Radiation safety training for accelerator facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Trinoskey, P.A.

1997-02-01

In November 1992, a working group was formed within the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) accelerator facilities to develop a generic safety training program to meet the basic requirements for individuals working in accelerator facilities. This training, by necessity, includes sections for inserting facility-specific information. The resulting course materials were issued by DOE as a handbook under its technical standards in 1996. Because experimenters may be at a facility for only a short time and often at odd times during the day, the working group felt that computer-based training would be useful. To that end, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) together have developed a computer-based safety training program for accelerator facilities. This interactive course not only enables trainees to receive facility- specific information, but time the training to their schedule and tailor it to their level of expertise

Safety guide data on radiation shielding in a reprocessing facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sekiguchi, Noboru; Naito, Yoshitaka

1986-04-01

In a reprocessing facility, various radiation sources are handled and have many geometrical conditions. To aim drawing up a safety guidebook on radiation shielding in order to evaluate shielding safety in a reprocessing facility with high reliability and reasonableness, JAERI trusted investigation on safety evaluation techniques of radiation shielding in a reprocessing facility to Nuclear Safety Research Association. This report is the collection of investigation results, and describes concept of shielding safety design principle, radiation sources in reprocessing facility and estimation of its strength, techniques of shielding calculations, and definite examples of shielding calculation in reprocessing facility. (author)

Decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance to regulatory bodies and operating organizations on planning and provision for the safe management of the decommissioning of non-reactor nuclear fuel cycle facilities. While the basic safety considerations for the decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are similar to those for nuclear power plants, there are important differences, notably in the design and operating parameters for the facilities, the type of radioactive material and the support systems available. It is the objective of this Safety Guide to provide guidance for the shutdown and eventual decommissioning of such facilities, their individual characteristics being taken into account

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

WEISS, E.V.

2000-12-15

Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste.

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

WEISS, E.V.

2000-01-01

Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste

In-pile experiments and test facilities proposed for fast reactor safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grolmes, M.A.; Avery, R.; Goldman, A.J.; Fauske, H.K.; Marchaterre, J.F.; Rose, D.; Wright, A.E.

1976-01-01

The role of in-pile experiments in support of the resolution of fast breeder reactor safety and licensing issues has been re-examined, with emphasis on key safety issues. Experiment needs have been related to the specific characteristics of these safety issues and to realistic requirements for additional test facility capabilities which can be achieved and utilized within the next ten years. It is found that those safety issues related to the energetics of core disruptive accidents have the largest impact on new facility requirements. However, utilization of existing facilities with modifications can provide for a continuing increase in experiment capability and experiment results on a timely bases. Emphasis has been placed upon maximum utilization of existing facilities and minimum requirements for new facilities. This evaluation has concluded that a new Safety Test Facility, STF, along with major modifications to the EBR II facility, improvement in TREAT capabilities, the existing Sodium Loop Safety Facility and corresponding Support Facilities provide the essential elements of the Safety Research Experiment Facilities (SAREF) required for resolution of key issues

Design aspects of radiological safety in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patkulkar, D.S.; Purohit, R.G.; Tripathi, R.M.

2014-01-01

In order to keep operational performance of a nuclear facility high and to keep occupational and public exposure ALARA, radiological safety provisions must be reviewed at the time of facility design. Deficiency in design culminates in deteriorated system performance and non adherence to safety standards and could sometimes result in radiological incident. Important radiological aspects relevant to safety were compiled based on operating experiences, design deficiencies brought out from past nuclear incidents, experience gained during maintenance, participation in design review of upcoming nuclear facilities and radiological emergency preparedness

Nuclear criticality safety program at the Fuel Cycle Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lell, R.M.; Fujita, E.K.; Tracy, D.B.; Klann, R.T.; Imel, G.R.; Benedict, R.W.; Rigg, R.H.

1994-01-01

The Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) is designed to demonstrate the feasibility of a novel commercial-scale remote pyrometallurgical process for metallic fuels from liquid metal-cooled reactors and to show closure of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) fuel cycle. Requirements for nuclear criticality safety impose the most restrictive of the various constraints on the operation of FCF. The upper limits on batch sizes and other important process parameters are determined principally by criticality safety considerations. To maintain an efficient operation within appropriate safety limits, it is necessary to formulate a nuclear criticality safety program that integrates equipment design, process development, process modeling, conduct of operations, a measurement program, adequate material control procedures, and nuclear criticality analysis. The nuclear criticality safety program for FCF reflects this integration, ensuring that the facility can be operated efficiently without compromising safety. The experience gained from the conduct of this program in the Fuel cycle Facility will be used to design and safely operate IFR facilities on a commercial scale. The key features of the nuclear criticality safety program are described. The relationship of these features to normal facility operation is also described

Supervision of the safety culture in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-11-01

This brochure issued by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI reports on safety culture aspects in nuclear facilities and ENSI’s activities as a supervisory instance. ENSI is the independent supervisory authority for the nuclear sector in Switzerland. A definition of safety culture is presented and the development of the concepts used in its monitoring are discussed. The main attributes of a good safety culture are discussed. Further, the conceptual basics and principles of such monitoring are looked at and the methods used for the supervision of safety culture in nuclear facilities are described

78 FR 48029 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

Science.gov (United States)

2013-08-07

... Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security By the authority vested in me as President by the... at reducing the safety risks and security risks associated with hazardous chemicals. However... to further improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators...

ACP Facility Safety Surveillance System Installation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

You, Gil Sung; Kook, D. H.; Choung, W. M.; Ku, J. H.; Cho, I. J.; You, G. S.; Kwon, K. C.; Lee, W. K.; Lee, E. P.

2006-10-01

The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process is under development for effective management of spent fuel by converting UO 2 into U-metal. For demonstration of this process, α-γ type new hotcell was built in the IMEF basement. All facilities which treat radioactive materials must manage CCTV system which is under control of Health Physics department. Three main points (including hotcell rear door area) have each camera, but operators who are in charge of facility management need to check the safety of the facility immediately through the network in his office. This needs introduce additional network cameras installation and this new surveillance system is expected to update the whole safety control ability with existing system

Spallation Neutron Source Accelerator Facility Target Safety and Non-safety Control Systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Battle, Ronald E.; DeVan, B.; Munro, John K. Jr.

2006-01-01

The Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) is a proton accelerator facility that generates neutrons for scientific researchers by spallation of neutrons from a mercury target. The SNS became operational on April 28, 2006, with first beam on target at approximately 200 W. The SNS accelerator, target, and conventional facilities controls are integrated by standardized hardware and software throughout the facility and were designed and fabricated to SNS conventions to ensure compatibility of systems with Experimental Physics Integrated Control System (EPICS). ControlLogix Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) interface to instruments and actuators, and EPICS performs the high-level integration of the PLCs such that all operator control can be accomplished from the Central Control room using EPICS graphical screens that pass process variables to and from the PLCs. Three active safety systems were designed to industry standards ISA S84.01 and IEEE 603 to meet the desired reliability for these safety systems. The safety systems protect facility workers and the environment from mercury vapor, mercury radiation, and proton beam radiation. The facility operators operated many of the systems prior to beam on target and developed the operating procedures. The safety and non-safety control systems were tested extensively prior to beam on target. This testing was crucial to identify wiring and software errors and failed components, the result of which was few problems during operation with beam on target. The SNS has continued beam on target since April to increase beam power, check out the scientific instruments, and continue testing the operation of facility subsystems

Enhancement of safety for reprocessing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-06-01

The adequacy of the safety measures for utility loss accidents in nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities which have been formulated by the nuclear enterprises is investigated in JNES which organizes an advanced committee to specifically study this problem. The results are reviewed in the present report including the case of such severe accidents as in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The report also represents a tentative proposal for examination standards of such unimaginable severe accidents as 'station blackout,' urgent safety measures necessary for reoperation of nuclear power plants and requested by nuclear and industrial safety agency, and pointing out and clarification of the potential weakness from the safety point of view, and collective and composite evaluation of safety of the relevant facilities. Furthermore, the definition of accident management is given as of controlled condition and the authorized way of thinking for the cases of plural events happening at the same time and the cases when risks exist radioactivity emits with explosion. (S. Ohno)

Radiation safety in X-ray facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-09-01

The guide specifies the radiation safety requirements for structural shielding and other safety arrangements used in X-ray facilities in medical and veterinary X-ray activities and in industry, research and education. The guide is also applicable to premises in which X-ray equipment intended for radiation therapy and operating at a voltage of less than 25 kV is used. The guide applies to new X-ray facilities in which X-ray equipment that has been used elsewhere is transferred. The radiation safety requirements for radiation therapy X-ray devices operating at a voltage exceeding 25 kV, and for the premices in which such devices are used, are set out in Guide ST 2.2

Radiation safety in X-ray facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-09-01

The guide specifies the radiation safety requirements for structural shielding and other safety arrangements used in X-ray facilities in medical and veterinary X-ray activities and in industry, research and education. The guide is also applicable to premises in which X-ray equipment intended for radiation therapy and operating at a voltage of less than 25 kV is used. The guide applies to new X-ray facilities in which X-ray equipment that has been used elsewhere is transferred. The radiation safety requirements for radiation therapy X-ray devices operating at a voltage exceeding 25 kV, and for the premices in which such devices are used, are set out in Guide ST 2.2.

Preliminary safety evaluation (PSE) for Sodium Storage Facility at the Fast Flux Test Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bowman, B.R.

1994-01-01

This evaluation was performed for the Sodium Storage Facility (SSF) which will be constructed at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) in the area adjacent to the South and West Dump Heat Exchanger (DHX) pits. The purpose of the facility is to allow unloading the sodium from the FFTF plant tanks and piping. The significant conclusion of this Preliminary Safety Evaluation (PSE) is that the only Safety Class 2 components are the four sodium storage tanks and their foundations. The building, because of its imminent risk to the tanks under an earthquake or high winds, will be Safety Class 3/2, which means the building has a Safety Class 3 function with the Safety Class 2 loads of seismic and wind factored into the design

Safety of fuel cycle facilities. Topical issues paper no. 3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ranguelova, V.; Niehaus, F.; Delattre, D.

2001-01-01

A wide range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are in operation. These installations process, use, store and dispose of radioactive material and cover: mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication (including mixed oxide fuel), reactor, interim spent fuel storage, reprocessing, waste treatment and waste disposal facilities. For the purposes of this paper, reactors and waste disposal facilities are not considered. The term 'fuel cycle facilities' covers only the remainder of the installations listed above. The IAEA Secretariat maintains a database of fuel cycle facilities in its Member States. Known as the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System (NFCIS), it is available as an on-line service through the Internet. More than 500 such facilities have been reported under this system. The facilities are listed by facility type and operating status. Approximately one third of all of the facilities are located in developing States. About half of all facilities are reported to be operating, of which approximately 40% are operating in developing States. In addition, some 60 facilities are either in the design stage or under construction. Although the radioactive source term for most fuel cycle facilities is lower than the source term for reactors, which results in less severe consequences to the public from potential accidents at these fuel cycle installations, recent events at some fuel cycle facilities have given rise to public concern which has to be addressed adequately by national regulatory bodies and at the international level. Worldwide, operational experience feedback warrants improvements in the safety of these facilities. Some of the hazards are similar for reactor and non-reactor facilities. However, the differences between these installations give rise to specific safety concerns at fuel cycle facilities. In particular, these concerns include: criticality, radiation protection of workers, chemical hazards, fire and explosion hazards. It is recognized

Chemical process safety at fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ayres, D.A.

1997-08-01

This NUREG provides broad guidance on chemical safety issues relevant to fuel cycle facilities. It describes an approach acceptable to the NRC staff, with examples that are not exhaustive, for addressing chemical process safety in the safe storage, handling, and processing of licensed nuclear material. It expounds to license holders and applicants a general philosophy of the role of chemical process safety with respect to NRC-licensed materials; sets forth the basic information needed to properly evaluate chemical process safety; and describes plausible methods of identifying and evaluating chemical hazards and assessing the adequacy of the chemical safety of the proposed equipment and facilities. Examples of equipment and methods commonly used to prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of chemical incidents are discussed in this document

Facts about food irradiation: Safety of irradiation facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

This fact sheet considers the safety of industrial irradiation facilities. Although there have been accidents, none of them has endangered public health or environmental safety, and the radiation processing industry is considered to have a very good safety record. Gamma irradiators do not produce radioactive waste, and the radiation sources at the facilities cannot explode nor in any other way release radioactivity into the environment. 3 refs

Implementing partnerships in nonreactor facility safety analyses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courtney, J.C.; Perry, W.H.; Phipps, R.D.

1996-01-01

Faculty and students from LSU have been participating in nuclear safety analyses and radiation protection projects at ANL-W at INEL since 1973. A mutually beneficial relationship has evolved that has resulted in generation of safety-related studies acceptable to Argonne and DOE, NRC, and state regulatory groups. Most of the safety projects have involved the Hot Fuel Examination Facility or the Fuel Conditioning Facility; both are hot cells that receive spent fuel from EBR-II. A table shows some of the major projects at ANL-W that involved LSU students and faculty

Health and Safety Management for Small-scale Methane Fermentation Facilities

Science.gov (United States)

Yamaoka, Masaru; Yuyama, Yoshito; Nakamura, Masato; Oritate, Fumiko

In this study, we considered health and safety management for small-scale methane fermentation facilities that treat 2-5 ton of biomass daily based on several years operation experience with an approximate capacity of 5 t·d-1. We also took account of existing knowledge, related laws and regulations. There are no qualifications or licenses required for management and operation of small-scale methane fermentation facilities, even though rural sewerage facilities with a relative similar function are required to obtain a legitimate license. Therefore, there are wide variations in health and safety consciousness of the operators of small-scale methane fermentation facilities. The industrial safety and health laws are not applied to the operation of small-scale methane fermentation facilities. However, in order to safely operate a small-scale methane fermentation facility, the occupational safety and health management system that the law recommends should be applied. The aims of this paper are to clarify the risk factors in small-scale methane fermentation facilities and encourage planning, design and operation of facilities based on health and safety management.

Critical experiments facility and criticality safety programs at JAERI

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kobayashi, Iwao; Tachimori, Shoichi; Takeshita, Isao; Suzaki, Takenori; Miyoshi, Yoshinori; Nomura, Yasushi

1985-10-01

The nuclear criticality safety is becoming a key point in Japan in the safety considerations for nuclear installations outside reactors such as spent fuel reprocessing facilities, plutonium fuel fabrication facilities, large scale hot alboratories, and so on. Especially a large scale spent fuel reprocessing facility is being designed and would be constructed in near future, therefore extensive experimental studies are needed for compilation of our own technical standards and also for verification of safety in a potential criticality accident to obtain public acceptance. Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is proceeding a construction program of a new criticality safety experimental facility where criticality data can be obtained for such solution fuels as mainly handled in a reprocessing facility and also chemical process experiments can be performed to investigate abnormal phenomena, e.g. plutonium behavior in solvent extraction process by using pulsed colums. In FY 1985 detail design of the facility will be completed and licensing review by the government would start in FY 1986. Experiments would start in FY 1990. Research subjects and main specifications of the facility are described. (author)

Safety assessment for radioactive waste disposal facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thanaletchumy Karuppiah; Mohd Abdul Wahab Yusof; Nik Marzuki Nik Ibrahim; Nurul Wahida Ahmad Khairuddin

2008-08-01

Safety assessments are used to evaluate the performance of a radioactive waste disposal facility and its impact on human health and the environment. This paper presents the overall information and methodology to carry out the safety assessment for a long term performance of a disposal system. A case study was also conducted to gain hands-on experience in the development and justification of scenarios, the formulation and implementation of models and the analysis of results. AMBER code using compartmental modeling approach was used to represent the migration and fate of contaminants in this training. This safety assessment is purely illustrative and it serves as a starting point for each development stage of a disposal facility. This assessment ultimately becomes more detail and specific as the facility evolves. (Author)

Life Management and Safety of Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fabbri, S.; Diluch, A.; Vega, G., E-mail: fabbri@cnea.gov.ar [Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

2014-10-15

The nuclear programme in Argentina includes: nuclear power and related supplies, medical and industrial applications, waste management, research and development and human training. Nuclear facilities require life management programs that allow a safe operation. Safety is the first priority for designers and operators. This can be attained with defence in depth: regular inspections and maintenance procedures to minimize failure risks. CNEA objectives in this area are to possess the necessary capability to give safe and fast technical support. Within this scheme, one of the main activities undertaken by CNEA is to provide technological assistance to the nuclear plants and research reactors. As a consequence of an increasing concern about safety and ageing a Life Management Department for safe operation was created to take care of these subjects. The goal is to elaborate a Safety Evaluation Process for the critical components of nuclear plants and other facilities. The overall objectives of a safety process are to ensure a continuous safe, reliable and effective operation of nuclear facilities and it means the implementation of the defence in deep concept to enhance safety for the protection of the public, the workers and the environment. (author)

Experimental facilities for gas-cooled reactor safety studies. Task group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

In 2007, the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) completed a study on Nuclear Safety Research in OECD Countries: Support Facilities for Existing and Advanced Reactors (SFEAR) which focused on facilities suitable for current and advanced water reactor systems. In a subsequent collective opinion on the subject, the CSNI recommended to conduct a similar exercise for Generation IV reactor designs, aiming to develop a strategy for ' better preparing the CSNI to play a role in the planned extension of safety research beyond the needs set by current operating reactors'. In that context, the CSNI established the Task Group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF) in 2008 with the objective of providing an overview of facilities suitable for performing safety research relevant to gas-cooled reactors and sodium fast reactors. This report addresses gas-cooled reactors; a similar report covering sodium fast reactors is under preparation. The findings of the TAREF are expected to trigger internationally funded CSNI projects on relevant safety issues at the key facilities identified. Such CSNI-sponsored projects constitute a means for efficiently obtaining the necessary data through internationally co-ordinated research. This report provides an overview of experimental facilities that can be used to carry out nuclear safety research for gas-cooled reactors and identifies priorities for organizing international co-operative programmes at selected facilities. The information has been collected and analysed by a Task Group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF) as part of an ongoing initiative of the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) which aims to define and to implement a strategy for the efficient utilisation of facilities and resources for Generation IV reactor systems. (author)

Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific relevance include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal

An Overview of INEL Fusion Safety R&D Facilities

Science.gov (United States)

McCarthy, K. A.; Smolik, G. R.; Anderl, R. A.; Carmack, W. J.; Longhurst, G. R.

1997-06-01

The Fusion Safety Program at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has the lead for fusion safety work in the United States. Over the years, we have developed several experimental facilities to provide data for fusion reactor safety analyses. We now have four major experimental facilities that provide data for use in safety assessments. The Steam-Reactivity Measurement System measures hydrogen generation rates and tritium mobilization rates in high-temperature (up to 1200°C) fusion relevant materials exposed to steam. The Volatilization of Activation Product Oxides Reactor Facility provides information on mobilization and transport and chemical reactivity of fusion relevant materials at high temperature (up to 1200°C) in an oxidizing environment (air or steam). The Fusion Aerosol Source Test Facility is a scaled-up version of VAPOR. The ion-implanta-tion/thermal-desorption system is dedicated to research into processes and phenomena associated with the interaction of hydrogen isotopes with fusion materials. In this paper we describe the capabilities of these facilities.

Preparation of safety and regulatory document for BARC Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prasad, S.S.; Jayarajan, K.

2017-01-01

In India, the necessary codes and safety guidelines for achieving the safety objectives are provided by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which are in conformity with the principles of radiation protection as formulated by the International Council of Radiation Protection (ICRP) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The same is followed by BARC Safety Council (BSC), which is the regulatory body for the BARC facilities. In addition to all types of fuel cycle facilities, BSC regulates safety of many types of conventional facilities. Many such types of facilities and projects are not under the regulatory purview of AERB. Therefore, the Council has also initiated a programme for development and publication of safety documents for installations in BARC in the fields/ topics yet not addressed by IAEA or AERB. This makes the task pioneering, as some of the areas taken up for defining the regulatory requirements are new, where standard regulatory documents are not available

Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

A well performed and adequately documented safety assessment of a nuclear facility will serve as a basis to determine whether the facility complies with the safety objectives, principles and criteria as stipulated by the national regulatory body of the country where the facility is in operation. International experience shows that the practices and methodologies used to perform safety assessments and periodic safety re-assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities differ significantly from county to country. Most developing countries do not have methods and guidance for safety assessment that are prescribed by the regulatory body. Typically the safety evaluation for the facility is based on a case by case assessment. Whilst conservative deterministic analyses are predominantly used as a licensing basis in many countries, recently probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques have been applied as a useful complementary tool to support safety decision making. The main benefit of PSA is to provide insights into the safety aspects of facility design and operation. PSA points up the potential environmental impacts of postulated accidents, including the dominant risk contributors, and enables safety analysts to compare options for reducing risk. In order to advise on how to apply PSA methodology for the safety assessment of non-reactor nuclear facilities, the IAEA organized several consultants meetings, which led to the preparation of this TECDOC. This document is intended as guidance for the conduct of PSA in non-nuclear facilities. The main emphasis here is on the general procedural steps of a PSA that is specific for a non-reactor nuclear facility, rather than the details of the specific methods. The report is directed at technical staff managing or performing such probabilistic assessments and to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for these PSAs. It is understood that the level of detail implied in the tasks presented in this

340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodovsky, T.J.

2010-01-01

The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3. The final hazard categorization for the deactivated 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility) is presented in this document. This hazard categorization was prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-1 027-92, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with Doe Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category (HC) 3. Routine nuclear waste receiving, storage, handling, and shipping operations at the 340 Facility have been deactivated, however, the facility contains a small amount of radioactive liquid and/or dry saltcake in two underground vault tanks. A seismic event and hydrogen deflagration were selected as bounding accidents. The generation of hydrogen in the vault tanks without active ventilation was determined to achieve a steady state volume of 0.33%, which is significantly less than the lower flammability limit of 4%. Therefore, a hydrogen deflagration is not possible in these tanks. The unmitigated release from a seismic event was used to categorize the facility consistent with the process defined in Nuclear Safety Technical Position (NSTP) 2002-2. The final sum-of-fractions calculation concluded that the facility is less than HC 3. The analysis did not identify any required engineered controls or design features. The Administrative Controls that were derived from the analysis are: (1) radiological inventory control, (2) facility change control, and (3) Safety Management Programs (SMPs). The facility configuration and radiological inventory shall be controlled to ensure that the assumptions in the analysis remain valid. The facility commitment to SMPs protects the integrity of the facility and environment by ensuring training, emergency response, and radiation protection. The full scale

Monitor for safety engineering facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sato, Akira; Kaneda, Mitsunori.

1982-01-01

Purpose: To improve the reactor safety and decrease misoperation upon periodical inspection by instantly obtaining the judgement for the stand-by states in engineering safety facilities of a nuclear power plant. Constitution: Process inputs representing the states of valves, pumps, flowrates or the likes of the facility are gathered into an input device and inputted to a status monitor. The status of the facility inputted to the input device are judged for each of the inputs in a judging section and recognized as a present system stand-by pattern of the system (Valve) to be inspected. While on the other hand, a normal system stand-by pattern previously stored in a memory unit is read out by an instruction from an operator console and judged by comparison with the system stand-by pattern in a comparison section. The results are displayed on a display device. Upon periodical inspection, inspection procedures stored in the memory unit are displayed on the display device by the instruction from the operator console. (Seki, T.)

CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

C.E. Sanders

2005-01-01

This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the CHF and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility

Development of High-Level Safety Requirements for a Pyroprocessing Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Seo, Seok Jun; Jo, Woo Jin; You, Gil Sung; Choung, Won Myung; Lee, Ho Hee; Kim, Hyun Min; Jeon, Hong Rae; Ku, Jeong Hoe; Lee, Hyo Jik [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a pyroproceesing technology to reduce the waste volume and recycle some elements. The pyroprocessing includes several treatment processes which are related with not only radiological and physical but also chemical and electrochemical properties. Thus, it is of importance to establish safety design requirements considering all the aspects of those properties for a reliable pyroprocessing facility. In this study, high-level requirements are presented in terms of not only radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, and seismic safety but also confinement and chemical safety for the unique characteristics of a pyroprocessing facility. Several high-level safety design requirements such as radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, seismic, confinement, and chemical processing were presented for a pyroprocessing facility. The requirements must fulfill domestic and international safety technology standards for a nuclear facility. Furthermore, additional requirements should be considered for the unique electrochemical treatments in a pyroprocessing facility.

Laser safety at high profile laser facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barat, K.

2010-01-01

Complete text of publication follows. Laser safety has been an active concern of laser users since the invention of the laser. Formal standards were developed in the early 1970's and still continue to be developed and refined. The goal of these standards is to give users guidance on the use of laser and consistent safety guidance and requirements for laser manufacturers. Laser safety in the typical research setting (government laboratory or university) is the greatest challenge to the laser user and laser safety officer. This is due to two factors. First, the very nature of research can put the user at risk; consider active manipulation of laser optics and beam paths, and user work with energized systems. Second, a laser safety culture that seems to accept laser injuries as part of the graduate student educational process. The fact is, laser safety at research settings, laboratories and universities still has long way to go. Major laser facilities have taken a more rigid and serious view of laser safety, its controls and procedures. Part of the rationale for this is that these facilities draw users from all around the world presenting the facility with a work force of users coming from a wide mix of laser safety cultures. Another factor is funding sources do not like bad publicity which can come from laser accidents and a poor safety record. The fact is that injuries, equipment damage and lost staff time slow down progress. Hence high profile/large laser projects need to adapt a higher safety regimen both from an engineering and administrative point of view. This presentation will discuss all these points and present examples. Acknowledgement. This work has been supported by the University of California, Director, Office of Science.

Safety overview of the National Ignition Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brereton, S.J.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.; Singh, M.; Tobin, M.; Trent, M.

1996-01-01

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed US Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium- tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF mission is to achieve inertial confinement fusion (ICF) ignition, access physical conditions in matter of interest to nuclear weapons physics, provide an above ground simulation capability for nuclear weapons effects testing, and contribute to the development of inertial fusion for electrical power production. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the operation of the NIF. It provides an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low

Safety report content and development for test loop facility on MARIA reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Konechko, A.; Shumskij, A.M.; Mikul'ahin, V.E.

1982-01-01

A 600 kW test loop facility for investigatin.o safety problems is realized on MARIA reactor in Poland together with USSR organizations. Safety reports have been developed in two steps at the designstage. The 1st report being essentially a preliminary safety analysis was developed within the scope of the feasibility study. At the engineering design stage the preliminary test loop facility safety report had been prepared considering measures excluding the possibility of the MARIA reactor damage. The test loop facility safety report is fulfilled for normal, transient and emergency operation regimes. Separate safety basing for each group of experiments will be prepared. The report presents the test loop facility safety criteria coordinated by the nuclear safety comission. They contains the preliminary reports on the test loop facility safety. At the final stage of construction and at thecommitioning stage the start-up safety report will be developed which after required correction and adding up the putting into operation data will turn into operation safety report [ru

Evolution of nuclear safety regulation for BARC Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jayarajan, K.; Taly, Y.K.

2017-01-01

Safety programmes in BARC stared during the formative years and grown its stature, as the years passed by. Seventeen years of BSC, with one hundred meetings, have been quite eventful with several achievements. BSC could bring all facilities of BARC under its safety umbrella and could streamline many safety and regulatory activities. BSC aims at incident free operation of all facilities and protection of the workers, the public, the environment from radiation and other hazards. Although, incidents could not be entirely prevented, BSC have taken every event as a lesson and used the experience for improving safety. Safety enhancement is an endless journey, which has to be performed by joining hands of the managers, designers, manufacturers, inspectors and operators, in addition to the regulators

Safety culture in a major nuclear fuel cycle facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pushparaja; Abani, M.C.

2002-01-01

Human factor plays an important role in development of safety culture in any nuclear fuel cycle facility. This is more relevant in major nuclear facility such as a reactor or a reprocessing plant. In Indian reprocessing plants, an effective worker's training, education and certification program is in place to sensitize the worker's response to safety and safe work procedures. The methodology followed to self evaluation of safety culture and the benefits in a reprocessing plant is briefly discussed. Various indicators of safety performance and visible signs of a good safety management are also qualitatively analyzed. (author)

Regulatory role and approach of BARC Safety Council in safety and occupational health in BARC facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rajdeep; Jayarajan, K.; Taly, Y.K.

2016-01-01

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre is involved in multidisciplinary research and developmental activities, related to peaceful use of nuclear energy and its societal benefits. In order to achieve high level of performance of these facilities, the best efforts are made to maintain good health of the plant personnel and good working conditions. BARC Safety Council (BSC), which is the regulatory body for BARC facilities, regulates radiation safety, industrial safety and surveillance of occupational health, by implementing various rules and guidelines in BARC facilities. BARC Safety framework consists of various committees in a 3-tier system. The first tier is BSC, which is the apex body authorized for issuing directives, permissions, consents and authorizations. It is having responsibility of ensuring protection and safety of public, environment, personnel and facilities of BARC through enforcement of radiation protection and industrial safety programmes. Besides the 18 committees in 2"n"d tier, there are 6 other expert committees which assist in functioning of BSC. (author)

RADON-type disposal facility safety case for the co-ordinated research project on improvement of safety assessment methodologies for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities (ISAM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guskov, A.; Batanjieva, B.; Kozak, M.W.; Torres-Vidal, C.

2002-01-01

The ISAM safety assessment methodology was applied to RADON-type facilities. The assessments conducted through the ISAM project were among the first conducted for these kinds of facilities. These assessments are anticipated to lead to significantly improved levels of safety in countries with such facilities. Experience gained though this RADON-type Safety Case was already used in Russia while developing national regulatory documents. (author)

Progress report concerning safety research for nuclear reactor facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

Examination and evaluation of safety research results for nuclear reactor facilities have been performed, as more than a year has elapsed since the plan had been initiated in April, 1976, by the special sub-committee for the safety of nuclear reactor facilities. The research is carried out by being divided roughly into 7 items, and seems to be steadily proceeding, though it does not yet reach the target. The above 7 items include researches for (1) criticality accident, (2) loss of coolant accident, (3) safety for light water reactor fuel, (4) construction safety for reactor facilities, (5) reduction of release of radioactive material, (6) safety evaluation based on the probability theory for reactor facilities, and (7) aseismatic measures for reactor facilities. With discussions on the progress and the results of the research this time, research on the behaviour on fuel in abnormal transients including in-core and out-core experiments has been added to the third item, deleting the power-cooling mismatch experiment in Nuclear Safety Research Reactor of JAERI. Also it has been decided to add two research to the seventh item, namely measured data collection, classification and analysis, and probability assessment of failures due to an earthquake. For these 7 items, the report describes the concrete contents of research to be performed in fiscal years of 1977 and 1978, by discussing on most rational and suitable contents conceivable at present. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

LMFBR safety experiment facility planning and analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stevenson, M.G.; Scott, J.H.

1976-01-01

In the past two years considerable effort has been placed on the planning and design of new facilities for the resolution of LMFBR safety issues. The paper reviews the key issues, the experiments needed to resolve them, and the design aspects of proposed new facilities. In addition, it presents a decision theory approach to selecting an optimal combination of modified and new facilities

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Larson, H L

2007-01-01

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Larson, H L

2007-09-07

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

Safety at the End of a Nuclear Facility's Life

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geis, John A.; McEahern, Patrice; Evans, Brad

2004-01-01

The objective of this paper is to capture the changes that are caused by the transition from nuclear operation through closure of defense nuclear facilities and convey lessons learned from their deactivation, decontamination and demolition. The specific area of discussion is focused on the planned reduction of safety equipment and consequent shift in hazard controls and safety management programs as the facility moves toward closure. The premise of the paper is that as the dominant hazards transition from nuclear to radiological and/or industrial, the facility control of the hazards and response to the potential upset conditions must transition as well to ensure safe and efficient operations. Using recent experience of the accelerated closure mission for U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, the current culture with respect to developing and implementing hazard controls and response to upset conditions is illustrated. Several events have been documented that provide insight into the challenges facing line managers and safety professionals at the end of a facility's life cycle. Replacing permanent systems with temporary equipment challenges the traditional concept of reliability. Workers disassemble safety systems daily, but must rely on some of these components or redundant systems as work continues. Decisions governing upkeep of systems that await demolition balance the risk of running to failure against the cost benefit of maintenance and repair. This is further complicated as regulators and safety professionals are often unfamiliar with these new conditions and continue to view facility work activities and potential upset conditions from a nuclear operations perspective. The results of this paper evaluate the differences in how regulatory, safety basis, and operational practices must adapt to the dynamic environment of decontamination and decommissioning in contrast to the relatively constant

CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

C.E. Sanders

2005-04-07

This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for

Data used for safety assessment of reprocessing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nomura, Yasushi; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Kanagawa, Akira

1990-08-01

For safety assessment of a reprocessing facility, it is important to know performance of radioactive materials in their accidental release and transfer. Accordingly, it is necessary to collect and prepare data for use in analyses for their performance. In JAERI, experiments such as for data acquisition, for source-term evaluation and for radioactive material transfer, are now planned to be performed. Prior to these experiments, it is decided to investigate data in use for accidental safety assessment of reprocessing plants and their based experimental data, thus to make it possible to recommend reasonable values for safety analysis parameters by evaluating the investigated results, to select the experimental items, to edit a safety assessment handbook and so on. In this line of objectives, JAERI rewarded a two-year contract of investigation to Nuclear Safety Research Association, to make a working group under a special committee on data investigation for reprocessing facility safety assessment. This report is a collection of results reviewed and checked by the working group. The contents consist of two parts, one for investigation and review of data used for safety assessment of domestic or oversea reprocessing facilities, and the other for investigation, review and evaluation of ANSI recommended American standard data reported by E. Walker together with their based experimental data resorting to the original referred reports. (author)

Safety assessment for spent fuel storage facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This Safety Practice has been prepared as part of the IAEA's programme on the safety assessment of interim spent fuel storage facilities which are not an integral part of an operating nuclear power plant. This report provides general guidance on the safety assessment process, discussing both deterministic and probabilistic assessment methods. It describes the safety assessment process for normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences and also related to accident conditions. 10 refs, 2 tabs

Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rule, Keith [PPPL

2014-05-01

The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

Safety analysis of the existing 850 Firing Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.

1986-01-01

A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 850 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives, which was classified as a moderate hazard per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

Safety analysis of the existing 851 Firing Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.

1986-01-01

A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 851 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but two of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exceptions were the linear accelerator and explosives, which were classified as moderate hazards per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BENECKE, M.W.

2000-01-01

The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

Review and assessment of nuclear facilities by the regulatory body. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on reviewing and assessing the various safety related submissions made by the operator of a nuclear facility at different stages (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure) in the facility's lifetime to determine whether the facility complies with the applicable safety objectives and requirements. This Safety Guide covers the review and assessment of submissions in relation to the safety of nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Objectives, management, planning and organizational matters relating to the review and assessment process are presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the bases for decision making and conduct of the review and assessment process. Section 4 covers aspects relating to the assessment of this process. The Appendix provides a generic list of topics to be covered in the review and assessment process

Review and assessment of nuclear facilities by the regulatory body. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on reviewing and assessing the various safety related submissions made by the operator of a nuclear facility at different stages (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure) in the facility's lifetime to determine whether the facility complies with the applicable safety objectives and requirements. This Safety Guide covers the review and assessment of submissions in relation to the safety of nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Objectives, management, planning and organizational matters relating to the review and assessment process are presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the bases for decision making and conduct of the review and assessment process. Section 4 covers aspects relating to the assessment of this process. The Appendix provides a generic list of topics to be covered in the review and assessment process

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Chinon nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Organization and staffing of the regulatory body for nuclear facilities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The purpose of this safety guide is to provide recommendations for national authorities on the appropriate management system, organization and staffing for the regulatory body responsible for the regulation of nuclear facilities in order to achieve compliance with the applicable safety requirements. This safety guide covers the organization and staffing in relation to nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And radioactive waste management facilities such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This safety guide also covers issues related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation

Radiation safety of gamma and electron irradiation facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

There are currently some 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation throughout virtually all Member States of the IAEA. The most widespread uses of these facilities are for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, and the eradication of insect infestation. The safety record of this industry has been very good. Nevertheless, there is a potential for accidents with serious consequences. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, so that a person accidentally present in the irradiation chamber can receive a lethal dose within minutes or seconds. Precautions against uncontrolled entry must therefore be taken. Furthermore, gamma irradiation facilities contain large amounts of radioactivity and if the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed, inhibiting direct access to carry out remedial work. Contamination can result from corroded or damaged sources, and decontamination can be very expensive. These aspects clearly indicate the need to achieve a high degree of safety and reliability in the facilities. This can be accomplished by effective quality control together with careful design, manufacture, installation, operation and decommissioning. The guidance in this Safety Series publication is intended for competent authorities responsible for regulating the use of radiation sources as well as the manufacturers, suppliers, installers and users of gamma and electron beam facilities. 20 refs, 6 figs

Radiation safety and regulatory aspects in Medical Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Banerjee, Sharmila

2017-01-01

Radiation safety and regulatory aspect of medical facilities are relevant in the context where radiation is used in providing healthcare to human patients. These include facilities, which carry out radiological procedures in diagnostic radiology, including dentistry, image-guided interventional procedures, nuclear medicine, and radiation therapy. The safety regulations provide recommendations and guidance on meeting the requirements for the safe use of radiation in medicine. The different safety aspects which come under its purview are the personnel involved in medical facilities where radiological procedures are performed which include the medical practitioners, radiation technologists, medical physicists, radiopharmacists, radiation protection and over and above all the patients. Regulatory aspects cover the guidelines provided by ethics committees, which regulate the administration of radioactive formulation in human patients. Nuclear medicine is a modality that utilizes radiopharmaceuticals either for diagnosis of physiological disorders related to anatomy, physiology and patho-physiology and for diagnosis and treatment of cancer

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D. T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2014-04-16

This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laycak, D. T.

2014-01-01

This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schnurer, H.L.

1977-01-01

Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

Radiation Safety of Gamma, Electron and X Ray Irradiation Facilities. Specific Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements of the BSS with regard to irradiation facilities. This Safety Guide provides specific, practical recommendations on the safe design and operation of gamma, electron and X ray irradiators for use by operating organizations and the designers of these facilities, and by regulatory bodies. SCOPE. The facilities considered in this publication include five types of irradiator, whether operated on a commercial basis or for research and development purposes. This publication is concerned with radiation safety issues and not with the uses of irradiators, nor does it cover the irradiation of product or its quality management. The five types of irradiator are: - Panoramic dry source storage irradiators; - Underwater irradiators, in which both the source and the product being irradiated are under water; - Panoramic wet source storage irradiators; - Electron beam irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the irradiation process; - X ray irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the irradiation process. Consideration of non-radiation-related risks and of the benefits resulting from the operation of irradiators is outside the scope of this Safety Guide. The practices of radiotherapy and radiography are also outside the scope of this Safety Guide. Category I gamma irradiators (i.e. 'self-shielded' irradiators) are outside the scope of this Safety Guide

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D

2008-06-16

This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 78, 89 (NPPs in operation), 465 (NPP under deconstruction), 102 (fuel storage facility), and 173 (radioactive waste conditioning and storage facility under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 78, 89 (NPPs in operation), 465 (NPP under deconstruction), 102 (fuel storage facility), and 173 (radioactive waste conditioning and storage facility under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee Cadwallader

2005-01-31

This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, B.; Torres-Vidal, C.

2002-01-01

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated research program ''Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities'' (ISAM) has developed improved safety assessment methodology for near surface disposal facilities. The program has been underway for three years and has included around 75 active participants from 40 countries. It has also provided examples for application to three safety cases--vault, Radon type and borehole radioactive waste disposal facilities. The program has served as an excellent forum for exchange of information and good practices on safety assessment approaches and methodologies used worldwide. It also provided an opportunity for reaching broad consensus on the safety assessment methodologies to be applied to near surface low and intermediate level waste repositories. The methodology has found widespread acceptance and the need for its application on real waste disposal facilities has been clearly identified. The ISAM was finalized by the end of 2000, working material documents are available and an IAEA report will be published in 2002 summarizing the work performed during the three years of the program. The outcome of the ISAM program provides a sound basis for moving forward to a new IAEA program, which will focus on practical application of the safety assessment methodologies to different purposes, such as licensing radioactive waste repositories, development of design concepts, upgrading existing facilities, reassessment of operating repositories, etc. The new program will also provide an opportunity for development of guidance on application of the methodology that will be of assistance to both safety assessors and regulators

Preliminary safety analysis report for the Waste Characterization Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-10-01

This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Characterization Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are to: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Characterization Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume. 142 refs., 38 figs., 39 tabs

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laycak, D.T.

2010-01-01

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting

Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D T

2008-06-16

This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas

Radiation Safety of Accelerator Facility with Regard to Regulation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dedi Sunaryadi; Gloria Doloresa

2003-01-01

The radiation safety of accelerator facility and the status of the facilities according to licensee in Indonesia as well as lesson learned from the accidents are described. The atomic energy Act No. 10 of 1997 enacted by the Government of Indonesia which is implemented in Radiation Safety Government Regulation No. 63 and 64 as well as practice-specific model regulation for licensing request are discussed. (author)

Final safety analysis report (FSAR) for waste receiving and processing (WRAP) facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Weidert, J.R.

1997-01-01

This safety analysis report provides a summary description of the WRAP Facility, focusing on significant safety-related characteristics of the location and facility design. This report demonstrates that adherence to the safety basis wi11 ensure necessary operational safety considerations have been addressed sufficiently and justifies the adequacy of the safety basis in protecting the health and safety of the public, workers, and the environment

Decommissioning of Medical, Industrial and Research Facilities. Safety Guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive materials and sources are produced, received, used and stored. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations, particularly to those in developing countries (as such facilities are predominant in these countries), for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such facilities. The Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants meetings and a Technical Committee meeting

Decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive materials and sources are produced, received, used and stored. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations, particularly to those in developing countries (as such facilities are predominant in these countries), for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such facilities. The Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants meetings and a Technical Committee meeting

Criticality safety considerations. Integral Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-09-01

This report summarizes the criticality analysis performed to address criticality safety concerns and to support facility design during the conceptual design phase of the Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Facility. The report addresses the criticality safety concerns, the design features of the facility relative to criticality, and the results of the analysis of both normal operating and hypothetical off-normal conditions. Key references are provided (Appendix C) if additional information is desired by the reader. The MRS Facility design was developed and the related analysis was performed in accordance with the MRS Facility Functional Design Criteria and the Basis for Design. The detailed description and calculations are documented in the Integral MRS Facility Conceptual Design Report. In addition to the summary portion of this report, explanatary notes for various terms, calculation methodology, and design parameters are presented in Appendix A. Appendix B provides a brief glossary of technical terms

Safety Software Guide Perspectives for the Design of New Nuclear Facilities (U)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

VINCENT, Andrew

2005-01-01

In June of this year, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued directives DOE O 414.1C and DOE G 414.1-4 to improve quality assurance programs, processes, and procedures among its safety contractors. Specifically, guidance entitled, ''Safety Software Guide for use with 10 CFR 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, DOE G 414.1-4'', provides information and acceptable methods to comply with safety software quality assurance (SQA) requirements. The guidance provides a roadmap for meeting DOE O 414.1C, ''Quality Assurance'', and the quality assurance program (QAP) requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart A, Quality Assurance, for DOE nuclear facilities and software application activities. [1, 2] The order and guide are part of a comprehensive implementation plan that addresses issues and concerns documented in Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2002-1. [3] Safety SQA requirements for DOE as well as National Nuclear Security Administration contractors are necessary to implement effective quality assurance (QA) processes and achieve safe nuclear facility operations. DOE G 414.1-4 was developed to provide guidance on establishing and implementing effective QA processes tied specifically to nuclear facility safety software applications. The Guide includes software application practices covered by appropriate national and international consensus standards and various processes currently in use at DOE facilities. While the safety software guidance is considered to be of sufficient rigor and depth to ensure acceptable reliability of safety software at all DOE nuclear facilities, new nuclear facilities are well suited to take advantage of the guide to ensure compliant programs and processes are implemented. Attributes such as the facility life-cycle stage and the hazardous nature of each facility operations are considered, along with the category and level of importance of the

NIF conventional facilities construction health and safety plan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benjamin, D W

1998-01-01

The purpose of this Plan is to outline the minimum health and safety requirements to which all participating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and non-LLNL employees (excluding National Ignition Facility [NIF] specific contractors and subcontractors covered under the construction subcontract packages (e.g., CSP-9)-see Construction Safety Program for the National Ignition Facility [CSP] Section I.B. ''NIF Construction Contractors and Subcontractors'' for specifics) shall adhere to for preventing job-related injuries and illnesses during Conventional Facilities construction activities at the NIF Project. For the purpose of this Plan, the term ''LLNL and non-LLNL employees'' includes LLNL employees, LLNL Plant Operations staff and their contractors, supplemental labor, contract labor, labor-only contractors, vendors, DOE representatives, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, and others such as visitors, students, consultants etc., performing on-site work or services in support of the NIF Project. Based upon an activity level determination explained in Section 1.2.18, in this document, these organizations or individuals may be required by site management to prepare their own NIF site-specific safety plan. LLNL employees will normally not be expected to prepare a site-specific safety plan. This Plan also outlines job-specific exposures and construction site safety activities with which LLNL and non-LLNL employees shall comply

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Blayais nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 86 and 110). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Civaux nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Golfech nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 135 and 142). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Tricastin nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the Tricastin NPPs (INBs no. 87 and 88). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Penly nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Chooz nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INB no. 75). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

CSER 94-012: Criticality safety evaluation report for 340 Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Altschuler, S.J.

1995-01-01

This Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) covers the 340 Facility which acts as a collecting point for liquid and solid waste from various facilities in the 300 Area. Criticality safety is achieved by controlling the amount and concentration of the fissionable material sent to the 340 Facility from the originating facilities in the 300 Area, a method similar to that used elsewhere at Hanford for the waste tank farms. Unlike those, however, the waste received at the 340 Facility will be far less radioactive. It is concluded that present operations meet the two contingency criterion. The facility will still be safely subcritical even after two independent and concurrent failures (either of equipment or administrative controls). The solid waste storage and liquid waste will be managed separately. The solid waste storage area is classified as exempt because it contains less than 15 grams of fissionable materials. The Radioactive Liquid Waste System is classified as isolated because it contains less than one third of a minimum critical mass. The criticality safety of the 340 Facility devoted to the Radioactive Liquid Waste System (RLWS) is assured by the form and concentration of the fissile material and could also be classified as a limited control facility. However, the 340 Facility has been operated as an isolated facility which results in a more conservative limit

Study of fast reactor safety test facilities. Preliminary report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bell, G.I.; Boudreau, J.E.; McLaughlin, T.; Palmer, R.G.; Starkovich, V.; Stein, W.E.; Stevenson, M.G.; Yarnell, Y.L.

1975-05-01

Included are sections dealing with the following topics: (1) perspective and philosophy of fast reactor safety analysis; (2) status of accident analysis and experimental needs; (3) experiment and facility definitions; (4) existing in-pile facilities; (5) new facility options; and (6) data acquisition methods

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Comprehensive safety cases for radioactive waste management facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woollam, P.B.

1993-01-01

Probabilistic safety assessment methodology is being applied by Nuclear Electric plc (NE) to the development of comprehensive safety cases for the radioactive waste management processing and accumulation facilities associated with its 26 reactor systems. This paper describes the methodology and the safety case assessment criteria employed by NE. An overview of the results from facilities used by the first 16 reactors is presented, together with more detail of a specific safety analysis: storage of fuel element debris. No risk to the public greater than 10 -6 /y has been identified and the more significant risks arise from the potential for radioactive waste fires. There are no unacceptable risks from external hazards such as flooding, aircrash or seismic events. Some operations previously expected to have significant risks in fact have negligible risks, while the few faults with risks exceeding the assessment criteria were only identified as a result of this study

Safety culture in industrial radiography facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vincent-Furo, Evelyn

2015-02-01

This project reviewed published IAEA materials and other documents on safety culture with specific references to industrial radiography. Safety culture requires all duties important to safety to be carried out correctly, with alertness, due thought and full knowledge, sound judgment and a proper sense of accountability. The development and maintenance of safety culture in an operating organization has to cover management systems, policies, responsibilities, procedures and organizational arrangements. The essence is to control radiation hazard, optimize radiation protection to prevent or reduce exposures and mitigate the consequences of accidents and incidents. To achieve a high degree of safety culture appropriate national and international infrastructure should exist to ensure effective training of workers and management system that supports commitment to safety culture at all level of the organization; management, managers and workforce. The result of the review revealed that all accidents in industrial radiography facilities were due to poor safety culture practices including inadequate regulatory control oversight. Some recommendations are provided and if implemented could improve safety culture leading to good safety performance which will significantly reduce accidents and their consequences in industrial radiography. These examples call for a review of safety culture in Industrial radiography. (au)

Yearly program of safety research in nuclear power facilities from fiscal 1981 to 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1984-01-01

Nuclear safety research plans for nuclear power facilities and others from fiscal 1981 to 1985 are presented for the following areas: the safety of LWR fuel, loss-of-coolant accidents, the structural safety of LWR installations, the reduction of radioactive material release from nuclear power facilities, the stochastic safety evaluation of nuclear power facilities, the aseismicity of nuclear power facilities, the safety of nuclear fuel facilities, and the safety of nuclear fuel transport vessels. In the respective areas, the needs for research and the outline of research works are summarized. Then, about the major research works in each area, the purpose, contents, term and responsible institution of the research are given. (Mori, K.)

Development of an auditable safety analysis in support of a radiological facility classification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kinney, M.D.; Young, B.

1995-01-01

In recent years, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities commonly have been classified as reactor, non-reactor nuclear, or nuclear facilities. Safety analysis documentation was prepared for these facilities, with few exceptions, using the requirements in either DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System; or DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Traditionally, this has been accomplished by development of an extensive Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which identifies hazards, assesses risks of facility operation, describes and analyzes adequacy of measures taken to control hazards, and evaluates potential accidents and their associated risks. This process is complicated by analysis of secondary hazards and adequacy of backup (redundant) systems. The traditional SAR process is advantageous for DOE facilities with appreciable hazards or operational risks. SAR preparation for a low-risk facility or process can be cost-prohibitive and quite challenging because conventional safety analysis protocols may not readily be applied to a low-risk facility. The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management recognized this potential disadvantage and issued an EM limited technical standard, No. 5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation. This standard can be used for developing documentation for a facility classified as radiological, including preparation of an auditable (defensible) safety analysis. In support of the radiological facility classification process, the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project has developed an auditable safety analysis document based upon the postulation criteria and hazards analysis techniques defined in DOE Order 5480.23

Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bengston, S.J.

1994-05-01

This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

Operational and safety requirement of radiation facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zulkafli Ghazali

2007-01-01

Gamma and electron irradiation facilities are the most common industrial sources of ionizing radiation. They have been used for medical, industrial and research purposes since the 1950s. Currently there are more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation worldwide. These facilities are either used for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, or the eradication of insect infestation. Irradiation with electron beam, gamma ray or ultra violet light can also destroy complex organic contaminants in both liquid and gaseous waste. EB systems are replacing traditional chemical sterilization methods in the medical supply industry. The ultra-violet curing facility, however, has found more industrial application in printing and furniture industries. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, and thus there is a potential of accidental exposure in the irradiation chamber which can be lethal within minutes. Although, the safety record of this industry has been relatively very good, there have been fatalities recorded in Italy (1975), Norway (1982), El Salvador (1989) and Israel (1990). Precautions against uncontrolled entry into irradiation chamber must therefore be taken. This is especially so in the case of gamma irradiation facilities those contain large amounts of radioactivity. If the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed. This paper will, to certain extent, describe safety procedure and system being installed at ALURTRON, Nuclear Malaysia to eliminate accidental exposure of electron beam irradiation. (author)

78 FR 69433 - Executive Order 13650 Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security Listening Sessions

Science.gov (United States)

2013-11-19

... Chemical Facility Safety and Security Listening Sessions AGENCY: National Protection and Programs... from stakeholders on issues pertaining to Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (Executive... regulations, guidance, and policies; and identifying best practices in chemical facility safety and security...

Regulatory measures of BARC Safety Council to control radiation exposure in BARC Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rajdeep; Jolly, V.M.; Jayarajan, K.

2018-01-01

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre is involved in multidisciplinary research and developmental activities, related to peaceful use of nuclear energy including societal benefits. BARC facilities at different parts of India include nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, research reactors, nuclear recycle facilities and various Physics, Chemistry and Biological laboratories. BARC Safety Council (BSC) is the regulatory body for BARC facilities and takes regulatory measures for radiation protection. BSC has many safety committees for radiation protection including Operating Plants Safety Review Committee (OPSRC), Committee to Review Applications for Authorization of Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (CRAASDRW) and Design Safety Review Committees (DSRC) in 2 nd tier and Unit Level Safety Committees (ULSCs) in 3 rd tier under OPSRC

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Bugey nuclear power plant (Ain (FR)): 4 PWR reactors in operation (INB 78 and 89), one partially dismantled graphite-gas reactor (INB 45), an inter-regional fuel storage facility (MIR, INB 102), and a radioactive waste storage and conditioning facility under construction (ICEDA, INB 173). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Integrated Framework for Patient Safety and Energy Efficiency in Healthcare Facilities Retrofit Projects.

Science.gov (United States)

Mohammadpour, Atefeh; Anumba, Chimay J; Messner, John I

2016-07-01

There is a growing focus on enhancing energy efficiency in healthcare facilities, many of which are decades old. Since replacement of all aging healthcare facilities is not economically feasible, the retrofitting of these facilities is an appropriate path, which also provides an opportunity to incorporate energy efficiency measures. In undertaking energy efficiency retrofits, it is vital that the safety of the patients in these facilities is maintained or enhanced. However, the interactions between patient safety and energy efficiency have not been adequately addressed to realize the full benefits of retrofitting healthcare facilities. To address this, an innovative integrated framework, the Patient Safety and Energy Efficiency (PATSiE) framework, was developed to simultaneously enhance patient safety and energy efficiency. The framework includes a step -: by -: step procedure for enhancing both patient safety and energy efficiency. It provides a structured overview of the different stages involved in retrofitting healthcare facilities and improves understanding of the intricacies associated with integrating patient safety improvements with energy efficiency enhancements. Evaluation of the PATSiE framework was conducted through focus groups with the key stakeholders in two case study healthcare facilities. The feedback from these stakeholders was generally positive, as they considered the framework useful and applicable to retrofit projects in the healthcare industry. © The Author(s) 2016.

Fast reactor test facilities in the US safety program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avery, R.; Dickerman, C.E.; Lennox, D.H.; Rose, D.

1979-01-01

The needs for safety information derivable from in-pile programs are reviewed, and the correlation made with existing and planned capability. In view of the current status of the U.S. breeder program, emphasis is given in the review to the impact of different fast breeder options on the required program and facilities. It is concluded that facility needs are somewhat independent of specific fast breeder concept, even though the relative emphasis on the various safety issues will differ. 8 refs

Enhancement of safety at nuclear facilities in Pakistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahmad, S.A.; Hayat, T.; Azhar, W.

2006-01-01

Pakistan is benefiting from nuclear technology mostly in health and energy sectors as well as agriculture and industry and has an impeccable safety record. At the national level uses of nuclear technology started in 1955 resulting in the operation of Karachi Radioisotope Center, Karachi, in December 1960. Pakistan Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) was formulated in 1964 with subsequent promulgation of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Ordinance in 1965 to cope with the anticipated introduction of a research reactor, namely PARR-I, and a nuclear power plant, namely KANUPP. Since then Pakistan's nuclear program has expanded to include numerous nuclear facilities of varied nature. This program has definite economic and social impacts by producing electricity, treating and diagnosing cancer patients, and introducing better crop varieties. Appropriate radiation protection includes a number of measures including database of sealed radiation sources at PAEC operated nuclear facilities, see Table l, updated during periodic physical verification of these sources, strict adherence to the BSS-115, IAEA recommended enforcement of zoning at research reactors and NPPs, etc. Pakistan is party to several international conventions and treaties, such as Convention of Nuclear Safety and Early Notification, to improve and enhance safety at its nuclear facilities. In addition Pakistan generally and PAEC particularly believes in a blend of prudent regulations and good/best practices. This is described in this paper. (Author)

Safety Assessment Methodologies and Their Application in Development of Near Surface Waste Disposal Facilities--ASAM Project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, B.; Metcalf, P.

2003-01-01

Safety of near surface disposal facilities is a primary focus and objective of stakeholders involved in radioactive waste management of low and intermediate level waste and safety assessment is an important tool contributing to the evaluation and demonstration of the overall safety of these facilities. It plays significant role in different stages of development of these facilities (site characterization, design, operation, closure) and especially for those facilities for which safety assessment has not been performed or safety has not been demonstrated yet and the future has not been decided. Safety assessments also create the basis for the safety arguments presented to nuclear regulators, public and other interested parties in respect of the safety of existing facilities, the measures to upgrade existing facilities and development of new facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a number of research coordinated projects in the field of development and improvement of approaches to safety assessment and methodologies for safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities, such as NSARS (Near Surface Radioactive Waste Disposal Safety Assessment Reliability Study) and ISAM (Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities) projects. These projects were very successful and showed that there is a need to promote the consistent application of the safety assessment methodologies and to explore approaches to regulatory review of safety assessments and safety cases in order to make safety related decisions. These objectives have been the basis of the IAEA follow up coordinated research project--ASAM (Application of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities), which will commence in November 2002 and continue for a period of three years

Application of the management system for facilities and activities. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

This Safety Guide supports the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. It provides generic guidance to aid in establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a management system that complies with the requirements established. In addition to this Safety Guide, there are a number of Safety Guides for specific technical areas. Together these provide all the guidance necessary for implementing these requirements. This publication supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-Q1-Q7 (1996). The guidance provided here may be used by organizations in the following ways: - To assist in the development of the management systems of organizations directly responsible for operating facilities and activities and providing services for: Nuclear facilities; Activities using sources of ionizing radiation; Radioactive waste management; The transport of radioactive material; Radiation protection activities; Any other practices or circumstances in which people may be exposed to radiation from naturally occurring or artificial sources; The regulation of such facilities and activities; - To assist in the development of the management systems of the relevant regulatory bodies; - By the operator, to specify to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any guidance of this Safety Guide that should be included in the supplier's management system for the supply and delivery of products

Design of Safety Parameter Monitoring Function in a Research Reactor Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Park, Jaekwan; Suh, Yongsuk [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-05-15

The primary purpose of the safety parameter monitoring system (SPDS) is to help operating personnel in the control room make quick assessments of the plant safety status. Thus, the basic function of the SPDS is a provision of a continuous indication of plant parameters or derived variables representative of the safety status of the plant. NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 provides details of the functional criteria for the SPDS, as one of the action plan requirements from TMI accident. The system provides various functions as follows: · Alerting based on safety function decision logics, · Success path analysis to achieve the integrity of the safety functions, · 3 layer display architecture - safety function, success path display for each safety function, system summary and equipment details for each safety function, · Integration with computer-based procedure. According to a Notice of the NSSC No. 2012-31, a research reactor facility generating more than 2 MW of power should also be furnished with the SPDS for emergency preparedness. Generally, a research reactor is a small size facility, and its number of instrumentations is fewer than that of NPPs. In particular, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions from an economic perspective. Therefore, a safety parameter display system optimized for a research reactor facility must be proposed. This paper provides the requirement analysis results and proposes the design of safety parameter monitoring function for a research reactor. The safety parameter monitoring function supporting control room personnel during emergency conditions should be designed in a research reactor facility. The facility size and number of signals are smaller than that of the power plants. Also, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions of nuclear power plants from an economic perspective. Thus, a safety parameter display system optimized to a research reactor must be proposed. First, we found important design items

Design of Safety Parameter Monitoring Function in a Research Reactor Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Park, Jaekwan; Suh, Yongsuk

2014-01-01

The primary purpose of the safety parameter monitoring system (SPDS) is to help operating personnel in the control room make quick assessments of the plant safety status. Thus, the basic function of the SPDS is a provision of a continuous indication of plant parameters or derived variables representative of the safety status of the plant. NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 provides details of the functional criteria for the SPDS, as one of the action plan requirements from TMI accident. The system provides various functions as follows: · Alerting based on safety function decision logics, · Success path analysis to achieve the integrity of the safety functions, · 3 layer display architecture - safety function, success path display for each safety function, system summary and equipment details for each safety function, · Integration with computer-based procedure. According to a Notice of the NSSC No. 2012-31, a research reactor facility generating more than 2 MW of power should also be furnished with the SPDS for emergency preparedness. Generally, a research reactor is a small size facility, and its number of instrumentations is fewer than that of NPPs. In particular, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions from an economic perspective. Therefore, a safety parameter display system optimized for a research reactor facility must be proposed. This paper provides the requirement analysis results and proposes the design of safety parameter monitoring function for a research reactor. The safety parameter monitoring function supporting control room personnel during emergency conditions should be designed in a research reactor facility. The facility size and number of signals are smaller than that of the power plants. Also, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions of nuclear power plants from an economic perspective. Thus, a safety parameter display system optimized to a research reactor must be proposed. First, we found important design items

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant (INB 75, Haut-Rhin, 68 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Penly nuclear power plant (INB 136 and 140, Seine-Maritime, 76 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant (INB 75, Haut-Rhin, 68 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Blayais nuclear power plant (INB 86 and 110, Gironde (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Penly nuclear power plant (INB 136 and 140, Seine-Maritime, 76 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Civaux nuclear power plant (INB 158 and 159, Vienne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Blayais nuclear power plant (INB 86 and 110, Gironde (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Civaux nuclear power plant (INB 158 and 159, Vienne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Safety of Long-term Interim Storage Facilities - Workshop Proceedings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

The objective of this workshop was to discuss and review current national activities, plans and regulatory approaches for the safety of long term interim storage facilities dedicated to spent nuclear fuel (SF), high level waste (HLW) and other radioactive materials with prolonged storage regimes. It was also intended to discuss results of experiments and to identify necessary R and D to confirm safety of fuel and cask during the long-term storage. Safety authorities and their Technical Support Organisation (TSO), Fuel Cycle Facilities (FCF) operating organisations and international organisations were invited to share information on their approaches, practices and current developments. The workshop was organised in an opening session, three technical sessions, and a conclusion session. The technical sessions were focused on: - National approaches for long term interim storage facilities; - Safety requirements, regulatory framework and implementation issues; - Technical issues and operational experience, needs for R and D. Each session consisted of a number of presentations followed by a panel discussion moderated by the session Chairs. A summary of each session and subsequent discussion that ensued are provided as well as a summary of the results of the workshop with the text of the papers given and presentations made

Modernization of safety system for the radiation facility for industrial sterilization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Drndarevic, V.; Djuric, D.; Koturovic, A.; Arandjelovic, M.; Mikic, R.

1995-01-01

Modernization of the existing safety system of the radiation facility for industrial sterilization at the Vinca Institute of nuclear science is done. In order to improve radiation safety of the facility, the latest recommendations and requirements of IAEA have been implemented. Concept and design of the modernized system are presented. The new elements of the safety system are described and the improvements achieved by means of this modernization are pointed out. (author)

Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-12-01

The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by DOE itself. The three major recommendations are: under any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE's nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 103, 104, 114 and 115). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 103, 104, 114 and 115). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 111 and 112). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INB no. 75). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 135 and 142). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 86 and 110). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-07-15

Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

Mechanistic facility safety and source term analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

PLYS, M.G.

1999-01-01

A PC-based computer program was created for facility safety and source term analysis at Hanford The program has been successfully applied to mechanistic prediction of source terms from chemical reactions in underground storage tanks, hydrogen combustion in double contained receiver tanks, and proccss evaluation including the potential for runaway reactions in spent nuclear fuel processing. Model features include user-defined facility room, flow path geometry, and heat conductors, user-defined non-ideal vapor and aerosol species, pressure- and density-driven gas flows, aerosol transport and deposition, and structure to accommodate facility-specific source terms. Example applications are presented here

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department. Annual report 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E.

2000-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Aarkrog, A.; Brodersen, K.

1998-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1997. The department's research and development activities were organized in four research programmes: Reactor Safety, Radiation protection, Radioecology, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1998

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E.

1999-04-01

The report present a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1998. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lsits of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

Transuranic-contaminated solid waste Treatment Development Facility. Final safety analysis report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Warner, C.L.

1979-07-01

The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Transuranic-Contaminated Solid-Waste Treatment Facility has been prepared in compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual Chapter 0531, Safety of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. The Treatment Development Facility (TDF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is a research and development facility dedicated to the study of radioactive-waste-management processes. This analysis addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and the design and operating characteristics of the first study process, controlled air incineration and aqueous scrub off-gas treatment with respect to both normal and accident conditions. The credible accidents having potentially serious consequences relative to the operation of the facility and the first process have been analyzed and the consequences of each postulated credible accident are presented. Descriptions of the control systems, engineered safeguards, and administrative and operational features designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such accidents are presented. The essential features of the operating and emergency procedures, environmental protection and monitoring programs, as well as the health and safety, quality assurance, and employee training programs are described

Transuranic-contaminated solid waste Treatment Development Facility. Final safety analysis report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Warner, C.L. (comp.)

1979-07-01

The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Transuranic-Contaminated Solid-Waste Treatment Facility has been prepared in compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual Chapter 0531, Safety of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. The Treatment Development Facility (TDF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is a research and development facility dedicated to the study of radioactive-waste-management processes. This analysis addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and the design and operating characteristics of the first study process, controlled air incineration and aqueous scrub off-gas treatment with respect to both normal and accident conditions. The credible accidents having potentially serious consequences relative to the operation of the facility and the first process have been analyzed and the consequences of each postulated credible accident are presented. Descriptions of the control systems, engineered safeguards, and administrative and operational features designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such accidents are presented. The essential features of the operating and emergency procedures, environmental protection and monitoring programs, as well as the health and safety, quality assurance, and employee training programs are described.

CP-50 calibration facility radiological safety assessment document

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chilton, M.W.; Hill, R.L.; Eubank, B.F.

1980-03-01

The CP-50 Calibration Facility Radiological Safety Assessment document, prepared at the request of the Nevada Operations Office of the US Department of Energy to satisfy provisions of ERDA Manual Chapter 0531, presents design features, systems controls, and procedures used in the operation of the calibration facility. Site and facility characteristics and routine and non-routine operations, including hypothetical incidents or accidents are discussed and design factors, source control systems, and radiation monitoring considerations are described

Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Volume 2, Guidance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in Vol. 1 of this Standard. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While Vol. 1 is generally applicable in that requirements there apply to a wide range of fusion facilities, this volume is concerned mainly with large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This volume is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment

Criticality safety research on nuclear fuel cycle facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Miyoshi, Yoshinori [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment

2004-07-01

This paper present d s current status and future program of the criticality safety research on nuclear fuel cycle made by Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. Experimental research on solution fuel treated in reprocessing plant has been performed using two critical facilities, STACY and TRACY. Fundamental data of static and transient characteristics are accumulated for validation of criticality safety codes. Subcritical measurements are also made for developing a monitoring system for criticality safety. Criticality safety codes system for solution and power system, and evaluation method related to burnup credit are developed. (author)

Preliminary safety assessment of the WIPP facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Balestri, R.J.; Torres, B.W.; Pahwa, S.B.; Brannen, J.P.

1979-01-01

This paper summarizes the efforts to perform a safety assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility being proposed for southeastern New Mexico. This preliminary safety assessment is limited to a consequence assessment in terms of the dose to a maximally exposed individual as a result of introducing the radionuclides into the biosphere. The extremely low doses to the organs as a result of the liquid breach scenarios are contrasted with the background radiation

Operational safety assessment of underground test facilities for mined geologic waste disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Elder, H.K.

1993-01-01

This paper describes the operational safety assessment for the underground facilities for the exploratory studies facility (ESF) at the Yucca Mountain Project. The systematic identification and evaluation of hazards related to the ESF is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach based on the analysis of potential accidents was used since radiological safety analysis was not required. The risk assessment summarized credible accident scenarios and the design provides mitigation of the risks to a level that the facility can be constructed and operated with an adequate level of safety. The risk assessment also provides reasonable assurance that all identifiable major accident scenarios have been reviewed and design mitigation features provided to ensure an adequate level of safety

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department. Annual report 1999

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majborn, B.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E. [eds.

2000-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1999

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Majborn, B.; Damkjær, A.; Jensen, Per Hedemann

2000-01-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department´s research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: "Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety" and"Radioecology and Tracer Studies". The nuclear...... facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are includedtogether with a summary of the staff´s participation in national and international committees....

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1997

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majborn, B.; Aarkrog, A.; Brodersen, K. [and others

1998-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1997. The department`s research and development activities were organized in four research programmes: Reactor Safety, Radiation protection, Radioecology, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff`s participation in national and international committees. (au) 11 tabs., 39 ills.; 74 refs.

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1998

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E

1999-04-01

The report present a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1998. The department`s research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: `Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety` and `Radioecology and Tracer Studies`. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lsits of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff`s participation in national and international committees. (au)

Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities department annual report 1996

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Floto, H.; Heydorn, K.; Oelgaard, P.L.

1997-04-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1996. The Department's research and development activities are organized in three research programmes: Radiation Protection, Reactor Safety, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the Research Reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the Educational Reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au) 2 tabs., 28 ills

NSC confirms principles for safety review on Radioactive Waste Burial Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1988-01-01

The Nuclear Safety Commission authorized the scope of Principles for Safety Examination on Radioactive Waste Burial Facilities as suitable, the draft report for which was established by the Special Committee on Safety Standards of Radioactive Waste (Chairman Prof. Masao Sago, Science University of Tokyo) and reported on March 10 to the NSC. The principles include the theory that the facility must be controlled step by step, corresponding to the amount of radioactivity over 300 to 400 years after the burial of low-level solid radioactive waste with site conditions safe even in the event of occurrence of a natural disaster. The principles will be used for administrative safety examination against the application of the business on low-level radioactive waste burial facility which Japan Nuclear Fuel Industries, Inc. is planning to install at Rokkashomura, Aomori Prefecture. (author)

Criticality safety and facility design considerations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waltz, W.R.

1991-06-01

Operations with fissile material introduce the risk of a criticality accident that may be lethal to nearby personnel. In addition, concerns over criticality safety can result in substantial delays and shutdown of facility operations. For these reasons, it is clear that the prevention of a nuclear criticality accident should play a major role in the design of a nuclear facility. The emphasis of this report will be placed on engineering design considerations in the prevention of criticality. The discussion will not include other important aspects, such as the physics of calculating limits nor criticality alarm systems

Safety in Elevators and Grain Handling Facilities. Module SH-27. Safety and Health.

Science.gov (United States)

Center for Occupational Research and Development, Inc., Waco, TX.

This student module on safety in elevators and grain handling facilities is one of 50 modules concerned with job safety and health. Following the introduction, 15 objectives (each keyed to a page in the text) the student is expected to accomplish are listed (e.g., Explain how explosion suppression works). Then each objective is taught in detail,…

A bicycle safety index for evaluating urban street facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

Asadi-Shekari, Zohreh; Moeinaddini, Mehdi; Zaly Shah, Muhammad

2015-01-01

The objectives of this research are to conceptualize the Bicycle Safety Index (BSI) that considers all parts of the street and to propose a universal guideline with microscale details. A point system method comparing existing safety facilities to a defined standard is proposed to estimate the BSI. Two streets in Singapore and Malaysia are chosen to examine this model. The majority of previous measurements to evaluate street conditions for cyclists usually cannot cover all parts of streets, including segments and intersections. Previous models also did not consider all safety indicators and cycling facilities at a microlevel in particular. This study introduces a new concept of a practical BSI to complete previous studies using its practical, easy-to-follow, point system-based outputs. This practical model can be used in different urban settings to estimate the level of safety for cycling and suggest some improvements based on the standards.

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facility of Brennilis - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Monts d'Arree (EL4-D or Brennilis) site (INB 162 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facilities of Brennilis - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Monts d'Arree (EL4-D or Brennilis) site (INB 162 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Psychometric model for safety culture assessment in nuclear research facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nascimento, C.S. do, E-mail: claudio.souza@ctmsp.mar.mil.br [Centro Tecnológico da Marinha em São Paulo (CTMSP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2468, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil); Andrade, D.A., E-mail: delvonei@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN – SP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2242, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil); Mesquita, R.N. de, E-mail: rnavarro@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN – SP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2242, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil)

2017-04-01

Highlights: • A psychometric model to evaluate ‘safety climate’ at nuclear research facilities. • The model presented evidences of good psychometric qualities. • The model was applied to nuclear research facilities in Brazil. • Some ‘safety culture’ weaknesses were detected in the assessed organization. • A potential tool to develop safety management programs in nuclear facilities. - Abstract: A safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants depends not only on technical performance, but also on the people and on the organization. Organizational factors have been recognized as the main causal mechanisms of accidents by research organizations through USA, Europe and Japan. Deficiencies related with these factors reveal weaknesses in the organization’s safety culture. A significant number of instruments to assess the safety culture based on psychometric models that evaluate safety climate through questionnaires, and which are based on reliability and validity evidences, have been published in health and ‘safety at work’ areas. However, there are few safety culture assessment instruments with these characteristics (reliability and validity) available on nuclear literature. Therefore, this work proposes an instrument to evaluate, with valid and reliable measures, the safety climate of nuclear research facilities. The instrument was developed based on methodological principles applied to research modeling and its psychometric properties were evaluated by a reliability analysis and validation of content, face and construct. The instrument was applied to an important nuclear research organization in Brazil. This organization comprises 4 research reactors and many nuclear laboratories. The survey results made possible a demographic characterization and the identification of some possible safety culture weaknesses and pointing out potential areas to be improved in the assessed organization. Good evidence of reliability with Cronbach's alpha

Psychometric model for safety culture assessment in nuclear research facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nascimento, C.S. do; Andrade, D.A.; Mesquita, R.N. de

2017-01-01

Highlights: • A psychometric model to evaluate ‘safety climate’ at nuclear research facilities. • The model presented evidences of good psychometric qualities. • The model was applied to nuclear research facilities in Brazil. • Some ‘safety culture’ weaknesses were detected in the assessed organization. • A potential tool to develop safety management programs in nuclear facilities. - Abstract: A safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants depends not only on technical performance, but also on the people and on the organization. Organizational factors have been recognized as the main causal mechanisms of accidents by research organizations through USA, Europe and Japan. Deficiencies related with these factors reveal weaknesses in the organization’s safety culture. A significant number of instruments to assess the safety culture based on psychometric models that evaluate safety climate through questionnaires, and which are based on reliability and validity evidences, have been published in health and ‘safety at work’ areas. However, there are few safety culture assessment instruments with these characteristics (reliability and validity) available on nuclear literature. Therefore, this work proposes an instrument to evaluate, with valid and reliable measures, the safety climate of nuclear research facilities. The instrument was developed based on methodological principles applied to research modeling and its psychometric properties were evaluated by a reliability analysis and validation of content, face and construct. The instrument was applied to an important nuclear research organization in Brazil. This organization comprises 4 research reactors and many nuclear laboratories. The survey results made possible a demographic characterization and the identification of some possible safety culture weaknesses and pointing out potential areas to be improved in the assessed organization. Good evidence of reliability with Cronbach's alpha

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chooz nuclear power plant (Ardennes (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (Chooz B, INB 139 and 144) and one partially dismantled PWR reactor (Chooz A, INB 163). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary followed by the viewpoint of the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Paluel nuclear power plant (INB no. 103 - Paluel 1, no. 104 - Paluel 2, no. 114 - Paluel 3 and no. 115 - Paluel 4, Cany-Barville - Seine-Maritime (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document ends with a glossary and no recommendation from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Paluel nuclear power plant (INB no. 103 - Paluel 1, no. 104 - Paluel 2, no. 114 - Paluel 3 and no. 115 - Paluel 4, Cany-Barville - Seine-Maritime (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Golfech nuclear power plant (INB 135 and 142, Tarn-et-Garonne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cattenom nuclear power plant (INB 124, 125, 126 and 137, Moselle (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cattenom nuclear power plant (INB 124, 125, 126 and 137, Moselle (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Golfech nuclear power plant (INB 135 and 142, Tarn-et-Garonne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chinon nuclear power plant (Indre-et-Loire, 37 (FR)): 4 PWR reactors in operation (Chinon B, INB 107 and 132), 3 partially dismantled graphite-gas reactors (Chinon A, INB 133, 153 and 161), a workshop for irradiated materials (AMI, INB 94), and an inter-regional fuel storage facility (MIR, INB 99). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chinon nuclear power plant (Indre-et-Loire, 37 (FR)): 4 PWR reactors in operation (Chinon B, INB 107 and 132), 3 partially dismantled graphite-gas reactors (Chinon A, INB 133, 153 and 161), a workshop for irradiated materials (AMI, INB 94), and an inter-regional fuel storage facility (MIR, INB 99). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Radiation safety aspects of new X-ray free electron laser facility, SACLA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Asano, Yoshihiro

2013-01-01

In the safety point of view, X-ray free electron laser facilities have some characteristics in comparison with 3 rd generation synchrotron radiation facilities. One is that the high energy electrons are always injected into the beam dump and the beamlines must be constructed in the direction of the movements of electrons, and another is that the total number of accelerated electrons of X-ray free electron laser facilities is much larger than that of synchrotron radiation facilities. In addition to the importance of safety interlock systems, therefore, it is important that high energy electrons never invade into X-ray free electron laser beamlines and the amount of accelerated electron beam losses must be reduced as much as possible. At SACLA, a safety permanent magnet was installed into the X-ray light beam axis, and a beam halo monitor and beam loss monitors were installed within and around the electron transport pipes, respectively. In comparison with the SPring-8 synchrotron radiation facility, shielding design of SACLA, outline of the radiation safety systems including the monitors will be presented

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Creys-Malville nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Creys-Malville nuclear power plant (also known as Superphenix power plant, INB no. 91, Creys-Mepieu - Isere (FR)) and the other fuel and waste storage facilities of the site (INB no. 141). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Creys-Malville nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Creys-Malville nuclear power plant (also known as Superphenix power plant, INB no. 91, Creys-Mepieu - Isere (FR)) and the other fuel and waste storage facilities of the site (INB no. 141). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-12-01

The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE`s nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation.

Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-12-01

The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE's nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation

Demonstration of safety of decommissioning of facilities using radioactive material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, Borislava; O'Donnell, Patricio

2008-01-01

Full text:The development of nuclear industry worldwide in the recent years has particular impact on the approach of operators, regulators and interested parties to the implementation of the final phases (decommissioning) of all facilities that use radioactive material (from nuclear power plants, fuel fabrication facilities, research reactors to small research or medical laboratories). Decommissioning is becoming an increasingly important activity for two main reasons - termination of the practice in a safe manner with the view to use the facility or the site for other purposes, or termination of the practice and reuse the facility or site for new built nuclear facilities. The latter is of special relevance to multi-facility sites where for example new nuclear power plants and envisaged. However, limited countries have the adequate legal and regulatory framework, and experience necessary for decommissioning. In order to respond to this challenge of the nuclear industry and assist Member States in the adequate planning, conduct and termination of decommissioning of wide range of facilities, over the last decade the IAEA has implemented and initiated several projects in this field. One of the main focuses of this assistance to operators, regulators and specialists involved in decommissioning is the evaluation and demonstration of safety of decommissioning. This importance of these Agency activities was also highlighted in the International Action Plan on Decommissioning, during the second Joint Convention meeting in 2006 and the International Conference on Lessons Learned from Decommissioning in Athens in 2006. The IAEA has been providing technical support to its Member States in this field through several mechanisms: (1) the establishment of a framework of safety standards on decommissioning and development of a supporting technical documents; (2) the establishment of an international peer review mechanism for decommissioning; (3) the technical cooperation projects

Status of safety in nuclear facilities - 2012. AREVA General Inspectorate Annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-05-01

After a message from the Areva's Chief Executive Officer and a message from the senior Vice President of safety, health, security, sustainable development, a text by the inspector general comments the key safety results (events, dose levels, radiological impacts), the inspection findings, the areas of vigilance (relationship with the ASN, the management of the criticality risk, and facility compliance), some significant topics after the Fukushima accident. Then this report addresses the status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the group's facilities and operations. It more specifically addresses the context and findings (lessons learned from the inspections, operating experience from event, employee radiation monitoring, environmental monitoring), crosscutting processes (safety management, controlling facility compliance, subcontractor guidance and management, crisis management), specific risks (criticality risk, fire hazards, transportation safety, radioactive waste management, pollution prevention, liability mitigation and dismantling), and areas for improvement and outlook

Systems engineering applied to integrated safety management for high consequence facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barter, R; Morais, B.

1998-01-01

Integrated Safety Management is a concept that is being actively promoted by the U.S. Department of Energy as a means of assuring safe operation of its facilities. The concept involves the integration of safety precepts into work planning rather than adjusting for safe operations after defining the work activity. The system engineering techniques used to design an integrated safety management system for a high consequence research facility are described. An example is given to show how the concepts evolved with the system design

Development of radiation safety monitoring system at gamma greenhouse gamma facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hairul Nizam Idris; Azimawati Ahmad, Ahmad Zaki Hussain; Ahmad Fairuz Mohd Nasir

2009-01-01

This paper is discussing about installation of radiation safety monitoring system at Gamma Greenhouse Gamma facility, Agrotechnology and Bioscience Division (BAB). This facility actually is an outdoor type irradiation facility, which first in Nuclear Malaysia and the only one in Malaysia. Source Cs-137 (801 Curie) was use as radiation source and it located at the centre of 30 metres diameter size of open irradiation area. The radiation measurement and monitoring system to be equipped in this facility were required the proper equipment and devices, specially purpose for application at outside of building. Research review, literature study and discussion with the equipment manufacturers was being carried out, in effort to identify the best system should be developed. Factors such as tropical climate, environment surrounding and security were considered during selecting the proper system. Since this facility involving with panoramic radiation type, several critical and strategic locations have been fixed with radiation detectors, up to the distance at 200 meter from the radiation source. Apart from that, this developed system also was built for capable to provide the online real-time reading (using internet). In general, it can be summarized that the radiation safety monitoring system for outdoor type irradiation facility was found much different and complex compared to the system for indoor type facility. Keyword: radiation monitoring, radiation safety, Gamma Greenhouse, outdoor irradiation facility, panoramic radiation. (Author)

Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cerruti, S.J.

1997-01-01

These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S ampersand H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules

Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cerruti, S.J.

1997-01-14

These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S & H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules.

Technical Safety Requirements for the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

CERN Document Server

Mahn, J A E M J G

2003-01-01

This document provides the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). The TSR is a compilation of requirements that define the conditions, the safe boundaries, and the administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous materials. These requirements constitute an agreement between DOE and Sandia National Laboratories management regarding the safe operation of the Gamma Irradiation Facility.

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Tricastin nuclear facility (BCOT) - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the management of the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Flamanville nuclear power plant (Manche (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (INB 108 and 109), and 1 PWR under construction (Flamanville 3, INB 167). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, water consumption and waste management at Flamanville 3 construction site) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Flamanville nuclear power plant (Manche (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (INB 108 and 109), and 1 PWR under construction (Flamanville 3, INB 167). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, water consumption and waste management at Flamanville 3 construction site) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chooz nuclear power plant (Ardennes (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (Chooz B, INB 139 and 144) and one partially dismantled PWR reactor (Chooz A, INB 163). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Belleville-Sur-Loire nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 127 and 128). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 111 and 112). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Dampierre-En-Burly nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 84 and 85). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Nogent-Sur-Seine nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 129 and 130). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laycak, D T

2010-03-05

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

Safety evaluation of the loss of fluid test facility project No. 394

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-05-01

Assessment of the safety of the LOFT facility and subsequent recommendations have been based on a comparison of the LOFT facility to requirements for commercial power reactors. In this comparison, the many unique features of the LOFT facility were considered including the low power level, the limited operational use as a test reactor, and the remoteness of the site. Based on this assessment, it is concluded, that while the likelihood of an accidental release of fission products may be greater than for a commercial power reactor, the consequences of such a release are reduced by the lower fission product inventory, the remoteness of the site and the capability of evacuating the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and adjacent areas. There is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will not be endangered due to operation of this facility, specifically: The INEL site is acceptable with respect to location, land use, population distribution, controlled access, hydrology, meteorology, geology and seismology. Sufficient engineered safety features have been included to assure that the potential offsite doses are well within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. The LOFT facility has been designed in general accordance with standards, guides and codes which are comparable to those applied to commercial power reactors and any exceptions to these have been based on the unique features of the LOFT facility. Certain matters including the final safety analyses based on detailed component designs, Technical Specifications, LOCE controls and detailed program plan have not been reviewed but we assume will properly be resolved by ERDA, which has the ultimate responsibility for the safety of this facility. Changes to the facility design or program plan such as removal of the fueled Mobile Test Assembly or blowdowns to the containment vessel also will require additional analyses and review. (U.S.)

Proceedings of the theme meeting on the journey of BARC Safety Council for strengthening safety culture in BARC facilities: 2000-2017

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jayarajan, K.; Jolly, V.M.

2017-07-01

The book has about one hundred articles, written by the regulators and the authorities of the facilities and projects of BARC. The articles are organised into four parts. Part-I gives an overview of the history of safety regulation in BARC and the details of BARC Safety Framework. Part-II of the book has articles about the facilities and projects of BARC, for which BSC had issued of regulatory consents. The facility-specific articles, written by the concerned project/facility authorities, emphasis safety aspects of the facilities and the regulatory processes they had undergone. This part is divided into seven sections, based on the broad category of facility. Experts in the concerned areas have written general articles on each category of facility. The Part-III consists of the work carried out by the specialised committees, which are under the purview of BSC. Some of the other regulatory activities of BSC are summarised in Part-IV of this book. In addition to safety and regulatory activities of BSC, the book contains the details of the major facilities and upcoming projects of BARC. Papers relevant to INIS are indexed separately

Safety analysis of the existing 804 and 845 firing facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Odell, B.N.

1986-01-01

A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 804 and 845 Firing Facilities at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, peronnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operation and credible accident that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequence were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives. Since this hazard has the potential for causing significant on-site and minimum off-site consequences, Bunkers 804 and 845 have been classified as moderate hazard facilties per DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at these facilities will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

Obtaining laser safety at a synchrotron radiation user facility: The Advanced Light Source

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barat, K.

1996-01-01

The Advanced Light Source (ALS) is a US national facility for scientific research and development located at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California. The ALS delivers the world's brightest synchrotron radiation in the far ultraviolet and soft X-ray regions of the spectrum. As a user facility it is available to researchers from industry, academia, and laboratories from around the world. Subsequently, a wide range of safety concerns become involved. This article relates not only to synchrotron facilities but to any user facility. A growing number of US centers are attracting organizations and individuals to use the equipment on site, for a fee. This includes synchrotron radiation and/or free electron facilities, specialty research centers, and laser job shops. Personnel coming to such a facility bring with them a broad spectrum of safety cultures. Upon entering, the guests must accommodate to the host facility safety procedures. This article describes a successful method to deal with that responsibility

Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

KRAHN, D.E.

2000-01-01

The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt of multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. removal of free water from the MCOs using the cold vacuum drying process, and inerting and testing of the MCOs before transport to the Canister Storage Building. Controls required for public safety, significant defense in depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included

Activity of safety review for the facilities using nuclear material (2). Safety review results and maintenance experiences for hot laboratories

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amagai, Tomio; Fujishima, Tadatsune; Mizukoshi, Yasutaka; Sakamoto, Naoki; Ohmori, Tsuyoshi

2009-01-01

In the site of O-arai Research and Development Center of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), five hot laboratories for post-irradiation examination and development of plutonium fuels are operated more than 30 years. A safety review method for preventive maintenance on these hot laboratories includes test facilities and devices are established in 2003. After that, the safety review of these facilities and devices are done and taken the necessary maintenance based on the results in each year. In 2008, 372 test facilities and devices in these hot laboratories were checked and reviewed by this method. As a results of the safety review, repair issues of 38 facilities of above 372 facilities were resolved. This report shows the review results and maintenance experiences based on the results. (author)

Safety evaluation report of hot cell facilities for demonstration of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

You, Gil Sung; Choung, W. M.; Ku, J. H.; Cho, I. J.; Kook, D. H.; Park, S. W.; Bek, S. Y.; Lee, E. P.

2004-10-01

The advanced spent fuel conditioning process(ACP) proposed to reduce the overall volume of the PWR spent fuel and improve safety and economy of the long-term storage of spent fuel. In the next phase(2004∼2006), the hot test will be carried out for verification of the ACP in a laboratory scale. For the hot test, the hot cell facilities of α- type and auxiliary facilities are required essentially for safe handling of high radioactive materials. As the hot cell facilities for demonstration of the ACP, a existing hot cell of β- type will be refurbished to minimize construction expenditures of hot cell facility. Up to now, the detail design of hot cell facilities and process were completed, and the safety analysis was performed to substantiate secure of conservative safety. The design data were submitted for licensing which was necessary for construction and operation of hot cell facilities. The safety investigation of KINS on hot cell facilities was completed, and the license for construction and operation of hot cell facilities was acquired already from MOST. In this report, the safety analysis report submitted to KINS was summarized. And also, the questionnaires issued from KINS and answers of KAERI in process of safety investigation were described in detail

Spent nuclear fuel project cold vacuum drying facility safety equipment list

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

IRWIN, J.J.

1999-01-01

This document provides the safety equipment list (SEL) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF). The SEL was prepared in accordance with the procedure for safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in HNF-PRO-516, ''Safety Structures, Systems, and Components,'' Revision 0 and HNF-PRO-097, Engineering Design and Evaluation, Revision 0. The SEL was developed in conjunction with HNF-SO-SNF-SAR-O02, Safety Analysis Report for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, Phase 2, Supporting Installation of Processing Systems (Garvin 1998). The SEL identifies the SSCs and their safety functions, the design basis accidents for which they are required to perform, the design criteria, codes and standards, and quality assurance requirements that are required for establishing the safety design basis of the SSCs. This SEL has been developed for the CVDF Phase 2 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and shall be updated, expanded, and revised in accordance with future phases of the CVDF SAR until the CVDF final SAR is approved

Safety aspects of front-end fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Srinivasan, G.R.

2003-01-01

Safety of fuel cycle facilities (FCFs) other than Nuclear Power Plants is gaining importance all over the nuclear world as one would not like to leave behind any area of nuclear field in the journey toward excellence in the safe conduct of business in the whole of the nuclear industry. Safety should be part of every day activities, procedures, business practices, system and in fact of the people themselves

A security/safety survey of long term care facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

Acorn, Jonathan R

2010-01-01

What are the major security/safety problems of long term care facilities? What steps are being taken by some facilities to mitigate such problems? Answers to these questions can be found in a survey of IAHSS members involved in long term care security conducted for the IAHSS Long Term Care Security Task Force. The survey, the author points out, focuses primarily on long term care facilities operated by hospitals and health systems. However, he believes, it does accurately reflect the security problems most long term facilities face, and presents valuable information on security systems and practices which should be also considered by independent and chain operated facilities.

Computer security at ukrainian nuclear facilities: interface between nuclear safety and security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chumak, D.; Klevtsov, O.

2015-01-01

Active introduction of information technology, computer instrumentation and control systems (I and C systems) in the nuclear field leads to a greater efficiency and management of technological processes at nuclear facilities. However, this trend brings a number of challenges related to cyber-attacks on the above elements, which violates computer security as well as nuclear safety and security of a nuclear facility. This paper considers regulatory support to computer security at the nuclear facilities in Ukraine. The issue of computer and information security considered in the context of physical protection, because it is an integral component. The paper focuses on the computer security of I and C systems important to nuclear safety. These systems are potentially vulnerable to cyber threats and, in case of cyber-attacks, the potential negative impact on the normal operational processes can lead to a breach of the nuclear facility security. While ensuring nuclear security of I and C systems, it interacts with nuclear safety, therefore, the paper considers an example of an integrated approach to the requirements of nuclear safety and security

Safety analysis and risk assessment of the National Ignition Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brereton, S.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.

1996-01-01

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed U.S. Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium-tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF mission is to achieve inertial confinement fusion (ICF) ignition, access physical conditions in matter of interest to nuclear weapons physics, provide an above ground simulation capability for nuclear weapons effects testing, and contribute to the development of inertial fusion for electrical power production. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the operation of the NIF and the methodology used to study them. It provides a summary of the methodology, an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear power plant (INB 111 and 112, Ardeche (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear power plant (INB 111 and 112, Ardeche (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Safety problems with abandoned explosive facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courtright, W.C.

1969-01-01

Procedures were developed for the safe removal of explosive and radioactive contaminated materials structures and drains from abandoned sites, including explosives processing and service buildings with a goal to return the entire area to its natural state and to permit public access. The safety problems encountered in the cleanup and their solutions are applicable to modification and maintenance work in operating explosive facilities. (U.S.)

The State Surveillance over Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Facilities Act No. 28/1984

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The Act lays down responsibilities of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission in the field of state surveillance over nuclear safety of nuclear facilities; determines the responsibilities of nuclear safety inspectors in their inspection activities; specifies duties of bodies and corporations responsible for nuclear safety of nuclear facilities; stipulates the obligation to set up emergency plans; and specifies penalties imposed on corporations and individuals for noncompliance with nuclear safety provisions. The Act entered into force on 4 April 1984. (J.B.)

Status of safety at Areva group facilities. 2007 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

This report describes the status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the facilities of the AREVA group and gives information on radiation protection in the service operations, as observed through the inspection programs and analyses carried out by the General Inspectorate in 2007. Having been submitted to the group's Supervisory Board, this report is sent to the bodies representing the personnel. Content: 1 - A look back at 2007 by the AREVA General Inspector: Visible progress in 2007, Implementation of the Nuclear Safety Charter, Notable events; 2 - Status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the nuclear facilities and service operations: Personnel radiation protection, Event tracking, Service operations, Criticality control, Radioactive waste and effluent management; 3 - Performance improvement actions; 4 - Description of the General Inspectorate; 5 - Glossary

Physics design of fast reactor safety test facilities for in-pile experiments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Travelli, A.; Matos, J.E.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Shaftman, D.H.; Tzanos, C.P.; Lam, S.K.; Pennington, E.M.; Woodruff, W.L.

1976-01-01

A determined effort to identify and resolve current Fast Breeder Reactor safety testing needs has recently resulted in a number of conceptual designs for FBR safety test facilities which are very complex and diverse both in their features and in their purpose. The paper discusses the physics foundations common to most fast reactor safety test facilities and the constraints which they impose on the design. The logical evolution, features, and capabilities of several major conceptual designs are discussed on the basis of this common background

OECD/NEA WGFCS Workshop: Safety Assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities - Regulatory Approaches and Industry Perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

Nuclear fuel is produced, processed, and stored mainly in industrial-scale facilities. Uranium ores are processed and refined to produce a pure uranium salt stream, Uranium is converted and enriched, nuclear fuel is fabricated (U fuel and U/Pu fuel for the closed cycle option); and spent fuel is stored and reprocessed in some countries (close cycle option). Facilities dedicated to the research and development of new fuel or new processes are also considered as Fuel Cycle Facilities. The safety assessment of nuclear facilities has often been led by the methodology and techniques initially developed for Nuclear Power Plants. As FCFs cover a wide diversity of installations the various approaches of national regulators, and their technical support organizations, for the Safety Assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities are also diverse, as are the approaches by their industries in providing safety justifications for their facilities. The objective of the Working Group on Fuel Cycle Safety is to advance the understanding for both regulators and operators of relevant aspects of nuclear fuel cycle safety in member countries. A large amount of experience is available in safety assessment of FCFs, which should be shared to develop ideas in this field. To contribute to this task, the Workshop on 'Safety Assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities - Regulatory Approaches and Industry Perspectives' was held in Toronto, on 27 - 29 September 2011. The workshop was hosted by Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. The current proceedings provide summary of the results of the workshop with the text of the papers given and presentations made

Improvement of safety approach for accident during operation of LILW disposal facility: Application for operational safety assessment of the near-surface LILW disposal facility in Korea

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Hyun Joo; Kim, Min Seong; Park, Jin Beak [Korea Radioactive Waste Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2017-06-15

To evaluate radiological impact from the operation of a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility, a logical presentation and explanation of expected accidental scenarios is essential to the stakeholders of the disposal facility. The logical assessment platform and procedure, including analysis of the safety function of disposal components, operational hazard analysis, operational risk analysis, and preparedness of remedial measures for operational safety, are improved in this study. In the operational risk analysis, both design measures and management measures are suggested to make it possible to connect among design, operation, and safety assessment within the same assessment platform. For the preparedness of logical assessment procedure, classifcation logic of an operational accident is suggested based on the probability of occurrence and consequences of assessment results. The improved assessment platform and procedure are applied to an operational accident analysis of the Korean low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility and partly presented in this paper.

Improvement of safety approach for accident during operation of LILW disposal facility: Application for operational safety assessment of the near-surface LILW disposal facility in Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun Joo; Kim, Min Seong; Park, Jin Beak

2017-01-01

To evaluate radiological impact from the operation of a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility, a logical presentation and explanation of expected accidental scenarios is essential to the stakeholders of the disposal facility. The logical assessment platform and procedure, including analysis of the safety function of disposal components, operational hazard analysis, operational risk analysis, and preparedness of remedial measures for operational safety, are improved in this study. In the operational risk analysis, both design measures and management measures are suggested to make it possible to connect among design, operation, and safety assessment within the same assessment platform. For the preparedness of logical assessment procedure, classifcation logic of an operational accident is suggested based on the probability of occurrence and consequences of assessment results. The improved assessment platform and procedure are applied to an operational accident analysis of the Korean low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility and partly presented in this paper

Regulatory inspection of nuclear facilities and enforcement by the regulatory body. Safety guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on the inspection of nuclear facilities, regulatory enforcement and related matters. The objective is to provide the regulatory body with a high level of confidence that operators have the processes in place to ensure compliance and that they do comply with legal requirements, including meeting the safety objectives and requirements of the regulatory body. However, in the event of non-compliance, the regulatory body should take appropriate enforcement action. This Safety Guide covers regulatory inspection and enforcement in relation to nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants; nuclear power plants; other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies; spent fuel reprocessing plants; and facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Section 2 sets out the objectives of regulatory inspection and enforcement. Section 3 covers the management of regulatory inspections. Section 4 covers the performance of regulatory inspections, including internal guidance, planning and preparation, methods of inspection and reports of inspections. Section 5 deals with regulatory enforcement actions. Section 6 covers the assessment of regulatory inspections and enforcement activities. The Appendix provides further details on inspection areas for nuclear facilities

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

CERN Document Server

Covey, L I

2000-01-01

The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste from Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Specific Safety Guide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-01-01

This Safety Guide provides guidance on the predisposal management of all types of radioactive waste (including spent nuclear fuel declared as waste and high level waste) generated at nuclear fuel cycle facilities. These waste management facilities may be located within larger facilities or may be separate, dedicated waste management facilities (including centralized waste management facilities). The Safety Guide covers all stages in the lifetime of these facilities, including their siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, and shutdown and decommissioning. It covers all steps carried out in the management of radioactive waste following its generation up to (but not including) disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning). Radioactive waste generated both during normal operation and in accident conditions is considered

Technical safety requirements for the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility (ACRRF)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boldt, K.R.; Morris, F.M.; Talley, D.G.; McCrory, F.M.

1998-01-01

The Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document is prepared and issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements. The bases for the TSR are established in the ACRRF Safety Analysis Report issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The TSR identifies the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the facility

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Belleville-sur-Loire nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 127 and 128). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Belleville-sur-Loire nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 127 and 128). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 84 and 85). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Saint-Alban Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 119 and 120). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 129 and 130). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 84 and 85). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Design of concrete structures important to safety of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-10-01

Civil engineering structures in nuclear installations form an important feature having implications to safety performance of these installations. The objective and minimum requirements for the design of civil engineering buildings/structures to be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety of nuclear installations in India (such as pressurised heavy water reactor and related systems) are specified in the Safety standard for civil engineering structures important to safety of nuclear facilities. This standard is written by AERB to specify guidelines for implementation of the above civil engineering safety standard in the design of concrete structures important to safety

Safety report for Central Interim Storage facility for radioactive waste from small producers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zeleznik, N.; Mele, I.

2004-01-01

In 1999 the Agency for Radwaste Management took over the management of the Central Interim Storage (CIS) in Brinje, intended only for radioactive waste from industrial, medical and research applications. With the transfer of the responsibilities for the storage operation, ARAO, the new operator of the facility, received also the request from the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration for refurbishment and reconstruction of the storage and for preparation of the safety report for the storage with the operational conditions and limitations. In order to fulfill these requirements ARAO first thoroughly reviewed the existing documentation on the facility, the facility itself and the stored inventory. Based on the findings of this review ARAO prepared several basic documents for improvement of the current conditions in the storage facility. In October 2000 the Plan for refurbishment and modernization of the CIS was prepared, providing an integral approach towards remediation and refurbishment of the facility, optimization of the inventory arrangement and modernization of the storage and storing utilization. In October 2001 project documentation for renewal of electric installations, water supply and sewage system, ventilation system, the improvements of the fire protection and remediation of minor defects discovered in building were completed according to the Act on Construction. In July 2003 the safety report was prepared, based on the facility status after the completion of the reconstruction works. It takes into account all improvements and changes introduced by the refurbishment and reconstruction of the facility according to project documentation. Besides the basic characteristics of the location and its surrounding, it also gives the technical description of the facility together with proposed solutions for the renewal of electric installations, renovation of water supply and sewage system, refurbishment of the ventilation system, the improvement of fire

Seismic safety of the LLL plutonium facility (Building 332)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Torkarz, F.J.; Shaw, G.

1980-01-01

This report states the basis for the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's assurance to the public that the plutonium operations at the Laboratory pose essentially no risk to anyone's health or safety, either under normal circumstances or in the event of an earthquake or a fire. The report is intended for a general audience, and so for the most part it is not highly technical. It summarizes the steps taken to ensure the seismic safety of the plutonium facility (Bldg. 332). It describes plutonium and its potential hazard and how the facility copes with that hazard. It recounts the geologic investigations and interpretations that led to the design-basis earthquake (DBE) for the Livermore site, and presents a summary analysis of the facility structure in relation to the DBE. An appendix presents a quantitative calculation of the health risk to the public associated with the worst-case hypothetical fire. The document supports the conclusions that the facility will continue to function safely after the maximum earthquake ground motion to which it may be subjected and that there is no evidence of a potential for surface offset under it

Integration of radiation and physical safety in large radiator facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lima, P.P.M.; Benedito, A.M.; Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da

2017-01-01

Growing international concern about radioactive sources after the Sept. 11, 2001 event has led to a strengthening of physical safety. There is evidence that the illicit use of radioactive sources is a real possibility and may result in harmful radiological consequences for the population and the environment. In Brazil there are about 2000 medical, industrial and research facilities with radioactive sources, of which 400 are Category 1 and 2 classified by the - International Atomic Energy Agency - AIEA, where large irradiators occupy a prominent position due to the very high cobalt-60 activities. The radiological safety is well established in these facilities, due to the intense work of the authorities in the Country. In the paper the main aspects on radiological and physical safety applied in the large radiators are presented, in order to integrate both concepts for the benefit of the safety as a whole. The research showed that the items related to radiation safety are well defined, for example, the tests on the access control devices to the irradiation room. On the other hand, items related to physical security, such as effective control of access to the company, use of safety cameras throughout the company, are not yet fully incorporated. Integration of radiation and physical safety is fundamental for total safety. The elaboration of a Brazilian regulation on the subject is of extreme importance

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Armstrong, D.L.

1994-08-01

This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Armstrong, D.L.

1994-08-01

This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

Radiological and the other safety aspects in the operation of electron beam facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Loterina, Roel Alamares

2003-01-01

The radiological safety aspects of the operation of an electron beam facility in general and the 3 MeV ALURTRON electron beam facility of the Malaysian Institute of Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) in particular were reviewed and evaluated. Evaluation was made based on existing records as well as actual monitoring around facility. Area monitoring results using TLDs are within permissible levels. The maximum reading of 7.29 mSv measured in year 2000 is very low as compared to the annual dose limit of 50 mSv/year. In general, the shielding for the installation is adequate and no significant radiation leakage were detected based on radiation survey results. However, measured radiation levels with a maximum of 1.9 mSv/h at the sampling ports easily exceed the limit of 25μSv/h. The facility is equipped with safety features, such as interlocked system, adequate shielding, engineered safety design of irradiation and accelerator rooms, and accessories such as conveyor system and product handling system. Warning lights and signals are adequately installed around the facility. Other identified hazards that may affect the operator, workers, and personnel were also evaluated based on previous records of monitoring. The ozone concentration levels with a maximum reading of 0.05 ppm measured in the environment of the facility are within the threshold limit value of 0.1 ppm. The measured noise levels at all locations around facility are generally below the maximum permissible level of 80dB. The ALURTRON has achieved a minimum safety requirement to warrant its full operation without relying on administrative controls and procedures to ensure safety in operation. (Auth.)

Risk management for existing energy facilities. A global approach to numerical safety goals

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pate-Cornell, M.E.

1993-01-01

This paper presents a structured set of numerical safety goals for risk management of existing energy facilities. The rationale behind these safety goals is based on principles of equity and economic efficiency. Some of the issues involved when using probabilistic risk analyses results for safety decisions are discussed. A brief review of existing safety targets and open-quotes floating numbersclose quotes is presented, and a set of safety goals for industrial risk management is proposed. Relaxation of these standards for existing facilities, the relevance of the lifetime of the plant, the treatment of uncertainties, and problems of failure dependencies are discussed briefly. 17 refs., 1 fig

Safety research experiment facilities, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho. Final environmental impact statement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liverman, J.L.

1977-09-01

This environmental statement was prepared for the Safety Research Experiment Facilities (SAREF) Project. The purpose of the proposed project is to modify some existing facilities and provide a new test facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for conducting fast breeder reactor (FBR) safety experiments. The SAREF Project proposal has been developed after an extensive study which identified the FBR safety research needs requiring in-reactor experiments and which evaluated the capability of various existing and new facilities to meet these needs. The proposed facilities provide for the in-reactor testing of large bundles of prototypical FBR fuel elements under a wide variety of conditions, ranging from those abnormal operating conditions which might be expected to occur during the life of an FBR power plant to the extremely low probability, hypothetical accidents used in the evaluation of some design options and in the assessment of the long-term potential risk associated with wide-acale deployment of the FBR

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Tricastin operational hot base nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

Developing guidance in the nuclear criticality safety assessment for fuel cycle facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Galet, C.; Evo, S.

2012-01-01

In this poster IRSN (Institute for radiation protection and nuclear safety) presents its safety guides whose purpose is to transmit the safety assessment know-how to any 'junior' staff or even to give a view of the safety approach on the overall risks to any staff member. IRSN has written a first version of such a safety guide for fuel cycle facilities and laboratories. It is organized into several chapters: some refer to types of assessments, others concern the types of risks. Currently, this guide contains 13 chapters and each chapter consists of three parts. In parallel to the development of criticality chapter of this guide, the IRSN criticality department has developed a nuclear criticality safety guide. It follows the structure of the three parts fore-mentioned, but it presents a more detailed first part and integrates, in the third part, the experience feedback collected on nuclear facilities. The nuclear criticality safety guide is online on the IRSN's web site

ASAM - The international programme on application of safety assessment methodologies for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, B.

2002-01-01

The IAEA has launched a new Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) on Application of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Waste Disposal Facilities (ASAM). The CRP will focus on the practical application of the safety assessment methodology, developed under the ISAM programme, for different purposes, such as developing design concepts, licensing, upgrading existing repositories, reassessment of operating disposal facilities. The overall aim of the programme is to assist safety assessors, regulators and other specialists involved in the development and review of safety assessment for near surface disposal facilities in order to achieve transparent, traceable and defendable evaluation of safety of these facilities. (author)

Safety Research Experiment Facilities, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho. Draft environmental statement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

This environmental statement was prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) in support of the Energy Research and Development Administration's (ERDA) proposal for legislative authorization and appropriations for the Safety Research Experiment Facilities (SAREF) Project. The purpose of the proposed project is to modify some existing facilities and provide a new test facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for conducting fast breeder reactor (FBR) safety experiments. The SAREF Project proposal has been developed after an extensive study which identified the FBR safety research needs requiring in-reactor experiments and which evaluated the capability of various existing and new facilities to meet these needs. The proposed facilities provide for the in-reactor testing of large bundles of prototypical FBR fuel elements under a wide variety of conditions, ranging from those abnormal operating conditions which might be expected to occur during the life of an FBR power plant to the extremely low probability, hypothetical accidents used in the evalution of some design options and in the assessment of the long-term potential risk associated with wide-scale deployment of the FBR

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear power plant (INB 129 and 130, Aube (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear power plant (INB 84 and 85, Loiret, 45 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear power plant (INB 84 and 85, Loiret, 45 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear power plant (INB 129 and 130, Aube (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Belleville-sur-Loire nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Belleville-sur-Loire nuclear power plant (INB no. 127 - Belleville 1 and no. 128 - Belleville 2, Belleville-sur-Loire and Sury-pres-Lere - Cher (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Capsule safety analysis of PRTF irradiation facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suwarto

2013-01-01

Power Ramp Test Facility (PRTF) is an irradiation facility used for fuel testing of power reactor. PRTF has a capsule which is a test fuel rod container. During operation, pressurized water of 160 bars flows through in the capsule. Due to the high pressure it should be analyzed the impact of the capsule on reactor core safety. This analysis has purpose to calculate the ability of capsule pressure capacity. The analysis was carried out by calculating pressure capacity. From the calculating results it can be concluded that the capsule with pressure capacity of 438 bars will be safe to prevent the operation pressure of PRTF. (author)

The advanced neutron source facility: Safety philosophy and studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Greene, S.R.; Harrington, R.M.

1988-01-01

The Advanced Neutron Source (ANS) is currently the only new civilian nuclear reactor facility proposed for construction in the United States. Even though the thermal power of this research-oriented reactor is a relatively low 300 MW, the design will undoubtedly receive intense scrutiny before construction is allowed to proceed. Safety studies are already under way to ensure that the maximum degree of safety in incorporated into the design and that the design is acceptable to the Department of Energy (DOE) and can meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. This document discusses these safety studies

Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S.

1995-05-01

This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities

Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S. [George Washington Univ., Washington, DC (United States). School of Engineering and Applied Science; Delicate, W.S. [KEVRIC Co., Inc., Silver Spring, MD (United States)

1995-05-01

This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities.

A proactive method for safety management in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grecco, Claudio Henrique dos Santos; Carvalho, Paulo Victor Rodrigues de; Santos, Isaac Antonio Luquetti dos

2014-01-01

Due to the modern approach to address the safety of nuclear facilities which highlights that these organizations must be able to assess and proactively manage their activities becomes increasingly important the need for instruments to evaluate working conditions. In this context, this work presents a proactive method of managing organizational safety, which has three innovative features: 1) the use of predictive indicators that provide current information on the performance of activities, allowing preventive actions and not just reactive in safety management, different from safety indicators traditionally used (reactive indicators) that are obtained after the occurrence of undesired events; 2) the adoption of resilience engineering approach in the development of indicators - indicators are based on six principles of resilience engineering: top management commitment, learning, flexibility, awareness, culture of justice and preparation for the problems; 3) the adoption of the concepts and properties of fuzzy set theory to deal with subjectivity and consistency of human trials in the evaluation of the indicators. The fuzzy theory is used primarily to map qualitative models of decision-making, and inaccurate representation methods. The results of this study aim an improvement in performance and safety in organizations. The method was applied in a radiopharmaceutical shipping sector of a nuclear facility. The results showed that the method is a good monitoring tool objectively and proactively of the working conditions of an organizational domain

Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

1995-01-01

These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

Safety analysis of the Los Alamos critical experiments facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Paxton, H.C.

1975-10-01

The safety of Pajarito Site critical assembly operations depends upon protection built into the facility, upon knowledgeable personnel, and upon good practice as defined by operating procedures and experimental plans. Distance, supplemented by shielding in some cases, would protect personnel against an extreme accident generating 10 19 fissions. During the facility's 28-year history, the direct cost of criticality accidents has translated to a risk of less than $200 per year

National Ignition Facility Project Site Safety Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dun, C

2003-01-01

This Safety Program for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) presents safety protocols and requirements that management and workers shall follow to assure a safe and healthful work environment during activities performed on the NIF Project site. The NIF Project Site Safety Program (NPSSP) requires that activities at the NIF Project site be performed in accordance with the ''LLNL ES and H Manual'' and the augmented set of controls and processes described in this NIF Project Site Safety Program. Specifically, this document: (1) Defines the fundamental NIF site safety philosophy. (2) Defines the areas covered by this safety program (see Appendix B). (3) Identifies management roles and responsibilities. (4) Defines core safety management processes. (5) Identifies NIF site-specific safety requirements. This NPSSP sets forth the responsibilities, requirements, rules, policies, and regulations for workers involved in work activities performed on the NIF Project site. Workers are required to implement measures to create a universal awareness that promotes safe practice at the work site and will achieve NIF management objectives in preventing accidents and illnesses. ES and H requirements are consistent with the ''LLNL ES and H Manual''. This NPSSP and implementing procedures (e.g., Management Walkabout, special work procedures, etc.,) are a comprehensive safety program that applies to NIF workers on the NIF Project site. The NIF Project site includes the B581/B681 site and support areas shown in Appendix B

Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-01-01

Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Russian Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning

Risk-informed approaches to assess ecological safety of facilities with radioactive waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vashchenko, V.N.; Zlochevskij, V.V.; Skalozubov, V.I.

2011-01-01

Ingenious risk-informed methods to assess ecological safety of facilities with radioactive waste are proposed in the paper. Probabilistic norms on lethal outcomes and reliability of safety barriers are used as safety criteria. Based on the probability measures, it is established that ecological safety conditions are met for the standard criterion of lethal outcomes

Safety analysis of IFR fuel processing in the Argonne National Laboratory Fuel Cycle Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Charak, I; Pedersen, D.R.; Forrester, R.J.; Phipps, R.D.

1993-01-01

The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) concept developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) includes on-site processing and recycling of discharged core and blanket fuel materials. The process is being demonstrated in the Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) at ANL's Idaho site. This paper describes the safety analyses that were performed in support of the FCF program; the resulting safety analysis report was the vehicle used to secure authorization to operate the facility and carry out the program, which is now under way. This work also provided some insights into safety-related issues of a commercial IFR fuel processing facility. These are also discussed

Department of Nuclear Safety Research and Nuclear Facilities annual report 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Floto, H.; Jacobsen, U.; Oelgaard, P.L.

1996-03-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Department of Nuclear Safety Research and Nuclear Facilities in 1995. The department's research and development activities are organized in three research programmes: Radiation Protection, Reactor Safety, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the Research Reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the Educational Reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au) 5 tabs., 21 ills

Department of Nuclear Safety Research and Nuclear Facilities annual report 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Floto, H.; Jacobsen, U.; Oelgaard, P.L. [eds.

1996-03-01

The report presents a summary of the work of the Department of Nuclear Safety Research and Nuclear Facilities in 1995. The department`s research and development activities are organized in three research programmes: Radiation Protection, Reactor Safety, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the Research Reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the Educational Reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff`s participation in national and international committees. (au) 5 tabs., 21 ills.

Life time estimation of SSCs for decommissioning safety of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeong, Kwan-Seong; Lee, Kune-Woo; Moon, Jei-Kwon; Jeong, Seong-Young; Lee, Jung-Jun; Kim, Geun-Ho; Choi, Byung-Seon

2012-01-01

Highlights: ► This paper suggests the expectation algorithm of SSCs life time for decommissioning safety of nuclear facilities. ► The life time of SSCs can be estimated by using fuzzy theory. ► The estimated results depend on the membership functions and performance characteristic functions. - Abstract: This paper suggests the estimation algorithm for life time of structure, system and components (SSCs) for decommissioning safety of nuclear facilities using the performance data of linguistic languages and fuzzy theory. The fuzzy estimation algorithm of life time can be easily applicable but the estimated results depend on the relevant membership functions and performance characteristic functions. This method will be expected to be very useful for maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear facilities’ SSCs as a safety assessment tool.

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the CNPE EDF nuclear facilities of Tricastin - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Tricastin nuclear power plant (INB 87 and 88, Saint-Paul-Trois-Chateaux, Drome (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Alban-Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Saint-Alban-Saint-Maurice nuclear power plant (INB 119 and 120, Isere (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Alban-Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Saint-Alban-Saint-Maurice nuclear power plant (INB 119 and 120, Isere (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Implementation plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Borsheim, G.L.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

1992-12-01

This document revises the original plan submitted in March 1991 for implementing the recommendations made by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in their Recommendation 90-7 to the US Department of Energy. Recommendation 90-7 addresses safety issues of concern for 24 single-shell, high-level radioactive waste tanks containing ferrocyanide compounds at the Hanford Site. The waste in these tanks is a potential safety concern because, under certain conditions involving elevated temperatures and low concentrations of nonparticipating diluents, ferrocyanide compounds in the presence of oxidizing materials can undergo a runaway (propagating) chemical reaction. This document describes those activities underway by the Hanford Site contractor responsible for waste tank safety that address each of the six parts of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7. This document also identifies the progress made on these activities since the beginning of the ferrocyanide safety program in September 1990. Revised schedules for planned activities are also included

Safety analysis report upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pan, P.Y.

1993-01-01

Plutonium research and development activities have resided at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since 1943. The function of the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) has been to perform basic special nuclear materials research and development and to support national defense and energy programs. The original Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for PF-4 was approved by DOE in 1978. This FSAR analyzed design-basis and bounding accidents. In 1986, DOE/AL published DOE/AL Order 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System'', as a requirement for preparation and review of safety analyses. To meet the new DOE requirements, the Facilities Management Group of the Nuclear Material Technology Division submitted a draft FSAR to DOE for approval in April 1991. This draft FSAR analyzed the new configurations and used a limited-scope probabilistic risk analysis for accident analysis. During the DOE review of the draft FSAR, DOE Order 5480.23 ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports'', was promulgated and was later officially released in April 1992. The new order significantly expands the scope, preparation, and maintenance efforts beyond those required in DOE/AL Order 5481.1B by requiring: description of institutional and human-factor safety programs; clear definitions of all facility-specific safety commitments; more comprehensive and detailed hazard assessment; use of new safety analysis methods; and annual updates of FSARs. This paper describes the safety analysis report (SAR) upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility in LANL. The SAR upgrade program is established to meet the requirements in DOE Order 5480.23. Described in this paper are the SAR background, authorization basis for operations, hazard classification, and technical program elements

Comprehensive safety cases for radioactive waste management facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Woollam, P.B.; Cameron, H.M.; Davies, A.R.; Hiscox, A.W.

1995-01-01

Probabilistic safety assessment methodology has been applied by Nuclear Electric plc (NE) to the development of comprehensive safety cases for the radioactive waste management processing and accumulation facilities associated with its 26 reactor systems. This paper describes the methodology and the safety case assessment criteria employed by NE. An overview of the results is presented, together with more detail of a specific safety analysis: storage of fuel element debris. No risk to the public greater than 10 -6 /y has been identified and the more significant risks arise from the potential for radioactive waste fires. There are no unacceptable risks from external hazards such as flooding, aircrash or seismic events. Some operations previously expected to have significant risks in fact have negligible risks, while the few faults with risks exceeding the assessment criteria were only identified as a result of this study

Documents pertaining to safety control of nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) controls the safety of nuclear facilities in Finland. This control encompasses on one hand the evaluation of plant safety on the basis of plans and analyses pertaining to the plant and on the other hand the inspection of plant structures, systems and components as well as of operational activity. STUK also monitors plants operational experience feedback and technical developments in the field, as well as the development of safety research and takes the necessary measures on their basis. Guide YVL 1.1 describes how STUK controls the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The documents to be submitted to STUK are described in the nuclear energy legislation and YVL guides. This guide presents the mode of delivery, quality, contents and number of documents to be submitted to STUK

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Alban Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 119 and 120). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-Des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 46, 74 and 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2013. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process) as well as the other pollutions. The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-Des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2014

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 46, 74 and 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2014. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process) as well as the other pollutions. The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Alban Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2013

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 119 and 120). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

Patient safety in maternal healthcare at secondary and tertiary level facilities in Delhi, India

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Chandrakant Lahariya

2015-01-01

Full Text Available Background: There is insufficient information on causes of unsafe care at facility levels in India. This study was conducted to understand the challenges in government hospitals in ensuring patient safety and to propose solutions to improve patient care. Materials and Methods: Desk review, in-depth interviews, and focused group discussions were conducted between January and March 2014. Healthcare providers and nodal persons for patient safety in Gynecology and Obstetrics Departments of government health facilities from Delhi state of India were included. Data were analyzed using qualitative research methods and presented adopting the "health system approach." Results: The patient safety was a major concern among healthcare providers. The key challenges identified were scarcity of resources, overcrowding at health facilities, poor communications, patient handovers, delay in referrals, and the limited continuity of care. Systematic attention on the training of care providers involved in service delivery, prescription audits, peer reviews, facility level capacity building plan, additional financial resources, leadership by institutional heads and policy makers were suggested as possible solutions. Conclusions: There is increasing awareness and understanding about challenges in patient safety. The available local information could be used for selection, designing, and implementation of measures to improve patient safety at facility levels. A systematic and sustained approach with attention on all functions of health systems could be beneficial. Patient safety could be used as an entry point to improve the quality of health care services in India.

Safety study of fire protection for nuclear fuel cycle facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

Insufficiencies in the fire protection system of the nuclear reactor facilities were pointed out when the fire occurred due to the Niigata prefecture-Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in July, 2007. This prompted the revision of the fire protection safety examination guideline for nuclear reactors as well as commercial guidelines. The commercial guidelines have been endorsed by the regulatory body. Now commercial fire protection standards for nuclear facilities such as the design guideline and the management guideline for protecting fire in the Light Water Reactors (LWRs) are available, however, those to apply to the nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility (MFFF) have not been established. For the improvement of fire protection system of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities, the development of a standard for the fire protection, corresponding to the commercial standard for LWRs were required. Thus, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) formulated a fire protection guidelines for nuclear fuel cycle facilities as a standard relevant to the fire protection of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities considering functions specific to the nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In formulating the guidelines, investigation has been conduced on the commercial guidelines for nuclear reactors in Japan and the standards relevant to the fire protection of nuclear facilities in USA and other countries as well as non-nuclear industrial fire protection standards. The guideline consists of two parts; Equipments and Management, as the commercial guidances of the nuclear reactor. In addition, the acquisition of fire evaluation data for a components (an electric cabinet, cable, oil etc.) targeted for spread of fire and the evaluation model of fire source were continued for the fire hazard analysis (FHA). (author)

76 FR 44985 - Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Flooding

Science.gov (United States)

2011-07-27

.... PHMSA-2011-0177] Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Flooding AGENCY... liquid pipelines to communicate the potential for damage to pipeline facilities caused by severe flooding... pipelines in case of flooding. ADDRESSES: This document can be viewed on the Office of Pipeline Safety home...

Review of the nuclear safety exercises carried out in French industrial facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kissel, Ph.P.; Renard, C.; Meramedjian, H.N.

1977-01-01

For several years the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA) has been organizing nuclear safety exercises in most nuclear industrial facilities, especially in fuel element fabrication plants, many of which are classified as basic nuclear facilities. The subject and extent of each exercise are decided by mutual agreement between the management of the facility and the CEA officials in charge of Assistance in Protection and Nuclear Safety (APSN). The authors deal with such subjects as criticality accidents (evacuation of facilities, regrouping of personnel, rescue operations etc.) and fire involving large quantities of radioactive material (protection of the environment by spraying water on fumes laden with radioactive aerosols etc.). During these exercises use is made of the resources available with the safety services of the facility, one or more mobile nuclear action teams of the CEA and the appropriate resources within the competence of public authorities, e.g. Civil Defence, the fire brigades, the Gendarmerie etc. Each exercise is followed by a meeting which gives an opportunity for constructive criticism and for the adoption of measures best suited for solving problems which invariably arise, such as choice of methods and resources, co-ordination of their simultaneous or gradual application and so on. (author)

Radioactive waste storage facilities, involvement of AVN in inspection and safety assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simenon, R.; Smidts, O.

2006-01-01

The legislative and regulatory framework in Belgium for the licensing and the operation of radioactive waste storage buildings are defined by the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001 (hereby providing the general regulations regarding to the protection of the population, the workers and the environment against the dangers of ionising radiation). This RD introduces in the Belgian law the radiological protection and ALARA-policy concepts. The licence of each nuclear facility takes the form of a Royal Decree of Authorization. It stipulates that the plant has to be in conformity with its Safety Analysis Report. This report is however not a public document but is legally binding. Up to now, the safety assessment for radioactive waste storage facilities, which is implemented in this Safety Analysis Report, has been judged on a case-by-case basis. AVN is an authorized inspection organisation to carry out the surveillance of the Belgian nuclear installations and performs hereby nuclear safety assessments. AVN has a role in the nuclear safety and radiation protection during all the phases of a nuclear facility: issuance of licenses, during design and construction phase, operation (including reviewing and formal approval of modifications) and finally the decommissioning. Permanent inspections are performed on a regular basis by AVN, this by a dedicated site inspector, who is responsible for a site of an operator with nuclear facilities. Besides the day-to-day inspections during operation there are also the periodic safety reviews. AVN assesses the methodological approaches for the analyses, reviews and approves the final studies and results. The conditioned waste in Belgium is stored on the Belgoprocess' sites (region Mol-Dessel) for an intermediate period (about 80 years). In the meantime, a well-defined inspection programme is being implemented to ensure that the conditioned waste continues to be stored safely during this temporary storage period. This programme was draw up by

Regulatory review and confidence building in post-closure safety assessments and safety cases for near surface disposal facilities-IAEA ASAM coordinated research programme

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gonzales, A.; Simeonov, G.; Bennett, D.G.; Nys, V.; Ben Belfadhel, M.

2005-01-01

Some years ago, the IAEA successfully concluded a Coordinated Research Program (CRP) called Islam, which focussed on the development of an Improved Safety Assessment Methodology for near-surface radioactive waste disposal facilities. In November 2002, and as an extension of ISAM, the IAEA launched a new CRP called ASAM, designed to test the Application of the Safety Assessment Methodology by considering a range of near-surface disposal facilities. The ASAM work programme is being implemented by three application working groups and two cross-cutting working groups. The application working groups are testing the applicability of the ISAM methodology by assessing an existing disposal facility in Hungary, a copper mine in South Africa, and a hypothetical facility containing heterogenous wastes, such as disused sealed sources. The first cross-cutting working group is addressing a number of technical issues that are common to all near-surface disposal facilities, while the second group, the Regulatory Review Working Group (RRWG) is developing guidance on how to gain confidence in safety assessments and safety cases, and on how to conduct regulatory reviews of safety assessments. This paper provides a brief overview of the work being conducted by the Regulatory Review Working Group. (author)

PANDA: A Multipurpose Integral Test Facility for LWR Safety Investigations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Paladino, D.; Dreier, J.

2012-01-01

The PANDA facility is a large scale, multicompartmental thermal hydraulic facility suited for investigations related to the safety of current and advanced LWRs. The facility is multipurpose, and the applications cover integral containment response tests, component tests, primary system tests, and separate effect tests. Experimental investigations carried on in the PANDA facility have been embedded in international projects, most of which under the auspices of the EU and OECD and with the support of a large number of organizations (regulatory bodies, technical dupport organizations, national laboratories, electric utilities, industries) worldwide. The paper provides an overview of the research programs performed in the PANDA facility in relation to BWR containment systems and those planned for PWR containment systems.

Proceedings of the Topical Meeting on the safety of nuclear fuel cycle intermediate storage facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The CSNI Working Group on Fuel Cycle Safety held an International Topical Meeting on safety aspects of Intermediate Storage Facilities in Newby Bridge, England, from 28 to 30 October 1997. The main purpose of the meeting was to provide a forum for the exchange of information on the technical issues on the safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities (intermediate storage). Titles of the papers are: An international view on the safety challenges to interim storage of spent fuel. Interim storage of intermediate and high-level waste in Belgium: a description and safety aspects. Encapsulated intermediate level waste product stores at Sellafield. Safety of interim storage facilities of spent fuel: the international dimension and the IAEA's activities. Reprocessing of irradiated fuel and radwaste conditioning at Belgoprocess site: an overview. Retrieval of wastes from interim storage silos at Sellafield. Outline of the fire and explosion of the bituminization facility and the activities of the investigation committee (STAIJAERI). The fire and explosion incident of the bituminization facility and the lessons learned from the incident. Study on the scenario of the fire incident and related analysis. Study on the scenario of the explosion incident and related analysis. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997 chemical explosion at the plutonium reclamation facility, Hanford site, Richland, Washington. Dry interim storage of spent nuclear fuel elements in Germany. Safe and effective system for the bulk receipt and storage of light water reactor fuel prior to reprocessing. Receiving and storage of glass canisters at vitrified waste storage center of Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Design and operational experience of dry cask storage systems. Sellafield MOX plant; Plant safety design (BNFL). The assessment of fault studies for intermediate term waste storage facilities within the UK nuclear regulatory regime. Non-active and active commissioning of the thermal oxide

Radiation safety program in a high dose rate brachytherapy facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodriguez, L.V.; Hermoso, T.M.; Solis, R.C.

2001-01-01

The use of remote afterloading equipment has been developed to improve radiation safety in the delivery of treatment in brachytherapy. Several accidents, however, have been reported involving high dose-rate brachytherapy system. These events, together with the desire to address the concerns of radiation workers, and the anticipated adoption of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation (IAEA, 1996), led to the development of the radiation safety program at the Department of Radiotherapy, Jose R. Reyes Memorial Medical Center and at the Division of Radiation Oncology, St. Luke's Medical Center. The radiation safety program covers five major aspects: quality control/quality assurance, radiation monitoring, preventive maintenance, administrative measures and quality audit. Measures for evaluation of effectiveness of the program include decreased unnecessary exposures of patients and staff, improved accuracy in treatment delivery and increased department efficiency due to the development of staff vigilance and decreased anxiety. The success in the implementation required the participation and cooperation of all the personnel involved in the procedures and strong management support. This paper will discuss the radiation safety program for a high dose rate brachytherapy facility developed at these two institutes which may serve as a guideline for other hospitals intending to install a similar facility. (author)

Safety Research Experiment Facility Project. Conceptual design report. Volume II. Building and facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-12-01

The conceptual design of Safety Research Experiment Facility (SAREF) site system includes a review and evaluation of previous geotechnical reports for the area where SAREF will be constructed and the conceptual design of access and in-plant roads, parking, experiment-transport-vehicle maneuvering areas, security fencing, drainage, borrow area development and restoration, and landscaping

Proceedings of the 1984 DOE nuclear reactor and facility safety conference. Volume II

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1984-01-01

This report is a collection of papers on reactor safety. The report takes the form of proceedings from the 1984 DOE Nuclear Reactor and Facility Safety Conference, Volume II of two. These proceedings cover Safety, Accidents, Training, Task/Job Analysis, Robotics and the Engineering Aspects of Man/Safety interfaces.

Proceedings of the 1984 DOE nuclear reactor and facility safety conference. Volume II

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-01-01

This report is a collection of papers on reactor safety. The report takes the form of proceedings from the 1984 DOE Nuclear Reactor and Facility Safety Conference, Volume II of two. These proceedings cover Safety, Accidents, Training, Task/Job Analysis, Robotics and the Engineering Aspects of Man/Safety interfaces

The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility: Status-2004

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anderl, R.A.; Longhurst, G.R.; Pawelko, R.J.; Sharpe, J.P.; Schuetz, S.T.; Petti, D.A.

2005-01-01

The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility, a US DOE National User Facility at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), comprises capabilities and infrastructure to support both tritium and non-tritium research activities important to the development of safe and environmentally friendly fusion energy. Research thrusts include (1) interactions of tritium and deuterium with plasma-facing-component (PFC) materials, (2) fusion safety issues [PFC material chemical reactivity and dust/debris generation, activation product mobilization, tritium behavior in fusion systems], and (3) molten salts and fusion liquids for tritium breeder and coolant applications. This paper updates the status of STAR and the capabilities for ongoing research activities, with an emphasis on the development, testing and integration of the infrastructure to support tritium research activities. Key elements of this infrastructure include a tritium storage and assay system, a tritium cleanup system to process glovebox and experiment tritiated effluent gases, and facility tritium monitoring systems

75 FR 9196 - Letter From Secretary of Energy Accepting Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-03-01

... DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Letter From Secretary of Energy Accepting Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) Recommendation 2009-2 AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The...: The Department of Energy (DOE) acknowledges receipt of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board...

Clinton P. Anderson Meson Physics Facility and its operational safety program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Putnam, T.M.

1975-01-01

The Clinton P. Anderson Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory consists of/ (1) a medium-energy, high-intensity linear proton accelerator; (2) experimental areas designed to support a multidisciplined program of research and practical applications; and (3) support facilities for accelerator operations and the experimental program. The high-intensity primary and secondary beams at LAMPF and the varied research program create many interesting and challenging problems for the Health Physics staff. A brief overview of LAMPF is presented, and the Operational Safety Program is discussed, with emphasis on the radiological safety and health physics aspects

Mixed Waste Management Facility Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Chapters 1 to 20

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1994-09-01

This document provides information on waste management practices, occupational safety, and a site characterization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A facility description, safety engineering analysis, mixed waste processing techniques, and auxiliary support systems are included.

Mixed Waste Management Facility Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Chapters 1 to 20

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

This document provides information on waste management practices, occupational safety, and a site characterization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A facility description, safety engineering analysis, mixed waste processing techniques, and auxiliary support systems are included

Use of risk information to safety regulation. Reprocessing facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2013-08-15

A procedure of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for a reprocessing facility has been under the development aiming to utilize risk information for safety regulations in this project. Activities in the fiscal year 2012 are summarized in the paper. A major activity is a fundamental study on a concept of serious accidents, requirements of serious accident management, and a policy of utilizing risk information for fabrication and reprocessing facilities. Other than the activity a study on release and transport of aerial radioactive materials at a serious accident in a reprocessing facility has been conducted. The outline and results are provided in the chapter 1 and 2 respectively. (author)

New safety performance indicators for safety assessment of radioactive waste disposal facilities. Cuban experience

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peralta Vital, J.L.; Castillo, R.G.; Olivera, J.

2002-01-01

The paper shows the Cuban experience on implementing geological disposal of radioactive waste and the necessity for identifying new safety performance indicators for the safety assessment (SA) of radioactive waste disposal facilities. The selected indicator was the concentration of natural radioactive elements (U, Ra, Th, K) in the Cuban geologic environment. We have carried out a group of investigations, which have allowed characterising the concentration for the whole Country, creating a wide database where this indicator is associated with the lithology. The main lithologies in Cuba are: the sedimentary rocks (70 percent of national occurrence), which are present in the three regions (limestone and lutite), and finally the igneous and metamorphic rocks. The results show the concentrations ranges of the natural radionuclides associated fundamentally to the variation in the lithology and geographical area of the Country. In Cuba, the higher concentration (ppm) of Uranium and Radium are referenced to the Central region associated to Skarn, while for Thorium (ppm) and Potassium (%), in the East region the concentration peaks in Tuffs have been found. The concentrations ranges obtained are preliminary, they characterise the behaviour of this parameter for the Cuban geology, but they do not represent limits for safety assessment purposes yet. Also other factors should be taken into account as the assessment context, time scales and others assumptions before establishing the final concentration limits for the natural radionuclides as a radiological and nuclear safety performance indicator complementary to dose and risk for safety assessment for radiological and nuclear facilities. (author)

Periodic Safety Review in Interim Storage Facilities - Current Regulation and Experiences in Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neles, Julia Mareike; Schmidt, Gerhard

2014-01-01

Periodic safety reviews in nuclear power plants in Germany have been performed since the end of the 1980's as an indirect follow-up of the accident in Chernobyl and, in the meantime, are formally required by law. During this process the guidelines governing this review were developed in stages and reached their final form in 1996. Interim storage facilities and other nuclear facilities at that time were not included, so the guidelines were solely focused on the specific safety issues of nuclear power plants. Following IAEA's recommendations, the Western European Nuclear Regulator Association (WENRA) introduced PSRs in its safety reference levels for storage facilities (current version in WGWD report 2.1 as of Feb 2011: SRLs 59 - 61). Based on these formulations, Germany improved its regulation in 2010 with a recommendation of the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (Entsorgungskommission, ESK), an expert advisory commission for the federal regulatory body BMU. The ESK formulated these detailed requirements in the 'ESK recommendation for guides to the performance of periodic safety reviews for interim storage facilities for irradiated fuel elements and heat-generating radioactive waste'. Before finalization of the guideline a test phase was introduced, aimed to test the new regulation in practice and to later include the lessons learned in the final formulation of the guideline. The two-year test phase started in October 2011 in which the performance of a PSR will be tested at two selected interim storage facilities. Currently these recommendations are discussed with interested/concerned institutions. The results of the test phase shall be considered for improvements of the draft and during the final preparation of guidelines. Currently the PSR for the first ISF is in an advanced stage, the second facility just started the process. Preliminary conclusions from the test phase show that the implementation of the draft guideline requires interpretation. The aim of a

Preliminary Safety Design Report for Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Timothy Solack; Carol Mason

2012-03-01

A new onsite, remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled low-level waste disposal for remote-handled low-level waste from the Idaho National Laboratory and for nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled low-level waste in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This preliminary safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by discussing site characteristics that impact accident analysis, by providing the facility and process information necessary to support the hazard analysis, by identifying and evaluating potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled low-level waste, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

Safety assessment of a vault-based disposal facility using the ISAM methodology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kelly, E.; Kim, C.-L.; Lietava, P.; Little, R.; Simon, I.

2002-01-01

As part of the IAEA's Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) on Improving Long-term of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Waste Disposal Facilities (ISAM), three example cases were developed. The aim was to testing the ISAM safety assessment methodology using as realistic as possible data. One of the Test Cases, the Vault Test Case (VTC), related to the disposal of low level radioactive waste (LLW) to a hypothetical facility comprising a set of above surface vaults. This paper uses the various steps of the ISAM safety assessment methodology to describe the work undertaken by ISAM participants in developing the VTC and provides some general conclusions that can be drawn from the findings of their work. (author)

Considerations in the safety assessment of sealed nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-06-01

This report is a part of the International Atomic Energy Agency's radioactive waste management programme, whose objective is to provide assistance to Member States in developing guidance for identifying safe alternatives for isolating radioactive waste from man and his environment. This report attempts to integrate information from the previous reports on decommissioning of nuclear facilities, mitigation of accidents at such facilities, and performance assessment of disposal systems to provide useful advice and qualitative guidance to those responsible for performance and safety assessments of sealed nuclear facilities by giving an overview of possible approaches and techniques for such assessments. In this context, the establishment of requirements and rules governing the radiological safety of personnel, the general public, and the environment for sealing and post-sealing activities will enable the choice of the most appropriated approach and help to promote consistency in both decommissioning and waste management standards. The near-field effects discussed in this document include gas generation, interactions of the groundwater and the residual water with other components of the system, thermal, thermo-mechanical, radiation effects and chemical and geochemical reactions. 59 refs, figs and tabs

Russian Federation: Passive Safety Components for Lead-Cooled Reactor Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sarkulov, M.K.

2015-01-01

There is a specific range of engineered features used traditionally in nuclear technology. As a rule, main reactivity control systems use conventional active actuators with solid-body control members and/or liquid systems with active injection of liquid absorber. Other operation principles are normally chosen for additional systems. Currently, the traditional approach to improving the reliability of a reactor facility suggests an increase in the number of safety components and systems which provide for mutual assurance or assist each other. There is a great variety of additional reactivity control members designed for the reactor facility control and shutdown, including hydrodynamic members in the form of rods (acting from the coolant flow); floating-type members (absorbers and displacers); storage-type and liquid members (used in separate channels); bulk members (pebble absorber); gas-based members (with a gas absorber); shape-memory members and others. Hydrodynamic systems were introduced at Beloyarsk NPP Units 1 and 2 and proposed for use in other facility designs, Gases and bulk materials have not been commonly accepted: the former because of the high cost of high-efficiency gaseous absorbers, and the latter because of the complecated monitoring of the bulk material position. It is rather difficult and not always necessary to use the same engineering approaches in new lead-cooled reactor facilities as in traditional ones. Similarly to the development of traditional safety systems, passive safety components (devices) shall be designed according to the essential requirements of the nuclear regulations of the Russian Federation

Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Facility 10CFR830 Safety Basis Related to Facility Experiments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tomberlin, T.A.

2002-01-01

The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), a DOE Category A reactor, was designed to provide an irradiation test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. The ATR Safety Analysis Report, determined by DOE to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, provides versatility in types of experiments that may be conducted. This paper addresses two general types of experiments in the ATR facility and how safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore this type of experiment is addressed with more detail in the safety basis. This allows individual safety analyses for these experiments to be more routine and repetitive. The second type of experiment is less defined and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, individual safety analyses for the second type of experiment tend to be more unique from experiment to experiment. Experiments are also discussed relative to ''major modifications'' and DOE-STD-1027-92. Application of the USQ process to ATR experiments is also discussed

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-Des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2012

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 46, 74 and 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2012. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process) as well as the other pollutions. The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

The selection of probabilistic safety assessment techniques for non-reactor nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vail, J.

1992-01-01

Historically, the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology of choice is the well known event tree/fault tree inductive technique. For reactor facilities is has stood the test of time. Some non-reactor nuclear facilities have found inductive methodologies difficult to apply. The stand-alone fault tree deductive technique has been used effectively to analyze risk in nuclear chemical processing facilities and waste handling facilities. The selection between the two choices suggest benefits from use of the deductive method for non-reactor facilities

Preparation of Phased and Merged Safety Analysis Reports for New DOE Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

BISHOP, G.E.

2000-01-01

The Spent Nuclear Fuels Project (SNFP) is charged with moving to storage 2,100 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel elements left over from plutonium production at DOE'S Hanford site in Washington state. Two new facilities, the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and the Canister Storage Building (CSB) are in final construction. In order to meet aggressive schedule commitments, the SNFP chose to prepare the safety analysis reports (SAR's) in phases that covered only specific portions of each facility's design as it was built. Each SAR also merged the preliminary and final safety analysis reports into a single SAR, thereby covering all aspects of design, construction, and operation for that portion (phase) of the facility. A policy of ''NRC equivalency'' was also implemented in parallel with this effort, with the goal of achieving a rigor of safety analysis equivalent to that of NRC-licensed fuel processing facilities. DOE Order 5480.23. ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports'' allows preparation of both a phased and a merged SAR to accelerate construction schedules. However, project managers must be aware that such acceleration is not guaranteed. Managers considering this approach for their project should be cognizant of numerous obstacles that will be encountered. Merging and phasing SAR's will create new, unique, and unanticipated difficulties which may actually slow construction unless expeditiously and correctly managed. Pitfalls to be avoided and good practices to be implemented in preparing phased and merged SAR's are presented. The value of applying NRC requirements to the DOE safety analysis process is also discussed. As of December, 1999, the SNFP has completed and approved a SAR for the CVDF. Approval of the SAR for the CSB is pending

Preclosure radiological safety analysis for the exploratory shaft facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ma, C.W.; Miller, D.D.; Jardine, L.J.

1992-06-01

This study assesses which structures, systems, and components of the exploratory shaft facility (ESF) are important to safety when the ESF is converted to become part of the operating waste repository. The assessment follows the methodology required by DOE Procedure AP-6.10Q. Failures of the converted ESF during the preclosure period have been evaluated, along with other underground accidents, to determine the potential offsite radiation doses and associated probabilities. The assessment indicates that failures of the ESF will not result in radiation doses greater than 0.5 rem at the nearest unrestricted area boundary. Furthermore, credible accidents in other underground facilities will not result in radiation doses larger than 0.5 rem, even if any structure, system, or component of the converted ESF fails at the same time. Therefore, no structure, system, or component of the converted ESF is important to safety

Safety and radiation protection in mining and milling facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Magalhaes, Maisa H.; Schenato, Flavia; Cruz, Paulo R., E-mail: maisahm@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: schenato@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: pcruz@cnen.gov.br [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Xavier, Ana M., E-mail: axavier@cnen.gov.br [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (ESPOA/CNEN-RS), Porto Alegre, RS (Brazil). Escritorio de Porto Alegre

2011-07-01

Federal Legislation in Brazil establishes that the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission - CNEN - is responsible for the surveillance of the industrialization of nuclear ores and the production and commerce of nuclear materials in such way that activities such as buying, selling, import and export, are subject to previous licensing and surveillance. Regulation CNEN-NN-4.01 on Safety and Radiation Protection in Mining and Milling Facilities of conventional ores containing naturally occurring radioactive materials, NORM, was issued in 2004 establishing both a methodology for classification of these facilities into three Categories, taking into account both the contents of uranium and thorium in the ores and the applicable radiation and safety requirements based on a graded approach. Although the lack of a licensing process in the above mentioned Regulation made its implementation a difficult task, CNEN, by means of an initial survey, identified ca. 30 mining and milling industries of conventional ores containing uranium and thorium with concentrations above 10 Bq/g. More recently, a new juridical understanding of the legislation concluded that CNEN must issue licences and authorizations for the possession and storage of all ores with uranium and thorium concentrations above exemption levels. A proper surveillance programme encompassing 13 of these mining facilities was then put forward aiming at the improvement of their safety and radiation protection. This article presents an overview of NORM exploitation in Brazil and put forward suggestions for achieving viable solutions for the protection of workers, general public and environment from the effects of ionizing radiation. (author)

Guidance for preparation of safety analysis reports for nonreactor facilities and operations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,'' and 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System'' require the preparation of appropriate safety analyses for each DOE operation and subsequent significant modifications including decommissioning, and independent review of each safety analysis. The purpose of this guide is to assist in the preparation and review of safety documentation for Oak Ridge Field Office (OR) nonreactor facilities and operation. Appendix A lists DOE Orders, NRC Regulatory Guides and other documents applicable to the preparation of safety analysis reports

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear power plant (Saint-Laurent-Nouan (FR)): 2 partially dismantled graphite-gas reactors and a graphite sleeves storage silo (INB 46 and 74), and 2 PWR reactors in operation (INB 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear power plant (Saint-Laurent-Nouan (FR)): 2 partially dismantled graphite-gas reactors and a graphite sleeves storage silo (INB 46 and 74), and 2 PWR reactors in operation (INB 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of EdF's Tricastin operational hot base nuclear facilities (BCOT) - 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

SRTC criticality technical review: Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 93-18 Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rathbun, R.

1993-01-01

Separate review of NMP-NCS-930058, open-quotes Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 93-18 Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility (U), August 17, 1993,close quotes was requested of SRTC Applied Physics Group. The NCSE is a criticality assessment to determine waste container uranium limits in the Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility. The NCSE under review concludes that the NDA room remains in a critically safe configuration for all normal and single credible abnormal conditions. The ability to make this conclusion is highly dependent on array limitation and inclusion of physical barriers between 2x2x1 arrays of boxes containing materials contaminated with uranium. After a thorough review of the NCSE and independent calculations, this reviewer agrees with that conclusion

Use of the event tree method for evaluate the safety of radioactive facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hernandez S, A.; Cornejo D, N.; Callis F, E.

2006-01-01

The work shows the validity of the use of Trees of Events like a quantitative method appropriate to carry out evaluations of radiological safety. Its were took like base the evaluations of safety of five Radiotherapy Departments, carried out in the mark of the process of authorization of these facilities. The risk values were obtained by means of the combination of the probabilities of occurrence of the events with its consequences. The use of the method allowed to suggest improvements to the existent safety systems, as well as to confirm that the current regulator requirements for this type of facilities to lead to practices with acceptable risk levels. (Author)

Environmental restoration contractor facility safety plan -- MO-561 100-D site remediation project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Donahoe, R.L.

1996-11-01

This safety plan is applicable to Environmental Restoration Contractor personnel who are permanently assigned to MO-561 or regularly work in the facility. The MO-561 Facility is located in the 100-D Area at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. This plan will: (a) identify hazards potentially to be encountered by occupants of MO-561; (b) provide requirements and safeguards to ensure personnel safety and regulatory compliance; (c) provide information and actions necessary for proper emergency response

An overview of FFTF [Fast Flux Test Facility] contributions to Liquid Metal Reactor Safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Waltar, A.E.; Padilla, A. Jr.

1990-11-01

The Fast Flux Test Facility has provided a very useful framework for testing the advances in Liquid Metal Reactor Safety Technology. During the licensing phase, the switch from a nonmechanistic bounding technique to the mechanistic approach was developed and implemented. During the operational phase, the consideration of new tests and core configurations led to use of the anticipated-transients-without-scram approach for beyond design basis events and the move towards passive safety. The future role of the Fast Flux Test Facility may involve additional passive safety and waste transmutation tests. 26 refs

AREVA General Inspectorate Annual Report 2013 - Status of safety in nuclear facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oursel, Luc; Riou, Jean

2014-06-01

This annual report by AREVA's General Inspectorate deals with the status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the group's facilities and operations over the course of 2013. Based on the findings made during implementation of the annual inspection program, this annual report also includes the results of the analysis of significant events and the observations and assessments of specialists in the Safety Health Security Sustainable Development Department (SHSSDD), supplemented by regular interaction with the safety regulators, different government agencies, stakeholders and other nuclear operators. Additionally, this report presents the action plans put into motion and the directions taken for continuous improvement in risk prevention for operations conducted in France and internationally. In 2013, the level of safety in the group's nuclear facilities and operations remained satisfactory, although improvements are necessary in some domains. This report is based on established indicators, analyses of reported events, responses to commitments made to the regulators, and the results of different improvement actions reported on in the inspected and supported entities. In 2013, no level 2 event on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) was reported, the bottom-up reporting of weak signals was confirmed, dose levels were low and there were no radiological impacts on the environment. The General Inspectorate conducted 45 inspections in 30 of the group's entities in 2013. Of these, 10 concerned sites outside France and 7 were conducted following events or particular situations. These inspections gave rise to 176 recommendations, which the inspected entities have translated into action plans. Verification of these different action plans according to planned procedures and announced schedules gave rise to 16 follow-up inspections. The major lessons learned from these inspections relate to project management, facility compliance and operational

Preparation of safety analysis reports (SARs) for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities. Format and content of SARs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-02-01

All facilities at which radioactive wastes are processed, stored and disposed of have the potential for causing hazards to humans and to the environment. Precautions must be taken in the siting, design and operation of the facilities to ensure that an adequate level of safety is achieved. The processes by which this is evaluated is called safety assessment. An important part of safety assessment is the documentation of the process. A well prepared safety analysis report (SAR) is essential if approval of the facility is to be obtained from the regulatory authorities. This TECDOC describes the format and content of a safety analysis report for a near surface radioactive waste disposal facility and will serve essentially as a checklist in this respect

Safety issues to be taken into account in designing future nuclear fusion facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Perrault, Didier, E-mail: didier.perrault@irsn.fr

2016-11-01

Highlights: • Assess if decay heat removal is a safety function. • Re-study accidents considered for ITER and identify those specific to DEMO. • Limit tritium inventory and optimize main gaseous tritium release routes. • Take into account constraints related to requirements of waste disposal routes. - Abstract: For several years now, the French “Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire” has been carrying out expertise of ITER fusion facility safety files at the request of the French “Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire”. As part of the lengthy process which should lead to mastering nuclear fusion, different fusion facility projects are currently under study throughout the world to be ready to continue building on the work which will take place in the ITER facility. On the basis of the experience acquired during the ITER safety expertise, the IRSN has carried out a preliminary study of the safety issues which seem necessary to take into account right from the earliest design phase of these DEMO facilities. The issues studied have included the decay heat removal, exposure to ionizing radiation, potential accidents, and effluent releases and waste. The study shows that it will be important to give priority to the following actions, given that their results would have a major influence on the design: assess if decay heat removal is a safety function, re-study the accidents considered in the context of the ITER project and identify those specific to DEMO, and optimize each of the main routes for gaseous tritium releases.

The study on safety facility criteria for radioactive waste repository

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, S. H.; Choi, M. H.; Han, S. H. and others

1992-12-01

The radioactive waste repository are necessary to install the engineered safety systems to secure the safety for operation of the repository in the event of fire and earthquake. Since the development of safety facility criteria requires a thorough understanding about the characteristics of the engineered safety systems, we should investigate by means of literature survey and visit SKB. In particular, definition, composition of the systems, functional requirement of the systems, engineered safety systems of foreign countries, system design, operation and maintenance requirement should be investigated : fire protection system, ventilation system, drainage system, I and C system, electric system, radiation monitoring system. This proposed criteria consist of purpose, scope of application, ventilation system, fire protection system, drainage system, electric system and this proposed criteria can be applied as a basic reference for the final criteria

Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities for disused sealed radioactive sources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Seunghee; Kim, Juyoul

2017-01-01

Highlights: • Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facility for DSRS was performed. • Engineered vault and rock-cavern type were considered for normal and well scenario. • 14 C, 226 Ra, 241 Am were primary nuclides contributing large portion of exposure dose. • Near surface disposal of DSRSs containing 14 C, 226 Ra and 241 Am should be restricted. - Abstract: Great attention has been recently paid to the post-closure safety assessment of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) around the world. Although the amount of volume of DSRSs generated from industry, medicine and research and education organization was relatively small compared with radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants, some DSRSs can pose a significant hazard to human health due to their high activities and long half-lives, if not appropriately managed and disposed. In this study, post-closure safety assessment was carried out for DSRSs generated from 1991 to 2014 in Korea in order to ensure long-term safety of near surface disposal facilities. Two kinds of disposal options were considered, i.e., engineered vault type disposal facility and rock-cavern type disposal facility. Rock-cavern type disposal facility has been under operation in Gyeongju city, republic of Korea since August 2015 and engineered vault type disposal facility will be constructed until December 2020 in the vicinity of rock-cavern disposal facility. Assessment endpoint was individual dose to the member of critical group, which was modeled by GoldSim, which has been widely used as probabilistic risk analysis software based on Monte Carlo simulation in the area of safety assessment of radioactive waste facilities. In normal groundwater scenario, the maximum exposure dose was extremely low, approximately 1 × 10 −7 mSv/yr, for both disposal options and satisfied the regulatory limit of 0.1 mSv/yr. However, in the

Waste Sampling and Characterization Facility (WSCF) Complex Safety Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

MELOY, R.T.

2003-01-01

The Waste Sampling and Characterization Facility (WSCF) is an analytical laboratory complex on the Hanford Site that was constructed to perform chemical and low-level radiological analyses on a variety of sample media in support of Hanford Site customer needs. The complex is located in the 600 area of the Hanford Site, east of the 200 West Area. Customers include effluent treatment facilities, waste disposal and storage facilities, and remediation projects. Customers primarily need analysis results for process control and to comply with federal, Washington State, and US. Department of Energy (DOE) environmental or industrial hygiene requirements. This document was prepared to analyze the facility for safety consequences and includes the following steps: Determine radionuclide and highly hazardous chemical inventories; Compare these inventories to the appropriate regulatory limits; Document the compliance status with respect to these limits; and Identify the administrative controls necessary to maintain this status

Pilot-benchmarking of the WENRA safety reference levels for the spent fuel intermediate storage facility Ahaus

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lorenz, Bernd; Roeder, Markus; Brandt, Klaus-Dieter

2008-01-01

Full text: The Western European Nuclear Regulator's Association (WENRA) has 2007 issued the draft of the 'Waste and Spent Fuel Storage Safety Reference Levels'. The objective of WENRA is to strive for a harmonized safety level of nuclear facilities within the European Community and these Reference Levels are a benchmark method to demonstrate the achieved level for the regulatory system and the implementation as well. Safety Reference Levels exist at the moment for Reactor Safety, Waste Storage and Decommissioning in different stages of development. ENISS, the European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards Initiative, a FORATOM based special organisation of nuclear operators, has discussed these Safety Reference Levels very intensively with WENRA and the agreement was to make a implementation benchmark-exercise for the storage facilities before the authorities finally agree on the Reference Levels. This benchmark was scheduled for the year 2008. Because of the special situation in Germany where a large number of storage facilities is in operation the German authorities felt that it would be useful to initiate a Pilot-Benchmark to get first results on the feasibility of the Reference Levels and the burden imposed to authorities and operators by these benchmark-exercises. GNS, a subsidiary company of the utilities, agreed to step into this process on a voluntary basis with its storage facility for spent fuel in Ahaus. The exercise was done in a very efficient way and in good co-operation between the authorities, local and federal, and the operator. The results in terms of safety assessments have been very satisfactory showing the high degree of safety. Although the facility was for the first time licensed already in 1987 the compliance with nearly all Reference Levels from 2007 could be demonstrated. It became also clear that newer facilities would fulfil the desired safety standard too. Nevertheless, in spite of the good results the exercise revealed some weak

Animal-assisted interventions: A national survey of health and safety policies in hospitals, eldercare facilities, and therapy animal organizations.

Science.gov (United States)

Linder, Deborah E; Siebens, Hannah C; Mueller, Megan K; Gibbs, Debra M; Freeman, Lisa M

2017-08-01

Animal-assisted intervention (AAI) programs are increasing in popularity, but it is unknown to what extent therapy animal organizations that provide AAI and the hospitals and eldercare facilities they work with implement effective animal health and safety policies to ensure safety of both animals and humans. Our study objective was to survey hospitals, eldercare facilities, and therapy animal organizations on their AAI policies and procedures. A survey of United States hospitals, eldercare facilities, and therapy animal organizations was administered to assess existing health and safety policies related to AAI programs. Forty-five eldercare facilities, 45 hospitals, and 27 therapy animal organizations were surveyed. Health and safety policies varied widely and potentially compromised human and animal safety. For example, 70% of therapy animal organizations potentially put patients at risk by allowing therapy animals eating raw meat diets to visit facilities. In general, hospitals had stricter requirements than eldercare facilities. This information suggests that there are gaps between the policies of facilities and therapy animal organizations compared with recent guidelines for animal visitation in hospitals. Facilities with AAI programs need to review their policies to address recent AAI guidelines to ensure the safety of animals and humans involved. Copyright © 2017 Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

34 CFR 75.683 - Health or safety standards for facilities.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... Conditions Must Be Met by a Grantee? Other Requirements for Certain Projects § 75.683 Health or safety... to the facilities that the grantee uses for the project. (Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3 and 3474) ...

A Study on the Allowable Safety Factor of Cut-Slopes for Nuclear Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Myung Soo; Yee, Eric [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

In this study, the issues of allowable safety factor design criteria for cut-slopes in nuclear facilities is derived through case analysis, a proposed construction work slope design criteria that provides relatively detailed conditions can be applied in case of the dry season and some unclear parts of slope design criteria be modified in case of the rainy season. This safety factor can be further subdivided into two; normal and earthquake factors, a factor of 1.5 is applied for normal conditions and a factor of 1.2 is applied for seismic conditions. This safety factor takes into consideration the effect of ground water and rainfall conditions. However, no criteria for the case of cut-slope in nuclear facilities and its response to seismic conditions is clearly defined, this can cause uncertainty in design. Therefore, this paper investigates the allowable safety factor for cut-slopes in nuclear facilities, reviews conditions of both local and international cut-slope models and finally suggests an alternative method of analysis. It is expected that the new design criteria adequately ensures the stability of the cut-slope to reflect clear conditions for both the supervising and design engineers.

Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nirider, L. Tom

2003-08-06

This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D&D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D&D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D&D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D&D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety.

Safety assessment methodologies and their application in development of near surface waste disposal facilities - the ASAM project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Metcalf, P.

2003-01-01

The scope of ASAM project covers near surface disposal facilities for all types of low and intermediate level wastes with emphasis of the post-closure safety assessment.The objectives are to explore practical application to a range of disposal facilities for a number of purposes e.g. development of design concepts, safety re-assessment, upgrading safety and to develop practical approaches to assist regulators, operators and other experts in review of safety assessment. The task of the Co-ordination Group are: reassessment of existing facilities - use of safety assessment in decision making on selection of options (volunteer site Hungary); disused sealed sources - evaluation of disposability of disused sealed sources in near surface facilities (volunteer site Saratov, Russia); mining and minerals processing waste - evaluation of long-term safety (volunteer site pmc S. Africa). An agreement on the scope and objectives of the project are reached and the further consideration, such as human intrusion/institutional control/security; waste from oil/gas industry; very low level waste; categorization of sealed sources coordinated with other IAEA activities are outlined

Preliminary design of safety and interlock system for indian test facility of diagnostic neutral beam

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tyagi, Himanshu; Soni, Jignesh; Yadav, Ratnakar; Bandyopadhyay, Mainak; Rotti, Chandramouli; Gahlaut, Agrajit; Joshi, Jaydeep; Parmar, Deepak; Bansal, Gourab; Pandya, Kaushal; Chakraborty, Arun

2016-01-01

Highlights: • Indian Test Facility being built to characterize DNB for ITER delivery. • Interlock system required to safeguard the investment incurred in building the facility and protecting ITER deliverable components. • Interlock levels upto 3IL-3 identified. • Safety instrumented system for occupational safety being designed. Safety I&C functions of SIL-2 identified. • The systems are based on ITER PIS and PSS design guidelines. - Abstract: Indian Test Facility (INTF) is being built in Institute For Plasma Research to characterize Diagnostic Neutral Beam in co-operation with ITER Organization. INTF is a complex system which consists of several plant systems like beam source, gas feed, vacuum, cryogenics, high voltage power supplies, high power RF generators, mechanical systems and diagnostics systems. Out of these, several INTF components are ITER deliverable, that is, beam source, beam line components and power supplies. To ensure successful operation of INTF involving integrated operation of all the constituent plant systems a matured Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS) is required. The INTF DACS is based on CODAC platform following on PCDH (Plant Control Design Handbook) guidelines. The experimental phases involve application of HV power supplies (100 KV) and High RF power (∼800 KW) which will produce energetic beam of maximum power 6MW within the facility for longer durations. Hence the entire facility will be exposed tohigh heat fluxes and RF radiations. To ensure investment protection and to provide occupational safety for working personnel a matured Safety and Interlock system is required for INTF. The Safety and Interlock systems are high-reliability I&C systems devoted completely to the specific functions. These systems will be separate from the conventional DACS of INTF which will handle the conventional control and acquisition functions. Both, the Safety and Interlock systems are based on IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 standards as

Preliminary design of safety and interlock system for indian test facility of diagnostic neutral beam

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tyagi, Himanshu, E-mail: htyagi@iter-india.org [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Soni, Jignesh [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Yadav, Ratnakar; Bandyopadhyay, Mainak; Rotti, Chandramouli [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Gahlaut, Agrajit [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Joshi, Jaydeep; Parmar, Deepak [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Bansal, Gourab; Pandya, Kaushal; Chakraborty, Arun [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India)

2016-11-15

Highlights: • Indian Test Facility being built to characterize DNB for ITER delivery. • Interlock system required to safeguard the investment incurred in building the facility and protecting ITER deliverable components. • Interlock levels upto 3IL-3 identified. • Safety instrumented system for occupational safety being designed. Safety I&C functions of SIL-2 identified. • The systems are based on ITER PIS and PSS design guidelines. - Abstract: Indian Test Facility (INTF) is being built in Institute For Plasma Research to characterize Diagnostic Neutral Beam in co-operation with ITER Organization. INTF is a complex system which consists of several plant systems like beam source, gas feed, vacuum, cryogenics, high voltage power supplies, high power RF generators, mechanical systems and diagnostics systems. Out of these, several INTF components are ITER deliverable, that is, beam source, beam line components and power supplies. To ensure successful operation of INTF involving integrated operation of all the constituent plant systems a matured Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS) is required. The INTF DACS is based on CODAC platform following on PCDH (Plant Control Design Handbook) guidelines. The experimental phases involve application of HV power supplies (100 KV) and High RF power (∼800 KW) which will produce energetic beam of maximum power 6MW within the facility for longer durations. Hence the entire facility will be exposed tohigh heat fluxes and RF radiations. To ensure investment protection and to provide occupational safety for working personnel a matured Safety and Interlock system is required for INTF. The Safety and Interlock systems are high-reliability I&C systems devoted completely to the specific functions. These systems will be separate from the conventional DACS of INTF which will handle the conventional control and acquisition functions. Both, the Safety and Interlock systems are based on IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 standards as

Comprehensive development plans for the low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility in Korea and preliminary safety assessment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jung, Kang Il; Kim, Jin Hyeong; Kwon, Mi Jin; Jeong, Mi Seon; Hong, Sung Wook; Park, Jin Beak [Korea Radioactive Waste Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-12-15

The disposal facility in Gyeongju is planning to dispose of 800,000 packages of low- and intermediate- level radioactive waste. This facility will be developed as a complex disposal facility that has various types of disposal facilities and accompanying management. In this study, based on the comprehensive development plan of the disposal facility, a preliminary post-closure safety assessment is performed to predict the phase development of the total capacity for the 800,000 packages to be disposed of at the site. The results for each scenario meet the performance target of the disposal facility. The assessment revealed that there is a significant impact of the inventory of intermediate-level radionuclide waste on the safety evaluation. Due to this finding, we introduce a disposal limit value for intermediate-level radioactive waste. With stepwise development of safety case, this development plan will increase the safety of disposal facilities by reducing uncertainties within the future development of the underground silo disposal facilities.

Safety assessments for centralized waste treatment and disposal facility in Puspokszilagy Hungary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Berci, K.; Hauszmann, Z.; Ormai, P.

2002-01-01

The centralized waste treatment and disposal facility Puspokszilagy is a shallow land, near surface engineered type disposal unit. The site, together with its geographic, geological and hydrogeological characteristics, is described. Data are given on the radioactive inventory. The operational safety assessment and the post-closure safety assessment is outlined. (author)

Criticality safety training at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garcia, A.S.; Courtney, J.C.; Thelen, V.N.

1983-01-01

HFEF comprises four hot cells and out-of-cell support facilities for the US breeder program. The HFEF criticality safety program includes training in the basic theory of criticality and in specific criticality hazard control rules that apply to HFEF. A professional staff-member oversees the implementation of the criticality prevention program

Nuclear Safety Co-Ordination within Oak Ridge Operations Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Johnson, W. A.; Pryor, W. A. [Research and Development Division, United States Atomic Energy Commission, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

1966-05-15

The Oak Ridge Operations Office of the USAEC has within its jurisdiction multiple contractors and facilities for research and for the production of fissile materials for the atomic energy programme. Among these facilities are gaseous diffusion plants for the production of {sup 235}U-enriched uranium hexafluoride, plants for the fabrication of special components and fuel for research and production reactors, and laboratories for pilot plant studies and basic research in nuclear technology. One research laboratory is also actively engaged in criticality experimental programmes and has been a major contributor of criticality data for safety applications. These diversified programmes include the processing, fabrication and transport of practically all forms and isotopic enrichments of uranium in quantities commensurate with both laboratory and volume production requirements. Consequently, adequate nuclear safety control with reasonable economy for operations of this magnitude demands not only co-ordination and liaison between contractor and USAEC staffs, but a continuing reappraisal of safety applications in light of the most advanced information. This report outlines the role of the Oak Ridge Operations Office in these pursuits and describes as examples some specific problems in which this office co-ordinated actions necessary for their resolution. Other examples are given of parametric and procedural applications in plant processes and fissile shipments emphasizing the use of recent experimental or calculated data. These examples involve the use of mass and geometric variables, neutron absorbers and moderation control. Departures from limits specified in existing nuclear safety guides are made to advantage in light of new data, special equipment design, contingencies and acceptable risks. (author)

W-1 Sodium Loop Safety Facility experiment centerline fuel thermocouple performance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meyers, S.C.; Henderson, J.M.

1980-05-01

The W-1 Sodium Loop Safety Facility (SLSF) experiment is the fifth in a series of experiments sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) as part of the National Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) Safety Assurance Program. The experiments are being conducted under the direction of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory (HEDL). The irradiation phase of the W-1 SLSF experiment was conducted between May 27 and July 20, 1979, and terminated with incipient fuel pin cladding failure during the final boiling transient. Experimental hardware and facility performed as designed, allowing completion of all planned tests and test objectives. This paper focuses on high temperature in-fuel thermocouples and discusses their development, fabrication, and performance in the W-1 experiment

Inquiry relating to safety due to modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (establishment of waste safety testing facility) in Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

Application was made to the director of the Science and Technology Agency (STA) for the license relating to the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (the establishment of waste safety testing facility) from the director of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute on November 30, 1978. After passing through the safety evaluation in the Nuclear Safety Bureau of STA, inquiry was conducted to the head of the Atomic Energy Safety Commission (AESC) on June 6, 1979, from the director of the STA. The head of AESC directed to conduct the safety examination to the head of the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Specialist Committee on June 7, 1979. The content of the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material is the establishment of waste safety testing facility to study and test the safety relating to the treatment and disposal of high level radioactive liquid wastes due to the reprocessing of spent fuel. As for the results of the safety examination, the siting of the waste safety testing facility which is located in the Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), and the test plan of the glass solidification of high level radioactive liquid are presented as the outline of the study plan. The building, main equipments including six cells, the isolation room and the glove box, the storage, and the disposal facilities for gas, liquid and solid wastes are explained as the outline of the facilities. Concerning the items from the viewpoint of safety, aseismatic design, slightly vacuum operation, shielding, decay heat removal, fire protection, explosion protection, criticality management, radiation management and environmental effect were evaluated, and the safety was confirmed. (Nakai, Y.)

Do provisions to advance chemical facility safety also advance chemical facility security? - An analysis of possible synergies

OpenAIRE

Hedlund, Frank Huess

2012-01-01

The European Commission has launched a study on the applicability of existing chemical industry safety provisions to enhancing security of chemical facilities covering the situation in 18 EU Member States. This paper reports some preliminary analytical findings regarding the extent to which existing provisions that have been put into existence to advance safety objectives due to synergy effects could be expected advance security objectives as well.The paper provides a conceptual definition of...

Ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities located in large cities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ryazantsev, E.P.; Kolyadin, V.I.; Bylkin, B.K.; Zverkov, Yu.A.

2002-01-01

The problems of ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities and other facilities representing a radiation hazard (hereinafter referred to as 'nuclear facilities') which are located in large cities are considered in the light of the experience with the 'Kurchatov Institute' Russian Research Centre. The accumulation of substantial quantities of spent nuclear fuel and radwaste at the Centre was an inevitable consequence of the military and civilian nuclear research programmes which started there in 1943. A comprehensive programme has been developed for reducing the impact of ionizing radiation on the Centre's personnel, the population living near the Centre and the local environment. The authors describe the basic elements of a programme for decommissioning reactor facilities and eliminating spent fuel and radwaste storage sites and also describe how the programme is progressing. (author)

Criticality safety analysis for mockup facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shin, Young Joon; Shin, Hee Sung; Kim, Ik Soo; Oh, Seung Chul; Ro, Seung Gy; Bae, Kang Mok

2000-03-01

Benchmark calculations for SCALE4.4 CSAS6 module have been performed for 31 UO 2 fuel, 15MOX fuel and 10 metal material criticality experiments and then calculation biases of the SCALE 4.4 CSAS6 module have been revealed to be 0.00982, 0.00579 and 0.02347, respectively. When CSAS6 is applied to the criticality safety analysis for the mockup facility in which several kinds of nuclear material components are included, the calculation bias of CSAS6 is conservatively taken to be 0.02347. With the aid of this benchmarked code system, criticality safety analyses for the mockup facility at normal and hypothetical accidental conditions have been carried out. It appears that the maximum K eff is 0.28356 well below than the critical limit, K eff =0.95 at normal condition. In a hypothetical accidental condition, the maximum K eff is found to be 0.73527 much lower than the subcritical limit. For another hypothetical accidental condition the nuclear material leaks out of container and spread or lump in the floor, it was assumed that the nuclear material is shaped into a slab and water exists in the empty space of the nuclear material. K eff has been calculated as function of slab thickness and the volume ratio of water to nuclear material. The result shows that the K eff increases as the water volume ratio increases. It is also revealed that the K eff reaches to the maximum value when water if filled in the empty space of nuclear material. The maximum K eff value is 0.93960 lower than the subcritical limit

Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities for disused sealed radioactive sources

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Seunghee; Kim, Juyoul, E-mail: gracemi@fnctech.com

2017-03-15

Highlights: • Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facility for DSRS was performed. • Engineered vault and rock-cavern type were considered for normal and well scenario. • {sup 14}C, {sup 226}Ra, {sup 241}Am were primary nuclides contributing large portion of exposure dose. • Near surface disposal of DSRSs containing {sup 14}C, {sup 226}Ra and {sup 241}Am should be restricted. - Abstract: Great attention has been recently paid to the post-closure safety assessment of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) around the world. Although the amount of volume of DSRSs generated from industry, medicine and research and education organization was relatively small compared with radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants, some DSRSs can pose a significant hazard to human health due to their high activities and long half-lives, if not appropriately managed and disposed. In this study, post-closure safety assessment was carried out for DSRSs generated from 1991 to 2014 in Korea in order to ensure long-term safety of near surface disposal facilities. Two kinds of disposal options were considered, i.e., engineered vault type disposal facility and rock-cavern type disposal facility. Rock-cavern type disposal facility has been under operation in Gyeongju city, republic of Korea since August 2015 and engineered vault type disposal facility will be constructed until December 2020 in the vicinity of rock-cavern disposal facility. Assessment endpoint was individual dose to the member of critical group, which was modeled by GoldSim, which has been widely used as probabilistic risk analysis software based on Monte Carlo simulation in the area of safety assessment of radioactive waste facilities. In normal groundwater scenario, the maximum exposure dose was extremely low, approximately 1 × 10{sup −7} mSv/yr, for both disposal options and satisfied the regulatory limit

Study of In-Pile test facility for fast reactor safety research: performance requirements and design features

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nonaka, N.; Kawatta, N.; Niwa, H.; Kondo, S.; Maeda, K

1996-12-31

This paper describes a program and the main design features of a new in-pile safety facility SERAPH planned for future fast reactor safety research. The current status of R and D on technical developments in relation to the research objectives and performance requirements to the facility design is given.

Closure of 324 Facility potential HEPA filter failure unreviewed safety questions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Enghusen, M.B.

1997-01-01

This document summarizes the activities which occurred to resolve an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) for the 324 Facility [Waste Technology Engineering Laboratory] involving Potential HEPA Filter Breach. The facility ventilation system had the capacity to fail the HEPA filters during accident conditions which would totally plug the filters. The ventilation system fans were modified which lowered fan operating parameters and prevented HEPA filter failures which might occur during accident conditions

The Fast Flux Test Facility built on safety

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

No other high-tech industry has grown as fast as the nuclear industry. The information available to the general public has not kept pace with the rapid growth of nuclear data---its growth has outpaced its media image and the safety of nuclear facilities has become a highly debated issue. This book is an attempt to bridge the gap between the high-tech information of the nuclear industry and its understanding by the general public. It explains the three levels of defense at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) and why these levels provide an acceptable margin to protect the general public and on-site personnel, while achieving FFTF's mission to provide research and development for the US Department of Energy

76 FR 14590 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safety of Facilities, Infrastructure, and...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-03-17

... makes it unlikely that a small business could afford to sustain the infrastructure required to perform...-AG73 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safety of Facilities, Infrastructure, and... facilities, infrastructure, and equipment that are intended for use by military or civilian personnel of the...

Safety Assessment for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities - From Methodology to the Use of Results in Decision Making

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batandjieva, B.; Ferch, R.; Joubert, A.; Kaulard, J.; Manson, P.; Percival, K.; Thierfeldt, St.

2008-01-01

The safety assessment of operational facilities in the nuclear industry is well understood and methodologies have been developed and refined over several decades. Similarly safety assessment methodologies for near surface disposal facilities have been harmonized internationally during the last few years. There is however relatively less widespread and documented experience of safety assessment for decommissioning among Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and consequently there is less commonalty of approaches internationally. The importance of safety during decommissioning was further emphasized at the first review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the Berlin Conference 'Safe Decommissioning for Nuclear Activities' (14-18 October 2002). As a consequence during its June 2004 meeting the IAEA Board of Governors approved an Action Plan on Decommissioning of nuclear Facilities that requested the Secretariat to 'establish a forum for the sharing and exchange of national information and experience on the application of safety assessment in the context of decommissioning and provide a means to convey this information to other interested parties, also drawing on the work of other international organizations in this area'. In response the IAEA launched the International Project Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety during Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (DeSa) in November 2004 with the following objectives: - To develop a harmonized approach to safety assessment and define the elements of safety assessment for decommissioning; - To investigate the practical applicability of the methodology and performance of safety assessments for the decommissioning of various types of facilities through a selected number of test cases; - To investigate approaches for review of safety assessments for decommissioning activities and the development of a regulatory

Radiation safety program in high dose rate brachytherapy facility at INHS Asvini

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kirti Tyagi

2014-01-01

Full Text Available Brachytherapy concerns primarily the use of radioactive sealed sources which are inserted into catheters or applicators and placed directly into tissue either inside or very close to the target volume. The use of radiation in treatment of patients involves both benefits and risks. It has been reported that early radiation workers had developed radiation induced cancers. These incidents lead to continuous work for the improvement of radiation safety of patients and personnel The use of remote afterloading equipment has been developed to improve radiation safety in the delivery of treatment in brachytherapy. The widespread adoption of high dose rate brachytherapy needs appropriate quality assurance measures to minimize the risks to both patients and medical staff. The radiation safety program covers five major aspects: quality control, quality assurance, radiation monitoring, preventive maintenance, administrative measures and quality audit. This paper will discuss the radiation safety program developedfor a high dose rate brachytherapy facility at our centre which may serve as a guideline for other centres intending to install a similar facility.

Report of the Task Group on Electrical Safety of Department of Energy facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

None

1993-01-01

The Task Group on Electrical Safety at DOE Facilities (Task Group), which was formally established on October 27, 1992. The Task Group reviewed the electrical safety-related occurrence history of, and conducted field visits to, seven DOE sites chosen to represent a cross section of the Department`s electrical safety activities. The purpose of the field visits was to review, firsthand, electrical safety programs and practices and to gain greater insight to the root causes and corrective actions taken for recently reported incidents. The electrical safety environment of the DOE complex is extremely varied, ranging from common office and industrial electrical systems to large high-voltage power distribution systems (commercial transmission line systems). It includes high-voltage/high-power systems associated with research programs such as linear accelerators and experimental fusion confinement systems. Age, condition, and magnitude of the facilities also varies, with facilities dating from the Manhattan Project, during World War II, to the most modem complexes. The complex is populated by Federal (DOE and other agencies) and contractor employees engaged in a wide variety of occupations and activities in office, research and development, and industrial settings. The sites visited included all of these variations and are considered by the Task Group to offer a valid representation of the Department`s electrical safety issues. The sites visited were Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Nevada Test Site (NTS), Savannah River Site (SRS), Hanford Reservation (Hanford), and the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Project (UMTRA) located at Grand Junction, Colorado.

Radiation safety management system in a radioactive facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amador, Zayda H.

2008-01-01

Full text: This paper illustrates the Cuban experience in implementing and promoting an effective radiation safety system for the Centre of Isotopes, the biggest radioactive facility of our country. Current management practice demands that an organization inculcate culture of safety in preventing radiation hazard. The aforementioned objectives of radiation protection can only be met when it is implemented and evaluated continuously. Commitment from the workforce to treat safety as a priority and the ability to turn a requirement into a practical language is also important to implement radiation safety policy efficiently. Maintaining and improving safety culture is a continuous process. There is a need to establish a program to measure, review and audit health and safety performance against predetermined standards. All those areas of the radiation protection program are considered (e.g. licensing and training of the staff, occupational exposure, authorization of the practices, control of the radioactive material, radiological occurrences, monitoring equipment, radioactive waste management, public exposure due to airborne effluents, audits and safety costs). A set of indicators designed to monitor key aspects of operational safety performance are used. Their trends over a period of time are analyzed with the modern information technologies, because this can provide an early warning to plant management for searching causes behind the observed changes. In addition to analyze the changes and trends, these indicators are compared against identified targets and goals to evaluate performance strengths and weaknesses. A structured and proper radiation self-auditing system is seen as a basic requirement to meet the current and future needs in sustainability of radiation safety. The integrated safety management system establishment has been identified as a goal and way for the continuous improvement. (author)

Safety issues relating to the design of fusion power facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stasko, R.R.; Wong, K.Y.; Russell, S.B.

1986-06-01

In order to make fusion power a viable future source of energy, it will be necessary to ensure that the cost of power for fusion electric generation is competitive with advanced fission concepts. In addition, fusion power will have to live up to its original promise of being a more radiologically benign technology than fission, and be able to demonstrate excellent operational safety performance. These two requirements are interrelated, since the selection of an appropriate safety philosophy early in the design phase could greatly reduce or eliminate the capital costs of elaborate safety related and protective sytems. This paper will briefly overview a few of the key safety issues presently recognized as critical to the ultimate achievement of licensable, environmentally safe and socially acceptable fusion power facilities. 12 refs

Proceeding of the 7. Seminar on Technology and Safety of Nuclear Power Plants and Nuclear Facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hastowo, Hudi; Antariksawan, Anhar R.; Soetrisnanto, Arnold Y; Jujuratisbela, Uju; Aziz, Ferhat; Su'ud, Zaki; Suprawhardana, M. Salman

2002-02-01

The seventh proceedings of seminar safety and technology of nuclear power plant and nuclear facilities, held by National Nuclear Energy Agency. The Aims of seminar is to exchange and disseminate information about safety and nuclear Power Plant Technology and Nuclear Facilities consist of technology; high temperature reactor and application for national development sustain able and high technology. This seminar level all aspects technology, Power Reactor research reactor, high temperature reactor and nuclear facilities. The article is separated by index

Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NIRIDER, L.T.

2003-01-01

This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D and D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D and D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D and D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D and D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety

Nuclear safety and radiation protection consideration in the design of research and development facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Akbar, M.R.

2010-01-01

Nuclear safety is a critically important aspect that must be considered in the design of a nuclear facility in order to ensure the protection of the workers, public and environment. This paper looks at the methodology, approach and incorporation of this aspect, specifically into the design of a research and development facility. The Health, Safety and Environmental Basis of Design is an initial analysis of nuclear safety and radiation protection considerations that is performed during the conceptual design phase and sets the baseline for what the design of the facility must conform to. It consists of general nuclear safety design principles, such as defence in depth and optimisation considerations, and a hazard management strategy. Following the Health, Safety and Environmental Basis of Design, a Preliminary Safety Assessment Report is generated during the basic design phase in conjunction with various analyses in order to assess the impact of hazards on the workers and members of the public. This assessment follows a hazard graded approach where the depth of the analysis will be determined by the impact of the worst case accident scenario in the facility. The assessment also includes a waste management strategy which is an essential aspect to be considered in the design in order to minimize the generation of waste. The safety assessment also demonstrates compliance to dose limits and risk criteria for the workers and members of the public set by the regulatory body and supported by a legal framework. Measures are taken to keep risk as low as reasonably achievable and prevent transgression of the risk and dose limits. However, a balance needs to be maintained between 5 reducing these doses further and the cost of such a reduction, which is known as optimization. It is therefore imperative to have nuclear safety specialists analyse the design in order to protect the worker and member of the public from unwarranted exposure to nuclear radiation. (author)

Problems and experience of ensuring nuclear safety in NPP spent fuel storage facilities in Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vnukov, Victor S.; Ryazanov, Boris G.

2003-01-01

The amount of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) spent fuel in special storage facilities of Russia runs to more than 15000 tons and the annual growth is equal to about 850 tons. The storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel from the main nuclear reactors of Russia (RBMK-1000, VVER-1000, BN-600, EGP-6) were designed in the 60s - 70s. In the last years when the concept of closed fuel cycle and safety requirements had changed, the need was generated to have the nuclear storage facilities more crowded. First of all it is due to the necessity to increase the storage capacity because the RBMK-1000, VVER-1000, EGP-6 fuel is not reprocessed. So there comes the need for the facilities of a bigger capacity which meet the current safety requirements. The paper presents the results of studies of the most important nuclear safety issues, in particular: development of regulatory requirements; analysis of design-basis and beyond-the design-basis accidents (DBA and BDBA); computation code development and verification; justification of nuclear safety when water density goes down; the use of burn-up fraction values; the necessity and possibility to experimentally study the storage facility subcriticality; development of storage norms and rules for new types of fuel assemblies with mixed fuel and burnable poison. (author)

Safety cases for the co-ordinated research project on improvement of safety assessment methodologies for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities (ISAM)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kozak, M.W.; Torres-Vidal, C.; Kelly, E.; Guskov, A.; Blerk, J. van

2002-01-01

A Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) has recently been completed on the Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near-Surface Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities (ISAM). A major aspect of the project was the use of safety cases for the practical application of safety assessment. An overview of the ISAM safety cases is given in this paper. (author)

Radiological Operational Safety Verification for LILW Disposal Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Ju Youl [FNC Technology, SNU, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Jeong, Seung Young; Kim, Byung Soo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2011-10-15

The successful implementation of radioactive waste repository program depends on scientific and technical aspects of excellent safety strategy as well as on societal aspects such as stakeholder acceptance and confidence. Monitoring is considered as key element in serving both ends. It covers all stages of the disposal process from site selection to institutional monitoring after the repository is closed. Basically, the purpose of the monitoring of radioactive waste disposal facility is not to reveal any increase of radioactivity due to the repository, but to provide reassurance and confirmation that the repository is fulfilling its passive safety purpose as an initial disposal concept and that long-term safety driven by regulatory requirements is ensured throughout the entire lifetime of disposal facility including post-closure phase. Five principal objectives of monitoring of geological disposal are summarized by IAEA-TECDOC-1208 as follows 1) Supporting management decisions in a staged programme of repository development: 2) Strengthening understanding of system behavior: 3) Societal decision making: 4) Accumulating an environmental database: 5) Nuclear safeguards (if repository contains fissile material, i.e., spent fuel or plutonium-rich waste) Based on the results of detailed studies of the above objectives and related phenomena, 6 categories of potential monitoring parameters are determined as follows: (1) degradation of repository structures, (2) behavior of the waste package and its associated buffer material, (3) near field chemical interactions between introduced materials, groundwater and host rock, (4) chemical and physical changes to the surrounding geosphere, (5) provision of an environmental database, and (6) nuclear safeguards. Typical monitoring parameters include temperature (heat), water level, pore-water and moisture content (groundwater), rock pressure, fractures, displacement and deformation (stress), water quality chemistry and dissolved

Report from the nuclear safety authority about the preparation of nuclear facilities to the year 2000 transition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lacoste, A.C.

1999-01-01

The French nuclear safety authority with the technical help of the Institute of Nuclear Protection and Safety (IPSN) started in 1998 an evaluation and control work of the measures taken by the different nuclear facility operators in anticipation of the year 2000 transition. This report makes a status of the state of preparation of nuclear facilities prior to the transition: 1 - The nuclear safety and the year 2000 transition (defense-in-depth approach, preventive actions); 2 - The action of the safety authority (demands addressed to the operators of nuclear facilities, technical evaluation and control of the methodology adopted by each operator, preparation of the safety authority to the transition, follow up of the international actions); 3 - Status of the preparation of the different operators: Electricite de France (EdF) (corrective actions, inventory and investigation of computer systems, results, corrections, preventive actions, defensive actions, synthesis), research centres, storage sites and shutdown reactors, waste storage centres of the ANDRA, CEA facilities, decommissioned or partially dismantled reactors, fuel cycle centres.. (J.S.)

Report to Congress on innovative safety and security technology solutions for alternative transportation facilities

Science.gov (United States)

2017-05-01

This research collected information on the frequency and impact of safety and security incidents (threats) at selected facilities and identified priority incidents at each facility. A customized all hazards approach was used to determine the ha...