety control ability with existing system

Spallation Neutron Source Accelerator Facility Target Safety and Non-safety Control Systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Battle, Ronald E.; DeVan, B.; Munro, John K. Jr.

2006-01-01

The Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) is a proton accelerator facility that generates neutrons for scientific researchers by spallation of neutrons from a mercury target. The SNS became operational on April 28, 2006, with first beam on target at approximately 200 W. The SNS accelerator, target, and conventional facilities controls are integrated by standardized hardware and software throughout the facility and were designed and fabricated to SNS conventions to ensure compatibility of systems with Experimental Physics Integrated Control System (EPICS). ControlLogix Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) interface to instruments and actuators, and EPICS performs the high-level integration of the PLCs such that all operator control can be accomplished from the Central Control room using EPICS graphical screens that pass process variables to and from the PLCs. Three active safety systems were designed to industry standards ISA S84.01 and IEEE 603 to meet the desired reliability for these safety systems. The safety systems protect facility workers and the environment from mercury vapor, mercury radiation, and proton beam radiation. The facility operators operated many of the systems prior to beam on target and developed the operating procedures. The safety and non-safety control systems were tested extensively prior to beam on target. This testing was crucial to identify wiring and software errors and failed components, the result of which was few problems during operation with beam on target. The SNS has continued beam on target since April to increase beam power, check out the scientific instruments, and continue testing the operation of facility subsystems

Enhancement of safety for reprocessing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-06-01

The adequacy of the safety measures for utility loss accidents in nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities which have been formulated by the nuclear enterprises is investigated in JNES which organizes an advanced committee to specifically study this problem. The results are reviewed in the present report including the case of such severe accidents as in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The report also represents a tentative proposal for examination standards of such unimaginable severe accidents as 'station blackout,' urgent safety measures necessary for reoperation of nuclear power plants and requested by nuclear and industrial safety agency, and pointing out and clarification of the potential weakness from the safety point of view, and collective and composite evaluation of safety of the relevant facilities. Furthermore, the definition of accident management is given as of controlled condition and the authorized way of thinking for the cases of plural events happening at the same time and the cases when risks exist radioactivity emits with explosion. (S. Ohno)

Radiation safety in X-ray facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-09-01

The guide specifies the radiation safety requirements for structural shielding and other safety arrangements used in X-ray facilities in medical and veterinary X-ray activities and in industry, research and education. The guide is also applicable to premises in which X-ray equipment intended for radiation therapy and operating at a voltage of less than 25 kV is used. The guide applies to new X-ray facilities in which X-ray equipment that has been used elsewhere is transferred. The radiation safety requirements for radiation therapy X-ray devices operating at a voltage exceeding 25 kV, and for the premices in which such devices are used, are set out in Guide ST 2.2

Radiation safety in X-ray facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-09-01

The guide specifies the radiation safety requirements for structural shielding and other safety arrangements used in X-ray facilities in medical and veterinary X-ray activities and in industry, research and education. The guide is also applicable to premises in which X-ray equipment intended for radiation therapy and operating at a voltage of less than 25 kV is used. The guide applies to new X-ray facilities in which X-ray equipment that has been used elsewhere is transferred. The radiation safety requirements for radiation therapy X-ray devices operating at a voltage exceeding 25 kV, and for the premices in which such devices are used, are set out in Guide ST 2.2.

Preliminary safety evaluation (PSE) for Sodium Storage Facility at the Fast Flux Test Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bowman, B.R.

1994-01-01

This evaluation was performed for the Sodium Storage Facility (SSF) which will be constructed at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) in the area adjacent to the South and West Dump Heat Exchanger (DHX) pits. The purpose of the facility is to allow unloading the sodium from the FFTF plant tanks and piping. The significant conclusion of this Preliminary Safety Evaluation (PSE) is that the only Safety Class 2 components are the four sodium storage tanks and their foundations. The building, because of its imminent risk to the tanks under an earthquake or high winds, will be Safety Class 3/2, which means the building has a Safety Class 3 function with the Safety Class 2 loads of seismic and wind factored into the design

Safety of fuel cycle facilities. Topical issues paper no. 3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ranguelova, V.; Niehaus, F.; Delattre, D.

2001-01-01

A wide range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are in operation. These installations process, use, store and dispose of radioactive material and cover: mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication (including mixed oxide fuel), reactor, interim spent fuel storage, reprocessing, waste treatment and waste disposal facilities. For the purposes of this paper, reactors and waste disposal facilities are not considered. The term 'fuel cycle facilities' covers only the remainder of the installations listed above. The IAEA Secretariat maintains a database of fuel cycle facilities in its Member States. Known as the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System (NFCIS), it is available as an on-line service through the Internet. More than 500 such facilities have been reported under this system. The facilities are listed by facility type and operating status. Approximately one third of all of the facilities are located in developing States. About half of all facilities are reported to be operating, of which approximately 40% are operating in developing States. In addition, some 60 facilities are either in the design stage or under construction. Although the radioactive source term for most fuel cycle facilities is lower than the source term for reactors, which results in less severe consequences to the public from potential accidents at these fuel cycle installations, recent events at some fuel cycle facilities have given rise to public concern which has to be addressed adequately by national regulatory bodies and at the international level. Worldwide, operational experience feedback warrants improvements in the safety of these facilities. Some of the hazards are similar for reactor and non-reactor facilities. However, the differences between these installations give rise to specific safety concerns at fuel cycle facilities. In particular, these concerns include: criticality, radiation protection of workers, chemical hazards, fire and explosion hazards. It is recognized

Chemical process safety at fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ayres, D.A.

1997-08-01

This NUREG provides broad guidance on chemical safety issues relevant to fuel cycle facilities. It describes an approach acceptable to the NRC staff, with examples that are not exhaustive, for addressing chemical process safety in the safe storage, handling, and processing of licensed nuclear material. It expounds to license holders and applicants a general philosophy of the role of chemical process safety with respect to NRC-licensed materials; sets forth the basic information needed to properly evaluate chemical process safety; and describes plausible methods of identifying and evaluating chemical hazards and assessing the adequacy of the chemical safety of the proposed equipment and facilities. Examples of equipment and methods commonly used to prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of chemical incidents are discussed in this document

Facts about food irradiation: Safety of irradiation facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

This fact sheet considers the safety of industrial irradiation facilities. Although there have been accidents, none of them has endangered public health or environmental safety, and the radiation processing industry is considered to have a very good safety record. Gamma irradiators do not produce radioactive waste, and the radiation sources at the facilities cannot explode nor in any other way release radioactivity into the environment. 3 refs

Implementing partnerships in nonreactor facility safety analyses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courtney, J.C.; Perry, W.H.; Phipps, R.D.

1996-01-01

Faculty and students from LSU have been participating in nuclear safety analyses and radiation protection projects at ANL-W at INEL since 1973. A mutually beneficial relationship has evolved that has resulted in generation of safety-related studies acceptable to Argonne and DOE, NRC, and state regulatory groups. Most of the safety projects have involved the Hot Fuel Examination Facility or the Fuel Conditioning Facility; both are hot cells that receive spent fuel from EBR-II. A table shows some of the major projects at ANL-W that involved LSU students and faculty

Health and Safety Management for Small-scale Methane Fermentation Facilities

Science.gov (United States)

Yamaoka, Masaru; Yuyama, Yoshito; Nakamura, Masato; Oritate, Fumiko

In this study, we considered health and safety management for small-scale methane fermentation facilities that treat 2-5 ton of biomass daily based on several years operation experience with an approximate capacity of 5 t·d-1. We also took account of existing knowledge, related laws and regulations. There are no qualifications or licenses required for management and operation of small-scale methane fermentation facilities, even though rural sewerage facilities with a relative similar function are required to obtain a legitimate license. Therefore, there are wide variations in health and safety consciousness of the operators of small-scale methane fermentation facilities. The industrial safety and health laws are not applied to the operation of small-scale methane fermentation facilities. However, in order to safely operate a small-scale methane fermentation facility, the occupational safety and health management system that the law recommends should be applied. The aims of this paper are to clarify the risk factors in small-scale methane fermentation facilities and encourage planning, design and operation of facilities based on health and safety management.

Critical experiments facility and criticality safety programs at JAERI

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kobayashi, Iwao; Tachimori, Shoichi; Takeshita, Isao; Suzaki, Takenori; Miyoshi, Yoshinori; Nomura, Yasushi

1985-10-01

The nuclear criticality safety is becoming a key point in Japan in the safety considerations for nuclear installations outside reactors such as spent fuel reprocessing facilities, plutonium fuel fabrication facilities, large scale hot alboratories, and so on. Especially a large scale spent fuel reprocessing facility is being designed and would be constructed in near future, therefore extensive experimental studies are needed for compilation of our own technical standards and also for verification of safety in a potential criticality accident to obtain public acceptance. Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is proceeding a construction program of a new criticality safety experimental facility where criticality data can be obtained for such solution fuels as mainly handled in a reprocessing facility and also chemical process experiments can be performed to investigate abnormal phenomena, e.g. plutonium behavior in solvent extraction process by using pulsed colums. In FY 1985 detail design of the facility will be completed and licensing review by the government would start in FY 1986. Experiments would start in FY 1990. Research subjects and main specifications of the facility are described. (author)

Safety assessment for radioactive waste disposal facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thanaletchumy Karuppiah; Mohd Abdul Wahab Yusof; Nik Marzuki Nik Ibrahim; Nurul Wahida Ahmad Khairuddin

2008-08-01

Safety assessments are used to evaluate the performance of a radioactive waste disposal facility and its impact on human health and the environment. This paper presents the overall information and methodology to carry out the safety assessment for a long term performance of a disposal system. A case study was also conducted to gain hands-on experience in the development and justification of scenarios, the formulation and implementation of models and the analysis of results. AMBER code using compartmental modeling approach was used to represent the migration and fate of contaminants in this training. This safety assessment is purely illustrative and it serves as a starting point for each development stage of a disposal facility. This assessment ultimately becomes more detail and specific as the facility evolves. (Author)

Life Management and Safety of Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fabbri, S.; Diluch, A.; Vega, G., E-mail: fabbri@cnea.gov.ar [Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

2014-10-15

The nuclear programme in Argentina includes: nuclear power and related supplies, medical and industrial applications, waste management, research and development and human training. Nuclear facilities require life management programs that allow a safe operation. Safety is the first priority for designers and operators. This can be attained with defence in depth: regular inspections and maintenance procedures to minimize failure risks. CNEA objectives in this area are to possess the necessary capability to give safe and fast technical support. Within this scheme, one of the main activities undertaken by CNEA is to provide technological assistance to the nuclear plants and research reactors. As a consequence of an increasing concern about safety and ageing a Life Management Department for safe operation was created to take care of these subjects. The goal is to elaborate a Safety Evaluation Process for the critical components of nuclear plants and other facilities. The overall objectives of a safety process are to ensure a continuous safe, reliable and effective operation of nuclear facilities and it means the implementation of the defence in deep concept to enhance safety for the protection of the public, the workers and the environment. (author)

Nuclear criticality safety basics for personnel working with nuclear fissionable materials. Phase I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vausher, A.L.

1984-10-01

DOE order 5480.1A, Chapter V, ''Safety of Nuclear Facilities,'' establishes safety procedures and requirements for DOE nuclear facilities. The ''Nuclear Criticality Safety Basic Program - Phase I'' is documented in this report. The revised program has been developed to clearly illustrate the concept of nuclear safety and to help the individual employee incorporate safe behavior in his daily work performance. Because of this, the subject of safety has been approached through its three fundamentals: scientific basis, engineering criteria, and administrative controls. Only basics of these three elements were presented. 5 refs

Experimental facilities for gas-cooled reactor safety studies. Task group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

In 2007, the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) completed a study on Nuclear Safety Research in OECD Countries: Support Facilities for Existing and Advanced Reactors (SFEAR) which focused on facilities suitable for current and advanced water reactor systems. In a subsequent collective opinion on the subject, the CSNI recommended to conduct a similar exercise for Generation IV reactor designs, aiming to develop a strategy for ' better preparing the CSNI to play a role in the planned extension of safety research beyond the needs set by current operating reactors'. In that context, the CSNI established the Task Group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF) in 2008 with the objective of providing an overview of facilities suitable for performing safety research relevant to gas-cooled reactors and sodium fast reactors. This report addresses gas-cooled reactors; a similar report covering sodium fast reactors is under preparation. The findings of the TAREF are expected to trigger internationally funded CSNI projects on relevant safety issues at the key facilities identified. Such CSNI-sponsored projects constitute a means for efficiently obtaining the necessary data through internationally co-ordinated research. This report provides an overview of experimental facilities that can be used to carry out nuclear safety research for gas-cooled reactors and identifies priorities for organizing international co-operative programmes at selected facilities. The information has been collected and analysed by a Task Group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF) as part of an ongoing initiative of the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) which aims to define and to implement a strategy for the efficient utilisation of facilities and resources for Generation IV reactor systems. (author)

Staffing, recruitment, training, qualification and certification of operating personnel of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-10-01

Safety of public, occupational workers and the protection of environment should be assured while activities for economic and social progress are pursued. These activities include the establishment and utilisation of nuclear facilities and the use of radioactive sources. This safety guide provides guidance on the aspects of staffing, recruitment, training, qualification and certification of operating personnel of nuclear power plants

Occupational safety and health textbook for radiological personnel employed in structural material testing

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abraham, J.

1981-01-01

The comprehensive textbook for X-ray and radiological testing personnel includes requirements and rules of occupational safety and health on the basis of Hungarian and international (mainly German) literature. In the chapter Fundamentals, X-ray and radioactive radiations, their measurements and biological effects, doses etc are described. In the chapter Occupational safety and health, the jobs representing radiation hazards are listed and safety regulations for them are reported. Finally, information for prevention and first aid is presented. Control questions are added to each part. The Appendix contains safety standards and regulations, information on legal aspects of safety and radiation protection as well as recommendations. (Sz.J.)

Public's right to information: An independent safety assessment of Department of Energy nuclear reactor facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stokely, E.

1981-02-01

The events at TMI prompted the Under Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) to establish the Nuclear Facilities Personnel Qualification and Training (NFPQT) Committee. This Committee was assigned the task of assessing the adequacy of nuclear facility personnel qualification and training at DOE-owned reactors in light of the Three Mile Island accident. The Committee was also asked to review recommendations and identify possible implications for DOE's nuclear facilities

Evaluation of Portable Multi-Gas Analyzers for use by Safety Personnel

Science.gov (United States)

Lueck, D. E.; Meneghelli, B. J.; Bardel, D. N.

1998-01-01

During confined space entry operations as well as Shuttle-safing operations, United Space Alliance (USA)/National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) safety personnel use a variety of portable instrumentation to monitor for hazardous levels of compounds such as nitrogen dioxide (N%), monomethylhydrazine (NMM), FREON 21, ammonia (NH3), oxygen (O2), and combustibles (as hydrogen (H2)). Except for O2 and H2, each compound is monitored using a single analyzer. In many cases these analyzers are 5 to 10 years old and require frequent maintenance. In addition, they are cumbersome to carry and tend to make the job of personnel monitoring physically taxing. As part of an effort to upgrade the sensor technology background information was requested from a total of 27 manufacturers of portable multi-gas instruments. A set of criteria was established to determine which vendors would be selected for laboratory evaluation. These criteria were based on requests made by USA/NASA Safety personnel in order to meet requirements within their respective areas for confined-space and Shuttle-safing operations. Each of the 27 manufacturers of multi-gas analyzers was sent a copy of the criteria and asked to fill in the appropriate information pertaining to their instrumentation. Based on the results of the sensor criteria worksheets, a total of 9 vendors out of 27 surveyed manufacturers were chosen for evaluation. Each vendor included in the final evaluation process was requested to configure each of two analyzers with NO2, NH3, O2, and combustible sensors. A set of lab tests was designed in order to determine which of the multi-gas instruments under evaluation was best suited for use in both shuttle and confined space operations. These tests included linearity/repeatability, zero/span drift response/recovery, humidity, interference, and maintenance. At the conclusion of lab testing three vendors were selected for additional field testing. Based on the results of both the lab and

Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific relevance include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal

An Overview of INEL Fusion Safety R&D Facilities

Science.gov (United States)

McCarthy, K. A.; Smolik, G. R.; Anderl, R. A.; Carmack, W. J.; Longhurst, G. R.

1997-06-01

The Fusion Safety Program at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has the lead for fusion safety work in the United States. Over the years, we have developed several experimental facilities to provide data for fusion reactor safety analyses. We now have four major experimental facilities that provide data for use in safety assessments. The Steam-Reactivity Measurement System measures hydrogen generation rates and tritium mobilization rates in high-temperature (up to 1200°C) fusion relevant materials exposed to steam. The Volatilization of Activation Product Oxides Reactor Facility provides information on mobilization and transport and chemical reactivity of fusion relevant materials at high temperature (up to 1200°C) in an oxidizing environment (air or steam). The Fusion Aerosol Source Test Facility is a scaled-up version of VAPOR. The ion-implanta-tion/thermal-desorption system is dedicated to research into processes and phenomena associated with the interaction of hydrogen isotopes with fusion materials. In this paper we describe the capabilities of these facilities.

Preparation of safety and regulatory document for BARC Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prasad, S.S.; Jayarajan, K.

2017-01-01

In India, the necessary codes and safety guidelines for achieving the safety objectives are provided by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which are in conformity with the principles of radiation protection as formulated by the International Council of Radiation Protection (ICRP) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The same is followed by BARC Safety Council (BSC), which is the regulatory body for the BARC facilities. In addition to all types of fuel cycle facilities, BSC regulates safety of many types of conventional facilities. Many such types of facilities and projects are not under the regulatory purview of AERB. Therefore, the Council has also initiated a programme for development and publication of safety documents for installations in BARC in the fields/ topics yet not addressed by IAEA or AERB. This makes the task pioneering, as some of the areas taken up for defining the regulatory requirements are new, where standard regulatory documents are not available

Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

A well performed and adequately documented safety assessment of a nuclear facility will serve as a basis to determine whether the facility complies with the safety objectives, principles and criteria as stipulated by the national regulatory body of the country where the facility is in operation. International experience shows that the practices and methodologies used to perform safety assessments and periodic safety re-assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities differ significantly from county to country. Most developing countries do not have methods and guidance for safety assessment that are prescribed by the regulatory body. Typically the safety evaluation for the facility is based on a case by case assessment. Whilst conservative deterministic analyses are predominantly used as a licensing basis in many countries, recently probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques have been applied as a useful complementary tool to support safety decision making. The main benefit of PSA is to provide insights into the safety aspects of facility design and operation. PSA points up the potential environmental impacts of postulated accidents, including the dominant risk contributors, and enables safety analysts to compare options for reducing risk. In order to advise on how to apply PSA methodology for the safety assessment of non-reactor nuclear facilities, the IAEA organized several consultants meetings, which led to the preparation of this TECDOC. This document is intended as guidance for the conduct of PSA in non-nuclear facilities. The main emphasis here is on the general procedural steps of a PSA that is specific for a non-reactor nuclear facility, rather than the details of the specific methods. The report is directed at technical staff managing or performing such probabilistic assessments and to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for these PSAs. It is understood that the level of detail implied in the tasks presented in this

Radiation protection training for personnel employed in medical facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McElroy, N.L.; Brodsky, A.

1985-05-01

This report provides information useful for planning and conducting radiation safety training in medical facilities to keep exposures as low as reasonably achievable, and to meet other regulatory, safety and loss prevention requirements in today's hospitals. A brief discussion of the elements and basic considerations of radation safety training programs is followed by a short bibliography of selected references and sample lecture (or session) outlines for various job categories. This information is intended for use by a professional who is thoroughly acquainted with the science and practice of radiation protection as well as the specific procedures and circumstances of the particular hospital's operations. Topics can be added or substracted, amplified or condensed as appropriate. 8 refs

340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodovsky, T.J.

2010-01-01

The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3. The final hazard categorization for the deactivated 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility) is presented in this document. This hazard categorization was prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-1 027-92, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with Doe Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category (HC) 3. Routine nuclear waste receiving, storage, handling, and shipping operations at the 340 Facility have been deactivated, however, the facility contains a small amount of radioactive liquid and/or dry saltcake in two underground vault tanks. A seismic event and hydrogen deflagration were selected as bounding accidents. The generation of hydrogen in the vault tanks without active ventilation was determined to achieve a steady state volume of 0.33%, which is significantly less than the lower flammability limit of 4%. Therefore, a hydrogen deflagration is not possible in these tanks. The unmitigated release from a seismic event was used to categorize the facility consistent with the process defined in Nuclear Safety Technical Position (NSTP) 2002-2. The final sum-of-fractions calculation concluded that the facility is less than HC 3. The analysis did not identify any required engineered controls or design features. The Administrative Controls that were derived from the analysis are: (1) radiological inventory control, (2) facility change control, and (3) Safety Management Programs (SMPs). The facility configuration and radiological inventory shall be controlled to ensure that the assumptions in the analysis remain valid. The facility commitment to SMPs protects the integrity of the facility and environment by ensuring training, emergency response, and radiation protection. The full scale

Large-coil-test-facility fault-tree analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-01-01

An operating-safety study is being conducted for the Large Coil Test Facility (LCTF). The purpose of this study is to provide the facility operators and users with added insight into potential problem areas that could affect the safety of personnel or the availability of equipment. This is a preliminary report, on Phase I of that study. A central feature of the study is the incorporation of engineering judgements (by LCTF personnel) into an outside, overall view of the facility. The LCTF was analyzed in terms of 32 subsystems, each of which are subject to failure from any of 15 generic failure initiators. The study identified approximately 40 primary areas of concern which were subjected to a computer analysis as an aid in understanding the complex subsystem interactions that can occur within the facility. The study did not analyze in detail the internal structure of the subsystems at the individual component level. A companion study using traditional fault tree techniques did analyze approximately 20% of the LCTF at the component level. A comparison between these two analysis techniques is included in Section 7

Operational safety at the FFTF

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baird, Q.L.; Hagan, J.W.; Seeman, S.E.; Baker, S.M.

1981-02-01

An extensive operational nuclear safety program has been an integral part of the design, startup, and initial operating phases of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). During the design and construction of the facility, a program of independent safety overviews and analyses assured the provision of responsible safety margins within the plant, protective systems, and engineered safety features for protection of the public, operating staff, and the facility. The program is continuing through surveillance of operations to verify continued adherence to the established operating envelope and for timely identification of any trends potentially adverse to those margins. Experience from operation of FFTF is being utilized in the development of enhanced operational nuclear safety aids for application in follow-on breeder reactor power systems. The commendable plant and personnel safety experiences of FFTF through its startup and ascension to full power demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the FFTF operational nuclear safety program

Monitor for safety engineering facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sato, Akira; Kaneda, Mitsunori.

1982-01-01

Purpose: To improve the reactor safety and decrease misoperation upon periodical inspection by instantly obtaining the judgement for the stand-by states in engineering safety facilities of a nuclear power plant. Constitution: Process inputs representing the states of valves, pumps, flowrates or the likes of the facility are gathered into an input device and inputted to a status monitor. The status of the facility inputted to the input device are judged for each of the inputs in a judging section and recognized as a present system stand-by pattern of the system (Valve) to be inspected. While on the other hand, a normal system stand-by pattern previously stored in a memory unit is read out by an instruction from an operator console and judged by comparison with the system stand-by pattern in a comparison section. The results are displayed on a display device. Upon periodical inspection, inspection procedures stored in the memory unit are displayed on the display device by the instruction from the operator console. (Seki, T.)

CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

C.E. Sanders

2005-01-01

This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the CHF and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility

Development of High-Level Safety Requirements for a Pyroprocessing Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Seo, Seok Jun; Jo, Woo Jin; You, Gil Sung; Choung, Won Myung; Lee, Ho Hee; Kim, Hyun Min; Jeon, Hong Rae; Ku, Jeong Hoe; Lee, Hyo Jik [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a pyroproceesing technology to reduce the waste volume and recycle some elements. The pyroprocessing includes several treatment processes which are related with not only radiological and physical but also chemical and electrochemical properties. Thus, it is of importance to establish safety design requirements considering all the aspects of those properties for a reliable pyroprocessing facility. In this study, high-level requirements are presented in terms of not only radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, and seismic safety but also confinement and chemical safety for the unique characteristics of a pyroprocessing facility. Several high-level safety design requirements such as radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, seismic, confinement, and chemical processing were presented for a pyroprocessing facility. The requirements must fulfill domestic and international safety technology standards for a nuclear facility. Furthermore, additional requirements should be considered for the unique electrochemical treatments in a pyroprocessing facility.

Laser safety at high profile laser facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barat, K.

2010-01-01

Complete text of publication follows. Laser safety has been an active concern of laser users since the invention of the laser. Formal standards were developed in the early 1970's and still continue to be developed and refined. The goal of these standards is to give users guidance on the use of laser and consistent safety guidance and requirements for laser manufacturers. Laser safety in the typical research setting (government laboratory or university) is the greatest challenge to the laser user and laser safety officer. This is due to two factors. First, the very nature of research can put the user at risk; consider active manipulation of laser optics and beam paths, and user work with energized systems. Second, a laser safety culture that seems to accept laser injuries as part of the graduate student educational process. The fact is, laser safety at research settings, laboratories and universities still has long way to go. Major laser facilities have taken a more rigid and serious view of laser safety, its controls and procedures. Part of the rationale for this is that these facilities draw users from all around the world presenting the facility with a work force of users coming from a wide mix of laser safety cultures. Another factor is funding sources do not like bad publicity which can come from laser accidents and a poor safety record. The fact is that injuries, equipment damage and lost staff time slow down progress. Hence high profile/large laser projects need to adapt a higher safety regimen both from an engineering and administrative point of view. This presentation will discuss all these points and present examples. Acknowledgement. This work has been supported by the University of California, Director, Office of Science.

Safety overview of the National Ignition Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brereton, S.J.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.; Singh, M.; Tobin, M.; Trent, M.

1996-01-01

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed US Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium- tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF mission is to achieve inertial confinement fusion (ICF) ignition, access physical conditions in matter of interest to nuclear weapons physics, provide an above ground simulation capability for nuclear weapons effects testing, and contribute to the development of inertial fusion for electrical power production. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the operation of the NIF. It provides an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low

Civaux nuclear facilities. 2009 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This annual report is established on account of article 21 of the 2006-686 French law from June 13, 2006, relative to the transparency and safety in the nuclear domain. It describes, first, the nuclear facilities of Civaux, and then the measures taken to ensure their safety (personnel radioprotection, actions implemented for nuclear safety improvement, organisation in crisis situation, external and internal controls, technical assessment of the facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2009), incidents and accidents registered in 2009, radioactive and chemical effluents released by the facilities in the environment, other pollutions, management of radioactive wastes, and, finally, the actions carried out in the domain of transparency and public information. A glossary and the viewpoint of the Committee of Hygiene, safety and working conditions about the content of the document conclude the report. (J.S.)

Chooz nuclear facilities. 2009 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This annual report is established on account of article 21 of the 2006-686 French law from June 13, 2006, relative to the transparency and safety in the nuclear domain. It describes, first, the nuclear facilities of Chooz, and then the measures taken to ensure their safety (personnel radioprotection, actions implemented for nuclear safety improvement, organisation in crisis situation, external and internal controls, technical assessment of the facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2009), incidents and accidents registered in 2009, radioactive and chemical effluents released by the facilities in the environment, other pollutions, management of radioactive wastes, and, finally, the actions carried out in the domain of transparency and public information. A glossary and the viewpoint of the Committee of Hygiene, safety and working conditions about the content of the document conclude the report. (J.S.)

Brennilis nuclear facilities. 2009 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This annual report is established on account of article 21 of the 2006-686 French law from June 13, 2006, relative to the transparency and safety in the nuclear domain. It describes, first, the nuclear facilities of Brennilis, and then the measures taken to ensure their safety (personnel radioprotection, actions implemented for nuclear safety improvement, organisation in crisis situation, external and internal controls, technical assessment of the facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2009), incidents and accidents registered in 2009, radioactive and chemical effluents released by the facilities in the environment, other pollutions, management of radioactive wastes, and, finally, the actions carried out in the domain of transparency and public information. A glossary and the viewpoint of the Committee of Hygiene, safety and working conditions about the content of the document conclude the report. (J.S.)

Safety report content and development for test loop facility on MARIA reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konechko, A.; Shumskij, A.M.; Mikul'ahin, V.E.

1982-01-01

A 600 kW test loop facility for investigatin.o safety problems is realized on MARIA reactor in Poland together with USSR organizations. Safety reports have been developed in two steps at the designstage. The 1st report being essentially a preliminary safety analysis was developed within the scope of the feasibility study. At the engineering design stage the preliminary test loop facility safety report had been prepared considering measures excluding the possibility of the MARIA reactor damage. The test loop facility safety report is fulfilled for normal, transient and emergency operation regimes. Separate safety basing for each group of experiments will be prepared. The report presents the test loop facility safety criteria coordinated by the nuclear safety comission. They contains the preliminary reports on the test loop facility safety. At the final stage of construction and at thecommitioning stage the start-up safety report will be developed which after required correction and adding up the putting into operation data will turn into operation safety report [ru

Role of the State Office for Nuclear Safety in testing special professional competence of selected personnel of nuclear facilities and selected personnel handling ionizing radiation sources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kovar, P.

2003-01-01

The laws and regulations governing the title topic are identified. The following terms are defined and their context highlighted: professional competence; special professional competence; selected personnel; requirements for selected personnel; requirements for selected personnel training; examination boards; and licensing procedure. (P.A.)

Evolution of nuclear safety regulation for BARC Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jayarajan, K.; Taly, Y.K.

2017-01-01

Safety programmes in BARC stared during the formative years and grown its stature, as the years passed by. Seventeen years of BSC, with one hundred meetings, have been quite eventful with several achievements. BSC could bring all facilities of BARC under its safety umbrella and could streamline many safety and regulatory activities. BSC aims at incident free operation of all facilities and protection of the workers, the public, the environment from radiation and other hazards. Although, incidents could not be entirely prevented, BSC have taken every event as a lesson and used the experience for improving safety. Safety enhancement is an endless journey, which has to be performed by joining hands of the managers, designers, manufacturers, inspectors and operators, in addition to the regulators

Safety culture in a major nuclear fuel cycle facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pushparaja; Abani, M.C.

2002-01-01

Human factor plays an important role in development of safety culture in any nuclear fuel cycle facility. This is more relevant in major nuclear facility such as a reactor or a reprocessing plant. In Indian reprocessing plants, an effective worker's training, education and certification program is in place to sensitize the worker's response to safety and safe work procedures. The methodology followed to self evaluation of safety culture and the benefits in a reprocessing plant is briefly discussed. Various indicators of safety performance and visible signs of a good safety management are also qualitatively analyzed. (author)

Safety assesment necessary in selecting the technologies for partial decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Application to research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Niculae, O.; Stan, C.; Vladescu, G.

2005-01-01

The main goal of this work is identification and evaluation of safety indicators - quantities used in monitoring the safety assurance during decommissioning processes in nuclear facilities identification of safety indicators is made on basis of qualitative and quantitative analysis, effected for both normal decommissioning, as well as in case of foreseen event occurrence. The safety indicators form an integrated system which can be represented by a pyramidal structural with the following levels (in increasing complexity order): specific indicators, strategic indicators, overall indicators, safety closure. This work suggests that evaluation of safety assurance level during the conduct of a decommissioning process to be based on the overall analysis of the set of indicators emphasizing not only the evaluation of individual safety indicators but also the interdependencies between them. The evaluation method is based on the 'step-by-step' principle. The evaluation was carried-out either directly or by means of dedicated evaluation forms which cover both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the analysis. At the some time identified are the adequate protection measures for the personnel implied in decommissioning, as well as for population and environment. The paper present also technologies adequate in the decommissioning. (authors)

RADON-type disposal facility safety case for the co-ordinated research project on improvement of safety assessment methodologies for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities (ISAM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guskov, A.; Batanjieva, B.; Kozak, M.W.; Torres-Vidal, C.

2002-01-01

The ISAM safety assessment methodology was applied to RADON-type facilities. The assessments conducted through the ISAM project were among the first conducted for these kinds of facilities. These assessments are anticipated to lead to significantly improved levels of safety in countries with such facilities. Experience gained though this RADON-type Safety Case was already used in Russia while developing national regulatory documents. (author)

Progress report concerning safety research for nuclear reactor facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

Examination and evaluation of safety research results for nuclear reactor facilities have been performed, as more than a year has elapsed since the plan had been initiated in April, 1976, by the special sub-committee for the safety of nuclear reactor facilities. The research is carried out by being divided roughly into 7 items, and seems to be steadily proceeding, though it does not yet reach the target. The above 7 items include researches for (1) criticality accident, (2) loss of coolant accident, (3) safety for light water reactor fuel, (4) construction safety for reactor facilities, (5) reduction of release of radioactive material, (6) safety evaluation based on the probability theory for reactor facilities, and (7) aseismatic measures for reactor facilities. With discussions on the progress and the results of the research this time, research on the behaviour on fuel in abnormal transients including in-core and out-core experiments has been added to the third item, deleting the power-cooling mismatch experiment in Nuclear Safety Research Reactor of JAERI. Also it has been decided to add two research to the seventh item, namely measured data collection, classification and analysis, and probability assessment of failures due to an earthquake. For these 7 items, the report describes the concrete contents of research to be performed in fiscal years of 1977 and 1978, by discussing on most rational and suitable contents conceivable at present. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

LMFBR safety experiment facility planning and analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stevenson, M.G.; Scott, J.H.

1976-01-01

In the past two years considerable effort has been placed on the planning and design of new facilities for the resolution of LMFBR safety issues. The paper reviews the key issues, the experiments needed to resolve them, and the design aspects of proposed new facilities. In addition, it presents a decision theory approach to selecting an optimal combination of modified and new facilities

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Larson, H L

2007-01-01

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Larson, H L

2007-09-07

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

Safety at the End of a Nuclear Facility's Life

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geis, John A.; McEahern, Patrice; Evans, Brad

2004-01-01

The objective of this paper is to capture the changes that are caused by the transition from nuclear operation through closure of defense nuclear facilities and convey lessons learned from their deactivation, decontamination and demolition. The specific area of discussion is focused on the planned reduction of safety equipment and consequent shift in hazard controls and safety management programs as the facility moves toward closure. The premise of the paper is that as the dominant hazards transition from nuclear to radiological and/or industrial, the facility control of the hazards and response to the potential upset conditions must transition as well to ensure safe and efficient operations. Using recent experience of the accelerated closure mission for U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, the current culture with respect to developing and implementing hazard controls and response to upset conditions is illustrated. Several events have been documented that provide insight into the challenges facing line managers and safety professionals at the end of a facility's life cycle. Replacing permanent systems with temporary equipment challenges the traditional concept of reliability. Workers disassemble safety systems daily, but must rely on some of these components or redundant systems as work continues. Decisions governing upkeep of systems that await demolition balance the risk of running to failure against the cost benefit of maintenance and repair. This is further complicated as regulators and safety professionals are often unfamiliar with these new conditions and continue to view facility work activities and potential upset conditions from a nuclear operations perspective. The results of this paper evaluate the differences in how regulatory, safety basis, and operational practices must adapt to the dynamic environment of decontamination and decommissioning in contrast to the relatively constant

Establishing management information system to solve the information management problem of nuclear safety related personnel's qualification management

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sun Haipeng; Liu Zhijun; Li Tianshu

2013-01-01

With the rapid progress of nuclear energy and nuclear technology utilization, nuclear safety related personnel play an increasingly important role in ensuring nuclear safety. NNSA personnel qualification management information system conducts a multi-faceted, effective, real-time monitoring and information collection for nuclear safety staff practice unit management, knowledge management, license application, appraisal management or supervision, training management or supervision and certified staff management, and also is a milestone for NNSA to build the state department with 'five-feature' (learning-oriented, service-oriented, economical, innovative, clean-type). (authors)

CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

C.E. Sanders

2005-04-07

This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for

Data used for safety assessment of reprocessing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nomura, Yasushi; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Kanagawa, Akira

1990-08-01

For safety assessment of a reprocessing facility, it is important to know performance of radioactive materials in their accidental release and transfer. Accordingly, it is necessary to collect and prepare data for use in analyses for their performance. In JAERI, experiments such as for data acquisition, for source-term evaluation and for radioactive material transfer, are now planned to be performed. Prior to these experiments, it is decided to investigate data in use for accidental safety assessment of reprocessing plants and their based experimental data, thus to make it possible to recommend reasonable values for safety analysis parameters by evaluating the investigated results, to select the experimental items, to edit a safety assessment handbook and so on. In this line of objectives, JAERI rewarded a two-year contract of investigation to Nuclear Safety Research Association, to make a working group under a special committee on data investigation for reprocessing facility safety assessment. This report is a collection of results reviewed and checked by the working group. The contents consist of two parts, one for investigation and review of data used for safety assessment of domestic or oversea reprocessing facilities, and the other for investigation, review and evaluation of ANSI recommended American standard data reported by E. Walker together with their based experimental data resorting to the original referred reports. (author)

49 CFR 193.2711 - Personnel health.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Personnel health. 193.2711 Section 193.2711 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY...: FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS Personnel Qualifications and Training § 193.2711 Personnel health. Each operator...

Safety assessment for spent fuel storage facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This Safety Practice has been prepared as part of the IAEA's programme on the safety assessment of interim spent fuel storage facilities which are not an integral part of an operating nuclear power plant. This report provides general guidance on the safety assessment process, discussing both deterministic and probabilistic assessment methods. It describes the safety assessment process for normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences and also related to accident conditions. 10 refs, 2 tabs

Specification ''E'' of the CEFRI concerning the enterprises employing personnel of A or B category working in nuclear facilities

CERN Document Server

Int. At. Energy Agency, Wien

2002-01-01

This document aims to specify the organization dispositions which have to bee taken by the enterprises employing personnel of A or B category to work in nuclear facilities. These dispositions should allow to respect the demands of the CEFRI in matter of formation, medical control and personnel dosimetry. (A.L.B.)

Health physics experience with nondestructive X-radiation facilities in the US Air Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stencel, J.R.; Piltingsrud, H.V.

1976-01-01

Radiation safety experience in the construction and use of enclosed nondestructive inspection (NDI) facilities in the US Air Force, has reaffirmed the constant need for the health physicist to continually monitor and assit in upgrading these facilities. Health physics contributions include evaluation of initial shielding requirements, proper selection of construction material, insuring that adequate safety devices are installed and adequate personnel dosimetry devices are available, surveying the facility, and assisting in the safety education program. There is a need to better define NDI warning/safety devices, using the National Bureau of Standards, (NBS) Handbook 107 as the most applicable guide

National synchrotron light source medical personnel protection interlock

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buda, S.; Gmur, N.F.; Larson, R.; Thomlinson, W.

1998-01-01

This report is founded on reports written in April 1987 by Robert Hettel for angiography operations at the Stanford Synchrotron Research Laboratory (SSRL) and a subsequent report covering angiography operations at the National Synchrotron Light Source (NSLS); BNL Informal Report 47681, June 1992. The latter report has now been rewritten in order to accurately reflect the design and installation of a new medical safety system at the NSLS X17B2 beamline Synchrotron Medical Research Facility (SMERF). Known originally as the Angiography Personnel Protection Interlock (APPI), this system has been modified to incorporate other medical imaging research programs on the same beamline and thus the name has been changed to the more generic Medical Personnel Protection Interlock (MPPI). This report will deal almost exclusively with the human imaging (angiography, bronchography, mammography) aspects of the safety system, but will briefly explain the modular aspects of the system allowing other medical experiments to be incorporated

NATIONAL SYNCHROTRON LIGHT SOURCE MEDICAL PERSONNEL PROTECTION INTERLOCK

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

BUDA,S.; GMUR,N.F.; LARSON,R.; THOMLINSON,W.

1998-11-03

This report is founded on reports written in April 1987 by Robert Hettel for angiography operations at the Stanford Synchrotron Research Laboratory (SSRL) and a subsequent report covering angiography operations at the National Synchrotron Light Source (NSLS); BNL Informal Report 47681, June 1992. The latter report has now been rewritten in order to accurately reflect the design and installation of a new medical safety system at the NSLS X17B2 beamline Synchrotron Medical Research Facility (SMERF). Known originally as the Angiography Personnel Protection Interlock (APPI), this system has been modified to incorporate other medical imaging research programs on the same beamline and thus the name has been changed to the more generic Medical Personnel Protection Interlock (MPPI). This report will deal almost exclusively with the human imaging (angiography, bronchography, mammography) aspects of the safety system, but will briefly explain the modular aspects of the system allowing other medical experiments to be incorporated.

Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BENECKE, M.W.

2000-01-01

The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

Review and assessment of nuclear facilities by the regulatory body. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on reviewing and assessing the various safety related submissions made by the operator of a nuclear facility at different stages (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure) in the facility's lifetime to determine whether the facility complies with the applicable safety objectives and requirements. This Safety Guide covers the review and assessment of submissions in relation to the safety of nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Objectives, management, planning and organizational matters relating to the review and assessment process are presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the bases for decision making and conduct of the review and assessment process. Section 4 covers aspects relating to the assessment of this process. The Appendix provides a generic list of topics to be covered in the review and assessment process

Review and assessment of nuclear facilities by the regulatory body. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on reviewing and assessing the various safety related submissions made by the operator of a nuclear facility at different stages (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure) in the facility's lifetime to determine whether the facility complies with the applicable safety objectives and requirements. This Safety Guide covers the review and assessment of submissions in relation to the safety of nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Objectives, management, planning and organizational matters relating to the review and assessment process are presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the bases for decision making and conduct of the review and assessment process. Section 4 covers aspects relating to the assessment of this process. The Appendix provides a generic list of topics to be covered in the review and assessment process

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Chinon nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Organization and staffing of the regulatory body for nuclear facilities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The purpose of this safety guide is to provide recommendations for national authorities on the appropriate management system, organization and staffing for the regulatory body responsible for the regulation of nuclear facilities in order to achieve compliance with the applicable safety requirements. This safety guide covers the organization and staffing in relation to nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And radioactive waste management facilities such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This safety guide also covers issues related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation

Nuclear Safety Charter

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The AREVA 'Values Charter' reaffirmed the priority that must be given to the requirement for a very high level of safety, which applies in particular to the nuclear field. The purpose of this Nuclear Safety Charter is to set forth the group's commitments in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection so as to ensure that this requirement is met throughout the life cycle of the facilities. It should enable each of us, in carrying out our duties, to commit to this requirement personally, for the company, and for all stakeholders. These commitments are anchored in organizational and action principles and in complete transparency. They build on a safety culture shared by all personnel and maintained by periodic refresher training. They are implemented through Safety, Health, and Environmental management systems. The purpose of these commitments, beyond strict compliance with the laws and regulations in force in countries in which we operate as a group, is to foster a continuous improvement initiative aimed at continually enhancing our overall performance as a group. Content: 1 - Organization: responsibility of the group's executive management and subsidiaries, prime responsibility of the operator, a system of clearly defined responsibilities that draws on skilled support and on independent control of operating personnel, the general inspectorate: a shared expertise and an independent control of the operating organization, an organization that can be adapted for emergency management. 2 - Action principles: nuclear safety applies to every stage in the plant life cycle, lessons learned are analyzed and capitalized through the continuous improvement initiative, analyzing risks in advance is the basis of Areva's safety culture, employees are empowered to improve nuclear Safety, the group is committed to a voluntary radiation protection initiative And a sustained effort in reducing waste and effluent from facility Operations, employees and subcontractors are treated

Implementation of radiation safety program in a medical institution

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Palanca, Elena D.

1999-01-01

A medical institution that utilizes radiation for the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of malignancies develops and implements a radiation safety program to keep occupational exposures of radiation workers and exposures of non-radiation workers and the public to the achievable and a more achievable minimum, to optimize the use of radiation, and to prevent misadministration. The hospital radiation safety program is established by a core medical radiation committee composed of trained radiation safety officers and head of authorized users of radioactive materials and radiation machines from the different departments. The radiation safety program sets up procedural guidelines of the safe use of radioactive material and of radiation equipment. It offers regular training to radiation workers and radiation safety awareness courses to hospital staff. The program has a comprehensive radiation safety information system or radsis that circularizes the radiation safety program in the hospital. The radsis keeps the drafted and updated records of safety guides and policies, radioactive material and equipment inventory, personnel dosimetry reports, administrative, regulatory and licensing activity document, laboratory procedures, emergency procedures, quality assurance and quality control program process, physics and dosimetry procedures and reports, personnel and hospital staff training program. The medical radiation protection committee is tasked to oversee the actual implementation of the radiation safety guidelines in the different radiation facilities in the hospital, to review personnel exposures, incident reports and ALARA actions, operating procedures, facility inspections and audit reports, to evaluate the existing radiation safety procedures, to make necessary changes to these procedures, and make modifications of course content of the training program. The effective implementation of the radiation safety program provides increased confidence that the physician and

Radiation safety of gamma and electron irradiation facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

There are currently some 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation throughout virtually all Member States of the IAEA. The most widespread uses of these facilities are for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, and the eradication of insect infestation. The safety record of this industry has been very good. Nevertheless, there is a potential for accidents with serious consequences. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, so that a person accidentally present in the irradiation chamber can receive a lethal dose within minutes or seconds. Precautions against uncontrolled entry must therefore be taken. Furthermore, gamma irradiation facilities contain large amounts of radioactivity and if the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed, inhibiting direct access to carry out remedial work. Contamination can result from corroded or damaged sources, and decontamination can be very expensive. These aspects clearly indicate the need to achieve a high degree of safety and reliability in the facilities. This can be accomplished by effective quality control together with careful design, manufacture, installation, operation and decommissioning. The guidance in this Safety Series publication is intended for competent authorities responsible for regulating the use of radiation sources as well as the manufacturers, suppliers, installers and users of gamma and electron beam facilities. 20 refs, 6 figs

Engineering design guidelines for nuclear criticality safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waltz, W.R.

1988-08-01

This document provides general engineering design guidelines specific to nuclear criticality safety for a facility where the potential for a criticality accident exists. The guide is applicable to the design of new SRP/SRL facilities and to major modifications Of existing facilities. The document is intended an: A guide for persons actively engaged in the design process. A resource document for persons charged with design review for adequacy relative to criticality safety. A resource document for facility operating personnel. The guide defines six basic criticality safety design objectives and provides information to assist in accomplishing each objective. The guide in intended to supplement the design requirements relating to criticality safety contained in applicable Department of Energy (DOE) documents. The scope of the guide is limited to engineering design guidelines associated with criticality safety and does not include other areas of the design process, such as: criticality safety analytical methods and modeling, nor requirements for control of the design process

Keys to effective third-party process safety audits

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Birkmire, John C.; Lay, James R.; McMahon, Mona C.

2007-01-01

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA's) Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation was promulgated in 1992. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) corresponding Risk Management Program (RMP) rule followed in 1996. Both programs include requirements for triennial compliance audits. Effective compliance audits are critical in identifying program weaknesses and ensuring the safety of facility personnel and the surrounding public. Large companies with corporate and facility health, safety, and environmental groups typically have the resources and experience to conduct audits internally, either through a corporate audit team or the sharing of personnel between multiple facilities. Small to medium sized businesses frequently do not have the expertise or the resources to perform compliance audits, and rely on third-party consultants to provide these services. This paper will discuss the observations of the authors in performing audits and working with PSM/RMP programs across a number of market sectors (e.g. chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, food and beverage, water treatment), including effective practices, hurdles to successful implementation and execution of programs, and typical program shortcomings. The paper will also discuss steps to improve the audit process and increase effectiveness whether performed by a third party or internally

48 CFR 352.223-70 - Safety and health.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... laboratories; and other applicable occupational health and safety standards issued by OSHA and included in 29... Commission Standards and Regulations, pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801 et... health and safety operating procedures and practices for both personnel and facilities: (i) Biosafety in...

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D. T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2014-04-16

This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laycak, D. T.

2014-01-01

This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

Non-technical issues in safety assessments for nuclear disposal facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kallenbach-Herbert, Beate; Brohmann, Bettina

2010-09-01

The paper highlights that a comprehensive approach to safety affords the consideration of technology, organisation, personnel and social environment. In several safety relevant contexts of nuclear waste disposal these fields are closely interrelated. The approach for the consideration of socio-scientific aspects which is sketched in this paper supports the systematic treatment of safety relevant non-technical issues in the safety case or in safety assessments for a disposal project. Furthermore it may foster the dialogue among specialists from the technical, the natural- and the socio-scientific field on questions of disposal safety. In this way it may contribute to a better understanding among the affected scientific disciplines in nuclear waste disposal.

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schnurer, H.L.

1977-01-01

Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D

2008-06-16

This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 78, 89 (NPPs in operation), 465 (NPP under deconstruction), 102 (fuel storage facility), and 173 (radioactive waste conditioning and storage facility under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 78, 89 (NPPs in operation), 465 (NPP under deconstruction), 102 (fuel storage facility), and 173 (radioactive waste conditioning and storage facility under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee Cadwallader

2005-01-31

This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, B.; Torres-Vidal, C.

2002-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated research program ''Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities'' (ISAM) has developed improved safety assessment methodology for near surface disposal facilities. The program has been underway for three years and has included around 75 active participants from 40 countries. It has also provided examples for application to three safety cases--vault, Radon type and borehole radioactive waste disposal facilities. The program has served as an excellent forum for exchange of information and good practices on safety assessment approaches and methodologies used worldwide. It also provided an opportunity for reaching broad consensus on the safety assessment methodologies to be applied to near surface low and intermediate level waste repositories. The methodology has found widespread acceptance and the need for its application on real waste disposal facilities has been clearly identified. The ISAM was finalized by the end of 2000, working material documents are available and an IAEA report will be published in 2002 summarizing the work performed during the three years of the program. The outcome of the ISAM program provides a sound basis for moving forward to a new IAEA program, which will focus on practical application of the safety assessment methodologies to different purposes, such as licensing radioactive waste repositories, development of design concepts, upgrading existing facilities, reassessment of operating repositories, etc. The new program will also provide an opportunity for development of guidance on application of the methodology that will be of assistance to both safety assessors and regulators

Preliminary safety analysis report for the Waste Characterization Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-10-01

This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Characterization Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are to: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Characterization Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume. 142 refs., 38 figs., 39 tabs

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laycak, D.T.

2010-01-01

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D T

2008-06-16

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas

Radiation Safety of Accelerator Facility with Regard to Regulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dedi Sunaryadi; Gloria Doloresa

2003-01-01

The radiation safety of accelerator facility and the status of the facilities according to licensee in Indonesia as well as lesson learned from the accidents are described. The atomic energy Act No. 10 of 1997 enacted by the Government of Indonesia which is implemented in Radiation Safety Government Regulation No. 63 and 64 as well as practice-specific model regulation for licensing request are discussed. (author)

Final safety analysis report (FSAR) for waste receiving and processing (WRAP) facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Weidert, J.R.

1997-01-01

This safety analysis report provides a summary description of the WRAP Facility, focusing on significant safety-related characteristics of the location and facility design. This report demonstrates that adherence to the safety basis wi11 ensure necessary operational safety considerations have been addressed sufficiently and justifies the adequacy of the safety basis in protecting the health and safety of the public, workers, and the environment

Project for the completion of a probabilistic safety analysis of an industrial irradiation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferro, R.; Troncoso, M.

1995-01-01

The probabilistic safety analysis is a very valuable instrument in safety studies of facilities with potential risk for the personnel, population and environment. One of the possible field of use of PSA techniques in the safety studies for industrial irradiation where serious accidents have occurred. For this reason a project has been undertaken to carry out the PSA in the Irradiation Plant of Research Institute of the Food Industry, which complements the safety studies of this facility

Decommissioning of Medical, Industrial and Research Facilities. Safety Guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive materials and sources are produced, received, used and stored. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations, particularly to those in developing countries (as such facilities are predominant in these countries), for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such facilities. The Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants meetings and a Technical Committee meeting

Decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive materials and sources are produced, received, used and stored. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations, particularly to those in developing countries (as such facilities are predominant in these countries), for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such facilities. The Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants meetings and a Technical Committee meeting

Criticality safety considerations. Integral Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-09-01

This report summarizes the criticality analysis performed to address criticality safety concerns and to support facility design during the conceptual design phase of the Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Facility. The report addresses the criticality safety concerns, the design features of the facility relative to criticality, and the results of the analysis of both normal operating and hypothetical off-normal conditions. Key references are provided (Appendix C) if additional information is desired by the reader. The MRS Facility design was developed and the related analysis was performed in accordance with the MRS Facility Functional Design Criteria and the Basis for Design. The detailed description and calculations are documented in the Integral MRS Facility Conceptual Design Report. In addition to the summary portion of this report, explanatary notes for various terms, calculation methodology, and design parameters are presented in Appendix A. Appendix B provides a brief glossary of technical terms

Safety Software Guide Perspectives for the Design of New Nuclear Facilities (U)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

VINCENT, Andrew

2005-01-01

In June of this year, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued directives DOE O 414.1C and DOE G 414.1-4 to improve quality assurance programs, processes, and procedures among its safety contractors. Specifically, guidance entitled, ''Safety Software Guide for use with 10 CFR 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, DOE G 414.1-4'', provides information and acceptable methods to comply with safety software quality assurance (SQA) requirements. The guidance provides a roadmap for meeting DOE O 414.1C, ''Quality Assurance'', and the quality assurance program (QAP) requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart A, Quality Assurance, for DOE nuclear facilities and software application activities. [1, 2] The order and guide are part of a comprehensive implementation plan that addresses issues and concerns documented in Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2002-1. [3] Safety SQA requirements for DOE as well as National Nuclear Security Administration contractors are necessary to implement effective quality assurance (QA) processes and achieve safe nuclear facility operations. DOE G 414.1-4 was developed to provide guidance on establishing and implementing effective QA processes tied specifically to nuclear facility safety software applications. The Guide includes software application practices covered by appropriate national and international consensus standards and various processes currently in use at DOE facilities. While the safety software guidance is considered to be of sufficient rigor and depth to ensure acceptable reliability of safety software at all DOE nuclear facilities, new nuclear facilities are well suited to take advantage of the guide to ensure compliant programs and processes are implemented. Attributes such as the facility life-cycle stage and the hazardous nature of each facility operations are considered, along with the category and level of importance of the

Safety analysis--200 Area Savannah River Site: Separations Area operations Building 211-H Outside Facilities. Supplement 11, Revision 1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1993-01-01

The H-Area Outside Facilities are located in the 200-H Separations Area and are comprised of a number of processes, utilities, and services that support the separations function. Included are enriched uranium loadout, bulk chemical storage, water handling, acid recovery, general purpose evaporation, and segregated solvent facilities. In addition, services for water, electricity, and steam are provided. This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents an analysis of the H-Area Outside Facilities and is one of a series of documents for the Separations Area as specified in the SR Implementation Plan for DOE order 5481.1A. The primary purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that the facility can be operated without undue risk to onsite or offsite populations, to the environment, and to operating personnel. In this report, risks are defined as the expected frequencies of accidents, multiplied by the resulting radiological consequences in person-rem. Following the summary description of facility and operations is the site evaluation including the unique features of the H-Area Outside Facilities. The facility and process design are described in Chapter 3.0 and a description of operations and their impact is given in Chapter 4.0. The accident analysis in Chapter 5.0 is followed by a list of safety related structures and systems (Chapter 6.0) and a description of the Quality Assurance program (Chapter 7.0). The accident analysis in this report focuses on estimating the risk from accidents as a result of operation of the facilities. The operations were evaluated on the basis of three considerations: potential radiological hazards, potential chemical toxicity hazards, and potential conditions uniquely different from normal industrial practice.

Safety analysis--200 Area Savannah River Site: Separations Area operations Building 211-H Outside Facilities. Supplement 11, Revision 1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-01-01

The H-Area Outside Facilities are located in the 200-H Separations Area and are comprised of a number of processes, utilities, and services that support the separations function. Included are enriched uranium loadout, bulk chemical storage, water handling, acid recovery, general purpose evaporation, and segregated solvent facilities. In addition, services for water, electricity, and steam are provided. This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents an analysis of the H-Area Outside Facilities and is one of a series of documents for the Separations Area as specified in the SR Implementation Plan for DOE order 5481.1A. The primary purpose of the analysis was to demonstrate that the facility can be operated without undue risk to onsite or offsite populations, to the environment, and to operating personnel. In this report, risks are defined as the expected frequencies of accidents, multiplied by the resulting radiological consequences in person-rem. Following the summary description of facility and operations is the site evaluation including the unique features of the H-Area Outside Facilities. The facility and process design are described in Chapter 3.0 and a description of operations and their impact is given in Chapter 4.0. The accident analysis in Chapter 5.0 is followed by a list of safety related structures and systems (Chapter 6.0) and a description of the Quality Assurance program (Chapter 7.0). The accident analysis in this report focuses on estimating the risk from accidents as a result of operation of the facilities. The operations were evaluated on the basis of three considerations: potential radiological hazards, potential chemical toxicity hazards, and potential conditions uniquely different from normal industrial practice

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Blayais nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 86 and 110). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Civaux nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Golfech nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 135 and 142). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Tricastin nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the Tricastin NPPs (INBs no. 87 and 88). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Penly nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Chooz nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INB no. 75). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Assuring the competence of nuclear power plant contractor personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-07-01

quality; the contractors performing work on-site or off-site (Section 3); contractors involved on a short-term or long-term basis; contractors involved in plant routine activities or performing unique/specific activities; contractor activities dealing with plant safety systems or systems important for safety, which may make more demands on contractor personnel competence. Contractor personnel provide essential services to nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, particularly during plant outages or for projects involving major upgrading of plant. Typical services are: unique services offered by specialised contractors; augmentation of NPP personnel for particular tasks; general services provided on a permanent basis. In providing these services contractor personnel encounter similar problems to those that challenge NPP personnel. Typical examples are assessment of risk, quality assurance, compliance with procedures, communications, teamwork, work in hazardous environments and concerns about nuclear safety. Accordingly, contractor personnel must be competent and effectively interface with NPP personnel when performing assigned duties. Assurance is required that contractor personnel meet the qualification criteria before undertaking any activities at a NPP site, as the NPP has a responsibility for establishing qualification criteria for its own personnel and for contractor personnel. The objective of this TECDOC is to assist NPPs and other organisations to ensure that NPP contractor personnel are competent to undertake their assigned tasks. This TECDOC addresses the competence of contractor personnel for an operating nuclear power plant or for a nuclear power plant under decommissioning. This TECDOC deals specifically with contractor personnel working on-site at a nuclear power plant; however, the principles addressed here have similar applicability to off-site work undertaken by contractors. This publication comprises 11 sections and 17 annexes containing

Assuring the competence of nuclear power plant contractor personnel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-07-01

quality; the contractors performing work on-site or off-site (Section 3); contractors involved on a short-term or long-term basis; contractors involved in plant routine activities or performing unique/specific activities; contractor activities dealing with plant safety systems or systems important for safety, which may make more demands on contractor personnel competence. Contractor personnel provide essential services to nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, particularly during plant outages or for projects involving major upgrading of plant. Typical services are: unique services offered by specialised contractors; augmentation of NPP personnel for particular tasks; general services provided on a permanent basis. In providing these services contractor personnel encounter similar problems to those that challenge NPP personnel. Typical examples are assessment of risk, quality assurance, compliance with procedures, communications, teamwork, work in hazardous environments and concerns about nuclear safety. Accordingly, contractor personnel must be competent and effectively interface with NPP personnel when performing assigned duties. Assurance is required that contractor personnel meet the qualification criteria before undertaking any activities at a NPP site, as the NPP has a responsibility for establishing qualification criteria for its own personnel and for contractor personnel. The objective of this TECDOC is to assist NPPs and other organisations to ensure that NPP contractor personnel are competent to undertake their assigned tasks. This TECDOC addresses the competence of contractor personnel for an operating nuclear power plant or for a nuclear power plant under decommissioning. This TECDOC deals specifically with contractor personnel working on-site at a nuclear power plant; however, the principles addressed here have similar applicability to off-site work undertaken by contractors. This publication comprises 11 sections and 17 annexes containing

CSER 94-012: Criticality safety evaluation report for 340 Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Altschuler, S.J.

1995-01-01

This Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) covers the 340 Facility which acts as a collecting point for liquid and solid waste from various facilities in the 300 Area. Criticality safety is achieved by controlling the amount and concentration of the fissionable material sent to the 340 Facility from the originating facilities in the 300 Area, a method similar to that used elsewhere at Hanford for the waste tank farms. Unlike those, however, the waste received at the 340 Facility will be far less radioactive. It is concluded that present operations meet the two contingency criterion. The facility will still be safely subcritical even after two independent and concurrent failures (either of equipment or administrative controls). The solid waste storage and liquid waste will be managed separately. The solid waste storage area is classified as exempt because it contains less than 15 grams of fissionable materials. The Radioactive Liquid Waste System is classified as isolated because it contains less than one third of a minimum critical mass. The criticality safety of the 340 Facility devoted to the Radioactive Liquid Waste System (RLWS) is assured by the form and concentration of the fissile material and could also be classified as a limited control facility. However, the 340 Facility has been operated as an isolated facility which results in a more conservative limit

Characterisation study of radionuclides in Hot Cell Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ghare, P.T.; Rath, D.P.; Govalkar, Atul; Mukherjee, Govinda; AniIKumar, S.; Yadav, R.K.B.; Mallik, G.K.

2016-01-01

Examination of different types of experimental as well as power reactor irradiated fuels and validation of fuel modeling codes is carried out in general Hot cell facility. The Hot cell facility has six concrete shielded hot cells, capable of handling radioactivity varying from 3.7 TBQ to 3700 TBq gamma activity. The facility was augmented with two hot cells having designed capacity to handle radioactivity of 9250 TBQ of equivalent activity of 60 Co. The study of characterization of various radionuclides present inside the hot cell of PIE facility was taken up. This study will help in providing valuable inputs for various radiological safety parameters to keep personnel exposure to ALARA level as per the mandate of radiation safety program

Study of fast reactor safety test facilities. Preliminary report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bell, G.I.; Boudreau, J.E.; McLaughlin, T.; Palmer, R.G.; Starkovich, V.; Stein, W.E.; Stevenson, M.G.; Yarnell, Y.L.

1975-05-01

Included are sections dealing with the following topics: (1) perspective and philosophy of fast reactor safety analysis; (2) status of accident analysis and experimental needs; (3) experiment and facility definitions; (4) existing in-pile facilities; (5) new facility options; and (6) data acquisition methods

Operational safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1977-01-01

The PNL Safety, Standards and Compliance Program contributed to the development and issuance of safety policies, standards, and criteria; for projects in the nuclear and nonnuclear areas. During 1976 the major emphasis was on developing criteria, instruments and methods to assure that radiation exposure to occupational personnel and to people in the environs of nuclear-related facilities is maintained at the lowest level technically and economically practicable. Progress in 1976 is reported on the preparation of guidelines for radiation exposure; Pu dosimetry studies; the preparation of an environmental monitoring handbook; and emergency instrumentation preparedness

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

30 CFR 77.1400 - Personnel hoists and elevators.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Personnel hoists and elevators. 77.1400 Section 77.1400 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS, SURFACE COAL MINES AND SURFACE WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Personnel Hoisting § 77.1400 Personnel...

MP-Division health and safety reference handbook

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Putnam, T.M.

1987-09-01

This report presents the objectives, organization, policies, and essential rules and procedures that have been adopted by MP Division and that form the basis of the Health and Safety Program of the Clinton P. Anderson Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF). The facility includes the beam-delivery systems for the Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Center and the Weapons Neutron Research Facility (LANSCE/WNR). The program is designed not only to assure the health and safety of all personnel, including users, in their work at LAMPF, and of MP-Division staff in their work on the LANSCE/WNR beam lines, but also to protect the facility (buildings and equipment) and the environment. 33 refs., 18 figs., 2 tabs

Radiation safety audit

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kadadunna, K.P.I.K.; Mod Ali, Noriah

2008-01-01

Audit has been seen as one of the effective methods to ensure harmonization in radiation protection. A radiation safety audit is a formal safety performance examination of existing or future work activities by an independent team. Regular audit will assist the management in its mission to maintain the facilities environment that is inherently safe for its employees. The audits review the adequacy of facilities for the type of use, training, and competency of workers, supervision by authorized users, availability of survey instruments, security of radioactive materials, minimization of personnel exposure to radiation, safety equipment, and the required record keeping. All approved areas of use are included in these periodic audits. Any deficiency found in the audit shall be corrected as soon as possible after they are reported. Radiation safety audit is a proactive approach to improve radiation safety practices and identify and prevent any potential radiation accident. It is an excellent tool to identify potential problem to radiation users and to assure that safety measures to eliminate or reduce the problems are fully considered. Radiation safety audit will help to develop safety culture of the facility. It is intended to be the cornerstone of a safety program designed to aid the facility, staff and management in maintaining a safe environment in which activities are carried out. The initiative of this work is to evaluate the need of having a proper audit as one of the mechanism to manage the safety using ionizing radiation. This study is focused on the need of having a proper radiation safety audit to identify deviations and deficiencies of radiation protection programmes. It will be based on studies conducted on several institutes/radiation facilities in Malaysia in 2006. Steps will then be formulated towards strengthening radiation safety through proper audit. This will result in a better working situation and confidence in the radiation protection community

Comprehensive safety cases for radioactive waste management facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woollam, P.B.

1993-01-01

Probabilistic safety assessment methodology is being applied by Nuclear Electric plc (NE) to the development of comprehensive safety cases for the radioactive waste management processing and accumulation facilities associated with its 26 reactor systems. This paper describes the methodology and the safety case assessment criteria employed by NE. An overview of the results from facilities used by the first 16 reactors is presented, together with more detail of a specific safety analysis: storage of fuel element debris. No risk to the public greater than 10 -6 /y has been identified and the more significant risks arise from the potential for radioactive waste fires. There are no unacceptable risks from external hazards such as flooding, aircrash or seismic events. Some operations previously expected to have significant risks in fact have negligible risks, while the few faults with risks exceeding the assessment criteria were only identified as a result of this study

Safety culture in industrial radiography facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vincent-Furo, Evelyn

2015-02-01

This project reviewed published IAEA materials and other documents on safety culture with specific references to industrial radiography. Safety culture requires all duties important to safety to be carried out correctly, with alertness, due thought and full knowledge, sound judgment and a proper sense of accountability. The development and maintenance of safety culture in an operating organization has to cover management systems, policies, responsibilities, procedures and organizational arrangements. The essence is to control radiation hazard, optimize radiation protection to prevent or reduce exposures and mitigate the consequences of accidents and incidents. To achieve a high degree of safety culture appropriate national and international infrastructure should exist to ensure effective training of workers and management system that supports commitment to safety culture at all level of the organization; management, managers and workforce. The result of the review revealed that all accidents in industrial radiography facilities were due to poor safety culture practices including inadequate regulatory control oversight. Some recommendations are provided and if implemented could improve safety culture leading to good safety performance which will significantly reduce accidents and their consequences in industrial radiography. These examples call for a review of safety culture in Industrial radiography. (au)

Questionnaire report of safety control on instrument in nuclear medicine laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-01-01

A questionaire survey concerning the safety of equipment and facilities used in nuclear medicine laboratories was made in order to clarify the incidence of accidents during nuclear medicine testing. The questionaire consists of two parts. One part contains questions regarding the testing personnel, facilities, equipment and maintenance and management of the equipment. The other part deals with accidents that had occurred within the areas under management, potential risks that may cause accidents, measures to improve safety management, troubles with and failure of equipment, and requests and opinions directed to equipment manufactures. It is concluded from results of the survey that to raise the safety of equipment, so-called man-machine interfaces should be improved by increasing the durability of equipment and performance of the personnel operating the equipment while reducing the physical and mental effects on the persons subjected to testing. Systematic educational measures, including lecture meetings and training courses, are required to raise the consciousness of personnel. Such education and training should cover safety handling techniques, including those for checking of equipment and for instructing and helping the persons under testing. (Nogami, K.)

Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear facilities. 2009 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This annual report is established on account of article 21 of the 2006-686 French law from June 13, 2006, relative to the transparency and safety in the nuclear domain. It describes, first, the nuclear facilities of Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux, and then the measures taken to ensure their safety (personnel radioprotection, actions implemented for nuclear safety improvement, organisation in crisis situation, external and internal controls, technical assessment of the facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2009), incidents and accidents registered in 2009, radioactive and chemical effluents released by the facilities in the environment, other pollutions, management of radioactive wastes, and, finally, the actions carried out in the domain of transparency and public information. A glossary and the viewpoint of the Committee of Hygiene, safety and working conditions about the content of the document conclude the report. (J.S.)

Yearly program of safety research in nuclear power facilities from fiscal 1981 to 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1984-01-01

Nuclear safety research plans for nuclear power facilities and others from fiscal 1981 to 1985 are presented for the following areas: the safety of LWR fuel, loss-of-coolant accidents, the structural safety of LWR installations, the reduction of radioactive material release from nuclear power facilities, the stochastic safety evaluation of nuclear power facilities, the aseismicity of nuclear power facilities, the safety of nuclear fuel facilities, and the safety of nuclear fuel transport vessels. In the respective areas, the needs for research and the outline of research works are summarized. Then, about the major research works in each area, the purpose, contents, term and responsible institution of the research are given. (Mori, K.)

Development of an auditable safety analysis in support of a radiological facility classification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kinney, M.D.; Young, B.

1995-01-01

In recent years, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities commonly have been classified as reactor, non-reactor nuclear, or nuclear facilities. Safety analysis documentation was prepared for these facilities, with few exceptions, using the requirements in either DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System; or DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Traditionally, this has been accomplished by development of an extensive Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which identifies hazards, assesses risks of facility operation, describes and analyzes adequacy of measures taken to control hazards, and evaluates potential accidents and their associated risks. This process is complicated by analysis of secondary hazards and adequacy of backup (redundant) systems. The traditional SAR process is advantageous for DOE facilities with appreciable hazards or operational risks. SAR preparation for a low-risk facility or process can be cost-prohibitive and quite challenging because conventional safety analysis protocols may not readily be applied to a low-risk facility. The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management recognized this potential disadvantage and issued an EM limited technical standard, No. 5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation. This standard can be used for developing documentation for a facility classified as radiological, including preparation of an auditable (defensible) safety analysis. In support of the radiological facility classification process, the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project has developed an auditable safety analysis document based upon the postulation criteria and hazards analysis techniques defined in DOE Order 5480.23

ORNL necessary and sufficient standards for environment, safety, and health. Final report of the Identification Team for other industrial, radiological, and non-radiological hazard facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-07-01

This Necessary and Sufficient (N and S) set of standards is for Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These facility classifications are based on a laboratory-wide approach to classify facilities by hazard category. An analysis of the hazards associated with the facilities at ORNL was conducted in 1993. To identify standards appropriate for these Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities, the activities conducted in these facilities were assessed, and the hazards associated with the activities were identified. A preliminary hazards list was distributed to all ORNL organizations. The hazards identified in prior hazard analyses are contained in the list, and a category of other was provided in each general hazard area. A workshop to assist organizations in properly completing the list was held. Completed hazard screening lists were compiled for each ORNL division, and a master list was compiled for all Other Industrial, Radiological Hazard, and Non-Radiological facilities and activities. The master list was compared against the results of prior hazard analyses by research and development and environment, safety, and health personnel to ensure completeness. This list, which served as a basis for identifying applicable environment, safety, and health standards, appears in Appendix A.

ORNL necessary and sufficient standards for environment, safety, and health. Final report of the Identification Team for other industrial, radiological, and non-radiological hazard facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-07-01

This Necessary and Sufficient (N and S) set of standards is for Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). These facility classifications are based on a laboratory-wide approach to classify facilities by hazard category. An analysis of the hazards associated with the facilities at ORNL was conducted in 1993. To identify standards appropriate for these Other Industrial, Radiological, and Non-Radiological Hazard Facilities, the activities conducted in these facilities were assessed, and the hazards associated with the activities were identified. A preliminary hazards list was distributed to all ORNL organizations. The hazards identified in prior hazard analyses are contained in the list, and a category of other was provided in each general hazard area. A workshop to assist organizations in properly completing the list was held. Completed hazard screening lists were compiled for each ORNL division, and a master list was compiled for all Other Industrial, Radiological Hazard, and Non-Radiological facilities and activities. The master list was compared against the results of prior hazard analyses by research and development and environment, safety, and health personnel to ensure completeness. This list, which served as a basis for identifying applicable environment, safety, and health standards, appears in Appendix A

Review of radiation safety in the cardiac catheterization laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, L.W.; Moore, R.J.; Balter, S.

1992-01-01

With the increasing use of coronary arteriography and interventional procedures, radiation exposure to patients and personnel working in cardiac catheterization laboratories has increased. Proper technique to minimize both patient and operator exposure is necessary. A practical approach to radiation safety in the cardiac catheterization laboratory is presented. This discussion should be useful to facilities with well-established radiation safety programs as well as facilities that require restructuring to cope with the radiation environment in a modern cardiac catheterization laboratory

Embracing Safe Ground Test Facility Operations and Maintenance

Science.gov (United States)

Dunn, Steven C.; Green, Donald R.

2010-01-01

Conducting integrated operations and maintenance in wind tunnel ground test facilities requires a balance of meeting due dates, efficient operation, responsiveness to the test customer, data quality, effective maintenance (relating to readiness and reliability), and personnel and facility safety. Safety is non-negotiable, so the balance must be an "and" with other requirements and needs. Pressure to deliver services faster at increasing levels of quality in under-maintained facilities is typical. A challenge for management is to balance the "need for speed" with safety and quality. It s especially important to communicate this balance across the organization - workers, with a desire to perform, can be tempted to cut corners on defined processes to increase speed. Having a lean staff can extend the time required for pre-test preparations, so providing a safe work environment for facility personnel and providing good stewardship for expensive National capabilities can be put at risk by one well-intending person using at-risk behavior. This paper documents a specific, though typical, operational environment and cites management and worker safety initiatives and tools used to provide a safe work environment. Results are presented and clearly show that the work environment is a relatively safe one, though still not good enough to keep from preventing injury. So, the journey to a zero injury work environment - both in measured reality and in the minds of each employee - continues. The intent of this paper is to provide a benchmark for others with operational environments and stimulate additional sharing and discussion on having and keeping a safe work environment.

Keys to effective third-party process safety audits

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Birkmire, John C. [Tourgee and Associates Inc., 11459 Cronhill Drive, Suite A, Owings Mills, MD 21117 (United States)]. E-mail: jbirkmire@taiengineering.com; Lay, James R. [5644 High Tor Hill, Columbia, MD 21045 (United States)]. E-mail: jim.lay21045@gmail.com; McMahon, Mona C. [General Physics Corporation, 6095 Marshalee Drive, Suite 300, Elkridge, MD 21075 (United States)]. E-mail: mmcmahon@gpworldwide.com

2007-04-11

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA's) Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation was promulgated in 1992. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) corresponding Risk Management Program (RMP) rule followed in 1996. Both programs include requirements for triennial compliance audits. Effective compliance audits are critical in identifying program weaknesses and ensuring the safety of facility personnel and the surrounding public. Large companies with corporate and facility health, safety, and environmental groups typically have the resources and experience to conduct audits internally, either through a corporate audit team or the sharing of personnel between multiple facilities. Small to medium sized businesses frequently do not have the expertise or the resources to perform compliance audits, and rely on third-party consultants to provide these services. This paper will discuss the observations of the authors in performing audits and working with PSM/RMP programs across a number of market sectors (e.g. chemical, petrochemical, pharmaceutical, food and beverage, water treatment), including effective practices, hurdles to successful implementation and execution of programs, and typical program shortcomings. The paper will also discuss steps to improve the audit process and increase effectiveness whether performed by a third party or internally.

Compressed Natural Gas Vehicle Maintenance Facility Modification Handbook

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kelly, K.; Melendez, M.; Gonzales, J.; Lynch, L.; Boale, B.; Kohout, J.

2017-09-28

To ensure the safety of personnel and facilities, vehicle maintenance facilities are required by law and by guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Fire Code (IFC) to exhibit certain design features. They are also required to be fitted with certain fire protection equipment and devices because of the potential for fire or explosion in the event of fuel leakage or spills. All fuels have an explosion or fire potential if specific conditions are present. This handbook covers the primary elements that must be considered when developing a CNG vehicle maintenance facility design that will protect against the ignition of natural gas releases. It also discusses specific protocols and training needed to ensure safety.

Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bengston, S.J.

1994-05-01

This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

Safety Analysis (SA) of the Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities (Buildings 514, 612, and 614) at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Odell, B.N.; Toy, A.J.

1979-12-13

This safety analysis was performed for the Manager of Plant Operations at LLL and fulfills the requirements of DOE Order 5481.1. The analysis was based on field inspections, document review, computer calculations, and extensive input from Waste Management personnel. It was concluded that the quantities of materials handled do not pose undue risks on- or off-site, even in postulated severe accidents. Risks from the various hazards at these facilities vary from low to moderate as specified in DOE Order 5481.1. Recommendations are made for additional management and technical support of waste disposal operations.

Safety Analysis (SA) of the Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities (Buildings 514, 612, and 614) at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.; Toy, A.J.

1979-01-01

This safety analysis was performed for the Manager of Plant Operations at LLL and fulfills the requirements of DOE Order 5481.1. The analysis was based on field inspections, document review, computer calculations, and extensive input from Waste Management personnel. It was concluded that the quantities of materials handled do not pose undue risks on- or off-site, even in postulated severe accidents. Risks from the various hazards at these facilities vary from low to moderate as specified in DOE Order 5481.1. Recommendations are made for additional management and technical support of waste disposal operations

Operational and safety requirement of radiation facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zulkafli Ghazali

2007-01-01

Gamma and electron irradiation facilities are the most common industrial sources of ionizing radiation. They have been used for medical, industrial and research purposes since the 1950s. Currently there are more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation worldwide. These facilities are either used for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, or the eradication of insect infestation. Irradiation with electron beam, gamma ray or ultra violet light can also destroy complex organic contaminants in both liquid and gaseous waste. EB systems are replacing traditional chemical sterilization methods in the medical supply industry. The ultra-violet curing facility, however, has found more industrial application in printing and furniture industries. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, and thus there is a potential of accidental exposure in the irradiation chamber which can be lethal within minutes. Although, the safety record of this industry has been relatively very good, there have been fatalities recorded in Italy (1975), Norway (1982), El Salvador (1989) and Israel (1990). Precautions against uncontrolled entry into irradiation chamber must therefore be taken. This is especially so in the case of gamma irradiation facilities those contain large amounts of radioactivity. If the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed. This paper will, to certain extent, describe safety procedure and system being installed at ALURTRON, Nuclear Malaysia to eliminate accidental exposure of electron beam irradiation. (author)

System reliability as perceived by maintenance personnel on petroleum production facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Antonovsky, A.; Pollock, C.; Straker, L.

2016-01-01

The aim of this research was to understand the relationship between maintenance staff perceptions of organisational effectiveness and operational reliability in petroleum operations. Engineering measures exist that assess the effectiveness of maintenance and reliability of equipment. These measures are typically retrospective and may not provide insight into what impedes system reliability. Perceptions of organisational effectiveness by the workforce may provide a predictive measure that could improve our understanding of the human factors that influence system reliability. Maintenance personnel (n=133) from nine petroleum production facilities completed a survey as part of a study of human factors and maintenance reliability. 69 respondents (51.9%) provided comments to an open-ended question in the survey, and these data were analysed using Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis to extract themes. Four super-ordinate themes were identified from the analysis: 1) Communication and access to information, 2) Efficiency of current work systems, 3) Need for better workgroup support, and 4) Management impacts on the workplace. We found a significant relationship between the frequency of the four super-ordinate themes and the facility reliability level as measured by ‘Mean Time Between Failures’: χ"2(6,N=158)=16.2, p=.013. These results demonstrated that operational effectiveness might be differentiated on the basis of survey-derived perceptions of maintenance personnel. - Highlights: • Thematic analysis of survey comments provided insights into workplace reliability • Worker’s comments on reliability related to technical data on time between failures • Management decision-making was the main theme in the lower reliability workplaces • Improving efficiency was the main theme in the higher reliability workplaces • Communication and better workgroup support were themes at all reliability levels

Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woods, P.J.

1998-05-01

This document provides a plan for implementing surveillance and maintenance (S ampersand M) activities to ensure the Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility is maintained in a safe, environmentally secure, and cost-effective manner until subsequent closure during the final disposition phase of decommissioning. This plan has been prepared in accordance with the guidelines provided in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM) Decommissioning Resource Manual (DOE/EM-0246) (DOE 1995), and Section 8.6 of TPA change form P-08-97-01 to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology, et al. 1996). Specific objectives of the S ampersand M program are: Ensure adequate containment of remaining radioactive and hazardous material. Provide security control for access into the facility and physical safety to surveillance personnel. Maintain the facility in a manner that will minimize potential hazards to the public, the environment, and surveillance personnel. Provide a plan for the identification and compliance with applicable environmental, safety, health, safeguards, and security requirements

78 FR 69433 - Executive Order 13650 Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security Listening Sessions

Science.gov (United States)

2013-11-19

... Chemical Facility Safety and Security Listening Sessions AGENCY: National Protection and Programs... from stakeholders on issues pertaining to Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (Executive... regulations, guidance, and policies; and identifying best practices in chemical facility safety and security...

Selected publications related to the experimental facilities of the Advanced Photon Source, 1987--1991

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

This report contain papers on work related to the experimental facilities of the Advanced Photon Source. The general topics of these papers are: insertion devices; front ends; high heat load x-ray optics; novel optics and techniques; and radiation safety, interlocks, and personnel safety

Practicing industrial safety - issues involved

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gunasekaran, P.

2016-01-01

Industrial safety is all about measures or techniques implemented to reduce the risk of injury, loss to persons, property or the environment in any industrial facility. The issue of industrial safety evolved concurrently with industrial development as a shift from compensation to prevention as well. Today, industrial safety is widely regarded as one of the most important factors that any business, large or small, must consider in its operations, as prevention of loss is also a part of profit. Factories Act of Central government and Rules made under it by the state deals with the provisions on industrial safety legislation. There are many other acts related to safety of personnel, property and environment. Occupational health and safety is also of primary concern. The aim is to regulate health and safety conditions for all employers. It includes safety standards and health standards. These acts encourage employers and employees to reduce workplace hazards and to implement new or improve existing safety and health standards; and develop innovative ways to achieve them. Maintain a reporting and record keeping system to monitor job-related injuries and illnesses; establish training programs to increase the number and competence of occupational safety and health personnel

Regulatory measures of BARC Safety Council to control radiation exposure in BARC Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rajdeep; Jolly, V.M.; Jayarajan, K.

2018-01-01

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre is involved in multidisciplinary research and developmental activities, related to peaceful use of nuclear energy including societal benefits. BARC facilities at different parts of India include nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, research reactors, nuclear recycle facilities and various Physics, Chemistry and Biological laboratories. BARC Safety Council (BSC) is the regulatory body for BARC facilities and takes regulatory measures for radiation protection. BSC has many safety committees for radiation protection including Operating Plants Safety Review Committee (OPSRC), Committee to Review Applications for Authorization of Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (CRAASDRW) and Design Safety Review Committees (DSRC) in 2 nd tier and Unit Level Safety Committees (ULSCs) in 3 rd tier under OPSRC

Status of safety at Areva group facilities. 2006 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

This report presents a snapshot of nuclear safety and radiation protection conditions in the AREVA group's nuclear installations in France and abroad, as well as of radiation protection aspects in service activities, as identified over the course of the annual inspections and analyses program carried out by the General Inspectorate in 2006. This report is presented to the AREVA Supervisory Board, communicated to the labor representation bodies concerned, and made public. In light of the inspections, appraisals and coordination missions it has performed, the General Inspectorate considers that the nuclear safety level of the AREVA group's nuclear installations is satisfactory. It particularly noted positive changes on numerous sites and efforts in the field of continuous improvement that have helped to strengthen nuclear safety. This has been possible through the full involvement of management teams, an improvement effort initiated by upper management, actions to increase personnel awareness of nuclear safety culture, and supervisors' heightened presence around operators. However, the occurrence of certain events in facilities has led us to question the nuclear safety repercussions that the changes to activities or organization on some sites have had. In these times of change, drifts in nuclear safety culture have been identified. The General Inspectorate considers that a preliminary analysis of the human and organizational factors of these changes, sized to match the impact the change has on nuclear safety, should be made to ensure that a guaranteed level of nuclear safety is maintained (allowance for changes to references, availability of the necessary skills, resources of the operating and support structures, etc.). Preparations should also be made to monitor the changes and spot any telltale signs of drift in the application phase. Managers should be extra vigilant and the occurrence of any drift should be systematically dealt with ahead of implementing

Qualification of NPP operations personnel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang Jiao.

1987-01-01

Competence of personnel is one of the important problems for safety operation of nuclear power plant. This paper gives a description of some aspects, such as the administration of NPP, posts, competence of personnel, training, assessing the competence and personnel management

Jefferson Lab IEC 61508/61511 Safety PLC Based Safety System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mahoney, Kelly; Robertson, Henry

2009-01-01

This paper describes the design of the new 12 GeV Upgrade Personnel Safety System (PSS) at the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (TJNAF). The new PSS design is based on the implementation of systems designed to meet international standards IEC61508 and IEC 61511 for programmable safety systems. In order to meet the IEC standards, TJNAF engineers evaluated several SIL 3 Safety PLCs before deciding on an optimal architecture. In addition to hardware considerations, software quality standards and practices must also be considered. Finally, we will discuss R and D that may lead to both high safety reliability and high machine availability that may be applicable to future accelerators such as the ILC.

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Bugey nuclear power plant (Ain (FR)): 4 PWR reactors in operation (INB 78 and 89), one partially dismantled graphite-gas reactor (INB 45), an inter-regional fuel storage facility (MIR, INB 102), and a radioactive waste storage and conditioning facility under construction (ICEDA, INB 173). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Integrated Framework for Patient Safety and Energy Efficiency in Healthcare Facilities Retrofit Projects.

Science.gov (United States)

Mohammadpour, Atefeh; Anumba, Chimay J; Messner, John I

2016-07-01

There is a growing focus on enhancing energy efficiency in healthcare facilities, many of which are decades old. Since replacement of all aging healthcare facilities is not economically feasible, the retrofitting of these facilities is an appropriate path, which also provides an opportunity to incorporate energy efficiency measures. In undertaking energy efficiency retrofits, it is vital that the safety of the patients in these facilities is maintained or enhanced. However, the interactions between patient safety and energy efficiency have not been adequately addressed to realize the full benefits of retrofitting healthcare facilities. To address this, an innovative integrated framework, the Patient Safety and Energy Efficiency (PATSiE) framework, was developed to simultaneously enhance patient safety and energy efficiency. The framework includes a step -: by -: step procedure for enhancing both patient safety and energy efficiency. It provides a structured overview of the different stages involved in retrofitting healthcare facilities and improves understanding of the intricacies associated with integrating patient safety improvements with energy efficiency enhancements. Evaluation of the PATSiE framework was conducted through focus groups with the key stakeholders in two case study healthcare facilities. The feedback from these stakeholders was generally positive, as they considered the framework useful and applicable to retrofit projects in the healthcare industry. © The Author(s) 2016.

Radiation safety training for industrial irradiators: What are we trying to accomplish?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smith, M.A.

1998-01-01

Radiation safety training at an industrial irradiator facility takes a different approach than the traditional methods and topics used at other facilities. Where the more routine industrial radiation users focus on standard training topics of contamination control, area surveys, and the traditional dogma of time, distance, and shielding, radiation safety in an industrial irradiation facility must be centered on preventing accidents. Because the primary methods for accomplishing that goal are engineering approaches such as safety system interlocks, training provided to facility personnel should address system operation and emergency actions. This presents challenges in delivering radiation safety training to an audience of varied educational and technical background where little to no commercially available training material specific to this type of operation exists

Fast reactor test facilities in the US safety program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avery, R.; Dickerman, C.E.; Lennox, D.H.; Rose, D.

1979-01-01

The needs for safety information derivable from in-pile programs are reviewed, and the correlation made with existing and planned capability. In view of the current status of the U.S. breeder program, emphasis is given in the review to the impact of different fast breeder options on the required program and facilities. It is concluded that facility needs are somewhat independent of specific fast breeder concept, even though the relative emphasis on the various safety issues will differ. 8 refs

Overview of NORM and activities by a NORM licensed permanent decontamination and waste processing facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mirro, G.A. [Growth Resources, Inc., Lafayette, LA (United States)

1997-02-01

This paper presents an overview of issues related to handling NORM materials, and provides a description of a facility designed for the processing of NORM contaminated equipment. With regard to handling NORM materials the author discusses sources of NORM, problems, regulations and disposal options, potential hazards, safety equipment, and issues related to personnel protection. For the facility, the author discusses: description of the permanent facility; the operations of the facility; the license it has for handling specific radioactive material; operating and safety procedures; decontamination facilities on site; NORM waste processing capabilities; and offsite NORM services which are available.

Enhancement of safety at nuclear facilities in Pakistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahmad, S.A.; Hayat, T.; Azhar, W.

2006-01-01

Pakistan is benefiting from nuclear technology mostly in health and energy sectors as well as agriculture and industry and has an impeccable safety record. At the national level uses of nuclear technology started in 1955 resulting in the operation of Karachi Radioisotope Center, Karachi, in December 1960. Pakistan Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) was formulated in 1964 with subsequent promulgation of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Ordinance in 1965 to cope with the anticipated introduction of a research reactor, namely PARR-I, and a nuclear power plant, namely KANUPP. Since then Pakistan's nuclear program has expanded to include numerous nuclear facilities of varied nature. This program has definite economic and social impacts by producing electricity, treating and diagnosing cancer patients, and introducing better crop varieties. Appropriate radiation protection includes a number of measures including database of sealed radiation sources at PAEC operated nuclear facilities, see Table l, updated during periodic physical verification of these sources, strict adherence to the BSS-115, IAEA recommended enforcement of zoning at research reactors and NPPs, etc. Pakistan is party to several international conventions and treaties, such as Convention of Nuclear Safety and Early Notification, to improve and enhance safety at its nuclear facilities. In addition Pakistan generally and PAEC particularly believes in a blend of prudent regulations and good/best practices. This is described in this paper. (Author)

Cold Vacuum Drying facility civil - structural system design description (SYS 06)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PITKOFF, C.C.

1999-01-01

This document describes the Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility civil - structural system. This system consists of the facility structure, including the administrative and process areas. The system's primary purpose is to provide for a facility to house the CVD process and personnel and to provide a tertiary level of containment. The document provides a description of the facility and demonstrates how the design meets the various requirements imposed by the safety analysis report and the design requirements document

Safety Assessment Methodologies and Their Application in Development of Near Surface Waste Disposal Facilities--ASAM Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, B.; Metcalf, P.

2003-01-01

Safety of near surface disposal facilities is a primary focus and objective of stakeholders involved in radioactive waste management of low and intermediate level waste and safety assessment is an important tool contributing to the evaluation and demonstration of the overall safety of these facilities. It plays significant role in different stages of development of these facilities (site characterization, design, operation, closure) and especially for those facilities for which safety assessment has not been performed or safety has not been demonstrated yet and the future has not been decided. Safety assessments also create the basis for the safety arguments presented to nuclear regulators, public and other interested parties in respect of the safety of existing facilities, the measures to upgrade existing facilities and development of new facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a number of research coordinated projects in the field of development and improvement of approaches to safety assessment and methodologies for safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities, such as NSARS (Near Surface Radioactive Waste Disposal Safety Assessment Reliability Study) and ISAM (Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities) projects. These projects were very successful and showed that there is a need to promote the consistent application of the safety assessment methodologies and to explore approaches to regulatory review of safety assessments and safety cases in order to make safety related decisions. These objectives have been the basis of the IAEA follow up coordinated research project--ASAM (Application of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities), which will commence in November 2002 and continue for a period of three years

Application of the management system for facilities and activities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

This Safety Guide supports the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. It provides generic guidance to aid in establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a management system that complies with the requirements established. In addition to this Safety Guide, there are a number of Safety Guides for specific technical areas. Together these provide all the guidance necessary for implementing these requirements. This publication supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-Q1-Q7 (1996). The guidance provided here may be used by organizations in the following ways: - To assist in the development of the management systems of organizations directly responsible for operating facilities and activities and providing services for: Nuclear facilities; Activities using sources of ionizing radiation; Radioactive waste management; The transport of radioactive material; Radiation protection activities; Any other practices or circumstances in which people may be exposed to radiation from naturally occurring or artificial sources; The regulation of such facilities and activities; - To assist in the development of the management systems of the relevant regulatory bodies; - By the operator, to specify to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any guidance of this Safety Guide that should be included in the supplier's management system for the supply and delivery of products

Tritium monitoring equipments for animal experiment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sato, Hiroo

1980-01-01

Animal experiment facilities using tritium are described with reference to laws and regulations concerning radiological safety. Usual breeding facilities and surrounding conditions at non-radioactive animal experiments are summarized on feasible and effective designs of tritium monitors. Characteristics and desirable arrangements of various kinds of tritium monitors such as ionization chambers, proportional counters and liquid scintillation detectors are discussed from the standpoint of monitoring for room, glove-box, stack, liquid waste and personnel. (J.P.N.)

Realities of proximity facility siting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

DeMott, D.L.

1981-01-01

Numerous commercial nuclear power plant sites have 2 to 3 reactors located together, and a group of Facilities with capabilities for fuel fabrication, a nuclear reactor, a storage area for spent fuel, and a maintenance area for contaminated equipment and radioactive waste storage are being designed and constructed in the US. The proximity of these facilities to each other provides that the ordinary flow of materials remain within a limited area. Interactions between the various facilities include shared resources such as communication, fire protection, security, medical services, transportation, water, electrical, personnel, emergency planning, transport of hazardous material between facilities, and common safety and radiological requirements between facilities. This paper will explore the advantages and disadvantages of multiple facilities at one site. Problem areas are identified, and recommendations for planning and coordination are discussed

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant (INB 75, Haut-Rhin, 68 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Penly nuclear power plant (INB 136 and 140, Seine-Maritime, 76 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant (INB 75, Haut-Rhin, 68 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Blayais nuclear power plant (INB 86 and 110, Gironde (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Penly nuclear power plant (INB 136 and 140, Seine-Maritime, 76 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Civaux nuclear power plant (INB 158 and 159, Vienne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Blayais nuclear power plant (INB 86 and 110, Gironde (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Civaux nuclear power plant (INB 158 and 159, Vienne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Safety of Long-term Interim Storage Facilities - Workshop Proceedings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

The objective of this workshop was to discuss and review current national activities, plans and regulatory approaches for the safety of long term interim storage facilities dedicated to spent nuclear fuel (SF), high level waste (HLW) and other radioactive materials with prolonged storage regimes. It was also intended to discuss results of experiments and to identify necessary R and D to confirm safety of fuel and cask during the long-term storage. Safety authorities and their Technical Support Organisation (TSO), Fuel Cycle Facilities (FCF) operating organisations and international organisations were invited to share information on their approaches, practices and current developments. The workshop was organised in an opening session, three technical sessions, and a conclusion session. The technical sessions were focused on: - National approaches for long term interim storage facilities; - Safety requirements, regulatory framework and implementation issues; - Technical issues and operational experience, needs for R and D. Each session consisted of a number of presentations followed by a panel discussion moderated by the session Chairs. A summary of each session and subsequent discussion that ensued are provided as well as a summary of the results of the workshop with the text of the papers given and presentations made

10 CFR 34.47 - Personnel monitoring.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Personnel monitoring. 34.47 Section 34.47 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSES FOR INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY AND RADIATION SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS Radiation Safety Requirements § 34.47 Personnel monitoring. (a) The licensee may not...

Modernization of safety system for the radiation facility for industrial sterilization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Drndarevic, V.; Djuric, D.; Koturovic, A.; Arandjelovic, M.; Mikic, R.

1995-01-01

Modernization of the existing safety system of the radiation facility for industrial sterilization at the Vinca Institute of nuclear science is done. In order to improve radiation safety of the facility, the latest recommendations and requirements of IAEA have been implemented. Concept and design of the modernized system are presented. The new elements of the safety system are described and the improvements achieved by means of this modernization are pointed out. (author)

Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-12-01

The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by DOE itself. The three major recommendations are: under any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE's nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 103, 104, 114 and 115). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 103, 104, 114 and 115). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 111 and 112). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INB no. 75). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 135 and 142). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 86 and 110). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-07-15

Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

Mechanistic facility safety and source term analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PLYS, M.G.

1999-01-01

A PC-based computer program was created for facility safety and source term analysis at Hanford The program has been successfully applied to mechanistic prediction of source terms from chemical reactions in underground storage tanks, hydrogen combustion in double contained receiver tanks, and proccss evaluation including the potential for runaway reactions in spent nuclear fuel processing. Model features include user-defined facility room, flow path geometry, and heat conductors, user-defined non-ideal vapor and aerosol species, pressure- and density-driven gas flows, aerosol transport and deposition, and structure to accommodate facility-specific source terms. Example applications are presented here

Laser safety at high profile projects

Science.gov (United States)

Barat, K.

2011-03-01

Laser Safety at high profile laser facilities tends to be more controlled than in the standard laser lab found at a research institution. The reason for this is the potential consequences for such facilities from incidents. This ranges from construction accidents, to equipment damage to personnel injuries. No laser user wants to sustain a laser eye injury. Unfortunately, many laser users, most commonly experienced researchers and inexperienced graduate students, do receive laser eye injuries during their careers. . More unforgiveable is the general acceptance of this scenario, as part of the research & development experience. How do senior researchers, safety personnel and management stop this trend? The answer lies in a cultural change that involves institutional training, user mentoring, hazard awareness by users and administrative controls. None of these would inhibit research activities. As a matter of fact, proper implementation of these controls would increase research productivity. This presentation will review and explain the steps needed to steer an institution, research division, group or individual lab towards a culture that should nearly eliminate laser accidents. As well as how high profile facilities try to avoid laser injuries. Using the definition of high profile facility as one who's funding in the million to billions of dollars or Euros and derives form government funding.

Design lessons from using programmable controllers in the MFTF-B personnel safety and interlocks system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Branum, J.D.

1983-01-01

Applying programmable controllers in critical applications such as personnel safety and interlocks systems requires special considerations in the design of both hardware and software. All modern programmable controller systems feature extensive internal diagnostic capabilities to protect against problems such as program memory errors; however most, if not all present designs lack an intrinsic capability for detecting and countering failures on the field-side of their I/O modules. Many of the most common styles of I/O modules can also introduce potentially dangerous sneak circuits, even without component failure. This paper presents the most significant lessons learned to date in the design of the MFTF-B Personnel Safety and Interlocks System, which utilizes two non-redundant programmable controllers with over 800 I/O points each. Specific problems recognized during the design process as well as those discovered during initial testing and operation are discussed along with their specific solutions in hardware and software

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department. Annual report 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E.

2000-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Aarkrog, A.; Brodersen, K.

1998-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1997. The department's research and development activities were organized in four research programmes: Reactor Safety, Radiation protection, Radioecology, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E.

1999-04-01

The report present a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1998. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lsits of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

Transuranic-contaminated solid waste Treatment Development Facility. Final safety analysis report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Warner, C.L.

1979-07-01

The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Transuranic-Contaminated Solid-Waste Treatment Facility has been prepared in compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual Chapter 0531, Safety of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. The Treatment Development Facility (TDF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is a research and development facility dedicated to the study of radioactive-waste-management processes. This analysis addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and the design and operating characteristics of the first study process, controlled air incineration and aqueous scrub off-gas treatment with respect to both normal and accident conditions. The credible accidents having potentially serious consequences relative to the operation of the facility and the first process have been analyzed and the consequences of each postulated credible accident are presented. Descriptions of the control systems, engineered safeguards, and administrative and operational features designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such accidents are presented. The essential features of the operating and emergency procedures, environmental protection and monitoring programs, as well as the health and safety, quality assurance, and employee training programs are described

Transuranic-contaminated solid waste Treatment Development Facility. Final safety analysis report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Warner, C.L. (comp.)

1979-07-01

The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Transuranic-Contaminated Solid-Waste Treatment Facility has been prepared in compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual Chapter 0531, Safety of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. The Treatment Development Facility (TDF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is a research and development facility dedicated to the study of radioactive-waste-management processes. This analysis addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and the design and operating characteristics of the first study process, controlled air incineration and aqueous scrub off-gas treatment with respect to both normal and accident conditions. The credible accidents having potentially serious consequences relative to the operation of the facility and the first process have been analyzed and the consequences of each postulated credible accident are presented. Descriptions of the control systems, engineered safeguards, and administrative and operational features designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such accidents are presented. The essential features of the operating and emergency procedures, environmental protection and monitoring programs, as well as the health and safety, quality assurance, and employee training programs are described.

CP-50 calibration facility radiological safety assessment document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chilton, M.W.; Hill, R.L.; Eubank, B.F.

1980-03-01

The CP-50 Calibration Facility Radiological Safety Assessment document, prepared at the request of the Nevada Operations Office of the US Department of Energy to satisfy provisions of ERDA Manual Chapter 0531, presents design features, systems controls, and procedures used in the operation of the calibration facility. Site and facility characteristics and routine and non-routine operations, including hypothetical incidents or accidents are discussed and design factors, source control systems, and radiation monitoring considerations are described

Criticality safety research on nuclear fuel cycle facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Miyoshi, Yoshinori [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment

2004-07-01

This paper present d s current status and future program of the criticality safety research on nuclear fuel cycle made by Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. Experimental research on solution fuel treated in reprocessing plant has been performed using two critical facilities, STACY and TRACY. Fundamental data of static and transient characteristics are accumulated for validation of criticality safety codes. Subcritical measurements are also made for developing a monitoring system for criticality safety. Criticality safety codes system for solution and power system, and evaluation method related to burnup credit are developed. (author)

Operational and environmental safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

The responsibility of the DOE Office of Operational and Environmental Safety is to assure that DOE-controlled activities are conducted in a manner that will minimize risks to the public and employees and will provide protection for property and the environment. The program supports the various energy technologies by identifying and resolving safety problems; developing and issuing safety policies, standards, and criteria; assuring compliance with DOE, Federal, and state safety regulations; and establishing procedures for reporting and investigating accidents in DOE operations. Guidelines for the radiation protection of personnel; radiation monitoring at nuclear facilities; an assessment of criticality accidents by fault tree analysis; and the preparation of environmental, safety, and health standards applicable to geothermal energy development are discussed

Safety design of the international fusion materials irradiation facility (IFMIF)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konishi, Satoshi; Yamaki, Daiju; Katsuta, Hiroji; Moeslang, Anton; Jameson, R.A.; Martone, Marcello; Shannon, T.E.

1997-11-01

In the Conceptual Design Activity of the IFMIF, major subsystems, as well as the entire facility is carefully designed to satisfy the safety requirements for any possible construction sites. Each subsystem is qualitatively analyzed to identify possible hazards to the workers, public and environments using Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). The results are reflected in the design and operation procedure. Shielding of radiation, particularly neutron around the test cell is one of the most important issue in normal operation. Radiation due to beam halo and activation is a hazard for operation personnel in the accelerator system. For the maintenance, remote handling technology is designed to be applied in various facilities of the IFMIF. Lithium loop and target system hold the majority of the radioactive material in the facility. Tritium and beryllium-7 are generated by the nuclear reaction during operation and thus needed to be removed continuously. They are also the potential hazards of airborne source in off-normal events. Minimization of inventory, separation and immobilization, and multiple confinement are considered in the design. Generation of radioactive waste is anticipated to be minor, but waste treatment systems for gas, liquid and solid wastes are designed to minimize the environmental impact. Lithium leak followed by a fire is a major concern, and extensive prevention plan is made in the target design. One of the design option considered is composed of; primary enclosure of the lithium loop, secondary containment filled with positive pressure argon, and an air tight lithium cell made of concrete with a steel lining. This study will report some technical issues considered in the design of IFMIF. It was concluded that the IFMIF can be designed and constructed to meet or exceed current safely standards for workers, public and the environment with existing technology and reasonable construction cost. (J.P.N.)

Preliminary safety assessment of the WIPP facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Balestri, R.J.; Torres, B.W.; Pahwa, S.B.; Brannen, J.P.

1979-01-01

This paper summarizes the efforts to perform a safety assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility being proposed for southeastern New Mexico. This preliminary safety assessment is limited to a consequence assessment in terms of the dose to a maximally exposed individual as a result of introducing the radionuclides into the biosphere. The extremely low doses to the organs as a result of the liquid breach scenarios are contrasted with the background radiation

Specification ''I'' of the CEFRI concerning the interim job enterprises proposing personnel of A or B category to work in nuclear facilities

CERN Document Server

Int. At. Energy Agency Wien

2002-01-01

This document aims to specify the organization dispositions which have to bee taken by the interim job enterprises proposing personnel of A or B category to work in nuclear facilities. These dispositions should allow to respect the demands of the CEFRI in matter of formation, medical control and personnel dosimetry. (A.L.B.)

10 CFR 39.65 - Personnel monitoring.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Personnel monitoring. 39.65 Section 39.65 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSES AND RADIATION SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR WELL LOGGING Radiation Safety Requirements § 39.65 Personnel monitoring. (a) The licensee may not permit an individual to act as a logging...

Operational safety assessment of underground test facilities for mined geologic waste disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elder, H.K.

1993-01-01

This paper describes the operational safety assessment for the underground facilities for the exploratory studies facility (ESF) at the Yucca Mountain Project. The systematic identification and evaluation of hazards related to the ESF is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach based on the analysis of potential accidents was used since radiological safety analysis was not required. The risk assessment summarized credible accident scenarios and the design provides mitigation of the risks to a level that the facility can be constructed and operated with an adequate level of safety. The risk assessment also provides reasonable assurance that all identifiable major accident scenarios have been reviewed and design mitigation features provided to ensure an adequate level of safety

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department. Annual report 1999

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majborn, B.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E. [eds.

2000-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1999

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Majborn, B.; Damkjær, A.; Jensen, Per Hedemann

2000-01-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department´s research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: "Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety" and"Radioecology and Tracer Studies". The nuclear...... facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are includedtogether with a summary of the staff´s participation in national and international committees....

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1997

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majborn, B.; Aarkrog, A.; Brodersen, K. [and others

1998-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1997. The department`s research and development activities were organized in four research programmes: Reactor Safety, Radiation protection, Radioecology, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff`s participation in national and international committees. (au) 11 tabs., 39 ills.; 74 refs.

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1998

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E

1999-04-01

The report present a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1998. The department`s research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: `Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety` and `Radioecology and Tracer Studies`. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lsits of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff`s participation in national and international committees. (au)

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities department annual report 1996

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Floto, H.; Heydorn, K.; Oelgaard, P.L.

1997-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1996. The Department's research and development activities are organized in three research programmes: Radiation Protection, Reactor Safety, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the Research Reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the Educational Reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au) 2 tabs., 28 ills

Guidelines for the calibration of personnel dosimeters

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roberson, P.L.; Holbrook, K.L.

1984-01-01

This guide describes minimum acceptable performance levels for personnel dosimetry systems used at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. The goal is to improve both the quality of radiological calibrations and the methods of comparing reported occupational doses between DOE facilities. Reference calibration techniques are defined. A standard for evaluation of personnel dosimetry systems and recommended design parameters for personnel dosimeters are also included. Approximate intervals for the radiation energies for which these guidelines are appropriate are 15 keV to 2 MeV for photons; above 0.3 MeV for beta particles; and 1 keV to 2 MeV for neutrons. An analysis of ANSI N13.11 was completed using performance evaluations of selected personnel dosimetry systems in use at DOE facilities. The results of this analysis are incorporated in the guidelines

NSC confirms principles for safety review on Radioactive Waste Burial Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1988-01-01

The Nuclear Safety Commission authorized the scope of Principles for Safety Examination on Radioactive Waste Burial Facilities as suitable, the draft report for which was established by the Special Committee on Safety Standards of Radioactive Waste (Chairman Prof. Masao Sago, Science University of Tokyo) and reported on March 10 to the NSC. The principles include the theory that the facility must be controlled step by step, corresponding to the amount of radioactivity over 300 to 400 years after the burial of low-level solid radioactive waste with site conditions safe even in the event of occurrence of a natural disaster. The principles will be used for administrative safety examination against the application of the business on low-level radioactive waste burial facility which Japan Nuclear Fuel Industries, Inc. is planning to install at Rokkashomura, Aomori Prefecture. (author)

Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility, July 30, 1999 (NIF-0001374-OC)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benjamin, D. W.

1999-01-01

These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and contractors/subcontractors. The General Rules-Code of Safe Practices shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S and H A-l that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Rules-Code of Safe Practices. (An interpreter must brief those employees who do not speak or read English fluently.) In addition, all contractors and subcontractors shall adopt a written General Rules-Code of Safe Practices that relates to their operations. The General Rules-Code of Safe Practices must be posted at a conspicuous location at the job site office or be provided to each supervisory employee who shall have it readily available. Copies of the General Rules-Code of Safe Practices can also be included in employee safety pamphlets

MP-Division health and safety reference handbook. [Contains glossary

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Putnam, T.M.

1987-09-01

This report presents the objectives, organization, policies, and essential rules and procedures that have been adopted by MP Division and that form the basis of the Health and Safety Program of the Clinton P. Anderson Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF). The facility includes the beam-delivery systems for the Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Center and the Weapons Neutron Research Facility (LANSCE/WNR). The program is designed not only to assure the health and safety of all personnel, including users, in their work at LAMPF, and of MP-Division staff in their work on the LANSCE/WNR beam lines, but also to protect the facility (buildings and equipment) and the environment. 33 refs., 18 figs., 2 tabs.

Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Treatment Building Safety Information Document (SID)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fatell, L.B.; Woolsey, G.B.

1993-04-15

This Safety Information Document (SID) provides a description and analysis of operations for the Hazardous Waste/Mixed Waste Disposal Facility Treatment Building (the Treatment Building). The Treatment Building has been classified as a moderate hazard facility, and the level of analysis performed and the methodology used are based on that classification. Preliminary design of the Treatment Building has identified the need for two separate buildings for waste treatment processes. The term Treatment Building applies to all these facilities. The evaluation of safety for the Treatment Building is accomplished in part by the identification of hazards associated with the facility and the analysis of the facility`s response to postulated events involving those hazards. The events are analyzed in terms of the facility features that minimize the causes of such events, the quantitative determination of the consequences, and the ability of the facility to cope with each event should it occur. The SID presents the methodology, assumptions, and results of the systematic evaluation of hazards associated with operation of the Treatment Building. The SID also addresses the spectrum of postulated credible events, involving those hazards, that could occur. Facility features important to safety are identified and discussed in the SID. The SID identifies hazards and reports the analysis of the spectrum of credible postulated events that can result in the following consequences: Personnel exposure to radiation; Radioactive material release to the environment; Personnel exposure to hazardous chemicals; Hazardous chemical release to the environment; Events leading to an onsite/offsite fatality; and Significant damage to government property. The SID addresses the consequences to the onsite and offsite populations resulting from postulated credible events and the safety features in place to control and mitigate the consequences.

Safety in Elevators and Grain Handling Facilities. Module SH-27. Safety and Health.

Science.gov (United States)

Center for Occupational Research and Development, Inc., Waco, TX.

This student module on safety in elevators and grain handling facilities is one of 50 modules concerned with job safety and health. Following the introduction, 15 objectives (each keyed to a page in the text) the student is expected to accomplish are listed (e.g., Explain how explosion suppression works). Then each objective is taught in detail,…

A bicycle safety index for evaluating urban street facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

Asadi-Shekari, Zohreh; Moeinaddini, Mehdi; Zaly Shah, Muhammad

2015-01-01

The objectives of this research are to conceptualize the Bicycle Safety Index (BSI) that considers all parts of the street and to propose a universal guideline with microscale details. A point system method comparing existing safety facilities to a defined standard is proposed to estimate the BSI. Two streets in Singapore and Malaysia are chosen to examine this model. The majority of previous measurements to evaluate street conditions for cyclists usually cannot cover all parts of streets, including segments and intersections. Previous models also did not consider all safety indicators and cycling facilities at a microlevel in particular. This study introduces a new concept of a practical BSI to complete previous studies using its practical, easy-to-follow, point system-based outputs. This practical model can be used in different urban settings to estimate the level of safety for cycling and suggest some improvements based on the standards.

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facility of Brennilis - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Monts d'Arree (EL4-D or Brennilis) site (INB 162 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facilities of Brennilis - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Monts d'Arree (EL4-D or Brennilis) site (INB 162 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Integrated system of safety features for spent fuel interim storage

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pantazi, Doina; Stanciu, Marcela; Mateescu, Silvia; Marin, Ion

1999-01-01

The design of the spent fuel interim storage facility (SFISF) must meet the applicable safety requirements in order to ensure radiological protection of the personnel, public and environment during all phases of the facility. To elaborate the safety documentation necessary for licensing, we were trying to chose the most appropriate approach related to safety features for SFISF, based on national and international regulations, standards and recommendations, as well as on the experience of other countries with similar facilities and finally, on our own experience in designing other nuclear objectives in Romania. The paper presents the issues that we consider important for the safety evaluation and are developed as a detailed diagram. The diagram contains in a logical succession the following issues: - fundamental principles of radioprotection; - fundamental safety principles of radioactive waste management; - safety objectives of SFISF; - safety criteria for SFISF; - safety requirements for SFISF; - siting criteria for SFISF; - siting requirements for SFISF. (authors)

Psychometric model for safety culture assessment in nuclear research facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nascimento, C.S. do, E-mail: claudio.souza@ctmsp.mar.mil.br [Centro Tecnológico da Marinha em São Paulo (CTMSP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2468, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil); Andrade, D.A., E-mail: delvonei@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN – SP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2242, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil); Mesquita, R.N. de, E-mail: rnavarro@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN – SP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2242, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil)

2017-04-01

Highlights: • A psychometric model to evaluate ‘safety climate’ at nuclear research facilities. • The model presented evidences of good psychometric qualities. • The model was applied to nuclear research facilities in Brazil. • Some ‘safety culture’ weaknesses were detected in the assessed organization. • A potential tool to develop safety management programs in nuclear facilities. - Abstract: A safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants depends not only on technical performance, but also on the people and on the organization. Organizational factors have been recognized as the main causal mechanisms of accidents by research organizations through USA, Europe and Japan. Deficiencies related with these factors reveal weaknesses in the organization’s safety culture. A significant number of instruments to assess the safety culture based on psychometric models that evaluate safety climate through questionnaires, and which are based on reliability and validity evidences, have been published in health and ‘safety at work’ areas. However, there are few safety culture assessment instruments with these characteristics (reliability and validity) available on nuclear literature. Therefore, this work proposes an instrument to evaluate, with valid and reliable measures, the safety climate of nuclear research facilities. The instrument was developed based on methodological principles applied to research modeling and its psychometric properties were evaluated by a reliability analysis and validation of content, face and construct. The instrument was applied to an important nuclear research organization in Brazil. This organization comprises 4 research reactors and many nuclear laboratories. The survey results made possible a demographic characterization and the identification of some possible safety culture weaknesses and pointing out potential areas to be improved in the assessed organization. Good evidence of reliability with Cronbach's alpha

Psychometric model for safety culture assessment in nuclear research facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nascimento, C.S. do; Andrade, D.A.; Mesquita, R.N. de

2017-01-01

Highlights: • A psychometric model to evaluate ‘safety climate’ at nuclear research facilities. • The model presented evidences of good psychometric qualities. • The model was applied to nuclear research facilities in Brazil. • Some ‘safety culture’ weaknesses were detected in the assessed organization. • A potential tool to develop safety management programs in nuclear facilities. - Abstract: A safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants depends not only on technical performance, but also on the people and on the organization. Organizational factors have been recognized as the main causal mechanisms of accidents by research organizations through USA, Europe and Japan. Deficiencies related with these factors reveal weaknesses in the organization’s safety culture. A significant number of instruments to assess the safety culture based on psychometric models that evaluate safety climate through questionnaires, and which are based on reliability and validity evidences, have been published in health and ‘safety at work’ areas. However, there are few safety culture assessment instruments with these characteristics (reliability and validity) available on nuclear literature. Therefore, this work proposes an instrument to evaluate, with valid and reliable measures, the safety climate of nuclear research facilities. The instrument was developed based on methodological principles applied to research modeling and its psychometric properties were evaluated by a reliability analysis and validation of content, face and construct. The instrument was applied to an important nuclear research organization in Brazil. This organization comprises 4 research reactors and many nuclear laboratories. The survey results made possible a demographic characterization and the identification of some possible safety culture weaknesses and pointing out potential areas to be improved in the assessed organization. Good evidence of reliability with Cronbach's alpha

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chooz nuclear power plant (Ardennes (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (Chooz B, INB 139 and 144) and one partially dismantled PWR reactor (Chooz A, INB 163). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary followed by the viewpoint of the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Paluel nuclear power plant (INB no. 103 - Paluel 1, no. 104 - Paluel 2, no. 114 - Paluel 3 and no. 115 - Paluel 4, Cany-Barville - Seine-Maritime (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document ends with a glossary and no recommendation from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Paluel nuclear power plant (INB no. 103 - Paluel 1, no. 104 - Paluel 2, no. 114 - Paluel 3 and no. 115 - Paluel 4, Cany-Barville - Seine-Maritime (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Golfech nuclear power plant (INB 135 and 142, Tarn-et-Garonne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cattenom nuclear power plant (INB 124, 125, 126 and 137, Moselle (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cattenom nuclear power plant (INB 124, 125, 126 and 137, Moselle (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Golfech nuclear power plant (INB 135 and 142, Tarn-et-Garonne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)