Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis of Tumor Progression

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Amy; Liao, David; Sturm, James; Austin, Robert

2014-03-01

Evolutionary game theory applied to two interacting cell populations can yield quantitative prediction of the future densities of the two cell populations based on the initial interaction terms. We will discuss how in a complex ecology that evolutionary game theory successfully predicts the future densities of strains of stromal and cancer cells (multiple myeloma), and discuss the possible clinical use of such analysis for predicting cancer progression. Supported by the National Science Foundation and the National Cancer Institute.

Evolutionary games in the multiverse.

Science.gov (United States)

Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Traulsen, Arne

2010-03-23

Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players with any number of strategies , there can be at most isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.

Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory

OpenAIRE

ZHOU, Chaohong; VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen

2009-01-01

Abstract: In this paper, we construct a mathematical model that applies tools from evolutionary game theory to issues in organizational ecology. Evolutionary game theory shares the key feature of mathematical rigor with the industrial organization tradition, but is similar to organizational ecology by emphasizing evolutionary dynamics. Evolutionary game theory may well be a complementary modeling tool for the analytical study of organizational ecology issues, next to formal logic, standard ga...

Passivity and Evolutionary Game Dynamics

KAUST Repository

Park, Shinkyu; Shamma, Jeff S.; Martins, Nuno C.

2018-01-01

This paper investigates an energy conservation and dissipation -- passivity -- aspect of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity using the state-space representation of the models, and we devise systematic methods to examine passivity and to identify properties of passive dynamic models. Based on the methods, we describe how passivity is connected to stability in population games and illustrate stability of passive dynamic models using numerical simulations.

Passivity and Evolutionary Game Dynamics

KAUST Repository

Park, Shinkyu

2018-03-21

This paper investigates an energy conservation and dissipation -- passivity -- aspect of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity using the state-space representation of the models, and we devise systematic methods to examine passivity and to identify properties of passive dynamic models. Based on the methods, we describe how passivity is connected to stability in population games and illustrate stability of passive dynamic models using numerical simulations.

Evolutionary Games with Randomly Changing Payoff Matrices

Science.gov (United States)

Yakushkina, Tatiana; Saakian, David B.; Bratus, Alexander; Hu, Chin-Kun

2015-06-01

Evolutionary games are used in various fields stretching from economics to biology. In most of these games a constant payoff matrix is assumed, although some works also consider dynamic payoff matrices. In this article we assume a possibility of switching the system between two regimes with different sets of payoff matrices. Potentially such a model can qualitatively describe the development of bacterial or cancer cells with a mutator gene present. A finite population evolutionary game is studied. The model describes the simplest version of annealed disorder in the payoff matrix and is exactly solvable at the large population limit. We analyze the dynamics of the model, and derive the equations for both the maximum and the variance of the distribution using the Hamilton-Jacobi equation formalism.

Evolutionary optimization and game strategies for advanced multi-disciplinary design applications to aeronautics and UAV design

CERN Document Server

Periaux, Jacques; Lee, Dong Seop Chris

2015-01-01

Many complex aeronautical design problems can be formulated with efficient multi-objective evolutionary optimization methods and game strategies. This book describes the role of advanced innovative evolution tools in the solution, or the set of solutions of single or multi disciplinary optimization. These tools use the concept of multi-population, asynchronous parallelization and hierarchical topology which allows different models including precise, intermediate and approximate models with each node belonging to the different hierarchical layer handled by a different Evolutionary Algorithm. The efficiency of evolutionary algorithms for both single and multi-objective optimization problems are significantly improved by the coupling of EAs with games and in particular by a new dynamic methodology named “Hybridized Nash-Pareto games”. Multi objective Optimization techniques and robust design problems taking into account uncertainties are introduced and explained in detail. Several applications dealing with c...

Spatial effect on stochastic dynamics of bistable evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

So, Kohaku H Z; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Kato, Takeo

2014-01-01

We consider the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable evolutionary games (coordination games), and examine how they are affected by spatial structure. A semiclassical approximation based on a path integral method is applied to stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with and without spatial structure, and the lifetimes of the metastable states are evaluated. It is shown that the population dependence of the lifetimes is qualitatively different in these two models. Our result indicates that spatial structure can accelerate the transitions between metastable states. (paper)

Why Darwin would have loved evolutionary game theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Brown, Joel S

2016-09-14

Humans have marvelled at the fit of form and function, the way organisms' traits seem remarkably suited to their lifestyles and ecologies. While natural selection provides the scientific basis for the fit of form and function, Darwin found certain adaptations vexing or particularly intriguing: sex ratios, sexual selection and altruism. The logic behind these adaptations resides in frequency-dependent selection where the value of a given heritable phenotype (i.e. strategy) to an individual depends upon the strategies of others. Game theory is a branch of mathematics that is uniquely suited to solving such puzzles. While game theoretic thinking enters into Darwin's arguments and those of evolutionists through much of the twentieth century, the tools of evolutionary game theory were not available to Darwin or most evolutionists until the 1970s, and its full scope has only unfolded in the last three decades. As a consequence, game theory is applied and appreciated rather spottily. Game theory not only applies to matrix games and social games, it also applies to speciation, macroevolution and perhaps even to cancer. I assert that life and natural selection are a game, and that game theory is the appropriate logic for framing and understanding adaptations. Its scope can include behaviours within species, state-dependent strategies (such as male, female and so much more), speciation and coevolution, and expands beyond microevolution to macroevolution. Game theory clarifies aspects of ecological and evolutionary stability in ways useful to understanding eco-evolutionary dynamics, niche construction and ecosystem engineering. In short, I would like to think that Darwin would have found game theory uniquely useful for his theory of natural selection. Let us see why this is so. © 2016 The Author(s).

Evolutionary games under incompetence.

Science.gov (United States)

Kleshnina, Maria; Filar, Jerzy A; Ejov, Vladimir; McKerral, Jody C

2018-02-26

The adaptation process of a species to a new environment is a significant area of study in biology. As part of natural selection, adaptation is a mutation process which improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species. Here, we investigate this process by combining the idea of incompetence with evolutionary game theory. In the sense of evolution, incompetence and training can be interpreted as a special learning process. With focus on the social side of the problem, we analyze the influence of incompetence on behavior of species. We introduce an incompetence parameter into a learning function in a single-population game and analyze its effect on the outcome of the replicator dynamics. Incompetence can change the outcome of the game and its dynamics, indicating its significance within what are inherently imperfect natural systems.

Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jonathan Newton

2018-05-01

Full Text Available Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.

Prediction of stock markets by the evolutionary mix-game model

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Fang; Gou, Chengling; Guo, Xiaoqian; Gao, Jieping

2008-06-01

This paper presents the efforts of using the evolutionary mix-game model, which is a modified form of the agent-based mix-game model, to predict financial time series. Here, we have carried out three methods to improve the original mix-game model by adding the abilities of strategy evolution to agents, and then applying the new model referred to as the evolutionary mix-game model to forecast the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. The results show that these modifications can improve the accuracy of prediction greatly when proper parameters are chosen.

Static and evolutionary quantum public goods games

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Liao Zeyang; Qin Gan; Hu Lingzhi; Li Songjian; Xu Nanyang [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Du Jiangfeng [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Fachbereich Physik, Universitaet Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund (Germany)], E-mail: djf@ustc.edu.cn

2008-05-12

We apply the continuous-variable quantization scheme to quantize public goods game and find that new pure strategy Nash equilibria emerge in the static case. Furthermore, in the evolutionary public goods game, entanglement can also contribute to the persistence of cooperation under various population structures without altruism, voluntary participation, and punishment.

Coevolution of Artificial Agents Using Evolutionary Computation in Bargaining Game

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sangwook Lee

2015-01-01

Full Text Available Analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issue in the field of game theory. This paper investigates the interaction and coevolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation (EC in the bargaining game. In particular, the game performance with regard to payoff through the interaction and coevolution of agents is studied. We present three kinds of EC based agents (EC-agent participating in the bargaining game: genetic algorithm (GA, particle swarm optimization (PSO, and differential evolution (DE. The agents’ performance with regard to changing condition is compared. From the simulation results it is found that the PSO-agent is superior to the other agents.

Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Altrock, Philipp M; Traulsen, Arne

2009-01-01

In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy A performs better than strategy B, strategy A will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. We show analytically that these times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an amazingly simple way under weak selection, i.e. strong stochasticity: the payoff difference Δπ is a linear function of the number of A individuals i, Δπ=u i+v. The unconditional mean exit time depends only on the constant term v. Given that a single A mutant takes over the population, the corresponding conditional mean exit time depends only on the density dependent term u. We demonstrate this finding for two commonly applied microscopic evolutionary processes.

Statistical mechanics of spatial evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miekisz, Jacek

2004-01-01

We discuss the long-run behaviour of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We use concepts and techniques of statistical mechanics to study game-theoretic models. In order to obtain results in the case of the so-called potential games, we analyse the thermodynamic limit of the appropriate models of interacting particles

Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games.

Science.gov (United States)

Argasinski, K; Broom, M

2013-10-01

In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of "costs" and "benefits", there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure "benefit" or "cost"? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic "cost" versus "benefits", is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of trade-offs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk-Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced.

Domain learning naming game for color categorization.

Science.gov (United States)

Li, Doujie; Fan, Zhongyan; Tang, Wallace K S

2017-01-01

Naming game simulates the evolution of vocabulary in a population of agents. Through pairwise interactions in the games, agents acquire a set of vocabulary in their memory for object naming. The existing model confines to a one-to-one mapping between a name and an object. Focus is usually put onto name consensus in the population rather than knowledge learning in agents, and hence simple learning model is usually adopted. However, the cognition system of human being is much more complex and knowledge is usually presented in a complicated form. Therefore, in this work, we extend the agent learning model and design a new game to incorporate domain learning, which is essential for more complicated form of knowledge. In particular, we demonstrate the evolution of color categorization and naming in a population of agents. We incorporate the human perceptive model into the agents and introduce two new concepts, namely subjective perception and subliminal stimulation, in domain learning. Simulation results show that, even without any supervision or pre-requisition, a consensus of a color naming system can be reached in a population solely via the interactions. Our work confirms the importance of society interactions in color categorization, which is a long debate topic in human cognition. Moreover, our work also demonstrates the possibility of cognitive system development in autonomous intelligent agents.

Dilemma strength as a framework for advancing evolutionary game theory. Reply to comments on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games"

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Zhen; Kokubo, Satoshi; Jusup, Marko; Tanimoto, Jun

2015-09-01

While comprehensive reviews of the literature, by gathering in one place most of the relevant information, undoubtedly steer the development of every scientific field, we found that the comments in response to a review article can be as informative as the review itself, if not more. Namely, reading through the comments on the ideas expressed in Ref. [1], we could identify a number of pressing problems for evolutionary game theory, indicating just how much space there still is for major advances and breakthroughs. In an attempt to bring a sense of order to a multitude of opinions, we roughly classified the comments into three categories, i.e. those concerned with: (i) the universality of scaling in heterogeneous topologies, including empirical dynamic networks [2-8], (ii) the universality of scaling for more general game setups, such as the inclusion of multiple strategies and external features [4,9-11], and (iii) experimental confirmations of the theoretical developments [2,12,13].

Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Poncela, Julia; Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus; Moreno, Yamir [Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, E-50009 Zaragoza (Spain); Traulsen, Arne [Emmy-Noether Group for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Ploen (Germany)], E-mail: traulsen@evolbio.mpg.de

2009-08-15

We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful in the past. The latter depends on the dynamics of strategies in the game, which we implement following the so-called Fermi rule such that the limits of weak and strong strategy selection can be explored. Our framework allows to address general evolutionary games. With only two parameters describing the preferential attachment and the intensity of selection, we describe a wide range of network structures and evolutionary scenarios. Our results show that even for moderate payoff preferential attachment, over represented hubs arise. Interestingly, we find that while the networks are growing, high levels of cooperation are attained, but the same network structure does not promote cooperation as a static network. Therefore, the mechanism of payoff preferential attachment is different to those usually invoked to explain the promotion of cooperation in static, already-grown networks.

Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poncela, Julia; Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus; Moreno, Yamir; Traulsen, Arne

2009-01-01

We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful in the past. The latter depends on the dynamics of strategies in the game, which we implement following the so-called Fermi rule such that the limits of weak and strong strategy selection can be explored. Our framework allows to address general evolutionary games. With only two parameters describing the preferential attachment and the intensity of selection, we describe a wide range of network structures and evolutionary scenarios. Our results show that even for moderate payoff preferential attachment, over represented hubs arise. Interestingly, we find that while the networks are growing, high levels of cooperation are attained, but the same network structure does not promote cooperation as a static network. Therefore, the mechanism of payoff preferential attachment is different to those usually invoked to explain the promotion of cooperation in static, already-grown networks.

Evolution of Cooperation in Evolutionary Games for Heterogeneous Interactions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qian Xiaolan; Yang Junzhong

2012-01-01

When a population structure is modelled as a square lattice, the cooperation may be improved for an evolutionary prisoner dilemma game or be inhibited for an evolutionary snowdrift game. In this work, we investigate cooperation in a population on a square lattice where the interaction among players contains both prisoner dilemma game and snowdrift game. The heterogeneity in interaction is introduced to the population in two different ways: the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every player (HCP) or the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every link between any two players (HCL). The resonant enhancement of cooperation in the case of HCP is observed while the resonant inhibition of cooperation in the case of HCL is prominent. The explanations on the enhancement or inhibition of cooperation are presented for these two cases. (general)

Multidimensional extended spatial evolutionary games.

Science.gov (United States)

Krześlak, Michał; Świerniak, Andrzej

2016-02-01

The goal of this paper is to study the classical hawk-dove model using mixed spatial evolutionary games (MSEG). In these games, played on a lattice, an additional spatial layer is introduced for dependence on more complex parameters and simulation of changes in the environment. Furthermore, diverse polymorphic equilibrium points dependent on cell reproduction, model parameters, and their simulation are discussed. Our analysis demonstrates the sensitivity properties of MSEGs and possibilities for further development. We discuss applications of MSEGs, particularly algorithms for modelling cell interactions during the development of tumours. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review

Science.gov (United States)

Szolnoki, Attila; Mobilia, Mauro; Jiang, Luo-Luo; Szczesny, Bartosz; Rucklidge, Alastair M.; Perc, Matjaž

2014-01-01

Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance is also at the heart of predator–prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth of marine sessile organisms and competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when the competing strategies are three or more, regardless of the particularities of the game. Here, we review recent advances on the rock–paper–scissors (RPS) and related evolutionary games, focusing, in particular, on pattern formation, the impact of mobility and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and zero-dimensional RPS models and the application of the complex Ginzburg–Landau equation, and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale ecological systems. Directions for future research, related, for example, to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules and invasion reversals owing to multi-point interactions, are also outlined. PMID:25232048

An application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination game.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Swami Iyer

Full Text Available The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.

An application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination game.

Science.gov (United States)

Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

2014-01-01

The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.

An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

Science.gov (United States)

Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

2014-01-01

The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games. PMID:24709851

Adaptive Topographies and Equilibrium Selection in an Evolutionary Game

Science.gov (United States)

Osinga, Hinke M.; Marshall, James A. R.

2015-01-01

It has long been known in the field of population genetics that adaptive topographies, in which population equilibria maximise mean population fitness for a trait regardless of its genetic bases, do not exist. Whether one chooses to model selection acting on a single locus or multiple loci does matter. In evolutionary game theory, analysis of a simple and general game involving distinct roles for the two players has shown that whether strategies are modelled using a single ‘locus’ or one ‘locus’ for each role, the stable population equilibria are unchanged and correspond to the fitness-maximising evolutionary stable strategies of the game. This is curious given the aforementioned population genetical results on the importance of the genetic bases of traits. Here we present a dynamical systems analysis of the game with roles detailing how, while the stable equilibria in this game are unchanged by the number of ‘loci’ modelled, equilibrium selection may differ under the two modelling approaches. PMID:25706762

Invisible hand effect in an evolutionary minority game model

Science.gov (United States)

Sysi-Aho, Marko; Saramäki, Jari; Kaski, Kimmo

2005-03-01

In this paper, we study the properties of a minority game with evolution realized by using genetic crossover to modify fixed-length decision-making strategies of agents. Although the agents in this evolutionary game act selfishly by trying to maximize their own performances only, it turns out that the whole society will eventually be rewarded optimally. This “invisible hand” effect is what Adam Smith over two centuries ago expected to take place in the context of free market mechanism. However, this behaviour of the society of agents is realized only under idealized conditions, where all agents are utilizing the same efficient evolutionary mechanism. If on the other hand part of the agents are adaptive, but not evolutionary, the system does not reach optimum performance, which is also the case if part of the evolutionary agents form a uniformly acting “cartel”.

Optimality and stability of symmetric evolutionary games with applications in genetic selection.

Science.gov (United States)

Huang, Yuanyuan; Hao, Yiping; Wang, Min; Zhou, Wen; Wu, Zhijun

2015-06-01

Symmetric evolutionary games, i.e., evolutionary games with symmetric fitness matrices, have important applications in population genetics, where they can be used to model for example the selection and evolution of the genotypes of a given population. In this paper, we review the theory for obtaining optimal and stable strategies for symmetric evolutionary games, and provide some new proofs and computational methods. In particular, we review the relationship between the symmetric evolutionary game and the generalized knapsack problem, and discuss the first and second order necessary and sufficient conditions that can be derived from this relationship for testing the optimality and stability of the strategies. Some of the conditions are given in different forms from those in previous work and can be verified more efficiently. We also derive more efficient computational methods for the evaluation of the conditions than conventional approaches. We demonstrate how these conditions can be applied to justifying the strategies and their stabilities for a special class of genetic selection games including some in the study of genetic disorders.

Evolutionary Games and Social Conventions

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hansen, Pelle Guldborg

2007-01-01

-defined metaphors of individual learning and social imitation processes, from which a revised theory of convention may be erected (see Sugden 2004, Binmore 1993 and Young 1998). This paper makes a general argument in support of the evolutionary turn in the theory of convention by a progressive exposition of its...... in Aumann (1976) and which, together with the assumptions of perfect rationality, came to be defining of classical game theory. However, classical game theory is currently undergoing severe crisis as a tool for exploring social phenomena; a crisis emerging from the problem of equilibrium selection around......Some thirty years ago Lewis published his Convention: A Philosophical Study (Lewis, 2002). This laid the foundation for a game-theoretic approach to social conventions, but became more famously known for its seminal analysis of common knowledge; the concept receiving its canonical analysis...

Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Feng Zhang

Full Text Available Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism, thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.

Chemical evolutionary games.

Science.gov (United States)

Aristotelous, Andreas C; Durrett, Richard

2014-05-01

Inspired by the use of hybrid cellular automata in modeling cancer, we introduce a generalization of evolutionary games in which cells produce and absorb chemicals, and the chemical concentrations dictate the death rates of cells and their fitnesses. Our long term aim is to understand how the details of the interactions in a system with n species and m chemicals translate into the qualitative behavior of the system. Here, we study two simple 2×2 games with two chemicals and revisit the two and three species versions of the one chemical colicin system studied earlier by Durrett and Levin (1997). We find that in the 2×2 examples, the behavior of our new spatial model can be predicted from that of the mean field differential equation using ideas of Durrett and Levin (1994). However, in the three species colicin model, the system with diffusion does not have the coexistence which occurs in the lattices model in which sites interact with only their nearest neighbors. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games

Science.gov (United States)

Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick

2012-01-01

By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures. PMID:22970237

Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

Science.gov (United States)

Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Cheng, Hongyan; Li, Yuting; Yang, Junzhong

2010-11-01

We investigate the effects of double-dealing behavior on cooperation in evolutionary games. Each individual in a population has two attributes: character and action. One's action may be consistent with one's character or not. We provide analytical results by a mean-field description of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs). Moreover, we give numerical results on different networks, ranging from square lattices to scale-free networks (SFNs). Two important conclusions have been drawn from the results on SFNs. Firstly, if only non-influential individuals (those with low degrees) have chances of becoming double-dealers, cooperation is certain to deteriorate. Secondly, when influential individuals (those with high degrees) adopt double-dealing behavior moderately, cooperation would be enhanced, which is in opposition to the traditional belief. These results help us to understand better the social phenomenon of the existence of double-dealers. In addition to the PDG, other types of games including the snowdrift game, the stag-hunt game and the harmony game have also been studied on our model. The results for these three games are also presented, which are consistent with the results for the PDG qualitatively. Furthermore, we consider our model under the co-evolution framework, in which the probability of an individual changing into a double-dealer and the individual strategy both could evolve during the evolutionary process.

Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks

Science.gov (United States)

Yong, Xi

2016-01-01

The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems. PMID:27118882

Analysis of the "naming game" with learning errors in communications.

Science.gov (United States)

Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong

2015-07-16

Naming game simulates the process of naming an objective by a population of agents organized in a certain communication network. By pair-wise iterative interactions, the population reaches consensus asymptotically. We study naming game with communication errors during pair-wise conversations, with error rates in a uniform probability distribution. First, a model of naming game with learning errors in communications (NGLE) is proposed. Then, a strategy for agents to prevent learning errors is suggested. To that end, three typical topologies of communication networks, namely random-graph, small-world and scale-free networks, are employed to investigate the effects of various learning errors. Simulation results on these models show that 1) learning errors slightly affect the convergence speed but distinctively increase the requirement for memory of each agent during lexicon propagation; 2) the maximum number of different words held by the population increases linearly as the error rate increases; 3) without applying any strategy to eliminate learning errors, there is a threshold of the learning errors which impairs the convergence. The new findings may help to better understand the role of learning errors in naming game as well as in human language development from a network science perspective.

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in minimum-effort coordination games

Science.gov (United States)

Li, Kun; Cong, Rui; Wang, Long

2016-08-01

The minimum-effort coordination game draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the predictions of classical game theory. Here, we combine evolutionary game theory and coalescence theory to investigate this game in finite populations. Both analytic results and individual-based simulations show that effort costs play a key role in the evolution of contribution levels, which is in good agreement with those observed experimentally. Besides well-mixed populations, set structured populations have also been taken into consideration. Therein we find that large number of sets and moderate migration rate greatly promote effort levels, especially for high effort costs.

Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Assaf, Michael; Mobilia, Mauro

2010-01-01

We study large fluctuations in evolutionary games belonging to the coordination and anti-coordination classes. The dynamics of these games, modeling cooperation dilemmas, is characterized by a coexistence fixed point separating two absorbing states. We are particularly interested in the problem of fixation that refers to the possibility that a few mutants take over the entire population. Here, the fixation phenomenon is induced by large fluctuations and is investigated by a semiclassical WKB (Wentzel–Kramers–Brillouin) theory generalized to treat stochastic systems possessing multiple absorbing states. Importantly, this method allows us to analyze the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics beyond the weak selection limit often considered in previous works. We accurately compute, including pre-exponential factors, the probability distribution function in the long-lived coexistence state and the mean fixation time necessary for a few mutants to take over the entire population in anti-coordination games, and also the fixation probability in the coordination class. Our analytical results compare excellently with extensive numerical simulations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our treatment is superior to the Fokker–Planck approximation when the selection intensity is finite

Bridging the gap between Schumpeterian competition and evolutionary game theory

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Andersen, Esben Sloth

This paper suggests that the analysis of Schumpeterian competition within the Nelson-Winter model should be complemented with evolutionary game theory. This model and its limitations for density-dependent Schumpeterian strategies are presented in terms of the equations of evolutionary dynamics. F...

A study of driver's route choice behavior based on evolutionary game theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Jiang, Xiaowei; Ji, Yanjie; Du, Muqing; Deng, Wei

2014-01-01

This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. A simulated network with two alternative routes and one variable message sign is built to illustrate the analytic method. We assume that the drivers in the transportation system are bounded rational, and the traffic information they receive is incomplete. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers' route choice decision-making behaviors. Here we conclude that the traffic information plays an important role in the route choice behavior. The driver's route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results also demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver's route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent.

THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND THE EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sirghi Nicoleta

2013-07-01

Full Text Available The neoclassical theory of the firm deals with the pattern of perfect competition, within which the perfect information available to economic agents provides instant allocation of production factors and access to economic goods. The Austrian School (C. Menger, L. von Mises, Hayek, etc. supported the idea of minimal state intervention on the markets, bringing important conceptual developments on the theory of the firm. Hirschleifer (1982 put forward the model of social and institutional functioning, arguing that the game theory is able to predict the outcome of the collective behavior and the human characteristics necessary for building the respective institutions.The evolutionary theory provides the firm and the entrepreneur the recognition of the functions of innovation, of generating and exploiting information and of organizing and coordinating production. The evolutionary perspective of the firm assumes the existence of a body of knowledge that is acquired through and builds up the organizational memory, subsequently found in routines, all choices being made based on these routines (Nelson and Winter, 2002. The evolution of the firm is considered to be similar to natural selection, but unlike the classic market selection, the evolutionists suggest the existence of a plurality of selection media. The present research is structured as follows: a brief introduction into the theories of the firm, the second part of the paper analyzes the theories of the firm from an institutional, neo-institutional and evolutionary perspective. In the third part of the paper the evolutionary games are described and analyzed from the evolutionary perspective of the firm. The last part of the paper represents a study of the “hawk-dove” game dynamic replicator. The final conclusions of the paper show that the evolutionary theory brings valuable contributions to the foundation of explanations regarding economic phenomena, indicating new directions for advanced

Stochastic noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies of a population of biological networks under natural selection.

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Bor-Sen; Yeh, Chin-Hsun

2017-12-01

We review current static and dynamic evolutionary game strategies of biological networks and discuss the lack of random genetic variations and stochastic environmental disturbances in these models. To include these factors, a population of evolving biological networks is modeled as a nonlinear stochastic biological system with Poisson-driven genetic variations and random environmental fluctuations (stimuli). To gain insight into the evolutionary game theory of stochastic biological networks under natural selection, the phenotypic robustness and network evolvability of noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies are discussed from a stochastic Nash game perspective. The noncooperative strategy can be transformed into an equivalent multi-objective optimization problem and is shown to display significantly improved network robustness to tolerate genetic variations and buffer environmental disturbances, maintaining phenotypic traits for longer than the cooperative strategy. However, the noncooperative case requires greater effort and more compromises between partly conflicting players. Global linearization is used to simplify the problem of solving nonlinear stochastic evolutionary games. Finally, a simple stochastic evolutionary model of a metabolic pathway is simulated to illustrate the procedure of solving for two evolutionary game strategies and to confirm and compare their respective characteristics in the evolutionary process. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Research on Information Sharing Mechanism of Network Organization Based on Evolutionary Game

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Lin; Liu, Gaozhi

2018-02-01

This article first elaborates the concept and effect of network organization, and the ability to share information is analyzed, secondly introduces the evolutionary game theory, network organization for information sharing all kinds of limitations, establishes the evolutionary game model, analyzes the dynamic evolution of network organization of information sharing, through reasoning and evolution. The network information sharing by the initial state and two sides of the game payoff matrix of excess profits and information is the information sharing of cost and risk sharing are the influence of network organization node information sharing decision.

Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Křivan, Vlastimil; Cressman, R.

2017-01-01

Roč. 416, MAR 07 (2017), s. 199-207 ISSN 0022-5193 EU Projects: European Commission(XE) 690817 - FourCmodelling Institutional support: RVO:60077344 Keywords : evolutionary game theory * Hawk-Dove game * pair formation Subject RIV: EH - Ecology, Behaviour OBOR OECD: Ecology Impact factor: 2.113, year: 2016 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103

A Graphical Evolutionary Game Approach to Social Learning

Science.gov (United States)

Cao, Xuanyu; Liu, K. J. Ray

2017-06-01

In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning method is proposed. In the proposed game-theoretic method, agents only need to communicate their binary decisions rather than the real-valued beliefs with their neighbors, which endows the method with low communication complexity. Under mean field approximations, we theoretically analyze the steady state equilibria of the game and show that the evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) coincide with the decisions of the benchmark centralized detector. Numerical experiments are implemented to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic learning method.

Name that Contraceptive! A Game for the Human Sexuality Classroom

Science.gov (United States)

Rosenthal, Martha S.

2010-01-01

There are many contraceptive choices available to people today. Learning about them can be dry, but the game "Name that Contraceptive!" can be a fun and interactive way to review, remember, and retain the details about contraceptive options. Name that Contraceptive is a card game in which students "bid" on the number of clues it will take them to…

Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Zhen; Wang, Lin; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

2015-05-01

Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and evolutionary game theory.

Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Fitness-Dependent Wright-Fisher Process with Noise

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Quan Ji; Wang Xianjia

2011-01-01

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright-Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2x2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player's rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner's dilemma games (PDG) and the snowdrift games (SG). We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments. (general)

Memory boosts turn taking in evolutionary dilemma games.

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Tao; Chen, Zhigang; Yang, Lei; Zou, You; Luo, Juan

2015-05-01

Spontaneous turn taking phenomenon can be observed in many self-organized systems, and the mechanism is unclear. This paper tries to model it by evolutionary dilemma games with memory mechanism. Prisoner's dilemma, Snowdrift (including Leader and Hero) and Stag-hunt games are unified on an extended S-T plane. Agents play game with all the others and make decision by the last game histories. The experiments find that when agents remember last 2-step histories or more, a kind of cooperative turn taking (CAD) bursts at the area of Snowdrift game with restriction of S + T > 2R and S ≠ T, while the consistent strategy (DorC) gathers on the line of S + T > 2R and S = T. We also find that the system's fitness ratio greatly improved with 2-step memory. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Evolutionary quantum game theory in the context of socio-economic systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hanauske, Matthias

2011-01-01

The evolution of socio-economic systems depend on the interdependent decision processes of its underlying system components. The mathematical model to describe the strategic decision of players within a socio-economic game is ''game theory''. ''Quantum game theory'' is a mathematical and conceptual amplification of classical game theory. The space of all conceivable decision paths is extended from the purely rational, measurable space in the Hilbert-space of complex numbers - which is the mathematical space where quantum theory is formulated. By the concept of a potential entanglement of the imaginary quantum strategy parts, it is possible to include cooperate decision path, caused by cultural or moral standards. If this strategy entanglement is large enough, then additional Nash equilibria can occur, previously present dominant strategies could become nonexistent and new evolutionary stable strategies do appear for some game classes. Within this PhD thesis the main results of classical and quantum games are summarized and all of the possible game classes of evolutionary (2 player)-(2 strategy) games are extended to quantum games. It is shown that the quantum extension of classical games with an underlying dilemma-like structure give different results, if the strength of strategic entanglement is above a certain barrier. After the German summary and the introduction paper, five different applications of the theory are discussed within the thesis. (orig.)

A Study of Driver’s Route Choice Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Xiaowei Jiang

2014-01-01

Full Text Available This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. A simulated network with two alternative routes and one variable message sign is built to illustrate the analytic method. We assume that the drivers in the transportation system are bounded rational, and the traffic information they receive is incomplete. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers’ route choice decision-making behaviors. Here we conclude that the traffic information plays an important role in the route choice behavior. The driver’s route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results also demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver’s route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent.

Evidence Combination From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective.

Science.gov (United States)

Deng, Xinyang; Han, Deqiang; Dezert, Jean; Deng, Yong; Shyr, Yu

2016-09-01

Dempster-Shafer evidence theory is a primary methodology for multisource information fusion because it is good at dealing with uncertain information. This theory provides a Dempster's rule of combination to synthesize multiple evidences from various information sources. However, in some cases, counter-intuitive results may be obtained based on that combination rule. Numerous new or improved methods have been proposed to suppress these counter-intuitive results based on perspectives, such as minimizing the information loss or deviation. Inspired by evolutionary game theory, this paper considers a biological and evolutionary perspective to study the combination of evidences. An evolutionary combination rule (ECR) is proposed to help find the most biologically supported proposition in a multievidence system. Within the proposed ECR, we develop a Jaccard matrix game to formalize the interaction between propositions in evidences, and utilize the replicator dynamics to mimick the evolution of propositions. Experimental results show that the proposed ECR can effectively suppress the counter-intuitive behaviors appeared in typical paradoxes of evidence theory, compared with many existing methods. Properties of the ECR, such as solution's stability and convergence, have been mathematically proved as well.

Applying Evolutionary Psychology to a Serious Game about Children's Interpersonal Conflict

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gordon P. D. Ingram

2012-12-01

Full Text Available This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9–12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

Applying evolutionary psychology to a serious game about children's interpersonal conflict.

Science.gov (United States)

Ingram, Gordon P D; Campos, Joana; Hondrou, Charline; Vasalou, Asimina; Martinho, Carlos; Joinson, Adam

2012-12-20

This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9-12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK) aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

Exploring social influence on evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games in networks

Science.gov (United States)

Zong, Hengshan; Jia, Guozhu; Cheng, Yang

2015-11-01

Though numerous studies demonstrate the importance of social influence in deciding individual decision-making process in networks, little has been done to explore its impact on players’ behavioral patterns in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs). This study investigates how social influenced strategy updating rules may affect the final equilibrium of game dynamics. The results show that weak social influence usually inhibits cooperation, while strong social influence has a mediating effect. The impacts of network structure and the existence of rebels in social influence scenarios are also tested. The paper provides a comprehensive interpretation on social influence effects on evolutionary PDGs in networks.

Quantum evolutionary stable strategies of 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sun, Z.W.

2009-01-01

Quantum evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) of games are considered as stable solutions to population games on molecular level. The distributive diagram of 2-player, 2-strategy (2 x 2) symmetric games is brought out to get a convenient way of looking for their quantum ESSs. It is found that transpositions, related to the parameters in classical payoff and those of initial quantum states, may occur when games are quantized. Conditions for transpositions are given in two tables. One can easily find quantum ESSs of a 2 x 2 symmetric game according to its transposition. This paper also draws an overall outline of NEs and ESSs of this kind of game.

Playing Multi-Action Adversarial Games: Online Evolutionary Planning versus Tree Search

OpenAIRE

Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Risi, Sebastian; Togelius, Julian

2017-01-01

We address the problem of playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games, which include many strategy games with extremely high branching factors as players take multiple actions each turn. This leads to the breakdown of standard tree search methods, including Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), as they become unable to reach a sufficient depth in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce Online Evolutionary Planning (OEP) to address this challenge, which searches for combinations of actions ...

Games of life and death: antibiotic resistance and production through the lens of evolutionary game theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Conlin, Peter L; Chandler, Josephine R; Kerr, Benjamin

2014-10-01

In this review, we demonstrate how game theory can be a useful first step in modeling and understanding interactions among bacteria that produce and resist antibiotics. We introduce the basic features of evolutionary game theory and explore model microbial systems that correspond to some classical games. Each game discussed defines a different category of social interaction with different resulting population dynamics (exclusion, coexistence, bistability, cycling). We then explore how the framework can be extended to incorporate some of the complexity of natural microbial communities. Overall, the game theoretical perspective helps to guide our expectations about the evolution of some forms of antibiotic resistance and production because it makes clear the precise nature of social interaction in this context. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cycle frequency in standard Rock-Paper-Scissors games: Evidence from experimental economics

Science.gov (United States)

Xu, Bin; Zhou, Hai-Jun; Wang, Zhijian

2013-10-01

The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a widely used model system in game theory. Evolutionary game theory predicts the existence of persistent cycles in the evolutionary trajectories of the RPS game, but experimental evidence has remained to be rather weak. In this work, we performed laboratory experiments on the RPS game and analyzed the social-state evolutionary trajectories of twelve populations of N=6 players. We found strong evidence supporting the existence of persistent cycles. The mean cycling frequency was measured to be 0.029±0.009 period per experimental round. Our experimental observations can be quantitatively explained by a simple non-equilibrium model, namely the discrete-time logit dynamical process with a noise parameter. Our work therefore favors the evolutionary game theory over the classical game theory for describing the dynamical behavior of the RPS game.

Some Analytical Properties of the Model for Stochastic Evolutionary Games in Finite Populations with Non-uniform Interaction Rate

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Quan Ji; Wang Xianjia

2013-01-01

Traditional evolutionary games assume uniform interaction rate, which means that the rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. But in some systems, especially biological systems, the players interact with each other discriminately. Taylor and Nowak (2006) were the first to establish the corresponding non-uniform interaction rate model by allowing the interaction rates to depend on strategies. Their model is based on replicator dynamics which assumes an infinite size population. But in reality, the number of individuals in the population is always finite, and there will be some random interference in the individuals' strategy selection process. Therefore, it is more practical to establish the corresponding stochastic evolutionary model in finite populations. In fact, the analysis of evolutionary games in a finite size population is more difficult. Just as Taylor and Nowak said in the outlook section of their paper, ''The analysis of non-uniform interaction rates should be extended to stochastic game dynamics of finite populations''. In this paper, we are exactly doing this work. We extend Taylor and Nowak's model from infinite to finite case, especially focusing on the infiuence of non-uniform connection characteristics on the evolutionary stable state of the system. We model the strategy evolutionary process of the population by a continuous ergodic Markov process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we can give the evolutionary stable state of the system. We make a complete classification of the symmetric 2 × 2 games. For each case game, the corresponding limit distribution of the Markov-based process is given when noise intensity is small enough. In contrast with most literatures in evolutionary games using the simulation method, all our results obtained are analytical. Especially, in the dominant-case game, coexistence of the two strategies may become evolutionary stable states in our model. This result can be

Phase transition and fast agreement in the Naming Game with preference for multi-word agents

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lipowska, Dorota; Lipowski, Adam

2014-01-01

We examine a variant of the Naming Game, where agents with several words communicate more often than single-word agents. Depending on the preference and dimensionality, the model either converges to a single-language state as in an ordinary Naming Game or remains in a disordered, multi-language phase. At the transition point separating these regimes, due to a percolation-like process, the model converges to a single-language state but much faster than in the ordinary naming game. We also show that the coarsening dynamics of the ordinary Naming Game is slower than expected due to stripe structures that sometimes spontaneously form during the evolution of the model. (paper)

Statistical physics and computational methods for evolutionary game theory

CERN Document Server

Javarone, Marco Alberto

2018-01-01

This book presents an introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) which is an emerging field in the area of complex systems attracting the attention of researchers from disparate scientific communities. EGT allows one to represent and study several complex phenomena, such as the emergence of cooperation in social systems, the role of conformity in shaping the equilibrium of a population, and the dynamics in biological and ecological systems. Since EGT models belong to the area of complex systems, statistical physics constitutes a fundamental ingredient for investigating their behavior. At the same time, the complexity of some EGT models, such as those realized by means of agent-based methods, often require the implementation of numerical simulations. Therefore, beyond providing an introduction to EGT, this book gives a brief overview of the main statistical physics tools (such as phase transitions and the Ising model) and computational strategies for simulating evolutionary games (such as Monte Carlo algor...

Continual Online Evolutionary Planning for In-Game Build Order Adaptation in StarCraft

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Justesen, Niels Orsleff; Risi, Sebastian

2017-01-01

able to switch between predefined strategies, which makes it hard to adapt to new situations. This paper introduces an evolutionary-based method to overcome this challenge, called Continual Online Evolutionary Planning (COEP), which is able to perform in-game adaptive build-order planning. COEP......The real-time strategy game StarCraft has become an important benchmark for AI research as it poses a complex environment with numerous challenges. An important strategic aspect in this game is to decide what buildings and units to produce. StarCraft bots playing in AI competitions today are only...... was added to an open source StarCraft bot called UAlbertaBot and is able to outperform the built-in bots in the game as well as being competitive against a number of scripted opening strategies. The COEP augmented bot can change its build order dynamically and quickly adapt to the opponent’s strategy....

Evolutionary games combining two or three pair coordinations on a square lattice

Science.gov (United States)

Király, Balázs; Szabó, György

2017-10-01

We study multiagent logit-rule-driven evolutionary games on a square lattice whose pair interactions are composed of a maximal number of nonoverlapping elementary coordination games describing Ising-type interactions between just two of the available strategies. Using Monte Carlo simulations we investigate the macroscopic noise-level-dependent behavior of the two- and three-pair games and the critical properties of the continuous phase transtitions these systems exhibit. The four-strategy game is shown to be equivalent to a system that consists of two independent and identical Ising models.

Environmental Policy and Technology Diffusion under Imperfect Competition. An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

De Vries, F.P.

2003-05-01

The analysis of the thesis centers around the diffusion incentives of different environmental policy instruments. Emission taxation, subsidies per unit of emission reduction, marketable emission permits and marketable emission credits will be discussed and compared to each other on how they affect the diffusion of an environmentally benign technology. The analysis is conducted within an applied evolutionary game theoretical framework. An extensive discussion of evolutionary game theory can be found in chapter 2. Chapter 3 reviews classical diffusion models: the epidemic, probit and classic game theoretical model. Then we shift our attention to general evolutionary diffusion models, followed by an outline of the use of evolutionary game theory as a tool for analyzing technology diffusion. The purpose of the chapter is to illustrate the main differences between the various models. Relevant parts of economic theory are reviewed in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 contains a survey and interpretive assessment of the current literature dealing with the impact of environmental policy instruments on the adoption and diffusion of a pollution abatement technology. The chapter illustrates and criticizes the static character of the most influential models. In chapter 2 it will become apparent that an evolutionary analysis is quite appealing when markets axe characterized by perfect competition. Enhanced competitiveness forces firms to produce efficiently in order to avoid elimination. However, in imperfect competitive markets competition is limited to only a small number of firms. Since the central market structure in this thesis is that of imperfect competition, chapter 5 examines the literature on evolutionary game models applied to these type of markets. The survey reveals that the literature focuses on determining whether the evolutionary game models generate output equilibria identical to the traditional static Cournot and Bertrand models or to other output levels. Chapter 6

Some results on ethnic conflicts based on evolutionary game simulation

Science.gov (United States)

Qin, Jun; Yi, Yunfei; Wu, Hongrun; Liu, Yuhang; Tong, Xiaonian; Zheng, Bojin

2014-07-01

The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially originating from the negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a harmonious ethnic relationship, some scholars have proposed a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing civic identity. However, this viewpoint is discussed only from a philosophical prospective and still lacks support of scientific evidences. Because ethnic group and ethnic identity are products of evolution and ethnic identity is the parochialism strategy under the perspective of game theory, this paper proposes an evolutionary game simulation model to study the relationship between civic identity and ethnic conflict based on evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicate that: (1) the ratio of individuals with civic identity has a negative association with the frequency of ethnic conflicts; (2) ethnic conflict will not die out by killing all ethnic members once for all, and it also cannot be reduced by a forcible pressure, i.e., increasing the ratio of individuals with civic identity; (3) the average frequencies of conflicts can stay in a low level by promoting civic identity periodically and persistently.

Microscopic activity patterns in the naming game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dall'Asta, Luca; Baronchelli, Andrea

2006-01-01

The models of statistical physics used to study collective phenomena in some interdisciplinary contexts, such as social dynamics and opinion spreading, do not consider the effects of the memory on individual decision processes. In contrast, in the naming game, a recently proposed model of language formation, each agent chooses a particular state, or opinion, by means of a memory-based negotiation process, during which a variable number of states is collected and kept in memory. In this perspective, the statistical features of the number of states collected by the agents become a relevant quantity to understand the dynamics of the model, and the influence of topological properties on memory-based models. By means of a master equation approach, we analyse the internal agent dynamics of the naming game in populations embedded on networks, finding that it strongly depends on very general topological properties of the system (e.g. average and fluctuations of the degree). However, the influence of topological properties on the microscopic individual dynamics is a general phenomenon that should characterize all those social interactions that can be modelled by memory-based negotiation processes

Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity

Science.gov (United States)

Amaral, Marco A.; Wardil, Lucas; Perc, Matjaž; da Silva, Jafferson K. L.

2016-04-01

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two different games. While in well-mixed populations the random mixture of the two games is always equivalent to the average single game, in structured populations this is not always the case. We show that the outcome is, in fact, strongly dependent on the distance of separation of the two games in the parameter space. Effectively, this distance introduces payoff heterogeneity, and the average game is returned only if the heterogeneity is small. For higher levels of heterogeneity the distance to the average game grows, which often involves the promotion of cooperation. The presented results support preceding research that highlights the favorable role of heterogeneity regardless of its origin, and they also emphasize the importance of the population structure in amplifying facilitators of cooperation.

A network growth model based on the evolutionary ultimatum game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Deng, L L; Zhou, G G; Cai, J H; Wang, C; Tang, W S

2012-01-01

In this paper, we provide a network growth model with incorporation into the ultimatum game dynamics. The network grows on the basis of the payoff-oriented preferential attachment mechanism, where a new node is added into the network and attached preferentially to nodes with higher payoffs. The interplay between the network growth and the game dynamics gives rise to quite interesting dynamical behaviors. Simulation results show the emergence of altruistic behaviors in the ultimatum game, which is affected by the growing network structure. Compared with the static counterpart case, the levels of altruistic behaviors are promoted. The corresponding strategy distributions and wealth distributions are also presented to further demonstrate the strategy evolutionary dynamics. Subsequently, we turn to the topological properties of the evolved network, by virtue of some statistics. The most studied characteristic path length and the clustering coefficient of the network are shown to indicate their small-world effect. Then the degree distributions are analyzed to clarify the interplay of structure and evolutionary dynamics. In particular, the difference between our growth network and the static counterpart is revealed. To explain clearly the evolved networks, the rich-club ordering and the assortative mixing coefficient are exploited to reveal the degree correlation. (paper)

Local communities obstruct global consensus: Naming game on multi-local-world networks

Science.gov (United States)

Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong; Fan, Zhengping; Xiang, Luna

2018-02-01

Community structure is essential for social communications, where individuals belonging to the same community are much more actively interacting and communicating with each other than those in different communities within the human society. Naming game, on the other hand, is a social communication model that simulates the process of learning a name of an object within a community of humans, where the individuals can generally reach global consensus asymptotically through iterative pair-wise conversations. The underlying network indicates the relationships among the individuals. In this paper, three typical topologies, namely random-graph, small-world and scale-free networks, are employed, which are embedded with the multi-local-world community structure, to study the naming game. Simulations show that (1) the convergence process to global consensus is getting slower as the community structure becomes more prominent, and eventually might fail; (2) if the inter-community connections are sufficiently dense, neither the number nor the size of the communities affects the convergence process; and (3) for different topologies with the same (or similar) average node-degree, local clustering of individuals obstruct or prohibit global consensus to take place. The results reveal the role of local communities in a global naming game in social network studies.

Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods.

Science.gov (United States)

Adami, Christoph; Schossau, Jory; Hintze, Arend

2016-12-01

Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic settings such as finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, stochastic decisions, communication between agents, and spatial interactions, require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. While highlighting standard mathematical results, we compare those to agent-based methods that can go beyond the limitations of equations and simulate the complexity of heterogeneous populations and an ever-changing set of interactors. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread (for example in the weak selection-strong mutation limit), but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Evolutionary Artificial Neural Network Weight Tuning to Optimize Decision Making for an Abstract Game

Science.gov (United States)

2010-03-01

EVOLUTIONARY ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK WEIGHT TUNING TO OPTIMIZE DECISION MAKING FOR AN ABSTRACT...AFIT/GCS/ENG/10-06 EVOLUTIONARY ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK WEIGHT TUNING TO OPTIMIZE DECISION MAKING FOR AN ABSTRACT GAME THESIS Presented...35 14: Diagram of pLoGANN’s Artificial Neural Network and

Analysis of Knowledge-Sharing Evolutionary Game in University Teacher Team

Science.gov (United States)

Huo, Mingkui

2013-01-01

The knowledge-sharing activity is a major drive force behind the progress and innovation of university teacher team. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article analyzes the knowledge-sharing process model of this team, studies the influencing mechanism of various factors such as knowledge aggregate gap, incentive coefficient and risk…

Application of evolutionary games to modeling carcinogenesis.

Science.gov (United States)

Swierniak, Andrzej; Krzeslak, Michal

2013-06-01

We review a quite large volume of literature concerning mathematical modelling of processes related to carcinogenesis and the growth of cancer cell populations based on the theory of evolutionary games. This review, although partly idiosyncratic, covers such major areas of cancer-related phenomena as production of cytotoxins, avoidance of apoptosis, production of growth factors, motility and invasion, and intra- and extracellular signaling. We discuss the results of other authors and append to them some additional results of our own simulations dealing with the possible dynamics and/or spatial distribution of the processes discussed.

Cooperative Evolutionary Game and Applications in Construction Supplier Tendency

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Qianqian Shi

2018-01-01

Full Text Available Major construction projects have a great influence on the national economy and society, wherein cooperative relationship between construction suppliers plays an increasingly significant role in the overall supply chain system. However, the relationships between suppliers are noncontractual, multistage, dynamic, and complicated. To gain a deeper insight into the suppliers’ cooperative relationships, an evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation tendency of multisuppliers. A replicator dynamic system is further formulated to investigate the evolutionary stable strategies of multisuppliers. Then, fourteen “when-then” type scenarios are concluded and classified into six different evolutionary tracks. Meanwhile, the critical influencing factors are identified. The results show that the suppliers’ production capacity, owner-supplier contract, and the owner’s incentive mechanism influence the cooperation tendency of suppliers directly. The managerial implications contribute to insightful references for a more stable cooperative relationship between the owner and suppliers.

Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Rongwu Lu

2018-01-01

Full Text Available Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution. Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis, this article studies replicator dynamics of the evolutionary model to make an optimization analysis of the behaviors of those interested parties and the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions. The results show how the charge of supervision of government department and inspection of coal mine enterprise impact the efficiency of safety management and the effect of constraint measures and incentive and other measures in safety management.

An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Courtois, P. [CIRED and University of Paris, Paris (France); Pereau, J.C. [OEP, University of Marne-la-Vallee, Marne-la-Vallee (France); Tazdait, T. [CIRED and OEP, University of Marne-la-Vallee, Marne-la-Vallee (France)

2001-10-01

We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours.

An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courtois, P.; Pereau, J.C.; Tazdait, T.

2001-10-01

We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours

Spatial evolutionary games of interaction among generic cancer cells

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bach, L.A.; Sumpter, D.J.T.; Alsner, J.

2003-01-01

Evolutionary game models of cellular interactions have shown that heterogeneity in the cellular genotypic composition is maintained through evolution to stable coexistence of growth-promoting and non-promoting cell types. We generalise these mean-field models and relax the assumption of perfect m...... at a cellular level. This study thus points a new direction towards more plausible spatial tumour modelling and the understanding of cancerous growth....

Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Zhen; Kokubo, Satoshi; Jusup, Marko; Tanimoto, Jun

2015-09-01

Why would natural selection favor the prevalence of cooperation within the groups of selfish individuals? A fruitful framework to address this question is evolutionary game theory, the essence of which is captured in the so-called social dilemmas. Such dilemmas have sparked the development of a variety of mathematical approaches to assess the conditions under which cooperation evolves. Furthermore, borrowing from statistical physics and network science, the research of the evolutionary game dynamics has been enriched with phenomena such as pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organization. Numerous advances in understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior over the last few decades have recently been distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and network reciprocity. However, when social viscosity is introduced into a population via any of the reciprocity mechanisms, the existing scaling parameters for the dilemma strength do not yield a unique answer as to how the evolutionary dynamics should unfold. Motivated by this problem, we review the developments that led to the present state of affairs, highlight the accompanying pitfalls, and propose new universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength. We prove universality by showing that the conditions for an ESS and the expressions for the internal equilibriums in an infinite, well-mixed population subjected to any of the five reciprocity mechanisms depend only on the new scaling parameters. A similar result is shown to hold for the fixation probability of the different strategies in a finite, well-mixed population. Furthermore, by means of numerical simulations, the same scaling parameters are shown to be effective even if the evolution of cooperation is considered on the spatial networks (with the exception of highly heterogeneous setups). We close the discussion by suggesting promising directions for future research

Naming game with biased assimilation over adaptive networks

Science.gov (United States)

Fu, Guiyuan; Zhang, Weidong

2018-01-01

The dynamics of two-word naming game incorporating the influence of biased assimilation over adaptive network is investigated in this paper. Firstly an extended naming game with biased assimilation (NGBA) is proposed. The hearer in NGBA accepts the received information in a biased manner, where he may refuse to accept the conveyed word from the speaker with a predefined probability, if the conveyed word is different from his current memory. Secondly, the adaptive network is formulated by rewiring the links. Theoretical analysis is developed to show that the population in NGBA will eventually reach global consensus on either A or B. Numerical simulation results show that the larger strength of biased assimilation on both words, the slower convergence speed, while larger strength of biased assimilation on only one word can slightly accelerate the convergence; larger population size can make the rate of convergence slower to a large extent when it increases from a relatively small size, while such effect becomes minor when the population size is large; the behavior of adaptively reconnecting the existing links can greatly accelerate the rate of convergence especially on the sparse connected network.

Older partner selection promotes the prevalence of cooperation in evolutionary games.

Science.gov (United States)

Yang, Guoli; Huang, Jincai; Zhang, Weiming

2014-10-21

Evolutionary games typically come with the interplays between evolution of individual strategy and adaptation to network structure. How these dynamics in the co-evolution promote (or obstruct) the cooperation is regarded as an important topic in social, economic, and biological fields. Combining spatial selection with partner choice, the focus of this paper is to identify which neighbour should be selected as a role to imitate during the process of co-evolution. Age, an internal attribute and kind of local piece of information regarding the survivability of the agent, is a significant consideration for the selection strategy. The analysis and simulations presented, demonstrate that older partner selection for strategy imitation could foster the evolution of cooperation. The younger partner selection, however, may decrease the level of cooperation. Our model highlights the importance of agent׳s age on the promotion of cooperation in evolutionary games, both efficiently and effectively. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Evolutionary games played by multi-agent system with different memory capacity

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan

2015-06-01

The evolution of cooperation is still an enigma. Resolution of cooperative dilemma is a hot topic as a perplexing interdisciplinary project, and has captured wide attention of researchers from many disciplines as a multidisciplinary field. Our main concern is the design of a networked evolutionary game model in which players show difference in memory capability. The idea of different memory capacities has its origin on the pervasive individual heterogeneity of real agents in nature. It is concluded that this proposed multiple memory capacity stimulates cooperation in lattice-structured populations. The networking effect is also investigated via a scale free network which is associated with the heterogeneous populations structure. Interestingly, results suggest that the effectiveness of a heterogeneous network at fostering cooperation is reduced in the presence of individual memory here. A thorough inquiry in the coevolutionary dynamics of individual memory and spatial structure in evolutionary games is planned for the immediate future.

Mean-field approximations of fixation time distributions of evolutionary game dynamics on graphs

Science.gov (United States)

Ying, Li-Min; Zhou, Jie; Tang, Ming; Guan, Shu-Guang; Zou, Yong

2018-02-01

The mean fixation time is often not accurate for describing the timescales of fixation probabilities of evolutionary games taking place on complex networks. We simulate the game dynamics on top of complex network topologies and approximate the fixation time distributions using a mean-field approach. We assume that there are two absorbing states. Numerically, we show that the mean fixation time is sufficient in characterizing the evolutionary timescales when network structures are close to the well-mixing condition. In contrast, the mean fixation time shows large inaccuracies when networks become sparse. The approximation accuracy is determined by the network structure, and hence by the suitability of the mean-field approach. The numerical results show good agreement with the theoretical predictions.

Population Games, Stable Games, and Passivity

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Michael J. Fox

2013-10-01

Full Text Available The class of “stable games”, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a “passive” dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.

Playing Multi-Action Adversarial Games: Online Evolutionary Planning versus Tree Search

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Risi, Sebastian

2017-01-01

We address the problem of playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games, which include many strategy games with extremely high branching factors as players take multiple actions each turn. This leads to the breakdown of standard tree search methods, including Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS......), as they become unable to reach a sufficient depth in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce Online Evolutionary Planning (OEP) to address this challenge, which searches for combinations of actions to perform during a single turn guided by a fitness function that evaluates the quality of a particular state....... We compare OEP to different MCTS variations that constrain the exploration to deal with the high branching factor in the turn-based multi-action game Hero Academy. While the constrained MCTS variations outperform the vanilla MCTS implementation by a large margin, OEP is able to search the space...

Evolutionary Stable Strategy

Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

Home; Journals; Resonance – Journal of Science Education; Volume 21; Issue 9. Evolutionary Stable Strategy: Application of Nash Equilibrium in Biology. General Article Volume 21 Issue 9 September 2016 pp 803- ... Keywords. Evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stable state, conflict, cooperation, biological games.

Integrating Evolutionary Game Theory into Mechanistic Genotype-Phenotype Mapping.

Science.gov (United States)

Zhu, Xuli; Jiang, Libo; Ye, Meixia; Sun, Lidan; Gragnoli, Claudia; Wu, Rongling

2016-05-01

Natural selection has shaped the evolution of organisms toward optimizing their structural and functional design. However, how this universal principle can enhance genotype-phenotype mapping of quantitative traits has remained unexplored. Here we show that the integration of this principle and functional mapping through evolutionary game theory gains new insight into the genetic architecture of complex traits. By viewing phenotype formation as an evolutionary system, we formulate mathematical equations to model the ecological mechanisms that drive the interaction and coordination of its constituent components toward population dynamics and stability. Functional mapping provides a procedure for estimating the genetic parameters that specify the dynamic relationship of competition and cooperation and predicting how genes mediate the evolution of this relationship during trait formation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Discontinuous phase transition in an open-ended Naming Game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Crokidakis, Nuno; Brigatti, Edgardo

2015-01-01

In this work we study on a 2D square lattice a recent version of the Naming Game, an agent-based model used for describing the emergence of linguistic structures. The system is open-ended and agents can invent new words throughout the evolution of the game, picking them up from a pool characterised by a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ. The model displays a nonequilibrium phase transition at a critical point σ c  ≈ 25.6, which separates an absorbing consensus state from an active fragmented state where agents continuously exchange different words. The finite-size scaling analysis of our simulations strongly suggests that the phase transition is discontinuous. (paper)

Cancer treatment as a game: integrating evolutionary game theory into the optimal control of chemotherapy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orlando, Paul A; Gatenby, Robert A; Brown, Joel S

2012-01-01

Chemotherapy for metastatic cancer commonly fails due to evolution of drug resistance in tumor cells. Here, we view cancer treatment as a game in which the oncologists choose a therapy and tumors ‘choose’ an adaptive strategy. We propose the oncologist can gain an upper hand in the game by choosing treatment strategies that anticipate the adaptations of the tumor. In particular, we examine the potential benefit of exploiting evolutionary tradeoffs in tumor adaptations to therapy. We analyze a math model where cancer cells face tradeoffs in allocation of resistance to two drugs. The tumor ‘chooses’ its strategy by natural selection and the oncologist chooses her strategy by solving a control problem. We find that when tumor cells perform best by investing resources to maximize response to one drug the optimal therapy is a time-invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, if cancer cells perform better using a generalist strategy allowing resistance to both drugs simultaneously, then the optimal protocol is a time varying solution in which the two drug concentrations negatively covary. However, drug interactions can significantly alter these results. We conclude that knowledge of both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interactions is crucial in planning optimal chemotherapy schedules for individual patients. (paper)

Cancer treatment as a game: integrating evolutionary game theory into the optimal control of chemotherapy

Science.gov (United States)

Orlando, Paul A.; Gatenby, Robert A.; Brown, Joel S.

2012-12-01

Chemotherapy for metastatic cancer commonly fails due to evolution of drug resistance in tumor cells. Here, we view cancer treatment as a game in which the oncologists choose a therapy and tumors ‘choose’ an adaptive strategy. We propose the oncologist can gain an upper hand in the game by choosing treatment strategies that anticipate the adaptations of the tumor. In particular, we examine the potential benefit of exploiting evolutionary tradeoffs in tumor adaptations to therapy. We analyze a math model where cancer cells face tradeoffs in allocation of resistance to two drugs. The tumor ‘chooses’ its strategy by natural selection and the oncologist chooses her strategy by solving a control problem. We find that when tumor cells perform best by investing resources to maximize response to one drug the optimal therapy is a time-invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, if cancer cells perform better using a generalist strategy allowing resistance to both drugs simultaneously, then the optimal protocol is a time varying solution in which the two drug concentrations negatively covary. However, drug interactions can significantly alter these results. We conclude that knowledge of both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interactions is crucial in planning optimal chemotherapy schedules for individual patients.

An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning.

Science.gov (United States)

Madeo, Dario; Talarico, Agostino; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro; Mocenni, Chiara; Santarnecchi, Emiliano

2017-11-22

Our brain is a complex system of interconnected regions spontaneously organized into distinct networks. The integration of information between and within these networks is a continuous process that can be observed even when the brain is at rest, i.e. not engaged in any particular task. Moreover, such spontaneous dynamics show predictive value over individual cognitive profile and constitute a potential marker in neurological and psychiatric conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN), able to capture brain's interregional dynamics by balancing emulative and non-emulative attitudes among brain regions. This results in the net behavior of nodes composing resting-state networks identified using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), determining their moment-to-moment level of activation and inhibition as expressed by positive and negative shifts in BOLD fMRI signal. By spontaneously generating low-frequency oscillatory behaviors, the EGN model is able to mimic functional connectivity dynamics, approximate fMRI time series on the basis of initial subset of available data, as well as simulate the impact of network lesions and provide evidence of compensation mechanisms across networks. Results suggest evolutionary game theory on networks as a new potential framework for the understanding of human brain network dynamics.

Development of a population of cancer cells: Observation and modeling by a Mixed Spatial Evolutionary Games approach.

Science.gov (United States)

Świerniak, Andrzej; Krześlak, Michał; Student, Sebastian; Rzeszowska-Wolny, Joanna

2016-09-21

Living cells, like whole living organisms during evolution, communicate with their neighbors, interact with the environment, divide, change their phenotypes, and eventually die. The development of specific ways of communication (through signaling molecules and receptors) allows some cellular subpopulations to survive better, to coordinate their physiological status, and during embryonal development to create tissues and organs or in some conditions to become tumors. Populations of cells cultured in vitro interact similarly, also competing for space and nutrients and stimulating each other to better survive or to die. The results of these intercellular interactions of different types seem to be good examples of biological evolutionary games, and have been the subjects of simulations by the methods of evolutionary game theory where individual cells are treated as players. Here we present examples of intercellular contacts in a population of living human cancer HeLa cells cultured in vitro and propose an evolutionary game theory approach to model the development of such populations. We propose a new technique termed Mixed Spatial Evolutionary Games (MSEG) which are played on multiple lattices corresponding to the possible cellular phenotypes which gives the possibility of simulating and investigating the effects of heterogeneity at the cellular level in addition to the population level. Analyses performed with MSEG suggested different ways in which cellular populations develop in the case of cells communicating directly and through factors released to the environment. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Analysis of naming game over networks in the presence of memory loss

Science.gov (United States)

Fu, Guiyuan; Cai, Yunze; Zhang, Weidong

2017-08-01

In this paper, we study the dynamics of naming game where individuals are under the influence of memory loss. An extended naming game incorporating memory loss is proposed. Different from the existing naming game models, the individual in the proposed model would forget some words with a probability in his memory during interaction and keep his conveyed word unchanged until he reaches a local agreement. We analyze the dynamics of the proposed model through extensive and comprehensive simulations, where four typical networks with different configuration are employed. The influence of memory loss as well as the population size on the performance of the proposed model is investigated. The simulation results show that (i) the stronger memory loss, the larger convergence time; (ii) as the strength of memory loss becomes stronger, maximum number of total words will decrease, while the maximum number of different words among the population remains almost unchanged; (iii) the maximum number of different words increases linearly with the increase of the population size and coincides with each other under different strength of memory loss. The findings in the proposed model may give an insight to understand better the influence of memory loss on the transient dynamics of language evolution and opinion formation over networks.

The stability concept of evolutionary game theory a dynamic approach

CERN Document Server

1992-01-01

These Notes grew from my research in evolutionary biology, specifically on the theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS theory), over the past ten years. Personally, evolutionary game theory has given me the opportunity to transfer my enthusiasm for abstract mathematics to more practical pursuits. I was fortunate to have entered this field in its infancy when many biologists recognized its potential but were not prepared to grant it general acceptance. This is no longer the case. ESS theory is now a rapidly expanding (in both applied and theoretical directions) force that no evolutionary biologist can afford to ignore. Perhaps, to continue the life-cycle metaphor, ESS theory is now in its late adolescence and displays much of the optimism and exuberance of this exciting age. There are dangers in writing a text about a theory at this stage of development. A comprehensive treatment would involve too many loose ends for the reader to appreciate the central message. On the other hand, the current central m...

Simulation of producers behaviour in the electricity market by evolutionary games

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Menniti, Daniele; Pinnarelli, Anna; Sorrentino, Nicola [Department of Electronic, Computer and System Science, University of Calabria (Italy)

2008-03-15

Simulation of the electricity market participant's behaviour is important for producers and consumers to determine their bidding strategies and for regulating the market rules. In literature, for this aim a lot of papers suggest to use the well-known theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately they cannot be applied in an easy way when a multi-players game has to be considered to simulate the operation of the electricity market. In this paper, the authors suggest to use the new theory of evolutionary games and the concept of near Nash equilibrium to simulate the electricity market in the presence of more than two producers. In particular, an opportune genetic algorithm has been developed; from the results reported in the paper, it is clear that this algorithm can be usefully utilised. (author)

Simulation of producers behaviour in the electricity market by evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menniti, Daniele; Pinnarelli, Anna; Sorrentino, Nicola

2008-01-01

Simulation of the electricity market participant's behaviour is important for producers and consumers to determine their bidding strategies and for regulating the market rules. In literature, for this aim a lot of papers suggest to use the well-known theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately they cannot be applied in an easy way when a multi-players game has to be considered to simulate the operation of the electricity market. In this paper, the authors suggest to use the new theory of evolutionary games and the concept of near Nash equilibrium to simulate the electricity market in the presence of more than two producers. In particular, an opportune genetic algorithm has been developed; from the results reported in the paper, it is clear that this algorithm can be usefully utilised. (author)

The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Sample, Christine; Allen, Benjamin

2017-11-01

Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large population size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the [Formula: see text] limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population limit, and the [Formula: see text] limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal mathematical definitions of the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits are provided. Applying these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be favored over a neutral mutation, are different in the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits. However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one strategy to be favored over another.

An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Moritz Hetzer

Full Text Available We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment.

An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games.

Science.gov (United States)

Hetzer, Moritz; Sornette, Didier

2013-01-01

We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment.

Detection of communities with Naming Game-based methods

Science.gov (United States)

Ribeiro, Carlos Henrique Costa

2017-01-01

Complex networks are often organized in groups or communities of agents that share the same features and/or functions, and this structural organization is built naturally with the formation of the system. In social networks, we argue that the dynamic of linguistic interactions of agreement among people can be a crucial factor in generating this community structure, given that sharing opinions with another person bounds them together, and disagreeing constantly would probably weaken the relationship. We present here a computational model of opinion exchange that uncovers the community structure of a network. Our aim is not to present a new community detection method proper, but to show how a model of social communication dynamics can reveal the (simple and overlapping) community structure in an emergent way. Our model is based on a standard Naming Game, but takes into consideration three social features: trust, uncertainty and opinion preference, that are built over time as agents communicate among themselves. We show that the separate addition of each social feature in the Naming Game results in gradual improvements with respect to community detection. In addition, the resulting uncertainty and trust values classify nodes and edges according to role and position in the network. Also, our model has shown a degree of accuracy both for non-overlapping and overlapping communities that are comparable with most algorithms specifically designed for topological community detection. PMID:28797097

Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tongyao Feng

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process.

Science.gov (United States)

Quan, Ji; Liu, Wei; Chu, Yuqing; Wang, Xianjia

2017-11-23

Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not be stochastically stable. In this paper, a model of voluntary public goods game with punishment is studied in a stochastic situation. Unlike the existing model, we describe the evolutionary process of strategies in the population as a generalized quasi-birth-and-death process. And we investigate the stochastic stable equilibrium (SSE) instead. By numerical experiments, we get all possible SSEs of the system for any combination of parameters, and investigate the influence of parameters on the probabilities of the system to select different equilibriums. It is found that in the stochastic situation, the introduction of the punishment and non-participation strategies can change the evolutionary dynamics of the system and equilibrium of the game. There is a large range of parameters that the system selects the cooperative states as its SSE with a high probability. This result provides us an insight and control method for the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game in stochastic situations.

State-Dependent Risk Preferences in Evolutionary Games

Science.gov (United States)

Roos, Patrick; Nau, Dana

There is much empirical evidence that human decision-making under risk does not correspond the decision-theoretic notion of "rational" decision making, namely to make choices that maximize the expected value. An open question is how such behavior could have arisen evolutionarily. We believe that the answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the interplay between risk-taking and sequentiality of choice in evolutionary environments.

Evolutionary Game Model Study of Construction Green Supply Chain Management under the Government Intervention

Science.gov (United States)

Xing, Yuanzhi; Deng, Xiaoyi

2017-11-01

The paper first has defined the concepts of green supply chain management and evolution game theory, and pointed out the characteristics of green supply chain management in construction. The main participants and key links of the construction green supply chain management are determined by constructing the organization framework. This paper established the evolutionary game model between construction enterprises and recycling enterprises for the green supply chain closed-loop structure. The waste recycling evolutionary stability equilibrium solution is obtained to explore the principle and effective scope of government policy intervention. This paper put forward the relevant countermeasures to the green supply chain management in construction recycling stage from the government point of view. The conclusion has reference value and guidance to the final product construction enterprises, recycling enterprises and the government during green supply chain.

An evolutionary-game model of tumour-cell interactions: possible relevance to gene therapy

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bach, L.A.; Bentzen, S.M.; Alsner, Jan

2001-01-01

Evolutionary games have been applied as simple mathematical models of populations where interactions between individuals control the dynamics. Recently, it has been proposed to use this type of model to describe the evolution of tumour cell populations with interactions between cells. We extent...

Fixation of strategies with the Moran and Fermi processes in evolutionary games

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Xuesong; He, Mingfeng; Kang, Yibin; Pan, Qiuhui

2017-10-01

A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite population was built. It combines the standard Moran and Fermi rules with two strategies cooperation and defection. We obtain the expressions of fixation probabilities and fixation times. The one-third rule which has been found in the frequency dependent Moran process also holds for our model. We obtain the conditions of strategy being an evolutionarily stable strategy in our model, and then make a comparison with the standard Moran process. Besides, the analytical results show that compared with the standard Moran process, fixation occurs with higher probabilities under a prisoner's dilemma game and coordination game, but with lower probabilities under a coexistence game. The simulation result shows that the fixation time in our mixed process is lower than that in the standard Fermi process. In comparison with the standard Moran process, fixation always takes more time on average in spatial populations, regardless of the game. In addition, the fixation time decreases with the growth of the number of neighbors.

Using Self-Adaptive Evolutionary Algorithms to Evolve Dynamism-Oriented Maps for a Real Time Strategy Game

OpenAIRE

Lara-Cabrera, Raúl; Cotta, Carlos; Fernández Leiva, Antonio J.

2013-01-01

This work presents a procedural content generation system that uses an evolutionary algorithm in order to generate interesting maps for a real-time strategy game, called Planet Wars. Interestingness is here captured by the dynamism of games (i.e., the extent to which they are action-packed). We consider two different approaches to measure the dynamism of the games resulting from these generated maps, one based on fluctuations in the resources controlled by either player and another one based ...

Evolutionary quantum game theory in the context of socio-economic systems; Evolutionaere Quanten-Spieltheorie im Kontext sozio-oekonomischer Systeme

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hanauske, Matthias

2011-02-14

The evolution of socio-economic systems depend on the interdependent decision processes of its underlying system components. The mathematical model to describe the strategic decision of players within a socio-economic game is ''game theory''. ''Quantum game theory'' is a mathematical and conceptual amplification of classical game theory. The space of all conceivable decision paths is extended from the purely rational, measurable space in the Hilbert-space of complex numbers - which is the mathematical space where quantum theory is formulated. By the concept of a potential entanglement of the imaginary quantum strategy parts, it is possible to include cooperate decision path, caused by cultural or moral standards. If this strategy entanglement is large enough, then additional Nash equilibria can occur, previously present dominant strategies could become nonexistent and new evolutionary stable strategies do appear for some game classes. Within this PhD thesis the main results of classical and quantum games are summarized and all of the possible game classes of evolutionary (2 player)-(2 strategy) games are extended to quantum games. It is shown that the quantum extension of classical games with an underlying dilemma-like structure give different results, if the strength of strategic entanglement is above a certain barrier. After the German summary and the introduction paper, five different applications of the theory are discussed within the thesis. (orig.)

Co-Evolution of Opinion and Strategy in Persuasion Dynamics:. AN Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Science.gov (United States)

Ding, Fei; Liu, Yun; Li, Yong

In this paper, a new model of opinion formation within the framework of evolutionary game theory is presented. The model simulates strategic situations when people are in opinion discussion. Heterogeneous agents adjust their behaviors to the environment during discussions, and their interacting strategies evolve together with opinions. In the proposed game, we take into account payoff discount to join a discussion, and the situation that people might drop out of an unpromising game. Analytical and emulational results show that evolution of opinion and strategy always tend to converge, with utility threshold, memory length, and decision uncertainty parameters influencing the convergence time. The model displays different dynamical regimes when we set differently the rule when people are at a loss in strategy.

Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Science.gov (United States)

Du, Wen-Bo; Cao, Xian-Bin; Liu, Run-Ran; Wang, Zhen

2012-09-01

Considering the inertia of individuals in real life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia: with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society.

The Effects of Sacred Value Networks Within an Evolutionary, Adversarial Game

Science.gov (United States)

McCalla, Scott G.; Short, Martin B.; Brantingham, P. Jeffrey

2013-05-01

The effects of personal relationships and shared ideologies on levels of crime and the formation of criminal coalitions are studied within the context of an adversarial, evolutionary game first introduced in Short et al. (Phys. Rev. E 82:066114, 2010). Here, we interpret these relationships as connections on a graph of N players. These connections are then used in a variety of ways to define each player's "sacred value network"—groups of individuals that are subject to special consideration or treatment by that player. We explore the effects on the dynamics of the system that these networks introduce, through various forms of protection from both victimization and punishment. Under local protection, these networks introduce a new fixed point within the game dynamics, which we find through a continuum approximation of the discrete game. Under more complicated, extended protection, we numerically observe the emergence of criminal coalitions, or "gangs". We also find that a high-crime steady state is much more frequent in the context of extended protection networks, in both the case of Erdős-Rényi and small world random graphs.

Optimal convergence in naming game with geography-based negotiation on small-world networks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Liu Runran, E-mail: runran@mail.ustc.edu.c [Department of Modern Physics and Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei Anhui 230026 (China); Wang Wenxu [School of Electrical, Computer and Energy Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287 (United States); Lai Yingcheng [School of Electrical, Computer and Energy Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287 (United States); Department of Physics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287 (United States); Chen Guanrong [Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong (Hong Kong); Wang Binghong [Department of Modern Physics and Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei Anhui 230026 (China); Research Center for Complex System Science, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology and Shanghai Academy of System Science, Shanghai 200093 (China)

2011-01-17

We propose a negotiation strategy to address the effect of geography on the dynamics of naming games over small-world networks. Communication and negotiation frequencies between two agents are determined by their geographical distance in terms of a parameter characterizing the correlation between interaction strength and the distance. A finding is that there exists an optimal parameter value leading to fastest convergence to global consensus on naming. Numerical computations and a theoretical analysis are provided to substantiate our findings.

Optimal convergence in naming game with geography-based negotiation on small-world networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liu Runran; Wang Wenxu; Lai Yingcheng; Chen Guanrong; Wang Binghong

2011-01-01

We propose a negotiation strategy to address the effect of geography on the dynamics of naming games over small-world networks. Communication and negotiation frequencies between two agents are determined by their geographical distance in terms of a parameter characterizing the correlation between interaction strength and the distance. A finding is that there exists an optimal parameter value leading to fastest convergence to global consensus on naming. Numerical computations and a theoretical analysis are provided to substantiate our findings.

Preferential selection based on strategy persistence and memory promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Yuanming; Huang, Changwei; Dai, Qionglin

2018-06-01

Strategy imitation plays a crucial role in evolutionary dynamics when we investigate the spontaneous emergence of cooperation under the framework of evolutionary game theory. Generally, when an individual updates his strategy, he needs to choose a role model whom he will learn from. In previous studies, individuals choose role models randomly from their neighbors. In recent works, researchers have considered that individuals choose role models according to neighbors' attractiveness characterized by the present network topology or historical payoffs. Here, we associate an individual's attractiveness with the strategy persistence, which characterizes how frequently he changes his strategy. We introduce a preferential parameter α to describe the nonlinear correlation between the selection probability and the strategy persistence and the memory length of individuals M into the evolutionary games. We investigate the effects of α and M on cooperation. Our results show that cooperation could be promoted when α > 0 and at the same time M > 1, which corresponds to the situation that individuals are inclined to select their neighbors with relatively higher persistence levels during the evolution. Moreover, we find that the cooperation level could reach the maximum at an optimal memory length when α > 0. Our work sheds light on how to promote cooperation through preferential selection based on strategy persistence and a limited memory length.

Evolutionary stability of mixed strategies on graphs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li, Yan; Liu, Xinsheng; Claussen, Jens Christian

2016-01-01

Up to the present time, the study of evolutionary dynamics mostly focused on pure strategy games in finite discrete strategy space, either in well-mixed or structured populations. In this paper, we study mixed strategy games in continuous strategy space on graphs of degree k . Each player is arranged on a vertex of the graph. The edges denote the interaction between two individuals. In the limit of weak selection, we first derive the payoff functions of two mixed strategies under three different updating rules, named birth–death, death–birth and imitation. Then we obtain the conditions for a strategy being a continuously stable strategy (CSS), and we also confirm that the equilibrium distribution corresponding to the CSS is neighborhood attracting and strongly uninvadable. Finally, we apply our theory to the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game to obtain possible CSS. Simulations are performed for the two special games and the results are well consistent with the conclusions we made. (paper)

Heterogeneous update mechanisms in evolutionary games: Mixing innovative and imitative dynamics

Science.gov (United States)

Amaral, Marco Antonio; Javarone, Marco Alberto

2018-04-01

Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows the introduction of elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase space. Often, these processes are strongly related, since an innovation can trigger the evolution, and the latter can provide the optimal conditions for the emergence of innovations. Both processes can be studied by using the framework of evolutionary game theory, where evolution constitutes an intrinsic mechanism. At the same time, the concept of innovation requires an opportune mathematical representation. Notably, innovation can be modeled as a strategy, or it can constitute the underlying mechanism that allows agents to change strategy. Here, we analyze the second case, investigating the behavior of a heterogeneous population, composed of imitative and innovative agents. Imitative agents change strategy only by imitating that of their neighbors, whereas innovative ones change strategy without the need for a copying source. The proposed model is analyzed by means of analytical calculations and numerical simulations in different topologies. Remarkably, results indicate that the mixing of mechanisms can be detrimental to cooperation near phase transitions. In those regions, the spatial reciprocity from imitative mechanisms is destroyed by innovative agents, leading to the downfall of cooperation. Our investigation sheds some light on the complex dynamics emerging from the heterogeneity of strategy revision methods, highlighting the role of innovation in evolutionary games.

What's in a Name: Is “Evolutionary Psychology” Eclipsing “Sociobiology” in the Scientific Literature?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gregory D. Webster

2007-10-01

Full Text Available Is the term “evolutionary psychology” supplanting “sociobiology” in the scientific literature? How influential was E. O. Wilson's (1975 book, Sociobiology, in establishing the discipline of the same name? Similarly, how influential were the two Tooby-Cosmides chapters appearing in The Adapted Mind (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992 in establishing evolutionary psychology as a viable outgrowth of sociobiology? The purpose of the present research was to answer these questions using quantitative analyses of publication trends. The Internet search engine Google Scholar was used to count the number of hits (i.e., the number of scholarly works, citations, etc. for “sociobiology” and “evolutionary psychology” separately per year from 1960 to 2003. Interrupted time-series analyses revealed significant increases (intercept shifts for sociobiology hits between 1974 and 1975, and for evolutionary psychology hits between 1991 and 1992. Evolutionary psychology hits also experienced a significant increase in change-over-time (a slope shift between 1991 and 1992. Growth curve analyses revealed that the rate of growth for evolutionary psychology, which was accelerating over time, was significantly greater than that for sociobiology, which was decelerating. The implications of these findings for understanding the histories of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are discussed.

Coevolution of network structure and cooperation in the public goods game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang Lei; Xia Chengyi; Wang Juan

2013-01-01

Recently, the emergence of cooperation has become a central topic in the evolutionary game field, and coevolution of game dynamics and network topology structure can give us a fresh viewpoint of how the network evolves and cooperation arises. In this paper, we show in detail a picture of the co-evolutionary behaviors between the microscopic structure of the network and cooperation promotion in the public goods game (PGG). Based on a mechanism named after evolutionary preferential attachment (EPA), in which the growth of the network depends on the outcome of PGG dynamics, we explore the structural properties of networks and cooperative behaviors taking place on the networks created by EPA rules. Extensive simulation results indicate that the structure of the resulting networks displays a transition from homogeneous to heterogeneous properties as the selection strength ϵ increases, and the cooperative behaviors have a non-trivial state in which cooperators and defectors can simultaneously occupy the hub nodes in the network. Current results are of interest for us to further understand the cooperation persistence and structure evolution in many natural, social and economical systems. (paper)

Analysis of Urban Car Owners Commute Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Huawei Gong

2015-01-01

Full Text Available With the aggravation of the traffic congestion in the city, car owners will have to give up commuting with private cars and take the public transportation instead. The paper uses the replication dynamic mechanism to simulate the learning and adjustment mechanism of the automobile owners commuting mode selection. The evolutionary stable strategy is used to describe the long-term evolution of competition game trend. Finally we simulate equilibrium and stability of an evolution of the game under a payoff imbalance situation. The research shows that a certain proportion of car owners will choose public transit under the pressure of public transport development and heavy traffic, and the proportion will be closely related to the initial conditions and urban transportation development policy.

Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Du Wenbo; Cao Xianbin; Liu Runran; Wang Zhen

2012-01-01

Considering the inertia of individuals in real life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia: with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society. (interdisciplinary physics and related areas of science and technology)

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation and Enterprise Emission from the Perspective of Environmental Tax

Science.gov (United States)

Mai, Yazong

2017-12-01

In the context of the upcoming implementation of the environmental tax policy, there is a need for a focus on the relationship between government regulation and corporate emissions. To achieve the real effect of environmental tax policy, government need to regulate the illegal emissions of enterprises. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper analyses the strategic set of government regulators and polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy. By using the evolutionary game model, the utility function and payoff matrix of the both sides are constructed, and the evolutionary analysis and strategy adjustment of the environmental governance target and the actual profit of the stakeholders are carried out. Thus, the wrong behaviours could be corrected so that the equilibrium of the evolutionary system can be achieved gradually, which could also get the evolutionary stable strategies of the government and the polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy.

Spatial evolutionary games with weak selection.

Science.gov (United States)

Nanda, Mridu; Durrett, Richard

2017-06-06

Recently, a rigorous mathematical theory has been developed for spatial games with weak selection, i.e., when the payoff differences between strategies are small. The key to the analysis is that when space and time are suitably rescaled, the spatial model converges to the solution of a partial differential equation (PDE). This approach can be used to analyze all [Formula: see text] games, but there are a number of [Formula: see text] games for which the behavior of the limiting PDE is not known. In this paper, we give rules for determining the behavior of a large class of [Formula: see text] games and check their validity using simulation. In words, the effect of space is equivalent to making changes in the payoff matrix, and once this is done, the behavior of the spatial game can be predicted from the behavior of the replicator equation for the modified game. We say predicted here because in some cases the behavior of the spatial game is different from that of the replicator equation for the modified game. For example, if a rock-paper-scissors game has a replicator equation that spirals out to the boundary, space stabilizes the system and produces an equilibrium.

Spatial Evolutionary Games of Interaction among Generic Cancer Cells

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bach, Lars Arve; Sumpter, David J.T.; Alsner, Jan

2003-01-01

Evolutionary game models of cellular interactions have shown that heterogeneity in the cellular genotypic composition is maintained through evolution to stable coexistence of growth-promoting and non-promoting cell types. We generalise these mean-field models and relax the assumption of perfect...... mixing of cells by instead implementing an individual-based model that includes the stochastic and spatial effects likely to occur in tumours. The scope for coexistence of genotypic strategies changed with the inclusion of explicit space and stochasticity. The spatial models show some interesting...... deviations from their mean-field counterparts, for example the possibility of altruistic (paracrine) cell strategies to thrive. Such effects can however, be highly sensitive to model implementation and the more realistic models with semi-synchronous and stochastic updating do not show evolution of altruism...

Evolutionary game theory for physical and biological scientists. I. Training and validating population dynamics equations.

Science.gov (United States)

Liao, David; Tlsty, Thea D

2014-08-06

Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.

An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Sector Coordination and Self-Organization

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Fernando P. Santos

2016-04-01

Full Text Available Coordination games provide ubiquitous interaction paradigms to frame human behavioral features, such as information transmission, conventions and languages as well as socio-economic processes and institutions. By using a dynamical approach, such as Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT, one is able to follow, in detail, the self-organization process by which a population of individuals coordinates into a given behavior. Real socio-economic scenarios, however, often involve the interaction between multiple co-evolving sectors, with specific options of their own, that call for generalized and more sophisticated mathematical frameworks. In this paper, we explore a general EGT approach to deal with coordination dynamics in which individuals from multiple sectors interact. Starting from a two-sector, consumer/producer scenario, we investigate the effects of including a third co-evolving sector that we call public. We explore the changes in the self-organization process of all sectors, given the feedback that this new sector imparts on the other two.

Scaling behavior can be tricky: Comment on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games" by Z. Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Hui, Pak Ming; Xu, Chen

2015-09-01

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful tool for studying the emergence of cooperation among competing individuals [1]. Popularly studied games include the prisoner's dilemma [2], snowdrift game [3] and stag hunt game [4]. They have been extensively studied for the extent of cooperative behavior under different dilemma strengths. Generally, the games can be defined by a 2 × 2 matrix and thus four payoff elements, T, R, P, and S, for the possible payoffs to players when they use pure strategies against each other. Detailed definitions of the four payoffs are given in the review by Wang et al. [5]. For simplicity, it is often the case that fewer parameters are invoked, e.g. a single parameter [3] and more generally two parameters [6]. Generally speaking, reducing the number of parameters has the effect of restricting the system to a certain subspace of the unreduced case. In addition, the spatial structures, such as a well-mixed population or a population forming a complex network, that govern the competing relationship and environment of the agents, and the evolutionary rules, that govern how agents update their strategies, are vital in determining how cooperation evolves, as well documented in the references of [5].

Translation of proper names in the novel «Hunger games» by S. Collins

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Zalesova N. M.

2016-05-01

Full Text Available the aim of the article is to study the methods used when translating proper names in the fantasy novel «Hunger games» by S. Collins. It was found out that the most popular ones are transcription, translation with the use of the traditional variant and semantic translation.

Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism

Science.gov (United States)

Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David R.

2015-08-01

Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We study a competitive Lotka-Volterra model, with number fluctuations, that accounts for natural population growth and encompasses interaction scenarios typical of evolutionary games. We show that, in an appropriate limit, the model describes standard evolutionary games with both genetic drift and overall population size fluctuations. However, there are also regimes where a varying population size can strongly influence the evolutionary dynamics. We focus on the strong mutualism scenario and demonstrate that standard evolutionary game theory fails to describe our simulation results. We then analytically and numerically determine fixation probabilities as well as mean fixation times using matched asymptotic expansions, taking into account the population size degree of freedom. These results elucidate the interplay between population dynamics and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism.

Science.gov (United States)

Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David R

2015-08-01

Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We study a competitive Lotka-Volterra model, with number fluctuations, that accounts for natural population growth and encompasses interaction scenarios typical of evolutionary games. We show that, in an appropriate limit, the model describes standard evolutionary games with both genetic drift and overall population size fluctuations. However, there are also regimes where a varying population size can strongly influence the evolutionary dynamics. We focus on the strong mutualism scenario and demonstrate that standard evolutionary game theory fails to describe our simulation results. We then analytically and numerically determine fixation probabilities as well as mean fixation times using matched asymptotic expansions, taking into account the population size degree of freedom. These results elucidate the interplay between population dynamics and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

Sequential interactions-in which one player plays first and another responds-promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games.

Science.gov (United States)

Laird, Robert A

2018-05-21

Cooperation is a central topic in evolutionary biology because (a) it is difficult to reconcile why individuals would act in a way that benefits others if such action is costly to themselves, and (b) it underpins many of the 'major transitions of evolution', making it essential for explaining the origins of successively higher levels of biological organization. Within evolutionary game theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games are the main theoretical constructs used to study the evolution of cooperation in dyadic interactions. In single-shot versions of these games, wherein individuals play each other only once, players typically act simultaneously rather than sequentially. Allowing one player to respond to the actions of its co-player-in the absence of any possibility of the responder being rewarded for cooperation or punished for defection, as in simultaneous or sequential iterated games-may seem to invite more incentive for exploitation and retaliation in single-shot games, compared to when interactions occur simultaneously, thereby reducing the likelihood that cooperative strategies can thrive. To the contrary, I use lattice-based, evolutionary-dynamical simulation models of single-shot games to demonstrate that under many conditions, sequential interactions have the potential to enhance unilaterally or mutually cooperative outcomes and increase the average payoff of populations, relative to simultaneous interactions-benefits that are especially prevalent in a spatially explicit context. This surprising result is attributable to the presence of conditional strategies that emerge in sequential games that can't occur in the corresponding simultaneous versions. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

On the Evolutionary Stability of Bargaining Inefficiency

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Poulsen, Anders

This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game tough behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary select...

Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Bo; Li Xiao-Teng; Chen Xiao-Song; Chen Wei; Liu Jian

2016-01-01

Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model. (paper)

A system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory for green supply chain management diffusion among Chinese manufacturers

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Tian, Yihui; Govindan, Kannan; Zhu, Qinghua

2014-01-01

In this study, a system dynamics (SD) model is developed to guide the subsidy policies to promote the diffusion of green supply chain management (GSCM) in China. The relationships of stakeholders such as government, enterprises and consumers are analyzed through evolutionary game theory. Finally...

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on the network with punishment and opportunistic partner switching

Science.gov (United States)

Takesue, H.

2018-02-01

Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative mechanisms, including partner switching. In this study, we investigate the combined effect of punishment and partner switching in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games conducted on a network. In the model, agents are located on the network and participate in the prisoner's dilemma games with punishment. In addition, they can opportunistically switch interaction partners to improve their payoff. Our Monte Carlo simulation showed that a large frequency of punishers is required to suppress defectors when the frequency of partner switching is low. In contrast, cooperation is the most abundant strategy when the frequency of partner switching is high regardless of the strength of punishment. Interestingly, cooperators become abundant not because they avoid the cost of inflicting punishment and earn a larger average payoff per game but rather because they have more numerous opportunities to be referred to as a role agent by defectors. Our results imply that the fluidity of social relationships has a profound effect on the adopted strategy in maintaining cooperation.

Language structure in the n -object naming game.

Science.gov (United States)

Lipowski, Adam; Lipowska, Dorota

2009-11-01

We examine a naming game with two agents trying to establish a common vocabulary for n objects. Such efforts lead to the emergence of language that allows for an efficient communication and exhibits some degree of homonymy and synonymy. Although homonymy reduces the communication efficiency, it seems to be a dynamical trap that persists for a long, and perhaps indefinite, time. On the other hand, synonymy does not reduce the efficiency of communication but appears to be only a transient feature of the language. Thus, in our model the role of synonymy decreases and in the long-time limit it becomes negligible. A similar rareness of synonymy is observed in present natural languages. The role of noise, that distorts the communicated words, is also examined. Although, in general, the noise reduces the communication efficiency, it also regroups the words so that they are more evenly distributed within the available "verbal" space.

Evolutionary dynamics of division of labor games with selfish agents

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Jianlei; Li, Qiaoyu; Zhang, Chunyan

2017-11-01

The division of labor is one of the most basic and widely studied aspects of collective behavior in natural systems. Studies of division of labor are concerned with the integration of the individual worker behavior into a colony level task organization and with the question of how the regulation of the division of labor may contribute to the colony efficiency. This paper investigates the evolution of the division of labor with three strategies by employing the evolutionary game theory. Thus, these available strategies are, respectively, strategy A (performing task A), strategy B (performing task B), and strategy D (not performing any task but only free riding others' contributions). And, two typical networks (i.e., BA scale-free network and lattice network) are employed here for describing the interaction structure among agents. The theoretical analysis together with simulation results reveal that the division of labor can evolve and leads to players that differ in their tendency to take on a given task. The conditions under which the division of labor evolves depend on the costs for performing the task, the benefits led by performing the task, and the interaction structures among the players who are involved with division of labor games.

Multilevel Evolutionary Algorithm that Optimizes the Structure of Scale-Free Networks for the Promotion of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Penghui; Liu, Jing

2017-06-28

Understanding the emergence of cooperation has long been a challenge across disciplines. Even if network reciprocity reflected the importance of population structure in promoting cooperation, it remains an open question how population structures can be optimized, thereby enhancing cooperation. In this paper, we attempt to apply the evolutionary algorithm (EA) to solve this highly complex problem. However, as it is hard to evaluate the fitness (cooperation level) of population structures, simply employing the canonical evolutionary algorithm (EA) may fail in optimization. Thus, we propose a new EA variant named mlEA-C PD -SFN to promote the cooperation level of scale-free networks (SFNs) in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). Meanwhile, to verify the preceding conclusions may not be applied to this problem, we also provide the optimization results of the comparative experiment (EA cluster ), which optimizes the clustering coefficient of structures. Even if preceding research concluded that highly clustered scale-free networks enhance cooperation, we find EA cluster does not perform desirably, while mlEA-C PD -SFN performs efficiently in different optimization environments. We hope that mlEA-C PD -SFN may help promote the structure of species in nature and that more general properties that enhance cooperation can be learned from the output structures.

Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

Science.gov (United States)

Yang, Bo; Li, Xiao-Teng; Chen, Wei; Liu, Jian; Chen, Xiao-Song

2016-10-01

Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model. Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 11121403 and 11504384

On the Evolutionary Stability of 'Tough' Bargaining Behavior

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Poulsen, Anders

2003-01-01

This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long as th...

The influence of tie strength on evolutionary games on networks: An empirical investigation

Science.gov (United States)

Buesser, Pierre; Peña, Jorge; Pestelacci, Enea; Tomassini, Marco

2011-11-01

Extending previous work on unweighted networks, we present here a systematic numerical investigation of standard evolutionary games on weighted networks. In the absence of any reliable model for generating weighted social networks, we attribute weights to links in a few ways supported by empirical data ranging from totally uncorrelated to weighted bipartite networks. The results of the extensive simulation work on standard complex network models show that, except in a case that does not seem to be common in social networks, taking the tie strength into account does not change in a radical manner the long-run steady-state behavior of the studied games. Besides model networks, we also included a real-life case drawn from a coauthorship network. In this case also, taking the weights into account only changes the results slightly with respect to the raw unweighted graph, although to draw more reliable conclusions on real social networks many more cases should be studied as these weighted networks become available.

Calculating evolutionary dynamics in structured populations.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Charles G Nathanson

2009-12-01

Full Text Available Evolution is shaping the world around us. At the core of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The outcome of an evolutionary process depends on population structure. Here we provide a general formula for calculating evolutionary dynamics in a wide class of structured populations. This class includes the recently introduced "games in phenotype space" and "evolutionary set theory." There can be local interactions for determining the relative fitness of individuals, but we require global updating, which means all individuals compete uniformly for reproduction. We study the competition of two strategies in the context of an evolutionary game and determine which strategy is favored in the limit of weak selection. We derive an intuitive formula for the structure coefficient, sigma, and provide a method for efficient numerical calculation.

Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?

Science.gov (United States)

Rosas, Alejandro

2010-05-21

Evolutionary game theory has shown that human cooperation thrives in different types of social interactions with a PD structure. Models treat the cooperative strategies within the different frameworks as discrete entities and sometimes even as contenders. Whereas strong reciprocity was acclaimed as superior to classic reciprocity for its ability to defeat defectors in public goods games, recent experiments and simulations show that costly punishment fails to promote cooperation in the IR and DR games, where classic reciprocity succeeds. My aim is to show that cooperative strategies across frameworks are capable of a unified treatment, for they are governed by a common underlying rule or norm. An analysis of the reputation and action rules that govern some representative cooperative strategies both in models and in economic experiments confirms that the different frameworks share a conditional action rule and several reputation rules. The common conditional rule contains an option between costly punishment and withholding benefits that provides alternative enforcement methods against defectors. Depending on the framework, individuals can switch to the appropriate strategy and method of enforcement. The stability of human cooperation looks more promising if one mechanism controls successful strategies across frameworks. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Games of multicellularity.

Science.gov (United States)

Kaveh, Kamran; Veller, Carl; Nowak, Martin A

2016-08-21

Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay together after reproduction. They reach complexes of a certain size, n, before producing single cells again. The cells within a complex derive payoff from an evolutionary game by interacting with each other. The reproductive rate of cells is proportional to their payoff. We consider all two-strategy games. We study deterministic evolutionary dynamics with mutations, and derive exact conditions for selection to favor one strategy over another. Our main result has the same symmetry as the well-known sigma condition, which has been proven for stochastic game dynamics and weak selection. For a maximum complex size of n=2 our result holds for any intensity of selection. For n≥3 it holds for weak selection. As specific examples we study the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games. Our model advances theoretical work on multicellularity by allowing for frequency-dependent interactions within groups. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A dynamic parking charge optimal control model under perspective of commuters' evolutionary game behavior

Science.gov (United States)

Lin, XuXun; Yuan, PengCheng

2018-01-01

In this research we consider commuters' dynamic learning effect by modeling the trip mode choice behavior from a new perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory. We explore the behavior pattern of different types of commuters and study the evolution path and equilibrium properties under different traffic conditions. We further establish a dynamic parking charge optimal control (referred to as DPCOC) model to alter commuters' trip mode choice while minimizing the total social cost. Numerical tests show. (1) Under fixed parking fee policy, the evolutionary results are completely decided by the travel time and the only method for public transit induction is to increase the parking charge price. (2) Compared with fixed parking fee policy, DPCOC policy proposed in this research has several advantages. Firstly, it can effectively turn the evolutionary path and evolutionary stable strategy to a better situation while minimizing the total social cost. Secondly, it can reduce the sensitivity of trip mode choice behavior to traffic congestion and improve the ability to resist interferences and emergencies. Thirdly, it is able to control the private car proportion to a stable state and make the trip behavior more predictable for the transportation management department. The research results can provide theoretical basis and decision-making references for commuters' mode choice prediction, dynamic setting of urban parking charge prices and public transit induction.

Evolutionary game theory: molecules as players.

Science.gov (United States)

Bohl, Katrin; Hummert, Sabine; Werner, Sarah; Basanta, David; Deutsch, Andreas; Schuster, Stefan; Theissen, Günter; Schroeter, Anja

2014-12-01

In this and an accompanying paper we review the use of game theoretical concepts in cell biology and molecular biology. This review focuses on the subcellular level by considering viruses, genes, and molecules as players. We discuss in which way catalytic RNA can be treated by game theory. Moreover, genes can compete for success in replication and can have different strategies in interactions with other genetic elements. Also transposable elements, or "jumping genes", can act as players because they usually bear different traits or strategies. Viruses compete in the case of co-infecting a host cell. Proteins interact in a game theoretical sense when forming heterodimers. Finally, we describe how the Shapley value can be applied to enzymes in metabolic pathways. We show that game theory can be successfully applied to describe and analyse scenarios at the molecular level resulting in counterintuitive conclusions.

Punishment in a complementarity game

Science.gov (United States)

Li, W.; Cai, X.; Wang, Q. A.

2006-05-01

We study the effects arisen from the punishment in an evolutionary complementarity game. Each round one member of population “buyers” deals with a randomly chosen member of population “sellers”. When the buyer's offer is greater than the seller's, a deal is done and both players are rewarded by gaining some points. Otherwise the transaction is not successful and both will lose certain points as punishment. Our simulations indicate that the resulting equilibrium of the game with punishment embedded is remarkably time-delayed compared to the counterpart of the non-punishment game. However, the median fee and the success rate of deals at the equilibrium remain nearly unchanged in various cases of games with different degrees of punishment, whether severe or not. Symmetry, between the two populations, and the equilibrium value can still be maintained when the members of both of them are punished fairly in any failed transaction. If they are done in a different manner, namely, the members of one population are subject to very severe punishment whereas their opponents receive less or no punishment at all, the latter in most cases will be better off.

Evolutionary Snowdrift Game Incorporating Costly Punishment

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yap Yee Jiun

2012-01-01

-watak, a, ß, dan nisbah faedah-kos r dalam SG, sistem tiga watak ini berkembang sama ada kepada keadaan mantap yang hanya terdiri daripada karekter C dan P atau hanya karekter C dan D dalam populasi gabungan sempurna. Situasi sebelumnya mempamerkan peningkatan dalam kerjasama berkaitan dengan SG, manakala yang sebelumnya mirip dengan SG. Dinamik dalam mendapatkan pelbagai keadaan mantap didapati adalah berbeza. Secara terperincinya, kunci utama dalam keadaan mantap dan dinamik diperolehi melalui simulasi yang diperolehi daripada satu set persamaan perbezaan. Kepekaan terhadap permulaan pembahagian watak dikaji dengan menggambarkan aliran dalam portrait fasa dan menganalisa sifat titik-titik tetap. Analisa juga menggambarkan fungsi karekter-P dalam menghalang suatu sistem daripada dicerobohi agen karekter-D.  Bermula dengan satu populasi yang hanya terdiri daripada agen C & D, karekter-D bertujuan menyerang sistem yang tidak mampu bertahan apabila pecahan permulaan agen P melebihi r/ß. Model, didefinisikan sebagai algoritma simulasi, boleh secara amnya menggabungkan banyak aspek menarik, seperti di dalam populasi rangkaian.KEYWORDS: evolutionary; snowdrift game; well-mixed population

Evolutionary fate of memory-one strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Xu-Sheng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Chen, Michael Z. Q.; Guan, Jian-Yue

2017-07-01

We study evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game involving a one-step memory mechanism of the individuals whenever making strategy updating. In particular, during the process of strategy updating, each individual keeps in mind all the outcome of the action pairs adopted by himself and each of his neighbors in the last interaction, and according to which the individuals decide what actions they will take in the next round. Computer simulation results imply that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy win out of the memory-one strategy set in the stationary state. This result is robust in a large range of the payoff parameter, and does not depend on the initial state of the system. Furthermore, theoretical analysis with mean field and quasi-static approximation predict the same result. Thus, our studies suggest that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy is a stable dominant strategy in repeated prisoner's dilemma game in homogeneous structured populations.

A Study on Standard Competition with Network Effect Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Ye; Wang, Bingdong; Li, Kangning

Owing to networks widespread in modern society, standard competition with network effect is now endowed with new connotation. This paper aims to study the impact of network effect on standard competition; it is organized in the mode of "introduction-model setup-equilibrium analysis-conclusion". Starting from a well-structured model of evolutionary game, it is then extended to a dynamic analysis. This article proves both theoretically and empirically that whether or not a standard can lead the market trends depends on the utility it would bring, and the author also discusses some advisable strategies revolving around the two factors of initial position and border break.

Procedural Content Generation for Real-Time Strategy Games

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Raúl Lara-Cabrera

2015-03-01

Full Text Available Videogames are one of the most important and profitable sectors in the industry of entertainment. Nowadays, the creation of a videogame is often a large-scale endeavor and bears many similarities with, e.g., movie production. On the central tasks in the development of a videogame is content generation, namely the definition of maps, terrains, non-player characters (NPCs and other graphical, musical and AI-related components of the game. Such generation is costly due to its complexity, the great amount of work required and the need of specialized manpower. Hence the relevance of optimizing the process and alleviating costs. In this sense, procedural content generation (PCG comes in handy as a means of reducing costs by using algorithmic techniques to automatically generate some game contents. PCG also provides advantages in terms of player experience since the contents generated are typically not fixed but can vary in different playing sessions, and can even adapt to the player herself. For this purpose, the underlying algorithmic technique used for PCG must be also flexible and adaptable. This is the case of computational intelligence in general and evolutionary algorithms in particular. In this work we shall provide an overview of the use of evolutionary intelligence for PCG, with special emphasis on its use within the context of real-time strategy games. We shall show how these techniques can address both playability and aesthetics, as well as improving the game AI.

A Distributed Dynamic Super Peer Selection Method Based on Evolutionary Game for Heterogeneous P2P Streaming Systems

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jing Chen

2013-01-01

Full Text Available Due to high efficiency and good scalability, hierarchical hybrid P2P architecture has drawn more and more attention in P2P streaming research and application fields recently. The problem about super peer selection, which is the key problem in hybrid heterogeneous P2P architecture, is becoming highly challenging because super peers must be selected from a huge and dynamically changing network. A distributed super peer selection (SPS algorithm for hybrid heterogeneous P2P streaming system based on evolutionary game is proposed in this paper. The super peer selection procedure is modeled based on evolutionary game framework firstly, and its evolutionarily stable strategies are analyzed. Then a distributed Q-learning algorithm (ESS-SPS according to the mixed strategies by analysis is proposed for the peers to converge to the ESSs based on its own payoff history. Compared to the traditional randomly super peer selection scheme, experiments results show that the proposed ESS-SPS algorithm achieves better performance in terms of social welfare and average upload rate of super peers and keeps the upload capacity of the P2P streaming system increasing steadily with the number of peers increasing.

Cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with probabilistic strategies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li Haihong; Dai Qionglin; Cheng Hongyan; Yang Junzhong

2012-01-01

Highlights: ► Introducing probabilistic strategies instead of the pure C/D in the PDG. ► The strategies patterns depends on interaction structures and updating rules. ► There exists an optimal increment of the probabilistic strategy. - Abstract: In this work, we investigate an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game in structured populations with probabilistic strategies instead of the pure strategies of cooperation and defection. We explore the model in details by considering different strategy update rules and different population structures. We find that the distribution of probabilistic strategies patterns is dependent on both the interaction structures and the updating rules. We also find that, when an individual updates her strategy by increasing or decreasing her probabilistic strategy a certain amount towards that of her opponent, there exists an optimal increment of the probabilistic strategy at which the cooperator frequency reaches its maximum.

The ecology of cancer from an evolutionary game theory perspective.

Science.gov (United States)

Pacheco, Jorge M; Santos, Francisco C; Dingli, David

2014-08-06

The accumulation of somatic mutations, to which the cellular genome is permanently exposed, often leads to cancer. Analysis of any tumour shows that, besides the malignant cells, one finds other 'supporting' cells such as fibroblasts, immune cells of various types and even blood vessels. Together, these cells generate the microenvironment that enables the malignant cell population to grow and ultimately lead to disease. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of tumour growth and response to therapy is incomplete unless the interactions between the malignant cells and normal cells are investigated in the environment in which they take place. The complex interactions between cells in such an ecosystem result from the exchange of information in the form of cytokines- and adhesion-dependent interactions. Such processes impose costs and benefits to the participating cells that may be conveniently recast in the form of a game pay-off matrix. As a result, tumour progression and dynamics can be described in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT), which provides a convenient framework in which to capture the frequency-dependent nature of ecosystem dynamics. Here, we provide a tutorial review of the central aspects of EGT, establishing a relation with the problem of cancer. Along the way, we also digress on fitness and of ways to compute it. Subsequently, we show how EGT can be applied to the study of the various manifestations and dynamics of multiple myeloma bone disease and its preceding condition known as monoclonal gammopathy of undetermined significance. We translate the complex biochemical signals into costs and benefits of different cell types, thus defining a game pay-off matrix. Then we use the well-known properties of the EGT equations to reduce the number of core parameters that characterize disease evolution. Finally, we provide an interpretation of these core parameters in terms of what their function is in the ecosystem we are describing and generate

Genome-driven evolutionary game theory helps understand the rise of metabolic interdependencies in microbial communities.

Science.gov (United States)

Zomorrodi, Ali R; Segrè, Daniel

2017-11-16

Metabolite exchanges in microbial communities give rise to ecological interactions that govern ecosystem diversity and stability. It is unclear, however, how the rise of these interactions varies across metabolites and organisms. Here we address this question by integrating genome-scale models of metabolism with evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we use microbial fitness values estimated by metabolic models to infer evolutionarily stable interactions in multi-species microbial "games". We first validate our approach using a well-characterized yeast cheater-cooperator system. We next perform over 80,000 in silico experiments to infer how metabolic interdependencies mediated by amino acid leakage in Escherichia coli vary across 189 amino acid pairs. While most pairs display shared patterns of inter-species interactions, multiple deviations are caused by pleiotropy and epistasis in metabolism. Furthermore, simulated invasion experiments reveal possible paths to obligate cross-feeding. Our study provides genomically driven insight into the rise of ecological interactions, with implications for microbiome research and synthetic ecology.

Designing a performance measurement system for supply chain using balanced scorecard, path analysis, cooperative game theory and evolutionary game theory: A Case Study

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Seyed Hootan Eskafi

2015-04-01

Full Text Available In recent years, supply chain management is known as the key factor for achieving competitive advantage. Better customer service, revenue improvement and cost reduction are the results of this philosophy. Organizations can manage the performance of their firms by appropriate goal setting, identifying criteria and continuous performance measurement, which creates a good view for the business circumstances. Developing and defining appropriate indicators at different levels of chain is necessary for implementing a performance measurement system. In this study, we propose a new method to determine the measurement indicators and strategies of the company in term of balanced scorecard. The study is a combination of balanced scorecard, path analysis, evolutionary game theory and cooperative game theory for strategic planning. The study offers an appropriate program for future activities of organizations and determines the present status of the firm. The implementation of the proposed method is introduced for a food producer and the results are analyzed.

Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alessandro Di Stefano

Full Text Available Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human cooperation emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolutionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis, allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscopically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in human cooperation.

Integrating evolutionary game theory into an agent-based model of ductal carcinoma in situ: Role of gap junctions in cancer progression.

Science.gov (United States)

Malekian, Negin; Habibi, Jafar; Zangooei, Mohammad Hossein; Aghakhani, Hojjat

2016-11-01

There are many cells with various phenotypic behaviors in cancer interacting with each other. For example, an apoptotic cell may induce apoptosis in adjacent cells. A living cell can also protect cells from undergoing apoptosis and necrosis. These survival and death signals are propagated through interaction pathways between adjacent cells called gap junctions. The function of these signals depends on the cellular context of the cell receiving them. For instance, a receiver cell experiencing a low level of oxygen may interpret a received survival signal as an apoptosis signal. In this study, we examine the effect of these signals on tumor growth. We make an evolutionary game theory component in order to model the signal propagation through gap junctions. The game payoffs are defined as a function of cellular context. Then, the game theory component is integrated into an agent-based model of tumor growth. After that, the integrated model is applied to ductal carcinoma in situ, a type of early stage breast cancer. Different scenarios are explored to observe the impact of the gap junction communication and parameters of the game theory component on cancer progression. We compare these scenarios by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test succeeds in proving a significant difference between the tumor growth of the model before and after considering the gap junction communication. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test also proves that the tumor growth significantly depends on the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis. In this study, the gap junction communication is modeled by using evolutionary game theory to illustrate its role at early stage cancers such as ductal carcinoma in situ. This work indicates that the gap junction communication and the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis can notably affect cancer progression. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making.

Science.gov (United States)

Toupo, Danielle F P; Strogatz, Steven H; Cohen, Jonathan D; Rand, David G

2015-07-01

We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model in which agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions in which having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition and suggest necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.

Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making

Science.gov (United States)

Toupo, Danielle F. P.; Strogatz, Steven H.; Cohen, Jonathan D.; Rand, David G.

2015-07-01

We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model in which agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions in which having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition and suggest necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.

Game equilibrium models I evolution and game dynamics

CERN Document Server

1991-01-01

There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to charac...

Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Prateek Verma

Full Text Available Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on corrupt officers. We examine the consequences of asymmetric and symmetric penalties by developing deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game-theoretic models of bribery. We find that the asymmetric penalty scheme can lead to a reduction in incidents of bribery. However, the extent of reduction depends on how the players update their strategies over time. If the interacting members change their strategies with a probability proportional to the payoff of the alternative strategy option, the reduction in incidents of bribery is less pronounced. Our results indicate that changing from a symmetric to an asymmetric penalty scheme may not suffice in achieving significant reductions in incidents of harassment bribery.

Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery.

Science.gov (United States)

Verma, Prateek; Sengupta, Supratim

2015-01-01

Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on corrupt officers. We examine the consequences of asymmetric and symmetric penalties by developing deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game-theoretic models of bribery. We find that the asymmetric penalty scheme can lead to a reduction in incidents of bribery. However, the extent of reduction depends on how the players update their strategies over time. If the interacting members change their strategies with a probability proportional to the payoff of the alternative strategy option, the reduction in incidents of bribery is less pronounced. Our results indicate that changing from a symmetric to an asymmetric penalty scheme may not suffice in achieving significant reductions in incidents of harassment bribery.

Equilibria, information and frustration in heterogeneous network games with conflicting preferences

Science.gov (United States)

Mazzoli, M.; Sánchez, A.

2017-11-01

Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has addressed this issue by combining the physics of complex networks with a description of interactions in terms of evolutionary game theory. We here take this research a step further by introducing a most salient societal factor such as the individuals’ preferences, a characteristic that is key to understanding much of the social phenomenology these days. We consider a heterogeneous, agent-based model in which agents interact strategically with their neighbors, but their preferences and payoffs for the possible actions differ. We study how such a heterogeneous network behaves under evolutionary dynamics and different strategic interactions, namely coordination games and best shot games. With this model we study the emergence of the equilibria predicted analytically in random graphs under best response dynamics, and we extend this test to unexplored contexts like proportional imitation and scale free networks. We show that some theoretically predicted equilibria do not arise in simulations with incomplete information, and we demonstrate the importance of the graph topology and the payoff function parameters for some games. Finally, we discuss our results with the available experimental evidence on coordination games, showing that our model agrees better with the experiment than standard economic theories, and draw hints as to how to maximize social efficiency in situations of conflicting preferences.

Analysis of the “naming game” with learning errors in communications

OpenAIRE

Yang Lou; Guanrong Chen

2015-01-01

Naming game simulates the process of naming an objective by a population of agents organized in a certain communication network. By pair-wise iterative interactions, the population reaches consensus asymptotically. We study naming game with communication errors during pair-wise conversations, with error rates in a uniform probability distribution. First, a model of naming game with learning errors in communications (NGLE) is proposed. Then, a strategy for agents to prevent learning errors is ...

Combining evolutionary game theory and network theory to analyze human cooperation patterns

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scatà, Marialisa; Di Stefano, Alessandro; La Corte, Aurelio; Liò, Pietro; Catania, Emanuele; Guardo, Ermanno; Pagano, Salvatore

2016-01-01

Highlights: • We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of human cooperation in a social network. • We introduce the concepts of “Critical Mass”, centrality measure and homophily. • The emergence of cooperation is affected by the spatial choice of the “Critical Mass”. • Our findings show that homophily speeds up the convergence towards cooperation. • Centrality and “Critical Mass” spatial choice partially offset the impact of homophily. - Abstract: As natural systems continuously evolve, the human cooperation dilemma represents an increasingly more challenging question. Humans cooperate in natural and social systems, but how it happens and what are the mechanisms which rule the emergence of cooperation, represent an open and fascinating issue. In this work, we investigate the evolution of cooperation through the analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of behaviours within the social network, where nodes can choose to cooperate or defect following the classical social dilemmas represented by Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games. To this aim, we introduce a sociological concept and statistical estimator, “Critical Mass”, to detect the minimum initial seed of cooperators able to trigger the diffusion process, and the centrality measure to select within the social network. Selecting different spatial configurations of the Critical Mass nodes, we highlight how the emergence of cooperation can be influenced by this spatial choice of the initial core in the network. Moreover, we target to shed light how the concept of homophily, a social shaping factor for which “birds of a feather flock together”, can affect the evolutionary process. Our findings show that homophily allows speeding up the diffusion process and make quicker the convergence towards human cooperation, while centrality measure and thus the Critical Mass selection, play a key role in the evolution showing how the spatial configurations can create some hidden patterns, partially

Flash Learning Games Wow Students and Instructors: Moving Toward An Academic Gaming Portal

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Dan H Lim

2003-02-01

Full Text Available This paper describes and discusses the rationale, background, design, and implementation of Flash learning games. The paper explains why Macromedia Flash has been selected as the authoring tool in the development of highly interactive learning games for online learning. The background evolutionary process of developing the learning games points out why it has been a daunting task to create compelling learning games that impact learning. Designing learning game objects that allow other educators to customize game content is the core of this paper. The author envisions this academic gaming project will evolve into an academic gaming portal, developed in conjunction with other major institutional partners.

Epigenetic game theory and its application in plants. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Yuan-Ming; Zhang, Yinghao; Guo, Mingyue

2017-03-01

Wang's et al. article [1] is the first to integrate game theory (especially evolutionary game theory) with epigenetic modification of zygotic genomes. They described and assessed a modeling framework based on evolutionary game theory to quantify, how sperms and oocytes interact through epigenetic processes, to determine embryo development. They also studied the internal mechanisms for normal embryo development: 1) evolutionary interactions between DNA methylation of the paternal and maternal genomes, and 2) the application of game theory to formulate and quantify how different genes compete or cooperate to regulate embryogenesis through methylation. Although it is not very comprehensive and profound regarding game theory modeling, this article bridges the gap between evolutionary game theory and the epigenetic control of embryo development by powerful ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The epiGame framework includes four aspects: 1) characterizing how epigenetic game theory works by the strategy matrix, in which the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis, are described by the cooperation and competition mechanisms, 2) quantifying the game that the direction and degree of P-M interactions over embryo development can be explained by the sign and magnitude of interaction parameters in model (2), 3) modeling epigenetic interactions within the morula, especially for two coupled nonlinear ODEs, with explicit functions in model (4), which provide a good fit to the observed data for the two sexes (adjusted R2 = 0.956), and 4) revealing multifactorial interactions in embryogenesis from the coupled ODEs in model (2) to triplet ODEs in model (6). Clearly, this article extends game theory from evolutionary game theory to epigenetic game theory.

Evolutionary Game Theory and Leadership

Science.gov (United States)

Guastello, Stephen J.

2009-01-01

Comments on the article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. This article offers a fresh perspective on leaders, followers, and their possible origins in nonhuman and primitive human behavior patterns. The connections between group coordination, leadership, and game theory have some…

Development of Chemistry Game Card as an Instructional Media in the Subject of Naming Chemical Compound in Grade X

Science.gov (United States)

Bayharti; Iswendi, I.; Arifin, M. N.

2018-04-01

The purpose of this research was to produce a chemistry game card as an instructional media in the subject of naming chemical compounds and determine the degree of validity and practicality of instructional media produced. Type of this research was Research and Development (R&D) that produced a product. The development model used was4-D model which comprises four stages incuding: (1) define, (2) design, (3) develop, and (4) disseminate. This research was restricted at the development stage. Chemistry game card developed was validated by seven validators and practicality was tested to class X6 students of SMAN 5 Padang. Instrument of this research is questionnair that consist of validity sheet and practicality sheet. Technique in collection data was done by distributing questionnaire to the validators, chemistry teachers, and students. The data were analyzed by using formula Cohen’s Kappa. Based on data analysis, validity of chemistry game card was0.87 with category highly valid and practicality of chemistry game card was 0.91 with category highly practice.

Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

OpenAIRE

Yi Zhao; Dong Li; Liqiang Pan

2015-01-01

On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business ...

From genes to games: cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive.

Science.gov (United States)

Traulsen, Arne; Reed, Floyd A

2012-04-21

Evolutionary change can be described on a genotypic level or a phenotypic level. Evolutionary game theory is typically thought of as a phenotypic approach, although it is frequently argued that it can also be used to describe population genetic evolution. Interpreting the interaction between alleles in a diploid genome as a two player game leads to interesting alternative perspectives on genetic evolution. Here we focus on the case of meiotic drive and illustrate how meiotic drive can be directly and precisely interpreted as a social dilemma, such as the prisoners dilemma or the snowdrift game, in which the drive allele takes more than its fair share. Resistance to meiotic drive can lead to the well understood cyclic dominance found in the rock-paper-scissors game. This perspective is well established for the replicator dynamics, but there is still considerable ground for mutual inspiration between the two fields. For example, evolutionary game theorists can benefit from considering the stochastic evolutionary dynamics arising from finite population size. Population geneticists can benefit from game theoretic tools and perspectives on genetic evolution. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

Science.gov (United States)

Shen, Chen; Chu, Chen; Geng, Yini; Jin, Jiahua; Chen, Fei; Shi, Lei

2018-01-01

Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase. Through numerical simulation, we have shown that voluntary participation could effectively promote the fraction of cooperation, which is also affected by the value of increment. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of the increment value on the density of different strategies and find that there exists an optimal increment value that plays an utmost role on the evolutionary dynamics. With regard to this observation, we unveil that an optimal value of increment can lead to strongest heterogeneity in agents' teaching ability, further promoting the evolution of cooperation.

Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Chen Shen

Full Text Available Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase. Through numerical simulation, we have shown that voluntary participation could effectively promote the fraction of cooperation, which is also affected by the value of increment. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of the increment value on the density of different strategies and find that there exists an optimal increment value that plays an utmost role on the evolutionary dynamics. With regard to this observation, we unveil that an optimal value of increment can lead to strongest heterogeneity in agents' teaching ability, further promoting the evolution of cooperation.

How to Love the Bomb: Trying to solve the prisoner's dilemma with evolutionary game theory

Science.gov (United States)

Castela, Vasco

Economists traditionally see altruistic acts as irrational. However, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a rational player can do worse than a moral player. The rules of the game imply that one cannot defend one's best interest if one tries to. Game theory has struggled to explain how an agent could have access to the strategically best outcome without behaving irrationally, but with little success. Can a complex systems approach do better?. Peter Danielson, using Evolutionary Game Theory, has avoided some of the assumptions of Game Theory by using a complexity approach to reframe the problem, and offers a solution of sorts. According to Danielson, the foundations of altruism are mechanisms of deterrence that rely on credible threat - we are nice for fear of retaliation. He is both right and wrong. It will be argued that utilitarian, consequentialist principles must have been at work to create the conditions for altruistic acts to be performed. It is wrong to expect, however, that the same reasons are the reasons for action. In order for a model of genuine altruism to be possible, an extra cog must be inserted in the mechanism of causality in order to distance moral action from its strategic advantages. If emotions fulfill this role, we can tell a story in which it is rational to act on altruistic motivations and materially advantageous to hold such motivations. Moral sentiments can be seen as a tool designed by evolution to help optimize cooperation in a social environment. The proposed account integrates the Humean theory of motivation with Robert Frank's commitment model and Aristotle's views on moral education, keeping an adequate story of how it can be in our material interest to be moral without having to renounce to the existence of genuine acts of altruism.

Quantum games on evolving random networks

OpenAIRE

Pawela, Łukasz

2015-01-01

We study the advantages of quantum strategies in evolutionary social dilemmas on evolving random networks. We focus our study on the two-player games: prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift and stag-hunt games. The obtained result show the benefits of quantum strategies for the prisoner's dilemma game. For the other two games, we obtain regions of parameters where the quantum strategies dominate, as well as regions where the classical strategies coexist.

Recidivism and Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: A Carrot and Stick Evolutionary Game

Science.gov (United States)

Berenji, Bijan; Chou, Tom; D'Orsogna, Maria R.

2014-01-01

Motivated by recent efforts by the criminal justice system to treat and rehabilitate nonviolent offenders rather than focusing solely on their punishment, we introduce an evolutionary game theoretic model to study the effects of “carrot and stick” intervention programs on criminal recidivism. We use stochastic simulations to study the evolution of a population where individuals may commit crimes depending on their past history, surrounding environment and, in the case of recidivists, on any counseling, educational or training programs available to them after being punished for their previous crimes. These sociological factors are embodied by effective parameters that determine the decision making probabilities. Players may decide to permanently reform or continue engaging in criminal activity, eventually reaching a state where they are considered incorrigible. Depending on parameter choices, the outcome of the game is a society with a majority of virtuous, rehabilitated citizens or incorrigibles. Since total resources may be limited, we constrain the combined punishment and rehabilitation costs per crime to be fixed, so that increasing one effort will necessarily decrease the other. We find that the most successful strategy in reducing crime is to optimally allocate resources so that after being punished, criminals experience impactful intervention programs, especially during the first stages of their return to society. Excessively harsh or lenient punishments are less effective. We also develop a system of coupled ordinary differential equations with memory effects to give a qualitative description of our simulated societal dynamics. We discuss our findings and sociological implications. PMID:24454884

Recidivism and rehabilitation of criminal offenders: a carrot and stick evolutionary game.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Bijan Berenji

Full Text Available Motivated by recent efforts by the criminal justice system to treat and rehabilitate nonviolent offenders rather than focusing solely on their punishment, we introduce an evolutionary game theoretic model to study the effects of "carrot and stick" intervention programs on criminal recidivism. We use stochastic simulations to study the evolution of a population where individuals may commit crimes depending on their past history, surrounding environment and, in the case of recidivists, on any counseling, educational or training programs available to them after being punished for their previous crimes. These sociological factors are embodied by effective parameters that determine the decision making probabilities. Players may decide to permanently reform or continue engaging in criminal activity, eventually reaching a state where they are considered incorrigible. Depending on parameter choices, the outcome of the game is a society with a majority of virtuous, rehabilitated citizens or incorrigibles. Since total resources may be limited, we constrain the combined punishment and rehabilitation costs per crime to be fixed, so that increasing one effort will necessarily decrease the other. We find that the most successful strategy in reducing crime is to optimally allocate resources so that after being punished, criminals experience impactful intervention programs, especially during the first stages of their return to society. Excessively harsh or lenient punishments are less effective. We also develop a system of coupled ordinary differential equations with memory effects to give a qualitative description of our simulated societal dynamics. We discuss our findings and sociological implications.

Analysing Buyers' and Sellers' Strategic Interactions in Marketplaces: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach

Science.gov (United States)

Vytelingum, Perukrishnen; Cliff, Dave; Jennings, Nicholas R.

We develop a new model to analyse the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers in market mechanisms. In particular, we wish to understand how the different strategies they adopt affect their economic efficiency in the market and to understand the impact of these choices on the overall efficiency of the marketplace. To this end, we adopt a two-population evolutionary game theoretic approach, where we consider how the behaviours of both buyers and sellers evolve in marketplaces. In so doing, we address the shortcomings of the previous state-of-the-art analytical model that assumes that buyers and sellers have to adopt the same mixed strategy in the market. Finally, we apply our model in one of the most common market mechanisms, the Continuous Double Auction, and demonstrate how it allows us to provide new insights into the strategic interactions of such trading agents.

An Organizational Structure Game (and BINGO! Is Its Name-O)

Science.gov (United States)

McMahon, Joan M.

2018-01-01

This article describes an in-class, noncomputerized, bingo game to accompany coverage of the topic of organizational structure. The game allows students to be actively involved in learning, solidify recognition and understanding of organizational structure terminology, apply understanding of organizational structure to an analysis of…

Importance of tie strengths in the prisoner's dilemma game on social networks

Science.gov (United States)

Xu, Bo; Liu, Lu; You, Weijia

2011-06-01

Though numerous researches have shown that tie strengths play a key role in the formation of collective behavior in social networks, little work has been done to explore their impact on the outcome of evolutionary games. In this Letter, we studied the effect of tie strength in the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by using online social network datasets. The results show that the fraction of cooperators has a non-trivial dependence on tie strength. Weak ties, just like previous researches on epidemics and information diffusion have shown, play a key role by the maintenance of cooperators in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games.

Multiscale structure in eco-evolutionary dynamics

Science.gov (United States)

Stacey, Blake C.

In a complex system, the individual components are neither so tightly coupled or correlated that they can all be treated as a single unit, nor so uncorrelated that they can be approximated as independent entities. Instead, patterns of interdependency lead to structure at multiple scales of organization. Evolution excels at producing such complex structures. In turn, the existence of these complex interrelationships within a biological system affects the evolutionary dynamics of that system. I present a mathematical formalism for multiscale structure, grounded in information theory, which makes these intuitions quantitative, and I show how dynamics defined in terms of population genetics or evolutionary game theory can lead to multiscale organization. For complex systems, "more is different," and I address this from several perspectives. Spatial host--consumer models demonstrate the importance of the structures which can arise due to dynamical pattern formation. Evolutionary game theory reveals the novel effects which can result from multiplayer games, nonlinear payoffs and ecological stochasticity. Replicator dynamics in an environment with mesoscale structure relates to generalized conditionalization rules in probability theory. The idea of natural selection "acting at multiple levels" has been mathematized in a variety of ways, not all of which are equivalent. We will face down the confusion, using the experience developed over the course of this thesis to clarify the situation.

Offspring mortality was a determinant factor in the evolution of paternal investment in humans: An evolutionary game approach.

Science.gov (United States)

López Alonso, Diego; Ortiz-Rodríguez, Isabel M

2017-04-21

Some researchers support the belief that man evolved philandering behavior because of the greater reproductive success of promiscuous males. According to this idea, deserting behavior from the man should be expected along with null paternal involvement in offspring care. Paradoxically however, the average offspring investment in the human male is far higher than that of any other male mammal, including other primates. In our work, we have addressed this conundrum by employing evolutionary game theory, using objective payoffs instead of, as are commonly used, arbitrary payoffs. Payoffs were computed as reproductive successes by a model based on trivial probabilities, implemented within the Barreto's Population Dynamics Toolbox (2014). The evolution of the parent conflict was simulated by a game with two players (the woman and the man). First, a simple game was assayed with two strategies, 'desert-unfaithful' and 'care-faithful'. Then, the game was played with a third mixed strategy, 'care-unfaithful'. The two-strategy game results were mainly determined by the offspring survival rate (s) and the non-paternity rate (z), with remaining factors playing a secondary role. Starting from two empirical estimates for both rates (s = 0.617 and z = 0.033) and decreasing the offspring mortality from near 0.4 to 0.1, the results were consistent with a win for the 'care-faithful' strategy. The 'desert-unfaithful' strategy only won at unrealistically high non-paternity rates (z>0.2). When three-strategy games were played, the mixed strategy of 'care-unfaithful' man could win the game in some less frequent cases. Regardless of the number of game strategies, 'care' fathers always won. These results strongly suggest that offspring mortality was the key factor in the evolution of paternal investment within the Homo branch. The 'care-faithful' strategy would have been the main strategy in human evolution but 'care-unfaithful' men did evolve at a lesser frequency. It can therefore be

Strategic interactions: Games of the Ju|'hoan.

Science.gov (United States)

de Voogt, Alex

2017-12-01

Three strategic games played by the Ju|'hoan-a board, a card, and a gesture game-complicate the rhetorics that suggest an evolutionary or psychological significance of play. They are mostly played by adults, although every individual adult does not necessarily engage in each game. The Ju|'hoan card and board game practices were transmitted through contact across large parts of Botswana and Namibia, while the gesture game n!àì has been known in other San communities. It suggests that the significance of strategic games is more likely found in its potential for social interaction (i.e., allowing to overcome cultural divides) than in evolution and psychology. Within the anthropological literature, strategy games were thought to be absent in egalitarian societies, such as that of the Ju|'hoan. Here, the roles of power, competition, and winning were thought to be disruptive and unwanted. A closer examination of the details behind the Ju|'hoan games shows that not only were strategy games adopted and adapted from neighboring societies but that the game of n!àì was developed by the Ju|'hoan into a competitive one. The evolutionary or psychological significance of play is informed by studies on individual play, children's play, and games with informal rules. When considering strategic games throughout history, it is their role of facilitator rather than the playing practice itself that makes games relevant across languages, cultural divides, and sociopolitical boundaries.

Economics and Mathematical Theory of Games

OpenAIRE

Ajda Fosner

2012-01-01

The theory of games is a branch of applied mathematics that is used in economics, management, and other social sciences. Moreover, it is used also in military science, political science, international relations, computer science, evolutionary biology, and ecology. It is a field of mathematics in which games are studied. The aim of this article is to present matrix games and the game theory. After the introduction, we will explain the methodology and give some examples. We will show applicatio...

Evolutionary stability concepts in a stochastic environment

Science.gov (United States)

Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Li, Cong; Lessard, Sabin; Tao, Yi

2017-09-01

Over the past 30 years, evolutionary game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy have been not only extensively developed and successfully applied to explain the evolution of animal behaviors, but also widely used in economics and social sciences. Nonetheless, the stochastic dynamical properties of evolutionary games in randomly fluctuating environments are still unclear. In this study, we investigate conditions for stochastic local stability of fixation states and constant interior equilibria in a two-phenotype model with random payoffs following pairwise interactions. Based on this model, we develop the concepts of stochastic evolutionary stability (SES) and stochastic convergence stability (SCS). We show that the condition for a pure strategy to be SES and SCS is more stringent than in a constant environment, while the condition for a constant mixed strategy to be SES is less stringent than the condition to be SCS, which is less stringent than the condition in a constant environment.

Intention recognition, commitment and their roles in the evolution of cooperation from artificial intelligence techniques to evolutionary game theory models

CERN Document Server

Han, The Anh

2013-01-01

This original and timely monograph describes a unique self-contained excursion that reveals to the readers the roles of two basic cognitive abilities, i.e. intention recognition and arranging commitments, in the evolution of cooperative behavior. This book analyses intention recognition, an important ability that helps agents predict others’ behavior, in its artificial intelligence and evolutionary computational modeling aspects, and proposes a novel intention recognition method. Furthermore, the book presents a new framework for intention-based decision making and illustrates several ways in which an ability to recognize intentions of others can enhance a decision making process. By employing the new intention recognition method and the tools of evolutionary game theory, this book introduces computational models demonstrating that intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation within populations of self-regarding agents. Finally, the book describes how commitment provides a pathway to the evol...

Modeling and Generating Strategy Games Mechanics

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Mahlmann, Tobias

of the game is, how players may manipulate the game world, etc. We present the Strategy Games Description Language (SGDL), a tree-based approach to model the game mechanics of strategy games. SGDL allows game designers to rapid prototype their game ideas with the help of our customisable game engine. We...... their games to individual players’ preferences by creating game content adaptively to how the player plays (and likes) a game. W we extend the notion of “procedural game content generation” by “game mechanics”. Game mechanics herein refer to the way that objects in a game may interact, what the goal...... present several example games to demonstrate the capabilities of the language and how to model common strategy game elements. Furthermore, we present methods to procedurally generate and evaluate game mechanics modelled in SGDL in terms of enjoyability. We argue that an evolutionary process can be used...

Constructionist Gaming: Understanding the Benefits of Making Games for Learning

Science.gov (United States)

Kafai, Yasmin B.; Burke, Quinn

2015-01-01

There has been considerable interest in examining the educational potential of playing video games. One crucial element, however, has traditionally been left out of these discussions--namely, children's learning through making their own games. In this article, we review and synthesize 55 studies from the last decade on making games and learning.…

Evolutionary programming for goal-driven dynamic planning

Science.gov (United States)

Vaccaro, James M.; Guest, Clark C.; Ross, David O.

2002-03-01

Many complex artificial intelligence (IA) problems are goal- driven in nature and the opportunity exists to realize the benefits of a goal-oriented solution. In many cases, such as in command and control, a goal-oriented approach may be the only option. One of many appropriate applications for such an approach is War Gaming. War Gaming is an important tool for command and control because it provides a set of alternative courses of actions so that military leaders can contemplate their next move in the battlefield. For instance, when making decisions that save lives, it is necessary to completely understand the consequences of a given order. A goal-oriented approach provides a slowly evolving tractably reasoned solution that inherently follows one of the principles of war: namely concentration on the objective. Future decision-making will depend not only on the battlefield, but also on a virtual world where military leaders can wage wars and determine their options by playing computer war games much like the real world. The problem with these games is that the built-in AI does not learn nor adapt and many times cheats, because the intelligent player has access to all the information, while the user has access to limited information provided on a display. These games are written for the purpose of entertainment and actions are calculated a priori and off-line, and are made prior or during their development. With these games getting more sophisticated in structure and less domain specific in scope, there needs to be a more general intelligent player that can adapt and learn in case the battlefield situations or the rules of engagement change. One such war game that might be considered is Risk. Risk incorporates the principles of war, is a top-down scalable model, and provides a good application for testing a variety of goal- oriented AI approaches. By integrating a goal-oriented hybrid approach, one can develop a program that plays the Risk game effectively and move

Game Theory - Its Applications to Ethical Decision Making

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cavagnetto Stefano

2014-01-01

Full Text Available The application of game theory according to Hargreaves-Heap and Varonfakis (1995 to understand human behaviour, and in particular ethical behaviour, is a valuable development, as game theory has gradually become one of the key frameworks to assist us in the understanding of social sciences. Esther (1982 and Aumann and Hart (1992 show that there are several studies that indicate the importance of a game theoretic framework in advancing our understanding of social behaviour and evolutionary sciences. Although the application of game theory in the above areas has largely been not formalised, its application in the fields of ethical conduct and human behaviour is at present developed in several respects with the gradual assistance of advances in related areas such as evolutionary biology and our understanding of group social behaviour.

The puzzle of partial migration: Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary game theory perspectives.

Science.gov (United States)

De Leenheer, Patrick; Mohapatra, Anushaya; Ohms, Haley A; Lytle, David A; Cushing, J M

2017-01-07

We consider the phenomenon of partial migration which is exhibited by populations in which some individuals migrate between habitats during their lifetime, but others do not. First, using an adaptive dynamics approach, we show that partial migration can be explained on the basis of negative density dependence in the per capita fertilities alone, provided that this density dependence is attenuated for increasing abundances of the subtypes that make up the population. We present an exact formula for the optimal proportion of migrants which is expressed in terms of the vital rates of migrant and non-migrant subtypes only. We show that this allocation strategy is both an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as well as a convergence stable strategy (CSS). To establish the former, we generalize the classical notion of an ESS because it is based on invasion exponents obtained from linearization arguments, which fail to capture the stabilizing effects of the nonlinear density dependence. These results clarify precisely when the notion of a "weak ESS", as proposed in Lundberg (2013) for a related model, is a genuine ESS. Secondly, we use an evolutionary game theory approach, and confirm, once again, that partial migration can be attributed to negative density dependence alone. In this context, the result holds even when density dependence is not attenuated. In this case, the optimal allocation strategy towards migrants is the same as the ESS stemming from the analysis based on the adaptive dynamics. The key feature of the population models considered here is that they are monotone dynamical systems, which enables a rather comprehensive mathematical analysis. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Interplay between cooperation-enhancing mechanisms in evolutionary games with tag-mediated interactions

Science.gov (United States)

Hadzibeganovic, Tarik; Stauffer, Dietrich; Han, Xiao-Pu

2018-04-01

Cooperation is fundamental for the long-term survival of biological, social, and technological networks. Previously, mechanisms for the enhancement of cooperation, such as network reciprocity, have largely been studied in isolation and with often inconclusive findings. Here, we present an evolutionary, multiagent-based, and spatially explicit computer model to specifically address the interactive interplay between such mechanisms. We systematically investigate the effects of phenotypic diversity, network structure, and rewards on cooperative behavior emerging in a population of reproducing artificial decision makers playing tag-mediated evolutionary games. Cooperative interactions are rewarded such that both the benefits of recipients and costs of donators are affected by the reward size. The reward size is determined by the number of cooperative acts occurring within a given reward time frame. Our computational experiments reveal that small reward frames promote unconditional cooperation in populations with both low and high diversity, whereas large reward frames lead to cycles of conditional and unconditional strategies at high but not at low diversity. Moreover, an interaction between rewards and spatial structure shows that relative to small reward frames, there is a strong difference between the frequency of conditional cooperators populating rewired versus non-rewired networks when the reward frame is large. Notably, in a less diverse population, the total number of defections is comparable across different network topologies, whereas in more diverse environments defections become more frequent in a regularly structured than in a rewired, small-world network of contacts. Acknowledging the importance of such interaction effects in social dilemmas will have inevitable consequences for the future design of cooperation-enhancing protocols in large-scale, distributed, and decentralized systems such as peer-to-peer networks.

Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M.; Wu, Rongling

2017-03-01

Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention.

Aspiration dynamics of multi-player games in finite populations.

Science.gov (United States)

Du, Jinming; Wu, Bin; Altrock, Philipp M; Wang, Long

2014-05-06

On studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer. In the latter case, individuals adjust their strategies based on a comparison of their pay-offs from the evolutionary game to a value they aspire, called the level of aspiration. Unlike imitation processes of pairwise comparison, aspiration-driven updates do not require additional information about the strategic environment and can thus be interpreted as being more spontaneous. Recent work has mainly focused on understanding how aspiration dynamics alter the evolutionary outcome in structured populations. However, the baseline case for understanding strategy selection is the well-mixed population case, which is still lacking sufficient understanding. We explore how aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics under imperfect rationality influence the average abundance of a strategy in multi-player evolutionary games with two strategies. We analytically derive a condition under which a strategy is more abundant than the other in the weak selection limiting case. This approach has a long-standing history in evolutionary games and is mostly applied for its mathematical approachability. Hence, we also explore strong selection numerically, which shows that our weak selection condition is a robust predictor of the average abundance of a strategy. The condition turns out to differ from that of a wide class of imitation dynamics, as long as the game is not dyadic. Therefore, a strategy favoured under imitation dynamics can be disfavoured under aspiration dynamics. This does not require any population structure, and thus highlights the intrinsic difference between imitation and aspiration dynamics.

Structure coefficients and strategy selection in multiplayer games.

Science.gov (United States)

McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph

2016-01-01

Evolutionary processes based on two-player games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Snowdrift Game are abundant in evolutionary game theory. These processes, including those based on games with more than two strategies, have been studied extensively under the assumption that selection is weak. However, games involving more than two players have not received the same level of attention. To address this issue, and to relate two-player games to multiplayer games, we introduce a notion of reducibility for multiplayer games that captures what it means to break down a multiplayer game into a sequence of interactions with fewer players. We discuss the role of reducibility in structured populations, and we give examples of games that are irreducible in any population structure. Since the known conditions for strategy selection, otherwise known as [Formula: see text]-rules, have been established only for two-player games with multiple strategies and for multiplayer games with two strategies, we extend these rules to multiplayer games with many strategies to account for irreducible games that cannot be reduced to those simpler types of games. In particular, we show that the number of structure coefficients required for a symmetric game with [Formula: see text]-player interactions and [Formula: see text] strategies grows in [Formula: see text] like [Formula: see text]. Our results also cover a type of ecologically asymmetric game based on payoff values that are derived not only from the strategies of the players, but also from their spatial positions within the population.

Evolutionary dynamics on graphs: Efficient method for weak selection

Science.gov (United States)

Fu, Feng; Wang, Long; Nowak, Martin A.; Hauert, Christoph

2009-04-01

Investigating the evolutionary dynamics of game theoretical interactions in populations where individuals are arranged on a graph can be challenging in terms of computation time. Here, we propose an efficient method to study any type of game on arbitrary graph structures for weak selection. In this limit, evolutionary game dynamics represents a first-order correction to neutral evolution. Spatial correlations can be empirically determined under neutral evolution and provide the basis for formulating the game dynamics as a discrete Markov process by incorporating a detailed description of the microscopic dynamics based on the neutral correlations. This framework is then applied to one of the most intriguing questions in evolutionary biology: the evolution of cooperation. We demonstrate that the degree heterogeneity of a graph impedes cooperation and that the success of tit for tat depends not only on the number of rounds but also on the degree of the graph. Moreover, considering the mutation-selection equilibrium shows that the symmetry of the stationary distribution of states under weak selection is skewed in favor of defectors for larger selection strengths. In particular, degree heterogeneity—a prominent feature of scale-free networks—generally results in a more pronounced increase in the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for evolution to favor cooperation as compared to regular graphs. This conclusion is corroborated by an analysis of the effects of population structures on the fixation probabilities of strategies in general 2×2 games for different types of graphs. Computer simulations confirm the predictive power of our method and illustrate the improved accuracy as compared to previous studies.

Semantic Web Compatible Names and Descriptions for Organisms

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, H.; Wilson, N.; McGuinness, D. L.

2012-12-01

Modern scientific names are critical for understanding the biological literature and provide a valuable way to understand evolutionary relationships. To validly publish a name, a description is required to separate the described group of organisms from those described by other names at the same level of the taxonomic hierarchy. The frequent revision of descriptions due to new evolutionary evidence has lead to situations where a single given scientific name may over time have multiple descriptions associated with it and a given published description may apply to multiple scientific names. Because of these many-to-many relationships between scientific names and descriptions, the usage of scientific names as a proxy for descriptions is inevitably ambiguous. Another issue lies in the fact that the precise application of scientific names often requires careful microscopic work, or increasingly, genetic sequencing, as scientific names are focused on the evolutionary relatedness between and within named groups such as species, genera, families, etc. This is problematic to many audiences, especially field biologists, who often do not have access to the instruments and tools required to make identifications on a microscopic or genetic basis. To better connect scientific names to descriptions and find a more convenient way to support computer assisted identification, we proposed the Semantic Vernacular System, a novel naming system that creates named, machine-interpretable descriptions for groups of organisms, and is compatible with the Semantic Web. Unlike the evolutionary relationship based scientific naming system, it emphasizes the observable features of organisms. By independently naming the descriptions composed of sets of observational features, as well as maintaining connections to scientific names, it preserves the observational data used to identify organisms. The system is designed to support a peer-review mechanism for creating new names, and uses a controlled

Unfair and Anomalous Evolutionary Dynamics from Fluctuating Payoffs

Science.gov (United States)

Stollmeier, Frank; Nagler, Jan

2018-02-01

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of randomness. These temporal variations in the payoffs can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics that are affected by varying payoffs remains difficult. Here we study the impact of arbitrary amplitudes and covariances of temporally varying payoffs on the dynamics. The evolutionary dynamics may be "unfair," meaning that, on average, two coexisting strategies may persistently receive different payoffs. This mechanism can induce an anomalous coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the prisoner's dilemma, and an unexpected selection reversal in the hawk-dove game.

Importance of tie strengths in the prisoner's dilemma game on social networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xu, Bo; Liu, Lu; You, Weijia

2011-01-01

Though numerous researches have shown that tie strengths play a key role in the formation of collective behavior in social networks, little work has been done to explore their impact on the outcome of evolutionary games. In this Letter, we studied the effect of tie strength in the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by using online social network datasets. The results show that the fraction of cooperators has a non-trivial dependence on tie strength. Weak ties, just like previous researches on epidemics and information diffusion have shown, play a key role by the maintenance of cooperators in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. -- Highlights: → Tie strength is used to measure heterogeneous influences of different pairs of nodes. → Weak ties play a role in maintaining cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games. → Micro-dynamics of nodes are illustrated to explain the conclusion.

The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Lili Deng

2016-01-01

Full Text Available We have studied evolutionary ultimatum game with spatially arranged players, who have choice between the two kinds of strategies (named greedy and altruist. The strategies in the ultimatum game here are described by p(i and a(i, that is, the probability of offering i to himself and the accepting probability when receiving i. By using computer simulations with C++ builder, we have provided the dynamics of the greedy and altruistic strategies and found that the proportion evolution of the “greedy” strategy for different initial cases is approximately 60%. Furthermore, the explanations for the interesting phenomenon are presented from different aspects. In addition, we illustrate that the factor of the expectation level (aspiration level in the updating rule plays an important role in the promotion of altruistic behaviors.

Optimizing Visual Properties of Game Content through Neuroevolution

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Liapis, Antonios; Yannakakis, Georgios N.; Togelius, Julian

This paper presents a search-based approach to generating game content that satisfies both gameplay requirements and user-expressed aesthetic criteria. Using evolutionary constraint satisfaction, we search for spaceships (for a space combat game) represented as compositional pattern...

Online Evolution for Multi-Action Adversarial Games

OpenAIRE

Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Togelius, Julian

2016-01-01

We present Online Evolution, a novel method for playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games. Such games, which include most strategy games, have extremely high branching factors due to each turn having multiple actions. In Online Evolution, an evolutionary algorithm is used to evolve the combination of atomic actions that make up a single move, with a state evaluation function used for fitness. We implement Online Evolution for the turn-based multi-action game Hero Academy and compare i...

Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yi Zhao

2015-01-01

Full Text Available On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business case to verify the evolution process of cooperation and competition relationship. The results show that (cooperation, cooperation is bound to be the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS and cooperation tends to be increasingly in-depth and expansive for commercial banks as well as e-commerce financial institutions in China. The complementarity of participants’ core competitiveness is explored as the root of cooperation. Finally, strategic suggestions are put forward on cooperation between e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks.

On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend

2011-01-01

We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman

Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Realpe-Gomez, John; Szczesny, Bartosz; Galla, Tobias; Dall’Asta, Luca

2012-01-01

Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning processes in a simple 2×2 game, for two-player games with cyclic interaction, and in the context of the best-shot network game. The analogues of finite populations in evolution are here finite batches of observations between strategy updates. We study when and how such fixation can occur, and present results on the average time-to-fixation from numerical simulations. Simple cases are also amenable to analytical approaches and we provide estimates of the behaviour of so-called escape times as a function of the batch size. The differences and similarities with escape and fixation in evolutionary dynamics are discussed. (paper)

Spatial snowdrift game in heterogeneous agent systems with co-evolutionary strategies and updating rules

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xia Hai-Jiang; Li Ping-Ping; Ke Jian-Hong; Lin Zhen-Quan

2015-01-01

We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the unconditional imitation rule; moreover, each agent can change his type to adopt another updating rule once the number he sequentially loses the game at is beyond his upper limit of tolerance. The cooperative behaviors of such heterogeneous systems are then investigated by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency and composition as functions of the cost-to-benefit ratio r are both of plateau structures with discontinuous steplike jumps, and the number of plateaux varies non-monotonically with the upper limit of tolerance ν T as well as the initial composition of agents f a0 . Besides, the quantities of the cooperation frequency and composition are dependent crucially on the system parameters including ν T , f a0 , and r. One intriguing observation is that when the upper limit of tolerance is small, the cooperation frequency will be abnormally enhanced with the increase of the cost-to-benefit ratio in the range of 0 < r < 1/4. We then probe into the relative cooperation frequencies of either type of agents, which are also of plateau structures dependent on the system parameters. Our results may be helpful to understand the cooperative behaviors of heterogenous agent systems. (paper)

When Reputation Enforces Evolutionary Cooperation in Unreliable MANETs.

Science.gov (United States)

Tang, Changbing; Li, Ang; Li, Xiang

2015-10-01

In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network functions rely on cooperation of self-interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel which results from loss of packets and noisy observation of transmissions. We propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet forwarding strategies in both structured and unstructured MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies and derive the threshold of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary game theoretic solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds the critical condition. In addition, the network throughput performance of our proposed strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy.

Constructionist Gaming: Understanding the Benefits of Making Games for Learning

OpenAIRE

Kafai, Yasmin B.; Burke, Quinn

2016-01-01

There has been considerable interest in examining the educational potential of playing video games. One crucial element, however, has traditionally been left out of these discussions?namely, children's learning through making their own games. In this article, we review and synthesize 55 studies from the last decade on making games and learning. We found that the majority of studies focused on teaching coding and academic content through game making, and that few studies explicitly examined th...

Study on system dynamics of evolutionary mix-game models

Science.gov (United States)

Gou, Chengling; Guo, Xiaoqian; Chen, Fang

2008-11-01

Mix-game model is ameliorated from an agent-based MG model, which is used to simulate the real financial market. Different from MG, there are two groups of agents in Mix-game: Group 1 plays a majority game and Group 2 plays a minority game. These two groups of agents have different bounded abilities to deal with historical information and to count their own performance. In this paper, we modify Mix-game model by assigning the evolution abilities to agents: if the winning rates of agents are smaller than a threshold, they will copy the best strategies the other agent has; and agents will repeat such evolution at certain time intervals. Through simulations this paper finds: (1) the average winning rates of agents in Group 1 and the mean volatilities increase with the increases of the thresholds of Group 1; (2) the average winning rates of both groups decrease but the mean volatilities of system increase with the increase of the thresholds of Group 2; (3) the thresholds of Group 2 have greater impact on system dynamics than the thresholds of Group 1; (4) the characteristics of system dynamics under different time intervals of strategy change are similar to each other qualitatively, but they are different quantitatively; (5) As the time interval of strategy change increases from 1 to 20, the system behaves more and more stable and the performances of agents in both groups become better also.

Randomness and arbitrary coordination in the reactive ultimatum game

Science.gov (United States)

da Silva, Roberto; Valverde, Pablo; Lamb, Luis C.

2016-07-01

Darwin's theory of evolution - as introduced in game theory by Maynard Smith - is not the only important evolutionary aspect in an evolutionary dynamics, since complex interdependencies, competition, and growth should be modeled by, for example, reactive aspects. In the ultimatum game, the reciprocity and the fifty-fifty partition seems to be a deviation from rational behavior of the players under the light of Nash equilibrium. Such equilibrium emerges, for example, from the punishment of the responder who generally tends to refuse unfair proposals. In the iterated version of the game, the proposers are able to improve their proposals by adding a value thus making fairer proposals. Such evolutionary aspects are not properly Darwinian-motivated, but they are endowed with a fundamental aspect: they reflect their actions according to value of the offers. Recently, a reactive version of the ultimatum game where acceptance occurs with fixed probability was proposed. In this paper, we aim at exploring this reactive version of the ultimatum game where the acceptance by players depends on the offer. In order to do so, we analyze two situations: (i) mean field and (ii) we consider players inserted within the networks with arbitrary coordination. We then show that the reactive aspect, here studied, thus far not analyzed in the evolutionary game theory literature can unveil an essential feature for the convergence to fifty-fifty split. Moreover we also analyze populations under four different polices ranging from a highly conservative to a moderate one, with respect to the decision in changing the proposal based on acceptances. We show that the idea of gaining less more times added to the reciprocity of the players is highly relevant to the concept of ;healthy; societies population bargaining.

Effects of Some Topological Ingredients on the Evolutionary Ultimatum Game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Deng Lili; Zhang Jianxiong; Tang Wansheng; Zhang Wei

2012-01-01

This study aims at figuring out the crucial topological ingredients which affect the outcomes of the ultimatum game located on different networks, encompassing the regular network, the random network, the small-world network, and the scale-free network. With the aid of random interchanging algorithm, we investigate the relations between the outcomes of the ultimatum game and some topological ingredients, including the average range, the clustering coefficient and the heterogeneity, and so forth. It is found that for the regular, random and small-work networks, the average range and the clustering coefficient have evident impacts on the ultimatum game, while for the scale-free network, the original degree heterogeneity and the underlying rich-club characterizations are the mainly important topological ingredients that influence the outcomes of ultimatum game substantially.

Natural games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anttila, Jani; Annila, Arto

2011-01-01

A course of a game is formulated as a physical process that will consume free energy in the least time. Accordingly, the rate of entropy increase is the payoff function that will subsume all forms of free energy that motivate diverse decisions. Also other concepts of game theory are related to their profound physical counterparts. When the physical portrayal of behavior is mathematically analyzed, the course of a game is found to be inherently unpredictable because each move affects motives in the future. Despite the non-holonomic character of the natural process, the objective of consuming free energy in the least time will direct an extensive-form game toward a Lyapunov-stable point that satisfies the minimax theorem. -- Highlights: → Behavior in the context of game theory is described as a natural process. → The rate of entropy increase, derived from statistical physics of open systems, is identified as the payoff function. → Entropy as the payoff function also clarifies motives of collaboration and subjective nature of decision making. → Evolutionary equation of motion that accounts for the course of a game is inherently unpredictable.

Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size.

Science.gov (United States)

McAvoy, Alex; Fraiman, Nicolas; Hauert, Christoph; Wakeley, John; Nowak, Martin A

2018-05-01

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended Wright-Fisher process with variable population size. In such a scenario, it is possible that the entire population becomes extinct. Survival of the population may depend on which strategy prevails in the game dynamics. Studying cooperative dilemmas, it is a natural feature of such a model that cooperators enable survival, while defectors drive extinction. Although defectors are favored for any mixed population, random drift could lead to their elimination and the resulting pure-cooperator population could survive. On the other hand, if the defectors remain, then the population will quickly go extinct because the frequency of cooperators steadily declines and defectors alone cannot survive. In a mutation-selection model, we find that (i) a steady supply of cooperators can enable long-term population survival, provided selection is sufficiently strong, and (ii) selection can increase the abundance of cooperators but reduce their relative frequency. Thus, evolutionary game dynamics in populations with variable size generate a multifaceted notion of what constitutes a trait's long-term success. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition.

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M; Wu, Rongling

2017-03-01

Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Cooperation in two-dimensional mixed-games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amaral, Marco A; Silva, Jafferson K L da; Wardil, Lucas

2015-01-01

Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two individuals is uniformly drawn from a sample of two different games. Using the master equation approach we show that the random mixture of two games is equivalent to play the average game when (i) the strategies are statistically independent of the game distribution and (ii) the transition rates are linear functions of the payoffs. We also use Monte-Carlo simulations in a two-dimensional lattice and mean-field techniques to investigate the scenario when the two above conditions do not hold. We find that even outside of such conditions, several quantities characterizing the mixed-games are still the same as the ones obtained in the average game when the two games are not very different. (paper)

Evolutionary Awareness

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gregory Gorelik

2014-10-01

Full Text Available In this article, we advance the concept of “evolutionary awareness,” a metacognitive framework that examines human thought and emotion from a naturalistic, evolutionary perspective. We begin by discussing the evolution and current functioning of the moral foundations on which our framework rests. Next, we discuss the possible applications of such an evolutionarily-informed ethical framework to several domains of human behavior, namely: sexual maturation, mate attraction, intrasexual competition, culture, and the separation between various academic disciplines. Finally, we discuss ways in which an evolutionary awareness can inform our cross-generational activities—which we refer to as “intergenerational extended phenotypes”—by helping us to construct a better future for ourselves, for other sentient beings, and for our environment.

Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games.

Science.gov (United States)

Nishimura, Takeshi; Okada, Akira; Shirata, Yasuhiro

2017-05-07

We consider the evolution of fairness and coalition formation in a three-person ultimatum game in which the coalition value depends on its size. Traditional game theory, which assumes selfish and rational players, predicts the largest and efficient coalition with a proposer exploiting most of the total value. In a stochastic evolutionary model (the frequency-dependent Moran process with mutations) where players make errors in estimating the payoffs and strategies of others, evolutionary selection favors the formation of a two-person subcoalition under weak selection and in the low mutation limit if and only if its coalition value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest coalition. Proposers offer 30-35% of the subcoalition value to a coalition member, excluding a non-member. Multilateral bargaining is critically different from the bilateral one. Coalition-forming behavior may cause economic inefficiency and social exclusion. Stochastic evolutionary game theory thus provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person ultimatum game. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Dynamics in atomic signaling games

KAUST Repository

Fox, Michael J.

2015-04-08

We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss.

Dynamics in atomic signaling games

KAUST Repository

Fox, Michael J.; Touri, Behrouz; Shamma, Jeff S.

2015-01-01

We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss.

Constructionist Gaming: Understanding the Benefits of Making Games for Learning

Science.gov (United States)

Kafai, Yasmin B.; Burke, Quinn

2015-01-01

There has been considerable interest in examining the educational potential of playing video games. One crucial element, however, has traditionally been left out of these discussions—namely, children's learning through making their own games. In this article, we review and synthesize 55 studies from the last decade on making games and learning. We found that the majority of studies focused on teaching coding and academic content through game making, and that few studies explicitly examined the roles of collaboration and identity in the game making process. We argue that future discussions of serious gaming ought to be more inclusive of constructionist approaches to realize the full potential of serious gaming. Making games, we contend, not only more genuinely introduces children to a range of technical skills but also better connects them to each other, addressing the persistent issues of access and diversity present in traditional digital gaming cultures. PMID:27019536

Importance of tie strengths in the prisoner's dilemma game on social networks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Xu, Bo, E-mail: xubosuper@163.com [Department of Information Systems, School of Economics and Management, Beihang University (China); Liu, Lu; You, Weijia [Department of Information Systems, School of Economics and Management, Beihang University (China)

2011-06-13

Though numerous researches have shown that tie strengths play a key role in the formation of collective behavior in social networks, little work has been done to explore their impact on the outcome of evolutionary games. In this Letter, we studied the effect of tie strength in the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by using online social network datasets. The results show that the fraction of cooperators has a non-trivial dependence on tie strength. Weak ties, just like previous researches on epidemics and information diffusion have shown, play a key role by the maintenance of cooperators in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. -- Highlights: → Tie strength is used to measure heterogeneous influences of different pairs of nodes. → Weak ties play a role in maintaining cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games. → Micro-dynamics of nodes are illustrated to explain the conclusion.

Odysseus «by any other/by no name» chez Polyphemos

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yoël L. Arbeitman

1995-12-01

Full Text Available Thesis: It is an accepted fact that name-games in Heroic Age Hebrew and Greek texts (archaic loci embedded in the long-redacted Biblical and Homeric texts held veritable significance in the period when the respective actions occurred. When in Ex. 2: 22 Moses names his First Born Son «Gēršōm», «because I was a resident-alien in a Land-Not-Mine», the implicatum is gēr šām «resident alien there» and any reader, knowing Hebrew, would recognize this second level word-game, one very serious. On the other hand, the translations of the LXX, the Vulgata, and Targum Onqelos are superb in meaning (semantically, but make the name aetiogies in vain, for they don't concern themselves with struggling to bring them across, an essential part of translation. But we are not concerned with translations in such word-games, only with the Urtext. Nevertheless in the Urtext of Odysseia IX, the names which the protagonist gives his inhospitable host, are apparently unmotivated. The author proposes very strong double motivation for the one form, viz. Oútis, the alternate form Mḗtis being automatically generated grammatically. As opposed to the biblical exx., knowledge of languages beyond that of the Greek Urtext is required to understand the name-games involved.

Epigenetic battle of the sexes. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Song

2017-03-01

Qian Wang et al. present an interesting framework, named epigenetic game theory, for modeling sex-based epigenetic dynamics during embryogenesis from a new viewpoint of evolutionary game theory [1]. That is, epigenomes of sperms and oocytes may coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to affect the fitness of embryos. The work uses a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to describe longitudinal trajectories of DNA methylation levels in both parental and maternal gametes and their dependence on each other. The insights gained from this review, i.e. dynamic methylation profiles and their interaction are potentially important to many fields, such as biomedicine and agriculture.

Recreational Games for Physical Education

Science.gov (United States)

Hume, Donald

2005-01-01

Recreational games can be incorporated into physical education programs to encourage play and activity among students during their leisure time. Students can play their own games during recess, before or after school, during intramural programs, or in their neighborhood with family and friends. This article describes five such games namely:…

Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jun-Zhou He

Full Text Available It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals. These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a "strong" player is greater than the "weak" players in the model of Diekmann (1993. This contradicts Selten's (1980 model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.

Goal-based dictator game

Science.gov (United States)

Zaibidi, Nerda Zura; Ibrahim, Adyda; Abidin, Norhaslinda Zainal

2014-12-01

A considerable number of studies have been conducted to study fairness issues using two-player game. Dictator Game is one of the two-player games that receive much attention. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary approach to the Dictator Game by using Goal programming to build a model of human decision-making for cooperation. The model is formulated based on the theories of cognitive neuroscience that is capable in capturing a more realistic fairness concerns between players in the games. We show that fairness will evolve by taking into account players' aspirations and preferences explicitly in terms of profit and fairness concerns. The model is then simulated to investigate any possible effective strategy for people in economics to deal with fairness coalition. Parallels are drawn between the approach and concepts of human decision making from the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychology. The proposed model is also able to help decision makers to plan or enhance the effective strategies for business purposes.

phyloXML: XML for evolutionary biology and comparative genomics.

Science.gov (United States)

Han, Mira V; Zmasek, Christian M

2009-10-27

Evolutionary trees are central to a wide range of biological studies. In many of these studies, tree nodes and branches need to be associated (or annotated) with various attributes. For example, in studies concerned with organismal relationships, tree nodes are associated with taxonomic names, whereas tree branches have lengths and oftentimes support values. Gene trees used in comparative genomics or phylogenomics are usually annotated with taxonomic information, genome-related data, such as gene names and functional annotations, as well as events such as gene duplications, speciations, or exon shufflings, combined with information related to the evolutionary tree itself. The data standards currently used for evolutionary trees have limited capacities to incorporate such annotations of different data types. We developed a XML language, named phyloXML, for describing evolutionary trees, as well as various associated data items. PhyloXML provides elements for commonly used items, such as branch lengths, support values, taxonomic names, and gene names and identifiers. By using "property" elements, phyloXML can be adapted to novel and unforeseen use cases. We also developed various software tools for reading, writing, conversion, and visualization of phyloXML formatted data. PhyloXML is an XML language defined by a complete schema in XSD that allows storing and exchanging the structures of evolutionary trees as well as associated data. More information about phyloXML itself, the XSD schema, as well as tools implementing and supporting phyloXML, is available at http://www.phyloxml.org.

Dynamic game balancing implementation using adaptive algorithm in mobile-based Safari Indonesia game

Science.gov (United States)

Yuniarti, Anny; Nata Wardanie, Novita; Kuswardayan, Imam

2018-03-01

In developing a game there is one method that should be applied to maintain the interest of players, namely dynamic game balancing. Dynamic game balancing is a process to match a player’s playing style with the behaviour, attributes, and game environment. This study applies dynamic game balancing using adaptive algorithm in scrolling shooter game type called Safari Indonesia which developed using Unity. The game of this type is portrayed by a fighter aircraft character trying to defend itself from insistent enemy attacks. This classic game is chosen to implement adaptive algorithms because it has quite complex attributes to be developed using dynamic game balancing. Tests conducted by distributing questionnaires to a number of players indicate that this method managed to reduce frustration and increase the pleasure factor in playing.

Wherever Hardware, There’ll be Games. The evolution of hardware and shifting industrial leadership in the gaming industry 1968-2004

OpenAIRE

Jörnmark, Jan

2005-01-01

Video game was the first truly digital entertainment medium, requiring processing power both in the production and consumption stage. Born out of the transistor, it was also intimately connected with its logic: the doubling of the processor capacity every 18th month or the halving of the price for the same processing capacity in the same time. Transistor technology and video games have been able to conquer society in an evolutionary process. Hence, video games have had an unprecedented abilit...

Psychology of Game Playing: Introduction to a Special Issue

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Andrew M. Colman

2015-12-01

Full Text Available Game theory has focused attention on different problems at different times in its history. Currently, attention is devoted to investigating how human decision makers with bounded rationality choose strategies in interactive decisions. Behavioral economics, and more generally experimental games, have appeared in the literature with accelerating frequency since 1990, and this cannot continue indefinitely without a proportional expansion of journal space. This Special Issue includes contributions to behavioral economics, experimental games, and evolutionary game theory, using theoretical, experimental, and agent-based modeling techniques.

The migration game in habitat network: the case of tuna

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Mariani, Patrizio; Krivan, Vlastimil; MacKenzie, Brian

2016-01-01

migration in direction of increasing fitness should lead to the ideal free distribution (IFD) which is the evolutionary stable strategy of the habitat selection game. We introduce a migration game which focuses on migrating dynamics leading to the IFD for age-structured populations and in time varying...

Evolutionary game theory and criticality

Science.gov (United States)

Mahmoodi, Korosh; Grigolini, Paolo

2017-01-01

We study a regular two-dimensional network of individuals playing the Prisonner’s Dilemma game with their neighbors, assigning to each individual the adoption of two different criteria to make a choice between cooperation and defection. For a fraction q  incentive to cheat yields the extinction of cooperation and a modest one leads to the survival of cooperation. We show that for K={{K}\\text{c}} the adoption of a very small value of ɛ exerts a bias in favor of either cooperation or defection, as a form of criticality-induced intelligence, which leads the system to select either the cooperation or the defection branch, when K>{{K}\\text{c}} . Intermediate values of ɛ annihilated criticality-induced cognition and, as consequence, may favor defection choice even in the case when a wise payoff consideration is expected to yield the emergence of cooperation.

Agents, games and evolution strategies at work and play

CERN Document Server

Kimbrough, Steven Orla

2011-01-01

StartersContexts of Strategic InteractionGames in the Wild and the Problems of PlayMixed MotivesPlaying Prisoner's DilemmaFanning Out: 2x2 Games and ModelsStag HuntPareto versus NashAffording CooperationMarkets and ApplicationsCompetitive MarketsMonopoly StoriesOligopoly: Cournot CompetitionOligopoly: Bertrand CompetitionSupply Curve BiddingTwo-Sided MatchingIDS GamesOrganizational AmbidexterityBargainingTopics in Strategic AnalysisLying and Related AbusesEvolutionary ModelsBackward InductionSumming UpAppendicesGame ConceptsUseful Mathematical ResultsFurther Arguments on the Surprise ExamResources on the WebBibliographyIndex.

The role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas: an evolutionary game theoretical view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Basanta, David; Scott, Jacob G; Anderson, Alexander R A; Rockne, Russ; Swanson, Kristin R

2011-01-01

Recent advances in clinical medicine have elucidated two significantly different subtypes of glioblastoma which carry very different prognoses, both defined by mutations in isocitrate dehydrogenase-1 (IDH-1). The mechanistic consequences of this mutation have not yet been fully clarified, with conflicting opinions existing in the literature; however, IDH-1 mutation may be used as a surrogate marker to distinguish between primary and secondary glioblastoma multiforme (sGBM) from malignant progression of a lower grade glioma. We develop a mathematical model of IDH-1 mutated secondary glioblastoma using evolutionary game theory to investigate the interactions between four different phenotypic populations within the tumor: autonomous growth, invasive, glycolytic, and the hybrid invasive/glycolytic cells. Our model recapitulates glioblastoma behavior well and is able to reproduce two recent experimental findings, as well as make novel predictions concerning the rate of invasive growth as a function of vascularity, and fluctuations in the proportions of phenotypic populations that a glioblastoma will experience under different microenvironmental constraints

The role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas: an evolutionary game theoretical view

Science.gov (United States)

Basanta, David; Scott, Jacob G.; Rockne, Russ; Swanson, Kristin R.; Anderson, Alexander R. A.

2011-02-01

Recent advances in clinical medicine have elucidated two significantly different subtypes of glioblastoma which carry very different prognoses, both defined by mutations in isocitrate dehydrogenase-1 (IDH-1). The mechanistic consequences of this mutation have not yet been fully clarified, with conflicting opinions existing in the literature; however, IDH-1 mutation may be used as a surrogate marker to distinguish between primary and secondary glioblastoma multiforme (sGBM) from malignant progression of a lower grade glioma. We develop a mathematical model of IDH-1 mutated secondary glioblastoma using evolutionary game theory to investigate the interactions between four different phenotypic populations within the tumor: autonomous growth, invasive, glycolytic, and the hybrid invasive/glycolytic cells. Our model recapitulates glioblastoma behavior well and is able to reproduce two recent experimental findings, as well as make novel predictions concerning the rate of invasive growth as a function of vascularity, and fluctuations in the proportions of phenotypic populations that a glioblastoma will experience under different microenvironmental constraints.

Motion depending on the strategies of players enhances cooperation in a co-evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cheng Hongyan; Li Haihong; Dai Qionglin; Zhu Yun; Yang Junzhong

2010-01-01

In the evolution of cooperation, the motion of players plays an important role. In this paper, we incorporate, into an evolutionary prisoner dilemma's game on networks, a new factor that cooperators and defectors move with different probabilities. By investigating the dependence of the cooperator frequency on the moving probabilities of cooperators and defectors, μ c and μ d , we find that cooperation is greatly enhanced in the parameter regime of μ c d . The snapshots of strategy pattern and the evolutions of cooperator clusters and defector clusters reveal that either the fast motion of defectors or the slow motion of cooperators always favors the formation of large cooperator clusters. The model is investigated on different types of networks such as square lattices, Erdoes-Renyi networks and scale-free networks and with different types of strategy-updating rules such as the richest-following rule and the Fermi rule. The numerical results show that the observed phenomena are robust to different networks and to different strategy-updating rules.

Learning Multidisciplinary Collaboration with Games

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Henriksen, Thomas Duus

2015-01-01

This chapter describes the design of a game-based learning process for developing communication in public organisations. The game-design presented here emphasises those parts of public organisations that tend to employ multidisciplinary teams for solving wicked problems. As such teams employ...... members from different, professional backgrounds, the game Public Professional sought to develop new understandings among team members and across professions. The purpose of this game was to facilitate an understanding among team members and across professions, a game-based learning process named Public...... from the game’s core mechanics....

Evolutionary robotics simulations help explain why reciprocity is rare in nature.

Science.gov (United States)

André, Jean-Baptiste; Nolfi, Stefano

2016-09-12

The relative rarity of reciprocity in nature, contrary to theoretical predictions that it should be widespread, is currently one of the major puzzles in social evolution theory. Here we use evolutionary robotics to solve this puzzle. We show that models based on game theory are misleading because they neglect the mechanics of behavior. In a series of experiments with simulated robots controlled by artificial neural networks, we find that reciprocity does not evolve, and show that this results from a general constraint that likely also prevents it from evolving in the wild. Reciprocity can evolve if it requires very few mutations, as is usually assumed in evolutionary game theoretic models, but not if, more realistically, it requires the accumulation of many adaptive mutations.

Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Evaluation of P2P File-Sharing Systems in Heterogeneous Environments

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yusuke Matsuda

2010-01-01

Full Text Available Peer-to-Peer (P2P file sharing is one of key technologies for achieving attractive P2P multimedia social networking. In P2P file-sharing systems, file availability is improved by cooperative users who cache and share files. Note that file caching carries costs such as storage consumption and processing load. In addition, users have different degrees of cooperativity in file caching and they are in different surrounding environments arising from the topological structure of P2P networks. With evolutionary game theory, this paper evaluates the performance of P2P file sharing systems in such heterogeneous environments. Using micro-macro dynamics, we analyze the impact of the heterogeneity of user selfishness on the file availability and system stability. Further, through simulation experiments with agent-based dynamics, we reveal how other aspects, for example, synchronization among nodes and topological structure, affect the system performance. Both analytical and simulation results show that the environmental heterogeneity contributes to the file availability and system stability.

Applications and extensions of epigenetic game theory. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Yaqun

2017-03-01

The authors are to be congratulated for a thought-provoking article [1], which reviews the epigenetic game theory (epiGame) that utilizes differential equations to study the epigenetic control of embryo development. It is a novel application of evolutionary game theory and provides biology researchers with useful methodologies to address scientific questions related to biological coordination of competition and cooperation.

Stability properties of nonlinear dynamical systems and evolutionary stable states

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gleria, Iram, E-mail: iram@fis.ufal.br [Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal de Alagoas, 57072-970 Maceió-AL (Brazil); Brenig, Leon [Faculté des Sciences, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1050 Brussels (Belgium); Rocha Filho, Tarcísio M.; Figueiredo, Annibal [Instituto de Física and International Center for Condensed Matter Physics, Universidade de Brasília, 70919-970 Brasília-DF (Brazil)

2017-03-18

Highlights: • We address the problem of equilibrium stability in a general class of non-linear systems. • We link Evolutionary Stable States (ESS) to stable fixed points of square quasi-polynomial (QP) systems. • We show that an interior ES point may be related to stable interior fixed points of QP systems. - Abstract: In this paper we address the problem of stability in a general class of non-linear systems. We establish a link between the concepts of asymptotic stable interior fixed points of square Quasi-Polynomial systems and evolutionary stable states, a property of some payoff matrices arising from evolutionary games.

Modeling evolutionary games in populations with demographic structure

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Li, Xiang-Yi; Giaimo, Stefano; Baudisch, Annette

2015-01-01

interactions, but usually omits life history and the demographic structure of the population. Here we show how an integration of both aspects can substantially alter the underlying evolutionary dynamics. We study the replicator dynamics of strategy interactions in life stage structured populations. Individuals...

Holistic Darwinism: the new evolutionary paradigm and some implications for political science.

Science.gov (United States)

Corning, Peter A

2008-03-01

Holistic Darwinism is a candidate name for a major paradigm shift that is currently underway in evolutionary biology and related disciplines. Important developments include (1) a growing appreciation for the fact that evolution is a multilevel process, from genes to ecosystems, and that interdependent coevolution is a ubiquitous phenomenon in nature; (2) a revitalization of group selection theory, which was banned (prematurely) from evolutionary biology over 30 years ago (groups may in fact be important evolutionary units); (3) a growing respect for the fact that the genome is not a "bean bag" (in biologist Ernst Mayr's caricature), much less a gladiatorial arena for competing selfish genes, but a complex, interdependent, cooperating system; (4) an increased recognition that symbiosis is an important phenomenon in nature and that symbiogenesis is a major source of innovation in evolution; (5) an array of new, more advanced game theory models, which support the growing evidence that cooperation is commonplace in nature and not a rare exception; (6) new research and theoretical work that stresses the role of nurture in evolution, including developmental processes, phenotypic plasticity, social information transfer (culture), and especially the role of behavioral innovations as pacemakers of evolutionary change (e.g., niche construction theory, which is concerned with the active role of organisms in shaping the evolutionary process, and gene-culture coevolution theory, which relates especially to the dynamics of human evolution); (7) and, not least, a broad effort to account for the evolution of biological complexity--from major transition theory to the "Synergism Hypothesis." Here I will briefly review these developments and will present a case for the proposition that this paradigm shift has profound implications for the social sciences, including specifically political theory, economic theory, and political science as a discipline. Interdependent superorganisms, it

Integrating genomics into evolutionary medicine.

Science.gov (United States)

Rodríguez, Juan Antonio; Marigorta, Urko M; Navarro, Arcadi

2014-12-01

The application of the principles of evolutionary biology into medicine was suggested long ago and is already providing insight into the ultimate causes of disease. However, a full systematic integration of medical genomics and evolutionary medicine is still missing. Here, we briefly review some cases where the combination of the two fields has proven profitable and highlight two of the main issues hindering the development of evolutionary genomic medicine as a mature field, namely the dissociation between fitness and health and the still considerable difficulties in predicting phenotypes from genotypes. We use publicly available data to illustrate both problems and conclude that new approaches are needed for evolutionary genomic medicine to overcome these obstacles. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

An introduction to game-theoretic modelling

CERN Document Server

Mesterton-Gibbons, Mike

2000-01-01

This is an introduction to game theory and applications with an emphasis on self-discovery from the perspective of a mathematical modeller. The book deals in a unified manner with the central concepts of both classical and evolutionary game theory. The key ideas are illustrated throughout by a wide variety of well-chosen examples of both human and non-human behavior, including car pooling, price fixing, food sharing, sex allocation and competition for territories or oviposition sites. There are numerous exercises with solutions.

Serious Games Development and Applications: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Serious Games Development and Applications (SGDA 2011)

OpenAIRE

2011-01-01

The recent re-emergence of serious games as a branch of video games has introduced the concept of games designed for a serious purpose other than pure entertainment. To date the major applications of serious games include education and training, engineering, medicine and healthcare, military applications, city planning, production, crisis response, just to name a few. If utilised alongside, or combined with conventional approaches serious games could provide a more powerful means of knowledge...

Creating Evaluation Profiles for Games Designed to be Fun: An Interpretive Framework for Serious Game Mechanics

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Ulrich, Frank; Helms, Niels Henrik

2017-01-01

an interpretive evaluation framework that can identify the educational value in COTS games. Application. The presented framework can create evaluative profiles of the learning, social, game, and immersive mechanics of COTS games as educational tools. Moreover, the framework can position COTS games between four...... intertwined dimensions, namely pedagogical, design, knowledge, and sociotechnical considerations. Demonstration. To validate the practical application of the interpretive framework, we apply it to a real-world example. Our demonstration reveals the usefulness of the framework. Conclusions. The framework...

Topology control with IPD network creation games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scholz, Jan C; Greiner, Martin O W

2007-01-01

Network creation games couple a two-players game with the evolution of network structure. A vertex player may increase its own payoff with a change of strategy or with a modification of its edge-defined neighbourhood. By referring to the iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD) game we show that this evolutionary dynamics converges to network-Nash equilibria, where no vertex is able to improve its payoff. The resulting network structure exhibits a strong dependence on the parameter of the payoff matrix. Degree distributions and cluster coefficients are also strongly affected by the specific interactions chosen for the neighbourhood exploration. This allows network creation games to be seen as a promising artificial-social-systems approach for a distributive topology control of complex networked systems

Diversity of neighborhoods promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

Science.gov (United States)

Ma, Yongjuan; Lu, Jun; Shi, Lei

2017-02-01

Explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important and interesting problems in a myriad of disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, statistical physics, social science and economics Up to now, there have been a great number of works aiming to this issue with the help of evolutionary game theory. However, vast majority of existing literatures simply assume that the interaction neighborhood and replacement neighborhood are symmetric, which seems inconsistent with real-world cases. In this paper, we consider the asymmetrical neighborhood: player of type A, whose factor is controlled by a parameter τ, has four interaction neighbors and four replacement neighbors, while player of type B, whose factor is controlled by a parameter 1 - τ, possess eight interaction neighbors and four replacement neighbors. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we found that middle τ can make the cooperation reach the highest level While for this finding, its robustness can be further validated in more games.

The (De-)Evolution of Evolution Games: A Content Analysis of the Representation of Evolution through Natural Selection in Digital Games

Science.gov (United States)

Leith, Alex P.; Ratan, Rabindra A.; Wohn, Donghee Yvette

2016-01-01

Given the diversity and complexity of education game mechanisms and topics, this article contributes to a theoretical understanding of how game mechanisms "map" to educational topics through inquiry-based learning. Namely, the article examines the presence of evolution through natural selection (ENS) in digital games. ENS is a…

Human Evolution, Movement, and Intelligence: Why Playing Games Counts as Smart

Science.gov (United States)

Kretchmar, R. Scott

2018-01-01

The article investigates several ways in which creating, entering, and playing games requires uniquely human levels of intelligence. It examines an element of our evolutionary heritage and the possibility that games (particularly in the form of sport) were among the first elements of culture. It describes sport as a "way of knowing," a…

Inactivation of tumor suppressor genes and cancer therapy: An evolutionary game theory approach.

Science.gov (United States)

Khadem, Heydar; Kebriaei, Hamed; Veisi, Zahra

2017-06-01

Inactivation of alleles in tumor suppressor genes (TSG) is one of the important issues resulting in evolution of cancerous cells. In this paper, the evolution of healthy, one and two missed allele cells is modeled using the concept of evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics. The proposed model also takes into account the interaction rates of the cells as designing parameters of the system. Different combinations of the equilibrium points of the parameterized nonlinear system is studied and categorized into some cases. In each case, the interaction rates' values are suggested in a way that the equilibrium points of the replicator dynamics are located on an appropriate region of the state space. Based on the suggested interaction rates, it is proved that the system doesn't have any undesirable interior equilibrium point as well. Therefore, the system will converge to the desirable region, where there is a scanty level of cancerous cells. In addition, the proposed conditions for interaction rates guarantee that, when a trajectory of the system reaches the boundaries, then it will stay there forever which is a desirable property since the equilibrium points have been already located on the boundaries, appropriately. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the suggestions in the elimination of the cancerous cells in different scenarios. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The evolutionary ecology of molecular replicators.

Science.gov (United States)

Nee, Sean

2016-08-01

By reasonable criteria, life on the Earth consists mainly of molecular replicators. These include viruses, transposons, transpovirons, coviruses and many more, with continuous new discoveries like Sputnik Virophage. Their study is inherently multidisciplinary, spanning microbiology, genetics, immunology and evolutionary theory, and the current view is that taking a unified approach has great power and promise. We support this with a new, unified, model of their evolutionary ecology, using contemporary evolutionary theory coupling the Price equation with game theory, studying the consequences of the molecular replicators' promiscuous use of each others' gene products for their natural history and evolutionary ecology. Even at this simple expository level, we can make a firm prediction of a new class of replicators exploiting viruses such as lentiviruses like SIVs, a family which includes HIV: these have been explicitly stated in the primary literature to be non-existent. Closely connected to this departure is the view that multicellular organism immunology is more about the management of chronic infections rather than the elimination of acute ones and new understandings emerging are changing our view of the kind of theatre we ourselves provide for the evolutionary play of molecular replicators. This study adds molecular replicators to bacteria in the emerging field of sociomicrobiology.

Nash evolutionary algorithms : Testing problem size in reconstruction problems in frame structures

OpenAIRE

Greiner, D.; Periaux, Jacques; Emperador, J.M.; Galván, B.; Winter, G.

2016-01-01

The use of evolutionary algorithms has been enhanced in recent years for solving real engineering problems, where the requirements of intense computational calculations are needed, especially when computational engineering simulations are involved (use of finite element method, boundary element method, etc). The coupling of game-theory concepts in evolutionary algorithms has been a recent line of research which could enhance the efficiency of the optimum design procedure and th...

Juegos, Canciones, Poemas y Adivinanzas (Games, Songs, Poems and Riddles).

Science.gov (United States)

Toro, Leonor; And Others

Printed in Spanish, this booklet contains games, songs, poems, riddles, and sayings for use with Puerto Rican migrant children. Eleven matching exercises present Spanish vocabulary related to clothing, food, and musical instruments. Eleven word search games teach Spanish names for body parts, masculine and feminine nouns, famous names, fruits and…

Ludic Educational Game Creation Tool

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Vidakis, Nikolaos; Syntychakis, Efthimios; Kalafatis, Konstantinos

2015-01-01

This paper presents initial findings and ongoing work of the game creation tool, a core component of the IOLAOS(IOLAOS in ancient Greece was a divine hero famed for helping with some of Heracles’s labors.) platform, a general open authorable framework for educational and training games. The game...... creation tool features a web editor, where the game narrative can be manipulated, according to specific needs. Moreover, this tool is applied for creating an educational game according to a reference scenario namely teaching schoolers road safety. A ludic approach is used both in game creation and play....... Helping children staying safe and preventing serious injury on the roads is crucial. In this context, this work presents an augmented version of the IOLAOS architecture including an enhanced game creation tool and a new multimodality module. In addition presents a case study for creating educational games...

Design and evaluation of a data-driven scenario generation framework for game-based training

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Luo, L.; Yin, H.; Cai, W.; Zhong, J.; Lees, M.

Generating suitable game scenarios that can cater for individual players has become an emerging challenge in procedural content generation. In this paper, we propose a data-driven scenario generation framework for game-based training. An evolutionary scenario generation process is designed with a

The Price Equation, Gradient Dynamics, and Continuous Trait Game Theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Lehtonen, Jussi

2018-01-01

A recent article convincingly nominated the Price equation as the fundamental theorem of evolution and used it as a foundation to derive several other theorems. A major section of evolutionary theory that was not addressed is that of game theory and gradient dynamics of continuous traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Deriving fundamental results in these fields under the unifying framework of the Price equation illuminates similarities and differences between approaches and allows a simple, unified view of game-theoretical and dynamic concepts. Using Taylor polynomials and the Price equation, I derive a dynamic measure of evolutionary change, a condition for singular points, the convergence stability criterion, and an alternative interpretation of evolutionary stability. Furthermore, by applying the Price equation to a multivariable Taylor polynomial, the direct fitness approach to kin selection emerges. Finally, I compare these results to the mean gradient equation of quantitative genetics and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics.

Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kristian Lindgren

2013-01-01

Full Text Available The finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained through most of the game. A game-theoretic reasoning based on backward induction eliminates strategies step by step until defection from the first round is the only remaining choice, reflecting the Nash equilibrium of the game. We investigate the Nash equilibrium solution for two different sets of strategies in an evolutionary context, using replicator-mutation dynamics. The first set consists of conditional cooperators, up to a certain round, while the second set in addition to these contains two strategy types that react differently on the first round action: The ”Convincer” strategies insist with two rounds of initial cooperation, trying to establish more cooperative play in the game, while the ”Follower” strategies, although being first round defectors, have the capability to respond to an invite in the first round. For both of these strategy sets, iterated elimination of strategies shows that the only Nash equilibria are given by defection from the first round. We show that the evolutionary dynamics of the first set is always characterised by a stable fixed point, corresponding to the Nash equilibrium, if the mutation rate is sufficiently small (but still positive. The second strategy set is numerically investigated, and we find that there are regions of parameter space where fixed points become unstable and the dynamics exhibits cycles of different strategy compositions. The results indicate that, even in the limit of very small mutation rate, the replicator-mutation dynamics does not necessarily bring the system with Convincers and Followers to the fixed point corresponding to the Nash equilibrium of the game. We also perform a detailed analysis of how the evolutionary behaviour depends on

Theoretical Approaches in Evolutionary Ecology: Environmental Feedback as a Unifying Perspective.

Science.gov (United States)

Lion, Sébastien

2018-01-01

Evolutionary biology and ecology have a strong theoretical underpinning, and this has fostered a variety of modeling approaches. A major challenge of this theoretical work has been to unravel the tangled feedback loop between ecology and evolution. This has prompted the development of two main classes of models. While quantitative genetics models jointly consider the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of a focal population, a separation of timescales between ecology and evolution is assumed by evolutionary game theory, adaptive dynamics, and inclusive fitness theory. As a result, theoretical evolutionary ecology tends to be divided among different schools of thought, with different toolboxes and motivations. My aim in this synthesis is to highlight the connections between these different approaches and clarify the current state of theory in evolutionary ecology. Central to this approach is to make explicit the dependence on environmental dynamics of the population and evolutionary dynamics, thereby materializing the eco-evolutionary feedback loop. This perspective sheds light on the interplay between environmental feedback and the timescales of ecological and evolutionary processes. I conclude by discussing some potential extensions and challenges to our current theoretical understanding of eco-evolutionary dynamics.

Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity: A Dynamic Game Approach

Science.gov (United States)

Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir

2009-12-01

Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators, which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show that the proposed dynamic game formulation satisfied the conditions for the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity: A Dynamic Game Approach

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sintayehu Dehnie

2009-01-01

Full Text Available Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators, which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS. Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show that the proposed dynamic game formulation satisfied the conditions for the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Neuroevolution in Games: State of the Art and Open Challenges

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Risi, Sebastian; Togelius, Julian

2015-01-01

This paper surveys research on applying neuroevolution (NE) to games. In neuroevolution, artificial neural networks are trained through evolutionary algorithms, taking inspiration from the way biological brains evolved. We analyse the application of NE in games along five different axes, which...... are the role NE is chosen to play in a game, the different types of neural networks used, the way these networks are evolved, how the fitness is determined and what type of input the network receives. The article also highlights important open research challenges in the field....

Scheduling for the National Hockey League Using a Multi-objective Evolutionary Algorithm

Science.gov (United States)

Craig, Sam; While, Lyndon; Barone, Luigi

We describe a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm that derives schedules for the National Hockey League according to three objectives: minimising the teams' total travel, promoting equity in rest time between games, and minimising long streaks of home or away games. Experiments show that the system is able to derive schedules that beat the 2008-9 NHL schedule in all objectives simultaneously, and that it returns a set of schedules that offer a range of trade-offs across the objectives.

Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in Structured Populations

Science.gov (United States)

Santos, Marta Daniela de Almeida

The pervasiveness of cooperation in Nature is not easily explained. If evolution is characterized by competition and survival of the fittest, why should selfish individuals cooperate with each other? Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) provides a suitable mathematical framework to study this problem, central to many areas of science. Conventionally, interactions between individuals are modeled in terms of one-shot, symmetric 2-Person Dilemmas of Cooperation, but many real-life situations involve decisions within groups with more than 2 individuals, which are best-dealt in the framework of N-Person games. In this Thesis, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of two paradigmatic collective social dilemmas - the N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma (NPD) and the N-Person Snowdrift Game (NSG) on structured populations, modeled by networks with diverse topological properties. Cooperative strategies are just one example of the many traits that can be transmitted on social networks. Several recent studies based on empirical evidence from a medical database have suggested the existence of a 3 degrees of influence rule, according to which not only our "friends", but also our friends' friends, and our friends' friends' friends, have a non-trivial influence on our decisions. We investigate the degree of peer influence that emerges from the spread of cooperative strategies, opinions and diseases on populations with distinct underlying networks of contacts. Our results show that networks naturally entangle individuals into interactions of many-body nature and that for each network class considered different processes lead to identical degrees of influence. None

Topological chaos of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular networks.

Science.gov (United States)

Jin, Weifeng; Chen, Fangyue

2016-02-21

The spatial version of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on infinitely large regular lattice with purely deterministic strategies and no memories among players is investigated in this paper. Based on the statistical inferences, it is pertinent to confirm that the frequency of cooperation for characterizing its macroscopic behaviors is very sensitive to the initial conditions, which is the most practically significant property of chaos. Its intrinsic complexity is then justified on firm ground from the theory of symbolic dynamics; that is, this game is topologically mixing and possesses positive topological entropy on its subsystems. It is demonstrated therefore that its frequency of cooperation could not be adopted by simply averaging over several steps after the game reaches the equilibrium state. Furthermore, the chaotically changing spatial patterns via empirical observations can be defined and justified in view of symbolic dynamics. It is worth mentioning that the procedure proposed in this work is also applicable to other deterministic spatial evolutionary games therein. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

An evolutionary game model for behavioral gambit of loyalists: Global awareness and risk-aversion

Science.gov (United States)

Alfinito, E.; Barra, A.; Beccaria, M.; Fachechi, A.; Macorini, G.

2018-02-01

We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by indifference with respect to the game at all: their dynamics is designed to account for risk-aversion as an innovative behavioral gambit. From this point of view, the choice of this solitary strategy is enhanced when innovation starts, while is depressed when it becomes the majority option. This implies that the payoff matrix of the game becomes dependent on the global awareness of the agents measured by the relevance of the population of the indifferent players. The resulting dynamics is nontrivial with different kinds of phase transition depending on a few model parameters. The phase diagram is studied on regular as well as complex networks.

Game theory decisions, interaction and evolution

CERN Document Server

Webb, James N

2007-01-01

This introduction to game theory is written from a mathematical perspective. Its primary purpose is to be a first course for undergraduate students of mathematics, but it also contains material which will be of interest to advanced students or researchers in biology and economics. The outstanding feature of the book is that it provides a unified account of three types of decision problem: Situations involving a single decision-maker: in which a sequence of choices is to be made in "a game against nature". This introduces the basic ideas of optimality and decision processes. Classical game theory: in which the interactions of two or more decision-makers are considered. This leads to the concept of the Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary game theory: in which the changing structure of a population of interacting decision makers is considered. This leads to the ideas of evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics. An understanding of basic calculus and probability is assumed but no prior knowledge of gam...

Cats and Portals: Video Games, Learning, and Play

Science.gov (United States)

Gee, James Paul

2008-01-01

The author builds on arguments he has made elsewhere that good commercial video games foster deep learning and problem solving and that such games in fact promote mastery as a form of play. Here he maintains that some good video games engage players with an important type of play, namely of play as discovery, of play as surmising new possibilities…

Evolutionary game theory and social learning can determine how vaccine scares unfold.

Science.gov (United States)

Bauch, Chris T; Bhattacharyya, Samit

2012-01-01

Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) autism vaccine scare in Britain. A "free rider" effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty). Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence--up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis--including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts.

Game theory and its applications in the social and biological sciences

CERN Document Server

Colman, Andrew M; Humphreys, Peter; Negrine, Ralph

2013-01-01

Andrew Coleman provides an accessible introduction to the fundamentals of mathematical gaming and other major applications in social psychology, decision theory, economics, politics, evolutionary biology, philosophy, operational research and sociology.

Towards gaze-controlled platform games

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Muñoz, Jorge; Yannakakis, Georgios N.; Mulvey, Fiona

2011-01-01

This paper introduces the concept of using gaze as a sole modality for fully controlling player characters of fast-paced action computer games. A user experiment is devised to collect gaze and gameplay data from subjects playing a version of the popular Super Mario Bros platform game. The initial...... analysis shows that there is a rather limited grid around Mario where the efficient player focuses her attention the most while playing the game. The useful grid as we name it, projects the amount of meaningful visual information a designer should use towards creating successful player character...... controllers with the use of artificial intelligence for a platform game like Super Mario. Information about the eyes' position on the screen and the state of the game are utilized as inputs of an artificial neural network, which is trained to approximate which keyboard action is to be performed at each game...

Orthogonally Evolved AI to Improve Difficulty Adjustment in Video Games

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hintze, Arend; Olson, Randal; Lehman, Joel Anthony

2016-01-01

Computer games are most engaging when their difficulty is well matched to the player's ability, thereby providing an experience in which the player is neither overwhelmed nor bored. In games where the player interacts with computer-controlled opponents, the difficulty of the game can be adjusted...... not only by changing the distribution of opponents or game resources, but also through modifying the skill of the opponents. Applying evolutionary algorithms to evolve the artificial intelligence that controls opponent agents is one established method for adjusting opponent difficulty. Less-evolved agents...... (i.e. agents subject to fewer generations of evolution) make for easier opponents, while highly-evolved agents are more challenging to overcome. In this publication we test a new approach for difficulty adjustment in games: orthogonally evolved AI, where the player receives support from collaborating...

Swipe this! the guide to great touchscreen game design

CERN Document Server

Rogers, Scott

2012-01-01

Learn to design games for tablets from a renowned game designer! Eager to start designing games for tablets but not sure where to start? Look no further! Gaming guru Scott Rogers has his finger on the pulse of tablet game design and is willing to impart his wisdom and secrets for designing exciting and successful games. As the creator of such venerable games as God of War, the SpongeBob Squarepants series, and Pac-Man World, to name a few, Rogers writes from personal experience and in this unique book, he hands you the tools to create your own tablet games for the iPad, Android tablets, Ninten

Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games

KAUST Repository

Mabrok, Mohamed; Shamma, Jeff S.

2017-01-01

Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population

Work stressed and play? A brief look at competitive gaming

OpenAIRE

Griffiths, MD

2017-01-01

To date, competitive gaming has not been widely researched or recognised in the scientific and professional literature on video games. As the name suggests, competitive gaming comprises players who regularly compete in tournaments organised and run by the gaming community, often for large monetary gains. Secondary benefits include the recognition and admiration of other gaming community members. Such tournaments are now often run by companies that host the events at large convention centres i...

Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit Quantal Response Dynamics in Game Theory

Science.gov (United States)

Zhuang, Qian; Di, Zengru; Wu, Jinshan

2014-01-01

Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be classified into stable (SQREs) and unstable (USQREs) equilibriums. This extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs) to evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games, including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those experiments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better predictive power than QREs and NEs. PMID:25157502

Cognitive Hierarchy Theory and Two-Person Games

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Carlos Gracia-Lázaro

2017-01-01

Full Text Available The outcome of many social and economic interactions, such as stock-market transactions, is strongly determined by the predictions that agents make about the behavior of other individuals. Cognitive hierarchy theory provides a framework to model the consequences of forecasting accuracy that has proven to fit data from certain types of game theory experiments, such as Keynesian beauty contests and entry games. Here, we focus on symmetric two-player-two-action games and establish an algorithm to find the players’ strategies according to the cognitive hierarchy approach. We show that the snowdrift game exhibits a pattern of behavior whose complexity grows as the cognitive levels of players increases. In addition to finding the solutions up to the third cognitive level, we demonstrate, in this theoretical frame, two new properties of snowdrift games: (i any snowdrift game can be characterized by only a parameter, its class; (ii they are anti-symmetric with respect to the diagonal of the pay-off’s space. Finally, we propose a model based on an evolutionary dynamics that captures the main features of the cognitive hierarchy theory.

Understanding Games as Played

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Leino, Olli Tapio

2009-01-01

Researchers interested in player’s experience would assumedly, across disciplines, agree that the goal behind enquiries into player’s experience is to understand the how games’ features end up affecting the player’s experience. Much of the contemporary interdisciplinary research into player......’s experience leans toward the empirical-scientific, in the forms (neuro)psychology, sociology and cognitive science, to name a few. In such approaches, for example demonstrating correlation between physiological symptoms and an in-game event may amount to ‘understanding’. However, the experience of computer...... game play is a viable topic also for computer game studies within the general tradition of humanities. In such context, the idea of ‘understanding an experience’ invites an approach focusing on the experienced significance of events and objects within computer game play. This focus, in turn, suggests...

The Evolution of Generosity in the Ultimatum Game

Science.gov (United States)

Hintze, Arend; Hertwig, Ralph

2016-01-01

When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased. To this end, they search for mechanisms that cause human behaviour to deviate from what seems to be the rational optimum. But perhaps human behaviour is not biased; perhaps research assumptions about the optimality of strategies are incomplete. In the one-shot anonymous symmetric ultimatum game (UG), humans fail to play optimally as defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, the distinction between kin and non-kin—with kin detection being a key evolutionary adaption—is often neglected when deriving the “optimal” strategy. We computationally evolved strategies in the UG that were equipped with an evolvable probability to discern kin from non-kin. When an opponent was not kin, agents evolved strategies that were similar to those used by humans. We therefore conclude that the strategy humans play is not irrational. The deviation between behaviour and the Nash equilibrium may rather be attributable to key evolutionary adaptations, such as kin detection. Our findings further suggest that social preference models are likely to capture mechanisms that permit people to play optimally in an evolutionary context. Once this context is taken into account, human behaviour no longer appears irrational. PMID:27677330

The Evolution of Generosity in the Ultimatum Game.

Science.gov (United States)

Hintze, Arend; Hertwig, Ralph

2016-09-28

When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased. To this end, they search for mechanisms that cause human behaviour to deviate from what seems to be the rational optimum. But perhaps human behaviour is not biased; perhaps research assumptions about the optimality of strategies are incomplete. In the one-shot anonymous symmetric ultimatum game (UG), humans fail to play optimally as defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, the distinction between kin and non-kin-with kin detection being a key evolutionary adaption-is often neglected when deriving the "optimal" strategy. We computationally evolved strategies in the UG that were equipped with an evolvable probability to discern kin from non-kin. When an opponent was not kin, agents evolved strategies that were similar to those used by humans. We therefore conclude that the strategy humans play is not irrational. The deviation between behaviour and the Nash equilibrium may rather be attributable to key evolutionary adaptations, such as kin detection. Our findings further suggest that social preference models are likely to capture mechanisms that permit people to play optimally in an evolutionary context. Once this context is taken into account, human behaviour no longer appears irrational.

Evolutionary Graphs with Frequency Dependent Fitness

Science.gov (United States)

Nie, Pu-Yan; Zhang, Pei-Ai

Evolutionary graph theory was recently proposed by Lieberman et al. in 2005. In the previous papers about evolutionary graphs (EGs), the fitness of the residents in the EGs is in general assumed to be unity, and the fitness of a mutant is assumed to be a constant r. We aim to extend EG to general cases in this paper, namely, the fitness of a mutant is heavily dependent upon frequency. The corresponding properties for these new EGs are analyzed, and the fixation probability is obtained for large population.

The Many Faces of Role-Playing Games

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hitchens, Michael; Drachen, Anders

2009-01-01

Role-playing games have grown and evolved into a large number of forms in the last thirty years, spanning digital as well as non-digital media. They demonstrate a wide variety in the number of participants, style of play and the formal and informal systems that govern them. Despite this diversity...... players at least seem to think they know when something is a role-playing game. Yet there is no commonly accepted definition which both captures games generally accepted as role-playing games and distinguishes them from other, similar, games which begs the question, whether roleplaying games are united...... by anything more than a colloquial name. Additionally, research involving these games is hampered by lack of a widely accepted definition of what constitutes a roleplaying game, as it is then not even possible to clearly delineate the subject of such research. In this paper various example of role-playing...

Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading--an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics.

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Hai-Feng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Tang, Ming; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2014-07-11

How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual behavioral responses, and the intrinsic epidemic dynamics. By incorporating evolutionary games into epidemic dynamics, we investigate the effects of two types of incentives strategies: partial-subsidy policy in which certain fraction of the cost of vaccination is offset, and free-subsidy policy in which donees are randomly selected and vaccinated at no cost. Through mean-field analysis and computations, we find that, under the partial-subsidy policy, the vaccination coverage depends monotonically on the sensitivity of individuals to payoff difference, but the dependence is non-monotonous for the free-subsidy policy. Due to the role models of the donees for relatively irrational individuals and the unchanged strategies of the donees for rational individuals, the free-subsidy policy can in general lead to higher vaccination coverage. Our findings indicate that any disease-control policy should be exercised with extreme care: its success depends on the complex interplay among the intrinsic mathematical rules of epidemic spreading, governmental policies, and behavioral responses of individuals.

Time scales in evolutionary game on adaptive networks

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cong, Rui, E-mail: congrui0000@126.com [School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi' an (China); Wu, Te; Qiu, Yuan-Ying [School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi' an (China); Wang, Long [School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi' an (China); Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing (China)

2014-02-01

Most previous studies concerning spatial games have assumed strategy updating occurs with a fixed ratio relative to interactions. We here set up a coevolutionary model to investigate how different ratio affects the evolution of cooperation on adaptive networks. Simulation results demonstrate that cooperation can be significantly enhanced under our rewiring mechanism, especially with slower natural selection. Meanwhile, slower selection induces larger network heterogeneity. Strong selection contracts the parameter area where cooperation thrives. Therefore, cooperation prevails whenever individuals are offered enough chances to adapt to the environment. Robustness of the results has been checked under rewiring cost or varied networks.

Game elements improve performance in a working memory training task

OpenAIRE

Manuel Ninaus; Gonçalo Pereira; René Stefitz; Rui Prada; Ana Paiva; Christa Neuper; Guilherme Wood

2015-01-01

The utilization of game elements in a non-game context is currently used in a vast range of different domains. However, research on game elements’ effects in cognitive tasks is still sparse. Thus, in this study we implemented three game elements, namely, progress bar, level indicator, and a thematic setting, in a working memory training task. We evaluated the impact of game elements on user performance and perceived state of flow when compared to a conventional version of the task. Participan...

Solving optimization problems by the public goods game

Science.gov (United States)

Javarone, Marco Alberto

2017-09-01

We introduce a method based on the Public Goods Game for solving optimization tasks. In particular, we focus on the Traveling Salesman Problem, i.e. a NP-hard problem whose search space exponentially grows increasing the number of cities. The proposed method considers a population whose agents are provided with a random solution to the given problem. In doing so, agents interact by playing the Public Goods Game using the fitness of their solution as currency of the game. Notably, agents with better solutions provide higher contributions, while those with lower ones tend to imitate the solution of richer agents for increasing their fitness. Numerical simulations show that the proposed method allows to compute exact solutions, and suboptimal ones, in the considered search spaces. As result, beyond to propose a new heuristic for combinatorial optimization problems, our work aims to highlight the potentiality of evolutionary game theory beyond its current horizons.

Efficient Software Assets for Fostering Learning in Applied Games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Maurer, Matthias; Nussbaumer, Alexander; Steiner, Christina; Van der Vegt, Wim; Nadolski, Rob; Nyamsuren, Enkhbold; Albert, Dietrich

2018-01-01

Digital game technologies are a promising way to enable training providers to reach other target groups, namely those who are not interested in traditional learning technologies. Theoretically, through using digital game technologies we are able to foster the acquisition of any competence by

Their Name is Half-Way

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Elena Bagina

2014-01-01

Full Text Available The article is devoted to the phenomenon of the Soviet architecture of the late 1950s – 60s. The name of the article is “Their name is halfway”. It expresses the sense of all the processes occurring both in society and architecture during the Khrushchev Thaw. Developing the socalled Stalin’s Empire in the 1930-1950s, the masters of architecture had travelled only half the way. If the power had not abruptly stopped this movement, we would probably have a unique modern architecture dissimilar to the “international style”. The collapse of the Soviet Union stopped the evolution of architecture again: the unique features of the Soviet architecture of the 1960s ceased to develop. Architects were carried away with ironic games of postmodernism, which led them to deadlock.

Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey.

Science.gov (United States)

Abdalzaher, Mohamed S; Seddik, Karim; Elsabrouty, Maha; Muta, Osamu; Furukawa, Hiroshi; Abdel-Rahman, Adel

2016-06-29

We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs) from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs.

Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mohamed S. Abdalzaher

2016-06-01

Full Text Available We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs.

The influence of deterministic and stochastic waiting time for triggering mortality and colonization events on the coexistence of cooperators and defectors in an evolutionary game model

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

YouHua Chen

2014-06-01

waiting time, both defectors and cooperators could coexist, regardless of the types of waiting time for colonization events. Defense (or cooperation rewards could determine the persistence time of both game players. When the defense reward is low, cooperators could persist better in the simulation. But when the defense reward becomes sufficiently higher, defectors would persist better. Overall, non-coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the present evolutionary game model is dependent on the stochastic mortality events, but not colonization events. In conclusion, my present study quantifies the influence of the temporally fluctuating motility-colonization dynamic on modeling the coexistence of species in the spatial evolutionary game.

Robustness of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on complex networks

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poncela, J; Gomez-Gardenes, J; FlorIa, L M; Moreno, Y

2007-01-01

Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma game in scale-free networks have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of cooperation. In this paper we address the issue of how the characterization of the asymptotic states of the evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial concentration of cooperators. We find that the measure and the connectedness properties of the set of nodes where cooperation reaches fixation is largely independent of initial conditions, in contrast with the behaviour of both the set of nodes where defection is fixed, and the fluctuating nodes. We also check for the robustness of these results when varying the degree heterogeneity along a one-parametric family of networks interpolating between the class of Erdos-Renyi graphs and the Barabasi-Albert networks

Adaptive Game Level Creation through Rank-based Interactive Evolution

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Liapis, Antonios; Martínez, Héctor Pérez; Togelius, Julian

2013-01-01

as fitness functions for the optimization of the generated content. The preference models are built via ranking-based preference learning, while the content is generated via evolutionary search. The proposed method is evaluated on the creation of strategy game maps, and its performance is tested using...

A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Maes, Michael; Nax, Heinrich H.

2016-01-01

‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a

Soft cooperation systems and games

Science.gov (United States)

Fernández, J. R.; Gallego, I.; Jiménez-Losada, A.; Ordóñez, M.

2018-04-01

A cooperative game for a set of agents establishes a fair allocation of the profit obtained for their cooperation. In order to obtain this allocation, a characteristic function is known. It establishes the profit of each coalition of agents if this coalition decides to act alone. Originally players are considered symmetric and then the allocation only depends on the characteristic function; this paper is about cooperative games with an asymmetric set of agents. We introduced cooperative games with a soft set of agents which explains those parameters determining the asymmetry among them in the cooperation. Now the characteristic function is defined not over the coalitions but over the soft coalitions, namely the profit depends not only on the formed coalition but also on the attributes considered for the players in the coalition. The best known of the allocation rules for cooperative games is the Shapley value. We propose a Shapley kind solution for soft games.

Why Shops Close Again : An Evolutionary Perspective on the Deregulation of Shopping Hours

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kosfeld, M.

1999-01-01

This paper introduces a new perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We study a retail economy where shopping hours have been deregulated recently. It is argued that first, the deregulation leads to a coordination problem between store owners

Promotion of cooperation induced by a self-questioning update rule in the spatial traveler's dilemma game

Science.gov (United States)

Miao, Qing; Wang, Juan; Hu, Meng-long; Zhang, Fan; Zhang, Qiu-shi; Xia, Cheng-yi

2014-01-01

In sociology and economics, evolutionary game theory has provided a powerful framework to illustrate the social dilemma's problems, and many evolutionary game models are presented, such as prisoner's dilemma game, snowdrift game, public goods game, and so on. In this paper, however, we focus on another typical pair-wise game model: Traveler's Dilemma Game (TDG), which has been deeply investigated in economics, but less attention has been paid to this topic within the physics community. We mainly discuss the influence of strategy update rules on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial TDG, and in detail explore the role of a novel self-questioning or self-learning update mechanism in the evolution of cooperation of the TDG model on the square lattice. In our self-questioning rule, each player does not imitate the strategy state of his or her nearest neighbors and simply plays the traveler's dilemma games twice with nearest neighbors: one is to calculate the actual payoff in the current game round; the other is to perform a virtual game which is used to obtain an intangible payoff if he or she adopts another random strategy. Then, the focal player decides to keep the current strategy or to change into that virtual strategy according to the Fermi-like dynamics. A great number of Monte Carlo simulations indicate that our self-questioning rule is a low information game decision-making mechanism which can greatly promote the evolution of cooperation for some specific conditions in the spatial TDG model. Furthermore, this novel rule can also be applied into the prisoner's dilemma game, and likewise the behavior of cooperation can be largely enhanced. Our results are of high importance to analyze and understand the emergence of cooperation within many real social and economical systems.

Classification, Naming and Evolutionary History of Glycosyltransferases from Sequenced Green and Red Algal Genomes

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Ulvskov, Peter; Paiva, Dionisio Soares; Domozych, David

2013-01-01

. In order to elucidate possible evolutionary links between the three advanced lineages in Archaeplastida, a genomic analysis was initiated. Fully sequenced genomes from the Rhodophyta and Virideplantae and the well-defined CAZy database on glycosyltransferases were included in the analysis. The number...

Interplay between social influence and competitive strategical games in multiplex networks.

Science.gov (United States)

Amato, Roberta; Díaz-Guilera, Albert; Kleineberg, Kaj-Kolja

2017-08-01

We present a model that takes into account the coupling between evolutionary game dynamics and social influence. Importantly, social influence and game dynamics take place in different domains, which we model as different layers of a multiplex network. We show that the coupling between these dynamical processes can lead to cooperation in scenarios where the pure game dynamics predicts defection. In addition, we show that the structure of the network layers and the relation between them can further increase cooperation. Remarkably, if the layers are related in a certain way, the system can reach a polarized metastable state. These findings could explain the prevalence of polarization observed in many social dilemmas.

Cooperation and punishment in an adversarial game: How defectors pave the way to a peaceful society

Science.gov (United States)

Short, M. B.; Brantingham, P. J.; D'Orsogna, M. R.

2010-12-01

The evolution of human cooperation has been the subject of much research, especially within the framework of evolutionary public goods games, where several mechanisms have been proposed to account for persistent cooperation. Yet, in addressing this issue, little attention has been given to games of a more adversarial nature, in which defecting players, rather than simply free riding, actively seek to harm others. Here, we develop an adversarial evolutionary game using the specific example of criminal activity, recasting the familiar public goods strategies of punishers, cooperators, and defectors in this light. We then introduce a strategy—the informant—with no clear analog in public goods games and show that individuals employing this strategy are a key to the emergence of systems where cooperation dominates. We also find that a defection-dominated regime may be transitioned to one that is cooperation-dominated by converting an optimal number of players into informants. We discuss these findings, the role of informants, and possible intervention strategies in extreme adversarial societies, such as those marred by wars and insurgencies.

Epigenetic information in gametes: Gaming from before fertilization. Comment on ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Shi, Junchao; Zhang, Xudong; Liu, Ying; Chen, Qi

2017-03-01

In their interesting article [1] Wang et al. proposed a mathematical model based on evolutionary game theory [2] to tackle the fundamental question in embryo development, that how sperm and egg interact with each other, through epigenetic processes, to form a zygote and direct successful embryo development. This work is based on the premise that epigenetic reprogramming (referring to the erasure and reconstruction of epigenetic marks, such as DNA methylation and histone modifications) after fertilization might be of paramount importance to maintain the normal development of embryos, a premise we fully agree, given the compelling experimental evidence reported [3]. Wang et al. have specifically chosen to employ the well-studied DNA methylation reprogramming process during mammalian early embryo development, as a basis to develop their mathematical model, namely epigenetic game theory (epiGame). They concluded that the DNA methylation pattern in mammalian early embryo could be formulated and quantified, and their model can be further used to quantify the interactions, such as competition and/or cooperation of expressed genes that maximize the fitness of embryos. The efforts by Wang et al. in quantitatively and systematically analyzing the beginning of life apparently hold value and represent a novel direction for future embryo development research from both theoretical and experimental biologists. On the other hand, we see their theory still at its infancy, because there are plenty more parameters to consider and there are spaces for debates, such as the cases of haploid embryo development [4]. Here, we briefly comment on the dynamic process of epigenetic reprogramming that goes beyond DNA methylation, a dynamic interplay that involves histone modifications, non-coding RNAs, transposable elements et al., as well as the potential input of the various types of 'hereditary' epigenetic information in the gametes - a game that has started before the fertilization.

Minority games, evolving capitals and replicator dynamics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Galla, Tobias; Zhang, Yi-Cheng

2009-01-01

We discuss a simple version of the minority game (MG) in which agents hold only one strategy each, but in which their capitals evolve dynamically according to their success and in which the total trading volume varies in time accordingly. This feature is known to be crucial for MGs to reproduce stylized facts of real market data. The stationary states and phase diagram of the model can be computed, and we show that the ergodicity breaking phase transition common for MGs, and marked by a divergence of the integrated response, is present also in this simplified model. An analogous majority game turns out to be relatively void of interesting features, and the total capital is found to diverge in time. Introducing a restraining force leads to a model akin to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory, and we demonstrate that here a different type of phase transition is observed. Finally we briefly discuss the relation of this model with one strategy per player to more sophisticated minority games with dynamical capitals and several trading strategies per agent

Cultural evolution: The case of babies’ first names

Science.gov (United States)

Xi, Ning; Zhang, Zi-Ke; Zhang, Yi-Cheng; Ge, Zehui; She, Li; Zhang, Kui

2014-07-01

In social sciences, there is currently rare consensus on the underlying mechanism for cultural evolution, partially due to lack of suitable data. The evolution of first names of newborn babies offers a remarkable example for such researches. In this paper, we employ the historical data on baby names from the United States to investigate the evolutionary process of culture, in particular focusing on how inequality among baby names changes over time. Then we propose a stochastic model where individual choice is determined by both individual preference and social influence, and show that the decrease in the strength of social influence can account for all the observed empirical features. Therefore, we claim that the weakening of social influence drives cultural evolution.

Game dynamic model for yeast development.

Science.gov (United States)

Huang, Yuanyuan; Wu, Zhijun

2012-07-01

Game theoretic models, along with replicator equations, have been applied successfully to the study of evolution of populations of competing species, including the growth of a population, the reaching of the population to an equilibrium state, and the evolutionary stability of the state. In this paper, we analyze a game model proposed by Gore et al. (Nature 456:253-256, 2009) in their recent study on the co-development of two mixed yeast strains. We examine the mathematical properties of this model with varying experimental parameters. We simulate the growths of the yeast strains and compare them with the experimental results. We also compute and analyze the equilibrium state of the system and prove that it is asymptotically and evolutionarily stable.

Online networks, social interaction and segregation: An evolutionary approach

OpenAIRE

Antoci, Angelo; Sabatini, Fabio

2018-01-01

There is growing evidence that face-to-face interaction is declining in many countries, exacerbating the phenomenon of social isolation. On the other hand, social interaction through online networking sites is steeply rising. To analyze these societal dynamics, we have built an evolutionary game model in which agents can choose between three strategies of social participation: 1) interaction via both online social networks and face-to-face encounters; 2) interaction by exclusive means of face...

A Game Theoretical Approach for Solving Winner Determination Problems

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Chen-Kun Tsung

2014-01-01

Full Text Available Determining the winners in combinatorial auctions to maximize the auctioneer's revenue is an NP-complete problem. Computing an optimal solution requires huge computation time in some instances. In this paper, we apply three concepts of the game theory to design an approximation algorithm: the stability of the Nash equilibrium, the self-learning of the evolutionary game, and the mistake making of the trembling hand assumption. According to our simulation results, the proposed algorithm produces near-optimal solutions in terms of the auctioneer's revenue. Moreover, reasonable computation time is another advantage of applying the proposed algorithm to the real-world services.

Measurable Strategies in Differential Games

Science.gov (United States)

Ivanov, R. P.

1990-02-01

Nonlinear approach-evasion differential games are considered in which the initial data depend on the time. These games are investigated in the class of strategies that are functions of three variables, namely, the time, the phase variable, and the current value of the other player's control, and are measurable jointly with respect to the time and the phase variable. The ideas of the Pontryagin methods in differential games and Krasovskiĭ's ideas on extremal aiming are developed, and it is shown that measurable strategies have broad applicability. It is proved that measurable strategies are compatible with differential equations with discontinuous right-hand side, and general theorems on the existence of solving measurable strategies in approach-evasion problems are proved, along with some auxiliary assertions. It is shown that the saddle point condition in the small game ensures the existence of solving measurable strategies. An example is given. Bibliography: 14 titles.

Abstract of Dynamic Range: When Game Design and Narratives Unite

OpenAIRE

Arsenault, Dominic

2005-01-01

This paper proposes a tool and methodology for measuring the degree of freedom given to a player in any resource-driven game (that is, any game in which managing resources is an integral part of the gameplay). This concept, which I call the Dynamic Range, can be used namely to evaluate a given game system’s potential for developing emergent narratives, as defined by Henry Jenkins in his publication Game Design as Narrative Architecture. While Jenkins places at the heart of the creation of nar...

Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders.

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan

2015-01-01

Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.

Game theory paradigm: a new tool for investigating social dysfunction in major depressive disorders

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yun eWang

2015-09-01

Full Text Available Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modelling offers a new tool for investigating social interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely-used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.

Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan

2015-01-01

Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD. PMID:26441689

Universal effect of dynamical reinforcement learning mechanism in spatial evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang, Hai-Feng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Wang, Bing-Hong

2012-01-01

One of the prototypical mechanisms in understanding the ubiquitous cooperation in social dilemma situations is the win–stay, lose–shift rule. In this work, a generalized win–stay, lose–shift learning model—a reinforcement learning model with dynamic aspiration level—is proposed to describe how humans adapt their social behaviors based on their social experiences. In the model, the players incorporate the information of the outcomes in previous rounds with time-dependent aspiration payoffs to regulate the probability of choosing cooperation. By investigating such a reinforcement learning rule in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game and public goods game, a most noteworthy viewpoint is that moderate greediness (i.e. moderate aspiration level) favors best the development and organization of collective cooperation. The generality of this observation is tested against different regulation strengths and different types of network of interaction as well. We also make comparisons with two recently proposed models to highlight the importance of the mechanism of adaptive aspiration level in supporting cooperation in structured populations

Arm chair activism: Serious games usage by INGOs for educational change

NARCIS (Netherlands)

P.A. Arora (Payal); S. Itu

2012-01-01

textabstractThe battle between educators and entertainers continue when it comes to gaming. While this is so, the edutainment battleground has expanded to include actors outside formal schooling agencies, namely International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). These actors employ digital games

Evolution of Fairness in the Not Quite Ultimatum Game

Science.gov (United States)

Ichinose, Genki; Sayama, Hiroki

2014-05-01

The Ultimatum Game (UG) is an economic game where two players (proposer and responder) decide how to split a certain amount of money. While traditional economic theories based on rational decision making predict that the proposer should make a minimal offer and the responder should accept it, human subjects tend to behave more fairly in UG. Previous studies suggested that extra information such as reputation, empathy, or spatial structure is needed for fairness to evolve in UG. Here we show that fairness can evolve without additional information if players make decisions probabilistically and may continue interactions when the offer is rejected, which we call the Not Quite Ultimatum Game (NQUG). Evolutionary simulations of NQUG showed that the probabilistic decision making contributes to the increase of proposers' offer amounts to avoid rejection, while the repetition of the game works to responders' advantage because they can wait until a good offer comes. These simple extensions greatly promote evolution of fairness in both proposers' offers and responders' acceptance thresholds.

Game theory in epigenetic reprogramming. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Hsu, Fei-Man; Chen, Pao-Yang

2017-03-01

Von Neumann and Morgenstern published the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944, describing game theory as a model in which intelligent rational decision-makers manage to find their best strategies in conflict, cooperative or other mutualistic relationships to acquire the greatest benefit [1]. This model was subsequently incorporated in ecology to simulate the ;fitness; of a species during natural selection, designated evolutionary game theory (EGT) [2]. Wang et al. proposed ;epiGame;, taking paternal and maternal genomes as ;intelligent; players that compete, cooperate or both during embryogenesis to maximize the fitness of the embryo [3]. They further extended game theory to an individual or single cell environment. During early zygote development, DNA methylation is reprogrammed such that the paternal genome is demethylated before the maternal genome. After the reset, the blastocyst is re-methylated during embryogenesis. At that time, the paternal and maternal genomes have a conflict of interest related to the expression of their own genes. The proposed epiGame models such interactive regulation between the parental genomes to reach a balance for embryo development (equation (2)).

Selfish or servant leadership? Leadership and followership personalities in coordination games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Gillet, J.; Cartwright, E.; van Vugt, M.

2010-01-01

We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual

An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Revision-Resistant Motivations and Strategic Reasoning

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

DeLancey, Craig

2008-01-01

.... In Ultimatum Games, for example. humans tend in one-shot anonymous interactions towards equal distributions of goods at high individual cost, often encouraged through retributive actions that result in significant personal cost...

A new concept: Epigenetic game theory. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Tao, Yi

2017-03-01

The evolutionary significance of the interaction between paternal and maternal genomes in fertilized zygotes is a very interesting and challenging question. Wang et al. developed the concept of epigenetic game theory, and they try to use this concept to explain the interaction between paternal and maternal genomes in fertilized zygotes [1]. They emphasize that the embryogenesis can be considered as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. More specifically, they integrate game theory to model the pattern of coordination of paternal genome and maternal genomes mediated by DNA methylation dynamics, and they called this epigenetic game theory.

Evolutionary games played by multi-agent system with different memory capacity

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan

2015-01-01

The evolution of cooperation is still an enigma. Resolution of cooperative dilemma is a hot topic as a perplexing interdisciplinary project, and has captured wide attention of researchers from many disciplines as a multidisciplinary field. Our main concern is the design of a networked evolutionary

Pegembangan Game dengan Menggunakan Teknologi Voice Recognition Berbasis Android

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Franky Hadinata Marpaung

2014-06-01

Full Text Available The purpose of this research is to create a new kind of game by using technology that rarely used in current games. It is developed as an entertainment media and also a social media in which the users can play the games together via multiplayer mode. This research uses Scrum development method since it supports small scaled developer and it supports software increment along the development. Using this game application, the users can play and watch interesting animations by controlling it with their voice, listen the character imitating the users’ voice, play various mini games both in single player or multiplayer mode via Bluetooth connection. The conclusion is that game application of My Name is Dug use voice recognition and inter-devices connection as its main features. It also has various mini games that support both single player and multiplayer.

iOS Game Development using SpriteKit Framework with Swift Programming Language

OpenAIRE

Gurung, Lal

2016-01-01

iOS is a mobile operating system for Apple manufactured phones and tablets. Mobile Gaming Industries are growing very fast, and compatibility with iOS is becoming very popular among game developers. The aim of this Bachelor’s thesis was to find the best available game development tools for iOS platform. The 2D game named Lapland was developed using Apple’s own native framework, SpriteKit. The game was written with the SpriteKit programming language. The combination of SpriteKit and Swift...

Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of an Evolutionary Social-Learning Game

Science.gov (United States)

2012-01-13

Nettle outlines the circumstances in which verbal communication is evolutionarily adaptive, and why few species have developed the ability to use...language despite its apparent advantages [28]. Nettle uses a significantly simpler model than the Cultaptation game, but provides insight that may be useful...provided by Kearns et al. was designed as an online algorithm, so it only returns the near-optimal action for the state at the root of the search tree

Fixation Probabilities of Evolutionary Graphs Based on the Positions of New Appearing Mutants

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Pei-ai Zhang

2014-01-01

Full Text Available Evolutionary graph theory is a nice measure to implement evolutionary dynamics on spatial structures of populations. To calculate the fixation probability is usually regarded as a Markov chain process, which is affected by the number of the individuals, the fitness of the mutant, the game strategy, and the structure of the population. However the position of the new mutant is important to its fixation probability. Here the position of the new mutant is laid emphasis on. The method is put forward to calculate the fixation probability of an evolutionary graph (EG of single level. Then for a class of bilevel EGs, their fixation probabilities are calculated and some propositions are discussed. The conclusion is obtained showing that the bilevel EG is more stable than the corresponding one-rooted EG.

Web-Based Quiz-Game-Like Formative Assessment: Development and Evaluation

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Tzu-Hua

2008-01-01

This research aims to develop a multiple-choice Web-based quiz-game-like formative assessment system, named GAM-WATA. The unique design of "Ask-Hint Strategy" turns the Web-based formative assessment into an online quiz game. "Ask-Hint Strategy" is composed of "Prune Strategy" and "Call-in Strategy".…

Impact of neighborhood separation on the spatial reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xia, Chengyi; Miao, Qin; Zhang, Juanjuan

2013-01-01

Highlights: • We present a novel game model in which interaction and learning neighborhood is not identical. • The separation between interaction and learning neighborhood can largely influence the cooperative behaviors. • Monte Carlo simulations are utilized to verify the evolution of cooperation. • When IN is fixed to be 4, medium-sized LN = 8 is the optimal size to promote the cooperation. • When LN is fixed to be 4, the cooperation can also be highly enhanced when IN > 4. -- Abstract: The evolutionary game theory is a very powerful tool to understand the collective cooperation behavior in many real-world systems. In the spatial game model, the payoff is often first obtained within a specific neighborhood (i.e., interaction neighborhood) and then the focal player imitates or learns the behavior of a randomly selected one inside another neighborhood which is named after the learning neighborhood. However, most studies often assume that the interaction neighborhood is identical with the learning neighborhood. Beyond this assumption, we present a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game model to discuss the impact of separation between interaction neighborhood and learning neighborhood on the cooperative behaviors among players on the square lattice. Extensive numerical simulations demonstrate that separating the interaction neighborhood from the learning neighborhood can dramatically affect the density of cooperators (ρ C ) in the population at the stationary state. In particular, compared to the standard case, we find that the medium-sized learning (interaction) neighborhood allows the cooperators to thrive and substantially favors the evolution of cooperation and ρ C can be greatly elevated when the interaction (learning) neighborhood is fixed, that is, too little or much information is not beneficial for players to make the contributions for the collective cooperation. Current results are conducive to further analyzing and understanding the emergence of

An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Revision-Resistant Motivations and Strategic Reasoning

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

DeLancey, Craig

2008-01-01

Strong reciprocity and other forms of cooperation with non-kin in large groups and in one-time social interactions is difficult to explain with traditional economic or with simple evolutionary accounts...

Echinococcus canadensis, E. borealis, and E. intermedius. What's in a name?

Science.gov (United States)

Lymbery, Alan J; Jenkins, Emily J; Schurer, Janna M; Thompson, R C Andrew

2015-01-01

The phylogenetic relationships of the G6, G7, G8, and G10 genotypes of Echinococcus granulosus are well defined, but their taxonomic status is currently unresolved. We apply an evolutionary species concept to infer that the G6 and G7 genotypes represent a single species that is different to both the G8 and G10 genotypes, and that the G8 and G10 genotypes are also on different evolutionary trajectories and, therefore, should be regarded as separate species. The names Echinococcus intermedius, Echinococcus canadensis, and Echinococcus borealis have been previously proposed for these three taxa (G6/7, G10 and G8, respectively) and we argue that it may be appropriate to resurrect these names. The correct delimitation and formal recognition of species of Echinococcus may have important veterinary and public health consequences. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Non-cooperative game theory in biology and cooperative reasoning in humans.

Science.gov (United States)

Kabalak, Alihan; Smirnova, Elena; Jost, Jürgen

2015-06-01

The readiness for spontaneous cooperation together with the assumptions that others share this cooperativity has been identified as a fundamental feature that distinguishes humans from other animals, including the great apes. At the same time, cooperativity presents an evolutionary puzzle because non-cooperators do better in a group of cooperators. We develop here an analysis of the process leading to cooperation in terms of rationality concepts, game theory and epistemic logic. We are, however, not attempting to reconstruct the actual evolutionary process. We rather want to provide the logical structure underlying cooperation in order to understand why cooperation is possible and what kind of reasoning and beliefs would lead to cooperative decision-making. Game theory depends on an underlying common belief in non-cooperative rationality of the players, and cooperativity similarly can utilize a common belief in cooperative rationality as its basis. We suggest a weaker concept of rational decision-making in games that encompasses both types of decision-making. We build this up in stages, starting from simple optimization, then using anticipation of the reaction of others, to finally arrive at reflexive and cooperative reasoning. While each stage is more difficult than the preceding, importantly, we also identify a reduction of complexity achieved by the consistent application of higher stage reasoning.

How players manage moral concerns to make video game violence enjoyable

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Klimmt, Christoph; Schmid, Hannah; Nosper, Andreas; Hartmann, Tilo; Vorderer, Peter

Research on video game violence has focused on the impact of aggression, but has so far neglected the processes and mechanisms underlying the enjoyment of video game violence. The present contribution examines a specific process in this context, namely players' strategies to cope with moral concern

Naming a structured world: a cultural route to duality of patterning.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Francesca Tria

Full Text Available The lexicons of human languages organize their units at two distinct levels. At a first combinatorial level, meaningless forms (typically referred to as phonemes are combined into meaningful units (typically referred to as morphemes. Thanks to this, many morphemes can be obtained by relatively simple combinations of a small number of phonemes. At a second compositional level of the lexicon, morphemes are composed into larger lexical units, the meaning of which is related to the individual meanings of the composing morphemes. This duality of patterning is not a necessity for lexicons and the question remains wide open regarding how a population of individuals is able to bootstrap such a structure and the evolutionary advantages of its emergence. Here we address this question in the framework of a multi-agents model, where a population of individuals plays simple naming games in a conceptual environment modeled as a graph. We demonstrate that errors in communication as well as a blending repair strategy, which crucially exploits a shared conceptual representation of the environment, are sufficient conditions for the emergence of duality of patterning, that can thus be explained in a pure cultural way. Compositional lexicons turn out to be faster to lead to successful communication than purely combinatorial lexicons, suggesting that meaning played a crucial role in the evolution of language.

The Genetic Precursors and the Advantageous and Disadvantageous Sequelae of Inhibited Temperament: An Evolutionary Perspective

Science.gov (United States)

Davies, Patrick T.; Cicchetti, Dante; Hentges, Rochelle F.; Sturge-Apple, Melissa L.

2013-01-01

Guided by evolutionary game theory (Korte, Koolhaas, Wingfield, & McEwen, 2005), this study aimed to identify the genetic precursors and the psychosocial sequelae of inhibited temperament in a sociodemographically disadvantaged and racially diverse sample (N = 201) of 2-year-old children who experienced elevated levels of domestic violence.…

EvoCommander: A Novel Game Based on Evolving and Switching Between Artificial Brains

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Jallov, D.; Risi, S.; Togelius, J.

2016-01-01

Neuroevolution (i.e. evolving artificial neural networks (ANNs) through evolutionary algorithms) has shown promise in evolving agents and robot controllers, which display complex behaviours and can adapt to their environments. These properties are also relevant to video games, since they can...

Evolutionary perspectives on ageing.

Science.gov (United States)

Reichard, Martin

2017-10-01

From an evolutionary perspective, ageing is a decrease in fitness with chronological age - expressed by an increase in mortality risk and/or decline in reproductive success and mediated by deterioration of functional performance. While this makes ageing intuitively paradoxical - detrimental to individual fitness - evolutionary theory offers answers as to why ageing has evolved. In this review, I first briefly examine the classic evolutionary theories of ageing and their empirical tests, and highlight recent findings that have advanced our understanding of the evolution of ageing (condition-dependent survival, positive pleiotropy). I then provide an overview of recent theoretical extensions and modifications that accommodate those new discoveries. I discuss the role of indeterminate (asymptotic) growth for lifetime increases in fecundity and ageing trajectories. I outline alternative views that challenge a universal existence of senescence - namely the lack of a germ-soma distinction and the ability of tissue replacement and retrogression to younger developmental stages in modular organisms. I argue that rejuvenation at the organismal level is plausible, but includes a return to a simple developmental stage. This may exempt a particular genotype from somatic defects but, correspondingly, removes any information acquired during development. A resolution of the question of whether a rejuvenated individual is the same entity is central to the recognition of whether current evolutionary theories of ageing, with their extensions and modifications, can explain the patterns of ageing across the Tree of Life. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Morals matter in economic games.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Felix C Brodbeck

Full Text Available Contrary to predictions from Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory, when making economic decisions in interpersonal situations, people take the interest of others into account and express various forms of solidarity, even in one-shot interactions with anonymous strangers. Research in other-regarding behavior is dominated by behavioral economical and evolutionary biological approaches. Psychological theory building, which addresses mental processes underlying other-regarding behavior, is rare. Based on Relational Models Theory (RMT, [1] and Relationship Regulation Theory (RRT, [2] it is proposed that moral motives influence individuals' decision behavior in interpersonal situations via conscious and unconscious (automatic processes. To test our propositions we developed the 'Dyadic Solidarity Game' and its solitary equivalent, the 'Self-Insurance Game'. Four experiments, in which the moral motives "Unity" and "Proportionality" were manipulated, support the propositions made. First, it was shown that consciously activated moral motives (via framing of the overall goal of the experiment and unconsciously activated moral motives (via subliminal priming influence other-regarding behavior. Second, this influence was only found in interpersonal, not in solitary situations. Third, by combining the analyses of the two experimental games the extent to which participants apply the Golden Rule ("treat others how you wish to be treated" could be established. Individuals with a "Unity" motive treated others like themselves, whereas individuals with a "Proportionality" motive gave others less then they gave themselves. The four experiments not only support the assumption that morals matter in economic games, they also deliver new insights in how morals matter in economic decision making.

Morals matter in economic games.

Science.gov (United States)

Brodbeck, Felix C; Kugler, Katharina G; Reif, Julia A M; Maier, Markus A

2013-01-01

Contrary to predictions from Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory, when making economic decisions in interpersonal situations, people take the interest of others into account and express various forms of solidarity, even in one-shot interactions with anonymous strangers. Research in other-regarding behavior is dominated by behavioral economical and evolutionary biological approaches. Psychological theory building, which addresses mental processes underlying other-regarding behavior, is rare. Based on Relational Models Theory (RMT, [1]) and Relationship Regulation Theory (RRT, [2]) it is proposed that moral motives influence individuals' decision behavior in interpersonal situations via conscious and unconscious (automatic) processes. To test our propositions we developed the 'Dyadic Solidarity Game' and its solitary equivalent, the 'Self-Insurance Game'. Four experiments, in which the moral motives "Unity" and "Proportionality" were manipulated, support the propositions made. First, it was shown that consciously activated moral motives (via framing of the overall goal of the experiment) and unconsciously activated moral motives (via subliminal priming) influence other-regarding behavior. Second, this influence was only found in interpersonal, not in solitary situations. Third, by combining the analyses of the two experimental games the extent to which participants apply the Golden Rule ("treat others how you wish to be treated") could be established. Individuals with a "Unity" motive treated others like themselves, whereas individuals with a "Proportionality" motive gave others less then they gave themselves. The four experiments not only support the assumption that morals matter in economic games, they also deliver new insights in how morals matter in economic decision making.

Game theory as a conceptual framework for managing insect pests.

Science.gov (United States)

Brown, Joel S; Staňková, Kateřina

2017-06-01

For over 100 years it has been recognized that insect pests evolve resistance to chemical pesticides. More recently, managers have advocated restrained use of pesticides, crop rotation, the use of multiple pesticides, and pesticide-free sanctuaries as resistance management practices. Game theory provides a conceptual framework for combining the resistance strategies of the insects and the control strategies of the pest manager into a unified conceptual and modelling framework. Game theory can contrast an ecologically enlightened application of pesticides with an evolutionarily enlightened one. In the former case the manager only considers ecological consequences whereas the latter anticipates the evolutionary response of the pests. Broader applications of this game theory approach include anti-biotic resistance, fisheries management and therapy resistance in cancer. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Negative correlates of computer game play in adolescents.

Science.gov (United States)

Colwell, J; Payne, J

2000-08-01

There is some concern that playing computer games may be associated with social isolation, lowered self-esteem, and aggression among adolescents. Measures of these variables were included in a questionnaire completed by 204 year eight students at a North London comprehensive school. Principal components analysis of a scale to assess needs fulfilled by game play provided some support for the notion of 'electronic friendship' among boys, but there was no evidence that game play leads to social isolation. Play was not linked to self-esteem in girls, but a negative relationship was obtained between self-esteem and frequency of play in boys. However, self-esteem was not associated with total exposure to game play. Aggression scores were not related to the number of games with aggressive content named among three favourite games, but they were positively correlated with total exposure to game play. A multiple regression analysis revealed that sex and total game play exposure each accounted for a significant but small amount of the variance in aggression scores. The positive correlation between playing computer games and aggression provides some justification for further investigation of the causal hypothesis, and possible methodologies are discussed.

Data mining teaching throughout cards game competition

OpenAIRE

Antoñanzas-Torres, Javier; Urraca, Ruben; Sodupe-Ortega, Enrique; Martínez-de-Pison, Francisco; Pernía-Espinoza, Alpha

2015-01-01

[EN] Data-mining techniques and statistical metrics learning can be complicated because of the complexity and overwhelming nature of this field. In this paper a class competition to improve learning of designing Decision Support Systems (DSS) by playing a classic cards game named "Copo" is proposed. The fact that this game is based on a probabilistic problem and that different solutions can be obtained represents a very typical kind of problem in the field of engineering and compu...

Using Digital Games to Learn Mathematics – What students think?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Su Ting Yong

2016-06-01

Full Text Available The aim of this study was to explore how university foundation students perceive the use of digital games in learning mathematics. Data was collected using an online questionnaire and 209 foundation university students participated in this study.  The questionnaire was used to explore students’ gaming experience and students’ attitude towards mathematics learning with digital games.  It was found that most of the university foundation students liked to play different types of digital games.  Males preferred playing digital games in more traditional male genres namely sport, racing, shooter, action adventure, role play and strategy games.  As for females, they generally preferred playing puzzle and simulation games.  Astonishingly, the foundation students were not very positive towards the use of digital games in learning mathematics, and their attitude was essentially influenced by their mathematics interest.  Students with greater interest in mathematics were more likely to support the use of digital games in learning. 

Stochastic Evolution Dynamic of the Rock-Scissors-Paper Game Based on a Quasi Birth and Death Process.

Science.gov (United States)

Yu, Qian; Fang, Debin; Zhang, Xiaoling; Jin, Chen; Ren, Qiyu

2016-06-27

Stochasticity plays an important role in the evolutionary dynamic of cyclic dominance within a finite population. To investigate the stochastic evolution process of the behaviour of bounded rational individuals, we model the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game as a finite, state dependent Quasi Birth and Death (QBD) process. We assume that bounded rational players can adjust their strategies by imitating the successful strategy according to the payoffs of the last round of the game, and then analyse the limiting distribution of the QBD process for the game stochastic evolutionary dynamic. The numerical experiments results are exhibited as pseudo colour ternary heat maps. Comparisons of these diagrams shows that the convergence property of long run equilibrium of the RSP game in populations depends on population size and the parameter of the payoff matrix and noise factor. The long run equilibrium is asymptotically stable, neutrally stable and unstable respectively according to the normalised parameters in the payoff matrix. Moreover, the results show that the distribution probability becomes more concentrated with a larger population size. This indicates that increasing the population size also increases the convergence speed of the stochastic evolution process while simultaneously reducing the influence of the noise factor.

Arm Chair Activism: Serious Games Usage by INGOs for Educational Change

Science.gov (United States)

Arora, Payal; Itu, Sorina

2012-01-01

The battle between educators and entertainers continues when it comes to gaming. While this is so, the edutainment battleground has expanded to include actors outside formal schooling agencies, namely International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). These actors employ digital games with the aim to educate and activate towards specific social…

Proper names in the satirical writing 'An ugly dream' by D. M. Forski

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Lilić Dragan V.

2014-01-01

Full Text Available In the satirical paper 'A Bad Dream', proper names form a significant lexical layer which contributes significantly to achieving a grotesque and satirical portrayal of the everyday reality of the milieu the writer describes in a humorous and sardonic way, condemning his negative and ugly sides. Transforming real names, the author builds very expressive units that become carriers of various meanings. The transformation is accomplished by the procedures of substitutional, permutational, restrictive and proscriptive metaplasm. The writer's creative approach - 'a game of names' - has a indubitable impact in modeling his artistic world.

Reconceptualizing Pedagogical Usability of and Teachers' Roles in Computer Game-Based Learning in School

Science.gov (United States)

Tzuo, Pei-Wen; Ling, Jennifer Isabelle Ong Pei; Yang, Chien-Hui; Chen, Vivian Hsueh-Hua

2012-01-01

At present, methods for the optimal use of two approaches to computer game-based learning in school to enhance students' learning, namely, computer game play and game design, are obscure because past research has been devoted more to designing rather than evaluating the implementation of these approaches in school. In addition, most studies…

Aplikasi Game Life Simulation Peternakan Domba Menggunakan Metode Fuzzy

OpenAIRE

Njoto, Evelyn; Liliana, Liliana; Intan, Rolly

2016-01-01

Many people are eager to learn more about the world of farming, not just knowing the name and shape of the animal. However, not everyone can travel to the farm to learn about the life cycle of the animal. One way that can be used to provide a learning experience about the life cycle of living beings in the fastest way is through a game. One of the game's genres that can be used to provide entertainment and educational aspects to the players is a life simulation. As a life simulation game, the...

An Educational Card Game for Learning Families of Chemical Elements

Science.gov (United States)

Mariscal, Antonio Joaquin Franco; Martinez, Jose Maria Oliva; Marquez, Serafin Bernal

2012-01-01

This paper describes an educational card game designed to help high school students (grade 10, 15-16 years old) "understand," as opposed to memorize, the periodic table. The game may also be used to identify different chemical elements found in daily life objects. As an additional value, students learn the names and symbols of the displayed…

Social embeddedness and economic opportunism: a game situation.

Science.gov (United States)

Sakalaki, Maria; Fousiani, Kyriaki

2012-06-01

According to Evolutionary Game Theory, multiple exchanges with partners are necessary to foster cooperation. Multiple exchanges with partners tend to enhance the good experience of the partners and the predictability of their behaviour and should therefore increase cooperativeness. This study explored whether social embeddedness, or the preference for close and stable social relationships, a variable which tends to increase multiple exchanges, is associated with more cooperative attitudes; and whether social embeddedness increases cooperative behavior towards unknown partners in a game situation. The first study, with 169 undergraduates, indicated that social embeddedness (preference for close and durable social relations) was negatively associated with opportunistic attitudes. The second study had a sample of 60 undergraduates playing a Trust Game with unknown partners and showed that self-reported social embeddedness was positively correlated with scores for cooperative economic behavior towards the partners. These results highlight the relationships of social embeddedness with cooperative attitudes and behaviour.

Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Science.gov (United States)

Pan, Qiuhui; Liu, Xuesong; Bao, Honglin; Su, Yu; He, Mingfeng

2018-02-01

In this paper, we study the effect of adaptive interaction on the evolution of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The connections of players are co-evolutionary with cooperation; whether adjacent players can play the prisoner's dilemma game is associated with the strategies they took in the preceding round. If a player defected in the preceding round, his neighbors will refuse to play the prisoner's dilemma game with him in accordance with a certain probability distribution. We use the disconnecting strength to represent this probability. We discuss the evolution of cooperation with different values of temptation to defect, sucker's payoff and disconnecting strength. The simulation results show that cooperation can be significantly enhanced through increasing the value of the disconnecting strength. In addition, the increase in disconnecting strength can improve the cooperators' ability to resist the increase in temptation and the decrease in reward. We study the parameter ranges for three different evolutionary results: cooperators extinction, defectors extinction, cooperator and defector co-existence. Meanwhile, we recruited volunteers and designed a human behavioral experiment to verify the theoretical simulation results. The punishment of disconnection has a positive effect on cooperation. A higher disconnecting strength will enhance cooperation more significantly. Our research findings reveal some significant insights into efficient mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation.

Promotion of cooperation induced by discriminators in the spatial multi-player donor-recipient game

Science.gov (United States)

Cui, Guang-Hai; Wang, Zhen; Ren, Jian-Kang; Lu, Kun; Li, Ming-Chu

2016-11-01

Although the two-player donor-recipient game has been used extensively in studying cooperation in social dilemmas, the scenario in which a donor can simultaneously donate resources to multiple recipients is also common in human societies, economic systems, and social networks. This paper formulates a model of the multi-player donor-recipient game considering a multi-recipient scenario. The promotion of cooperation is also studied by introducing a discriminative cooperation strategy into the game, which donates resources to recipients in proportion to their previous donations with a cost for the collection of information. The evolutionary dynamics of individual strategies are explored in homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios by leveraging spatial evolutionary game theory. The results show that in a homogeneous scenario, defectors can dominate the network at the equilibrium state only when the cost-to-benefit ratio (R) of donated resources is large. In a heterogeneous scenario, three strategies can coexist all the time within the range of R that was studied, and the promotion of cooperation is more effective when the values of R are smaller. Results from a single node evolution and the formation of local patterns of interaction are provided, and it is analytically shown that discriminators can maintain fairness in resource donation and guarantee long-term cooperation when R is not too large.

Despotism, democracy, and the evolutionary dynamics of leadership and followership.

Science.gov (United States)

Van Vugt, Mark

2009-01-01

Responds to comments made by George B. Graen and Stephen J. Guastello on the current author's article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. In the original article my co-authors and I proposed a new way of thinking about leadership, informed by evolutionary (neo-Darwinian) theory. In the first commentary, Graen noted that we ignored a number of recently developed psychological theories of leadership that take into account the leader-follower relationship, most notably LMX theory. LMX theory asserts that leadership effectiveness and team performance are affected by the quality of working relationships between superior and subordinates. Because the original article primarily dealt with questions about the origins of leadership--the phylogenetic and evolutionary causes--we had to be concise in our review of proximate psychological theories of leadership. In the second commentary, Guastello concurred with the importance of an evolutionary game analysis for studying leadership but disagreed with certain details of our analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

A review of game-theoretic models of road user behaviour.

Science.gov (United States)

Elvik, Rune

2014-01-01

This paper reviews game-theoretic models that have been developed to explain road user behaviour in situations where road users interact with each other. The paper includes the following game-theoretic models: 1.A general model of the interaction between road users and their possible reaction to measures improving safety (behavioural adaptation).2.Choice of vehicle size as a Prisoners’ dilemma game.3.Speed choice as a co-ordination game.4.Speed compliance as a game between drivers and the police.5.Merging into traffic from an acceleration lane as a mixed-strategy game.6.Choice of level of attention in following situations as an evolutionary game.7.Choice of departure time to avoid congestion as variant of a Prisoners’ dilemma game.8.Interaction between cyclists crossing the road and car drivers.9.Dipping headlights at night well ahead of the point when glare becomes noticeable.10.Choice of evasive action in a situation when cars are on collision course. The models reviewed are different in many respects, but a common feature of the models is that they can explain how informal norms of behaviour can develop among road users and be sustained even if these informal norms violate the formal regulations of the traffic code. Game-theoretic models are not applicable to every conceivable interaction between road users or to situations in which road users choose behaviour without interacting with other road users. Nevertheless, it is likely that game-theoretic models can be applied more widely than they have been until now. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

LewiSpace: An Exploratory Study with a Machine Learning Model in an Educational Game

Science.gov (United States)

Ghali, Ramla; Ouellet, Sébastien; Frasson, Claude

2016-01-01

The use of educational games as a tool for providing learners with a playful and educational aspect is widespread. In this paper, we present an educational game that we developed to teach a chemistry lesson, namely drawing a Lewis diagram. Our game is a 3D environment known as LewiSpace and aims at balancing between playful and educational…

Perceptions of video gaming careers and its implications on parental mediation

OpenAIRE

Jiow, Hee Jhee; Athwal, Rayvinder Jit Singh; Chew, Ling Ling; Elias, Muhammad Helmi; Lim, Nina; Lye, Qin Ting; Ng, Xin Yu; Woo, Kenneth

2018-01-01

Since its advent in the 1970s, the video game industry has superseded its film counterpart, sporting a growth rate quadrupling that of other media and entertainment sectors. In contemporary times, video gaming occupations — namely game designers, professional gamers and YouTubers — have gained prominence, bolstered by the support of the media industry and government agencies. Yet, little remains known about the perceptions of these careers from the standpoint of parents and young gamers. This...

Evolutionary experience design – the case of Otopia

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hansen, Kenneth

experiences with the case of “Otopia”. “Otopia” is a large scale, new media experiment, which combines the areas of computer games, sports and performance in to a spectator oriented concept; it was premiered in a dome tent at the Roskilde Festival in Denmark the summer 2005. This paper presents and discusses......The design of experiences is a complicated challenge. It might not even be possible to design such a “thing”, but only to design for it. If this is the case it could seem appropriate with an evolutionary approach. This paper introduces such an approach to the design of new public oriented...... used as a means of specifying the basic immaterial design form. This discussion leads to the suggestion of a rule-based evolutionary model for the design of situations as a practical option for designers of new spectator oriented experiences in the future The project of Otopia was supported...

25 CFR 547.9 - What are the minimum technical standards for Class II gaming system accounting functions?

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... gaming system accounting functions? 547.9 Section 547.9 Indians NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION... accounting functions? This section provides standards for accounting functions used in Class II gaming systems. (a) Required accounting data.The following minimum accounting data, however named, shall be...

Leveraging Insights from Mainstream Gameplay to Inform STEM Game Design: Great Idea, but What Comes Next?

Science.gov (United States)

Biles, Melissa

2012-01-01

This response to Leah A. Bricker and Phillip Bell's paper, "GodMode is his video game name", examines their assertion that the social nexus of gaming practices is an important factor to consider for those looking to design STEM video games. I propose that we need to go beyond the investigation into which aspects of games play a role in learning,…

Botanical name changes – nuisance or a quest for precision?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Bruce G. Cook

2015-01-01

Full Text Available To understand the need for the seemingly regular changes to plant names applied to many tropical forage species, it is necessary to be aware of the rules that govern botanical nomenclature.  The binomial naming system, first proposed in 1753, is governed by rules defined in the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi and plants (ICN.  These rules have been strengthened as necessary over the years in the interest of providing practitioners with plant names that are unique for each species, and presented in an hierarchical format that shows the evolutionary relationships between plants.  This paper includes a table of name changes accepted by the USDA Germplasm Resources Information Network (GRIN for species used in tropical forage research and development over the last half century.  The need to use legitimate plant names is emphasized and suggestions are made on how practitioners might best deal with the changes.Keywords: Taxonomy, nomenclature, tropical forages.DOI: 10.17138/TGFT(334-40

QUALIY PARAMETERS AND SHELF LIFE OF GAME MEAT DURING FROZEN STORAGE

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

M. Spaziani

2011-01-01

Full Text Available This study examined the effect of the duration of frozen storage at –20°C on the game meat quality parameters, namely the pH, colour, thawing and cooking losses. The oxidative stability of game meat was evaluated by the production of thiobarbituric acid reactive substances (TBARS. Frozen storage duration did not extensively influence either the quality properties, or the oxidative stability of game meat. Therefore, it was hypothesized that the higher amount of a- tocopherol in the muscles of game compared to pellet-fed animals could be mainly responsible for the lower lipid oxidation and longer shelf life.

Improving Operational Wargaming: Its All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses a War

Science.gov (United States)

2016-05-26

consciously or subconsciously bias the game towards a particular side or outcome if they step outside of their role as an impartial arbiter.32...wargame designer to ensure the selected objectives are appropriate to wargaming, are not conflicting, and do not bias the wargame toward a...organizations supporting the game, to name a few. Observers can induce pathologies by actively influencing the game, or unintentionally biasing participants

Application-Driven Educational Game to Assist Young Children in Learning English Vocabulary

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Zhi-Hong; Lee, Shu-Yu

2018-01-01

This paper describes the development of an educational game, named My-Pet-Shop, to enhance young children's learning of English vocabulary. The educational game is underpinned by an application-driven model, which consists of three components: application scenario, subject learning, and learning regulation. An empirical study is further conducted…

A Game Theoretic Approach to Swarm Robotics

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

S. N. Givigi

2006-01-01

Full Text Available In this article, we discuss some techniques for achieving swarm intelligent robots through the use of traits of personality. Traits of personality are characteristics of each robot that, altogether, define the robot's behaviours. We discuss the use of evolutionary psychology to select a set of traits of personality that will evolve due to a learning process based on reinforcement learning. The use of Game Theory is introduced, and some simulations showing its potential are reported.

Collaborative and Competitive Video Games for Teaching Computing in Higher Education

Science.gov (United States)

Smith, Spencer; Chan, Samantha

2017-01-01

This study measures the success of using a collaborative and competitive video game, named Space Race, to teach computing to first year engineering students. Space Race is played by teams of four, each with their own tablet, collaborating to compete against the other teams in the class. The impact of the game on student learning was studied…

Collective influence in evolutionary social dilemmas

Science.gov (United States)

Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

2016-03-01

When evolutionary games are contested in structured populations, the degree of each player in the network plays an important role. If they exist, hubs often determine the fate of the population in remarkable ways. Recent research based on optimal percolation in random networks has shown, however, that the degree is neither the sole nor the best predictor of influence in complex networks. Low-degree nodes may also be optimal influencers if they are hierarchically linked to hubs. Taking this into account leads to the formalism of collective influence in complex networks, which as we show here, has far-reaching implications for the favorable resolution of social dilemmas. In particular, there exists an optimal hierarchical depth for the determination of collective influence that we use to describe the potency of players for passing their strategies, which depends on the strength of the social dilemma. Interestingly, the degree, which corresponds to the baseline depth zero, is optimal only when the temptation to defect is small. Our research reveals that evolutionary success stories are related to spreading processes which are rooted in favorable hierarchical structures that extend beyond local neighborhoods.

Evolution of learned strategy choice in a frequency-dependent game.

Science.gov (United States)

Katsnelson, Edith; Motro, Uzi; Feldman, Marcus W; Lotem, Arnon

2012-03-22

In frequency-dependent games, strategy choice may be innate or learned. While experimental evidence in the producer-scrounger game suggests that learned strategy choice may be common, a recent theoretical analysis demonstrated that learning by only some individuals prevents learning from evolving in others. Here, however, we model learning explicitly, and demonstrate that learning can easily evolve in the whole population. We used an agent-based evolutionary simulation of the producer-scrounger game to test the success of two general learning rules for strategy choice. We found that learning was eventually acquired by all individuals under a sufficient degree of environmental fluctuation, and when players were phenotypically asymmetric. In the absence of sufficient environmental change or phenotypic asymmetries, the correct target for learning seems to be confounded by game dynamics, and innate strategy choice is likely to be fixed in the population. The results demonstrate that under biologically plausible conditions, learning can easily evolve in the whole population and that phenotypic asymmetry is important for the evolution of learned strategy choice, especially in a stable or mildly changing environment.

A Game-Theoretic Response Strategy for Coordinator Attack in Wireless Sensor Networks

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Jianhua; Yue, Guangxue; Shang, Huiliang; Li, Hongjie

2014-01-01

The coordinator is a specific node that controls the whole network and has a significant impact on the performance in cooperative multihop ZigBee wireless sensor networks (ZWSNs). However, the malicious node attacks coordinator nodes in an effort to waste the resources and disrupt the operation of the network. Attacking leads to a failure of one round of communication between the source nodes and destination nodes. Coordinator selection is a technique that can considerably defend against attack and reduce the data delivery delay, and increase network performance of cooperative communications. In this paper, we propose an adaptive coordinator selection algorithm using game and fuzzy logic aiming at both minimizing the average number of hops and maximizing network lifetime. The proposed game model consists of two interrelated formulations: a stochastic game for dynamic defense and a best response policy using evolutionary game formulation for coordinator selection. The stable equilibrium best policy to response defense is obtained from this game model. It is shown that the proposed scheme can improve reliability and save energy during the network lifetime with respect to security. PMID:25105171

Repeated thinking promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang Jun; Cai Kaiquan; Du Wenbo; Cao Xianbin

2012-01-01

Inspired by the realistic process of taking decisions in social life, we have proposed a repeated thinking mechanism in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are denoted by the vertices and play games with their direct neighbors. Under our mechanism, a player i will randomly select a neighbor j and then deliberate for M times before strategy updating. It will remain unchanged if not all M considerations suggest it to learn the strategy of j. We mainly focus on the evolution of cooperation in the systems. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level f C is remarkably promoted and f C has a monotonic dependence on the caution parameter M, indicating that being cautious facilitates the emergence and persistence of cooperation. We give a simple but clear explanation for this cooperation promotion via detecting the cooperator-defector transition process. Moreover, the robustness of this mechanism is also examined on different noise levels and game models. (paper)

Competence-impeding electronic games and players' aggressive feelings, thoughts, and behaviors.

Science.gov (United States)

Przybylski, Andrew K; Deci, Edward L; Deci, Edward; Rigby, C Scott; Ryan, Richard M

2014-03-01

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 106(3) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2014-07574-006). In the article, the name of author Edward Deci was missing his middle name initial and should have read as Edward L. Deci. In addition, an incorrect version of figure 1 was published.] Recent studies have examined whether electronic games foster aggression. At present, the extent to which games contribute to aggression and the mechanisms through which such links may exist are hotly debated points. In current research we tested a motivational hypothesis derived from self-determination theory-that gaming would be associated with indicators of human aggression to the degree that the interactive elements of games serve to impede players' fundamental psychological need for competence. Seven studies, using multiple methods to manipulate player competence and a range of approaches for evaluating aggression, indicated that competence-impeding play led to higher levels of aggressive feelings, easier access to aggressive thoughts, and a greater likelihood of enacting aggressive behavior. Results indicated that player perceived competence was positively related to gaming motivation, a factor that was, in turn, negatively associated with player aggression. Overall, this pattern of effects was found to be independent of the presence or absence of violent game contents. We discuss the results in respect to research focused on psychological need frustration and satisfaction and as they regard gaming-related aggression literature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

Zero-determinant strategy: An underway revolution in game theory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hao Dong; Rong Zhi-Hai; Zhou Tao

2014-01-01

Repeated games describe situations where players interact with each other in a dynamic pattern and make decisions according to outcomes of previous stage games. Very recently, Press and Dyson have revealed a new class of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies for the repeated games, which can enforce a fixed linear relationship between expected payoffs of two players, indicating that a smart player can control her unwitting co-player's payoff in a unilateral way [Proc. Acad. Natl. Sci. USA 109, 10409 (2012)]. The theory of ZD strategies provides a novel viewpoint to depict interactions among players, and fundamentally changes the research paradigm of game theory. In this brief survey, we first introduce the mathematical framework of ZD strategies, and review the properties and constrains of two specifications of ZD strategies, called pinning strategies and extortion strategies. Then we review some representative research progresses, including robustness analysis, cooperative ZD strategy analysis, and evolutionary stability analysis. Finally, we discuss some significant extensions to ZD strategies, including the multi-player ZD strategies, and ZD strategies under noise. Challenges in related research fields are also listed. (topical review - statistical physics and complex systems)

Economic Game Theory to Model the Attenuation of Virulence of an Obligate Intracellular Bacterium.

Science.gov (United States)

Tago, Damian; Meyer, Damien F

2016-01-01

Diseases induced by obligate intracellular pathogens have a large burden on global human and animal health. Understanding the factors involved in the virulence and fitness of these pathogens contributes to the development of control strategies against these diseases. Based on biological observations, a theoretical model using game theory is proposed to explain how obligate intracellular bacteria interact with their host. The equilibrium in such a game shows that the virulence and fitness of the bacterium is host-triggered and by changing the host's defense system to which the bacterium is confronted, an evolutionary process leads to an attenuated strain. Although, the attenuation procedure has already been conducted in practice in order to develop an attenuated vaccine (e.g., with Ehrlichia ruminantium), there was a lack of understanding of the theoretical basis behind this process. Our work provides a model to better comprehend the existence of different phenotypes and some underlying evolutionary mechanisms for the virulence of obligate intracellular bacteria.

The Model of Games to Develop Fundamental Movement of Kindergarten Students

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kristanto Adi Nugroho

2018-05-01

Full Text Available The study aimed for developing a game model to optimize the achievement of the fundamental movement of kindergarten students. The results of the research were expected to be a credible and standardized reference for teachers in teaching. The research was conducted using research and development method which was divided into two stages, namely pre-development stage and development stage. The pre-development stage consisted of literature review, relevant research and preliminary studies. The development stage consisted of drafting, expert validation, limited-scale trials, large-scale trials, and operational trials. Expert validation involved two experts using focus group discussion (FGD techniques. The limited scale and extensive test were conducted to see the aspects of substantive content, and the implementation of the model has been qualitatively suitable for the use in the kindergarten. There were 10 children as research subjects were tested on a limited-scale test and there were 24 children on a large-scale test. In operational test using experimental method, there were 47 children. The Instruments used in data collection process at the pre-development stage were interview guides and field notes while in the development stage the researcher used questionnaires and Fundamental Motor Pattern Assessment Instrument to measure the level of motion skills of the children. The data analysis techniques used were qualitative and quantitative analysis (statistics. Result studied of the development of the game model consisted of ten game models, namely: 1 the flying bird game; 2 the ball relay game; 3 The ball kicking game; 4 the balloon tapping game; 5 the seeking and jumping game; 6 the arranging letter game; 7 the sticking picture game; 8 the composing names game; 9 the frog counting game, and 10 the numbers adventure games. Based on the content validator’s assessment, the content of materials was 86 points (82% which was in very good category, the

Spore: Spawning Evolutionary Misconceptions?

Science.gov (United States)

Bean, Thomas E.; Sinatra, Gale M.; Schrader, P. G.

2010-10-01

The use of computer simulations as educational tools may afford the means to develop understanding of evolution as a natural, emergent, and decentralized process. However, special consideration of developmental constraints on learning may be necessary when using these technologies. Specifically, the essentialist (biological forms possess an immutable essence), teleological (assignment of purpose to living things and/or parts of living things that may not be purposeful), and intentionality (assumption that events are caused by an intelligent agent) biases may be reinforced through the use of computer simulations, rather than addressed with instruction. We examine the video game Spore for its depiction of evolutionary content and its potential to reinforce these cognitive biases. In particular, we discuss three pedagogical strategies to mitigate weaknesses of Spore and other computer simulations: directly targeting misconceptions through refutational approaches, targeting specific principles of scientific inquiry, and directly addressing issues related to models as cognitive tools.

Design and Implementation of a Bingo Game for Teaching the Periodic Table

Science.gov (United States)

Franco-Mariscal, Antonio Joaquín; Cano-Iglesias, María José

2014-01-01

This article describes a game designed to help Spanish high school students (grade 10, age 15-16) understand the periodic table. It combines some features of bingo and a puzzle in the same pedagogical game, making it an engaging approach for learning about this important teaching tool. Students are given a verbal clue -- the name of a chemical…

On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games

Science.gov (United States)

Awasthi, Pranjal; Balcan, Maria-Florina; Blum, Avrim; Sheffet, Or; Vempala, Santosh

One reason for wanting to compute an (approximate) Nash equilibrium of a game is to predict how players will play. However, if the game has multiple equilibria that are far apart, or ɛ-equilibria that are far in variation distance from the true Nash equilibrium strategies, then this prediction may not be possible even in principle. Motivated by this consideration, in this paper we define the notion of games that are approximation stable, meaning that all ɛ-approximate equilibria are contained inside a small ball of radius Δ around a true equilibrium, and investigate a number of their properties. Many natural small games such as matching pennies and rock-paper-scissors are indeed approximation stable. We show furthermore there exist 2-player n-by-n approximation-stable games in which the Nash equilibrium and all approximate equilibria have support Ω(log n). On the other hand, we show all (ɛ,Δ) approximation-stable games must have an ɛ-equilibrium of support O(Δ^{2-o(1)}/ɛ2{log n}), yielding an immediate n^{O(Δ^{2-o(1)}/ɛ^2log n)}-time algorithm, improving over the bound of [11] for games satisfying this condition. We in addition give a polynomial-time algorithm for the case that Δ and ɛ are sufficiently close together. We also consider an inverse property, namely that all non-approximate equilibria are far from some true equilibrium, and give an efficient algorithm for games satisfying that condition.

Cleaning symbiosis as an evolutionary game: To cheat or not to cheat?

Science.gov (United States)

Poulin; Vickery

1995-07-07

Cleaning symbiosis is an apparently mutualistic relationship, occurring in diverse taxa, in which cleaners remove ectoparasites from the body of their clients. Here its evolution is explored with a simple game theory model in which both participants play against each other using either honest or cheating strategies. Honest clients pose for cleaners and have their ectoparasites removed, cheating clients eat the cleaners. Honest cleaners eat their clients' ectoparasites, cheating cleaners feed mainly on client tissues. The conditions that favour either strategy are obtained when the game is resolved: (i) the cost of being cleaned by a cheat and the proportion of cheats in the cleaner population determine the relative value of honesty in clients, and (ii) the advantages of being an honest cleaner depend on the relative fitness value of ectoparasites as food versus client tissues. A scenario for the origin of the cleaning symbiosis can also be derived from the model, in which the specialization of both participants need not be simultaneous. The model is based on the relationship between specialized cleaner fish and their client fish on coral reefs, but its conclusions are used in an examination of other cleaning associations. Copyright 1995 Academic Press Limited

The dating mind: evolutionary psychology and the emerging science of human courtship.

Science.gov (United States)

Oesch, Nathan; Miklousic, Igor

2012-12-20

In the New York Times bestselling book The Game: Penetrating the Secret Society of Pickup Artists (2006), the world was granted its first exclusive introduction to the steadily growing dating coach and pick-up artist community. Many of its most prominent authorities claim to use insights and information gleaned both through first-hand experience as well as empirical research in evolutionary psychology. One of the industry's most well-respected authorities, the illusionist Erik von Markovik, promotes a three-phase model of human courtship: Attraction, building mutual Comfort and Trust, and Seduction. The following review argues that many of these claims are in fact grounded in solid empirical findings from social, physiological and evolutionary psychology. Two texts which represent much of this literature are critiqued and their implications discussed.

Online Computer Games as Collaborative Learning Environments: Prospects and Challenges for Tertiary Education

Science.gov (United States)

Papastergiou, Marina

2009-01-01

This study is aimed at presenting a critical overview of recent research studies on the use of educational online games as collaborative learning environments in Tertiary Education (TE), namely higher education and vocational training, with a view to identifying: a) the elements that online games should include in order to support fruitful and…

Game elements improve performance in a working memory training task

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Manuel Ninaus

2015-02-01

Full Text Available The utilization of game elements in a non-game context is currently used in a vast range of different domains. However, research on game elements’ effects in cognitive tasks is still sparse. Thus, in this study we implemented three game elements, namely, progress bar, level indicator, and a thematic setting, in a working memory training task. We evaluated the impact of game elements on user performance and perceived state of flow when compared to a conventional version of the task. Participants interacting with game elements showed higher scores in the working memory training task than participants from a control group who completed the working memory training task without the game elements. Moreover, game elements facilitated the individuals’ performance closer to their maximum working memory capacity. Finally, the perceived flow did not differ between the two groups, which indicates that game elements can induce better performance without changing the perception of being “in the zone”, that is without an increase in anxiety or boredom. This empirical study indicates that certain game elements can improve the performance and efficiency in a working memory task by increasing users’ ability and willingness to train at their optimal performance level. 

Evolutionary dynamics of fluctuating populations with strong mutualism

Science.gov (United States)

Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David

2013-03-01

Evolutionary game theory with finite interacting populations is receiving increased attention, including subtle phenomena associated with number fluctuations, i.e., ``genetic drift.'' Models of cooperation and competition often utilize a simplified Moran model, with a strictly fixed total population size. We explore a more general evolutionary model with independent fluctuations in the numbers of two distinct species, in a regime characterized by ``strong mutualism.'' The model has two absorbing states, each corresponding to fixation of one of the two species, and allows exploration of the interplay between growth, competition, and mutualism. When mutualism is favored, number fluctuations eventually drive the system away from a stable fixed point, characterized by cooperation, to one of the absorbing states. Well-mixed populations will thus be taken over by a single species in a finite time, despite the bias towards cooperation. We calculate both the fixation probability and the mean fixation time as a function of the initial conditions and carrying capacities in the strong mutualism regime, using the method of matched asymptotic expansions. Our results are compared to computer simulations.

Beating Cheaters at Their Own Game

Science.gov (United States)

Rauch, Joseph; Kondev, Jane; Sanchez, Alvaro

2014-03-01

Public goods games occur over many different scales in nature, from microbial biofilms to the human commons. On each scale stable populations of cooperators (members who invest into producing some good shared by the entire population) and cheaters (members who make no investment yet still share the common goods) has been observed. This observation raises interesting questions, like how do cooperators maintain their presence in a game that seems to heavily favor cheaters, and what strategies for cooperation could populations employ to increase their success? We propose a model of a public goods game with two different player populations, S and D, which employ two different strategies: the D population always cheats and the S population makes a stochastic decision whether to cooperate or not. We find that stochastic cooperation improves the success of the S population over the competing D population, but at a price. As the probability of cheating by the S players increases they outcompete the D players but the total population becomes more ecologically unstable (i.e., the likelihood of its extinction grows). We investigate this trade off between evolutionary success and ecological stability and propose experiments using populations of yeast cells to test our predictions.

Group penalty on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhang, Chunyan; Zhang, Jianlei; Xie, Guangming; Wang, Long

2010-01-01

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that aims to integrate group penalty into the framework of evolutionary games. Existing groups are deleted whenever the collective gains of the focal individuals are less than a deletion threshold value. Meanwhile, newcomers are added after each game iteration to maintain the fixed population size. The networking effect is also studied via four representative interaction networks which are associated with the population structure. We conclude that the cooperation level has a strong dependence on the deletion threshold, and the suitable value range of the deletion threshold which is associated with the maximal cooperation frequency has been found. Simulation results also show that optimum values of the deletion threshold can still warrant the most potent promotion of cooperation, irrespective of which of the four topologies is applied

奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人的演化博弈%Analysis of the evolutionary game of reward-based crowdfunding platforms and entrepreneurs

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

邓必腾; 赵征

2017-01-01

To investigate the selection mechanism of the reward-based crowdfunding platform operation mode,a game model was developed by employing the evolutionary game theory.With this model the evolutionary dynamic stability of the selection for every stakeholder''s strategy was analyzed,and critical factors that determine the selection mechanism of the reward-based crowdfunding platform operation mode were explored by means of numerical simulation.The main result indicates that the key factor influencing the selection mechanism contains the following five dimensions: entrepreneurs'' demand for financing,crowdfunding platform service rates,service efficiency of the crowdfunding platform,opportunity cost of the crowdfunding platform to provide high quality services and government regulation of the reward-based crowdfunding market.%为研究奖励式众筹平台运作模式选择行为的决策机理,运用演化博弈理论的分析方法,构建奖励式众筹模式下奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人策略行为的演化博弈模型,对各利益主体策略的选择进行了演化动态稳定性分析,并通过数值仿真探求影响奖励式众筹平台运作模式选择的关键因素.研究表明:项目发起人的融资需求量,众筹平台收取的服务费率,众筹平台提供高服务的效率,众筹平台提供高服务的机会成本以及政府对众筹行业的监管程度是影响奖励式众筹平台运作模式的关键因素.

Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Torsten Heinrich

2013-08-01

Full Text Available We investigate aspects of institutional change in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework, in principle focusing on problems of coordination in groups when new solutions to a problem become available. In an evolutionary game with an underlying dilemma structure, we let a number of new strategies become gradually available to the agents. The dilemma structure of the situation is not changed by these. Older strategies offer a lesser payoff than newly available ones. The problem that agents have to solve for realizing improved results is, therefore, to coordinate on newly available strategies. Strategies are taken to represent institutions; the coordination on a new strategy by agents, hence, represents a change in the institutional framework of a group. The simulations we run show a stable pattern regarding such institutional changes. A number of institutions are found to coexist, with the specific number depending on the relation of payoffs achievable through the coordination of different strategies. Usually, the strategies leading to the highest possible payoff are not among these. This can be taken to reflect the heterogeneity of rules in larger groups, with different subgroups showing different behavior patterns.

Supermodular Games and Potential Games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Brânzei, R.; Mallozzi, L.; Tijs, S.H.

2001-01-01

Potential games and supermodular games are attractive games, especially because under certain conditions they possess pure Nash equilibria. Subclasses of games with a potential are considered which are also strategically equivalent to supermodular games. The focus is on two-person zero-sum games and

Random and non-random mating populations: Evolutionary dynamics in meiotic drive.

Science.gov (United States)

Sarkar, Bijan

2016-01-01

Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The model draws attention to the role of viability selections of different types to examine the stable nature of polymorphic equilibrium. A bridge between population genetics and evolutionary game theory has been built up by applying the concept of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. In addition to pointing out the influences of male and female segregation ratios on selection, configuration structure reveals some noted results, e.g., Hardy-Weinberg frequencies hold in replicator dynamics, occurrence of faster evolution at the maximized variance fitness, existence of mixed Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in asymmetric games, the tending evolution to follow not only a 1:1 sex ratio but also a 1:1 different alleles ratio at particular gene locus. Through construction of replicator dynamics in the group selection framework, our selection model introduces a redefining bases of game theory to incorporate non-random mating where a mating parameter associated with population structure is dependent on the social structure. Also, the model exposes the fact that the number of polymorphic equilibria will depend on the algebraic expression of population structure. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Mathematical games, abstract games

CERN Document Server

Neto, Joao Pedro

2013-01-01

User-friendly, visually appealing collection offers both new and classic strategic board games. Includes abstract games for two and three players and mathematical games such as Nim and games on graphs.

Gamification Quest:* Design and Development of a gamification game

OpenAIRE

Alisandra Senabre, Luis

2017-01-01

Treball Final de Grau en Disseny i Desenvolupament de Videojocs. Codi: VJ1241. Curs acadèmic: 2016/2017 Nowadays video games are taking a more active role in our society. A field in which they have not yet highlighted but have great potential is in the education system. In this document, Gamification Quest: * is presented. It forms part of a bigger educational project named Gamification Quest which pretends to join the education system with video games, in order to motivate the students...

Development and Validation of Kid Tsu Chu Futbol Games for Character Development

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sulistiyono

2017-08-01

Full Text Available This research aims to develop and validation games to develop character in the students Football School under 12 years age group. This study was conducted using R and D. This study produced a product in the form of games related to the process of training, but can be used to develop the student’s character. Games that resulted from this research given the name “Tsu Chu Kid Futbol Games For Character Development”. Games have the flexible nature can be placed at the warm-up, core, and cooling at a football training process. The game must have at least two training purposes with the provisions of the first objective should be able to develop the character, and the second objective can develop one component among the components of the physical, technical, or tactics.

Decoding Computer Games: Studying “Special Operation 85”

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Bahareh Jalalzadeh

2009-11-01

Full Text Available As other media, computer games convey messages which have tow features: explicit and implicit. Semiologically studying computer games and comparing them with narrative structures, the present study attempts to discover the messages they convey. Therefore we have studied and decoded “Special operation 85” as a semiological text. Results show that the game’s features, as naming, interests and motivations of the engaged people, and the events narrated, all lead the producers to their goals of introducing and publicizing Iranian-Islamic cultural values. Although this feature makes “Special Opreation 85” a unique game, it fails in its attempt to produce a mythical personage in Iranian-Islamic cultural context.

Coevolution of game and network structure with adjustable linking

Science.gov (United States)

Qin, Shao-Meng; Zhang, Guo-Yong; Chen, Yong

2009-12-01

Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, in the real world, social interaction could change the relationship among people. And the change of social structure will also affect people’s strategies. We build a coevolution model of prisoner’s dilemma game and network structure to study the dynamic interaction in the real world. Differing from other coevolution models, players rewire their network connections according to the density of cooperation and other players’ payoffs. We use a parameter α to control the effect of payoff in the process of rewiring. Based on the asynchronous update rule and Monte Carlo simulation, we find that, when players prefer to rewire their links to those who are richer, the temptation can increase the cooperation density.

Learning lean with lego: developing and evaluating the efficacy of a serious game

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Fabiano Leal

Full Text Available Abstract This study presents the use of a serious game developed to teach Lean philosophy. The structure of this game was built from theoretical elements and predefined learning events. Learning outcomes and student motivation were considered in the evaluation of the efficacy of the game. This serious game was applied to four groups of students with different profiles. The evaluation results were compared among these groups of students. It can be concluded that the serious game developed showed positive results in learning and motivation demonstrated by the students, regardless of the group analyzed. The main contributions to the literature presented in this article were the serious game (named 3L that was developed and the efficacy evaluation method, considering the learning and motivation demonstrated in different profiles of students.

A game is a game is a game

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Jørgensen, Ida Kathrine Hammeleff

2017-01-01

Recently self-referentiality have occurred as a trend among game designers and have also enjoyed sporadic attention in academia. However, in academia, discussions of self-referential games often rest on proceduralist arguments and a too exclusive focus on the game object. This paper draws...... on the typology of meta-pictures developed by art historian J.W.T. Mitchell. Based on this typology, this paper discusses the notion of meta-games and suggest a broad conception of such games that includes not only the game object, but also the player and the discourse in which it is interpreted....

Effective seeding strategy in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on online social networks

Science.gov (United States)

Xu, Bo; Shi, Huibin; Wang, Jianwei; Huang, Yun

2015-04-01

This paper explores effective seeding strategies in prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on online social networks, i.e. the optimal strategy to obtain global cooperation with minimum cost. Three distinct seeding strategies are compared by performing computer simulations on real online social network datasets. Our finding suggests that degree centrality seeding outperforms other strategies regardless of the initial payoff setting or network size. Celebrities of online social networks play key roles in preserving cooperation.

Powerful elderly characters in video games: Flemeth of Dragon Age

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Elisabeta Toma

2015-12-01

Full Text Available As games are becoming an increasingly popular medium in various demographic and professional strata, scholars are discussing their content and how they shape society. However, despite an increase in gender analysis of video games, little has been written about orienting games towards an elderly audience, or game representations of aging and older persons. Games specifically designed for older persons are focused on improving cognitive functions, starting from the assumption that the elderly are in need of special games in order to repair age-related deficits. This repair-focused design philosophy comes at the expense of pursuing a broader understanding of quality of life and non-programmatic entertainment. Games-for-fun that also explicitly target the elderly as an audience are almost invisible. In this article we turn our attention to a powerful elderly feminine character in an AAA game designed for entertainment without a serious mission, namely Flemeth from Dragon Age. We discuss how the game depicts and models older characters: What repertoire of portraits has Flemeth as an old woman, in the Dragon Age games? How does Flemeth contribute to an enlarged repertoire of portrayals of old women in video games? We conclude that Flemeth’s gender and age displays in Dragon Age do not impoverish her portrayal but, on the contrary, turn her into a powerful and complex character, thus offering a model for game design to represent and invite older players.

Game innovation through conceptual blending

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Möring, Sebastian Martin

In  this  paper  I  wish  to  apply implications of  the  Conceptual  Blending  Theory  to  computer  games.  I  will  analyze  chosen  examples  and  discuss  them  as  a  result  of  video  game  innovation  made  possible  through  "conceptual  blending."  Conceptual  blending  links  at  least.......,  Hell.  The  purpose  of  my  approach  is  not  so  much  to  validate  the  ideas  of  conceptual  blending  theory  through  another  field  of  examples  (computer  games)  but  to  name  and analyze characteristics of the mentioned games with the  help of a given method.......  integration  network  consisting  of  at  least  two  input  spaces,  a  generic  space  and  a  blended  space  as  well  as  its  governing  principles  consisting  of  composition,  completion,  and  elaboration.  With  the  help  of  these  instruments  I  analyze computer  games like  Tuper  Tario  Tros...

Heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

OpenAIRE

Perc, Matjaž; Wang, Zhen

2017-01-01

To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hope of successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible to act as strategy sources is bounded to the immediate neighbors of each individual. But which one of these strategy sources should potentially be copied? Previous research dealt with this question either by selecting the fittest or by selecting one player u...

The effect of ostracism and optional participation on the evolution of cooperation in the voluntary public goods game.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mayuko Nakamaru

Full Text Available Not only animals, plants and microbes but also humans cooperate in groups. The evolution of cooperation in a group is an evolutionary puzzle, because defectors always obtain a higher benefit than cooperators. When people participate in a group, they evaluate group member's reputations and then decide whether to participate in it. In some groups, membership is open to all who are willing to participate in the group. In other groups, a candidate is excluded from membership if group members regard the candidate's reputation as bad. We developed an evolutionary game model and investigated how participation in groups and ostracism influence the evolution of cooperation in groups when group members play the voluntary public goods game, by means of computer simulation. When group membership is open to all candidates and those candidates can decide whether to participate in a group, cooperation cannot be sustainable. However, cooperation is sustainable when a candidate cannot be a member unless all group members admit them to membership. Therefore, it is not participation in a group but rather ostracism, which functions as costless punishment on defectors, that is essential to sustain cooperation in the voluntary public goods game.

Why Shops Close Again : An Evolutionary Perspective on the Deregulation of Shopping Hours

OpenAIRE

Kosfeld, M.

1999-01-01

This paper introduces a new perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We study a retail economy where shopping hours have been deregulated recently. It is argued that first, the deregulation leads to a coordination problem between store owners and customers, and second, the ‘solution’ to this problem depends on the specific cost structure of stores and the preferences of customers. In particular, it may happen that, even if extended shoppi...

I dare you to punish me-vendettas in games of cooperation.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Katrin Fehl

Full Text Available Everybody has heard of neighbours, who have been fighting over some minor topic for years. The fight goes back and forth, giving the neighbours a hard time. These kind of reciprocal punishments are known as vendettas and they are a cross-cultural phenomenon. In evolutionary biology, punishment is seen as a mechanism for maintaining cooperative behaviour. However, this notion of punishment excludes vendettas. Vendettas pose a special kind of evolutionary problem: they incur high costs on individuals, i.e. costs of punishing and costs of being punished, without any benefits. Theoretically speaking, punishment should be rare in dyadic relationships and vendettas would not evolve under natural selection. In contrast, punishment is assumed to be more efficient in group environments which then can pave the way for vendettas. Accordingly, we found that under the experimental conditions of a prisoner's dilemma game, human participants punished only rarely and vendettas are scarce. In contrast, we found that participants retaliated frequently in the group environment of a public goods game. They even engaged in cost-intense vendettas (i.e. continuous retaliation, especially when the first punishment was unjustified or ambiguous. Here, punishment was mainly targeted at defectors in the beginning, but provocations led to mushrooming of counter-punishments. Despite the counter-punishing behaviour, participants were able to enhance cooperation levels in the public goods game. Few participants even seemed to anticipate the outbreak of costly vendettas and delayed their punishment to the last possible moment. Overall, our results highlight the importance of different social environments while studying punishment as a cooperation-enhancing mechanism.

I dare you to punish me-vendettas in games of cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Fehl, Katrin; Sommerfeld, Ralf D; Semmann, Dirk; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Milinski, Manfred

2012-01-01

Everybody has heard of neighbours, who have been fighting over some minor topic for years. The fight goes back and forth, giving the neighbours a hard time. These kind of reciprocal punishments are known as vendettas and they are a cross-cultural phenomenon. In evolutionary biology, punishment is seen as a mechanism for maintaining cooperative behaviour. However, this notion of punishment excludes vendettas. Vendettas pose a special kind of evolutionary problem: they incur high costs on individuals, i.e. costs of punishing and costs of being punished, without any benefits. Theoretically speaking, punishment should be rare in dyadic relationships and vendettas would not evolve under natural selection. In contrast, punishment is assumed to be more efficient in group environments which then can pave the way for vendettas. Accordingly, we found that under the experimental conditions of a prisoner's dilemma game, human participants punished only rarely and vendettas are scarce. In contrast, we found that participants retaliated frequently in the group environment of a public goods game. They even engaged in cost-intense vendettas (i.e. continuous retaliation), especially when the first punishment was unjustified or ambiguous. Here, punishment was mainly targeted at defectors in the beginning, but provocations led to mushrooming of counter-punishments. Despite the counter-punishing behaviour, participants were able to enhance cooperation levels in the public goods game. Few participants even seemed to anticipate the outbreak of costly vendettas and delayed their punishment to the last possible moment. Overall, our results highlight the importance of different social environments while studying punishment as a cooperation-enhancing mechanism.

I Dare You to Punish Me—Vendettas in Games of Cooperation

Science.gov (United States)

Fehl, Katrin; Sommerfeld, Ralf D.; Semmann, Dirk; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Milinski, Manfred

2012-01-01

Everybody has heard of neighbours, who have been fighting over some minor topic for years. The fight goes back and forth, giving the neighbours a hard time. These kind of reciprocal punishments are known as vendettas and they are a cross-cultural phenomenon. In evolutionary biology, punishment is seen as a mechanism for maintaining cooperative behaviour. However, this notion of punishment excludes vendettas. Vendettas pose a special kind of evolutionary problem: they incur high costs on individuals, i.e. costs of punishing and costs of being punished, without any benefits. Theoretically speaking, punishment should be rare in dyadic relationships and vendettas would not evolve under natural selection. In contrast, punishment is assumed to be more efficient in group environments which then can pave the way for vendettas. Accordingly, we found that under the experimental conditions of a prisoner’s dilemma game, human participants punished only rarely and vendettas are scarce. In contrast, we found that participants retaliated frequently in the group environment of a public goods game. They even engaged in cost-intense vendettas (i.e. continuous retaliation), especially when the first punishment was unjustified or ambiguous. Here, punishment was mainly targeted at defectors in the beginning, but provocations led to mushrooming of counter-punishments. Despite the counter-punishing behaviour, participants were able to enhance cooperation levels in the public goods game. Few participants even seemed to anticipate the outbreak of costly vendettas and delayed their punishment to the last possible moment. Overall, our results highlight the importance of different social environments while studying punishment as a cooperation-enhancing mechanism. PMID:23028776

Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István; Hoffman, Moshe; Frederickson, Megan E; Pierce, Naomi E; Yu, Douglas W

2011-12-01

We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice in the absence of signalling. Applications range from ant-plants to microbiomes. (2) Contract theory distinguishes two longstanding but weakly differentiated explanations of host response to defectors: host sanctions and partner fidelity feedback. Host traits that selectively punish misbehaving symbionts are parsimoniously interpreted as pre-adaptations. Yucca-moth and legume-rhizobia mutualisms are argued to be examples of partner fidelity feedback. (3) The theory of public goods shows that cooperation in multi-player interactions can evolve in the absence of assortment, in one-shot social dilemmas among non-kin. Applications include alarm calls in vertebrates and exoenzymes in microbes. 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/CNRS.

Tobacco imagery in video games: ratings and gamer recall.

Science.gov (United States)

Forsyth, Susan R; Malone, Ruth E

2016-09-01

To assess whether tobacco content found in video games was appropriately labelled for tobacco-related content by the Entertainment and Software Ratings Board (ESRB). Sixty-five gamer participants (self-identified age range 13-50) were interviewed in-person (n=25) or online (n=40) and asked (A) to list favourite games and (B) to name games that they could recall containing tobacco content. The ESRB database was searched for all games mentioned to ascertain whether they had been assigned tobacco-related content descriptors. Games were independently assessed for tobacco content by examining user-created game wiki sites and watching YouTube videos of gameplay. Games with tobacco-related ESRB content descriptors and/or with tobacco imagery verified by researchers were considered to contain tobacco content. Games identified by participants as including tobacco but lacking verifiable tobacco content were treated as not containing tobacco content. Participants recalled playing 140 unique games, of which 118 were listed in the ESRB database. Participants explicitly recalled tobacco content in 31% (37/118) of the games, of which 94% (35/37) included independently verified tobacco content. Only 8% (9/118) of the games had received ESRB tobacco-related content descriptors, but researchers verified that 42% (50/118) contained such content; 42% (49/118) of games were rated 'M' for mature (content deemed appropriate for ages 17+). Of these, 76% (37/49) contained verified tobacco content; however, only 4% (2/49) received ESRB tobacco-related content descriptors. Gamers are exposed to tobacco imagery in many video games. The ESRB is not a reliable source for determining whether video games contain tobacco imagery. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/

Convex games versus clan games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Brânzei, R.; Dimitrov, D.A.; Tijs, S.H.

2008-01-01

In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic

Convex Games versus Clan Games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Brânzei, R.; Dimitrov, D.A.; Tijs, S.H.

2006-01-01

In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games.We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games.Furthermore, each monotonic

Game on! : Evaluation malaria games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Rob Willems

2014-01-01

The goal of GameOn! is to develop a serious video game. The object: to develop a serious game that aims to change behavior through awareness. The setup A multidisciplinary group which unites expertise from didactic and game production backgrounds produces an educational game for an international

Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Wei Pan

2016-01-01

Full Text Available We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters.

Forthcoming Issue on Game Theory and Political Economy

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

William D. Ferguson

2013-09-01

Full Text Available Game theory offers a rigorous set of concepts, relationships, and models that invite myriad applications to problems of political economy. Indeed, game theory can serve as a fundamental modeling technique that can bridge microfoundations of political and economic exchanges, with developmental processes and macro implications related to growth and distribution. Applications can range from localized interactions within workplaces, firms, political organizations, and community groups; to intermediate-level market, industry, community, or inter-organizational transactions; to encompassing national, regional, population, or global interactions. At any of these levels, game models can illustrate strategic responses of economic or political actors (individuals or organizations to specifiable conditions concerning any or all of the following: prevailing social context—notably informal institutions (such as social norms and formal institutions (such as mutually understood laws and regulations; available information (complete or not; accessible or strategically manipulated; agents’ motivations (material and/or social; and even levels of rationality—substantive (full cognition or bounded (limited cognition. Applicable models may operate on the basis of given institutional context and preference orientations or may explore associated developmental processes, including adaptive social learning. Of particular interest are representations of one or more of the myriad social dilemmas (or collective-action problems that inhabit political economy, associated exercises or distributions of power, and/or representations of potential resolutions to such dilemmas—perhaps with policy implications. Accordingly, this forthcoming issue of Economies seeks game-theoretic models based on classical, evolutionary, behavioral, or epistemic game theory that can be applied to one or more problems in political economy.

The Use of Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games in CALL: An Analysis of Research

Science.gov (United States)

Peterson, Mark

2016-01-01

Contemporary CALL research reflects renewed interest in digital games. One aspect of this phenomenon namely, use of massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs), has expanded significantly, highlighting the need for a review. This paper analyzes findings from 10 learner-based studies that draw on accounts of SLA informed by cognitive…

An Evolutionary Perspective on the Crabtree Effect

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Thomas ePfeiffer

2014-10-01

Full Text Available The capability to ferment sugars into ethanol is a key metabolic trait of yeasts. Crabtree-positive yeasts use fermentation even in the presence of oxygen, where they could, in principle, rely on the respiration pathway. This is surprising because fermentation has a much lower ATP yield than respiration (2 ATP vs. approximately 18 ATP per glucose. While genetic events in the evolution of the Crabtree effect have been identified, the selective advantages provided by this trait remain controversial. In this review we analyse explanations for the emergence of the Crabtree effect from an evolutionary and game-theoretical perspective. We argue that an increased rate of ATP production is likely the most important factor behind the emergence of the Crabtree effect.

Educational games for health professionals.

Science.gov (United States)

Akl, Elie A; Kairouz, Victor F; Sackett, Kay M; Erdley, William S; Mustafa, Reem A; Fiander, Michelle; Gabriel, Carolynne; Schünemann, Holger

2013-03-28

The use of games as an educational strategy has the potential to improve health professionals' performance (e.g. adherence to standards of care) through improving their knowledge, skills and attitudes. The objective was to assess the effect of educational games on health professionals' performance, knowledge, skills, attitude and satisfaction, and on patient outcomes. We searched the following databases in January 2012: MEDLINE, AMED, CINAHL, Cochrane Central Database of Controlled Trials, EMBASE, EPOC Register, ERIC, Proquest Dissertations & Theses Database, and PsycINFO. Related reviews were sought in DARE and the above named databases. Database searches identified 1546 citations. We also screened the reference lists of included studies in relevant reviews, contacted authors of relevant papers and reviews, and searched ISI Web of Science for papers citing studies included in the review. These search methods identified an additional 62 unique citations for a total of 1608 for this update. We included randomized controlled trials (RCT), controlled clinical trials (CCT), controlled before and after (CBA) and interrupted time-series analysis (ITS). Study participants were qualified health professionals or in postgraduate training. The intervention was an educational game with "a form of competitive activity or sport played according to rules". Using a standardized data form we extracted data on methodological quality, participants, interventions and outcomes of interest that included patient outcomes, professional behavior (process of care outcomes), and professional's knowledge, skills, attitude and satisfaction. The search strategy identified a total of 2079 unique citations. Out of 84 potentially eligible citations, we included two RCTs. The game evaluated in the first study used as a reinforcement technique, was based on the television game show "Family Feud" and focused on infection control. The study did not assess any patient or process of care outcomes. The

A Problem-Based Learning Approach of Teaching Mathematics to Media Technology Students Using a Game Engine

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Triantafyllou, Evangelia; Misfeldt, Morten; Timcenko, Olga

2015-01-01

In this article, we present our idea of using a game engine (Unity) to teach Media Technology students mathematics-related concepts. In order to observe how the introduction of a technological tool, namely the game engine, changes the practices in mathematical work, we adopted the anthropological...

Game mechanics : advanced game design

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Adams, Ernest; Dormans, Joris

2012-01-01

Game Mechanics is aimed at game design students and industry professionals who want to improve their understanding of how to design, build, and test the mechanics of a game. Game Mechanics will show you how to design, test, and tune the core mechanics of a game—any game, from a huge role-playing

A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions.

Science.gov (United States)

Broom, Mark; Lafaye, Charlotte; Pattni, Karan; Rychtář, Jan

2015-12-01

Recently, the study of structured populations using models of evolutionary processes on graphs has begun to incorporate a more general type of interaction between individuals, allowing multi-player games to be played among the population. In this paper, we develop a birth-death dynamics for use in such models and consider the evolution of populations for special cases of very small graphs where we can easily identify all of the population states and carry out exact analyses. To do so, we study two multi-player games, a Hawk-Dove game and a public goods game. Our focus is on finding the fixation probability of an individual from one type, cooperator or defector in the case of the public goods game, within a population of the other type. We compare this value for both games on several graphs under different parameter values and assumptions, and identify some interesting general features of our model. In particular there is a very close relationship between the fixation probability and the mean temperature, with high temperatures helping fitter individuals and punishing unfit ones and so enhancing selection, whereas low temperatures give a levelling effect which suppresses selection.

Adaptive Incentive Controls for Stackelberg Games with Unknown Cost Functionals.

Science.gov (United States)

1984-01-01

APR EZT:: F I AN 73S e OsL:-: UNCLASSI?:-- Q4~.’~- .A.., 6, *~*i i~~*~~*.- U ADAPTIVE INCENTIVE CONTROLS FOR STACKELBERG GAMES WITH UNKNOWN COST...AD-A161 885 ADAPTIVE INCENTIVE CONTROLS FOR STACKELBERG GAMES WITH i/1 UNKNOWN COST FUNCTIONALSCU) ILLINOIS UNIV AT URBANA DECISION AND CONTROL LAB T...ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7.. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION CoriaeLcenef~pda~ Joint Services Electronics Program Laboratory, Univ. of Illinois N/A

Attacker-defender game from a network science perspective

Science.gov (United States)

Li, Ya-Peng; Tan, Suo-Yi; Deng, Ye; Wu, Jun

2018-05-01

Dealing with the protection of critical infrastructures, many game-theoretic methods have been developed to study the strategic interactions between defenders and attackers. However, most game models ignore the interrelationship between different components within a certain system. In this paper, we propose a simultaneous-move attacker-defender game model, which is a two-player zero-sum static game with complete information. The strategies and payoffs of this game are defined on the basis of the topology structure of the infrastructure system, which is represented by a complex network. Due to the complexity of strategies, the attack and defense strategies are confined by two typical strategies, namely, targeted strategy and random strategy. The simulation results indicate that in a scale-free network, the attacker virtually always attacks randomly in the Nash equilibrium. With a small cost-sensitive parameter, representing the degree to which costs increase with the importance of a target, the defender protects the hub targets with large degrees preferentially. When the cost-sensitive parameter exceeds a threshold, the defender switches to protecting nodes randomly. Our work provides a new theoretical framework to analyze the confrontations between the attacker and the defender on critical infrastructures and deserves further study.

Capability and Interface Assessment of Gaming Technologies for Future Multi-Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems

Science.gov (United States)

2011-08-01

Playing Games ( MMORPG ), which necessitate the management of multiple independent entities with sophisticated capabilities; and finally, arcade-style... MMORPG , SA 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE...tested platform for simultaneous control of multiple entities. Similarly, the popularity of Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games ( MMORPG

Multiple steady states, limit cycles and chaotic attractors in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hommes, C.H.; Ochea, M.I.

2010-01-01

This paper investigates, by means of simple, three and four strategy games, the occurrence of periodic and chaotic behaviour in a smooth version of the Best Response Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main finding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics, generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit

Extinction rates in tumour public goods games.

Science.gov (United States)

Gerlee, Philip; Altrock, Philipp M

2017-09-01

Cancer evolution and progression are shaped by cellular interactions and Darwinian selection. Evolutionary game theory incorporates both of these principles, and has been proposed as a framework to understand tumour cell population dynamics. A cornerstone of evolutionary dynamics is the replicator equation, which describes changes in the relative abundance of different cell types, and is able to predict evolutionary equilibria. Typically, the replicator equation focuses on differences in relative fitness. We here show that this framework might not be sufficient under all circumstances, as it neglects important aspects of population growth. Standard replicator dynamics might miss critical differences in the time it takes to reach an equilibrium, as this time also depends on cellular turnover in growing but bounded populations. As the system reaches a stable manifold, the time to reach equilibrium depends on cellular death and birth rates. These rates shape the time scales, in particular, in coevolutionary dynamics of growth factor producers and free-riders. Replicator dynamics might be an appropriate framework only when birth and death rates are of similar magnitude. Otherwise, population growth effects cannot be neglected when predicting the time to reach an equilibrium, and cell-type-specific rates have to be accounted for explicitly. © 2017 The Authors.

Pattern formation, social forces, and diffusion instability in games with success-driven motion

Science.gov (United States)

Helbing, Dirk

2009-02-01

A local agglomeration of cooperators can support the survival or spreading of cooperation, even when cooperation is predicted to die out according to the replicator equation, which is often used in evolutionary game theory to study the spreading and disappearance of strategies. In this paper, it is shown that success-driven motion can trigger such local agglomeration and may, therefore, be used to supplement other mechanisms supporting cooperation, like reputation or punishment. Success-driven motion is formulated here as a function of the game-theoretical payoffs. It can change the outcome and dynamics of spatial games dramatically, in particular as it causes attractive or repulsive interaction forces. These forces act when the spatial distributions of strategies are inhomogeneous. However, even when starting with homogeneous initial conditions, small perturbations can trigger large inhomogeneities by a pattern-formation instability, when certain conditions are fulfilled. Here, these instability conditions are studied for the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that asymmetrical diffusion can drive social, economic, and biological systems into the unstable regime, if these would be stable without diffusion.

Set-Theoretic Inequalities in Stochastic Noncooperative Games with Coalition

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ailada Treerattrakoon

2008-04-01

Full Text Available We model and analyze antagonistic stochastic games of three players, two of whom form a coalition against the third one. The actions of the players are modeled by random walk processes recording the cumulative damages to each player at any moment of time. The game continues until the single player or the coalition is defeated. The defeat of any particular player takes place when the associated process (representing the collateral damage crosses a fixed threshold. Once the threshold is exceeded at some time, the associated player exits the game. All involved processes are being “observed by a third party process” so that the information regarding the status of all players is restricted to those special epochs. Furthermore, all processed are modulated (with their parameters being modified in due course of the game. We obtain a closed form joint functional of the named processes at key reference points.

Doing Justice to the Imitation Game

Science.gov (United States)

Lassègue, Jean

My claim in this article is that the 1950 paper in which Turing describes the world-famous set-up of the Imitation Game is much richer and intriguing than the formalist ersatz coined in the early 1970s under the name "Turing Test". Therefore, doing justice to the Imitation Game implies showing first, that the formalist interpretation misses some crucial points in Turing's line of thought and second, that the 1950 paper should not be understood as the Magna Chartaof strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) but as a work in progressfocused on the notion of Form. This has unexpected consequences about the status of Mind, and from a more general point of view, about the way we interpret the notions of Science and Language.

Applying ecological and evolutionary theory to cancer: a long and winding road.

Science.gov (United States)

Thomas, Frédéric; Fisher, Daniel; Fort, Philippe; Marie, Jean-Pierre; Daoust, Simon; Roche, Benjamin; Grunau, Christoph; Cosseau, Céline; Mitta, Guillaume; Baghdiguian, Stephen; Rousset, François; Lassus, Patrice; Assenat, Eric; Grégoire, Damien; Missé, Dorothée; Lorz, Alexander; Billy, Frédérique; Vainchenker, William; Delhommeau, François; Koscielny, Serge; Itzykson, Raphael; Tang, Ruoping; Fava, Fanny; Ballesta, Annabelle; Lepoutre, Thomas; Krasinska, Liliana; Dulic, Vjekoslav; Raynaud, Peggy; Blache, Philippe; Quittau-Prevostel, Corinne; Vignal, Emmanuel; Trauchessec, Hélène; Perthame, Benoit; Clairambault, Jean; Volpert, Vitali; Solary, Eric; Hibner, Urszula; Hochberg, Michael E

2013-01-01

Since the mid 1970s, cancer has been described as a process of Darwinian evolution, with somatic cellular selection and evolution being the fundamental processes leading to malignancy and its many manifestations (neoangiogenesis, evasion of the immune system, metastasis, and resistance to therapies). Historically, little attention has been placed on applications of evolutionary biology to understanding and controlling neoplastic progression and to prevent therapeutic failures. This is now beginning to change, and there is a growing international interest in the interface between cancer and evolutionary biology. The objective of this introduction is first to describe the basic ideas and concepts linking evolutionary biology to cancer. We then present four major fronts where the evolutionary perspective is most developed, namely laboratory and clinical models, mathematical models, databases, and techniques and assays. Finally, we discuss several of the most promising challenges and future prospects in this interdisciplinary research direction in the war against cancer.

Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in neutral populations

Science.gov (United States)

Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

2018-01-01

Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the formation of homogeneous clusters, which is the hallmark of network reciprocity. Here we go beyond this traditional setup and study the spatiotemporal dynamics of cooperation in a population of populations. We use the prisoner's dilemma game as the mathematical model and show that considering several populations simultaneously gives rise to fascinating spatiotemporal dynamics and pattern formation. Even the simplest assumption that strategies between different populations are payoff-neutral with one another results in the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, where defectors of one population become prey of cooperators in the other population, and vice versa. Moreover, if social interactions within different populations are characterized by significantly different temptations to defect, we observe that defectors in the population with the largest temptation counterintuitively vanish the fastest, while cooperators that hang on eventually take over the whole available space. Our results reveal that considering the simultaneous presence of different populations significantly expands the complexity of evolutionary dynamics in structured populations, and it allows us to understand the stability of cooperation under adverse conditions that could never be bridged by network reciprocity alone.

Illusion Master: Extending Self-Presence and Challenging Immersion in and through Digital Games

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Josef Florian Micallef

2016-11-01

Full Text Available This paper provides an extension of the definition of the concept of self-presence (named Objective self-presence in digital games, and in doing so, challenges the traditional concepts of immersion and presence / self-presence in games. The design process of the submitted game Illusion Master is used as a case study to show how the related concepts of presence and immersion can be addressed in a different manner in and through digital games. It is argued that self-presence need not necessarily involve a situation where players feel as if their virtual self is their actual self. In games studies, this definition of presence is very much linked to the concept of immersion, which looks at how a player is surrounded by an immersive new reality. In this paper, it is argued that self-presence can also manifest itself through a double-consciousness where a player is both engrossed in the game, while remaining conscious of him/herself as a human being engaging with a game outside the game world.

Wavelet evolutionary network for complex-constrained portfolio rebalancing

Science.gov (United States)

Suganya, N. C.; Vijayalakshmi Pai, G. A.

2012-07-01

Portfolio rebalancing problem deals with resetting the proportion of different assets in a portfolio with respect to changing market conditions. The constraints included in the portfolio rebalancing problem are basic, cardinality, bounding, class and proportional transaction cost. In this study, a new heuristic algorithm named wavelet evolutionary network (WEN) is proposed for the solution of complex-constrained portfolio rebalancing problem. Initially, the empirical covariance matrix, one of the key inputs to the problem, is estimated using the wavelet shrinkage denoising technique to obtain better optimal portfolios. Secondly, the complex cardinality constraint is eliminated using k-means cluster analysis. Finally, WEN strategy with logical procedures is employed to find the initial proportion of investment in portfolio of assets and also rebalance them after certain period. Experimental studies of WEN are undertaken on Bombay Stock Exchange, India (BSE200 index, period: July 2001-July 2006) and Tokyo Stock Exchange, Japan (Nikkei225 index, period: March 2002-March 2007) data sets. The result obtained using WEN is compared with the only existing counterpart named Hopfield evolutionary network (HEN) strategy and also verifies that WEN performs better than HEN. In addition, different performance metrics and data envelopment analysis are carried out to prove the robustness and efficiency of WEN over HEN strategy.