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Sample records for evolutionary naming game

  1. Asymmetric Evolutionary Games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alex McAvoy

    2015-08-01

    Full Text Available Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.

  2. Asymmetric Evolutionary Games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph

    2015-08-01

    Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.

  3. Structural symmetry in evolutionary games

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    McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph

    2015-01-01

    In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a randomly occurring mutant will fixate in the population. However, in a structured population, this fixation probability may depend on where the mutant arises. Moreover, the fixation probability is just one quantity by which one can measure the success of a mutant; fixation time, for instance, is another. We define a notion of homogeneity for evolutionary games that captures what it means for two single-mutant states, i.e. two configurations of a single mutant in an otherwise-monomorphic population, to be ‘evolutionarily equivalent’ in the sense that all measures of evolutionary success are the same for both configurations. Using asymmetric games, we argue that the term ‘homogeneous’ should apply to the evolutionary process as a whole rather than to just the population structure. For evolutionary matrix games in graph-structured populations, we give precise conditions under which the resulting process is homogeneous. Finally, we show that asymmetric matrix games can be reduced to symmetric games if the population structure possesses a sufficient degree of symmetry. PMID:26423436

  4. Evolutionary potential games on lattices

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    Szabó, György, E-mail: szabo@mfa.kfki.hu; Borsos, István, E-mail: borsos@mfa.kfki.hu

    2016-04-05

    Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the “equilibrium state” by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.

  5. Evolutionary games in the multiverse.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Traulsen, Arne

    2010-03-23

    Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players with any number of strategies , there can be at most isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.

  6. Asymptotic properties of restricted naming games

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    Bhattacherjee, Biplab; Datta, Amitava; Manna, S. S.

    2017-07-01

    Asymptotic properties of the symmetric and asymmetric naming games have been studied under some restrictions in a community of agents. In one version, the vocabulary sizes of the agents are restricted to finite capacities. In this case, compared to the original naming games, the dynamics takes much longer time for achieving the consensus. In the second version, the symmetric game starts with a limited number of distinct names distributed among the agents. Three different quantities are measured for a quantitative comparison, namely, the maximum value of the total number of names in the community, the time at which the community attains the maximal number of names, and the global convergence time. Using an extensive numerical study, the entire set of three power law exponents characterizing these quantities are estimated for both the versions which are observed to be distinctly different from their counter parts of the original naming games.

  7. Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games

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    Nowak, Martin A.; Sigmund, Karl

    2004-02-01

    Darwinian dynamics based on mutation and selection form the core of mathematical models for adaptation and coevolution of biological populations. The evolutionary outcome is often not a fitness-maximizing equilibrium but can include oscillations and chaos. For studying frequency-dependent selection, game-theoretic arguments are more appropriate than optimization algorithms. Replicator and adaptive dynamics describe short- and long-term evolution in phenotype space and have found applications ranging from animal behavior and ecology to speciation, macroevolution, and human language. Evolutionary game theory is an essential component of a mathematical and computational approach to biology.

  8. Names for Games: Locating 2 × 2 Games

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    Bryan Randolph Bruns

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Stag Hunts, and other two-person two-move (2 × 2 models of strategic situations have played a central role in the development of game theory. The Robinson–Goforth topology of payoff swaps reveals a natural order in the payoff space of 2 × 2 games, visualized in their four-layer “periodic table” format that elegantly organizes the diversity of 2 × 2 games, showing relationships and potential transformations between neighboring games. This article presents additional visualizations of the topology, and a naming system for locating all 2 × 2 games as combinations of game payoff patterns from the symmetric ordinal 2 × 2 games. The symmetric ordinal games act as coordinates locating games in maps of the payoff space of 2 × 2 games, including not only asymmetric ordinal games and the complete set of games with ties, but also ordinal and normalized equivalents of all games with ratio or real-value payoffs. An efficient nomenclature can contribute to a systematic understanding of the diversity of elementary social situations; clarify relationships between social dilemmas and other joint preference structures; identify interesting games; show potential solutions available through transforming incentives; catalog the variety of models of 2 × 2 strategic situations available for experimentation, simulation, and analysis; and facilitate cumulative and comparative research in game theory.

  9. Evolutionary Games and Social Conventions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Pelle Guldborg

    2007-01-01

    Some thirty years ago Lewis published his Convention: A Philosophical Study (Lewis, 2002). This laid the foundation for a game-theoretic approach to social conventions, but became more famously known for its seminal analysis of common knowledge; the concept receiving its canonical analysis...... in Aumann (1976) and which, together with the assumptions of perfect rationality, came to be defining of classical game theory. However, classical game theory is currently undergoing severe crisis as a tool for exploring social phenomena; a crisis emerging from the problem of equilibrium selection around......-defined metaphors of individual learning and social imitation processes, from which a revised theory of convention may be erected (see Sugden 2004, Binmore 1993 and Young 1998). This paper makes a general argument in support of the evolutionary turn in the theory of convention by a progressive exposition of its...

  10. Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games

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    Stamatios Katsikas

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game.

  11. Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games

    KAUST Repository

    Mabrok, Mohamed

    2017-01-05

    Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population games, namely so-called “stable games”. In particular, it was shown that a combination of stable games and (an analogue of) passive evolutionary dynamics results in stable convergence to Nash equilibrium. This paper considers the converse question of necessary conditions for evolutionary dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all generalized stable games. Using methods from robust control analysis, we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to construct a generalized stable game that results in instability. The results are illustrated on selected evolutionary dynamics with particular attention to replicator dynamics, which are also shown to be lossless, a special class of passive systems.

  12. Essays on nonlinear evolutionary game dynamics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ochea, M.I.

    2010-01-01

    Evolutionary game theory has been viewed as an evolutionary repair of rational actor game theory in the hope that a population of boundedly rational players may attain convergence to classic rational solutions, such as the Nash Equilibrium, via some learning or evolutionary process. In this thesis

  13. Domain learning naming game for color categorization.

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    Li, Doujie; Fan, Zhongyan; Tang, Wallace K S

    2017-01-01

    Naming game simulates the evolution of vocabulary in a population of agents. Through pairwise interactions in the games, agents acquire a set of vocabulary in their memory for object naming. The existing model confines to a one-to-one mapping between a name and an object. Focus is usually put onto name consensus in the population rather than knowledge learning in agents, and hence simple learning model is usually adopted. However, the cognition system of human being is much more complex and knowledge is usually presented in a complicated form. Therefore, in this work, we extend the agent learning model and design a new game to incorporate domain learning, which is essential for more complicated form of knowledge. In particular, we demonstrate the evolution of color categorization and naming in a population of agents. We incorporate the human perceptive model into the agents and introduce two new concepts, namely subjective perception and subliminal stimulation, in domain learning. Simulation results show that, even without any supervision or pre-requisition, a consensus of a color naming system can be reached in a population solely via the interactions. Our work confirms the importance of society interactions in color categorization, which is a long debate topic in human cognition. Moreover, our work also demonstrates the possibility of cognitive system development in autonomous intelligent agents.

  14. Static and evolutionary quantum public goods games

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    Liao Zeyang; Qin Gan; Hu Lingzhi; Li Songjian; Xu Nanyang [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Du Jiangfeng [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Fachbereich Physik, Universitaet Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund (Germany)], E-mail: djf@ustc.edu.cn

    2008-05-12

    We apply the continuous-variable quantization scheme to quantize public goods game and find that new pure strategy Nash equilibria emerge in the static case. Furthermore, in the evolutionary public goods game, entanglement can also contribute to the persistence of cooperation under various population structures without altruism, voluntary participation, and punishment.

  15. Mean-Potential Law in Evolutionary Games

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    Nałecz-Jawecki, Paweł; Miekisz, Jacek

    2018-01-01

    The Letter presents a novel way to connect random walks, stochastic differential equations, and evolutionary game theory. We introduce a new concept of a potential function for discrete-space stochastic systems. It is based on a correspondence between one-dimensional stochastic differential equations and random walks, which may be exact not only in the continuous limit but also in finite-state spaces. Our method is useful for computation of fixation probabilities in discrete stochastic dynamical systems with two absorbing states. We apply it to evolutionary games, formulating two simple and intuitive criteria for evolutionary stability of pure Nash equilibria in finite populations. In particular, we show that the 1 /3 law of evolutionary games, introduced by Nowak et al. [Nature, 2004], follows from a more general mean-potential law.

  16. Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory

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    Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend

    2009-01-01

    We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative �tness (vector) function both locally and globally. By global (local) ray projection we mean a projection of the vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray

  17. Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jorge Peña

    2016-08-01

    Full Text Available There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering.

  18. Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peña, Jorge; Wu, Bin; Arranz, Jordi; Traulsen, Arne

    2016-08-01

    There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering.

  19. Evolutionary Game Theory and Leadership

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    Guastello, Stephen J.

    2009-01-01

    Comments on the article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. This article offers a fresh perspective on leaders, followers, and their possible origins in nonhuman and primitive human behavior patterns. The connections between group coordination, leadership, and game theory have some…

  20. Name that Contraceptive! A Game for the Human Sexuality Classroom

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    Rosenthal, Martha S.

    2010-01-01

    There are many contraceptive choices available to people today. Learning about them can be dry, but the game "Name that Contraceptive!" can be a fun and interactive way to review, remember, and retain the details about contraceptive options. Name that Contraceptive is a card game in which students "bid" on the number of clues it will take them to…

  1. Extrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games

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    Wu, Bin; García, Julián; Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne

    2013-01-01

    In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By “qualitatively valid” we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies . In particular, rank changes are almost certain for , which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection. PMID:24339769

  2. Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bin Wu

    Full Text Available In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By "qualitatively valid" we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies [Formula: see text]. In particular, rank changes are almost certain for [Formula: see text], which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection.

  3. Evolutionary game theory: cells as players.

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    Hummert, Sabine; Bohl, Katrin; Basanta, David; Deutsch, Andreas; Werner, Sarah; Theissen, Günter; Schroeter, Anja; Schuster, Stefan

    2014-12-01

    In two papers we review game theory applications in biology below the level of cognitive living beings. It can be seen that evolution and natural selection replace the rationality of the actors appropriately. Even in these micro worlds, competing situations and cooperative relationships can be found and modeled by evolutionary game theory. Also those units of the lowest levels of life show different strategies for different environmental situations or different partners. We give a wide overview of evolutionary game theory applications to microscopic units. In this first review situations on the cellular level are tackled. In particular metabolic problems are discussed, such as ATP-producing pathways, secretion of public goods and cross-feeding. Further topics are cyclic competition among more than two partners, intra- and inter-cellular signalling, the struggle between pathogens and the immune system, and the interactions of cancer cells. Moreover, we introduce the theoretical basics to encourage scientists to investigate problems in cell biology and molecular biology by evolutionary game theory.

  4. Social dilemmas in multistrategy evolutionary potential games

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    Szabó, György; Bunth, Gergely

    2018-01-01

    The nature of social dilemmas is studied in n -strategy evolutionary potential games on a square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions and the logit rule. For symmetric games with symmetric payoff matrices there are no dilemmas because of the coincidence of individual and common interests. The dilemmas are caused by the antisymmetric parts of the self- and cross-dependent payoff components if it modifies the preferred Nash equilibrium. The contentment of players and the emergence of dilemmas in the preferred Nash equilibria are illustrated on some two-dimensional cross sections of the parameter space.

  5. Evolutionary Minority Game with searching behavior

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    Zhang, Wei; Sun, Yuxin; Feng, Xu; Xiong, Xiong

    2015-10-01

    In this paper, we determine the impact of searching behavior on the evolutionary minority game (EMG). We introduce searching behavior in two ways: optimal neighbor searching and global searching. Our study investigates the distribution equilibriums of probabilities that agents follow a given strategy and on system performance of the game. The results indicate that the distribution equilibriums of the probabilities are different with searching behavior, as opposed to without searching behavior. The system performance becomes worse after adding the searching behavior. Additionally, we test other variables in a standard EMG with and without searching behavior.

  6. Evolutionary game theory and leadership.

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    Guastello, Stephen J

    2009-01-01

    Comments on the article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. This article offers a fresh perspective on leaders, followers, and their possible origins in nonhuman and primitive human behavior patterns. The connections between group coordination, leadership, and game theory have some prior history (Guastello, 2002; Guastello, Bock, Caldwell, & Bond, 2005; Guastello & Bond, 2004, 2007; Guastello & Guastello, 1998), however, that suggests that some points made by Van Vugt et al. could have been more accurate. The current author provides some suggetions to the author to improve on the accuracy of this article. PsycINFO Database Record 2009 APA.

  7. Evolutionary game theory and criticality

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    Mahmoodi, Korosh; Grigolini, Paolo

    2017-01-01

    We study a regular two-dimensional network of individuals playing the Prisonner’s Dilemma game with their neighbors, assigning to each individual the adoption of two different criteria to make a choice between cooperation and defection. For a fraction q  social pressure generates criticality. When q  =  0 a large incentive to cheat yields the extinction of cooperation and a modest one leads to the survival of cooperation. We show that for K={{K}\\text{c}} the adoption of a very small value of ɛ exerts a bias in favor of either cooperation or defection, as a form of criticality-induced intelligence, which leads the system to select either the cooperation or the defection branch, when K>{{K}\\text{c}} . Intermediate values of ɛ annihilated criticality-induced cognition and, as consequence, may favor defection choice even in the case when a wise payoff consideration is expected to yield the emergence of cooperation.

  8. Bridging the gap between Schumpeterian competition and evolutionary game theory

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, Esben Sloth

    This paper suggests that the analysis of Schumpeterian competition within the Nelson-Winter model should be complemented with evolutionary game theory. This model and its limitations for density-dependent Schumpeterian strategies are presented in terms of the equations of evolutionary dynamics....... Formulated as evolutionary games, the set of strategies can easily be extended from innovators and imitators to routinists, complementors, and mixers. All strategies are presented in relation to a modified version of the Hawk-Dove Game. In this setting, the possibility of coexistence of several Schumpeterian...... strategies is proved. This is an example of Schumpeterian competition within evolutionary game theory....

  9. Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium

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    Wang, Zhen; Wang, Lin; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

    2015-05-01

    Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and evolutionary game theory.

  10. Modeling Poker Challenges by Evolutionary Game Theory

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    Marco Alberto Javarone

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available We introduce a model for studying the evolutionary dynamics of Poker. Notably, despite its wide diffusion and the raised scientific interest around it, Poker still represents an open challenge. Recent attempts for uncovering its real nature, based on statistical physics, showed that Poker in some conditions can be considered as a skill game. In addition, preliminary investigations reported a neat difference between tournaments and ‘cash game’ challenges, i.e., between the two main configurations for playing Poker. Notably, these previous models analyzed populations composed of rational and irrational agents, identifying in the former those that play Poker by using a mathematical strategy, while in the latter those playing randomly. Remarkably, tournaments require very few rational agents to make Poker a skill game, while ‘cash game’ may require several rational agents for not being classified as gambling. In addition, when the agent interactions are based on the ‘cash game’ configuration, the population shows an interesting bistable behavior that deserves further attention. In the proposed model, we aim to study the evolutionary dynamics of Poker by using the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, in order to get further insights on its nature, and for better clarifying those points that remained open in the previous works (as the mentioned bistable behavior. In particular, we analyze the dynamics of an agent population composed of rational and irrational agents, that modify their behavior driven by two possible mechanisms: self-evaluation of the gained payoff, and social imitation. Results allow to identify a relation between the mechanisms for updating the agents’ behavior and the final equilibrium of the population. Moreover, the proposed model provides further details on the bistable behavior observed in the ‘cash game’ configuration.

  11. Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium

    CERN Document Server

    Wang, Zhen; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaz

    2015-01-01

    Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling th...

  12. Towards a richer evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McNamara, John M

    2013-11-06

    Most examples of the application of evolutionary game theory to problems in biology involve highly simplified models. I contend that it is time to move on and include much more richness in models. In particular, more thought needs to be given to the importance of (i) between-individual variation; (ii) the interaction between individuals, and hence the process by which decisions are reached; (iii) the ecological and life-history context of the situation; (iv) the traits that are under selection, and (v) the underlying psychological mechanisms that lead to behaviour. I give examples where including variation between individuals fundamentally changes predicted outcomes of a game. Variation also selects for real-time responses, again resulting in changed outcomes. Variation can select for other traits, such as choosiness and social sensitivity. More generally, many problems involve coevolution of more than one trait. I identify situations where a reductionist approach, in which a game is isolated from is ecological setting, can be misleading. I also highlight the need to consider flexibility of behaviour, mental states and other issues concerned with the evolution of mechanism.

  13. Chaotic Characteristics and Application of Cooperative Game and Evolutionary Game

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yujing Yang

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available According to a dynamical multiteam Cournot game in exploitation of a renewable resource, a new dynamic Cournot duopoly game model with team players in exploitation of a renewable resource is built up in this paper. Based on the theory of bifurcations of dynamical systems, the stability of the system is studied and the local stable region of Nash equilibrium point is obtained. The effect of the output adjustment speed parameters and the weight parameter of the system on the dynamic characteristics of the system are researched. The complexity of the system is described via the bifurcation diagrams, the Lyapunov exponents, the phase portrait, the time history diagram, and the fractal dimension. Furthermore, the chaos control of the system is realized by the parameter adjustment method. At last, an evolutionary game as a special dynamic system is constructed and analyzed which is more useful and helpful in application. The derived results have very important theoretical and practical values for the renewable resource market and companies.

  14. Coevolution of Artificial Agents Using Evolutionary Computation in Bargaining Game

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    Sangwook Lee

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issue in the field of game theory. This paper investigates the interaction and coevolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation (EC in the bargaining game. In particular, the game performance with regard to payoff through the interaction and coevolution of agents is studied. We present three kinds of EC based agents (EC-agent participating in the bargaining game: genetic algorithm (GA, particle swarm optimization (PSO, and differential evolution (DE. The agents’ performance with regard to changing condition is compared. From the simulation results it is found that the PSO-agent is superior to the other agents.

  15. An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Dario Madeo; Agostino Talarico; Alvaro Pascual-Leone; Chiara Mocenni; Emiliano Santarnecchi

    2017-01-01

    ... conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN...

  16. Strategy selection in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tan, Shaolin; Feng, Shasha; Wang, Pei; Chen, Yao

    2014-11-01

    Evolutionary game theory provides an appropriate tool for investigating the competition and diffusion of behavioral traits in biological or social populations. A core challenge in evolutionary game theory is the strategy selection problem: Given two strategies, which one is favored by the population? Recent studies suggest that the answer depends not only on the payoff functions of strategies but also on the interaction structure of the population. Group interactions are one of the fundamental interactive modes within populations. This work aims to investigate the strategy selection problem in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks. In detail, the strategy selection conditions are obtained for some typical networks with group interactions. Furthermore, the obtained conditions are applied to investigate selection between cooperation and defection in populations. The conditions for evolution of cooperation are derived for both the public goods game and volunteer's dilemma game. Numerical experiments validate the above analytical results.

  17. Strategic analysis in evolutionary genetics and the theory of games

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Unknown

    This paper is written in memory of John Maynard Smith. In a brief survey it discusses essential aspects of how game theory in biology relates to its counterpart in eco- nomics, the major transition in game theory initiated by. Maynard Smith, the discrepancies between genetic and phenotypic models in evolutionary biology, ...

  18. Evolutionary stability for matrix games under time constraints.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Garay, József; Csiszár, Villő; Móri, Tamás F

    2017-02-21

    Game theory focuses on payoffs and typically ignores time constraints that play an important role in evolutionary processes where the repetition of games can depend on the strategies, too. We introduce a matrix game under time constraints, where each pairwise interaction has two consequences: both players receive a payoff and they cannot play the next game for a specified time duration. Thus our model is defined by two matrices: a payoff matrix and an average time duration matrix. Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionary stability is extended to this class of games. We illustrate the effect of time constraints by the well-known prisoner's dilemma game, where additional time constraints can ensure the existence of unique evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), both pure and mixed, or the coexistence of two pure ESS. Our general results may be useful in several fields of biology where evolutionary game theory is applied, principally in ecological games, where time constraints play an inevitable role. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. Four classes of interactions for evolutionary games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szabó, György; Bodó, Kinga S; Allen, Benjamin; Nowak, Martin A

    2015-08-01

    The symmetric four-strategy games are decomposed into a linear combination of 16 basis games represented by orthogonal matrices. Among these basis games four classes can be distinguished as it is already found for the three-strategy games. The games with self-dependent (cross-dependent) payoffs are characterized by matrices consisting of uniform rows (columns). Six of 16 basis games describe coordination-type interactions among the strategy pairs and three basis games span the parameter space of the cyclic components that are analogous to the rock-paper-scissors games. In the absence of cyclic components the game is a potential game and the potential matrix is evaluated. The main features of the four classes of games are discussed separately and we illustrate some characteristic strategy distributions on a square lattice in the low noise limit if logit rule controls the strategy evolution. Analysis of the general properties indicates similar types of interactions at larger number of strategies for the symmetric matrix games.

  20. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of minimum-effort coordination games

    CERN Document Server

    Li, Kun; Wang, Long

    2016-01-01

    The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the predictions of classic game theory. In the framework of classic game theory, any common effort level is a strict and trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium, so that no desideratum is provided for selecting among them. Behavior experiments, however, show that the effort levels employed by subjects are inversely related to the effort costs. Here, we combine coalescence theory and evolutionary game theory to investigate this game in finite populations. Both analytic results and individual-based simulations show that effort costs play a key role in the evolution of contribution levels, which is in good agreement with those observed experimentally. Besides well-mixed populations, set structured populations, where the population structure itself is a consequence of the evolutio...

  1. Bone remodeling as a spatial evolutionary game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ryser, Marc D; Murgas, Kevin A

    2017-04-07

    Bone remodeling is a complex process involving cell-cell interactions, biochemical signaling and mechanical stimuli. Early models of the biological aspects of remodeling were non-spatial and focused on the local dynamics at a fixed location in the bone. Several spatial extensions of these models have been proposed, but they generally suffer from two limitations: first, they are not amenable to analysis and are computationally expensive, and second, they neglect the role played by bone-embedded osteocytes. To address these issues, we developed a novel model of spatial remodeling based on the principles of evolutionary game theory. The analytically tractable framework describes the spatial interactions between zones of bone resorption, bone formation and quiescent bone, and explicitly accounts for regulation of remodeling by bone-embedded, mechanotransducing osteocytes. Using tools from the theory of interacting particle systems we systematically classified the different dynamic regimes of the spatial model and identified regions of parameter space that allow for global coexistence of resorption, formation and quiescence, as observed in physiological remodeling. In coexistence scenarios, three-dimensional simulations revealed the emergence of sponge-like bone clusters. Comparison between spatial and non-spatial dynamics revealed substantial differences and suggested a stabilizing role of space. Our findings emphasize the importance of accounting for spatial structure and bone-embedded osteocytes when modeling the process of bone remodeling. Thanks to the lattice-based framework, the proposed model can easily be coupled to a mechanical model of bone loading. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  2. Evolutionary Snowdrift Game Incorporating Costly Punishment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yap Yee Jiun

    2012-01-01

    -watak, a, ß, dan nisbah faedah-kos r dalam SG, sistem tiga watak ini berkembang sama ada kepada keadaan mantap yang hanya terdiri daripada karekter C dan P atau hanya karekter C dan D dalam populasi gabungan sempurna. Situasi sebelumnya mempamerkan peningkatan dalam kerjasama berkaitan dengan SG, manakala yang sebelumnya mirip dengan SG. Dinamik dalam mendapatkan pelbagai keadaan mantap didapati adalah berbeza. Secara terperincinya, kunci utama dalam keadaan mantap dan dinamik diperolehi melalui simulasi yang diperolehi daripada satu set persamaan perbezaan. Kepekaan terhadap permulaan pembahagian watak dikaji dengan menggambarkan aliran dalam portrait fasa dan menganalisa sifat titik-titik tetap. Analisa juga menggambarkan fungsi karekter-P dalam menghalang suatu sistem daripada dicerobohi agen karekter-D.  Bermula dengan satu populasi yang hanya terdiri daripada agen C & D, karekter-D bertujuan menyerang sistem yang tidak mampu bertahan apabila pecahan permulaan agen P melebihi r/ß. Model, didefinisikan sebagai algoritma simulasi, boleh secara amnya menggabungkan banyak aspek menarik, seperti di dalam populasi rangkaian.KEYWORDS: evolutionary; snowdrift game; well-mixed population

  3. Communicating with sentences: A multi-word naming game model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong; Hu, Jianwei

    2018-01-01

    Naming game simulates the process of naming an object by a single word, in which a population of communicating agents can reach global consensus asymptotically through iteratively pair-wise conversations. We propose an extension of the single-word model to a multi-word naming game (MWNG), simulating the case of describing a complex object by a sentence (multiple words). Words are defined in categories, and then organized as sentences by combining them from different categories. We refer to a formatted combination of several words as a pattern. In such an MWNG, through a pair-wise conversation, it requires the hearer to achieve consensus with the speaker with respect to both every single word in the sentence as well as the sentence pattern, so as to guarantee the correct meaning of the saying; otherwise, they fail reaching consensus in the interaction. We validate the model in three typical topologies as the underlying communication network, and employ both conventional and man-designed patterns in performing the MWNG.

  4. Why Darwin would have loved evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brown, Joel S

    2016-09-14

    Humans have marvelled at the fit of form and function, the way organisms' traits seem remarkably suited to their lifestyles and ecologies. While natural selection provides the scientific basis for the fit of form and function, Darwin found certain adaptations vexing or particularly intriguing: sex ratios, sexual selection and altruism. The logic behind these adaptations resides in frequency-dependent selection where the value of a given heritable phenotype (i.e. strategy) to an individual depends upon the strategies of others. Game theory is a branch of mathematics that is uniquely suited to solving such puzzles. While game theoretic thinking enters into Darwin's arguments and those of evolutionists through much of the twentieth century, the tools of evolutionary game theory were not available to Darwin or most evolutionists until the 1970s, and its full scope has only unfolded in the last three decades. As a consequence, game theory is applied and appreciated rather spottily. Game theory not only applies to matrix games and social games, it also applies to speciation, macroevolution and perhaps even to cancer. I assert that life and natural selection are a game, and that game theory is the appropriate logic for framing and understanding adaptations. Its scope can include behaviours within species, state-dependent strategies (such as male, female and so much more), speciation and coevolution, and expands beyond microevolution to macroevolution. Game theory clarifies aspects of ecological and evolutionary stability in ways useful to understanding eco-evolutionary dynamics, niche construction and ecosystem engineering. In short, I would like to think that Darwin would have found game theory uniquely useful for his theory of natural selection. Let us see why this is so. © 2016 The Author(s).

  5. Why Darwin would have loved evolutionary game theory

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-01-01

    Humans have marvelled at the fit of form and function, the way organisms' traits seem remarkably suited to their lifestyles and ecologies. While natural selection provides the scientific basis for the fit of form and function, Darwin found certain adaptations vexing or particularly intriguing: sex ratios, sexual selection and altruism. The logic behind these adaptations resides in frequency-dependent selection where the value of a given heritable phenotype (i.e. strategy) to an individual depends upon the strategies of others. Game theory is a branch of mathematics that is uniquely suited to solving such puzzles. While game theoretic thinking enters into Darwin's arguments and those of evolutionists through much of the twentieth century, the tools of evolutionary game theory were not available to Darwin or most evolutionists until the 1970s, and its full scope has only unfolded in the last three decades. As a consequence, game theory is applied and appreciated rather spottily. Game theory not only applies to matrix games and social games, it also applies to speciation, macroevolution and perhaps even to cancer. I assert that life and natural selection are a game, and that game theory is the appropriate logic for framing and understanding adaptations. Its scope can include behaviours within species, state-dependent strategies (such as male, female and so much more), speciation and coevolution, and expands beyond microevolution to macroevolution. Game theory clarifies aspects of ecological and evolutionary stability in ways useful to understanding eco-evolutionary dynamics, niche construction and ecosystem engineering. In short, I would like to think that Darwin would have found game theory uniquely useful for his theory of natural selection. Let us see why this is so. PMID:27605503

  6. Detection of communities with Naming Game-based methods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Uzun, Thais Gobet; Ribeiro, Carlos Henrique Costa

    2017-01-01

    Complex networks are often organized in groups or communities of agents that share the same features and/or functions, and this structural organization is built naturally with the formation of the system. In social networks, we argue that the dynamic of linguistic interactions of agreement among people can be a crucial factor in generating this community structure, given that sharing opinions with another person bounds them together, and disagreeing constantly would probably weaken the relationship. We present here a computational model of opinion exchange that uncovers the community structure of a network. Our aim is not to present a new community detection method proper, but to show how a model of social communication dynamics can reveal the (simple and overlapping) community structure in an emergent way. Our model is based on a standard Naming Game, but takes into consideration three social features: trust, uncertainty and opinion preference, that are built over time as agents communicate among themselves. We show that the separate addition of each social feature in the Naming Game results in gradual improvements with respect to community detection. In addition, the resulting uncertainty and trust values classify nodes and edges according to role and position in the network. Also, our model has shown a degree of accuracy both for non-overlapping and overlapping communities that are comparable with most algorithms specifically designed for topological community detection.

  7. Naming game with biased assimilation over adaptive networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fu, Guiyuan; Zhang, Weidong

    2018-01-01

    The dynamics of two-word naming game incorporating the influence of biased assimilation over adaptive network is investigated in this paper. Firstly an extended naming game with biased assimilation (NGBA) is proposed. The hearer in NGBA accepts the received information in a biased manner, where he may refuse to accept the conveyed word from the speaker with a predefined probability, if the conveyed word is different from his current memory. Secondly, the adaptive network is formulated by rewiring the links. Theoretical analysis is developed to show that the population in NGBA will eventually reach global consensus on either A or B. Numerical simulation results show that the larger strength of biased assimilation on both words, the slower convergence speed, while larger strength of biased assimilation on only one word can slightly accelerate the convergence; larger population size can make the rate of convergence slower to a large extent when it increases from a relatively small size, while such effect becomes minor when the population size is large; the behavior of adaptively reconnecting the existing links can greatly accelerate the rate of convergence especially on the sparse connected network.

  8. Altruistic duality in evolutionary game theory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cheon, Taksu

    2003-11-01

    A game-theoretic dynamical model of social preference and enlightened self-interest is formulated. Existence of symmetry and duality in the game matrices with altruistic social preference is revealed. The model quantitatively describes the dynamical evolution of altruism in prisoner's dilemma and the regime change in prey-predator dynamics.

  9. Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Chaitanya S. Gokhale; Arne Traulsen

    2012-01-01

    .... However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size.

  10. Invisible hand effect in an evolutionary minority game model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sysi-Aho, Marko; Saramäki, Jari; Kaski, Kimmo

    2005-03-01

    In this paper, we study the properties of a minority game with evolution realized by using genetic crossover to modify fixed-length decision-making strategies of agents. Although the agents in this evolutionary game act selfishly by trying to maximize their own performances only, it turns out that the whole society will eventually be rewarded optimally. This “invisible hand” effect is what Adam Smith over two centuries ago expected to take place in the context of free market mechanism. However, this behaviour of the society of agents is realized only under idealized conditions, where all agents are utilizing the same efficient evolutionary mechanism. If on the other hand part of the agents are adaptive, but not evolutionary, the system does not reach optimum performance, which is also the case if part of the evolutionary agents form a uniformly acting “cartel”.

  11. Modeling evolutionary games in populations with demographic structure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Li, Xiang-Yi; Giaimo, Stefano; Baudisch, Annette

    2015-01-01

    Classic life history models are often based on optimization algorithms, focusing on the adaptation of survival and reproduction to the environment, while neglecting frequency dependent interactions in the population. Evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, studies frequency dependent strategy...... interactions, but usually omits life history and the demographic structure of the population. Here we show how an integration of both aspects can substantially alter the underlying evolutionary dynamics. We study the replicator dynamics of strategy interactions in life stage structured populations. Individuals...

  12. Evolutionary game theory: molecules as players.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bohl, Katrin; Hummert, Sabine; Werner, Sarah; Basanta, David; Deutsch, Andreas; Schuster, Stefan; Theissen, Günter; Schroeter, Anja

    2014-12-01

    In this and an accompanying paper we review the use of game theoretical concepts in cell biology and molecular biology. This review focuses on the subcellular level by considering viruses, genes, and molecules as players. We discuss in which way catalytic RNA can be treated by game theory. Moreover, genes can compete for success in replication and can have different strategies in interactions with other genetic elements. Also transposable elements, or "jumping genes", can act as players because they usually bear different traits or strategies. Viruses compete in the case of co-infecting a host cell. Proteins interact in a game theoretical sense when forming heterodimers. Finally, we describe how the Shapley value can be applied to enzymes in metabolic pathways. We show that game theory can be successfully applied to describe and analyse scenarios at the molecular level resulting in counterintuitive conclusions.

  13. Near-Minimal Node Control of Networked Evolutionary Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Riehl, James Robert; Cao, Ming

    2014-01-01

    We investigate a problem related to the controllability of networked evolutionary games, first presenting an algorithm that computes a near-minimal set of nodes to drive all nodes in a tree network to a desired strategy, and then briefly discussing an algorithm that works for arbitrary networks

  14. Strategic analysis in evolutionary genetics and the theory of games

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Home; Journals; Journal of Genetics; Volume 84; Issue 1. Strategic analysis in evolutionary genetics and the theory of games. Peter Hammerstein. Perspectives Volume 84 Issue 1 April 2005 pp 7-12. Fulltext. Click here to view fulltext PDF. Permanent link: http://www.ias.ac.in/article/fulltext/jgen/084/01/0007-0012. Keywords.

  15. Some Results on Ethnic Conflicts Based on Evolutionary Game Simulation

    CERN Document Server

    Qin, Jun; Wu, Hongrun; Liu, Yuhang; Tong, Xiaonian; Zheng, Bojin

    2014-01-01

    The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially origining from negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a harmonious ethnic relationship, some scholars have proposed a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing civic identity. However, this viewpoint is discussed only from a philosophical prospective and still lack supports of scientific evidences. Because ethic group and ethnic identity are products of evolution and ethnic identity is the parochialism strategy under the perspective of game theory, this paper proposes an evolutionary game simulation model to study the relationship between civic identity and ethnic conflict based on evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicate that: 1) the ratio of individuals with civic identity has a positive association with the frequency of ethnic conflicts; 2) ethnic conflict will not die out by killing all ethni...

  16. Testability of evolutionary game dynamics based on experimental economics data

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Yijia; Chen, Xiaojie; Wang, Zhijian

    2017-11-01

    Understanding the dynamic processes of a real game system requires an appropriate dynamics model, and rigorously testing a dynamics model is nontrivial. In our methodological research, we develop an approach to testing the validity of game dynamics models that considers the dynamic patterns of angular momentum and speed as measurement variables. Using Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) games as an example, we illustrate the geometric patterns in the experiment data. We then derive the related theoretical patterns from a series of typical dynamics models. By testing the goodness-of-fit between the experimental and theoretical patterns, we show that the validity of these models can be evaluated quantitatively. Our approach establishes a link between dynamics models and experimental systems, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the most effective and rigorous strategy for ascertaining the testability of evolutionary game dynamics models.

  17. Evolutionary swarm neural network game engine for Capture Go.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cai, Xindi; Venayagamoorthy, Ganesh K; Wunsch, Donald C

    2010-03-01

    Evaluation of the current board position is critical in computer game engines. In sufficiently complex games, such a task is too difficult for a traditional brute force search to accomplish, even when combined with expert knowledge bases. This motivates the investigation of alternatives. This paper investigates the combination of neural networks, particle swarm optimization (PSO), and evolutionary algorithms (EAs) to train a board evaluator from zero knowledge. By enhancing the survivors of an EA with PSO, the hybrid algorithm successfully trains the high-dimensional neural networks to provide an evaluation of the game board through self-play. Experimental results, on the benchmark game of Capture Go, demonstrate that the hybrid algorithm can be more powerful than its individual parts, with the system playing against EA and PSO trained game engines. Also, the winning results of tournaments against a Hill-Climbing trained game engine confirm that the improvement comes from the hybrid algorithm itself. The hybrid game engine is also demonstrated against a hand-coded defensive player and a web player. Copyright 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. An application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Swami Iyer

    Full Text Available The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.

  19. An application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

    2014-01-01

    The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.

  20. An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

    2014-01-01

    The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games. PMID:24709851

  1. Adaptive Topographies and Equilibrium Selection in an Evolutionary Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Osinga, Hinke M.; Marshall, James A. R.

    2015-01-01

    It has long been known in the field of population genetics that adaptive topographies, in which population equilibria maximise mean population fitness for a trait regardless of its genetic bases, do not exist. Whether one chooses to model selection acting on a single locus or multiple loci does matter. In evolutionary game theory, analysis of a simple and general game involving distinct roles for the two players has shown that whether strategies are modelled using a single ‘locus’ or one ‘locus’ for each role, the stable population equilibria are unchanged and correspond to the fitness-maximising evolutionary stable strategies of the game. This is curious given the aforementioned population genetical results on the importance of the genetic bases of traits. Here we present a dynamical systems analysis of the game with roles detailing how, while the stable equilibria in this game are unchanged by the number of ‘loci’ modelled, equilibrium selection may differ under the two modelling approaches. PMID:25706762

  2. Evolutionary game theory as a framework for studying biological invasions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pintor, Lauren M; Brown, Joel S; Vincent, Thomas L

    2011-04-01

    Although biological invasions pose serious threats to biodiversity, they also provide the opportunity to better understand interactions between the ecological and evolutionary processes structuring populations and communities. However, ecoevolutionary frameworks for studying species invasions are lacking. We propose using game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as a conceptual framework for integrating the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of invasions. We suggest that the pathways by which a recipient community may have no ESS provide mechanistic hypotheses for how such communities may be vulnerable to invasion and how invaders can exploit these vulnerabilities. We distinguish among these pathways by formalizing the evolutionary contexts of the invader relative to the recipient community. We model both the ecological and the adaptive dynamics of the interacting species. We show how the ESS concept provides new mechanistic hypotheses for when invasions result in long- or short-term increases in biodiversity, species replacement, and subsequent evolutionary changes.

  3. Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ricardo Azevedo Araujo

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium in the game theory evolutionary set up. A complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labour market is provided.

  4. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND THE EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sirghi Nicoleta

    2013-07-01

    Full Text Available The neoclassical theory of the firm deals with the pattern of perfect competition, within which the perfect information available to economic agents provides instant allocation of production factors and access to economic goods. The Austrian School (C. Menger, L. von Mises, Hayek, etc. supported the idea of minimal state intervention on the markets, bringing important conceptual developments on the theory of the firm. Hirschleifer (1982 put forward the model of social and institutional functioning, arguing that the game theory is able to predict the outcome of the collective behavior and the human characteristics necessary for building the respective institutions.The evolutionary theory provides the firm and the entrepreneur the recognition of the functions of innovation, of generating and exploiting information and of organizing and coordinating production. The evolutionary perspective of the firm assumes the existence of a body of knowledge that is acquired through and builds up the organizational memory, subsequently found in routines, all choices being made based on these routines (Nelson and Winter, 2002. The evolution of the firm is considered to be similar to natural selection, but unlike the classic market selection, the evolutionists suggest the existence of a plurality of selection media. The present research is structured as follows: a brief introduction into the theories of the firm, the second part of the paper analyzes the theories of the firm from an institutional, neo-institutional and evolutionary perspective. In the third part of the paper the evolutionary games are described and analyzed from the evolutionary perspective of the firm. The last part of the paper represents a study of the “hawk-dove” game dynamic replicator. The final conclusions of the paper show that the evolutionary theory brings valuable contributions to the foundation of explanations regarding economic phenomena, indicating new directions for advanced

  5. Dilemma strength as a framework for advancing evolutionary game theory. Reply to comments on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games"

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Zhen; Kokubo, Satoshi; Jusup, Marko; Tanimoto, Jun

    2015-09-01

    While comprehensive reviews of the literature, by gathering in one place most of the relevant information, undoubtedly steer the development of every scientific field, we found that the comments in response to a review article can be as informative as the review itself, if not more. Namely, reading through the comments on the ideas expressed in Ref. [1], we could identify a number of pressing problems for evolutionary game theory, indicating just how much space there still is for major advances and breakthroughs. In an attempt to bring a sense of order to a multitude of opinions, we roughly classified the comments into three categories, i.e. those concerned with: (i) the universality of scaling in heterogeneous topologies, including empirical dynamic networks [2-8], (ii) the universality of scaling for more general game setups, such as the inclusion of multiple strategies and external features [4,9-11], and (iii) experimental confirmations of the theoretical developments [2,12,13].

  6. Extinction dynamics from metastable coexistences in an evolutionary game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Hye Jin; Traulsen, Arne

    2017-10-01

    Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics can lead to stable coexistences of different types. Stochasticity, however, drives the loss of such coexistences. This extinction is usually accompanied by population size fluctuations. We investigate the most probable extinction trajectory under such fluctuations by mapping a stochastic evolutionary model to a problem of classical mechanics using the Wentzel-Kramers-Brillouin (WKB) approximation. Our results show that more abundant types in a coexistence may be more likely to go extinct first, in good agreement with previous results. The distance between the coexistence and extinction points is not a good predictor of extinction either. Instead, the WKB method correctly predicts the type going extinct first.

  7. Statistical physics and computational methods for evolutionary game theory

    CERN Document Server

    Javarone, Marco Alberto

    2018-01-01

    This book presents an introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) which is an emerging field in the area of complex systems attracting the attention of researchers from disparate scientific communities. EGT allows one to represent and study several complex phenomena, such as the emergence of cooperation in social systems, the role of conformity in shaping the equilibrium of a population, and the dynamics in biological and ecological systems. Since EGT models belong to the area of complex systems, statistical physics constitutes a fundamental ingredient for investigating their behavior. At the same time, the complexity of some EGT models, such as those realized by means of agent-based methods, often require the implementation of numerical simulations. Therefore, beyond providing an introduction to EGT, this book gives a brief overview of the main statistical physics tools (such as phase transitions and the Ising model) and computational strategies for simulating evolutionary games (such as Monte Carlo algor...

  8. Game Theory-Inspired Evolutionary Algorithm for Global Optimization

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guanci Yang

    2017-09-01

    Full Text Available Many approaches that model specific intelligent behaviors perform excellently in solving complex optimization problems. Game theory is widely recognized as an important tool in many fields. This paper introduces a game theory-inspired evolutionary algorithm for global optimization (GameEA. A formulation to estimate payoff expectations is provided, which is a mechanism to make a player become a rational decision-maker. GameEA has one population (i.e., set of players and generates new offspring only through an imitation operator and a belief-learning operator. An imitation operator adopts learning strategies and actions from other players to improve its competitiveness and applies these strategies to future games where one player updates its chromosome by strategically copying segments of gene sequences from a competitor. Belief learning refers to models in which a player adjusts his/her strategies, behavior or chromosomes by analyzing the current history information to improve solution quality. Experimental results on various classes of problems show that GameEA outperforms the other four algorithms on stability, robustness, and accuracy.

  9. Games of life and death: antibiotic resistance and production through the lens of evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Conlin, Peter L; Chandler, Josephine R; Kerr, Benjamin

    2014-10-01

    In this review, we demonstrate how game theory can be a useful first step in modeling and understanding interactions among bacteria that produce and resist antibiotics. We introduce the basic features of evolutionary game theory and explore model microbial systems that correspond to some classical games. Each game discussed defines a different category of social interaction with different resulting population dynamics (exclusion, coexistence, bistability, cycling). We then explore how the framework can be extended to incorporate some of the complexity of natural microbial communities. Overall, the game theoretical perspective helps to guide our expectations about the evolution of some forms of antibiotic resistance and production because it makes clear the precise nature of social interaction in this context. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  10. Spatial Evolutionary Games of Interaction among Generic Cancer Cells

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bach, Lars Arve; Sumpter, David J.T.; Alsner, Jan

    2003-01-01

    Evolutionary game models of cellular interactions have shown that heterogeneity in the cellular genotypic composition is maintained through evolution to stable coexistence of growth-promoting and non-promoting cell types. We generalise these mean-field models and relax the assumption of perfect m...... at a cellular level. This study thus points a new direction towards more plausible spatial tumour modelling and the understanding of cancerous growth....

  11. Changes of behavior tendency in the evolutionary minority game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yu-Xia; Liang, Wen-Yao; Liu, Xue-Mei

    2014-11-01

    It is by now well established that the agents change from extreme behavior to confusion when the situation changed from easy time to depression in the evolutionary minority game. However in this letter we explore the dynamics of evolving population with negative values of the reward, and demonstrate that the one-time phase change is a little part. In particular, we show the changes of behavior tendency and reveal the underlying dynamics of the changes.

  12. Promotion of cooperation in evolutionary game dynamics with local information.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Xuesong; Pan, Qiuhui; He, Mingfeng

    2018-01-21

    In this paper, we propose a strategy-updating rule driven by local information, which is called Local process. Unlike the standard Moran process, the Local process does not require global information about the strategic environment. By analyzing the dynamical behavior of the system, we explore how the local information influences the fixation of cooperation in two-player evolutionary games. Under weak selection, the decreasing local information leads to an increase of the fixation probability when natural selection does not favor cooperation replacing defection. In the limit of sufficiently large selection, the analytical results indicate that the fixation probability increases with the decrease of the local information, irrespective of the evolutionary games. Furthermore, for the dominance of defection games under weak selection and for coexistence games, the decreasing of local information will lead to a speedup of a single cooperator taking over the population. Overall, to some extent, the local information is conducive to promoting the cooperation. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  13. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szabó, György; Hauert, Christoph

    2002-12-01

    Voluntary participation in public good games has recently been demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to avoid deadlocks in states of mutual defection and to promote persistent cooperative behavior. Apart from cooperators and defectors a third strategical type is considered: the risk averse loners who are unwilling to participate in the social enterprise and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type of cyclic dominance of the three strategies. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the effects of voluntary participation crucially depend on the underlying population structure. While leading to homogeneous states of all loners in well-mixed populations, we demonstrate that cyclic dominance produces self-organizing patterns on square lattices but leads to different types of oscillatory behavior on random regular graphs: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic, or increasing oscillations occur. These Monte Carlo simulations are complemented by predictions from pair approximation reproducing the results for random regular graphs particularly well.

  14. Evolutionary stability in continuous nonlinear public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Molina, Chai; Earn, David J D

    2017-01-01

    We investigate a type of public goods games played in groups of individuals who choose how much to contribute towards the production of a common good, at a cost to themselves. In these games, the common good is produced based on the sum of contributions from all group members, then equally distributed among them. In applications, the dependence of the common good on the total contribution is often nonlinear (e.g., exhibiting synergy or diminishing returns). To date, most theoretical and experimental studies have addressed scenarios in which the set of possible contributions is discrete. However, in many real-world situations, contributions are continuous (e.g., individuals volunteering their time). The "n-player snowdrift games" that we analyze involve continuously varying contributions. We establish under what conditions populations of contributing (or "cooperating") individuals can evolve and persist. Previous work on snowdrift games, using adaptive dynamics, has found that what we term an "equally cooperative" strategy is locally convergently and evolutionarily stable. Using static evolutionary game theory, we find conditions under which this strategy is actually globally evolutionarily stable. All these results refer to stability to invasion by a single mutant. We broaden the scope of existing stability results by showing that the equally cooperative strategy is locally stable to potentially large population perturbations, i.e., allowing for the possibility that mutants make up a non-negligible proportion of the population (due, for example, to genetic drift, environmental variability or dispersal).

  15. Trust Dynamics in WSNs: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Shigen Shen

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available A sensor node (SN in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs can decide whether to collaborate with others based on a trust management system (TMS by making a trust decision. In this paper, we study the trust decision and its dynamics that play a key role to stabilize the whole network using evolutionary game theory. When SNs are making their decisions to select action Trust or Mistrust, a WSNs trust game is created to reflect their utilities. An incentive mechanism bound with one SN’s trust degree is incorporated into this trust game and effectively promotes SNs to select action Trust. The replicator dynamics of SNs’ trust evolution, illustrating the evolutionary process of SNs selecting their actions, are given. We then propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies can be attained under different parameter values, which supply theoretical foundations to devise a TMS for WSNs. Moreover, we can find out the conditions that will lead SNs to choose action Trust as their final behavior. In this manner, we can assure WSNs’ security and stability by introducing a trust mechanism to satisfy these conditions. Experimental results have confirmed the proposed theorems and the effects of the incentive mechanism.

  16. Modeling evolutionary games in populations with demographic structure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Xiang-Yi; Giaimo, Stefano; Baudisch, Annette; Traulsen, Arne

    2015-09-07

    Classic life history models are often based on optimization algorithms, focusing on the adaptation of survival and reproduction to the environment, while neglecting frequency dependent interactions in the population. Evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, studies frequency dependent strategy interactions, but usually omits life history and the demographic structure of the population. Here we show how an integration of both aspects can substantially alter the underlying evolutionary dynamics. We study the replicator dynamics of strategy interactions in life stage structured populations. Individuals have two basic strategic behaviours, interacting in pairwise games. A player may condition behaviour on the life stage of its own, or that of the opponent, or the matching of life stages between both players. A strategy is thus defined as the set of rules that determines a player׳s life stage dependent behaviours. We show that the diversity of life stage structures and life stage dependent strategies can promote each other, and the stable frequency of basic strategic behaviours can deviate from game equilibrium in populations with life stage structures. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  17. Evidence Combination From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Xinyang; Han, Deqiang; Dezert, Jean; Deng, Yong; Shyr, Yu

    2016-09-01

    Dempster-Shafer evidence theory is a primary methodology for multisource information fusion because it is good at dealing with uncertain information. This theory provides a Dempster's rule of combination to synthesize multiple evidences from various information sources. However, in some cases, counter-intuitive results may be obtained based on that combination rule. Numerous new or improved methods have been proposed to suppress these counter-intuitive results based on perspectives, such as minimizing the information loss or deviation. Inspired by evolutionary game theory, this paper considers a biological and evolutionary perspective to study the combination of evidences. An evolutionary combination rule (ECR) is proposed to help find the most biologically supported proposition in a multievidence system. Within the proposed ECR, we develop a Jaccard matrix game to formalize the interaction between propositions in evidences, and utilize the replicator dynamics to mimick the evolution of propositions. Experimental results show that the proposed ECR can effectively suppress the counter-intuitive behaviors appeared in typical paradoxes of evidence theory, compared with many existing methods. Properties of the ECR, such as solution's stability and convergence, have been mathematically proved as well.

  18. Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with heterogenous structures.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wes Maciejewski

    2014-04-01

    Full Text Available Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections between individuals are more conducive to the spread of cooperative behaviours. In this article we show that such a conclusion largely depends on the individual-level interactions that take place. In particular, averaging payoffs garnered through game interactions rather than accumulating the payoffs can altogether remove the cooperative advantage of heterogeneous graphs while such a difference does not affect the outcome on homogeneous structures. In addition, the rate at which game interactions occur can alter the evolutionary outcome. Less interactions allow heterogeneous graphs to support more cooperation than homogeneous graphs, while higher rates of interactions make homogeneous and heterogeneous graphs virtually indistinguishable in their ability to support cooperation. Most importantly, we show that common measures of evolutionary advantage used in homogeneous populations, such as a comparison of the fixation probability of a rare mutant to that of the resident type, are no longer valid in heterogeneous populations. Heterogeneity causes a bias in where mutations occur in the population which affects the mutant's fixation probability. We derive the appropriate measures for heterogeneous populations that account for this bias.

  19. Integrating Evolutionary Game Theory into Mechanistic Genotype-Phenotype Mapping.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhu, Xuli; Jiang, Libo; Ye, Meixia; Sun, Lidan; Gragnoli, Claudia; Wu, Rongling

    2016-05-01

    Natural selection has shaped the evolution of organisms toward optimizing their structural and functional design. However, how this universal principle can enhance genotype-phenotype mapping of quantitative traits has remained unexplored. Here we show that the integration of this principle and functional mapping through evolutionary game theory gains new insight into the genetic architecture of complex traits. By viewing phenotype formation as an evolutionary system, we formulate mathematical equations to model the ecological mechanisms that drive the interaction and coordination of its constituent components toward population dynamics and stability. Functional mapping provides a procedure for estimating the genetic parameters that specify the dynamic relationship of competition and cooperation and predicting how genes mediate the evolution of this relationship during trait formation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  20. An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Madeo, Dario; Talarico, Agostino; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro; Mocenni, Chiara; Santarnecchi, Emiliano

    2017-11-22

    Our brain is a complex system of interconnected regions spontaneously organized into distinct networks. The integration of information between and within these networks is a continuous process that can be observed even when the brain is at rest, i.e. not engaged in any particular task. Moreover, such spontaneous dynamics show predictive value over individual cognitive profile and constitute a potential marker in neurological and psychiatric conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN), able to capture brain's interregional dynamics by balancing emulative and non-emulative attitudes among brain regions. This results in the net behavior of nodes composing resting-state networks identified using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), determining their moment-to-moment level of activation and inhibition as expressed by positive and negative shifts in BOLD fMRI signal. By spontaneously generating low-frequency oscillatory behaviors, the EGN model is able to mimic functional connectivity dynamics, approximate fMRI time series on the basis of initial subset of available data, as well as simulate the impact of network lesions and provide evidence of compensation mechanisms across networks. Results suggest evolutionary game theory on networks as a new potential framework for the understanding of human brain network dynamics.

  1. Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gokhale, Chaitanya S.; Traulsen, Arne

    2012-01-01

    Coevolution of two species is typically thought to favour the evolution of faster evolutionary rates helping a species keep ahead in the Red Queen race, where ‘it takes all the running you can do to stay where you are’. In contrast, if species are in a mutualistic relationship, it was proposed that the Red King effect may act, where it can be beneficial to evolve slower than the mutualistic species. The Red King hypothesis proposes that the species which evolves slower can gain a larger share of the benefits. However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size. PMID:22977149

  2. Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Traulsen, Arne

    2012-11-22

    Coevolution of two species is typically thought to favour the evolution of faster evolutionary rates helping a species keep ahead in the Red Queen race, where 'it takes all the running you can do to stay where you are'. In contrast, if species are in a mutualistic relationship, it was proposed that the Red King effect may act, where it can be beneficial to evolve slower than the mutualistic species. The Red King hypothesis proposes that the species which evolves slower can gain a larger share of the benefits. However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size.

  3. Evolutionary optimization and game strategies for advanced multi-disciplinary design applications to aeronautics and UAV design

    CERN Document Server

    Periaux, Jacques; Lee, Dong Seop Chris

    2015-01-01

    Many complex aeronautical design problems can be formulated with efficient multi-objective evolutionary optimization methods and game strategies. This book describes the role of advanced innovative evolution tools in the solution, or the set of solutions of single or multi disciplinary optimization. These tools use the concept of multi-population, asynchronous parallelization and hierarchical topology which allows different models including precise, intermediate and approximate models with each node belonging to the different hierarchical layer handled by a different Evolutionary Algorithm. The efficiency of evolutionary algorithms for both single and multi-objective optimization problems are significantly improved by the coupling of EAs with games and in particular by a new dynamic methodology named “Hybridized Nash-Pareto games”. Multi objective Optimization techniques and robust design problems taking into account uncertainties are introduced and explained in detail. Several applications dealing with c...

  4. The stability concept of evolutionary game theory a dynamic approach

    CERN Document Server

    1992-01-01

    These Notes grew from my research in evolutionary biology, specifically on the theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS theory), over the past ten years. Personally, evolutionary game theory has given me the opportunity to transfer my enthusiasm for abstract mathematics to more practical pursuits. I was fortunate to have entered this field in its infancy when many biologists recognized its potential but were not prepared to grant it general acceptance. This is no longer the case. ESS theory is now a rapidly expanding (in both applied and theoretical directions) force that no evolutionary biologist can afford to ignore. Perhaps, to continue the life-cycle metaphor, ESS theory is now in its late adolescence and displays much of the optimism and exuberance of this exciting age. There are dangers in writing a text about a theory at this stage of development. A comprehensive treatment would involve too many loose ends for the reader to appreciate the central message. On the other hand, the current central m...

  5. Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adami, Christoph; Schossau, Jory; Hintze, Arend

    2016-12-01

    Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic settings such as finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, stochastic decisions, communication between agents, and spatial interactions, require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. While highlighting standard mathematical results, we compare those to agent-based methods that can go beyond the limitations of equations and simulate the complexity of heterogeneous populations and an ever-changing set of interactors. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread (for example in the weak selection-strong mutation limit), but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  6. Communication scheme based on evolutionary spatial 2×2 games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ziaukas, Pranas; Ragulskis, Tautvydas; Ragulskis, Minvydas

    2014-06-01

    A visual communication scheme based on evolutionary spatial 2×2 games is proposed in this paper. Self-organizing patterns induced by complex interactions between competing individuals are exploited for hiding and transmitting secret visual information. Properties of the proposed communication scheme are discussed in details. It is shown that the hiding capacity of the system (the minimum size of the detectable primitives and the minimum distance between two primitives) is sufficient for the effective transmission of digital dichotomous images. Also, it is demonstrated that the proposed communication scheme is resilient to time backwards, plain image attacks and is highly sensitive to perturbations of private and public keys. Several computational experiments are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed communication scheme.

  7. The Simulation Study of the Change of Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rui QIN

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available This article tries to analyze the characteristics of the accounting standard for business enterprises, which is based on the idea of evolutionary game, in order to build a game model between stakeholders, and to conduct the simulation of the game model with NetLogo software. It shows the performance of all participants in the course of the game in a dynamic process, and the simulation results are analyzed, accordingly.

  8. The Simulation Study of the Change of Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

    OpenAIRE

    Qin, Rui; Zhaoquan JIAN

    2015-01-01

    This article tries to analyze the characteristics of the accounting standard for business enterprises, which is based on the idea of evolutionary game, in order to build a game model between stakeholders, and to conduct the simulation of the game model with NetLogo software. It shows the performance of all participants in the course of the game in a dynamic process, and the simulation results are analyzed, accordingly.

  9. Evolutionary Game between Commensal and Pathogenic Microbes in Intestinal Microbiota

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Amy Wu

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available The human intestinal microbiota plays a fundamental role in host health and is associated with many diseases when the homeostasis is disturbed. Although recent achievements in metagenomic sequencing have begun to reveal the variety of microbial composition associated with healthy and disease states, species-specific interactions and systematic dynamics still pose a great challenge to resolve the complexity of human microbiota. Using Clostridium difficile infection in human intestinal microbiota as an example, we apply evolutionary game theory to gain a fundamental understanding of the phenotypic variability and dynamic progression of microbiota. Here, microbiota dynamics are determined by the frequency-dependent fitness of each phenotypic population in the presence of the others. More specifically, the fitness is a function of phenotypic composition of the microbiota. We show how the phenotypic variability of microbiota can be explained by game theoretical approach. Knowledge of this study provides a new perspective in administrating antibiotic when dealing with pathogenic invasion. Instead of solely targeting to pathogens, therapies should aim at the whole ecosystem by reducing the fitness of pathogens compared to that of commensal microbes. In this case, the system will eradicate the pathogens by itself.

  10. Dynamic Properties of Evolutionary Multi-player Games in Finite Populations

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bin Wu

    2013-05-01

    Full Text Available William D. Hamilton famously stated that “human life is a many person game and not just a disjoined collection of two person games”. However, most of the theoretical results in evolutionary game theory have been developed for two player games. In spite of a multitude of examples ranging from humans to bacteria, multi-player games have received less attention than pairwise games due to their inherent complexity. Such complexities arise from the fact that group interactions cannot always be considered as a sum of multiple pairwise interactions. Mathematically, multi-player games provide a natural way to introduce non-linear, polynomial fitness functions into evolutionary game theory, whereas pairwise games lead to linear fitness functions. Similarly, studying finite populations is a natural way of introducing intrinsic stochasticity into population dynamics. While these topics have been dealt with individually, few have addressed the combination of finite populations and multi-player games so far. We are investigating the dynamical properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations. Properties of the fixation probability and fixation time, which are relevant for rare mutations, are addressed in well mixed populations. For more frequent mutations, the average abundance is investigated in well mixed as well as in structured populations. While the fixation properties are generalizations of the results from two player scenarios, addressing the average abundance in multi-player games gives rise to novel outcomes not possible in pairwise games.

  11. The ecology of cancer from an evolutionary game theory perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pacheco, Jorge M; Santos, Francisco C; Dingli, David

    2014-08-06

    The accumulation of somatic mutations, to which the cellular genome is permanently exposed, often leads to cancer. Analysis of any tumour shows that, besides the malignant cells, one finds other 'supporting' cells such as fibroblasts, immune cells of various types and even blood vessels. Together, these cells generate the microenvironment that enables the malignant cell population to grow and ultimately lead to disease. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of tumour growth and response to therapy is incomplete unless the interactions between the malignant cells and normal cells are investigated in the environment in which they take place. The complex interactions between cells in such an ecosystem result from the exchange of information in the form of cytokines- and adhesion-dependent interactions. Such processes impose costs and benefits to the participating cells that may be conveniently recast in the form of a game pay-off matrix. As a result, tumour progression and dynamics can be described in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT), which provides a convenient framework in which to capture the frequency-dependent nature of ecosystem dynamics. Here, we provide a tutorial review of the central aspects of EGT, establishing a relation with the problem of cancer. Along the way, we also digress on fitness and of ways to compute it. Subsequently, we show how EGT can be applied to the study of the various manifestations and dynamics of multiple myeloma bone disease and its preceding condition known as monoclonal gammopathy of undetermined significance. We translate the complex biochemical signals into costs and benefits of different cell types, thus defining a game pay-off matrix. Then we use the well-known properties of the EGT equations to reduce the number of core parameters that characterize disease evolution. Finally, we provide an interpretation of these core parameters in terms of what their function is in the ecosystem we are describing and generate

  12. A Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model of Modular Production Network

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wei He

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available As a new organization mode of production in the 21st century, modular production network is deemed extensively to be a source of competitiveness for lead firms in manufacturing industries. However, despite the abundant studies on the modular production network, there are very few studies from a dynamic perspective to discuss the conditions on which a modular production network develops. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the development of modular production network. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of member enterprises in a modular production network. Furthermore, by using NetLogo software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the effectiveness of the model. From the model, we can find that the final stable equilibrium strategy is related to such factors as the initial cost, the extra payoff, the cooperation willingness of both parties, the cooperation efforts, and the proportion each party can get from the extra payoff. To encourage the cooperation of production integrator and modular supplier, some suggestions are also provided.

  13. Fixation probabilities of evolutionary coordination games on two coupled populations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Liye; Ying, Limin; Zhou, Jie; Guan, Shuguang; Zou, Yong

    2016-09-01

    Evolutionary forces resulted from competitions between different populations are common, which change the evolutionary behavior of a single population. In an isolated population of coordination games of two strategies (e.g., s1 and s2), the previous studies focused on determining the fixation probability that the system is occupied by only one strategy (s1) and their expectation times, given an initial mixture of two strategies. In this work, we propose a model of two interdependent populations, disclosing the effects of the interaction strength on fixation probabilities. In the well-mixing limit, a detailed linear stability analysis is performed, which allows us to find and to classify the different equilibria, yielding a clear picture of the bifurcation patterns in phase space. We demonstrate that the interactions between populations crucially alter the dynamic behavior. More specifically, if the coupling strength is larger than some threshold value, the critical initial density of one strategy (s1) that corresponds to fixation is significantly delayed. Instead, the two populations evolve to the opposite state of all (s2) strategy, which are in favor of the red queen hypothesis. We delineate the extinction time of strategy (s1) explicitly, which is an exponential form. These results are validated by systematic numerical simulations.

  14. Stochastic noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies of a population of biological networks under natural selection.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Bor-Sen; Yeh, Chin-Hsun

    2017-12-01

    We review current static and dynamic evolutionary game strategies of biological networks and discuss the lack of random genetic variations and stochastic environmental disturbances in these models. To include these factors, a population of evolving biological networks is modeled as a nonlinear stochastic biological system with Poisson-driven genetic variations and random environmental fluctuations (stimuli). To gain insight into the evolutionary game theory of stochastic biological networks under natural selection, the phenotypic robustness and network evolvability of noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies are discussed from a stochastic Nash game perspective. The noncooperative strategy can be transformed into an equivalent multi-objective optimization problem and is shown to display significantly improved network robustness to tolerate genetic variations and buffer environmental disturbances, maintaining phenotypic traits for longer than the cooperative strategy. However, the noncooperative case requires greater effort and more compromises between partly conflicting players. Global linearization is used to simplify the problem of solving nonlinear stochastic evolutionary games. Finally, a simple stochastic evolutionary model of a metabolic pathway is simulated to illustrate the procedure of solving for two evolutionary game strategies and to confirm and compare their respective characteristics in the evolutionary process. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  15. Cancer treatment as a game: integrating evolutionary game theory into the optimal control of chemotherapy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Orlando, Paul A.; Gatenby, Robert A.; Brown, Joel S.

    2012-01-01

    Chemotherapy for metastatic cancer commonly fails due to evolution of drug resistance in tumor cells. Here, we view cancer treatment as a game in which the oncologists choose a therapy and tumors “choose” an adaptive strategy. We propose the oncologist can gain an upper hand in the game by choosing treatment strategies that anticipate the adaptations of the tumor. In particular, we examine the potential benefit of exploiting evolutionary tradeoffs in tumor adaptations to therapy. We analyze a math model where cancer cells face tradeoffs in allocation of resistance to two drugs. The tumor “chooses” its strategy by natural selection and the oncologist chooses her strategy by solving a control problem. We find that when tumor cells perform best by investing resources to maximize response to one drug the optimal therapy is a time-invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, if cancer cells perform better using a generalist strategy allowing resistance to both drugs simultaneously, then the optimal protocol is a time varying solution in which the two drug concentrations negatively covary. However, drug interactions can significantly alter these results. We conclude that knowledge of both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interactions is crucial in planning optimal chemotherapy schedules for individual patients. PMID:23197192

  16. Evolutionary game theory of growth factor production: implications for tumour heterogeneity and resistance to therapies

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Archetti, M

    2013-01-01

    .... I use evolutionary game theory to model collective interactions between cancer cells, to analyse the dynamics of the production of growth factors and the effect of therapies that reduce their amount...

  17. Impact of Roles Assignation on Heterogeneous Populations in Evolutionary Dictator Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Xinyang; Liu, Qi; Sadiq, Rehan; Deng, Yong

    2014-11-01

    The evolution of cooperation is a hot and challenging topic in the field of evolutionary game theory. Altruistic behavior, as a particular form of cooperation, has been widely studied by the ultimatum game but not by the dictator game, which provides a more elegant way to identify the altruistic component of behaviors. In this paper, the evolutionary dictator game is applied to model the real motivations of altruism. A degree-based regime is utilized to assess the impact of the assignation of roles on evolutionary outcome in populations of heterogeneous structure with two kinds of strategic updating mechanisms, which are based on Darwin's theory of evolution and punctuated equilibrium, respectively. The results show that the evolutionary outcome is affected by the role assignation and that this impact also depends on the strategic updating mechanisms, the function used to evaluate players' success, and the structure of populations.

  18. Opinion formation in time-varying social networks: The case of Naming Game

    CERN Document Server

    Maity, Suman Kalyan; Mukherjee, Animesh

    2012-01-01

    We study the dynamics of the Naming Game as an opinion formation model on time-varying social networks. This agent-based model captures the essential features of the agreement dynamics by means of a memory-based negotiation process. Our study focuses on the impact of time-varying properties of the social network of the agents on the Naming Game dynamics. We investigate the outcomes of the dynamics on two different types of time-varying data - (i) the networks vary across days and (ii) the networks vary within very short intervals of time (20 seconds). In the first case, we find that networks with strong community structure hinder the system from reaching global agreement; the evolution of the Naming Game in these networks maintains clusters of coexisting opinions indefinitely leading to metastability. In the second case, we investigate the evolution of the Naming Game in perfect synchronization with the time evolution of the underlying social network shedding new light on the traditional emergent properties o...

  19. Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hilbe, Christian; Wu, Bin; Traulsen, Arne; Nowak, Martin A.

    2015-01-01

    Repetition is one of the key mechanisms to maintain cooperation. In long-term relationships, in which individuals can react to their peers׳ past actions, evolution can promote cooperative strategies that would not be stable in one-shot encounters. The iterated prisoner׳s dilemma illustrates the power of repetition. Many of the key strategies for this game, such as ALLD, ALLC, Tit-for-Tat, or generous Tit-for-Tat, share a common property: players using these strategies enforce a linear relationship between their own payoff and their co-player׳s payoff. Such strategies have been termed zero-determinant (ZD). Recently, it was shown that ZD strategies also exist for multiplayer social dilemmas, and here we explore their evolutionary performance. For small group sizes, ZD strategies play a similar role as for the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma: extortionate ZD strategies are critical for the emergence of cooperation, whereas generous ZD strategies are important to maintain cooperation. In large groups, however, generous strategies tend to become unstable and selfish behaviors gain the upper hand. Our results suggest that repeated interactions alone are not sufficient to maintain large-scale cooperation. Instead, large groups require further mechanisms to sustain cooperation, such as the formation of alliances or institutions, or additional pairwise interactions between group members. PMID:25843220

  20. Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hilbe, Christian; Wu, Bin; Traulsen, Arne; Nowak, Martin A

    2015-06-07

    Repetition is one of the key mechanisms to maintain cooperation. In long-term relationships, in which individuals can react to their peers׳ past actions, evolution can promote cooperative strategies that would not be stable in one-shot encounters. The iterated prisoner׳s dilemma illustrates the power of repetition. Many of the key strategies for this game, such as ALLD, ALLC, Tit-for-Tat, or generous Tit-for-Tat, share a common property: players using these strategies enforce a linear relationship between their own payoff and their co-player׳s payoff. Such strategies have been termed zero-determinant (ZD). Recently, it was shown that ZD strategies also exist for multiplayer social dilemmas, and here we explore their evolutionary performance. For small group sizes, ZD strategies play a similar role as for the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma: extortionate ZD strategies are critical for the emergence of cooperation, whereas generous ZD strategies are important to maintain cooperation. In large groups, however, generous strategies tend to become unstable and selfish behaviors gain the upper hand. Our results suggest that repeated interactions alone are not sufficient to maintain large-scale cooperation. Instead, large groups require further mechanisms to sustain cooperation, such as the formation of alliances or institutions, or additional pairwise interactions between group members. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

  1. Local communities obstruct global consensus: Naming game on multi-local-world networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong; Fan, Zhengping; Xiang, Luna

    2018-02-01

    Community structure is essential for social communications, where individuals belonging to the same community are much more actively interacting and communicating with each other than those in different communities within the human society. Naming game, on the other hand, is a social communication model that simulates the process of learning a name of an object within a community of humans, where the individuals can generally reach global consensus asymptotically through iterative pair-wise conversations. The underlying network indicates the relationships among the individuals. In this paper, three typical topologies, namely random-graph, small-world and scale-free networks, are employed, which are embedded with the multi-local-world community structure, to study the naming game. Simulations show that (1) the convergence process to global consensus is getting slower as the community structure becomes more prominent, and eventually might fail; (2) if the inter-community connections are sufficiently dense, neither the number nor the size of the communities affects the convergence process; and (3) for different topologies with the same (or similar) average node-degree, local clustering of individuals obstruct or prohibit global consensus to take place. The results reveal the role of local communities in a global naming game in social network studies.

  2. The Phenotypic Gambit: Selective Pressures and ESS Methodology in Evolutionary Game Theory

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rubin, Hannah

    2016-01-01

    The ‘phenotypic gambit,’ the assumption that we can ignore genetics and look at the fitness of phenotypes to determine the expected evolutionary dynamics of a population, is often used in evolutionary game theory. However, as this paper will show, an overlooked genotype to phenotype map can

  3. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Co-opetition Relationship between Regional Logistics Nodes

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    D.Z. Wang

    2014-04-01

    Full Text Available The evolutionary game of co-opetition relationship between regional logistics nodes is studied in this paper. A replicator dynamic model is built to obtain the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS of the game. Then, according to the status and level of logistics nodes, the symmetric and asymmetric game models based on evolutionary game theory are proposed, respectively. The former is used to analyze the changing trends of co-opetition relationship between logistics nodes from a same layer of a logistics network. While the latter can be used to deal with the relationship forecasting problems between logistics nodes from different layers. The result of the case study reveals that the proposed models have good practicability and accuracy in dealing with the relationship forecasting problems within a regional logistics network.

  4. Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yong, Xi

    2016-01-01

    The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems. PMID:27118882

  5. Evolutionary games combining two or three pair coordinations on a square lattice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Király, Balázs; Szabó, György

    2017-10-01

    We study multiagent logit-rule-driven evolutionary games on a square lattice whose pair interactions are composed of a maximal number of nonoverlapping elementary coordination games describing Ising-type interactions between just two of the available strategies. Using Monte Carlo simulations we investigate the macroscopic noise-level-dependent behavior of the two- and three-pair games and the critical properties of the continuous phase transtitions these systems exhibit. The four-strategy game is shown to be equivalent to a system that consists of two independent and identical Ising models.

  6. Viability of an elementary syntactic structure in a population playing Naming Games

    CERN Document Server

    Brigatti, Edgardo

    2012-01-01

    We explore how the social dynamics of communication and learning can bring about the rise of a syntactic communication in a population of speakers. Our study is developed starting from a version of the Naming Game model where an elementary syntactic structure is introduced. This analysis shows how the transition from non-syntactic to syntactic communication is socially favored in communities which need to exchange a large number of concepts.

  7. Naming games in two-dimensional and small-world-connected random geometric networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lu, Qiming; Korniss, G.; Szymanski, B. K.

    2008-01-01

    We investigate a prototypical agent-based model, the naming game, on two-dimensional random geometric networks. The naming game [Baronchelli , J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. (2006) P06014] is a minimal model, employing local communications that captures the emergence of shared communication schemes (languages) in a population of autonomous semiotic agents. Implementing the naming games with local broadcasts on random geometric graphs, serves as a model for agreement dynamics in large-scale, autonomously operating wireless sensor networks. Further, it captures essential features of the scaling properties of the agreement process for spatially embedded autonomous agents. Among the relevant observables capturing the temporal properties of the agreement process, we investigate the cluster-size distribution and the distribution of the agreement times, both exhibiting dynamic scaling. We also present results for the case when a small density of long-range communication links are added on top of the random geometric graph, resulting in a “small-world”-like network and yielding a significantly reduced time to reach global agreement. We construct a finite-size scaling analysis for the agreement times in this case.

  8. Naming games in two-dimensional and small-world-connected random geometric networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lu, Qiming; Korniss, G; Szymanski, B K

    2008-01-01

    We investigate a prototypical agent-based model, the naming game, on two-dimensional random geometric networks. The naming game [Baronchelli, J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. (2006) P06014] is a minimal model, employing local communications that captures the emergence of shared communication schemes (languages) in a population of autonomous semiotic agents. Implementing the naming games with local broadcasts on random geometric graphs, serves as a model for agreement dynamics in large-scale, autonomously operating wireless sensor networks. Further, it captures essential features of the scaling properties of the agreement process for spatially embedded autonomous agents. Among the relevant observables capturing the temporal properties of the agreement process, we investigate the cluster-size distribution and the distribution of the agreement times, both exhibiting dynamic scaling. We also present results for the case when a small density of long-range communication links are added on top of the random geometric graph, resulting in a "small-world"-like network and yielding a significantly reduced time to reach global agreement. We construct a finite-size scaling analysis for the agreement times in this case.

  9. Analysis of naming game over networks in the presence of memory loss

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fu, Guiyuan; Cai, Yunze; Zhang, Weidong

    2017-08-01

    In this paper, we study the dynamics of naming game where individuals are under the influence of memory loss. An extended naming game incorporating memory loss is proposed. Different from the existing naming game models, the individual in the proposed model would forget some words with a probability in his memory during interaction and keep his conveyed word unchanged until he reaches a local agreement. We analyze the dynamics of the proposed model through extensive and comprehensive simulations, where four typical networks with different configuration are employed. The influence of memory loss as well as the population size on the performance of the proposed model is investigated. The simulation results show that (i) the stronger memory loss, the larger convergence time; (ii) as the strength of memory loss becomes stronger, maximum number of total words will decrease, while the maximum number of different words among the population remains almost unchanged; (iii) the maximum number of different words increases linearly with the increase of the population size and coincides with each other under different strength of memory loss. The findings in the proposed model may give an insight to understand better the influence of memory loss on the transient dynamics of language evolution and opinion formation over networks.

  10. Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Feng Zhang

    Full Text Available Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism, thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.

  11. Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Feng; Hui, Cang

    2011-01-01

    Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism), thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.

  12. Continual Online Evolutionary Planning for In-Game Build Order Adaptation in StarCraft

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Justesen, Niels Orsleff; Risi, Sebastian

    2017-01-01

    able to switch between predefined strategies, which makes it hard to adapt to new situations. This paper introduces an evolutionary-based method to overcome this challenge, called Continual Online Evolutionary Planning (COEP), which is able to perform in-game adaptive build-order planning. COEP...... was added to an open source StarCraft bot called UAlbertaBot and is able to outperform the built-in bots in the game as well as being competitive against a number of scripted opening strategies. The COEP augmented bot can change its build order dynamically and quickly adapt to the opponent’s strategy.......The real-time strategy game StarCraft has become an important benchmark for AI research as it poses a complex environment with numerous challenges. An important strategic aspect in this game is to decide what buildings and units to produce. StarCraft bots playing in AI competitions today are only...

  13. Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick

    2012-01-01

    By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures. PMID:22970237

  14. Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick

    2012-01-01

    By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, "games on graphs" study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner's dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner's dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures.

  15. Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jorge Peña

    Full Text Available By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, "games on graphs" study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner's dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner's dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures.

  16. Exploring social influence on evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games in networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zong, Hengshan; Jia, Guozhu; Cheng, Yang

    2015-11-01

    Though numerous studies demonstrate the importance of social influence in deciding individual decision-making process in networks, little has been done to explore its impact on players’ behavioral patterns in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs). This study investigates how social influenced strategy updating rules may affect the final equilibrium of game dynamics. The results show that weak social influence usually inhibits cooperation, while strong social influence has a mediating effect. The impacts of network structure and the existence of rebels in social influence scenarios are also tested. The paper provides a comprehensive interpretation on social influence effects on evolutionary PDGs in networks.

  17. Emergence of fast agreement in an overhearing population: The case of the naming game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kalyan Maity, Suman; Mukherjee, Animesh; Tria, Francesca; Loreto, Vittorio

    2013-03-01

    The naming game (NG) describes the agreement dynamics of a population of N agents interacting locally in pairs leading to the emergence of a shared vocabulary. This model has its relevance in the novel fields of semiotic dynamics and specifically to opinion formation and language evolution. The application of this model ranges from wireless sensor networks as spreading algorithms, leader election algorithms to user-based social tagging systems. In this paper, we introduce the concept of overhearing (i.e., at every time step of the game, a random set of Nδ individuals are chosen from the population who overhear the transmitted word from the speaker and accordingly reshape their inventories). When δ = 0 one recovers the behavior of the original NG. As one increases δ, the population of agents reaches a faster agreement with a significantly low-memory requirement. The convergence time to reach global consensus scales as logN as δ approaches 1.

  18. Modeling the emergence of a new language: Naming Game with hybridization

    CERN Document Server

    Pucci, L; Servedio, V D P

    2013-01-01

    In recent times, the research field of language dynamics has focused on the investigation of language evolution, dividing the work in three evolutive steps, according to the level of complexity: lexicon, categories and grammar. The Naming Game is a simple model capable of accounting for the emergence of a lexicon, intended as the set of words through which objects are named. We introduce a stochastic modification of the Naming Game model with the aim of characterizing the emergence of a new language as the result of the interaction of agents. We fix the initial phase by splitting the population in two sets speaking either language A or B. Whenever the result of the interaction of two individuals results in an agent able to speak both A and B, we introduce a finite probability that this state turns into a new idiom C, so to mimic a sort of hybridization process. We study the system in the space of parameters defining the interaction, and show that the proposed model displays a rich variety of behaviours, despi...

  19. In-Depth Analysis of the Naming Game Dynamics:. the Homogeneous Mixing Case

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baronchelli, Andrea; Loreto, Vittorio; Steels, Luc

    Language emergence and evolution have recently gained growing attention through multi-agent models and mathematical frameworks to study their behavior. Here we investigate further the Naming Game, a model able to account for the emergence of a shared vocabulary of form-meaning associations through social/cultural learning. Due to the simplicity of both the structure of the agents and their interaction rules, the dynamics of this model can be analyzed in great detail using numerical simulations and analytical arguments. This paper first reviews some existing results and then presents a new overall understanding.

  20. Non-Payoff Monotonic Dynamics in an Evolutionary Game of Courtship

    CERN Document Server

    Chacoma, Andrés; Zanette, Damián H

    2015-01-01

    We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by self-esteem, turns out to be non-payoff monotonic. This property gives rise to nontrivial evolution in the players' strategies, which we study both numerically and analytically.

  1. Analysis of Knowledge-Sharing Evolutionary Game in University Teacher Team

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huo, Mingkui

    2013-01-01

    The knowledge-sharing activity is a major drive force behind the progress and innovation of university teacher team. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article analyzes the knowledge-sharing process model of this team, studies the influencing mechanism of various factors such as knowledge aggregate gap, incentive coefficient and risk…

  2. A study of driver's route choice behavior based on evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jiang, Xiaowei; Ji, Yanjie; Du, Muqing; Deng, Wei

    2014-01-01

    This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. A simulated network with two alternative routes and one variable message sign is built to illustrate the analytic method. We assume that the drivers in the transportation system are bounded rational, and the traffic information they receive is incomplete. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers' route choice decision-making behaviors. Here we conclude that the traffic information plays an important role in the route choice behavior. The driver's route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results also demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver's route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent.

  3. Applying evolutionary psychology to a serious game about children's interpersonal conflict.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ingram, Gordon P D; Campos, Joana; Hondrou, Charline; Vasalou, Asimina; Martinho, Carlos; Joinson, Adam

    2012-12-20

    This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9-12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK) aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

  4. Applying Evolutionary Psychology to a Serious Game about Children's Interpersonal Conflict

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gordon P. D. Ingram

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9–12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

  5. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Competitive Information Dissemination on Social Networks: An Agent-Based Computational Approach

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Qing Sun

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Social networks are formed by individuals, in which personalities, utility functions, and interaction rules are made as close to reality as possible. Taking the competitive product-related information as a case, we proposed a game-theoretic model for competitive information dissemination in social networks. The model is presented to explain how human factors impact competitive information dissemination which is described as the dynamic of a coordination game and players’ payoff is defined by a utility function. Then we design a computational system that integrates the agent, the evolutionary game, and the social network. The approach can help to visualize the evolution of % of competitive information adoption and diffusion, grasp the dynamic evolution features in information adoption game over time, and explore microlevel interactions among users in different network structure under various scenarios. We discuss several scenarios to analyze the influence of several factors on the dissemination of competitive information, ranging from personality of individuals to structure of networks.

  6. Design games : A conceptual framework for dynamic evolutionary design

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Sönmez, N.O.; Erdem, A.

    2014-01-01

    Most evolutionary computation (EC) applications in design fields either assume simplified, static, performance-oriented procedures for design or focus on well-defined sub-problems, to be able to impose problem-solving and optimization schemes on design tasks, which render known EC techniques

  7. Self-organization of nodes in mobile ad hoc networks using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Janusz Kusyk

    2011-07-01

    Full Text Available In this paper, we present a distributed and scalable evolutionary game played by autonomous mobile ad hoc network (MANET nodes to place themselves uniformly over a dynamically changing environment without a centralized controller. A node spreading evolutionary game, called NSEG, runs at each mobile node, autonomously makes movement decisions based on localized data while the movement probabilities of possible next locations are assigned by a forced-based genetic algorithm (FGA. Because FGA takes only into account the current position of the neighboring nodes, our NSEG, combining FGA with game theory, can find better locations. In NSEG, autonomous node movement decisions are based on the outcome of the locally run FGA and the spatial game set up among it and the nodes in its neighborhood. NSEG is a good candidate for the node spreading class of applications used in both military tasks and commercial applications. We present a formal analysis of our NSEG to prove that an evolutionary stable state is its convergence point. Simulation experiments demonstrate that NSEG performs well with respect to network area coverage, uniform distribution of mobile nodes, and convergence speed.

  8. An IUR evolutionary game model on the patent cooperate of Shandong China

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Mengmeng; Ma, Yinghong; Liu, Zhiyuan; You, Xuemei

    2017-06-01

    Organizations of industries and university & research institutes cooperate to meet their respective needs based on social contacts, trust and share complementary resources. From the perspective of complex network together with the patent data of Shandong province in China, a novel evolutionary game model on patent cooperation network is presented. Two sides in the game model are industries and universities & research institutes respectively. The cooperation is represented by a connection when a new patent is developed together by the two sides. The optimal strategy of the evolutionary game model is quantified by the average positive cooperation probability p ¯ and the average payoff U ¯ . The feasibility of this game model is simulated on the parameters such as the knowledge spillover, the punishment, the development cost and the distribution coefficient of the benefit. The numerical simulations show that the cooperative behaviors are affected by the variation of parameters. The knowledge spillover displays different behaviors when the punishment is larger than the development cost or less than it. Those results indicate that reasonable punishment would improve the positive cooperation. The appropriate punishment will be useful to enhance the big degree nodes positively cooperate with industries and universities & research institutes. And an equitable plan for the distribution of cooperative profits is half-and-half distribution strategy for the two sides in game.

  9. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation and Enterprise Emission from the Perspective of Environmental Tax

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mai, Yazong

    2017-12-01

    In the context of the upcoming implementation of the environmental tax policy, there is a need for a focus on the relationship between government regulation and corporate emissions. To achieve the real effect of environmental tax policy, government need to regulate the illegal emissions of enterprises. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper analyses the strategic set of government regulators and polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy. By using the evolutionary game model, the utility function and payoff matrix of the both sides are constructed, and the evolutionary analysis and strategy adjustment of the environmental governance target and the actual profit of the stakeholders are carried out. Thus, the wrong behaviours could be corrected so that the equilibrium of the evolutionary system can be achieved gradually, which could also get the evolutionary stable strategies of the government and the polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy.

  10. What's in a Name: Is “Evolutionary Psychology” Eclipsing “Sociobiology” in the Scientific Literature?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gregory D. Webster

    2007-10-01

    Full Text Available Is the term “evolutionary psychology” supplanting “sociobiology” in the scientific literature? How influential was E. O. Wilson's (1975 book, Sociobiology, in establishing the discipline of the same name? Similarly, how influential were the two Tooby-Cosmides chapters appearing in The Adapted Mind (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992 in establishing evolutionary psychology as a viable outgrowth of sociobiology? The purpose of the present research was to answer these questions using quantitative analyses of publication trends. The Internet search engine Google Scholar was used to count the number of hits (i.e., the number of scholarly works, citations, etc. for “sociobiology” and “evolutionary psychology” separately per year from 1960 to 2003. Interrupted time-series analyses revealed significant increases (intercept shifts for sociobiology hits between 1974 and 1975, and for evolutionary psychology hits between 1991 and 1992. Evolutionary psychology hits also experienced a significant increase in change-over-time (a slope shift between 1991 and 1992. Growth curve analyses revealed that the rate of growth for evolutionary psychology, which was accelerating over time, was significantly greater than that for sociobiology, which was decelerating. The implications of these findings for understanding the histories of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are discussed.

  11. Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pichugin, Yuriy; Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Garcia, Julián; Traulsen, Arne; Rainey, Paul B

    2015-12-21

    The evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations has received much attention, but little is known about the effects of different modes of migration of individuals between groups. Here, we have incorporated four different modes of migration that differ in the degree of coordination among the individuals. For each mode of migration, we identify the set of multiplayer games in which the cooperative strategy has higher fixation probability than defection. The comparison shows that the set of games under which cooperation may evolve generally expands depending upon the degree of coordination among the migrating individuals. Weak altruism can evolve under all modes of individual migration, provided that the benefit to cost ratio is high enough. Strong altruism, however, evolves only if the mode of migration involves coordination of individual actions. Depending upon the migration frequency and degree of coordination among individuals, conditions that allow selection to work at the level of groups can be established. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  12. Evolutionary Game Model Study of Construction Green Supply Chain Management under the Government Intervention

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xing, Yuanzhi; Deng, Xiaoyi

    2017-11-01

    The paper first has defined the concepts of green supply chain management and evolution game theory, and pointed out the characteristics of green supply chain management in construction. The main participants and key links of the construction green supply chain management are determined by constructing the organization framework. This paper established the evolutionary game model between construction enterprises and recycling enterprises for the green supply chain closed-loop structure. The waste recycling evolutionary stability equilibrium solution is obtained to explore the principle and effective scope of government policy intervention. This paper put forward the relevant countermeasures to the green supply chain management in construction recycling stage from the government point of view. The conclusion has reference value and guidance to the final product construction enterprises, recycling enterprises and the government during green supply chain.

  13. Mean-field approximations of fixation time distributions of evolutionary game dynamics on graphs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ying, Li-Min; Zhou, Jie; Tang, Ming; Guan, Shu-Guang; Zou, Yong

    2018-02-01

    The mean fixation time is often not accurate for describing the timescales of fixation probabilities of evolutionary games taking place on complex networks. We simulate the game dynamics on top of complex network topologies and approximate the fixation time distributions using a mean-field approach. We assume that there are two absorbing states. Numerically, we show that the mean fixation time is sufficient in characterizing the evolutionary timescales when network structures are close to the well-mixing condition. In contrast, the mean fixation time shows large inaccuracies when networks become sparse. The approximation accuracy is determined by the network structure, and hence by the suitability of the mean-field approach. The numerical results show good agreement with the theoretical predictions.

  14. Older partner selection promotes the prevalence of cooperation in evolutionary games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, Guoli; Huang, Jincai; Zhang, Weiming

    2014-10-21

    Evolutionary games typically come with the interplays between evolution of individual strategy and adaptation to network structure. How these dynamics in the co-evolution promote (or obstruct) the cooperation is regarded as an important topic in social, economic, and biological fields. Combining spatial selection with partner choice, the focus of this paper is to identify which neighbour should be selected as a role to imitate during the process of co-evolution. Age, an internal attribute and kind of local piece of information regarding the survivability of the agent, is a significant consideration for the selection strategy. The analysis and simulations presented, demonstrate that older partner selection for strategy imitation could foster the evolution of cooperation. The younger partner selection, however, may decrease the level of cooperation. Our model highlights the importance of agent׳s age on the promotion of cooperation in evolutionary games, both efficiently and effectively. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  15. Co-Evolution of Opinion and Strategy in Persuasion Dynamics:. AN Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ding, Fei; Liu, Yun; Li, Yong

    In this paper, a new model of opinion formation within the framework of evolutionary game theory is presented. The model simulates strategic situations when people are in opinion discussion. Heterogeneous agents adjust their behaviors to the environment during discussions, and their interacting strategies evolve together with opinions. In the proposed game, we take into account payoff discount to join a discussion, and the situation that people might drop out of an unpromising game. Analytical and emulational results show that evolution of opinion and strategy always tend to converge, with utility threshold, memory length, and decision uncertainty parameters influencing the convergence time. The model displays different dynamical regimes when we set differently the rule when people are at a loss in strategy.

  16. Playing Multi-Action Adversarial Games: Online Evolutionary Planning versus Tree Search

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Risi, Sebastian

    2017-01-01

    We address the problem of playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games, which include many strategy games with extremely high branching factors as players take multiple actions each turn. This leads to the breakdown of standard tree search methods, including Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS......), as they become unable to reach a sufficient depth in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce Online Evolutionary Planning (OEP) to address this challenge, which searches for combinations of actions to perform during a single turn guided by a fitness function that evaluates the quality of a particular state...... of plans more efficiently than any of the tested tree search methods as it has a relative advantage when the number of actions per turn increases....

  17. Evolutionary game theory for physical and biological scientists. I. Training and validating population dynamics equations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liao, David; Tlsty, Thea D

    2014-08-06

    Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.

  18. Metric clusters in evolutionary games on scale-free networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kleineberg, Kaj-Kolja

    2017-12-01

    The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas in structured populations has been studied extensively in recent years. Whereas many theoretical studies have found that a heterogeneous network of contacts favors cooperation, the impact of spatial effects in scale-free networks is still not well understood. In addition to being heterogeneous, real contact networks exhibit a high mean local clustering coefficient, which implies the existence of an underlying metric space. Here we show that evolutionary dynamics in scale-free networks self-organize into spatial patterns in the underlying metric space. The resulting metric clusters of cooperators are able to survive in social dilemmas as their spatial organization shields them from surrounding defectors, similar to spatial selection in Euclidean space. We show that under certain conditions these metric clusters are more efficient than the most connected nodes at sustaining cooperation and that heterogeneity does not always favor-but can even hinder-cooperation in social dilemmas.

  19. Altruistic behavior pays, or the importance of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sánchez, Angel; Cuesta, José A.; Roca, Carlos P.

    2005-07-01

    Human behavior is one of the main problems for evolution, as it is often the case that human actions are disadvantageous for the self and advantageous for other people. Behind this puzzle are our beliefs about rational behavior, based on game theory. Here we show that by going beyond the standard game-theoretical conventions, apparently altruistic behavior can be understood as self-interested. We discuss in detail an example related to the so called Ultimatum game and illustrate the appearance of altruistic behavior induced by fluctuations. In addition, we claim that in general settings, fluctuations play a very relevant role, and we support this claim by considering a completely different example, namely the Stag-Hunt game.

  20. Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tongyao Feng

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

  1. Fixation of strategies with the Moran and Fermi processes in evolutionary games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Xuesong; He, Mingfeng; Kang, Yibin; Pan, Qiuhui

    2017-10-01

    A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite population was built. It combines the standard Moran and Fermi rules with two strategies cooperation and defection. We obtain the expressions of fixation probabilities and fixation times. The one-third rule which has been found in the frequency dependent Moran process also holds for our model. We obtain the conditions of strategy being an evolutionarily stable strategy in our model, and then make a comparison with the standard Moran process. Besides, the analytical results show that compared with the standard Moran process, fixation occurs with higher probabilities under a prisoner's dilemma game and coordination game, but with lower probabilities under a coexistence game. The simulation result shows that the fixation time in our mixed process is lower than that in the standard Fermi process. In comparison with the standard Moran process, fixation always takes more time on average in spatial populations, regardless of the game. In addition, the fixation time decreases with the growth of the number of neighbors.

  2. Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, Bo; Li, Xiao-Teng; Chen, Wei; Liu, Jian; Chen, Xiao-Song

    2016-10-01

    Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model. Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 11121403 and 11504384

  3. Analysis of the high-dimensional naming game with committed minorities

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pickering, William; Szymanski, Boleslaw K.; Lim, Chjan

    2016-05-01

    The naming game has become an archetype for linguistic evolution and mathematical social behavioral analysis. In the model presented here, there are N individuals and K words. Our contribution is developing a robust method that handles the case when K =O (N ) . The initial condition plays a crucial role in the ordering of the system. We find that the system with high Shannon entropy has a higher consensus time and a lower critical fraction of zealots compared to low-entropy states. We also show that the critical number of committed agents decreases with the number of opinions and grows with the community size for each word. These results complement earlier conclusions that diversity of opinion is essential for evolution; without it, the system stagnates in the status quo [S. A. Marvel et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 118702 (2012), 10.1103/PhysRevLett.109.118702]. In contrast, our results suggest that committed minorities can more easily conquer highly diverse systems, showing them to be inherently unstable.

  4. Improving Islamic Students’ Ability on Mastering Names and Responsibilities of Angels through Word Guessing Game

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yosmiza Yusra

    2017-07-01

    Full Text Available From the researcher's experience in the field, many students were reluctant to ask for any clarification, unwilling to express their opinion, less able to give feedback, and did disruptive behaviors during the learning process. Ideally, students are expected to be active and involved in the learning process and to get good learning outcomes. This study is a Class Action Research (CAR, which attempts to improve students' activity and learning outcomes. The research was conducted through four main stages: planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reflection. The research findings from teaching the names and responsibilities of angels through the classical method do not obtain maximum result. On the other hand, word guessing learning model shows better results than that of the classical one. In this model, students are motivated to compete with one another in making and answering the questions. The normally passive students are encouraged to participate actively in learning. Thus, it can be concluded that the learning process with of the game will improve students' learning outcomes.

  5. An Evolutionary Model of Cooperation, Fairness and Altruistic Punishment in Public Good Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hetzer, Moritz; Sornette, Didier

    2013-01-01

    We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment. PMID:24260101

  6. The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sample, Christine; Allen, Benjamin

    2017-11-01

    Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large population size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the [Formula: see text] limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population limit, and the [Formula: see text] limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal mathematical definitions of the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits are provided. Applying these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be favored over a neutral mutation, are different in the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits. However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one strategy to be favored over another.

  7. Connecting game theory and evolutionary network control for the computational control of soccer matches

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alessandro Ferrarini

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available Game theory, also known as interactive decision theory, is an umbrella term for the logical side of decision science, including both human and non-human events. In this paper a new game theory model is introduced in order to tame complex human events like soccer matches. Soccer-Decoder is a math algorithm recently introduced in order to simulate soccer matches by merging together 3 scientific methods: game theory, differential calculus and stochastic simulations. The philosophy behind Soccer-Decoder is that even very complex real world events, when turned into their irreducible essence, can be understood and predicted. In this work, Soccer-Decoder is combined with Evolutionary Network Control in order to provide a proficient tool to decide the most proper game strategies for determining winning strategies in soccer events. An illustrative example is given. The ratio behind this work is that even very complex real world events can be simulated and then controlled when using appropriate scientific tools.

  8. Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Collaborative Sensing Model in Emergency CRAHNs

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sasirekha GVK

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Game theory has been a tool of choice for modeling dynamic interactions between autonomous systems. Cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRAHNs constituted of autonomous wireless nodes are a natural fit for game theory-based modeling. The game theory-based model is particularly suitable for “collaborative spectrum sensing” where each cognitive radio senses the spectrum and shares the results with other nodes such that the targeted sensing accuracy is achieved. Spectrum sensing in CRAHNs, especially when used in emergency scenarios such as disaster management and military applications, needs to be not only accurate and resource efficient, but also adaptive to the changing number of users as well as signal-to-noise ratios. In addition, spectrum sensing mechanism must also be proactive, fair, and tolerant to security attacks. Existing work in collaborative spectrum sensing has mostly been confined to resource efficiency in static systems using request-based reactive sensing resulting in high latencies. In this paper, evolutionary game theory (EGT is used to model the behavior of the emergency CRAHNS, providing an efficient model for collaborative spectrum sensing. The resulting implementation model is adaptive to the changes in its environment such as signal-to-noise ratio and number of users in the network. The analytical and simulation models presented validate the system design and the desired performance.

  9. Analysis of Urban Car Owners Commute Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Model

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Huawei Gong

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available With the aggravation of the traffic congestion in the city, car owners will have to give up commuting with private cars and take the public transportation instead. The paper uses the replication dynamic mechanism to simulate the learning and adjustment mechanism of the automobile owners commuting mode selection. The evolutionary stable strategy is used to describe the long-term evolution of competition game trend. Finally we simulate equilibrium and stability of an evolution of the game under a payoff imbalance situation. The research shows that a certain proportion of car owners will choose public transit under the pressure of public transport development and heavy traffic, and the proportion will be closely related to the initial conditions and urban transportation development policy.

  10. A Study on Standard Competition with Network Effect Based on Evolutionary Game Model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Ye; Wang, Bingdong; Li, Kangning

    Owing to networks widespread in modern society, standard competition with network effect is now endowed with new connotation. This paper aims to study the impact of network effect on standard competition; it is organized in the mode of "introduction-model setup-equilibrium analysis-conclusion". Starting from a well-structured model of evolutionary game, it is then extended to a dynamic analysis. This article proves both theoretically and empirically that whether or not a standard can lead the market trends depends on the utility it would bring, and the author also discusses some advisable strategies revolving around the two factors of initial position and border break.

  11. The evolutionary analysis of the ultimatum game based on the net-profit decision

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Lu; Ye, Shun-qiang; Jones, Michael C.; Ye, Ye; Wang, Meng; Xie, Neng-gang

    2015-07-01

    In an ultimatum game where competitive pressures and alternating roles exist, we suppose that players make their decisions based on the net profit of their own. Here we conduct a behavioral experiment in a selection examination, and then we establish a model and study the evolution of strategies on square lattices. In this model, we specify a player's strategy with two parameters: offer level α ∈ [ 0 , 1) and net profit acceptance level β ∈ [ - 1 , 1) . Evolutionary results show that individuals characterized by fairness (α → 0.5) and moderate kindness (β kindness rather than fairness increases the average payoff of the whole population. Moreover, we conclude that the emergence of kindness is promoted by the spatial structure, and eventually the evolutionary advantage is gained by kindness.

  12. An evolutionary inspection game with labour unions on small-world networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kamal, Salahuddin M.; Al-Hadeethi, Yas; Abolaban, Fouad A.; Al-Marzouki, Fahd M.; Perc, Matjaž

    2015-03-01

    We study an evolutionary inspection game where agents can chose between working and shirking. The evolutionary process is staged on a small-world network, through which agents compare their incomes and, based on the outcome, decide which strategy to adopt. Moreover, we introduce union members that have certain privileges, of which the extent depends on the bargaining power of the union. We determine how the union affects the overall performance of the firm that employs the agents, and what are its influences on the employees. We find that, depending on its bargaining power, the union has significant leverage to deteriorate the productivity of a firm, and consequently also to lower the long-run benefits of the employees.

  13. A dynamic parking charge optimal control model under perspective of commuters' evolutionary game behavior

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lin, XuXun; Yuan, PengCheng

    2018-01-01

    In this research we consider commuters' dynamic learning effect by modeling the trip mode choice behavior from a new perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory. We explore the behavior pattern of different types of commuters and study the evolution path and equilibrium properties under different traffic conditions. We further establish a dynamic parking charge optimal control (referred to as DPCOC) model to alter commuters' trip mode choice while minimizing the total social cost. Numerical tests show. (1) Under fixed parking fee policy, the evolutionary results are completely decided by the travel time and the only method for public transit induction is to increase the parking charge price. (2) Compared with fixed parking fee policy, DPCOC policy proposed in this research has several advantages. Firstly, it can effectively turn the evolutionary path and evolutionary stable strategy to a better situation while minimizing the total social cost. Secondly, it can reduce the sensitivity of trip mode choice behavior to traffic congestion and improve the ability to resist interferences and emergencies. Thirdly, it is able to control the private car proportion to a stable state and make the trip behavior more predictable for the transportation management department. The research results can provide theoretical basis and decision-making references for commuters' mode choice prediction, dynamic setting of urban parking charge prices and public transit induction.

  14. Exploring Voluntary Vaccinating Behaviors using Evolutionary N-person Threshold Games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shi, Benyun; Wang, Weihao; Qiu, Hongjun; Chen, Yu-Wang; Peng, Shaoliang

    2017-11-27

    Understanding individuals' voluntary vaccinating behaviors plays essential roles in making vaccination policies for many vaccinepreventable diseases. Usually, individuals decide whether to vaccinate through evaluating the relative cost of vaccination and infection according to their own interests. Mounting evidence shows that the best vaccine coverage level for the population as a whole can hardly be achieved due to the effects of herd immunity. In this paper, taking into consideration the herd immunity threshold, we present an evolutionary N-person threshold game, where individuals can dynamically adjust their vaccinating strategies and their payoffs depend nonlinearly on whether or not the herd immunity threshold is reached. First, in well-mixed populations, we analyze the relationships at equilibrium among the fraction of vaccinated individuals, the population size, the basic reproduction number and the relative cost of vaccination and infection. Then, we carry out simulations on four types of complex networks to explore the evolutionary dynamics of the N-person threshold game in structured populations. Specifically, we investigate the effects of disease severity and population structure on the vaccine coverage for different relative costs of vaccination and infection. The results and findings can offer new insight into designing incentive-based vaccination policies for disease intervention and control.

  15. Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rauch, Joseph; Kondev, Jane; Sanchez, Alvaro

    2017-02-01

    Microbial populations often rely on the cooperative production of extracellular 'public goods' molecules. The cooperative nature of public good production may lead to minimum viable population sizes, below which populations collapse. In addition, 'cooperator' public goods producing individuals face evolutionary competition from non-producing mutants, or 'freeloaders'. Thus, public goods cooperators should be resilient not only to the invasion of freeloaders, but also to ecological perturbations that may push their populations below a sustainable threshold. Through a mathematical analysis of the Ecological Public Goods Game, we show that game parameters that improve the cooperating population's stability to freeloader invasion also lead to a low ecological resilience. Complex regulatory strategies mimicking those used by microbes in nature may allow cooperators to beat this trade-off and become evolutionarily stable to invading freeloaders while at the same time maximizing their ecological resilience. Our results thus identify the coupling between resilience to evolutionary and ecological challenges as a key factor for the long-term viability of public goods cooperators. © 2017 The Author(s).

  16. Extreme Selection Unifies Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite and Infinite Populations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Della Rossa, Fabio; Dercole, Fabio; Vicini, Cristina

    2017-05-01

    We show that when selection is extreme-the fittest strategy always reproduces or is imitated-the unequivalence between the possible evolutionary game scenarios in finite and infinite populations resolves, in the sense that the three generic outcomes-dominance, coexistence, and mutual exclusion-emerge in well-mixed populations of any size. We consider the simplest setting of a 2-player-2-strategy symmetric game and the two most common microscopic definitions of strategy spreading-the frequency-dependent Moran process and the imitation process by pairwise comparison-both in the case allowing any intensity of selection. We show that of the seven different invasion and fixation scenarios that are generically possible in finite populations-fixation being more or less likely to occur and rapid compared to the neutral game-the three that are possible in large populations are the same three that occur for sufficiently strong selection: (1) invasion and fast fixation of one strategy; (2) mutual invasion and slow fixation of one strategy; (3) no invasion and no fixation. Moreover (and interestingly), in the limit of extreme selection 2 becomes mutual invasion and no fixation, a case not possible for finite intensity of selection that better corresponds to the deterministic case of coexistence. In the extreme selection limit, we also derive the large population deterministic limit of the two considered stochastic processes.

  17. How to Love the Bomb: Trying to solve the prisoner's dilemma with evolutionary game theory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Castela, Vasco

    Economists traditionally see altruistic acts as irrational. However, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a rational player can do worse than a moral player. The rules of the game imply that one cannot defend one's best interest if one tries to. Game theory has struggled to explain how an agent could have access to the strategically best outcome without behaving irrationally, but with little success. Can a complex systems approach do better?. Peter Danielson, using Evolutionary Game Theory, has avoided some of the assumptions of Game Theory by using a complexity approach to reframe the problem, and offers a solution of sorts. According to Danielson, the foundations of altruism are mechanisms of deterrence that rely on credible threat - we are nice for fear of retaliation. He is both right and wrong. It will be argued that utilitarian, consequentialist principles must have been at work to create the conditions for altruistic acts to be performed. It is wrong to expect, however, that the same reasons are the reasons for action. In order for a model of genuine altruism to be possible, an extra cog must be inserted in the mechanism of causality in order to distance moral action from its strategic advantages. If emotions fulfill this role, we can tell a story in which it is rational to act on altruistic motivations and materially advantageous to hold such motivations. Moral sentiments can be seen as a tool designed by evolution to help optimize cooperation in a social environment. The proposed account integrates the Humean theory of motivation with Robert Frank's commitment model and Aristotle's views on moral education, keeping an adequate story of how it can be in our material interest to be moral without having to renounce to the existence of genuine acts of altruism.

  18. Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets alumnus Daniel Richardson named Central Michigan game Hokie Hero

    OpenAIRE

    Cox, Carrie

    2010-01-01

    Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets alumnus Capt. Daniel Richardson, U.S. Air Force, who earned a degree in industrial and systems engineering from the College of Engineering and a minor in leadership studies from the Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets Rice Center for Leader Development in 2004 has been selected as the Hokie Hero for the Virginia Tech versus Central Michigan University game.

  19. Classification, naming and evolutionary history of glycosyltransferases from sequenced green and red algal genomes.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Peter Ulvskov

    Full Text Available The Archaeplastida consists of three lineages, Rhodophyta, Virideplantae and Glaucophyta. The extracellular matrix of most members of the Rhodophyta and Viridiplantae consists of carbohydrate-based or a highly glycosylated protein-based cell wall while the Glaucophyte covering is poorly resolved. In order to elucidate possible evolutionary links between the three advanced lineages in Archaeplastida, a genomic analysis was initiated. Fully sequenced genomes from the Rhodophyta and Virideplantae and the well-defined CAZy database on glycosyltransferases were included in the analysis. The number of glycosyltransferases found in the Rhodophyta and Chlorophyta are generally much lower then in land plants (Embryophyta. Three specific features exhibited by land plants increase the number of glycosyltransferases in their genomes: (1 cell wall biosynthesis, the more complex land plant cell walls require a larger number of glycosyltransferases for biosynthesis, (2 a richer set of protein glycosylation, and (3 glycosylation of secondary metabolites, demonstrated by a large proportion of family GT1 being involved in secondary metabolite biosynthesis. In a comparative analysis of polysaccharide biosynthesis amongst the taxa of this study, clear distinctions or similarities were observed in (1 N-linked protein glycosylation, i.e., Chlorophyta has different mannosylation and glucosylation patterns, (2 GPI anchor biosynthesis, which is apparently missing in the Rhodophyta and truncated in the Chlorophyta, (3 cell wall biosynthesis, where the land plants have unique cell wall related polymers not found in green and red algae, and (4 O-linked glycosylation where comprehensive orthology was observed in glycosylation between the Chlorophyta and land plants but not between the target proteins.

  20. Largest Laplacian eigenvalue predicts the emergence of costly punishment in the evolutionary ultimatum game on networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Xiang; Cao, Lang

    2009-12-01

    In recent years, there has been a growing interest in studying the role of costly punishment in promoting altruistic behaviors among selfish individuals. Rejections in ultimatum bargaining as a metaphor exemplify costly punishment, where the division of a sum of resources proposed by one side may be rejected by the other side, and both sides get nothing. Under a setting of the network of contacts among players, we find that the largest Laplacian eigenvalue of the network determines the critical division of players’ proposals, below which pure punishers who never accept any offers will emerge as a phase transition in the system. The critical division of offers that predicts the emergence of costly punishment is termed as the selfishness tolerance of a network within evolutionary ultimatum game, and extensive numerical simulations on the data of the science collaboration network, and computer-generated small-world/scale-free networks support the analytical findings.

  1. An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Sector Coordination and Self-Organization

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fernando P. Santos

    2016-04-01

    Full Text Available Coordination games provide ubiquitous interaction paradigms to frame human behavioral features, such as information transmission, conventions and languages as well as socio-economic processes and institutions. By using a dynamical approach, such as Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT, one is able to follow, in detail, the self-organization process by which a population of individuals coordinates into a given behavior. Real socio-economic scenarios, however, often involve the interaction between multiple co-evolving sectors, with specific options of their own, that call for generalized and more sophisticated mathematical frameworks. In this paper, we explore a general EGT approach to deal with coordination dynamics in which individuals from multiple sectors interact. Starting from a two-sector, consumer/producer scenario, we investigate the effects of including a third co-evolving sector that we call public. We explore the changes in the self-organization process of all sectors, given the feedback that this new sector imparts on the other two.

  2. Genome-driven evolutionary game theory helps understand the rise of metabolic interdependencies in microbial communities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zomorrodi, Ali R; Segrè, Daniel

    2017-11-16

    Metabolite exchanges in microbial communities give rise to ecological interactions that govern ecosystem diversity and stability. It is unclear, however, how the rise of these interactions varies across metabolites and organisms. Here we address this question by integrating genome-scale models of metabolism with evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we use microbial fitness values estimated by metabolic models to infer evolutionarily stable interactions in multi-species microbial "games". We first validate our approach using a well-characterized yeast cheater-cooperator system. We next perform over 80,000 in silico experiments to infer how metabolic interdependencies mediated by amino acid leakage in Escherichia coli vary across 189 amino acid pairs. While most pairs display shared patterns of inter-species interactions, multiple deviations are caused by pleiotropy and epistasis in metabolism. Furthermore, simulated invasion experiments reveal possible paths to obligate cross-feeding. Our study provides genomically driven insight into the rise of ecological interactions, with implications for microbiome research and synthetic ecology.

  3. Recidivism and rehabilitation of criminal offenders: a carrot and stick evolutionary game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bijan Berenji

    Full Text Available Motivated by recent efforts by the criminal justice system to treat and rehabilitate nonviolent offenders rather than focusing solely on their punishment, we introduce an evolutionary game theoretic model to study the effects of "carrot and stick" intervention programs on criminal recidivism. We use stochastic simulations to study the evolution of a population where individuals may commit crimes depending on their past history, surrounding environment and, in the case of recidivists, on any counseling, educational or training programs available to them after being punished for their previous crimes. These sociological factors are embodied by effective parameters that determine the decision making probabilities. Players may decide to permanently reform or continue engaging in criminal activity, eventually reaching a state where they are considered incorrigible. Depending on parameter choices, the outcome of the game is a society with a majority of virtuous, rehabilitated citizens or incorrigibles. Since total resources may be limited, we constrain the combined punishment and rehabilitation costs per crime to be fixed, so that increasing one effort will necessarily decrease the other. We find that the most successful strategy in reducing crime is to optimally allocate resources so that after being punished, criminals experience impactful intervention programs, especially during the first stages of their return to society. Excessively harsh or lenient punishments are less effective. We also develop a system of coupled ordinary differential equations with memory effects to give a qualitative description of our simulated societal dynamics. We discuss our findings and sociological implications.

  4. SIS evolutionary game model and multi-agent simulation of an infectious disease emergency.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, Fan; Yang, Qing; Liu, Xingxing; Wang, Pan

    2015-01-01

    Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) infectious disease outbreaks are hazardous events. However, if governments sectors do not adequately supervise such outbreaks, these infectious diseases could spread significantly, resulting in large economic losses and social issues. In this paper, an evolutionary game and simulation model based on the interactions between strategies and states was proposed, and the game between the public and government sectors and its impact on epidemic situations was discussed. Replicator dynamics equations and the multi-agent model simulation were used for analysis. According to replicator dynamics equations as well as the multi-agent model simulation, the public all eventually adopted the mobility strategy. In addition, the supervision strength of the governmental sectors was equal to 0 after the strength fluctuated at a low level under the trigger strategy. Ultimately, the entire public shifted to the S state throughout the course of the emergency. Social order was maintained and social loss was controlled to a certain extent in the final analysis.

  5. Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games

    CERN Document Server

    Szabo, Gyorgy; 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.015

    2011-01-01

    Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect income from symmetric two-person two-strategy (called cooperation and defection) games with their nearest neighbors. During the elementary steps of evolution a randomly chosen player modifies her strategy in order to maximize stochastically her utility function composed from her own and the co-players' income with weight factors $1-Q$ and Q. These models are studied within a wide range of payoff parameters using Monte Carlo simulations for noisy strategy updates and by spatial stability analysis in the low noise limit. For fraternal players ($Q=1/2$) the system evolves into ordered arrangements of strategies in the low noise limit in a way providing optimum payoff for the whole society. Dominance of defectors, representing the "tragedy of the commons", is found within the region...

  6. Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Solution for Virtual Routers with Padding Misbehavior in Cloud Computing

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xia-an Bi

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available With the development of cloud computing and virtualization, a physical router can be multiplexed as a large number of virtual routers. TCP-based interactive applications have an incentive to improve their performance by padding “junk packets” into the network among real communication packets. This padding misbehavior will upgrade short TCP flows from “mice” to “elephants” and consequently lead to network congestion and breakdown. This paper presents a detailed solution and analysis for describing the normal behavior and padding misbehavior of virtual routers. In particular, a system model for analyzing behavior of virtual routers is based on evolutionary game model, and, through analyzing the stability of the equilibrium points, the stable point is the solution to the problem. The clear evolutionary path of network applications with the normal behavior and padding misbehavior is analyzed by the corresponding graph. Then this paper gives the behavior control suggestions to effectively restrain the padding misbehavior and maintain stable high-throughputs of the router. The simulation results demonstrate that our solution can effectively restrain the padding misbehavior and maintain stable high-throughputs of the router simultaneously compared with the classical queue management.

  7. Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alessandro Di Stefano

    Full Text Available Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human cooperation emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolutionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis, allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscopically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in human cooperation.

  8. Reconstructing Networks from Profit Sequences in Evolutionary Games via a Multiobjective Optimization Approach with Lasso Initialization

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Kai; Liu, Jing; Wang, Shuai

    2016-11-01

    Evolutionary games (EG) model a common type of interactions in various complex, networked, natural and social systems. Given such a system with only profit sequences being available, reconstructing the interacting structure of EG networks is fundamental to understand and control its collective dynamics. Existing approaches used to handle this problem, such as the lasso, a convex optimization method, need a user-defined constant to control the tradeoff between the natural sparsity of networks and measurement error (the difference between observed data and simulated data). However, a shortcoming of these approaches is that it is not easy to determine these key parameters which can maximize the performance. In contrast to these approaches, we first model the EG network reconstruction problem as a multiobjective optimization problem (MOP), and then develop a framework which involves multiobjective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA), followed by solution selection based on knee regions, termed as MOEANet, to solve this MOP. We also design an effective initialization operator based on the lasso for MOEA. We apply the proposed method to reconstruct various types of synthetic and real-world networks, and the results show that our approach is effective to avoid the above parameter selecting problem and can reconstruct EG networks with high accuracy.

  9. Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Di Stefano, Alessandro; Scatà, Marialisa; La Corte, Aurelio; Liò, Pietro; Catania, Emanuele; Guardo, Ermanno; Pagano, Salvatore

    2015-01-01

    Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human cooperation emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolutionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis, allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscopically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in human cooperation.

  10. Towards an Extended Evolutionary Game Theory with Survival Analysis and Agreement Algorithms for Modeling Uncertainty, Vulnerability, and Deception

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ma, Zhanshan (Sam)

    Competition, cooperation and communication are the three fundamental relationships upon which natural selection acts in the evolution of life. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a 'marriage' between game theory and Darwin's evolution theory; it gains additional modeling power and flexibility by adopting population dynamics theory. In EGT, natural selection acts as optimization agents and produces inherent strategies, which eliminates some essential assumptions in traditional game theory such as rationality and allows more realistic modeling of many problems. Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Sir Philip Sidney (SPS) games are two well-known examples of EGT, which are formulated to study cooperation and communication, respectively. Despite its huge success, EGT exposes a certain degree of weakness in dealing with time-, space- and covariate-dependent (i.e., dynamic) uncertainty, vulnerability and deception. In this paper, I propose to extend EGT in two ways to overcome the weakness. First, I introduce survival analysis modeling to describe the lifetime or fitness of game players. This extension allows more flexible and powerful modeling of the dynamic uncertainty and vulnerability (collectively equivalent to the dynamic frailty in survival analysis). Secondly, I introduce agreement algorithms, which can be the Agreement algorithms in distributed computing (e.g., Byzantine Generals Problem [6][8], Dynamic Hybrid Fault Models [12]) or any algorithms that set and enforce the rules for players to determine their consensus. The second extension is particularly useful for modeling dynamic deception (e.g., asymmetric faults in fault tolerance and deception in animal communication). From a computational perspective, the extended evolutionary game theory (EEGT) modeling, when implemented in simulation, is equivalent to an optimization methodology that is similar to evolutionary computing approaches such as Genetic algorithms with dynamic populations [15][17].

  11. God's Name is not a Game: Performative Apologetics in Sufi Dhikr ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    This article examines debates surrounding the proper performance of communal dhikr, or reciting God's name, within the Fayḍa Tijāniyya Sufi community in Senegal. The controversial practice of yëngu ('moving oneself'), or dancing and drumming during dhikr, has become popular among some Fayḍa youth. Although ...

  12. The ‘Hawk-Dove’ Game and the Speed of the Evolutionary Process in Small Heterogeneous Populations

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bernhard Voelkl

    2010-05-01

    Full Text Available I study the speed of the evolutionary process on small heterogeneous graphs using the Hawk-Dove game. The graphs are based on empirical observation data of grooming interactions in 81 primate groups. Analytic results for the star graph have revealed that irregular graphs can slow down the evolutionary process by increasing the mean time to absorption. Here I show that the same effects can be found for graphs representing natural animal populations which are much less heterogeneous than star graphs. Degree variance has proven to be a good predictor for the mean time to absorption also for these graphs.

  13. O jogo do nome nas subjetividades travestis The game of the name in the transvesti's subjetivitys

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Caio César Souza Camargo Próchno

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Desde o nascimento o nome representa uma das primeiras características a ser adquiridas pelo sujeito que deverá acompanhá-lo como marca distintiva na sociedade. Ao mesmo tempo, o nome, por meio da gramática substantiva do masculino ou feminino, impõe uma relação binária rígida entre os sexos marcando, além da denominação, a determinação de normas relativas à sexualidade e ao gênero. Por meio da participação em um projeto de extensão voltado para o público travesti da cidade de Uberlândia, surge o interesse em problematizar o direito personalíssimo do nome no encontro com as subjetividades travestis. A problemática impressa pelas travestis vem questionar o nome como distintivo da pessoalidade, dada a ambiguidade característica do grupo na fronteira entre masculino-feminino. Apresenta-se, dessa forma, a tensão presente entre os limites linguísticos e jurídicos do direito personalíssimo do nome frente às "invenções e subversões" do gênero travesti.Since the birth, the name is one of the first features to be acquired by the being, which shall follow him as a distinct mark in the society. At the same time, the name, through the male or female substantive grammar, imposes a rigid binary relationship between the genders, marking, beyond the denomination, the determination of norms related to the sexuality and the gender. Through the participation in an extension project concerning the transvesty audience in the city of Uberlândia, comes the interest to problematize the name's extreme personal right in the transvestite's subjectivities. The transvestite expressed problematic comes to question the name as personal distinctive, by the groups' characteristic ambiguity in the male-female border. There is, after that, a tension between the linguistic and juridical limits of the name's extreme personal right facing the "inventions and subvertions" of the transvesty gender.

  14. The puzzle of partial migration: Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary game theory perspectives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    De Leenheer, Patrick; Mohapatra, Anushaya; Ohms, Haley A; Lytle, David A; Cushing, J M

    2017-01-07

    We consider the phenomenon of partial migration which is exhibited by populations in which some individuals migrate between habitats during their lifetime, but others do not. First, using an adaptive dynamics approach, we show that partial migration can be explained on the basis of negative density dependence in the per capita fertilities alone, provided that this density dependence is attenuated for increasing abundances of the subtypes that make up the population. We present an exact formula for the optimal proportion of migrants which is expressed in terms of the vital rates of migrant and non-migrant subtypes only. We show that this allocation strategy is both an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as well as a convergence stable strategy (CSS). To establish the former, we generalize the classical notion of an ESS because it is based on invasion exponents obtained from linearization arguments, which fail to capture the stabilizing effects of the nonlinear density dependence. These results clarify precisely when the notion of a "weak ESS", as proposed in Lundberg (2013) for a related model, is a genuine ESS. Secondly, we use an evolutionary game theory approach, and confirm, once again, that partial migration can be attributed to negative density dependence alone. In this context, the result holds even when density dependence is not attenuated. In this case, the optimal allocation strategy towards migrants is the same as the ESS stemming from the analysis based on the adaptive dynamics. The key feature of the population models considered here is that they are monotone dynamical systems, which enables a rather comprehensive mathematical analysis. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  15. Cascading failures and the emergence of cooperation in evolutionary-game based models of social and economical networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Wen-Xu; Lai, Ying-Cheng; Armbruster, Dieter

    2011-09-01

    We study catastrophic behaviors in large networked systems in the paradigm of evolutionary games by incorporating a realistic "death" or "bankruptcy" mechanism. We find that a cascading bankruptcy process can arise when defection strategies exist and individuals are vulnerable to deficit. Strikingly, we observe that, after the catastrophic cascading process terminates, cooperators are the sole survivors, regardless of the game types and of the connection patterns among individuals as determined by the topology of the underlying network. It is necessary that individuals cooperate with each other to survive the catastrophic failures. Cooperation thus becomes the optimal strategy and absolutely outperforms defection in the game evolution with respect to the "death" mechanism. Our results can be useful for understanding large-scale catastrophe in real-world systems and in particular, they may yield insights into significant social and economical phenomena such as large-scale failures of financial institutions and corporations during an economic recession.

  16. Inactivation of tumor suppressor genes and cancer therapy: An evolutionary game theory approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Khadem, Heydar; Kebriaei, Hamed; Veisi, Zahra

    2017-06-01

    Inactivation of alleles in tumor suppressor genes (TSG) is one of the important issues resulting in evolution of cancerous cells. In this paper, the evolution of healthy, one and two missed allele cells is modeled using the concept of evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics. The proposed model also takes into account the interaction rates of the cells as designing parameters of the system. Different combinations of the equilibrium points of the parameterized nonlinear system is studied and categorized into some cases. In each case, the interaction rates' values are suggested in a way that the equilibrium points of the replicator dynamics are located on an appropriate region of the state space. Based on the suggested interaction rates, it is proved that the system doesn't have any undesirable interior equilibrium point as well. Therefore, the system will converge to the desirable region, where there is a scanty level of cancerous cells. In addition, the proposed conditions for interaction rates guarantee that, when a trajectory of the system reaches the boundaries, then it will stay there forever which is a desirable property since the equilibrium points have been already located on the boundaries, appropriately. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the suggestions in the elimination of the cancerous cells in different scenarios. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  17. The role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas: an evolutionary game theoretical view

    Science.gov (United States)

    Basanta, David; Scott, Jacob G.; Rockne, Russ; Swanson, Kristin R.; Anderson, Alexander R. A.

    2011-02-01

    Recent advances in clinical medicine have elucidated two significantly different subtypes of glioblastoma which carry very different prognoses, both defined by mutations in isocitrate dehydrogenase-1 (IDH-1). The mechanistic consequences of this mutation have not yet been fully clarified, with conflicting opinions existing in the literature; however, IDH-1 mutation may be used as a surrogate marker to distinguish between primary and secondary glioblastoma multiforme (sGBM) from malignant progression of a lower grade glioma. We develop a mathematical model of IDH-1 mutated secondary glioblastoma using evolutionary game theory to investigate the interactions between four different phenotypic populations within the tumor: autonomous growth, invasive, glycolytic, and the hybrid invasive/glycolytic cells. Our model recapitulates glioblastoma behavior well and is able to reproduce two recent experimental findings, as well as make novel predictions concerning the rate of invasive growth as a function of vascularity, and fluctuations in the proportions of phenotypic populations that a glioblastoma will experience under different microenvironmental constraints.

  18. An evolutionary vaccination game in the modified activity driven network by considering the closeness

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, Dun; Sun, Mei

    2016-02-01

    In this paper, we explore an evolutionary vaccination game in the modified activity driven network by considering the closeness. We set a closeness parameter p which is used to describe the way of connection between two individuals. The simulation results show that the closeness p may have an active role in weakening both the spreading of epidemic and the vaccination. Besides, when vaccination is not allowed, the final recovered density increases with the value of the ratio of the infection rate to the recovery rate λ / μ. However, when vaccination is allowed the final density of recovered individual first increases and then decreases with the value of λ / μ. Two variables are designed to identify the relation between the individuals' activities and their states. The results draw that both recovered and vaccinated frequency increase with the increase of the individuals' activities. Meanwhile, the immune fee has less impact on the individuals' vaccination than the closeness. While the λ / μ is in a certain range, with the increase of the value of λ / μ, the recovered frequency of the whole crowds reduces. Our results, therefore, reveal the fact that the best of intentions may lead to backfire.

  19. An evolutionary game for the diffusion of rumor in complex networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Dandan; Ma, Jing; Tian, Zihao; Zhu, Hengmin

    2015-09-01

    In this paper, we investigate the rumor diffusion process according to the evolutionary game framework. By using three real social network datasets, we find that increasing the judgment ability of individuals could curb the diffusion of rumor effectively. Under the same level of punishment cost, there are more spreaders in the network that has larger average degree. Moreover, the punishment fraction has more significant impact than the risk coefficient on the controlling of rumor diffusion. There exist some optimal risk coefficients and punishment fractions that could help more people refusing to spread rumor. In addition, the effect of the tie strength on the final fraction of spreaders is investigated. The results indicate that the rumor can be suppressed soon if the individuals preferentially select the neighbor either weaker or stronger ties persistently to update their strategy. However, choosing neighbor blindly may promote the spread of rumor. Finally, by comparing three kinds of punishment mechanisms, we show that taking the lead in punishing the higher degree nodes is the most effective measure to reduce the coverage of rumor.

  20. Designing a performance measurement system for supply chain using balanced scorecard, path analysis, cooperative game theory and evolutionary game theory: A Case Study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Seyed Hootan Eskafi

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, supply chain management is known as the key factor for achieving competitive advantage. Better customer service, revenue improvement and cost reduction are the results of this philosophy. Organizations can manage the performance of their firms by appropriate goal setting, identifying criteria and continuous performance measurement, which creates a good view for the business circumstances. Developing and defining appropriate indicators at different levels of chain is necessary for implementing a performance measurement system. In this study, we propose a new method to determine the measurement indicators and strategies of the company in term of balanced scorecard. The study is a combination of balanced scorecard, path analysis, evolutionary game theory and cooperative game theory for strategic planning. The study offers an appropriate program for future activities of organizations and determines the present status of the firm. The implementation of the proposed method is introduced for a food producer and the results are analyzed.

  1. Evolutionary quantum game theory in the context of socio-economic systems; Evolutionaere Quanten-Spieltheorie im Kontext sozio-oekonomischer Systeme

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hanauske, Matthias

    2011-02-14

    The evolution of socio-economic systems depend on the interdependent decision processes of its underlying system components. The mathematical model to describe the strategic decision of players within a socio-economic game is ''game theory''. ''Quantum game theory'' is a mathematical and conceptual amplification of classical game theory. The space of all conceivable decision paths is extended from the purely rational, measurable space in the Hilbert-space of complex numbers - which is the mathematical space where quantum theory is formulated. By the concept of a potential entanglement of the imaginary quantum strategy parts, it is possible to include cooperate decision path, caused by cultural or moral standards. If this strategy entanglement is large enough, then additional Nash equilibria can occur, previously present dominant strategies could become nonexistent and new evolutionary stable strategies do appear for some game classes. Within this PhD thesis the main results of classical and quantum games are summarized and all of the possible game classes of evolutionary (2 player)-(2 strategy) games are extended to quantum games. It is shown that the quantum extension of classical games with an underlying dilemma-like structure give different results, if the strength of strategic entanglement is above a certain barrier. After the German summary and the introduction paper, five different applications of the theory are discussed within the thesis. (orig.)

  2. Evolutionary Game Theory and Social Learning Can Determine How Vaccine Scares Unfold

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bauch, Chris T.; Bhattacharyya, Samit

    2012-01-01

    Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) autism vaccine scare in Britain. A “free rider” effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty). Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence—up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis—including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts. PMID:22496631

  3. Evolutionary game theory and social learning can determine how vaccine scares unfold.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chris T Bauch

    Full Text Available Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR autism vaccine scare in Britain. A "free rider" effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty. Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence--up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis--including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts.

  4. Evolutionary emergence of angiogenesis in avascular tumors using a spatial public goods game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Javad Salimi Sartakhti

    Full Text Available Natural selection in cancer often results in the emergence of increasingly malignant tumor cells that display many if not all of the hallmarks of cancer. One of the most important traits acquired during cancer progression is angiogenesis. Tumor cells capable of secreting pro-angiogenic factors can be seen as cooperators where the improved oxygenation, nutrient delivery and waste disposal resulting from angiogenesis could be seen as a public good. Under this view, the relatively costly secretion of molecular signals required to orchestrate angiogenesis would be undertaken exclusively by cooperating tumor cells but the benefits of angiogenesis would be felt by neighboring tumor cells regardless of their contribution to the process. In this work we detail a mathematical model to better understand how clones capable of secreting pro-angiogenic factors can emerge in a tumor made of non-cooperative tumor cells. Given the importance of the spatial configuration of the tumor in determining the efficacy of the secretion of pro-angiogenic factors as well as the benefits of angiogenesis we have developed a spatial game theoretic approach where interactions and public good diffusion are described by graphs. The results show that structure of the population affects the evolutionary dynamics of the pro-angiogenic clone. Specifically, when the benefit of angiogenesis is represented by sigmoid function with regards to the number of pro-angiogenic clones then the probability of the coexistence of pro-angiogenic and angiogenesis-neutral clones increases. Our results demonstrate that pro-angiogenic clone equilibrates into clusters that appear from surrounding vascular tissues towards the center of tumor. These clusters appear notably less dense after anti-angiogenic therapy.

  5. A system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory for green supply chain management diffusion among Chinese manufacturers

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Tian, Yihui; Govindan, Kannan; Zhu, Qinghua

    2014-01-01

    In this study, a system dynamics (SD) model is developed to guide the subsidy policies to promote the diffusion of green supply chain management (GSCM) in China. The relationships of stakeholders such as government, enterprises and consumers are analyzed through evolutionary game theory. Finally......, the GSCM diffusion process is simulated by the model with a case study on Chinese automotive manufacturing industry. The results show that the subsidies for manufacturers are better than that for consumers to promote GSCM diffusion, and the environmental awareness is another influential key factor....

  6. Intention recognition, commitment and their roles in the evolution of cooperation from artificial intelligence techniques to evolutionary game theory models

    CERN Document Server

    Han, The Anh

    2013-01-01

    This original and timely monograph describes a unique self-contained excursion that reveals to the readers the roles of two basic cognitive abilities, i.e. intention recognition and arranging commitments, in the evolution of cooperative behavior. This book analyses intention recognition, an important ability that helps agents predict others’ behavior, in its artificial intelligence and evolutionary computational modeling aspects, and proposes a novel intention recognition method. Furthermore, the book presents a new framework for intention-based decision making and illustrates several ways in which an ability to recognize intentions of others can enhance a decision making process. By employing the new intention recognition method and the tools of evolutionary game theory, this book introduces computational models demonstrating that intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation within populations of self-regarding agents. Finally, the book describes how commitment provides a pathway to the evol...

  7. Offspring mortality was a determinant factor in the evolution of paternal investment in humans: An evolutionary game approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    López Alonso, Diego; Ortiz-Rodríguez, Isabel M

    2017-04-21

    Some researchers support the belief that man evolved philandering behavior because of the greater reproductive success of promiscuous males. According to this idea, deserting behavior from the man should be expected along with null paternal involvement in offspring care. Paradoxically however, the average offspring investment in the human male is far higher than that of any other male mammal, including other primates. In our work, we have addressed this conundrum by employing evolutionary game theory, using objective payoffs instead of, as are commonly used, arbitrary payoffs. Payoffs were computed as reproductive successes by a model based on trivial probabilities, implemented within the Barreto's Population Dynamics Toolbox (2014). The evolution of the parent conflict was simulated by a game with two players (the woman and the man). First, a simple game was assayed with two strategies, 'desert-unfaithful' and 'care-faithful'. Then, the game was played with a third mixed strategy, 'care-unfaithful'. The two-strategy game results were mainly determined by the offspring survival rate (s) and the non-paternity rate (z), with remaining factors playing a secondary role. Starting from two empirical estimates for both rates (s = 0.617 and z = 0.033) and decreasing the offspring mortality from near 0.4 to 0.1, the results were consistent with a win for the 'care-faithful' strategy. The 'desert-unfaithful' strategy only won at unrealistically high non-paternity rates (z>0.2). When three-strategy games were played, the mixed strategy of 'care-unfaithful' man could win the game in some less frequent cases. Regardless of the number of game strategies, 'care' fathers always won. These results strongly suggest that offspring mortality was the key factor in the evolution of paternal investment within the Homo branch. The 'care-faithful' strategy would have been the main strategy in human evolution but 'care-unfaithful' men did evolve at a lesser frequency. It can therefore be

  8. An experimental investigation of evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors game

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Hoffman, Moshe; Suetens, Sigrid; Gneezy, U.; Nowak, Martin A.

    2015-01-01

    Game theory describes social behaviors in humans and other biological organisms. By far, the most powerful tool available to game theorists is the concept of a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is motivated by perfect rationality. NE specifies a strategy for everyone, such that no one would benefit by

  9. An experimental investigation of evolutionary dynamics in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Hoffman, M.; Suetens, S.; Gneezy, U.; Nowak, M.A.

    2015-01-01

    Game theory describes social behaviors in humans and other biological organisms. By far, the most powerful tool available to game theorists is the concept of a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is motivated by perfect rationality. NE specifies a strategy for everyone, such that no one would benefit by

  10. An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Hetzer, Moritz; Sornette, Didier

    2013-01-01

    We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective...

  11. A Distributed Dynamic Super Peer Selection Method Based on Evolutionary Game for Heterogeneous P2P Streaming Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jing Chen

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Due to high efficiency and good scalability, hierarchical hybrid P2P architecture has drawn more and more attention in P2P streaming research and application fields recently. The problem about super peer selection, which is the key problem in hybrid heterogeneous P2P architecture, is becoming highly challenging because super peers must be selected from a huge and dynamically changing network. A distributed super peer selection (SPS algorithm for hybrid heterogeneous P2P streaming system based on evolutionary game is proposed in this paper. The super peer selection procedure is modeled based on evolutionary game framework firstly, and its evolutionarily stable strategies are analyzed. Then a distributed Q-learning algorithm (ESS-SPS according to the mixed strategies by analysis is proposed for the peers to converge to the ESSs based on its own payoff history. Compared to the traditional randomly super peer selection scheme, experiments results show that the proposed ESS-SPS algorithm achieves better performance in terms of social welfare and average upload rate of super peers and keeps the upload capacity of the P2P streaming system increasing steadily with the number of peers increasing.

  12. ``GodMode is his video game name'': situating learning and identity in structures of social practice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bricker, Leah A.; Bell, Philip

    2012-12-01

    In this paper, we report on the structural nexus of one youth's gaming practices across contexts and over time. We utilize data from an ethnography of youth science and technology learning, as well as expertise development, across settings and developmental time. We use Ole Dreier's theory of persons to understand how this youth is able to develop considerable gaming expertise. Additionally, we explicate the learning practices embedded in the structural nexus of this youth's gaming and we examine associated issues of learning and identity. We problematize the lack of continuity between his formal schooling experiences and the structural nexus of his gaming practices as situated in a variety of other contexts and we reflect on the implications for the design of STEM gaming experiences in formal school environments.

  13. Interdisciplinary benefits of a theory of cultural evolution centered at the group-level: the emergence of macro-neuroeconomics and social evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mattei, Tobias A

    2014-06-01

    The theoretical concepts developed in the target article, in which the author proposes a new paradigm of cultural evolution based not on the individuals' characteristics, but rather on more global collective properties described as "group-traits" (which emerge when a group of individuals exhibit both differentiation and organization), may have a broader scientific impact that transcend the boundaries of social and evolutionary psychology, paving the way for the emergence of macro-neuroeconomics and social evolutionary game theory.

  14. Adaptive Selection of Cryptographic Protocols in Wireless Sensor Networks using Evolutionary Game Theory

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Arora, Srishti; Singh, Prabhjot; Gupta, Ashok Ji

    2016-01-01

    ... with contrary motives contend with each other. Various solutions basedon Game theory have been recently proposed which dealt with security aspects of wireless sensor networks(WSNs). However, th...

  15. An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Revision-Resistant Motivations and Strategic Reasoning

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    DeLancey, Craig

    2008-01-01

    Strong reciprocity and other forms of cooperation with non-kin in large groups and in one-time social interactions is difficult to explain with traditional economic or with simple evolutionary accounts...

  16. Evolutionary Artificial Neural Network Weight Tuning to Optimize Decision Making for an Abstract Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-01

    the rather imprecise stochastic math , filled with assumptions, that plays an important role in GAs. Trends Genetic Algorithms operate over large...To use a sports analogy, if a novice basketball player plays one-on-one against a professional basketball player for one thousand games, he will in

  17. The coexistence of hosts with different abilities to discriminate against cheater partners: an evolutionary game-theory approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Steidinger, Brian S; Bever, James D

    2014-06-01

    Evolutionary theory predicts that mutualisms based on the reciprocal exchange of costly services should be susceptible to exploitation by cheaters. Consistent with theory, both cheating and discrimination against cheaters are ubiquitous features of mutualisms. Several recent studies have confirmed that host species differ in the extent that they are able to discriminate against cheaters, suggesting that cheating may be stabilized by the existence of susceptible hosts (dubbed "givers"). We use an evolutionary game-theoretical approach to demonstrate how discriminating and giver hosts associating with mutualist and cheater partners can coexist. Discriminators drive the proportion of cheaters below a critical threshold, at which point there is no benefit to investing resources into discrimination. This promotes givers, who benefit from mutualists but allow cheater populations to rebound. We then apply this model to the plant-mycorrhizal mutualism and demonstrate it is one mechanism for generating host-specific responses to mycorrhizal fungal species necessary to generate negative plant-soil feedbacks. Our model makes several falsifiable, qualitative predictions for plant-mycorrhizal population dynamics across gradients of soil phosphorus availability and interhost differences in ability to discriminate. Finally, we suggest applications and limitations of the model with regard to coexistence in specific biological systems.

  18. Evolutionary games played by multi-agent system with different memory capacity

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan

    2015-01-01

    The evolution of cooperation is still an enigma. Resolution of cooperative dilemma is a hot topic as a perplexing interdisciplinary project, and has captured wide attention of researchers from many disciplines as a multidisciplinary field. Our main concern is the design of a networked evolutionary

  19. Effect of network topology on the evolutionary ultimatum game based on the net-profit decision

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ye, Shun-Qiang; Wang, Lu; Jones, Michael C.; Ye, Ye; Wang, Meng; Xie, Neng-Gang

    2016-04-01

    The ubiquity of altruist behavior amongst humans has long been a significant puzzle in the social sciences. Ultimatum game has proved to be a useful tool for explaining altruistic behavior among selfish individuals. In an ultimatum game where alternating roles exist, we suppose that players make their decisions based on the net profit of their own. In this paper, we specify a player's strategy with two parameters: offer level α ∈ [ 0,1) and net profit acceptance level β ∈ [ - 1,1). By Monte Carlo simulation, we analyze separately the effect of the size of the neighborhood, the small-world property and the heterogeneity of the degree distributions of the networks. Results show that compared with results observed for homogeneous networks, heterogeneous networks lead to more rational outcomes. Moreover, network structure has no effect on the evolution of kindness level, so moderate kindness is adaptable to any social groups and organizations.

  20. Effective seeding strategy in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on online social networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Bo; Shi, Huibin; Wang, Jianwei; Huang, Yun

    2015-04-01

    This paper explores effective seeding strategies in prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on online social networks, i.e. the optimal strategy to obtain global cooperation with minimum cost. Three distinct seeding strategies are compared by performing computer simulations on real online social network datasets. Our finding suggests that degree centrality seeding outperforms other strategies regardless of the initial payoff setting or network size. Celebrities of online social networks play key roles in preserving cooperation.

  1. The logic of social sharing: an evolutionary game analysis of adaptive norm development.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tatsuya, Tatsuya; Takezawa, Masanori; Hastie, Reid

    2003-01-01

    Although norms can potentially serve useful constructs to understand human minds, being fundamentally social in evolutionary as well as cultural senses, there are as yet no useful psychological theories of adaptive norm development. This article provides an illustrative model about how a norm emerges in a society. We focus on the "communal-sharing norm" in primordial societies, a norm designating uncertain resources as common properties to be shared with other members. Based on anthropological findings, we develop a theory about how the communal-sharing norm emerges and is maintained. Then, using evolutionary computer simulations, we test several hypotheses about the conditions under which the norm will dominate social resource sharing. We further test behavioral implications of the norm, demonstrating that uncertainty involved in resource acquisition is a key factor that triggers the psychology of sharing even in highly industrialized societies. Finally, we discuss the importance of norm construct for analyzing the dynamic relation between minds and society.

  2. Testability of evolutionary game dynamics models based on experimental economics data

    CERN Document Server

    Wang, Yijia; Wang, Zhijian

    2016-01-01

    In order to better understand the dynamic processes of a real game system, we need an appropriate dynamics model, so to evaluate the validity of a model is not a trivial task. Here, we demonstrate an approach, considering the dynamic patterns of angular momentum and speed as the measurement variables, for evaluating the validity of various dynamics models. Using the data in real time Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) games experiments, we obtain the experimental patterns, and then derive the related theoretical patterns from a series of typical dynamics models respectively. By testing the goodness-of-fit between the experimental and theoretical patterns, the validity of the models can be evaluated. One of the results is that, among all the non-parametric models tested, the best-known Replicator dynamics model performs almost worst, while the Projection dynamics model performs best. Besides providing new empirical patterns of social dynamics, we demonstrate that the approach can be an effective and rigorous method to ...

  3. Universal effect of dynamical reinforcement learning mechanism in spatial evolutionary games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Hai-Feng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Wang, Bing-Hong

    2012-06-01

    One of the prototypical mechanisms in understanding the ubiquitous cooperation in social dilemma situations is the win-stay, lose-shift rule. In this work, a generalized win-stay, lose-shift learning model—a reinforcement learning model with dynamic aspiration level—is proposed to describe how humans adapt their social behaviors based on their social experiences. In the model, the players incorporate the information of the outcomes in previous rounds with time-dependent aspiration payoffs to regulate the probability of choosing cooperation. By investigating such a reinforcement learning rule in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game and public goods game, a most noteworthy viewpoint is that moderate greediness (i.e. moderate aspiration level) favors best the development and organization of collective cooperation. The generality of this observation is tested against different regulation strengths and different types of network of interaction as well. We also make comparisons with two recently proposed models to highlight the importance of the mechanism of adaptive aspiration level in supporting cooperation in structured populations.

  4. Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wei Pan

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters.

  5. Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

    OpenAIRE

    Yi Zhao; Dong Li; Liqiang Pan

    2015-01-01

    On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business ...

  6. Motion depending on the strategies of players enhances cooperation in a co-evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cheng Hongyan; Li Haihong; Dai Qionglin; Zhu Yun; Yang Junzhong, E-mail: hycheng@bupt.edu.cn [School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876 (China)

    2010-12-15

    In the evolution of cooperation, the motion of players plays an important role. In this paper, we incorporate, into an evolutionary prisoner dilemma's game on networks, a new factor that cooperators and defectors move with different probabilities. By investigating the dependence of the cooperator frequency on the moving probabilities of cooperators and defectors, {mu}{sub c} and {mu}{sub d}, we find that cooperation is greatly enhanced in the parameter regime of {mu}{sub c}<{mu}{sub d}. The snapshots of strategy pattern and the evolutions of cooperator clusters and defector clusters reveal that either the fast motion of defectors or the slow motion of cooperators always favors the formation of large cooperator clusters. The model is investigated on different types of networks such as square lattices, Erdoes-Renyi networks and scale-free networks and with different types of strategy-updating rules such as the richest-following rule and the Fermi rule. The numerical results show that the observed phenomena are robust to different networks and to different strategy-updating rules.

  7. Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Evaluation of P2P File-Sharing Systems in Heterogeneous Environments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yusuke Matsuda

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available Peer-to-Peer (P2P file sharing is one of key technologies for achieving attractive P2P multimedia social networking. In P2P file-sharing systems, file availability is improved by cooperative users who cache and share files. Note that file caching carries costs such as storage consumption and processing load. In addition, users have different degrees of cooperativity in file caching and they are in different surrounding environments arising from the topological structure of P2P networks. With evolutionary game theory, this paper evaluates the performance of P2P file sharing systems in such heterogeneous environments. Using micro-macro dynamics, we analyze the impact of the heterogeneity of user selfishness on the file availability and system stability. Further, through simulation experiments with agent-based dynamics, we reveal how other aspects, for example, synchronization among nodes and topological structure, affect the system performance. Both analytical and simulation results show that the environmental heterogeneity contributes to the file availability and system stability.

  8. A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perc, Matjaž; Szolnoki, Attila

    2015-06-01

    As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do not respond linearly to mitigation attempts. A more apt model entails ordinary people who neither commit nor sanction crime as the third strategy besides the criminals and punishers. Since ordinary people free-ride on the sanctioning efforts of punishers, they may introduce cyclic dominance that enables the coexistence of all three competing strategies. In this setup ordinary individuals become the biggest impediment to crime abatement. We therefore also consider heterogeneous punisher strategies, which seek to reduce their investment into fighting crime in order to attain a more competitive payoff. We show that this diversity of punishment leads to an explosion of complexity in the system, where the benefits and pitfalls of criminal behavior are revealed in the most unexpected ways. Due to the raise and fall of different alliances no less than six consecutive phase transitions occur in dependence on solely the temptation to succumb to criminal behavior, leading the population from ordinary people-dominated across punisher-dominated to crime-dominated phases, yet always failing to abolish crime completely.

  9. Influences of agents with a self-reputation awareness component in an evolutionary spatial IPD game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chung-Yuan Huang

    Full Text Available Iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD researchers have shown that strong positive reputations plus an efficient reputation evaluation system encourages both sides to pursue long-term collaboration and to avoid falling into mutual defection cycles. In agent-based environments with reliable reputation rating systems, agents interested in maximizing their private interests must show concern for other agents as well as their own self-reputations--an important capability that standard IPD game agents lack. Here we present a novel learning agent model possessing self-reputation awareness. Agents in our proposed model are capable of evaluating self-behaviors based on a mix of public and private interest considerations, and of testing various solutions aimed at meeting social standards. Simulation results indicate multiple outcomes from the addition of a small percentage of self-reputation awareness agents: faster cooperation, faster movement toward stability in an agent society, a higher level of public interest in the agent society, the resolution of common conflicts between public and private interests, and a lower potential for rational individual behavior to transform into irrational group behavior.

  10. Influences of agents with a self-reputation awareness component in an evolutionary spatial IPD game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Chung-Yuan; Lee, Chun-Liang

    2014-01-01

    Iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) researchers have shown that strong positive reputations plus an efficient reputation evaluation system encourages both sides to pursue long-term collaboration and to avoid falling into mutual defection cycles. In agent-based environments with reliable reputation rating systems, agents interested in maximizing their private interests must show concern for other agents as well as their own self-reputations--an important capability that standard IPD game agents lack. Here we present a novel learning agent model possessing self-reputation awareness. Agents in our proposed model are capable of evaluating self-behaviors based on a mix of public and private interest considerations, and of testing various solutions aimed at meeting social standards. Simulation results indicate multiple outcomes from the addition of a small percentage of self-reputation awareness agents: faster cooperation, faster movement toward stability in an agent society, a higher level of public interest in the agent society, the resolution of common conflicts between public and private interests, and a lower potential for rational individual behavior to transform into irrational group behavior.

  11. Gaming

    CERN Document Server

    Duke, Richard D

    2014-01-01

    Als Richard Duke sein Buch ""Gaming: The Future's Language"" 1974 veröffentlichte, war er ein Pionier für die Entwicklung und Anwendung von Planspielen in Politik, Strategieentwicklung und Management. Das Buch wurde zu einem viel zitierten Standardwerk. 2014 feiert die von Richard D. Duke gegründete International Simulation and Gaming Association (ISAGA) ihr 45-jähriges Bestehen. Gleichzeitig legt Richard D. Duke eine überarbeitete Auflage seines Klassikers vor.   Inhaltsverzeichnis TABLE OF CONTENTSAcknowledgments Preface SECTION I1. The ProblemSECTION II2. Modes of Human Communication3. Mode

  12. Positive and negative effects of social impact on evolutionary vaccination game in networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ichinose, Genki; Kurisaku, Takehiro

    2017-02-01

    Preventing infectious disease like flu from spreading to large communities is one of the most important issues for humans. One effective strategy is voluntary vaccination, however, there is always the temptation for people refusing to be vaccinated because once herd immunity is achieved, infection risk is greatly reduced. In this paper, we study the effect of social impact on the vaccination behavior resulting in preventing infectious disease in networks. The evolutionary simulation results show that the social impact has both positive and negative effects on the vaccination behavior. Especially, in heterogeneous networks, if the vaccination cost is low the behavior is more promoted than the case without social impact. In contrast, if the cost is high, the behavior is reduced compared to the case without social impact. Moreover, the vaccination behavior is effective in heterogeneous networks more than in homogeneous networks. This implies that the social impact puts people at risk in homogeneous networks. We also evaluate the results from the social cost related to the vaccination policy.

  13. Sparky's Firehouse (Games)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Parents Educators MENU Home Videos Games & Apps Activities Sparky Firetrucks Parents Educators Firetrucks Videos Games Sparky Apps Activities The name and image of Sparky are registered trademarks ...

  14. Integrating evolutionary game theory into an agent-based model of ductal carcinoma in situ: Role of gap junctions in cancer progression.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Malekian, Negin; Habibi, Jafar; Zangooei, Mohammad Hossein; Aghakhani, Hojjat

    2016-11-01

    There are many cells with various phenotypic behaviors in cancer interacting with each other. For example, an apoptotic cell may induce apoptosis in adjacent cells. A living cell can also protect cells from undergoing apoptosis and necrosis. These survival and death signals are propagated through interaction pathways between adjacent cells called gap junctions. The function of these signals depends on the cellular context of the cell receiving them. For instance, a receiver cell experiencing a low level of oxygen may interpret a received survival signal as an apoptosis signal. In this study, we examine the effect of these signals on tumor growth. We make an evolutionary game theory component in order to model the signal propagation through gap junctions. The game payoffs are defined as a function of cellular context. Then, the game theory component is integrated into an agent-based model of tumor growth. After that, the integrated model is applied to ductal carcinoma in situ, a type of early stage breast cancer. Different scenarios are explored to observe the impact of the gap junction communication and parameters of the game theory component on cancer progression. We compare these scenarios by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test succeeds in proving a significant difference between the tumor growth of the model before and after considering the gap junction communication. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test also proves that the tumor growth significantly depends on the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis. In this study, the gap junction communication is modeled by using evolutionary game theory to illustrate its role at early stage cancers such as ductal carcinoma in situ. This work indicates that the gap junction communication and the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis can notably affect cancer progression. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  15. Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yi Zhao

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business case to verify the evolution process of cooperation and competition relationship. The results show that (cooperation, cooperation is bound to be the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS and cooperation tends to be increasingly in-depth and expansive for commercial banks as well as e-commerce financial institutions in China. The complementarity of participants’ core competitiveness is explored as the root of cooperation. Finally, strategic suggestions are put forward on cooperation between e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks.

  16. Population Games, Stable Games, and Passivity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Michael J. Fox

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available The class of “stable games”, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a “passive” dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.

  17. The influence of deterministic and stochastic waiting time for triggering mortality and colonization events on the coexistence of cooperators and defectors in an evolutionary game model

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    YouHua Chen

    2014-06-01

    waiting time, both defectors and cooperators could coexist, regardless of the types of waiting time for colonization events. Defense (or cooperation rewards could determine the persistence time of both game players. When the defense reward is low, cooperators could persist better in the simulation. But when the defense reward becomes sufficiently higher, defectors would persist better. Overall, non-coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the present evolutionary game model is dependent on the stochastic mortality events, but not colonization events. In conclusion, my present study quantifies the influence of the temporally fluctuating motility-colonization dynamic on modeling the coexistence of species in the spatial evolutionary game.

  18. Analysis of the Complexity Entropy and Chaos Control of the Bullwhip Effect Considering Price of Evolutionary Game between Two Retailers

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Junhai Ma

    2016-11-01

    Full Text Available In this research, a model is established to represent a supply chain, which consists of one manufacturer and two retailers. The price-sensitive demand model is considered and the price game system is built according to the rule of bounded rationality as well as the entropy theory. With the increase of the price adjustment speed, the game system may go into chaos from the stable and periodic state. The bullwhip effect and inventory variance ratio of different stages that the system falls in are compared in real time. We also employ the delayed feedback control method to control the system and succeed in mitigating the bullwhip effect of the system. On the whole, the bullwhip effect and inventory variance ratio in the stable state are smaller than those in period-doubling and chaos. In the stable state, there is an optimal price adjustment speed to obtain both the lowest bullwhip effect and inventory variance ratio.

  19. Video Games and Citizenship

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Bourgonjon, Jeroen; Soetaert, Ronald

    2013-01-01

    ... by exploring a particular aspect of digitization that affects young people, namely video games. They explore the new social spaces which emerge in video game culture and how these spaces relate to community building and citizenship...

  20. Equivalence of cooperation indexes. Comment on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games" by Z. Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martinez-Vaquero, Luis; Grujić, Jelena; Lenaerts, Tom

    2016-03-01

    Symmetric 2 × 2 games where two players can select between two actions and the payoff depends on what they both choose, provide one of the simplest models to study the evolution of cooperation. The actions are usually called cooperation (C) and defection (D) and the payoffs they receive are R (reward for mutual cooperation), P (punishment for mutual defection), T (temptation to defect) and S (suckers payoff). The relative ordering of these 4 payoff values determines the type of dilemma: Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) when T > R > P > S, Snowdrift with T > R > S > P and Stag-Hunt with R > T > P > S. Within the framework of Darwinian Evolution it is well known that in the PD, where both greed (T > R) and fear (P > S) are present, the evolution of cooperation is an important conundrum [1], requiring the identification of mechanisms to overcome it.

  1. Geographic Names

    Data.gov (United States)

    Minnesota Department of Natural Resources — The Geographic Names Information System (GNIS), developed by the United States Geological Survey in cooperation with the U.S. Board of Geographic Names, provides...

  2. Evolutionary Awareness

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gregory Gorelik

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available In this article, we advance the concept of “evolutionary awareness,” a metacognitive framework that examines human thought and emotion from a naturalistic, evolutionary perspective. We begin by discussing the evolution and current functioning of the moral foundations on which our framework rests. Next, we discuss the possible applications of such an evolutionarily-informed ethical framework to several domains of human behavior, namely: sexual maturation, mate attraction, intrasexual competition, culture, and the separation between various academic disciplines. Finally, we discuss ways in which an evolutionary awareness can inform our cross-generational activities—which we refer to as “intergenerational extended phenotypes”—by helping us to construct a better future for ourselves, for other sentient beings, and for our environment.

  3. Monochromatic Names

    Science.gov (United States)

    Main, Marisa J.

    2009-01-01

    The author describes a lesson for middle school students involving their names, with outlets for uniqueness and self-expression. Focusing on contrast, design elements, and a monochromatic color scheme, students created name designs that they loved. Tips for adaptation for special needs students are included. The lesson confirms basic design and…

  4. Mathematical games, abstract games

    CERN Document Server

    Neto, Joao Pedro

    2013-01-01

    User-friendly, visually appealing collection offers both new and classic strategic board games. Includes abstract games for two and three players and mathematical games such as Nim and games on graphs.

  5. On the Evolutionary Stability of Bargaining Inefficiency

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Poulsen, Anders

    This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game tough behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary...

  6. Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nowak, Martin A.; Tarnita, Corina E.; Antal, Tibor

    2010-01-01

    Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces. PMID:20008382

  7. Evolutionary Games and Computer Simulations

    CERN Document Server

    Huberman, B A; Huberman, Bernardo A.; Glance, Natalie S.

    1993-01-01

    Abstract: The prisoner's dilemma has long been considered the paradigm for studying the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals. Because of its importance, it has been studied through computer experiments as well as in the laboratory and by analytical means. However, there are important differences between the way a system composed of many interacting elements is simulated by a digital machine and the manner in which it behaves when studied in real experiments. In some instances, these disparities can be marked enough so as to cast doubt on the implications of cellular automata type simulations for the study of cooperation in social systems. In particular, if such a simulation imposes space-time granularity, then its ability to describe the real world may be compromised. Indeed, we show that the results of digital simulations regarding territoriality and cooperation differ greatly when time is discrete as opposed to continuous.

  8. Temporal mortality-colonization dynamic can influence the coexistence and persistence patterns of cooperators and defectors in an evolutionary game model

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    YouHua Chen

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available In the present report, the coexistence and persistence time patterns of Prisoners' Dilemma game players were explored in 2D spatial grid systems by considering the impacts of the mortality-colonization temporal dynamic specifically. Our results showed that the waiting time for triggering a colonization event could remarkably influence and change the extinction patterns of both cooperators and defectors. Interestingly, a relatively high frequency of stochastic colonization events could promote the persistence of defectors but not cooperators. In contrast, a low frequency of stochastic- or constant-time colonization events could facilitate the persistence of cooperators but not defectors. However, a long waiting time would be detrimental to the survival of both game players and drives them to go extinction in faster rates. At last, it was found that colonization strength played a relatively weak role on influencing the coexistence scenarios of both game players, but should be kept small if the coexistence of game players is needed to maintain. In conclusion, our study provides evidence showing that the temporal trade-off of mortality and colonization activities would influence the evolution of PD game and the persistence of cooperators and defectors.

  9. Constructionist Gaming: Understanding the Benefits of Making Games for Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kafai, Yasmin B.; Burke, Quinn

    2015-01-01

    There has been considerable interest in examining the educational potential of playing video games. One crucial element, however, has traditionally been left out of these discussions--namely, children's learning through making their own games. In this article, we review and synthesize 55 studies from the last decade on making games and learning.…

  10. Flash Learning Games Wow Students and Instructors: Moving Toward An Academic Gaming Portal

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dan H Lim

    2003-02-01

    Full Text Available This paper describes and discusses the rationale, background, design, and implementation of Flash learning games. The paper explains why Macromedia Flash has been selected as the authoring tool in the development of highly interactive learning games for online learning. The background evolutionary process of developing the learning games points out why it has been a daunting task to create compelling learning games that impact learning. Designing learning game objects that allow other educators to customize game content is the core of this paper. The author envisions this academic gaming project will evolve into an academic gaming portal, developed in conjunction with other major institutional partners.

  11. Symmetric Decomposition of Asymmetric Games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tuyls, Karl; Pérolat, Julien; Lanctot, Marc; Ostrovski, Georg; Savani, Rahul; Leibo, Joel Z; Ord, Toby; Graepel, Thore; Legg, Shane

    2018-01-17

    We introduce new theoretical insights into two-population asymmetric games allowing for an elegant symmetric decomposition into two single population symmetric games. Specifically, we show how an asymmetric bimatrix game (A,B) can be decomposed into its symmetric counterparts by envisioning and investigating the payoff tables (A and B) that constitute the asymmetric game, as two independent, single population, symmetric games. We reveal several surprising formal relationships between an asymmetric two-population game and its symmetric single population counterparts, which facilitate a convenient analysis of the original asymmetric game due to the dimensionality reduction of the decomposition. The main finding reveals that if (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of an asymmetric game (A,B), this implies that y is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric counterpart game determined by payoff table A, and x is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric counterpart game determined by payoff table B. Also the reverse holds and combinations of Nash equilibria of the counterpart games form Nash equilibria of the asymmetric game. We illustrate how these formal relationships aid in identifying and analysing the Nash structure of asymmetric games, by examining the evolutionary dynamics of the simpler counterpart games in several canonical examples.

  12. Flash Learning Games Wow Students and Instructors: Moving Toward An Academic Gaming Portal

    OpenAIRE

    Dan H Lim

    2003-01-01

    This paper describes and discusses the rationale, background, design, and implementation of Flash learning games. The paper explains why Macromedia Flash has been selected as the authoring tool in the development of highly interactive learning games for online learning. The background evolutionary process of developing the learning games points out why it has been a daunting task to create compelling learning games that impact learning. Designing learning game objects that allow other educato...

  13. Constructionist Gaming: Understanding the Benefits of Making Games for Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kafai, Yasmin B.; Burke, Quinn

    2015-01-01

    There has been considerable interest in examining the educational potential of playing video games. One crucial element, however, has traditionally been left out of these discussions—namely, children's learning through making their own games. In this article, we review and synthesize 55 studies from the last decade on making games and learning. We found that the majority of studies focused on teaching coding and academic content through game making, and that few studies explicitly examined the roles of collaboration and identity in the game making process. We argue that future discussions of serious gaming ought to be more inclusive of constructionist approaches to realize the full potential of serious gaming. Making games, we contend, not only more genuinely introduces children to a range of technical skills but also better connects them to each other, addressing the persistent issues of access and diversity present in traditional digital gaming cultures. PMID:27019536

  14. Procedural Content Generation for Real-Time Strategy Games

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Raúl Lara-Cabrera

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available Videogames are one of the most important and profitable sectors in the industry of entertainment. Nowadays, the creation of a videogame is often a large-scale endeavor and bears many similarities with, e.g., movie production. On the central tasks in the development of a videogame is content generation, namely the definition of maps, terrains, non-player characters (NPCs and other graphical, musical and AI-related components of the game. Such generation is costly due to its complexity, the great amount of work required and the need of specialized manpower. Hence the relevance of optimizing the process and alleviating costs. In this sense, procedural content generation (PCG comes in handy as a means of reducing costs by using algorithmic techniques to automatically generate some game contents. PCG also provides advantages in terms of player experience since the contents generated are typically not fixed but can vary in different playing sessions, and can even adapt to the player herself. For this purpose, the underlying algorithmic technique used for PCG must be also flexible and adaptable. This is the case of computational intelligence in general and evolutionary algorithms in particular. In this work we shall provide an overview of the use of evolutionary intelligence for PCG, with special emphasis on its use within the context of real-time strategy games. We shall show how these techniques can address both playability and aesthetics, as well as improving the game AI.

  15. Supermodular Games and Potential Games

    OpenAIRE

    Brânzei, R.; Mallozzi, L.; Tijs, S.H.

    2001-01-01

    Potential games and supermodular games are attractive games, especially because under certain conditions they possess pure Nash equilibria. Subclasses of games with a potential are considered which are also strategically equivalent to supermodular games. The focus is on two-person zero-sum games and two-person Cournot games.

  16. On the Evolutionary Stability of 'Tough' Bargaining Behavior

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Poulsen, Anders

    2003-01-01

    This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long...

  17. Total Integrative Evolutionary Communication

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nedergaard Thomsen, Ole; Brier, Søren

    2014-01-01

    In this paper we outline a cybersemiotic foundation for the trend of pragmatics-based functional linguistics, Functional Discourse Grammar. Cybersemiotics is a substantial inter- and transdisciplinary semiotic theory which integrates, on the one hand, second-order cybernetics and autopoiesis theory...... and, on the other, Peircean biosemiotics. According to Cybersemiotics, language is primarily a creative process of total integrative evolutionary communication. It comprises three evolutionary stages: (1) biological reflexive languaging (the reflexive foundation of social coordination), (2......). In this inclusive hierarchy language games subsume the other stages, and thus human evolutionary communication is primarily a symbolic-conventional practice. It is intertwined with the practice of living, that is, with different life forms, including other forms of semiotic behavior. Together they form a coherent...

  18. The Role of Noise in the Spatial Public Goods Game

    CERN Document Server

    Javarone, Marco Alberto

    2016-01-01

    In this work we aim to analyze the role of noise in the spatial Public Goods Game, one of the most famous games in Evolutionary Game Theory. The dynamics of this game is affected by a number of parameters and processes, namely the topology of interactions among the agents, the synergy factor, and the strategy revision phase. The latter is a process that allows agents to change their strategy. Notably, rational agents tend to imitate richer neighbors, in order to increase the probability to maximize their payoff. By implementing a stochastic revision process, it is possible to control the level of noise in the system, so that even irrational updates may occur. In particular, in this work we study the effect of noise on the macroscopic behavior of a finite structured population playing the Public Goods Game. We consider both the case of a homogeneous population, where the noise in the system is controlled by tuning a parameter representing the level of stochasticity in the strategy revision phase, and a heterog...

  19. Supermodular Games and Potential Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brânzei, R.; Mallozzi, L.; Tijs, S.H.

    2001-01-01

    Potential games and supermodular games are attractive games, especially because under certain conditions they possess pure Nash equilibria. Subclasses of games with a potential are considered which are also strategically equivalent to supermodular games. The focus is on two-person zero-sum games and

  20. Ludic Educational Game Creation Tool

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Vidakis, Nikolaos; Syntychakis, Efthimios; Kalafatis, Konstantinos

    2015-01-01

    creation tool features a web editor, where the game narrative can be manipulated, according to specific needs. Moreover, this tool is applied for creating an educational game according to a reference scenario namely teaching schoolers road safety. A ludic approach is used both in game creation and play...... for teaching road safety, by employing ludic interfaces for both the game creator and the game player, as well as ludic game design........ Helping children staying safe and preventing serious injury on the roads is crucial. In this context, this work presents an augmented version of the IOLAOS architecture including an enhanced game creation tool and a new multimodality module. In addition presents a case study for creating educational games...

  1. Equilibria, information and frustration in heterogeneous network games with conflicting preferences

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mazzoli, M.; Sánchez, A.

    2017-11-01

    Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has addressed this issue by combining the physics of complex networks with a description of interactions in terms of evolutionary game theory. We here take this research a step further by introducing a most salient societal factor such as the individuals’ preferences, a characteristic that is key to understanding much of the social phenomenology these days. We consider a heterogeneous, agent-based model in which agents interact strategically with their neighbors, but their preferences and payoffs for the possible actions differ. We study how such a heterogeneous network behaves under evolutionary dynamics and different strategic interactions, namely coordination games and best shot games. With this model we study the emergence of the equilibria predicted analytically in random graphs under best response dynamics, and we extend this test to unexplored contexts like proportional imitation and scale free networks. We show that some theoretically predicted equilibria do not arise in simulations with incomplete information, and we demonstrate the importance of the graph topology and the payoff function parameters for some games. Finally, we discuss our results with the available experimental evidence on coordination games, showing that our model agrees better with the experiment than standard economic theories, and draw hints as to how to maximize social efficiency in situations of conflicting preferences.

  2. Video Games and Citizenship

    OpenAIRE

    Bourgonjon, Jeroen; Soetaert, Ronald

    2013-01-01

    In their article "Video Games and Citizenship" Jeroen Bourgonjon and Ronald Soetaert argue that digitization problematizes and broadens our perspective on culture and popular media, and that this has important ramifications for our understanding of citizenship. Bourgonjon and Soetaert respond to the call of Gert Biesta for the contextualized study of young people's practices by exploring a particular aspect of digitization that affects young people, namely video games. They explore the new so...

  3. Differential games

    CERN Document Server

    Friedman, Avner

    2006-01-01

    This volume lays the mathematical foundations for the theory of differential games, developing a rigorous mathematical framework with existence theorems. It begins with a precise definition of a differential game and advances to considerations of games of fixed duration, games of pursuit and evasion, the computation of saddle points, games of survival, and games with restricted phase coordinates. Final chapters cover selected topics (including capturability and games with delayed information) and N-person games.Geared toward graduate students, Differential Games will be of particular interest

  4. Game on!

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rob Willems

    2014-01-01

    The goal of GameOn! is to develop a serious video game. The object: to develop a serious game that aims to change behavior through awareness. The setup A multidisciplinary group which unites expertise from didactic and game production backgrounds produces an educational game for an international

  5. Playful Gaming.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Makedon, Alexander

    A philosophical analysis of play and games is undertaken in this paper. Playful gaming, which is shown to be a synthesis of play and games, is utilized as a category for undertaking the examination of play and games. The significance of playful gaming to education is demonstrated through analyses of Plato's, Dewey's, Sartre's, and Marcuse's…

  6. Structure coefficients and strategy selection in multiplayer games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph

    2016-01-01

    Evolutionary processes based on two-player games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Snowdrift Game are abundant in evolutionary game theory. These processes, including those based on games with more than two strategies, have been studied extensively under the assumption that selection is weak. However, games involving more than two players have not received the same level of attention. To address this issue, and to relate two-player games to multiplayer games, we introduce a notion of reducibility for multiplayer games that captures what it means to break down a multiplayer game into a sequence of interactions with fewer players. We discuss the role of reducibility in structured populations, and we give examples of games that are irreducible in any population structure. Since the known conditions for strategy selection, otherwise known as [Formula: see text]-rules, have been established only for two-player games with multiple strategies and for multiplayer games with two strategies, we extend these rules to multiplayer games with many strategies to account for irreducible games that cannot be reduced to those simpler types of games. In particular, we show that the number of structure coefficients required for a symmetric game with [Formula: see text]-player interactions and [Formula: see text] strategies grows in [Formula: see text] like [Formula: see text]. Our results also cover a type of ecologically asymmetric game based on payoff values that are derived not only from the strategies of the players, but also from their spatial positions within the population.

  7. Convex Games versus Clan Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brânzei, R.; Dimitrov, D.A.; Tijs, S.H.

    2006-01-01

    In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games.We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games.Furthermore, each monotonic

  8. Game on! : Evaluation malaria games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rob Willems

    2014-01-01

    The goal of GameOn! is to develop a serious video game. The object: to develop a serious game that aims to change behavior through awareness. The setup A multidisciplinary group which unites expertise from didactic and game production backgrounds produces an educational game for an international

  9. Game mechanics : advanced game design

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Adams, Ernest; Dormans, Joris

    2012-01-01

    Game Mechanics is aimed at game design students and industry professionals who want to improve their understanding of how to design, build, and test the mechanics of a game. Game Mechanics will show you how to design, test, and tune the core mechanics of a game—any game, from a huge role-playing

  10. The Game /

    OpenAIRE

    Selimoğlu, Can; Selimoglu, Can

    2006-01-01

    Video games are multimedia products. A multimedia product primarily functions as a communication medium. To transmit preloaded messages to the users is a multimedia product's highest priority mission regardless of the content,. Entertainment aspect is more important in video games compared to other types of multimedia products and interactivity in video games is not simply navigating through the content. That is because video games have game dynamics. A person playing a video game attends mor...

  11. Developmental Purposes of Commercial Games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Practical Pointers, 1977

    1977-01-01

    Listed are 45 table, target, manipulative, active, and creative games with such developmental purposes as associative learning, tactile discrimination, and visual motor integration. Information includes the name of the item, distributor, price, description, and developmental purpose. (JYC)

  12. Epigenetic battle of the sexes. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Song

    2017-03-01

    Qian Wang et al. present an interesting framework, named epigenetic game theory, for modeling sex-based epigenetic dynamics during embryogenesis from a new viewpoint of evolutionary game theory [1]. That is, epigenomes of sperms and oocytes may coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to affect the fitness of embryos. The work uses a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to describe longitudinal trajectories of DNA methylation levels in both parental and maternal gametes and their dependence on each other. The insights gained from this review, i.e. dynamic methylation profiles and their interaction are potentially important to many fields, such as biomedicine and agriculture.

  13. Naming names: eponyms and biological history.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vedantam, Gayatri; Viswanathan, V K

    2012-01-01

    The constraints imposed by available experimental data, and the need for precision, typically limits the eloquence of researchers. Scientists, however, indulge in their literary and poetic selves in the names that they bestow on genes and proteins, on organisms and diseases. We briefly review some familiar names in the Inside Passage, and explore their historical antecedents.

  14. Evolutionary Nephrology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chevalier, Robert L

    2017-05-01

    Progressive kidney disease follows nephron loss, hyperfiltration, and incomplete repair, a process described as "maladaptive." In the past 20 years, a new discipline has emerged that expands research horizons: evolutionary medicine. In contrast to physiologic (homeostatic) adaptation, evolutionary adaptation is the result of reproductive success that reflects natural selection. Evolutionary explanations for physiologically maladaptive responses can emerge from mismatch of the phenotype with environment or evolutionary tradeoffs. Evolutionary adaptation to a terrestrial environment resulted in a vulnerable energy-consuming renal tubule and a hypoxic, hyperosmolar microenvironment. Natural selection favors successful energy investment strategy: energy is allocated to maintenance of nephron integrity through reproductive years, but this declines with increasing senescence after ~40 years of age. Risk factors for chronic kidney disease include restricted fetal growth or preterm birth (life history tradeoff resulting in fewer nephrons), evolutionary selection for APOL1 mutations (that provide resistance to trypanosome infection, a tradeoff), and modern life experience (Western diet mismatch leading to diabetes and hypertension). Current advances in genomics, epigenetics, and developmental biology have revealed proximate causes of kidney disease, but attempts to slow kidney disease remain elusive. Evolutionary medicine provides a complementary approach by addressing ultimate causes of kidney disease. Marked variation in nephron number at birth, nephron heterogeneity, and changing susceptibility to kidney injury throughout life history are the result of evolutionary processes. Combined application of molecular genetics, evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo), developmental programming and life history theory may yield new strategies for prevention and treatment of chronic kidney disease.

  15. Replicator dynamics for optional public good games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hauert, C.; De Monte, Silvia; Hofbauer, J.

    2002-01-01

    The public goods game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. Since the dominant strategy is to defect, both classical and evolutionary game theory predict the asocial outcome that no player contributes to the public goods. In contr...

  16. Perancangan Game Edukasi “Cooking for Child”

    OpenAIRE

    Aprilina, Cheri; Al Fatta, Hanif

    2014-01-01

    Design of Education Game “Cooking for Child” is a game about the way to cook and know about what is all about in the kitchen. This game is specialized for kids above seven years old. This game consists lots of education such as the names of cooking utensils and their functions, also the english name of them. Otherwise, there is also some rules to play this game like the preparation before, during, and after cooking. This game also includes safety cooking code. This game is made to educate ki...

  17. Global Search and Local Ascent for Large Cournot Games

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Maria Sarasan

    2010-12-01

    Full Text Available Equilibria detection in large games is a fundamental problem in computational game theory. A memetic algorithm, Global Search and Local Ascent (GSLA, is proposed. GSLA's performance is evaluated by means of numerical experiments within the framework of a Cournot game involving up to 100 players and by comparison with an evolutionary multiobjective optimization algorithm adapted for Nash equilibria detection.

  18. Evolutionary programming for goal-driven dynamic planning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vaccaro, James M.; Guest, Clark C.; Ross, David O.

    2002-03-01

    Many complex artificial intelligence (IA) problems are goal- driven in nature and the opportunity exists to realize the benefits of a goal-oriented solution. In many cases, such as in command and control, a goal-oriented approach may be the only option. One of many appropriate applications for such an approach is War Gaming. War Gaming is an important tool for command and control because it provides a set of alternative courses of actions so that military leaders can contemplate their next move in the battlefield. For instance, when making decisions that save lives, it is necessary to completely understand the consequences of a given order. A goal-oriented approach provides a slowly evolving tractably reasoned solution that inherently follows one of the principles of war: namely concentration on the objective. Future decision-making will depend not only on the battlefield, but also on a virtual world where military leaders can wage wars and determine their options by playing computer war games much like the real world. The problem with these games is that the built-in AI does not learn nor adapt and many times cheats, because the intelligent player has access to all the information, while the user has access to limited information provided on a display. These games are written for the purpose of entertainment and actions are calculated a priori and off-line, and are made prior or during their development. With these games getting more sophisticated in structure and less domain specific in scope, there needs to be a more general intelligent player that can adapt and learn in case the battlefield situations or the rules of engagement change. One such war game that might be considered is Risk. Risk incorporates the principles of war, is a top-down scalable model, and provides a good application for testing a variety of goal- oriented AI approaches. By integrating a goal-oriented hybrid approach, one can develop a program that plays the Risk game effectively and move

  19. User Experience in Digital Games: Differences between Laboratory and Home

    Science.gov (United States)

    Takatalo, Jari; Hakkinen, Jukka; Kaistinen, Jyrki; Nyman, Gote

    2011-01-01

    Playing entertainment computer, video, and portable games, namely, digital games, is receiving more and more attention in academic research. Games are studied in different situations with numerous methods, but little is known about if and how the playing situation affects the user experience (UX) in games. In addition, it is hard to understand and…

  20. Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-12

    evolutionary change, and the name sources of the Navy’s ships have not been immune to this change.”9 The July 2012 Navy report to Congress states that...Legion of Honor, and the Croix de Guerre with Gilt Star and 2 palms; Whereas during World War II, Clifton B. Cates led Marines at Guadalcanal, and

  1. Opportunities and Risks in Online Gaming Environments

    OpenAIRE

    Sanders, Benjamin George

    2016-01-01

    Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPGs) have evolved from traditional video games in that they embrace both the technology of the Internet and video games. The massive “exodus” from the physical offline world to online gaming communities brings with it not only a number of unique and exciting opportunities, but also a number of emerging and serious risks. This research set out to examine the unique opportunities and risks to vulnerable individuals, namely, young adults, te...

  2. Game Theory

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Game Theory is a collection of short interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the most influential and prominent scholars in game theory. We hear their views on game theory, its aim, scope, use, the future direction of game theory and how their work fits in these respects....

  3. What's in a Name

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bush, Sarah B.; Albanese, Judith; Karp, Karen S.

    2016-01-01

    Historically, some baby names have been more popular during a specific time span, whereas other names are considered timeless. The Internet article, "How to Tell Someone's Age When All You Know Is Her Name" (Silver and McCann 2014), describes the phenomenon of the rise and fall of name popularity, which served as a catalyst for the…

  4. British Sign Name Customs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Day, Linda; Sutton-Spence, Rachel

    2010-01-01

    Research presented here describes the sign names and the customs of name allocation within the British Deaf community. While some aspects of British Sign Language sign names and British Deaf naming customs differ from those in most Western societies, there are many similarities. There are also similarities with other societies outside the more…

  5. Understanding Games as Played

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Leino, Olli Tapio

    2009-01-01

    Researchers interested in player’s experience would assumedly, across disciplines, agree that the goal behind enquiries into player’s experience is to understand the how games’ features end up affecting the player’s experience. Much of the contemporary interdisciplinary research into player......’s experience leans toward the empirical-scientific, in the forms (neuro)psychology, sociology and cognitive science, to name a few. In such approaches, for example demonstrating correlation between physiological symptoms and an in-game event may amount to ‘understanding’. However, the experience of computer...... game play is a viable topic also for computer game studies within the general tradition of humanities. In such context, the idea of ‘understanding an experience’ invites an approach focusing on the experienced significance of events and objects within computer game play. This focus, in turn, suggests...

  6. Swipe this! the guide to great touchscreen game design

    CERN Document Server

    Rogers, Scott

    2012-01-01

    Learn to design games for tablets from a renowned game designer! Eager to start designing games for tablets but not sure where to start? Look no further! Gaming guru Scott Rogers has his finger on the pulse of tablet game design and is willing to impart his wisdom and secrets for designing exciting and successful games. As the creator of such venerable games as God of War, the SpongeBob Squarepants series, and Pac-Man World, to name a few, Rogers writes from personal experience and in this unique book, he hands you the tools to create your own tablet games for the iPad, Android tablets, Ninten

  7. Multigame effect in finite populations induces strategy linkage between two games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hashimoto, Koh

    2014-03-21

    Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption that the population size is infinite. However, in reality, population sizes are finite. Recently, stochastic processes in finite populations have been introduced into evolutionary games in order to study finite size effects in evolutionary game dynamics. However, most of these studies focus on populations playing only single games. In this study, we investigate a finite population with two games and show that a finite population playing two games tends to evolve toward a specific direction to form particular linkages between the strategies of the two games. Copyright © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

  8. Evolutionary dynamics of group fairness.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Santos, Fernando P; Santos, Francisco C; Paiva, Ana; Pacheco, Jorge M

    2015-08-07

    The emergence and impact of fairness is commonly studied in the context of 2-person games, notably the Ultimatum Game. Often, however, humans face problems of collective action involving more than two individuals where fairness is known to play a very important role, and whose dynamics cannot be inferred from what is known from 2-person games. Here, we propose a generalization of the Ultimatum Game for an arbitrary number of players--the Multiplayer Ultimatum Game. Proposals are made to a group of responders who must individually reject or accept the proposal. If the total number of individual acceptances stands below a given threshold, the offer will be rejected; otherwise, the offer will be accepted, and equally shared by all responders. We investigate the evolution of fairness in populations of individuals by means of evolutionary game theory, providing both analytical insights and results from numerical simulations. We show how imposing stringent consensuses significantly increases the value of the proposals, leading to fairer outcomes and more tolerant players. Furthermore, we show how stochastic effects--such as imitation errors and/or errors when assessing the fitness of others--may further enhance the overall success in reaching fair collective action. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  9. Evolutionary Nephrology

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert L. Chevalier

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available Progressive kidney disease follows nephron loss, hyperfiltration, and incomplete repair, a process described as “maladaptive.” In the past 20 years, a new discipline has emerged that expands research horizons: evolutionary medicine. In contrast to physiologic (homeostatic adaptation, evolutionary adaptation is the result of reproductive success that reflects natural selection. Evolutionary explanations for physiologically maladaptive responses can emerge from mismatch of the phenotype with environment or from evolutionary tradeoffs. Evolutionary adaptation to a terrestrial environment resulted in a vulnerable energy-consuming renal tubule and a hypoxic, hyperosmolar microenvironment. Natural selection favors successful energy investment strategy: energy is allocated to maintenance of nephron integrity through reproductive years, but this declines with increasing senescence after ∼40 years of age. Risk factors for chronic kidney disease include restricted fetal growth or preterm birth (life history tradeoff resulting in fewer nephrons, evolutionary selection for APOL1 mutations (which provide resistance to trypanosome infection, a tradeoff, and modern life experience (Western diet mismatch leading to diabetes and hypertension. Current advances in genomics, epigenetics, and developmental biology have revealed proximate causes of kidney disease, but attempts to slow kidney disease remain elusive. Evolutionary medicine provides a complementary approach by addressing ultimate causes of kidney disease. Marked variation in nephron number at birth, nephron heterogeneity, and changing susceptibility to kidney injury throughout the life history are the result of evolutionary processes. Combined application of molecular genetics, evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo, developmental programming, and life history theory may yield new strategies for prevention and treatment of chronic kidney disease.

  10. Marine Place Names

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce — This data set contains the geographic place names for features in the U.S territorial waters and outer continental shelf. These names can be used to find or define a...

  11. Cataloguing Urdu Names

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dogra, R. C.

    1973-01-01

    The major problem in cataloging Urdu names is in the identification of the personal name and the entry word. The author examines practices followed by various libraries, and then discusses the rules for entry. (28 references) (Author/SJ)

  12. Writerly Gaming: Political Gaming

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, Christian Ulrik

    2007-01-01

    software for private entertainment (looking/feeling real) or they can be pragmatic software used for training of professionals (affecting soldiers’, pilots’, etc. perception of the real). A third, and less debated game-reality relationship, based on public awareness and typically a socio-political agenda...

  13. Game equilibrium models I evolution and game dynamics

    CERN Document Server

    1991-01-01

    There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to charac...

  14. Naming as Strategic Communication

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Schmeltz, Line; Kjeldsen, Anna Karina

    2016-01-01

    This article presents a framework for understanding corporate name change as strategic communication. From a corporate branding perspective, the choice of a new name can be seen as a wish to stand out from a group of similar organizations. Conversely, from an institutional perspective, name change....... Second, it offers practical support to organizations, private as well as public, who find themselves in a situation where changing the name of the organization could be a way to reach either communicative or organizational goals....

  15. What's in a name?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ernst, Erik

    Feature interaction may arise in many dierent ways, but one of the core topics is the issue of name binding: When two or more entities are composed, say A and B, and they provide more than one declaration of the same name, say n, should the composed entity contain one subentity under that name n...

  16. Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M.; Wu, Rongling

    2017-03-01

    Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention.

  17. Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M; Wu, Rongling

    2017-03-01

    Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  18. The urban environmental perception with use of photographic images: a semiotic instrument named Game of the Perception A percepção ambiental urbana com uso de imagens fotográficas: um instrumento semiótico denominado Jogo da Percepção

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Luzia Marta Bellini

    2007-01-01

    Full Text Available This article about signs of urban environmental perception was developed in the city of Medianeira, Southwestern Paraná – Brazil. Part of perceptive information of local social actors was obtained by means of analysis of photographic images with the use of a new investigation instrument that we named Game of the Perception. The activity of the Game encouraged the participating social actors to observe the context of the local environment and perceptually judge practices and habits of the city population, and also experience odd situations on effective practices and use of the environment. Este artigo sobre percepção sígnica ambiental urbana foi desenvolvido na cidade de Medianeira, Sudoeste do Paraná – Brasil. Parte das informações perceptivas dos atores sociais locais foi obtida por meio da análise de imagens fotográficas com o uso de um novo instrumento de investigação que denominamos Jogo da Percepção. A atividade do Jogo estimulou os atores sociais participantes a observar o contexto do ambiente local e ajuizar perceptivamente costumes e hábitos da população da cidade bem como vivenciar situações de estranhamento sobre práticas vigentes no uso do ambiente.

  19. [Game addiction].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mori, Akio; Iwadate, Masako; Minakawa, Nahoko T; Kawashima, Satoshi

    2015-09-01

    The purpose of this article is to analyze the South Korea and China of computer game research, and the current state of research in Japan. Excessive game actions were analyzed by PET-MRI, MRI, fMRI, NIRS, EEG. These results showed that the prefrontal cortical activity decreased during game play. Also, game addiction causes damage to the prefrontal cortex. The NIRS-EEG and simultaneous recording, during game play correspond well with the decrease of β band and oxygen-hemoglobin. The α band did not change with game play. However, oxygen-hemoglobin decreased during game play. South Korea, game addiction measures have been analyzed since 2002, but in Japan the research is recent.

  20. Gundolf S. Freyermuth Games/ Game Design/ Game Studies: An Introduction

    OpenAIRE

    Feleki, Despoina

    2017-01-01

    Gundolf S. Freyermuth Games/ Game Design/ Game Studies: An Introduction Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, Germany 2015. Pp. 290. ISBN: 978-3-8376-2983-5. Despoina Feleki Games, Game Design, Game Studies: An Introduction scrutinizes the developments in game production from analog to digital technology, Game Design theories, and, finally, the newly formed academic discipline of Game Studies. It attempts a critical assessment of the interdisciplinarity in media studies that accounts for, according ...

  1. Biform Games

    OpenAIRE

    Adam Brandenburger; Harborne Stuart

    2007-01-01

    Both noncooperative and cooperative game theory have been applied to business strategy. We propose a hybrid noncooperative-cooperative game model, which we call a biform game. This is designed to formalize the notion of business strategy as making moves to try to shape the competitive environment in a favorable way. (The noncooperative component of a biform game models the strategic moves. The cooperative component models the resulting competitive environment.) We give biform models of variou...

  2. Casual Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Ole Ertløv

    2015-01-01

    Casual games have become a widespread activity that fills our leisure time. This article introduces to the phenomenon casual games – their definition and the history. Furthermore the article presents and discusses the experience of and engagement or immersion in playing these games as it is put...... forward by recent research. The theoretical approach is based on media psychology, phenomenology and reversal theory. Finally it is argued that playing casual games is fundamental pleasurable to both paratelic as well as telic metamotivational states....

  3. Spoken name pronunciation evaluation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tepperman, Joseph; Narayanan, Shrikanth

    2004-10-01

    Recognition of spoken names is an important ASR task since many speech applications can be associated with it. However, the task is also among the most difficult ones due to the large number of names, their varying origins, and the multiple valid pronunciations of any given name, largely dependent upon the speaker's mother tongue and familiarity with the name. In order to explore the speaker- and language-dependent pronunciation variability issues present in name pronunciation, a spoken name database was collected from 101 speakers with varying native languages. Each speaker was asked to pronounce 80 polysyllabic names, uniformly chosen from ten language origins. In preliminary experiments, various prosodic features were used to train Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) to identify misplaced syllabic emphasis within the name, at roughly 85% accuracy. Articulatory features (voicing, place, and manner of articulation) derived from MFCCs were also incorporated for that purpose. The combined prosodic and articulatory features were used to automatically grade the quality of name pronunciation. These scores can be used to provide meaningful feedback to foreign language learners. A detailed description of the name database and some preliminary results on the accuracy of detecting misplaced stress patterns will be reported.

  4. Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend

    2008-01-01

    We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global ray-projection

  5. Optimizing Visual Properties of Game Content through Neuroevolution

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Liapis, Antonios; Yannakakis, Georgios N.; Togelius, Julian

    This paper presents a search-based approach to generating game content that satisfies both gameplay requirements and user-expressed aesthetic criteria. Using evolutionary constraint satisfaction, we search for spaceships (for a space combat game) represented as compositional pattern-producing net......This paper presents a search-based approach to generating game content that satisfies both gameplay requirements and user-expressed aesthetic criteria. Using evolutionary constraint satisfaction, we search for spaceships (for a space combat game) represented as compositional pattern...

  6. Stability properties of nonlinear dynamical systems and evolutionary stable states

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gleria, Iram; Brenig, Leon; Rocha Filho, Tarcísio M.; Figueiredo, Annibal

    2017-03-01

    In this paper we address the problem of stability in a general class of non-linear systems. We establish a link between the concepts of asymptotic stable interior fixed points of square Quasi-Polynomial systems and evolutionary stable states, a property of some payoff matrices arising from evolutionary games.

  7. Evolutionary macroecology

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    José Alexandre F. Diniz-Filho

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available Macroecology focuses on ecological questions at broad spatial and temporal scales, providing a statistical description of patterns in species abundance, distribution and diversity. More recently, historical components of these patterns have begun to be investigated more deeply. We tentatively refer to the practice of explicitly taking species history into account, both analytically and conceptually, as ‘evolutionary macroecology’. We discuss how the evolutionary dimension can be incorporated into macroecology through two orthogonal and complementary data types: fossils and phylogenies. Research traditions dealing with these data have developed more‐or‐less independently over the last 20–30 years, but merging them will help elucidate the historical components of diversity gradients and the evolutionary dynamics of species’ traits. Here we highlight conceptual and methodological advances in merging these two research traditions and review the viewpoints and toolboxes that can, in combination, help address patterns and unveil processes at temporal and spatial macro‐scales.

  8. Evolutionary Expectations

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nash, Ulrik William

    2014-01-01

    cognitive bounds will perceive business opportunities identically. In addition, because cues provide information about latent causal structures of the environment, changes in causality must be accompanied by changes in cognitive representations if adaptation is to be maintained. The concept of evolutionary......, they are correlated among people who share environments because these individuals satisfice within their cognitive bounds by using cues in order of validity, as opposed to using cues arbitrarily. Any difference in expectations thereby arise from differences in cognitive ability, because two individuals with identical......The concept of evolutionary expectations descends from cue learning psychology, synthesizing ideas on rational expectations with ideas on bounded rationality, to provide support for these ideas simultaneously. Evolutionary expectations are rational, but within cognitive bounds. Moreover...

  9. [Evolutionary medicine].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wjst, M

    2013-12-01

    Evolutionary medicine allows new insights into long standing medical problems. Are we "really stoneagers on the fast lane"? This insight might have enormous consequences and will allow new answers that could never been provided by traditional anthropology. Only now this is made possible using data from molecular medicine and systems biology. Thereby evolutionary medicine takes a leap from a merely theoretical discipline to practical fields - reproductive, nutritional and preventive medicine, as well as microbiology, immunology and psychiatry. Evolutionary medicine is not another "just so story" but a serious candidate for the medical curriculum providing a universal understanding of health and disease based on our biological origin. © Georg Thieme Verlag KG Stuttgart · New York.

  10. Origins of NASA names

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wells, H. T.; Whiteley, S. H.; Karegeannes, C. E.

    1976-01-01

    Names are selected for NASA spaceflight projects and programs from various sources. Some have their foundations in mythology and astrology or legend and folklore. Some have historic connotations; others are based on a description of their mission, often resulting in an acronym. Included are names of launch vehicles, spacecraft, manned spaceflight programs, sounding rockets, and NASA field installations. This study is limited to names of approved projects through 1974; it does not include names of numerous projects which have been or are being studied or projects that were canceled or postponed before reaching actual flight.

  11. Game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dufwenberg, Martin

    2011-03-01

    Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence each other. I discuss the nature of game-theoretic analysis, the history of game theory, why game theory is useful for understanding human psychology, and why game theory has played a key role in the recent explosion of interest in the field of behavioral economics. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 167-173 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.119 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  12. Strategic interactions: Games of the Ju|'hoan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    de Voogt, Alex

    2017-12-01

    Three strategic games played by the Ju|'hoan-a board, a card, and a gesture game-complicate the rhetorics that suggest an evolutionary or psychological significance of play. They are mostly played by adults, although every individual adult does not necessarily engage in each game. The Ju|'hoan card and board game practices were transmitted through contact across large parts of Botswana and Namibia, while the gesture game n!àì has been known in other San communities. It suggests that the significance of strategic games is more likely found in its potential for social interaction (i.e., allowing to overcome cultural divides) than in evolution and psychology. Within the anthropological literature, strategy games were thought to be absent in egalitarian societies, such as that of the Ju|'hoan. Here, the roles of power, competition, and winning were thought to be disruptive and unwanted. A closer examination of the details behind the Ju|'hoan games shows that not only were strategy games adopted and adapted from neighboring societies but that the game of n!àì was developed by the Ju|'hoan into a competitive one. The evolutionary or psychological significance of play is informed by studies on individual play, children's play, and games with informal rules. When considering strategic games throughout history, it is their role of facilitator rather than the playing practice itself that makes games relevant across languages, cultural divides, and sociopolitical boundaries.

  13. On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend

    2011-01-01

    We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman

  14. The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lili Deng

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available We have studied evolutionary ultimatum game with spatially arranged players, who have choice between the two kinds of strategies (named greedy and altruist. The strategies in the ultimatum game here are described by p(i and a(i, that is, the probability of offering i to himself and the accepting probability when receiving i. By using computer simulations with C++ builder, we have provided the dynamics of the greedy and altruistic strategies and found that the proportion evolution of the “greedy” strategy for different initial cases is approximately 60%. Furthermore, the explanations for the interesting phenomenon are presented from different aspects. In addition, we illustrate that the factor of the expectation level (aspiration level in the updating rule plays an important role in the promotion of altruistic behaviors.

  15. Learning Multidisciplinary Collaboration with Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Henriksen, Thomas Duus

    2015-01-01

    This chapter describes the design of a game-based learning process for developing communication in public organisations. The game-design presented here emphasises those parts of public organisations that tend to employ multidisciplinary teams for solving wicked problems. As such teams employ...... members from different, professional backgrounds, the game Public Professional sought to develop new understandings among team members and across professions. The purpose of this game was to facilitate an understanding among team members and across professions, a game-based learning process named Public...... Professional was designed. Its purpose was to a) provide team members with a shared language for discussing work related problems in regard to communication. To facilitate an understanding on the collaboration across professions, and to provide a space for dialogue about professional cooperation, Public...

  16. What's in a Name?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wyatt, J. F.

    1987-01-01

    A study examined the preferences of British teenagers for names of higher education institutions, including the use of terms such as "academy, college, college of higher education, college of arts and sciences, institute, or school," and geographic, religious, royal, or personal names. (MSE)

  17. Directory of awardee names

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1999-07-01

    Standardization of grant and contract awardee names has been an area of concern since the development of the Department`s Procurement and Assistance Data System (PADS). A joint effort was begun in 1983 by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) and the Office of Procurement and Assistance Management/Information Systems and Analysis Division to develop a means for providing uniformity of awardee names. As a result of this effort, a method of assigning vendor identification codes to each unique awardee name, division, city, and state combination was developed and is maintained by OSTI. Changes to vendor identification codes or awardee names contained in PADS can be made only by OSTI. Awardee names in the Directory indicate that the awardee has had a prime contract (excluding purchase orders of $10,000 or less) with, or a financial assistance award from, the Department. Award status--active, inactive, or retired--is not shown. The Directory is in alphabetic sequence based on awardee name and reflects the OSTI-assigned vendor identification code to the right of the name. A vendor identification code is assigned to each unique awardee name, division, city, and state (for place of performance). The same vendor identification code is used for awards throughout the Department.

  18. Names and Weapons.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kauffman, Charles

    1989-01-01

    Traces the theoretical significance of using names as titles for situations, and applies this analysis to the United States' intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Argues that the names given to ICBMs preserve their utility as weapons by linking them to the myths of the nineteenth-century western frontier. (MM)

  19. Naming the Ethological Subject.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Benson, Etienne S

    2016-03-01

    Argument In recent decades, through the work of Jane Goodall and other ethologists, the practice of giving personal names to nonhuman animals who are the subjects of scientific research has become associated with claims about animal personhood and scientific objectivity. While critics argue that such naming practices predispose the researcher toward anthropomorphism, supporters suggest that it sensitizes the researcher to individual differences and social relations. Both critics and supporters agree that naming tends to be associated with the recognition of individual animal rights. The history of the naming of research animals since the late nineteenth century shows, however, that the practice has served a variety of purposes, most of which have raised few ethical or epistemological concerns. Names have been used to identify research animals who play dual roles as pets, workers, or patients, to enhance their market value, and to facilitate their identification in the field. The multifaceted history of naming suggests both that the use of personal names by Goodall and others is less of a radical break with previous practices than it might first appear to be and that the use of personal names to recognize the individuality, sentience, or rights of nonhuman animals faces inherent limits and contradictions.

  20. Some dynamics of signaling games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huttegger, Simon; Skyrms, Brian; Tarrès, Pierre; Wagner, Elliott

    2014-07-22

    Information transfer is a basic feature of life that includes signaling within and between organisms. Owing to its interactive nature, signaling can be investigated by using game theory. Game theoretic models of signaling have a long tradition in biology, economics, and philosophy. For a long time the analyses of these games has mostly relied on using static equilibrium concepts such as Pareto optimal Nash equilibria or evolutionarily stable strategies. More recently signaling games of various types have been investigated with the help of game dynamics, which includes dynamical models of evolution and individual learning. A dynamical analysis leads to more nuanced conclusions as to the outcomes of signaling interactions. Here we explore different kinds of signaling games that range from interactions without conflicts of interest between the players to interactions where their interests are seriously misaligned. We consider these games within the context of evolutionary dynamics (both infinite and finite population models) and learning dynamics (reinforcement learning). Some results are specific features of a particular dynamical model, whereas others turn out to be quite robust across different models. This suggests that there are certain qualitative aspects that are common to many real-world signaling interactions.

  1. Defining fitness in evolutionary models

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    The analysis of evolutionary models requires an appropriate definition for fitness. In this paper, I review such definitions in relation to the five major dimensions by which models may be described, namely. finite versus infinite (or very large) population size,; type of environment (constant, fixed length, temporally stochastic, ...

  2. Integrating genomics into evolutionary medicine.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rodríguez, Juan Antonio; Marigorta, Urko M; Navarro, Arcadi

    2014-12-01

    The application of the principles of evolutionary biology into medicine was suggested long ago and is already providing insight into the ultimate causes of disease. However, a full systematic integration of medical genomics and evolutionary medicine is still missing. Here, we briefly review some cases where the combination of the two fields has proven profitable and highlight two of the main issues hindering the development of evolutionary genomic medicine as a mature field, namely the dissociation between fitness and health and the still considerable difficulties in predicting phenotypes from genotypes. We use publicly available data to illustrate both problems and conclude that new approaches are needed for evolutionary genomic medicine to overcome these obstacles. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  3. Evolutionary stability concepts in a stochastic environment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Li, Cong; Lessard, Sabin; Tao, Yi

    2017-09-01

    Over the past 30 years, evolutionary game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy have been not only extensively developed and successfully applied to explain the evolution of animal behaviors, but also widely used in economics and social sciences. Nonetheless, the stochastic dynamical properties of evolutionary games in randomly fluctuating environments are still unclear. In this study, we investigate conditions for stochastic local stability of fixation states and constant interior equilibria in a two-phenotype model with random payoffs following pairwise interactions. Based on this model, we develop the concepts of stochastic evolutionary stability (SES) and stochastic convergence stability (SCS). We show that the condition for a pure strategy to be SES and SCS is more stringent than in a constant environment, while the condition for a constant mixed strategy to be SES is less stringent than the condition to be SCS, which is less stringent than the condition in a constant environment.

  4. Name agreement in picture naming : An ERP study

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Cheng, Xiaorong; Schafer, Graham; Akyürek, Elkan G.

    Name agreement is the extent to which different people agree on a name for a particular picture. Previous studies have found that it takes longer to name low name agreement pictures than high name agreement pictures. To examine the effect of name agreement in the online process of picture naming, we

  5. "Name" that Animal

    Science.gov (United States)

    Laird, Shirley

    2010-01-01

    In this article, the author describes a texture and pattern project. Students started by doing an outline contour drawing of an animal. With the outline drawn, the students then write one of their names to fit "inside" the animal.

  6. Positional games

    CERN Document Server

    Hefetz, Dan; Stojaković, Miloš; Szabó, Tibor

    2014-01-01

    This text serves as a thorough introduction to the rapidly developing field of positional games. This area constitutes an important branch of combinatorics, whose aim it is to systematically develop an extensive mathematical basis for a variety of two-player perfect information games. These range from such popular games as Tic-Tac-Toe and Hex to purely abstract games played on graphs and hypergraphs. The subject of positional games is strongly related to several other branches of combinatorics such as Ramsey theory, extremal graph and set theory, and the probabilistic method. These notes cover a variety of topics in positional games, including both classical results and recent important developments. They are presented in an accessible way and are accompanied by exercises of varying difficulty, helping the reader to better understand the theory. The text will benefit both researchers and graduate students in combinatorics and adjacent fields.

  7. Emotional Gaming

    OpenAIRE

    Madeira, Filipa; Arriaga,Patrícia; Adrião, Joana; Lopes, Ricardo; Esteves,Francisco

    2013-01-01

    In recent years, research on the psychology of gaming has examined the negative and positive outcomes of playing video games. Thus far, a variety of affective phenomena have been investigated. In this chapter we will continue this exploration by examining the emotions elicited by the act of playing video games. Because the study of emotions must rely on different type of methods, including subjective self-reports (e.g., description of feelings), neuropsychophysiological measurements ...

  8. Problem Gaming

    OpenAIRE

    Strate, Simon Wolter; Dreyer, Maria; Petersen, Freja Astrid; Willumsen, Ea Christina

    2013-01-01

    This paper investigates the psychological and social consequences of excessive online computer use. The study is based on an assumption that immoderate time spent on online gaming will have negative consequences for the identity creation processes and the ability to socialize in a non-gaming context. The paper argues that by asserting that gaming addiction exist a question of autonomy vs. beneficence will be raised, as some will search to find a treatment for such a diagnosis. By using differ...

  9. Video games

    OpenAIRE

    Kolář, Vojtěch

    2012-01-01

    This thesis is based on a detailed analysis of various topics related to the question of whether video games can be art. In the first place it analyzes the current academic discussion on this subject and confronts different opinions of both supporters and objectors of the idea, that video games can be a full-fledged art form. The second point of this paper is to analyze the properties, that are inherent to video games, in order to find the reason, why cultural elite considers video games as i...

  10. Game Spaces

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kristiansen, Erik

    2015-01-01

    or she suddenly finds himself in another world, where artefacts are given new meaning and where other rules apply. This makes sense, but also demands that play and non-play can be easily separated. Even so, the concept of the magic circle has never been analysed with respect to the spatial configuration......, called “pervasive games.” These are games that are based on computer technology, but use a physical space as the game space as opposed to video games. Coupling spatial configuration with performance theory of rituals as liminal phenomena, I put forward a model and a new understanding of the magic circle...

  11. Design Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Johansson, Martin Wetterstrand

    2007-01-01

    In this paper design games are discussed as an approach to managing design sessions. The focus is on the collaborative design session and more particular on how to set up the collaboration and reinsure progress. Design games have the advantage of framing the collaborative assignment at hand....... Experiments can be set up to explore possible futures and design games has the qualities of elegantly focus the work at the same time as it lessens the burden for the process facilitator. The present paper goes into detail about how design games can be set up to facilitate collaboration and how the design...

  12. Serious Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, Christian Ulrik

    2006-01-01

    T hese days one of the buzzwords in computer game industry and research is ‘Serious Games’ – games where the actions of the player are not limited to the virtual world but are somehow related to the real world. Computer games can be strong environments for learning and training skills in the real...... world. Computer games can also be persuasive – they can be used for advertising (‘adver-gaming’) and induce the players to buy a particular product in the real world or they can propagate a particular political viewpoint or a critique of the real world. The area of ‘serious gaming’ is vast and varied....

  13. Game physics

    CERN Document Server

    Eberly, David H

    2010-01-01

    ""Game Physics, 2nd Edition"" provides clear descriptions of the mathematics and algorithms needed to create a powerful physics engine - while providing a solid reference for all of the math you will encounter anywhere in game development: quaternions, linear algebra, and calculus. Implementing physical simulations for real-time games is a complex task that requires a solid understanding of a wide range of concepts from the fields of mathematics and physics. Previously, the relevant information could only be gleaned through obscure research papers. Thanks to ""Game Physics"", all this informa

  14. Evolutionary institutionalism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fürstenberg, Dr Kai

    Institutions are hard to define and hard to study. Long prominent in political science have been two theories: Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Arising from the life sciences is now a third: Evolutionary Institutionalism (EI). Comparative strengths and weaknesses of these three theories warrant review, and the value-to-be-added by expanding the third beyond Darwinian evolutionary theory deserves consideration. Should evolutionary institutionalism expand to accommodate new understanding in ecology, such as might apply to the emergence of stability, and in genetics, such as might apply to political behavior? Core arguments are reviewed for each theory with more detailed exposition of the third, EI. Particular attention is paid to EI's gene-institution analogy; to variation, selection, and retention of institutional traits; to endogeneity and exogeneity; to agency and structure; and to ecosystem effects, institutional stability, and empirical limitations in behavioral genetics. RCI, HI, and EI are distinct but complementary. Institutional change, while amenable to rational-choice analysis and, retrospectively, to criticaljuncture and path-dependency analysis, is also, and importantly, ecological. Stability, like change, is an emergent property of institutions, which tend to stabilize after change in a manner analogous to allopatric speciation. EI is more than metaphorically biological in that institutional behaviors are driven by human behaviors whose evolution long preceded the appearance of institutions themselves.

  15. Strategic teaching and learning in games

    OpenAIRE

    Schipper, Burkhard

    2015-01-01

    It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be "evolutionary stable" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order secure at l...

  16. Cats and Portals: Video Games, Learning, and Play

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gee, James Paul

    2008-01-01

    The author builds on arguments he has made elsewhere that good commercial video games foster deep learning and problem solving and that such games in fact promote mastery as a form of play. Here he maintains that some good video games engage players with an important type of play, namely of play as discovery, of play as surmising new possibilities…

  17. Creating Digital Games as Interactive Learning Environments: Factors That Affect Palestinian Teachers' Success in Modifying Video Games for Instruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Younis, Bilal Khaleel

    2012-01-01

    The purpose of this study was to investigate the factors that might predict Palestinian teachers' success in modding games for instruction. An instructional game design model named Game Modding for Non-Professionals (GMNP) was created specifically for the training of Palestinian teachers during this study. This study addressed the question: To…

  18. Neuroevolution in Games: State of the Art and Open Challenges

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Risi, Sebastian; Togelius, Julian

    2015-01-01

    This paper surveys research on applying neuroevolution (NE) to games. In neuroevolution, artificial neural networks are trained through evolutionary algorithms, taking inspiration from the way biological brains evolved. We analyse the application of NE in games along five different axes, which...

  19. Small game

    Science.gov (United States)

    John C. Kilgo

    2005-01-01

    Although small game currently is not harvested on the Savannah river Site(SRS) soutside of the Crackerneck Wildlife Management area and logical Reserve (CWMA), several species of small game occur on SRS. these include snipe (Gallinago gallinago), American woodcock (Scolopax minor), morning dove (Zenaida macroura...

  20. Inuit Games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keewatin Regional Education Authority, Rankin Inlet (Northwest Territories).

    The purpose of this publication is to record the traditional games played by the Inuit and to preserve a unique form of sports and recreation found in northern Canada. Written in English and Inupiaq, this manual contains descriptions of games played throughout the Arctic with special emphasis on the Keewatin Region, suggestions for teaching Inuit…

  1. Semantic Web Compatible Names and Descriptions for Organisms

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, H.; Wilson, N.; McGuinness, D. L.

    2012-12-01

    Modern scientific names are critical for understanding the biological literature and provide a valuable way to understand evolutionary relationships. To validly publish a name, a description is required to separate the described group of organisms from those described by other names at the same level of the taxonomic hierarchy. The frequent revision of descriptions due to new evolutionary evidence has lead to situations where a single given scientific name may over time have multiple descriptions associated with it and a given published description may apply to multiple scientific names. Because of these many-to-many relationships between scientific names and descriptions, the usage of scientific names as a proxy for descriptions is inevitably ambiguous. Another issue lies in the fact that the precise application of scientific names often requires careful microscopic work, or increasingly, genetic sequencing, as scientific names are focused on the evolutionary relatedness between and within named groups such as species, genera, families, etc. This is problematic to many audiences, especially field biologists, who often do not have access to the instruments and tools required to make identifications on a microscopic or genetic basis. To better connect scientific names to descriptions and find a more convenient way to support computer assisted identification, we proposed the Semantic Vernacular System, a novel naming system that creates named, machine-interpretable descriptions for groups of organisms, and is compatible with the Semantic Web. Unlike the evolutionary relationship based scientific naming system, it emphasizes the observable features of organisms. By independently naming the descriptions composed of sets of observational features, as well as maintaining connections to scientific names, it preserves the observational data used to identify organisms. The system is designed to support a peer-review mechanism for creating new names, and uses a controlled

  2. Measuring name system health

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Casalicchio, Emiliano; Caselli, M.; Coletta, Alessio; Di Blasi, Salvatore; Fovino, Igor Nai; Butts, Jonathan; Shenoi, Sujeet

    2012-01-01

    Modern critical infrastructure assets are exposed to security threats arising from their use of IP networks and the Domain Name System (DNS). This paper focuses on the health of DNS. Indeed, due to the increased reliance on the Internet, the degradation of DNS could have significant consequences for

  3. Christian Names of Karelians

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Denis V. Kuzmin

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available The article analyses the forms of Christian names used in the past and in the present on the territory of the Karelian ethnic group’s settlement — in Finland, as well as in Russian Karelia, Tver and Leningrad regions. The main aim of the article is to sum up the findings of previous research and to provide an analysis of new anthroponymic data retrieved from the 16th–17th centuries historical documents or collected by the author and other researchers during field trips. After outlining the main stages of the development of the Orthodox religion on the Karelian lands, the author gives an insight into the history of the formation of the Karelian Orthodox anthroponymicon. The article shows that after the adoption of Orthodox religion in 1227 Karelians adopted a large number of Christian names which later were modified according to the phonetic and morphologic patterns of the Karelian language. In Karelian, canonical Christian names received numerous folk variants, part of which derived from the Russian language forms used on the neighboring Russian lands. The article focuses on the main ways of phonetic and morphological adaptation of Russian forms in the Karelian language. The author emphasizes that Karelian forms of Christian names feature a rather well-built phonetic and morphological system, which allows not only to explain the origin of obscure forms but to restore a number of forms which might have been used earlier in the Karelian language but were completely lost.

  4. Leveraging Insights from Mainstream Gameplay to Inform STEM Game Design: Great Idea, but What Comes Next?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Biles, Melissa

    2012-01-01

    This response to Leah A. Bricker and Phillip Bell's paper, "GodMode is his video game name", examines their assertion that the social nexus of gaming practices is an important factor to consider for those looking to design STEM video games. I propose that we need to go beyond the investigation into which aspects of games play a role in learning,…

  5. Upbringing and education through games at a youth summer camp

    OpenAIRE

    RUDOLFOVÁ, Lenka

    2012-01-01

    This bachelor thesis named "The education and teaching by game in children's leisure time programs" presents analysis of possibility of application the games in leisure time programs. The goal of this thesis is to create summary of about the games within experiental pedagogy. Next goal is to create the publication "Holiday guide teacher". This publication can be used as a methodology for the preparation of the game programs.

  6. Juegos, Canciones, Poemas y Adivinanzas (Games, Songs, Poems and Riddles).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Toro, Leonor; And Others

    Printed in Spanish, this booklet contains games, songs, poems, riddles, and sayings for use with Puerto Rican migrant children. Eleven matching exercises present Spanish vocabulary related to clothing, food, and musical instruments. Eleven word search games teach Spanish names for body parts, masculine and feminine nouns, famous names, fruits and…

  7. Towards gaze-controlled platform games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Muñoz, Jorge; Yannakakis, Georgios N.; Mulvey, Fiona

    2011-01-01

    controllers with the use of artificial intelligence for a platform game like Super Mario. Information about the eyes' position on the screen and the state of the game are utilized as inputs of an artificial neural network, which is trained to approximate which keyboard action is to be performed at each game...... analysis shows that there is a rather limited grid around Mario where the efficient player focuses her attention the most while playing the game. The useful grid as we name it, projects the amount of meaningful visual information a designer should use towards creating successful player character...

  8. Multiple explanations in Darwinian evolutionary theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bock, Walter J

    2010-03-01

    Variational evolutionary theory as advocated by Darwin is not a single theory, but a bundle of related but independent theories, namely: (a) variational evolution; (b) gradualism rather than large leaps; (c) processes of phyletic evolution and of speciation; (d) causes for the formation of varying individuals in populations and for the action of selective agents; and (e) all organisms evolved from a common ancestor. The first four are nomological-deductive explanations and the fifth is historical-narrative. Therefore evolutionary theory must be divided into nomological and historical theories which are both testable against objective empirical observations. To be scientific, historical evolutionary theories must be based on well corroborated nomological theories, both evolutionary and functional. Nomological and general historical evolutionary theories are well tested and must be considered as strongly corroborated scientific theories. Opponents of evolutionary theory are concerned only with historical evolutionary theories, having little interest in nomological theory. Yet given a well corroborated nomological evolutionary theory, historical evolutionary theories follow automatically. If understood correctly, both forms of evolutionary theories stand on their own as corroborated scientific theories and should not be labeled as facts.

  9. Name Searching and Information Retrieval

    CERN Document Server

    Thompson, P; Thompson, Paul; Dozier, Christopher C.

    1997-01-01

    The main application of name searching has been name matching in a database of names. This paper discusses a different application: improving information retrieval through name recognition. It investigates name recognition accuracy, and the effect on retrieval performance of indexing and searching personal names differently from non-name terms in the context of ranked retrieval. The main conclusions are: that name recognition in text can be effective; that names occur frequently enough in a variety of domains, including those of legal documents and news databases, to make recognition worthwhile; and that retrieval performance can be improved using name searching.

  10. Their Name is Half-Way

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elena Bagina

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available The article is devoted to the phenomenon of the Soviet architecture of the late 1950s – 60s. The name of the article is “Their name is halfway”. It expresses the sense of all the processes occurring both in society and architecture during the Khrushchev Thaw. Developing the socalled Stalin’s Empire in the 1930-1950s, the masters of architecture had travelled only half the way. If the power had not abruptly stopped this movement, we would probably have a unique modern architecture dissimilar to the “international style”. The collapse of the Soviet Union stopped the evolution of architecture again: the unique features of the Soviet architecture of the 1960s ceased to develop. Architects were carried away with ironic games of postmodernism, which led them to deadlock.

  11. The naming game: A discrepancy among the medical community.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Loukas, Marios; Aly, Islam; Tubbs, R Shane; Anderson, Robert H

    2016-04-01

    As anatomists we rely on the nomenclature of structures in order to describe them appropriately, particularly their orientation in respect to their surrounding. The terminology used by the anatomist to describe an organ, muscle, or nerve within the body is taught to medical students as law. Students learn to describe structures in the "anatomical position", which has been accepted in the literature since the original Latin Nomina Anatomica. They therefore familiarize themselves with the use of terms such as superior, inferior, posterior and anterior to describe all anatomical structures, except in respect of the heart. The heart is still described in the original Valentine position. As anatomists we owe it to the medical and research community to correct the nomenclature to minimize confusion, and to describe the heart properly in respect to its surrounding structures. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  12. The Assignment Game : The Reduced Game

    OpenAIRE

    Guillermo OWEN

    1992-01-01

    Let v be an assignment game. For a given reference payoff vector (x; y), and a coalition S, bargaining within the coalition can be represented by either the reduced game or the derived game. It is known that the reduced game need not be an assignment game (in fact, it need not be super additive) while the derived game is another assignment game, with modified reservation prices. We prove that, when the reference vector is in the core of the game, the derived game is the super additive cover o...

  13. An evolutionary approach to military history

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xabier Rubio Campillo

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper provides a new way of analysing the concept of change within the field of military history. The proposal is based on the use of complex adaptive systems and evolutionary theory. We introduce the concepts of selection, adaptation and coevolution to explain how war is managed in different societies, and game theory to explore decision-making processes of commanders. We emphasize the value of integrating formal modeling and computational simulations in order to apply the approach to real case studies. Our conclusions outline the advantages of an evolutionary military history in the difficult task of understanding the causes of transformation in past battlefields and armies.

  14. Systematizing game learning analytics for serious games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Alonso-Fernandez, Cristina; Calvo-Morata, Antonio; Freire, Manuel; Martinez-Ortiz, Ivan; Fernandez-Manjon, Baltasar

    2017-01-01

    Applying games in education provides multiple benefits clearly visible in entertainment games: their engaging, goal-oriented nature encourages students to improve while they play. Educational games, also known as Serious Games (SGs) are video games designed with a main purpose other than

  15. What's in a Name? Understanding Profile Name Reuse on Twitter

    OpenAIRE

    Mariconti, E.; Onaolapo, J.; Ahmad, S.; Nikiforou, N.(Nevis Laboratory, Columbia University, Irvington, NY, United States); Egele, M.; Nikiforakis, N.; Stringhini, G.

    2017-01-01

    Users on Twitter are commonly identified by their profile names. These names are used when directly addressing users on Twitter, are part of their profile page URLs, and can become a trademark for popular accounts, with people referring to celebrities by their real name and their profile name, interchangeably. Twitter, however, has chosen to not permanently link profile names to their corresponding user accounts. In fact, Twitter allows users to change their profile name, and afterwards makes...

  16. Using a voice to put a name to a face: the psycholinguistics of proper name comprehension.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barr, Dale J; Jackson, Laura; Phillips, Isobel

    2014-02-01

    We propose that hearing a proper name (e.g., Kevin) in a particular voice serves as a compound memory cue that directly activates representations of a mutually known target person, often permitting reference resolution without any complex computation of shared knowledge. In a referential communication study, pairs of friends played a communication game, in which we monitored the eyes of one friend (the addressee) while he or she sought to identify the target person, in a set of four photos, on the basis of a name spoken aloud. When the name was spoken by a friend, addressees rapidly identified the target person, and this facilitation was independent of whether the friend was articulating a message he or she had designed versus one from a third party with whom the target person was not shared. Our findings suggest that the comprehension system takes advantage of regularities in the environment to minimize effortful computation about who knows what.

  17. Randomness and Arbitrary Coordination in the Reactive Ultimatum Game

    CERN Document Server

    da Silva, Roberto; Lamb, Luis C

    2015-01-01

    Darwin's theory of evolution - as introduced in game theory by Maynard Smith - is not the only important evolutionary aspect in a evolutionary dynamics, since complex interdependencies, competition, and growth should be modeled by, for example, reactive aspects. In the ultimatum game the reciprocity and the fifty-fifty partition seems to be a deviation from rational behavior of the players under the light of the Nash equilibrium concept.Such equilibrium emerges, for example, from the punishment of the responder who generally tends to refuse unfair proposals. In the iterated version of the game, the proposers are able to improve their proposals by adding a value thus making fairer proposals. Such evolutionary aspects are not properly Darwinian-motivated, but they are endowed with a fundamental aspect: they reflect their actions according to value of the offers. Recently, a reactive version of the ultimatum game where acceptance occurs with fixed probability was proposed. In this paper, we aim at exploring this...

  18. Serious Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Christensen, Jens

    Serious Games er et nyt it-forretningsområde, der siden årtusindskiftet er vokset frem, først i USA og dernæst i Vesteuropa og and i-lande. Til forskel fra computerspil er serious games ikke underholdning, men tænkt som et værktøj til støtte for statens og erhvervslivets forskellige funktioner. D...

  19. (ludo) game

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Dr Obe

    the work at Kelvin Mcleish 8 which merely used the exponential transition firing to illustrate a Petri net token game animation. This in effect is not a real life game. ... For a review of the history of Petri nets and an extensive bibliography, the reader is referred to 6.7.12.13. A Petri net has been described in. 8.13 as a convenient ...

  20. Computer Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    1992-01-01

    Using NASA studies of advanced lunar exploration and colonization, KDT Industries, Inc. and Wesson International have developed MOONBASE, a computer game. The player, or team commander, must build and operate a lunar base using NASA technology. He has 10 years to explore the surface, select a site and assemble structures brought from Earth into an efficient base. The game was introduced in 1991 by Texas Space Grant Consortium.

  1. Auditory responsive naming versus visual confrontation naming in dementia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, Kimberly M; Finney, Glen R; Meador, Kimford J; Loring, David W

    2010-01-01

    Dysnomia is typically assessed during neuropsychological evaluation through visual confrontation naming. Responsive naming to description, however, has been shown to have a more distributed representation in both fMRI and cortical stimulation studies. While naming deficits are common in dementia, the relative sensitivity of visual confrontation versus auditory responsive naming has not been directly investigated. The current study compared visual confrontation naming and auditory responsive naming in a dementia sample of mixed etiologies to examine patterns of performance across these naming tasks. A total of 50 patients with dementia of various etiologies were administered visual confrontation naming and auditory responsive naming tasks using stimuli that were matched in overall word frequency. Patients performed significantly worse on auditory responsive naming than visual confrontation naming. Additionally, patients with mixed Alzheimer's disease/vascular dementia performed more poorly on auditory responsive naming than did patients with probable Alzheimer's disease, although no group differences were seen on the visual confrontation naming task. Auditory responsive naming correlated with a larger number of neuropsychological tests of executive function than did visual confrontation naming. Auditory responsive naming appears to be more sensitive to effects of increased of lesion burden compared to visual confrontation naming. We believe that this reflects more widespread topographical distribution of auditory naming sites within the temporal lobe, but may also reflect the contributions of working memory and cognitive flexibility to performance.

  2. Playing Games with Timed Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    David, Alexandre; Larsen, Kim Guldstrand; Chatain, Thomas

    2009-01-01

    In this paper we focus on property-preserving preorders between timed game automata and their application to control of partially observable systems. Following the example of timed simulation between timed automata, we define timed alternating simulation as a preorder between timed game automata......, which preserves controllability. We define a method to reduce the timed alternating simulation problem to a safety game. We show how timed alternating simulation can be used to control efficiently a partially observable system. This method is illustrated by a generic case study....

  3. What's in a Name?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bonneau, Joseph; Just, Mike; Matthews, Greg

    We study the efficiency of statistical attacks on human authentication systems relying on personal knowledge questions. We adapt techniques from guessing theory to measure security against a trawling attacker attempting to compromise a large number of strangers' accounts. We then examine a diverse corpus of real-world statistical distributions for likely answer categories such as the names of people, pets, and places and find that personal knowledge questions are significantly less secure than graphical or textual passwords. We also demonstrate that statistics can be used to increase security by proactively shaping the answer distribution to lower the prevalence of common responses.

  4. Fracture eponyms: personal names

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    A. S. Zolotov

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The paper describes the origin of bone fracture eponyms. The authors compiled a list of 60 most established fracture names proposed by physicians in 16th-20th centuries who mainly were skilled, mature and outstanding experts from countries with advanced conventional medicine and often represented the recognized surgical schools. Eponym records are important for understanding the history and subject of the chosen profession as well as knowledge of eponymic fractures facilitates communication between physicians of allied disciplines.

  5. Donor Tag Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Donor Community > Games > Donor Tag Game Donor Tag Game This feature requires version 6 or later of ... of Needles LGBTQ+ Donors Blood Donor Community SleevesUp Games Facebook Avatars and Badges Banners eCards Make a ...

  6. Game development tool essentials

    CERN Document Server

    Berinstein, Paula; Ardolino, Alessandro; Franco, Simon; Herubel, Adrien; McCutchan, John; Nedelcu, Nicusor; Nitschke, Benjamin; Olmstead, Don; Robinet, Fabrice; Ronchi, Christian; Turkowski, Rita; Walter, Robert; Samour, Gustavo

    2014-01-01

    Offers game developers new techniques for streamlining the critical game tools pipeline. Inspires game developers to share their secrets and improve the productivity of the entire industry. Helps game industry practitioners compete in a hyper-competitive environment.

  7. Goal-based dictator game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zaibidi, Nerda Zura; Ibrahim, Adyda; Abidin, Norhaslinda Zainal

    2014-12-01

    A considerable number of studies have been conducted to study fairness issues using two-player game. Dictator Game is one of the two-player games that receive much attention. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary approach to the Dictator Game by using Goal programming to build a model of human decision-making for cooperation. The model is formulated based on the theories of cognitive neuroscience that is capable in capturing a more realistic fairness concerns between players in the games. We show that fairness will evolve by taking into account players' aspirations and preferences explicitly in terms of profit and fairness concerns. The model is then simulated to investigate any possible effective strategy for people in economics to deal with fairness coalition. Parallels are drawn between the approach and concepts of human decision making from the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychology. The proposed model is also able to help decision makers to plan or enhance the effective strategies for business purposes.

  8. Holistic Darwinism: the new evolutionary paradigm and some implications for political science.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Corning, Peter A

    2008-03-01

    Holistic Darwinism is a candidate name for a major paradigm shift that is currently underway in evolutionary biology and related disciplines. Important developments include (1) a growing appreciation for the fact that evolution is a multilevel process, from genes to ecosystems, and that interdependent coevolution is a ubiquitous phenomenon in nature; (2) a revitalization of group selection theory, which was banned (prematurely) from evolutionary biology over 30 years ago (groups may in fact be important evolutionary units); (3) a growing respect for the fact that the genome is not a "bean bag" (in biologist Ernst Mayr's caricature), much less a gladiatorial arena for competing selfish genes, but a complex, interdependent, cooperating system; (4) an increased recognition that symbiosis is an important phenomenon in nature and that symbiogenesis is a major source of innovation in evolution; (5) an array of new, more advanced game theory models, which support the growing evidence that cooperation is commonplace in nature and not a rare exception; (6) new research and theoretical work that stresses the role of nurture in evolution, including developmental processes, phenotypic plasticity, social information transfer (culture), and especially the role of behavioral innovations as pacemakers of evolutionary change (e.g., niche construction theory, which is concerned with the active role of organisms in shaping the evolutionary process, and gene-culture coevolution theory, which relates especially to the dynamics of human evolution); (7) and, not least, a broad effort to account for the evolution of biological complexity--from major transition theory to the "Synergism Hypothesis." Here I will briefly review these developments and will present a case for the proposition that this paradigm shift has profound implications for the social sciences, including specifically political theory, economic theory, and political science as a discipline. Interdependent superorganisms, it

  9. Evolutionary developmental psychology

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    King, Ashley C; Bjorklund, David F

    2010-01-01

    The field of evolutionary developmental psychology can potentially broaden the horizons of mainstream evolutionary psychology by combining the principles of Darwinian evolution by natural selection...

  10. Branding a business name

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bulatović Ivan

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The process of globalization, international businesses, as well as competitive markets imposed the companies (large ones, as well as the others to position in the required market. Making profit, which is the basic aim of every company, in such market environment can only be achieved by demonstrating distinct characteristics of a company, the characteristics which distinguish it from others with the same or similar activities. Historical and analysis of the current market have shown that being recognizable in the multitude of similar companies is a huge challenge, but also one of the main preconditions for successful operations. The moment a company is registered it acquires a specific identity primarily owing to its business name, which distinguishes it from other companies during that first period. Practically at the same time, the company starts creating its image or goodwill by means of several distinctive ways. One of them is branding business name or corporate branding. However, apart from large benefits, companies may also have big difficulties and risks in the same process as well.

  11. Game engines: a survey

    OpenAIRE

    A. Andrade

    2015-01-01

    Due to hardware limitations at the origin of the video game industry, each new game was generally coded from the ground up. Years later, from the evolution of hardware and the need for quick game development cycles, spawned the concept of game engine. A game engine is a reusable software layer allowing the separation of common game concepts from the game assets (levels, graphics, etc.). This paper surveys fourteen different game engines relevant today, ranging from the industry-level to the n...

  12. Game mechanics engine

    OpenAIRE

    Magnusson, Lars V

    2011-01-01

    Game logic and game rules exists in all computer games, but they are created di erently for all game engines. This game engine dependency exists because of how the internal object model is implemented in the engine, as a place where game logic data is intermingled with the data needed by the low- level subsystems. This thesis propose a game object model design, based on existing theory, that removes this dependency and establish a general game logic framework. The thesis the...

  13. What every chemist should know about plant names.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Erkens, Roy Hubertus Johannes

    2011-01-01

    Chemists screen plants for their constituents on a daily basis, and the data gathered is of importance to a wide range of fields such as medicine, evolutionary biology and ecology. However, the use of this data is sometimes impeded by incorrect citation of the species names. In this Viewpoint, I explain why chemists should be aware of the essentials of plant naming, and describe some easy quality checks that can be performed to avoid errors being perpetuated.

  14. Drinking Game Studies

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Debus, Michael S.

    2016-01-01

    The paper examines research on drinking game participation from a game studies ontological perspective, covering definition, classification and problems with the, in the studies implied, underlying ontology of drinking games.......The paper examines research on drinking game participation from a game studies ontological perspective, covering definition, classification and problems with the, in the studies implied, underlying ontology of drinking games....

  15. [Biofeedback computer games].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dzhafarov, O A; Donskaia, O G; Zubkov, A A

    2007-01-01

    Biofeedback systems for game training are reviewed. The origins, evolution, main principles, and specific features of biofeedback game training are considered. A line of novel biofeedback game systems is described. These game systems can be classified as game screens included into an integrated treating system or as individual computer games based on biological feedback.

  16. Evolutionary dynamics and the evolution of multiplayer cooperation in a subdivided population.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pattni, Karan; Broom, Mark; Rychtář, Jan

    2017-09-21

    The classical models of evolution have been developed to incorporate structured populations using evolutionary graph theory and, more recently, a new framework has been developed to allow for more flexible population structures which potentially change through time and can accommodate multiplayer games with variable group sizes. In this paper we extend this work in three key ways. Firstly by developing a complete set of evolutionary dynamics so that the range of dynamic processes used in classical evolutionary graph theory can be applied. Secondly, by building upon previous models to allow for a general subpopulation structure, where all subpopulation members have a common movement distribution. Subpopulations can have varying levels of stability, represented by the proportion of interactions occurring between subpopulation members; in our representation of the population all subpopulation members are represented by a single vertex. In conjunction with this we extend the important concept of temperature (the temperature of a vertex is the sum of all the weights coming into that vertex; generally, the higher the temperature, the higher the rate of turnover of individuals at a vertex). Finally, we have used these new developments to consider the evolution of cooperation in a class of populations which possess this subpopulation structure using a multiplayer public goods game. We show that cooperation can evolve providing that subpopulations are sufficiently stable, with the smaller the subpopulations the easier it is for cooperation to evolve. We introduce a new concept of temperature, namely "subgroup temperature", which can be used to explain our results. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  17. Willow plant name 'Preble'

    Science.gov (United States)

    Abrahamson, Lawrence P.; Kopp, Richard F.; Smart, Lawrence B.; Volk, Timothy A.

    2014-06-10

    A distinct female cultivar of Salix viminalis.times.(Salix sachalinensis.times.Salix miyabeana) named `Preble`, characterized by rapid stem growth producing 29% more woody biomass than the average of three current production cultivars (Salix.times.dasyclados `SV1` (unpatented), Salix sachalinensis `SX61` (unpatented), and Salix miyabeana `SX64` (unpatented)) when grown in the same field for the same length of time (three growing seasons after coppice) in two different trials in Constableville, N.Y. and Middlebury, Vt. `Preble` can be planted from dormant stem cuttings, produces multiple stems after coppice and the stem biomass can be harvested when the plant is dormant. In the spring following harvest, the plant will re-sprout very vigorously, producing new stems that can be harvested repeatedly after two to four years of growth. `Preble` displays a low incidence of rust disease and is not damaged by potato leafhoppers.

  18. Named Entity Linking Algorithm

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. F. Panteleev

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available In the tasks of processing text in natural language, Named Entity Linking (NEL represents the task to define and link some entity, which is found in the text, with some entity in the knowledge base (for example, Dbpedia. Currently, there is a diversity of approaches to solve this problem, but two main classes can be identified: graph-based approaches and machine learning-based ones. Graph and Machine Learning approaches-based algorithm is proposed accordingly to the stated assumptions about the interrelations of named entities in a sentence and in general.In the case of graph-based approaches, it is necessary to solve the problem of identifying an optimal set of the related entities according to some metric that characterizes the distance between these entities in a graph built on some knowledge base. Due to limitations in processing power, to solve this task directly is impossible. Therefore, its modification is proposed. Based on the algorithms of machine learning, an independent solution cannot be built due to small volumes of training datasets relevant to NEL task. However, their use can contribute to improving the quality of the algorithm. The adaptation of the Latent Dirichlet Allocation model is proposed in order to obtain a measure of the compatibility of attributes of various entities encountered in one context.The efficiency of the proposed algorithm was experimentally tested. A test dataset was independently generated. On its basis the performance of the model was compared using the proposed algorithm with the open source product DBpedia Spotlight, which solves the NEL problem.The mockup, based on the proposed algorithm, showed a low speed as compared to DBpedia Spotlight. However, the fact that it has shown higher accuracy, stipulates the prospects for work in this direction.The main directions of development were proposed in order to increase the accuracy of the system and its productivity.

  19. Psychology of Game Playing: Introduction to a Special Issue

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Andrew M. Colman

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Game theory has focused attention on different problems at different times in its history. Currently, attention is devoted to investigating how human decision makers with bounded rationality choose strategies in interactive decisions. Behavioral economics, and more generally experimental games, have appeared in the literature with accelerating frequency since 1990, and this cannot continue indefinitely without a proportional expansion of journal space. This Special Issue includes contributions to behavioral economics, experimental games, and evolutionary game theory, using theoretical, experimental, and agent-based modeling techniques.

  20. Online evolution for multi-action adversarial games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Justesen, Niels Orsleff; Mahlmann, Tobias; Togelius, Julian

    2016-01-01

    We present Online Evolution, a novel method for playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games. Such games, which include most strategy games, have extremely high branching factors due to each turn having multiple actions. In Online Evolution, an evolutionary algorithm is used to evolve...... the combination of atomic actions that make up a single move, with a state evaluation function used for fitness. We implement Online Evolution for the turn-based multi-action game Hero Academy and compare it with a standard Monte Carlo Tree Search implementation as well as two types of greedy algorithms. Online...

  1. Applications and extensions of epigenetic game theory. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Yaqun

    2017-03-01

    The authors are to be congratulated for a thought-provoking article [1], which reviews the epigenetic game theory (epiGame) that utilizes differential equations to study the epigenetic control of embryo development. It is a novel application of evolutionary game theory and provides biology researchers with useful methodologies to address scientific questions related to biological coordination of competition and cooperation.

  2. Socioeconomic determinants of first names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bloothooft, G.; Onland, D.

    2011-01-01

    Modern naming practices in the Netherlands between 1982 and 2005 were studied on the basis of 1409 popular first names, divided into fourteen name groups determined by the common preferences of parents for the names involved. Socioeconomic variables such as family income, parents' level of

  3. The Many Faces of Role-Playing Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hitchens, Michael; Drachen, Anders

    2009-01-01

    Role-playing games have grown and evolved into a large number of forms in the last thirty years, spanning digital as well as non-digital media. They demonstrate a wide variety in the number of participants, style of play and the formal and informal systems that govern them. Despite this diversity...... players at least seem to think they know when something is a role-playing game. Yet there is no commonly accepted definition which both captures games generally accepted as role-playing games and distinguishes them from other, similar, games which begs the question, whether roleplaying games are united...... by anything more than a colloquial name. Additionally, research involving these games is hampered by lack of a widely accepted definition of what constitutes a roleplaying game, as it is then not even possible to clearly delineate the subject of such research. In this paper various example of role...

  4. Importance of tie strengths in the prisoner's dilemma game on social networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Bo; Liu, Lu; You, Weijia

    2011-06-01

    Though numerous researches have shown that tie strengths play a key role in the formation of collective behavior in social networks, little work has been done to explore their impact on the outcome of evolutionary games. In this Letter, we studied the effect of tie strength in the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by using online social network datasets. The results show that the fraction of cooperators has a non-trivial dependence on tie strength. Weak ties, just like previous researches on epidemics and information diffusion have shown, play a key role by the maintenance of cooperators in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games.

  5. General game playing

    CERN Document Server

    Genesereth, Michael

    2014-01-01

    General game players are computer systems able to play strategy games based solely on formal game descriptions supplied at ""runtime"" (n other words, they don't know the rules until the game starts). Unlike specialized game players, such as Deep Blue, general game players cannot rely on algorithms designed in advance for specific games; they must discover such algorithms themselves. General game playing expertise depends on intelligence on the part of the game player and not just intelligence of the programmer of the game player.GGP is an interesting application in its own right. It is intell

  6. Serious Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Salovaara-Moring, Inka

    There has recently been considerable attention paid to the gamification of digital journalism. Where the current technological and social affordances of web 2.0 storytelling have proved less attractive to younger users, the persuasive features of game logics have added new dimensions to interactive......, participatory journalism. This notion refers to realitybased news games that can act both as an independent medium for news content and as a supplement to traditional forms of coverage. Simultaneously, persuasive logics of gamification offer new ways to engage actuality through media space’s augmented reality....... This paper1 explores the new spatio-epistemological realities of two journalistic games, asking how the spatial, operational, and procedural realities of storytelling change through ‘gamification’. It reflects on the spatial dimension of digital journalism in order to challenge the traditional, generic...

  7. Dynamics in atomic signaling games

    KAUST Repository

    Fox, Michael J.

    2015-04-08

    We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss.

  8. Dynamics in atomic signaling games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fox, Michael J; Touri, Behrouz; Shamma, Jeff S

    2015-07-07

    We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  9. History of NAMES Conferences

    Science.gov (United States)

    Filippov, Lev

    2013-03-01

    Franco-Russian NAMES Seminars are held for the purpose of reviewing and discussing actual developments in the field of materials science by researchers from Russia and from the Lorraine Region of France. In more precise terms, as set down by the organizers of the seminar (the Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys and the Institut National Polytechnique de Lorraine), the mission of the seminars is as follows: the development of scientific and academic contacts, giving a new impulse to joint fundamental research and technology transfer the development and consolidation of scientific, technical and business collaboration between the regions of Russia and Lorraine through direct contact between the universities, institutes and companies involved The first Seminar took place on 27-29 October 2004, at the Institut National Polytechnique de Lorraine (on the premises of the Ecole Européenne d'Ingénieurs en Génie des Matériaux, Nancy, France). The number, variety and quality of the oral presentations given and posters exhibited at the first Seminar were of high international standard. 30 oral presentations were given and 72 posters were presented by 19 participants from five universities and three institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences participants from 11 laboratories of three universities from the Lorraine region three industrial companies, including the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company—EADS, and ANVAR (Agence Nationale de Valorisation de la Recherche) From 2005 onwards, it was decided to organize the Seminar every other year. The second Seminar convened on the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys on 10-12 November 2005 in Moscow, Russia. The seminar demonstrated the efficiency of the scientific partnership founded between the research groups of Russia and France during the first Seminar. High productivity of the Franco-Russian scientific cooperation on the basis of the Research-Educational Franco

  10. Verified Gaming

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kiniry, Joseph Roland; Zimmerman, Daniel

    2011-01-01

    ---falls every year and any mention of mathematics in the classroom seems to frighten students away. So the question is: How do we attract new students in computing to the area of dependable software systems? Over the past several years at three universities we have experimented with the use of computer games...... as a target domain for software engineering project courses that focus on reliable systems engineering. This position paper summarizes our experiences in incorporating rigorous software engineering into courses whose projects include computer games....

  11. Evolutionary Information Theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mark Burgin

    2013-04-01

    Full Text Available Evolutionary information theory is a constructive approach that studies information in the context of evolutionary processes, which are ubiquitous in nature and society. In this paper, we develop foundations of evolutionary information theory, building several measures of evolutionary information and obtaining their properties. These measures are based on mathematical models of evolutionary computations, machines and automata. To measure evolutionary information in an invariant form, we construct and study universal evolutionary machines and automata, which form the base for evolutionary information theory. The first class of measures introduced and studied in this paper is evolutionary information size of symbolic objects relative to classes of automata or machines. In particular, it is proved that there is an invariant and optimal evolutionary information size relative to different classes of evolutionary machines. As a rule, different classes of algorithms or automata determine different information size for the same object. The more powerful classes of algorithms or automata decrease the information size of an object in comparison with the information size of an object relative to weaker4 classes of algorithms or machines. The second class of measures for evolutionary information in symbolic objects is studied by introduction of the quantity of evolutionary information about symbolic objects relative to a class of automata or machines. To give an example of applications, we briefly describe a possibility of modeling physical evolution with evolutionary machines to demonstrate applicability of evolutionary information theory to all material processes. At the end of the paper, directions for future research are suggested.

  12. Serious Games: Video Games for Good?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sanford, Kathy; Starr, Lisa J.; Merkel, Liz; Bonsor Kurki, Sarah

    2015-01-01

    As video games become a ubiquitous part of today's culture internationally, as educators and parents we need to turn our attention to how video games are being understood and used in informal and formal settings. Serious games have developed as a genre of video games marketed for educating youth about a range of world issues. At face value this…

  13. Educational games for health professionals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Akl, Elie A; Kairouz, Victor F; Sackett, Kay M; Erdley, William S; Mustafa, Reem A; Fiander, Michelle; Gabriel, Carolynne; Schünemann, Holger

    2013-03-28

    The use of games as an educational strategy has the potential to improve health professionals' performance (e.g. adherence to standards of care) through improving their knowledge, skills and attitudes. The objective was to assess the effect of educational games on health professionals' performance, knowledge, skills, attitude and satisfaction, and on patient outcomes. We searched the following databases in January 2012: MEDLINE, AMED, CINAHL, Cochrane Central Database of Controlled Trials, EMBASE, EPOC Register, ERIC, Proquest Dissertations & Theses Database, and PsycINFO. Related reviews were sought in DARE and the above named databases. Database searches identified 1546 citations. We also screened the reference lists of included studies in relevant reviews, contacted authors of relevant papers and reviews, and searched ISI Web of Science for papers citing studies included in the review. These search methods identified an additional 62 unique citations for a total of 1608 for this update. We included randomized controlled trials (RCT), controlled clinical trials (CCT), controlled before and after (CBA) and interrupted time-series analysis (ITS). Study participants were qualified health professionals or in postgraduate training. The intervention was an educational game with "a form of competitive activity or sport played according to rules". Using a standardized data form we extracted data on methodological quality, participants, interventions and outcomes of interest that included patient outcomes, professional behavior (process of care outcomes), and professional's knowledge, skills, attitude and satisfaction. The search strategy identified a total of 2079 unique citations. Out of 84 potentially eligible citations, we included two RCTs. The game evaluated in the first study used as a reinforcement technique, was based on the television game show "Family Feud" and focused on infection control. The study did not assess any patient or process of care outcomes. The

  14. Authoring of digital games via card games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Valente, Andrea; Marchetti, Emanuela

    2014-01-01

    Literature and previous studies show that creative play is easy to emerge when children interact with tangible, low-tech toys and games than with digital games. This paradoxical situation is linked to the long-standing problem of end-users (or players) authoring of digital contents and systems. We...... are to show how card games can represent digital games, how playful play can emerge in card games and digital games, and to begin defining a new way to express game behavior without the use of universal programming languages....

  15. A Technique for Mapping Mathematics Content to Game Design

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vani Kalloo

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Research has shown that games can be valuable tools for learning mathematics. In this paper, we explain how we tackled the challenge of mapping mathematics content to games in the design of mathematics learning games. We present a unique technique for mapping mathematics content to game design. The technique can be used to improve the game design process by guiding the designer through one of the more challenging stages of the design process, namely, that of incorporating mathematics content into a game. The technique is based on several factors such as mathematics learning pedagogy, game type categorization, the mathematics curriculum, and past research experience. The technique is unique since it focuses on guiding the game designer through the process of mapping the mathematics content to the game idea. Additionally, the technique incorporates several important game design principles. A preliminary evaluation of the technique was conducted with several amateur game designers. Although there are several limitations of the technique, the evaluation shows that it was useful in helping the game designers to design suitable mathematics learning games

  16. Game Theory

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Let us move further and introduce temporal structures into our games. Our next story is that of two compulsive bargainers. Kavi and Satya try to divide Rs.100 which ..... about inflation. Hence, we need to devalue the payoffs we receive in the future. This is what is known as the discount factor. We can now easily see that for ...

  17. Urban Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Løssing, Tobias; Nielsen, Rune

    2004-01-01

    Games, er ikke produktudvikling i traditionel forstand, men derimod en reflekteret designproces, der forsøger at optage spilteoretiske og HCI-relaterede problemstillinger. I denne artikel vil vi koncentrere os om udvalgte principielle overvejelser i udviklingen af især forhandlings- og debatspil, som...

  18. Game Changers

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Helms, Niels Henrik

    2012-01-01

    at forsøge at beskrive nogle af de mekanismer, som gør, at nogle af disse kreative industrier bliver netop kreative og innovative, at de ikke alene kan klare sig, men også ændre og udvikle både indhold, form og organisering – at de bliver det der på managementsprog hedder game changers....

  19. Game Cinematography

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Burelli, Paolo

    2016-01-01

    with the virtual world. This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of the research in virtual and game cinematography, ranging from its early focus on how to control and animate the virtual camera to support interaction to its relationship with player experience and emotions. Furthermore, we will show...

  20. Global Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Bottenburg, Maarten

    2001-01-01

    Why is soccer the sport of choice in South America, while baseball has soared to popularity in the Carribean? How did cricket become India's national sport, while China is a stronghold of table tennis? In Global Games, Maarten van Bottenburg asserts that it is the 'hidden competition' of social and

  1. Gaming conservation

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Fletcher, Robert

    2017-01-01

    This article explores the role of digital (video and computer) games in the rise of what Büscher (2014) calls "nature 2.0": new web-related media that allow users to move beyond passive voyeurism to actively "co-create" or "prosume" the images and processes promoted by organizations committed to

  2. The (De-)Evolution of Evolution Games: A Content Analysis of the Representation of Evolution through Natural Selection in Digital Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leith, Alex P.; Ratan, Rabindra A.; Wohn, Donghee Yvette

    2016-01-01

    Given the diversity and complexity of education game mechanisms and topics, this article contributes to a theoretical understanding of how game mechanisms "map" to educational topics through inquiry-based learning. Namely, the article examines the presence of evolution through natural selection (ENS) in digital games. ENS is a…

  3. Name agreement in picture naming: an ERP study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cheng, Xiaorong; Schafer, Graham; Akyürek, Elkan G

    2010-06-01

    Name agreement is the extent to which different people agree on a name for a particular picture. Previous studies have found that it takes longer to name low name agreement pictures than high name agreement pictures. To examine the effect of name agreement in the online process of picture naming, we compared event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded whilst 19 healthy, native English speakers silently named pictures which had either high or low name agreement. A series of ERP components was examined: P1 approximately 120ms from picture onset, N1 around 170ms, P2 around 220ms, N2 around 290ms, and P3 around 400ms. Additionally, a late time window from 800 to 900ms was considered. Name agreement had an early effect, starting at P1 and possibly resulting from uncertainty of picture identity, and continuing into N2, possibly resulting from alternative names for pictures. These results support the idea that name agreement affects two consecutive processes: first, object recognition, and second, lexical selection and/or phonological encoding. Copyright 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  4. Stability properties of nonlinear dynamical systems and evolutionary stable states

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gleria, Iram, E-mail: iram@fis.ufal.br [Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal de Alagoas, 57072-970 Maceió-AL (Brazil); Brenig, Leon [Faculté des Sciences, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1050 Brussels (Belgium); Rocha Filho, Tarcísio M.; Figueiredo, Annibal [Instituto de Física and International Center for Condensed Matter Physics, Universidade de Brasília, 70919-970 Brasília-DF (Brazil)

    2017-03-18

    Highlights: • We address the problem of equilibrium stability in a general class of non-linear systems. • We link Evolutionary Stable States (ESS) to stable fixed points of square quasi-polynomial (QP) systems. • We show that an interior ES point may be related to stable interior fixed points of QP systems. - Abstract: In this paper we address the problem of stability in a general class of non-linear systems. We establish a link between the concepts of asymptotic stable interior fixed points of square Quasi-Polynomial systems and evolutionary stable states, a property of some payoff matrices arising from evolutionary games.

  5. Security Games Involving Search and Patrolling

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-04-28

    periods, the time needed to disable it or disrupt the network. The Patroller chooses a walk on the network. The Patroller wins the game if his walk is...certain classes of graphs. The grant is acknowledged in this publication. (iii) Predator Search for Prey This work applies the theory of repeated games...more usually studied in computer science and graph theory , namely sequences of adjacent edges, traversed from end to end at unit speed. A useful method

  6. Understanding Video Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Heide Smith, Jonas; Tosca, Susana Pajares; Egenfeldt-Nielsen, Simon

    From Pong to PlayStation 3 and beyond, Understanding Video Games is the first general introduction to the exciting new field of video game studies. This textbook traces the history of video games, introduces the major theories used to analyze games such as ludology and narratology, reviews...... the economics of the game industry, examines the aesthetics of game design, surveys the broad range of game genres, explores player culture, and addresses the major debates surrounding the medium, from educational benefits to the effects of violence. Throughout the book, the authors ask readers to consider...... larger questions about the medium: * What defines a video game? * Who plays games? * Why do we play games? * How do games affect the player? Extensively illustrated, Understanding Video Games is an indispensable and comprehensive resource for those interested in the ways video games are reshaping...

  7. Index to scientific plant names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Steenis-Kruseman, van M.J.

    1955-01-01

    Families and higher taxa have been entered under their name. Suprageneric epithets have been entered under the family name to which they belong preceded by the indication of their rank (tribes, e.g.).

  8. Defining Game Mechanics

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sicart (Vila), Miguel Angel

    2008-01-01

    This article defins game mechanics in relation to rules and challenges. Game mechanics are methods invoked by agents for interacting with the game world. I apply this definition to a comparative analysis of the games Rez, Every Extend Extra and Shadow of the Colossus that will show the relevance...... of a formal definition of game mechanics. Udgivelsesdato: Dec 2008...

  9. Teaching Using Computer Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, Lee Dee; Shell, Duane; Khandaker, Nobel; Soh, Leen-Kiat

    2011-01-01

    Computer games have long been used for teaching. Current reviews lack categorization and analysis using learning models which would help instructors assess the usefulness of computer games. We divide the use of games into two classes: game playing and game development. We discuss the Input-Process-Outcome (IPO) model for the learning process when…

  10. Naming a structured world: a cultural route to duality of patterning.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Francesca Tria

    Full Text Available The lexicons of human languages organize their units at two distinct levels. At a first combinatorial level, meaningless forms (typically referred to as phonemes are combined into meaningful units (typically referred to as morphemes. Thanks to this, many morphemes can be obtained by relatively simple combinations of a small number of phonemes. At a second compositional level of the lexicon, morphemes are composed into larger lexical units, the meaning of which is related to the individual meanings of the composing morphemes. This duality of patterning is not a necessity for lexicons and the question remains wide open regarding how a population of individuals is able to bootstrap such a structure and the evolutionary advantages of its emergence. Here we address this question in the framework of a multi-agents model, where a population of individuals plays simple naming games in a conceptual environment modeled as a graph. We demonstrate that errors in communication as well as a blending repair strategy, which crucially exploits a shared conceptual representation of the environment, are sufficient conditions for the emergence of duality of patterning, that can thus be explained in a pure cultural way. Compositional lexicons turn out to be faster to lead to successful communication than purely combinatorial lexicons, suggesting that meaning played a crucial role in the evolution of language.

  11. Naming a structured world: a cultural route to duality of patterning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tria, Francesca; Galantucci, Bruno; Loreto, Vittorio

    2012-01-01

    The lexicons of human languages organize their units at two distinct levels. At a first combinatorial level, meaningless forms (typically referred to as phonemes) are combined into meaningful units (typically referred to as morphemes). Thanks to this, many morphemes can be obtained by relatively simple combinations of a small number of phonemes. At a second compositional level of the lexicon, morphemes are composed into larger lexical units, the meaning of which is related to the individual meanings of the composing morphemes. This duality of patterning is not a necessity for lexicons and the question remains wide open regarding how a population of individuals is able to bootstrap such a structure and the evolutionary advantages of its emergence. Here we address this question in the framework of a multi-agents model, where a population of individuals plays simple naming games in a conceptual environment modeled as a graph. We demonstrate that errors in communication as well as a blending repair strategy, which crucially exploits a shared conceptual representation of the environment, are sufficient conditions for the emergence of duality of patterning, that can thus be explained in a pure cultural way. Compositional lexicons turn out to be faster to lead to successful communication than purely combinatorial lexicons, suggesting that meaning played a crucial role in the evolution of language.

  12. Armenian Names of Sky Constellations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mickaelian, A. M.; Farmanyan, S. V.; Mikayelyan, A. A.

    2016-12-01

    The work is devoted to the correction and recovery of the Armenian names of the sky constellations, as they were forgotten or distorted during the Soviet years, mainly due to the translation from Russian. A total of 34 constellation names have been corrected. A brief overview of the history of the division of the sky into constellations and their naming is also given. At the end, the list of all 88 constellations is given with the names in Latin, English, Russian and Armenian.

  13. Uncovering trends in gene naming

    OpenAIRE

    Seringhaus, Michael R.; Cayting, Philip D; Gerstein, Mark B.

    2008-01-01

    We take stock of current genetic nomenclature and attempt to organize strange and notable gene names. We categorize, for instance, those that involve a naming system transferred from another context (for example, Pavlov’s dogs). We hope this analysis provides clues to better steer gene naming in the future.

  14. Uncovering trends in gene naming.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seringhaus, Michael R; Cayting, Philip D; Gerstein, Mark B

    2008-01-31

    We take stock of current genetic nomenclature and attempt to organize strange and notable gene names. We categorize, for instance, those that involve a naming system transferred from another context (for example, Pavlov's dogs). We hope this analysis provides clues to better steer gene naming in the future.

  15. GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES IN THE WORLD

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    in New Zealand and in the. Cape Province, A cursory glance at any list of names will show how many places there are with the same name. Toponyms in any particular language are also used in other languages, and in other countries. So we speak of Am- sterdam, London, New York and Ot- tawa. Sometimes the names ...

  16. Interference in Joint Picture Naming

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gambi, Chiara; Van de Cavey, Joris; Pickering, Martin J.

    2015-01-01

    In 4 experiments we showed that picture naming latencies are affected by beliefs about the task concurrently performed by another speaker. Participants took longer to name pictures when they believed that their partner concurrently named pictures than when they believed their partner was silent (Experiments 1 and 4) or concurrently categorized the…

  17. A family of names : rune-names and ogam-names and their relation to alphabet letter-names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Griffiths, Alan

    2013-01-01

    The current consensus is that vernacular names assigned to the runes of the Germanic fuþark and to Irish ogam characters are indigenous creations independent of Mediterranean alphabet traditions. I propose, however, that ogam-names are based on interpretations of Hebrew, Greek or Latin letter-names

  18. Is envy one of the possible evolutionary roots of charity?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Garay, József; Móri, Tamás F

    2011-10-01

    We introduce an evolutionary game in which envy and charity can be considered as a consequence of Darwinian competition, i.e. individuals aim at increasing their own proportion rather than their absolute contribution to the next generation, and other-regarding-preference is a "method" for that. If the damage is additive and its cost is low, an envious strategy defeats a neutral strategy (rational strategy maximizing its own income). If damage is multiplicative, then coexistence of neutral and envious strategists is possible. Envy is a conditional spiteful strategy, thus in envious groups there is less damage than in spiteful groups, so envy decreases the total cost of spiteful competition. Although envy can be selected out in a mixed population of envious, neutral and spiteful individuals when damage is additive, the envious-spiteful strategists (envious within its kin and spiteful outside its kin) outperform neutral and spiteful ones in a simple kin-selection scenario. Furthermore, Clytemnestra's strategy, namely donating to richer people to evokes envious attacks on them, can spread through an envious group. Moreover, the envious-donator strategy (giving to the poorest and damaging the richer individuals) can spread in the envious group. Charity is a "buy-off" behaviour, since the donator can decrease its own damage from envy, thus charity further decreases the total cost of spiteful competition. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. Wherever Hardware, There’ll be Games. The evolution of hardware and shifting industrial leadership in the gaming industry 1968-2004

    OpenAIRE

    Jörnmark, Jan

    2005-01-01

    Video game was the first truly digital entertainment medium, requiring processing power both in the production and consumption stage. Born out of the transistor, it was also intimately connected with its logic: the doubling of the processor capacity every 18th month or the halving of the price for the same processing capacity in the same time. Transistor technology and video games have been able to conquer society in an evolutionary process. Hence, video games have had an unprecedented abilit...

  20. Evolution of Decisions in Population Games with Sequentially Searching Individuals

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tadeas Priklopil

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available In many social situations, individuals endeavor to find the single best possible partner, but are constrained to evaluate the candidates in sequence. Examples include the search for mates, economic partnerships, or any other long-term ties where the choice to interact involves two parties. Surprisingly, however, previous theoretical work on mutual choice problems focuses on finding equilibrium solutions, while ignoring the evolutionary dynamics of decisions. Empirically, this may be of high importance, as some equilibrium solutions can never be reached unless the population undergoes radical changes and a sufficient number of individuals change their decisions simultaneously. To address this question, we apply a mutual choice sequential search problem in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that allows one to find solutions that are favored by evolution. As an example, we study the influence of sequential search on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. For this, we focus on the classic snowdrift game and the prisoner’s dilemma game.

  1. A Five-Species Jungle Game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yibin Kang

    Full Text Available In this paper, we investigate the five-species Jungle game in the framework of evolutionary game theory. We address the coexistence and biodiversity of the system using mean-field theory and Monte Carlo simulations. Then, we find that the inhibition from the bottom-level species to the top-level species can be critical factors that affect biodiversity, no matter how it is distributed, whether homogeneously well mixed or structured. We also find that predators' different preferences for food affect species' coexistence.

  2. Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations

    CERN Document Server

    Wang, Zhen; Perc, Matjaz

    2014-01-01

    Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix, the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These resu...

  3. Can You Say My Name?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Erz, Antonia; Christensen, Bo T.

    Whereas brand name research has focused on the semantic meaning or sounds of names, processing fluency lends further support to the idea that meaning goes beyond semantics. Extant research has shown that phonological fluency, i.e., the ease or difficulty with which people pronounce names, can...... affect their judgments of people and objects. We extend this research by investigating the effect of phonological fluency on recognition and recall of novel non-word brand names in three laboratory experiments. The results provide us with a more fine-grained idea of fluency effects on memory of non......-word brand names....

  4. Can You Say My Name?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Erz, Antonia; Christensen, Bo T.

    affect their judgments of people and objects. We extend this research by investigating the effect of phonological fluency on recognition and recall of novel non-word brand names in three laboratory experiments. The results provide us with a more fine-grained idea of fluency effects on memory of non......Whereas brand name research has focused on the semantic meaning or sounds of names, processing fluency lends further support to the idea that meaning goes beyond semantics. Extant research has shown that phonological fluency, i.e., the ease or difficulty with which people pronounce names, can......-word brand names....

  5. GEOGRAPHIC NAMES INFORMATION SYSTEM (GNIS) ...

    Science.gov (United States)

    The Geographic Names Information System (GNIS), developed by the U.S. Geological Survey in cooperation with the U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN), contains information about physical and cultural geographic features in the United States and associated areas, both current and historical, but not including roads and highways. The database also contains geographic names in Antarctica. The database holds the Federally recognized name of each feature and defines the location of the feature by state, county, USGS topographic map, and geographic coordinates. Other feature attributes include names or spellings other than the official name, feature designations, feature class, historical and descriptive information, and for some categories of features the geometric boundaries. The database assigns a unique feature identifier, a random number, that is a key for accessing, integrating, or reconciling GNIS data with other data sets. The GNIS is our Nation's official repository of domestic geographic feature names information.

  6. The Green Revolution Game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Corbridge, Stuart

    1985-01-01

    The Green Revolution game helps college students learn about agrarian change in which people use science to transform nature. The rational and basic objectives of the game are discussed, and the game's strengths and weaknesses are examined. (RM)

  7. Sovereignty Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas

    This book offers an in-depth examination of the strategic use of State sovereignty in contemporary European and international affairs and the consequences of this for authority relations in Europe and beyond. It suggests a new approach to the study of State sovereignty, proposing to understand th...... the use of sovereignty as games where States are becoming more instrumental in their claims to sovereignty and skilled in adapting it to the challenges that they face....

  8. A game is a game is a game

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jørgensen, Ida Kathrine Hammeleff

    2017-01-01

    Recently self-referentiality have occurred as a trend among game designers and have also enjoyed sporadic attention in academia. However, in academia, discussions of self-referential games often rest on proceduralist arguments and a too exclusive focus on the game object. This paper draws on the ...

  9. Powerful elderly characters in video games: Flemeth of Dragon Age

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elisabeta Toma

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available As games are becoming an increasingly popular medium in various demographic and professional strata, scholars are discussing their content and how they shape society. However, despite an increase in gender analysis of video games, little has been written about orienting games towards an elderly audience, or game representations of aging and older persons. Games specifically designed for older persons are focused on improving cognitive functions, starting from the assumption that the elderly are in need of special games in order to repair age-related deficits. This repair-focused design philosophy comes at the expense of pursuing a broader understanding of quality of life and non-programmatic entertainment. Games-for-fun that also explicitly target the elderly as an audience are almost invisible. In this article we turn our attention to a powerful elderly feminine character in an AAA game designed for entertainment without a serious mission, namely Flemeth from Dragon Age. We discuss how the game depicts and models older characters: What repertoire of portraits has Flemeth as an old woman, in the Dragon Age games? How does Flemeth contribute to an enlarged repertoire of portrayals of old women in video games? We conclude that Flemeth’s gender and age displays in Dragon Age do not impoverish her portrayal but, on the contrary, turn her into a powerful and complex character, thus offering a model for game design to represent and invite older players.

  10. Pegembangan Game dengan Menggunakan Teknologi Voice Recognition Berbasis Android

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Franky Hadinata Marpaung

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of this research is to create a new kind of game by using technology that rarely used in current games. It is developed as an entertainment media and also a social media in which the users can play the games together via multiplayer mode. This research uses Scrum development method since it supports small scaled developer and it supports software increment along the development. Using this game application, the users can play and watch interesting animations by controlling it with their voice, listen the character imitating the users’ voice, play various mini games both in single player or multiplayer mode via Bluetooth connection. The conclusion is that game application of My Name is Dug use voice recognition and inter-devices connection as its main features. It also has various mini games that support both single player and multiplayer.

  11. A game magically circling

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ejsing-Duun, Stine

    2011-01-01

    This chapter analyses the relationship between players, the game world, and the ordinary world in alternative reality games (ARGs) and location-based games (LBGs). These games use technology to create a game world in the everyday scene. The topic of this chapter is the concept of the 'magic circle......', which defines the relationship between play and the ordinary world, and how this concept relates to a new kind of game....

  12. Computer Games and Instruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tobias, Sigmund, Ed.; Fletcher, J. D., Ed.

    2011-01-01

    There is intense interest in computer games. A total of 65 percent of all American households play computer games, and sales of such games increased 22.9 percent last year. The average amount of game playing time was found to be 13.2 hours per week. The popularity and market success of games is evident from both the increased earnings from games,…

  13. An Educational Card Game for Learning Families of Chemical Elements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mariscal, Antonio Joaquin Franco; Martinez, Jose Maria Oliva; Marquez, Serafin Bernal

    2012-01-01

    This paper describes an educational card game designed to help high school students (grade 10, 15-16 years old) "understand," as opposed to memorize, the periodic table. The game may also be used to identify different chemical elements found in daily life objects. As an additional value, students learn the names and symbols of the displayed…

  14. How Digital Scaffolds in Games Direct Problem-Solving Behaviors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sun, Chuen-Tsai; Wang, Dai-Yi; Chan, Hui-Ling

    2011-01-01

    Digital systems offer computational power and instant feedback. Game designers are using these features to create scaffolding tools to reduce player frustration. However, researchers are finding some unexpected effects of scaffolding on strategy development and problem-solving behaviors. We used a digital Sudoku game named "Professor Sudoku" to…

  15. LewiSpace: An Exploratory Study with a Machine Learning Model in an Educational Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ghali, Ramla; Ouellet, Sébastien; Frasson, Claude

    2016-01-01

    The use of educational games as a tool for providing learners with a playful and educational aspect is widespread. In this paper, we present an educational game that we developed to teach a chemistry lesson, namely drawing a Lewis diagram. Our game is a 3D environment known as LewiSpace and aims at balancing between playful and educational…

  16. Reconceptualizing Pedagogical Usability of and Teachers' Roles in Computer Game-Based Learning in School

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tzuo, Pei-Wen; Ling, Jennifer Isabelle Ong Pei; Yang, Chien-Hui; Chen, Vivian Hsueh-Hua

    2012-01-01

    At present, methods for the optimal use of two approaches to computer game-based learning in school to enhance students' learning, namely, computer game play and game design, are obscure because past research has been devoted more to designing rather than evaluating the implementation of these approaches in school. In addition, most studies…

  17. Game engines: a survey

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    A. Andrade

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available Due to hardware limitations at the origin of the video game industry, each new game was generally coded from the ground up. Years later, from the evolution of hardware and the need for quick game development cycles, spawned the concept of game engine. A game engine is a reusable software layer allowing the separation of common game concepts from the game assets (levels, graphics, etc.. This paper surveys fourteen different game engines relevant today, ranging from the industry-level to the newcomer-friendlier ones.

  18. The mathematics of games

    CERN Document Server

    Beasley, John D

    2006-01-01

    ""Mind-exercising and thought-provoking.""-New ScientistIf playing games is natural for humans, analyzing games is equally natural for mathematicians. Even the simplest of games involves the fundamentals of mathematics, such as figuring out the best move or the odds of a certain chance event. This entertaining and wide-ranging guide demonstrates how simple mathematical analysis can throw unexpected light on games of every type-games of chance, games of skill, games of chance and skill, and automatic games.Just how random is a card shuffle or a throw of the dice? Is bluffing a valid poker strat

  19. Games, theory and applications

    CERN Document Server

    Thomas, L C

    2011-01-01

    Anyone with a knowledge of basic mathematics will find this an accessible and informative introduction to game theory. It opens with the theory of two-person zero-sum games, two-person non-zero sum games, and n-person games, at a level between nonmathematical introductory books and technical mathematical game theory books. Succeeding sections focus on a variety of applications - including introductory explanations of gaming and meta games - that offer nonspecialists information about new areas of game theory at a comprehensible level. Numerous exercises appear with full solutions, in addition

  20. Morals matter in economic games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Felix C Brodbeck

    Full Text Available Contrary to predictions from Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory, when making economic decisions in interpersonal situations, people take the interest of others into account and express various forms of solidarity, even in one-shot interactions with anonymous strangers. Research in other-regarding behavior is dominated by behavioral economical and evolutionary biological approaches. Psychological theory building, which addresses mental processes underlying other-regarding behavior, is rare. Based on Relational Models Theory (RMT, [1] and Relationship Regulation Theory (RRT, [2] it is proposed that moral motives influence individuals' decision behavior in interpersonal situations via conscious and unconscious (automatic processes. To test our propositions we developed the 'Dyadic Solidarity Game' and its solitary equivalent, the 'Self-Insurance Game'. Four experiments, in which the moral motives "Unity" and "Proportionality" were manipulated, support the propositions made. First, it was shown that consciously activated moral motives (via framing of the overall goal of the experiment and unconsciously activated moral motives (via subliminal priming influence other-regarding behavior. Second, this influence was only found in interpersonal, not in solitary situations. Third, by combining the analyses of the two experimental games the extent to which participants apply the Golden Rule ("treat others how you wish to be treated" could be established. Individuals with a "Unity" motive treated others like themselves, whereas individuals with a "Proportionality" motive gave others less then they gave themselves. The four experiments not only support the assumption that morals matter in economic games, they also deliver new insights in how morals matter in economic decision making.

  1. The (De-)evolution of Evolution Games: A Content Analysis of the Representation of Evolution Through Natural Selection in Digital Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leith, Alex P.; Ratan, Rabindra A.; Wohn, Donghee Yvette

    2016-08-01

    Given the diversity and complexity of education game mechanisms and topics, this article contributes to a theoretical understanding of how game mechanisms "map" to educational topics through inquiry-based learning. Namely, the article examines the presence of evolution through natural selection (ENS) in digital games. ENS is a fundamentally important and widely misunderstood theory. This analysis of ENS portrayal in digital games provides insight into the use of games in teaching ENS. Systematic database search results were coded for the three principles of ENS: phenotypic variation, differential fitness, and fitness heritability. Though thousands of games use the term evolution, few presented elements of evolution, and even fewer contained all principles of ENS. Games developed to specifically teach evolution were difficult to find through Web searches. These overall deficiencies in ENS games reflect the inherent incompatibility between game control elements and the automatic process of ENS.

  2. Dictionary of minor planet names

    CERN Document Server

    Schmadel, Lutz D

    1997-01-01

    Until recently, minor planet name citations were scattered in the astronomical literature, and the origin of many names remained obscure In 1988 the IAU Commission 20 established a study group to elucidate the meanings of asteroid names Later on the author continued in collecting and indexing all new relevant data This book contains the names, and their meanings, of all - as yet 5252 - named minor planets It informs about the discoverers as well as the circumstances of the discovery of all 7041 minor planets that were numbered up to June 1996 In addition to being of practical value for identification purposes, the collection provides a most interesting historical insight into the work of those astronomers who over two centuries vested their affinities in a rich and colourful variety of ingenious names, from heavenly goddesses to more prosaic constructions This third, revised and enlarged edition comprises about 40% more information than was provided with the first one of 1992

  3. Armenian Names of the Planets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harutyunian, Haik A.

    2007-08-01

    Striking similarities between the Armenian names of visible to the naked eye planets and their ancient Greek names used before 6 - 5 centuries BC are presented. Mercury, for instance, was called Stilbon in Greece which means “the Gleaming” and coincides with Armenian Paylatsou. One of the names of Venus was Phosphoros and in Armenia it is called Lusaber - both of these terms meaning the “Bringer of Light”. Ancient Greeks named the fourth planet Pyroeis meaning “fiery”. The Armenian name of this planet Hrat consists of the word “hur” meaning fire and a suffix “at”. Jupiter's and Saturn's ancient names are considered as well. Moreover, the term planet has its Armenian version being in the use more than 2500 years.

  4. Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan

    2015-01-01

    Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.

  5. Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan

    2015-01-01

    Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD. PMID:26441689

  6. Game theory paradigm: a new tool for investigating social dysfunction in major depressive disorders

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yun eWang

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modelling offers a new tool for investigating social interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely-used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.

  7. Design of Game Space

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kristiansen, Erik

    2011-01-01

    Playing games of any kind, from tennis to board games, it is easy to notice that games are configured in space, often using stripes or a kind of map on a board. Some games are clearly performed within this marked border, while it may be difficult to pinpoint such a visual border in a game like hide....... This makes sense, but also demands that play and non-play can be easily separated. I will examine how games make use of space, and show that the magic circle not only is a viable, though criticized, concept but should be understood as a spatial concept. In order to do this several games are examined, leading...... to introduce a spatial model of the game performance comprising a primary and secondary game space. I will show how new game genres can profit from using this model when designing new games....

  8. Evolutionary molecular medicine.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nesse, Randolph M; Ganten, Detlev; Gregory, T Ryan; Omenn, Gilbert S

    2012-05-01

    Evolution has long provided a foundation for population genetics, but some major advances in evolutionary biology from the twentieth century that provide foundations for evolutionary medicine are only now being applied in molecular medicine. They include the need for both proximate and evolutionary explanations, kin selection, evolutionary models for cooperation, competition between alleles, co-evolution, and new strategies for tracing phylogenies and identifying signals of selection. Recent advances in genomics are transforming evolutionary biology in ways that create even more opportunities for progress at its interfaces with genetics, medicine, and public health. This article reviews 15 evolutionary principles and their applications in molecular medicine in hopes that readers will use them and related principles to speed the development of evolutionary molecular medicine.

  9. The standard set game of a cooperative game

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bumb, A.F.; Hoede, C.

    2003-01-01

    We show that for every cooperative game a corresponding set game can be defined, called the standard set game. Values for set games can be applied to this standard game and determine allocations for the cooperative game. On the other hand, notions for cooperative games, like the Shapley value, the

  10. A Game Theoretic Approach to Swarm Robotics

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. N. Givigi

    2006-01-01

    Full Text Available In this article, we discuss some techniques for achieving swarm intelligent robots through the use of traits of personality. Traits of personality are characteristics of each robot that, altogether, define the robot's behaviours. We discuss the use of evolutionary psychology to select a set of traits of personality that will evolve due to a learning process based on reinforcement learning. The use of Game Theory is introduced, and some simulations showing its potential are reported.

  11. Parity Games and Automata for Game Logic

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Hansen, H.H.; Kupke, C.; Marti, J.; Venema, Y.; Madeira, A.; Benevides, M.

    2018-01-01

    Parikh’s game logic is a PDL-like fixpoint logic interpreted on monotone neighbourhood frames that represent the strategic power of players in determined two-player games. Game logic translates into a fragment of the monotone μ-calculus, which in turn is expressively equivalent to monotone modal

  12. Exaptation, adaptation, and evolutionary psychology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schulz, Armin

    2013-01-01

    One of the most well known methodological criticisms of evolutionary psychology is Gould's claim that the program pays too much attention to adaptations, and not enough to exaptations. Almost as well known is the standard rebuttal of that criticism: namely, that the study of exaptations in fact depends on the study of adaptations. However, as I try to show in this paper, it is premature to think that this is where this debate ends. First, the notion of exaptation that is commonly used in this debate is different from the one that Gould and Vrba originally defined. Noting this is particularly important, since, second, the standard reply to Gould's criticism only works if the criticism is framed in terms of the former notion of exaptation, and not the latter. However, third, this ultimately does not change the outcome of the debate much, as evolutionary psychologists can respond to the revamped criticism of their program by claiming that the original notion of exaptation is theoretically and empirically uninteresting. By discussing these issues further, I also seek to determine, more generally, which ways of approaching the adaptationism debate in evolutionary biology are useful, and which not.

  13. A name is a name is a name: some thoughts and personal opinions about molluscan scientific names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dance, S.P.

    2009-01-01

    Since 1758, with the publication of Systema Naturae by Linnaeus, thousands of scientific names have been proposed for molluscs. The derivation and uses of many of them are here examined from various viewpoints, beginning with names based on appearance, size, vertical distribution, and location.

  14. GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES IN THE WORLD

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    To further the standardization of geo- graphical names at both the national and international levels, the United Na- tions Group of Experts on. Geo- graphical Names (UNGEGN) was es- tablished in pursuance of Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolu- tions 715 A (XXVII) of 23 April 1959 and. 1314 (LXIV) of 31 May ...

  15. Translating African Names in Fiction

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Isaiah Bariki

    2009-12-01

    Full Text Available In this paper, we study the sociocultural and ethnopragmatic significance of African names as used by the Yoruba and Izon of Nigeria and the Akan of Ghana. From the perspective of linguistic anthropology, we show the non-arbitrary nature of these names and demonstrate the need to translate them, particularly in fictional texts, so that their significance may be preserved.

  16. Index to scientific plant names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    NN,

    1993-01-01

    Suprageneric epithets have been entered under the family name to which they belong preceded by the indication of their rank (subfamily, tribe, etc.). Infrageneric epithets have been entered immediately under the generic name to which they belong, preceeded by the indication of their rank (subgenus,

  17. Index to scientific plant names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    NN,

    1997-01-01

    Suprageneric epithets have been entered under the family name to which they belong preceded by the indication of their rank (subfamily, tribe, etc.). Infrageneric epithets have been entered immediately under the generic name to which they belong, preceded by the indication of their rank (subgenus,

  18. Index to scientific plant names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    NN,

    2002-01-01

    Numbers refer to page numbers. Infrageneric epithets have been entered directly under the generic name to which they belong, preceded by the indication of their rank (subg., sect., etc.). Infraspecific epithets have been entered under the specific name to which they belong, preceded by the

  19. Index to scientific plant names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    NN,

    1996-01-01

    Suprageneric epithets have been entered under the family name to which they belong preceded by the indication of their rank (subfamily, tribe, etc.)- Infrageneric epithets have been entered immediately under the generic name to which they belong, preceded by the indication of their rank (subgenus,

  20. Index to scientific plant names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Steenis-Kruseman, van M.J.

    1948-01-01

    Suprageneric epiphels have been entered under the family name to which they belong preceded by the indication of their rank (tribes, e.g.). Supraspecific epithets have been entered under the generic name to which they belong preceded by the indication of their rank (sections, series).

  1. Number names and number understanding

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ejersbo, Lisser Rye; Misfeldt, Morten

    2014-01-01

    through using mathematical names for the numbers such as one-ten-one for 11 and five-ten-six for 56. The project combines the renaming of numbers with supporting the teaching with the new number names. Our hypothesis is that Danish children have more difficulties learning and working with numbers, because...

  2. Author Name Disambiguation in MEDLINE.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Torvik, Vetle I; Smalheiser, Neil R

    2009-07-01

    BACKGROUND: We recently described "Author-ity," a model for estimating the probability that two articles in MEDLINE, sharing the same author name, were written by the same individual. Features include shared title words, journal name, coauthors, medical subject headings, language, affiliations, and author name features (middle initial, suffix, and prevalence in MEDLINE). Here we test the hypothesis that the Author-ity model will suffice to disambiguate author names for the vast majority of articles in MEDLINE. METHODS: Enhancements include: (a) incorporating first names and their variants, email addresses, and correlations between specific last names and affiliation words; (b) new methods of generating large unbiased training sets; (c) new methods for estimating the prior probability; (d) a weighted least squares algorithm for correcting transitivity violations; and (e) a maximum likelihood based agglomerative algorithm for computing clusters of articles that represent inferred author-individuals. RESULTS: Pairwise comparisons were computed for all author names on all 15.3 million articles in MEDLINE (2006 baseline), that share last name and first initial, to create Author-ity 2006, a database that has each name on each article assigned to one of 6.7 million inferred author-individual clusters. Recall is estimated at ~98.8%. Lumping (putting two different individuals into the same cluster) affects ~0.5% of clusters, whereas splitting (assigning articles written by the same individual to >1 cluster) affects ~2% of articles. IMPACT: The Author-ity model can be applied generally to other bibliographic databases. Author name disambiguation allows information retrieval and data integration to become person-centered, not just document-centered, setting the stage for new data mining and social network tools that will facilitate the analysis of scholarly publishing and collaboration behavior. AVAILABILITY: The Author-ity 2006 database is available for nonprofit academic

  3. Mobile Game for Learning Bacteriology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sugimura, Ryo; Kawazu, Sotaro; Tamari, Hiroki; Watanabe, Kodai; Nishimura, Yohei; Oguma, Toshiki; Watanabe, Katsushiro; Kaneko, Kosuke; Okada, Yoshihiro; Yoshida, Motofumi; Takano, Shigeru; Inoue, Hitoshi

    2014-01-01

    This paper treats serious games. Recently, one of the game genres called serious game has become popular, which has other purposes besides enjoyments like education, training and so on. Especially, learning games of the serious games seem very attractive for the age of video games so that the authors developed a mobile game for learning…

  4. Patience of matrix games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt; Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus; Podolskii, Vladimir V.

    2013-01-01

    For matrix games we study how small nonzero probability must be used in optimal strategies. We show that for image win–lose–draw games (i.e. image matrix games) nonzero probabilities smaller than image are never needed. We also construct an explicit image win–lose game such that the unique optimal...

  5. Learning with Calculator Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frahm, Bruce

    2013-01-01

    Educational games provide a fun introduction to new material and a review of mathematical algorithms. Specifically, games can be designed to assist students in developing mathematical skills as an incidental consequence of the game-playing process. The programs presented in this article are adaptations of board games or television shows that…

  6. Design Games to Learn

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Marchetti, Emanuela; Valente, Andrea

    2014-01-01

    programming with digital creativity. In our preliminary study we transposed a digital game into a card game and observed students while shifting between playing and design thinking. Results from this study suggest that the notion of altering a digital game through a card-based transposition of the same game...

  7. Games for Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gee, James Paul

    2013-01-01

    Today there is a great deal of interest in and a lot of hype about using video games in schools. Video games are a new silver bullet. Games can create good learning because they teach in powerful ways. The theory behind game-based learning is not really new, but a traditional and well-tested approach to deep and effective learning, often…

  8. Games for Rehabilitation

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Petersson, Eva; Brown, David

    This anthology on games for rehabilitation contains a serious chapters on game methods and apps or research that compares game systems or modified games or interface devices (Wii, Eyetoy, Kinect, DDR) applied across all areas of clinical care and clinically focused research....

  9. Abstract of Dynamic Range: When Game Design and Narratives Unite

    OpenAIRE

    Arsenault, Dominic

    2005-01-01

    This paper proposes a tool and methodology for measuring the degree of freedom given to a player in any resource-driven game (that is, any game in which managing resources is an integral part of the gameplay). This concept, which I call the Dynamic Range, can be used namely to evaluate a given game system’s potential for developing emergent narratives, as defined by Henry Jenkins in his publication Game Design as Narrative Architecture. While Jenkins places at the heart of the creation of nar...

  10. Entanglement guarantees emergence of cooperation in quantum prisoner's dilemma games on networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Angsheng; Yong, Xi

    2014-09-05

    It was known that cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games fails to emerge in homogenous networks such as random graphs. Here we proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game. The game consists of two players, in which each player has three choices of strategy: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q). We found that quantum entanglement guarantees emergence of a new cooperation, the super cooperation of the quantum prisoner's dilemma games, and that entanglement is the mechanism of guaranteed emergence of cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on networks. We showed that for a game with temptation b, there exists a threshold arccos √b/b for a measurement of entanglement, beyond which, (super) cooperation of evolutionary quantum prisoner's dilemma games is guaranteed to quickly emerge, giving rise to stochastic convergence of the cooperations, that if the entanglement degree γ is less than the threshold arccos √b/b, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games is positively correlated to the entanglement degree γ, and that if γ is less than arccos √b/b and b is beyond some boundary, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games on random graphs decreases as the average degree of the graphs increases.

  11. Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure

    Science.gov (United States)

    Allen, Benjamin; Lippner, Gabor; Chen, Yu-Ting; Fotouhi, Babak; Momeni, Naghmeh; Yau, Shing-Tung; Nowak, Martin A.

    2017-03-01

    Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a population can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations remains difficult. Mathematical results are known for special structures in which all individuals have the same number of neighbours. The general case, in which the number of neighbours can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class that suggests there is no efficient algorithm. Whether a simple solution for weak selection exists has remained unanswered. Here we provide a solution for weak selection that applies to any graph or network. Our method relies on calculating the coalescence times of random walks. We evaluate large numbers of diverse population structures for their propensity to favour cooperation. We study how small changes in population structure—graph surgery—affect evolutionary outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties.

  12. Game Development in Unity : Game Production, Game Mechanics and the Effects of Gaming

    OpenAIRE

    Dansie, Jason

    2013-01-01

    The goal of this thesis is to examine how video games are designed and to see how differ-ent game mechanics work and how to use them in the development of a game, as well as examine what are both the positive and negative effects games have on adults and children. This thesis looks at how games in general are developed in Unity, a 3D game engine which has become not only popular but a standard in the gaming industry. The thesis describes how the interface in Unity is used to quickly gene...

  13. Computer Games and Art

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anton Sukhov

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available This article devoted to the search of relevant sources (primary and secondary and characteristics of computer games that allow to include them in the field of art (such as the creation of artistic games, computer graphics, active interaction with other forms of art, signs of spiritual aesthetic act, own temporality of computer games, “aesthetic illusion”, interactivity. In general, modern computer games can be attributed to commercial art and popular culture (blockbuster games and to elite forms of contemporary media art (author’s games, visionary games.

  14. Analysis of the “naming game” with learning errors in communications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong

    2015-07-01

    Naming game simulates the process of naming an objective by a population of agents organized in a certain communication network. By pair-wise iterative interactions, the population reaches consensus asymptotically. We study naming game with communication errors during pair-wise conversations, with error rates in a uniform probability distribution. First, a model of naming game with learning errors in communications (NGLE) is proposed. Then, a strategy for agents to prevent learning errors is suggested. To that end, three typical topologies of communication networks, namely random-graph, small-world and scale-free networks, are employed to investigate the effects of various learning errors. Simulation results on these models show that 1) learning errors slightly affect the convergence speed but distinctively increase the requirement for memory of each agent during lexicon propagation; 2) the maximum number of different words held by the population increases linearly as the error rate increases; 3) without applying any strategy to eliminate learning errors, there is a threshold of the learning errors which impairs the convergence. The new findings may help to better understand the role of learning errors in naming game as well as in human language development from a network science perspective.

  15. Deterministic Graphical Games Revisited

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersson, Daniel; Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt; Miltersen, Peter Bro

    2008-01-01

    We revisit the deterministic graphical games of Washburn. A deterministic graphical game can be described as a simple stochastic game (a notion due to Anne Condon), except that we allow arbitrary real payoffs but disallow moves of chance. We study the complexity of solving deterministic graphical...... games and obtain an almost-linear time comparison-based algorithm for computing an equilibrium of such a game. The existence of a linear time comparison-based algorithm remains an open problem....

  16. Simulation of interactive games

    OpenAIRE

    Heiberg, Fredrik

    2016-01-01

    Interactive online games are increasingly popular in today's society, and the industry is growing fast. Games take place in a virtual world and involve interaction with other players. Some online games connect millions of people, and the game studios enjoy enormous revenue utilising different business models. The interactive game market has changed a lot over the years, and player demands have increased concerning functionality, content, and price. As a result, the costs related to developmen...

  17. The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shubik, Martin

    2002-01-01

    Discusses the use of lightly controlled games, primarily in classes in game theory. Considers the value of such games from the viewpoint of both teaching and experimentation and discusses context; control; pros and cons of games in teaching; experimental games; and games in class, including cooperative game theory. (Author/LRW)

  18. Games and Sports Preferences of Children

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ayan, Sinan

    2013-01-01

    The Turkish educational system entered into the process of a compulsory 12 years of school education starting from the 2012-2013 academic year. In this process, the name of the physical education lesson has been changed to "games and physical activities" in the primary schools that offer education for 4 years. The aim of the present…

  19. Epigenetic game theory and its application in plants. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yuan-Ming; Zhang, Yinghao; Guo, Mingyue

    2017-03-01

    Wang's et al. article [1] is the first to integrate game theory (especially evolutionary game theory) with epigenetic modification of zygotic genomes. They described and assessed a modeling framework based on evolutionary game theory to quantify, how sperms and oocytes interact through epigenetic processes, to determine embryo development. They also studied the internal mechanisms for normal embryo development: 1) evolutionary interactions between DNA methylation of the paternal and maternal genomes, and 2) the application of game theory to formulate and quantify how different genes compete or cooperate to regulate embryogenesis through methylation. Although it is not very comprehensive and profound regarding game theory modeling, this article bridges the gap between evolutionary game theory and the epigenetic control of embryo development by powerful ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The epiGame framework includes four aspects: 1) characterizing how epigenetic game theory works by the strategy matrix, in which the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis, are described by the cooperation and competition mechanisms, 2) quantifying the game that the direction and degree of P-M interactions over embryo development can be explained by the sign and magnitude of interaction parameters in model (2), 3) modeling epigenetic interactions within the morula, especially for two coupled nonlinear ODEs, with explicit functions in model (4), which provide a good fit to the observed data for the two sexes (adjusted R2 = 0.956), and 4) revealing multifactorial interactions in embryogenesis from the coupled ODEs in model (2) to triplet ODEs in model (6). Clearly, this article extends game theory from evolutionary game theory to epigenetic game theory.

  20. Remembering the evolutionary Freud.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Young, Allan

    2006-03-01

    Throughout his career as a writer, Sigmund Freud maintained an interest in the evolutionary origins of the human mind and its neurotic and psychotic disorders. In common with many writers then and now, he believed that the evolutionary past is conserved in the mind and the brain. Today the "evolutionary Freud" is nearly forgotten. Even among Freudians, he is regarded to be a red herring, relevant only to the extent that he diverts attention from the enduring achievements of the authentic Freud. There are three ways to explain these attitudes. First, the evolutionary Freud's key work is the "Overview of the Transference Neurosis" (1915). But it was published at an inopportune moment, forty years after the author's death, during the so-called "Freud wars." Second, Freud eventually lost interest in the "Overview" and the prospect of a comprehensive evolutionary theory of psychopathology. The publication of The Ego and the Id (1923), introducing Freud's structural theory of the psyche, marked the point of no return. Finally, Freud's evolutionary theory is simply not credible. It is based on just-so stories and a thoroughly discredited evolutionary mechanism, Lamarckian use-inheritance. Explanations one and two are probably correct but also uninteresting. Explanation number three assumes that there is a fundamental difference between Freud's evolutionary narratives (not credible) and the evolutionary accounts of psychopathology that currently circulate in psychiatry and mainstream journals (credible). The assumption is mistaken but worth investigating.

  1. Dictionary of Minor Planet Names

    CERN Document Server

    Schmadel, Lutz D

    2007-01-01

    Dictionary of Minor Planet Names, Fifth Edition, is the official reference for the field of the IAU, which serves as the internationally recognised authority for assigning designations to celestial bodies and any surface features on them. The accelerating rate of the discovery of minor planets has not only made a new edition of this established compendium necessary but has also significantly altered its scope: this thoroughly revised edition concentrates on the approximately 10,000 minor planets that carry a name. It provides authoritative information about the basis for all names of minor planets. In addition to being of practical value for identification purposes, this collection provides a most interesting historical insight into the work of those astronomers who over two centuries vested their affinities in a rich and colorful variety of ingenious names, from heavenly goddesses to more prosaic constructions. The fifth edition serves as the primary reference, with plans for complementary booklets with newl...

  2. Predictors of picture naming speed.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alario, F Xavier; Ferrand, Ludovic; Laganaro, Marina; New, Boris; Frauenfelder, Uli H; Segui, Juan

    2004-02-01

    We report the results of a large-scale picture naming experiment in which we evaluated the potential contribution of nine theoretically relevant factors to naming latencies. The experiment included a large number of items and a large sample of participants. In order to make this experiment as similar as possible to classic picture naming experiments, participants were familiarized with the materials during a training session. Speeded naming latencies were determined by a software key on the basis of the digital recording of the responses. The effects of various variables on these latencies were assessed with multiple regression techniques, using a repeated measures design. The interpretation of the observed effects is discussed in relation to previous studies and current views on lexical access during speech production.

  3. Chadwick named college communications manager

    OpenAIRE

    Owczarski, Mark

    2006-01-01

    Heather Riley Chadwick of Blacksburg, Va., has been named communications manager for the College of Architecture and Urban Studies at Virginia Tech. Previously, she served as the marketing and communications manager for Virginia Tech's Office of Student Programs.

  4. Place Names in Multicultural Societies

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Thomas Hylland Eriksen

    2012-08-01

    Full Text Available It is not unthinkable that in a not too distant future, citizens of Oslo will have the opportunity to meet for appointments at Salimi Square, to shop for vegetables in Kharian Street, to enjoy their picnics in Rubina Rana Park and to drive to the nearby town of Drammen on Mogadishu Road. Historical change may lead to politically motivated changes in place names, although often slow and uneven, and major upheavals such as revolutions tend to entail a total renovation of the names of streets, parks and other urban fixtures. The names of towns and villages tend to stick more stubbornly. This short essay looks at these three modes, drawing on exam- ples from Tehran, Trinidad and Toronto, eventually relating them ten- tatively to the emergent multiethnic reality in Oslo and the future prospects for place names in the city.

  5. Named Entity Recognition for IDEAL

    OpenAIRE

    Du, Qianzhou; Zhang, Xuan

    2015-01-01

    This project explored how to apply Named Entity Recognition to large Twitter and web page datasets to extract useful entities such as people, organization, location, and date. In addition, this NER utility has been scaled to the MapReduce framework on the Hadoop cluster. A schema and software allow this to be integrated with IDEAL. The term “Named Entity”, which was first introduced by Grishman and Sundheim, is widely used in Natural Language Processing (NLP). The researchers were focusing...

  6. Elemental Etymology: What's in a Name?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ball, David W.

    1985-01-01

    Examines the origin of the names (or etymologies) of the chemical elements. Includes tables listing elements: (1) with names of obscure origin; (2) named for colors; (3) named after real or mythical people; (4) named after places; (5) named after heavenly bodies; and (6) having names of miscellaneous origin. (JN)

  7. On the preservation of cooperation in two-strategy games with nonlocal interactions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aydogmus, Ozgur; Zhou, Wen; Kang, Yun

    2017-03-01

    Nonlocal interactions such as spatial interaction are ubiquitous in nature and may alter the equilibrium in evolutionary dynamics. Models including nonlocal spatial interactions can provide a further understanding on the preservation and emergence of cooperation in evolutionary dynamics. In this paper, we consider a variety of two-strategy evolutionary spatial games with nonlocal interactions based on an integro-differential replicator equation. By defining the invasion speed and minimal traveling wave speed for the derived model, we study the effects of the payoffs, the selection pressure and the spatial parameter on the preservation of cooperation. One of our most interesting findings is that, for the Prisoners Dilemma games in which the defection is the only evolutionary stable strategy for unstructured populations, analyses on its asymptotic speed of propagation suggest that, in contrast with spatially homogeneous games, the cooperators can invade the habitat under proper conditions. Other two-strategy evolutionary spatial games are also explored. Both our theoretical and numerical studies show that the nonlocal spatial interaction favors diversity in strategies in a population and is able to preserve cooperation in a competing environment. A real data application in a virus mutation study echoes our theoretical observations. In addition, we compare the results of our model to the partial differential equation approach to demonstrate the importance of including non-local interaction component in evolutionary game models. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  8. Alternate Reality Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kristiansen, Erik

    2014-01-01

    What. Urban Games are games that take place in the real-world of the players, and which make use of the properties of the city. Alternate Reality Games (ARGs) are urban games that pretend to be conspiracy theories that really are happening in the life of the players. The games are experienced...... through events, challenges and collaborative puzzle solving and may evolve through the engagement of the players. This new design method, Aulaia, addresses the design of urban games in the form of ARGs. Along with the design method several examples from real world ARGs are given. Why. ARGs and other urban...... games are usually large and complicated undertakings, which require many coordinated activities in order to make successful games. This design method secures a structured approach, not only for the design of the game, but also for the launch and running. ARGs develop along with the players and require...

  9. Use of game-theoretical methods in biochemistry and biophysics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schuster, Stefan; Kreft, Jan-Ulrich; Schroeter, Anja; Pfeiffer, Thomas

    2008-04-01

    Evolutionary game theory can be considered as an extension of the theory of evolutionary optimisation in that two or more organisms (or more generally, units of replication) tend to optimise their properties in an interdependent way. Thus, the outcome of the strategy adopted by one species (e.g., as a result of mutation and selection) depends on the strategy adopted by the other species. In this review, the use of evolutionary game theory for analysing biochemical and biophysical systems is discussed. The presentation is illustrated by a number of instructive examples such as the competition between microorganisms using different metabolic pathways for adenosine triphosphate production, the secretion of extracellular enzymes, the growth of trees and photosynthesis. These examples show that, due to conflicts of interest, the global optimum (in the sense of being the best solution for the whole system) is not always obtained. For example, some yeast species use metabolic pathways that waste nutrients, and in a dense tree canopy, trees grow taller than would be optimal for biomass productivity. From the viewpoint of game theory, the examples considered can be described by the Prisoner's Dilemma, snowdrift game, Tragedy of the Commons and rock-scissors-paper game.

  10. Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mohamed S. Abdalzaher

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs.

  11. Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Abdalzaher, Mohamed S; Seddik, Karim; Elsabrouty, Maha; Muta, Osamu; Furukawa, Hiroshi; Abdel-Rahman, Adel

    2016-06-29

    We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs) from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs.

  12. Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey

    Science.gov (United States)

    Abdalzaher, Mohamed S.; Seddik, Karim; Elsabrouty, Maha; Muta, Osamu; Furukawa, Hiroshi; Abdel-Rahman, Adel

    2016-01-01

    We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs) from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs. PMID:27367700

  13. Decomposition of Network Communication Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dietzenbacher, Bas; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud

    2015-01-01

    Using network control structures this paper introduces network communication games as a generalization of vertex games and edge games corresponding to communication situations and studies their decomposition into unanimity games. We obtain a relation between the dividends of the network

  14. Game elements improve performance in a working memory training task

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Manuel Ninaus

    2015-02-01

    Full Text Available The utilization of game elements in a non-game context is currently used in a vast range of different domains. However, research on game elements’ effects in cognitive tasks is still sparse. Thus, in this study we implemented three game elements, namely, progress bar, level indicator, and a thematic setting, in a working memory training task. We evaluated the impact of game elements on user performance and perceived state of flow when compared to a conventional version of the task. Participants interacting with game elements showed higher scores in the working memory training task than participants from a control group who completed the working memory training task without the game elements. Moreover, game elements facilitated the individuals’ performance closer to their maximum working memory capacity. Finally, the perceived flow did not differ between the two groups, which indicates that game elements can induce better performance without changing the perception of being “in the zone”, that is without an increase in anxiety or boredom. This empirical study indicates that certain game elements can improve the performance and efficiency in a working memory task by increasing users’ ability and willingness to train at their optimal performance level. 

  15. Evolutionary Biology Today

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Home; Journals; Resonance – Journal of Science Education; Volume 7; Issue 11. Evolutionary Biology Today - The Domain of Evolutionary Biology. Amitabh Joshi. Series Article Volume 7 Issue 11 November 2002 pp 8-17. Fulltext. Click here to view fulltext PDF. Permanent link:

  16. Part E: Evolutionary Computation

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    2015-01-01

    evolutionary algorithms, such as memetic algorithms, which have emerged as a very promising tool for solving many real-world problems in a multitude of areas of science and technology. Moreover, parallel evolutionary combinatorial optimization has been presented. Search operators, which are crucial in all...

  17. Evolutionary Biology Today

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Amitabh Joshi studies and teaches evolutionary ' genetics and population ecology at the Jawaharlal. Nehru Centre for Advanced. Scientific Research,. Bangalore. His current research interests are in life- history, evolution, the evolutionary genetics of biological clocks, the evolution of ecological specialization dynamics. He.

  18. Evolutionary humanoid robotics

    CERN Document Server

    Eaton, Malachy

    2015-01-01

    This book examines how two distinct strands of research on autonomous robots, evolutionary robotics and humanoid robot research, are converging. The book will be valuable for researchers and postgraduate students working in the areas of evolutionary robotics and bio-inspired computing.

  19. Evolutionary Biology Today

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Home; Journals; Resonance – Journal of Science Education; Volume 8; Issue 2. Evolutionary Biology Today - What do Evolutionary Biologists do? Amitabh Joshi. Series Article Volume 8 Issue 2 February 2003 pp 6-18. Fulltext. Click here to view fulltext PDF. Permanent link:

  20. Applying evolutionary anthropology

    OpenAIRE

    Gibson, Mhairi A; Lawson, David W

    2015-01-01

    Evolutionary anthropology provides a powerful theoretical framework for understanding how both current environments and legacies of past selection shape human behavioral diversity. This integrative and pluralistic field, combining ethnographic, demographic, and sociological methods, has provided new insights into the ultimate forces and proximate pathways that guide human adaptation and variation. Here, we present the argument that evolutionary anthropological studies of human behavior also h...

  1. Games on Games. Game Design as Critical Reflexive Practice

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Giovanni Caruso

    2016-11-01

    Full Text Available Can video game design be compared to more formalized practices of scientific research or speculation within game studies? And, by virtue of an intellectual leap that in itself calls for discussion, can video games be considered as an efficient vehicle for the presentation of certain kinds of knowledge, in the same way in which papers, conference presentations, and books are? What Ratto defines as critical making (2011, the practice of producing artifacts of different sorts in order to supplement and extend critical reflection, may apply to video games as well. Forms of research through design (Zimmerman, Forlizzi and Evenson, 2007, of carpentry (Bogost, 2012, and speculative design (Dunne and Raby, 2013 have been analyzed, discussed, and maybe most importantly, put into practice in different fields of cultural and scientific production. To address this gap and to map the current (and future state of self-reflexive games, we asked both researchers and designers to imagine an application of these concepts to video games. Paraphrasing Zimmerman, Forlizzi and Evenson, what does research through game design might mean? What epistemological insights can we derive from the act of designing, making and playing video games?

  2. Dictionary of Minor Planet Names

    CERN Document Server

    Schmadel, Lutz

    2012-01-01

    The quantity of numbered minor planets has now well exceeded a quarter million. The new sixth edition of the Dictionary of Minor Planet Names, which is the IAU’s official reference work for the field, now covers more than 17,000 named minor planets. In addition to being of practical value for identification purposes, the Dictionary of Minor Planet Names provides authoritative information on the basis of the rich and colorful variety of ingenious names, from heavenly goddesses to artists, from scientists to Nobel laureates, from historical or political figures to ordinary women and men, from mountains to buildings, as well as a variety of compound terms and curiosities. This sixth edition of the Dictionary of Minor Planet Names has grown by more than 7,000 entries compared to the fifth edition and by more than 2,000 compared to the fifth edition, including its two addenda published in 2006 and 2009. In addition, there are many  corrections, revisions and updates to the entries published in earlier editions....

  3. Rational Expectations in Games

    OpenAIRE

    Robert J. Aumann; Jacques H. Dreze

    2008-01-01

    A player i's actions in a game are determined by her beliefs about other players; these depend on the game's real-life context, not only its formal description. Define a game situation as a game together with such beliefs; call the beliefs— and i's resulting expectation—rational if there is common knowledge of rationality and a common prior. In two-person zero-sum games, i's only rational expectation is the game’s value. In an arbitrary game G, we characterize i's rational expectations in ter...

  4. What games do

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jessen, Jari Due; Jessen, Carsten

    2014-01-01

    When interacting with computer games, users are forced to follow the rules of the game in return of the excitement, joy, fun, or other pursued experiences. In this paper, we investigate how games achieve these experiences in the perspective of Actor Network Theory (ANT). Based on a qualitative...... study we conclude that both board games and computer games are actors that produce experiences by exercising power over the user’s abilities, for example their cognitive functions. Games are designed to take advantage of the characteristics of the human players....

  5. Ageing and digital games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Iversen, Sara Mosberg

    Digital games are still to a great degree considered a medium mainly for young boys. However, available statistics on Western media use show that this is far from the case. Increasingly, people of all ages and genders play digital games, also older adults in their early 60s and beyond. The aim...... of the book is to examine, analyse and discuss: 1) What older adults do with digital games and what meanings the use of digital games take on in the everyday life of older adults; 2) How older adults are perceived by society in relation to digital games; 3) How play and games can be used both...

  6. phyloXML: XML for evolutionary biology and comparative genomics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, Mira V; Zmasek, Christian M

    2009-10-27

    Evolutionary trees are central to a wide range of biological studies. In many of these studies, tree nodes and branches need to be associated (or annotated) with various attributes. For example, in studies concerned with organismal relationships, tree nodes are associated with taxonomic names, whereas tree branches have lengths and oftentimes support values. Gene trees used in comparative genomics or phylogenomics are usually annotated with taxonomic information, genome-related data, such as gene names and functional annotations, as well as events such as gene duplications, speciations, or exon shufflings, combined with information related to the evolutionary tree itself. The data standards currently used for evolutionary trees have limited capacities to incorporate such annotations of different data types. We developed a XML language, named phyloXML, for describing evolutionary trees, as well as various associated data items. PhyloXML provides elements for commonly used items, such as branch lengths, support values, taxonomic names, and gene names and identifiers. By using "property" elements, phyloXML can be adapted to novel and unforeseen use cases. We also developed various software tools for reading, writing, conversion, and visualization of phyloXML formatted data. PhyloXML is an XML language defined by a complete schema in XSD that allows storing and exchanging the structures of evolutionary trees as well as associated data. More information about phyloXML itself, the XSD schema, as well as tools implementing and supporting phyloXML, is available at http://www.phyloxml.org.

  7. Game Genre Evolution for Educational Games

    OpenAIRE

    Watters, Carolyn

    2005-01-01

    Game Genre Evolution for Educational Games Introduction Mass media, such as radio and television, are complex combinations of channel and genre. Genres allow us to make distinctions and choices within a given medium largely on the basis of content and form, for example, talk shows, dramas, or sitcoms. Modern digital games have gained the status of mass medium [8] and genre are very evident. From the McLuhan perspective [2], the personal and social consequences of a medium result from the new ...

  8. Cultural evolution: The case of babies’ first names

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xi, Ning; Zhang, Zi-Ke; Zhang, Yi-Cheng; Ge, Zehui; She, Li; Zhang, Kui

    2014-07-01

    In social sciences, there is currently rare consensus on the underlying mechanism for cultural evolution, partially due to lack of suitable data. The evolution of first names of newborn babies offers a remarkable example for such researches. In this paper, we employ the historical data on baby names from the United States to investigate the evolutionary process of culture, in particular focusing on how inequality among baby names changes over time. Then we propose a stochastic model where individual choice is determined by both individual preference and social influence, and show that the decrease in the strength of social influence can account for all the observed empirical features. Therefore, we claim that the weakening of social influence drives cultural evolution.

  9. Names of infamy: tainted eponyms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vajda, F J E; Davis, S M; Byrne, E

    2015-04-01

    The use of eponyms is controversial. A distinction must be made between those doctors and scientists after whom disorders and syndromes are named in honour of their discoveries, and those whose discoveries were made as a result of maltreatment of defenceless prisoners, utilizing specimens from victims of Nazi extermination policies, and euthanasia victims of racial policies. The second group of scientists should have their names expunged from the historical record, and their deeds brought to the attention of their colleagues. We are not however advocating the abolition of eponyms in general, only tainted ones. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  10. Group-size diversity in public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peña, Jorge

    2012-03-01

    Public goods games are models of social dilemmas where cooperators pay a cost for the production of a public good while defectors free ride on the contributions of cooperators. In the traditional framework of evolutionary game theory, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors result from interactions in groups formed by binomial sampling from an infinite population. Despite empirical evidence showing that group-size distributions in nature are highly heterogeneous, most models of social evolution assume that the group size is constant. In this article, I remove this assumption and explore the effects of having random group sizes on the evolutionary dynamics of public goods games. By a straightforward application of Jensen's inequality, I show that the outcome of general nonlinear public goods games depends not only on the average group size but also on the variance of the group-size distribution. This general result is illustrated with two nonlinear public goods games (the public goods game with discounting or synergy and the N-person volunteer's dilemma) and three different group-size distributions (Poisson, geometric, and Waring). The results suggest that failing to acknowledge the natural variation of group sizes can lead to an underestimation of the actual level of cooperation exhibited in evolving populations. © 2011 The Author. Evolution© 2011 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

  11. The Price Equation, Gradient Dynamics, and Continuous Trait Game Theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lehtonen, Jussi

    2018-01-01

    A recent article convincingly nominated the Price equation as the fundamental theorem of evolution and used it as a foundation to derive several other theorems. A major section of evolutionary theory that was not addressed is that of game theory and gradient dynamics of continuous traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Deriving fundamental results in these fields under the unifying framework of the Price equation illuminates similarities and differences between approaches and allows a simple, unified view of game-theoretical and dynamic concepts. Using Taylor polynomials and the Price equation, I derive a dynamic measure of evolutionary change, a condition for singular points, the convergence stability criterion, and an alternative interpretation of evolutionary stability. Furthermore, by applying the Price equation to a multivariable Taylor polynomial, the direct fitness approach to kin selection emerges. Finally, I compare these results to the mean gradient equation of quantitative genetics and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics.

  12. Aspiration dynamics of multi-player games in finite populations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Du, Jinming; Wu, Bin; Altrock, Philipp M.; Wang, Long

    2014-01-01

    On studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer. In the latter case, individuals adjust their strategies based on a comparison of their pay-offs from the evolutionary game to a value they aspire, called the level of aspiration. Unlike imitation processes of pairwise comparison, aspiration-driven updates do not require additional information about the strategic environment and can thus be interpreted as being more spontaneous. Recent work has mainly focused on understanding how aspiration dynamics alter the evolutionary outcome in structured populations. However, the baseline case for understanding strategy selection is the well-mixed population case, which is still lacking sufficient understanding. We explore how aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics under imperfect rationality influence the average abundance of a strategy in multi-player evolutionary games with two strategies. We analytically derive a condition under which a strategy is more abundant than the other in the weak selection limiting case. This approach has a long-standing history in evolutionary games and is mostly applied for its mathematical approachability. Hence, we also explore strong selection numerically, which shows that our weak selection condition is a robust predictor of the average abundance of a strategy. The condition turns out to differ from that of a wide class of imitation dynamics, as long as the game is not dyadic. Therefore, a strategy favoured under imitation dynamics can be disfavoured under aspiration dynamics. This does not require any population structure, and thus highlights the intrinsic difference between imitation and aspiration dynamics. PMID:24598208

  13. Randomness and arbitrary coordination in the reactive ultimatum game

    Science.gov (United States)

    da Silva, Roberto; Valverde, Pablo; Lamb, Luis C.

    2016-07-01

    Darwin's theory of evolution - as introduced in game theory by Maynard Smith - is not the only important evolutionary aspect in an evolutionary dynamics, since complex interdependencies, competition, and growth should be modeled by, for example, reactive aspects. In the ultimatum game, the reciprocity and the fifty-fifty partition seems to be a deviation from rational behavior of the players under the light of Nash equilibrium. Such equilibrium emerges, for example, from the punishment of the responder who generally tends to refuse unfair proposals. In the iterated version of the game, the proposers are able to improve their proposals by adding a value thus making fairer proposals. Such evolutionary aspects are not properly Darwinian-motivated, but they are endowed with a fundamental aspect: they reflect their actions according to value of the offers. Recently, a reactive version of the ultimatum game where acceptance occurs with fixed probability was proposed. In this paper, we aim at exploring this reactive version of the ultimatum game where the acceptance by players depends on the offer. In order to do so, we analyze two situations: (i) mean field and (ii) we consider players inserted within the networks with arbitrary coordination. We then show that the reactive aspect, here studied, thus far not analyzed in the evolutionary game theory literature can unveil an essential feature for the convergence to fifty-fifty split. Moreover we also analyze populations under four different polices ranging from a highly conservative to a moderate one, with respect to the decision in changing the proposal based on acceptances. We show that the idea of gaining less more times added to the reciprocity of the players is highly relevant to the concept of ;healthy; societies population bargaining.

  14. Diversity of neighborhoods promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ma, Yongjuan; Lu, Jun; Shi, Lei

    2017-02-01

    Explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important and interesting problems in a myriad of disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, statistical physics, social science and economics Up to now, there have been a great number of works aiming to this issue with the help of evolutionary game theory. However, vast majority of existing literatures simply assume that the interaction neighborhood and replacement neighborhood are symmetric, which seems inconsistent with real-world cases. In this paper, we consider the asymmetrical neighborhood: player of type A, whose factor is controlled by a parameter τ, has four interaction neighbors and four replacement neighbors, while player of type B, whose factor is controlled by a parameter 1 - τ, possess eight interaction neighbors and four replacement neighbors. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we found that middle τ can make the cooperation reach the highest level While for this finding, its robustness can be further validated in more games.

  15. The medical excuse game revisited.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Corson-Rikert, Janet; Christmas, William A

    2009-01-01

    Academic policies that require medical excuses are based on mistrust of students and conflict with institutional honor codes. Such policies undermine the philosophical and educational foundations of higher education; namely, to model and nurture honesty, integrity, and citizenship in emerging adults. Instead, they encourage hypocrisy and exaggeration by requiring students to prove they are sick enough to produce temporary disability. More pragmatically, the "game" also consumes valuable clinician time. The authors describe their experiences with medical excuse policies at their respective institutions and offer suggestions for other colleges and universities.

  16. Overview and Comparative Analysis of Game Engines for Desktop and Mobile Devices

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Eleftheria Christopoulou

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available Game engines are tools that expedite the highly demanding process of developing games. Nowadays, the great interest of people from various fields on serious games has made even more demanding the usage of game engines, since people with limited coding skills are also involved in developing serious games. Literature in the field has studied game engines focusing on specific needs, such as 3D mobile game engines or open source 3D game engines. The motivation of this article and at the same time the advancement brought by it in the field, lies in the extension of an existing framework for the comparative analysis of several game engines that export games at least on Android and iOS mobile devices and cover a wide range of different user profiles and needs. In order to validate the results of this comparative analysis a shooter game was developed for Android devices based on official tutorials of the two game engines that came out to be more powerful, namely Unity and Unreal Engine 4. In conclusion, there is not a single game engine that is better for every purpose and the extensive overview provided can help users choose the most suitable game engine for their needs.

  17. Stinging Insect Matching Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... for Kids ▸ Stinging Insect Matching Game Share | Stinging Insect Matching Game Stinging insects can ruin summer fun for those who are ... the difference between the different kinds of stinging insects in order to keep your summer safe and ...

  18. Game development with Swift

    CERN Document Server

    Haney, Stephen

    2015-01-01

    If you wish to create and publish fun iOS games using Swift, then this book is for you. You should be familiar with basic programming concepts. However, no prior game development or Apple ecosystem experience is required.

  19. Olympic Games volunteering genesis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Oleksandr Tomenko

    2017-04-01

    Full Text Available Purpose: to consider the development of volunteer activity in relation to the Olympic Games. Material & Methods: theoretical scientific works of domestic and foreign scientists on the development of volunteer activities regarding their participation in the Olympic Games are analyzed, considered the main legal documents relating to the Olympic sport. Results: Statistical indicators of participation of volunteers in the Winter and Summer Olympics Games are analyzed and presented. The role and significance of volunteers' activity in the organization and holding of the Olympic Games are revealed. Conclusion: evolution of the volunteer movement, with reference to the Olympic Games, originates from the first games that took place in 1896 in Athens. To date, volunteers are an integral part of the organization and holding of the Olympic Games, their activities help to solve a number of organizational issues, the creation of a corresponding atmosphere and image at a sporting event, largely determine the success of games.

  20. Designing an Educational Game

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bjørner, Thomas; Hansen, Charina Benedikte Søgaard

    2010-01-01

    When designing games with learning purposes used in a classroom, there often occur problems about the lack of learning content or the lack of game contents. Other disadvantages of existing educational games are the difficulty to provide a continual balance between the challenge and the pupils......’ skill to control and solve the given task. In this paper we suggest three different perspectives that need to be communicated across in order to design a useful educational game: teachers, pupils and game designers. It is our intention with this paper to suggest some design principles for educational...... games, and to integrate teachers, pupils and game designers needs and requirements. To set up these design principles for educational games we have used a holistic perspective. This means that the design principles must be seen in coherence within the social and physical environment. The design...