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Sample records for facilities safety board

  1. 75 FR 9196 - Letter From Secretary of Energy Accepting Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-01

    ... DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Letter From Secretary of Energy Accepting Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) Recommendation 2009-2 AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The...: The Department of Energy (DOE) acknowledges receipt of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board...

  2. Implementation plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borsheim, G.L.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1992-12-01

    This document revises the original plan submitted in March 1991 for implementing the recommendations made by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in their Recommendation 90-7 to the US Department of Energy. Recommendation 90-7 addresses safety issues of concern for 24 single-shell, high-level radioactive waste tanks containing ferrocyanide compounds at the Hanford Site. The waste in these tanks is a potential safety concern because, under certain conditions involving elevated temperatures and low concentrations of nonparticipating diluents, ferrocyanide compounds in the presence of oxidizing materials can undergo a runaway (propagating) chemical reaction. This document describes those activities underway by the Hanford Site contractor responsible for waste tank safety that address each of the six parts of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7. This document also identifies the progress made on these activities since the beginning of the ferrocyanide safety program in September 1990. Revised schedules for planned activities are also included

  3. 78 FR 9902 - DOE Response to Recommendation 2012-2 of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Hanford...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-12

    ... Safety Board, Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas Safety Strategy; Correction AGENCY: Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice; Correction SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) published a document in the Federal... Facilities Safety Board, Hanford Tank Farms Flammable Gas Safety Strategy. This document corrects an error in...

  4. Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 1999

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This is the tenth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department's defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department's defense nuclear facilities. During 1999, Departmental activities resulted in the closure of nine Board recommendations. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with three Board recommendations. One new Board recommendation was received and accepted by the Department in 1999, and a new implementation plan is being developed to address this recommendation. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, opening of a repository for long-term storage of transuranic wastes, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction

  5. Annual report to Congress: Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Calendar Year 1999

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    2000-02-01

    This is the tenth Annual Report to the Congress describing Department of Energy activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). The Board, an independent executive-branch agency established in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at the Department's defense nuclear facilities. The Board also reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the Department's defense nuclear facilities. During 1999, Departmental activities resulted in the closure of nine Board recommendations. In addition, the Department has completed all implementation plan milestones associated with three Board recommendations. One new Board recommendation was received and accepted by the Department in 1999, and a new implementation plan is being developed to address this recommendation. The Department has also made significant progress with a number of broad-based initiatives to improve safety. These include expanded implementation of integrated safety management at field sites, opening of a repository for long-term storage of transuranic wastes, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  6. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 for the period ending December 31, 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Forbes, C.J.

    1993-03-01

    This is the seventh quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks that contain ferrocyanide compounds. In the presence of oxidizing materials, such as nitrates or nitrites, ferrocyanide can be made to explode in the laboratory by heating it to high temperatures [above 285 degrees C (545 degrees F)]. In the mid 1950s approximately 140 metric tons of ferrocyanide were added to 24 underground high-level radioactive waste tanks. An implementation plan (Cash 1991) responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990) was issued in March 1991 describing the activities that were planned and underway to address each of the six parts of Recommendation 90-7. A revision to the original plan was transmitted to US Department of Energy by Westinghouse Hanford Company in December 1992. Milestones completed this quarter are described in this report. Contents of this report include: Introduction; Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Implementation Plan Task Activities (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation for enhanced temperature measurement, Recommendation for continuous temperature monitoring, Recommendation for cover gas monitoring, Recommendation for ferrocyanide waste characterization, Recommendation for chemical reaction studies, and Recommendation for emergency response planning); Schedules; and References. All actions recommended by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board for emergency planning by Hanford Site emergency preparedness organizations have been completed

  7. Annual report to Congress. Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 2000

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    2001-03-01

    This Annual Report to the Congress describes the Department of Energy's activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. During 2000, the Department completed its implementation and proposed closure of one Board recommendation and completed all implementation plan milestones associated with two additional Board recommendations. Also in 2000, the Department formally accepted two new Board recommendations and developed implementation plans in response to those recommendations. The Department also made significant progress with a number of broad-based safety initiatives. These include initial implementation of integrated safety management at field sites and within headquarters program offices, issuance of a nuclear safety rule, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction.

  8. Annual report to Congress. Department of Energy activities relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, calendar year 2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This Annual Report to the Congress describes the Department of Energy's activities in response to formal recommendations and other interactions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. During 2000, the Department completed its implementation and proposed closure of one Board recommendation and completed all implementation plan milestones associated with two additional Board recommendations. Also in 2000, the Department formally accepted two new Board recommendations and developed implementation plans in response to those recommendations. The Department also made significant progress with a number of broad-based safety initiatives. These include initial implementation of integrated safety management at field sites and within headquarters program offices, issuance of a nuclear safety rule, and continued progress on stabilizing excess nuclear materials to achieve significant risk reduction

  9. H.R. 4121: A Bill to establish an independent safety board to oversee Department of Energy nuclear facilities. Introduced in the House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, March 9, 1988

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1988-01-01

    The bill H.R. 4121 if enacted would establish an independent safety board to oversee the Department of Energy nuclear facilities. This board would be a part of the executive branch and would be known as the Federal Facilities Nuclear Safety Board. The structure, functions, and powers of the Board as well as the responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy in full cooperation with the board, the format of board recommendations, the method of board reporting, and authorization for funding for the board are presented in detail. The bill was referred to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Armed Services

  10. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 for the period ending December 31, 1991

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Atwood, J.M.

    1992-01-01

    This quarterly report provides a status of the activities underway at the Hanford Site on the ferrocyanide safety issues as requested by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in their Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990). In March 1991, an DNFSB Implementation Plan (Cash 1991a) was prepared and sent to the DNFSB responding to the six parts of Recommendation 90-7. All of the activities in the DNFSB Implementation Plan are underway and the status of each is described

  11. 76 FR 42686 - DOE Response to Recommendation 2011-1 of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Safety...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-19

    ... examples of a failed safety culture.'' The Department disagrees with this categorization and believes the... Safety Board, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant AGENCY: Department of Energy... Recommendation 2011-1, concerning Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, to the...

  12. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    Through the Atomic Energy Act, Congress made is possible for the public to get a full and fair hearing on civilian nuclear matters. Individuals who are directly affected by any licensing action involving a facility producing or utilizing nuclear materials may participate in a formal hearing, on the record, before independent judges on the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP or Panel). Frequently, in deciding whether a license, permit, amendment, or extension should be granted to a particular applicant, the Panel members must be more than mere umpires. If appropriate, they are authorized to go beyond the issues the parties place before them in order to identify, explore, and resolve significant questions involving threats to the public health and safety that come to a board's attention during the proceedings. This brochure explains the purpose of the panel. Also addressed are: type of hearing handled; method of public participation; formality of hearings; high-level waste; other panel responsibilities and litigation technology

  13. 75 FR 16869 - Areva Enrichment Services, LLC; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-02

    ... Enrichment Services, LLC; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Pursuant to delegation by the... following proceeding: Areva Enrichment Services, LLC (Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility) This Board is being established pursuant to a Notice of Hearing and Commission Order regarding the application of Areva Enrichment...

  14. Preparation of safety and regulatory document for BARC Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prasad, S.S.; Jayarajan, K.

    2017-01-01

    In India, the necessary codes and safety guidelines for achieving the safety objectives are provided by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which are in conformity with the principles of radiation protection as formulated by the International Council of Radiation Protection (ICRP) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The same is followed by BARC Safety Council (BSC), which is the regulatory body for the BARC facilities. In addition to all types of fuel cycle facilities, BSC regulates safety of many types of conventional facilities. Many such types of facilities and projects are not under the regulatory purview of AERB. Therefore, the Council has also initiated a programme for development and publication of safety documents for installations in BARC in the fields/ topics yet not addressed by IAEA or AERB. This makes the task pioneering, as some of the areas taken up for defining the regulatory requirements are new, where standard regulatory documents are not available

  15. Nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-02-01

    This book reviews the accomplishments, operations, and problems faced by the defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Specifically, it discusses the recommendations that the Safety Board made to improve safety and health conditions at the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities, problems the Safety Board has encountered in hiring technical staff, and management problems that could affect the Safety Board's independence and credibility

  16. 76 FR 58049 - Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; Honeywell International, Inc.; Metropolis Works Uranium...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-19

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 40-3392-MLA; ASLBP No. 11-910-01-MLA-BD01] Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; Honeywell International, Inc.; Metropolis Works Uranium Conversion Facility... assurance for its Metropolis Works uranium conversion facility in Metropolis, Illinois. \\1\\ LBP-11-19, 74...

  17. Quarterly report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1991-10-01

    This is the second quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing safety issues associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks that contain ferrocyanide compounds. An implementation plan (Cash 1991) responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990) was issued in March 1991 describing the activities planned and underway to address each of the six parts of the recommendation. All of the activities listed in the implementation plan are underway, including the multifunctional instrument tree and infrared tasks which resumed in late July. Although technical difficulties and resource limitations delayed some work, noteworthy progress has been made in completing a number of ferrocyanide program milestones. Thermal modeling shows that the heat loading of tank 241-BY-104 is much lower than previously listed and that significant hot spots within the waste are highly unlikely, if not possible. Computerized continuous temperature monitoring was installed on schedule on five of the highest interest tanks and five additional tanks will be on-line in December. Tank intrusive sampling is proceeding and the first vapor samples were obtained in mid-October. Spectral scans were completed for twelve tanks and substantial progress was made on design of an infrared scanning system. Chemical reaction studies are underway with synthetic ferrocyanide compounds believed to be more representative of the ferrocyanide materials actually deposited in the tanks. Tests indicate that water plays a major role in impeding a possible runaway reaction. An emergency planning exercise was conducted in May, emergency procedures were updated this quarter, and validation of the procedures and a second emergency exercise is scheduled for October

  18. 76 FR 11523 - Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; AREVA Enrichment Services, LLC (Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-02

    ... and Licensing Board; AREVA Enrichment Services, LLC (Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility); Notice of... Governmental Entities Regarding Environmental Portion of Enrichment Facility Licensing Proceeding February 24.... White. In this 10 CFR part 70 proceeding regarding the request of applicant AREVA Enrichment Services...

  19. 76 FR 387 - Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; AREVA Enrichment Services, LLC (Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-04

    ... and Licensing Board; AREVA Enrichment Services, LLC (Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility) December 17, 2010... construction and operation of a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility--denoted as the Eagle Rock... site at http://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/arevanc.html . These and other documents relating...

  20. 77 FR 54570 - Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-09-05

    ... DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board AGENCY... the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Senior Executive Service (SES) Performance Review.... The PRB shall review and evaluate the initial summary rating of the senior executive's performance...

  1. 78 FR 55244 - Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board; Membership

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-10

    ... DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board... the membership of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Senior Executive Service (SES... rating of a senior executive's performance, the executive's response, and the higher level official's...

  2. Status of safety at Areva group facilities. 2007 annual report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This report describes the status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the facilities of the AREVA group and gives information on radiation protection in the service operations, as observed through the inspection programs and analyses carried out by the General Inspectorate in 2007. Having been submitted to the group's Supervisory Board, this report is sent to the bodies representing the personnel. Content: 1 - A look back at 2007 by the AREVA General Inspector: Visible progress in 2007, Implementation of the Nuclear Safety Charter, Notable events; 2 - Status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the nuclear facilities and service operations: Personnel radiation protection, Event tracking, Service operations, Criticality control, Radioactive waste and effluent management; 3 - Performance improvement actions; 4 - Description of the General Inspectorate; 5 - Glossary

  3. Safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific reference include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The safety objective, concepts and safety principles; 3. Legal framework and regulatory supervision; 4. The management system and verification of safety; 5. Siting of the facility; 6. Design of the facility; 7. Construction of the facility; 8. Commissioning of the facility; 9. Operation of the facility; 10. Decommissioning of the facility; Appendix I: Requirements specific to uranium fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix II: Requirements specific to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix III: Requirements specific to conversion facilities and enrichment facilities

  4. 77 FR 51943 - Procedures for Safety Investigations

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-28

    ... rule, Procedures for Safety Investigations, which published July 27, 2012 in the Federal Register, 77... DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 10 CFR Part 1708 Procedures for Safety Investigations AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of comment period...

  5. Safety Software Guide Perspectives for the Design of New Nuclear Facilities (U)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VINCENT, Andrew

    2005-01-01

    In June of this year, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued directives DOE O 414.1C and DOE G 414.1-4 to improve quality assurance programs, processes, and procedures among its safety contractors. Specifically, guidance entitled, ''Safety Software Guide for use with 10 CFR 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, DOE G 414.1-4'', provides information and acceptable methods to comply with safety software quality assurance (SQA) requirements. The guidance provides a roadmap for meeting DOE O 414.1C, ''Quality Assurance'', and the quality assurance program (QAP) requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830, Subpart A, Quality Assurance, for DOE nuclear facilities and software application activities. [1, 2] The order and guide are part of a comprehensive implementation plan that addresses issues and concerns documented in Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2002-1. [3] Safety SQA requirements for DOE as well as National Nuclear Security Administration contractors are necessary to implement effective quality assurance (QA) processes and achieve safe nuclear facility operations. DOE G 414.1-4 was developed to provide guidance on establishing and implementing effective QA processes tied specifically to nuclear facility safety software applications. The Guide includes software application practices covered by appropriate national and international consensus standards and various processes currently in use at DOE facilities. While the safety software guidance is considered to be of sufficient rigor and depth to ensure acceptable reliability of safety software at all DOE nuclear facilities, new nuclear facilities are well suited to take advantage of the guide to ensure compliant programs and processes are implemented. Attributes such as the facility life-cycle stage and the hazardous nature of each facility operations are considered, along with the category and level of importance of the

  6. A recommendation of the National Board for Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection for the appointment of Nuclear Safety Control Officers for research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adler, B.

    1990-01-01

    The Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection of the GDR requires that the managers of plants where nuclear facilities are operated appoint Control Officers for the fields of radiation protection, nuclear safety, physical protection, and accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The Control Officers are staff members of the operating organization but their appointment is subject to approval by the National Board and requires adequate qualification. The main task of the Control Officers as specialists is to give advice to the plant manager who retains responsibility for the safety of nuclear facilities, and to verify on his behalf that all requirements within their competence are met by the operating group. For this reason the Control Officer has to be absolutely independent of the head of the operating group. To enable the Control Officers to accomplish all necessary control activities and to guarantee independence from the head of the operating group, the plant manager has to establish adequate regulations of operation. As a pattern for such regulations the National Board has issued a Recommendation for the Appointment of Nuclear Safety Control Officers for Research Reactors, which provides a comprehensive survey of the requisite qualification features as well as the duties and rights of these Control Officers. This recommendation will be dealt with in the presentation

  7. Radioactive wastes. Safety of storage facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Devillers, Ch.

    2001-01-01

    A radioactive waste storage facility is designed in a way that ensures the isolation of wastes with respect to the biosphere. This function comprises the damping of the gamma and neutron radiations from the wastes, and the confinement of the radionuclides content of the wastes. The safety approach is based on two time scales: the safety of the insulation system during the main phase of radioactive decay, and the assessment of the radiological risks following this phase. The safety of a surface storage facility is based on a three-barrier concept (container, storage structures, site). The confidence in the safety of the facility is based on the quality assurance of the barriers and on their surveillance and maintenance. The safety of a deep repository will be based on the site quality, on the design and construction of structures and on the quality of the safety demonstration. This article deals with the safety approach and principles of storage facilities: 1 - recall of the different types of storage facilities; 2 - different phases of the life of a storage facility and regulatory steps; 3 - safety and radiation protection goals (time scales, radiation protection goals); 4 - safety approach and principles of storage facilities: safety of the isolation system (confinement system, safety analysis, scenarios, radiological consequences, safety principles), assessment of the radiation risks after the main phase of decay; 5 - safety of surface storage facilities: safety analysis of the confinement system of the Aube plant (barriers, scenarios, modeling, efficiency), evaluation of radiological risks after the main phase of decay; experience feedback of the Manche plant; variants of surface storage facilities in France and abroad (very low activity wastes, mine wastes, short living wastes with low and average activity); 6 - safety of deep geological disposal facilities: legal framework of the French research; international context; safety analysis of the confinement system

  8. 340 Waste Handling Facility interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bendixsen, R.B.

    1995-01-01

    This document establishes the interim safety basis (ISB) for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility). An ISB is a documented safety basis that provides a justification for the continued operation of the facility until an upgraded final safety analysis report is prepared that complies with US Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The ISB for the 340 Facility documents the current design and operation of the facility. The 340 Facility ISB (ISB-003) is based on a facility walkdown and review of the design and operation of the facility, as described in the existing safety documentation. The safety documents reviewed, to develop ISB-003, include the following: OSD-SW-153-0001, Operating Specification Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1990); OSR-SW-152-00003, Operating Limits for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (WHC 1989); SD-RE-SAP-013, Safety Analysis Report for Packaging, Railroad Liquid Waste Tank Cars (Mercado 1993); SD-WM-TM-001, Safety Assessment Document for the 340 Waste Handling Facility (Berneski 1994a); SD-WM-SEL-016, 340 Facility Safety Equipment List (Berneski 1992); and 340 Complex Fire Hazard Analysis, Draft (Hughes Assoc. Inc. 1994)

  9. 77 FR 26790 - Meeting of the Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-05-07

    ... Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board AGENCY: Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Bureau of Justice... meeting (via conference call-in) of the Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board (``Board'') to... INFORMATION: The Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board carries out those advisory functions...

  10. Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF 6 ; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  11. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  12. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  13. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.? read more The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are

  14. Passengers' perception of the safety demonstration on board an aircraft

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ruenruoy, Ratchada

    The cabin safety demonstration on board an aircraft is one of the methods to provide safety information for passengers before aircraft takeoff. However, passengers' enthusiasm toward safety demonstrations is normally low. Therefore, the study of passengers' perception toward safety briefings on board an aircraft is important in increasing the safety awareness for the travelling public on commercial aircraft. A survey was distributed to measure the perceptions of Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU) faculty and staff, Aerospace students, and international students who have traveled in the last year. It was generally found that watching the cabin safety demonstration before aircraft takeoff was believed to be important for passengers. However, the attention to the safety demonstration remained low because the safety briefings were not good enough in terms of clear communication, particularly in the recorded audio demonstration and the live safety demonstration methods of briefing.

  15. The Atomic Energy Control Board and the uranium mining industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duncan, R.M.

    The Atomic Energy Control Board controls prescribed substances and nuclear facilities through a licensing system. It is only recently that this system has been applied to the uranium industry. There are four stages in the licensing procedure before a Mine-Mill Facility Operating Licence is issued: exploration requires an underground exploration permit; site approval is needed before the start of the development stage; development approval is required before the construction of the mill and waste management facilities and depends on the information in a preliminary safety report; the granting of a final operating licence occurs after the Board is satisfied with the final safety report, operating policies and principles, tailings management, and decommissioning plans. The Board has resource management policies designed to ensure that uranium reserves are available to meet Canada's needs. The administration of safeguards is also the Board's responsibility. (LL)

  16. 78 FR 25476 - Meeting of the Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-01

    ... Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board AGENCY: Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Department of...) of the Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board to consider a range of issues of [email protected] . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board carries out...

  17. 29 CFR 541.606 - Board, lodging or other facilities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... DEFINING AND DELIMITING THE EXEMPTIONS FOR EXECUTIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, PROFESSIONAL, COMPUTER AND OUTSIDE SALES EMPLOYEES Salary Requirements § 541.606 Board, lodging or other facilities. (a) To qualify for...

  18. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel annual report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    In Fiscal Year 1990, The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (Panel) handled 40 proceedings involving the construction, operation, and maintenance of commercial nuclear power reactors or other activities requiring a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report summarizes, highlights, and analyzes how the judges and licensing boards of the Panel addressed the wide-ranging issues raised in these proceedings during the year

  19. Nuclear materials facility safety initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peddicord, K.L.; Nelson, P.; Roundhill, M.; Jardine, L.J.; Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M.; Khromov, V.V.; Kruchkov, E.; Bolyatko, V.; Kazanskij, Yu.; Vorobeva, I.; Lash, T.R.; Newton, D.; Harris, B.

    2000-01-01

    Safety in any facility in the nuclear fuel cycle is a fundamental goal. However, it is recognized that, for example, should an accident occur in either the U.S. or Russia, the results could seriously delay joint activities to store and disposition weapons fissile materials in both countries. To address this, plans are underway jointly to develop a nuclear materials facility safety initiative. The focus of the initiative would be to share expertise which would lead in improvements in safety and safe practices in the nuclear fuel cycle.The program has two components. The first is a lab-to-lab initiative. The second involves university-to-university collaboration.The lab-to-lab and university-to-university programs will contribute to increased safety in facilities dealing with nuclear materials and related processes. These programs will support important bilateral initiatives, develop the next generation of scientists and engineers which will deal with these challenges, and foster the development of a safety culture

  20. 340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-04-01

    This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people.

  1. 340 waste handling facility interim safety basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    VAIL, T.S.

    1999-01-01

    This document presents an interim safety basis for the 340 Waste Handling Facility classifying the 340 Facility as a Hazard Category 3 facility. The hazard analysis quantifies the operating safety envelop for this facility and demonstrates that the facility can be operated without a significant threat to onsite or offsite people

  2. Probabilistic safety assessment for food irradiation facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solanki, R.B.; Prasad, M.; Sonawane, A.U.; Gupta, S.K.

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► Different considerations are required in PSA for Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities. ► We carried out PSA for food irradiation facility as a part of safety evaluation. ► The results indicate that the fatal exposure risk is below the ‘acceptable risk’. ► Adequate operator training and observing good safety culture would reduce the risk. - Abstract: Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is widely used for safety evaluation of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) worldwide. The approaches and methodologies are matured and general consensus exists on using these approaches in PSA applications. However, PSA applications for safety evaluation for non-reactor facilities are limited. Due to differences in the processes in nuclear reactor facilities and non-reactor facilities, the considerations are different in application of PSA to these facilities. The food irradiation facilities utilize gamma irradiation sources, X-ray machines and electron accelerators for the purpose of radiation processing of variety of food items. This is categorized as Non-Reactor Nuclear Facility. In this paper, the application of PSA to safety evaluation of food irradiation facility is presented considering the ‘fatality due to radiation overexposure’ as a risk measure. The results indicate that the frequency of the fatal exposure is below the numerical acceptance guidance for the risk to the individual. Further, it is found that the overall risk to the over exposure can be reduced by providing the adequate operator training and observing good safety culture.

  3. 76 FR 51065 - Florida Power & Light Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-17

    ... & Light Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Pursuant to delegation by the... hereby given that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) is being established to preside over the following proceeding: Florida Power & Light Company (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1) This proceeding involves a...

  4. 75 FR 54915 - Meeting of the Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-09

    ... Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board AGENCY: Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Justice. ACTION... Officer Medal of Valor Review Board to vote on recommendations for the 2009-2010 Medal of Valor... Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board carries out those advisory functions specified in 42 U...

  5. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved

  6. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in DOE-STD-6002-96, Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities: Requirements. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While the requirements in DOE-STD-6002-96 are generally applicable to a wide range of fusion facilities, this Standard, DOE-STD-6003-96, is concerned mainly with the implementation of those requirements in large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This Standard is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment as opposed to regulation by other regulatory agencies. As the need for guidance involving other types of fusion facilities or other regulatory environments emerges, additional guidance volumes should be prepared. The concepts, processes, and recommendations set forth here are for guidance only. They will contribute to safety at magnetic fusion facilities

  7. Safety Oversight of Decommissioning Activities at DOE Nuclear Sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zull, Lawrence M.; Yeniscavich, William

    2008-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is an independent federal agency established by Congress in 1988 to provide nuclear safety oversight of activities at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. The activities under the Board's jurisdiction include the design, construction, startup, operation, and decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities at DOE sites. This paper reviews the Board's safety oversight of decommissioning activities at DOE sites, identifies the safety problems observed, and discusses Board initiatives to improve the safety of decommissioning activities at DOE sites. The decommissioning of former defense nuclear facilities has reduced the risk of radioactive material contamination and exposure to the public and site workers. In general, efforts to perform decommissioning work at DOE defense nuclear sites have been successful, and contractors performing decommissioning work have a good safety record. Decommissioning activities have recently been completed at sites identified for closure, including the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, the Fernald Closure Project, and the Miamisburg Closure Project (the Mound site). The Rocky Flats and Fernald sites, which produced plutonium parts and uranium materials for defense needs (respectively), have been turned into wildlife refuges. The Mound site, which performed R and D activities on nuclear materials, has been converted into an industrial and technology park called the Mound Advanced Technology Center. The DOE Office of Legacy Management is responsible for the long term stewardship of these former EM sites. The Board has reviewed many decommissioning activities, and noted that there are valuable lessons learned that can benefit both DOE and the contractor. As part of its ongoing safety oversight responsibilities, the Board and its staff will continue to review the safety of DOE and contractor decommissioning activities at DOE defense nuclear sites

  8. Development, application, and validation of a survey for infectious disease control practices at equine boarding facilities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kirby, Alanna T; Traub-Dargatz, Josie L; Hill, Ashley E; Kogan, Lori R; Morley, Paul S; Heird, James C

    2010-11-15

    To develop a questionnaire for self-assessment of biosecurity practices at equine boarding facilities and to evaluate infectious disease control practices in these facilities in Colorado. Cross-sectional study. 64 equine boarding facilities in Colorado. Survey questions were rated according to importance for prevention and containment of equine infectious diseases. Point values (range, 0 to 20) were assigned for possible responses, with greater values given for optimal infection control methods. Questionnaires were mailed to equine boarding facilities in Colorado advertised on the World Wide Web. Survey responses were compared with assessments made by a member of the research team during visits to 30 randomly selected facilities. Agreement among results was analyzed via a kappa test and rated as poor, fair, moderate, substantial, or nearly perfect. Survey responses were received for 64 of 163 (39%) equine boarding facilities. Scores ranged from 106 to 402 points (maximum possible score, 418). Most facilities received better scores for movement and housing of equids than for other sections of the survey. Respondents at 24 of 48 (50%) facilities that routinely received new equids reported isolation of new arrivals. Agreement between self-assessment by survey respondents and evaluation by a member of the research team was determined to be fair to substantial. Most equine boarding facilities have opportunities to improve measures for prevention or containment of contagious diseases (eg, isolation of newly arrived equids and use of written health management protocols). Most self-assessments of infection control practices were accurate.

  9. Type A Accident Investigation Board report on the January 17, 1996, electrical accident with injury in Technical Area 21 Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility Los Alamos National Laboratory. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-04-01

    An electrical accident was investigated in which a crafts person received serious injuries as a result of coming into contact with a 13.2 kilovolt (kV) electrical cable in the basement of Building 209 in Technical Area 21 (TA-21-209) in the Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility (TSFF) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In conducting its investigation, the Accident Investigation Board used various analytical techniques, including events and causal factor analysis, barrier analysis, change analysis, fault tree analysis, materials analysis, and root cause analysis. The board inspected the accident site, reviewed events surrounding the accident, conducted extensive interviews and document reviews, and performed causation analyses to determine the factors that contributed to the accident, including any management system deficiencies. Relevant management systems and factors that could have contributed to the accident were evaluated in accordance with the guiding principles of safety management identified by the Secretary of Energy in an October 1994 letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and subsequently to Congress

  10. Type A Accident Investigation Board report on the January 17, 1996, electrical accident with injury in Technical Area 21 Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility Los Alamos National Laboratory. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-04-01

    An electrical accident was investigated in which a crafts person received serious injuries as a result of coming into contact with a 13.2 kilovolt (kV) electrical cable in the basement of Building 209 in Technical Area 21 (TA-21-209) in the Tritium Science and Fabrication Facility (TSFF) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In conducting its investigation, the Accident Investigation Board used various analytical techniques, including events and causal factor analysis, barrier analysis, change analysis, fault tree analysis, materials analysis, and root cause analysis. The board inspected the accident site, reviewed events surrounding the accident, conducted extensive interviews and document reviews, and performed causation analyses to determine the factors that contributed to the accident, including any management system deficiencies. Relevant management systems and factors that could have contributed to the accident were evaluated in accordance with the guiding principles of safety management identified by the Secretary of Energy in an October 1994 letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and subsequently to Congress.

  11. 75 FR 54400 - Florida Power and Light Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-07

    ...] Florida Power and Light Company; Establishment of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Pursuant to delegation..., notice is hereby given that an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) is being established to preside over the following proceeding: Florida Power & Light Company (Turkey Point Units 6 and 7) This...

  12. Review of the Tritium Extraction Facility design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barton, R.W.; Bamdad, F.; Blackman, J.

    2000-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) is an independent executive branch agency responsible for technical safety oversight of the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) defense nuclear facilities. One of DNFSB's responsibilities is the review of design and construction projects for DOE's defense nuclear facilities to ensure that adequate health and safety requirements are identified and implemented. These reviews are performed with the expectation that facility designs are being developed within the framework of a site's Integrated Safety Management (ISM) program. This paper describes the application of ISM principles in DNFSB's ongoing review of the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) design/construction project

  13. Review of the Tritium Extraction Facility Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ronald W. Barton; Farid Bamdad; Joel Blackman

    2000-01-01

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) is an independent executive branch agency responsible for technical safety oversight of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) defense nuclear facilities. One of DNFSB's responsibilities is the review of design and construction projects for DOE's defense nuclear facilities to ensure that adequate health and safety requirements are identified and implemented. These reviews are performed with the expectation that facility designs are being developed within the framework of a site's Integrated Safety Management (ISM) program. This paper describes the application of ISM principles in DNFSB's ongoing review of the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) design/construction project

  14. Proceedings of the Topical Meeting on the safety of nuclear fuel cycle intermediate storage facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The CSNI Working Group on Fuel Cycle Safety held an International Topical Meeting on safety aspects of Intermediate Storage Facilities in Newby Bridge, England, from 28 to 30 October 1997. The main purpose of the meeting was to provide a forum for the exchange of information on the technical issues on the safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities (intermediate storage). Titles of the papers are: An international view on the safety challenges to interim storage of spent fuel. Interim storage of intermediate and high-level waste in Belgium: a description and safety aspects. Encapsulated intermediate level waste product stores at Sellafield. Safety of interim storage facilities of spent fuel: the international dimension and the IAEA's activities. Reprocessing of irradiated fuel and radwaste conditioning at Belgoprocess site: an overview. Retrieval of wastes from interim storage silos at Sellafield. Outline of the fire and explosion of the bituminization facility and the activities of the investigation committee (STAIJAERI). The fire and explosion incident of the bituminization facility and the lessons learned from the incident. Study on the scenario of the fire incident and related analysis. Study on the scenario of the explosion incident and related analysis. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997 chemical explosion at the plutonium reclamation facility, Hanford site, Richland, Washington. Dry interim storage of spent nuclear fuel elements in Germany. Safe and effective system for the bulk receipt and storage of light water reactor fuel prior to reprocessing. Receiving and storage of glass canisters at vitrified waste storage center of Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. Design and operational experience of dry cask storage systems. Sellafield MOX plant; Plant safety design (BNFL). The assessment of fault studies for intermediate term waste storage facilities within the UK nuclear regulatory regime. Non-active and active commissioning of the thermal oxide

  15. Upgrading safety systems of industrial irradiation facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gomes, R.S.; Gomes, J.D.R.L.; Costa, E.L.C.; Costa, M.L.L.; Thomé, Z.D.

    2017-01-01

    The first industrial irradiation facility in operation in Brazil was designed in the 70s. Nowadays, twelve commercial and research facilities are in operation and two already decommissioned. Minor modifications and upgrades, as sensors replacement, have been introduced in these facilities, in order to reduce the technological gap in the control and safety systems. The safety systems are designed in agreement with the codes and standards at the time. Since then, new standards, codes and recommendations, as well as lessons learned from accidents, have been issued by various international committees or regulatory bodies. The rapid advance of the industry makes the safety equipment used in the original construction become obsolete. The decreasing demand for these older products means that they are no longer produced, which can make it impossible or costly to obtain spare parts and the expansion of legacy systems to include new features. This work aims to evaluate existing safety systems at Brazilian irradiation facilities, mainly the oldest facilities, taking into account the recommended IAEA's design requirements. Irrespective of the fact that during its operational period no event with victims have been recorded in Brazilian facilities, and that the regulatory inspections do not present any serious deviations regarding the safety procedures, it is necessary an assessment of safety system with the purpose of bringing their systems to 'the state of the art', avoiding their rapid obsolescence. This study has also taken into account the knowledge, concepts and solutions developed to upgrading safety system in irradiation facilities throughout the world. (author)

  16. Upgrading safety systems of industrial irradiation facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gomes, R.S.; Gomes, J.D.R.L.; Costa, E.L.C.; Costa, M.L.L., E-mail: rogeriog@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: jlopes@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: evaldo@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: mara@cnen.gov.br [Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Diretoria de Radioproteção e Segurança Nuclear; Thomé, Z.D., E-mail: zielithome@gmail.com [Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Seção de Engenharia Nuclear

    2017-07-01

    The first industrial irradiation facility in operation in Brazil was designed in the 70s. Nowadays, twelve commercial and research facilities are in operation and two already decommissioned. Minor modifications and upgrades, as sensors replacement, have been introduced in these facilities, in order to reduce the technological gap in the control and safety systems. The safety systems are designed in agreement with the codes and standards at the time. Since then, new standards, codes and recommendations, as well as lessons learned from accidents, have been issued by various international committees or regulatory bodies. The rapid advance of the industry makes the safety equipment used in the original construction become obsolete. The decreasing demand for these older products means that they are no longer produced, which can make it impossible or costly to obtain spare parts and the expansion of legacy systems to include new features. This work aims to evaluate existing safety systems at Brazilian irradiation facilities, mainly the oldest facilities, taking into account the recommended IAEA's design requirements. Irrespective of the fact that during its operational period no event with victims have been recorded in Brazilian facilities, and that the regulatory inspections do not present any serious deviations regarding the safety procedures, it is necessary an assessment of safety system with the purpose of bringing their systems to 'the state of the art', avoiding their rapid obsolescence. This study has also taken into account the knowledge, concepts and solutions developed to upgrading safety system in irradiation facilities throughout the world. (author)

  17. Overseeing oversight: governance of quality and safety by hospital boards in the English NHS.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mannion, Russell; Davies, Huw; Freeman, Tim; Millar, Ross; Jacobs, Rowena; Kasteridis, Panos

    2015-01-01

    To contribute towards an understanding of hospital board composition and to explore board oversight of patient safety and health care quality in the English NHS. We reviewed the theory related to hospital board governance and undertook two national surveys about board management in NHS acute and specialist hospital trusts in England. The first survey was issued to 150 trusts in 2011/2012 and was completed online via a dedicated web tool. A total 145 replies were received (97% response rate). The second online survey was undertaken in 2012/2013 and targeted individual board members, using a previously validated standard instrument on board members' attitudes and competencies (the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire). A total of 334 responses were received from 165 executive and 169 non-executive board members, providing at least one response from 95 of the 144 NHS trusts then in existence (66% response rate). Over 90% of the English NHS trust boards had 10-15 members. We found no significant difference in board size between trusts of different types (e.g. Foundation Trusts versus non-Foundation Trusts and Teaching Hospital Trusts versus non-Teaching Hospital Trusts). Clinical representation on boards was limited: around 62% had three or fewer members with clinical backgrounds. For about two-thirds of the trusts (63%), board members with a clinical background comprised less than 30% of the members. Boards were using a wide range and mix of quantitative performance metrics and soft intelligence (e.g. walk-arounds, patient stories) to monitor their organisations with regard to patient safety. The Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire data showed generally high or very high levels of agreement with desirable statements of practice in each of its six dimensions. Aggregate levels of agreement within each dimension ranged from 73% (for the dimension addressing interpersonal issues) to 85% (on the political). English NHS boards largely hold a wide range of attitudes and

  18. IAEA safety requirements for safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, G.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorises the Agency to establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property. In that respect, the IAEA has established a Safety Fundamentals publication which contains ten safety principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. A number of these principles require safety assessments to be carried out as a means of evaluating compliance with safety requirements for all nuclear facilities and activities and to determine the measures that need to be taken to ensure safety. The safety assessments are required to be carried out and documented by the organisation responsible for operating the facility or conducting the activity, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorisation process. In addition to the principles of the Safety Fundamentals, the IAEA establishes requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment and which are governed by the principles in the Safety Fundamentals. The IAEA's Safety Requirements publication 'Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities', establishes the safety requirements that need to be fulfilled in conducting and maintaining safety assessments for the lifetime of facilities and activities, with specific attention to defence in depth and the requirement for a graded approach to the application of these safety requirements across the wide range of fuel cycle facilities and activities. Requirements for independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the operating organisation, including the requirement for the safety assessment to be periodically reviewed and updated are also covered. For many fuel cycle facilities and activities, environmental impact assessments and non-radiological risk assessments will be required. The

  19. A graded approach to safety documentation at processing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cowen, M.L.

    1992-01-01

    Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) has over 40 major Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) in preparation for non-reactor facilities. These facilities include nuclear material production facilities, waste management facilities, support laboratories and environmental remediation facilities. The SARs for these various projects encompass hazard levels from High to Low, and mission times from startup, through operation, to shutdown. All of these efforts are competing for scarce resources, and therefore some mechanism is required for balancing the documentation requirements. Three of the key variables useful for the decision making process are Depth of Safety Analysis, Urgency of Safety Analysis, and Resource Availability. This report discusses safety documentation at processing facilities

  20. Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    MITCHELL,GERRY W.; LONGLEY,SUSAN W.; PHILBIN,JEFFREY S.; MAHN,JEFFREY A.; BERRY,DONALD T.; SCHWERS,NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK,THOMAS E.; NAEGELI,ROBERT E.

    2000-11-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

  1. Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MITCHELL, GERRY W.; LONGLEY, SUSAN W.; PHILBIN, JEFFREY S.; MAHN, JEFFREY A.; BERRY, DONALD T.; SCHWERS, NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK, THOMAS E.; NAEGELI, ROBERT E.

    2000-01-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR

  2. DRY TRANSFER FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-01-01

    This design calculation updates the previous criticality evaluation for the fuel handling, transfer, and staging operations to be performed in the Dry Transfer Facility (DTF) including the remediation area. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that operations performed in the DTF and RF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Dry Transfer Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173737], p. 3-8). A description of the changes is as follows: (1) Update the supporting calculations for the various Category 1 and 2 event sequences as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 171429], Section 7). (2) Update the criticality safety calculations for the DTF staging racks and the remediation pool to reflect the current design. This design calculation focuses on commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies, i.e., pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) SNF. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) owned SNF is evaluated in depth in the ''Canister Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations'' (BSC 2005 [DIRS 173284]) and is also applicable to DTF operations. Further, the design and safety analyses of the naval SNF canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. Also, note that the results for the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) Site specific Cask (MSC) calculations are limited to the

  3. Responsibility for quality improvement and patient safety: hospital board and medical staff leadership challenges.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Goeschel, Christine A; Wachter, Robert M; Pronovost, Peter J

    2010-07-01

    Concern about the quality and safety of health care persists, 10 years after the 1999 Institute of Medicine report To Err is Human. Despite growing awareness of quality and safety risks, and significant efforts to improve, progress is difficult to measure. Hospital leaders, including boards and medical staffs, are accountable to improve care, yet they often address this duty independently. Shared responsibility for quality and patient safety improvement presents unique challenges and unprecedented opportunities for boards and medical staffs. To capitalize on the pressure to improve, both groups may benefit from a better understanding of their synergistic potential. Boards should be educated about the quality of care provided in their institutions and about the challenges of valid measurement and accurate reporting. Boards strengthen their quality oversight capacity by recruiting physicians for vacant board seats. Medical staff members strengthen their role as hospital leaders when they understand the unique duties of the governing board. A quality improvement strategy rooted in synergistic efforts by the board and the medical staff may offer the greatest potential for safer care. Such a mutually advantageous approach requires a clear appreciation of roles and responsibilities and respect for differences. In this article, we review these responsibilities, describe opportunities for boards and medical staffs to collaborate as leaders, and offer recommendations for how boards and medical staff members can address the challenges of shared responsibility for quality of care.

  4. Status of safety at Areva group facilities. 2007 annual report; Areva, etat de surete des installations nucleaires. Rapport annuel 2007

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-07-01

    This report describes the status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the facilities of the AREVA group and gives information on radiation protection in the service operations, as observed through the inspection programs and analyses carried out by the General Inspectorate in 2007. Having been submitted to the group's Supervisory Board, this report is sent to the bodies representing the personnel. Content: 1 - A look back at 2007 by the AREVA General Inspector: Visible progress in 2007, Implementation of the Nuclear Safety Charter, Notable events; 2 - Status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the nuclear facilities and service operations: Personnel radiation protection, Event tracking, Service operations, Criticality control, Radioactive waste and effluent management; 3 - Performance improvement actions; 4 - Description of the General Inspectorate; 5 - Glossary.

  5. Radiation safety training for accelerator facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trinoskey, P.A.

    1997-02-01

    In November 1992, a working group was formed within the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) accelerator facilities to develop a generic safety training program to meet the basic requirements for individuals working in accelerator facilities. This training, by necessity, includes sections for inserting facility-specific information. The resulting course materials were issued by DOE as a handbook under its technical standards in 1996. Because experimenters may be at a facility for only a short time and often at odd times during the day, the working group felt that computer-based training would be useful. To that end, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) together have developed a computer-based safety training program for accelerator facilities. This interactive course not only enables trainees to receive facility- specific information, but time the training to their schedule and tailor it to their level of expertise

  6. Safety guide data on radiation shielding in a reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sekiguchi, Noboru; Naito, Yoshitaka

    1986-04-01

    In a reprocessing facility, various radiation sources are handled and have many geometrical conditions. To aim drawing up a safety guidebook on radiation shielding in order to evaluate shielding safety in a reprocessing facility with high reliability and reasonableness, JAERI trusted investigation on safety evaluation techniques of radiation shielding in a reprocessing facility to Nuclear Safety Research Association. This report is the collection of investigation results, and describes concept of shielding safety design principle, radiation sources in reprocessing facility and estimation of its strength, techniques of shielding calculations, and definite examples of shielding calculation in reprocessing facility. (author)

  7. Decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance to regulatory bodies and operating organizations on planning and provision for the safe management of the decommissioning of non-reactor nuclear fuel cycle facilities. While the basic safety considerations for the decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are similar to those for nuclear power plants, there are important differences, notably in the design and operating parameters for the facilities, the type of radioactive material and the support systems available. It is the objective of this Safety Guide to provide guidance for the shutdown and eventual decommissioning of such facilities, their individual characteristics being taken into account

  8. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    WEISS, E.V.

    2000-12-15

    Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste.

  9. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    WEISS, E.V.

    2000-01-01

    Data and calculations from previous criticality safety evaluations and analyses were used to evaluate criticality safety for the entire Tank Farms facility to support the continued waste storage mission. This criticality safety evaluation concludes that a criticality accident at the Tank Farms facility is an incredible event due to the existing form (chemistry) and distribution (neutron absorbers) of tank waste. Limits and controls for receipt of waste from other facilities and maintenance of tank waste condition are set forth to maintain the margin subcriticality in tank waste

  10. In-pile experiments and test facilities proposed for fast reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grolmes, M.A.; Avery, R.; Goldman, A.J.; Fauske, H.K.; Marchaterre, J.F.; Rose, D.; Wright, A.E.

    1976-01-01

    The role of in-pile experiments in support of the resolution of fast breeder reactor safety and licensing issues has been re-examined, with emphasis on key safety issues. Experiment needs have been related to the specific characteristics of these safety issues and to realistic requirements for additional test facility capabilities which can be achieved and utilized within the next ten years. It is found that those safety issues related to the energetics of core disruptive accidents have the largest impact on new facility requirements. However, utilization of existing facilities with modifications can provide for a continuing increase in experiment capability and experiment results on a timely bases. Emphasis has been placed upon maximum utilization of existing facilities and minimum requirements for new facilities. This evaluation has concluded that a new Safety Test Facility, STF, along with major modifications to the EBR II facility, improvement in TREAT capabilities, the existing Sodium Loop Safety Facility and corresponding Support Facilities provide the essential elements of the Safety Research Experiment Facilities (SAREF) required for resolution of key issues

  11. Design aspects of radiological safety in nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patkulkar, D.S.; Purohit, R.G.; Tripathi, R.M.

    2014-01-01

    In order to keep operational performance of a nuclear facility high and to keep occupational and public exposure ALARA, radiological safety provisions must be reviewed at the time of facility design. Deficiency in design culminates in deteriorated system performance and non adherence to safety standards and could sometimes result in radiological incident. Important radiological aspects relevant to safety were compiled based on operating experiences, design deficiencies brought out from past nuclear incidents, experience gained during maintenance, participation in design review of upcoming nuclear facilities and radiological emergency preparedness

  12. Nuclear criticality safety program at the Fuel Cycle Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lell, R.M.; Fujita, E.K.; Tracy, D.B.; Klann, R.T.; Imel, G.R.; Benedict, R.W.; Rigg, R.H.

    1994-01-01

    The Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) is designed to demonstrate the feasibility of a novel commercial-scale remote pyrometallurgical process for metallic fuels from liquid metal-cooled reactors and to show closure of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) fuel cycle. Requirements for nuclear criticality safety impose the most restrictive of the various constraints on the operation of FCF. The upper limits on batch sizes and other important process parameters are determined principally by criticality safety considerations. To maintain an efficient operation within appropriate safety limits, it is necessary to formulate a nuclear criticality safety program that integrates equipment design, process development, process modeling, conduct of operations, a measurement program, adequate material control procedures, and nuclear criticality analysis. The nuclear criticality safety program for FCF reflects this integration, ensuring that the facility can be operated efficiently without compromising safety. The experience gained from the conduct of this program in the Fuel cycle Facility will be used to design and safely operate IFR facilities on a commercial scale. The key features of the nuclear criticality safety program are described. The relationship of these features to normal facility operation is also described

  13. Supervision of the safety culture in nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-11-01

    This brochure issued by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI reports on safety culture aspects in nuclear facilities and ENSI’s activities as a supervisory instance. ENSI is the independent supervisory authority for the nuclear sector in Switzerland. A definition of safety culture is presented and the development of the concepts used in its monitoring are discussed. The main attributes of a good safety culture are discussed. Further, the conceptual basics and principles of such monitoring are looked at and the methods used for the supervision of safety culture in nuclear facilities are described

  14. 78 FR 48029 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-07

    ... Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security By the authority vested in me as President by the... at reducing the safety risks and security risks associated with hazardous chemicals. However... to further improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators...

  15. ACP Facility Safety Surveillance System Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    You, Gil Sung; Kook, D. H.; Choung, W. M.; Ku, J. H.; Cho, I. J.; You, G. S.; Kwon, K. C.; Lee, W. K.; Lee, E. P.

    2006-10-01

    The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process is under development for effective management of spent fuel by converting UO 2 into U-metal. For demonstration of this process, α-γ type new hotcell was built in the IMEF basement. All facilities which treat radioactive materials must manage CCTV system which is under control of Health Physics department. Three main points (including hotcell rear door area) have each camera, but operators who are in charge of facility management need to check the safety of the facility immediately through the network in his office. This needs introduce additional network cameras installation and this new surveillance system is expected to update the whole safety control ability with existing system

  16. Spallation Neutron Source Accelerator Facility Target Safety and Non-safety Control Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Battle, Ronald E.; DeVan, B.; Munro, John K. Jr.

    2006-01-01

    The Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) is a proton accelerator facility that generates neutrons for scientific researchers by spallation of neutrons from a mercury target. The SNS became operational on April 28, 2006, with first beam on target at approximately 200 W. The SNS accelerator, target, and conventional facilities controls are integrated by standardized hardware and software throughout the facility and were designed and fabricated to SNS conventions to ensure compatibility of systems with Experimental Physics Integrated Control System (EPICS). ControlLogix Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) interface to instruments and actuators, and EPICS performs the high-level integration of the PLCs such that all operator control can be accomplished from the Central Control room using EPICS graphical screens that pass process variables to and from the PLCs. Three active safety systems were designed to industry standards ISA S84.01 and IEEE 603 to meet the desired reliability for these safety systems. The safety systems protect facility workers and the environment from mercury vapor, mercury radiation, and proton beam radiation. The facility operators operated many of the systems prior to beam on target and developed the operating procedures. The safety and non-safety control systems were tested extensively prior to beam on target. This testing was crucial to identify wiring and software errors and failed components, the result of which was few problems during operation with beam on target. The SNS has continued beam on target since April to increase beam power, check out the scientific instruments, and continue testing the operation of facility subsystems

  17. Enhancement of safety for reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-06-01

    The adequacy of the safety measures for utility loss accidents in nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities which have been formulated by the nuclear enterprises is investigated in JNES which organizes an advanced committee to specifically study this problem. The results are reviewed in the present report including the case of such severe accidents as in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The report also represents a tentative proposal for examination standards of such unimaginable severe accidents as 'station blackout,' urgent safety measures necessary for reoperation of nuclear power plants and requested by nuclear and industrial safety agency, and pointing out and clarification of the potential weakness from the safety point of view, and collective and composite evaluation of safety of the relevant facilities. Furthermore, the definition of accident management is given as of controlled condition and the authorized way of thinking for the cases of plural events happening at the same time and the cases when risks exist radioactivity emits with explosion. (S. Ohno)

  18. Radiation safety in X-ray facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-09-01

    The guide specifies the radiation safety requirements for structural shielding and other safety arrangements used in X-ray facilities in medical and veterinary X-ray activities and in industry, research and education. The guide is also applicable to premises in which X-ray equipment intended for radiation therapy and operating at a voltage of less than 25 kV is used. The guide applies to new X-ray facilities in which X-ray equipment that has been used elsewhere is transferred. The radiation safety requirements for radiation therapy X-ray devices operating at a voltage exceeding 25 kV, and for the premices in which such devices are used, are set out in Guide ST 2.2

  19. Radiation safety in X-ray facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-09-01

    The guide specifies the radiation safety requirements for structural shielding and other safety arrangements used in X-ray facilities in medical and veterinary X-ray activities and in industry, research and education. The guide is also applicable to premises in which X-ray equipment intended for radiation therapy and operating at a voltage of less than 25 kV is used. The guide applies to new X-ray facilities in which X-ray equipment that has been used elsewhere is transferred. The radiation safety requirements for radiation therapy X-ray devices operating at a voltage exceeding 25 kV, and for the premices in which such devices are used, are set out in Guide ST 2.2.

  20. Preliminary safety evaluation (PSE) for Sodium Storage Facility at the Fast Flux Test Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowman, B.R.

    1994-01-01

    This evaluation was performed for the Sodium Storage Facility (SSF) which will be constructed at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) in the area adjacent to the South and West Dump Heat Exchanger (DHX) pits. The purpose of the facility is to allow unloading the sodium from the FFTF plant tanks and piping. The significant conclusion of this Preliminary Safety Evaluation (PSE) is that the only Safety Class 2 components are the four sodium storage tanks and their foundations. The building, because of its imminent risk to the tanks under an earthquake or high winds, will be Safety Class 3/2, which means the building has a Safety Class 3 function with the Safety Class 2 loads of seismic and wind factored into the design

  1. Safety of fuel cycle facilities. Topical issues paper no. 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ranguelova, V.; Niehaus, F.; Delattre, D.

    2001-01-01

    A wide range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are in operation. These installations process, use, store and dispose of radioactive material and cover: mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication (including mixed oxide fuel), reactor, interim spent fuel storage, reprocessing, waste treatment and waste disposal facilities. For the purposes of this paper, reactors and waste disposal facilities are not considered. The term 'fuel cycle facilities' covers only the remainder of the installations listed above. The IAEA Secretariat maintains a database of fuel cycle facilities in its Member States. Known as the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System (NFCIS), it is available as an on-line service through the Internet. More than 500 such facilities have been reported under this system. The facilities are listed by facility type and operating status. Approximately one third of all of the facilities are located in developing States. About half of all facilities are reported to be operating, of which approximately 40% are operating in developing States. In addition, some 60 facilities are either in the design stage or under construction. Although the radioactive source term for most fuel cycle facilities is lower than the source term for reactors, which results in less severe consequences to the public from potential accidents at these fuel cycle installations, recent events at some fuel cycle facilities have given rise to public concern which has to be addressed adequately by national regulatory bodies and at the international level. Worldwide, operational experience feedback warrants improvements in the safety of these facilities. Some of the hazards are similar for reactor and non-reactor facilities. However, the differences between these installations give rise to specific safety concerns at fuel cycle facilities. In particular, these concerns include: criticality, radiation protection of workers, chemical hazards, fire and explosion hazards. It is recognized

  2. Chemical process safety at fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayres, D.A.

    1997-08-01

    This NUREG provides broad guidance on chemical safety issues relevant to fuel cycle facilities. It describes an approach acceptable to the NRC staff, with examples that are not exhaustive, for addressing chemical process safety in the safe storage, handling, and processing of licensed nuclear material. It expounds to license holders and applicants a general philosophy of the role of chemical process safety with respect to NRC-licensed materials; sets forth the basic information needed to properly evaluate chemical process safety; and describes plausible methods of identifying and evaluating chemical hazards and assessing the adequacy of the chemical safety of the proposed equipment and facilities. Examples of equipment and methods commonly used to prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of chemical incidents are discussed in this document

  3. Facts about food irradiation: Safety of irradiation facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    This fact sheet considers the safety of industrial irradiation facilities. Although there have been accidents, none of them has endangered public health or environmental safety, and the radiation processing industry is considered to have a very good safety record. Gamma irradiators do not produce radioactive waste, and the radiation sources at the facilities cannot explode nor in any other way release radioactivity into the environment. 3 refs

  4. Implementing partnerships in nonreactor facility safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courtney, J.C.; Perry, W.H.; Phipps, R.D.

    1996-01-01

    Faculty and students from LSU have been participating in nuclear safety analyses and radiation protection projects at ANL-W at INEL since 1973. A mutually beneficial relationship has evolved that has resulted in generation of safety-related studies acceptable to Argonne and DOE, NRC, and state regulatory groups. Most of the safety projects have involved the Hot Fuel Examination Facility or the Fuel Conditioning Facility; both are hot cells that receive spent fuel from EBR-II. A table shows some of the major projects at ANL-W that involved LSU students and faculty

  5. Safety Assessment for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities - From Methodology to the Use of Results in Decision Making

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Batandjieva, B.; Ferch, R.; Joubert, A.; Kaulard, J.; Manson, P.; Percival, K.; Thierfeldt, St.

    2008-01-01

    The safety assessment of operational facilities in the nuclear industry is well understood and methodologies have been developed and refined over several decades. Similarly safety assessment methodologies for near surface disposal facilities have been harmonized internationally during the last few years. There is however relatively less widespread and documented experience of safety assessment for decommissioning among Member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and consequently there is less commonalty of approaches internationally. The importance of safety during decommissioning was further emphasized at the first review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the Berlin Conference 'Safe Decommissioning for Nuclear Activities' (14-18 October 2002). As a consequence during its June 2004 meeting the IAEA Board of Governors approved an Action Plan on Decommissioning of nuclear Facilities that requested the Secretariat to 'establish a forum for the sharing and exchange of national information and experience on the application of safety assessment in the context of decommissioning and provide a means to convey this information to other interested parties, also drawing on the work of other international organizations in this area'. In response the IAEA launched the International Project Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety during Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (DeSa) in November 2004 with the following objectives: - To develop a harmonized approach to safety assessment and define the elements of safety assessment for decommissioning; - To investigate the practical applicability of the methodology and performance of safety assessments for the decommissioning of various types of facilities through a selected number of test cases; - To investigate approaches for review of safety assessments for decommissioning activities and the development of a regulatory

  6. National Transportation Safety Board : weak internal control impaired financial accountability

    Science.gov (United States)

    2001-09-28

    The U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to review the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) internal controls over selected types of fiscal year expenditures. They were asked to determine whether internal control weaknesses were a...

  7. Health and Safety Management for Small-scale Methane Fermentation Facilities

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamaoka, Masaru; Yuyama, Yoshito; Nakamura, Masato; Oritate, Fumiko

    In this study, we considered health and safety management for small-scale methane fermentation facilities that treat 2-5 ton of biomass daily based on several years operation experience with an approximate capacity of 5 t·d-1. We also took account of existing knowledge, related laws and regulations. There are no qualifications or licenses required for management and operation of small-scale methane fermentation facilities, even though rural sewerage facilities with a relative similar function are required to obtain a legitimate license. Therefore, there are wide variations in health and safety consciousness of the operators of small-scale methane fermentation facilities. The industrial safety and health laws are not applied to the operation of small-scale methane fermentation facilities. However, in order to safely operate a small-scale methane fermentation facility, the occupational safety and health management system that the law recommends should be applied. The aims of this paper are to clarify the risk factors in small-scale methane fermentation facilities and encourage planning, design and operation of facilities based on health and safety management.

  8. Critical experiments facility and criticality safety programs at JAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobayashi, Iwao; Tachimori, Shoichi; Takeshita, Isao; Suzaki, Takenori; Miyoshi, Yoshinori; Nomura, Yasushi

    1985-10-01

    The nuclear criticality safety is becoming a key point in Japan in the safety considerations for nuclear installations outside reactors such as spent fuel reprocessing facilities, plutonium fuel fabrication facilities, large scale hot alboratories, and so on. Especially a large scale spent fuel reprocessing facility is being designed and would be constructed in near future, therefore extensive experimental studies are needed for compilation of our own technical standards and also for verification of safety in a potential criticality accident to obtain public acceptance. Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is proceeding a construction program of a new criticality safety experimental facility where criticality data can be obtained for such solution fuels as mainly handled in a reprocessing facility and also chemical process experiments can be performed to investigate abnormal phenomena, e.g. plutonium behavior in solvent extraction process by using pulsed colums. In FY 1985 detail design of the facility will be completed and licensing review by the government would start in FY 1986. Experiments would start in FY 1990. Research subjects and main specifications of the facility are described. (author)

  9. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel annual report, fiscal year 1989

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cotter, B.P. Jr.

    1990-07-01

    In Fiscal Year 1989, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) handled 40 proceedings involving the construction, operation and maintenance of commercial nuclear power reactors or other activities requiring a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report summarizes, highlights and analyzes how the wide-ranging issues raised in these proceedings were addressed by the Judges and Licensing Boards of the ASLBP during the year. 5 figs., 3 tabs

  10. Safety assessment for radioactive waste disposal facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thanaletchumy Karuppiah; Mohd Abdul Wahab Yusof; Nik Marzuki Nik Ibrahim; Nurul Wahida Ahmad Khairuddin

    2008-08-01

    Safety assessments are used to evaluate the performance of a radioactive waste disposal facility and its impact on human health and the environment. This paper presents the overall information and methodology to carry out the safety assessment for a long term performance of a disposal system. A case study was also conducted to gain hands-on experience in the development and justification of scenarios, the formulation and implementation of models and the analysis of results. AMBER code using compartmental modeling approach was used to represent the migration and fate of contaminants in this training. This safety assessment is purely illustrative and it serves as a starting point for each development stage of a disposal facility. This assessment ultimately becomes more detail and specific as the facility evolves. (Author)

  11. The Department of Energy nuclear criticality safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Felty, J.R.

    2004-01-01

    This paper broadly covers key events and activities from which the Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) evolved. The NCSP maintains fundamental infrastructure that supports operational criticality safety programs. This infrastructure includes continued development and maintenance of key calculational tools, differential and integral data measurements, benchmark compilation, development of training resources, hands-on training, and web-based systems to enhance information preservation and dissemination. The NCSP was initiated in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 97-2, Criticality Safety, and evolved from a predecessor program, the Nuclear Criticality Predictability Program, that was initiated in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 93-2, The Need for Critical Experiment Capability. This paper also discusses the role Dr. Sol Pearlstein played in helping the Department of Energy lay the foundation for a robust and enduring criticality safety infrastructure.

  12. Life Management and Safety of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fabbri, S.; Diluch, A.; Vega, G., E-mail: fabbri@cnea.gov.ar [Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

    2014-10-15

    The nuclear programme in Argentina includes: nuclear power and related supplies, medical and industrial applications, waste management, research and development and human training. Nuclear facilities require life management programs that allow a safe operation. Safety is the first priority for designers and operators. This can be attained with defence in depth: regular inspections and maintenance procedures to minimize failure risks. CNEA objectives in this area are to possess the necessary capability to give safe and fast technical support. Within this scheme, one of the main activities undertaken by CNEA is to provide technological assistance to the nuclear plants and research reactors. As a consequence of an increasing concern about safety and ageing a Life Management Department for safe operation was created to take care of these subjects. The goal is to elaborate a Safety Evaluation Process for the critical components of nuclear plants and other facilities. The overall objectives of a safety process are to ensure a continuous safe, reliable and effective operation of nuclear facilities and it means the implementation of the defence in deep concept to enhance safety for the protection of the public, the workers and the environment. (author)

  13. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel annual report, Fiscal year 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    In Fiscal Year 1992, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (''the Panel'') handled 38 proceedings. The cases addressed issues in the construction, operation, and maintenance of commercial nuclear power reactors and other activities requiring a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This reports sets out the Panel's caseload during the year and summarizes, highlights, and analyzes how the wide-ranging issues raised in those proceedings were addressed by the Panel's judges and licensing boards

  14. Experimental facilities for gas-cooled reactor safety studies. Task group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    In 2007, the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) completed a study on Nuclear Safety Research in OECD Countries: Support Facilities for Existing and Advanced Reactors (SFEAR) which focused on facilities suitable for current and advanced water reactor systems. In a subsequent collective opinion on the subject, the CSNI recommended to conduct a similar exercise for Generation IV reactor designs, aiming to develop a strategy for ' better preparing the CSNI to play a role in the planned extension of safety research beyond the needs set by current operating reactors'. In that context, the CSNI established the Task Group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF) in 2008 with the objective of providing an overview of facilities suitable for performing safety research relevant to gas-cooled reactors and sodium fast reactors. This report addresses gas-cooled reactors; a similar report covering sodium fast reactors is under preparation. The findings of the TAREF are expected to trigger internationally funded CSNI projects on relevant safety issues at the key facilities identified. Such CSNI-sponsored projects constitute a means for efficiently obtaining the necessary data through internationally co-ordinated research. This report provides an overview of experimental facilities that can be used to carry out nuclear safety research for gas-cooled reactors and identifies priorities for organizing international co-operative programmes at selected facilities. The information has been collected and analysed by a Task Group on Advanced Reactor Experimental Facilities (TAREF) as part of an ongoing initiative of the NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) which aims to define and to implement a strategy for the efficient utilisation of facilities and resources for Generation IV reactor systems. (author)

  15. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff practice and procedure digest: Commission, Appeal Board, and Licensing Board decisions issued from July 1, 1972 through March 31, 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    A digest is given of a number of Commission, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, and Atomic Safety and Licensing Board decisions issued during the period from July 1, 1972 to March 31, 1986, interpreting the NRC's Rules of Practice. Parts of earlier editions and supplements are replaced, and amendments to the Rules of Practice effective through March 31, 1986 are reflected. The material included deals with applications, prehearing matters, hearings, post-hearing matters, appeals, and decisions related to general matters. Decisions are indexed by facility, citation, CFR, statutes, case law, and other legal citations

  16. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific relevance include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal

  17. An Overview of INEL Fusion Safety R&D Facilities

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCarthy, K. A.; Smolik, G. R.; Anderl, R. A.; Carmack, W. J.; Longhurst, G. R.

    1997-06-01

    The Fusion Safety Program at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has the lead for fusion safety work in the United States. Over the years, we have developed several experimental facilities to provide data for fusion reactor safety analyses. We now have four major experimental facilities that provide data for use in safety assessments. The Steam-Reactivity Measurement System measures hydrogen generation rates and tritium mobilization rates in high-temperature (up to 1200°C) fusion relevant materials exposed to steam. The Volatilization of Activation Product Oxides Reactor Facility provides information on mobilization and transport and chemical reactivity of fusion relevant materials at high temperature (up to 1200°C) in an oxidizing environment (air or steam). The Fusion Aerosol Source Test Facility is a scaled-up version of VAPOR. The ion-implanta-tion/thermal-desorption system is dedicated to research into processes and phenomena associated with the interaction of hydrogen isotopes with fusion materials. In this paper we describe the capabilities of these facilities.

  18. Procedures for conducting probabilistic safety assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    A well performed and adequately documented safety assessment of a nuclear facility will serve as a basis to determine whether the facility complies with the safety objectives, principles and criteria as stipulated by the national regulatory body of the country where the facility is in operation. International experience shows that the practices and methodologies used to perform safety assessments and periodic safety re-assessment for non-reactor nuclear facilities differ significantly from county to country. Most developing countries do not have methods and guidance for safety assessment that are prescribed by the regulatory body. Typically the safety evaluation for the facility is based on a case by case assessment. Whilst conservative deterministic analyses are predominantly used as a licensing basis in many countries, recently probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques have been applied as a useful complementary tool to support safety decision making. The main benefit of PSA is to provide insights into the safety aspects of facility design and operation. PSA points up the potential environmental impacts of postulated accidents, including the dominant risk contributors, and enables safety analysts to compare options for reducing risk. In order to advise on how to apply PSA methodology for the safety assessment of non-reactor nuclear facilities, the IAEA organized several consultants meetings, which led to the preparation of this TECDOC. This document is intended as guidance for the conduct of PSA in non-nuclear facilities. The main emphasis here is on the general procedural steps of a PSA that is specific for a non-reactor nuclear facility, rather than the details of the specific methods. The report is directed at technical staff managing or performing such probabilistic assessments and to promote a standardized framework, terminology and form of documentation for these PSAs. It is understood that the level of detail implied in the tasks presented in this

  19. Nuclear safety review for the year 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-12-01

    The Nuclear Safety Review attempts to summarize the global nuclear safety scene during 1997. It starts with discussion of significant safety related events worldwide: International cooperation; reactor facilities; radioactive waste management; medical uses of radiation sources; events at other facilities and transport of radioactive material. This is followed by a description of principal IAEA activities that contributed to global nuclear safety, namely: legally binding international agreements; non-binding safety standards and their application. The third part highlights developments in Member States as they reported them. The review closes with a description of issues that are likely to be prominent in the coming year(s). A draft version was submitted to the March 1998 session of the IAEA Board of Governors, and this final version has been prepared in light of the discussion in the Board and was submitted for information to the 42nd session of the IAEA General Conference

  20. 340 Waste handling Facility Hazard Categorization and Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodovsky, T.J.

    2010-01-01

    The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category 3. The final hazard categorization for the deactivated 340 Waste Handling Facility (340 Facility) is presented in this document. This hazard categorization was prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-1 027-92, Change Notice 1, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with Doe Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The analysis presented in this document provides the basis for categorizing the facility as less than Hazard Category (HC) 3. Routine nuclear waste receiving, storage, handling, and shipping operations at the 340 Facility have been deactivated, however, the facility contains a small amount of radioactive liquid and/or dry saltcake in two underground vault tanks. A seismic event and hydrogen deflagration were selected as bounding accidents. The generation of hydrogen in the vault tanks without active ventilation was determined to achieve a steady state volume of 0.33%, which is significantly less than the lower flammability limit of 4%. Therefore, a hydrogen deflagration is not possible in these tanks. The unmitigated release from a seismic event was used to categorize the facility consistent with the process defined in Nuclear Safety Technical Position (NSTP) 2002-2. The final sum-of-fractions calculation concluded that the facility is less than HC 3. The analysis did not identify any required engineered controls or design features. The Administrative Controls that were derived from the analysis are: (1) radiological inventory control, (2) facility change control, and (3) Safety Management Programs (SMPs). The facility configuration and radiological inventory shall be controlled to ensure that the assumptions in the analysis remain valid. The facility commitment to SMPs protects the integrity of the facility and environment by ensuring training, emergency response, and radiation protection. The full scale

  1. Monitor for safety engineering facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Akira; Kaneda, Mitsunori.

    1982-01-01

    Purpose: To improve the reactor safety and decrease misoperation upon periodical inspection by instantly obtaining the judgement for the stand-by states in engineering safety facilities of a nuclear power plant. Constitution: Process inputs representing the states of valves, pumps, flowrates or the likes of the facility are gathered into an input device and inputted to a status monitor. The status of the facility inputted to the input device are judged for each of the inputs in a judging section and recognized as a present system stand-by pattern of the system (Valve) to be inspected. While on the other hand, a normal system stand-by pattern previously stored in a memory unit is read out by an instruction from an operator console and judged by comparison with the system stand-by pattern in a comparison section. The results are displayed on a display device. Upon periodical inspection, inspection procedures stored in the memory unit are displayed on the display device by the instruction from the operator console. (Seki, T.)

  2. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-01-01

    This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for the current design of the CHF and may not reflect the ongoing design evolution of the facility

  3. Development of High-Level Safety Requirements for a Pyroprocessing Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Seok Jun; Jo, Woo Jin; You, Gil Sung; Choung, Won Myung; Lee, Ho Hee; Kim, Hyun Min; Jeon, Hong Rae; Ku, Jeong Hoe; Lee, Hyo Jik [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a pyroproceesing technology to reduce the waste volume and recycle some elements. The pyroprocessing includes several treatment processes which are related with not only radiological and physical but also chemical and electrochemical properties. Thus, it is of importance to establish safety design requirements considering all the aspects of those properties for a reliable pyroprocessing facility. In this study, high-level requirements are presented in terms of not only radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, and seismic safety but also confinement and chemical safety for the unique characteristics of a pyroprocessing facility. Several high-level safety design requirements such as radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, seismic, confinement, and chemical processing were presented for a pyroprocessing facility. The requirements must fulfill domestic and international safety technology standards for a nuclear facility. Furthermore, additional requirements should be considered for the unique electrochemical treatments in a pyroprocessing facility.

  4. Hospital board oversight of quality and safety: a stakeholder analysis exploring the role of trust and intelligence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Millar, Ross; Freeman, Tim; Mannion, Russell

    2015-06-16

    Hospital boards, those executive members charged with developing appropriate organisational strategies and cultures, have an important role to play in safeguarding the care provided by their organisation. However, recent concerns have been raised over boards' ability to enact their duty to ensure the quality and safety of care. This paper offers critical reflection on the relationship between hospital board oversight and patient safety. In doing so it highlights new perspectives and suggestions for developing this area of study. The article draws on 10 interviews with key informants and policy actors who form part of the 'issue network' interested in the promotion of patient safety in the English National Health Service. The interviews surfaced a series of narratives regarding hospital board oversight of patient safety. These elaborated on the role of trust and intelligence in highlighting the potential dangers and limitations of approaches to hospital board oversight which have been narrowly focused on a risk-based view of organisational performance. In response, a need to engage with the development of trust based organisational relationships is identified, in which effective board oversight is built on 'trust' characterised by styles of leadership and behaviours that are attentive to the needs and concerns of both staff and patients. Effective board oversight also requires the gathering and triangulating of 'intelligence' generated from both national and local information sources. We call for a re-imagination of hospital board oversight in the light of these different perspectives and articulate an emerging research agenda in this area.

  5. Development of an Adjustable board and a Rotational Board for Scaffold

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jang, Myunghoun

    2017-06-01

    Scaffold is widely used in high work-places inside and outside of a building construction site. It is inexpensive and is installed and dismantled easily. Although standards and ledgers of a steel tube and coupler scaffold are installed in a regular distance, the distances of transoms are not equal in some places. Sometimes a working platform or a board is absent in the corner of scaffold. This may cause safety accidents because a foothold is not stable on the transoms. An adjustable safety board and a rotational safety board are suggested in this paper. The adjustable board consists of two footholds. The small one is inserted into the large one. The rotational board covers not only right angle but also acute or obtuse angles. These safety boards for scaffold help to decrease safety accidents in construction sites.

  6. Laser safety at high profile laser facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barat, K.

    2010-01-01

    Complete text of publication follows. Laser safety has been an active concern of laser users since the invention of the laser. Formal standards were developed in the early 1970's and still continue to be developed and refined. The goal of these standards is to give users guidance on the use of laser and consistent safety guidance and requirements for laser manufacturers. Laser safety in the typical research setting (government laboratory or university) is the greatest challenge to the laser user and laser safety officer. This is due to two factors. First, the very nature of research can put the user at risk; consider active manipulation of laser optics and beam paths, and user work with energized systems. Second, a laser safety culture that seems to accept laser injuries as part of the graduate student educational process. The fact is, laser safety at research settings, laboratories and universities still has long way to go. Major laser facilities have taken a more rigid and serious view of laser safety, its controls and procedures. Part of the rationale for this is that these facilities draw users from all around the world presenting the facility with a work force of users coming from a wide mix of laser safety cultures. Another factor is funding sources do not like bad publicity which can come from laser accidents and a poor safety record. The fact is that injuries, equipment damage and lost staff time slow down progress. Hence high profile/large laser projects need to adapt a higher safety regimen both from an engineering and administrative point of view. This presentation will discuss all these points and present examples. Acknowledgement. This work has been supported by the University of California, Director, Office of Science.

  7. Summary of Federal Aviation Administration Responses to National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1981-01-01

    i It: Wo. r (A’I) upr,;cl. ’ Vih t_’o a . hc pre-.ntal, i c ould (1lay a pilot’s t ;f,L..ion to a suit.bl, ba-ckup approach in th- event of radar or...analysis and your recommendation. Since y) ,anigh.ne Bond Admin ist rator 2 Enclosures NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. ISSUED: October

  8. Safety overview of the National Ignition Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brereton, S.J.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.; Singh, M.; Tobin, M.; Trent, M.

    1996-01-01

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed US Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium- tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF mission is to achieve inertial confinement fusion (ICF) ignition, access physical conditions in matter of interest to nuclear weapons physics, provide an above ground simulation capability for nuclear weapons effects testing, and contribute to the development of inertial fusion for electrical power production. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the operation of the NIF. It provides an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low

  9. Safety report content and development for test loop facility on MARIA reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konechko, A.; Shumskij, A.M.; Mikul'ahin, V.E.

    1982-01-01

    A 600 kW test loop facility for investigatin.o safety problems is realized on MARIA reactor in Poland together with USSR organizations. Safety reports have been developed in two steps at the designstage. The 1st report being essentially a preliminary safety analysis was developed within the scope of the feasibility study. At the engineering design stage the preliminary test loop facility safety report had been prepared considering measures excluding the possibility of the MARIA reactor damage. The test loop facility safety report is fulfilled for normal, transient and emergency operation regimes. Separate safety basing for each group of experiments will be prepared. The report presents the test loop facility safety criteria coordinated by the nuclear safety comission. They contains the preliminary reports on the test loop facility safety. At the final stage of construction and at thecommitioning stage the start-up safety report will be developed which after required correction and adding up the putting into operation data will turn into operation safety report [ru

  10. Evolution of nuclear safety regulation for BARC Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jayarajan, K.; Taly, Y.K.

    2017-01-01

    Safety programmes in BARC stared during the formative years and grown its stature, as the years passed by. Seventeen years of BSC, with one hundred meetings, have been quite eventful with several achievements. BSC could bring all facilities of BARC under its safety umbrella and could streamline many safety and regulatory activities. BSC aims at incident free operation of all facilities and protection of the workers, the public, the environment from radiation and other hazards. Although, incidents could not be entirely prevented, BSC have taken every event as a lesson and used the experience for improving safety. Safety enhancement is an endless journey, which has to be performed by joining hands of the managers, designers, manufacturers, inspectors and operators, in addition to the regulators

  11. Safety culture in a major nuclear fuel cycle facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pushparaja; Abani, M.C.

    2002-01-01

    Human factor plays an important role in development of safety culture in any nuclear fuel cycle facility. This is more relevant in major nuclear facility such as a reactor or a reprocessing plant. In Indian reprocessing plants, an effective worker's training, education and certification program is in place to sensitize the worker's response to safety and safe work procedures. The methodology followed to self evaluation of safety culture and the benefits in a reprocessing plant is briefly discussed. Various indicators of safety performance and visible signs of a good safety management are also qualitatively analyzed. (author)

  12. Regulatory role and approach of BARC Safety Council in safety and occupational health in BARC facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajdeep; Jayarajan, K.; Taly, Y.K.

    2016-01-01

    Bhabha Atomic Research Centre is involved in multidisciplinary research and developmental activities, related to peaceful use of nuclear energy and its societal benefits. In order to achieve high level of performance of these facilities, the best efforts are made to maintain good health of the plant personnel and good working conditions. BARC Safety Council (BSC), which is the regulatory body for BARC facilities, regulates radiation safety, industrial safety and surveillance of occupational health, by implementing various rules and guidelines in BARC facilities. BARC Safety framework consists of various committees in a 3-tier system. The first tier is BSC, which is the apex body authorized for issuing directives, permissions, consents and authorizations. It is having responsibility of ensuring protection and safety of public, environment, personnel and facilities of BARC through enforcement of radiation protection and industrial safety programmes. Besides the 18 committees in 2"n"d tier, there are 6 other expert committees which assist in functioning of BSC. (author)

  13. RADON-type disposal facility safety case for the co-ordinated research project on improvement of safety assessment methodologies for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities (ISAM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guskov, A.; Batanjieva, B.; Kozak, M.W.; Torres-Vidal, C.

    2002-01-01

    The ISAM safety assessment methodology was applied to RADON-type facilities. The assessments conducted through the ISAM project were among the first conducted for these kinds of facilities. These assessments are anticipated to lead to significantly improved levels of safety in countries with such facilities. Experience gained though this RADON-type Safety Case was already used in Russia while developing national regulatory documents. (author)

  14. Progress report concerning safety research for nuclear reactor facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    Examination and evaluation of safety research results for nuclear reactor facilities have been performed, as more than a year has elapsed since the plan had been initiated in April, 1976, by the special sub-committee for the safety of nuclear reactor facilities. The research is carried out by being divided roughly into 7 items, and seems to be steadily proceeding, though it does not yet reach the target. The above 7 items include researches for (1) criticality accident, (2) loss of coolant accident, (3) safety for light water reactor fuel, (4) construction safety for reactor facilities, (5) reduction of release of radioactive material, (6) safety evaluation based on the probability theory for reactor facilities, and (7) aseismatic measures for reactor facilities. With discussions on the progress and the results of the research this time, research on the behaviour on fuel in abnormal transients including in-core and out-core experiments has been added to the third item, deleting the power-cooling mismatch experiment in Nuclear Safety Research Reactor of JAERI. Also it has been decided to add two research to the seventh item, namely measured data collection, classification and analysis, and probability assessment of failures due to an earthquake. For these 7 items, the report describes the concrete contents of research to be performed in fiscal years of 1977 and 1978, by discussing on most rational and suitable contents conceivable at present. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

  15. The working of RVNRL pilot plant of Rubber Board and it's safety devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Britto, I.J.; Thomas, E.V.

    1996-01-01

    A pilot plant for producing radiation vulcanized natural rubber latex (RVNRL) was established at Rubber Board, India in 1992. Irradiation is done by a batch process in the plant. The plant has a versatile safety system for safety of operators and people working in and around the plant

  16. LMFBR safety experiment facility planning and analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevenson, M.G.; Scott, J.H.

    1976-01-01

    In the past two years considerable effort has been placed on the planning and design of new facilities for the resolution of LMFBR safety issues. The paper reviews the key issues, the experiments needed to resolve them, and the design aspects of proposed new facilities. In addition, it presents a decision theory approach to selecting an optimal combination of modified and new facilities

  17. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larson, H L

    2007-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  18. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  19. Safety at the End of a Nuclear Facility's Life

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geis, John A.; McEahern, Patrice; Evans, Brad

    2004-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to capture the changes that are caused by the transition from nuclear operation through closure of defense nuclear facilities and convey lessons learned from their deactivation, decontamination and demolition. The specific area of discussion is focused on the planned reduction of safety equipment and consequent shift in hazard controls and safety management programs as the facility moves toward closure. The premise of the paper is that as the dominant hazards transition from nuclear to radiological and/or industrial, the facility control of the hazards and response to the potential upset conditions must transition as well to ensure safe and efficient operations. Using recent experience of the accelerated closure mission for U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, the current culture with respect to developing and implementing hazard controls and response to upset conditions is illustrated. Several events have been documented that provide insight into the challenges facing line managers and safety professionals at the end of a facility's life cycle. Replacing permanent systems with temporary equipment challenges the traditional concept of reliability. Workers disassemble safety systems daily, but must rely on some of these components or redundant systems as work continues. Decisions governing upkeep of systems that await demolition balance the risk of running to failure against the cost benefit of maintenance and repair. This is further complicated as regulators and safety professionals are often unfamiliar with these new conditions and continue to view facility work activities and potential upset conditions from a nuclear operations perspective. The results of this paper evaluate the differences in how regulatory, safety basis, and operational practices must adapt to the dynamic environment of decontamination and decommissioning in contrast to the relatively constant

  20. CANISTER HANDLING FACILITY CRITICALITY SAFETY CALCULATIONS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    C.E. Sanders

    2005-04-07

    This design calculation revises and updates the previous criticality evaluation for the canister handling, transfer and staging operations to be performed in the Canister Handling Facility (CHF) documented in BSC [Bechtel SAIC Company] 2004 [DIRS 167614]. The purpose of the calculation is to demonstrate that the handling operations of canisters performed in the CHF meet the nuclear criticality safety design criteria specified in the ''Project Design Criteria (PDC) Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171599], Section 4.9.2.2), the nuclear facility safety requirement in ''Project Requirements Document'' (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275], p. 4-206), the functional/operational nuclear safety requirement in the ''Project Functional and Operational Requirements'' document (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], p. 75), and the functional nuclear criticality safety requirements described in the ''Canister Handling Facility Description Document'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], Sections 3.1.1.3.4.13 and 3.2.3). Specific scope of work contained in this activity consists of updating the Category 1 and 2 event sequence evaluations as identified in the ''Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application'' (BSC 2004 [DIRS 167268], Section 7). The CHF is limited in throughput capacity to handling sealed U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) canisters, defense high-level radioactive waste (DHLW), naval canisters, multicanister overpacks (MCOs), vertical dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), and multipurpose canisters (MPCs) (if and when they become available) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168992], p. 1-1). It should be noted that the design and safety analyses of the naval canisters are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Navy (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) and will not be included in this document. In addition, this calculation is valid for

  1. The regulation of uranium refineries and conversion facilities in Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Didyk, J.P.

    1986-04-01

    The nuclear regulatory process as it applies to uranium refineries and conversion facilities in Canada is reviewed. In the early 1980s, Eldorado Resources Limited proposed to construct and operate new facilities for refining yellowcake and for the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ). These projects were subject to regulation by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB). A description of the AECB's comprehensive licensing process covering all stages of siting, construction, operation and eventual decommissioning of nuclear facilities is traced as it was applied to the Eldorado projects. The AECB's concern with occupational health and safety, with public health and safety and with the protection of the environment in so far as it affects public health and safety is emphasized. Some regulatory difficulties encountered during the project's development which led to opening up the licensing process to public input and closer coordination of regulatory activities with other provincial and federal regulatory agencies are described. The Board's regulatory operational compliance program for uranium refineries and conversion facilities is summarized

  2. Data used for safety assessment of reprocessing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, Yasushi; Suzuki, Atsuyuki; Kanagawa, Akira

    1990-08-01

    For safety assessment of a reprocessing facility, it is important to know performance of radioactive materials in their accidental release and transfer. Accordingly, it is necessary to collect and prepare data for use in analyses for their performance. In JAERI, experiments such as for data acquisition, for source-term evaluation and for radioactive material transfer, are now planned to be performed. Prior to these experiments, it is decided to investigate data in use for accidental safety assessment of reprocessing plants and their based experimental data, thus to make it possible to recommend reasonable values for safety analysis parameters by evaluating the investigated results, to select the experimental items, to edit a safety assessment handbook and so on. In this line of objectives, JAERI rewarded a two-year contract of investigation to Nuclear Safety Research Association, to make a working group under a special committee on data investigation for reprocessing facility safety assessment. This report is a collection of results reviewed and checked by the working group. The contents consist of two parts, one for investigation and review of data used for safety assessment of domestic or oversea reprocessing facilities, and the other for investigation, review and evaluation of ANSI recommended American standard data reported by E. Walker together with their based experimental data resorting to the original referred reports. (author)

  3. Safety assessment for spent fuel storage facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This Safety Practice has been prepared as part of the IAEA's programme on the safety assessment of interim spent fuel storage facilities which are not an integral part of an operating nuclear power plant. This report provides general guidance on the safety assessment process, discussing both deterministic and probabilistic assessment methods. It describes the safety assessment process for normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences and also related to accident conditions. 10 refs, 2 tabs

  4. Safety assessment methodologies for near surface disposal facilities. Results of a co-ordinated research project (ISAM). Volume 1: Review and enhancement of safety assessment approaches and tools. Volume 2: Test cases

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-07-01

    For several decades, countries have made use of near surface facilities for the disposal of low and intermediate level radioactive waste. In line with the internationally agreed principles of radioactive waste management, the safety of these facilities needs to be ensured during all stages of their lifetimes, including the post-closure period. By the mid 1990s, formal methodologies for evaluating the long term safety of such facilities had been developed, but intercomparison of these methodologies had revealed a number of discrepancies between them. Consequently, in 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency launched a Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) on Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities (ISAM). The particular objectives of the CRP were to provide a critical evaluation of the approaches and tools used in post-closure safety assessment for proposed and existing near-surface radioactive waste disposal facilities, enhance the approaches and tools used and build confidence in the approaches and tools used. The CRP ran until 2000 and resulted in the development of a harmonized assessment methodology (the ISAM project methodology), which was applied to a number of test cases. Over seventy participants from twenty-two Member States played an active role in the project and it attracted interest from around seven hundred persons involved with safety assessment in seventy-two Member States. The results of the CRP have contributed to the Action Plan on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management which was approved by the Board of Governors and endorsed by the General Conference in September 2001. Specifically, they contribute to Action 5, which requests the IAEA Secretariat to 'develop a structured and systematic programme to ensure adequate application of the Agency's waste safety standards', by elaborating on the Safety Requirements on 'Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste' (Safety Standards Series No. WS-R-1) and

  5. Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rule, Keith [PPPL

    2014-05-01

    The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

  6. Safety analysis of the existing 850 Firing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-01-01

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 850 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives, which was classified as a moderate hazard per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

  7. Safety analysis of the existing 851 Firing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-01-01

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 851 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but two of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exceptions were the linear accelerator and explosives, which were classified as moderate hazards per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

  8. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  9. Review and assessment of nuclear facilities by the regulatory body. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on reviewing and assessing the various safety related submissions made by the operator of a nuclear facility at different stages (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure) in the facility's lifetime to determine whether the facility complies with the applicable safety objectives and requirements. This Safety Guide covers the review and assessment of submissions in relation to the safety of nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Objectives, management, planning and organizational matters relating to the review and assessment process are presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the bases for decision making and conduct of the review and assessment process. Section 4 covers aspects relating to the assessment of this process. The Appendix provides a generic list of topics to be covered in the review and assessment process

  10. Review and assessment of nuclear facilities by the regulatory body. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on reviewing and assessing the various safety related submissions made by the operator of a nuclear facility at different stages (siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning or closure) in the facility's lifetime to determine whether the facility complies with the applicable safety objectives and requirements. This Safety Guide covers the review and assessment of submissions in relation to the safety of nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Objectives, management, planning and organizational matters relating to the review and assessment process are presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the bases for decision making and conduct of the review and assessment process. Section 4 covers aspects relating to the assessment of this process. The Appendix provides a generic list of topics to be covered in the review and assessment process

  11. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Chinon nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  12. Organization and staffing of the regulatory body for nuclear facilities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this safety guide is to provide recommendations for national authorities on the appropriate management system, organization and staffing for the regulatory body responsible for the regulation of nuclear facilities in order to achieve compliance with the applicable safety requirements. This safety guide covers the organization and staffing in relation to nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants. Nuclear power plants. Other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies. Spent fuel reprocessing plants. And radioactive waste management facilities such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This safety guide also covers issues related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation

  13. 77 FR 1748 - Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; Calvert Cliffs 3 Nuclear Project, LLC, and UniStar Nuclear...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-11

    ... under represents potential contributions of wind and solar power, the combination alternative depends... Judge Ronald M. Spritzer, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, Mail Stop T-3F23, U.S. Nuclear..., Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, Mail Stop T-3F23, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Fax: (301...

  14. Radiation safety of gamma and electron irradiation facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    There are currently some 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation throughout virtually all Member States of the IAEA. The most widespread uses of these facilities are for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, and the eradication of insect infestation. The safety record of this industry has been very good. Nevertheless, there is a potential for accidents with serious consequences. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, so that a person accidentally present in the irradiation chamber can receive a lethal dose within minutes or seconds. Precautions against uncontrolled entry must therefore be taken. Furthermore, gamma irradiation facilities contain large amounts of radioactivity and if the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed, inhibiting direct access to carry out remedial work. Contamination can result from corroded or damaged sources, and decontamination can be very expensive. These aspects clearly indicate the need to achieve a high degree of safety and reliability in the facilities. This can be accomplished by effective quality control together with careful design, manufacture, installation, operation and decommissioning. The guidance in this Safety Series publication is intended for competent authorities responsible for regulating the use of radiation sources as well as the manufacturers, suppliers, installers and users of gamma and electron beam facilities. 20 refs, 6 figs

  15. Site safety progress review of spent fuel central interim storage facility. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gurpinar, A.; Serva, L.; Giuliani

    1995-01-01

    Following the request of the Czech Power Board (CEZ) and within the scope of the Technical Cooperation Project CZR/9/003, a progress review of the site safety of the Spent Fuel Central Interim Storage Facility (SFCISF) was performed. The review involved the first two stages of the works comprising the regional survey and identification of candidate sites for the underground and surface storage options. Five sites have been identified as a result of the previous works. The following two stages will involved the identification of the preferred candidate sites for the two options and the final site qualification. The present review had the purpose of assessing the work already performed and making recommendations for the next two stages of works

  16. National Energy Board Emergency Management Program : annex to Natural Resources Canada Civil Emergency Plan no. 004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lever, G.; LeMay, R.

    2006-01-01

    As a matter of primary public interest, safety is included in the National Energy Board's (NEB) mandate. The Board is responsible for ensuring companies involved with energy development and pipelines comply with regulations concerning the safety of employees, the public, and the environment. The purpose of the NEB's Emergency Management Program is to establish a prompt and coordinated response to an emergency which occurs at any facility or operation regulated by the NEB; promote safety and security and assure compliance with regulatory requirements in order to protect the public, workers, property and the environment during the life cycle of facilities and operations; and, have a documented set of procedures that accomplish these objectives. The Board ensures that companies identify and manage the potential hazards associated with their facilities; conduct a risk analysis of those hazards; and, manage the risks in order to protect the public and personnel, the security of the facilities and the environment. All companies under the Board's jurisdiction are responsible for developing and maintaining an Emergency Response and Preparedness Program for all aspects of their operations. In the event an emergency occurs, the regulated company is responsible for responding to the emergency and coordinating emergency response activities. Typically, the NEB responds on site to incidents that result in death or serious injury; involve a significant release of hydrocarbons; could result in potential or real impact due to loss of service; pose imminent threats identified by Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada or other agencies; attract significant media attention, or on the advice of Natural Resources Canada or other federal Agencies. The first part of this document described the initial response check list while the second part outlined the Emergency response framework. 2 tabs., 3 figs., 15 appendices

  17. Radiation safety and regulatory aspects in Medical Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Banerjee, Sharmila

    2017-01-01

    Radiation safety and regulatory aspect of medical facilities are relevant in the context where radiation is used in providing healthcare to human patients. These include facilities, which carry out radiological procedures in diagnostic radiology, including dentistry, image-guided interventional procedures, nuclear medicine, and radiation therapy. The safety regulations provide recommendations and guidance on meeting the requirements for the safe use of radiation in medicine. The different safety aspects which come under its purview are the personnel involved in medical facilities where radiological procedures are performed which include the medical practitioners, radiation technologists, medical physicists, radiopharmacists, radiation protection and over and above all the patients. Regulatory aspects cover the guidelines provided by ethics committees, which regulate the administration of radioactive formulation in human patients. Nuclear medicine is a modality that utilizes radiopharmaceuticals either for diagnosis of physiological disorders related to anatomy, physiology and patho-physiology and for diagnosis and treatment of cancer

  18. 76 FR 28790 - Board of Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-18

    ... Hearing Loss Prevention; Personal Protective Technologies; Health Hazard Evaluations; Construction Safety... Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH) In accordance with... relating to occupational safety and health and to mine health. The Board of Scientific Counselors shall...

  19. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D. T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2014-04-16

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  20. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D. T.

    2014-01-01

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  1. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

  2. Health and safety regulation of uranium mining and milling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dory, A.B.

    1980-07-01

    The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board licenses all nuclear facilities in Canada, including uranium mines and mills. The protection of health, safety and the environment is one of the requirements of each licence. A limit of 4 Working Level Months exposure to radon and radon daughters annually has been set, and guidelines for weekly or more frequent workplace monitoring have been established. Personal monitoring devices are being tested, and thermoluminescent dosimeters are to be introduced. The Board reviews its licensees' ventilation plans continuously. The staged licensing process involves the granting of the following documents: 1) ore removal; 2) underground exploration permit; 3) site and construction approval; 4) mining facility operating licence; 5) shut-down approval. Compliance with regulations and licence conditions is monitored mainly by inspectors appointed by provincial agencies, with Board staff exercising auditing fuctions. The Board involves the workers directly with their own health and safety by sending their unions copies of all relevant documents and inviting comments

  3. 78 FR 11651 - Board of Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-19

    ... Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH) In accordance with..., research, experiments, and demonstrations relating to occupational safety and health and to mine health... Occupational Safety and Health on research and prevention programs. Specifically, the Board shall provide...

  4. 77 FR 47850 - Board of Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-08-10

    ... Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH) In accordance with..., research, experiments, and demonstrations relating to occupational safety and health and to mine health... Occupational Safety and Health on research and prevention programs. Specifically, the Board shall provide...

  5. Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schnurer, H.L.

    1977-01-01

    Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

  6. Radiation Safety of Gamma, Electron and X Ray Irradiation Facilities. Specific Safety Guide (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements of the BSS with regard to irradiation facilities. This Safety Guide provides specific, practical recommendations on the safe design and operation of gamma, electron and X ray irradiators for use by operating organizations and the designers of these facilities, and by regulatory bodies. SCOPE. The facilities considered in this publication include five types of irradiator, whether operated on a commercial basis or for research and development purposes. This publication is concerned with radiation safety issues and not with the uses of irradiators, nor does it cover the irradiation of product or its quality management. The five types of irradiator are: - Panoramic dry source storage irradiators; - Underwater irradiators, in which both the source and the product being irradiated are under water; - Panoramic wet source storage irradiators; - Electron beam irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the irradiation process; - X ray irradiation facilities, in which irradiation is performed in an area that is potentially accessible to personnel, but that is kept inaccessible during the irradiation process. Consideration of non-radiation-related risks and of the benefits resulting from the operation of irradiators is outside the scope of this Safety Guide. The practices of radiotherapy and radiography are also outside the scope of this Safety Guide. Category I gamma irradiators (i.e. 'self-shielded' irradiators) are outside the scope of this Safety Guide

  7. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D

    2008-06-16

    This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  8. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 78, 89 (NPPs in operation), 465 (NPP under deconstruction), 102 (fuel storage facility), and 173 (radioactive waste conditioning and storage facility under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  9. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 78, 89 (NPPs in operation), 465 (NPP under deconstruction), 102 (fuel storage facility), and 173 (radioactive waste conditioning and storage facility under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  10. Occupational Safety Review of High Technology Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee Cadwallader

    2005-01-31

    This report contains reviews of operating experiences, selected accident events, and industrial safety performance indicators that document the performance of the major US DOE magnetic fusion experiments and particle accelerators. These data are useful to form a basis for the occupational safety level at matured research facilities with known sets of safety rules and regulations. Some of the issues discussed are radiation safety, electromagnetic energy exposure events, and some of the more widespread issues of working at height, equipment fires, confined space work, electrical work, and other industrial hazards. Nuclear power plant industrial safety data are also included for comparison.

  11. Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Batandjieva, B.; Torres-Vidal, C.

    2002-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Coordinated research program ''Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities'' (ISAM) has developed improved safety assessment methodology for near surface disposal facilities. The program has been underway for three years and has included around 75 active participants from 40 countries. It has also provided examples for application to three safety cases--vault, Radon type and borehole radioactive waste disposal facilities. The program has served as an excellent forum for exchange of information and good practices on safety assessment approaches and methodologies used worldwide. It also provided an opportunity for reaching broad consensus on the safety assessment methodologies to be applied to near surface low and intermediate level waste repositories. The methodology has found widespread acceptance and the need for its application on real waste disposal facilities has been clearly identified. The ISAM was finalized by the end of 2000, working material documents are available and an IAEA report will be published in 2002 summarizing the work performed during the three years of the program. The outcome of the ISAM program provides a sound basis for moving forward to a new IAEA program, which will focus on practical application of the safety assessment methodologies to different purposes, such as licensing radioactive waste repositories, development of design concepts, upgrading existing facilities, reassessment of operating repositories, etc. The new program will also provide an opportunity for development of guidance on application of the methodology that will be of assistance to both safety assessors and regulators

  12. Preliminary safety analysis report for the Waste Characterization Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Characterization Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are to: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Characterization Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume. 142 refs., 38 figs., 39 tabs

  13. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D.T.

    2010-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting

  14. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D T

    2008-06-16

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas

  15. 78 FR 51729 - Board of Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-21

    ... Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH) In accordance with... demonstrations relating to occupational safety and health and to mine health. The Board of Scientific Counselors shall provide guidance to the Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health on...

  16. Radiation Safety of Accelerator Facility with Regard to Regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dedi Sunaryadi; Gloria Doloresa

    2003-01-01

    The radiation safety of accelerator facility and the status of the facilities according to licensee in Indonesia as well as lesson learned from the accidents are described. The atomic energy Act No. 10 of 1997 enacted by the Government of Indonesia which is implemented in Radiation Safety Government Regulation No. 63 and 64 as well as practice-specific model regulation for licensing request are discussed. (author)

  17. Final safety analysis report (FSAR) for waste receiving and processing (WRAP) facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weidert, J.R.

    1997-01-01

    This safety analysis report provides a summary description of the WRAP Facility, focusing on significant safety-related characteristics of the location and facility design. This report demonstrates that adherence to the safety basis wi11 ensure necessary operational safety considerations have been addressed sufficiently and justifies the adequacy of the safety basis in protecting the health and safety of the public, workers, and the environment

  18. Decommissioning of Medical, Industrial and Research Facilities. Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive materials and sources are produced, received, used and stored. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations, particularly to those in developing countries (as such facilities are predominant in these countries), for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such facilities. The Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants meetings and a Technical Committee meeting

  19. Decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Radioactive waste is produced in the generation of nuclear power and the use of radioactive materials in industry, research and medicine. The importance of the safe management of radioactive waste for the protection of human health and the environment has long been recognized, and considerable experience has been gained in this field. The IAEA's Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme aimed at establishing a coherent and comprehensive set of principles and requirements for the safe management of waste and formulating the guidelines necessary for their application. This is accomplished within the IAEA Safety Standards Series in an internally consistent set of publications that reflect an international consensus. The publications will provide Member States with a comprehensive series of internationally agreed publications to assist in the derivation of, and to complement, national criteria, standards and practices. The Safety Standards Series consists of three categories of publications: Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Guides. With respect to the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards Programme, the set of publications is currently undergoing review to ensure a harmonized approach throughout the Safety Standards Series. This Safety Guide addresses the subject of decommissioning of medical, industrial and research facilities where radioactive materials and sources are produced, received, used and stored. It is intended to provide guidance to national authorities and operating organizations, particularly to those in developing countries (as such facilities are predominant in these countries), for the planning and safe management of the decommissioning of such facilities. The Safety Guide has been prepared through a series of Consultants meetings and a Technical Committee meeting

  20. Criticality safety considerations. Integral Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-09-01

    This report summarizes the criticality analysis performed to address criticality safety concerns and to support facility design during the conceptual design phase of the Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) Facility. The report addresses the criticality safety concerns, the design features of the facility relative to criticality, and the results of the analysis of both normal operating and hypothetical off-normal conditions. Key references are provided (Appendix C) if additional information is desired by the reader. The MRS Facility design was developed and the related analysis was performed in accordance with the MRS Facility Functional Design Criteria and the Basis for Design. The detailed description and calculations are documented in the Integral MRS Facility Conceptual Design Report. In addition to the summary portion of this report, explanatary notes for various terms, calculation methodology, and design parameters are presented in Appendix A. Appendix B provides a brief glossary of technical terms

  1. NIF conventional facilities construction health and safety plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benjamin, D W

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Plan is to outline the minimum health and safety requirements to which all participating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and non-LLNL employees (excluding National Ignition Facility [NIF] specific contractors and subcontractors covered under the construction subcontract packages (e.g., CSP-9)-see Construction Safety Program for the National Ignition Facility [CSP] Section I.B. ''NIF Construction Contractors and Subcontractors'' for specifics) shall adhere to for preventing job-related injuries and illnesses during Conventional Facilities construction activities at the NIF Project. For the purpose of this Plan, the term ''LLNL and non-LLNL employees'' includes LLNL employees, LLNL Plant Operations staff and their contractors, supplemental labor, contract labor, labor-only contractors, vendors, DOE representatives, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, and others such as visitors, students, consultants etc., performing on-site work or services in support of the NIF Project. Based upon an activity level determination explained in Section 1.2.18, in this document, these organizations or individuals may be required by site management to prepare their own NIF site-specific safety plan. LLNL employees will normally not be expected to prepare a site-specific safety plan. This Plan also outlines job-specific exposures and construction site safety activities with which LLNL and non-LLNL employees shall comply

  2. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Blayais nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 86 and 110). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  3. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Civaux nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  4. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Golfech nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 135 and 142). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  5. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Tricastin nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the Tricastin NPPs (INBs no. 87 and 88). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  6. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Penly nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  7. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  8. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Chooz nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  9. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  10. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INB no. 75). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  11. Consultation with the filipino boarding home: an after-care facility in Hawaii.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yutiao, M; Kinzie, J D

    1975-01-01

    This report describes a unique Hawaiian after-care facility the Filipino operated boarding home, and the approaches useful in consultation with the operators. The majority of the boarding homes for psychiatric patients are operated by recent Filipino immigrants. This fact is explained by their current social position and also by cultural values--such as aiding others and an extended family system--which are present in the Philippines. In consultation with seventeen such boarding home operators, cultural beliefs and values played a great part in their approach to patients. These approaches created special problems and assets in their management of patients from other ethnic groups such as Japanese, Caucasian and Hawaiian. A problem-oriented approach to consultation proved useful initially and set the stage for other forms of intervention. This included allowing the operator to ventilate her feelings about the patient; bridging the communication gap between operators and patients; dissipating the operators' stereotypic perception of patients; and educating the operators about mental illness. Our impressions and indirect evidence indicated that Filipino boarding home operators perform a useful service and, with consultation sensitive to their values, can become even more effective.

  12. CSER 94-012: Criticality safety evaluation report for 340 Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altschuler, S.J.

    1995-01-01

    This Criticality Safety Evaluation Report (CSER) covers the 340 Facility which acts as a collecting point for liquid and solid waste from various facilities in the 300 Area. Criticality safety is achieved by controlling the amount and concentration of the fissionable material sent to the 340 Facility from the originating facilities in the 300 Area, a method similar to that used elsewhere at Hanford for the waste tank farms. Unlike those, however, the waste received at the 340 Facility will be far less radioactive. It is concluded that present operations meet the two contingency criterion. The facility will still be safely subcritical even after two independent and concurrent failures (either of equipment or administrative controls). The solid waste storage and liquid waste will be managed separately. The solid waste storage area is classified as exempt because it contains less than 15 grams of fissionable materials. The Radioactive Liquid Waste System is classified as isolated because it contains less than one third of a minimum critical mass. The criticality safety of the 340 Facility devoted to the Radioactive Liquid Waste System (RLWS) is assured by the form and concentration of the fissile material and could also be classified as a limited control facility. However, the 340 Facility has been operated as an isolated facility which results in a more conservative limit

  13. Study of fast reactor safety test facilities. Preliminary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bell, G.I.; Boudreau, J.E.; McLaughlin, T.; Palmer, R.G.; Starkovich, V.; Stein, W.E.; Stevenson, M.G.; Yarnell, Y.L.

    1975-05-01

    Included are sections dealing with the following topics: (1) perspective and philosophy of fast reactor safety analysis; (2) status of accident analysis and experimental needs; (3) experiment and facility definitions; (4) existing in-pile facilities; (5) new facility options; and (6) data acquisition methods

  14. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  15. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the facilities (INBs no. 94 (irradiated materials workshop), 99 (fuel storage facility), 107 and 132 (NPPs in operation), 133, 153 and 161 (NPPs under deconstruction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  16. Comprehensive safety cases for radioactive waste management facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woollam, P.B.

    1993-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment methodology is being applied by Nuclear Electric plc (NE) to the development of comprehensive safety cases for the radioactive waste management processing and accumulation facilities associated with its 26 reactor systems. This paper describes the methodology and the safety case assessment criteria employed by NE. An overview of the results from facilities used by the first 16 reactors is presented, together with more detail of a specific safety analysis: storage of fuel element debris. No risk to the public greater than 10 -6 /y has been identified and the more significant risks arise from the potential for radioactive waste fires. There are no unacceptable risks from external hazards such as flooding, aircrash or seismic events. Some operations previously expected to have significant risks in fact have negligible risks, while the few faults with risks exceeding the assessment criteria were only identified as a result of this study

  17. Safety culture in industrial radiography facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vincent-Furo, Evelyn

    2015-02-01

    This project reviewed published IAEA materials and other documents on safety culture with specific references to industrial radiography. Safety culture requires all duties important to safety to be carried out correctly, with alertness, due thought and full knowledge, sound judgment and a proper sense of accountability. The development and maintenance of safety culture in an operating organization has to cover management systems, policies, responsibilities, procedures and organizational arrangements. The essence is to control radiation hazard, optimize radiation protection to prevent or reduce exposures and mitigate the consequences of accidents and incidents. To achieve a high degree of safety culture appropriate national and international infrastructure should exist to ensure effective training of workers and management system that supports commitment to safety culture at all level of the organization; management, managers and workforce. The result of the review revealed that all accidents in industrial radiography facilities were due to poor safety culture practices including inadequate regulatory control oversight. Some recommendations are provided and if implemented could improve safety culture leading to good safety performance which will significantly reduce accidents and their consequences in industrial radiography. These examples call for a review of safety culture in Industrial radiography. (au)

  18. Yearly program of safety research in nuclear power facilities from fiscal 1981 to 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    Nuclear safety research plans for nuclear power facilities and others from fiscal 1981 to 1985 are presented for the following areas: the safety of LWR fuel, loss-of-coolant accidents, the structural safety of LWR installations, the reduction of radioactive material release from nuclear power facilities, the stochastic safety evaluation of nuclear power facilities, the aseismicity of nuclear power facilities, the safety of nuclear fuel facilities, and the safety of nuclear fuel transport vessels. In the respective areas, the needs for research and the outline of research works are summarized. Then, about the major research works in each area, the purpose, contents, term and responsible institution of the research are given. (Mori, K.)

  19. Development of an auditable safety analysis in support of a radiological facility classification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kinney, M.D.; Young, B.

    1995-01-01

    In recent years, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities commonly have been classified as reactor, non-reactor nuclear, or nuclear facilities. Safety analysis documentation was prepared for these facilities, with few exceptions, using the requirements in either DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System; or DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Traditionally, this has been accomplished by development of an extensive Safety Analysis Report (SAR), which identifies hazards, assesses risks of facility operation, describes and analyzes adequacy of measures taken to control hazards, and evaluates potential accidents and their associated risks. This process is complicated by analysis of secondary hazards and adequacy of backup (redundant) systems. The traditional SAR process is advantageous for DOE facilities with appreciable hazards or operational risks. SAR preparation for a low-risk facility or process can be cost-prohibitive and quite challenging because conventional safety analysis protocols may not readily be applied to a low-risk facility. The DOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management recognized this potential disadvantage and issued an EM limited technical standard, No. 5502-94, Hazard Baseline Documentation. This standard can be used for developing documentation for a facility classified as radiological, including preparation of an auditable (defensible) safety analysis. In support of the radiological facility classification process, the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) Project has developed an auditable safety analysis document based upon the postulation criteria and hazards analysis techniques defined in DOE Order 5480.23

  20. Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bengston, S.J.

    1994-05-01

    This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

  1. Operational and safety requirement of radiation facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zulkafli Ghazali

    2007-01-01

    Gamma and electron irradiation facilities are the most common industrial sources of ionizing radiation. They have been used for medical, industrial and research purposes since the 1950s. Currently there are more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation worldwide. These facilities are either used for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, or the eradication of insect infestation. Irradiation with electron beam, gamma ray or ultra violet light can also destroy complex organic contaminants in both liquid and gaseous waste. EB systems are replacing traditional chemical sterilization methods in the medical supply industry. The ultra-violet curing facility, however, has found more industrial application in printing and furniture industries. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, and thus there is a potential of accidental exposure in the irradiation chamber which can be lethal within minutes. Although, the safety record of this industry has been relatively very good, there have been fatalities recorded in Italy (1975), Norway (1982), El Salvador (1989) and Israel (1990). Precautions against uncontrolled entry into irradiation chamber must therefore be taken. This is especially so in the case of gamma irradiation facilities those contain large amounts of radioactivity. If the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed. This paper will, to certain extent, describe safety procedure and system being installed at ALURTRON, Nuclear Malaysia to eliminate accidental exposure of electron beam irradiation. (author)

  2. Functions of the National Board for Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection of the German Democratic Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Functions of the National Board for Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection of the GDR are described considering the following aspects: Nuclear plant safety, nuclear safeguards, physical protection, safety in working areas, environmental protection including radioactive waste management, protection of man by medical supervision and dosimetry, further training, international co-operation and information. (author)

  3. 78 FR 69433 - Executive Order 13650 Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security Listening Sessions

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-19

    ... Chemical Facility Safety and Security Listening Sessions AGENCY: National Protection and Programs... from stakeholders on issues pertaining to Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (Executive... regulations, guidance, and policies; and identifying best practices in chemical facility safety and security...

  4. Regulatory measures of BARC Safety Council to control radiation exposure in BARC Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajdeep; Jolly, V.M.; Jayarajan, K.

    2018-01-01

    Bhabha Atomic Research Centre is involved in multidisciplinary research and developmental activities, related to peaceful use of nuclear energy including societal benefits. BARC facilities at different parts of India include nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, research reactors, nuclear recycle facilities and various Physics, Chemistry and Biological laboratories. BARC Safety Council (BSC) is the regulatory body for BARC facilities and takes regulatory measures for radiation protection. BSC has many safety committees for radiation protection including Operating Plants Safety Review Committee (OPSRC), Committee to Review Applications for Authorization of Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (CRAASDRW) and Design Safety Review Committees (DSRC) in 2 nd tier and Unit Level Safety Committees (ULSCs) in 3 rd tier under OPSRC

  5. 76 FR 65729 - Board of Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-10-24

    ... Recommendations for Respiratory Diseases, Hearing Loss Prevention, Personal Protective Technologies, and Health... Scientific Counselors, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BSC, NIOSH) In accordance with..., and demonstrations relating to occupational safety and health and to mine health. The Board of...

  6. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Bugey nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Bugey nuclear power plant (Ain (FR)): 4 PWR reactors in operation (INB 78 and 89), one partially dismantled graphite-gas reactor (INB 45), an inter-regional fuel storage facility (MIR, INB 102), and a radioactive waste storage and conditioning facility under construction (ICEDA, INB 173). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  7. Integrated Framework for Patient Safety and Energy Efficiency in Healthcare Facilities Retrofit Projects.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mohammadpour, Atefeh; Anumba, Chimay J; Messner, John I

    2016-07-01

    There is a growing focus on enhancing energy efficiency in healthcare facilities, many of which are decades old. Since replacement of all aging healthcare facilities is not economically feasible, the retrofitting of these facilities is an appropriate path, which also provides an opportunity to incorporate energy efficiency measures. In undertaking energy efficiency retrofits, it is vital that the safety of the patients in these facilities is maintained or enhanced. However, the interactions between patient safety and energy efficiency have not been adequately addressed to realize the full benefits of retrofitting healthcare facilities. To address this, an innovative integrated framework, the Patient Safety and Energy Efficiency (PATSiE) framework, was developed to simultaneously enhance patient safety and energy efficiency. The framework includes a step -: by -: step procedure for enhancing both patient safety and energy efficiency. It provides a structured overview of the different stages involved in retrofitting healthcare facilities and improves understanding of the intricacies associated with integrating patient safety improvements with energy efficiency enhancements. Evaluation of the PATSiE framework was conducted through focus groups with the key stakeholders in two case study healthcare facilities. The feedback from these stakeholders was generally positive, as they considered the framework useful and applicable to retrofit projects in the healthcare industry. © The Author(s) 2016.

  8. Fast reactor test facilities in the US safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avery, R.; Dickerman, C.E.; Lennox, D.H.; Rose, D.

    1979-01-01

    The needs for safety information derivable from in-pile programs are reviewed, and the correlation made with existing and planned capability. In view of the current status of the U.S. breeder program, emphasis is given in the review to the impact of different fast breeder options on the required program and facilities. It is concluded that facility needs are somewhat independent of specific fast breeder concept, even though the relative emphasis on the various safety issues will differ. 8 refs

  9. Enhancement of safety at nuclear facilities in Pakistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahmad, S.A.; Hayat, T.; Azhar, W.

    2006-01-01

    Pakistan is benefiting from nuclear technology mostly in health and energy sectors as well as agriculture and industry and has an impeccable safety record. At the national level uses of nuclear technology started in 1955 resulting in the operation of Karachi Radioisotope Center, Karachi, in December 1960. Pakistan Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) was formulated in 1964 with subsequent promulgation of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Ordinance in 1965 to cope with the anticipated introduction of a research reactor, namely PARR-I, and a nuclear power plant, namely KANUPP. Since then Pakistan's nuclear program has expanded to include numerous nuclear facilities of varied nature. This program has definite economic and social impacts by producing electricity, treating and diagnosing cancer patients, and introducing better crop varieties. Appropriate radiation protection includes a number of measures including database of sealed radiation sources at PAEC operated nuclear facilities, see Table l, updated during periodic physical verification of these sources, strict adherence to the BSS-115, IAEA recommended enforcement of zoning at research reactors and NPPs, etc. Pakistan is party to several international conventions and treaties, such as Convention of Nuclear Safety and Early Notification, to improve and enhance safety at its nuclear facilities. In addition Pakistan generally and PAEC particularly believes in a blend of prudent regulations and good/best practices. This is described in this paper. (Author)

  10. Safety Assessment Methodologies and Their Application in Development of Near Surface Waste Disposal Facilities--ASAM Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Batandjieva, B.; Metcalf, P.

    2003-01-01

    Safety of near surface disposal facilities is a primary focus and objective of stakeholders involved in radioactive waste management of low and intermediate level waste and safety assessment is an important tool contributing to the evaluation and demonstration of the overall safety of these facilities. It plays significant role in different stages of development of these facilities (site characterization, design, operation, closure) and especially for those facilities for which safety assessment has not been performed or safety has not been demonstrated yet and the future has not been decided. Safety assessments also create the basis for the safety arguments presented to nuclear regulators, public and other interested parties in respect of the safety of existing facilities, the measures to upgrade existing facilities and development of new facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has initiated a number of research coordinated projects in the field of development and improvement of approaches to safety assessment and methodologies for safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities, such as NSARS (Near Surface Radioactive Waste Disposal Safety Assessment Reliability Study) and ISAM (Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities) projects. These projects were very successful and showed that there is a need to promote the consistent application of the safety assessment methodologies and to explore approaches to regulatory review of safety assessments and safety cases in order to make safety related decisions. These objectives have been the basis of the IAEA follow up coordinated research project--ASAM (Application of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Disposal Facilities), which will commence in November 2002 and continue for a period of three years

  11. Application of the management system for facilities and activities. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Guide supports the Safety Requirements publication on The Management System for Facilities and Activities. It provides generic guidance to aid in establishing, implementing, assessing and continually improving a management system that complies with the requirements established. In addition to this Safety Guide, there are a number of Safety Guides for specific technical areas. Together these provide all the guidance necessary for implementing these requirements. This publication supersedes Safety Series No. 50-SG-Q1-Q7 (1996). The guidance provided here may be used by organizations in the following ways: - To assist in the development of the management systems of organizations directly responsible for operating facilities and activities and providing services for: Nuclear facilities; Activities using sources of ionizing radiation; Radioactive waste management; The transport of radioactive material; Radiation protection activities; Any other practices or circumstances in which people may be exposed to radiation from naturally occurring or artificial sources; The regulation of such facilities and activities; - To assist in the development of the management systems of the relevant regulatory bodies; - By the operator, to specify to a supplier, via contractual documentation, any guidance of this Safety Guide that should be included in the supplier's management system for the supply and delivery of products

  12. Design of Safety Parameter Monitoring Function in a Research Reactor Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Jaekwan; Suh, Yongsuk [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    The primary purpose of the safety parameter monitoring system (SPDS) is to help operating personnel in the control room make quick assessments of the plant safety status. Thus, the basic function of the SPDS is a provision of a continuous indication of plant parameters or derived variables representative of the safety status of the plant. NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 provides details of the functional criteria for the SPDS, as one of the action plan requirements from TMI accident. The system provides various functions as follows: · Alerting based on safety function decision logics, · Success path analysis to achieve the integrity of the safety functions, · 3 layer display architecture - safety function, success path display for each safety function, system summary and equipment details for each safety function, · Integration with computer-based procedure. According to a Notice of the NSSC No. 2012-31, a research reactor facility generating more than 2 MW of power should also be furnished with the SPDS for emergency preparedness. Generally, a research reactor is a small size facility, and its number of instrumentations is fewer than that of NPPs. In particular, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions from an economic perspective. Therefore, a safety parameter display system optimized for a research reactor facility must be proposed. This paper provides the requirement analysis results and proposes the design of safety parameter monitoring function for a research reactor. The safety parameter monitoring function supporting control room personnel during emergency conditions should be designed in a research reactor facility. The facility size and number of signals are smaller than that of the power plants. Also, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions of nuclear power plants from an economic perspective. Thus, a safety parameter display system optimized to a research reactor must be proposed. First, we found important design items

  13. Design of Safety Parameter Monitoring Function in a Research Reactor Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jaekwan; Suh, Yongsuk

    2014-01-01

    The primary purpose of the safety parameter monitoring system (SPDS) is to help operating personnel in the control room make quick assessments of the plant safety status. Thus, the basic function of the SPDS is a provision of a continuous indication of plant parameters or derived variables representative of the safety status of the plant. NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 provides details of the functional criteria for the SPDS, as one of the action plan requirements from TMI accident. The system provides various functions as follows: · Alerting based on safety function decision logics, · Success path analysis to achieve the integrity of the safety functions, · 3 layer display architecture - safety function, success path display for each safety function, system summary and equipment details for each safety function, · Integration with computer-based procedure. According to a Notice of the NSSC No. 2012-31, a research reactor facility generating more than 2 MW of power should also be furnished with the SPDS for emergency preparedness. Generally, a research reactor is a small size facility, and its number of instrumentations is fewer than that of NPPs. In particular, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions from an economic perspective. Therefore, a safety parameter display system optimized for a research reactor facility must be proposed. This paper provides the requirement analysis results and proposes the design of safety parameter monitoring function for a research reactor. The safety parameter monitoring function supporting control room personnel during emergency conditions should be designed in a research reactor facility. The facility size and number of signals are smaller than that of the power plants. Also, it is actually hard to have various and powerful functions of nuclear power plants from an economic perspective. Thus, a safety parameter display system optimized to a research reactor must be proposed. First, we found important design items

  14. Enacting corporate governance of healthcare safety and quality: a dramaturgy of hospital boards in England.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Freeman, Tim; Millar, Ross; Mannion, Russell; Davies, Huw

    2016-02-01

    The governance of patient safety is a challenging concern for all health systems. Yet, while the role of executive boards receives increased scrutiny, the area remains theoretically and methodologically underdeveloped. Specifically, we lack a detailed understanding of the performative aspects at play: what board members say and do to discharge their accountabilities for patient safety. This article draws on qualitative data from overt non-participant observation of four NHS hospital Foundation Trust boards in England. Applying a dramaturgical framework to explore scripting, setting, staging and performance, we found important differences between case study sites in the performative dimensions of processing and interpretation of infection control data. We detail the practices associated with these differences--the legitimation of current performance, the querying of data classification, and the naming and shaming of executives--to consider their implications. © 2015 The Authors. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.

  15. Status of safety at Areva group facilities. 2006 annual report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This report presents a snapshot of nuclear safety and radiation protection conditions in the AREVA group's nuclear installations in France and abroad, as well as of radiation protection aspects in service activities, as identified over the course of the annual inspections and analyses program carried out by the General Inspectorate in 2006. This report is presented to the AREVA Supervisory Board, communicated to the labor representation bodies concerned, and made public. In light of the inspections, appraisals and coordination missions it has performed, the General Inspectorate considers that the nuclear safety level of the AREVA group's nuclear installations is satisfactory. It particularly noted positive changes on numerous sites and efforts in the field of continuous improvement that have helped to strengthen nuclear safety. This has been possible through the full involvement of management teams, an improvement effort initiated by upper management, actions to increase personnel awareness of nuclear safety culture, and supervisors' heightened presence around operators. However, the occurrence of certain events in facilities has led us to question the nuclear safety repercussions that the changes to activities or organization on some sites have had. In these times of change, drifts in nuclear safety culture have been identified. The General Inspectorate considers that a preliminary analysis of the human and organizational factors of these changes, sized to match the impact the change has on nuclear safety, should be made to ensure that a guaranteed level of nuclear safety is maintained (allowance for changes to references, availability of the necessary skills, resources of the operating and support structures, etc.). Preparations should also be made to monitor the changes and spot any telltale signs of drift in the application phase. Managers should be extra vigilant and the occurrence of any drift should be systematically dealt with ahead of implementing

  16. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant (INB 75, Haut-Rhin, 68 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  17. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

  18. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Penly nuclear power plant (INB 136 and 140, Seine-Maritime, 76 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  19. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant (INB 75, Haut-Rhin, 68 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  20. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Blayais nuclear power plant (INB 86 and 110, Gironde (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  1. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  2. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

  3. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Penly nuclear power plant (INB 136 and 140, Seine-Maritime, 76 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  4. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

  5. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Gravelines nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Gravelines nuclear power plant (INB 96, 97 and 122, Nord (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  6. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Civaux nuclear power plant (INB 158 and 159, Vienne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  7. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Blayais nuclear power plant (INB 86 and 110, Gironde (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  8. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Civaux nuclear power plant (INB 158 and 159, Vienne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  9. Safety of Long-term Interim Storage Facilities - Workshop Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The objective of this workshop was to discuss and review current national activities, plans and regulatory approaches for the safety of long term interim storage facilities dedicated to spent nuclear fuel (SF), high level waste (HLW) and other radioactive materials with prolonged storage regimes. It was also intended to discuss results of experiments and to identify necessary R and D to confirm safety of fuel and cask during the long-term storage. Safety authorities and their Technical Support Organisation (TSO), Fuel Cycle Facilities (FCF) operating organisations and international organisations were invited to share information on their approaches, practices and current developments. The workshop was organised in an opening session, three technical sessions, and a conclusion session. The technical sessions were focused on: - National approaches for long term interim storage facilities; - Safety requirements, regulatory framework and implementation issues; - Technical issues and operational experience, needs for R and D. Each session consisted of a number of presentations followed by a panel discussion moderated by the session Chairs. A summary of each session and subsequent discussion that ensued are provided as well as a summary of the results of the workshop with the text of the papers given and presentations made

  10. Safety measures for the main control board replacement project at Ikata units 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hashimoto, Nozomu; Tada, Kenji

    2013-01-01

    When Units 1 and 2 of the Ikata Power Station underwent replacement of their main control boards, control cabinets, and associated equipment, it was necessary to remove all the control boards, cabinets, and cables from the control building including from the main control room. This meant the loss of operation and monitoring functions in the main control room and functions of control cabinets. To maintain the operation and monitoring functions required under plant shutdown conditions, temporary operation and monitoring equipment (i.e., temporary main control board) was installed in the temporary main control room. The advance preparations included a trial switching from the permanent to the temporary main control board to identify and address potential problems in advance. When the replacement work was underway, a work schedule sheet posted in the temporary and the permanent control rooms was used to prevent human errors caused by operators’ recognition errors. Monitoring and control signals were switched from the old boards to the temporary boards and from the temporary boards to the new boards at appropriate timings to ensure plant safety during the replacement operation. (author)

  11. Modernization of safety system for the radiation facility for industrial sterilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drndarevic, V.; Djuric, D.; Koturovic, A.; Arandjelovic, M.; Mikic, R.

    1995-01-01

    Modernization of the existing safety system of the radiation facility for industrial sterilization at the Vinca Institute of nuclear science is done. In order to improve radiation safety of the facility, the latest recommendations and requirements of IAEA have been implemented. Concept and design of the modernized system are presented. The new elements of the safety system are described and the improvements achieved by means of this modernization are pointed out. (author)

  12. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-12-01

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by DOE itself. The three major recommendations are: under any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE's nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation

  13. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 103, 104, 114 and 115). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  14. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  15. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 103, 104, 114 and 115). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  16. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  17. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 111 and 112). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  18. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Penly nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 136 and 140). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  19. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Fessenheim nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INB no. 75). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  20. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 135 and 142). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  1. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Civaux nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 158 and 159). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  2. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  3. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  4. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  5. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 139, 144 and 163 (under dismantling)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  6. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Blayais nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 86 and 110). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  7. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 124, 125, 126 and 137). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  8. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 108, 109 and 167 (under construction)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  9. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-07-15

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  10. Mechanistic facility safety and source term analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PLYS, M.G.

    1999-01-01

    A PC-based computer program was created for facility safety and source term analysis at Hanford The program has been successfully applied to mechanistic prediction of source terms from chemical reactions in underground storage tanks, hydrogen combustion in double contained receiver tanks, and proccss evaluation including the potential for runaway reactions in spent nuclear fuel processing. Model features include user-defined facility room, flow path geometry, and heat conductors, user-defined non-ideal vapor and aerosol species, pressure- and density-driven gas flows, aerosol transport and deposition, and structure to accommodate facility-specific source terms. Example applications are presented here

  11. Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department. Annual report 1999

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Majborn, B.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E.

    2000-04-01

    The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

  12. Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Majborn, B.; Aarkrog, A.; Brodersen, K.

    1998-04-01

    The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1997. The department's research and development activities were organized in four research programmes: Reactor Safety, Radiation protection, Radioecology, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

  13. Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E.

    1999-04-01

    The report present a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1998. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lsits of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

  14. Transuranic-contaminated solid waste Treatment Development Facility. Final safety analysis report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warner, C.L.

    1979-07-01

    The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Transuranic-Contaminated Solid-Waste Treatment Facility has been prepared in compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual Chapter 0531, Safety of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. The Treatment Development Facility (TDF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is a research and development facility dedicated to the study of radioactive-waste-management processes. This analysis addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and the design and operating characteristics of the first study process, controlled air incineration and aqueous scrub off-gas treatment with respect to both normal and accident conditions. The credible accidents having potentially serious consequences relative to the operation of the facility and the first process have been analyzed and the consequences of each postulated credible accident are presented. Descriptions of the control systems, engineered safeguards, and administrative and operational features designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such accidents are presented. The essential features of the operating and emergency procedures, environmental protection and monitoring programs, as well as the health and safety, quality assurance, and employee training programs are described

  15. Transuranic-contaminated solid waste Treatment Development Facility. Final safety analysis report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Warner, C.L. (comp.)

    1979-07-01

    The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Transuranic-Contaminated Solid-Waste Treatment Facility has been prepared in compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual Chapter 0531, Safety of Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities. The Treatment Development Facility (TDF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is a research and development facility dedicated to the study of radioactive-waste-management processes. This analysis addresses site assessment, facility design and construction, and the design and operating characteristics of the first study process, controlled air incineration and aqueous scrub off-gas treatment with respect to both normal and accident conditions. The credible accidents having potentially serious consequences relative to the operation of the facility and the first process have been analyzed and the consequences of each postulated credible accident are presented. Descriptions of the control systems, engineered safeguards, and administrative and operational features designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of such accidents are presented. The essential features of the operating and emergency procedures, environmental protection and monitoring programs, as well as the health and safety, quality assurance, and employee training programs are described.

  16. CP-50 calibration facility radiological safety assessment document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chilton, M.W.; Hill, R.L.; Eubank, B.F.

    1980-03-01

    The CP-50 Calibration Facility Radiological Safety Assessment document, prepared at the request of the Nevada Operations Office of the US Department of Energy to satisfy provisions of ERDA Manual Chapter 0531, presents design features, systems controls, and procedures used in the operation of the calibration facility. Site and facility characteristics and routine and non-routine operations, including hypothetical incidents or accidents are discussed and design factors, source control systems, and radiation monitoring considerations are described

  17. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Volume 2, Guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This document provides guidance for the implementation of the requirements identified in Vol. 1 of this Standard. This guidance is intended for the managers, designers, operators, and other personnel with safety responsibilities for facilities designated as magnetic fusion facilities. While Vol. 1 is generally applicable in that requirements there apply to a wide range of fusion facilities, this volume is concerned mainly with large facilities such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Using a risk-based prioritization, the concepts presented here may also be applied to other magnetic fusion facilities. This volume is oriented toward regulation in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment

  18. Criticality safety research on nuclear fuel cycle facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miyoshi, Yoshinori [Japan Atomic Energy Research Inst., Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan). Tokai Research Establishment

    2004-07-01

    This paper present d s current status and future program of the criticality safety research on nuclear fuel cycle made by Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. Experimental research on solution fuel treated in reprocessing plant has been performed using two critical facilities, STACY and TRACY. Fundamental data of static and transient characteristics are accumulated for validation of criticality safety codes. Subcritical measurements are also made for developing a monitoring system for criticality safety. Criticality safety codes system for solution and power system, and evaluation method related to burnup credit are developed. (author)

  19. Preliminary safety assessment of the WIPP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balestri, R.J.; Torres, B.W.; Pahwa, S.B.; Brannen, J.P.

    1979-01-01

    This paper summarizes the efforts to perform a safety assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility being proposed for southeastern New Mexico. This preliminary safety assessment is limited to a consequence assessment in terms of the dose to a maximally exposed individual as a result of introducing the radionuclides into the biosphere. The extremely low doses to the organs as a result of the liquid breach scenarios are contrasted with the background radiation

  20. Operational safety assessment of underground test facilities for mined geologic waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elder, H.K.

    1993-01-01

    This paper describes the operational safety assessment for the underground facilities for the exploratory studies facility (ESF) at the Yucca Mountain Project. The systematic identification and evaluation of hazards related to the ESF is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach based on the analysis of potential accidents was used since radiological safety analysis was not required. The risk assessment summarized credible accident scenarios and the design provides mitigation of the risks to a level that the facility can be constructed and operated with an adequate level of safety. The risk assessment also provides reasonable assurance that all identifiable major accident scenarios have been reviewed and design mitigation features provided to ensure an adequate level of safety

  1. Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department. Annual report 1999

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majborn, B.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E. [eds.

    2000-04-01

    The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department's research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: 'Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety' and 'Radioecology and Tracer Studies'. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au)

  2. Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1999

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Majborn, B.; Damkjær, A.; Jensen, Per Hedemann

    2000-01-01

    The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1999. The department´s research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: "Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety" and"Radioecology and Tracer Studies". The nuclear...... facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR 3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Management Plant, and the educational reactor DR 1. Lists of staff and publications are includedtogether with a summary of the staff´s participation in national and international committees....

  3. Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1997

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majborn, B.; Aarkrog, A.; Brodersen, K. [and others

    1998-04-01

    The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1997. The department`s research and development activities were organized in four research programmes: Reactor Safety, Radiation protection, Radioecology, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff`s participation in national and international committees. (au) 11 tabs., 39 ills.; 74 refs.

  4. Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department annual report 1998

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Hedemann Jensen, P.; Nielsen, S.P.; Nonboel, E

    1999-04-01

    The report present a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1998. The department`s research and development activities were organized in two research programmes: `Radiation Protection and Reactor Safety` and `Radioecology and Tracer Studies`. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the research reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment plant, and the educational reactor DR1. Lsits of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff`s participation in national and international committees. (au)

  5. Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities department annual report 1996

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Floto, H.; Heydorn, K.; Oelgaard, P.L.

    1997-04-01

    The report presents a summary of the work of the Nuclear Safety Research and Facilities Department in 1996. The Department's research and development activities are organized in three research programmes: Radiation Protection, Reactor Safety, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the Research Reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the Educational Reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au) 2 tabs., 28 ills

  6. NSC confirms principles for safety review on Radioactive Waste Burial Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1988-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety Commission authorized the scope of Principles for Safety Examination on Radioactive Waste Burial Facilities as suitable, the draft report for which was established by the Special Committee on Safety Standards of Radioactive Waste (Chairman Prof. Masao Sago, Science University of Tokyo) and reported on March 10 to the NSC. The principles include the theory that the facility must be controlled step by step, corresponding to the amount of radioactivity over 300 to 400 years after the burial of low-level solid radioactive waste with site conditions safe even in the event of occurrence of a natural disaster. The principles will be used for administrative safety examination against the application of the business on low-level radioactive waste burial facility which Japan Nuclear Fuel Industries, Inc. is planning to install at Rokkashomura, Aomori Prefecture. (author)

  7. Criticality safety and facility design considerations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waltz, W.R.

    1991-06-01

    Operations with fissile material introduce the risk of a criticality accident that may be lethal to nearby personnel. In addition, concerns over criticality safety can result in substantial delays and shutdown of facility operations. For these reasons, it is clear that the prevention of a nuclear criticality accident should play a major role in the design of a nuclear facility. The emphasis of this report will be placed on engineering design considerations in the prevention of criticality. The discussion will not include other important aspects, such as the physics of calculating limits nor criticality alarm systems

  8. Safety in Elevators and Grain Handling Facilities. Module SH-27. Safety and Health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Center for Occupational Research and Development, Inc., Waco, TX.

    This student module on safety in elevators and grain handling facilities is one of 50 modules concerned with job safety and health. Following the introduction, 15 objectives (each keyed to a page in the text) the student is expected to accomplish are listed (e.g., Explain how explosion suppression works). Then each objective is taught in detail,…

  9. A bicycle safety index for evaluating urban street facilities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Asadi-Shekari, Zohreh; Moeinaddini, Mehdi; Zaly Shah, Muhammad

    2015-01-01

    The objectives of this research are to conceptualize the Bicycle Safety Index (BSI) that considers all parts of the street and to propose a universal guideline with microscale details. A point system method comparing existing safety facilities to a defined standard is proposed to estimate the BSI. Two streets in Singapore and Malaysia are chosen to examine this model. The majority of previous measurements to evaluate street conditions for cyclists usually cannot cover all parts of streets, including segments and intersections. Previous models also did not consider all safety indicators and cycling facilities at a microlevel in particular. This study introduces a new concept of a practical BSI to complete previous studies using its practical, easy-to-follow, point system-based outputs. This practical model can be used in different urban settings to estimate the level of safety for cycling and suggest some improvements based on the standards.

  10. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facility of Brennilis - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Monts d'Arree (EL4-D or Brennilis) site (INB 162 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  11. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the nuclear facilities of Brennilis - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Monts d'Arree (EL4-D or Brennilis) site (INB 162 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  12. Psychometric model for safety culture assessment in nuclear research facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nascimento, C.S. do, E-mail: claudio.souza@ctmsp.mar.mil.br [Centro Tecnológico da Marinha em São Paulo (CTMSP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2468, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil); Andrade, D.A., E-mail: delvonei@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN – SP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2242, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil); Mesquita, R.N. de, E-mail: rnavarro@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN – SP), Av. Professor Lineu Prestes 2242, 05508-000 São Paulo, SP (Brazil)

    2017-04-01

    Highlights: • A psychometric model to evaluate ‘safety climate’ at nuclear research facilities. • The model presented evidences of good psychometric qualities. • The model was applied to nuclear research facilities in Brazil. • Some ‘safety culture’ weaknesses were detected in the assessed organization. • A potential tool to develop safety management programs in nuclear facilities. - Abstract: A safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants depends not only on technical performance, but also on the people and on the organization. Organizational factors have been recognized as the main causal mechanisms of accidents by research organizations through USA, Europe and Japan. Deficiencies related with these factors reveal weaknesses in the organization’s safety culture. A significant number of instruments to assess the safety culture based on psychometric models that evaluate safety climate through questionnaires, and which are based on reliability and validity evidences, have been published in health and ‘safety at work’ areas. However, there are few safety culture assessment instruments with these characteristics (reliability and validity) available on nuclear literature. Therefore, this work proposes an instrument to evaluate, with valid and reliable measures, the safety climate of nuclear research facilities. The instrument was developed based on methodological principles applied to research modeling and its psychometric properties were evaluated by a reliability analysis and validation of content, face and construct. The instrument was applied to an important nuclear research organization in Brazil. This organization comprises 4 research reactors and many nuclear laboratories. The survey results made possible a demographic characterization and the identification of some possible safety culture weaknesses and pointing out potential areas to be improved in the assessed organization. Good evidence of reliability with Cronbach's alpha

  13. Psychometric model for safety culture assessment in nuclear research facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nascimento, C.S. do; Andrade, D.A.; Mesquita, R.N. de

    2017-01-01

    Highlights: • A psychometric model to evaluate ‘safety climate’ at nuclear research facilities. • The model presented evidences of good psychometric qualities. • The model was applied to nuclear research facilities in Brazil. • Some ‘safety culture’ weaknesses were detected in the assessed organization. • A potential tool to develop safety management programs in nuclear facilities. - Abstract: A safe and reliable operation of nuclear power plants depends not only on technical performance, but also on the people and on the organization. Organizational factors have been recognized as the main causal mechanisms of accidents by research organizations through USA, Europe and Japan. Deficiencies related with these factors reveal weaknesses in the organization’s safety culture. A significant number of instruments to assess the safety culture based on psychometric models that evaluate safety climate through questionnaires, and which are based on reliability and validity evidences, have been published in health and ‘safety at work’ areas. However, there are few safety culture assessment instruments with these characteristics (reliability and validity) available on nuclear literature. Therefore, this work proposes an instrument to evaluate, with valid and reliable measures, the safety climate of nuclear research facilities. The instrument was developed based on methodological principles applied to research modeling and its psychometric properties were evaluated by a reliability analysis and validation of content, face and construct. The instrument was applied to an important nuclear research organization in Brazil. This organization comprises 4 research reactors and many nuclear laboratories. The survey results made possible a demographic characterization and the identification of some possible safety culture weaknesses and pointing out potential areas to be improved in the assessed organization. Good evidence of reliability with Cronbach's alpha

  14. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chooz nuclear power plant (Ardennes (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (Chooz B, INB 139 and 144) and one partially dismantled PWR reactor (Chooz A, INB 163). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary followed by the viewpoint of the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  15. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Paluel nuclear power plant (INB no. 103 - Paluel 1, no. 104 - Paluel 2, no. 114 - Paluel 3 and no. 115 - Paluel 4, Cany-Barville - Seine-Maritime (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document ends with a glossary and no recommendation from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  16. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Paluel nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Paluel nuclear power plant (INB no. 103 - Paluel 1, no. 104 - Paluel 2, no. 114 - Paluel 3 and no. 115 - Paluel 4, Cany-Barville - Seine-Maritime (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  17. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Golfech nuclear power plant (INB 135 and 142, Tarn-et-Garonne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  18. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cattenom nuclear power plant (INB 124, 125, 126 and 137, Moselle (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  19. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cattenom nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cattenom nuclear power plant (INB 124, 125, 126 and 137, Moselle (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  20. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Golfech nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Golfech nuclear power plant (INB 135 and 142, Tarn-et-Garonne (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  1. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chinon nuclear power plant (Indre-et-Loire, 37 (FR)): 4 PWR reactors in operation (Chinon B, INB 107 and 132), 3 partially dismantled graphite-gas reactors (Chinon A, INB 133, 153 and 161), a workshop for irradiated materials (AMI, INB 94), and an inter-regional fuel storage facility (MIR, INB 99). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  2. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chinon nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chinon nuclear power plant (Indre-et-Loire, 37 (FR)): 4 PWR reactors in operation (Chinon B, INB 107 and 132), 3 partially dismantled graphite-gas reactors (Chinon A, INB 133, 153 and 161), a workshop for irradiated materials (AMI, INB 94), and an inter-regional fuel storage facility (MIR, INB 99). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  3. Consenting process for radiation facilities. V. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-03-01

    Safety codes and standards are formulated on the basis of nationally and internationally accepted safety criteria for design, construction and operation of specific equipment, systems, structures and components of nuclear and radiation facilities. Safety, codes establish the objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety. Safety codes establish the objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety. Safety guides elaborate various requirements and furnish approaches for their implementation. Safety manuals deal with specific topics and contain detailed scientific and technical information on the subject. These documents are prepared by experts in the relevant fields and are extensively reviewed by advisory committees of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) before they are published. The documents are revised when necessary, in the light of experience and feedback from users as well as new developments in the field. AERB issued a safety code on Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities (AERB/SC/G) to spell out the requirements/obligations to be met by a nuclear or radiation facility for the issue of regulatory consent at every stage. This safety guide apprises the details of the regulatory requirements for setting up the radiation facility such as consenting process, the stages requiring consent, wherever applicable documents to be submitted and the nature and extent of review. The guide also gives information on methods of review and assessment adopted by AERB

  4. Consenting process for radiation facilities. V. 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-03-01

    Safety codes and standards are formulated on the basis of nationally and internationally accepted safety criteria for design, construction and operation of specific equipment, systems, structures and components of nuclear and radiation facilities. Safety, codes establish the objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety. Safety codes establish the objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety. Safety guides elaborate various requirements and furnish approaches for their implementation. Safety manuals deal with specific topics and contain detailed scientific and technical information on the subject. These documents are prepared by experts in the relevant fields and are extensively reviewed by advisory committees of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) before they are published. The documents are revised when necessary, in the light of experience and feedback from users as well as new developments in the field. AERB issued a safety code on Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities (AERB/SC/G) to spell out the requirements/obligations to be met by a nuclear or radiation facility for the issue of regulatory consent at every stage. This safety guide apprises the details of the regulatory requirements for setting up the radiation facility such as consenting process, the stages requiring consent, wherever applicable documents to be submitted and the nature and extent of review. The guide also gives information on methods of review and assessment adopted by AERB

  5. Consenting process for radiation facilities. V. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-03-01

    Safety codes and standards are formulated on the basis of nationally and internationally accepted safety criteria for design, construction and operation of specific equipment, systems, structures and components of nuclear and radiation facilities. Safety, codes establish the objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety. Safety codes establish the objectives and set requirements that shall be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety. Safety guides elaborate various requirements and furnish approaches for their implementation. Safety manuals deal with specific topics and contain detailed scientific and technical information on the subject. These documents are prepared by experts in the relevant fields and are extensively reviewed by advisory committees of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) before they are published. The documents are revised when necessary, in the light of experience and feedback from users as well as new developments in the field. AERB issued a safety code on Regulation of Nuclear and Radiation Facilities (AERB/SC/G) to spell out the requirements/obligations to be met by a nuclear or radiation facility for the issue of regulatory consent at every stage. This safety guide apprises the details of the regulatory requirements for setting up the radiation facility such as consenting process, the stages requiring consent, wherever applicable documents to be submitted and the nature and extent of review. The guide also gives information on methods of review and assessment adopted by AERB

  6. Radiation safety aspects of new X-ray free electron laser facility, SACLA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asano, Yoshihiro

    2013-01-01

    In the safety point of view, X-ray free electron laser facilities have some characteristics in comparison with 3 rd generation synchrotron radiation facilities. One is that the high energy electrons are always injected into the beam dump and the beamlines must be constructed in the direction of the movements of electrons, and another is that the total number of accelerated electrons of X-ray free electron laser facilities is much larger than that of synchrotron radiation facilities. In addition to the importance of safety interlock systems, therefore, it is important that high energy electrons never invade into X-ray free electron laser beamlines and the amount of accelerated electron beam losses must be reduced as much as possible. At SACLA, a safety permanent magnet was installed into the X-ray light beam axis, and a beam halo monitor and beam loss monitors were installed within and around the electron transport pipes, respectively. In comparison with the SPring-8 synchrotron radiation facility, shielding design of SACLA, outline of the radiation safety systems including the monitors will be presented

  7. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Creys-Malville nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Creys-Malville nuclear power plant (also known as Superphenix power plant, INB no. 91, Creys-Mepieu - Isere (FR)) and the other fuel and waste storage facilities of the site (INB no. 141). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

  8. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Creys-Malville nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the partially dismantled facilities of the Creys-Malville nuclear power plant (also known as Superphenix power plant, INB no. 91, Creys-Mepieu - Isere (FR)) and the other fuel and waste storage facilities of the site (INB no. 141). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  9. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-12-01

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE`s nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation.

  10. Improving the regulation of safety at DOE nuclear facilities. Final report: Appendices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-12-01

    The report strongly recommends that, with the end of the Cold War, safety and health at DOE facilities should be regulated by outside agencies rather than by any regulatory scheme, DOE must maintain a strong internal safety management system; essentially all aspects of safety at DOE's nuclear facilities should be externally regulated; and existing agencies rather than a new one should be responsible for external regulation

  11. Safety in urban environment and emergency notice boards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Confortini, Claudia; Tira, Maurizio

    2008-01-01

    Reliable and safe urban system conditions have to be a crucial goal of ordinary planning activities. Among planning goals, priority must be given to indications relating to the safety levels to be achieved and to the amount of resources to be directed towards reducing the vulnerability of urban systems and therefore of the measures to be taken. Uban vulnerability cannot in fact be reduced to the sum of the vulnerability of single buildings or to the physical vulnerability of its various components. This research work consists of identifying those urban sub-areas that are important for safety in relation to natural risks, ambits that should be highlighted by means of permanent emergency notice boards/billboards. What are the hazard notices relating to all natural hazards and related risks? Where are they located? Are they clear and straightforward so that all residents and visitors are able to understand them, as it is already the case for road signs (or at least it should be)? What urban sub-areas are worth highlighting in relation to natural risks, acting for example as escape routes or meeting points? How is information for the public managed in order that people are immediately, easily and regularly notified? What is the relation of such signals to ordinary traffic signals? Research into the state of the art of permanent notice boards/billboards of this type, currently distinguished only by sporadic and local initiatives, aims at carrying out a census of and recognizing urban elements already considered as important for reducing the vulnerability of the urban system to different natural calamities and at providing new highlights as regards the identification of new ones. The next step is to work out a decision and common-language strategy for planning these elements and for their adequate signposting, so as to be able to live in the urban environment with awareness, safety and confidence, including with respect to more remote and therefore often neglected

  12. Demonstration of safety of decommissioning of facilities using radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Batandjieva, Borislava; O'Donnell, Patricio

    2008-01-01

    Full text:The development of nuclear industry worldwide in the recent years has particular impact on the approach of operators, regulators and interested parties to the implementation of the final phases (decommissioning) of all facilities that use radioactive material (from nuclear power plants, fuel fabrication facilities, research reactors to small research or medical laboratories). Decommissioning is becoming an increasingly important activity for two main reasons - termination of the practice in a safe manner with the view to use the facility or the site for other purposes, or termination of the practice and reuse the facility or site for new built nuclear facilities. The latter is of special relevance to multi-facility sites where for example new nuclear power plants and envisaged. However, limited countries have the adequate legal and regulatory framework, and experience necessary for decommissioning. In order to respond to this challenge of the nuclear industry and assist Member States in the adequate planning, conduct and termination of decommissioning of wide range of facilities, over the last decade the IAEA has implemented and initiated several projects in this field. One of the main focuses of this assistance to operators, regulators and specialists involved in decommissioning is the evaluation and demonstration of safety of decommissioning. This importance of these Agency activities was also highlighted in the International Action Plan on Decommissioning, during the second Joint Convention meeting in 2006 and the International Conference on Lessons Learned from Decommissioning in Athens in 2006. The IAEA has been providing technical support to its Member States in this field through several mechanisms: (1) the establishment of a framework of safety standards on decommissioning and development of a supporting technical documents; (2) the establishment of an international peer review mechanism for decommissioning; (3) the technical cooperation projects

  13. Status of safety in nuclear facilities - 2012. AREVA General Inspectorate Annual report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-05-01

    After a message from the Areva's Chief Executive Officer and a message from the senior Vice President of safety, health, security, sustainable development, a text by the inspector general comments the key safety results (events, dose levels, radiological impacts), the inspection findings, the areas of vigilance (relationship with the ASN, the management of the criticality risk, and facility compliance), some significant topics after the Fukushima accident. Then this report addresses the status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the group's facilities and operations. It more specifically addresses the context and findings (lessons learned from the inspections, operating experience from event, employee radiation monitoring, environmental monitoring), crosscutting processes (safety management, controlling facility compliance, subcontractor guidance and management, crisis management), specific risks (criticality risk, fire hazards, transportation safety, radioactive waste management, pollution prevention, liability mitigation and dismantling), and areas for improvement and outlook

  14. Systems engineering applied to integrated safety management for high consequence facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barter, R; Morais, B.

    1998-01-01

    Integrated Safety Management is a concept that is being actively promoted by the U.S. Department of Energy as a means of assuring safe operation of its facilities. The concept involves the integration of safety precepts into work planning rather than adjusting for safe operations after defining the work activity. The system engineering techniques used to design an integrated safety management system for a high consequence research facility are described. An example is given to show how the concepts evolved with the system design

  15. Development of radiation safety monitoring system at gamma greenhouse gamma facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hairul Nizam Idris; Azimawati Ahmad, Ahmad Zaki Hussain; Ahmad Fairuz Mohd Nasir

    2009-01-01

    This paper is discussing about installation of radiation safety monitoring system at Gamma Greenhouse Gamma facility, Agrotechnology and Bioscience Division (BAB). This facility actually is an outdoor type irradiation facility, which first in Nuclear Malaysia and the only one in Malaysia. Source Cs-137 (801 Curie) was use as radiation source and it located at the centre of 30 metres diameter size of open irradiation area. The radiation measurement and monitoring system to be equipped in this facility were required the proper equipment and devices, specially purpose for application at outside of building. Research review, literature study and discussion with the equipment manufacturers was being carried out, in effort to identify the best system should be developed. Factors such as tropical climate, environment surrounding and security were considered during selecting the proper system. Since this facility involving with panoramic radiation type, several critical and strategic locations have been fixed with radiation detectors, up to the distance at 200 meter from the radiation source. Apart from that, this developed system also was built for capable to provide the online real-time reading (using internet). In general, it can be summarized that the radiation safety monitoring system for outdoor type irradiation facility was found much different and complex compared to the system for indoor type facility. Keyword: radiation monitoring, radiation safety, Gamma Greenhouse, outdoor irradiation facility, panoramic radiation. (Author)

  16. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Biennial Report, Fiscal Years 1993--1994. Volume 6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-08-01

    In Fiscal Year 1993, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (``the Panel``) handled 30 proceedings. In Fiscal Year 1994, the Panel handled 36 proceedings. The cases addressed issues in the construction, operation, and maintenance of commercial nuclear power reactors and other activities requiring a license form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report sets out the Panel`s caseload during the year and summarizes, highlight, and analyzes how the wide- ranging issues raised in those proceedings were addressed by the Panel`s judges and licensing boards.

  17. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Biennial Report, Fiscal Years 1993--1994. Volume 6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-08-01

    In Fiscal Year 1993, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (''the Panel'') handled 30 proceedings. In Fiscal Year 1994, the Panel handled 36 proceedings. The cases addressed issues in the construction, operation, and maintenance of commercial nuclear power reactors and other activities requiring a license form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This report sets out the Panel's caseload during the year and summarizes, highlight, and analyzes how the wide- ranging issues raised in those proceedings were addressed by the Panel's judges and licensing boards

  18. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-01-01

    These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S ampersand H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules

  19. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-01-14

    These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S & H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules.

  20. Technical Safety Requirements for the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

    CERN Document Server

    Mahn, J A E M J G

    2003-01-01

    This document provides the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). The TSR is a compilation of requirements that define the conditions, the safe boundaries, and the administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous materials. These requirements constitute an agreement between DOE and Sandia National Laboratories management regarding the safe operation of the Gamma Irradiation Facility.

  1. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Tricastin nuclear facility (BCOT) - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the management of the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  2. Safety of DOE nuclear facilities. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, First Session, H.R. 783, H.R. 2047 and H.R. 3123, November 5 and 19, 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1988-01-01

    H.R. 783 is a bill to require the Secretary of Energy to ensure the compliance of certain operations of the Department of Energy (DOE) with Federal environmental standards and for other purposes. H.R. 2047 is a bill to establish a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Agency in order to provide for increased standards of safety with respect to radioactive emissions resulting from activities carried out at nuclear facilities of DOE. H.R. 3123 is a bill to create an independent oversight board to ensure the safety of United States Government nuclear facilities, to apply the provisions of OSHA to certain DOE nuclear facilities, to clarify the jurisdiction and powers of Government agencies dealing with nuclear wastes, to ensure independent research on the effects of radiation on human beings, and for other purposes

  3. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Flamanville nuclear power plant (Manche (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (INB 108 and 109), and 1 PWR under construction (Flamanville 3, INB 167). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, water consumption and waste management at Flamanville 3 construction site) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  4. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Flamanville nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Flamanville nuclear power plant (Manche (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (INB 108 and 109), and 1 PWR under construction (Flamanville 3, INB 167). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, water consumption and waste management at Flamanville 3 construction site) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  5. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Chooz nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Chooz nuclear power plant (Ardennes (FR)): 2 PWR reactors in operation (Chooz B, INB 139 and 144) and one partially dismantled PWR reactor (Chooz A, INB 163). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  6. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff practice and procedure digest: Commission, Appeal Board and Licensing Board decisions, July 1972--December 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-11-01

    This Revision 10 of the fourth edition of the NRC Staff Practice and Procedure Digest contains a digest of a number of Commission, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, and Atomic Safety and licensing Board decisions issued during the period from July 1, 1972 to December 31, 1987 interpreting the NRC's Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2. This Revision 10 replaces in part earlier editions and supplements and includes appropriate changes reflecting the amendments to the Rules of Practice effective through December 31, 1987. The Digest is roughly structured in accordance with the chronological sequence of the nuclear facility licensing process as set forth in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 2. Those decisions which did not fit into that structure are dealt with in a section on ''general matters.'' Where appropriate, particular decisions are indexed under more than one heading. Some topical headings contain no decision citations or discussion

  7. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff practice and procedure digest: Commission, Appeal Board and Licensing Board decisions, July 1972--September 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-07-01

    This Revision 9 of the fourth edition of the NRC Staff Practice and Procedure Digest contains a digest of a number of Commission, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, and Atomic Safety and Licensing Board decisions issued during the period from July 1, 1972 to September 30, 1987 interpreting the NRC's Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2. This Revision 9 replaces in part earlier editions and supplements and includes appropriate changes reflecting the amendments to the Rules of Practice effective through September 30, 1987. The Digest is roughly structured in accordance with the chronological sequence of the nuclear facility licensing process as set forth in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 2. Those decisions which did not fit into that structure are dealt with in a section on ''general matters.'' Where appropriate, particular decisions are indexed under more than one heading. Some topical headings contain no decisions citations or discussion. It is anticipated that future updates to the Digest will utilize these headings

  8. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Belleville-Sur-Loire nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 127 and 128). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  9. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 111 and 112). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  10. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Dampierre-En-Burly nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 84 and 85). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  11. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Nogent-Sur-Seine nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 129 and 130). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  12. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D T

    2010-03-05

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  13. Safety evaluation of the loss of fluid test facility project No. 394

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-05-01

    Assessment of the safety of the LOFT facility and subsequent recommendations have been based on a comparison of the LOFT facility to requirements for commercial power reactors. In this comparison, the many unique features of the LOFT facility were considered including the low power level, the limited operational use as a test reactor, and the remoteness of the site. Based on this assessment, it is concluded, that while the likelihood of an accidental release of fission products may be greater than for a commercial power reactor, the consequences of such a release are reduced by the lower fission product inventory, the remoteness of the site and the capability of evacuating the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and adjacent areas. There is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will not be endangered due to operation of this facility, specifically: The INEL site is acceptable with respect to location, land use, population distribution, controlled access, hydrology, meteorology, geology and seismology. Sufficient engineered safety features have been included to assure that the potential offsite doses are well within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. The LOFT facility has been designed in general accordance with standards, guides and codes which are comparable to those applied to commercial power reactors and any exceptions to these have been based on the unique features of the LOFT facility. Certain matters including the final safety analyses based on detailed component designs, Technical Specifications, LOCE controls and detailed program plan have not been reviewed but we assume will properly be resolved by ERDA, which has the ultimate responsibility for the safety of this facility. Changes to the facility design or program plan such as removal of the fueled Mobile Test Assembly or blowdowns to the containment vessel also will require additional analyses and review. (U.S.)

  14. Safety Assessment for Decommissioning

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-06-15

    In the past few decades, international guidance has been developed on methods for assessing the safety of predisposal and disposal facilities for radioactive waste. More recently, it has been recognized that there is also a need for specific guidance on safety assessment in the context of decommissioning nuclear facilities. The importance of safety during decommissioning was highlighted at the International Conference on Safe Decommissioning for Nuclear Activities held in Berlin in 2002 and at the First Review Meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2003. At its June 2004 meeting, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved the International Action Plan on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities (GOV/2004/40), which called on the IAEA to: ''establish a forum for the sharing and exchange of national information and experience on the application of safety assessment in the context of decommissioning and provide a means to convey this information to other interested parties, also drawing on the work of other international organizations in this area''. In response, in November 2004, the IAEA launched the international project Evaluation and Demonstration of Safety for Decommissioning of Facilities Using Radioactive Material (DeSa) with the following objectives: -To develop a harmonized approach to safety assessment and to define the elements of safety assessment for decommissioning, including the application of a graded approach; -To investigate the practical applicability of the methodology and performance of safety assessments for the decommissioning of various types of facility through a selected number of test cases; -To investigate approaches for the review of safety assessments for decommissioning activities and the development of a regulatory approach for reviewing safety assessments for decommissioning activities and as a basis for regulatory decision making; -To provide a forum

  15. Proceedings of the theme meeting on the journey of BARC Safety Council for strengthening safety culture in BARC facilities: 2000-2017

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jayarajan, K.; Jolly, V.M.

    2017-07-01

    The book has about one hundred articles, written by the regulators and the authorities of the facilities and projects of BARC. The articles are organised into four parts. Part-I gives an overview of the history of safety regulation in BARC and the details of BARC Safety Framework. Part-II of the book has articles about the facilities and projects of BARC, for which BSC had issued of regulatory consents. The facility-specific articles, written by the concerned project/facility authorities, emphasis safety aspects of the facilities and the regulatory processes they had undergone. This part is divided into seven sections, based on the broad category of facility. Experts in the concerned areas have written general articles on each category of facility. The Part-III consists of the work carried out by the specialised committees, which are under the purview of BSC. Some of the other regulatory activities of BSC are summarised in Part-IV of this book. In addition to safety and regulatory activities of BSC, the book contains the details of the major facilities and upcoming projects of BARC. Papers relevant to INIS are indexed separately

  16. Safety analysis of the existing 804 and 845 firing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-01-01

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 804 and 845 Firing Facilities at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, peronnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operation and credible accident that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequence were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives. Since this hazard has the potential for causing significant on-site and minimum off-site consequences, Bunkers 804 and 845 have been classified as moderate hazard facilties per DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at these facilities will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public

  17. Obtaining laser safety at a synchrotron radiation user facility: The Advanced Light Source

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barat, K.

    1996-01-01

    The Advanced Light Source (ALS) is a US national facility for scientific research and development located at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California. The ALS delivers the world's brightest synchrotron radiation in the far ultraviolet and soft X-ray regions of the spectrum. As a user facility it is available to researchers from industry, academia, and laboratories from around the world. Subsequently, a wide range of safety concerns become involved. This article relates not only to synchrotron facilities but to any user facility. A growing number of US centers are attracting organizations and individuals to use the equipment on site, for a fee. This includes synchrotron radiation and/or free electron facilities, specialty research centers, and laser job shops. Personnel coming to such a facility bring with them a broad spectrum of safety cultures. Upon entering, the guests must accommodate to the host facility safety procedures. This article describes a successful method to deal with that responsibility

  18. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt of multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. removal of free water from the MCOs using the cold vacuum drying process, and inerting and testing of the MCOs before transport to the Canister Storage Building. Controls required for public safety, significant defense in depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included

  19. Activity of safety review for the facilities using nuclear material (2). Safety review results and maintenance experiences for hot laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amagai, Tomio; Fujishima, Tadatsune; Mizukoshi, Yasutaka; Sakamoto, Naoki; Ohmori, Tsuyoshi

    2009-01-01

    In the site of O-arai Research and Development Center of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), five hot laboratories for post-irradiation examination and development of plutonium fuels are operated more than 30 years. A safety review method for preventive maintenance on these hot laboratories includes test facilities and devices are established in 2003. After that, the safety review of these facilities and devices are done and taken the necessary maintenance based on the results in each year. In 2008, 372 test facilities and devices in these hot laboratories were checked and reviewed by this method. As a results of the safety review, repair issues of 38 facilities of above 372 facilities were resolved. This report shows the review results and maintenance experiences based on the results. (author)

  20. Safety evaluation report of hot cell facilities for demonstration of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    You, Gil Sung; Choung, W. M.; Ku, J. H.; Cho, I. J.; Kook, D. H.; Park, S. W.; Bek, S. Y.; Lee, E. P.

    2004-10-01

    The advanced spent fuel conditioning process(ACP) proposed to reduce the overall volume of the PWR spent fuel and improve safety and economy of the long-term storage of spent fuel. In the next phase(2004∼2006), the hot test will be carried out for verification of the ACP in a laboratory scale. For the hot test, the hot cell facilities of α- type and auxiliary facilities are required essentially for safe handling of high radioactive materials. As the hot cell facilities for demonstration of the ACP, a existing hot cell of β- type will be refurbished to minimize construction expenditures of hot cell facility. Up to now, the detail design of hot cell facilities and process were completed, and the safety analysis was performed to substantiate secure of conservative safety. The design data were submitted for licensing which was necessary for construction and operation of hot cell facilities. The safety investigation of KINS on hot cell facilities was completed, and the license for construction and operation of hot cell facilities was acquired already from MOST. In this report, the safety analysis report submitted to KINS was summarized. And also, the questionnaires issued from KINS and answers of KAERI in process of safety investigation were described in detail

  1. 76 FR 77561 - Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; In the Matter of Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; (Levy County...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-13

    ...] Atomic Safety and Licensing Board; In the Matter of Progress Energy Florida, Inc.; (Levy County Nuclear....\\1\\ On February 23, 2009, this Board was established to handle the matter and to preside over any... resulting from active and passive dewatering; 2. Impacts resulting from the connection of the site to the...

  2. Spent nuclear fuel project cold vacuum drying facility safety equipment list

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    IRWIN, J.J.

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the safety equipment list (SEL) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF). The SEL was prepared in accordance with the procedure for safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in HNF-PRO-516, ''Safety Structures, Systems, and Components,'' Revision 0 and HNF-PRO-097, Engineering Design and Evaluation, Revision 0. The SEL was developed in conjunction with HNF-SO-SNF-SAR-O02, Safety Analysis Report for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility, Phase 2, Supporting Installation of Processing Systems (Garvin 1998). The SEL identifies the SSCs and their safety functions, the design basis accidents for which they are required to perform, the design criteria, codes and standards, and quality assurance requirements that are required for establishing the safety design basis of the SSCs. This SEL has been developed for the CVDF Phase 2 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and shall be updated, expanded, and revised in accordance with future phases of the CVDF SAR until the CVDF final SAR is approved

  3. Safety aspects of front-end fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srinivasan, G.R.

    2003-01-01

    Safety of fuel cycle facilities (FCFs) other than Nuclear Power Plants is gaining importance all over the nuclear world as one would not like to leave behind any area of nuclear field in the journey toward excellence in the safe conduct of business in the whole of the nuclear industry. Safety should be part of every day activities, procedures, business practices, system and in fact of the people themselves

  4. A security/safety survey of long term care facilities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Acorn, Jonathan R

    2010-01-01

    What are the major security/safety problems of long term care facilities? What steps are being taken by some facilities to mitigate such problems? Answers to these questions can be found in a survey of IAHSS members involved in long term care security conducted for the IAHSS Long Term Care Security Task Force. The survey, the author points out, focuses primarily on long term care facilities operated by hospitals and health systems. However, he believes, it does accurately reflect the security problems most long term facilities face, and presents valuable information on security systems and practices which should be also considered by independent and chain operated facilities.

  5. Computer security at ukrainian nuclear facilities: interface between nuclear safety and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chumak, D.; Klevtsov, O.

    2015-01-01

    Active introduction of information technology, computer instrumentation and control systems (I and C systems) in the nuclear field leads to a greater efficiency and management of technological processes at nuclear facilities. However, this trend brings a number of challenges related to cyber-attacks on the above elements, which violates computer security as well as nuclear safety and security of a nuclear facility. This paper considers regulatory support to computer security at the nuclear facilities in Ukraine. The issue of computer and information security considered in the context of physical protection, because it is an integral component. The paper focuses on the computer security of I and C systems important to nuclear safety. These systems are potentially vulnerable to cyber threats and, in case of cyber-attacks, the potential negative impact on the normal operational processes can lead to a breach of the nuclear facility security. While ensuring nuclear security of I and C systems, it interacts with nuclear safety, therefore, the paper considers an example of an integrated approach to the requirements of nuclear safety and security

  6. Safety analysis and risk assessment of the National Ignition Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brereton, S.; McLouth, L.; Odell, B.

    1996-01-01

    The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is a proposed U.S. Department of Energy inertial confinement laser fusion facility. The candidate sites for locating the NIF are: Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the preferred site. The NIF will operate by focusing 192 laser beams onto a tiny deuterium-tritium target located at the center of a spherical target chamber. The NIF mission is to achieve inertial confinement fusion (ICF) ignition, access physical conditions in matter of interest to nuclear weapons physics, provide an above ground simulation capability for nuclear weapons effects testing, and contribute to the development of inertial fusion for electrical power production. The NIF has been classified as a radiological, low hazard facility on the basis of a preliminary hazards analysis and according to the DOE methodology for facility classification. This requires that a safety analysis be prepared under DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System. A draft Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) has been written, and this will be finalized later in 1996. This paper summarizes the safety issues associated with the operation of the NIF and the methodology used to study them. It provides a summary of the methodology, an overview of the hazards, estimates maximum routine and accidental exposures for the preferred site of LLNL, and concludes that the risks from NIF operations are low

  7. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear power plant (INB 111 and 112, Ardeche (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  8. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Cruas-Meysse nuclear power plant (INB 111 and 112, Ardeche (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  9. Refinement of boards' role required.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Umbdenstock, R J

    1987-01-01

    The governing board's role in health care is not changing, but new competitive forces necessitate a refinement of the board's approach to fulfilling its role. In a free-standing, community, not-for-profit hospital, the board functions as though it were the "owner." Although it does not truly own the facility in the legal sense, the board does have legal, fiduciary, and financial responsibilities conferred on it by the state. In a religious-sponsored facility, the board fulfills these same obligations on behalf of the sponsoring institute, subject to the institute's reserved powers. In multi-institutional systems, the hospital board's power and authority depend on the role granted it by the system. Boards in all types of facilities are currently faced with the following challenges: Fulfilling their basic responsibilities, such as legal requirements, financial duties, and obligations for the quality of care. Encouraging management and the board itself to "think strategically" in attacking new competitive market forces while protecting the organization's traditional mission and values. Assessing recommended strategies in light of consequences if constituencies think the organization is abandoning its commitments. Boards can take several steps to match their mode of operation with the challenges of the new environment. Boards must rededicate themselves to the hospital's mission. Trustees must expand their understanding of health care trends and issues and their effect on the organization. Boards must evaluate and help strengthen management's performance, rather than acting as a "watchdog" in an adversarial position. Boards must think strategically, rather than focusing solely on operational details. Boards must evaluate the methods they use for conducting business.

  10. Safety problems with abandoned explosive facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courtright, W.C.

    1969-01-01

    Procedures were developed for the safe removal of explosive and radioactive contaminated materials structures and drains from abandoned sites, including explosives processing and service buildings with a goal to return the entire area to its natural state and to permit public access. The safety problems encountered in the cleanup and their solutions are applicable to modification and maintenance work in operating explosive facilities. (U.S.)

  11. Safety Culture: Lessons Learned from the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations Board

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Griffon, M.

    2016-01-01

    The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigation of the 2005 BP Texas City Refinery disaster as well as the Baker Panel Report have set the stage for the consideration of human and organizational factors and safety culture as contributing causes of major accidents in the oil and gas industry. The investigation of the BP Texas City tragedy in many ways started a shift in the way the oil and chemical industry sectors looked at process safety and the importance of human and organizational factors in improving safety. Since the BP Texas City incident the CSB has investigated several incidents, including the 2010 Macondo disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, where organizational factors and safety culture, once again, were contributing causes of the incidents. In the Texas City incident the CSB found that “while most attention was focused on the injury rate, the overall safety culture and process safety management (PSM) program had serious deficiencies.” The CSB concluded that “safety campaigns, goals, and rewards focused on improving personal safety metrics and worker behaviors rather than on process safety and management safety systems.” The Baker panel, established as a result of a CSB recommendation, did a more extensive review of BPs safety culture. The Baker panel found that ‘while BP has aspirational goals of “no accidents, no harm to people” BP has not provided effective leadership in making certain it’s management and US refining workforce understand what is expected of them regarding process safety performance.’ This may have been in part due to a misinterpretation of positive trends in personal injury rates as an indicator of effective process safety. The panel also found that “at some of its US refineries BP has not established a positive, trusting and open environment with effective lines of communication between management and the workforce, including employee representatives.” In 2010 when the CSB began to

  12. The State Surveillance over Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Facilities Act No. 28/1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Act lays down responsibilities of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission in the field of state surveillance over nuclear safety of nuclear facilities; determines the responsibilities of nuclear safety inspectors in their inspection activities; specifies duties of bodies and corporations responsible for nuclear safety of nuclear facilities; stipulates the obligation to set up emergency plans; and specifies penalties imposed on corporations and individuals for noncompliance with nuclear safety provisions. The Act entered into force on 4 April 1984. (J.B.)

  13. Physics design of fast reactor safety test facilities for in-pile experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Travelli, A.; Matos, J.E.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Shaftman, D.H.; Tzanos, C.P.; Lam, S.K.; Pennington, E.M.; Woodruff, W.L.

    1976-01-01

    A determined effort to identify and resolve current Fast Breeder Reactor safety testing needs has recently resulted in a number of conceptual designs for FBR safety test facilities which are very complex and diverse both in their features and in their purpose. The paper discusses the physics foundations common to most fast reactor safety test facilities and the constraints which they impose on the design. The logical evolution, features, and capabilities of several major conceptual designs are discussed on the basis of this common background

  14. OECD/NEA WGFCS Workshop: Safety Assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities - Regulatory Approaches and Industry Perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear fuel is produced, processed, and stored mainly in industrial-scale facilities. Uranium ores are processed and refined to produce a pure uranium salt stream, Uranium is converted and enriched, nuclear fuel is fabricated (U fuel and U/Pu fuel for the closed cycle option); and spent fuel is stored and reprocessed in some countries (close cycle option). Facilities dedicated to the research and development of new fuel or new processes are also considered as Fuel Cycle Facilities. The safety assessment of nuclear facilities has often been led by the methodology and techniques initially developed for Nuclear Power Plants. As FCFs cover a wide diversity of installations the various approaches of national regulators, and their technical support organizations, for the Safety Assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities are also diverse, as are the approaches by their industries in providing safety justifications for their facilities. The objective of the Working Group on Fuel Cycle Safety is to advance the understanding for both regulators and operators of relevant aspects of nuclear fuel cycle safety in member countries. A large amount of experience is available in safety assessment of FCFs, which should be shared to develop ideas in this field. To contribute to this task, the Workshop on 'Safety Assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities - Regulatory Approaches and Industry Perspectives' was held in Toronto, on 27 - 29 September 2011. The workshop was hosted by Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. The current proceedings provide summary of the results of the workshop with the text of the papers given and presentations made

  15. 76 FR 37375 - Meeting of the Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-27

    ... INFORMATION: The Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board carries out those advisory functions... who wish to participate must register at least seven (7) days in advance of the meeting/conference... registration. Anyone requiring special accommodations should contact Mr. Joy at least seven (7) days in advance...

  16. Improvement of safety approach for accident during operation of LILW disposal facility: Application for operational safety assessment of the near-surface LILW disposal facility in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Hyun Joo; Kim, Min Seong; Park, Jin Beak [Korea Radioactive Waste Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-06-15

    To evaluate radiological impact from the operation of a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility, a logical presentation and explanation of expected accidental scenarios is essential to the stakeholders of the disposal facility. The logical assessment platform and procedure, including analysis of the safety function of disposal components, operational hazard analysis, operational risk analysis, and preparedness of remedial measures for operational safety, are improved in this study. In the operational risk analysis, both design measures and management measures are suggested to make it possible to connect among design, operation, and safety assessment within the same assessment platform. For the preparedness of logical assessment procedure, classifcation logic of an operational accident is suggested based on the probability of occurrence and consequences of assessment results. The improved assessment platform and procedure are applied to an operational accident analysis of the Korean low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility and partly presented in this paper.

  17. Improvement of safety approach for accident during operation of LILW disposal facility: Application for operational safety assessment of the near-surface LILW disposal facility in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyun Joo; Kim, Min Seong; Park, Jin Beak

    2017-01-01

    To evaluate radiological impact from the operation of a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility, a logical presentation and explanation of expected accidental scenarios is essential to the stakeholders of the disposal facility. The logical assessment platform and procedure, including analysis of the safety function of disposal components, operational hazard analysis, operational risk analysis, and preparedness of remedial measures for operational safety, are improved in this study. In the operational risk analysis, both design measures and management measures are suggested to make it possible to connect among design, operation, and safety assessment within the same assessment platform. For the preparedness of logical assessment procedure, classifcation logic of an operational accident is suggested based on the probability of occurrence and consequences of assessment results. The improved assessment platform and procedure are applied to an operational accident analysis of the Korean low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility and partly presented in this paper

  18. Regulatory inspection of nuclear facilities and enforcement by the regulatory body. Safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations for regulatory bodies on the inspection of nuclear facilities, regulatory enforcement and related matters. The objective is to provide the regulatory body with a high level of confidence that operators have the processes in place to ensure compliance and that they do comply with legal requirements, including meeting the safety objectives and requirements of the regulatory body. However, in the event of non-compliance, the regulatory body should take appropriate enforcement action. This Safety Guide covers regulatory inspection and enforcement in relation to nuclear facilities such as: enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants; nuclear power plants; other reactors such as research reactors and critical assemblies; spent fuel reprocessing plants; and facilities for radioactive waste management, such as treatment, storage and disposal facilities. This Safety Guide also covers issues relating to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, the closure of waste disposal facilities and site rehabilitation. Section 2 sets out the objectives of regulatory inspection and enforcement. Section 3 covers the management of regulatory inspections. Section 4 covers the performance of regulatory inspections, including internal guidance, planning and preparation, methods of inspection and reports of inspections. Section 5 deals with regulatory enforcement actions. Section 6 covers the assessment of regulatory inspections and enforcement activities. The Appendix provides further details on inspection areas for nuclear facilities

  19. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

    CERN Document Server

    Covey, L I

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

  20. Patients overwhelmingly prefer inpatient boarding to emergency department boarding.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Viccellio, Peter; Zito, Joseph A; Sayage, Valerie; Chohan, Jasmine; Garra, Gregory; Santora, Carolyn; Singer, Adam J

    2013-12-01

    Boarding of admitted patients in the emergency department (ED) is a major cause of crowding. One alternative to boarding in the ED, a full-capacity protocol where boarded patients are redeployed to inpatient units, can reduce crowding and improve overall flow. Our aim was to compare patient satisfaction with boarding in the ED vs. inpatient hallways. We performed a structured telephone survey regarding patient experiences and preferences for boarding among admitted ED patients who experienced boarding in the ED hallway and then were subsequently transferred to inpatient hallways. Demographic and clinical characteristics, as well as patient preferences, including items related to patient comfort and safety using a 5-point scale, were recorded and descriptive statistics were used to summarize the data. Of 110 patients contacted, 105 consented to participate. Mean age was 57 ± 16 years and 52% were female. All patients were initially boarded in the ED in a hallway before their transfer to an inpatient hallway bed. The overall preferred location after admission was the inpatient hallway in 85% (95% confidence interval 75-90) of respondents. In comparing ED vs. inpatient hallway boarding, the following percentages of respondents preferred inpatient boarding with regard to the following 8 items: rest, 85%; safety, 83%; confidentiality, 82%; treatment, 78%; comfort, 79%; quiet, 84%; staff availability, 84%; and privacy, 84%. For no item was there a preference for boarding in the ED. Patients overwhelmingly preferred the inpatient hallway rather than the ED hallway when admitted to the hospital. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  1. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste from Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Specific Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides guidance on the predisposal management of all types of radioactive waste (including spent nuclear fuel declared as waste and high level waste) generated at nuclear fuel cycle facilities. These waste management facilities may be located within larger facilities or may be separate, dedicated waste management facilities (including centralized waste management facilities). The Safety Guide covers all stages in the lifetime of these facilities, including their siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, and shutdown and decommissioning. It covers all steps carried out in the management of radioactive waste following its generation up to (but not including) disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning). Radioactive waste generated both during normal operation and in accident conditions is considered

  2. Technical safety requirements for the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility (ACRRF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boldt, K.R.; Morris, F.M.; Talley, D.G.; McCrory, F.M.

    1998-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document is prepared and issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements. The bases for the TSR are established in the ACRRF Safety Analysis Report issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The TSR identifies the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the facility

  3. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Belleville-sur-Loire nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 127 and 128). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  4. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Belleville-sur-Loire nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 127 and 128). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  5. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 84 and 85). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  6. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of Saint-Alban Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 119 and 120). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  7. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 129 and 130). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  8. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 84 and 85). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  9. Design of concrete structures important to safety of nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-10-01

    Civil engineering structures in nuclear installations form an important feature having implications to safety performance of these installations. The objective and minimum requirements for the design of civil engineering buildings/structures to be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety of nuclear installations in India (such as pressurised heavy water reactor and related systems) are specified in the Safety standard for civil engineering structures important to safety of nuclear facilities. This standard is written by AERB to specify guidelines for implementation of the above civil engineering safety standard in the design of concrete structures important to safety

  10. Safety report for Central Interim Storage facility for radioactive waste from small producers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zeleznik, N.; Mele, I.

    2004-01-01

    In 1999 the Agency for Radwaste Management took over the management of the Central Interim Storage (CIS) in Brinje, intended only for radioactive waste from industrial, medical and research applications. With the transfer of the responsibilities for the storage operation, ARAO, the new operator of the facility, received also the request from the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration for refurbishment and reconstruction of the storage and for preparation of the safety report for the storage with the operational conditions and limitations. In order to fulfill these requirements ARAO first thoroughly reviewed the existing documentation on the facility, the facility itself and the stored inventory. Based on the findings of this review ARAO prepared several basic documents for improvement of the current conditions in the storage facility. In October 2000 the Plan for refurbishment and modernization of the CIS was prepared, providing an integral approach towards remediation and refurbishment of the facility, optimization of the inventory arrangement and modernization of the storage and storing utilization. In October 2001 project documentation for renewal of electric installations, water supply and sewage system, ventilation system, the improvements of the fire protection and remediation of minor defects discovered in building were completed according to the Act on Construction. In July 2003 the safety report was prepared, based on the facility status after the completion of the reconstruction works. It takes into account all improvements and changes introduced by the refurbishment and reconstruction of the facility according to project documentation. Besides the basic characteristics of the location and its surrounding, it also gives the technical description of the facility together with proposed solutions for the renewal of electric installations, renovation of water supply and sewage system, refurbishment of the ventilation system, the improvement of fire

  11. Seismic safety of the LLL plutonium facility (Building 332)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Torkarz, F.J.; Shaw, G.

    1980-01-01

    This report states the basis for the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's assurance to the public that the plutonium operations at the Laboratory pose essentially no risk to anyone's health or safety, either under normal circumstances or in the event of an earthquake or a fire. The report is intended for a general audience, and so for the most part it is not highly technical. It summarizes the steps taken to ensure the seismic safety of the plutonium facility (Bldg. 332). It describes plutonium and its potential hazard and how the facility copes with that hazard. It recounts the geologic investigations and interpretations that led to the design-basis earthquake (DBE) for the Livermore site, and presents a summary analysis of the facility structure in relation to the DBE. An appendix presents a quantitative calculation of the health risk to the public associated with the worst-case hypothetical fire. The document supports the conclusions that the facility will continue to function safely after the maximum earthquake ground motion to which it may be subjected and that there is no evidence of a potential for surface offset under it

  12. Integration of radiation and physical safety in large radiator facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lima, P.P.M.; Benedito, A.M.; Lima, C.M.A.; Silva, F.C.A. da

    2017-01-01

    Growing international concern about radioactive sources after the Sept. 11, 2001 event has led to a strengthening of physical safety. There is evidence that the illicit use of radioactive sources is a real possibility and may result in harmful radiological consequences for the population and the environment. In Brazil there are about 2000 medical, industrial and research facilities with radioactive sources, of which 400 are Category 1 and 2 classified by the - International Atomic Energy Agency - AIEA, where large irradiators occupy a prominent position due to the very high cobalt-60 activities. The radiological safety is well established in these facilities, due to the intense work of the authorities in the Country. In the paper the main aspects on radiological and physical safety applied in the large radiators are presented, in order to integrate both concepts for the benefit of the safety as a whole. The research showed that the items related to radiation safety are well defined, for example, the tests on the access control devices to the irradiation room. On the other hand, items related to physical security, such as effective control of access to the company, use of safety cameras throughout the company, are not yet fully incorporated. Integration of radiation and physical safety is fundamental for total safety. The elaboration of a Brazilian regulation on the subject is of extreme importance

  13. 75 FR 30859 - Meeting of the Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-02

    ... INFORMATION: The Public Safety Officer Medal of Valor Review Board carries out those advisory functions... participate must register at least seven (7) days in advance of the meeting/conference call by contacting Mr.... Anyone requiring special accommodations should contact Mr. Joy at least seven (7) days in advance of the...

  14. Waste minimization at a plutonium processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1995-01-01

    As part of Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) mission to reduce the nuclear danger throughout the world, the plutonium processing facility at LANL maintains expertise and skills in nuclear weapons technologies as well as leadership in all peaceful applications of plutonium technologies, including fuel fabrication for terrestrial and space reactors and heat sources and thermoelectric generators for space missions. Another near-term challenge resulted from two safety assessments performed by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the U.S. Department of Energy during the past two years. These assessments have necessitated the processing and stabilization of plutonium contained in tons of residues so that they can be stored safely for an indefinite period. This report describes waste streams and approaches to waste reduction of plutonium management

  15. Excerpts from the introductory statement. IAEA Board of Governors. Vienna, 19 March 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2000-01-01

    In his introductory statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, the IAEA Director General gave an overview of the Agency's activities regarding technological issues in nuclear power and non-power applications; safety issues related to nuclear power plants and research reactors; decommissioning of nuclear facilities; safety of radiation sources; and marine transport of radioactive materials. Further in the document he gives a brief description of the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear verification; Agency's participation in a field mission to Kosovo on environmental assessment of the consequences of the use of depleted uranium in ammunition; safety standards discussions with ICAO

  16. Administrative Arrangement between the Atomic Control Board of Canada and le Service central de surete des installations nucleaires du Ministere de l'Industrie et de l'Amenagement du Territoire de la Republique francaise for the Exchange of Technical Information and Cooperation in the Regulation of Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    This Arrangement between the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada (AECB) and the French Central Service for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (SCSIN) entered into force on the date of its signature and will remain in effect for five years. The Arrangement provides for the exchange of information between both agencies on the regulation of nuclear facilities and intervention measures in cases of emergency. This includes information on regulatory procedures for the safety of designated nuclear facilities, notification of important events, such as serious operating incidents, reactor shutdowns ordered by the regulatory authorities, etc. (NEA) [fr

  17. Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armstrong, D.L.

    1994-08-01

    This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment

  18. Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Project W-296) Safety Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Armstrong, D.L.

    1994-08-01

    This Safety Assessment is based on information derived from the Conceptual Design Report for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (DOE/RL 1994) and ancillary documentation developed during the conceptual design phase of Project W-296. The Safety Assessment has been prepared to support the Solid Waste Burial Ground Interim Safety Basis document. The purpose of the Safety Assessment is to provide an evaluation of the design to determine if the process, as proposed, will comply with US Department of Energy (DOE) Limits for radioactive and hazardous material exposures and be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint. The evaluation considered affects on the worker, onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

  19. Boarding school rules.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Griffiths, Matt

    2017-01-04

    Ofsted inspects and regulates services that care for children and young people, including boarding facilities. Medication management is an integral part of caring for children in boarding schools, and robust systems must be in place to pass inspection. These systems must cover how medicines are dispensed, administered and stored at the facility, risk assessments, identifying which pupils can manage their own medicines and the individual health needs of boarders, so that care plans can be put in place for children with specific needs.

  20. Radiological and the other safety aspects in the operation of electron beam facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Loterina, Roel Alamares

    2003-01-01

    The radiological safety aspects of the operation of an electron beam facility in general and the 3 MeV ALURTRON electron beam facility of the Malaysian Institute of Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) in particular were reviewed and evaluated. Evaluation was made based on existing records as well as actual monitoring around facility. Area monitoring results using TLDs are within permissible levels. The maximum reading of 7.29 mSv measured in year 2000 is very low as compared to the annual dose limit of 50 mSv/year. In general, the shielding for the installation is adequate and no significant radiation leakage were detected based on radiation survey results. However, measured radiation levels with a maximum of 1.9 mSv/h at the sampling ports easily exceed the limit of 25μSv/h. The facility is equipped with safety features, such as interlocked system, adequate shielding, engineered safety design of irradiation and accelerator rooms, and accessories such as conveyor system and product handling system. Warning lights and signals are adequately installed around the facility. Other identified hazards that may affect the operator, workers, and personnel were also evaluated based on previous records of monitoring. The ozone concentration levels with a maximum reading of 0.05 ppm measured in the environment of the facility are within the threshold limit value of 0.1 ppm. The measured noise levels at all locations around facility are generally below the maximum permissible level of 80dB. The ALURTRON has achieved a minimum safety requirement to warrant its full operation without relying on administrative controls and procedures to ensure safety in operation. (Auth.)

  1. Risk management for existing energy facilities. A global approach to numerical safety goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pate-Cornell, M.E.

    1993-01-01

    This paper presents a structured set of numerical safety goals for risk management of existing energy facilities. The rationale behind these safety goals is based on principles of equity and economic efficiency. Some of the issues involved when using probabilistic risk analyses results for safety decisions are discussed. A brief review of existing safety targets and open-quotes floating numbersclose quotes is presented, and a set of safety goals for industrial risk management is proposed. Relaxation of these standards for existing facilities, the relevance of the lifetime of the plant, the treatment of uncertainties, and problems of failure dependencies are discussed briefly. 17 refs., 1 fig

  2. Safety research experiment facilities, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho. Final environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liverman, J.L.

    1977-09-01

    This environmental statement was prepared for the Safety Research Experiment Facilities (SAREF) Project. The purpose of the proposed project is to modify some existing facilities and provide a new test facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for conducting fast breeder reactor (FBR) safety experiments. The SAREF Project proposal has been developed after an extensive study which identified the FBR safety research needs requiring in-reactor experiments and which evaluated the capability of various existing and new facilities to meet these needs. The proposed facilities provide for the in-reactor testing of large bundles of prototypical FBR fuel elements under a wide variety of conditions, ranging from those abnormal operating conditions which might be expected to occur during the life of an FBR power plant to the extremely low probability, hypothetical accidents used in the evaluation of some design options and in the assessment of the long-term potential risk associated with wide-acale deployment of the FBR

  3. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Tricastin operational hot base nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions

  4. The role and structure of the Atomic Energy Control Board

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamel, P.E.

    1981-04-01

    The Atomic Energy Control Board is responsible for the control and supervision of the application and use of nuclear materials and the operation of nuclear facilities to ensure that the health and safety of people are protected and that the nuclear materials and equipment are used only in accordance with the government non-proliferation policy. Requirements for control and supervision are made into regulations subject to approval by the Governor in Council. They are applied through a comprehensive licensing system. The interpretation and implementation of the regulations are contained in a series of regulatory documents published from time to time by the Board. The functional organization of staff that assist the Board for the administration, the assessment and issuance of licenses, compliance and inspection, as well as for the management of the regulatory research program is described. (author) [fr

  5. The Atomic Energy Control Board requirements for the radioisotope licensing of a radiopharmaceutical facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kennedy, P.

    1980-01-01

    Items that must be addressed by an applicant for a radioisotope license in Canada are described. Site, design and operating conditions, safety assessment, organization, emergency procedures and operating policies and procedures must be described to the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), in support of any license application. All information submitted in support of the application is subject to AECB's policy on public access to that information. (OT)

  6. Developing guidance in the nuclear criticality safety assessment for fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Galet, C.; Evo, S.

    2012-01-01

    In this poster IRSN (Institute for radiation protection and nuclear safety) presents its safety guides whose purpose is to transmit the safety assessment know-how to any 'junior' staff or even to give a view of the safety approach on the overall risks to any staff member. IRSN has written a first version of such a safety guide for fuel cycle facilities and laboratories. It is organized into several chapters: some refer to types of assessments, others concern the types of risks. Currently, this guide contains 13 chapters and each chapter consists of three parts. In parallel to the development of criticality chapter of this guide, the IRSN criticality department has developed a nuclear criticality safety guide. It follows the structure of the three parts fore-mentioned, but it presents a more detailed first part and integrates, in the third part, the experience feedback collected on nuclear facilities. The nuclear criticality safety guide is online on the IRSN's web site

  7. ASAM - The international programme on application of safety assessment methodologies for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Batandjieva, B.

    2002-01-01

    The IAEA has launched a new Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) on Application of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Waste Disposal Facilities (ASAM). The CRP will focus on the practical application of the safety assessment methodology, developed under the ISAM programme, for different purposes, such as developing design concepts, licensing, upgrading existing repositories, reassessment of operating disposal facilities. The overall aim of the programme is to assist safety assessors, regulators and other specialists involved in the development and review of safety assessment for near surface disposal facilities in order to achieve transparent, traceable and defendable evaluation of safety of these facilities. (author)

  8. Safety Research Experiment Facilities, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho. Draft environmental statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    This environmental statement was prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) in support of the Energy Research and Development Administration's (ERDA) proposal for legislative authorization and appropriations for the Safety Research Experiment Facilities (SAREF) Project. The purpose of the proposed project is to modify some existing facilities and provide a new test facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for conducting fast breeder reactor (FBR) safety experiments. The SAREF Project proposal has been developed after an extensive study which identified the FBR safety research needs requiring in-reactor experiments and which evaluated the capability of various existing and new facilities to meet these needs. The proposed facilities provide for the in-reactor testing of large bundles of prototypical FBR fuel elements under a wide variety of conditions, ranging from those abnormal operating conditions which might be expected to occur during the life of an FBR power plant to the extremely low probability, hypothetical accidents used in the evalution of some design options and in the assessment of the long-term potential risk associated with wide-scale deployment of the FBR

  9. 77 FR 71454 - Notice of Atomic Safety And Licensing Board Reconstitution, Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-11-30

    ... accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule. See 10 CFR 2.302 et seq. Issued at Rockville, Maryland this 16th day of November 2012. E. Roy Hawkens, Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel...

  10. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear power plant (INB 129 and 130, Aube (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  11. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear power plant (INB 84 and 85, Loiret, 45 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  12. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Dampierre-en-Burly nuclear power plant (INB 84 and 85, Loiret, 45 (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  13. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Nogent-sur-Seine nuclear power plant (INB 129 and 130, Aube (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  14. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Belleville-sur-Loire nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Belleville-sur-Loire nuclear power plant (INB no. 127 - Belleville 1 and no. 128 - Belleville 2, Belleville-sur-Loire and Sury-pres-Lere - Cher (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  15. Capsule safety analysis of PRTF irradiation facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suwarto

    2013-01-01

    Power Ramp Test Facility (PRTF) is an irradiation facility used for fuel testing of power reactor. PRTF has a capsule which is a test fuel rod container. During operation, pressurized water of 160 bars flows through in the capsule. Due to the high pressure it should be analyzed the impact of the capsule on reactor core safety. This analysis has purpose to calculate the ability of capsule pressure capacity. The analysis was carried out by calculating pressure capacity. From the calculating results it can be concluded that the capsule with pressure capacity of 438 bars will be safe to prevent the operation pressure of PRTF. (author)

  16. The advanced neutron source facility: Safety philosophy and studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greene, S.R.; Harrington, R.M.

    1988-01-01

    The Advanced Neutron Source (ANS) is currently the only new civilian nuclear reactor facility proposed for construction in the United States. Even though the thermal power of this research-oriented reactor is a relatively low 300 MW, the design will undoubtedly receive intense scrutiny before construction is allowed to proceed. Safety studies are already under way to ensure that the maximum degree of safety in incorporated into the design and that the design is acceptable to the Department of Energy (DOE) and can meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. This document discusses these safety studies

  17. Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S.

    1995-05-01

    This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities

  18. Management concepts and safety applications for nuclear fuel facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eisner, H.; Scotti, R.S. [George Washington Univ., Washington, DC (United States). School of Engineering and Applied Science; Delicate, W.S. [KEVRIC Co., Inc., Silver Spring, MD (United States)

    1995-05-01

    This report presents an overview of effectiveness of management control of safety. It reviews several modern management control theories as well as the general functions of management and relates them to safety issues at the corporate and at the process safety management (PSM) program level. Following these discussions, structured technique for assessing management of the safety function is suggested. Seven modern management control theories are summarized, including business process reengineering, the learning organization, capability maturity, total quality management, quality assurance and control, reliability centered maintenance, and industrial process safety. Each of these theories is examined for-its principal characteristics and implications for safety management. The five general management functions of planning, organizing, directing, monitoring, and integrating, which together provide control over all company operations, are discussed. Under the broad categories of Safety Culture, Leadership and Commitment, and Operating Excellence, key corporate safety elements and their subelements are examined. The three categories under which PSM program-level safety issues are described are Technology, Personnel, and Facilities.

  19. A proactive method for safety management in nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grecco, Claudio Henrique dos Santos; Carvalho, Paulo Victor Rodrigues de; Santos, Isaac Antonio Luquetti dos

    2014-01-01

    Due to the modern approach to address the safety of nuclear facilities which highlights that these organizations must be able to assess and proactively manage their activities becomes increasingly important the need for instruments to evaluate working conditions. In this context, this work presents a proactive method of managing organizational safety, which has three innovative features: 1) the use of predictive indicators that provide current information on the performance of activities, allowing preventive actions and not just reactive in safety management, different from safety indicators traditionally used (reactive indicators) that are obtained after the occurrence of undesired events; 2) the adoption of resilience engineering approach in the development of indicators - indicators are based on six principles of resilience engineering: top management commitment, learning, flexibility, awareness, culture of justice and preparation for the problems; 3) the adoption of the concepts and properties of fuzzy set theory to deal with subjectivity and consistency of human trials in the evaluation of the indicators. The fuzzy theory is used primarily to map qualitative models of decision-making, and inaccurate representation methods. The results of this study aim an improvement in performance and safety in organizations. The method was applied in a radiopharmaceutical shipping sector of a nuclear facility. The results showed that the method is a good monitoring tool objectively and proactively of the working conditions of an organizational domain

  20. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  1. Safety analysis of the Los Alamos critical experiments facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paxton, H.C.

    1975-10-01

    The safety of Pajarito Site critical assembly operations depends upon protection built into the facility, upon knowledgeable personnel, and upon good practice as defined by operating procedures and experimental plans. Distance, supplemented by shielding in some cases, would protect personnel against an extreme accident generating 10 19 fissions. During the facility's 28-year history, the direct cost of criticality accidents has translated to a risk of less than $200 per year

  2. National Ignition Facility Project Site Safety Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dun, C

    2003-01-01

    This Safety Program for the National Ignition Facility (NIF) presents safety protocols and requirements that management and workers shall follow to assure a safe and healthful work environment during activities performed on the NIF Project site. The NIF Project Site Safety Program (NPSSP) requires that activities at the NIF Project site be performed in accordance with the ''LLNL ES and H Manual'' and the augmented set of controls and processes described in this NIF Project Site Safety Program. Specifically, this document: (1) Defines the fundamental NIF site safety philosophy. (2) Defines the areas covered by this safety program (see Appendix B). (3) Identifies management roles and responsibilities. (4) Defines core safety management processes. (5) Identifies NIF site-specific safety requirements. This NPSSP sets forth the responsibilities, requirements, rules, policies, and regulations for workers involved in work activities performed on the NIF Project site. Workers are required to implement measures to create a universal awareness that promotes safe practice at the work site and will achieve NIF management objectives in preventing accidents and illnesses. ES and H requirements are consistent with the ''LLNL ES and H Manual''. This NPSSP and implementing procedures (e.g., Management Walkabout, special work procedures, etc.,) are a comprehensive safety program that applies to NIF workers on the NIF Project site. The NIF Project site includes the B581/B681 site and support areas shown in Appendix B

  3. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  4. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning

  5. Risk-informed approaches to assess ecological safety of facilities with radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vashchenko, V.N.; Zlochevskij, V.V.; Skalozubov, V.I.

    2011-01-01

    Ingenious risk-informed methods to assess ecological safety of facilities with radioactive waste are proposed in the paper. Probabilistic norms on lethal outcomes and reliability of safety barriers are used as safety criteria. Based on the probability measures, it is established that ecological safety conditions are met for the standard criterion of lethal outcomes

  6. Safety analysis of IFR fuel processing in the Argonne National Laboratory Fuel Cycle Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Charak, I; Pedersen, D.R.; Forrester, R.J.; Phipps, R.D.

    1993-01-01

    The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) concept developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) includes on-site processing and recycling of discharged core and blanket fuel materials. The process is being demonstrated in the Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) at ANL's Idaho site. This paper describes the safety analyses that were performed in support of the FCF program; the resulting safety analysis report was the vehicle used to secure authorization to operate the facility and carry out the program, which is now under way. This work also provided some insights into safety-related issues of a commercial IFR fuel processing facility. These are also discussed

  7. Department of Nuclear Safety Research and Nuclear Facilities annual report 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Floto, H.; Jacobsen, U.; Oelgaard, P.L.

    1996-03-01

    The report presents a summary of the work of the Department of Nuclear Safety Research and Nuclear Facilities in 1995. The department's research and development activities are organized in three research programmes: Radiation Protection, Reactor Safety, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the Research Reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the Educational Reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff's participation in national and international committees. (au) 5 tabs., 21 ills

  8. Department of Nuclear Safety Research and Nuclear Facilities annual report 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majborn, B.; Brodersen, K.; Damkjaer, A.; Floto, H.; Jacobsen, U.; Oelgaard, P.L. [eds.

    1996-03-01

    The report presents a summary of the work of the Department of Nuclear Safety Research and Nuclear Facilities in 1995. The department`s research and development activities are organized in three research programmes: Radiation Protection, Reactor Safety, and Radioanalytical Chemistry. The nuclear facilities operated by the department include the Research Reactor DR3, the Isotope Laboratory, the Waste Treatment Plant, and the Educational Reactor DR1. Lists of staff and publications are included together with a summary of the staff`s participation in national and international committees. (au) 5 tabs., 21 ills.

  9. Life time estimation of SSCs for decommissioning safety of nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Kwan-Seong; Lee, Kune-Woo; Moon, Jei-Kwon; Jeong, Seong-Young; Lee, Jung-Jun; Kim, Geun-Ho; Choi, Byung-Seon

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► This paper suggests the expectation algorithm of SSCs life time for decommissioning safety of nuclear facilities. ► The life time of SSCs can be estimated by using fuzzy theory. ► The estimated results depend on the membership functions and performance characteristic functions. - Abstract: This paper suggests the estimation algorithm for life time of structure, system and components (SSCs) for decommissioning safety of nuclear facilities using the performance data of linguistic languages and fuzzy theory. The fuzzy estimation algorithm of life time can be easily applicable but the estimated results depend on the relevant membership functions and performance characteristic functions. This method will be expected to be very useful for maintenance and decommissioning of nuclear facilities’ SSCs as a safety assessment tool.

  10. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the CNPE EDF nuclear facilities of Tricastin - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Tricastin nuclear power plant (INB 87 and 88, Saint-Paul-Trois-Chateaux, Drome (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  11. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Alban-Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Saint-Alban-Saint-Maurice nuclear power plant (INB 119 and 120, Isere (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  12. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Alban-Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Saint-Alban-Saint-Maurice nuclear power plant (INB 119 and 120, Isere (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  13. Safety analysis report upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pan, P.Y.

    1993-01-01

    Plutonium research and development activities have resided at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since 1943. The function of the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) has been to perform basic special nuclear materials research and development and to support national defense and energy programs. The original Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for PF-4 was approved by DOE in 1978. This FSAR analyzed design-basis and bounding accidents. In 1986, DOE/AL published DOE/AL Order 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System'', as a requirement for preparation and review of safety analyses. To meet the new DOE requirements, the Facilities Management Group of the Nuclear Material Technology Division submitted a draft FSAR to DOE for approval in April 1991. This draft FSAR analyzed the new configurations and used a limited-scope probabilistic risk analysis for accident analysis. During the DOE review of the draft FSAR, DOE Order 5480.23 ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports'', was promulgated and was later officially released in April 1992. The new order significantly expands the scope, preparation, and maintenance efforts beyond those required in DOE/AL Order 5481.1B by requiring: description of institutional and human-factor safety programs; clear definitions of all facility-specific safety commitments; more comprehensive and detailed hazard assessment; use of new safety analysis methods; and annual updates of FSARs. This paper describes the safety analysis report (SAR) upgrade program at the Plutonium Facility in LANL. The SAR upgrade program is established to meet the requirements in DOE Order 5480.23. Described in this paper are the SAR background, authorization basis for operations, hazard classification, and technical program elements

  14. Comprehensive safety cases for radioactive waste management facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woollam, P.B.; Cameron, H.M.; Davies, A.R.; Hiscox, A.W.

    1995-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment methodology has been applied by Nuclear Electric plc (NE) to the development of comprehensive safety cases for the radioactive waste management processing and accumulation facilities associated with its 26 reactor systems. This paper describes the methodology and the safety case assessment criteria employed by NE. An overview of the results is presented, together with more detail of a specific safety analysis: storage of fuel element debris. No risk to the public greater than 10 -6 /y has been identified and the more significant risks arise from the potential for radioactive waste fires. There are no unacceptable risks from external hazards such as flooding, aircrash or seismic events. Some operations previously expected to have significant risks in fact have negligible risks, while the few faults with risks exceeding the assessment criteria were only identified as a result of this study

  15. Documents pertaining to safety control of nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) controls the safety of nuclear facilities in Finland. This control encompasses on one hand the evaluation of plant safety on the basis of plans and analyses pertaining to the plant and on the other hand the inspection of plant structures, systems and components as well as of operational activity. STUK also monitors plants operational experience feedback and technical developments in the field, as well as the development of safety research and takes the necessary measures on their basis. Guide YVL 1.1 describes how STUK controls the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The documents to be submitted to STUK are described in the nuclear energy legislation and YVL guides. This guide presents the mode of delivery, quality, contents and number of documents to be submitted to STUK

  16. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Alban Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 119 and 120). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  17. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-Des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 46, 74 and 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2013. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process) as well as the other pollutions. The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  18. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-Des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 46, 74 and 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2014. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2014, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process) as well as the other pollutions. The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  19. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Alban Saint-Maurice nuclear facilities - 2013

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 119 and 120). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2013, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process). The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix

  20. Patient safety in maternal healthcare at secondary and tertiary level facilities in Delhi, India

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chandrakant Lahariya

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Background: There is insufficient information on causes of unsafe care at facility levels in India. This study was conducted to understand the challenges in government hospitals in ensuring patient safety and to propose solutions to improve patient care. Materials and Methods: Desk review, in-depth interviews, and focused group discussions were conducted between January and March 2014. Healthcare providers and nodal persons for patient safety in Gynecology and Obstetrics Departments of government health facilities from Delhi state of India were included. Data were analyzed using qualitative research methods and presented adopting the "health system approach." Results: The patient safety was a major concern among healthcare providers. The key challenges identified were scarcity of resources, overcrowding at health facilities, poor communications, patient handovers, delay in referrals, and the limited continuity of care. Systematic attention on the training of care providers involved in service delivery, prescription audits, peer reviews, facility level capacity building plan, additional financial resources, leadership by institutional heads and policy makers were suggested as possible solutions. Conclusions: There is increasing awareness and understanding about challenges in patient safety. The available local information could be used for selection, designing, and implementation of measures to improve patient safety at facility levels. A systematic and sustained approach with attention on all functions of health systems could be beneficial. Patient safety could be used as an entry point to improve the quality of health care services in India.

  1. Safety study of fire protection for nuclear fuel cycle facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Insufficiencies in the fire protection system of the nuclear reactor facilities were pointed out when the fire occurred due to the Niigata prefecture-Chuetsu-oki Earthquake in July, 2007. This prompted the revision of the fire protection safety examination guideline for nuclear reactors as well as commercial guidelines. The commercial guidelines have been endorsed by the regulatory body. Now commercial fire protection standards for nuclear facilities such as the design guideline and the management guideline for protecting fire in the Light Water Reactors (LWRs) are available, however, those to apply to the nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility (MFFF) have not been established. For the improvement of fire protection system of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities, the development of a standard for the fire protection, corresponding to the commercial standard for LWRs were required. Thus, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) formulated a fire protection guidelines for nuclear fuel cycle facilities as a standard relevant to the fire protection of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities considering functions specific to the nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In formulating the guidelines, investigation has been conduced on the commercial guidelines for nuclear reactors in Japan and the standards relevant to the fire protection of nuclear facilities in USA and other countries as well as non-nuclear industrial fire protection standards. The guideline consists of two parts; Equipments and Management, as the commercial guidances of the nuclear reactor. In addition, the acquisition of fire evaluation data for a components (an electric cabinet, cable, oil etc.) targeted for spread of fire and the evaluation model of fire source were continued for the fire hazard analysis (FHA). (author)

  2. 76 FR 44985 - Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Flooding

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-27

    .... PHMSA-2011-0177] Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Flooding AGENCY... liquid pipelines to communicate the potential for damage to pipeline facilities caused by severe flooding... pipelines in case of flooding. ADDRESSES: This document can be viewed on the Office of Pipeline Safety home...

  3. Notification: FY 2012 Management Challenges and Internal Control Weaknesses for the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    February 1, 2012. The EPA Office of Inspector General is beginning work to update our list of areas we consider to be the key management challenges confronting the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.

  4. 78 FR 53790 - Public Forum-Safety Culture: Enhancing Transportation Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-30

    ... NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Public Forum--Safety Culture: Enhancing Transportation Safety On Tuesday and Wednesday, September 10-11, 2013, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will convene a forum titled, ``Safety Culture: Enhancing Transportation Safety.'' The forum will begin at 9:00...

  5. Accident investigation board report on the May 14, 1997, chemical explosion at the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, Hanford Site,Richland, Washington - final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gerton, R.E.

    1997-01-01

    On May 14, 1997, at 7:53 p.m. (PDT), a chemical explosion occur-red in Tank A- 109 in Room 40 of the Plutonium Reclamation Facility (Facility) located in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site, approximately 30 miles north of Richland, Washington. The inactive processing Facility is part of the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). On May 16, 1997, Lloyd L. Piper, Deputy Manager, acting for John D. Wagoner, Manager, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Richland Operations Office (RL), formally established an Accident Investigation Board (Board) to investigate the explosion in accordance with DOE Order 225. 1, Accident Investigations. The Board commenced its investigation on May 15, 1997, completed the investigation on July 2, 1997, and submitted its findings to the RL Manager on July 26, 1997. The scope of the Board's investigation was to review and analyze the circumstances of the events that led to the explosion; to analyze facts and to determine the causes of the accident; and to develop conclusions and judgments of need that may help prevent a recurrence of the accident. The scope also included the application of lessons learned from similar accidents within DOE. In addition to this detailed report, a companion document has also been prepared that provides a concise summary of the facts and conclusions of this report, with an emphasis on management issues (DOE/RL-97-63)

  6. Review of the nuclear safety exercises carried out in French industrial facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kissel, Ph.P.; Renard, C.; Meramedjian, H.N.

    1977-01-01

    For several years the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA) has been organizing nuclear safety exercises in most nuclear industrial facilities, especially in fuel element fabrication plants, many of which are classified as basic nuclear facilities. The subject and extent of each exercise are decided by mutual agreement between the management of the facility and the CEA officials in charge of Assistance in Protection and Nuclear Safety (APSN). The authors deal with such subjects as criticality accidents (evacuation of facilities, regrouping of personnel, rescue operations etc.) and fire involving large quantities of radioactive material (protection of the environment by spraying water on fumes laden with radioactive aerosols etc.). During these exercises use is made of the resources available with the safety services of the facility, one or more mobile nuclear action teams of the CEA and the appropriate resources within the competence of public authorities, e.g. Civil Defence, the fire brigades, the Gendarmerie etc. Each exercise is followed by a meeting which gives an opportunity for constructive criticism and for the adoption of measures best suited for solving problems which invariably arise, such as choice of methods and resources, co-ordination of their simultaneous or gradual application and so on. (author)

  7. Radioactive waste storage facilities, involvement of AVN in inspection and safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simenon, R.; Smidts, O.

    2006-01-01

    The legislative and regulatory framework in Belgium for the licensing and the operation of radioactive waste storage buildings are defined by the Royal Decree of 20 July 2001 (hereby providing the general regulations regarding to the protection of the population, the workers and the environment against the dangers of ionising radiation). This RD introduces in the Belgian law the radiological protection and ALARA-policy concepts. The licence of each nuclear facility takes the form of a Royal Decree of Authorization. It stipulates that the plant has to be in conformity with its Safety Analysis Report. This report is however not a public document but is legally binding. Up to now, the safety assessment for radioactive waste storage facilities, which is implemented in this Safety Analysis Report, has been judged on a case-by-case basis. AVN is an authorized inspection organisation to carry out the surveillance of the Belgian nuclear installations and performs hereby nuclear safety assessments. AVN has a role in the nuclear safety and radiation protection during all the phases of a nuclear facility: issuance of licenses, during design and construction phase, operation (including reviewing and formal approval of modifications) and finally the decommissioning. Permanent inspections are performed on a regular basis by AVN, this by a dedicated site inspector, who is responsible for a site of an operator with nuclear facilities. Besides the day-to-day inspections during operation there are also the periodic safety reviews. AVN assesses the methodological approaches for the analyses, reviews and approves the final studies and results. The conditioned waste in Belgium is stored on the Belgoprocess' sites (region Mol-Dessel) for an intermediate period (about 80 years). In the meantime, a well-defined inspection programme is being implemented to ensure that the conditioned waste continues to be stored safely during this temporary storage period. This programme was draw up by

  8. Regulatory review and confidence building in post-closure safety assessments and safety cases for near surface disposal facilities-IAEA ASAM coordinated research programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gonzales, A.; Simeonov, G.; Bennett, D.G.; Nys, V.; Ben Belfadhel, M.

    2005-01-01

    Some years ago, the IAEA successfully concluded a Coordinated Research Program (CRP) called Islam, which focussed on the development of an Improved Safety Assessment Methodology for near-surface radioactive waste disposal facilities. In November 2002, and as an extension of ISAM, the IAEA launched a new CRP called ASAM, designed to test the Application of the Safety Assessment Methodology by considering a range of near-surface disposal facilities. The ASAM work programme is being implemented by three application working groups and two cross-cutting working groups. The application working groups are testing the applicability of the ISAM methodology by assessing an existing disposal facility in Hungary, a copper mine in South Africa, and a hypothetical facility containing heterogenous wastes, such as disused sealed sources. The first cross-cutting working group is addressing a number of technical issues that are common to all near-surface disposal facilities, while the second group, the Regulatory Review Working Group (RRWG) is developing guidance on how to gain confidence in safety assessments and safety cases, and on how to conduct regulatory reviews of safety assessments. This paper provides a brief overview of the work being conducted by the Regulatory Review Working Group. (author)

  9. PANDA: A Multipurpose Integral Test Facility for LWR Safety Investigations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paladino, D.; Dreier, J.

    2012-01-01

    The PANDA facility is a large scale, multicompartmental thermal hydraulic facility suited for investigations related to the safety of current and advanced LWRs. The facility is multipurpose, and the applications cover integral containment response tests, component tests, primary system tests, and separate effect tests. Experimental investigations carried on in the PANDA facility have been embedded in international projects, most of which under the auspices of the EU and OECD and with the support of a large number of organizations (regulatory bodies, technical dupport organizations, national laboratories, electric utilities, industries) worldwide. The paper provides an overview of the research programs performed in the PANDA facility in relation to BWR containment systems and those planned for PWR containment systems.

  10. X-ray facility for the ground calibration of the X-ray monitor JEM-X on board INTEGRAL

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Loffredo, G.; Pelliciari, C.; Frontera, F.

    2003-01-01

    We describe the X-ray facility developed for the calibration of the X-ray monitor JEM-X on board the INTEGRAL satellite. The apparatus allowed the scanning of the detector geometric area with a pencil beam of desired energy over the major part of the passband of the instrument. The monochromatic...

  11. Radiation safety program in a high dose rate brachytherapy facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, L.V.; Hermoso, T.M.; Solis, R.C.

    2001-01-01

    The use of remote afterloading equipment has been developed to improve radiation safety in the delivery of treatment in brachytherapy. Several accidents, however, have been reported involving high dose-rate brachytherapy system. These events, together with the desire to address the concerns of radiation workers, and the anticipated adoption of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation (IAEA, 1996), led to the development of the radiation safety program at the Department of Radiotherapy, Jose R. Reyes Memorial Medical Center and at the Division of Radiation Oncology, St. Luke's Medical Center. The radiation safety program covers five major aspects: quality control/quality assurance, radiation monitoring, preventive maintenance, administrative measures and quality audit. Measures for evaluation of effectiveness of the program include decreased unnecessary exposures of patients and staff, improved accuracy in treatment delivery and increased department efficiency due to the development of staff vigilance and decreased anxiety. The success in the implementation required the participation and cooperation of all the personnel involved in the procedures and strong management support. This paper will discuss the radiation safety program for a high dose rate brachytherapy facility developed at these two institutes which may serve as a guideline for other hospitals intending to install a similar facility. (author)

  12. Safety Research Experiment Facility Project. Conceptual design report. Volume II. Building and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-12-01

    The conceptual design of Safety Research Experiment Facility (SAREF) site system includes a review and evaluation of previous geotechnical reports for the area where SAREF will be constructed and the conceptual design of access and in-plant roads, parking, experiment-transport-vehicle maneuvering areas, security fencing, drainage, borrow area development and restoration, and landscaping

  13. Proceedings of the 1984 DOE nuclear reactor and facility safety conference. Volume II

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1984-01-01

    This report is a collection of papers on reactor safety. The report takes the form of proceedings from the 1984 DOE Nuclear Reactor and Facility Safety Conference, Volume II of two. These proceedings cover Safety, Accidents, Training, Task/Job Analysis, Robotics and the Engineering Aspects of Man/Safety interfaces.

  14. Proceedings of the 1984 DOE nuclear reactor and facility safety conference. Volume II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    This report is a collection of papers on reactor safety. The report takes the form of proceedings from the 1984 DOE Nuclear Reactor and Facility Safety Conference, Volume II of two. These proceedings cover Safety, Accidents, Training, Task/Job Analysis, Robotics and the Engineering Aspects of Man/Safety interfaces

  15. The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility: Status-2004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderl, R.A.; Longhurst, G.R.; Pawelko, R.J.; Sharpe, J.P.; Schuetz, S.T.; Petti, D.A.

    2005-01-01

    The Safety and Tritium Applied Research (STAR) Facility, a US DOE National User Facility at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), comprises capabilities and infrastructure to support both tritium and non-tritium research activities important to the development of safe and environmentally friendly fusion energy. Research thrusts include (1) interactions of tritium and deuterium with plasma-facing-component (PFC) materials, (2) fusion safety issues [PFC material chemical reactivity and dust/debris generation, activation product mobilization, tritium behavior in fusion systems], and (3) molten salts and fusion liquids for tritium breeder and coolant applications. This paper updates the status of STAR and the capabilities for ongoing research activities, with an emphasis on the development, testing and integration of the infrastructure to support tritium research activities. Key elements of this infrastructure include a tritium storage and assay system, a tritium cleanup system to process glovebox and experiment tritiated effluent gases, and facility tritium monitoring systems

  16. Clinton P. Anderson Meson Physics Facility and its operational safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Putnam, T.M.

    1975-01-01

    The Clinton P. Anderson Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF) at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory consists of/ (1) a medium-energy, high-intensity linear proton accelerator; (2) experimental areas designed to support a multidisciplined program of research and practical applications; and (3) support facilities for accelerator operations and the experimental program. The high-intensity primary and secondary beams at LAMPF and the varied research program create many interesting and challenging problems for the Health Physics staff. A brief overview of LAMPF is presented, and the Operational Safety Program is discussed, with emphasis on the radiological safety and health physics aspects

  17. Mixed Waste Management Facility Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Chapters 1 to 20

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-09-01

    This document provides information on waste management practices, occupational safety, and a site characterization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A facility description, safety engineering analysis, mixed waste processing techniques, and auxiliary support systems are included.

  18. Mixed Waste Management Facility Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Chapters 1 to 20

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    This document provides information on waste management practices, occupational safety, and a site characterization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A facility description, safety engineering analysis, mixed waste processing techniques, and auxiliary support systems are included

  19. Use of risk information to safety regulation. Reprocessing facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    A procedure of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for a reprocessing facility has been under the development aiming to utilize risk information for safety regulations in this project. Activities in the fiscal year 2012 are summarized in the paper. A major activity is a fundamental study on a concept of serious accidents, requirements of serious accident management, and a policy of utilizing risk information for fabrication and reprocessing facilities. Other than the activity a study on release and transport of aerial radioactive materials at a serious accident in a reprocessing facility has been conducted. The outline and results are provided in the chapter 1 and 2 respectively. (author)

  20. New safety performance indicators for safety assessment of radioactive waste disposal facilities. Cuban experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peralta Vital, J.L.; Castillo, R.G.; Olivera, J.

    2002-01-01

    The paper shows the Cuban experience on implementing geological disposal of radioactive waste and the necessity for identifying new safety performance indicators for the safety assessment (SA) of radioactive waste disposal facilities. The selected indicator was the concentration of natural radioactive elements (U, Ra, Th, K) in the Cuban geologic environment. We have carried out a group of investigations, which have allowed characterising the concentration for the whole Country, creating a wide database where this indicator is associated with the lithology. The main lithologies in Cuba are: the sedimentary rocks (70 percent of national occurrence), which are present in the three regions (limestone and lutite), and finally the igneous and metamorphic rocks. The results show the concentrations ranges of the natural radionuclides associated fundamentally to the variation in the lithology and geographical area of the Country. In Cuba, the higher concentration (ppm) of Uranium and Radium are referenced to the Central region associated to Skarn, while for Thorium (ppm) and Potassium (%), in the East region the concentration peaks in Tuffs have been found. The concentrations ranges obtained are preliminary, they characterise the behaviour of this parameter for the Cuban geology, but they do not represent limits for safety assessment purposes yet. Also other factors should be taken into account as the assessment context, time scales and others assumptions before establishing the final concentration limits for the natural radionuclides as a radiological and nuclear safety performance indicator complementary to dose and risk for safety assessment for radiological and nuclear facilities. (author)

  1. Periodic Safety Review in Interim Storage Facilities - Current Regulation and Experiences in Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neles, Julia Mareike; Schmidt, Gerhard

    2014-01-01

    Periodic safety reviews in nuclear power plants in Germany have been performed since the end of the 1980's as an indirect follow-up of the accident in Chernobyl and, in the meantime, are formally required by law. During this process the guidelines governing this review were developed in stages and reached their final form in 1996. Interim storage facilities and other nuclear facilities at that time were not included, so the guidelines were solely focused on the specific safety issues of nuclear power plants. Following IAEA's recommendations, the Western European Nuclear Regulator Association (WENRA) introduced PSRs in its safety reference levels for storage facilities (current version in WGWD report 2.1 as of Feb 2011: SRLs 59 - 61). Based on these formulations, Germany improved its regulation in 2010 with a recommendation of the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (Entsorgungskommission, ESK), an expert advisory commission for the federal regulatory body BMU. The ESK formulated these detailed requirements in the 'ESK recommendation for guides to the performance of periodic safety reviews for interim storage facilities for irradiated fuel elements and heat-generating radioactive waste'. Before finalization of the guideline a test phase was introduced, aimed to test the new regulation in practice and to later include the lessons learned in the final formulation of the guideline. The two-year test phase started in October 2011 in which the performance of a PSR will be tested at two selected interim storage facilities. Currently these recommendations are discussed with interested/concerned institutions. The results of the test phase shall be considered for improvements of the draft and during the final preparation of guidelines. Currently the PSR for the first ISF is in an advanced stage, the second facility just started the process. Preliminary conclusions from the test phase show that the implementation of the draft guideline requires interpretation. The aim of a

  2. Preliminary Safety Design Report for Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Timothy Solack; Carol Mason

    2012-03-01

    A new onsite, remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility has been identified as the highest ranked alternative for providing continued, uninterrupted remote-handled low-level waste disposal for remote-handled low-level waste from the Idaho National Laboratory and for nuclear fuel processing activities at the Naval Reactors Facility. Historically, this type of waste has been disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. Disposal of remote-handled low-level waste in concrete disposal vaults at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex will continue until the facility is full or until it must be closed in preparation for final remediation of the Subsurface Disposal Area (approximately at the end of Fiscal Year 2017). This preliminary safety design report supports the design of a proposed onsite remote-handled low-level waste disposal facility by providing an initial nuclear facility hazard categorization, by discussing site characteristics that impact accident analysis, by providing the facility and process information necessary to support the hazard analysis, by identifying and evaluating potential hazards for processes associated with onsite handling and disposal of remote-handled low-level waste, and by discussing the need for safety features that will become part of the facility design.

  3. Safety assessment of a vault-based disposal facility using the ISAM methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelly, E.; Kim, C.-L.; Lietava, P.; Little, R.; Simon, I.

    2002-01-01

    As part of the IAEA's Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) on Improving Long-term of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near Surface Waste Disposal Facilities (ISAM), three example cases were developed. The aim was to testing the ISAM safety assessment methodology using as realistic as possible data. One of the Test Cases, the Vault Test Case (VTC), related to the disposal of low level radioactive waste (LLW) to a hypothetical facility comprising a set of above surface vaults. This paper uses the various steps of the ISAM safety assessment methodology to describe the work undertaken by ISAM participants in developing the VTC and provides some general conclusions that can be drawn from the findings of their work. (author)

  4. Considerations in the safety assessment of sealed nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-06-01

    This report is a part of the International Atomic Energy Agency's radioactive waste management programme, whose objective is to provide assistance to Member States in developing guidance for identifying safe alternatives for isolating radioactive waste from man and his environment. This report attempts to integrate information from the previous reports on decommissioning of nuclear facilities, mitigation of accidents at such facilities, and performance assessment of disposal systems to provide useful advice and qualitative guidance to those responsible for performance and safety assessments of sealed nuclear facilities by giving an overview of possible approaches and techniques for such assessments. In this context, the establishment of requirements and rules governing the radiological safety of personnel, the general public, and the environment for sealing and post-sealing activities will enable the choice of the most appropriated approach and help to promote consistency in both decommissioning and waste management standards. The near-field effects discussed in this document include gas generation, interactions of the groundwater and the residual water with other components of the system, thermal, thermo-mechanical, radiation effects and chemical and geochemical reactions. 59 refs, figs and tabs

  5. Russian Federation: Passive Safety Components for Lead-Cooled Reactor Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sarkulov, M.K.

    2015-01-01

    There is a specific range of engineered features used traditionally in nuclear technology. As a rule, main reactivity control systems use conventional active actuators with solid-body control members and/or liquid systems with active injection of liquid absorber. Other operation principles are normally chosen for additional systems. Currently, the traditional approach to improving the reliability of a reactor facility suggests an increase in the number of safety components and systems which provide for mutual assurance or assist each other. There is a great variety of additional reactivity control members designed for the reactor facility control and shutdown, including hydrodynamic members in the form of rods (acting from the coolant flow); floating-type members (absorbers and displacers); storage-type and liquid members (used in separate channels); bulk members (pebble absorber); gas-based members (with a gas absorber); shape-memory members and others. Hydrodynamic systems were introduced at Beloyarsk NPP Units 1 and 2 and proposed for use in other facility designs, Gases and bulk materials have not been commonly accepted: the former because of the high cost of high-efficiency gaseous absorbers, and the latter because of the complecated monitoring of the bulk material position. It is rather difficult and not always necessary to use the same engineering approaches in new lead-cooled reactor facilities as in traditional ones. Similarly to the development of traditional safety systems, passive safety components (devices) shall be designed according to the essential requirements of the nuclear regulations of the Russian Federation

  6. Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Facility 10CFR830 Safety Basis Related to Facility Experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tomberlin, T.A.

    2002-01-01

    The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), a DOE Category A reactor, was designed to provide an irradiation test environment for conducting a variety of experiments. The ATR Safety Analysis Report, determined by DOE to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, provides versatility in types of experiments that may be conducted. This paper addresses two general types of experiments in the ATR facility and how safety analyses for experiments are related to the ATR safety basis. One type of experiment is more routine and generally represents greater risks; therefore this type of experiment is addressed with more detail in the safety basis. This allows individual safety analyses for these experiments to be more routine and repetitive. The second type of experiment is less defined and is permitted under more general controls. Therefore, individual safety analyses for the second type of experiment tend to be more unique from experiment to experiment. Experiments are also discussed relative to ''major modifications'' and DOE-STD-1027-92. Application of the USQ process to ATR experiments is also discussed

  7. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-Des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This safety report was established in accordance with articles L. 125-15 and L. 125-16 of the French environmental code. It presents, first, the NPPs (INBs no. 46, 74 and 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures carried out in 2012. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2012, if any, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, the radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility are presented (type of waste, quantities, conditioning process) as well as the other pollutions. The document concludes with a presentation of the actions of communication and public information made by the direction of the facility. A glossary and the list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions are given in appendix. (J.S.)

  8. S. 1304: DOE Nuclear Safety and Environment Act. Introduced in the Senate of the United States, One Hundred First Congress, First Session, July 12, 1989

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1989-01-01

    A bill was introduced to enhance nuclear safety at Department of Energy nuclear facilities, to modify certain functions of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, to apply the provisions of OSHA to certain Department of Energy nuclear facilities, to clarify the jurisdiction and powers of Government agencies dealing with nuclear wastes, to ensure independent research on the effects of radiation on human beings, to encourage a process of environmental compliance and cleanup at these facilities, and to protect communities that contain these facilities

  9. The selection of probabilistic safety assessment techniques for non-reactor nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vail, J.

    1992-01-01

    Historically, the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology of choice is the well known event tree/fault tree inductive technique. For reactor facilities is has stood the test of time. Some non-reactor nuclear facilities have found inductive methodologies difficult to apply. The stand-alone fault tree deductive technique has been used effectively to analyze risk in nuclear chemical processing facilities and waste handling facilities. The selection between the two choices suggest benefits from use of the deductive method for non-reactor facilities

  10. Preparation of Phased and Merged Safety Analysis Reports for New DOE Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BISHOP, G.E.

    2000-01-01

    The Spent Nuclear Fuels Project (SNFP) is charged with moving to storage 2,100 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel elements left over from plutonium production at DOE'S Hanford site in Washington state. Two new facilities, the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and the Canister Storage Building (CSB) are in final construction. In order to meet aggressive schedule commitments, the SNFP chose to prepare the safety analysis reports (SAR's) in phases that covered only specific portions of each facility's design as it was built. Each SAR also merged the preliminary and final safety analysis reports into a single SAR, thereby covering all aspects of design, construction, and operation for that portion (phase) of the facility. A policy of ''NRC equivalency'' was also implemented in parallel with this effort, with the goal of achieving a rigor of safety analysis equivalent to that of NRC-licensed fuel processing facilities. DOE Order 5480.23. ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports'' allows preparation of both a phased and a merged SAR to accelerate construction schedules. However, project managers must be aware that such acceleration is not guaranteed. Managers considering this approach for their project should be cognizant of numerous obstacles that will be encountered. Merging and phasing SAR's will create new, unique, and unanticipated difficulties which may actually slow construction unless expeditiously and correctly managed. Pitfalls to be avoided and good practices to be implemented in preparing phased and merged SAR's are presented. The value of applying NRC requirements to the DOE safety analysis process is also discussed. As of December, 1999, the SNFP has completed and approved a SAR for the CVDF. Approval of the SAR for the CSB is pending

  11. Preclosure radiological safety analysis for the exploratory shaft facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ma, C.W.; Miller, D.D.; Jardine, L.J.

    1992-06-01

    This study assesses which structures, systems, and components of the exploratory shaft facility (ESF) are important to safety when the ESF is converted to become part of the operating waste repository. The assessment follows the methodology required by DOE Procedure AP-6.10Q. Failures of the converted ESF during the preclosure period have been evaluated, along with other underground accidents, to determine the potential offsite radiation doses and associated probabilities. The assessment indicates that failures of the ESF will not result in radiation doses greater than 0.5 rem at the nearest unrestricted area boundary. Furthermore, credible accidents in other underground facilities will not result in radiation doses larger than 0.5 rem, even if any structure, system, or component of the converted ESF fails at the same time. Therefore, no structure, system, or component of the converted ESF is important to safety

  12. Safety and radiation protection in mining and milling facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Magalhaes, Maisa H.; Schenato, Flavia; Cruz, Paulo R., E-mail: maisahm@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: schenato@cnen.gov.br, E-mail: pcruz@cnen.gov.br [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Xavier, Ana M., E-mail: axavier@cnen.gov.br [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (ESPOA/CNEN-RS), Porto Alegre, RS (Brazil). Escritorio de Porto Alegre

    2011-07-01

    Federal Legislation in Brazil establishes that the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission - CNEN - is responsible for the surveillance of the industrialization of nuclear ores and the production and commerce of nuclear materials in such way that activities such as buying, selling, import and export, are subject to previous licensing and surveillance. Regulation CNEN-NN-4.01 on Safety and Radiation Protection in Mining and Milling Facilities of conventional ores containing naturally occurring radioactive materials, NORM, was issued in 2004 establishing both a methodology for classification of these facilities into three Categories, taking into account both the contents of uranium and thorium in the ores and the applicable radiation and safety requirements based on a graded approach. Although the lack of a licensing process in the above mentioned Regulation made its implementation a difficult task, CNEN, by means of an initial survey, identified ca. 30 mining and milling industries of conventional ores containing uranium and thorium with concentrations above 10 Bq/g. More recently, a new juridical understanding of the legislation concluded that CNEN must issue licences and authorizations for the possession and storage of all ores with uranium and thorium concentrations above exemption levels. A proper surveillance programme encompassing 13 of these mining facilities was then put forward aiming at the improvement of their safety and radiation protection. This article presents an overview of NORM exploitation in Brazil and put forward suggestions for achieving viable solutions for the protection of workers, general public and environment from the effects of ionizing radiation. (author)

  13. 78 FR 66785 - SES Performance Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-06

    ... Safety Board. Steven E. Goldberg, Chief Financial Officer, National Transportation Safety Board. John.... Goldberg's rating review). Anthony P. Scardino, Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office... CONTACT: Emily T. Carroll, Chief, Human Resources Division, Office of Administration, National...

  14. 76 FR 76122 - Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-06

    ... CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board... change in the membership of the Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board for the Chemical Safety... Senior Executive Service (SES) and makes recommendations as to final annual performance ratings for...

  15. 78 FR 57837 - Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-20

    ... CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board... change in the membership of the Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board for the Chemical Safety... Senior Executive Service (SES) and makes recommendations as to final annual performance ratings for...

  16. Guidance for preparation of safety analysis reports for nonreactor facilities and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports,'' and 5481.1B, ''Safety Analysis and Review System'' require the preparation of appropriate safety analyses for each DOE operation and subsequent significant modifications including decommissioning, and independent review of each safety analysis. The purpose of this guide is to assist in the preparation and review of safety documentation for Oak Ridge Field Office (OR) nonreactor facilities and operation. Appendix A lists DOE Orders, NRC Regulatory Guides and other documents applicable to the preparation of safety analysis reports

  17. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear power plant (Saint-Laurent-Nouan (FR)): 2 partially dismantled graphite-gas reactors and a graphite sleeves storage silo (INB 46 and 74), and 2 PWR reactors in operation (INB 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2011, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  18. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear facilities - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux nuclear power plant (Saint-Laurent-Nouan (FR)): 2 partially dismantled graphite-gas reactors and a graphite sleeves storage silo (INB 46 and 74), and 2 PWR reactors in operation (INB 100). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise, microbial proliferation in cooling towers) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  19. 75 FR 1028 - Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-08

    ... CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board... change in the membership of the Senior Executive Service Performance Review Board for the Chemical Safety... performance ratings of members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) and makes recommendations as to final...

  20. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of EdF's Tricastin operational hot base nuclear facilities (BCOT) - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  1. SRTC criticality technical review: Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 93-18 Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rathbun, R.

    1993-01-01

    Separate review of NMP-NCS-930058, open-quotes Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 93-18 Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility (U), August 17, 1993,close quotes was requested of SRTC Applied Physics Group. The NCSE is a criticality assessment to determine waste container uranium limits in the Uranium Solidification Facility's Waste Handling Facility. The NCSE under review concludes that the NDA room remains in a critically safe configuration for all normal and single credible abnormal conditions. The ability to make this conclusion is highly dependent on array limitation and inclusion of physical barriers between 2x2x1 arrays of boxes containing materials contaminated with uranium. After a thorough review of the NCSE and independent calculations, this reviewer agrees with that conclusion

  2. Use of the event tree method for evaluate the safety of radioactive facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hernandez S, A.; Cornejo D, N.; Callis F, E.

    2006-01-01

    The work shows the validity of the use of Trees of Events like a quantitative method appropriate to carry out evaluations of radiological safety. Its were took like base the evaluations of safety of five Radiotherapy Departments, carried out in the mark of the process of authorization of these facilities. The risk values were obtained by means of the combination of the probabilities of occurrence of the events with its consequences. The use of the method allowed to suggest improvements to the existent safety systems, as well as to confirm that the current regulator requirements for this type of facilities to lead to practices with acceptable risk levels. (Author)

  3. Environmental restoration contractor facility safety plan -- MO-561 100-D site remediation project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donahoe, R.L.

    1996-11-01

    This safety plan is applicable to Environmental Restoration Contractor personnel who are permanently assigned to MO-561 or regularly work in the facility. The MO-561 Facility is located in the 100-D Area at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. This plan will: (a) identify hazards potentially to be encountered by occupants of MO-561; (b) provide requirements and safeguards to ensure personnel safety and regulatory compliance; (c) provide information and actions necessary for proper emergency response

  4. An overview of FFTF [Fast Flux Test Facility] contributions to Liquid Metal Reactor Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waltar, A.E.; Padilla, A. Jr.

    1990-11-01

    The Fast Flux Test Facility has provided a very useful framework for testing the advances in Liquid Metal Reactor Safety Technology. During the licensing phase, the switch from a nonmechanistic bounding technique to the mechanistic approach was developed and implemented. During the operational phase, the consideration of new tests and core configurations led to use of the anticipated-transients-without-scram approach for beyond design basis events and the move towards passive safety. The future role of the Fast Flux Test Facility may involve additional passive safety and waste transmutation tests. 26 refs

  5. Radiological safety of nuclear power plants in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sathish, A.V.

    2015-01-01

    Safety in nuclear power plants (NPPs) is often less understood and more talked about, thus the author wanted to share the facts to clear the myths. Safety is accorded overriding priority in all the activities. All nuclear facilities are sited, designed, constructed, commissioned and operated in accordance with strict quality and safety standards. Principles of defence in depth, redundancy and diversity are followed in the design of all nuclear facilities and their systems/components. PPs in India are not only safe but are also well regulated, have proper radiological protection of workers and the public, regular surveillance, approved standard operating and maintenance procedures, a well-defined waste management methodology, periodically rehearsed emergency preparedness and disaster management plans. The regulatory framework in the country is robust, with the independent Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) having powers to frame the policies, laying down safety standards, monitoring and enforcing all the safety provisions. As a result, India's safety record has been excellent in over 400 reactor years of operation of power reactors

  6. AREVA General Inspectorate Annual Report 2013 - Status of safety in nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oursel, Luc; Riou, Jean

    2014-06-01

    This annual report by AREVA's General Inspectorate deals with the status of nuclear safety and radiation protection in the group's facilities and operations over the course of 2013. Based on the findings made during implementation of the annual inspection program, this annual report also includes the results of the analysis of significant events and the observations and assessments of specialists in the Safety Health Security Sustainable Development Department (SHSSDD), supplemented by regular interaction with the safety regulators, different government agencies, stakeholders and other nuclear operators. Additionally, this report presents the action plans put into motion and the directions taken for continuous improvement in risk prevention for operations conducted in France and internationally. In 2013, the level of safety in the group's nuclear facilities and operations remained satisfactory, although improvements are necessary in some domains. This report is based on established indicators, analyses of reported events, responses to commitments made to the regulators, and the results of different improvement actions reported on in the inspected and supported entities. In 2013, no level 2 event on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) was reported, the bottom-up reporting of weak signals was confirmed, dose levels were low and there were no radiological impacts on the environment. The General Inspectorate conducted 45 inspections in 30 of the group's entities in 2013. Of these, 10 concerned sites outside France and 7 were conducted following events or particular situations. These inspections gave rise to 176 recommendations, which the inspected entities have translated into action plans. Verification of these different action plans according to planned procedures and announced schedules gave rise to 16 follow-up inspections. The major lessons learned from these inspections relate to project management, facility compliance and operational

  7. Preparation of safety analysis reports (SARs) for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities. Format and content of SARs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    All facilities at which radioactive wastes are processed, stored and disposed of have the potential for causing hazards to humans and to the environment. Precautions must be taken in the siting, design and operation of the facilities to ensure that an adequate level of safety is achieved. The processes by which this is evaluated is called safety assessment. An important part of safety assessment is the documentation of the process. A well prepared safety analysis report (SAR) is essential if approval of the facility is to be obtained from the regulatory authorities. This TECDOC describes the format and content of a safety analysis report for a near surface radioactive waste disposal facility and will serve essentially as a checklist in this respect

  8. Atomic safety and licensing board panel: Annual report, Fiscal Year 1988

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-03-01

    This is the fiscal year 1988 annual report of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel. In response to further reduction in is authorized staffing level and with an eye toward the proposed full- text, electronic docket of the expected High-Level Waste Repository proceedings, the Panel stepped up efforts during fiscal year 1988 to extend the scope, depth and availability of its Computer Assistance Project (CAP) through INQUIRE. INQUIRE, and the Panel's ability to use the system to expeditiously manage and search the massive records that characterize our most complex cases, has generated great interest among legal practitioners and adjudicatory bodies throughout the United States and Canada

  9. Safety issues to be taken into account in designing future nuclear fusion facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Perrault, Didier, E-mail: didier.perrault@irsn.fr

    2016-11-01

    Highlights: • Assess if decay heat removal is a safety function. • Re-study accidents considered for ITER and identify those specific to DEMO. • Limit tritium inventory and optimize main gaseous tritium release routes. • Take into account constraints related to requirements of waste disposal routes. - Abstract: For several years now, the French “Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire” has been carrying out expertise of ITER fusion facility safety files at the request of the French “Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire”. As part of the lengthy process which should lead to mastering nuclear fusion, different fusion facility projects are currently under study throughout the world to be ready to continue building on the work which will take place in the ITER facility. On the basis of the experience acquired during the ITER safety expertise, the IRSN has carried out a preliminary study of the safety issues which seem necessary to take into account right from the earliest design phase of these DEMO facilities. The issues studied have included the decay heat removal, exposure to ionizing radiation, potential accidents, and effluent releases and waste. The study shows that it will be important to give priority to the following actions, given that their results would have a major influence on the design: assess if decay heat removal is a safety function, re-study the accidents considered in the context of the ITER project and identify those specific to DEMO, and optimize each of the main routes for gaseous tritium releases.

  10. The study on safety facility criteria for radioactive waste repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, S. H.; Choi, M. H.; Han, S. H. and others

    1992-12-01

    The radioactive waste repository are necessary to install the engineered safety systems to secure the safety for operation of the repository in the event of fire and earthquake. Since the development of safety facility criteria requires a thorough understanding about the characteristics of the engineered safety systems, we should investigate by means of literature survey and visit SKB. In particular, definition, composition of the systems, functional requirement of the systems, engineered safety systems of foreign countries, system design, operation and maintenance requirement should be investigated : fire protection system, ventilation system, drainage system, I and C system, electric system, radiation monitoring system. This proposed criteria consist of purpose, scope of application, ventilation system, fire protection system, drainage system, electric system and this proposed criteria can be applied as a basic reference for the final criteria

  11. Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities for disused sealed radioactive sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Seunghee; Kim, Juyoul

    2017-01-01

    Highlights: • Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facility for DSRS was performed. • Engineered vault and rock-cavern type were considered for normal and well scenario. • 14 C, 226 Ra, 241 Am were primary nuclides contributing large portion of exposure dose. • Near surface disposal of DSRSs containing 14 C, 226 Ra and 241 Am should be restricted. - Abstract: Great attention has been recently paid to the post-closure safety assessment of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) around the world. Although the amount of volume of DSRSs generated from industry, medicine and research and education organization was relatively small compared with radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants, some DSRSs can pose a significant hazard to human health due to their high activities and long half-lives, if not appropriately managed and disposed. In this study, post-closure safety assessment was carried out for DSRSs generated from 1991 to 2014 in Korea in order to ensure long-term safety of near surface disposal facilities. Two kinds of disposal options were considered, i.e., engineered vault type disposal facility and rock-cavern type disposal facility. Rock-cavern type disposal facility has been under operation in Gyeongju city, republic of Korea since August 2015 and engineered vault type disposal facility will be constructed until December 2020 in the vicinity of rock-cavern disposal facility. Assessment endpoint was individual dose to the member of critical group, which was modeled by GoldSim, which has been widely used as probabilistic risk analysis software based on Monte Carlo simulation in the area of safety assessment of radioactive waste facilities. In normal groundwater scenario, the maximum exposure dose was extremely low, approximately 1 × 10 −7 mSv/yr, for both disposal options and satisfied the regulatory limit of 0.1 mSv/yr. However, in the

  12. Additional information for impact response of the restart safety rods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yau, W.W.F.

    1991-01-01

    WSRC-RP-91-677 studied the structural response of the safety rods under the conditions of brake failure and accidental release. It was concluded that the maximum impact loading to the safety rod is 6020 pounds based on conservative considerations that energy dissipation attributable to fluid resistance and reactor superstructure flexibility. The staffers of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board reviewed the results and inquired about the extent of conservatism. By request of the RESTART team, I reassessed the impact force due to these conservative assumptions. This memorandum reports these assessments

  13. Waste Sampling and Characterization Facility (WSCF) Complex Safety Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MELOY, R.T.

    2003-01-01

    The Waste Sampling and Characterization Facility (WSCF) is an analytical laboratory complex on the Hanford Site that was constructed to perform chemical and low-level radiological analyses on a variety of sample media in support of Hanford Site customer needs. The complex is located in the 600 area of the Hanford Site, east of the 200 West Area. Customers include effluent treatment facilities, waste disposal and storage facilities, and remediation projects. Customers primarily need analysis results for process control and to comply with federal, Washington State, and US. Department of Energy (DOE) environmental or industrial hygiene requirements. This document was prepared to analyze the facility for safety consequences and includes the following steps: Determine radionuclide and highly hazardous chemical inventories; Compare these inventories to the appropriate regulatory limits; Document the compliance status with respect to these limits; and Identify the administrative controls necessary to maintain this status

  14. Regulatory inspection practices for industrial safety (electrical, mechanical, material handling and conventional aspects)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agarwal, K.

    2017-01-01

    Regulatory Inspection (RI) of BARC facilities and projects are carried out under the guidance of BARC Safety Council (BSC) Secretariat. Basically facilities and projects have been divided into two board categories viz. radiological facilities and non-radiological facilities. The Rls of radiological facilities should be carried out under OPSRC and of non-radiological facilities under CFSRC. Periodicity of inspection shall be at least once in a year. The RI of projects is carried out under concerned DSRC. RI practices with industrial safety which includes electrical, mechanical, material handling and conventional aspect for these facilities starts with check lists. The inspection areas are prepared in the form of checklists which includes availability of approved documents, compliance status of previous RIT and various safety committee's recommendations, radiological status of facilities, prompt reporting of safety related unusual occurrences, major incident, site visit for verification of actual status of system/plant. The practices for inspection in the area of electrical safety shall include checking of maintenance procedure for all critical class IV system equipment's such as HT panel, LT panel, transformer and motors. Load testing of Class III system such as D.G. set etc. shall be carried out as technical specification surveillance schedule. Status of aviation lights, number of qualified staff, availability of qualified staff etc. shall be form of inspection

  15. Pilot-benchmarking of the WENRA safety reference levels for the spent fuel intermediate storage facility Ahaus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lorenz, Bernd; Roeder, Markus; Brandt, Klaus-Dieter

    2008-01-01

    Full text: The Western European Nuclear Regulator's Association (WENRA) has 2007 issued the draft of the 'Waste and Spent Fuel Storage Safety Reference Levels'. The objective of WENRA is to strive for a harmonized safety level of nuclear facilities within the European Community and these Reference Levels are a benchmark method to demonstrate the achieved level for the regulatory system and the implementation as well. Safety Reference Levels exist at the moment for Reactor Safety, Waste Storage and Decommissioning in different stages of development. ENISS, the European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards Initiative, a FORATOM based special organisation of nuclear operators, has discussed these Safety Reference Levels very intensively with WENRA and the agreement was to make a implementation benchmark-exercise for the storage facilities before the authorities finally agree on the Reference Levels. This benchmark was scheduled for the year 2008. Because of the special situation in Germany where a large number of storage facilities is in operation the German authorities felt that it would be useful to initiate a Pilot-Benchmark to get first results on the feasibility of the Reference Levels and the burden imposed to authorities and operators by these benchmark-exercises. GNS, a subsidiary company of the utilities, agreed to step into this process on a voluntary basis with its storage facility for spent fuel in Ahaus. The exercise was done in a very efficient way and in good co-operation between the authorities, local and federal, and the operator. The results in terms of safety assessments have been very satisfactory showing the high degree of safety. Although the facility was for the first time licensed already in 1987 the compliance with nearly all Reference Levels from 2007 could be demonstrated. It became also clear that newer facilities would fulfil the desired safety standard too. Nevertheless, in spite of the good results the exercise revealed some weak

  16. Animal-assisted interventions: A national survey of health and safety policies in hospitals, eldercare facilities, and therapy animal organizations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Linder, Deborah E; Siebens, Hannah C; Mueller, Megan K; Gibbs, Debra M; Freeman, Lisa M

    2017-08-01

    Animal-assisted intervention (AAI) programs are increasing in popularity, but it is unknown to what extent therapy animal organizations that provide AAI and the hospitals and eldercare facilities they work with implement effective animal health and safety policies to ensure safety of both animals and humans. Our study objective was to survey hospitals, eldercare facilities, and therapy animal organizations on their AAI policies and procedures. A survey of United States hospitals, eldercare facilities, and therapy animal organizations was administered to assess existing health and safety policies related to AAI programs. Forty-five eldercare facilities, 45 hospitals, and 27 therapy animal organizations were surveyed. Health and safety policies varied widely and potentially compromised human and animal safety. For example, 70% of therapy animal organizations potentially put patients at risk by allowing therapy animals eating raw meat diets to visit facilities. In general, hospitals had stricter requirements than eldercare facilities. This information suggests that there are gaps between the policies of facilities and therapy animal organizations compared with recent guidelines for animal visitation in hospitals. Facilities with AAI programs need to review their policies to address recent AAI guidelines to ensure the safety of animals and humans involved. Copyright © 2017 Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  17. 34 CFR 75.683 - Health or safety standards for facilities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Conditions Must Be Met by a Grantee? Other Requirements for Certain Projects § 75.683 Health or safety... to the facilities that the grantee uses for the project. (Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3 and 3474) ...

  18. A Study on the Allowable Safety Factor of Cut-Slopes for Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Myung Soo; Yee, Eric [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    In this study, the issues of allowable safety factor design criteria for cut-slopes in nuclear facilities is derived through case analysis, a proposed construction work slope design criteria that provides relatively detailed conditions can be applied in case of the dry season and some unclear parts of slope design criteria be modified in case of the rainy season. This safety factor can be further subdivided into two; normal and earthquake factors, a factor of 1.5 is applied for normal conditions and a factor of 1.2 is applied for seismic conditions. This safety factor takes into consideration the effect of ground water and rainfall conditions. However, no criteria for the case of cut-slope in nuclear facilities and its response to seismic conditions is clearly defined, this can cause uncertainty in design. Therefore, this paper investigates the allowable safety factor for cut-slopes in nuclear facilities, reviews conditions of both local and international cut-slope models and finally suggests an alternative method of analysis. It is expected that the new design criteria adequately ensures the stability of the cut-slope to reflect clear conditions for both the supervising and design engineers.

  19. Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nirider, L. Tom

    2003-08-06

    This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D&D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D&D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D&D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D&D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety.

  20. Safety assessment methodologies and their application in development of near surface waste disposal facilities - the ASAM project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, P.

    2003-01-01

    The scope of ASAM project covers near surface disposal facilities for all types of low and intermediate level wastes with emphasis of the post-closure safety assessment.The objectives are to explore practical application to a range of disposal facilities for a number of purposes e.g. development of design concepts, safety re-assessment, upgrading safety and to develop practical approaches to assist regulators, operators and other experts in review of safety assessment. The task of the Co-ordination Group are: reassessment of existing facilities - use of safety assessment in decision making on selection of options (volunteer site Hungary); disused sealed sources - evaluation of disposability of disused sealed sources in near surface facilities (volunteer site Saratov, Russia); mining and minerals processing waste - evaluation of long-term safety (volunteer site pmc S. Africa). An agreement on the scope and objectives of the project are reached and the further consideration, such as human intrusion/institutional control/security; waste from oil/gas industry; very low level waste; categorization of sealed sources coordinated with other IAEA activities are outlined

  1. Preliminary design of safety and interlock system for indian test facility of diagnostic neutral beam

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyagi, Himanshu; Soni, Jignesh; Yadav, Ratnakar; Bandyopadhyay, Mainak; Rotti, Chandramouli; Gahlaut, Agrajit; Joshi, Jaydeep; Parmar, Deepak; Bansal, Gourab; Pandya, Kaushal; Chakraborty, Arun

    2016-01-01

    Highlights: • Indian Test Facility being built to characterize DNB for ITER delivery. • Interlock system required to safeguard the investment incurred in building the facility and protecting ITER deliverable components. • Interlock levels upto 3IL-3 identified. • Safety instrumented system for occupational safety being designed. Safety I&C functions of SIL-2 identified. • The systems are based on ITER PIS and PSS design guidelines. - Abstract: Indian Test Facility (INTF) is being built in Institute For Plasma Research to characterize Diagnostic Neutral Beam in co-operation with ITER Organization. INTF is a complex system which consists of several plant systems like beam source, gas feed, vacuum, cryogenics, high voltage power supplies, high power RF generators, mechanical systems and diagnostics systems. Out of these, several INTF components are ITER deliverable, that is, beam source, beam line components and power supplies. To ensure successful operation of INTF involving integrated operation of all the constituent plant systems a matured Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS) is required. The INTF DACS is based on CODAC platform following on PCDH (Plant Control Design Handbook) guidelines. The experimental phases involve application of HV power supplies (100 KV) and High RF power (∼800 KW) which will produce energetic beam of maximum power 6MW within the facility for longer durations. Hence the entire facility will be exposed tohigh heat fluxes and RF radiations. To ensure investment protection and to provide occupational safety for working personnel a matured Safety and Interlock system is required for INTF. The Safety and Interlock systems are high-reliability I&C systems devoted completely to the specific functions. These systems will be separate from the conventional DACS of INTF which will handle the conventional control and acquisition functions. Both, the Safety and Interlock systems are based on IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 standards as

  2. Preliminary design of safety and interlock system for indian test facility of diagnostic neutral beam

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tyagi, Himanshu, E-mail: htyagi@iter-india.org [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Soni, Jignesh [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Yadav, Ratnakar; Bandyopadhyay, Mainak; Rotti, Chandramouli [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Gahlaut, Agrajit [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Joshi, Jaydeep; Parmar, Deepak [ITER-India, Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India); Bansal, Gourab; Pandya, Kaushal; Chakraborty, Arun [Institute For Plasma Research, Bhat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat (India)

    2016-11-15

    Highlights: • Indian Test Facility being built to characterize DNB for ITER delivery. • Interlock system required to safeguard the investment incurred in building the facility and protecting ITER deliverable components. • Interlock levels upto 3IL-3 identified. • Safety instrumented system for occupational safety being designed. Safety I&C functions of SIL-2 identified. • The systems are based on ITER PIS and PSS design guidelines. - Abstract: Indian Test Facility (INTF) is being built in Institute For Plasma Research to characterize Diagnostic Neutral Beam in co-operation with ITER Organization. INTF is a complex system which consists of several plant systems like beam source, gas feed, vacuum, cryogenics, high voltage power supplies, high power RF generators, mechanical systems and diagnostics systems. Out of these, several INTF components are ITER deliverable, that is, beam source, beam line components and power supplies. To ensure successful operation of INTF involving integrated operation of all the constituent plant systems a matured Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS) is required. The INTF DACS is based on CODAC platform following on PCDH (Plant Control Design Handbook) guidelines. The experimental phases involve application of HV power supplies (100 KV) and High RF power (∼800 KW) which will produce energetic beam of maximum power 6MW within the facility for longer durations. Hence the entire facility will be exposed tohigh heat fluxes and RF radiations. To ensure investment protection and to provide occupational safety for working personnel a matured Safety and Interlock system is required for INTF. The Safety and Interlock systems are high-reliability I&C systems devoted completely to the specific functions. These systems will be separate from the conventional DACS of INTF which will handle the conventional control and acquisition functions. Both, the Safety and Interlock systems are based on IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 standards as

  3. Comprehensive development plans for the low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility in Korea and preliminary safety assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Kang Il; Kim, Jin Hyeong; Kwon, Mi Jin; Jeong, Mi Seon; Hong, Sung Wook; Park, Jin Beak [Korea Radioactive Waste Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-12-15

    The disposal facility in Gyeongju is planning to dispose of 800,000 packages of low- and intermediate- level radioactive waste. This facility will be developed as a complex disposal facility that has various types of disposal facilities and accompanying management. In this study, based on the comprehensive development plan of the disposal facility, a preliminary post-closure safety assessment is performed to predict the phase development of the total capacity for the 800,000 packages to be disposed of at the site. The results for each scenario meet the performance target of the disposal facility. The assessment revealed that there is a significant impact of the inventory of intermediate-level radionuclide waste on the safety evaluation. Due to this finding, we introduce a disposal limit value for intermediate-level radioactive waste. With stepwise development of safety case, this development plan will increase the safety of disposal facilities by reducing uncertainties within the future development of the underground silo disposal facilities.

  4. Safety assessments for centralized waste treatment and disposal facility in Puspokszilagy Hungary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berci, K.; Hauszmann, Z.; Ormai, P.

    2002-01-01

    The centralized waste treatment and disposal facility Puspokszilagy is a shallow land, near surface engineered type disposal unit. The site, together with its geographic, geological and hydrogeological characteristics, is described. Data are given on the radioactive inventory. The operational safety assessment and the post-closure safety assessment is outlined. (author)

  5. An empirical investigation of the work environment on board industrial- and cruise ships and the associations with safety

    OpenAIRE

    Heidenstrøm, Øyvind Teige

    2011-01-01

    The overall aim of this study was to examine the work environment and the associations with safety, and see the relations with occupational accidents and undesired events on board industrial and cruise ships. 215 seafarers participated in this quantitative survey study, with a response rate of 35%. When conducting the hierarchical block regression analysis separately on superiors/officers and subordinates/ratings, the work environment emerged as a predictor for safety status (compliance, atti...

  6. 77 FR 41258 - FOIA Fee Schedule Update

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-07-13

    ... DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 10 CFR Part 1703 FOIA Fee Schedule Update AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. ACTION: Establishment of FOIA Fee Schedule. SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is publishing its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Fee Schedule Update pursuant to...

  7. 76 FR 43819 - FOIA Fee Schedule Update

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-22

    ... DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 10 CFR Part 1703 FOIA Fee Schedule Update AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. ACTION: Establishment of FOIA Fee Schedule. SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is publishing its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Fee Schedule Update pursuant to...

  8. Criticality safety training at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia, A.S.; Courtney, J.C.; Thelen, V.N.

    1983-01-01

    HFEF comprises four hot cells and out-of-cell support facilities for the US breeder program. The HFEF criticality safety program includes training in the basic theory of criticality and in specific criticality hazard control rules that apply to HFEF. A professional staff-member oversees the implementation of the criticality prevention program

  9. Nuclear Safety Co-Ordination within Oak Ridge Operations Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, W. A.; Pryor, W. A. [Research and Development Division, United States Atomic Energy Commission, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    1966-05-15

    The Oak Ridge Operations Office of the USAEC has within its jurisdiction multiple contractors and facilities for research and for the production of fissile materials for the atomic energy programme. Among these facilities are gaseous diffusion plants for the production of {sup 235}U-enriched uranium hexafluoride, plants for the fabrication of special components and fuel for research and production reactors, and laboratories for pilot plant studies and basic research in nuclear technology. One research laboratory is also actively engaged in criticality experimental programmes and has been a major contributor of criticality data for safety applications. These diversified programmes include the processing, fabrication and transport of practically all forms and isotopic enrichments of uranium in quantities commensurate with both laboratory and volume production requirements. Consequently, adequate nuclear safety control with reasonable economy for operations of this magnitude demands not only co-ordination and liaison between contractor and USAEC staffs, but a continuing reappraisal of safety applications in light of the most advanced information. This report outlines the role of the Oak Ridge Operations Office in these pursuits and describes as examples some specific problems in which this office co-ordinated actions necessary for their resolution. Other examples are given of parametric and procedural applications in plant processes and fissile shipments emphasizing the use of recent experimental or calculated data. These examples involve the use of mass and geometric variables, neutron absorbers and moderation control. Departures from limits specified in existing nuclear safety guides are made to advantage in light of new data, special equipment design, contingencies and acceptable risks. (author)

  10. W-1 Sodium Loop Safety Facility experiment centerline fuel thermocouple performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meyers, S.C.; Henderson, J.M.

    1980-05-01

    The W-1 Sodium Loop Safety Facility (SLSF) experiment is the fifth in a series of experiments sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) as part of the National Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) Safety Assurance Program. The experiments are being conducted under the direction of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory (HEDL). The irradiation phase of the W-1 SLSF experiment was conducted between May 27 and July 20, 1979, and terminated with incipient fuel pin cladding failure during the final boiling transient. Experimental hardware and facility performed as designed, allowing completion of all planned tests and test objectives. This paper focuses on high temperature in-fuel thermocouples and discusses their development, fabrication, and performance in the W-1 experiment

  11. Inquiry relating to safety due to modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (establishment of waste safety testing facility) in Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Application was made to the director of the Science and Technology Agency (STA) for the license relating to the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material (the establishment of waste safety testing facility) from the director of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute on November 30, 1978. After passing through the safety evaluation in the Nuclear Safety Bureau of STA, inquiry was conducted to the head of the Atomic Energy Safety Commission (AESC) on June 6, 1979, from the director of the STA. The head of AESC directed to conduct the safety examination to the head of the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Specialist Committee on June 7, 1979. The content of the modification of usage of nuclear fuel material is the establishment of waste safety testing facility to study and test the safety relating to the treatment and disposal of high level radioactive liquid wastes due to the reprocessing of spent fuel. As for the results of the safety examination, the siting of the waste safety testing facility which is located in the Tokai Laboratory, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI), and the test plan of the glass solidification of high level radioactive liquid are presented as the outline of the study plan. The building, main equipments including six cells, the isolation room and the glove box, the storage, and the disposal facilities for gas, liquid and solid wastes are explained as the outline of the facilities. Concerning the items from the viewpoint of safety, aseismatic design, slightly vacuum operation, shielding, decay heat removal, fire protection, explosion protection, criticality management, radiation management and environmental effect were evaluated, and the safety was confirmed. (Nakai, Y.)

  12. Do provisions to advance chemical facility safety also advance chemical facility security? - An analysis of possible synergies

    OpenAIRE

    Hedlund, Frank Huess

    2012-01-01

    The European Commission has launched a study on the applicability of existing chemical industry safety provisions to enhancing security of chemical facilities covering the situation in 18 EU Member States. This paper reports some preliminary analytical findings regarding the extent to which existing provisions that have been put into existence to advance safety objectives due to synergy effects could be expected advance security objectives as well.The paper provides a conceptual definition of...

  13. Ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities located in large cities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryazantsev, E.P.; Kolyadin, V.I.; Bylkin, B.K.; Zverkov, Yu.A.

    2002-01-01

    The problems of ensuring the safety of nuclear facilities and other facilities representing a radiation hazard (hereinafter referred to as 'nuclear facilities') which are located in large cities are considered in the light of the experience with the 'Kurchatov Institute' Russian Research Centre. The accumulation of substantial quantities of spent nuclear fuel and radwaste at the Centre was an inevitable consequence of the military and civilian nuclear research programmes which started there in 1943. A comprehensive programme has been developed for reducing the impact of ionizing radiation on the Centre's personnel, the population living near the Centre and the local environment. The authors describe the basic elements of a programme for decommissioning reactor facilities and eliminating spent fuel and radwaste storage sites and also describe how the programme is progressing. (author)

  14. Criticality safety analysis for mockup facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Young Joon; Shin, Hee Sung; Kim, Ik Soo; Oh, Seung Chul; Ro, Seung Gy; Bae, Kang Mok

    2000-03-01

    Benchmark calculations for SCALE4.4 CSAS6 module have been performed for 31 UO 2 fuel, 15MOX fuel and 10 metal material criticality experiments and then calculation biases of the SCALE 4.4 CSAS6 module have been revealed to be 0.00982, 0.00579 and 0.02347, respectively. When CSAS6 is applied to the criticality safety analysis for the mockup facility in which several kinds of nuclear material components are included, the calculation bias of CSAS6 is conservatively taken to be 0.02347. With the aid of this benchmarked code system, criticality safety analyses for the mockup facility at normal and hypothetical accidental conditions have been carried out. It appears that the maximum K eff is 0.28356 well below than the critical limit, K eff =0.95 at normal condition. In a hypothetical accidental condition, the maximum K eff is found to be 0.73527 much lower than the subcritical limit. For another hypothetical accidental condition the nuclear material leaks out of container and spread or lump in the floor, it was assumed that the nuclear material is shaped into a slab and water exists in the empty space of the nuclear material. K eff has been calculated as function of slab thickness and the volume ratio of water to nuclear material. The result shows that the K eff increases as the water volume ratio increases. It is also revealed that the K eff reaches to the maximum value when water if filled in the empty space of nuclear material. The maximum K eff value is 0.93960 lower than the subcritical limit

  15. Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities for disused sealed radioactive sources

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Seunghee; Kim, Juyoul, E-mail: gracemi@fnctech.com

    2017-03-15

    Highlights: • Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facility for DSRS was performed. • Engineered vault and rock-cavern type were considered for normal and well scenario. • {sup 14}C, {sup 226}Ra, {sup 241}Am were primary nuclides contributing large portion of exposure dose. • Near surface disposal of DSRSs containing {sup 14}C, {sup 226}Ra and {sup 241}Am should be restricted. - Abstract: Great attention has been recently paid to the post-closure safety assessment of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) around the world. Although the amount of volume of DSRSs generated from industry, medicine and research and education organization was relatively small compared with radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants, some DSRSs can pose a significant hazard to human health due to their high activities and long half-lives, if not appropriately managed and disposed. In this study, post-closure safety assessment was carried out for DSRSs generated from 1991 to 2014 in Korea in order to ensure long-term safety of near surface disposal facilities. Two kinds of disposal options were considered, i.e., engineered vault type disposal facility and rock-cavern type disposal facility. Rock-cavern type disposal facility has been under operation in Gyeongju city, republic of Korea since August 2015 and engineered vault type disposal facility will be constructed until December 2020 in the vicinity of rock-cavern disposal facility. Assessment endpoint was individual dose to the member of critical group, which was modeled by GoldSim, which has been widely used as probabilistic risk analysis software based on Monte Carlo simulation in the area of safety assessment of radioactive waste facilities. In normal groundwater scenario, the maximum exposure dose was extremely low, approximately 1 × 10{sup −7} mSv/yr, for both disposal options and satisfied the regulatory limit

  16. Progress report: 1996 Radiation Safety Systems Division

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bhagwat, A.M.; Sharma, D.N.; Abani, M.C.; Mehta, S.K.

    1997-01-01

    The activities of Radiation Safety Systems Division include (i) development of specialised monitoring systems and radiation safety information network, (ii) radiation hazards control at the nuclear fuel cycle facilities, the radioisotope programmes at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and for the accelerators programme at BARC and Centre for Advanced Technology (CAT), Indore. The systems on which development and upgradation work was carried out during the year included aerial gamma spectrometer, automated environment monitor using railway network, radioisotope package monitor and air monitors for tritium and alpha active aerosols. Other R and D efforts at the division included assessment of risk for radiation exposures and evaluation of ICRP 60 recommendations in the Indian context, shielding evaluation and dosimetry for the new upcoming accelerator facilities and solid state nuclear track detector techniques for neutron measurements. The expertise of the divisional members was provided for 36 safety committees of BARC and Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). Twenty three publications were brought out during the year 1996. (author)

  17. Regulatory safety aspects of nuclear waste management operations in India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sundararajan, A.R.

    2000-01-01

    The Department of Atomic Energy in India as part of its programme to harness the nuclear energy for generation of nuclear power has been operating a whole range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities including waste management plants for more than four decades. The waste management plants include three high level waste immobilisation plants, one in operation, one under commissioning and one more under construction. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is mandated to review and authorise from the safety angle the siting, the design, the construction and the operation of the waste management plants. The regulatory procedures, which involve multi-tier review adopted for ensuring the safety of these facilities, are described in this paper. (author)

  18. Study of In-Pile test facility for fast reactor safety research: performance requirements and design features

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nonaka, N.; Kawatta, N.; Niwa, H.; Kondo, S.; Maeda, K

    1996-12-31

    This paper describes a program and the main design features of a new in-pile safety facility SERAPH planned for future fast reactor safety research. The current status of R and D on technical developments in relation to the research objectives and performance requirements to the facility design is given.

  19. Closure of 324 Facility potential HEPA filter failure unreviewed safety questions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Enghusen, M.B.

    1997-01-01

    This document summarizes the activities which occurred to resolve an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) for the 324 Facility [Waste Technology Engineering Laboratory] involving Potential HEPA Filter Breach. The facility ventilation system had the capacity to fail the HEPA filters during accident conditions which would totally plug the filters. The ventilation system fans were modified which lowered fan operating parameters and prevented HEPA filter failures which might occur during accident conditions

  20. The Fast Flux Test Facility built on safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    No other high-tech industry has grown as fast as the nuclear industry. The information available to the general public has not kept pace with the rapid growth of nuclear data---its growth has outpaced its media image and the safety of nuclear facilities has become a highly debated issue. This book is an attempt to bridge the gap between the high-tech information of the nuclear industry and its understanding by the general public. It explains the three levels of defense at the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) and why these levels provide an acceptable margin to protect the general public and on-site personnel, while achieving FFTF's mission to provide research and development for the US Department of Energy

  1. A Fire Safety Certification System for Board and Care Operators and Staff. SBIR Phase II: Final Report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Walker, Bonnie L.

    This report describes Phase II of a project which developed a system for delivering fire safety training to board and care providers who serve adults with developmental disabilities. Phase II focused on developing and pilot testing a "train the trainers" workshop for instructors and field testing the provider's workshop. Evaluation of…

  2. 76 FR 14590 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safety of Facilities, Infrastructure, and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-17

    ... makes it unlikely that a small business could afford to sustain the infrastructure required to perform...-AG73 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safety of Facilities, Infrastructure, and... facilities, infrastructure, and equipment that are intended for use by military or civilian personnel of the...

  3. Radiation safety program in high dose rate brachytherapy facility at INHS Asvini

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kirti Tyagi

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available Brachytherapy concerns primarily the use of radioactive sealed sources which are inserted into catheters or applicators and placed directly into tissue either inside or very close to the target volume. The use of radiation in treatment of patients involves both benefits and risks. It has been reported that early radiation workers had developed radiation induced cancers. These incidents lead to continuous work for the improvement of radiation safety of patients and personnel The use of remote afterloading equipment has been developed to improve radiation safety in the delivery of treatment in brachytherapy. The widespread adoption of high dose rate brachytherapy needs appropriate quality assurance measures to minimize the risks to both patients and medical staff. The radiation safety program covers five major aspects: quality control, quality assurance, radiation monitoring, preventive maintenance, administrative measures and quality audit. This paper will discuss the radiation safety program developedfor a high dose rate brachytherapy facility at our centre which may serve as a guideline for other centres intending to install a similar facility.

  4. Report of the Task Group on Electrical Safety of Department of Energy facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1993-01-01

    The Task Group on Electrical Safety at DOE Facilities (Task Group), which was formally established on October 27, 1992. The Task Group reviewed the electrical safety-related occurrence history of, and conducted field visits to, seven DOE sites chosen to represent a cross section of the Department`s electrical safety activities. The purpose of the field visits was to review, firsthand, electrical safety programs and practices and to gain greater insight to the root causes and corrective actions taken for recently reported incidents. The electrical safety environment of the DOE complex is extremely varied, ranging from common office and industrial electrical systems to large high-voltage power distribution systems (commercial transmission line systems). It includes high-voltage/high-power systems associated with research programs such as linear accelerators and experimental fusion confinement systems. Age, condition, and magnitude of the facilities also varies, with facilities dating from the Manhattan Project, during World War II, to the most modem complexes. The complex is populated by Federal (DOE and other agencies) and contractor employees engaged in a wide variety of occupations and activities in office, research and development, and industrial settings. The sites visited included all of these variations and are considered by the Task Group to offer a valid representation of the Department`s electrical safety issues. The sites visited were Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Nevada Test Site (NTS), Savannah River Site (SRS), Hanford Reservation (Hanford), and the Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Project (UMTRA) located at Grand Junction, Colorado.

  5. Radiation safety management system in a radioactive facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amador, Zayda H.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: This paper illustrates the Cuban experience in implementing and promoting an effective radiation safety system for the Centre of Isotopes, the biggest radioactive facility of our country. Current management practice demands that an organization inculcate culture of safety in preventing radiation hazard. The aforementioned objectives of radiation protection can only be met when it is implemented and evaluated continuously. Commitment from the workforce to treat safety as a priority and the ability to turn a requirement into a practical language is also important to implement radiation safety policy efficiently. Maintaining and improving safety culture is a continuous process. There is a need to establish a program to measure, review and audit health and safety performance against predetermined standards. All those areas of the radiation protection program are considered (e.g. licensing and training of the staff, occupational exposure, authorization of the practices, control of the radioactive material, radiological occurrences, monitoring equipment, radioactive waste management, public exposure due to airborne effluents, audits and safety costs). A set of indicators designed to monitor key aspects of operational safety performance are used. Their trends over a period of time are analyzed with the modern information technologies, because this can provide an early warning to plant management for searching causes behind the observed changes. In addition to analyze the changes and trends, these indicators are compared against identified targets and goals to evaluate performance strengths and weaknesses. A structured and proper radiation self-auditing system is seen as a basic requirement to meet the current and future needs in sustainability of radiation safety. The integrated safety management system establishment has been identified as a goal and way for the continuous improvement. (author)

  6. Self-imposed self-assessment program at a DOE Nuclear Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geoffrion, R.R.; Loud, J.J.; Walter, E.C.

    1996-01-01

    The Nuclear Materials and Technology (NMT) Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has implemented a performance-based self-assessment program at the TA-55 plutonium facility. The program was conceptualized and developed by LANL's internal assessment group, AA-2. The management walkaround program fosters continuous improvement in NMT products and performance of its activities. The program, based on experience from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, is endorsed at the site by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environment, Safety, and Health (ES ampersand H) personnel and by the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board. The self-assessment program focuses on how work is actually performed rather than on paperwork or process compliance. Managers critically and continually assess ES ampersand H, conduct of operations, and other functional area requirements

  7. Safety issues relating to the design of fusion power facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stasko, R.R.; Wong, K.Y.; Russell, S.B.

    1986-06-01

    In order to make fusion power a viable future source of energy, it will be necessary to ensure that the cost of power for fusion electric generation is competitive with advanced fission concepts. In addition, fusion power will have to live up to its original promise of being a more radiologically benign technology than fission, and be able to demonstrate excellent operational safety performance. These two requirements are interrelated, since the selection of an appropriate safety philosophy early in the design phase could greatly reduce or eliminate the capital costs of elaborate safety related and protective sytems. This paper will briefly overview a few of the key safety issues presently recognized as critical to the ultimate achievement of licensable, environmentally safe and socially acceptable fusion power facilities. 12 refs

  8. Proceeding of the 7. Seminar on Technology and Safety of Nuclear Power Plants and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hastowo, Hudi; Antariksawan, Anhar R.; Soetrisnanto, Arnold Y; Jujuratisbela, Uju; Aziz, Ferhat; Su'ud, Zaki; Suprawhardana, M. Salman

    2002-02-01

    The seventh proceedings of seminar safety and technology of nuclear power plant and nuclear facilities, held by National Nuclear Energy Agency. The Aims of seminar is to exchange and disseminate information about safety and nuclear Power Plant Technology and Nuclear Facilities consist of technology; high temperature reactor and application for national development sustain able and high technology. This seminar level all aspects technology, Power Reactor research reactor, high temperature reactor and nuclear facilities. The article is separated by index

  9. Criticality Safety Lessons Learned in a Deactivation and Decommissioning Environment [A Guide for Facility and Project Managers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NIRIDER, L.T.

    2003-01-01

    This document was designed as a reference and a primer for facility and project managers responsible for Deactivation and Decommissioning (D and D) processes in facilities containing significant inventories of fissionable materials. The document contains lessons learned and guidance for the development and management of criticality safety programs. It also contains information gleaned from occurrence reports, assessment reports, facility operations and management, NDA program reviews, criticality safety experts, and criticality safety evaluations. This information is designed to assist in the planning process and operational activities. Sufficient details are provided to allow the reader to understand the events, the lessons learned, and how to apply the information to present or planned D and D processes. Information is also provided on general lessons learned including criticality safety evaluations and criticality safety program requirements during D and D activities. The document also explores recent and past criticality accidents in operating facilities, and it extracts lessons learned pertinent to D and D activities. A reference section is included to provide additional information. This document does not address D and D lessons learned that are not pertinent to criticality safety

  10. Nuclear safety and radiation protection consideration in the design of research and development facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Akbar, M.R.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear safety is a critically important aspect that must be considered in the design of a nuclear facility in order to ensure the protection of the workers, public and environment. This paper looks at the methodology, approach and incorporation of this aspect, specifically into the design of a research and development facility. The Health, Safety and Environmental Basis of Design is an initial analysis of nuclear safety and radiation protection considerations that is performed during the conceptual design phase and sets the baseline for what the design of the facility must conform to. It consists of general nuclear safety design principles, such as defence in depth and optimisation considerations, and a hazard management strategy. Following the Health, Safety and Environmental Basis of Design, a Preliminary Safety Assessment Report is generated during the basic design phase in conjunction with various analyses in order to assess the impact of hazards on the workers and members of the public. This assessment follows a hazard graded approach where the depth of the analysis will be determined by the impact of the worst case accident scenario in the facility. The assessment also includes a waste management strategy which is an essential aspect to be considered in the design in order to minimize the generation of waste. The safety assessment also demonstrates compliance to dose limits and risk criteria for the workers and members of the public set by the regulatory body and supported by a legal framework. Measures are taken to keep risk as low as reasonably achievable and prevent transgression of the risk and dose limits. However, a balance needs to be maintained between 5 reducing these doses further and the cost of such a reduction, which is known as optimization. It is therefore imperative to have nuclear safety specialists analyse the design in order to protect the worker and member of the public from unwarranted exposure to nuclear radiation. (author)

  11. Problems and experience of ensuring nuclear safety in NPP spent fuel storage facilities in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vnukov, Victor S.; Ryazanov, Boris G.

    2003-01-01

    The amount of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) spent fuel in special storage facilities of Russia runs to more than 15000 tons and the annual growth is equal to about 850 tons. The storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel from the main nuclear reactors of Russia (RBMK-1000, VVER-1000, BN-600, EGP-6) were designed in the 60s - 70s. In the last years when the concept of closed fuel cycle and safety requirements had changed, the need was generated to have the nuclear storage facilities more crowded. First of all it is due to the necessity to increase the storage capacity because the RBMK-1000, VVER-1000, EGP-6 fuel is not reprocessed. So there comes the need for the facilities of a bigger capacity which meet the current safety requirements. The paper presents the results of studies of the most important nuclear safety issues, in particular: development of regulatory requirements; analysis of design-basis and beyond-the design-basis accidents (DBA and BDBA); computation code development and verification; justification of nuclear safety when water density goes down; the use of burn-up fraction values; the necessity and possibility to experimentally study the storage facility subcriticality; development of storage norms and rules for new types of fuel assemblies with mixed fuel and burnable poison. (author)

  12. Safety cases for the co-ordinated research project on improvement of safety assessment methodologies for near surface radioactive waste disposal facilities (ISAM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kozak, M.W.; Torres-Vidal, C.; Kelly, E.; Guskov, A.; Blerk, J. van

    2002-01-01

    A Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) has recently been completed on the Improvement of Safety Assessment Methodologies for Near-Surface Radioactive Waste Disposal Facilities (ISAM). A major aspect of the project was the use of safety cases for the practical application of safety assessment. An overview of the ISAM safety cases is given in this paper. (author)

  13. The European Commission proposes changes to the directive on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2013-01-01

    The European Commission proposes changes in the ancient European directive on nuclear safety in order to europeanize nuclear safety. The first proposal is to submit all European nuclear facilities to a control every 6 years by a board of foreign experts. Another proposal is to impose that every new power plant should be designed so that the radiological impact of an accident should be limited to the facility itself. The same proposal would impose for every nuclear plant the presence of an emergency center resistant to radiation, earthquakes and floods. The reporting of any incident occurring in a nuclear plant would be made compulsory. The decision to extend the operating life of a nuclear plant would be suspended to the results of a compulsory safety test. (A.C.)

  14. Radiological Operational Safety Verification for LILW Disposal Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ju Youl [FNC Technology, SNU, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Jeong, Seung Young; Kim, Byung Soo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-10-15

    The successful implementation of radioactive waste repository program depends on scientific and technical aspects of excellent safety strategy as well as on societal aspects such as stakeholder acceptance and confidence. Monitoring is considered as key element in serving both ends. It covers all stages of the disposal process from site selection to institutional monitoring after the repository is closed. Basically, the purpose of the monitoring of radioactive waste disposal facility is not to reveal any increase of radioactivity due to the repository, but to provide reassurance and confirmation that the repository is fulfilling its passive safety purpose as an initial disposal concept and that long-term safety driven by regulatory requirements is ensured throughout the entire lifetime of disposal facility including post-closure phase. Five principal objectives of monitoring of geological disposal are summarized by IAEA-TECDOC-1208 as follows 1) Supporting management decisions in a staged programme of repository development: 2) Strengthening understanding of system behavior: 3) Societal decision making: 4) Accumulating an environmental database: 5) Nuclear safeguards (if repository contains fissile material, i.e., spent fuel or plutonium-rich waste) Based on the results of detailed studies of the above objectives and related phenomena, 6 categories of potential monitoring parameters are determined as follows: (1) degradation of repository structures, (2) behavior of the waste package and its associated buffer material, (3) near field chemical interactions between introduced materials, groundwater and host rock, (4) chemical and physical changes to the surrounding geosphere, (5) provision of an environmental database, and (6) nuclear safeguards. Typical monitoring parameters include temperature (heat), water level, pore-water and moisture content (groundwater), rock pressure, fractures, displacement and deformation (stress), water quality chemistry and dissolved

  15. Report from the nuclear safety authority about the preparation of nuclear facilities to the year 2000 transition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lacoste, A.C.

    1999-01-01

    The French nuclear safety authority with the technical help of the Institute of Nuclear Protection and Safety (IPSN) started in 1998 an evaluation and control work of the measures taken by the different nuclear facility operators in anticipation of the year 2000 transition. This report makes a status of the state of preparation of nuclear facilities prior to the transition: 1 - The nuclear safety and the year 2000 transition (defense-in-depth approach, preventive actions); 2 - The action of the safety authority (demands addressed to the operators of nuclear facilities, technical evaluation and control of the methodology adopted by each operator, preparation of the safety authority to the transition, follow up of the international actions); 3 - Status of the preparation of the different operators: Electricite de France (EdF) (corrective actions, inventory and investigation of computer systems, results, corrections, preventive actions, defensive actions, synthesis), research centres, storage sites and shutdown reactors, waste storage centres of the ANDRA, CEA facilities, decommissioned or partially dismantled reactors, fuel cycle centres.. (J.S.)

  16. Report to Congress on innovative safety and security technology solutions for alternative transportation facilities

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-05-01

    This research collected information on the frequency and impact of safety and security incidents (threats) at selected facilities and identified priority incidents at each facility. A customized all hazards approach was used to determine the ha...

  17. A Fire Safety Certification System for Board and Care Operators and Staff. SBIR Phase I: Final Report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Walker, Bonnie L.

    This report describes the development and pilot testing of a fire safety certification system for board and care operators and staff who serve clients with developmental disabilities. During Phase 1, training materials were developed, including a trainer's manual, a participant's coursebook a videotape, an audiotape, and a pre-/post test which was…

  18. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of the basic nuclear facilities of the Tricastin nuclear power plant - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the facilities of the Tricastin nuclear power plant (INB 87 and 88, Saint-Paul-Trois-Chateaux, Drome (FR)). Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facilities are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, are reported as well as the radioactive and non-radioactive (chemical, thermal) effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facilities are presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. Other environmental impacts (noise) are presented with their mitigation measures. Actions in favour of transparency and public information are presented as well. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  19. Compilation of nuclear safety criteria potential application to DOE nonreactor facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-03-01

    This bibliographic document compiles nuclear safety criteria applied to the various areas of nuclear safety addressed in a Safety Analysis Report for a nonreactor nuclear facility (NNF). The criteria listed are derived from federal regulations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guides and publications, DOE and DOE contractor publications, and industry codes and standards. The titles of the chapters and sections of Regulatory Guide 3.26, ''Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Fuel Reprocessing Plants'' were used to format the chapters and sections of this compilation. In each section the criteria are compiled in four groups, namely: (1) Code of Federal Regulations, (2) USNRC Regulatory Guides, (3) Codes and Standards, and (4) Supplementary Information

  20. Design, fabrication and erection of steel structures important to safety of nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-10-01

    Civil engineering structures in nuclear installations form an important feature having implications to safety performance of these installations. The objective and minimum requirements for the design of civil engineering buildings/structures to be fulfilled to provide adequate assurance for safety of nuclear installations in India (such as pressurised heavy water reactor and related systems) are specified in the Safety Standard for Civil Engineering Structures Important to Safety of Nuclear Facilities. This standard is written by AERB to specify guidelines for implementation of the above civil engineering safety standard in the design, fabrication and erection of steel structures important to safety

  1. A retrospective analysis of boarding times for adolescents in psychiatric crisis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Campbell, Michael; Pierce, Jessica

    2018-02-05

    The boarding of children and adolescents with identified psychiatric conditions at medical facilities has numerous negative effects on the patients and the systems that treat them. Efforts to minimize boarding times serves to increase patients' access to appropriate levels of care, redirect medical resources to patients who need them most, and reduce safety risks to people and property. This study explores the role Clinical Social Workers can play in facilitation of care and highlights the advantages of a coordinated data collection process facilitated by the effective use of the Electronic Medical Record. A retrospective chart analysis of 100 patients admitted to the Emergency department at a pediatric hospital in Central Florida was conducted for patients seen between 1 January 2015 and 30 June 2016. The data suggest key correlates that may impact the boarding times of pediatric patients presenting in a psychiatric crisis and the average duration of boarding time in hours (M = 5.11, SD = 2.07) was found to be significantly lower than prior published studies in the adult and pediatric literature. Discussion of these data implications on behavioral health practice is discussed.

  2. Quarterly report on the Ferrocyanide Safety Program for the period ending June 30, 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meacham, J.E.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.

    1995-07-01

    This is the seventeenth quarterly report on the progress of activities addressing the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue associated with Hanford Site high-level radioactive waste tanks. Progress in the Ferrocyanide Safety Program is reviewed, including work addressing the six pans of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-7 (FR 1990). All work activities are described in the revised program plan (DOE 1994b), and this report follows the same format presented there. A summary of the key events occurring this quarter is presented

  3. Use of risk information to safety regulation. Fabrication facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    A procedure of ISA (Integrated Safety Analysis) for uranium fuel fabrication/enrichment facilities has been under the development aiming to utilize risk information for safety regulations in this project. Activities in the fiscal year 2012 are summarized in the paper. There are two major activities in the year. First one is a study on ISA procedure for external events such as earthquakes. Second one is that for chemical consequences such as UF6 and HF. Other than the activities a fundamental study on a policy of utilizing risk information was conducted. The outline and results are provided in the chapter 1 and 2 respectively. (author)

  4. The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for management systems that integrate safety, health, security, quality assurance and environmental objectives. A successful management system ensures that nuclear safety matters are not dealt with in isolation but are considered within the context of all these objectives. The aim of this publication is to assist Member States in establishing and implementing effective management systems that integrate all aspects of managing nuclear facilities and activities in a coherent manner. It details the planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all these requirements are satisfied. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system; 3. Management responsibility; 4. Resource management; 5. Process implementation; 6. Measurement, assessment and improvement.

  5. Uranium Production Safety Assessment Team. UPSAT. An international peer review service for uranium production facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The IAEA Uranium Production Safety Assessment Team (UPSAT) programme is designed to assist Member States to improve the safe operation of uranium production facilities. This programme facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experience between team members and industry personnel. An UPSAT mission is an international expert review, conducted outside of any regulatory framework. The programme is implemented in the spirit of voluntary co-operation to contribute to the enhancement of operational safety and practices where it is most effective, at the facility itself. An UPSAT review supplements other facility and regulatory efforts which may have the same objective

  6. Analysis of characteristics and radiation safety situation of uranium mining and metallurgy facilities in north area of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Ruilan; Li Jianhui; Wang Xiaoqing; Huang Mingquan

    2014-01-01

    According to the radiation safety management of uranium mining and metallurgy facilities in north area of China, features and radiation safety conditions of uranium mining and metallurgy facilities in north area of China were analyzed based on summarizing the inspection data for 2011-2013. So the main problems of radiation environment security on uranium mine were studied. The relevant management measures and recommendations were put forward, and the basis for environmental radiation safety management decision making of uranium mining and metallurgy facilities in future was provided. (authors)

  7. Do provisions to advance chemical facility safety also advance chemical facility security? An analysis of possible synergies

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hedlund, Frank Huess

    2012-01-01

    The European Commission has launched a study on the applicability of existing chemical industry safety provisions to enhancing security of chemical facilities covering the situation in 18 EU Member States. This paper reports some preliminary analytical findings regarding the extent to which exist...

  8. 78 FR 41991 - Pipeline Safety: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused by Flooding

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-12

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No...: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); DOT. ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory... Gas and Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems. Subject: Potential for Damage to Pipeline Facilities Caused...

  9. Tech assist/fire safety assessment of 100K area facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, B.H.

    1994-01-01

    This Tech Assist/Fire Safety Assessment provides a comprehensive assessment of the 100K Area Facilities at the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site for fire protection upgrades that may be needed given the limited remaining service life of these facilities. This assessment considers the relative nature of observed fire risks and whether the installed fire protection systems adequately control this risk. The analysis is based on compliance with DOE Orders, NFPA Codes and Standards, and recognized industry practice. Limited remaining service life (i.e., 6 to 12 years), current value of each facility, comparison to the best protected class of industrial risk, and the potential for exemptions from DOE requirements are key factors for recommendations presented in this report

  10. Insights from the Probabilistic Safety Assessment Application to Subsurface Operations at the Preclosure Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Mee Jeong; Jung, Jong Tae

    2009-01-01

    In this paper, we present the insights obtained through the PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) application to subsurface operation at the preclosure facilities of the repository. At present, medium-low level waste repository has been constructed in Korea, and studies for disposal of high level wastes are under way. Also, safety analysis for repository operation has been performed. Thus, we performed a probabilistic safety analysis for surface operation at the preclosure facilities with PSA methodology for a nuclear power plant. Since we don't have a code to analyze the waste repository safety analysis, we used the codes, AIMS (Advanced Information Management System for PSA) and FTREX (Fault Tree Reliability Evaluation eXpert) which are developed for a nuclear power plant's PSA to develop ET (Event Tree) and FT (Fault Tree), and to quantify for an example analysis

  11. PANDA a multi-purpose thermal-hydraulics facility devoted to nuclear reactor containment safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paladino, Domenico

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents the multi purpose facility PANDA devised for the safety analysis of nuclear reactor containment. The passive safety systems for LWRs have been explained with details about the PAssive Nachzerfallswärmeabfuhr und Druck-Abbau Testanlage (PANDA)

  12. [RADIATION SAFETY DURING REMEDIATION OF THE "SEVRAO" FACILITIES].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shandala, N K; Kiselev, S M; Titov, A V; Simakov, A V; Seregin, V A; Kryuchkov, V P; Bogdanova, L S; Grachev, M I

    2015-01-01

    Within a framework of national program on elimination of nuclear legacy, State Corporation "Rosatom" is working on rehabilitation at the temporary waste storage facility at Andreeva Bay (Northwest Center for radioactive waste "SEVRAO"--the branch of "RosRAO"), located in the North-West of Russia. In the article there is presented an analysis of the current state of supervision for radiation safety of personnel and population in the context of readiness of the regulator to the implementation of an effective oversight of radiation safety in the process of radiation-hazardous work. Presented in the article results of radiation-hygienic monitoring are an informative indicator of the effectiveness of realized rehabilitation measures and characterize the radiation environment in the surveillance zone as a normal, without the tendency to its deterioration.

  13. Guidelines for preparing criticality safety evaluations at Department of Energy non-reactor nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-11-01

    This document contains guidelines that should be followed when preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations that will be used to demonstrate the safety of operations performed at DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities. Adherence to these guidelines will provide consistency and uniformity in criticality safety evaluations (CSEs) across the complex and will document compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.24

  14. Dose control programme of Hot Cell facility at Isotope Wing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapkal, Jyotsna A.; Suresh, Manju; Shreenivas, V.; Amruta, C.T.; Yadav, R.K.B.; Gopalkrishanan, R.K.; Patil, B.N.; Sastry, K.V.S.

    2015-01-01

    Hot Cell Facility of Board of Radiation Isotope Technology (BRIT) at Radiological Laboratories (RLG) is involved in fabrication of sealed radioisotopes like Cobalt-60, Cesium-137 and Iridium-192 radioisotopes which are widely used for various medical and industrial applications. In the field of Medicine, above radioactive sources are used for treatment procedures such as Teletherapy and Brachytherapy. 192 Ir radioisotope is widely used for industrial radiography particularly for non-destructive testing of welds in steel in the oil and gas industries. In spite of the increased production of these radioisotopes to meet the requirements from medical and industrial sector, the annual Collective Dose for BRIT facility, during 2011-2013 has shown a downward trend. This paper describes in brief the measures adopted by the facility based on the radiological safety inputs provided by Radiation Hazards Control (RHC) Unit of Isotope Wing, RLG for reducing the collective dose during year 2012 and 2013 by nearly 40% of collective dose consumed for year-2011. Strict implementation of the radiological safety measures during handling of radioactive sources, administrative controls and engineered safety measures resulted in lowering of collective dose during year 2011-2013. (author)

  15. Radiological safety assessment of a reference INTOR facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, T.A.; Stasko, R.R.; Watts, R.T.; Shaw, G.; Morrison, C.A.; Russell, S.; Kempe, T.; Zimmerman, R.

    1985-03-01

    This report consists of a number of separate studies all of which were performed in support of INTOR Critical Issue D: Tritium Containment and Personnel Access vs Remote Maintenance. The common thread running through these studies is the radiological safety element in the design and operation of the INTOR facility. The intent is to help establish a firm basis for comparisons between a reactor cell maintenance option which requires personnel access, and one which involves completely remote maintenance

  16. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff practice and procedure digest. Commission, Appeal Board and Licensing Board Decision, July 1972 - June 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-04-01

    This is the seventh edition of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff Practice and Procedure Digest. It contains a digest of a number of Commission, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, and Atomic Safety and Licensing Board decisions issued during the period from July 1, 1972 to June 1995 interpreting the NRC rules of practice in 10 CFR part 2

  17. 30 CFR 75.1903 - Underground diesel fuel storage facilities and areas; construction and safety precautions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... areas; construction and safety precautions. 75.1903 Section 75.1903 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND...; construction and safety precautions. (a) Permanent underground diesel fuel storage facilities must be— (1... with at least 240 pounds of rock dust and provided with two portable multipurpose dry chemical type...

  18. Regulation of chemical safety at fuel cycle facilities by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramsey, Kevin M.

    2013-01-01

    When the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established in 1975, its regulations were based on radiation dose limits. Chemical hazards rarely influenced NRC regulations. After the Three Mile Island reactor accident in 1979, the NRC staff was directed to address emergency planning at non-reactor facilities. Several fuel cycle facilities were ordered to submit emergency plans consistent with reactor emergency plans because no other guidance was available. NRC published a notice that it was writing regulations to codify the requirements in the Orders and upgrade the emergency plans to address all hazards, including chemical hazards. The legal authority of NRC to regulate chemical safety was questioned. In 1986, an overfilled uranium hexafluoride cylinder ruptured and killed a worker. The NRC staff was directed to address emergency planning for hazardous chemicals in its regulations. The final rule included a requirement for fuel cycle facilities to certify compliance with legislation requiring local authorities to establish emergency plans for hazardous chemicals. As with emergency planning, NRC's authority to regulate chemical safety during routine operations was limited. NRC established memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with other regulatory agencies to encourage exchange of information between the agencies regarding occupational hazards. In 2000, NRC published new, performance-based, regulations for fuel cycle facilities. The new regulations required an integrated safety analysis (ISA) which used quantitative standards to assess chemical exposures. Some unique chemical exposure cases were addressed while implementing the new regulations. In addition, some gaps remain in the regulation of hazardous chemicals at fuel cycle facilities. The status of ongoing efforts to improve regulation of chemical safety at fuel cycle facilities is discussed. (authors)

  19. Risk-Informing Safety Reviews for Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mubayi, V.; Azarm, A.; Yue, M.; Mukaddam, W.; Good, G.; Gonzalez, F.; Bari, R.A.

    2011-03-13

    This paper describes a methodology used to model potential accidents in fuel cycle facilities that employ chemical processes to separate and purify nuclear materials. The methodology is illustrated with an example that uses event and fault trees to estimate the frequency of a specific energetic reaction that can occur in nuclear material processing facilities. The methodology used probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)-related tools as well as information about the chemical reaction characteristics, information on plant design and operational features, and generic data about component failure rates and human error rates. The accident frequency estimates for the specific reaction help to risk-inform the safety review process and assess compliance with regulatory requirements.

  20. Risk-Informing Safety Reviews for Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mubayi, V.; Azarm, A.; Yue, M.; Mukaddam, W.; Good, G.; Gonzalez, F.; Bari, R.A.

    2011-01-01

    This paper describes a methodology used to model potential accidents in fuel cycle facilities that employ chemical processes to separate and purify nuclear materials. The methodology is illustrated with an example that uses event and fault trees to estimate the frequency of a specific energetic reaction that can occur in nuclear material processing facilities. The methodology used probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)-related tools as well as information about the chemical reaction characteristics, information on plant design and operational features, and generic data about component failure rates and human error rates. The accident frequency estimates for the specific reaction help to risk-inform the safety review process and assess compliance with regulatory requirements.