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Sample records for evolutionary naming game

  1. Polymorphic Evolutionary Games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fishman, Michael A

    2016-06-07

    In this paper, I present an analytical framework for polymorphic evolutionary games suitable for explicitly modeling evolutionary processes in diploid populations with sexual reproduction. The principal aspect of the proposed approach is adding diploid genetics cum sexual recombination to a traditional evolutionary game, and switching from phenotypes to haplotypes as the new game׳s pure strategies. Here, the relevant pure strategy׳s payoffs derived by summing the payoffs of all the phenotypes capable of producing gametes containing that particular haplotype weighted by the pertinent probabilities. The resulting game is structurally identical to the familiar Evolutionary Games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998. Cambridge University Press), and can be analyzed in terms of an established analytical framework for such games. And these results can be translated into the terms of genotypic, and whence, phenotypic evolutionary stability pertinent to the original game. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  2. The Name Game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crawley, Sharon J.

    Described is a game which provides a method for teaching students to locate cities and towns on a map. Students are provided with a list of descriptive phrases which stand for the name of a city, e.g., hot weather town (Summerville, Georgia); a chocolate candy bar (Hershey, Pennsylvania). Using a map, students must then try to find the name of a…

  3. Evolutionary Multiplayer Games

    OpenAIRE

    Gokhale, Chaitanya S.; Traulsen, Arne

    2014-01-01

    Evolutionary game theory has become one of the most diverse and far reaching theories in biology. Applications of this theory range from cell dynamics to social evolution. However, many applications make it clear that inherent non-linearities of natural systems need to be taken into account. One way of introducing such non-linearities into evolutionary games is by the inclusion of multiple players. An example is of social dilemmas, where group benefits could e.g.\\ increase less than linear wi...

  4. Asymmetric Evolutionary Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph

    2015-01-01

    Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games. PMID:26308326

  5. Evolutionary games on graphs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szabó, György; Fáth, Gábor

    2007-07-01

    Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first four sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fifth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The next three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.

  6. Evolutionary games under incompetence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kleshnina, Maria; Filar, Jerzy A; Ejov, Vladimir; McKerral, Jody C

    2018-02-26

    The adaptation process of a species to a new environment is a significant area of study in biology. As part of natural selection, adaptation is a mutation process which improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species. Here, we investigate this process by combining the idea of incompetence with evolutionary game theory. In the sense of evolution, incompetence and training can be interpreted as a special learning process. With focus on the social side of the problem, we analyze the influence of incompetence on behavior of species. We introduce an incompetence parameter into a learning function in a single-population game and analyze its effect on the outcome of the replicator dynamics. Incompetence can change the outcome of the game and its dynamics, indicating its significance within what are inherently imperfect natural systems.

  7. Multi-language naming game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhou, Jianfeng; Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong; Tang, Wallace K. S.

    2018-04-01

    Naming game is a simulation-based experiment used to study the evolution of languages. The conventional naming game focuses on a single language. In this paper, a novel naming game model named multi-language naming game (MLNG) is proposed, where the agents are different-language speakers who cannot communicate with each other without a translator (interpreter) in between. The MLNG model is general, capable of managing k different languages with k ≥ 2. For illustration, the paper only discusses the MLNG with two different languages, and studies five representative network topologies, namely random-graph, WS small-world, NW small-world, scale-free, and random-triangle topologies. Simulation and analysis results both show that: 1) using the network features and based on the proportion of translators the probability of establishing a conversation between two or three agents can be theoretically estimated; 2) the relationship between the convergence speed and the proportion of translators has a power-law-like relation; 3) different agents require different memory sizes, thus a local memory allocation rule is recommended for saving memory resources. The new model and new findings should be useful for further studies of naming games and for better understanding of languages evolution from a dynamical network perspective.

  8. Chemical evolutionary games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aristotelous, Andreas C; Durrett, Richard

    2014-05-01

    Inspired by the use of hybrid cellular automata in modeling cancer, we introduce a generalization of evolutionary games in which cells produce and absorb chemicals, and the chemical concentrations dictate the death rates of cells and their fitnesses. Our long term aim is to understand how the details of the interactions in a system with n species and m chemicals translate into the qualitative behavior of the system. Here, we study two simple 2×2 games with two chemicals and revisit the two and three species versions of the one chemical colicin system studied earlier by Durrett and Levin (1997). We find that in the 2×2 examples, the behavior of our new spatial model can be predicted from that of the mean field differential equation using ideas of Durrett and Levin (1994). However, in the three species colicin model, the system with diffusion does not have the coexistence which occurs in the lattices model in which sites interact with only their nearest neighbors. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  9. Evolutionary potential games on lattices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szabó, György; Borsos, István

    2016-01-01

    Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the “equilibrium state” by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.

  10. Evolutionary potential games on lattices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Szabó, György, E-mail: szabo@mfa.kfki.hu; Borsos, István, E-mail: borsos@mfa.kfki.hu

    2016-04-05

    Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the “equilibrium state” by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.

  11. Evolutionary potential games on lattices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szabó, György; Borsos, István

    2016-04-01

    Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the "equilibrium state" by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.

  12. Passivity and Evolutionary Game Dynamics

    KAUST Repository

    Park, Shinkyu; Shamma, Jeff S.; Martins, Nuno C.

    2018-01-01

    This paper investigates an energy conservation and dissipation -- passivity -- aspect of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity using the state-space representation of the models, and we devise systematic methods to examine passivity and to identify properties of passive dynamic models. Based on the methods, we describe how passivity is connected to stability in population games and illustrate stability of passive dynamic models using numerical simulations.

  13. Passivity and Evolutionary Game Dynamics

    KAUST Repository

    Park, Shinkyu

    2018-03-21

    This paper investigates an energy conservation and dissipation -- passivity -- aspect of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity using the state-space representation of the models, and we devise systematic methods to examine passivity and to identify properties of passive dynamic models. Based on the methods, we describe how passivity is connected to stability in population games and illustrate stability of passive dynamic models using numerical simulations.

  14. Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jonathan Newton

    2018-05-01

    Full Text Available Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.

  15. Naming game with learning errors in communications

    OpenAIRE

    Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong

    2014-01-01

    Naming game simulates the process of naming an objective by a population of agents organized in a certain communication network topology. By pair-wise iterative interactions, the population reaches a consensus state asymptotically. In this paper, we study naming game with communication errors during pair-wise conversations, where errors are represented by error rates in a uniform probability distribution. First, a model of naming game with learning errors in communications (NGLE) is proposed....

  16. Evolutionary games in the multiverse.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Traulsen, Arne

    2010-03-23

    Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players with any number of strategies , there can be at most isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.

  17. Multidimensional extended spatial evolutionary games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Krześlak, Michał; Świerniak, Andrzej

    2016-02-01

    The goal of this paper is to study the classical hawk-dove model using mixed spatial evolutionary games (MSEG). In these games, played on a lattice, an additional spatial layer is introduced for dependence on more complex parameters and simulation of changes in the environment. Furthermore, diverse polymorphic equilibrium points dependent on cell reproduction, model parameters, and their simulation are discussed. Our analysis demonstrates the sensitivity properties of MSEGs and possibilities for further development. We discuss applications of MSEGs, particularly algorithms for modelling cell interactions during the development of tumours. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. Evolutionary Games and Social Conventions

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Pelle Guldborg

    2007-01-01

    -defined metaphors of individual learning and social imitation processes, from which a revised theory of convention may be erected (see Sugden 2004, Binmore 1993 and Young 1998). This paper makes a general argument in support of the evolutionary turn in the theory of convention by a progressive exposition of its...... in Aumann (1976) and which, together with the assumptions of perfect rationality, came to be defining of classical game theory. However, classical game theory is currently undergoing severe crisis as a tool for exploring social phenomena; a crisis emerging from the problem of equilibrium selection around......Some thirty years ago Lewis published his Convention: A Philosophical Study (Lewis, 2002). This laid the foundation for a game-theoretic approach to social conventions, but became more famously known for its seminal analysis of common knowledge; the concept receiving its canonical analysis...

  19. On economic applications of evolutionary game theory

    OpenAIRE

    Daniel Friedman

    1998-01-01

    Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.

  20. Essays on nonlinear evolutionary game dynamics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ochea, M.I.

    2010-01-01

    Evolutionary game theory has been viewed as an evolutionary repair of rational actor game theory in the hope that a population of boundedly rational players may attain convergence to classic rational solutions, such as the Nash Equilibrium, via some learning or evolutionary process. In this thesis

  1. Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games

    KAUST Repository

    Mabrok, Mohamed

    2017-01-05

    Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population games, namely so-called “stable games”. In particular, it was shown that a combination of stable games and (an analogue of) passive evolutionary dynamics results in stable convergence to Nash equilibrium. This paper considers the converse question of necessary conditions for evolutionary dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all generalized stable games. Using methods from robust control analysis, we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to construct a generalized stable game that results in instability. The results are illustrated on selected evolutionary dynamics with particular attention to replicator dynamics, which are also shown to be lossless, a special class of passive systems.

  2. Domain learning naming game for color categorization.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Doujie; Fan, Zhongyan; Tang, Wallace K S

    2017-01-01

    Naming game simulates the evolution of vocabulary in a population of agents. Through pairwise interactions in the games, agents acquire a set of vocabulary in their memory for object naming. The existing model confines to a one-to-one mapping between a name and an object. Focus is usually put onto name consensus in the population rather than knowledge learning in agents, and hence simple learning model is usually adopted. However, the cognition system of human being is much more complex and knowledge is usually presented in a complicated form. Therefore, in this work, we extend the agent learning model and design a new game to incorporate domain learning, which is essential for more complicated form of knowledge. In particular, we demonstrate the evolution of color categorization and naming in a population of agents. We incorporate the human perceptive model into the agents and introduce two new concepts, namely subjective perception and subliminal stimulation, in domain learning. Simulation results show that, even without any supervision or pre-requisition, a consensus of a color naming system can be reached in a population solely via the interactions. Our work confirms the importance of society interactions in color categorization, which is a long debate topic in human cognition. Moreover, our work also demonstrates the possibility of cognitive system development in autonomous intelligent agents.

  3. Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis of Tumor Progression

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Amy; Liao, David; Sturm, James; Austin, Robert

    2014-03-01

    Evolutionary game theory applied to two interacting cell populations can yield quantitative prediction of the future densities of the two cell populations based on the initial interaction terms. We will discuss how in a complex ecology that evolutionary game theory successfully predicts the future densities of strains of stromal and cancer cells (multiple myeloma), and discuss the possible clinical use of such analysis for predicting cancer progression. Supported by the National Science Foundation and the National Cancer Institute.

  4. Static and evolutionary quantum public goods games

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liao Zeyang; Qin Gan; Hu Lingzhi; Li Songjian; Xu Nanyang [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Du Jiangfeng [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Fachbereich Physik, Universitaet Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund (Germany)], E-mail: djf@ustc.edu.cn

    2008-05-12

    We apply the continuous-variable quantization scheme to quantize public goods game and find that new pure strategy Nash equilibria emerge in the static case. Furthermore, in the evolutionary public goods game, entanglement can also contribute to the persistence of cooperation under various population structures without altruism, voluntary participation, and punishment.

  5. Mean-Potential Law in Evolutionary Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nałecz-Jawecki, Paweł; Miekisz, Jacek

    2018-01-01

    The Letter presents a novel way to connect random walks, stochastic differential equations, and evolutionary game theory. We introduce a new concept of a potential function for discrete-space stochastic systems. It is based on a correspondence between one-dimensional stochastic differential equations and random walks, which may be exact not only in the continuous limit but also in finite-state spaces. Our method is useful for computation of fixation probabilities in discrete stochastic dynamical systems with two absorbing states. We apply it to evolutionary games, formulating two simple and intuitive criteria for evolutionary stability of pure Nash equilibria in finite populations. In particular, we show that the 1 /3 law of evolutionary games, introduced by Nowak et al. [Nature, 2004], follows from a more general mean-potential law.

  6. Microscopic activity patterns in the naming game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dall'Asta, Luca; Baronchelli, Andrea

    2006-01-01

    The models of statistical physics used to study collective phenomena in some interdisciplinary contexts, such as social dynamics and opinion spreading, do not consider the effects of the memory on individual decision processes. In contrast, in the naming game, a recently proposed model of language formation, each agent chooses a particular state, or opinion, by means of a memory-based negotiation process, during which a variable number of states is collected and kept in memory. In this perspective, the statistical features of the number of states collected by the agents become a relevant quantity to understand the dynamics of the model, and the influence of topological properties on memory-based models. By means of a master equation approach, we analyse the internal agent dynamics of the naming game in populations embedded on networks, finding that it strongly depends on very general topological properties of the system (e.g. average and fluctuations of the degree). However, the influence of topological properties on the microscopic individual dynamics is a general phenomenon that should characterize all those social interactions that can be modelled by memory-based negotiation processes

  7. Statistical mechanics of spatial evolutionary games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miekisz, Jacek

    2004-01-01

    We discuss the long-run behaviour of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We use concepts and techniques of statistical mechanics to study game-theoretic models. In order to obtain results in the case of the so-called potential games, we analyse the thermodynamic limit of the appropriate models of interacting particles

  8. Evolutionary Games with Randomly Changing Payoff Matrices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yakushkina, Tatiana; Saakian, David B.; Bratus, Alexander; Hu, Chin-Kun

    2015-06-01

    Evolutionary games are used in various fields stretching from economics to biology. In most of these games a constant payoff matrix is assumed, although some works also consider dynamic payoff matrices. In this article we assume a possibility of switching the system between two regimes with different sets of payoff matrices. Potentially such a model can qualitatively describe the development of bacterial or cancer cells with a mutator gene present. A finite population evolutionary game is studied. The model describes the simplest version of annealed disorder in the payoff matrix and is exactly solvable at the large population limit. We analyze the dynamics of the model, and derive the equations for both the maximum and the variance of the distribution using the Hamilton-Jacobi equation formalism.

  9. Evolutionary Game Theory and Leadership

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guastello, Stephen J.

    2009-01-01

    Comments on the article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. This article offers a fresh perspective on leaders, followers, and their possible origins in nonhuman and primitive human behavior patterns. The connections between group coordination, leadership, and game theory have some…

  10. Extrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Bin; García, Julián; Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne

    2013-01-01

    In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By “qualitatively valid” we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies . In particular, rank changes are almost certain for , which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection. PMID:24339769

  11. Evolutionary game theory: cells as players.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hummert, Sabine; Bohl, Katrin; Basanta, David; Deutsch, Andreas; Werner, Sarah; Theissen, Günter; Schroeter, Anja; Schuster, Stefan

    2014-12-01

    In two papers we review game theory applications in biology below the level of cognitive living beings. It can be seen that evolution and natural selection replace the rationality of the actors appropriately. Even in these micro worlds, competing situations and cooperative relationships can be found and modeled by evolutionary game theory. Also those units of the lowest levels of life show different strategies for different environmental situations or different partners. We give a wide overview of evolutionary game theory applications to microscopic units. In this first review situations on the cellular level are tackled. In particular metabolic problems are discussed, such as ATP-producing pathways, secretion of public goods and cross-feeding. Further topics are cyclic competition among more than two partners, intra- and inter-cellular signalling, the struggle between pathogens and the immune system, and the interactions of cancer cells. Moreover, we introduce the theoretical basics to encourage scientists to investigate problems in cell biology and molecular biology by evolutionary game theory.

  12. Evolutionary game theory and criticality

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mahmoodi, Korosh; Grigolini, Paolo

    2017-01-01

    We study a regular two-dimensional network of individuals playing the Prisonner’s Dilemma game with their neighbors, assigning to each individual the adoption of two different criteria to make a choice between cooperation and defection. For a fraction q  incentive to cheat yields the extinction of cooperation and a modest one leads to the survival of cooperation. We show that for K={{K}\\text{c}} the adoption of a very small value of ɛ exerts a bias in favor of either cooperation or defection, as a form of criticality-induced intelligence, which leads the system to select either the cooperation or the defection branch, when K>{{K}\\text{c}} . Intermediate values of ɛ annihilated criticality-induced cognition and, as consequence, may favor defection choice even in the case when a wise payoff consideration is expected to yield the emergence of cooperation.

  13. Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review

    Science.gov (United States)

    Szolnoki, Attila; Mobilia, Mauro; Jiang, Luo-Luo; Szczesny, Bartosz; Rucklidge, Alastair M.; Perc, Matjaž

    2014-01-01

    Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance is also at the heart of predator–prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth of marine sessile organisms and competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when the competing strategies are three or more, regardless of the particularities of the game. Here, we review recent advances on the rock–paper–scissors (RPS) and related evolutionary games, focusing, in particular, on pattern formation, the impact of mobility and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and zero-dimensional RPS models and the application of the complex Ginzburg–Landau equation, and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale ecological systems. Directions for future research, related, for example, to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules and invasion reversals owing to multi-point interactions, are also outlined. PMID:25232048

  14. Evolutionary competition between boundedly rational behavioral rules in oligopoly games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cerboni Baiardi, Lorenzo; Lamantia, Fabio; Radi, Davide

    2015-01-01

    In this paper, we propose an evolutionary model of oligopoly competition where agents can select between different behavioral rules to make decisions on productions. We formalize the model as a general class of evolutionary oligopoly games and then we consider an example with two specific rules, namely Local Monopolistic Approximation and Gradient dynamics. We provide several results on the global dynamic properties of the model, showing that in some cases the attractor of the system may belong to an invariant plane where only one behavioral rule is adopted (monomorphic state). The attractors on the invariant planes can be either strong attractors or weak attractors. However, we also explain why the system can be in a state of Evolutionary Stable Heterogeneity, where it is more profitable for the agents to employ both heuristics in the long term (polymorphic state).

  15. Name that Contraceptive! A Game for the Human Sexuality Classroom

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rosenthal, Martha S.

    2010-01-01

    There are many contraceptive choices available to people today. Learning about them can be dry, but the game "Name that Contraceptive!" can be a fun and interactive way to review, remember, and retain the details about contraceptive options. Name that Contraceptive is a card game in which students "bid" on the number of clues it will take them to…

  16. Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Assaf, Michael; Mobilia, Mauro

    2010-01-01

    We study large fluctuations in evolutionary games belonging to the coordination and anti-coordination classes. The dynamics of these games, modeling cooperation dilemmas, is characterized by a coexistence fixed point separating two absorbing states. We are particularly interested in the problem of fixation that refers to the possibility that a few mutants take over the entire population. Here, the fixation phenomenon is induced by large fluctuations and is investigated by a semiclassical WKB (Wentzel–Kramers–Brillouin) theory generalized to treat stochastic systems possessing multiple absorbing states. Importantly, this method allows us to analyze the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics beyond the weak selection limit often considered in previous works. We accurately compute, including pre-exponential factors, the probability distribution function in the long-lived coexistence state and the mean fixation time necessary for a few mutants to take over the entire population in anti-coordination games, and also the fixation probability in the coordination class. Our analytical results compare excellently with extensive numerical simulations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our treatment is superior to the Fokker–Planck approximation when the selection intensity is finite

  17. Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Zhen; Wang, Lin; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

    2015-05-01

    Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and evolutionary game theory.

  18. Application of evolutionary games to modeling carcinogenesis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swierniak, Andrzej; Krzeslak, Michal

    2013-06-01

    We review a quite large volume of literature concerning mathematical modelling of processes related to carcinogenesis and the growth of cancer cell populations based on the theory of evolutionary games. This review, although partly idiosyncratic, covers such major areas of cancer-related phenomena as production of cytotoxins, avoidance of apoptosis, production of growth factors, motility and invasion, and intra- and extracellular signaling. We discuss the results of other authors and append to them some additional results of our own simulations dealing with the possible dynamics and/or spatial distribution of the processes discussed.

  19. Spatial effect on stochastic dynamics of bistable evolutionary games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    So, Kohaku H Z; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Kato, Takeo

    2014-01-01

    We consider the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable evolutionary games (coordination games), and examine how they are affected by spatial structure. A semiclassical approximation based on a path integral method is applied to stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with and without spatial structure, and the lifetimes of the metastable states are evaluated. It is shown that the population dependence of the lifetimes is qualitatively different in these two models. Our result indicates that spatial structure can accelerate the transitions between metastable states. (paper)

  20. Coevolution of Artificial Agents Using Evolutionary Computation in Bargaining Game

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sangwook Lee

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issue in the field of game theory. This paper investigates the interaction and coevolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation (EC in the bargaining game. In particular, the game performance with regard to payoff through the interaction and coevolution of agents is studied. We present three kinds of EC based agents (EC-agent participating in the bargaining game: genetic algorithm (GA, particle swarm optimization (PSO, and differential evolution (DE. The agents’ performance with regard to changing condition is compared. From the simulation results it is found that the PSO-agent is superior to the other agents.

  1. Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Argasinski, K; Broom, M

    2013-10-01

    In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of "costs" and "benefits", there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure "benefit" or "cost"? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic "cost" versus "benefits", is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of trade-offs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk-Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced.

  2. Multi-objective optimization of an arch dam shape under static loads using an evolutionary game method

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meng, Rui; Cheong, Kang Hao; Bao, Wei; Wong, Kelvin Kian Loong; Wang, Lu; Xie, Neng-gang

    2018-06-01

    This article attempts to evaluate the safety and economic performance of an arch dam under the action of static loads. The geometric description of a crown cantilever section and the horizontal arch ring is presented. A three-objective optimization model of arch dam shape is established based on the arch dam volume, maximum principal tensile stress and total strain energy. The evolutionary game method is then applied to obtain the optimal solution. In the evolutionary game technique, a novel and more efficient exploration method of the game players' strategy space, named the 'sorting partition method under the threshold limit', is presented, with the game profit functions constructed according to both competitive and cooperative behaviour. By way of example, three optimization goals have all shown improvements over the initial solutions. In particular, the evolutionary game method has potentially faster convergence. This demonstrates the preliminary proof of principle of the evolutionary game method.

  3. Analysis of the "naming game" with learning errors in communications.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong

    2015-07-16

    Naming game simulates the process of naming an objective by a population of agents organized in a certain communication network. By pair-wise iterative interactions, the population reaches consensus asymptotically. We study naming game with communication errors during pair-wise conversations, with error rates in a uniform probability distribution. First, a model of naming game with learning errors in communications (NGLE) is proposed. Then, a strategy for agents to prevent learning errors is suggested. To that end, three typical topologies of communication networks, namely random-graph, small-world and scale-free networks, are employed to investigate the effects of various learning errors. Simulation results on these models show that 1) learning errors slightly affect the convergence speed but distinctively increase the requirement for memory of each agent during lexicon propagation; 2) the maximum number of different words held by the population increases linearly as the error rate increases; 3) without applying any strategy to eliminate learning errors, there is a threshold of the learning errors which impairs the convergence. The new findings may help to better understand the role of learning errors in naming game as well as in human language development from a network science perspective.

  4. Evolutionary dynamics of a smoothed war of attrition game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Iyer, Swami; Killingback, Timothy

    2016-05-07

    In evolutionary game theory the War of Attrition game is intended to model animal contests which are decided by non-aggressive behavior, such as the length of time that a participant will persist in the contest. The classical War of Attrition game assumes that no errors are made in the implementation of an animal׳s strategy. However, it is inevitable in reality that such errors must sometimes occur. Here we introduce an extension of the classical War of Attrition game which includes the effect of errors in the implementation of an individual׳s strategy. This extension of the classical game has the important feature that the payoff is continuous, and as a consequence admits evolutionary behavior that is fundamentally different from that possible in the original game. We study the evolutionary dynamics of this new game in well-mixed populations both analytically using adaptive dynamics and through individual-based simulations, and show that there are a variety of possible outcomes, including simple monomorphic or dimorphic configurations which are evolutionarily stable and cannot occur in the classical War of Attrition game. In addition, we study the evolutionary dynamics of this extended game in a variety of spatially and socially structured populations, as represented by different complex network topologies, and show that similar outcomes can also occur in these situations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  5. Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Křivan, Vlastimil; Cressman, R.

    2017-01-01

    Roč. 416, MAR 07 (2017), s. 199-207 ISSN 0022-5193 EU Projects: European Commission(XE) 690817 - FourCmodelling Institutional support: RVO:60077344 Keywords : evolutionary game theory * Hawk-Dove game * pair formation Subject RIV: EH - Ecology, Behaviour OBOR OECD: Ecology Impact factor: 2.113, year: 2016 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103

  6. Bridging the gap between Schumpeterian competition and evolutionary game theory

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, Esben Sloth

    This paper suggests that the analysis of Schumpeterian competition within the Nelson-Winter model should be complemented with evolutionary game theory. This model and its limitations for density-dependent Schumpeterian strategies are presented in terms of the equations of evolutionary dynamics. F...

  7. Evolutionary Snowdrift Game Incorporating Costly Punishment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yap Yee Jiun

    2012-01-01

    -watak, a, ß, dan nisbah faedah-kos r dalam SG, sistem tiga watak ini berkembang sama ada kepada keadaan mantap yang hanya terdiri daripada karekter C dan P atau hanya karekter C dan D dalam populasi gabungan sempurna. Situasi sebelumnya mempamerkan peningkatan dalam kerjasama berkaitan dengan SG, manakala yang sebelumnya mirip dengan SG. Dinamik dalam mendapatkan pelbagai keadaan mantap didapati adalah berbeza. Secara terperincinya, kunci utama dalam keadaan mantap dan dinamik diperolehi melalui simulasi yang diperolehi daripada satu set persamaan perbezaan. Kepekaan terhadap permulaan pembahagian watak dikaji dengan menggambarkan aliran dalam portrait fasa dan menganalisa sifat titik-titik tetap. Analisa juga menggambarkan fungsi karekter-P dalam menghalang suatu sistem daripada dicerobohi agen karekter-D.  Bermula dengan satu populasi yang hanya terdiri daripada agen C & D, karekter-D bertujuan menyerang sistem yang tidak mampu bertahan apabila pecahan permulaan agen P melebihi r/ß. Model, didefinisikan sebagai algoritma simulasi, boleh secara amnya menggabungkan banyak aspek menarik, seperti di dalam populasi rangkaian.KEYWORDS: evolutionary; snowdrift game; well-mixed population

  8. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in minimum-effort coordination games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Kun; Cong, Rui; Wang, Long

    2016-08-01

    The minimum-effort coordination game draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the predictions of classical game theory. Here, we combine evolutionary game theory and coalescence theory to investigate this game in finite populations. Both analytic results and individual-based simulations show that effort costs play a key role in the evolution of contribution levels, which is in good agreement with those observed experimentally. Besides well-mixed populations, set structured populations have also been taken into consideration. Therein we find that large number of sets and moderate migration rate greatly promote effort levels, especially for high effort costs.

  9. Why Darwin would have loved evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brown, Joel S

    2016-09-14

    Humans have marvelled at the fit of form and function, the way organisms' traits seem remarkably suited to their lifestyles and ecologies. While natural selection provides the scientific basis for the fit of form and function, Darwin found certain adaptations vexing or particularly intriguing: sex ratios, sexual selection and altruism. The logic behind these adaptations resides in frequency-dependent selection where the value of a given heritable phenotype (i.e. strategy) to an individual depends upon the strategies of others. Game theory is a branch of mathematics that is uniquely suited to solving such puzzles. While game theoretic thinking enters into Darwin's arguments and those of evolutionists through much of the twentieth century, the tools of evolutionary game theory were not available to Darwin or most evolutionists until the 1970s, and its full scope has only unfolded in the last three decades. As a consequence, game theory is applied and appreciated rather spottily. Game theory not only applies to matrix games and social games, it also applies to speciation, macroevolution and perhaps even to cancer. I assert that life and natural selection are a game, and that game theory is the appropriate logic for framing and understanding adaptations. Its scope can include behaviours within species, state-dependent strategies (such as male, female and so much more), speciation and coevolution, and expands beyond microevolution to macroevolution. Game theory clarifies aspects of ecological and evolutionary stability in ways useful to understanding eco-evolutionary dynamics, niche construction and ecosystem engineering. In short, I would like to think that Darwin would have found game theory uniquely useful for his theory of natural selection. Let us see why this is so. © 2016 The Author(s).

  10. Spatial evolutionary games with weak selection.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nanda, Mridu; Durrett, Richard

    2017-06-06

    Recently, a rigorous mathematical theory has been developed for spatial games with weak selection, i.e., when the payoff differences between strategies are small. The key to the analysis is that when space and time are suitably rescaled, the spatial model converges to the solution of a partial differential equation (PDE). This approach can be used to analyze all [Formula: see text] games, but there are a number of [Formula: see text] games for which the behavior of the limiting PDE is not known. In this paper, we give rules for determining the behavior of a large class of [Formula: see text] games and check their validity using simulation. In words, the effect of space is equivalent to making changes in the payoff matrix, and once this is done, the behavior of the spatial game can be predicted from the behavior of the replicator equation for the modified game. We say predicted here because in some cases the behavior of the spatial game is different from that of the replicator equation for the modified game. For example, if a rock-paper-scissors game has a replicator equation that spirals out to the boundary, space stabilizes the system and produces an equilibrium.

  11. Understanding herding based on a co-evolutionary model for strategy and game structure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, Tao; Huang, Keke; Cheng, Yuan; Zheng, Xiaoping

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: •We model herding effect in emergency from perspective of evolutionary game theory. •Rational subpopulation survives only when the game parameter is significantly large. •Herding effect may arise if the relative rewarding for rational agents is small. •Increasing the relative rewarding for rational agents will prevent herding effect. •The evolution result is unstable if the game parameter approaches critical points. -- Abstract: So far, there has been no conclusion on the mechanism for herding, which is often discussed in the academia. Assuming escaping behavior of individuals in emergency is rational rather than out of panic according to recent findings in social psychology, we investigate the behavioral evolution of large crowds from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Specifically, evolution of the whole population divided into two subpopulations, namely the co-evolution of strategy and game structure, is numerically simulated based on the game theoretical models built and the evolutionary rule designed, and a series of phenomena including extinction of one subpopulation and herding effect are predicted in the proposed framework. Furthermore, if the rewarding for rational agents becomes significantly larger than that for emotional ones, herding effect will disappear. It is exciting that some phase transition points with interesting properties for the system can be found. In addition, our model framework is able to explain the fact that it is difficult for mavericks to prevail in society. The current results of this work will be helpful in understanding and restraining herding effect in real life

  12. Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altrock, Philipp M; Traulsen, Arne

    2009-01-01

    In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy A performs better than strategy B, strategy A will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. We show analytically that these times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an amazingly simple way under weak selection, i.e. strong stochasticity: the payoff difference Δπ is a linear function of the number of A individuals i, Δπ=u i+v. The unconditional mean exit time depends only on the constant term v. Given that a single A mutant takes over the population, the corresponding conditional mean exit time depends only on the density dependent term u. We demonstrate this finding for two commonly applied microscopic evolutionary processes.

  13. Evolution of Cooperation in Evolutionary Games for Heterogeneous Interactions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qian Xiaolan; Yang Junzhong

    2012-01-01

    When a population structure is modelled as a square lattice, the cooperation may be improved for an evolutionary prisoner dilemma game or be inhibited for an evolutionary snowdrift game. In this work, we investigate cooperation in a population on a square lattice where the interaction among players contains both prisoner dilemma game and snowdrift game. The heterogeneity in interaction is introduced to the population in two different ways: the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every player (HCP) or the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every link between any two players (HCL). The resonant enhancement of cooperation in the case of HCP is observed while the resonant inhibition of cooperation in the case of HCL is prominent. The explanations on the enhancement or inhibition of cooperation are presented for these two cases. (general)

  14. Invisible hand effect in an evolutionary minority game model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sysi-Aho, Marko; Saramäki, Jari; Kaski, Kimmo

    2005-03-01

    In this paper, we study the properties of a minority game with evolution realized by using genetic crossover to modify fixed-length decision-making strategies of agents. Although the agents in this evolutionary game act selfishly by trying to maximize their own performances only, it turns out that the whole society will eventually be rewarded optimally. This “invisible hand” effect is what Adam Smith over two centuries ago expected to take place in the context of free market mechanism. However, this behaviour of the society of agents is realized only under idealized conditions, where all agents are utilizing the same efficient evolutionary mechanism. If on the other hand part of the agents are adaptive, but not evolutionary, the system does not reach optimum performance, which is also the case if part of the evolutionary agents form a uniformly acting “cartel”.

  15. Evolutionary game theory: molecules as players.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bohl, Katrin; Hummert, Sabine; Werner, Sarah; Basanta, David; Deutsch, Andreas; Schuster, Stefan; Theissen, Günter; Schroeter, Anja

    2014-12-01

    In this and an accompanying paper we review the use of game theoretical concepts in cell biology and molecular biology. This review focuses on the subcellular level by considering viruses, genes, and molecules as players. We discuss in which way catalytic RNA can be treated by game theory. Moreover, genes can compete for success in replication and can have different strategies in interactions with other genetic elements. Also transposable elements, or "jumping genes", can act as players because they usually bear different traits or strategies. Viruses compete in the case of co-infecting a host cell. Proteins interact in a game theoretical sense when forming heterodimers. Finally, we describe how the Shapley value can be applied to enzymes in metabolic pathways. We show that game theory can be successfully applied to describe and analyse scenarios at the molecular level resulting in counterintuitive conclusions.

  16. Discontinuous phase transition in an open-ended Naming Game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crokidakis, Nuno; Brigatti, Edgardo

    2015-01-01

    In this work we study on a 2D square lattice a recent version of the Naming Game, an agent-based model used for describing the emergence of linguistic structures. The system is open-ended and agents can invent new words throughout the evolution of the game, picking them up from a pool characterised by a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ. The model displays a nonequilibrium phase transition at a critical point σ c  ≈ 25.6, which separates an absorbing consensus state from an active fragmented state where agents continuously exchange different words. The finite-size scaling analysis of our simulations strongly suggests that the phase transition is discontinuous. (paper)

  17. Memory boosts turn taking in evolutionary dilemma games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Tao; Chen, Zhigang; Yang, Lei; Zou, You; Luo, Juan

    2015-05-01

    Spontaneous turn taking phenomenon can be observed in many self-organized systems, and the mechanism is unclear. This paper tries to model it by evolutionary dilemma games with memory mechanism. Prisoner's dilemma, Snowdrift (including Leader and Hero) and Stag-hunt games are unified on an extended S-T plane. Agents play game with all the others and make decision by the last game histories. The experiments find that when agents remember last 2-step histories or more, a kind of cooperative turn taking (CAD) bursts at the area of Snowdrift game with restriction of S + T > 2R and S ≠ T, while the consistent strategy (DorC) gathers on the line of S + T > 2R and S = T. We also find that the system's fitness ratio greatly improved with 2-step memory. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. Naming game with biased assimilation over adaptive networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fu, Guiyuan; Zhang, Weidong

    2018-01-01

    The dynamics of two-word naming game incorporating the influence of biased assimilation over adaptive network is investigated in this paper. Firstly an extended naming game with biased assimilation (NGBA) is proposed. The hearer in NGBA accepts the received information in a biased manner, where he may refuse to accept the conveyed word from the speaker with a predefined probability, if the conveyed word is different from his current memory. Secondly, the adaptive network is formulated by rewiring the links. Theoretical analysis is developed to show that the population in NGBA will eventually reach global consensus on either A or B. Numerical simulation results show that the larger strength of biased assimilation on both words, the slower convergence speed, while larger strength of biased assimilation on only one word can slightly accelerate the convergence; larger population size can make the rate of convergence slower to a large extent when it increases from a relatively small size, while such effect becomes minor when the population size is large; the behavior of adaptively reconnecting the existing links can greatly accelerate the rate of convergence especially on the sparse connected network.

  19. Detection of communities with Naming Game-based methods

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ribeiro, Carlos Henrique Costa

    2017-01-01

    Complex networks are often organized in groups or communities of agents that share the same features and/or functions, and this structural organization is built naturally with the formation of the system. In social networks, we argue that the dynamic of linguistic interactions of agreement among people can be a crucial factor in generating this community structure, given that sharing opinions with another person bounds them together, and disagreeing constantly would probably weaken the relationship. We present here a computational model of opinion exchange that uncovers the community structure of a network. Our aim is not to present a new community detection method proper, but to show how a model of social communication dynamics can reveal the (simple and overlapping) community structure in an emergent way. Our model is based on a standard Naming Game, but takes into consideration three social features: trust, uncertainty and opinion preference, that are built over time as agents communicate among themselves. We show that the separate addition of each social feature in the Naming Game results in gradual improvements with respect to community detection. In addition, the resulting uncertainty and trust values classify nodes and edges according to role and position in the network. Also, our model has shown a degree of accuracy both for non-overlapping and overlapping communities that are comparable with most algorithms specifically designed for topological community detection. PMID:28797097

  20. A Graphical Evolutionary Game Approach to Social Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cao, Xuanyu; Liu, K. J. Ray

    2017-06-01

    In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning method is proposed. In the proposed game-theoretic method, agents only need to communicate their binary decisions rather than the real-valued beliefs with their neighbors, which endows the method with low communication complexity. Under mean field approximations, we theoretically analyze the steady state equilibria of the game and show that the evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) coincide with the decisions of the benchmark centralized detector. Numerical experiments are implemented to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic learning method.

  1. Adaptive Topographies and Equilibrium Selection in an Evolutionary Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Osinga, Hinke M.; Marshall, James A. R.

    2015-01-01

    It has long been known in the field of population genetics that adaptive topographies, in which population equilibria maximise mean population fitness for a trait regardless of its genetic bases, do not exist. Whether one chooses to model selection acting on a single locus or multiple loci does matter. In evolutionary game theory, analysis of a simple and general game involving distinct roles for the two players has shown that whether strategies are modelled using a single ‘locus’ or one ‘locus’ for each role, the stable population equilibria are unchanged and correspond to the fitness-maximising evolutionary stable strategies of the game. This is curious given the aforementioned population genetical results on the importance of the genetic bases of traits. Here we present a dynamical systems analysis of the game with roles detailing how, while the stable equilibria in this game are unchanged by the number of ‘loci’ modelled, equilibrium selection may differ under the two modelling approaches. PMID:25706762

  2. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND THE EVOLUTIONARY GAMES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sirghi Nicoleta

    2013-07-01

    Full Text Available The neoclassical theory of the firm deals with the pattern of perfect competition, within which the perfect information available to economic agents provides instant allocation of production factors and access to economic goods. The Austrian School (C. Menger, L. von Mises, Hayek, etc. supported the idea of minimal state intervention on the markets, bringing important conceptual developments on the theory of the firm. Hirschleifer (1982 put forward the model of social and institutional functioning, arguing that the game theory is able to predict the outcome of the collective behavior and the human characteristics necessary for building the respective institutions.The evolutionary theory provides the firm and the entrepreneur the recognition of the functions of innovation, of generating and exploiting information and of organizing and coordinating production. The evolutionary perspective of the firm assumes the existence of a body of knowledge that is acquired through and builds up the organizational memory, subsequently found in routines, all choices being made based on these routines (Nelson and Winter, 2002. The evolution of the firm is considered to be similar to natural selection, but unlike the classic market selection, the evolutionists suggest the existence of a plurality of selection media. The present research is structured as follows: a brief introduction into the theories of the firm, the second part of the paper analyzes the theories of the firm from an institutional, neo-institutional and evolutionary perspective. In the third part of the paper the evolutionary games are described and analyzed from the evolutionary perspective of the firm. The last part of the paper represents a study of the “hawk-dove” game dynamic replicator. The final conclusions of the paper show that the evolutionary theory brings valuable contributions to the foundation of explanations regarding economic phenomena, indicating new directions for advanced

  3. Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory

    OpenAIRE

    ZHOU, Chaohong; VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen

    2009-01-01

    Abstract: In this paper, we construct a mathematical model that applies tools from evolutionary game theory to issues in organizational ecology. Evolutionary game theory shares the key feature of mathematical rigor with the industrial organization tradition, but is similar to organizational ecology by emphasizing evolutionary dynamics. Evolutionary game theory may well be a complementary modeling tool for the analytical study of organizational ecology issues, next to formal logic, standard ga...

  4. Language structure in the n -object naming game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lipowski, Adam; Lipowska, Dorota

    2009-11-01

    We examine a naming game with two agents trying to establish a common vocabulary for n objects. Such efforts lead to the emergence of language that allows for an efficient communication and exhibits some degree of homonymy and synonymy. Although homonymy reduces the communication efficiency, it seems to be a dynamical trap that persists for a long, and perhaps indefinite, time. On the other hand, synonymy does not reduce the efficiency of communication but appears to be only a transient feature of the language. Thus, in our model the role of synonymy decreases and in the long-time limit it becomes negligible. A similar rareness of synonymy is observed in present natural languages. The role of noise, that distorts the communicated words, is also examined. Although, in general, the noise reduces the communication efficiency, it also regroups the words so that they are more evenly distributed within the available "verbal" space.

  5. Dilemma strength as a framework for advancing evolutionary game theory. Reply to comments on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games"

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Zhen; Kokubo, Satoshi; Jusup, Marko; Tanimoto, Jun

    2015-09-01

    While comprehensive reviews of the literature, by gathering in one place most of the relevant information, undoubtedly steer the development of every scientific field, we found that the comments in response to a review article can be as informative as the review itself, if not more. Namely, reading through the comments on the ideas expressed in Ref. [1], we could identify a number of pressing problems for evolutionary game theory, indicating just how much space there still is for major advances and breakthroughs. In an attempt to bring a sense of order to a multitude of opinions, we roughly classified the comments into three categories, i.e. those concerned with: (i) the universality of scaling in heterogeneous topologies, including empirical dynamic networks [2-8], (ii) the universality of scaling for more general game setups, such as the inclusion of multiple strategies and external features [4,9-11], and (iii) experimental confirmations of the theoretical developments [2,12,13].

  6. Statistical physics and computational methods for evolutionary game theory

    CERN Document Server

    Javarone, Marco Alberto

    2018-01-01

    This book presents an introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) which is an emerging field in the area of complex systems attracting the attention of researchers from disparate scientific communities. EGT allows one to represent and study several complex phenomena, such as the emergence of cooperation in social systems, the role of conformity in shaping the equilibrium of a population, and the dynamics in biological and ecological systems. Since EGT models belong to the area of complex systems, statistical physics constitutes a fundamental ingredient for investigating their behavior. At the same time, the complexity of some EGT models, such as those realized by means of agent-based methods, often require the implementation of numerical simulations. Therefore, beyond providing an introduction to EGT, this book gives a brief overview of the main statistical physics tools (such as phase transitions and the Ising model) and computational strategies for simulating evolutionary games (such as Monte Carlo algor...

  7. Spatial evolutionary games of interaction among generic cancer cells

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bach, L.A.; Sumpter, D.J.T.; Alsner, J.

    2003-01-01

    Evolutionary game models of cellular interactions have shown that heterogeneity in the cellular genotypic composition is maintained through evolution to stable coexistence of growth-promoting and non-promoting cell types. We generalise these mean-field models and relax the assumption of perfect m...... at a cellular level. This study thus points a new direction towards more plausible spatial tumour modelling and the understanding of cancerous growth....

  8. An application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Swami Iyer

    Full Text Available The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.

  9. An application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

    2014-01-01

    The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.

  10. An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

    2014-01-01

    The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games. PMID:24709851

  11. Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poncela, Julia; Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus; Moreno, Yamir [Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, E-50009 Zaragoza (Spain); Traulsen, Arne [Emmy-Noether Group for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Ploen (Germany)], E-mail: traulsen@evolbio.mpg.de

    2009-08-15

    We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful in the past. The latter depends on the dynamics of strategies in the game, which we implement following the so-called Fermi rule such that the limits of weak and strong strategy selection can be explored. Our framework allows to address general evolutionary games. With only two parameters describing the preferential attachment and the intensity of selection, we describe a wide range of network structures and evolutionary scenarios. Our results show that even for moderate payoff preferential attachment, over represented hubs arise. Interestingly, we find that while the networks are growing, high levels of cooperation are attained, but the same network structure does not promote cooperation as a static network. Therefore, the mechanism of payoff preferential attachment is different to those usually invoked to explain the promotion of cooperation in static, already-grown networks.

  12. Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poncela, Julia; Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus; Moreno, Yamir; Traulsen, Arne

    2009-01-01

    We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful in the past. The latter depends on the dynamics of strategies in the game, which we implement following the so-called Fermi rule such that the limits of weak and strong strategy selection can be explored. Our framework allows to address general evolutionary games. With only two parameters describing the preferential attachment and the intensity of selection, we describe a wide range of network structures and evolutionary scenarios. Our results show that even for moderate payoff preferential attachment, over represented hubs arise. Interestingly, we find that while the networks are growing, high levels of cooperation are attained, but the same network structure does not promote cooperation as a static network. Therefore, the mechanism of payoff preferential attachment is different to those usually invoked to explain the promotion of cooperation in static, already-grown networks.

  13. Cooperative Evolutionary Game and Applications in Construction Supplier Tendency

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Qianqian Shi

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Major construction projects have a great influence on the national economy and society, wherein cooperative relationship between construction suppliers plays an increasingly significant role in the overall supply chain system. However, the relationships between suppliers are noncontractual, multistage, dynamic, and complicated. To gain a deeper insight into the suppliers’ cooperative relationships, an evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation tendency of multisuppliers. A replicator dynamic system is further formulated to investigate the evolutionary stable strategies of multisuppliers. Then, fourteen “when-then” type scenarios are concluded and classified into six different evolutionary tracks. Meanwhile, the critical influencing factors are identified. The results show that the suppliers’ production capacity, owner-supplier contract, and the owner’s incentive mechanism influence the cooperation tendency of suppliers directly. The managerial implications contribute to insightful references for a more stable cooperative relationship between the owner and suppliers.

  14. Games of life and death: antibiotic resistance and production through the lens of evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Conlin, Peter L; Chandler, Josephine R; Kerr, Benjamin

    2014-10-01

    In this review, we demonstrate how game theory can be a useful first step in modeling and understanding interactions among bacteria that produce and resist antibiotics. We introduce the basic features of evolutionary game theory and explore model microbial systems that correspond to some classical games. Each game discussed defines a different category of social interaction with different resulting population dynamics (exclusion, coexistence, bistability, cycling). We then explore how the framework can be extended to incorporate some of the complexity of natural microbial communities. Overall, the game theoretical perspective helps to guide our expectations about the evolution of some forms of antibiotic resistance and production because it makes clear the precise nature of social interaction in this context. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  15. Some results on ethnic conflicts based on evolutionary game simulation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Qin, Jun; Yi, Yunfei; Wu, Hongrun; Liu, Yuhang; Tong, Xiaonian; Zheng, Bojin

    2014-07-01

    The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially originating from the negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a harmonious ethnic relationship, some scholars have proposed a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing civic identity. However, this viewpoint is discussed only from a philosophical prospective and still lacks support of scientific evidences. Because ethnic group and ethnic identity are products of evolution and ethnic identity is the parochialism strategy under the perspective of game theory, this paper proposes an evolutionary game simulation model to study the relationship between civic identity and ethnic conflict based on evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicate that: (1) the ratio of individuals with civic identity has a negative association with the frequency of ethnic conflicts; (2) ethnic conflict will not die out by killing all ethnic members once for all, and it also cannot be reduced by a forcible pressure, i.e., increasing the ratio of individuals with civic identity; (3) the average frequencies of conflicts can stay in a low level by promoting civic identity periodically and persistently.

  16. A network growth model based on the evolutionary ultimatum game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deng, L L; Zhou, G G; Cai, J H; Wang, C; Tang, W S

    2012-01-01

    In this paper, we provide a network growth model with incorporation into the ultimatum game dynamics. The network grows on the basis of the payoff-oriented preferential attachment mechanism, where a new node is added into the network and attached preferentially to nodes with higher payoffs. The interplay between the network growth and the game dynamics gives rise to quite interesting dynamical behaviors. Simulation results show the emergence of altruistic behaviors in the ultimatum game, which is affected by the growing network structure. Compared with the static counterpart case, the levels of altruistic behaviors are promoted. The corresponding strategy distributions and wealth distributions are also presented to further demonstrate the strategy evolutionary dynamics. Subsequently, we turn to the topological properties of the evolved network, by virtue of some statistics. The most studied characteristic path length and the clustering coefficient of the network are shown to indicate their small-world effect. Then the degree distributions are analyzed to clarify the interplay of structure and evolutionary dynamics. In particular, the difference between our growth network and the static counterpart is revealed. To explain clearly the evolved networks, the rich-club ordering and the assortative mixing coefficient are exploited to reveal the degree correlation. (paper)

  17. Evidence Combination From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Xinyang; Han, Deqiang; Dezert, Jean; Deng, Yong; Shyr, Yu

    2016-09-01

    Dempster-Shafer evidence theory is a primary methodology for multisource information fusion because it is good at dealing with uncertain information. This theory provides a Dempster's rule of combination to synthesize multiple evidences from various information sources. However, in some cases, counter-intuitive results may be obtained based on that combination rule. Numerous new or improved methods have been proposed to suppress these counter-intuitive results based on perspectives, such as minimizing the information loss or deviation. Inspired by evolutionary game theory, this paper considers a biological and evolutionary perspective to study the combination of evidences. An evolutionary combination rule (ECR) is proposed to help find the most biologically supported proposition in a multievidence system. Within the proposed ECR, we develop a Jaccard matrix game to formalize the interaction between propositions in evidences, and utilize the replicator dynamics to mimick the evolution of propositions. Experimental results show that the proposed ECR can effectively suppress the counter-intuitive behaviors appeared in typical paradoxes of evidence theory, compared with many existing methods. Properties of the ECR, such as solution's stability and convergence, have been mathematically proved as well.

  18. Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Zhen; Kokubo, Satoshi; Jusup, Marko; Tanimoto, Jun

    2015-09-01

    Why would natural selection favor the prevalence of cooperation within the groups of selfish individuals? A fruitful framework to address this question is evolutionary game theory, the essence of which is captured in the so-called social dilemmas. Such dilemmas have sparked the development of a variety of mathematical approaches to assess the conditions under which cooperation evolves. Furthermore, borrowing from statistical physics and network science, the research of the evolutionary game dynamics has been enriched with phenomena such as pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organization. Numerous advances in understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior over the last few decades have recently been distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and network reciprocity. However, when social viscosity is introduced into a population via any of the reciprocity mechanisms, the existing scaling parameters for the dilemma strength do not yield a unique answer as to how the evolutionary dynamics should unfold. Motivated by this problem, we review the developments that led to the present state of affairs, highlight the accompanying pitfalls, and propose new universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength. We prove universality by showing that the conditions for an ESS and the expressions for the internal equilibriums in an infinite, well-mixed population subjected to any of the five reciprocity mechanisms depend only on the new scaling parameters. A similar result is shown to hold for the fixation probability of the different strategies in a finite, well-mixed population. Furthermore, by means of numerical simulations, the same scaling parameters are shown to be effective even if the evolution of cooperation is considered on the spatial networks (with the exception of highly heterogeneous setups). We close the discussion by suggesting promising directions for future research

  19. An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Courtois, P. [CIRED and University of Paris, Paris (France); Pereau, J.C. [OEP, University of Marne-la-Vallee, Marne-la-Vallee (France); Tazdait, T. [CIRED and OEP, University of Marne-la-Vallee, Marne-la-Vallee (France)

    2001-10-01

    We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours.

  20. Integrating Evolutionary Game Theory into Mechanistic Genotype-Phenotype Mapping.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhu, Xuli; Jiang, Libo; Ye, Meixia; Sun, Lidan; Gragnoli, Claudia; Wu, Rongling

    2016-05-01

    Natural selection has shaped the evolution of organisms toward optimizing their structural and functional design. However, how this universal principle can enhance genotype-phenotype mapping of quantitative traits has remained unexplored. Here we show that the integration of this principle and functional mapping through evolutionary game theory gains new insight into the genetic architecture of complex traits. By viewing phenotype formation as an evolutionary system, we formulate mathematical equations to model the ecological mechanisms that drive the interaction and coordination of its constituent components toward population dynamics and stability. Functional mapping provides a procedure for estimating the genetic parameters that specify the dynamic relationship of competition and cooperation and predicting how genes mediate the evolution of this relationship during trait formation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  1. An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courtois, P.; Pereau, J.C.; Tazdait, T.

    2001-10-01

    We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours

  2. State-Dependent Risk Preferences in Evolutionary Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roos, Patrick; Nau, Dana

    There is much empirical evidence that human decision-making under risk does not correspond the decision-theoretic notion of "rational" decision making, namely to make choices that maximize the expected value. An open question is how such behavior could have arisen evolutionarily. We believe that the answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the interplay between risk-taking and sequentiality of choice in evolutionary environments.

  3. An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Madeo, Dario; Talarico, Agostino; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro; Mocenni, Chiara; Santarnecchi, Emiliano

    2017-11-22

    Our brain is a complex system of interconnected regions spontaneously organized into distinct networks. The integration of information between and within these networks is a continuous process that can be observed even when the brain is at rest, i.e. not engaged in any particular task. Moreover, such spontaneous dynamics show predictive value over individual cognitive profile and constitute a potential marker in neurological and psychiatric conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN), able to capture brain's interregional dynamics by balancing emulative and non-emulative attitudes among brain regions. This results in the net behavior of nodes composing resting-state networks identified using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), determining their moment-to-moment level of activation and inhibition as expressed by positive and negative shifts in BOLD fMRI signal. By spontaneously generating low-frequency oscillatory behaviors, the EGN model is able to mimic functional connectivity dynamics, approximate fMRI time series on the basis of initial subset of available data, as well as simulate the impact of network lesions and provide evidence of compensation mechanisms across networks. Results suggest evolutionary game theory on networks as a new potential framework for the understanding of human brain network dynamics.

  4. Evolutionary optimization and game strategies for advanced multi-disciplinary design applications to aeronautics and UAV design

    CERN Document Server

    Periaux, Jacques; Lee, Dong Seop Chris

    2015-01-01

    Many complex aeronautical design problems can be formulated with efficient multi-objective evolutionary optimization methods and game strategies. This book describes the role of advanced innovative evolution tools in the solution, or the set of solutions of single or multi disciplinary optimization. These tools use the concept of multi-population, asynchronous parallelization and hierarchical topology which allows different models including precise, intermediate and approximate models with each node belonging to the different hierarchical layer handled by a different Evolutionary Algorithm. The efficiency of evolutionary algorithms for both single and multi-objective optimization problems are significantly improved by the coupling of EAs with games and in particular by a new dynamic methodology named “Hybridized Nash-Pareto games”. Multi objective Optimization techniques and robust design problems taking into account uncertainties are introduced and explained in detail. Several applications dealing with c...

  5. The stability concept of evolutionary game theory a dynamic approach

    CERN Document Server

    1992-01-01

    These Notes grew from my research in evolutionary biology, specifically on the theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS theory), over the past ten years. Personally, evolutionary game theory has given me the opportunity to transfer my enthusiasm for abstract mathematics to more practical pursuits. I was fortunate to have entered this field in its infancy when many biologists recognized its potential but were not prepared to grant it general acceptance. This is no longer the case. ESS theory is now a rapidly expanding (in both applied and theoretical directions) force that no evolutionary biologist can afford to ignore. Perhaps, to continue the life-cycle metaphor, ESS theory is now in its late adolescence and displays much of the optimism and exuberance of this exciting age. There are dangers in writing a text about a theory at this stage of development. A comprehensive treatment would involve too many loose ends for the reader to appreciate the central message. On the other hand, the current central m...

  6. Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adami, Christoph; Schossau, Jory; Hintze, Arend

    2016-12-01

    Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic settings such as finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, stochastic decisions, communication between agents, and spatial interactions, require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. While highlighting standard mathematical results, we compare those to agent-based methods that can go beyond the limitations of equations and simulate the complexity of heterogeneous populations and an ever-changing set of interactors. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread (for example in the weak selection-strong mutation limit), but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  7. Spatial Evolutionary Games of Interaction among Generic Cancer Cells

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bach, Lars Arve; Sumpter, David J.T.; Alsner, Jan

    2003-01-01

    Evolutionary game models of cellular interactions have shown that heterogeneity in the cellular genotypic composition is maintained through evolution to stable coexistence of growth-promoting and non-promoting cell types. We generalise these mean-field models and relax the assumption of perfect...... mixing of cells by instead implementing an individual-based model that includes the stochastic and spatial effects likely to occur in tumours. The scope for coexistence of genotypic strategies changed with the inclusion of explicit space and stochasticity. The spatial models show some interesting...... deviations from their mean-field counterparts, for example the possibility of altruistic (paracrine) cell strategies to thrive. Such effects can however, be highly sensitive to model implementation and the more realistic models with semi-synchronous and stochastic updating do not show evolution of altruism...

  8. Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Du, Wen-Bo; Cao, Xian-Bin; Liu, Run-Ran; Wang, Zhen

    2012-09-01

    Considering the inertia of individuals in real life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia: with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society.

  9. Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Du Wenbo; Cao Xianbin; Liu Runran; Wang Zhen

    2012-01-01

    Considering the inertia of individuals in real life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia: with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society. (interdisciplinary physics and related areas of science and technology)

  10. Phase transition and fast agreement in the Naming Game with preference for multi-word agents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lipowska, Dorota; Lipowski, Adam

    2014-01-01

    We examine a variant of the Naming Game, where agents with several words communicate more often than single-word agents. Depending on the preference and dimensionality, the model either converges to a single-language state as in an ordinary Naming Game or remains in a disordered, multi-language phase. At the transition point separating these regimes, due to a percolation-like process, the model converges to a single-language state but much faster than in the ordinary naming game. We also show that the coarsening dynamics of the ordinary Naming Game is slower than expected due to stripe structures that sometimes spontaneously form during the evolution of the model. (paper)

  11. Evolutionary dynamics of division of labor games with selfish agents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Li, Qiaoyu; Zhang, Chunyan

    2017-11-01

    The division of labor is one of the most basic and widely studied aspects of collective behavior in natural systems. Studies of division of labor are concerned with the integration of the individual worker behavior into a colony level task organization and with the question of how the regulation of the division of labor may contribute to the colony efficiency. This paper investigates the evolution of the division of labor with three strategies by employing the evolutionary game theory. Thus, these available strategies are, respectively, strategy A (performing task A), strategy B (performing task B), and strategy D (not performing any task but only free riding others' contributions). And, two typical networks (i.e., BA scale-free network and lattice network) are employed here for describing the interaction structure among agents. The theoretical analysis together with simulation results reveal that the division of labor can evolve and leads to players that differ in their tendency to take on a given task. The conditions under which the division of labor evolves depend on the costs for performing the task, the benefits led by performing the task, and the interaction structures among the players who are involved with division of labor games.

  12. The ecology of cancer from an evolutionary game theory perspective.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pacheco, Jorge M; Santos, Francisco C; Dingli, David

    2014-08-06

    The accumulation of somatic mutations, to which the cellular genome is permanently exposed, often leads to cancer. Analysis of any tumour shows that, besides the malignant cells, one finds other 'supporting' cells such as fibroblasts, immune cells of various types and even blood vessels. Together, these cells generate the microenvironment that enables the malignant cell population to grow and ultimately lead to disease. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of tumour growth and response to therapy is incomplete unless the interactions between the malignant cells and normal cells are investigated in the environment in which they take place. The complex interactions between cells in such an ecosystem result from the exchange of information in the form of cytokines- and adhesion-dependent interactions. Such processes impose costs and benefits to the participating cells that may be conveniently recast in the form of a game pay-off matrix. As a result, tumour progression and dynamics can be described in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT), which provides a convenient framework in which to capture the frequency-dependent nature of ecosystem dynamics. Here, we provide a tutorial review of the central aspects of EGT, establishing a relation with the problem of cancer. Along the way, we also digress on fitness and of ways to compute it. Subsequently, we show how EGT can be applied to the study of the various manifestations and dynamics of multiple myeloma bone disease and its preceding condition known as monoclonal gammopathy of undetermined significance. We translate the complex biochemical signals into costs and benefits of different cell types, thus defining a game pay-off matrix. Then we use the well-known properties of the EGT equations to reduce the number of core parameters that characterize disease evolution. Finally, we provide an interpretation of these core parameters in terms of what their function is in the ecosystem we are describing and generate

  13. Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Amaral, Marco A.; Wardil, Lucas; Perc, Matjaž; da Silva, Jafferson K. L.

    2016-04-01

    Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two different games. While in well-mixed populations the random mixture of the two games is always equivalent to the average single game, in structured populations this is not always the case. We show that the outcome is, in fact, strongly dependent on the distance of separation of the two games in the parameter space. Effectively, this distance introduces payoff heterogeneity, and the average game is returned only if the heterogeneity is small. For higher levels of heterogeneity the distance to the average game grows, which often involves the promotion of cooperation. The presented results support preceding research that highlights the favorable role of heterogeneity regardless of its origin, and they also emphasize the importance of the population structure in amplifying facilitators of cooperation.

  14. Quantum evolutionary stable strategies of 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun, Z.W.

    2009-01-01

    Quantum evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) of games are considered as stable solutions to population games on molecular level. The distributive diagram of 2-player, 2-strategy (2 x 2) symmetric games is brought out to get a convenient way of looking for their quantum ESSs. It is found that transpositions, related to the parameters in classical payoff and those of initial quantum states, may occur when games are quantized. Conditions for transpositions are given in two tables. One can easily find quantum ESSs of a 2 x 2 symmetric game according to its transposition. This paper also draws an overall outline of NEs and ESSs of this kind of game.

  15. Prediction of stock markets by the evolutionary mix-game model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Fang; Gou, Chengling; Guo, Xiaoqian; Gao, Jieping

    2008-06-01

    This paper presents the efforts of using the evolutionary mix-game model, which is a modified form of the agent-based mix-game model, to predict financial time series. Here, we have carried out three methods to improve the original mix-game model by adding the abilities of strategy evolution to agents, and then applying the new model referred to as the evolutionary mix-game model to forecast the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. The results show that these modifications can improve the accuracy of prediction greatly when proper parameters are chosen.

  16. Stochastic noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies of a population of biological networks under natural selection.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Bor-Sen; Yeh, Chin-Hsun

    2017-12-01

    We review current static and dynamic evolutionary game strategies of biological networks and discuss the lack of random genetic variations and stochastic environmental disturbances in these models. To include these factors, a population of evolving biological networks is modeled as a nonlinear stochastic biological system with Poisson-driven genetic variations and random environmental fluctuations (stimuli). To gain insight into the evolutionary game theory of stochastic biological networks under natural selection, the phenotypic robustness and network evolvability of noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies are discussed from a stochastic Nash game perspective. The noncooperative strategy can be transformed into an equivalent multi-objective optimization problem and is shown to display significantly improved network robustness to tolerate genetic variations and buffer environmental disturbances, maintaining phenotypic traits for longer than the cooperative strategy. However, the noncooperative case requires greater effort and more compromises between partly conflicting players. Global linearization is used to simplify the problem of solving nonlinear stochastic evolutionary games. Finally, a simple stochastic evolutionary model of a metabolic pathway is simulated to illustrate the procedure of solving for two evolutionary game strategies and to confirm and compare their respective characteristics in the evolutionary process. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  17. Cancer treatment as a game: integrating evolutionary game theory into the optimal control of chemotherapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orlando, Paul A; Gatenby, Robert A; Brown, Joel S

    2012-01-01

    Chemotherapy for metastatic cancer commonly fails due to evolution of drug resistance in tumor cells. Here, we view cancer treatment as a game in which the oncologists choose a therapy and tumors ‘choose’ an adaptive strategy. We propose the oncologist can gain an upper hand in the game by choosing treatment strategies that anticipate the adaptations of the tumor. In particular, we examine the potential benefit of exploiting evolutionary tradeoffs in tumor adaptations to therapy. We analyze a math model where cancer cells face tradeoffs in allocation of resistance to two drugs. The tumor ‘chooses’ its strategy by natural selection and the oncologist chooses her strategy by solving a control problem. We find that when tumor cells perform best by investing resources to maximize response to one drug the optimal therapy is a time-invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, if cancer cells perform better using a generalist strategy allowing resistance to both drugs simultaneously, then the optimal protocol is a time varying solution in which the two drug concentrations negatively covary. However, drug interactions can significantly alter these results. We conclude that knowledge of both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interactions is crucial in planning optimal chemotherapy schedules for individual patients. (paper)

  18. Cancer treatment as a game: integrating evolutionary game theory into the optimal control of chemotherapy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Orlando, Paul A.; Gatenby, Robert A.; Brown, Joel S.

    2012-12-01

    Chemotherapy for metastatic cancer commonly fails due to evolution of drug resistance in tumor cells. Here, we view cancer treatment as a game in which the oncologists choose a therapy and tumors ‘choose’ an adaptive strategy. We propose the oncologist can gain an upper hand in the game by choosing treatment strategies that anticipate the adaptations of the tumor. In particular, we examine the potential benefit of exploiting evolutionary tradeoffs in tumor adaptations to therapy. We analyze a math model where cancer cells face tradeoffs in allocation of resistance to two drugs. The tumor ‘chooses’ its strategy by natural selection and the oncologist chooses her strategy by solving a control problem. We find that when tumor cells perform best by investing resources to maximize response to one drug the optimal therapy is a time-invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, if cancer cells perform better using a generalist strategy allowing resistance to both drugs simultaneously, then the optimal protocol is a time varying solution in which the two drug concentrations negatively covary. However, drug interactions can significantly alter these results. We conclude that knowledge of both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interactions is crucial in planning optimal chemotherapy schedules for individual patients.

  19. Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Toupo, Danielle F P; Strogatz, Steven H; Cohen, Jonathan D; Rand, David G

    2015-07-01

    We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model in which agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions in which having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition and suggest necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.

  20. Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making

    Science.gov (United States)

    Toupo, Danielle F. P.; Strogatz, Steven H.; Cohen, Jonathan D.; Rand, David G.

    2015-07-01

    We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model in which agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions in which having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition and suggest necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.

  1. Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Fitness-Dependent Wright-Fisher Process with Noise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quan Ji; Wang Xianjia

    2011-01-01

    Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright-Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2x2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player's rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner's dilemma games (PDG) and the snowdrift games (SG). We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments. (general)

  2. Evolutionary Artificial Neural Network Weight Tuning to Optimize Decision Making for an Abstract Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-01

    EVOLUTIONARY ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK WEIGHT TUNING TO OPTIMIZE DECISION MAKING FOR AN ABSTRACT...AFIT/GCS/ENG/10-06 EVOLUTIONARY ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK WEIGHT TUNING TO OPTIMIZE DECISION MAKING FOR AN ABSTRACT GAME THESIS Presented...35 14: Diagram of pLoGANN’s Artificial Neural Network and

  3. Playing Multi-Action Adversarial Games: Online Evolutionary Planning versus Tree Search

    OpenAIRE

    Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Risi, Sebastian; Togelius, Julian

    2017-01-01

    We address the problem of playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games, which include many strategy games with extremely high branching factors as players take multiple actions each turn. This leads to the breakdown of standard tree search methods, including Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), as they become unable to reach a sufficient depth in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce Online Evolutionary Planning (OEP) to address this challenge, which searches for combinations of actions ...

  4. Research on Information Sharing Mechanism of Network Organization Based on Evolutionary Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Lin; Liu, Gaozhi

    2018-02-01

    This article first elaborates the concept and effect of network organization, and the ability to share information is analyzed, secondly introduces the evolutionary game theory, network organization for information sharing all kinds of limitations, establishes the evolutionary game model, analyzes the dynamic evolution of network organization of information sharing, through reasoning and evolution. The network information sharing by the initial state and two sides of the game payoff matrix of excess profits and information is the information sharing of cost and risk sharing are the influence of network organization node information sharing decision.

  5. Evolutionary quantum game theory in the context of socio-economic systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanauske, Matthias

    2011-01-01

    The evolution of socio-economic systems depend on the interdependent decision processes of its underlying system components. The mathematical model to describe the strategic decision of players within a socio-economic game is ''game theory''. ''Quantum game theory'' is a mathematical and conceptual amplification of classical game theory. The space of all conceivable decision paths is extended from the purely rational, measurable space in the Hilbert-space of complex numbers - which is the mathematical space where quantum theory is formulated. By the concept of a potential entanglement of the imaginary quantum strategy parts, it is possible to include cooperate decision path, caused by cultural or moral standards. If this strategy entanglement is large enough, then additional Nash equilibria can occur, previously present dominant strategies could become nonexistent and new evolutionary stable strategies do appear for some game classes. Within this PhD thesis the main results of classical and quantum games are summarized and all of the possible game classes of evolutionary (2 player)-(2 strategy) games are extended to quantum games. It is shown that the quantum extension of classical games with an underlying dilemma-like structure give different results, if the strength of strategic entanglement is above a certain barrier. After the German summary and the introduction paper, five different applications of the theory are discussed within the thesis. (orig.)

  6. Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yong, Xi

    2016-01-01

    The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems. PMID:27118882

  7. Optimal convergence in naming game with geography-based negotiation on small-world networks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Liu Runran, E-mail: runran@mail.ustc.edu.c [Department of Modern Physics and Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei Anhui 230026 (China); Wang Wenxu [School of Electrical, Computer and Energy Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287 (United States); Lai Yingcheng [School of Electrical, Computer and Energy Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287 (United States); Department of Physics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287 (United States); Chen Guanrong [Department of Electronic Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong (Hong Kong); Wang Binghong [Department of Modern Physics and Nonlinear Science Center, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei Anhui 230026 (China); Research Center for Complex System Science, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology and Shanghai Academy of System Science, Shanghai 200093 (China)

    2011-01-17

    We propose a negotiation strategy to address the effect of geography on the dynamics of naming games over small-world networks. Communication and negotiation frequencies between two agents are determined by their geographical distance in terms of a parameter characterizing the correlation between interaction strength and the distance. A finding is that there exists an optimal parameter value leading to fastest convergence to global consensus on naming. Numerical computations and a theoretical analysis are provided to substantiate our findings.

  8. Optimal convergence in naming game with geography-based negotiation on small-world networks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Runran; Wang Wenxu; Lai Yingcheng; Chen Guanrong; Wang Binghong

    2011-01-01

    We propose a negotiation strategy to address the effect of geography on the dynamics of naming games over small-world networks. Communication and negotiation frequencies between two agents are determined by their geographical distance in terms of a parameter characterizing the correlation between interaction strength and the distance. A finding is that there exists an optimal parameter value leading to fastest convergence to global consensus on naming. Numerical computations and a theoretical analysis are provided to substantiate our findings.

  9. Evolutionary games combining two or three pair coordinations on a square lattice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Király, Balázs; Szabó, György

    2017-10-01

    We study multiagent logit-rule-driven evolutionary games on a square lattice whose pair interactions are composed of a maximal number of nonoverlapping elementary coordination games describing Ising-type interactions between just two of the available strategies. Using Monte Carlo simulations we investigate the macroscopic noise-level-dependent behavior of the two- and three-pair games and the critical properties of the continuous phase transtitions these systems exhibit. The four-strategy game is shown to be equivalent to a system that consists of two independent and identical Ising models.

  10. Translation of proper names in the novel «Hunger games» by S. Collins

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zalesova N. M.

    2016-05-01

    Full Text Available the aim of the article is to study the methods used when translating proper names in the fantasy novel «Hunger games» by S. Collins. It was found out that the most popular ones are transcription, translation with the use of the traditional variant and semantic translation.

  11. Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Feng Zhang

    Full Text Available Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism, thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.

  12. Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Cheng, Hongyan; Li, Yuting; Yang, Junzhong

    2010-11-01

    We investigate the effects of double-dealing behavior on cooperation in evolutionary games. Each individual in a population has two attributes: character and action. One's action may be consistent with one's character or not. We provide analytical results by a mean-field description of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs). Moreover, we give numerical results on different networks, ranging from square lattices to scale-free networks (SFNs). Two important conclusions have been drawn from the results on SFNs. Firstly, if only non-influential individuals (those with low degrees) have chances of becoming double-dealers, cooperation is certain to deteriorate. Secondly, when influential individuals (those with high degrees) adopt double-dealing behavior moderately, cooperation would be enhanced, which is in opposition to the traditional belief. These results help us to understand better the social phenomenon of the existence of double-dealers. In addition to the PDG, other types of games including the snowdrift game, the stag-hunt game and the harmony game have also been studied on our model. The results for these three games are also presented, which are consistent with the results for the PDG qualitatively. Furthermore, we consider our model under the co-evolution framework, in which the probability of an individual changing into a double-dealer and the individual strategy both could evolve during the evolutionary process.

  13. Local communities obstruct global consensus: Naming game on multi-local-world networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong; Fan, Zhengping; Xiang, Luna

    2018-02-01

    Community structure is essential for social communications, where individuals belonging to the same community are much more actively interacting and communicating with each other than those in different communities within the human society. Naming game, on the other hand, is a social communication model that simulates the process of learning a name of an object within a community of humans, where the individuals can generally reach global consensus asymptotically through iterative pair-wise conversations. The underlying network indicates the relationships among the individuals. In this paper, three typical topologies, namely random-graph, small-world and scale-free networks, are employed, which are embedded with the multi-local-world community structure, to study the naming game. Simulations show that (1) the convergence process to global consensus is getting slower as the community structure becomes more prominent, and eventually might fail; (2) if the inter-community connections are sufficiently dense, neither the number nor the size of the communities affects the convergence process; and (3) for different topologies with the same (or similar) average node-degree, local clustering of individuals obstruct or prohibit global consensus to take place. The results reveal the role of local communities in a global naming game in social network studies.

  14. Continual Online Evolutionary Planning for In-Game Build Order Adaptation in StarCraft

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Justesen, Niels Orsleff; Risi, Sebastian

    2017-01-01

    able to switch between predefined strategies, which makes it hard to adapt to new situations. This paper introduces an evolutionary-based method to overcome this challenge, called Continual Online Evolutionary Planning (COEP), which is able to perform in-game adaptive build-order planning. COEP......The real-time strategy game StarCraft has become an important benchmark for AI research as it poses a complex environment with numerous challenges. An important strategic aspect in this game is to decide what buildings and units to produce. StarCraft bots playing in AI competitions today are only...... was added to an open source StarCraft bot called UAlbertaBot and is able to outperform the built-in bots in the game as well as being competitive against a number of scripted opening strategies. The COEP augmented bot can change its build order dynamically and quickly adapt to the opponent’s strategy....

  15. Exploring social influence on evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games in networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zong, Hengshan; Jia, Guozhu; Cheng, Yang

    2015-11-01

    Though numerous studies demonstrate the importance of social influence in deciding individual decision-making process in networks, little has been done to explore its impact on players’ behavioral patterns in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs). This study investigates how social influenced strategy updating rules may affect the final equilibrium of game dynamics. The results show that weak social influence usually inhibits cooperation, while strong social influence has a mediating effect. The impacts of network structure and the existence of rebels in social influence scenarios are also tested. The paper provides a comprehensive interpretation on social influence effects on evolutionary PDGs in networks.

  16. Optimality and stability of symmetric evolutionary games with applications in genetic selection.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Yuanyuan; Hao, Yiping; Wang, Min; Zhou, Wen; Wu, Zhijun

    2015-06-01

    Symmetric evolutionary games, i.e., evolutionary games with symmetric fitness matrices, have important applications in population genetics, where they can be used to model for example the selection and evolution of the genotypes of a given population. In this paper, we review the theory for obtaining optimal and stable strategies for symmetric evolutionary games, and provide some new proofs and computational methods. In particular, we review the relationship between the symmetric evolutionary game and the generalized knapsack problem, and discuss the first and second order necessary and sufficient conditions that can be derived from this relationship for testing the optimality and stability of the strategies. Some of the conditions are given in different forms from those in previous work and can be verified more efficiently. We also derive more efficient computational methods for the evaluation of the conditions than conventional approaches. We demonstrate how these conditions can be applied to justifying the strategies and their stabilities for a special class of genetic selection games including some in the study of genetic disorders.

  17. Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick

    2012-01-01

    By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures. PMID:22970237

  18. Effects of Some Topological Ingredients on the Evolutionary Ultimatum Game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deng Lili; Zhang Jianxiong; Tang Wansheng; Zhang Wei

    2012-01-01

    This study aims at figuring out the crucial topological ingredients which affect the outcomes of the ultimatum game located on different networks, encompassing the regular network, the random network, the small-world network, and the scale-free network. With the aid of random interchanging algorithm, we investigate the relations between the outcomes of the ultimatum game and some topological ingredients, including the average range, the clustering coefficient and the heterogeneity, and so forth. It is found that for the regular, random and small-work networks, the average range and the clustering coefficient have evident impacts on the ultimatum game, while for the scale-free network, the original degree heterogeneity and the underlying rich-club characterizations are the mainly important topological ingredients that influence the outcomes of ultimatum game substantially.

  19. Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games

    KAUST Repository

    Mabrok, Mohamed; Shamma, Jeff S.

    2017-01-01

    Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population

  20. Analysis of naming game over networks in the presence of memory loss

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fu, Guiyuan; Cai, Yunze; Zhang, Weidong

    2017-08-01

    In this paper, we study the dynamics of naming game where individuals are under the influence of memory loss. An extended naming game incorporating memory loss is proposed. Different from the existing naming game models, the individual in the proposed model would forget some words with a probability in his memory during interaction and keep his conveyed word unchanged until he reaches a local agreement. We analyze the dynamics of the proposed model through extensive and comprehensive simulations, where four typical networks with different configuration are employed. The influence of memory loss as well as the population size on the performance of the proposed model is investigated. The simulation results show that (i) the stronger memory loss, the larger convergence time; (ii) as the strength of memory loss becomes stronger, maximum number of total words will decrease, while the maximum number of different words among the population remains almost unchanged; (iii) the maximum number of different words increases linearly with the increase of the population size and coincides with each other under different strength of memory loss. The findings in the proposed model may give an insight to understand better the influence of memory loss on the transient dynamics of language evolution and opinion formation over networks.

  1. Study on system dynamics of evolutionary mix-game models

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gou, Chengling; Guo, Xiaoqian; Chen, Fang

    2008-11-01

    Mix-game model is ameliorated from an agent-based MG model, which is used to simulate the real financial market. Different from MG, there are two groups of agents in Mix-game: Group 1 plays a majority game and Group 2 plays a minority game. These two groups of agents have different bounded abilities to deal with historical information and to count their own performance. In this paper, we modify Mix-game model by assigning the evolution abilities to agents: if the winning rates of agents are smaller than a threshold, they will copy the best strategies the other agent has; and agents will repeat such evolution at certain time intervals. Through simulations this paper finds: (1) the average winning rates of agents in Group 1 and the mean volatilities increase with the increases of the thresholds of Group 1; (2) the average winning rates of both groups decrease but the mean volatilities of system increase with the increase of the thresholds of Group 2; (3) the thresholds of Group 2 have greater impact on system dynamics than the thresholds of Group 1; (4) the characteristics of system dynamics under different time intervals of strategy change are similar to each other qualitatively, but they are different quantitatively; (5) As the time interval of strategy change increases from 1 to 20, the system behaves more and more stable and the performances of agents in both groups become better also.

  2. An evolutionary-game model of tumour-cell interactions: possible relevance to gene therapy

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bach, L.A.; Bentzen, S.M.; Alsner, Jan

    2001-01-01

    Evolutionary games have been applied as simple mathematical models of populations where interactions between individuals control the dynamics. Recently, it has been proposed to use this type of model to describe the evolution of tumour cell populations with interactions between cells. We extent...

  3. Analysis of Knowledge-Sharing Evolutionary Game in University Teacher Team

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huo, Mingkui

    2013-01-01

    The knowledge-sharing activity is a major drive force behind the progress and innovation of university teacher team. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article analyzes the knowledge-sharing process model of this team, studies the influencing mechanism of various factors such as knowledge aggregate gap, incentive coefficient and risk…

  4. A study of driver's route choice behavior based on evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jiang, Xiaowei; Ji, Yanjie; Du, Muqing; Deng, Wei

    2014-01-01

    This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. A simulated network with two alternative routes and one variable message sign is built to illustrate the analytic method. We assume that the drivers in the transportation system are bounded rational, and the traffic information they receive is incomplete. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers' route choice decision-making behaviors. Here we conclude that the traffic information plays an important role in the route choice behavior. The driver's route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results also demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver's route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent.

  5. A Study of Driver’s Route Choice Behavior Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xiaowei Jiang

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. A simulated network with two alternative routes and one variable message sign is built to illustrate the analytic method. We assume that the drivers in the transportation system are bounded rational, and the traffic information they receive is incomplete. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers’ route choice decision-making behaviors. Here we conclude that the traffic information plays an important role in the route choice behavior. The driver’s route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results also demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver’s route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent.

  6. Modeling evolutionary games in populations with demographic structure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Li, Xiang-Yi; Giaimo, Stefano; Baudisch, Annette

    2015-01-01

    interactions, but usually omits life history and the demographic structure of the population. Here we show how an integration of both aspects can substantially alter the underlying evolutionary dynamics. We study the replicator dynamics of strategy interactions in life stage structured populations. Individuals...

  7. Applying Evolutionary Psychology to a Serious Game about Children's Interpersonal Conflict

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gordon P. D. Ingram

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9–12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

  8. Applying evolutionary psychology to a serious game about children's interpersonal conflict.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ingram, Gordon P D; Campos, Joana; Hondrou, Charline; Vasalou, Asimina; Martinho, Carlos; Joinson, Adam

    2012-12-20

    This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9-12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK) aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

  9. What's in a Name: Is “Evolutionary Psychology” Eclipsing “Sociobiology” in the Scientific Literature?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gregory D. Webster

    2007-10-01

    Full Text Available Is the term “evolutionary psychology” supplanting “sociobiology” in the scientific literature? How influential was E. O. Wilson's (1975 book, Sociobiology, in establishing the discipline of the same name? Similarly, how influential were the two Tooby-Cosmides chapters appearing in The Adapted Mind (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992 in establishing evolutionary psychology as a viable outgrowth of sociobiology? The purpose of the present research was to answer these questions using quantitative analyses of publication trends. The Internet search engine Google Scholar was used to count the number of hits (i.e., the number of scholarly works, citations, etc. for “sociobiology” and “evolutionary psychology” separately per year from 1960 to 2003. Interrupted time-series analyses revealed significant increases (intercept shifts for sociobiology hits between 1974 and 1975, and for evolutionary psychology hits between 1991 and 1992. Evolutionary psychology hits also experienced a significant increase in change-over-time (a slope shift between 1991 and 1992. Growth curve analyses revealed that the rate of growth for evolutionary psychology, which was accelerating over time, was significantly greater than that for sociobiology, which was decelerating. The implications of these findings for understanding the histories of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are discussed.

  10. Playing Multi-Action Adversarial Games: Online Evolutionary Planning versus Tree Search

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Risi, Sebastian

    2017-01-01

    We address the problem of playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games, which include many strategy games with extremely high branching factors as players take multiple actions each turn. This leads to the breakdown of standard tree search methods, including Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS......), as they become unable to reach a sufficient depth in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce Online Evolutionary Planning (OEP) to address this challenge, which searches for combinations of actions to perform during a single turn guided by a fitness function that evaluates the quality of a particular state....... We compare OEP to different MCTS variations that constrain the exploration to deal with the high branching factor in the turn-based multi-action game Hero Academy. While the constrained MCTS variations outperform the vanilla MCTS implementation by a large margin, OEP is able to search the space...

  11. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation and Enterprise Emission from the Perspective of Environmental Tax

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mai, Yazong

    2017-12-01

    In the context of the upcoming implementation of the environmental tax policy, there is a need for a focus on the relationship between government regulation and corporate emissions. To achieve the real effect of environmental tax policy, government need to regulate the illegal emissions of enterprises. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper analyses the strategic set of government regulators and polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy. By using the evolutionary game model, the utility function and payoff matrix of the both sides are constructed, and the evolutionary analysis and strategy adjustment of the environmental governance target and the actual profit of the stakeholders are carried out. Thus, the wrong behaviours could be corrected so that the equilibrium of the evolutionary system can be achieved gradually, which could also get the evolutionary stable strategies of the government and the polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy.

  12. Time scales in evolutionary game on adaptive networks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cong, Rui, E-mail: congrui0000@126.com [School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi' an (China); Wu, Te; Qiu, Yuan-Ying [School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi' an (China); Wang, Long [School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi' an (China); Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing (China)

    2014-02-01

    Most previous studies concerning spatial games have assumed strategy updating occurs with a fixed ratio relative to interactions. We here set up a coevolutionary model to investigate how different ratio affects the evolution of cooperation on adaptive networks. Simulation results demonstrate that cooperation can be significantly enhanced under our rewiring mechanism, especially with slower natural selection. Meanwhile, slower selection induces larger network heterogeneity. Strong selection contracts the parameter area where cooperation thrives. Therefore, cooperation prevails whenever individuals are offered enough chances to adapt to the environment. Robustness of the results has been checked under rewiring cost or varied networks.

  13. Older partner selection promotes the prevalence of cooperation in evolutionary games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, Guoli; Huang, Jincai; Zhang, Weiming

    2014-10-21

    Evolutionary games typically come with the interplays between evolution of individual strategy and adaptation to network structure. How these dynamics in the co-evolution promote (or obstruct) the cooperation is regarded as an important topic in social, economic, and biological fields. Combining spatial selection with partner choice, the focus of this paper is to identify which neighbour should be selected as a role to imitate during the process of co-evolution. Age, an internal attribute and kind of local piece of information regarding the survivability of the agent, is a significant consideration for the selection strategy. The analysis and simulations presented, demonstrate that older partner selection for strategy imitation could foster the evolution of cooperation. The younger partner selection, however, may decrease the level of cooperation. Our model highlights the importance of agent׳s age on the promotion of cooperation in evolutionary games, both efficiently and effectively. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  14. Evolutionary Game Model Study of Construction Green Supply Chain Management under the Government Intervention

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xing, Yuanzhi; Deng, Xiaoyi

    2017-11-01

    The paper first has defined the concepts of green supply chain management and evolution game theory, and pointed out the characteristics of green supply chain management in construction. The main participants and key links of the construction green supply chain management are determined by constructing the organization framework. This paper established the evolutionary game model between construction enterprises and recycling enterprises for the green supply chain closed-loop structure. The waste recycling evolutionary stability equilibrium solution is obtained to explore the principle and effective scope of government policy intervention. This paper put forward the relevant countermeasures to the green supply chain management in construction recycling stage from the government point of view. The conclusion has reference value and guidance to the final product construction enterprises, recycling enterprises and the government during green supply chain.

  15. Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rongwu Lu

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution. Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis, this article studies replicator dynamics of the evolutionary model to make an optimization analysis of the behaviors of those interested parties and the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions. The results show how the charge of supervision of government department and inspection of coal mine enterprise impact the efficiency of safety management and the effect of constraint measures and incentive and other measures in safety management.

  16. Evolutionary games played by multi-agent system with different memory capacity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan

    2015-06-01

    The evolution of cooperation is still an enigma. Resolution of cooperative dilemma is a hot topic as a perplexing interdisciplinary project, and has captured wide attention of researchers from many disciplines as a multidisciplinary field. Our main concern is the design of a networked evolutionary game model in which players show difference in memory capability. The idea of different memory capacities has its origin on the pervasive individual heterogeneity of real agents in nature. It is concluded that this proposed multiple memory capacity stimulates cooperation in lattice-structured populations. The networking effect is also investigated via a scale free network which is associated with the heterogeneous populations structure. Interestingly, results suggest that the effectiveness of a heterogeneous network at fostering cooperation is reduced in the presence of individual memory here. A thorough inquiry in the coevolutionary dynamics of individual memory and spatial structure in evolutionary games is planned for the immediate future.

  17. Mean-field approximations of fixation time distributions of evolutionary game dynamics on graphs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ying, Li-Min; Zhou, Jie; Tang, Ming; Guan, Shu-Guang; Zou, Yong

    2018-02-01

    The mean fixation time is often not accurate for describing the timescales of fixation probabilities of evolutionary games taking place on complex networks. We simulate the game dynamics on top of complex network topologies and approximate the fixation time distributions using a mean-field approach. We assume that there are two absorbing states. Numerically, we show that the mean fixation time is sufficient in characterizing the evolutionary timescales when network structures are close to the well-mixing condition. In contrast, the mean fixation time shows large inaccuracies when networks become sparse. The approximation accuracy is determined by the network structure, and hence by the suitability of the mean-field approach. The numerical results show good agreement with the theoretical predictions.

  18. Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Quan, Ji; Liu, Wei; Chu, Yuqing; Wang, Xianjia

    2017-11-23

    Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not be stochastically stable. In this paper, a model of voluntary public goods game with punishment is studied in a stochastic situation. Unlike the existing model, we describe the evolutionary process of strategies in the population as a generalized quasi-birth-and-death process. And we investigate the stochastic stable equilibrium (SSE) instead. By numerical experiments, we get all possible SSEs of the system for any combination of parameters, and investigate the influence of parameters on the probabilities of the system to select different equilibriums. It is found that in the stochastic situation, the introduction of the punishment and non-participation strategies can change the evolutionary dynamics of the system and equilibrium of the game. There is a large range of parameters that the system selects the cooperative states as its SSE with a high probability. This result provides us an insight and control method for the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game in stochastic situations.

  19. Co-Evolution of Opinion and Strategy in Persuasion Dynamics:. AN Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ding, Fei; Liu, Yun; Li, Yong

    In this paper, a new model of opinion formation within the framework of evolutionary game theory is presented. The model simulates strategic situations when people are in opinion discussion. Heterogeneous agents adjust their behaviors to the environment during discussions, and their interacting strategies evolve together with opinions. In the proposed game, we take into account payoff discount to join a discussion, and the situation that people might drop out of an unpromising game. Analytical and emulational results show that evolution of opinion and strategy always tend to converge, with utility threshold, memory length, and decision uncertainty parameters influencing the convergence time. The model displays different dynamical regimes when we set differently the rule when people are at a loss in strategy.

  20. Simulation of producers behaviour in the electricity market by evolutionary games

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Menniti, Daniele; Pinnarelli, Anna; Sorrentino, Nicola [Department of Electronic, Computer and System Science, University of Calabria (Italy)

    2008-03-15

    Simulation of the electricity market participant's behaviour is important for producers and consumers to determine their bidding strategies and for regulating the market rules. In literature, for this aim a lot of papers suggest to use the well-known theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately they cannot be applied in an easy way when a multi-players game has to be considered to simulate the operation of the electricity market. In this paper, the authors suggest to use the new theory of evolutionary games and the concept of near Nash equilibrium to simulate the electricity market in the presence of more than two producers. In particular, an opportune genetic algorithm has been developed; from the results reported in the paper, it is clear that this algorithm can be usefully utilised. (author)

  1. Evolutionary game theory for physical and biological scientists. I. Training and validating population dynamics equations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liao, David; Tlsty, Thea D

    2014-08-06

    Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.

  2. Simulation of producers behaviour in the electricity market by evolutionary games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menniti, Daniele; Pinnarelli, Anna; Sorrentino, Nicola

    2008-01-01

    Simulation of the electricity market participant's behaviour is important for producers and consumers to determine their bidding strategies and for regulating the market rules. In literature, for this aim a lot of papers suggest to use the well-known theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately they cannot be applied in an easy way when a multi-players game has to be considered to simulate the operation of the electricity market. In this paper, the authors suggest to use the new theory of evolutionary games and the concept of near Nash equilibrium to simulate the electricity market in the presence of more than two producers. In particular, an opportune genetic algorithm has been developed; from the results reported in the paper, it is clear that this algorithm can be usefully utilised. (author)

  3. Environmental Policy and Technology Diffusion under Imperfect Competition. An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    De Vries, F.P.

    2003-05-01

    The analysis of the thesis centers around the diffusion incentives of different environmental policy instruments. Emission taxation, subsidies per unit of emission reduction, marketable emission permits and marketable emission credits will be discussed and compared to each other on how they affect the diffusion of an environmentally benign technology. The analysis is conducted within an applied evolutionary game theoretical framework. An extensive discussion of evolutionary game theory can be found in chapter 2. Chapter 3 reviews classical diffusion models: the epidemic, probit and classic game theoretical model. Then we shift our attention to general evolutionary diffusion models, followed by an outline of the use of evolutionary game theory as a tool for analyzing technology diffusion. The purpose of the chapter is to illustrate the main differences between the various models. Relevant parts of economic theory are reviewed in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 contains a survey and interpretive assessment of the current literature dealing with the impact of environmental policy instruments on the adoption and diffusion of a pollution abatement technology. The chapter illustrates and criticizes the static character of the most influential models. In chapter 2 it will become apparent that an evolutionary analysis is quite appealing when markets axe characterized by perfect competition. Enhanced competitiveness forces firms to produce efficiently in order to avoid elimination. However, in imperfect competitive markets competition is limited to only a small number of firms. Since the central market structure in this thesis is that of imperfect competition, chapter 5 examines the literature on evolutionary game models applied to these type of markets. The survey reveals that the literature focuses on determining whether the evolutionary game models generate output equilibria identical to the traditional static Cournot and Bertrand models or to other output levels. Chapter 6

  4. Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tongyao Feng

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

  5. Classification, Naming and Evolutionary History of Glycosyltransferases from Sequenced Green and Red Algal Genomes

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ulvskov, Peter; Paiva, Dionisio Soares; Domozych, David

    2013-01-01

    . In order to elucidate possible evolutionary links between the three advanced lineages in Archaeplastida, a genomic analysis was initiated. Fully sequenced genomes from the Rhodophyta and Virideplantae and the well-defined CAZy database on glycosyltransferases were included in the analysis. The number...

  6. Evolutionary snowdrift game incorporating costly punishment in structured populations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chan, Nat W. H.; Xu, C.; Tey, Siew Kian; Yap, Yee Jiun; Hui, P. M.

    2013-01-01

    The role of punishment and the effects of a structured population in promoting cooperation are important issues. Within a recent model of snowdrift game (SG) incorporating a costly punishing strategy (P), we study the effects of a population connected through a square lattice. The punishers, who carry basically a cooperative (C) character, are willing to pay a cost α so as to punish a non-cooperative (D) opponent by β. Depending on α, β, the cost-to-benefit ratio r in SG, and the initial conditions, the system evolves into different phases that could be homogeneous or inhomogeneous. The spatial structure imposes geometrical constraint on how one agent is affected by neighboring agents. Results of extensive numerical simulations, both for the steady state and the dynamics, are presented. Possible phases are identified and discussed, and isolated phases in the r-β space are identified as special local structures of strategies that are stable due to the lattice structure. In contrast to a well-mixed population where punishers are suppressed due to the cost of punishment, the altruistic punishing strategy can flourish and prevail for appropriate values of the parameters, implying an enhancement in cooperation by imposing punishments in a structured population. The system could evolve to a phase corresponding to the coexistence of C, D, and P strategies at some particular payoff parameters, and such a phase is absent in a well-mixed population. The pair approximation, a commonly used analytic approach, is extended from a two-strategy system to a three-strategy system. We show that the pair approximation can, at best, capture the numerical results only qualitatively. Due to the improper way of including spatial correlation imposed by the lattice structure, the approximation does not give the frequencies of C, D, and P accurately and fails to give the homogeneous AllD and AllP phases.

  7. Costly punishment and cooperation in the evolutionary snowdrift game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, C.; Ji, M.; Yap, Yee Jiun; Zheng, Da-Fang; Hui, P. M.

    2011-05-01

    The role of punishments in promoting cooperation is an important issue. We incorporate costly punishments into the snowdrift game (SG) by introducing a third punishing (P) character, and study the effects. The punishers, who carry basically a cooperative (C) character, are willing to pay a cost α so as to punish a non-cooperative (D) opponent by β. Depending on the initial fractions of the characters, α, β, and the cost-to-benefit ratio r in the SG, the three-character system evolves into a steady state consisting either only of C and P characters or only of C and D characters, in a well-mixed population. The former situation represents an enhancement in cooperation relative to the SG, while the latter is similar to the SG. The dynamics in approaching these different steady states are found to be different. Analytically, the key features in the dynamics and the steady states observed in simulations are captured by a set of differential equations. The sensitivity to the initial distribution of characters is studied by depicting the flow in a phase portrait and analyzing the nature of fixed points. The analysis also shows the role of P-character agents in preventing a system from invasion by D-character agents. Starting from a population consisting only of C and P agents, a D-character agent intended to invade the system cannot survive when the initial fraction of P agents is greater than r/β. Our model, defined intentionally as a simulation algorithm, can be readily generalized to incorporate many interesting effects, such as those in a networked population.

  8. Using Self-Adaptive Evolutionary Algorithms to Evolve Dynamism-Oriented Maps for a Real Time Strategy Game

    OpenAIRE

    Lara-Cabrera, Raúl; Cotta, Carlos; Fernández Leiva, Antonio J.

    2013-01-01

    This work presents a procedural content generation system that uses an evolutionary algorithm in order to generate interesting maps for a real-time strategy game, called Planet Wars. Interestingness is here captured by the dynamism of games (i.e., the extent to which they are action-packed). We consider two different approaches to measure the dynamism of the games resulting from these generated maps, one based on fluctuations in the resources controlled by either player and another one based ...

  9. Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, Bo; Li, Xiao-Teng; Chen, Wei; Liu, Jian; Chen, Xiao-Song

    2016-10-01

    Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model. Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 11121403 and 11504384

  10. Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Bo; Li Xiao-Teng; Chen Xiao-Song; Chen Wei; Liu Jian

    2016-01-01

    Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model. (paper)

  11. Fixation of strategies with the Moran and Fermi processes in evolutionary games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Xuesong; He, Mingfeng; Kang, Yibin; Pan, Qiuhui

    2017-10-01

    A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite population was built. It combines the standard Moran and Fermi rules with two strategies cooperation and defection. We obtain the expressions of fixation probabilities and fixation times. The one-third rule which has been found in the frequency dependent Moran process also holds for our model. We obtain the conditions of strategy being an evolutionarily stable strategy in our model, and then make a comparison with the standard Moran process. Besides, the analytical results show that compared with the standard Moran process, fixation occurs with higher probabilities under a prisoner's dilemma game and coordination game, but with lower probabilities under a coexistence game. The simulation result shows that the fixation time in our mixed process is lower than that in the standard Fermi process. In comparison with the standard Moran process, fixation always takes more time on average in spatial populations, regardless of the game. In addition, the fixation time decreases with the growth of the number of neighbors.

  12. Preferential selection based on strategy persistence and memory promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Yuanming; Huang, Changwei; Dai, Qionglin

    2018-06-01

    Strategy imitation plays a crucial role in evolutionary dynamics when we investigate the spontaneous emergence of cooperation under the framework of evolutionary game theory. Generally, when an individual updates his strategy, he needs to choose a role model whom he will learn from. In previous studies, individuals choose role models randomly from their neighbors. In recent works, researchers have considered that individuals choose role models according to neighbors' attractiveness characterized by the present network topology or historical payoffs. Here, we associate an individual's attractiveness with the strategy persistence, which characterizes how frequently he changes his strategy. We introduce a preferential parameter α to describe the nonlinear correlation between the selection probability and the strategy persistence and the memory length of individuals M into the evolutionary games. We investigate the effects of α and M on cooperation. Our results show that cooperation could be promoted when α > 0 and at the same time M > 1, which corresponds to the situation that individuals are inclined to select their neighbors with relatively higher persistence levels during the evolution. Moreover, we find that the cooperation level could reach the maximum at an optimal memory length when α > 0. Our work sheds light on how to promote cooperation through preferential selection based on strategy persistence and a limited memory length.

  13. An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hetzer, Moritz; Sornette, Didier

    2013-01-01

    We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment.

  14. The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sample, Christine; Allen, Benjamin

    2017-11-01

    Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large population size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the [Formula: see text] limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population limit, and the [Formula: see text] limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal mathematical definitions of the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits are provided. Applying these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be favored over a neutral mutation, are different in the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits. However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one strategy to be favored over another.

  15. An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Moritz Hetzer

    Full Text Available We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment.

  16. Analysis of Urban Car Owners Commute Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Model

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Huawei Gong

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available With the aggravation of the traffic congestion in the city, car owners will have to give up commuting with private cars and take the public transportation instead. The paper uses the replication dynamic mechanism to simulate the learning and adjustment mechanism of the automobile owners commuting mode selection. The evolutionary stable strategy is used to describe the long-term evolution of competition game trend. Finally we simulate equilibrium and stability of an evolution of the game under a payoff imbalance situation. The research shows that a certain proportion of car owners will choose public transit under the pressure of public transport development and heavy traffic, and the proportion will be closely related to the initial conditions and urban transportation development policy.

  17. Evolutionary fate of memory-one strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Xu-Sheng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Chen, Michael Z. Q.; Guan, Jian-Yue

    2017-07-01

    We study evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game involving a one-step memory mechanism of the individuals whenever making strategy updating. In particular, during the process of strategy updating, each individual keeps in mind all the outcome of the action pairs adopted by himself and each of his neighbors in the last interaction, and according to which the individuals decide what actions they will take in the next round. Computer simulation results imply that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy win out of the memory-one strategy set in the stationary state. This result is robust in a large range of the payoff parameter, and does not depend on the initial state of the system. Furthermore, theoretical analysis with mean field and quasi-static approximation predict the same result. Thus, our studies suggest that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy is a stable dominant strategy in repeated prisoner's dilemma game in homogeneous structured populations.

  18. A Study on Standard Competition with Network Effect Based on Evolutionary Game Model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Ye; Wang, Bingdong; Li, Kangning

    Owing to networks widespread in modern society, standard competition with network effect is now endowed with new connotation. This paper aims to study the impact of network effect on standard competition; it is organized in the mode of "introduction-model setup-equilibrium analysis-conclusion". Starting from a well-structured model of evolutionary game, it is then extended to a dynamic analysis. This article proves both theoretically and empirically that whether or not a standard can lead the market trends depends on the utility it would bring, and the author also discusses some advisable strategies revolving around the two factors of initial position and border break.

  19. A dynamic parking charge optimal control model under perspective of commuters' evolutionary game behavior

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lin, XuXun; Yuan, PengCheng

    2018-01-01

    In this research we consider commuters' dynamic learning effect by modeling the trip mode choice behavior from a new perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory. We explore the behavior pattern of different types of commuters and study the evolution path and equilibrium properties under different traffic conditions. We further establish a dynamic parking charge optimal control (referred to as DPCOC) model to alter commuters' trip mode choice while minimizing the total social cost. Numerical tests show. (1) Under fixed parking fee policy, the evolutionary results are completely decided by the travel time and the only method for public transit induction is to increase the parking charge price. (2) Compared with fixed parking fee policy, DPCOC policy proposed in this research has several advantages. Firstly, it can effectively turn the evolutionary path and evolutionary stable strategy to a better situation while minimizing the total social cost. Secondly, it can reduce the sensitivity of trip mode choice behavior to traffic congestion and improve the ability to resist interferences and emergencies. Thirdly, it is able to control the private car proportion to a stable state and make the trip behavior more predictable for the transportation management department. The research results can provide theoretical basis and decision-making references for commuters' mode choice prediction, dynamic setting of urban parking charge prices and public transit induction.

  20. Heterogeneous update mechanisms in evolutionary games: Mixing innovative and imitative dynamics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Amaral, Marco Antonio; Javarone, Marco Alberto

    2018-04-01

    Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows the introduction of elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase space. Often, these processes are strongly related, since an innovation can trigger the evolution, and the latter can provide the optimal conditions for the emergence of innovations. Both processes can be studied by using the framework of evolutionary game theory, where evolution constitutes an intrinsic mechanism. At the same time, the concept of innovation requires an opportune mathematical representation. Notably, innovation can be modeled as a strategy, or it can constitute the underlying mechanism that allows agents to change strategy. Here, we analyze the second case, investigating the behavior of a heterogeneous population, composed of imitative and innovative agents. Imitative agents change strategy only by imitating that of their neighbors, whereas innovative ones change strategy without the need for a copying source. The proposed model is analyzed by means of analytical calculations and numerical simulations in different topologies. Remarkably, results indicate that the mixing of mechanisms can be detrimental to cooperation near phase transitions. In those regions, the spatial reciprocity from imitative mechanisms is destroyed by innovative agents, leading to the downfall of cooperation. Our investigation sheds some light on the complex dynamics emerging from the heterogeneity of strategy revision methods, highlighting the role of innovation in evolutionary games.

  1. Classification, Naming and Evolutionary History of Glycosyltransferases from Sequenced Green and Red Algal Genomes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ulvskov, Peter; Paiva, Dionisio Soares; Domozych, David; Harholt, Jesper

    2013-01-01

    The Archaeplastida consists of three lineages, Rhodophyta, Virideplantae and Glaucophyta. The extracellular matrix of most members of the Rhodophyta and Viridiplantae consists of carbohydrate-based or a highly glycosylated protein-based cell wall while the Glaucophyte covering is poorly resolved. In order to elucidate possible evolutionary links between the three advanced lineages in Archaeplastida, a genomic analysis was initiated. Fully sequenced genomes from the Rhodophyta and Virideplantae and the well-defined CAZy database on glycosyltransferases were included in the analysis. The number of glycosyltransferases found in the Rhodophyta and Chlorophyta are generally much lower then in land plants (Embryophyta). Three specific features exhibited by land plants increase the number of glycosyltransferases in their genomes: (1) cell wall biosynthesis, the more complex land plant cell walls require a larger number of glycosyltransferases for biosynthesis, (2) a richer set of protein glycosylation, and (3) glycosylation of secondary metabolites, demonstrated by a large proportion of family GT1 being involved in secondary metabolite biosynthesis. In a comparative analysis of polysaccharide biosynthesis amongst the taxa of this study, clear distinctions or similarities were observed in (1) N-linked protein glycosylation, i.e., Chlorophyta has different mannosylation and glucosylation patterns, (2) GPI anchor biosynthesis, which is apparently missing in the Rhodophyta and truncated in the Chlorophyta, (3) cell wall biosynthesis, where the land plants have unique cell wall related polymers not found in green and red algae, and (4) O-linked glycosylation where comprehensive orthology was observed in glycosylation between the Chlorophyta and land plants but not between the target proteins. PMID:24146880

  2. Some Analytical Properties of the Model for Stochastic Evolutionary Games in Finite Populations with Non-uniform Interaction Rate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quan Ji; Wang Xianjia

    2013-01-01

    Traditional evolutionary games assume uniform interaction rate, which means that the rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. But in some systems, especially biological systems, the players interact with each other discriminately. Taylor and Nowak (2006) were the first to establish the corresponding non-uniform interaction rate model by allowing the interaction rates to depend on strategies. Their model is based on replicator dynamics which assumes an infinite size population. But in reality, the number of individuals in the population is always finite, and there will be some random interference in the individuals' strategy selection process. Therefore, it is more practical to establish the corresponding stochastic evolutionary model in finite populations. In fact, the analysis of evolutionary games in a finite size population is more difficult. Just as Taylor and Nowak said in the outlook section of their paper, ''The analysis of non-uniform interaction rates should be extended to stochastic game dynamics of finite populations''. In this paper, we are exactly doing this work. We extend Taylor and Nowak's model from infinite to finite case, especially focusing on the infiuence of non-uniform connection characteristics on the evolutionary stable state of the system. We model the strategy evolutionary process of the population by a continuous ergodic Markov process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we can give the evolutionary stable state of the system. We make a complete classification of the symmetric 2 × 2 games. For each case game, the corresponding limit distribution of the Markov-based process is given when noise intensity is small enough. In contrast with most literatures in evolutionary games using the simulation method, all our results obtained are analytical. Especially, in the dominant-case game, coexistence of the two strategies may become evolutionary stable states in our model. This result can be

  3. The Effects of Sacred Value Networks Within an Evolutionary, Adversarial Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCalla, Scott G.; Short, Martin B.; Brantingham, P. Jeffrey

    2013-05-01

    The effects of personal relationships and shared ideologies on levels of crime and the formation of criminal coalitions are studied within the context of an adversarial, evolutionary game first introduced in Short et al. (Phys. Rev. E 82:066114, 2010). Here, we interpret these relationships as connections on a graph of N players. These connections are then used in a variety of ways to define each player's "sacred value network"—groups of individuals that are subject to special consideration or treatment by that player. We explore the effects on the dynamics of the system that these networks introduce, through various forms of protection from both victimization and punishment. Under local protection, these networks introduce a new fixed point within the game dynamics, which we find through a continuum approximation of the discrete game. Under more complicated, extended protection, we numerically observe the emergence of criminal coalitions, or "gangs". We also find that a high-crime steady state is much more frequent in the context of extended protection networks, in both the case of Erdős-Rényi and small world random graphs.

  4. Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on the network with punishment and opportunistic partner switching

    Science.gov (United States)

    Takesue, H.

    2018-02-01

    Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative mechanisms, including partner switching. In this study, we investigate the combined effect of punishment and partner switching in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games conducted on a network. In the model, agents are located on the network and participate in the prisoner's dilemma games with punishment. In addition, they can opportunistically switch interaction partners to improve their payoff. Our Monte Carlo simulation showed that a large frequency of punishers is required to suppress defectors when the frequency of partner switching is low. In contrast, cooperation is the most abundant strategy when the frequency of partner switching is high regardless of the strength of punishment. Interestingly, cooperators become abundant not because they avoid the cost of inflicting punishment and earn a larger average payoff per game but rather because they have more numerous opportunities to be referred to as a role agent by defectors. Our results imply that the fluidity of social relationships has a profound effect on the adopted strategy in maintaining cooperation.

  5. Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rosas, Alejandro

    2010-05-21

    Evolutionary game theory has shown that human cooperation thrives in different types of social interactions with a PD structure. Models treat the cooperative strategies within the different frameworks as discrete entities and sometimes even as contenders. Whereas strong reciprocity was acclaimed as superior to classic reciprocity for its ability to defeat defectors in public goods games, recent experiments and simulations show that costly punishment fails to promote cooperation in the IR and DR games, where classic reciprocity succeeds. My aim is to show that cooperative strategies across frameworks are capable of a unified treatment, for they are governed by a common underlying rule or norm. An analysis of the reputation and action rules that govern some representative cooperative strategies both in models and in economic experiments confirms that the different frameworks share a conditional action rule and several reputation rules. The common conditional rule contains an option between costly punishment and withholding benefits that provides alternative enforcement methods against defectors. Depending on the framework, individuals can switch to the appropriate strategy and method of enforcement. The stability of human cooperation looks more promising if one mechanism controls successful strategies across frameworks. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

  6. How to Love the Bomb: Trying to solve the prisoner's dilemma with evolutionary game theory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Castela, Vasco

    Economists traditionally see altruistic acts as irrational. However, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a rational player can do worse than a moral player. The rules of the game imply that one cannot defend one's best interest if one tries to. Game theory has struggled to explain how an agent could have access to the strategically best outcome without behaving irrationally, but with little success. Can a complex systems approach do better?. Peter Danielson, using Evolutionary Game Theory, has avoided some of the assumptions of Game Theory by using a complexity approach to reframe the problem, and offers a solution of sorts. According to Danielson, the foundations of altruism are mechanisms of deterrence that rely on credible threat - we are nice for fear of retaliation. He is both right and wrong. It will be argued that utilitarian, consequentialist principles must have been at work to create the conditions for altruistic acts to be performed. It is wrong to expect, however, that the same reasons are the reasons for action. In order for a model of genuine altruism to be possible, an extra cog must be inserted in the mechanism of causality in order to distance moral action from its strategic advantages. If emotions fulfill this role, we can tell a story in which it is rational to act on altruistic motivations and materially advantageous to hold such motivations. Moral sentiments can be seen as a tool designed by evolution to help optimize cooperation in a social environment. The proposed account integrates the Humean theory of motivation with Robert Frank's commitment model and Aristotle's views on moral education, keeping an adequate story of how it can be in our material interest to be moral without having to renounce to the existence of genuine acts of altruism.

  7. An Organizational Structure Game (and BINGO! Is Its Name-O)

    Science.gov (United States)

    McMahon, Joan M.

    2018-01-01

    This article describes an in-class, noncomputerized, bingo game to accompany coverage of the topic of organizational structure. The game allows students to be actively involved in learning, solidify recognition and understanding of organizational structure terminology, apply understanding of organizational structure to an analysis of…

  8. Development of a population of cancer cells: Observation and modeling by a Mixed Spatial Evolutionary Games approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Świerniak, Andrzej; Krześlak, Michał; Student, Sebastian; Rzeszowska-Wolny, Joanna

    2016-09-21

    Living cells, like whole living organisms during evolution, communicate with their neighbors, interact with the environment, divide, change their phenotypes, and eventually die. The development of specific ways of communication (through signaling molecules and receptors) allows some cellular subpopulations to survive better, to coordinate their physiological status, and during embryonal development to create tissues and organs or in some conditions to become tumors. Populations of cells cultured in vitro interact similarly, also competing for space and nutrients and stimulating each other to better survive or to die. The results of these intercellular interactions of different types seem to be good examples of biological evolutionary games, and have been the subjects of simulations by the methods of evolutionary game theory where individual cells are treated as players. Here we present examples of intercellular contacts in a population of living human cancer HeLa cells cultured in vitro and propose an evolutionary game theory approach to model the development of such populations. We propose a new technique termed Mixed Spatial Evolutionary Games (MSEG) which are played on multiple lattices corresponding to the possible cellular phenotypes which gives the possibility of simulating and investigating the effects of heterogeneity at the cellular level in addition to the population level. Analyses performed with MSEG suggested different ways in which cellular populations develop in the case of cells communicating directly and through factors released to the environment. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  9. A system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory for green supply chain management diffusion among Chinese manufacturers

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Tian, Yihui; Govindan, Kannan; Zhu, Qinghua

    2014-01-01

    In this study, a system dynamics (SD) model is developed to guide the subsidy policies to promote the diffusion of green supply chain management (GSCM) in China. The relationships of stakeholders such as government, enterprises and consumers are analyzed through evolutionary game theory. Finally...

  10. Analysing Buyers' and Sellers' Strategic Interactions in Marketplaces: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vytelingum, Perukrishnen; Cliff, Dave; Jennings, Nicholas R.

    We develop a new model to analyse the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers in market mechanisms. In particular, we wish to understand how the different strategies they adopt affect their economic efficiency in the market and to understand the impact of these choices on the overall efficiency of the marketplace. To this end, we adopt a two-population evolutionary game theoretic approach, where we consider how the behaviours of both buyers and sellers evolve in marketplaces. In so doing, we address the shortcomings of the previous state-of-the-art analytical model that assumes that buyers and sellers have to adopt the same mixed strategy in the market. Finally, we apply our model in one of the most common market mechanisms, the Continuous Double Auction, and demonstrate how it allows us to provide new insights into the strategic interactions of such trading agents.

  11. Cooperation in an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with probabilistic strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Haihong; Dai Qionglin; Cheng Hongyan; Yang Junzhong

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► Introducing probabilistic strategies instead of the pure C/D in the PDG. ► The strategies patterns depends on interaction structures and updating rules. ► There exists an optimal increment of the probabilistic strategy. - Abstract: In this work, we investigate an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game in structured populations with probabilistic strategies instead of the pure strategies of cooperation and defection. We explore the model in details by considering different strategy update rules and different population structures. We find that the distribution of probabilistic strategies patterns is dependent on both the interaction structures and the updating rules. We also find that, when an individual updates her strategy by increasing or decreasing her probabilistic strategy a certain amount towards that of her opponent, there exists an optimal increment of the probabilistic strategy at which the cooperator frequency reaches its maximum.

  12. An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Sector Coordination and Self-Organization

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fernando P. Santos

    2016-04-01

    Full Text Available Coordination games provide ubiquitous interaction paradigms to frame human behavioral features, such as information transmission, conventions and languages as well as socio-economic processes and institutions. By using a dynamical approach, such as Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT, one is able to follow, in detail, the self-organization process by which a population of individuals coordinates into a given behavior. Real socio-economic scenarios, however, often involve the interaction between multiple co-evolving sectors, with specific options of their own, that call for generalized and more sophisticated mathematical frameworks. In this paper, we explore a general EGT approach to deal with coordination dynamics in which individuals from multiple sectors interact. Starting from a two-sector, consumer/producer scenario, we investigate the effects of including a third co-evolving sector that we call public. We explore the changes in the self-organization process of all sectors, given the feedback that this new sector imparts on the other two.

  13. Genome-driven evolutionary game theory helps understand the rise of metabolic interdependencies in microbial communities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zomorrodi, Ali R; Segrè, Daniel

    2017-11-16

    Metabolite exchanges in microbial communities give rise to ecological interactions that govern ecosystem diversity and stability. It is unclear, however, how the rise of these interactions varies across metabolites and organisms. Here we address this question by integrating genome-scale models of metabolism with evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we use microbial fitness values estimated by metabolic models to infer evolutionarily stable interactions in multi-species microbial "games". We first validate our approach using a well-characterized yeast cheater-cooperator system. We next perform over 80,000 in silico experiments to infer how metabolic interdependencies mediated by amino acid leakage in Escherichia coli vary across 189 amino acid pairs. While most pairs display shared patterns of inter-species interactions, multiple deviations are caused by pleiotropy and epistasis in metabolism. Furthermore, simulated invasion experiments reveal possible paths to obligate cross-feeding. Our study provides genomically driven insight into the rise of ecological interactions, with implications for microbiome research and synthetic ecology.

  14. Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Chen Shen

    Full Text Available Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase. Through numerical simulation, we have shown that voluntary participation could effectively promote the fraction of cooperation, which is also affected by the value of increment. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of the increment value on the density of different strategies and find that there exists an optimal increment value that plays an utmost role on the evolutionary dynamics. With regard to this observation, we unveil that an optimal value of increment can lead to strongest heterogeneity in agents' teaching ability, further promoting the evolution of cooperation.

  15. Recidivism and Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: A Carrot and Stick Evolutionary Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Berenji, Bijan; Chou, Tom; D'Orsogna, Maria R.

    2014-01-01

    Motivated by recent efforts by the criminal justice system to treat and rehabilitate nonviolent offenders rather than focusing solely on their punishment, we introduce an evolutionary game theoretic model to study the effects of “carrot and stick” intervention programs on criminal recidivism. We use stochastic simulations to study the evolution of a population where individuals may commit crimes depending on their past history, surrounding environment and, in the case of recidivists, on any counseling, educational or training programs available to them after being punished for their previous crimes. These sociological factors are embodied by effective parameters that determine the decision making probabilities. Players may decide to permanently reform or continue engaging in criminal activity, eventually reaching a state where they are considered incorrigible. Depending on parameter choices, the outcome of the game is a society with a majority of virtuous, rehabilitated citizens or incorrigibles. Since total resources may be limited, we constrain the combined punishment and rehabilitation costs per crime to be fixed, so that increasing one effort will necessarily decrease the other. We find that the most successful strategy in reducing crime is to optimally allocate resources so that after being punished, criminals experience impactful intervention programs, especially during the first stages of their return to society. Excessively harsh or lenient punishments are less effective. We also develop a system of coupled ordinary differential equations with memory effects to give a qualitative description of our simulated societal dynamics. We discuss our findings and sociological implications. PMID:24454884

  16. Spatial snowdrift game in heterogeneous agent systems with co-evolutionary strategies and updating rules

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xia Hai-Jiang; Li Ping-Ping; Ke Jian-Hong; Lin Zhen-Quan

    2015-01-01

    We propose an evolutionary snowdrift game model for heterogeneous systems with two types of agents, in which the inner-directed agents adopt the memory-based updating rule while the copycat-like ones take the unconditional imitation rule; moreover, each agent can change his type to adopt another updating rule once the number he sequentially loses the game at is beyond his upper limit of tolerance. The cooperative behaviors of such heterogeneous systems are then investigated by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show the equilibrium cooperation frequency and composition as functions of the cost-to-benefit ratio r are both of plateau structures with discontinuous steplike jumps, and the number of plateaux varies non-monotonically with the upper limit of tolerance ν T as well as the initial composition of agents f a0 . Besides, the quantities of the cooperation frequency and composition are dependent crucially on the system parameters including ν T , f a0 , and r. One intriguing observation is that when the upper limit of tolerance is small, the cooperation frequency will be abnormally enhanced with the increase of the cost-to-benefit ratio in the range of 0 < r < 1/4. We then probe into the relative cooperation frequencies of either type of agents, which are also of plateau structures dependent on the system parameters. Our results may be helpful to understand the cooperative behaviors of heterogenous agent systems. (paper)

  17. The influence of tie strength on evolutionary games on networks: An empirical investigation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Buesser, Pierre; Peña, Jorge; Pestelacci, Enea; Tomassini, Marco

    2011-11-01

    Extending previous work on unweighted networks, we present here a systematic numerical investigation of standard evolutionary games on weighted networks. In the absence of any reliable model for generating weighted social networks, we attribute weights to links in a few ways supported by empirical data ranging from totally uncorrelated to weighted bipartite networks. The results of the extensive simulation work on standard complex network models show that, except in a case that does not seem to be common in social networks, taking the tie strength into account does not change in a radical manner the long-run steady-state behavior of the studied games. Besides model networks, we also included a real-life case drawn from a coauthorship network. In this case also, taking the weights into account only changes the results slightly with respect to the raw unweighted graph, although to draw more reliable conclusions on real social networks many more cases should be studied as these weighted networks become available.

  18. Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shen, Chen; Chu, Chen; Geng, Yini; Jin, Jiahua; Chen, Fei; Shi, Lei

    2018-01-01

    Voluntary participation, as an additional strategy involved in repeated games, has been proved to be an efficient way to promote the evolution of cooperation theoretically and empirically. Besides, current studies show that the coevolution of teaching activity can promote cooperation. Thus, inspired by aforementioned above, we investigate the effect of coevolution of teaching activity on the evolution of cooperation for prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation: when the focal player successfully enforces its strategy on the opponent, his teaching ability will get an increase. Through numerical simulation, we have shown that voluntary participation could effectively promote the fraction of cooperation, which is also affected by the value of increment. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of the increment value on the density of different strategies and find that there exists an optimal increment value that plays an utmost role on the evolutionary dynamics. With regard to this observation, we unveil that an optimal value of increment can lead to strongest heterogeneity in agents' teaching ability, further promoting the evolution of cooperation.

  19. Recidivism and rehabilitation of criminal offenders: a carrot and stick evolutionary game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bijan Berenji

    Full Text Available Motivated by recent efforts by the criminal justice system to treat and rehabilitate nonviolent offenders rather than focusing solely on their punishment, we introduce an evolutionary game theoretic model to study the effects of "carrot and stick" intervention programs on criminal recidivism. We use stochastic simulations to study the evolution of a population where individuals may commit crimes depending on their past history, surrounding environment and, in the case of recidivists, on any counseling, educational or training programs available to them after being punished for their previous crimes. These sociological factors are embodied by effective parameters that determine the decision making probabilities. Players may decide to permanently reform or continue engaging in criminal activity, eventually reaching a state where they are considered incorrigible. Depending on parameter choices, the outcome of the game is a society with a majority of virtuous, rehabilitated citizens or incorrigibles. Since total resources may be limited, we constrain the combined punishment and rehabilitation costs per crime to be fixed, so that increasing one effort will necessarily decrease the other. We find that the most successful strategy in reducing crime is to optimally allocate resources so that after being punished, criminals experience impactful intervention programs, especially during the first stages of their return to society. Excessively harsh or lenient punishments are less effective. We also develop a system of coupled ordinary differential equations with memory effects to give a qualitative description of our simulated societal dynamics. We discuss our findings and sociological implications.

  20. Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alessandro Di Stefano

    Full Text Available Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human cooperation emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolutionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis, allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscopically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in human cooperation.

  1. Combining evolutionary game theory and network theory to analyze human cooperation patterns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scatà, Marialisa; Di Stefano, Alessandro; La Corte, Aurelio; Liò, Pietro; Catania, Emanuele; Guardo, Ermanno; Pagano, Salvatore

    2016-01-01

    Highlights: • We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of human cooperation in a social network. • We introduce the concepts of “Critical Mass”, centrality measure and homophily. • The emergence of cooperation is affected by the spatial choice of the “Critical Mass”. • Our findings show that homophily speeds up the convergence towards cooperation. • Centrality and “Critical Mass” spatial choice partially offset the impact of homophily. - Abstract: As natural systems continuously evolve, the human cooperation dilemma represents an increasingly more challenging question. Humans cooperate in natural and social systems, but how it happens and what are the mechanisms which rule the emergence of cooperation, represent an open and fascinating issue. In this work, we investigate the evolution of cooperation through the analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of behaviours within the social network, where nodes can choose to cooperate or defect following the classical social dilemmas represented by Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games. To this aim, we introduce a sociological concept and statistical estimator, “Critical Mass”, to detect the minimum initial seed of cooperators able to trigger the diffusion process, and the centrality measure to select within the social network. Selecting different spatial configurations of the Critical Mass nodes, we highlight how the emergence of cooperation can be influenced by this spatial choice of the initial core in the network. Moreover, we target to shed light how the concept of homophily, a social shaping factor for which “birds of a feather flock together”, can affect the evolutionary process. Our findings show that homophily allows speeding up the diffusion process and make quicker the convergence towards human cooperation, while centrality measure and thus the Critical Mass selection, play a key role in the evolution showing how the spatial configurations can create some hidden patterns, partially

  2. Development of Chemistry Game Card as an Instructional Media in the Subject of Naming Chemical Compound in Grade X

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bayharti; Iswendi, I.; Arifin, M. N.

    2018-04-01

    The purpose of this research was to produce a chemistry game card as an instructional media in the subject of naming chemical compounds and determine the degree of validity and practicality of instructional media produced. Type of this research was Research and Development (R&D) that produced a product. The development model used was4-D model which comprises four stages incuding: (1) define, (2) design, (3) develop, and (4) disseminate. This research was restricted at the development stage. Chemistry game card developed was validated by seven validators and practicality was tested to class X6 students of SMAN 5 Padang. Instrument of this research is questionnair that consist of validity sheet and practicality sheet. Technique in collection data was done by distributing questionnaire to the validators, chemistry teachers, and students. The data were analyzed by using formula Cohen’s Kappa. Based on data analysis, validity of chemistry game card was0.87 with category highly valid and practicality of chemistry game card was 0.91 with category highly practice.

  3. The puzzle of partial migration: Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary game theory perspectives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    De Leenheer, Patrick; Mohapatra, Anushaya; Ohms, Haley A; Lytle, David A; Cushing, J M

    2017-01-07

    We consider the phenomenon of partial migration which is exhibited by populations in which some individuals migrate between habitats during their lifetime, but others do not. First, using an adaptive dynamics approach, we show that partial migration can be explained on the basis of negative density dependence in the per capita fertilities alone, provided that this density dependence is attenuated for increasing abundances of the subtypes that make up the population. We present an exact formula for the optimal proportion of migrants which is expressed in terms of the vital rates of migrant and non-migrant subtypes only. We show that this allocation strategy is both an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as well as a convergence stable strategy (CSS). To establish the former, we generalize the classical notion of an ESS because it is based on invasion exponents obtained from linearization arguments, which fail to capture the stabilizing effects of the nonlinear density dependence. These results clarify precisely when the notion of a "weak ESS", as proposed in Lundberg (2013) for a related model, is a genuine ESS. Secondly, we use an evolutionary game theory approach, and confirm, once again, that partial migration can be attributed to negative density dependence alone. In this context, the result holds even when density dependence is not attenuated. In this case, the optimal allocation strategy towards migrants is the same as the ESS stemming from the analysis based on the adaptive dynamics. The key feature of the population models considered here is that they are monotone dynamical systems, which enables a rather comprehensive mathematical analysis. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  4. Interplay between cooperation-enhancing mechanisms in evolutionary games with tag-mediated interactions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hadzibeganovic, Tarik; Stauffer, Dietrich; Han, Xiao-Pu

    2018-04-01

    Cooperation is fundamental for the long-term survival of biological, social, and technological networks. Previously, mechanisms for the enhancement of cooperation, such as network reciprocity, have largely been studied in isolation and with often inconclusive findings. Here, we present an evolutionary, multiagent-based, and spatially explicit computer model to specifically address the interactive interplay between such mechanisms. We systematically investigate the effects of phenotypic diversity, network structure, and rewards on cooperative behavior emerging in a population of reproducing artificial decision makers playing tag-mediated evolutionary games. Cooperative interactions are rewarded such that both the benefits of recipients and costs of donators are affected by the reward size. The reward size is determined by the number of cooperative acts occurring within a given reward time frame. Our computational experiments reveal that small reward frames promote unconditional cooperation in populations with both low and high diversity, whereas large reward frames lead to cycles of conditional and unconditional strategies at high but not at low diversity. Moreover, an interaction between rewards and spatial structure shows that relative to small reward frames, there is a strong difference between the frequency of conditional cooperators populating rewired versus non-rewired networks when the reward frame is large. Notably, in a less diverse population, the total number of defections is comparable across different network topologies, whereas in more diverse environments defections become more frequent in a regularly structured than in a rewired, small-world network of contacts. Acknowledging the importance of such interaction effects in social dilemmas will have inevitable consequences for the future design of cooperation-enhancing protocols in large-scale, distributed, and decentralized systems such as peer-to-peer networks.

  5. The role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas: an evolutionary game theoretical view

    Science.gov (United States)

    Basanta, David; Scott, Jacob G.; Rockne, Russ; Swanson, Kristin R.; Anderson, Alexander R. A.

    2011-02-01

    Recent advances in clinical medicine have elucidated two significantly different subtypes of glioblastoma which carry very different prognoses, both defined by mutations in isocitrate dehydrogenase-1 (IDH-1). The mechanistic consequences of this mutation have not yet been fully clarified, with conflicting opinions existing in the literature; however, IDH-1 mutation may be used as a surrogate marker to distinguish between primary and secondary glioblastoma multiforme (sGBM) from malignant progression of a lower grade glioma. We develop a mathematical model of IDH-1 mutated secondary glioblastoma using evolutionary game theory to investigate the interactions between four different phenotypic populations within the tumor: autonomous growth, invasive, glycolytic, and the hybrid invasive/glycolytic cells. Our model recapitulates glioblastoma behavior well and is able to reproduce two recent experimental findings, as well as make novel predictions concerning the rate of invasive growth as a function of vascularity, and fluctuations in the proportions of phenotypic populations that a glioblastoma will experience under different microenvironmental constraints.

  6. The role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas: an evolutionary game theoretical view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Basanta, David; Scott, Jacob G; Anderson, Alexander R A; Rockne, Russ; Swanson, Kristin R

    2011-01-01

    Recent advances in clinical medicine have elucidated two significantly different subtypes of glioblastoma which carry very different prognoses, both defined by mutations in isocitrate dehydrogenase-1 (IDH-1). The mechanistic consequences of this mutation have not yet been fully clarified, with conflicting opinions existing in the literature; however, IDH-1 mutation may be used as a surrogate marker to distinguish between primary and secondary glioblastoma multiforme (sGBM) from malignant progression of a lower grade glioma. We develop a mathematical model of IDH-1 mutated secondary glioblastoma using evolutionary game theory to investigate the interactions between four different phenotypic populations within the tumor: autonomous growth, invasive, glycolytic, and the hybrid invasive/glycolytic cells. Our model recapitulates glioblastoma behavior well and is able to reproduce two recent experimental findings, as well as make novel predictions concerning the rate of invasive growth as a function of vascularity, and fluctuations in the proportions of phenotypic populations that a glioblastoma will experience under different microenvironmental constraints

  7. Inactivation of tumor suppressor genes and cancer therapy: An evolutionary game theory approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Khadem, Heydar; Kebriaei, Hamed; Veisi, Zahra

    2017-06-01

    Inactivation of alleles in tumor suppressor genes (TSG) is one of the important issues resulting in evolution of cancerous cells. In this paper, the evolution of healthy, one and two missed allele cells is modeled using the concept of evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics. The proposed model also takes into account the interaction rates of the cells as designing parameters of the system. Different combinations of the equilibrium points of the parameterized nonlinear system is studied and categorized into some cases. In each case, the interaction rates' values are suggested in a way that the equilibrium points of the replicator dynamics are located on an appropriate region of the state space. Based on the suggested interaction rates, it is proved that the system doesn't have any undesirable interior equilibrium point as well. Therefore, the system will converge to the desirable region, where there is a scanty level of cancerous cells. In addition, the proposed conditions for interaction rates guarantee that, when a trajectory of the system reaches the boundaries, then it will stay there forever which is a desirable property since the equilibrium points have been already located on the boundaries, appropriately. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the suggestions in the elimination of the cancerous cells in different scenarios. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  8. Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Prateek Verma

    Full Text Available Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on corrupt officers. We examine the consequences of asymmetric and symmetric penalties by developing deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game-theoretic models of bribery. We find that the asymmetric penalty scheme can lead to a reduction in incidents of bribery. However, the extent of reduction depends on how the players update their strategies over time. If the interacting members change their strategies with a probability proportional to the payoff of the alternative strategy option, the reduction in incidents of bribery is less pronounced. Our results indicate that changing from a symmetric to an asymmetric penalty scheme may not suffice in achieving significant reductions in incidents of harassment bribery.

  9. Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Verma, Prateek; Sengupta, Supratim

    2015-01-01

    Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on corrupt officers. We examine the consequences of asymmetric and symmetric penalties by developing deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game-theoretic models of bribery. We find that the asymmetric penalty scheme can lead to a reduction in incidents of bribery. However, the extent of reduction depends on how the players update their strategies over time. If the interacting members change their strategies with a probability proportional to the payoff of the alternative strategy option, the reduction in incidents of bribery is less pronounced. Our results indicate that changing from a symmetric to an asymmetric penalty scheme may not suffice in achieving significant reductions in incidents of harassment bribery.

  10. Evolutionary game theory and social learning can determine how vaccine scares unfold.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bauch, Chris T; Bhattacharyya, Samit

    2012-01-01

    Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) autism vaccine scare in Britain. A "free rider" effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty). Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence--up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis--including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts.

  11. Designing a performance measurement system for supply chain using balanced scorecard, path analysis, cooperative game theory and evolutionary game theory: A Case Study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Seyed Hootan Eskafi

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, supply chain management is known as the key factor for achieving competitive advantage. Better customer service, revenue improvement and cost reduction are the results of this philosophy. Organizations can manage the performance of their firms by appropriate goal setting, identifying criteria and continuous performance measurement, which creates a good view for the business circumstances. Developing and defining appropriate indicators at different levels of chain is necessary for implementing a performance measurement system. In this study, we propose a new method to determine the measurement indicators and strategies of the company in term of balanced scorecard. The study is a combination of balanced scorecard, path analysis, evolutionary game theory and cooperative game theory for strategic planning. The study offers an appropriate program for future activities of organizations and determines the present status of the firm. The implementation of the proposed method is introduced for a food producer and the results are analyzed.

  12. O jogo do nome nas subjetividades travestis The game of the name in the transvesti's subjetivitys

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Caio César Souza Camargo Próchno

    2011-08-01

    Full Text Available Desde o nascimento o nome representa uma das primeiras características a ser adquiridas pelo sujeito que deverá acompanhá-lo como marca distintiva na sociedade. Ao mesmo tempo, o nome, por meio da gramática substantiva do masculino ou feminino, impõe uma relação binária rígida entre os sexos marcando, além da denominação, a determinação de normas relativas à sexualidade e ao gênero. Por meio da participação em um projeto de extensão voltado para o público travesti da cidade de Uberlândia, surge o interesse em problematizar o direito personalíssimo do nome no encontro com as subjetividades travestis. A problemática impressa pelas travestis vem questionar o nome como distintivo da pessoalidade, dada a ambiguidade característica do grupo na fronteira entre masculino-feminino. Apresenta-se, dessa forma, a tensão presente entre os limites linguísticos e jurídicos do direito personalíssimo do nome frente às "invenções e subversões" do gênero travesti.Since the birth, the name is one of the first features to be acquired by the being, which shall follow him as a distinct mark in the society. At the same time, the name, through the male or female substantive grammar, imposes a rigid binary relationship between the genders, marking, beyond the denomination, the determination of norms related to the sexuality and the gender. Through the participation in an extension project concerning the transvesty audience in the city of Uberlândia, comes the interest to problematize the name's extreme personal right in the transvestite's subjectivities. The transvestite expressed problematic comes to question the name as personal distinctive, by the groups' characteristic ambiguity in the male-female border. There is, after that, a tension between the linguistic and juridical limits of the name's extreme personal right facing the "inventions and subvertions" of the transvesty gender.

  13. Evolutionary quantum game theory in the context of socio-economic systems; Evolutionaere Quanten-Spieltheorie im Kontext sozio-oekonomischer Systeme

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hanauske, Matthias

    2011-02-14

    The evolution of socio-economic systems depend on the interdependent decision processes of its underlying system components. The mathematical model to describe the strategic decision of players within a socio-economic game is ''game theory''. ''Quantum game theory'' is a mathematical and conceptual amplification of classical game theory. The space of all conceivable decision paths is extended from the purely rational, measurable space in the Hilbert-space of complex numbers - which is the mathematical space where quantum theory is formulated. By the concept of a potential entanglement of the imaginary quantum strategy parts, it is possible to include cooperate decision path, caused by cultural or moral standards. If this strategy entanglement is large enough, then additional Nash equilibria can occur, previously present dominant strategies could become nonexistent and new evolutionary stable strategies do appear for some game classes. Within this PhD thesis the main results of classical and quantum games are summarized and all of the possible game classes of evolutionary (2 player)-(2 strategy) games are extended to quantum games. It is shown that the quantum extension of classical games with an underlying dilemma-like structure give different results, if the strength of strategic entanglement is above a certain barrier. After the German summary and the introduction paper, five different applications of the theory are discussed within the thesis. (orig.)

  14. Multilevel Evolutionary Algorithm that Optimizes the Structure of Scale-Free Networks for the Promotion of Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Penghui; Liu, Jing

    2017-06-28

    Understanding the emergence of cooperation has long been a challenge across disciplines. Even if network reciprocity reflected the importance of population structure in promoting cooperation, it remains an open question how population structures can be optimized, thereby enhancing cooperation. In this paper, we attempt to apply the evolutionary algorithm (EA) to solve this highly complex problem. However, as it is hard to evaluate the fitness (cooperation level) of population structures, simply employing the canonical evolutionary algorithm (EA) may fail in optimization. Thus, we propose a new EA variant named mlEA-C PD -SFN to promote the cooperation level of scale-free networks (SFNs) in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). Meanwhile, to verify the preceding conclusions may not be applied to this problem, we also provide the optimization results of the comparative experiment (EA cluster ), which optimizes the clustering coefficient of structures. Even if preceding research concluded that highly clustered scale-free networks enhance cooperation, we find EA cluster does not perform desirably, while mlEA-C PD -SFN performs efficiently in different optimization environments. We hope that mlEA-C PD -SFN may help promote the structure of species in nature and that more general properties that enhance cooperation can be learned from the output structures.

  15. Intention recognition, commitment and their roles in the evolution of cooperation from artificial intelligence techniques to evolutionary game theory models

    CERN Document Server

    Han, The Anh

    2013-01-01

    This original and timely monograph describes a unique self-contained excursion that reveals to the readers the roles of two basic cognitive abilities, i.e. intention recognition and arranging commitments, in the evolution of cooperative behavior. This book analyses intention recognition, an important ability that helps agents predict others’ behavior, in its artificial intelligence and evolutionary computational modeling aspects, and proposes a novel intention recognition method. Furthermore, the book presents a new framework for intention-based decision making and illustrates several ways in which an ability to recognize intentions of others can enhance a decision making process. By employing the new intention recognition method and the tools of evolutionary game theory, this book introduces computational models demonstrating that intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation within populations of self-regarding agents. Finally, the book describes how commitment provides a pathway to the evol...

  16. Offspring mortality was a determinant factor in the evolution of paternal investment in humans: An evolutionary game approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    López Alonso, Diego; Ortiz-Rodríguez, Isabel M

    2017-04-21

    Some researchers support the belief that man evolved philandering behavior because of the greater reproductive success of promiscuous males. According to this idea, deserting behavior from the man should be expected along with null paternal involvement in offspring care. Paradoxically however, the average offspring investment in the human male is far higher than that of any other male mammal, including other primates. In our work, we have addressed this conundrum by employing evolutionary game theory, using objective payoffs instead of, as are commonly used, arbitrary payoffs. Payoffs were computed as reproductive successes by a model based on trivial probabilities, implemented within the Barreto's Population Dynamics Toolbox (2014). The evolution of the parent conflict was simulated by a game with two players (the woman and the man). First, a simple game was assayed with two strategies, 'desert-unfaithful' and 'care-faithful'. Then, the game was played with a third mixed strategy, 'care-unfaithful'. The two-strategy game results were mainly determined by the offspring survival rate (s) and the non-paternity rate (z), with remaining factors playing a secondary role. Starting from two empirical estimates for both rates (s = 0.617 and z = 0.033) and decreasing the offspring mortality from near 0.4 to 0.1, the results were consistent with a win for the 'care-faithful' strategy. The 'desert-unfaithful' strategy only won at unrealistically high non-paternity rates (z>0.2). When three-strategy games were played, the mixed strategy of 'care-unfaithful' man could win the game in some less frequent cases. Regardless of the number of game strategies, 'care' fathers always won. These results strongly suggest that offspring mortality was the key factor in the evolution of paternal investment within the Homo branch. The 'care-faithful' strategy would have been the main strategy in human evolution but 'care-unfaithful' men did evolve at a lesser frequency. It can therefore be

  17. An evolutionary game model for behavioral gambit of loyalists: Global awareness and risk-aversion

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alfinito, E.; Barra, A.; Beccaria, M.; Fachechi, A.; Macorini, G.

    2018-02-01

    We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by indifference with respect to the game at all: their dynamics is designed to account for risk-aversion as an innovative behavioral gambit. From this point of view, the choice of this solitary strategy is enhanced when innovation starts, while is depressed when it becomes the majority option. This implies that the payoff matrix of the game becomes dependent on the global awareness of the agents measured by the relevance of the population of the indifferent players. The resulting dynamics is nontrivial with different kinds of phase transition depending on a few model parameters. The phase diagram is studied on regular as well as complex networks.

  18. A Distributed Dynamic Super Peer Selection Method Based on Evolutionary Game for Heterogeneous P2P Streaming Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jing Chen

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Due to high efficiency and good scalability, hierarchical hybrid P2P architecture has drawn more and more attention in P2P streaming research and application fields recently. The problem about super peer selection, which is the key problem in hybrid heterogeneous P2P architecture, is becoming highly challenging because super peers must be selected from a huge and dynamically changing network. A distributed super peer selection (SPS algorithm for hybrid heterogeneous P2P streaming system based on evolutionary game is proposed in this paper. The super peer selection procedure is modeled based on evolutionary game framework firstly, and its evolutionarily stable strategies are analyzed. Then a distributed Q-learning algorithm (ESS-SPS according to the mixed strategies by analysis is proposed for the peers to converge to the ESSs based on its own payoff history. Compared to the traditional randomly super peer selection scheme, experiments results show that the proposed ESS-SPS algorithm achieves better performance in terms of social welfare and average upload rate of super peers and keeps the upload capacity of the P2P streaming system increasing steadily with the number of peers increasing.

  19. Cycle frequency in standard Rock-Paper-Scissors games: Evidence from experimental economics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Bin; Zhou, Hai-Jun; Wang, Zhijian

    2013-10-01

    The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a widely used model system in game theory. Evolutionary game theory predicts the existence of persistent cycles in the evolutionary trajectories of the RPS game, but experimental evidence has remained to be rather weak. In this work, we performed laboratory experiments on the RPS game and analyzed the social-state evolutionary trajectories of twelve populations of N=6 players. We found strong evidence supporting the existence of persistent cycles. The mean cycling frequency was measured to be 0.029±0.009 period per experimental round. Our experimental observations can be quantitatively explained by a simple non-equilibrium model, namely the discrete-time logit dynamical process with a noise parameter. Our work therefore favors the evolutionary game theory over the classical game theory for describing the dynamical behavior of the RPS game.

  20. An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Revision-Resistant Motivations and Strategic Reasoning

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    DeLancey, Craig

    2008-01-01

    .... In Ultimatum Games, for example. humans tend in one-shot anonymous interactions towards equal distributions of goods at high individual cost, often encouraged through retributive actions that result in significant personal cost...

  1. An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Revision-Resistant Motivations and Strategic Reasoning

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    DeLancey, Craig

    2008-01-01

    Strong reciprocity and other forms of cooperation with non-kin in large groups and in one-time social interactions is difficult to explain with traditional economic or with simple evolutionary accounts...

  2. Evolutionary Stable Strategy

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Home; Journals; Resonance – Journal of Science Education; Volume 21; Issue 9. Evolutionary Stable Strategy: Application of Nash Equilibrium in Biology. General Article Volume 21 Issue 9 September 2016 pp 803- ... Keywords. Evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stable state, conflict, cooperation, biological games.

  3. Multiple steady states, limit cycles and chaotic attractors in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Hommes, C.H.; Ochea, M.I.

    2010-01-01

    This paper investigates, by means of simple, three and four strategy games, the occurrence of periodic and chaotic behaviour in a smooth version of the Best Response Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main finding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics, generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit

  4. Evolutionary games played by multi-agent system with different memory capacity

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan

    2015-01-01

    The evolution of cooperation is still an enigma. Resolution of cooperative dilemma is a hot topic as a perplexing interdisciplinary project, and has captured wide attention of researchers from many disciplines as a multidisciplinary field. Our main concern is the design of a networked evolutionary

  5. Effect of network topology on the evolutionary ultimatum game based on the net-profit decision

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ye, Shun-Qiang; Wang, Lu; Jones, Michael C.; Ye, Ye; Wang, Meng; Xie, Neng-Gang

    2016-04-01

    The ubiquity of altruist behavior amongst humans has long been a significant puzzle in the social sciences. Ultimatum game has proved to be a useful tool for explaining altruistic behavior among selfish individuals. In an ultimatum game where alternating roles exist, we suppose that players make their decisions based on the net profit of their own. In this paper, we specify a player's strategy with two parameters: offer level α ∈ [ 0,1) and net profit acceptance level β ∈ [ - 1,1). By Monte Carlo simulation, we analyze separately the effect of the size of the neighborhood, the small-world property and the heterogeneity of the degree distributions of the networks. Results show that compared with results observed for homogeneous networks, heterogeneous networks lead to more rational outcomes. Moreover, network structure has no effect on the evolution of kindness level, so moderate kindness is adaptable to any social groups and organizations.

  6. Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of an Evolutionary Social-Learning Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-01-13

    Nettle outlines the circumstances in which verbal communication is evolutionarily adaptive, and why few species have developed the ability to use...language despite its apparent advantages [28]. Nettle uses a significantly simpler model than the Cultaptation game, but provides insight that may be useful...provided by Kearns et al. was designed as an online algorithm, so it only returns the near-optimal action for the state at the root of the search tree

  7. Effective seeding strategy in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on online social networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Bo; Shi, Huibin; Wang, Jianwei; Huang, Yun

    2015-04-01

    This paper explores effective seeding strategies in prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on online social networks, i.e. the optimal strategy to obtain global cooperation with minimum cost. Three distinct seeding strategies are compared by performing computer simulations on real online social network datasets. Our finding suggests that degree centrality seeding outperforms other strategies regardless of the initial payoff setting or network size. Celebrities of online social networks play key roles in preserving cooperation.

  8. Strong solutions and instability for the fitness gradient system in evolutionary games between two populations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Qiuju; Belmonte, Andrew; deForest, Russ; Liu, Chun; Tan, Zhong

    2017-04-01

    In this paper, we study a fitness gradient system for two populations interacting via a symmetric game. The population dynamics are governed by a conservation law, with a spatial migration flux determined by the fitness. By applying the Galerkin method, we establish the existence, regularity and uniqueness of global solutions to an approximate system, which retains most of the interesting mathematical properties of the original fitness gradient system. Furthermore, we show that a Turing instability occurs for equilibrium states of the fitness gradient system, and its approximations.

  9. A Self-Adaptive Evolutionary Approach to the Evolution of Aesthetic Maps for a RTS Game

    OpenAIRE

    Lara-Cabrera, Raúl; Cotta, Carlos; Fernández-Leiva, Antonio J.

    2014-01-01

    Procedural content generation (PCG) is a research eld on the rise,with numerous papers devoted to this topic. This paper presents a PCG method based on a self-adaptive evolution strategy for the automatic generation of maps for the real-time strategy (RTS) game PlanetWars. These maps are generated in order to ful ll the aesthetic preferences of the user, as implied by her assessment of a collection of maps used as training set. A topological approach is used for the characterization of th...

  10. Scaling behavior can be tricky: Comment on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games" by Z. Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hui, Pak Ming; Xu, Chen

    2015-09-01

    Evolutionary game theory is a powerful tool for studying the emergence of cooperation among competing individuals [1]. Popularly studied games include the prisoner's dilemma [2], snowdrift game [3] and stag hunt game [4]. They have been extensively studied for the extent of cooperative behavior under different dilemma strengths. Generally, the games can be defined by a 2 × 2 matrix and thus four payoff elements, T, R, P, and S, for the possible payoffs to players when they use pure strategies against each other. Detailed definitions of the four payoffs are given in the review by Wang et al. [5]. For simplicity, it is often the case that fewer parameters are invoked, e.g. a single parameter [3] and more generally two parameters [6]. Generally speaking, reducing the number of parameters has the effect of restricting the system to a certain subspace of the unreduced case. In addition, the spatial structures, such as a well-mixed population or a population forming a complex network, that govern the competing relationship and environment of the agents, and the evolutionary rules, that govern how agents update their strategies, are vital in determining how cooperation evolves, as well documented in the references of [5].

  11. Universal effect of dynamical reinforcement learning mechanism in spatial evolutionary games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang, Hai-Feng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Wang, Bing-Hong

    2012-01-01

    One of the prototypical mechanisms in understanding the ubiquitous cooperation in social dilemma situations is the win–stay, lose–shift rule. In this work, a generalized win–stay, lose–shift learning model—a reinforcement learning model with dynamic aspiration level—is proposed to describe how humans adapt their social behaviors based on their social experiences. In the model, the players incorporate the information of the outcomes in previous rounds with time-dependent aspiration payoffs to regulate the probability of choosing cooperation. By investigating such a reinforcement learning rule in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game and public goods game, a most noteworthy viewpoint is that moderate greediness (i.e. moderate aspiration level) favors best the development and organization of collective cooperation. The generality of this observation is tested against different regulation strengths and different types of network of interaction as well. We also make comparisons with two recently proposed models to highlight the importance of the mechanism of adaptive aspiration level in supporting cooperation in structured populations

  12. Cleaning symbiosis as an evolutionary game: To cheat or not to cheat?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Poulin; Vickery

    1995-07-07

    Cleaning symbiosis is an apparently mutualistic relationship, occurring in diverse taxa, in which cleaners remove ectoparasites from the body of their clients. Here its evolution is explored with a simple game theory model in which both participants play against each other using either honest or cheating strategies. Honest clients pose for cleaners and have their ectoparasites removed, cheating clients eat the cleaners. Honest cleaners eat their clients' ectoparasites, cheating cleaners feed mainly on client tissues. The conditions that favour either strategy are obtained when the game is resolved: (i) the cost of being cleaned by a cheat and the proportion of cheats in the cleaner population determine the relative value of honesty in clients, and (ii) the advantages of being an honest cleaner depend on the relative fitness value of ectoparasites as food versus client tissues. A scenario for the origin of the cleaning symbiosis can also be derived from the model, in which the specialization of both participants need not be simultaneous. The model is based on the relationship between specialized cleaner fish and their client fish on coral reefs, but its conclusions are used in an examination of other cleaning associations. Copyright 1995 Academic Press Limited

  13. Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Wei Pan

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters.

  14. Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

    OpenAIRE

    Yi Zhao; Dong Li; Liqiang Pan

    2015-01-01

    On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business ...

  15. Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Evaluation of P2P File-Sharing Systems in Heterogeneous Environments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yusuke Matsuda

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available Peer-to-Peer (P2P file sharing is one of key technologies for achieving attractive P2P multimedia social networking. In P2P file-sharing systems, file availability is improved by cooperative users who cache and share files. Note that file caching carries costs such as storage consumption and processing load. In addition, users have different degrees of cooperativity in file caching and they are in different surrounding environments arising from the topological structure of P2P networks. With evolutionary game theory, this paper evaluates the performance of P2P file sharing systems in such heterogeneous environments. Using micro-macro dynamics, we analyze the impact of the heterogeneity of user selfishness on the file availability and system stability. Further, through simulation experiments with agent-based dynamics, we reveal how other aspects, for example, synchronization among nodes and topological structure, affect the system performance. Both analytical and simulation results show that the environmental heterogeneity contributes to the file availability and system stability.

  16. Motion depending on the strategies of players enhances cooperation in a co-evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cheng Hongyan; Li Haihong; Dai Qionglin; Zhu Yun; Yang Junzhong

    2010-01-01

    In the evolution of cooperation, the motion of players plays an important role. In this paper, we incorporate, into an evolutionary prisoner dilemma's game on networks, a new factor that cooperators and defectors move with different probabilities. By investigating the dependence of the cooperator frequency on the moving probabilities of cooperators and defectors, μ c and μ d , we find that cooperation is greatly enhanced in the parameter regime of μ c d . The snapshots of strategy pattern and the evolutions of cooperator clusters and defector clusters reveal that either the fast motion of defectors or the slow motion of cooperators always favors the formation of large cooperator clusters. The model is investigated on different types of networks such as square lattices, Erdoes-Renyi networks and scale-free networks and with different types of strategy-updating rules such as the richest-following rule and the Fermi rule. The numerical results show that the observed phenomena are robust to different networks and to different strategy-updating rules.

  17. Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading--an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Hai-Feng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Tang, Ming; Lai, Ying-Cheng

    2014-07-11

    How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual behavioral responses, and the intrinsic epidemic dynamics. By incorporating evolutionary games into epidemic dynamics, we investigate the effects of two types of incentives strategies: partial-subsidy policy in which certain fraction of the cost of vaccination is offset, and free-subsidy policy in which donees are randomly selected and vaccinated at no cost. Through mean-field analysis and computations, we find that, under the partial-subsidy policy, the vaccination coverage depends monotonically on the sensitivity of individuals to payoff difference, but the dependence is non-monotonous for the free-subsidy policy. Due to the role models of the donees for relatively irrational individuals and the unchanged strategies of the donees for rational individuals, the free-subsidy policy can in general lead to higher vaccination coverage. Our findings indicate that any disease-control policy should be exercised with extreme care: its success depends on the complex interplay among the intrinsic mathematical rules of epidemic spreading, governmental policies, and behavioral responses of individuals.

  18. Effect of initial fraction of cooperators on cooperative behavior in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Keizo Shigaki

    Full Text Available We investigate the influence of initial fraction of cooperators on the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games. Compared with the results of heterogeneous networks, we find that there is a relatively low initial fraction of cooperators to guarantee higher equilibrium cooperative level. While this interesting phenomenon is contrary to the commonly shared knowledge that higher initial fraction of cooperators can provide better environment for the evolution of cooperation. To support our outcome, we explore the time courses of cooperation and find that the whole course can be divided into two sequent stages: enduring (END and expanding (EXP periods. At the end of END period, thought there is a limited number of cooperator clusters left for the case of low initial setup, these clusters can smoothly expand to hold the whole system in the EXP period. However, for high initial fraction of cooperators, superfluous cooperator clusters hinder their effective expansion, which induces many remaining defectors surrounding the cooperator clusters. Moreover, through intensive analysis, we also demonstrate that when the tendency of three cooperation cluster characteristics (cluster size, cluster number and cluster shape are consistent within END and EXP periods, the state that maximizes cooperation can be favored.

  19. A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perc, Matjaž; Szolnoki, Attila

    2015-06-01

    As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do not respond linearly to mitigation attempts. A more apt model entails ordinary people who neither commit nor sanction crime as the third strategy besides the criminals and punishers. Since ordinary people free-ride on the sanctioning efforts of punishers, they may introduce cyclic dominance that enables the coexistence of all three competing strategies. In this setup ordinary individuals become the biggest impediment to crime abatement. We therefore also consider heterogeneous punisher strategies, which seek to reduce their investment into fighting crime in order to attain a more competitive payoff. We show that this diversity of punishment leads to an explosion of complexity in the system, where the benefits and pitfalls of criminal behavior are revealed in the most unexpected ways. Due to the raise and fall of different alliances no less than six consecutive phase transitions occur in dependence on solely the temptation to succumb to criminal behavior, leading the population from ordinary people-dominated across punisher-dominated to crime-dominated phases, yet always failing to abolish crime completely.

  20. A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perc, Matjaž; Szolnoki, Attila

    2015-06-05

    As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do not respond linearly to mitigation attempts. A more apt model entails ordinary people who neither commit nor sanction crime as the third strategy besides the criminals and punishers. Since ordinary people free-ride on the sanctioning efforts of punishers, they may introduce cyclic dominance that enables the coexistence of all three competing strategies. In this setup ordinary individuals become the biggest impediment to crime abatement. We therefore also consider heterogeneous punisher strategies, which seek to reduce their investment into fighting crime in order to attain a more competitive payoff. We show that this diversity of punishment leads to an explosion of complexity in the system, where the benefits and pitfalls of criminal behavior are revealed in the most unexpected ways. Due to the raise and fall of different alliances no less than six consecutive phase transitions occur in dependence on solely the temptation to succumb to criminal behavior, leading the population from ordinary people-dominated across punisher-dominated to crime-dominated phases, yet always failing to abolish crime completely.

  1. How can we model selectively neutral density dependence in evolutionary games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Argasinski, Krzysztof; Kozłowski, Jan

    2008-03-01

    The problem of density dependence appears in all approaches to the modelling of population dynamics. It is pertinent to classic models (i.e., Lotka-Volterra's), and also population genetics and game theoretical models related to the replicator dynamics. There is no density dependence in the classic formulation of replicator dynamics, which means that population size may grow to infinity. Therefore the question arises: How is unlimited population growth suppressed in frequency-dependent models? Two categories of solutions can be found in the literature. In the first, replicator dynamics is independent of background fitness. In the second type of solution, a multiplicative suppression coefficient is used, as in a logistic equation. Both approaches have disadvantages. The first one is incompatible with the methods of life history theory and basic probabilistic intuitions. The logistic type of suppression of per capita growth rate stops trajectories of selection when population size reaches the maximal value (carrying capacity); hence this method does not satisfy selective neutrality. To overcome these difficulties, we must explicitly consider turn-over of individuals dependent on mortality rate. This new approach leads to two interesting predictions. First, the equilibrium value of population size is lower than carrying capacity and depends on the mortality rate. Second, although the phase portrait of selection trajectories is the same as in density-independent replicator dynamics, pace of selection slows down when population size approaches equilibrium, and then remains constant and dependent on the rate of turn-over of individuals.

  2. Integrating evolutionary game theory into an agent-based model of ductal carcinoma in situ: Role of gap junctions in cancer progression.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Malekian, Negin; Habibi, Jafar; Zangooei, Mohammad Hossein; Aghakhani, Hojjat

    2016-11-01

    There are many cells with various phenotypic behaviors in cancer interacting with each other. For example, an apoptotic cell may induce apoptosis in adjacent cells. A living cell can also protect cells from undergoing apoptosis and necrosis. These survival and death signals are propagated through interaction pathways between adjacent cells called gap junctions. The function of these signals depends on the cellular context of the cell receiving them. For instance, a receiver cell experiencing a low level of oxygen may interpret a received survival signal as an apoptosis signal. In this study, we examine the effect of these signals on tumor growth. We make an evolutionary game theory component in order to model the signal propagation through gap junctions. The game payoffs are defined as a function of cellular context. Then, the game theory component is integrated into an agent-based model of tumor growth. After that, the integrated model is applied to ductal carcinoma in situ, a type of early stage breast cancer. Different scenarios are explored to observe the impact of the gap junction communication and parameters of the game theory component on cancer progression. We compare these scenarios by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test succeeds in proving a significant difference between the tumor growth of the model before and after considering the gap junction communication. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test also proves that the tumor growth significantly depends on the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis. In this study, the gap junction communication is modeled by using evolutionary game theory to illustrate its role at early stage cancers such as ductal carcinoma in situ. This work indicates that the gap junction communication and the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis can notably affect cancer progression. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  3. Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yi Zhao

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business case to verify the evolution process of cooperation and competition relationship. The results show that (cooperation, cooperation is bound to be the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS and cooperation tends to be increasingly in-depth and expansive for commercial banks as well as e-commerce financial institutions in China. The complementarity of participants’ core competitiveness is explored as the root of cooperation. Finally, strategic suggestions are put forward on cooperation between e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks.

  4. Gaming

    CERN Document Server

    Duke, Richard D

    2014-01-01

    Als Richard Duke sein Buch ""Gaming: The Future's Language"" 1974 veröffentlichte, war er ein Pionier für die Entwicklung und Anwendung von Planspielen in Politik, Strategieentwicklung und Management. Das Buch wurde zu einem viel zitierten Standardwerk. 2014 feiert die von Richard D. Duke gegründete International Simulation and Gaming Association (ISAGA) ihr 45-jähriges Bestehen. Gleichzeitig legt Richard D. Duke eine überarbeitete Auflage seines Klassikers vor.   Inhaltsverzeichnis TABLE OF CONTENTSAcknowledgments Preface SECTION I1. The ProblemSECTION II2. Modes of Human Communication3. Mode

  5. The influence of deterministic and stochastic waiting time for triggering mortality and colonization events on the coexistence of cooperators and defectors in an evolutionary game model

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    YouHua Chen

    2014-06-01

    waiting time, both defectors and cooperators could coexist, regardless of the types of waiting time for colonization events. Defense (or cooperation rewards could determine the persistence time of both game players. When the defense reward is low, cooperators could persist better in the simulation. But when the defense reward becomes sufficiently higher, defectors would persist better. Overall, non-coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the present evolutionary game model is dependent on the stochastic mortality events, but not colonization events. In conclusion, my present study quantifies the influence of the temporally fluctuating motility-colonization dynamic on modeling the coexistence of species in the spatial evolutionary game.

  6. Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis on Selection Behavior of Trans-Regional Hospitals and Patients in Telemedicine System

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yuxuan Gao

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available This study applies the game theory to the discussion and analysis of trans-regional Telemedicine System, builds the game model of the selection strategies of trans-regional hospitals and patients and analyzes evolving paths, equilibrium states and influencing factors of the three parties. It is derived that medical insurance reimbursement proportion of specialized hospitals, government support for general hospitals and medical expenses in specialized hospitals, operating costs of general hospitals are the influential factors in the Telemedicine System. Finally, a numerical stimulation is conducted with Matlapb based on the data from ligChina Health and Family Planning Statistical Yearbook 2015l/ig.

  7. Population Games, Stable Games, and Passivity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Michael J. Fox

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available The class of “stable games”, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a “passive” dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.

  8. Sequential interactions-in which one player plays first and another responds-promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Laird, Robert A

    2018-05-21

    Cooperation is a central topic in evolutionary biology because (a) it is difficult to reconcile why individuals would act in a way that benefits others if such action is costly to themselves, and (b) it underpins many of the 'major transitions of evolution', making it essential for explaining the origins of successively higher levels of biological organization. Within evolutionary game theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games are the main theoretical constructs used to study the evolution of cooperation in dyadic interactions. In single-shot versions of these games, wherein individuals play each other only once, players typically act simultaneously rather than sequentially. Allowing one player to respond to the actions of its co-player-in the absence of any possibility of the responder being rewarded for cooperation or punished for defection, as in simultaneous or sequential iterated games-may seem to invite more incentive for exploitation and retaliation in single-shot games, compared to when interactions occur simultaneously, thereby reducing the likelihood that cooperative strategies can thrive. To the contrary, I use lattice-based, evolutionary-dynamical simulation models of single-shot games to demonstrate that under many conditions, sequential interactions have the potential to enhance unilaterally or mutually cooperative outcomes and increase the average payoff of populations, relative to simultaneous interactions-benefits that are especially prevalent in a spatially explicit context. This surprising result is attributable to the presence of conditional strategies that emerge in sequential games that can't occur in the corresponding simultaneous versions. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  9. Analysis of the Complexity Entropy and Chaos Control of the Bullwhip Effect Considering Price of Evolutionary Game between Two Retailers

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Junhai Ma

    2016-11-01

    Full Text Available In this research, a model is established to represent a supply chain, which consists of one manufacturer and two retailers. The price-sensitive demand model is considered and the price game system is built according to the rule of bounded rationality as well as the entropy theory. With the increase of the price adjustment speed, the game system may go into chaos from the stable and periodic state. The bullwhip effect and inventory variance ratio of different stages that the system falls in are compared in real time. We also employ the delayed feedback control method to control the system and succeed in mitigating the bullwhip effect of the system. On the whole, the bullwhip effect and inventory variance ratio in the stable state are smaller than those in period-doubling and chaos. In the stable state, there is an optimal price adjustment speed to obtain both the lowest bullwhip effect and inventory variance ratio.

  10. Evolutionary Awareness

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gregory Gorelik

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available In this article, we advance the concept of “evolutionary awareness,” a metacognitive framework that examines human thought and emotion from a naturalistic, evolutionary perspective. We begin by discussing the evolution and current functioning of the moral foundations on which our framework rests. Next, we discuss the possible applications of such an evolutionarily-informed ethical framework to several domains of human behavior, namely: sexual maturation, mate attraction, intrasexual competition, culture, and the separation between various academic disciplines. Finally, we discuss ways in which an evolutionary awareness can inform our cross-generational activities—which we refer to as “intergenerational extended phenotypes”—by helping us to construct a better future for ourselves, for other sentient beings, and for our environment.

  11. Geographic Names

    Data.gov (United States)

    Minnesota Department of Natural Resources — The Geographic Names Information System (GNIS), developed by the United States Geological Survey in cooperation with the U.S. Board of Geographic Names, provides...

  12. Modeling and Generating Strategy Games Mechanics

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Mahlmann, Tobias

    of the game is, how players may manipulate the game world, etc. We present the Strategy Games Description Language (SGDL), a tree-based approach to model the game mechanics of strategy games. SGDL allows game designers to rapid prototype their game ideas with the help of our customisable game engine. We...... their games to individual players’ preferences by creating game content adaptively to how the player plays (and likes) a game. W we extend the notion of “procedural game content generation” by “game mechanics”. Game mechanics herein refer to the way that objects in a game may interact, what the goal...... present several example games to demonstrate the capabilities of the language and how to model common strategy game elements. Furthermore, we present methods to procedurally generate and evaluate game mechanics modelled in SGDL in terms of enjoyability. We argue that an evolutionary process can be used...

  13. On the Evolutionary Stability of Bargaining Inefficiency

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Poulsen, Anders

    This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game tough behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary select...

  14. Evolutionary stability of mixed strategies on graphs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li, Yan; Liu, Xinsheng; Claussen, Jens Christian

    2016-01-01

    Up to the present time, the study of evolutionary dynamics mostly focused on pure strategy games in finite discrete strategy space, either in well-mixed or structured populations. In this paper, we study mixed strategy games in continuous strategy space on graphs of degree k . Each player is arranged on a vertex of the graph. The edges denote the interaction between two individuals. In the limit of weak selection, we first derive the payoff functions of two mixed strategies under three different updating rules, named birth–death, death–birth and imitation. Then we obtain the conditions for a strategy being a continuously stable strategy (CSS), and we also confirm that the equilibrium distribution corresponding to the CSS is neighborhood attracting and strongly uninvadable. Finally, we apply our theory to the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game to obtain possible CSS. Simulations are performed for the two special games and the results are well consistent with the conclusions we made. (paper)

  15. Punishment in a complementarity game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, W.; Cai, X.; Wang, Q. A.

    2006-05-01

    We study the effects arisen from the punishment in an evolutionary complementarity game. Each round one member of population “buyers” deals with a randomly chosen member of population “sellers”. When the buyer's offer is greater than the seller's, a deal is done and both players are rewarded by gaining some points. Otherwise the transaction is not successful and both will lose certain points as punishment. Our simulations indicate that the resulting equilibrium of the game with punishment embedded is remarkably time-delayed compared to the counterpart of the non-punishment game. However, the median fee and the success rate of deals at the equilibrium remain nearly unchanged in various cases of games with different degrees of punishment, whether severe or not. Symmetry, between the two populations, and the equilibrium value can still be maintained when the members of both of them are punished fairly in any failed transaction. If they are done in a different manner, namely, the members of one population are subject to very severe punishment whereas their opponents receive less or no punishment at all, the latter in most cases will be better off.

  16. Natural games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anttila, Jani; Annila, Arto

    2011-01-01

    A course of a game is formulated as a physical process that will consume free energy in the least time. Accordingly, the rate of entropy increase is the payoff function that will subsume all forms of free energy that motivate diverse decisions. Also other concepts of game theory are related to their profound physical counterparts. When the physical portrayal of behavior is mathematically analyzed, the course of a game is found to be inherently unpredictable because each move affects motives in the future. Despite the non-holonomic character of the natural process, the objective of consuming free energy in the least time will direct an extensive-form game toward a Lyapunov-stable point that satisfies the minimax theorem. -- Highlights: → Behavior in the context of game theory is described as a natural process. → The rate of entropy increase, derived from statistical physics of open systems, is identified as the payoff function. → Entropy as the payoff function also clarifies motives of collaboration and subjective nature of decision making. → Evolutionary equation of motion that accounts for the course of a game is inherently unpredictable.

  17. Mathematical games, abstract games

    CERN Document Server

    Neto, Joao Pedro

    2013-01-01

    User-friendly, visually appealing collection offers both new and classic strategic board games. Includes abstract games for two and three players and mathematical games such as Nim and games on graphs.

  18. 奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人的演化博弈%Analysis of the evolutionary game of reward-based crowdfunding platforms and entrepreneurs

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    邓必腾; 赵征

    2017-01-01

    To investigate the selection mechanism of the reward-based crowdfunding platform operation mode,a game model was developed by employing the evolutionary game theory.With this model the evolutionary dynamic stability of the selection for every stakeholder''s strategy was analyzed,and critical factors that determine the selection mechanism of the reward-based crowdfunding platform operation mode were explored by means of numerical simulation.The main result indicates that the key factor influencing the selection mechanism contains the following five dimensions: entrepreneurs'' demand for financing,crowdfunding platform service rates,service efficiency of the crowdfunding platform,opportunity cost of the crowdfunding platform to provide high quality services and government regulation of the reward-based crowdfunding market.%为研究奖励式众筹平台运作模式选择行为的决策机理,运用演化博弈理论的分析方法,构建奖励式众筹模式下奖励式众筹平台与项目发起人策略行为的演化博弈模型,对各利益主体策略的选择进行了演化动态稳定性分析,并通过数值仿真探求影响奖励式众筹平台运作模式选择的关键因素.研究表明:项目发起人的融资需求量,众筹平台收取的服务费率,众筹平台提供高服务的效率,众筹平台提供高服务的机会成本以及政府对众筹行业的监管程度是影响奖励式众筹平台运作模式的关键因素.

  19. On the Evolutionary Stability of 'Tough' Bargaining Behavior

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Poulsen, Anders

    2003-01-01

    This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long as th...

  20. Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David R.

    2015-08-01

    Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We study a competitive Lotka-Volterra model, with number fluctuations, that accounts for natural population growth and encompasses interaction scenarios typical of evolutionary games. We show that, in an appropriate limit, the model describes standard evolutionary games with both genetic drift and overall population size fluctuations. However, there are also regimes where a varying population size can strongly influence the evolutionary dynamics. We focus on the strong mutualism scenario and demonstrate that standard evolutionary game theory fails to describe our simulation results. We then analytically and numerically determine fixation probabilities as well as mean fixation times using matched asymptotic expansions, taking into account the population size degree of freedom. These results elucidate the interplay between population dynamics and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

  1. Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David R

    2015-08-01

    Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We study a competitive Lotka-Volterra model, with number fluctuations, that accounts for natural population growth and encompasses interaction scenarios typical of evolutionary games. We show that, in an appropriate limit, the model describes standard evolutionary games with both genetic drift and overall population size fluctuations. However, there are also regimes where a varying population size can strongly influence the evolutionary dynamics. We focus on the strong mutualism scenario and demonstrate that standard evolutionary game theory fails to describe our simulation results. We then analytically and numerically determine fixation probabilities as well as mean fixation times using matched asymptotic expansions, taking into account the population size degree of freedom. These results elucidate the interplay between population dynamics and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

  2. Evolutionary Nephrology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chevalier, Robert L

    2017-05-01

    Progressive kidney disease follows nephron loss, hyperfiltration, and incomplete repair, a process described as "maladaptive." In the past 20 years, a new discipline has emerged that expands research horizons: evolutionary medicine. In contrast to physiologic (homeostatic) adaptation, evolutionary adaptation is the result of reproductive success that reflects natural selection. Evolutionary explanations for physiologically maladaptive responses can emerge from mismatch of the phenotype with environment or evolutionary tradeoffs. Evolutionary adaptation to a terrestrial environment resulted in a vulnerable energy-consuming renal tubule and a hypoxic, hyperosmolar microenvironment. Natural selection favors successful energy investment strategy: energy is allocated to maintenance of nephron integrity through reproductive years, but this declines with increasing senescence after ~40 years of age. Risk factors for chronic kidney disease include restricted fetal growth or preterm birth (life history tradeoff resulting in fewer nephrons), evolutionary selection for APOL1 mutations (that provide resistance to trypanosome infection, a tradeoff), and modern life experience (Western diet mismatch leading to diabetes and hypertension). Current advances in genomics, epigenetics, and developmental biology have revealed proximate causes of kidney disease, but attempts to slow kidney disease remain elusive. Evolutionary medicine provides a complementary approach by addressing ultimate causes of kidney disease. Marked variation in nephron number at birth, nephron heterogeneity, and changing susceptibility to kidney injury throughout life history are the result of evolutionary processes. Combined application of molecular genetics, evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo), developmental programming and life history theory may yield new strategies for prevention and treatment of chronic kidney disease.

  3. Flash Learning Games Wow Students and Instructors: Moving Toward An Academic Gaming Portal

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dan H Lim

    2003-02-01

    Full Text Available This paper describes and discusses the rationale, background, design, and implementation of Flash learning games. The paper explains why Macromedia Flash has been selected as the authoring tool in the development of highly interactive learning games for online learning. The background evolutionary process of developing the learning games points out why it has been a daunting task to create compelling learning games that impact learning. Designing learning game objects that allow other educators to customize game content is the core of this paper. The author envisions this academic gaming project will evolve into an academic gaming portal, developed in conjunction with other major institutional partners.

  4. Towards unified characterization of cooperation mechanisms. Comment on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games" by Z. Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, The Anh

    2015-09-01

    "I will jump into the river to save two brothers or eight cousins": This famous quote by J.B.S. Haldane accurately anticipates the conditions under which cooperation is the favorable choice in an interaction between genetic relatives. The general condition can later be formulated as a surprisingly simple mathematical expression, known as the Hamilton's rule, stating that natural selection favors cooperation if the genetic relatedness (r) between the donor and the recipient of a cooperative act is greater than its cost (c) to benefit (b) ratio [1]: r > c / b. Motivated by Hamilton's elegant early studies, researchers have attempted to find simple and concise rules that characterize the conditions for cooperation to be selected under various social viscosity [2,3]. For example, the seminal work by M. Nowak [3] in 2006 shows that similarly simple rules can be derived that govern each of the other four popular mechanisms of cooperation-direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, group selection and network reciprocity-, which can be expressed via the cost-to-benefit ratio being smaller than some critical value associated with the mechanism at work (as seen, for kin interactions, the critical value is relatedness). However, these rules are restricted to the donor and recipient (D&R) paradigm. The question is thus whether it is possible to obtain simple rules even for the general case? The answer is not trivial as a general two-player game is described by four independent parameters, not just two as in the D&R game.

  5. Constructionist Gaming: Understanding the Benefits of Making Games for Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kafai, Yasmin B.; Burke, Quinn

    2015-01-01

    There has been considerable interest in examining the educational potential of playing video games. One crucial element, however, has traditionally been left out of these discussions--namely, children's learning through making their own games. In this article, we review and synthesize 55 studies from the last decade on making games and learning.…

  6. Recreational Games for Physical Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hume, Donald

    2005-01-01

    Recreational games can be incorporated into physical education programs to encourage play and activity among students during their leisure time. Students can play their own games during recess, before or after school, during intramural programs, or in their neighborhood with family and friends. This article describes five such games namely:…

  7. Procedural Content Generation for Real-Time Strategy Games

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Raúl Lara-Cabrera

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available Videogames are one of the most important and profitable sectors in the industry of entertainment. Nowadays, the creation of a videogame is often a large-scale endeavor and bears many similarities with, e.g., movie production. On the central tasks in the development of a videogame is content generation, namely the definition of maps, terrains, non-player characters (NPCs and other graphical, musical and AI-related components of the game. Such generation is costly due to its complexity, the great amount of work required and the need of specialized manpower. Hence the relevance of optimizing the process and alleviating costs. In this sense, procedural content generation (PCG comes in handy as a means of reducing costs by using algorithmic techniques to automatically generate some game contents. PCG also provides advantages in terms of player experience since the contents generated are typically not fixed but can vary in different playing sessions, and can even adapt to the player herself. For this purpose, the underlying algorithmic technique used for PCG must be also flexible and adaptable. This is the case of computational intelligence in general and evolutionary algorithms in particular. In this work we shall provide an overview of the use of evolutionary intelligence for PCG, with special emphasis on its use within the context of real-time strategy games. We shall show how these techniques can address both playability and aesthetics, as well as improving the game AI.

  8. Calculating evolutionary dynamics in structured populations.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Charles G Nathanson

    2009-12-01

    Full Text Available Evolution is shaping the world around us. At the core of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The outcome of an evolutionary process depends on population structure. Here we provide a general formula for calculating evolutionary dynamics in a wide class of structured populations. This class includes the recently introduced "games in phenotype space" and "evolutionary set theory." There can be local interactions for determining the relative fitness of individuals, but we require global updating, which means all individuals compete uniformly for reproduction. We study the competition of two strategies in the context of an evolutionary game and determine which strategy is favored in the limit of weak selection. We derive an intuitive formula for the structure coefficient, sigma, and provide a method for efficient numerical calculation.

  9. Optimizing Visual Properties of Game Content through Neuroevolution

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Liapis, Antonios; Yannakakis, Georgios N.; Togelius, Julian

    This paper presents a search-based approach to generating game content that satisfies both gameplay requirements and user-expressed aesthetic criteria. Using evolutionary constraint satisfaction, we search for spaceships (for a space combat game) represented as compositional pattern...

  10. Evolutionary Nephrology

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Robert L. Chevalier

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available Progressive kidney disease follows nephron loss, hyperfiltration, and incomplete repair, a process described as “maladaptive.” In the past 20 years, a new discipline has emerged that expands research horizons: evolutionary medicine. In contrast to physiologic (homeostatic adaptation, evolutionary adaptation is the result of reproductive success that reflects natural selection. Evolutionary explanations for physiologically maladaptive responses can emerge from mismatch of the phenotype with environment or from evolutionary tradeoffs. Evolutionary adaptation to a terrestrial environment resulted in a vulnerable energy-consuming renal tubule and a hypoxic, hyperosmolar microenvironment. Natural selection favors successful energy investment strategy: energy is allocated to maintenance of nephron integrity through reproductive years, but this declines with increasing senescence after ∼40 years of age. Risk factors for chronic kidney disease include restricted fetal growth or preterm birth (life history tradeoff resulting in fewer nephrons, evolutionary selection for APOL1 mutations (which provide resistance to trypanosome infection, a tradeoff, and modern life experience (Western diet mismatch leading to diabetes and hypertension. Current advances in genomics, epigenetics, and developmental biology have revealed proximate causes of kidney disease, but attempts to slow kidney disease remain elusive. Evolutionary medicine provides a complementary approach by addressing ultimate causes of kidney disease. Marked variation in nephron number at birth, nephron heterogeneity, and changing susceptibility to kidney injury throughout the life history are the result of evolutionary processes. Combined application of molecular genetics, evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo, developmental programming, and life history theory may yield new strategies for prevention and treatment of chronic kidney disease.

  11. Constructionist Gaming: Understanding the Benefits of Making Games for Learning

    OpenAIRE

    Kafai, Yasmin B.; Burke, Quinn

    2016-01-01

    There has been considerable interest in examining the educational potential of playing video games. One crucial element, however, has traditionally been left out of these discussions?namely, children's learning through making their own games. In this article, we review and synthesize 55 studies from the last decade on making games and learning. We found that the majority of studies focused on teaching coding and academic content through game making, and that few studies explicitly examined th...

  12. Evolutionary thinking

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hunt, Tam

    2014-01-01

    Evolution as an idea has a lengthy history, even though the idea of evolution is generally associated with Darwin today. Rebecca Stott provides an engaging and thoughtful overview of this history of evolutionary thinking in her 2013 book, Darwin's Ghosts: The Secret History of Evolution. Since Darwin, the debate over evolution—both how it takes place and, in a long war of words with religiously-oriented thinkers, whether it takes place—has been sustained and heated. A growing share of this debate is now devoted to examining how evolutionary thinking affects areas outside of biology. How do our lives change when we recognize that all is in flux? What can we learn about life more generally if we study change instead of stasis? Carter Phipps’ book, Evolutionaries: Unlocking the Spiritual and Cultural Potential of Science's Greatest Idea, delves deep into this relatively new development. Phipps generally takes as a given the validity of the Modern Synthesis of evolutionary biology. His story takes us into, as the subtitle suggests, the spiritual and cultural implications of evolutionary thinking. Can religion and evolution be reconciled? Can evolutionary thinking lead to a new type of spirituality? Is our culture already being changed in ways that we don't realize by evolutionary thinking? These are all important questions and Phipps book is a great introduction to this discussion. Phipps is an author, journalist, and contributor to the emerging “integral” or “evolutionary” cultural movement that combines the insights of Integral Philosophy, evolutionary science, developmental psychology, and the social sciences. He has served as the Executive Editor of EnlightenNext magazine (no longer published) and more recently is the co-founder of the Institute for Cultural Evolution, a public policy think tank addressing the cultural roots of America's political challenges. What follows is an email interview with Phipps. PMID:26478766

  13. Evolutionary Demography

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Levitis, Daniel

    2015-01-01

    of biological and cultural evolution. Demographic variation within and among human populations is influenced by our biology, and therefore by natural selection and our evolutionary background. Demographic methods are necessary for studying populations of other species, and for quantifying evolutionary fitness......Demography is the quantitative study of population processes, while evolution is a population process that influences all aspects of biological organisms, including their demography. Demographic traits common to all human populations are the products of biological evolution or the interaction...

  14. Constructionist Gaming: Understanding the Benefits of Making Games for Learning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kafai, Yasmin B.; Burke, Quinn

    2015-01-01

    There has been considerable interest in examining the educational potential of playing video games. One crucial element, however, has traditionally been left out of these discussions—namely, children's learning through making their own games. In this article, we review and synthesize 55 studies from the last decade on making games and learning. We found that the majority of studies focused on teaching coding and academic content through game making, and that few studies explicitly examined the roles of collaboration and identity in the game making process. We argue that future discussions of serious gaming ought to be more inclusive of constructionist approaches to realize the full potential of serious gaming. Making games, we contend, not only more genuinely introduces children to a range of technical skills but also better connects them to each other, addressing the persistent issues of access and diversity present in traditional digital gaming cultures. PMID:27019536

  15. Games of multicellularity.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kaveh, Kamran; Veller, Carl; Nowak, Martin A

    2016-08-21

    Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay together after reproduction. They reach complexes of a certain size, n, before producing single cells again. The cells within a complex derive payoff from an evolutionary game by interacting with each other. The reproductive rate of cells is proportional to their payoff. We consider all two-strategy games. We study deterministic evolutionary dynamics with mutations, and derive exact conditions for selection to favor one strategy over another. Our main result has the same symmetry as the well-known sigma condition, which has been proven for stochastic game dynamics and weak selection. For a maximum complex size of n=2 our result holds for any intensity of selection. For n≥3 it holds for weak selection. As specific examples we study the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games. Our model advances theoretical work on multicellularity by allowing for frequency-dependent interactions within groups. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  16. Economics and Mathematical Theory of Games

    OpenAIRE

    Ajda Fosner

    2012-01-01

    The theory of games is a branch of applied mathematics that is used in economics, management, and other social sciences. Moreover, it is used also in military science, political science, international relations, computer science, evolutionary biology, and ecology. It is a field of mathematics in which games are studied. The aim of this article is to present matrix games and the game theory. After the introduction, we will explain the methodology and give some examples. We will show applicatio...

  17. Quantum games on evolving random networks

    OpenAIRE

    Pawela, Łukasz

    2015-01-01

    We study the advantages of quantum strategies in evolutionary social dilemmas on evolving random networks. We focus our study on the two-player games: prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift and stag-hunt games. The obtained result show the benefits of quantum strategies for the prisoner's dilemma game. For the other two games, we obtain regions of parameters where the quantum strategies dominate, as well as regions where the classical strategies coexist.

  18. Online Games

    OpenAIRE

    Kerr, Aphra; Ivory, James D.

    2015-01-01

    When we agreed to edit the theme on online games for this Encyclopedia our first question was, “What is meant by online games?” Scholars of games distinguish between nondigital games (such as board games) and digital games, rather than between online and offline games. With networked consoles and smartphones it is becoming harder and harder to find players in the wealthy industrialized countries who play “offline” digital games. Most games developers now include ...

  19. Analysis of the “naming game” with learning errors in communications

    OpenAIRE

    Yang Lou; Guanrong Chen

    2015-01-01

    Naming game simulates the process of naming an objective by a population of agents organized in a certain communication network. By pair-wise iterative interactions, the population reaches consensus asymptotically. We study naming game with communication errors during pair-wise conversations, with error rates in a uniform probability distribution. First, a model of naming game with learning errors in communications (NGLE) is proposed. Then, a strategy for agents to prevent learning errors is ...

  20. Evolutionary Expectations

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nash, Ulrik William

    2014-01-01

    , they are correlated among people who share environments because these individuals satisfice within their cognitive bounds by using cues in order of validity, as opposed to using cues arbitrarily. Any difference in expectations thereby arise from differences in cognitive ability, because two individuals with identical...... cognitive bounds will perceive business opportunities identically. In addition, because cues provide information about latent causal structures of the environment, changes in causality must be accompanied by changes in cognitive representations if adaptation is to be maintained. The concept of evolutionary......The concept of evolutionary expectations descends from cue learning psychology, synthesizing ideas on rational expectations with ideas on bounded rationality, to provide support for these ideas simultaneously. Evolutionary expectations are rational, but within cognitive bounds. Moreover...

  1. [Evolutionary medicine].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wjst, M

    2013-12-01

    Evolutionary medicine allows new insights into long standing medical problems. Are we "really stoneagers on the fast lane"? This insight might have enormous consequences and will allow new answers that could never been provided by traditional anthropology. Only now this is made possible using data from molecular medicine and systems biology. Thereby evolutionary medicine takes a leap from a merely theoretical discipline to practical fields - reproductive, nutritional and preventive medicine, as well as microbiology, immunology and psychiatry. Evolutionary medicine is not another "just so story" but a serious candidate for the medical curriculum providing a universal understanding of health and disease based on our biological origin. © Georg Thieme Verlag KG Stuttgart · New York.

  2. Evolutionary programming for goal-driven dynamic planning

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vaccaro, James M.; Guest, Clark C.; Ross, David O.

    2002-03-01

    Many complex artificial intelligence (IA) problems are goal- driven in nature and the opportunity exists to realize the benefits of a goal-oriented solution. In many cases, such as in command and control, a goal-oriented approach may be the only option. One of many appropriate applications for such an approach is War Gaming. War Gaming is an important tool for command and control because it provides a set of alternative courses of actions so that military leaders can contemplate their next move in the battlefield. For instance, when making decisions that save lives, it is necessary to completely understand the consequences of a given order. A goal-oriented approach provides a slowly evolving tractably reasoned solution that inherently follows one of the principles of war: namely concentration on the objective. Future decision-making will depend not only on the battlefield, but also on a virtual world where military leaders can wage wars and determine their options by playing computer war games much like the real world. The problem with these games is that the built-in AI does not learn nor adapt and many times cheats, because the intelligent player has access to all the information, while the user has access to limited information provided on a display. These games are written for the purpose of entertainment and actions are calculated a priori and off-line, and are made prior or during their development. With these games getting more sophisticated in structure and less domain specific in scope, there needs to be a more general intelligent player that can adapt and learn in case the battlefield situations or the rules of engagement change. One such war game that might be considered is Risk. Risk incorporates the principles of war, is a top-down scalable model, and provides a good application for testing a variety of goal- oriented AI approaches. By integrating a goal-oriented hybrid approach, one can develop a program that plays the Risk game effectively and move

  3. Equilibria, information and frustration in heterogeneous network games with conflicting preferences

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mazzoli, M.; Sánchez, A.

    2017-11-01

    Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has addressed this issue by combining the physics of complex networks with a description of interactions in terms of evolutionary game theory. We here take this research a step further by introducing a most salient societal factor such as the individuals’ preferences, a characteristic that is key to understanding much of the social phenomenology these days. We consider a heterogeneous, agent-based model in which agents interact strategically with their neighbors, but their preferences and payoffs for the possible actions differ. We study how such a heterogeneous network behaves under evolutionary dynamics and different strategic interactions, namely coordination games and best shot games. With this model we study the emergence of the equilibria predicted analytically in random graphs under best response dynamics, and we extend this test to unexplored contexts like proportional imitation and scale free networks. We show that some theoretically predicted equilibria do not arise in simulations with incomplete information, and we demonstrate the importance of the graph topology and the payoff function parameters for some games. Finally, we discuss our results with the available experimental evidence on coordination games, showing that our model agrees better with the experiment than standard economic theories, and draw hints as to how to maximize social efficiency in situations of conflicting preferences.

  4. The three names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bas Jongenelen

    2011-01-01

    Two spectators are each asked to think of a girl's name (because your sister in law is pregnant and names are a big issue at the moment in your family.) You explain that you have a boy's name in your head, and you ask the spectators to think what this boy's name might be. You write three names on a

  5. Productive Gaming

    OpenAIRE

    Brandstätter , Ulrich; Sommerer , Christa

    2016-01-01

    Part 4: Short Papers; International audience; Video games can be appropriated for productive purposes. Commercial games and game engines are often used for video productions, and game development companies provide development kits and modding environments to gaming communities and independent developers. With gamification, game principles are deployed in non-game contexts for benefits beyond pure entertainment. Most approaches are more focused on using games and their design elements rather t...

  6. Evolutionary perspectives on ageing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reichard, Martin

    2017-10-01

    From an evolutionary perspective, ageing is a decrease in fitness with chronological age - expressed by an increase in mortality risk and/or decline in reproductive success and mediated by deterioration of functional performance. While this makes ageing intuitively paradoxical - detrimental to individual fitness - evolutionary theory offers answers as to why ageing has evolved. In this review, I first briefly examine the classic evolutionary theories of ageing and their empirical tests, and highlight recent findings that have advanced our understanding of the evolution of ageing (condition-dependent survival, positive pleiotropy). I then provide an overview of recent theoretical extensions and modifications that accommodate those new discoveries. I discuss the role of indeterminate (asymptotic) growth for lifetime increases in fecundity and ageing trajectories. I outline alternative views that challenge a universal existence of senescence - namely the lack of a germ-soma distinction and the ability of tissue replacement and retrogression to younger developmental stages in modular organisms. I argue that rejuvenation at the organismal level is plausible, but includes a return to a simple developmental stage. This may exempt a particular genotype from somatic defects but, correspondingly, removes any information acquired during development. A resolution of the question of whether a rejuvenated individual is the same entity is central to the recognition of whether current evolutionary theories of ageing, with their extensions and modifications, can explain the patterns of ageing across the Tree of Life. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  7. Evolutionary robotics

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    In evolutionary robotics, a suitable robot control system is developed automatically through evolution due to the interactions between the robot and its environment. It is a complicated task, as the robot and the environment constitute a highly dynamical system. Several methods have been tried by various investigators to ...

  8. Ludic Educational Game Creation Tool

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Vidakis, Nikolaos; Syntychakis, Efthimios; Kalafatis, Konstantinos

    2015-01-01

    This paper presents initial findings and ongoing work of the game creation tool, a core component of the IOLAOS(IOLAOS in ancient Greece was a divine hero famed for helping with some of Heracles’s labors.) platform, a general open authorable framework for educational and training games. The game...... creation tool features a web editor, where the game narrative can be manipulated, according to specific needs. Moreover, this tool is applied for creating an educational game according to a reference scenario namely teaching schoolers road safety. A ludic approach is used both in game creation and play....... Helping children staying safe and preventing serious injury on the roads is crucial. In this context, this work presents an augmented version of the IOLAOS architecture including an enhanced game creation tool and a new multimodality module. In addition presents a case study for creating educational games...

  9. Supermodular Games and Potential Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brânzei, R.; Mallozzi, L.; Tijs, S.H.

    2001-01-01

    Potential games and supermodular games are attractive games, especially because under certain conditions they possess pure Nash equilibria. Subclasses of games with a potential are considered which are also strategically equivalent to supermodular games. The focus is on two-person zero-sum games and

  10. Learning Multidisciplinary Collaboration with Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Henriksen, Thomas Duus

    2015-01-01

    This chapter describes the design of a game-based learning process for developing communication in public organisations. The game-design presented here emphasises those parts of public organisations that tend to employ multidisciplinary teams for solving wicked problems. As such teams employ...... members from different, professional backgrounds, the game Public Professional sought to develop new understandings among team members and across professions. The purpose of this game was to facilitate an understanding among team members and across professions, a game-based learning process named Public...... from the game’s core mechanics....

  11. Spore: Spawning Evolutionary Misconceptions?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bean, Thomas E.; Sinatra, Gale M.; Schrader, P. G.

    2010-10-01

    The use of computer simulations as educational tools may afford the means to develop understanding of evolution as a natural, emergent, and decentralized process. However, special consideration of developmental constraints on learning may be necessary when using these technologies. Specifically, the essentialist (biological forms possess an immutable essence), teleological (assignment of purpose to living things and/or parts of living things that may not be purposeful), and intentionality (assumption that events are caused by an intelligent agent) biases may be reinforced through the use of computer simulations, rather than addressed with instruction. We examine the video game Spore for its depiction of evolutionary content and its potential to reinforce these cognitive biases. In particular, we discuss three pedagogical strategies to mitigate weaknesses of Spore and other computer simulations: directly targeting misconceptions through refutational approaches, targeting specific principles of scientific inquiry, and directly addressing issues related to models as cognitive tools.

  12. What's in a Name

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bush, Sarah B.; Albanese, Judith; Karp, Karen S.

    2016-01-01

    Historically, some baby names have been more popular during a specific time span, whereas other names are considered timeless. The Internet article, "How to Tell Someone's Age When All You Know Is Her Name" (Silver and McCann 2014), describes the phenomenon of the rise and fall of name popularity, which served as a catalyst for the…

  13. British Sign Name Customs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Day, Linda; Sutton-Spence, Rachel

    2010-01-01

    Research presented here describes the sign names and the customs of name allocation within the British Deaf community. While some aspects of British Sign Language sign names and British Deaf naming customs differ from those in most Western societies, there are many similarities. There are also similarities with other societies outside the more…

  14. Integrating genomics into evolutionary medicine.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rodríguez, Juan Antonio; Marigorta, Urko M; Navarro, Arcadi

    2014-12-01

    The application of the principles of evolutionary biology into medicine was suggested long ago and is already providing insight into the ultimate causes of disease. However, a full systematic integration of medical genomics and evolutionary medicine is still missing. Here, we briefly review some cases where the combination of the two fields has proven profitable and highlight two of the main issues hindering the development of evolutionary genomic medicine as a mature field, namely the dissociation between fitness and health and the still considerable difficulties in predicting phenotypes from genotypes. We use publicly available data to illustrate both problems and conclude that new approaches are needed for evolutionary genomic medicine to overcome these obstacles. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  15. Evolutionary institutionalism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fürstenberg, Dr Kai

    Institutions are hard to define and hard to study. Long prominent in political science have been two theories: Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Arising from the life sciences is now a third: Evolutionary Institutionalism (EI). Comparative strengths and weaknesses of these three theories warrant review, and the value-to-be-added by expanding the third beyond Darwinian evolutionary theory deserves consideration. Should evolutionary institutionalism expand to accommodate new understanding in ecology, such as might apply to the emergence of stability, and in genetics, such as might apply to political behavior? Core arguments are reviewed for each theory with more detailed exposition of the third, EI. Particular attention is paid to EI's gene-institution analogy; to variation, selection, and retention of institutional traits; to endogeneity and exogeneity; to agency and structure; and to ecosystem effects, institutional stability, and empirical limitations in behavioral genetics. RCI, HI, and EI are distinct but complementary. Institutional change, while amenable to rational-choice analysis and, retrospectively, to criticaljuncture and path-dependency analysis, is also, and importantly, ecological. Stability, like change, is an emergent property of institutions, which tend to stabilize after change in a manner analogous to allopatric speciation. EI is more than metaphorically biological in that institutional behaviors are driven by human behaviors whose evolution long preceded the appearance of institutions themselves.

  16. Epigenetic battle of the sexes. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, Song

    2017-03-01

    Qian Wang et al. present an interesting framework, named epigenetic game theory, for modeling sex-based epigenetic dynamics during embryogenesis from a new viewpoint of evolutionary game theory [1]. That is, epigenomes of sperms and oocytes may coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to affect the fitness of embryos. The work uses a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to describe longitudinal trajectories of DNA methylation levels in both parental and maternal gametes and their dependence on each other. The insights gained from this review, i.e. dynamic methylation profiles and their interaction are potentially important to many fields, such as biomedicine and agriculture.

  17. Structure coefficients and strategy selection in multiplayer games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph

    2016-01-01

    Evolutionary processes based on two-player games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Snowdrift Game are abundant in evolutionary game theory. These processes, including those based on games with more than two strategies, have been studied extensively under the assumption that selection is weak. However, games involving more than two players have not received the same level of attention. To address this issue, and to relate two-player games to multiplayer games, we introduce a notion of reducibility for multiplayer games that captures what it means to break down a multiplayer game into a sequence of interactions with fewer players. We discuss the role of reducibility in structured populations, and we give examples of games that are irreducible in any population structure. Since the known conditions for strategy selection, otherwise known as [Formula: see text]-rules, have been established only for two-player games with multiple strategies and for multiplayer games with two strategies, we extend these rules to multiplayer games with many strategies to account for irreducible games that cannot be reduced to those simpler types of games. In particular, we show that the number of structure coefficients required for a symmetric game with [Formula: see text]-player interactions and [Formula: see text] strategies grows in [Formula: see text] like [Formula: see text]. Our results also cover a type of ecologically asymmetric game based on payoff values that are derived not only from the strategies of the players, but also from their spatial positions within the population.

  18. Game theory : Noncooperative games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Damme, E.E.C.; Wright, J.

    2015-01-01

    We describe noncooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core. We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as

  19. On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend

    2011-01-01

    We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman

  20. Differential games

    CERN Document Server

    Friedman, Avner

    2006-01-01

    This volume lays the mathematical foundations for the theory of differential games, developing a rigorous mathematical framework with existence theorems. It begins with a precise definition of a differential game and advances to considerations of games of fixed duration, games of pursuit and evasion, the computation of saddle points, games of survival, and games with restricted phase coordinates. Final chapters cover selected topics (including capturability and games with delayed information) and N-person games.Geared toward graduate students, Differential Games will be of particular interest

  1. Distribution of Chinese names

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Ding-wei

    2013-03-01

    We present a statistical model for the distribution of Chinese names. Both family names and given names are studied on the same basis. With naive expectation, the distribution of family names can be very different from that of given names. One is affected mostly by genealogy, while the other can be dominated by cultural effects. However, we find that both distributions can be well described by the same model. Various scaling behaviors can be understood as a result of stochastic processes. The exponents of different power-law distributions are controlled by a single parameter. We also comment on the significance of full-name repetition in Chinese population.

  2. Coevolution of network structure and cooperation in the public goods game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Lei; Xia Chengyi; Wang Juan

    2013-01-01

    Recently, the emergence of cooperation has become a central topic in the evolutionary game field, and coevolution of game dynamics and network topology structure can give us a fresh viewpoint of how the network evolves and cooperation arises. In this paper, we show in detail a picture of the co-evolutionary behaviors between the microscopic structure of the network and cooperation promotion in the public goods game (PGG). Based on a mechanism named after evolutionary preferential attachment (EPA), in which the growth of the network depends on the outcome of PGG dynamics, we explore the structural properties of networks and cooperative behaviors taking place on the networks created by EPA rules. Extensive simulation results indicate that the structure of the resulting networks displays a transition from homogeneous to heterogeneous properties as the selection strength ϵ increases, and the cooperative behaviors have a non-trivial state in which cooperators and defectors can simultaneously occupy the hub nodes in the network. Current results are of interest for us to further understand the cooperation persistence and structure evolution in many natural, social and economical systems. (paper)

  3. Marine Place Names

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce — This data set contains the geographic place names for features in the U.S territorial waters and outer continental shelf. These names can be used to find or define a...

  4. Evolutionary stability concepts in a stochastic environment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Li, Cong; Lessard, Sabin; Tao, Yi

    2017-09-01

    Over the past 30 years, evolutionary game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy have been not only extensively developed and successfully applied to explain the evolution of animal behaviors, but also widely used in economics and social sciences. Nonetheless, the stochastic dynamical properties of evolutionary games in randomly fluctuating environments are still unclear. In this study, we investigate conditions for stochastic local stability of fixation states and constant interior equilibria in a two-phenotype model with random payoffs following pairwise interactions. Based on this model, we develop the concepts of stochastic evolutionary stability (SES) and stochastic convergence stability (SCS). We show that the condition for a pure strategy to be SES and SCS is more stringent than in a constant environment, while the condition for a constant mixed strategy to be SES is less stringent than the condition to be SCS, which is less stringent than the condition in a constant environment.

  5. Convex games versus clan games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brânzei, R.; Dimitrov, D.A.; Tijs, S.H.

    2008-01-01

    In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic

  6. Convex Games versus Clan Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Brânzei, R.; Dimitrov, D.A.; Tijs, S.H.

    2006-01-01

    In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games.We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games.Furthermore, each monotonic

  7. Game on! : Evaluation malaria games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rob Willems

    2014-01-01

    The goal of GameOn! is to develop a serious video game. The object: to develop a serious game that aims to change behavior through awareness. The setup A multidisciplinary group which unites expertise from didactic and game production backgrounds produces an educational game for an international

  8. Game mechanics : advanced game design

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Adams, Ernest; Dormans, Joris

    2012-01-01

    Game Mechanics is aimed at game design students and industry professionals who want to improve their understanding of how to design, build, and test the mechanics of a game. Game Mechanics will show you how to design, test, and tune the core mechanics of a game—any game, from a huge role-playing

  9. Naming as Strategic Communication

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Schmeltz, Line; Kjeldsen, Anna Karina

    2016-01-01

    This article presents a framework for understanding corporate name change as strategic communication. From a corporate branding perspective, the choice of a new name can be seen as a wish to stand out from a group of similar organizations. Conversely, from an institutional perspective, name change...

  10. Evolutionary Game Analysis on Opportunistic Behavior Based on Cooperative Spillover%基于合作溢出的机会主义行为演化博弈分析

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    邢乐斌; 王旭

    2011-01-01

    Enterprises in the market economy and knowledge society are forming strategic alliance with each other in order to obtain necessary skills and capabilities. Strategic alliance opportunities inevitably create opportunistic and self-interest behaviors, thereby resulting in disorderly competition and reduced alliance profit. It is important to learn how to develop a healthy alliance by reducing opportunism behaviors and improving alliance profits. In reality, alliance members tend to take effective supervisory and preventive measures to avoid cooperative spillover of exclusion resource, and reduce or avoid the loss of their own interests. Therefore, research of alliance stability and alliance income should be based on at least two aspects: supervisory and preventive measures, as well as cooperative spillover of exclusion resource.The current research on alliance and opportunism behaviors of alliance members is mainly based on single factor, such as information symmetry, supervision and prevention, external environment, cooperative spillover effect of exclusion resource, trust or culture. Two or more influencing factors were rarely considered at the same time. According to the evolutionary game theory, this paper uses a replicator equation as our basic model to characterize the change of opportunist proportion and mutually beneficial proportion when cooperative spillover occurs. We also analyze evolution laws under stable alliance equilibrium, and potential influence of cooperative spillover on alliance profits.In the first part we construct an alliance system that is created by many individuals. The evolutionary game model is based on exclusion resources that takes opportunist proportion in alliance and mutually beneficial proportion. In the second part, we calculate the stable alliance equilibrium point and study the evolution law of opportunistic behavior according to the Jacobin matrix. Excessive prevention cost can stop cooperative spillover of mutually beneficial

  11. Understanding Games as Played

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Leino, Olli Tapio

    2009-01-01

    Researchers interested in player’s experience would assumedly, across disciplines, agree that the goal behind enquiries into player’s experience is to understand the how games’ features end up affecting the player’s experience. Much of the contemporary interdisciplinary research into player......’s experience leans toward the empirical-scientific, in the forms (neuro)psychology, sociology and cognitive science, to name a few. In such approaches, for example demonstrating correlation between physiological symptoms and an in-game event may amount to ‘understanding’. However, the experience of computer...... game play is a viable topic also for computer game studies within the general tradition of humanities. In such context, the idea of ‘understanding an experience’ invites an approach focusing on the experienced significance of events and objects within computer game play. This focus, in turn, suggests...

  12. Personalised gaming

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bakkes, S.; Tan, C.T.; Pisan, Y.

    2012-01-01

    This article focuses on personalised games, which we define as games that utilise player models for the purpose of tailoring the game experience to the individual player. The main contribution of the article is a motivation for personalised gaming, supported by an extensive overview of scientific

  13. Game Studies

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Raessens, J.F.F.

    2016-01-01

    This entry describes game studies as a dynamic interdisciplinary field of academic study and research that focuses on digital games and play in a wide variety of social and cultural contexts. It examines the history of game studies from its prehistory, when games were looked at as part of other

  14. Game theory

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hendricks, Vincent F.

    Game Theory is a collection of short interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the most influential and prominent scholars in game theory. We hear their views on game theory, its aim, scope, use, the future direction of game theory and how their work fits in these respects....

  15. Swipe this! the guide to great touchscreen game design

    CERN Document Server

    Rogers, Scott

    2012-01-01

    Learn to design games for tablets from a renowned game designer! Eager to start designing games for tablets but not sure where to start? Look no further! Gaming guru Scott Rogers has his finger on the pulse of tablet game design and is willing to impart his wisdom and secrets for designing exciting and successful games. As the creator of such venerable games as God of War, the SpongeBob Squarepants series, and Pac-Man World, to name a few, Rogers writes from personal experience and in this unique book, he hands you the tools to create your own tablet games for the iPad, Android tablets, Ninten

  16. Online Evolution for Multi-Action Adversarial Games

    OpenAIRE

    Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Togelius, Julian

    2016-01-01

    We present Online Evolution, a novel method for playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games. Such games, which include most strategy games, have extremely high branching factors due to each turn having multiple actions. In Online Evolution, an evolutionary algorithm is used to evolve the combination of atomic actions that make up a single move, with a state evaluation function used for fitness. We implement Online Evolution for the turn-based multi-action game Hero Academy and compare i...

  17. Game equilibrium models I evolution and game dynamics

    CERN Document Server

    1991-01-01

    There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to charac...

  18. 长期合作关系中惩罚机制的演化博弈分析%Evolutionary game analysis on punishment mechanism of long-term cooperative partnership

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    陈通; 罗晓彬; 汪勇杰

    2015-01-01

    In the public cultural PPP project management,establishing long-term cooperative partnership between construction unit and contractor will help reduce the cost of trust and acquire long-term gains.But some contractors take opportunistic be-havior by using information superiority for the pursuit of excess earnings and undermine the long-term cooperation condition. So,construction unit should take certain management tools to inhibit contractors’opportunistic behaviors.The inhibitory effect and necessity of the punishment mechanism for opportunistic behavior are investigated by establishing evolutionary game model and analyzing evolution path of the contractors’opportunistic behaviors in the long-term cooperation condition.The re-sults show that punishment mechanism does not play significant inhibitory role on the opportunistic behavior of the contractor under the condition of establishing long-term cooperative partnership in public cultural PPP projects.Based on this,construc-tion unit should fully communicate with the contractors to establish integrity and cooperation platform,and try to improve the potential long-term cooperative revenue through a variety of ways to achieve mutual benefit.%在公共文化 PPP 项目管理中,建设单位和承包商建立长期合作伙伴关系有助于降低信任成本,获得长期收益;但不排除承包商为追求超额收益,运用信息优势采取机会主义行为,破坏长期合作状态。因此,建设单位需采取一定的管理手段来抑制承包商的机会主义行为。运用演化博弈理论建立模型,分析承包商机会主义的演化路径,探讨在长期合作状态下,惩罚机制对承包商机会主义行为的抑制效果及其建立的必要性。结果表明,公共文化 PPP 项目中,在双方建立长期合作关系的前提下,惩罚机制对承包商的机会主义行为并未起到较为显著的抑制效果。基于此,建设单位应与承包商进行充分

  19. Directory of awardee names

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1999-07-01

    Standardization of grant and contract awardee names has been an area of concern since the development of the Department`s Procurement and Assistance Data System (PADS). A joint effort was begun in 1983 by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) and the Office of Procurement and Assistance Management/Information Systems and Analysis Division to develop a means for providing uniformity of awardee names. As a result of this effort, a method of assigning vendor identification codes to each unique awardee name, division, city, and state combination was developed and is maintained by OSTI. Changes to vendor identification codes or awardee names contained in PADS can be made only by OSTI. Awardee names in the Directory indicate that the awardee has had a prime contract (excluding purchase orders of $10,000 or less) with, or a financial assistance award from, the Department. Award status--active, inactive, or retired--is not shown. The Directory is in alphabetic sequence based on awardee name and reflects the OSTI-assigned vendor identification code to the right of the name. A vendor identification code is assigned to each unique awardee name, division, city, and state (for place of performance). The same vendor identification code is used for awards throughout the Department.

  20. Cooperation in two-dimensional mixed-games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amaral, Marco A; Silva, Jafferson K L da; Wardil, Lucas

    2015-01-01

    Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two individuals is uniformly drawn from a sample of two different games. Using the master equation approach we show that the random mixture of two games is equivalent to play the average game when (i) the strategies are statistically independent of the game distribution and (ii) the transition rates are linear functions of the payoffs. We also use Monte-Carlo simulations in a two-dimensional lattice and mean-field techniques to investigate the scenario when the two above conditions do not hold. We find that even outside of such conditions, several quantities characterizing the mixed-games are still the same as the ones obtained in the average game when the two games are not very different. (paper)

  1. Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M.; Wu, Rongling

    2017-03-01

    Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention.

  2. Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M; Wu, Rongling

    2017-03-01

    Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  3. Name agreement in picture naming : An ERP study

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Cheng, Xiaorong; Schafer, Graham; Akyürek, Elkan G.

    Name agreement is the extent to which different people agree on a name for a particular picture. Previous studies have found that it takes longer to name low name agreement pictures than high name agreement pictures. To examine the effect of name agreement in the online process of picture naming, we

  4. "Name" that Animal

    Science.gov (United States)

    Laird, Shirley

    2010-01-01

    In this article, the author describes a texture and pattern project. Students started by doing an outline contour drawing of an animal. With the outline drawn, the students then write one of their names to fit "inside" the animal.

  5. Writerly Gaming: Political Gaming

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, Christian Ulrik

    2007-01-01

    software for private entertainment (looking/feeling real) or they can be pragmatic software used for training of professionals (affecting soldiers’, pilots’, etc. perception of the real). A third, and less debated game-reality relationship, based on public awareness and typically a socio-political agenda...

  6. Creating Evaluation Profiles for Games Designed to be Fun: An Interpretive Framework for Serious Game Mechanics

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ulrich, Frank; Helms, Niels Henrik

    2017-01-01

    an interpretive evaluation framework that can identify the educational value in COTS games. Application. The presented framework can create evaluative profiles of the learning, social, game, and immersive mechanics of COTS games as educational tools. Moreover, the framework can position COTS games between four...... intertwined dimensions, namely pedagogical, design, knowledge, and sociotechnical considerations. Demonstration. To validate the practical application of the interpretive framework, we apply it to a real-world example. Our demonstration reveals the usefulness of the framework. Conclusions. The framework...

  7. Work stressed and play? A brief look at competitive gaming

    OpenAIRE

    Griffiths, MD

    2017-01-01

    To date, competitive gaming has not been widely researched or recognised in the scientific and professional literature on video games. As the name suggests, competitive gaming comprises players who regularly compete in tournaments organised and run by the gaming community, often for large monetary gains. Secondary benefits include the recognition and admiration of other gaming community members. Such tournaments are now often run by companies that host the events at large convention centres i...

  8. Game elements improve performance in a working memory training task

    OpenAIRE

    Manuel Ninaus; Gonçalo Pereira; René Stefitz; Rui Prada; Ana Paiva; Christa Neuper; Guilherme Wood

    2015-01-01

    The utilization of game elements in a non-game context is currently used in a vast range of different domains. However, research on game elements’ effects in cognitive tasks is still sparse. Thus, in this study we implemented three game elements, namely, progress bar, level indicator, and a thematic setting, in a working memory training task. We evaluated the impact of game elements on user performance and perceived state of flow when compared to a conventional version of the task. Participan...

  9. The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lili Deng

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available We have studied evolutionary ultimatum game with spatially arranged players, who have choice between the two kinds of strategies (named greedy and altruist. The strategies in the ultimatum game here are described by p(i and a(i, that is, the probability of offering i to himself and the accepting probability when receiving i. By using computer simulations with C++ builder, we have provided the dynamics of the greedy and altruistic strategies and found that the proportion evolution of the “greedy” strategy for different initial cases is approximately 60%. Furthermore, the explanations for the interesting phenomenon are presented from different aspects. In addition, we illustrate that the factor of the expectation level (aspiration level in the updating rule plays an important role in the promotion of altruistic behaviors.

  10. Serious Games Development and Applications: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Serious Games Development and Applications (SGDA 2011)

    OpenAIRE

    2011-01-01

    The recent re-emergence of serious games as a branch of video games has introduced the concept of games designed for a serious purpose other than pure entertainment. To date the major applications of serious games include education and training, engineering, medicine and healthcare, military applications, city planning, production, crisis response, just to name a few. If utilised alongside, or combined with conventional approaches serious games could provide a more powerful means of knowledge...

  11. (ludo) game

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Dr Obe

    participants make decisions with or without the intervention of ... formulation of game theory started in 1944 with the publication of the book ... Nearly all games require seeing patterns, making plans, searching ..... utility/ outcome. •. Players will ...

  12. [Game addiction].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mori, Akio; Iwadate, Masako; Minakawa, Nahoko T; Kawashima, Satoshi

    2015-09-01

    The purpose of this article is to analyze the South Korea and China of computer game research, and the current state of research in Japan. Excessive game actions were analyzed by PET-MRI, MRI, fMRI, NIRS, EEG. These results showed that the prefrontal cortical activity decreased during game play. Also, game addiction causes damage to the prefrontal cortex. The NIRS-EEG and simultaneous recording, during game play correspond well with the decrease of β band and oxygen-hemoglobin. The α band did not change with game play. However, oxygen-hemoglobin decreased during game play. South Korea, game addiction measures have been analyzed since 2002, but in Japan the research is recent.

  13. Strategic interactions: Games of the Ju|'hoan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    de Voogt, Alex

    2017-12-01

    Three strategic games played by the Ju|'hoan-a board, a card, and a gesture game-complicate the rhetorics that suggest an evolutionary or psychological significance of play. They are mostly played by adults, although every individual adult does not necessarily engage in each game. The Ju|'hoan card and board game practices were transmitted through contact across large parts of Botswana and Namibia, while the gesture game n!àì has been known in other San communities. It suggests that the significance of strategic games is more likely found in its potential for social interaction (i.e., allowing to overcome cultural divides) than in evolution and psychology. Within the anthropological literature, strategy games were thought to be absent in egalitarian societies, such as that of the Ju|'hoan. Here, the roles of power, competition, and winning were thought to be disruptive and unwanted. A closer examination of the details behind the Ju|'hoan games shows that not only were strategy games adopted and adapted from neighboring societies but that the game of n!àì was developed by the Ju|'hoan into a competitive one. The evolutionary or psychological significance of play is informed by studies on individual play, children's play, and games with informal rules. When considering strategic games throughout history, it is their role of facilitator rather than the playing practice itself that makes games relevant across languages, cultural divides, and sociopolitical boundaries.

  14. Dynamic game balancing implementation using adaptive algorithm in mobile-based Safari Indonesia game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yuniarti, Anny; Nata Wardanie, Novita; Kuswardayan, Imam

    2018-03-01

    In developing a game there is one method that should be applied to maintain the interest of players, namely dynamic game balancing. Dynamic game balancing is a process to match a player’s playing style with the behaviour, attributes, and game environment. This study applies dynamic game balancing using adaptive algorithm in scrolling shooter game type called Safari Indonesia which developed using Unity. The game of this type is portrayed by a fighter aircraft character trying to defend itself from insistent enemy attacks. This classic game is chosen to implement adaptive algorithms because it has quite complex attributes to be developed using dynamic game balancing. Tests conducted by distributing questionnaires to a number of players indicate that this method managed to reduce frustration and increase the pleasure factor in playing.

  15. Casual Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Ole Ertløv

    2015-01-01

    Casual games have become a widespread activity that fills our leisure time. This article introduces to the phenomenon casual games – their definition and the history. Furthermore the article presents and discusses the experience of and engagement or immersion in playing these games as it is put...... forward by recent research. The theoretical approach is based on media psychology, phenomenology and reversal theory. Finally it is argued that playing casual games is fundamental pleasurable to both paratelic as well as telic metamotivational states....

  16. Semantic Web Compatible Names and Descriptions for Organisms

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, H.; Wilson, N.; McGuinness, D. L.

    2012-12-01

    Modern scientific names are critical for understanding the biological literature and provide a valuable way to understand evolutionary relationships. To validly publish a name, a description is required to separate the described group of organisms from those described by other names at the same level of the taxonomic hierarchy. The frequent revision of descriptions due to new evolutionary evidence has lead to situations where a single given scientific name may over time have multiple descriptions associated with it and a given published description may apply to multiple scientific names. Because of these many-to-many relationships between scientific names and descriptions, the usage of scientific names as a proxy for descriptions is inevitably ambiguous. Another issue lies in the fact that the precise application of scientific names often requires careful microscopic work, or increasingly, genetic sequencing, as scientific names are focused on the evolutionary relatedness between and within named groups such as species, genera, families, etc. This is problematic to many audiences, especially field biologists, who often do not have access to the instruments and tools required to make identifications on a microscopic or genetic basis. To better connect scientific names to descriptions and find a more convenient way to support computer assisted identification, we proposed the Semantic Vernacular System, a novel naming system that creates named, machine-interpretable descriptions for groups of organisms, and is compatible with the Semantic Web. Unlike the evolutionary relationship based scientific naming system, it emphasizes the observable features of organisms. By independently naming the descriptions composed of sets of observational features, as well as maintaining connections to scientific names, it preserves the observational data used to identify organisms. The system is designed to support a peer-review mechanism for creating new names, and uses a controlled

  17. MULTIPATH COMMUNICATIONS USING NAMES

    OpenAIRE

    Purushothama, Rashmi

    2011-01-01

    Increased host mobility, and multi-homing make IP address management very complex in applications. Due to host mobility, the IP address of a host may change dynamically, and also frequently. Multi-homing leads to multiple IP addresses for a single host. Name-based socket is a solution to address the complex IP address management. It relieves the applications from the overhead, and moves it to the operating system. It uses a constant name, instead of an IP address to establish a connection, th...

  18. Game Spaces

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kristiansen, Erik

    2015-01-01

    , called “pervasive games.” These are games that are based on computer technology, but use a physical space as the game space as opposed to video games. Coupling spatial configuration with performance theory of rituals as liminal phenomena, I put forward a model and a new understanding of the magic circle......When we play games of any kind, from tennis to board games, it is easy to notice that games seem to be configured in space, often using stripes or a kind of map on a board. Some games are clearly performed within this marked border, while it may be difficult to pinpoint such a border in games like...... hide-and-seek, but even these games are still spatially configured. The border (visible or not) both seem to separate and uphold the game that it is meant for. This chapter sets out to analyse the possible border that separates a game from the surrounding world. Johan Huizinga noted this “separateness...

  19. Holistic Darwinism: the new evolutionary paradigm and some implications for political science.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Corning, Peter A

    2008-03-01

    Holistic Darwinism is a candidate name for a major paradigm shift that is currently underway in evolutionary biology and related disciplines. Important developments include (1) a growing appreciation for the fact that evolution is a multilevel process, from genes to ecosystems, and that interdependent coevolution is a ubiquitous phenomenon in nature; (2) a revitalization of group selection theory, which was banned (prematurely) from evolutionary biology over 30 years ago (groups may in fact be important evolutionary units); (3) a growing respect for the fact that the genome is not a "bean bag" (in biologist Ernst Mayr's caricature), much less a gladiatorial arena for competing selfish genes, but a complex, interdependent, cooperating system; (4) an increased recognition that symbiosis is an important phenomenon in nature and that symbiogenesis is a major source of innovation in evolution; (5) an array of new, more advanced game theory models, which support the growing evidence that cooperation is commonplace in nature and not a rare exception; (6) new research and theoretical work that stresses the role of nurture in evolution, including developmental processes, phenotypic plasticity, social information transfer (culture), and especially the role of behavioral innovations as pacemakers of evolutionary change (e.g., niche construction theory, which is concerned with the active role of organisms in shaping the evolutionary process, and gene-culture coevolution theory, which relates especially to the dynamics of human evolution); (7) and, not least, a broad effort to account for the evolution of biological complexity--from major transition theory to the "Synergism Hypothesis." Here I will briefly review these developments and will present a case for the proposition that this paradigm shift has profound implications for the social sciences, including specifically political theory, economic theory, and political science as a discipline. Interdependent superorganisms, it

  20. Multiscale structure in eco-evolutionary dynamics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stacey, Blake C.

    In a complex system, the individual components are neither so tightly coupled or correlated that they can all be treated as a single unit, nor so uncorrelated that they can be approximated as independent entities. Instead, patterns of interdependency lead to structure at multiple scales of organization. Evolution excels at producing such complex structures. In turn, the existence of these complex interrelationships within a biological system affects the evolutionary dynamics of that system. I present a mathematical formalism for multiscale structure, grounded in information theory, which makes these intuitions quantitative, and I show how dynamics defined in terms of population genetics or evolutionary game theory can lead to multiscale organization. For complex systems, "more is different," and I address this from several perspectives. Spatial host--consumer models demonstrate the importance of the structures which can arise due to dynamical pattern formation. Evolutionary game theory reveals the novel effects which can result from multiplayer games, nonlinear payoffs and ecological stochasticity. Replicator dynamics in an environment with mesoscale structure relates to generalized conditionalization rules in probability theory. The idea of natural selection "acting at multiple levels" has been mathematized in a variety of ways, not all of which are equivalent. We will face down the confusion, using the experience developed over the course of this thesis to clarify the situation.

  1. Measuring name system health

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Casalicchio, Emiliano; Caselli, Marco; Coletta, Alessio; Di Blasi, Salvatore; Fovino, Igor Nai; Butts, Jonathan; Shenoi, Sujeet

    2012-01-01

    Modern critical infrastructure assets are exposed to security threats arising from their use of IP networks and the Domain Name System (DNS). This paper focuses on the health of DNS. Indeed, due to the increased reliance on the Internet, the degradation of DNS could have significant consequences for

  2. Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jun-Zhou He

    Full Text Available It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals. These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a "strong" player is greater than the "weak" players in the model of Diekmann (1993. This contradicts Selten's (1980 model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.

  3. Game theory.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dufwenberg, Martin

    2011-03-01

    Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence each other. I discuss the nature of game-theoretic analysis, the history of game theory, why game theory is useful for understanding human psychology, and why game theory has played a key role in the recent explosion of interest in the field of behavioral economics. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 167-173 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.119 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  4. Video games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Funk, Jeanne B

    2005-06-01

    The video game industry insists that it is doing everything possible to provide information about the content of games so that parents can make informed choices; however, surveys indicate that ratings may not reflect consumer views of the nature of the content. This article describes some of the currently popular video games, as well as developments that are on the horizon, and discusses the status of research on the positive and negative impacts of playing video games. Recommendations are made to help parents ensure that children play games that are consistent with their values.

  5. Soft cooperation systems and games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fernández, J. R.; Gallego, I.; Jiménez-Losada, A.; Ordóñez, M.

    2018-04-01

    A cooperative game for a set of agents establishes a fair allocation of the profit obtained for their cooperation. In order to obtain this allocation, a characteristic function is known. It establishes the profit of each coalition of agents if this coalition decides to act alone. Originally players are considered symmetric and then the allocation only depends on the characteristic function; this paper is about cooperative games with an asymmetric set of agents. We introduced cooperative games with a soft set of agents which explains those parameters determining the asymmetry among them in the cooperation. Now the characteristic function is defined not over the coalitions but over the soft coalitions, namely the profit depends not only on the formed coalition but also on the attributes considered for the players in the coalition. The best known of the allocation rules for cooperative games is the Shapley value. We propose a Shapley kind solution for soft games.

  6. Theriocide: Naming Animal Killing

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Piers Beirne

    2014-08-01

    Full Text Available In this essay I recommend ‘theriocide’ as the name for those diverse human actions that cause the deaths of animals. Like the killing of one human by another, theriocide may be socially acceptable or unacceptable, legal or illegal. It may be intentional or unintentional and may involve active maltreatment or passive neglect. Theriocide may occur one-on-one, in small groups or in large-scale social institutions. The numerous and sometimes intersecting sites of theriocide include intensive rearing regimes; hunting and fishing; trafficking; vivisection; militarism; pollution; and human-induced climate change. If the killing of animals by humans is as harmful to them as homicide is to humans, then the proper naming of such deaths offers a remedy, however small, to the extensive privileging of human lives over those of other animals. Inevitably, the essay leads to a shocking question: Is theriocide murder?

  7. Names For Free

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Pouillard, Nicolas; Bernardy, Jean-Philippe

    2013-01-01

    We propose a novel technique to represent names and binders in Haskell. The dynamic (run-time) representation is based on de Bruijn indices, but it features an interface to write and manipulate variables conviently, using Haskell-level lambdas and variables. The key idea is to use rich types...... and manipulation in a natural way, while retaining the good properties of representations based on de Bruijn indices....

  8. Attractive evolutionary equilibria

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend

    2011-01-01

    We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary

  9. Their Name is Half-Way

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elena Bagina

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available The article is devoted to the phenomenon of the Soviet architecture of the late 1950s – 60s. The name of the article is “Their name is halfway”. It expresses the sense of all the processes occurring both in society and architecture during the Khrushchev Thaw. Developing the socalled Stalin’s Empire in the 1930-1950s, the masters of architecture had travelled only half the way. If the power had not abruptly stopped this movement, we would probably have a unique modern architecture dissimilar to the “international style”. The collapse of the Soviet Union stopped the evolution of architecture again: the unique features of the Soviet architecture of the 1960s ceased to develop. Architects were carried away with ironic games of postmodernism, which led them to deadlock.

  10. The migration game in habitat network: the case of tuna

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Mariani, Patrizio; Krivan, Vlastimil; MacKenzie, Brian

    2016-01-01

    migration in direction of increasing fitness should lead to the ideal free distribution (IFD) which is the evolutionary stable strategy of the habitat selection game. We introduce a migration game which focuses on migrating dynamics leading to the IFD for age-structured populations and in time varying...

  11. Stability properties of nonlinear dynamical systems and evolutionary stable states

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gleria, Iram, E-mail: iram@fis.ufal.br [Instituto de Física, Universidade Federal de Alagoas, 57072-970 Maceió-AL (Brazil); Brenig, Leon [Faculté des Sciences, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1050 Brussels (Belgium); Rocha Filho, Tarcísio M.; Figueiredo, Annibal [Instituto de Física and International Center for Condensed Matter Physics, Universidade de Brasília, 70919-970 Brasília-DF (Brazil)

    2017-03-18

    Highlights: • We address the problem of equilibrium stability in a general class of non-linear systems. • We link Evolutionary Stable States (ESS) to stable fixed points of square quasi-polynomial (QP) systems. • We show that an interior ES point may be related to stable interior fixed points of QP systems. - Abstract: In this paper we address the problem of stability in a general class of non-linear systems. We establish a link between the concepts of asymptotic stable interior fixed points of square Quasi-Polynomial systems and evolutionary stable states, a property of some payoff matrices arising from evolutionary games.

  12. What's in a Name?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bonneau, Joseph; Just, Mike; Matthews, Greg

    We study the efficiency of statistical attacks on human authentication systems relying on personal knowledge questions. We adapt techniques from guessing theory to measure security against a trawling attacker attempting to compromise a large number of strangers' accounts. We then examine a diverse corpus of real-world statistical distributions for likely answer categories such as the names of people, pets, and places and find that personal knowledge questions are significantly less secure than graphical or textual passwords. We also demonstrate that statistics can be used to increase security by proactively shaping the answer distribution to lower the prevalence of common responses.

  13. What's in a name?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Whalley, Mark

    2008-03-01

    During a lesson with my A-level physics class, my school's head of English came into the lab and happened to notice the whiteboard. I had just started teaching a section on particle physics and was acquainting the students with the multitude of names found in the particle world. Among others, the board contained the words lepton, hadron, meson, baryon, photon, gluon, boson, muon, neutrino, fermion and quark. The head of English pointed out that none of the words on the board were intelligible to anyone else in the school. He added that the words themselves were utterly bizarre, although in fairness he did recognize the reference to James Joyce.

  14. Positional games

    CERN Document Server

    Hefetz, Dan; Stojaković, Miloš; Szabó, Tibor

    2014-01-01

    This text serves as a thorough introduction to the rapidly developing field of positional games. This area constitutes an important branch of combinatorics, whose aim it is to systematically develop an extensive mathematical basis for a variety of two-player perfect information games. These range from such popular games as Tic-Tac-Toe and Hex to purely abstract games played on graphs and hypergraphs. The subject of positional games is strongly related to several other branches of combinatorics such as Ramsey theory, extremal graph and set theory, and the probabilistic method. These notes cover a variety of topics in positional games, including both classical results and recent important developments. They are presented in an accessible way and are accompanied by exercises of varying difficulty, helping the reader to better understand the theory. The text will benefit both researchers and graduate students in combinatorics and adjacent fields.

  15. Cats and Portals: Video Games, Learning, and Play

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gee, James Paul

    2008-01-01

    The author builds on arguments he has made elsewhere that good commercial video games foster deep learning and problem solving and that such games in fact promote mastery as a form of play. Here he maintains that some good video games engage players with an important type of play, namely of play as discovery, of play as surmising new possibilities…

  16. Emotional Gaming

    OpenAIRE

    Madeira, Filipa; Arriaga, Patrícia; Adrião, Joana; Lopes, Ricardo; Esteves, Francisco

    2013-01-01

    In recent years, research on the psychology of gaming has examined the negative and positive outcomes of playing video games. Thus far, a variety of affective phenomena have been investigated. In this chapter we will continue this exploration by examining the emotions elicited by the act of playing video games. Because the study of emotions must rely on different type of methods, including subjective self-reports (e.g., description of feelings), neuropsychophysiological measurements ...

  17. Simulation games

    OpenAIRE

    Giddings, S.

    2013-01-01

    This chapter outlines the conventions and pleasures of simulation games as a category, and explores the complicated and contested term simulation. This concept goes to the heart of what computer games and video games are, and the ways in which they articulate ideas, processes, and phenomena between their virtual worlds and the actual world. It has been argued that simulations generate and communicate knowledge and events quite differently from the long-­dominant cultural mode of narrative. Th...

  18. Branding a business name

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Bulatović Ivan

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The process of globalization, international businesses, as well as competitive markets imposed the companies (large ones, as well as the others to position in the required market. Making profit, which is the basic aim of every company, in such market environment can only be achieved by demonstrating distinct characteristics of a company, the characteristics which distinguish it from others with the same or similar activities. Historical and analysis of the current market have shown that being recognizable in the multitude of similar companies is a huge challenge, but also one of the main preconditions for successful operations. The moment a company is registered it acquires a specific identity primarily owing to its business name, which distinguishes it from other companies during that first period. Practically at the same time, the company starts creating its image or goodwill by means of several distinctive ways. One of them is branding business name or corporate branding. However, apart from large benefits, companies may also have big difficulties and risks in the same process as well.

  19. Evolutionary and developmental modules.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lacquaniti, Francesco; Ivanenko, Yuri P; d'Avella, Andrea; Zelik, Karl E; Zago, Myrka

    2013-01-01

    The identification of biological modules at the systems level often follows top-down decomposition of a task goal, or bottom-up decomposition of multidimensional data arrays into basic elements or patterns representing shared features. These approaches traditionally have been applied to mature, fully developed systems. Here we review some results from two other perspectives on modularity, namely the developmental and evolutionary perspective. There is growing evidence that modular units of development were highly preserved and recombined during evolution. We first consider a few examples of modules well identifiable from morphology. Next we consider the more difficult issue of identifying functional developmental modules. We dwell especially on modular control of locomotion to argue that the building blocks used to construct different locomotor behaviors are similar across several animal species, presumably related to ancestral neural networks of command. A recurrent theme from comparative studies is that the developmental addition of new premotor modules underlies the postnatal acquisition and refinement of several different motor behaviors in vertebrates.

  20. Game physics

    CERN Document Server

    Eberly, David H

    2010-01-01

    ""Game Physics, 2nd Edition"" provides clear descriptions of the mathematics and algorithms needed to create a powerful physics engine - while providing a solid reference for all of the math you will encounter anywhere in game development: quaternions, linear algebra, and calculus. Implementing physical simulations for real-time games is a complex task that requires a solid understanding of a wide range of concepts from the fields of mathematics and physics. Previously, the relevant information could only be gleaned through obscure research papers. Thanks to ""Game Physics"", all this informa

  1. Serious Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, Christian Ulrik

    2006-01-01

    T hese days one of the buzzwords in computer game industry and research is ‘Serious Games’ – games where the actions of the player are not limited to the virtual world but are somehow related to the real world. Computer games can be strong environments for learning and training skills in the real...... world. Computer games can also be persuasive – they can be used for advertising (‘adver-gaming’) and induce the players to buy a particular product in the real world or they can propagate a particular political viewpoint or a critique of the real world. The area of ‘serious gaming’ is vast and varied....

  2. Design Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Johansson, Martin Wetterstrand

    2007-01-01

    In this paper design games are discussed as an approach to managing design sessions. The focus is on the collaborative design session and more particular on how to set up the collaboration and reinsure progress. Design games have the advantage of framing the collaborative assignment at hand....... Experiments can be set up to explore possible futures and design games has the qualities of elegantly focus the work at the same time as it lessens the burden for the process facilitator. The present paper goes into detail about how design games can be set up to facilitate collaboration and how the design...

  3. Video games

    OpenAIRE

    Kolář, Vojtěch

    2012-01-01

    This thesis is based on a detailed analysis of various topics related to the question of whether video games can be art. In the first place it analyzes the current academic discussion on this subject and confronts different opinions of both supporters and objectors of the idea, that video games can be a full-fledged art form. The second point of this paper is to analyze the properties, that are inherent to video games, in order to find the reason, why cultural elite considers video games as i...

  4. Evolutionary molecular medicine.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nesse, Randolph M; Ganten, Detlev; Gregory, T Ryan; Omenn, Gilbert S

    2012-05-01

    Evolution has long provided a foundation for population genetics, but some major advances in evolutionary biology from the twentieth century that provide foundations for evolutionary medicine are only now being applied in molecular medicine. They include the need for both proximate and evolutionary explanations, kin selection, evolutionary models for cooperation, competition between alleles, co-evolution, and new strategies for tracing phylogenies and identifying signals of selection. Recent advances in genomics are transforming evolutionary biology in ways that create even more opportunities for progress at its interfaces with genetics, medicine, and public health. This article reviews 15 evolutionary principles and their applications in molecular medicine in hopes that readers will use them and related principles to speed the development of evolutionary molecular medicine.

  5. The evolutionary ecology of molecular replicators.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nee, Sean

    2016-08-01

    By reasonable criteria, life on the Earth consists mainly of molecular replicators. These include viruses, transposons, transpovirons, coviruses and many more, with continuous new discoveries like Sputnik Virophage. Their study is inherently multidisciplinary, spanning microbiology, genetics, immunology and evolutionary theory, and the current view is that taking a unified approach has great power and promise. We support this with a new, unified, model of their evolutionary ecology, using contemporary evolutionary theory coupling the Price equation with game theory, studying the consequences of the molecular replicators' promiscuous use of each others' gene products for their natural history and evolutionary ecology. Even at this simple expository level, we can make a firm prediction of a new class of replicators exploiting viruses such as lentiviruses like SIVs, a family which includes HIV: these have been explicitly stated in the primary literature to be non-existent. Closely connected to this departure is the view that multicellular organism immunology is more about the management of chronic infections rather than the elimination of acute ones and new understandings emerging are changing our view of the kind of theatre we ourselves provide for the evolutionary play of molecular replicators. This study adds molecular replicators to bacteria in the emerging field of sociomicrobiology.

  6. The Name Game: What Shall We Call Ourselves?. Guest Writer

    Science.gov (United States)

    Franklin, Renee E.

    2009-01-01

    In this article, the author describes her efforts to collect perspectives about the topic of most appropriate job title for school library administrators. The author presents the results of a pilot study (with 31 respondents) and a national study (with 213 respondents) conducted to answer two research questions: (1) "What do future school…

  7. Named Entity Linking Algorithm

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M. F. Panteleev

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available In the tasks of processing text in natural language, Named Entity Linking (NEL represents the task to define and link some entity, which is found in the text, with some entity in the knowledge base (for example, Dbpedia. Currently, there is a diversity of approaches to solve this problem, but two main classes can be identified: graph-based approaches and machine learning-based ones. Graph and Machine Learning approaches-based algorithm is proposed accordingly to the stated assumptions about the interrelations of named entities in a sentence and in general.In the case of graph-based approaches, it is necessary to solve the problem of identifying an optimal set of the related entities according to some metric that characterizes the distance between these entities in a graph built on some knowledge base. Due to limitations in processing power, to solve this task directly is impossible. Therefore, its modification is proposed. Based on the algorithms of machine learning, an independent solution cannot be built due to small volumes of training datasets relevant to NEL task. However, their use can contribute to improving the quality of the algorithm. The adaptation of the Latent Dirichlet Allocation model is proposed in order to obtain a measure of the compatibility of attributes of various entities encountered in one context.The efficiency of the proposed algorithm was experimentally tested. A test dataset was independently generated. On its basis the performance of the model was compared using the proposed algorithm with the open source product DBpedia Spotlight, which solves the NEL problem.The mockup, based on the proposed algorithm, showed a low speed as compared to DBpedia Spotlight. However, the fact that it has shown higher accuracy, stipulates the prospects for work in this direction.The main directions of development were proposed in order to increase the accuracy of the system and its productivity.

  8. Leveraging Insights from Mainstream Gameplay to Inform STEM Game Design: Great Idea, but What Comes Next?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Biles, Melissa

    2012-01-01

    This response to Leah A. Bricker and Phillip Bell's paper, "GodMode is his video game name", examines their assertion that the social nexus of gaming practices is an important factor to consider for those looking to design STEM video games. I propose that we need to go beyond the investigation into which aspects of games play a role in learning,…

  9. Juegos, Canciones, Poemas y Adivinanzas (Games, Songs, Poems and Riddles).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Toro, Leonor; And Others

    Printed in Spanish, this booklet contains games, songs, poems, riddles, and sayings for use with Puerto Rican migrant children. Eleven matching exercises present Spanish vocabulary related to clothing, food, and musical instruments. Eleven word search games teach Spanish names for body parts, masculine and feminine nouns, famous names, fruits and…

  10. Epistemic Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shaffer, David Williamson

    2005-01-01

    In an article in this issue of "Innovate", Jim Gee asks the question "What would a state of the art instructional video game look like?" Based on the game "Full Spectrum Warrior", he concludes that one model is "to pick [a] domain of authentic professionalism well, intelligently select the skills and knowledge to…

  11. Socioeconomic determinants of first names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bloothooft, G.; Onland, D.

    2011-01-01

    Modern naming practices in the Netherlands between 1982 and 2005 were studied on the basis of 1409 popular first names, divided into fourteen name groups determined by the common preferences of parents for the names involved. Socioeconomic variables such as family income, parents' level of

  12. When Reputation Enforces Evolutionary Cooperation in Unreliable MANETs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tang, Changbing; Li, Ang; Li, Xiang

    2015-10-01

    In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network functions rely on cooperation of self-interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel which results from loss of packets and noisy observation of transmissions. We propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet forwarding strategies in both structured and unstructured MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies and derive the threshold of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary game theoretic solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds the critical condition. In addition, the network throughput performance of our proposed strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy.

  13. Dictionary of Alaska place names

    Science.gov (United States)

    Orth, Donald J.

    1971-01-01

    This work is an alphabetical list of the geographic names that are now applied and have been applied to places and features of the Alaska landscape. Principal names, compiled from modem maps and charts and printed in boldface type, generally reflect present-day local usage. They conform to the principles of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names for establishing standard names for use on Government maps and in other Government publications. Each name entry gives the present-day spelling along with variant spellings and names; identifies the feature named; presents the origin and history of the name; and, where possible, gives the meaning of an Eskimo, Aleut, Indian, or foreign name. Variant, obsolete, and doubtful names are alphabetically listed and are cross referenced, where necessary, to the principal entries.

  14. History of NAMES Conferences

    Science.gov (United States)

    Filippov, Lev

    2013-03-01

    Franco-Russian NAMES Seminars are held for the purpose of reviewing and discussing actual developments in the field of materials science by researchers from Russia and from the Lorraine Region of France. In more precise terms, as set down by the organizers of the seminar (the Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys and the Institut National Polytechnique de Lorraine), the mission of the seminars is as follows: the development of scientific and academic contacts, giving a new impulse to joint fundamental research and technology transfer the development and consolidation of scientific, technical and business collaboration between the regions of Russia and Lorraine through direct contact between the universities, institutes and companies involved The first Seminar took place on 27-29 October 2004, at the Institut National Polytechnique de Lorraine (on the premises of the Ecole Européenne d'Ingénieurs en Génie des Matériaux, Nancy, France). The number, variety and quality of the oral presentations given and posters exhibited at the first Seminar were of high international standard. 30 oral presentations were given and 72 posters were presented by 19 participants from five universities and three institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences participants from 11 laboratories of three universities from the Lorraine region three industrial companies, including the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company—EADS, and ANVAR (Agence Nationale de Valorisation de la Recherche) From 2005 onwards, it was decided to organize the Seminar every other year. The second Seminar convened on the occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys on 10-12 November 2005 in Moscow, Russia. The seminar demonstrated the efficiency of the scientific partnership founded between the research groups of Russia and France during the first Seminar. High productivity of the Franco-Russian scientific cooperation on the basis of the Research-Educational Franco

  15. Measurable Strategies in Differential Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ivanov, R. P.

    1990-02-01

    Nonlinear approach-evasion differential games are considered in which the initial data depend on the time. These games are investigated in the class of strategies that are functions of three variables, namely, the time, the phase variable, and the current value of the other player's control, and are measurable jointly with respect to the time and the phase variable. The ideas of the Pontryagin methods in differential games and Krasovskiĭ's ideas on extremal aiming are developed, and it is shown that measurable strategies have broad applicability. It is proved that measurable strategies are compatible with differential equations with discontinuous right-hand side, and general theorems on the existence of solving measurable strategies in approach-evasion problems are proved, along with some auxiliary assertions. It is shown that the saddle point condition in the small game ensures the existence of solving measurable strategies. An example is given. Bibliography: 14 titles.

  16. Remembering the evolutionary Freud.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Young, Allan

    2006-03-01

    Throughout his career as a writer, Sigmund Freud maintained an interest in the evolutionary origins of the human mind and its neurotic and psychotic disorders. In common with many writers then and now, he believed that the evolutionary past is conserved in the mind and the brain. Today the "evolutionary Freud" is nearly forgotten. Even among Freudians, he is regarded to be a red herring, relevant only to the extent that he diverts attention from the enduring achievements of the authentic Freud. There are three ways to explain these attitudes. First, the evolutionary Freud's key work is the "Overview of the Transference Neurosis" (1915). But it was published at an inopportune moment, forty years after the author's death, during the so-called "Freud wars." Second, Freud eventually lost interest in the "Overview" and the prospect of a comprehensive evolutionary theory of psychopathology. The publication of The Ego and the Id (1923), introducing Freud's structural theory of the psyche, marked the point of no return. Finally, Freud's evolutionary theory is simply not credible. It is based on just-so stories and a thoroughly discredited evolutionary mechanism, Lamarckian use-inheritance. Explanations one and two are probably correct but also uninteresting. Explanation number three assumes that there is a fundamental difference between Freud's evolutionary narratives (not credible) and the evolutionary accounts of psychopathology that currently circulate in psychiatry and mainstream journals (credible). The assumption is mistaken but worth investigating.

  17. Evolutionary Graphs with Frequency Dependent Fitness

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nie, Pu-Yan; Zhang, Pei-Ai

    Evolutionary graph theory was recently proposed by Lieberman et al. in 2005. In the previous papers about evolutionary graphs (EGs), the fitness of the residents in the EGs is in general assumed to be unity, and the fitness of a mutant is assumed to be a constant r. We aim to extend EG to general cases in this paper, namely, the fitness of a mutant is heavily dependent upon frequency. The corresponding properties for these new EGs are analyzed, and the fixation probability is obtained for large population.

  18. Towards gaze-controlled platform games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Muñoz, Jorge; Yannakakis, Georgios N.; Mulvey, Fiona

    2011-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of using gaze as a sole modality for fully controlling player characters of fast-paced action computer games. A user experiment is devised to collect gaze and gameplay data from subjects playing a version of the popular Super Mario Bros platform game. The initial...... analysis shows that there is a rather limited grid around Mario where the efficient player focuses her attention the most while playing the game. The useful grid as we name it, projects the amount of meaningful visual information a designer should use towards creating successful player character...... controllers with the use of artificial intelligence for a platform game like Super Mario. Information about the eyes' position on the screen and the state of the game are utilized as inputs of an artificial neural network, which is trained to approximate which keyboard action is to be performed at each game...

  19. Goal-based dictator game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zaibidi, Nerda Zura; Ibrahim, Adyda; Abidin, Norhaslinda Zainal

    2014-12-01

    A considerable number of studies have been conducted to study fairness issues using two-player game. Dictator Game is one of the two-player games that receive much attention. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary approach to the Dictator Game by using Goal programming to build a model of human decision-making for cooperation. The model is formulated based on the theories of cognitive neuroscience that is capable in capturing a more realistic fairness concerns between players in the games. We show that fairness will evolve by taking into account players' aspirations and preferences explicitly in terms of profit and fairness concerns. The model is then simulated to investigate any possible effective strategy for people in economics to deal with fairness coalition. Parallels are drawn between the approach and concepts of human decision making from the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychology. The proposed model is also able to help decision makers to plan or enhance the effective strategies for business purposes.

  20. Systematizing game learning analytics for serious games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Alonso-Fernandez, Cristina; Calvo Morata, Antonio; Freire, Manuel; Martinez-Ortiz, Ivan; Fernandez-Manjon, Baltasar

    2017-01-01

    Applying games in education provides multiple benefits clearly visible in entertainment games: their engaging, goal-oriented nature encourages students to improve while they play. Educational games, also known as Serious Games (SGs) are video games designed with a main purpose other than

  1. Attractive evolutionary equilibria

    OpenAIRE

    Roorda, Berend; Joosten, Reinoud

    2011-01-01

    We present attractiveness, a refinement criterion for evolutionary equilibria. Equilibria surviving this criterion are robust to small perturbations of the underlying payoff system or the dynamics at hand. Furthermore, certain attractive equilibria are equivalent to others for certain evolutionary dynamics. For instance, each attractive evolutionarily stable strategy is an attractive evolutionarily stable equilibrium for certain barycentric ray-projection dynamics, and vice versa.

  2. Importance of tie strengths in the prisoner's dilemma game on social networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Bo; Liu, Lu; You, Weijia

    2011-06-01

    Though numerous researches have shown that tie strengths play a key role in the formation of collective behavior in social networks, little work has been done to explore their impact on the outcome of evolutionary games. In this Letter, we studied the effect of tie strength in the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by using online social network datasets. The results show that the fraction of cooperators has a non-trivial dependence on tie strength. Weak ties, just like previous researches on epidemics and information diffusion have shown, play a key role by the maintenance of cooperators in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games.

  3. Applications and extensions of epigenetic game theory. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Yaqun

    2017-03-01

    The authors are to be congratulated for a thought-provoking article [1], which reviews the epigenetic game theory (epiGame) that utilizes differential equations to study the epigenetic control of embryo development. It is a novel application of evolutionary game theory and provides biology researchers with useful methodologies to address scientific questions related to biological coordination of competition and cooperation.

  4. Natural games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Anttila, Jani; Annila, Arto

    2011-10-01

    A course of a game is formulated as a physical process that will consume free energy in the least time. Accordingly, the rate of entropy increase is the payoff function that will subsume all forms of free energy that motivate diverse decisions. Also other concepts of game theory are related to their profound physical counterparts. When the physical portrayal of behavior is mathematically analyzed, the course of a game is found to be inherently unpredictable because each move affects motives in the future. Despite the non-holonomic character of the natural process, the objective of consuming free energy in the least time will direct an extensive-form game toward a Lyapunov-stable point that satisfies the minimax theorem.

  5. Psychology of Game Playing: Introduction to a Special Issue

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Andrew M. Colman

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Game theory has focused attention on different problems at different times in its history. Currently, attention is devoted to investigating how human decision makers with bounded rationality choose strategies in interactive decisions. Behavioral economics, and more generally experimental games, have appeared in the literature with accelerating frequency since 1990, and this cannot continue indefinitely without a proportional expansion of journal space. This Special Issue includes contributions to behavioral economics, experimental games, and evolutionary game theory, using theoretical, experimental, and agent-based modeling techniques.

  6. Golden Games

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    LI XIAO

    2010-01-01

    @@ China is not expected to sweep the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games the way it dominated the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics.However,it has made Chinese Olympic history after winning three gold medals when the Games passed the halfway point of scheduled competition on February 20.On that day,18-year-old Zhou Yang overcame three South Korean rivals to win the women's short-track speed skating 1,500-meter final.

  7. Playing Games with Timed Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    David, Alexandre; Larsen, Kim Guldstrand; Chatain, Thomas

    2009-01-01

    In this paper we focus on property-preserving preorders between timed game automata and their application to control of partially observable systems. Following the example of timed simulation between timed automata, we define timed alternating simulation as a preorder between timed game automata......, which preserves controllability. We define a method to reduce the timed alternating simulation problem to a safety game. We show how timed alternating simulation can be used to control efficiently a partially observable system. This method is illustrated by a generic case study....

  8. Minority Games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metzler, R

    2005-01-01

    New branches of scientific disciplines often have a few paradigmatic models that serve as a testing ground for theories and a starting point for new inquiries. In the late 1990s, one of these models found fertile ground in the growing field of econophysics: the Minority Game (MG), a model for speculative markets that combined conceptual simplicity with interesting emergent behaviour and challenging mathematics. The two basic ingredients were the minority mechanism (a large number of players have to choose one of two alternatives in each round, and the minority wins) and limited rationality (each player has a small set of decision rules, and chooses the more successful ones). Combining these, one observes a phase transition between a crowded and an inefficient market phase, fat-tailed price distributions at the transition, and many other nontrivial effects. Now, seven years after the first paper, three of the key players-Damien Challet, Matteo Marsili and Yi-Cheng Zhang-have published a monograph that summarizes the current state of the science. The book consists of two parts: a 100-page overview of the various aspects of the MG, and reprints of many essential papers. The first chapters of Part I give a well-written description of the motivation and the history behind the MG, and then go into the phenomenology and the mathematical treatment of the model. The authors emphasize the 'physics' underlying the behaviour and give coherent, intuitive explanations that are difficult to extract from the original papers. The mathematics is outlined, but calculations are not carried out in great detail (maybe they could have been included in an appendix). Chapter 4 then discusses how and why the MG is a model for speculative markets, how it can be modified to give a closer fit to observed market statistics (in particular, reproducing the 'stylized facts' of fat-tailed distributions and volatility clustering), and what conclusions one can draw from the behaviour of the MG when

  9. Naming a structured world: a cultural route to duality of patterning.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Francesca Tria

    Full Text Available The lexicons of human languages organize their units at two distinct levels. At a first combinatorial level, meaningless forms (typically referred to as phonemes are combined into meaningful units (typically referred to as morphemes. Thanks to this, many morphemes can be obtained by relatively simple combinations of a small number of phonemes. At a second compositional level of the lexicon, morphemes are composed into larger lexical units, the meaning of which is related to the individual meanings of the composing morphemes. This duality of patterning is not a necessity for lexicons and the question remains wide open regarding how a population of individuals is able to bootstrap such a structure and the evolutionary advantages of its emergence. Here we address this question in the framework of a multi-agents model, where a population of individuals plays simple naming games in a conceptual environment modeled as a graph. We demonstrate that errors in communication as well as a blending repair strategy, which crucially exploits a shared conceptual representation of the environment, are sufficient conditions for the emergence of duality of patterning, that can thus be explained in a pure cultural way. Compositional lexicons turn out to be faster to lead to successful communication than purely combinatorial lexicons, suggesting that meaning played a crucial role in the evolution of language.

  10. Can You Say My Name?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Erz, Antonia; Christensen, Bo T.

    Whereas brand name research has focused on the semantic meaning or sounds of names, processing fluency lends further support to the idea that meaning goes beyond semantics. Extant research has shown that phonological fluency, i.e., the ease or difficulty with which people pronounce names, can...

  11. A family of names : rune-names and ogam-names and their relation to alphabet letter-names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Griffiths, Alan

    2013-01-01

    The current consensus is that vernacular names assigned to the runes of the Germanic fuþark and to Irish ogam characters are indigenous creations independent of Mediterranean alphabet traditions. I propose, however, that ogam-names are based on interpretations of Hebrew, Greek or Latin letter-names

  12. Game development tool essentials

    CERN Document Server

    Berinstein, Paula; Ardolino, Alessandro; Franco, Simon; Herubel, Adrien; McCutchan, John; Nedelcu, Nicusor; Nitschke, Benjamin; Olmstead, Don; Robinet, Fabrice; Ronchi, Christian; Turkowski, Rita; Walter, Robert; Samour, Gustavo

    2014-01-01

    Offers game developers new techniques for streamlining the critical game tools pipeline. Inspires game developers to share their secrets and improve the productivity of the entire industry. Helps game industry practitioners compete in a hyper-competitive environment.

  13. Game mechanics engine

    OpenAIRE

    Magnusson, Lars V

    2011-01-01

    Game logic and game rules exists in all computer games, but they are created di erently for all game engines. This game engine dependency exists because of how the internal object model is implemented in the engine, as a place where game logic data is intermingled with the data needed by the low- level subsystems. This thesis propose a game object model design, based on existing theory, that removes this dependency and establish a general game logic framework. The thesis the...

  14. GEOGRAPHIC NAMES INFORMATION SYSTEM (GNIS) ...

    Science.gov (United States)

    The Geographic Names Information System (GNIS), developed by the U.S. Geological Survey in cooperation with the U.S. Board on Geographic Names (BGN), contains information about physical and cultural geographic features in the United States and associated areas, both current and historical, but not including roads and highways. The database also contains geographic names in Antarctica. The database holds the Federally recognized name of each feature and defines the location of the feature by state, county, USGS topographic map, and geographic coordinates. Other feature attributes include names or spellings other than the official name, feature designations, feature class, historical and descriptive information, and for some categories of features the geometric boundaries. The database assigns a unique feature identifier, a random number, that is a key for accessing, integrating, or reconciling GNIS data with other data sets. The GNIS is our Nation's official repository of domestic geographic feature names information.

  15. Dynamics in atomic signaling games

    KAUST Repository

    Fox, Michael J.

    2015-04-08

    We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss.

  16. Dynamics in atomic signaling games

    KAUST Repository

    Fox, Michael J.; Touri, Behrouz; Shamma, Jeff S.

    2015-01-01

    We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss.

  17. Drinking Game Studies

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Debus, Michael S.

    2016-01-01

    The paper examines research on drinking game participation from a game studies ontological perspective, covering definition, classification and problems with the, in the studies implied, underlying ontology of drinking games.......The paper examines research on drinking game participation from a game studies ontological perspective, covering definition, classification and problems with the, in the studies implied, underlying ontology of drinking games....

  18. Topology control with IPD network creation games

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scholz, Jan C; Greiner, Martin O W

    2007-01-01

    Network creation games couple a two-players game with the evolution of network structure. A vertex player may increase its own payoff with a change of strategy or with a modification of its edge-defined neighbourhood. By referring to the iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD) game we show that this evolutionary dynamics converges to network-Nash equilibria, where no vertex is able to improve its payoff. The resulting network structure exhibits a strong dependence on the parameter of the payoff matrix. Degree distributions and cluster coefficients are also strongly affected by the specific interactions chosen for the neighbourhood exploration. This allows network creation games to be seen as a promising artificial-social-systems approach for a distributive topology control of complex networked systems

  19. Gamers on Games and Gaming : Implications for Educational Game Design

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Van Staalduinen, J.P.

    2012-01-01

    In the past two decades, there has been a steadily increasing interest in the use of games for educational purposes. This has led to an increased design, use and study of educational games; games where the players learn through playing. However, experiments with the educational use of games have not

  20. The Many Faces of Role-Playing Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hitchens, Michael; Drachen, Anders

    2009-01-01

    Role-playing games have grown and evolved into a large number of forms in the last thirty years, spanning digital as well as non-digital media. They demonstrate a wide variety in the number of participants, style of play and the formal and informal systems that govern them. Despite this diversity...... players at least seem to think they know when something is a role-playing game. Yet there is no commonly accepted definition which both captures games generally accepted as role-playing games and distinguishes them from other, similar, games which begs the question, whether roleplaying games are united...... by anything more than a colloquial name. Additionally, research involving these games is hampered by lack of a widely accepted definition of what constitutes a roleplaying game, as it is then not even possible to clearly delineate the subject of such research. In this paper various example of role-playing...

  1. phyloXML: XML for evolutionary biology and comparative genomics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Han, Mira V; Zmasek, Christian M

    2009-10-27

    Evolutionary trees are central to a wide range of biological studies. In many of these studies, tree nodes and branches need to be associated (or annotated) with various attributes. For example, in studies concerned with organismal relationships, tree nodes are associated with taxonomic names, whereas tree branches have lengths and oftentimes support values. Gene trees used in comparative genomics or phylogenomics are usually annotated with taxonomic information, genome-related data, such as gene names and functional annotations, as well as events such as gene duplications, speciations, or exon shufflings, combined with information related to the evolutionary tree itself. The data standards currently used for evolutionary trees have limited capacities to incorporate such annotations of different data types. We developed a XML language, named phyloXML, for describing evolutionary trees, as well as various associated data items. PhyloXML provides elements for commonly used items, such as branch lengths, support values, taxonomic names, and gene names and identifiers. By using "property" elements, phyloXML can be adapted to novel and unforeseen use cases. We also developed various software tools for reading, writing, conversion, and visualization of phyloXML formatted data. PhyloXML is an XML language defined by a complete schema in XSD that allows storing and exchanging the structures of evolutionary trees as well as associated data. More information about phyloXML itself, the XSD schema, as well as tools implementing and supporting phyloXML, is available at http://www.phyloxml.org.

  2. Quantum Mechanics predicts evolutionary biology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Torday, J S

    2018-07-01

    Nowhere are the shortcomings of conventional descriptive biology more evident than in the literature on Quantum Biology. In the on-going effort to apply Quantum Mechanics to evolutionary biology, merging Quantum Mechanics with the fundamentals of evolution as the First Principles of Physiology-namely negentropy, chemiosmosis and homeostasis-offers an authentic opportunity to understand how and why physics constitutes the basic principles of biology. Negentropy and chemiosmosis confer determinism on the unicell, whereas homeostasis constitutes Free Will because it offers a probabilistic range of physiologic set points. Similarly, on this basis several principles of Quantum Mechanics also apply directly to biology. The Pauli Exclusion Principle is both deterministic and probabilistic, whereas non-localization and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle are both probabilistic, providing the long-sought after ontologic and causal continuum from physics to biology and evolution as the holistic integration recognized as consciousness for the first time. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  3. Origins of evolutionary transitions

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    2014-03-15

    Mar 15, 2014 ... ... of events: 'Entities that were capable of independent replication ... There have been many major evolutionary events that this definition of .... selection at level x to exclusive selection at x – will probably require a multiplicity ...

  4. Evolutionary relationships among Astroviridae

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Lukashov, Vladimir V.; Goudsmit, Jaap

    2002-01-01

    To study the evolutionary relationships among astroviruses, all available sequences for members of the family Astroviridae were collected. Phylogenetic analysis distinguished two deep-rooted groups: one comprising mammalian astroviruses, with ovine astrovirus being an outlier, and the other

  5. Names of Southern African grasses: Name changes and additional ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    The main reasons for changes in botanical names are briefly reviewed, with examples from the lists. At this time, about 1040 grass species and subspecific taxa are recognized in the subcontinent. Keywords: botanical research; botanical research institute; botany; grass; grasses; identification; name change; nomenclature; ...

  6. General game playing

    CERN Document Server

    Genesereth, Michael

    2014-01-01

    General game players are computer systems able to play strategy games based solely on formal game descriptions supplied at ""runtime"" (n other words, they don't know the rules until the game starts). Unlike specialized game players, such as Deep Blue, general game players cannot rely on algorithms designed in advance for specific games; they must discover such algorithms themselves. General game playing expertise depends on intelligence on the part of the game player and not just intelligence of the programmer of the game player.GGP is an interesting application in its own right. It is intell

  7. Serious Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Christensen, Jens

    Serious Games er et nyt it-forretningsområde, der siden årtusindskiftet er vokset frem, først i USA og dernæst i Vesteuropa og and i-lande. Til forskel fra computerspil er serious games ikke underholdning, men tænkt som et værktøj til støtte for statens og erhvervslivets forskellige funktioner. Det...... amerikanske militær har været fødselshjælper for den nye teknologi. Herfra har serious games bredt sig til andre sektorer og og i-lande, inkl. Danmark. Bogen skildrer, hvordan det nye forretningsområde er i færd med at blive udkrystalliseret af en række beslægtede industrigrene, og hvordan udviklingen er...

  8. Serious Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Salovaara-Moring, Inka

    There has recently been considerable attention paid to the gamification of digital journalism. Where the current technological and social affordances of web 2.0 storytelling have proved less attractive to younger users, the persuasive features of game logics have added new dimensions to interactive......, participatory journalism. This notion refers to realitybased news games that can act both as an independent medium for news content and as a supplement to traditional forms of coverage. Simultaneously, persuasive logics of gamification offer new ways to engage actuality through media space’s augmented reality....... This paper1 explores the new spatio-epistemological realities of two journalistic games, asking how the spatial, operational, and procedural realities of storytelling change through ‘gamification’. It reflects on the spatial dimension of digital journalism in order to challenge the traditional, generic...

  9. Cognitive components of picture naming.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, C J; Paivio, A; Clark, J M

    1996-07-01

    A substantial research literature documents the effects of diverse item attributes, task conditions, and participant characteristics on the case of picture naming. The authors review what the research has revealed about 3 generally accepted stages of naming a pictured object: object identification, name activation, and response generation. They also show that dual coding theory gives a coherent and plausible account of these findings without positing amodal conceptual representations, and they identify issues and methods that may further advance the understanding of picture naming and related cognitive tasks.

  10. Fictional names and fictional discourse

    OpenAIRE

    Panizza, Chiara

    2017-01-01

    [eng] In this dissertation I present a critical study of fiction, focusing on the semantics of fictional names and fictional discourse. I am concerned with the issue of whether fictional names need to refer, and also with the related issue of whether fictional characters need to exist, in order to best account for our linguistic practices involving fictional names. Fictional names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, ‘Anna Karenina’, ‘Emma Woodhouse’ and ‘Don Quixote of La Mancha’ ordinarily occur in diff...

  11. Evolutionary dynamics under interactive diversity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Su, Qi; Li, Aming; Wang, Long

    2017-10-01

    As evidenced by many cases in human societies, individuals often make different behavior decisions in different interactions, and adaptively adjust their behavior in changeable interactive scenarios. However, up to now, how such diverse interactive behavior affects cooperation dynamics has still remained unknown. Here we develop a general framework of interactive diversity, which models individuals’ separated behavior against distinct opponents and their adaptive adjustment in response to opponents’ strategies, to explore the evolution of cooperation. We find that interactive diversity enables individuals to reciprocate every single opponent, and thus sustains large-scale reciprocal interactions. Our work witnesses an impressive boost of cooperation for a notably extensive range of parameters and for all pairwise games. These results are robust against well-mixed and various networked populations, and against degree-normalized and cumulative payoff patterns. From the perspective of network dynamics, distinguished from individuals competing for nodes in most previous work, in this paper, the system evolves in the form of behavior disseminating along edges. We propose a theoretical method based on evolution of edges, which predicts well both the frequency of cooperation and the compact cooperation clusters. Our thorough investigation clarifies the positive role of interactive diversity in resolving social dilemmas and highlights the significance of understanding evolutionary dynamics from the viewpoint of edge dynamics.

  12. Game theory and its applications in the social and biological sciences

    CERN Document Server

    Colman, Andrew M; Humphreys, Peter; Negrine, Ralph

    2013-01-01

    Andrew Coleman provides an accessible introduction to the fundamentals of mathematical gaming and other major applications in social psychology, decision theory, economics, politics, evolutionary biology, philosophy, operational research and sociology.

  13. The (De-)Evolution of Evolution Games: A Content Analysis of the Representation of Evolution through Natural Selection in Digital Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leith, Alex P.; Ratan, Rabindra A.; Wohn, Donghee Yvette

    2016-01-01

    Given the diversity and complexity of education game mechanisms and topics, this article contributes to a theoretical understanding of how game mechanisms "map" to educational topics through inquiry-based learning. Namely, the article examines the presence of evolution through natural selection (ENS) in digital games. ENS is a…

  14. Educational games for health professionals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Akl, Elie A; Kairouz, Victor F; Sackett, Kay M; Erdley, William S; Mustafa, Reem A; Fiander, Michelle; Gabriel, Carolynne; Schünemann, Holger

    2013-03-28

    The use of games as an educational strategy has the potential to improve health professionals' performance (e.g. adherence to standards of care) through improving their knowledge, skills and attitudes. The objective was to assess the effect of educational games on health professionals' performance, knowledge, skills, attitude and satisfaction, and on patient outcomes. We searched the following databases in January 2012: MEDLINE, AMED, CINAHL, Cochrane Central Database of Controlled Trials, EMBASE, EPOC Register, ERIC, Proquest Dissertations & Theses Database, and PsycINFO. Related reviews were sought in DARE and the above named databases. Database searches identified 1546 citations. We also screened the reference lists of included studies in relevant reviews, contacted authors of relevant papers and reviews, and searched ISI Web of Science for papers citing studies included in the review. These search methods identified an additional 62 unique citations for a total of 1608 for this update. We included randomized controlled trials (RCT), controlled clinical trials (CCT), controlled before and after (CBA) and interrupted time-series analysis (ITS). Study participants were qualified health professionals or in postgraduate training. The intervention was an educational game with "a form of competitive activity or sport played according to rules". Using a standardized data form we extracted data on methodological quality, participants, interventions and outcomes of interest that included patient outcomes, professional behavior (process of care outcomes), and professional's knowledge, skills, attitude and satisfaction. The search strategy identified a total of 2079 unique citations. Out of 84 potentially eligible citations, we included two RCTs. The game evaluated in the first study used as a reinforcement technique, was based on the television game show "Family Feud" and focused on infection control. The study did not assess any patient or process of care outcomes. The

  15. Wherever Hardware, There’ll be Games. The evolution of hardware and shifting industrial leadership in the gaming industry 1968-2004

    OpenAIRE

    Jörnmark, Jan

    2005-01-01

    Video game was the first truly digital entertainment medium, requiring processing power both in the production and consumption stage. Born out of the transistor, it was also intimately connected with its logic: the doubling of the processor capacity every 18th month or the halving of the price for the same processing capacity in the same time. Transistor technology and video games have been able to conquer society in an evolutionary process. Hence, video games have had an unprecedented abilit...

  16. Serious Games: Video Games for Good?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sanford, Kathy; Starr, Lisa J.; Merkel, Liz; Bonsor Kurki, Sarah

    2015-01-01

    As video games become a ubiquitous part of today's culture internationally, as educators and parents we need to turn our attention to how video games are being understood and used in informal and formal settings. Serious games have developed as a genre of video games marketed for educating youth about a range of world issues. At face value this…

  17. A name is a name is a name: some thoughts and personal opinions about molluscan scientific names

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Dance, S.P.

    2009-01-01

    Since 1758, with the publication of Systema Naturae by Linnaeus, thousands of scientific names have been proposed for molluscs. The derivation and uses of many of them are here examined from various viewpoints, beginning with names based on appearance, size, vertical distribution, and location.

  18. Data mining teaching throughout cards game competition

    OpenAIRE

    Antoñanzas-Torres, Javier; Urraca, Ruben; Sodupe-Ortega, Enrique; Martínez-de-Pison, Francisco; Pernía-Espinoza, Alpha

    2015-01-01

    [EN] Data-mining techniques and statistical metrics learning can be complicated because of the complexity and overwhelming nature of this field. In this paper a class competition to improve learning of designing Decision Support Systems (DSS) by playing a classic cards game named "Copo" is proposed. The fact that this game is based on a probabilistic problem and that different solutions can be obtained represents a very typical kind of problem in the field of engineering and compu...

  19. Unfair and Anomalous Evolutionary Dynamics from Fluctuating Payoffs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stollmeier, Frank; Nagler, Jan

    2018-02-01

    Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of randomness. These temporal variations in the payoffs can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics that are affected by varying payoffs remains difficult. Here we study the impact of arbitrary amplitudes and covariances of temporally varying payoffs on the dynamics. The evolutionary dynamics may be "unfair," meaning that, on average, two coexisting strategies may persistently receive different payoffs. This mechanism can induce an anomalous coexistence of cooperators and defectors in the prisoner's dilemma, and an unexpected selection reversal in the hawk-dove game.

  20. Diversity of neighborhoods promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ma, Yongjuan; Lu, Jun; Shi, Lei

    2017-02-01

    Explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important and interesting problems in a myriad of disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, statistical physics, social science and economics Up to now, there have been a great number of works aiming to this issue with the help of evolutionary game theory. However, vast majority of existing literatures simply assume that the interaction neighborhood and replacement neighborhood are symmetric, which seems inconsistent with real-world cases. In this paper, we consider the asymmetrical neighborhood: player of type A, whose factor is controlled by a parameter τ, has four interaction neighbors and four replacement neighbors, while player of type B, whose factor is controlled by a parameter 1 - τ, possess eight interaction neighbors and four replacement neighbors. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we found that middle τ can make the cooperation reach the highest level While for this finding, its robustness can be further validated in more games.

  1. An introduction to game-theoretic modelling

    CERN Document Server

    Mesterton-Gibbons, Mike

    2000-01-01

    This is an introduction to game theory and applications with an emphasis on self-discovery from the perspective of a mathematical modeller. The book deals in a unified manner with the central concepts of both classical and evolutionary game theory. The key ideas are illustrated throughout by a wide variety of well-chosen examples of both human and non-human behavior, including car pooling, price fixing, food sharing, sex allocation and competition for territories or oviposition sites. There are numerous exercises with solutions.

  2. Game Theory - Its Applications to Ethical Decision Making

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Cavagnetto Stefano

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available The application of game theory according to Hargreaves-Heap and Varonfakis (1995 to understand human behaviour, and in particular ethical behaviour, is a valuable development, as game theory has gradually become one of the key frameworks to assist us in the understanding of social sciences. Esther (1982 and Aumann and Hart (1992 show that there are several studies that indicate the importance of a game theoretic framework in advancing our understanding of social behaviour and evolutionary sciences. Although the application of game theory in the above areas has largely been not formalised, its application in the fields of ethical conduct and human behaviour is at present developed in several respects with the gradual assistance of advances in related areas such as evolutionary biology and our understanding of group social behaviour.

  3. Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Realpe-Gomez, John; Szczesny, Bartosz; Galla, Tobias; Dall’Asta, Luca

    2012-01-01

    Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations is known to fixate eventually in the absence of mutation. We here show that a similar phenomenon can be found in stochastic game dynamical batch learning, and investigate fixation in learning processes in a simple 2×2 game, for two-player games with cyclic interaction, and in the context of the best-shot network game. The analogues of finite populations in evolution are here finite batches of observations between strategy updates. We study when and how such fixation can occur, and present results on the average time-to-fixation from numerical simulations. Simple cases are also amenable to analytical approaches and we provide estimates of the behaviour of so-called escape times as a function of the batch size. The differences and similarities with escape and fixation in evolutionary dynamics are discussed. (paper)

  4. Global Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Bottenburg, Maarten

    2001-01-01

    Why is soccer the sport of choice in South America, while baseball has soared to popularity in the Carribean? How did cricket become India's national sport, while China is a stronghold of table tennis? In Global Games, Maarten van Bottenburg asserts that it is the 'hidden competition' of social and

  5. Urban Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nielsen, Rune; Løssing, Tobias

    2004-01-01

    Games, er ikke produktudvikling i traditionel forstand, men derimod en reflekteret designproces, der forsøger at optage spilteoretiske og HCI-relaterede problemstillinger. I denne artikel vil vi koncentrere os om udvalgte principielle overvejelser i udviklingen af især forhandlings- og debatspil, som...

  6. Gaming conservation

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Fletcher, Robert

    2017-01-01

    This article explores the role of digital (video and computer) games in the rise of what Büscher (2014) calls "nature 2.0": new web-related media that allow users to move beyond passive voyeurism to actively "co-create" or "prosume" the images and processes promoted by organizations committed to

  7. [Lecture Games] Python programming game

    OpenAIRE

    Johnsen, Andreas Lyngstad; Ushakov, Georgy

    2011-01-01

    Pythia is a programming game that allows the player to change pieces of theirenvironment through use of the programming language Python. The idea is that thegame could be used as a part of teaching simple programming to first year universitystudents. The game should be fun enough for the students to keep playing, teachenough for it to earn a place as a teaching tool, and it should be usable by allstudents. It should also be possible for a teacher to create their own content for theg...

  8. Proteomics in evolutionary ecology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baer, B; Millar, A H

    2016-03-01

    Evolutionary ecologists are traditionally gene-focused, as genes propagate phenotypic traits across generations and mutations and recombination in the DNA generate genetic diversity required for evolutionary processes. As a consequence, the inheritance of changed DNA provides a molecular explanation for the functional changes associated with natural selection. A direct focus on proteins on the other hand, the actual molecular agents responsible for the expression of a phenotypic trait, receives far less interest from ecologists and evolutionary biologists. This is partially due to the central dogma of molecular biology that appears to define proteins as the 'dead-end of molecular information flow' as well as technical limitations in identifying and studying proteins and their diversity in the field and in many of the more exotic genera often favored in ecological studies. Here we provide an overview of a newly forming field of research that we refer to as 'Evolutionary Proteomics'. We point out that the origins of cellular function are related to the properties of polypeptide and RNA and their interactions with the environment, rather than DNA descent, and that the critical role of horizontal gene transfer in evolution is more about coopting new proteins to impact cellular processes than it is about modifying gene function. Furthermore, post-transcriptional and post-translational processes generate a remarkable diversity of mature proteins from a single gene, and the properties of these mature proteins can also influence inheritance through genetic and perhaps epigenetic mechanisms. The influence of post-transcriptional diversification on evolutionary processes could provide a novel mechanistic underpinning for elements of rapid, directed evolutionary changes and adaptations as observed for a variety of evolutionary processes. Modern state-of the art technologies based on mass spectrometry are now available to identify and quantify peptides, proteins, protein

  9. Minority Games

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Metzler, R [Institut fuer Theoretische Physik, Universitaet Wuerzburg, Am Hubland, D-97074 Wuerzburg (Germany)

    2005-02-25

    New branches of scientific disciplines often have a few paradigmatic models that serve as a testing ground for theories and a starting point for new inquiries. In the late 1990s, one of these models found fertile ground in the growing field of econophysics: the Minority Game (MG), a model for speculative markets that combined conceptual simplicity with interesting emergent behaviour and challenging mathematics. The two basic ingredients were the minority mechanism (a large number of players have to choose one of two alternatives in each round, and the minority wins) and limited rationality (each player has a small set of decision rules, and chooses the more successful ones). Combining these, one observes a phase transition between a crowded and an inefficient market phase, fat-tailed price distributions at the transition, and many other nontrivial effects. Now, seven years after the first paper, three of the key players-Damien Challet, Matteo Marsili and Yi-Cheng Zhang-have published a monograph that summarizes the current state of the science. The book consists of two parts: a 100-page overview of the various aspects of the MG, and reprints of many essential papers. The first chapters of Part I give a well-written description of the motivation and the history behind the MG, and then go into the phenomenology and the mathematical treatment of the model. The authors emphasize the 'physics' underlying the behaviour and give coherent, intuitive explanations that are difficult to extract from the original papers. The mathematics is outlined, but calculations are not carried out in great detail (maybe they could have been included in an appendix). Chapter 4 then discusses how and why the MG is a model for speculative markets, how it can be modified to give a closer fit to observed market statistics (in particular, reproducing the 'stylized facts' of fat-tailed distributions and volatility clustering), and what conclusions one can draw from the

  10. A game is a game is a game

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jørgensen, Ida Kathrine Hammeleff

    2017-01-01

    Recently self-referentiality have occurred as a trend among game designers and have also enjoyed sporadic attention in academia. However, in academia, discussions of self-referential games often rest on proceduralist arguments and a too exclusive focus on the game object. This paper draws...... on the typology of meta-pictures developed by art historian J.W.T. Mitchell. Based on this typology, this paper discusses the notion of meta-games and suggest a broad conception of such games that includes not only the game object, but also the player and the discourse in which it is interpreted....

  11. Applying evolutionary anthropology.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gibson, Mhairi A; Lawson, David W

    2015-01-01

    Evolutionary anthropology provides a powerful theoretical framework for understanding how both current environments and legacies of past selection shape human behavioral diversity. This integrative and pluralistic field, combining ethnographic, demographic, and sociological methods, has provided new insights into the ultimate forces and proximate pathways that guide human adaptation and variation. Here, we present the argument that evolutionary anthropological studies of human behavior also hold great, largely untapped, potential to guide the design, implementation, and evaluation of social and public health policy. Focusing on the key anthropological themes of reproduction, production, and distribution we highlight classic and recent research demonstrating the value of an evolutionary perspective to improving human well-being. The challenge now comes in transforming relevance into action and, for that, evolutionary behavioral anthropologists will need to forge deeper connections with other applied social scientists and policy-makers. We are hopeful that these developments are underway and that, with the current tide of enthusiasm for evidence-based approaches to policy, evolutionary anthropology is well positioned to make a strong contribution. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

  12. Applying Evolutionary Anthropology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gibson, Mhairi A; Lawson, David W

    2015-01-01

    Evolutionary anthropology provides a powerful theoretical framework for understanding how both current environments and legacies of past selection shape human behavioral diversity. This integrative and pluralistic field, combining ethnographic, demographic, and sociological methods, has provided new insights into the ultimate forces and proximate pathways that guide human adaptation and variation. Here, we present the argument that evolutionary anthropological studies of human behavior also hold great, largely untapped, potential to guide the design, implementation, and evaluation of social and public health policy. Focusing on the key anthropological themes of reproduction, production, and distribution we highlight classic and recent research demonstrating the value of an evolutionary perspective to improving human well-being. The challenge now comes in transforming relevance into action and, for that, evolutionary behavioral anthropologists will need to forge deeper connections with other applied social scientists and policy-makers. We are hopeful that these developments are underway and that, with the current tide of enthusiasm for evidence-based approaches to policy, evolutionary anthropology is well positioned to make a strong contribution. PMID:25684561

  13. Online networks, social interaction and segregation: An evolutionary approach

    OpenAIRE

    Antoci, Angelo; Sabatini, Fabio

    2018-01-01

    There is growing evidence that face-to-face interaction is declining in many countries, exacerbating the phenomenon of social isolation. On the other hand, social interaction through online networking sites is steeply rising. To analyze these societal dynamics, we have built an evolutionary game model in which agents can choose between three strategies of social participation: 1) interaction via both online social networks and face-to-face encounters; 2) interaction by exclusive means of face...

  14. Defining Game Mechanics

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sicart (Vila), Miguel Angel

    2008-01-01

    This article defins game mechanics in relation to rules and challenges. Game mechanics are methods invoked by agents for interacting with the game world. I apply this definition to a comparative analysis of the games Rez, Every Extend Extra and Shadow of the Colossus that will show the relevance...... of a formal definition of game mechanics. Udgivelsesdato: Dec 2008...

  15. Models and games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Väänänen, J.

    2011-01-01

    This gentle introduction to logic and model theory is based on a systematic use of three important games in logic: the semantic game; the Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game; and the model existence game. The third game has not been isolated in the literature before but it underlies the concepts of Beth

  16. Teaching Using Computer Games

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miller, Lee Dee; Shell, Duane; Khandaker, Nobel; Soh, Leen-Kiat

    2011-01-01

    Computer games have long been used for teaching. Current reviews lack categorization and analysis using learning models which would help instructors assess the usefulness of computer games. We divide the use of games into two classes: game playing and game development. We discuss the Input-Process-Outcome (IPO) model for the learning process when…

  17. Alena Lidzhieva, About Games

    OpenAIRE

    Dovurkaev, Karu; Churyumov, Anton

    2015-01-01

    Alena talks about traditional games, including khorma khotn, tsagan monda, mongn bus, nyarn shinj, and games played with ankle bones. Tsagan monda was a game played at night by several people. The rule is simple: A ball made of white cow skin is pushed into a hole. Games with ankle bones were reserved only for boys. Girls did not play such games. Arcadia

  18. Evolutionary dynamics on graphs: Efficient method for weak selection

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fu, Feng; Wang, Long; Nowak, Martin A.; Hauert, Christoph

    2009-04-01

    Investigating the evolutionary dynamics of game theoretical interactions in populations where individuals are arranged on a graph can be challenging in terms of computation time. Here, we propose an efficient method to study any type of game on arbitrary graph structures for weak selection. In this limit, evolutionary game dynamics represents a first-order correction to neutral evolution. Spatial correlations can be empirically determined under neutral evolution and provide the basis for formulating the game dynamics as a discrete Markov process by incorporating a detailed description of the microscopic dynamics based on the neutral correlations. This framework is then applied to one of the most intriguing questions in evolutionary biology: the evolution of cooperation. We demonstrate that the degree heterogeneity of a graph impedes cooperation and that the success of tit for tat depends not only on the number of rounds but also on the degree of the graph. Moreover, considering the mutation-selection equilibrium shows that the symmetry of the stationary distribution of states under weak selection is skewed in favor of defectors for larger selection strengths. In particular, degree heterogeneity—a prominent feature of scale-free networks—generally results in a more pronounced increase in the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for evolution to favor cooperation as compared to regular graphs. This conclusion is corroborated by an analysis of the effects of population structures on the fixation probabilities of strategies in general 2×2 games for different types of graphs. Computer simulations confirm the predictive power of our method and illustrate the improved accuracy as compared to previous studies.

  19. Number names and number understanding

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ejersbo, Lisser Rye; Misfeldt, Morten

    2014-01-01

    This paper concerns the results from the first year of a three-year research project involving the relationship between Danish number names and their corresponding digits in the canonical base 10 system. The project aims to develop a system to help the students’ understanding of the base 10 syste...... the Danish number names are more complicated than in other languages. Keywords: A research project in grade 0 and 1th in a Danish school, Base-10 system, two-digit number names, semiotic, cognitive perspectives....

  20. Archaeogenetics in evolutionary medicine.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bouwman, Abigail; Rühli, Frank

    2016-09-01

    Archaeogenetics is the study of exploration of ancient DNA (aDNA) of more than 70 years old. It is an important part of the wider studies of many different areas of our past, including animal, plant and pathogen evolution and domestication events. Hereby, we address specifically the impact of research in archaeogenetics in the broader field of evolutionary medicine. Studies on ancient hominid genomes help to understand even modern health patterns. Human genetic microevolution, e.g. related to abilities of post-weaning milk consumption, and specifically genetic adaptation in disease susceptibility, e.g. towards malaria and other infectious diseases, are of the upmost importance in contributions of archeogenetics on the evolutionary understanding of human health and disease. With the increase in both the understanding of modern medical genetics and the ability to deep sequence ancient genetic information, the field of archaeogenetic evolutionary medicine is blossoming.

  1. Part E: Evolutionary Computation

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    2015-01-01

    of Computational Intelligence. First, comprehensive surveys of genetic algorithms, genetic programming, evolution strategies, parallel evolutionary algorithms are presented, which are readable and constructive so that a large audience might find them useful and – to some extent – ready to use. Some more general...... kinds of evolutionary algorithms, have been prudently analyzed. This analysis was followed by a thorough analysis of various issues involved in stochastic local search algorithms. An interesting survey of various technological and industrial applications in mechanical engineering and design has been...... topics like the estimation of distribution algorithms, indicator-based selection, etc., are also discussed. An important problem, from a theoretical and practical point of view, of learning classifier systems is presented in depth. Multiobjective evolutionary algorithms, which constitute one of the most...

  2. Evolutionary Statistical Procedures

    CERN Document Server

    Baragona, Roberto; Poli, Irene

    2011-01-01

    This proposed text appears to be a good introduction to evolutionary computation for use in applied statistics research. The authors draw from a vast base of knowledge about the current literature in both the design of evolutionary algorithms and statistical techniques. Modern statistical research is on the threshold of solving increasingly complex problems in high dimensions, and the generalization of its methodology to parameters whose estimators do not follow mathematically simple distributions is underway. Many of these challenges involve optimizing functions for which analytic solutions a

  3. Asteroid named after CAS scientist

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2007-01-01

    @@ An asteroid has been named after CAS astronomy historian XI Zezong with the approval of the International Minor Planet Nomenclature Committee (IMPNC), announced China's National Astronomical Observatories at CAS (NAOC) on 17 August.

  4. Dictionary of Minor Planet Names

    CERN Document Server

    Schmadel, Lutz D

    2007-01-01

    Dictionary of Minor Planet Names, Fifth Edition, is the official reference for the field of the IAU, which serves as the internationally recognised authority for assigning designations to celestial bodies and any surface features on them. The accelerating rate of the discovery of minor planets has not only made a new edition of this established compendium necessary but has also significantly altered its scope: this thoroughly revised edition concentrates on the approximately 10,000 minor planets that carry a name. It provides authoritative information about the basis for all names of minor planets. In addition to being of practical value for identification purposes, this collection provides a most interesting historical insight into the work of those astronomers who over two centuries vested their affinities in a rich and colorful variety of ingenious names, from heavenly goddesses to more prosaic constructions. The fifth edition serves as the primary reference, with plans for complementary booklets with newl...

  5. Design and evaluation of a data-driven scenario generation framework for game-based training

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Luo, L.; Yin, H.; Cai, W.; Zhong, J.; Lees, M.

    Generating suitable game scenarios that can cater for individual players has become an emerging challenge in procedural content generation. In this paper, we propose a data-driven scenario generation framework for game-based training. An evolutionary scenario generation process is designed with a

  6. Human Evolution, Movement, and Intelligence: Why Playing Games Counts as Smart

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kretchmar, R. Scott

    2018-01-01

    The article investigates several ways in which creating, entering, and playing games requires uniquely human levels of intelligence. It examines an element of our evolutionary heritage and the possibility that games (particularly in the form of sport) were among the first elements of culture. It describes sport as a "way of knowing," a…

  7. Scheduling for the National Hockey League Using a Multi-objective Evolutionary Algorithm

    Science.gov (United States)

    Craig, Sam; While, Lyndon; Barone, Luigi

    We describe a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm that derives schedules for the National Hockey League according to three objectives: minimising the teams' total travel, promoting equity in rest time between games, and minimising long streaks of home or away games. Experiments show that the system is able to derive schedules that beat the 2008-9 NHL schedule in all objectives simultaneously, and that it returns a set of schedules that offer a range of trade-offs across the objectives.

  8. Authoring of digital games via card games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Valente, Andrea; Marchetti, Emanuela

    2014-01-01

    Literature and previous studies show that creative play is easy to emerge when children interact with tangible, low-tech toys and games than with digital games. This paradoxical situation is linked to the long-standing problem of end-users (or players) authoring of digital contents and systems. We...... are to show how card games can represent digital games, how playful play can emerge in card games and digital games, and to begin defining a new way to express game behavior without the use of universal programming languages....... propose a new scenario in which trading card games help making sense and re-design computer games, to support players express themselves aesthetically and in a highly creative way. Our aim is to look for a middle ground between players becoming programmers and simply editing levels. The main contributions...

  9. Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan

    2015-01-01

    Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.

  10. Game theory paradigm: a new tool for investigating social dysfunction in major depressive disorders

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yun eWang

    2015-09-01

    Full Text Available Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modelling offers a new tool for investigating social interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely-used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.

  11. Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan

    2015-01-01

    Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD. PMID:26441689

  12. Pegembangan Game dengan Menggunakan Teknologi Voice Recognition Berbasis Android

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Franky Hadinata Marpaung

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of this research is to create a new kind of game by using technology that rarely used in current games. It is developed as an entertainment media and also a social media in which the users can play the games together via multiplayer mode. This research uses Scrum development method since it supports small scaled developer and it supports software increment along the development. Using this game application, the users can play and watch interesting animations by controlling it with their voice, listen the character imitating the users’ voice, play various mini games both in single player or multiplayer mode via Bluetooth connection. The conclusion is that game application of My Name is Dug use voice recognition and inter-devices connection as its main features. It also has various mini games that support both single player and multiplayer.

  13. Total Integrative Evolutionary Communication

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nedergaard Thomsen, Ole; Brier, Søren

    2014-01-01

    ) instinctual-motivational-emotional sign plays (a level which is shared with other animals and is the domain of ethology), and (3) premeditated, intentional symbol-based language games (specifically human unitary thinking-speaking-gesturing, the domain of pragmatics-based functional linguistics...

  14. An Educational Card Game for Learning Families of Chemical Elements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mariscal, Antonio Joaquin Franco; Martinez, Jose Maria Oliva; Marquez, Serafin Bernal

    2012-01-01

    This paper describes an educational card game designed to help high school students (grade 10, 15-16 years old) "understand," as opposed to memorize, the periodic table. The game may also be used to identify different chemical elements found in daily life objects. As an additional value, students learn the names and symbols of the displayed…

  15. Efficient Software Assets for Fostering Learning in Applied Games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Maurer, Matthias; Nussbaumer, Alexander; Steiner, Christina; Van der Vegt, Wim; Nadolski, Rob; Nyamsuren, Enkhbold; Albert, Dietrich

    2018-01-01

    Digital game technologies are a promising way to enable training providers to reach other target groups, namely those who are not interested in traditional learning technologies. Theoretically, through using digital game technologies we are able to foster the acquisition of any competence by

  16. Powerful elderly characters in video games: Flemeth of Dragon Age

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elisabeta Toma

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available As games are becoming an increasingly popular medium in various demographic and professional strata, scholars are discussing their content and how they shape society. However, despite an increase in gender analysis of video games, little has been written about orienting games towards an elderly audience, or game representations of aging and older persons. Games specifically designed for older persons are focused on improving cognitive functions, starting from the assumption that the elderly are in need of special games in order to repair age-related deficits. This repair-focused design philosophy comes at the expense of pursuing a broader understanding of quality of life and non-programmatic entertainment. Games-for-fun that also explicitly target the elderly as an audience are almost invisible. In this article we turn our attention to a powerful elderly feminine character in an AAA game designed for entertainment without a serious mission, namely Flemeth from Dragon Age. We discuss how the game depicts and models older characters: What repertoire of portraits has Flemeth as an old woman, in the Dragon Age games? How does Flemeth contribute to an enlarged repertoire of portrayals of old women in video games? We conclude that Flemeth’s gender and age displays in Dragon Age do not impoverish her portrayal but, on the contrary, turn her into a powerful and complex character, thus offering a model for game design to represent and invite older players.

  17. Reconceptualizing Pedagogical Usability of and Teachers' Roles in Computer Game-Based Learning in School

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tzuo, Pei-Wen; Ling, Jennifer Isabelle Ong Pei; Yang, Chien-Hui; Chen, Vivian Hsueh-Hua

    2012-01-01

    At present, methods for the optimal use of two approaches to computer game-based learning in school to enhance students' learning, namely, computer game play and game design, are obscure because past research has been devoted more to designing rather than evaluating the implementation of these approaches in school. In addition, most studies…

  18. LewiSpace: An Exploratory Study with a Machine Learning Model in an Educational Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ghali, Ramla; Ouellet, Sébastien; Frasson, Claude

    2016-01-01

    The use of educational games as a tool for providing learners with a playful and educational aspect is widespread. In this paper, we present an educational game that we developed to teach a chemistry lesson, namely drawing a Lewis diagram. Our game is a 3D environment known as LewiSpace and aims at balancing between playful and educational…

  19. Nash evolutionary algorithms : Testing problem size in reconstruction problems in frame structures

    OpenAIRE

    Greiner, D.; Periaux, Jacques; Emperador, J.M.; Galván, B.; Winter, G.

    2016-01-01

    The use of evolutionary algorithms has been enhanced in recent years for solving real engineering problems, where the requirements of intense computational calculations are needed, especially when computational engineering simulations are involved (use of finite element method, boundary element method, etc). The coupling of game-theory concepts in evolutionary algorithms has been a recent line of research which could enhance the efficiency of the optimum design procedure and th...

  20. EVOLUTIONARY FOUNDATIONS FOR MOLECULAR MEDICINE

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nesse, Randolph M.; Ganten, Detlev; Gregory, T. Ryan; Omenn, Gilbert S.

    2015-01-01

    Evolution has long provided a foundation for population genetics, but many major advances in evolutionary biology from the 20th century are only now being applied in molecular medicine. They include the distinction between proximate and evolutionary explanations, kin selection, evolutionary models for cooperation, and new strategies for tracing phylogenies and identifying signals of selection. Recent advances in genomics are further transforming evolutionary biology and creating yet more opportunities for progress at the interface of evolution with genetics, medicine, and public health. This article reviews 15 evolutionary principles and their applications in molecular medicine in hopes that readers will use them and others to speed the development of evolutionary molecular medicine. PMID:22544168

  1. Flow Game

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Olsen, Jesper Lind

    2003-01-01

    Flow Game er et dialogspil, der kan bruges som ledelsesværktøj, ledertræning, samtaletræning, coachingtræning og ideudvikling m.m. Gennem dilemmakort provokeres en dialog og teori-U inspireret afklaring- og udviklingsproces, hvor der enten arbejdes på en gruppes eller et individs vision/innovatio......Flow Game er et dialogspil, der kan bruges som ledelsesværktøj, ledertræning, samtaletræning, coachingtræning og ideudvikling m.m. Gennem dilemmakort provokeres en dialog og teori-U inspireret afklaring- og udviklingsproces, hvor der enten arbejdes på en gruppes eller et individs vision...

  2. Impact of neighborhood separation on the spatial reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xia, Chengyi; Miao, Qin; Zhang, Juanjuan

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • We present a novel game model in which interaction and learning neighborhood is not identical. • The separation between interaction and learning neighborhood can largely influence the cooperative behaviors. • Monte Carlo simulations are utilized to verify the evolution of cooperation. • When IN is fixed to be 4, medium-sized LN = 8 is the optimal size to promote the cooperation. • When LN is fixed to be 4, the cooperation can also be highly enhanced when IN > 4. -- Abstract: The evolutionary game theory is a very powerful tool to understand the collective cooperation behavior in many real-world systems. In the spatial game model, the payoff is often first obtained within a specific neighborhood (i.e., interaction neighborhood) and then the focal player imitates or learns the behavior of a randomly selected one inside another neighborhood which is named after the learning neighborhood. However, most studies often assume that the interaction neighborhood is identical with the learning neighborhood. Beyond this assumption, we present a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game model to discuss the impact of separation between interaction neighborhood and learning neighborhood on the cooperative behaviors among players on the square lattice. Extensive numerical simulations demonstrate that separating the interaction neighborhood from the learning neighborhood can dramatically affect the density of cooperators (ρ C ) in the population at the stationary state. In particular, compared to the standard case, we find that the medium-sized learning (interaction) neighborhood allows the cooperators to thrive and substantially favors the evolution of cooperation and ρ C can be greatly elevated when the interaction (learning) neighborhood is fixed, that is, too little or much information is not beneficial for players to make the contributions for the collective cooperation. Current results are conducive to further analyzing and understanding the emergence of

  3. The Game of Tri

    Science.gov (United States)

    Haggard, Gary; Schonberger, Ann Koch

    1977-01-01

    The paper-and-pencil game "Tri" is described. The authors argue that students gain logical skills by playing the game, and that the game lends itself to the introduction of diverse mathematical ideas. (SD)

  4. Play the MRI Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Teachers' Questionnaire MRI Play MRI the Magnetic Miracle Game About the game In the MRI imaging technique, strong magnets and ... last will in Paris. Play the Blood Typing Game Try to save some patients and learn about ...

  5. Play the Electrocardiogram Game

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... and Work Teachers' Questionnaire Electrocardiogram Play the ECG Game About the game ECG is used for diagnosing heart conditions by ... last will in Paris. Play the Blood Typing Game Try to save some patients and learn about ...

  6. Morals matter in economic games.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Felix C Brodbeck

    Full Text Available Contrary to predictions from Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory, when making economic decisions in interpersonal situations, people take the interest of others into account and express various forms of solidarity, even in one-shot interactions with anonymous strangers. Research in other-regarding behavior is dominated by behavioral economical and evolutionary biological approaches. Psychological theory building, which addresses mental processes underlying other-regarding behavior, is rare. Based on Relational Models Theory (RMT, [1] and Relationship Regulation Theory (RRT, [2] it is proposed that moral motives influence individuals' decision behavior in interpersonal situations via conscious and unconscious (automatic processes. To test our propositions we developed the 'Dyadic Solidarity Game' and its solitary equivalent, the 'Self-Insurance Game'. Four experiments, in which the moral motives "Unity" and "Proportionality" were manipulated, support the propositions made. First, it was shown that consciously activated moral motives (via framing of the overall goal of the experiment and unconsciously activated moral motives (via subliminal priming influence other-regarding behavior. Second, this influence was only found in interpersonal, not in solitary situations. Third, by combining the analyses of the two experimental games the extent to which participants apply the Golden Rule ("treat others how you wish to be treated" could be established. Individuals with a "Unity" motive treated others like themselves, whereas individuals with a "Proportionality" motive gave others less then they gave themselves. The four experiments not only support the assumption that morals matter in economic games, they also deliver new insights in how morals matter in economic decision making.

  7. Morals matter in economic games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Brodbeck, Felix C; Kugler, Katharina G; Reif, Julia A M; Maier, Markus A

    2013-01-01

    Contrary to predictions from Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory, when making economic decisions in interpersonal situations, people take the interest of others into account and express various forms of solidarity, even in one-shot interactions with anonymous strangers. Research in other-regarding behavior is dominated by behavioral economical and evolutionary biological approaches. Psychological theory building, which addresses mental processes underlying other-regarding behavior, is rare. Based on Relational Models Theory (RMT, [1]) and Relationship Regulation Theory (RRT, [2]) it is proposed that moral motives influence individuals' decision behavior in interpersonal situations via conscious and unconscious (automatic) processes. To test our propositions we developed the 'Dyadic Solidarity Game' and its solitary equivalent, the 'Self-Insurance Game'. Four experiments, in which the moral motives "Unity" and "Proportionality" were manipulated, support the propositions made. First, it was shown that consciously activated moral motives (via framing of the overall goal of the experiment) and unconsciously activated moral motives (via subliminal priming) influence other-regarding behavior. Second, this influence was only found in interpersonal, not in solitary situations. Third, by combining the analyses of the two experimental games the extent to which participants apply the Golden Rule ("treat others how you wish to be treated") could be established. Individuals with a "Unity" motive treated others like themselves, whereas individuals with a "Proportionality" motive gave others less then they gave themselves. The four experiments not only support the assumption that morals matter in economic games, they also deliver new insights in how morals matter in economic decision making.

  8. A Game Theoretic Approach to Swarm Robotics

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. N. Givigi

    2006-01-01

    Full Text Available In this article, we discuss some techniques for achieving swarm intelligent robots through the use of traits of personality. Traits of personality are characteristics of each robot that, altogether, define the robot's behaviours. We discuss the use of evolutionary psychology to select a set of traits of personality that will evolve due to a learning process based on reinforcement learning. The use of Game Theory is introduced, and some simulations showing its potential are reported.

  9. Negotiation Games

    OpenAIRE

    Philipp Hoffmann

    2015-01-01

    Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for...

  10. Sovereignty Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas

    This book offers an in-depth examination of the strategic use of State sovereignty in contemporary European and international affairs and the consequences of this for authority relations in Europe and beyond. It suggests a new approach to the study of State sovereignty, proposing to understand th...... the use of sovereignty as games where States are becoming more instrumental in their claims to sovereignty and skilled in adapting it to the challenges that they face....

  11. Board game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brennan, N.S.

    1982-01-01

    A board game comprises a board, a number of counters and two dice. The board is marked to provide a central area, representing the nucleus of an atom, and six or more annular rings extending concentrically around the central area, the rings being divided into 2,8,18,32,48 and 72 squares. Each ring represents an electron shell, and some of the squares are numbered, the number representing the atomic number of different elements. (author)

  12. Elemental Etymology: What's in a Name?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ball, David W.

    1985-01-01

    Examines the origin of the names (or etymologies) of the chemical elements. Includes tables listing elements: (1) with names of obscure origin; (2) named for colors; (3) named after real or mythical people; (4) named after places; (5) named after heavenly bodies; and (6) having names of miscellaneous origin. (JN)

  13. Evolutionary trends in Heteroptera

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Cobben, R.H.

    1968-01-01

    1. This work, the first volume of a series dealing with evolutionary trends in Heteroptera, is concerned with the egg system of about 400 species. The data are presented systematically in chapters 1 and 2 with a critical review of the literature after each family.

    2. Chapter 3 evaluates facts

  14. Evolutionary mysteries in meiosis

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Lenormand, Thomas; Engelstädter, Jan; Johnston, Susan E.; Wijnker, Erik; Haag, Christoph R.

    2016-01-01

    Meiosis is a key event of sexual life cycles in eukaryotes. Its mechanistic details have been uncovered in several model organisms, and most of its essential features have received various and often contradictory evolutionary interpretations. In this perspective, we present an overview of these

  15. Applications of Evolutionary Computation

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Mora, Antonio M.; Squillero, Giovanni; Di Chio, C; Agapitos, Alexandros; Cagnoni, Stefano; Cotta, Carlos; Fernández De Vega, F; Di Caro, G A; Drechsler, R.; Ekárt, A; Esparcia-Alcázar, Anna I.; Farooq, M; Langdon, W B; Merelo-Guervós, J.J.; Preuss, M; Richter, O.-M.H.; Silva, Sara; Sim$\\$~oes, A; Squillero, Giovanni; Tarantino, Ernesto; Tettamanzi, Andrea G B; Togelius, J; Urquhart, Neil; Uyar, A S; Yannakakis, G N; Smith, Stephen L; Caserta, Marco; Ramirez, Adriana; Voß, Stefan; Squillero, Giovanni; Burelli, Paolo; Mora, Antonio M.; Squillero, Giovanni; Jan, Mathieu; Matthias, M; Di Chio, C; Agapitos, Alexandros; Cagnoni, Stefano; Cotta, Carlos; Fernández De Vega, F; Di Caro, G A; Drechsler, R.; Ekárt, A; Esparcia-Alcázar, Anna I.; Farooq, M; Langdon, W B; Merelo-Guervós, J.J.; Preuss, M; Richter, O.-M.H.; Silva, Sara; Sim$\\$~oes, A; Squillero, Giovanni; Tarantino, Ernesto; Tettamanzi, Andrea G B; Togelius, J; Urquhart, Neil; Uyar, A S; Yannakakis, G N; Caserta, Marco; Ramirez, Adriana; Voß, Stefan; Squillero, Giovanni; Burelli, Paolo; Esparcia-Alcazar, Anna I; Silva, Sara; Agapitos, Alexandros; Cotta, Carlos; De Falco, Ivanoe; Cioppa, Antonio Della; Diwold, Konrad; Ekart, Aniko; Tarantino, Ernesto; Vega, Francisco Fernandez De; Burelli, Paolo; Sim, Kevin; Cagnoni, Stefano; Simoes, Anabela; Merelo, J.J.; Urquhart, Neil; Haasdijk, Evert; Zhang, Mengjie; Squillero, Giovanni; Eiben, A E; Tettamanzi, Andrea G B; Glette, Kyrre; Rohlfshagen, Philipp; Schaefer, Robert; Caserta, Marco; Ramirez, Adriana; Voß, Stefan

    2015-01-01

    The application of genetic and evolutionary computation to problems in medicine has increased rapidly over the past five years, but there are specific issues and challenges that distinguish it from other real-world applications. Obtaining reliable and coherent patient data, establishing the clinical

  16. Editorial overview: Evolutionary psychology

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Gangestad, S.W.; Tybur, J.M.

    2016-01-01

    Functional approaches in psychology - which ask what behavior is good for - are almost as old as scientific psychology itself. Yet sophisticated, generative functional theories were not possible until developments in evolutionary biology in the mid-20th century. Arising in the last three decades,

  17. Biochemistry and evolutionary biology

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Biochemical information has been crucial for the development of evolutionary biology. On the one hand, the sequence information now appearing is producing a huge increase in the amount of data available for phylogenetic analysis; on the other hand, and perhaps more fundamentally, it allows understanding of the ...

  18. Evolutionary Biology Today

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    Hindi and English. Port 1. Resonance, Vo1.7 ... they use. Of course, many evolutionary biologists do work with fossils or DNA, or both, but there are also large numbers of ... The first major division that I like to make is between studies focussed ...

  19. Learning: An Evolutionary Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swann, Joanna

    2009-01-01

    This paper draws on the philosophy of Karl Popper to present a descriptive evolutionary epistemology that offers philosophical solutions to the following related problems: "What happens when learning takes place?" and "What happens in human learning?" It provides a detailed analysis of how learning takes place without any direct transfer of…

  20. Complex systems, evolutionary planning?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bertolini, L.; de Roo, G.; Silva, E.A.

    2010-01-01

    Coping with uncertainty is a defining challenge for spatial planners. Accordingly, most spatial planning theories and methods are aimed at reducing uncertainty. However, the question is what should be done when this seems impossible? This chapter proposes an evolutionary interpretation of spatial

  1. Molluscan Evolutionary Development

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Wanninger, Andreas Wilhelm Georg; Koop, Damien; Moshel-Lynch, Sharon

    2008-01-01

    Brought together by Winston F. Ponder and David R. Lindberg, thirty-six experts on the evolution of the Mollusca provide an up-to-date review of its evolutionary history. The Mollusca are the second largest animal phylum and boast a fossil record of over 540 million years. They exhibit remarkable...

  2. A game magically circling

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ejsing-Duun, Stine

    2011-01-01

    This chapter analyses the relationship between players, the game world, and the ordinary world in alternative reality games (ARGs) and location-based games (LBGs). These games use technology to create a game world in the everyday scene. The topic of this chapter is the concept of the 'magic circle......', which defines the relationship between play and the ordinary world, and how this concept relates to a new kind of game....

  3. Computer Games and Instruction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tobias, Sigmund, Ed.; Fletcher, J. D., Ed.

    2011-01-01

    There is intense interest in computer games. A total of 65 percent of all American households play computer games, and sales of such games increased 22.9 percent last year. The average amount of game playing time was found to be 13.2 hours per week. The popularity and market success of games is evident from both the increased earnings from games,…

  4. PROOF BY GAMES

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-03-01

    Robot, in order to explore automated strategies ). The Game Client receives level data from the Game Server and implements the game as the player sees...formal verification domain. If formal verification problems could be turned into entertaining video games , those games could be crowd- sourced to a large...style gates that would destroy the Circuitbots. As the game evolved we found no good strategies for constraint ordering that worked significantly

  5. Mechanizing Exploratory Game Design

    OpenAIRE

    Smith, Adam Marshall

    2012-01-01

    Game design is an art form that deals with inherently interactive artifacts. Game designers craft games (assembled from rule systems and content), but they really seek to manipulate play: the interaction between games and players. When developing new games that are similar to past games, a designer may rely on previous experience with related designs and relatively easy access to players familiar with conventional design choices. When exploratorily venturing into uncharted territory, uncoveri...

  6. Cultural evolution: The case of babies’ first names

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xi, Ning; Zhang, Zi-Ke; Zhang, Yi-Cheng; Ge, Zehui; She, Li; Zhang, Kui

    2014-07-01

    In social sciences, there is currently rare consensus on the underlying mechanism for cultural evolution, partially due to lack of suitable data. The evolution of first names of newborn babies offers a remarkable example for such researches. In this paper, we employ the historical data on baby names from the United States to investigate the evolutionary process of culture, in particular focusing on how inequality among baby names changes over time. Then we propose a stochastic model where individual choice is determined by both individual preference and social influence, and show that the decrease in the strength of social influence can account for all the observed empirical features. Therefore, we claim that the weakening of social influence drives cultural evolution.

  7. Neuroevolution in Games: State of the Art and Open Challenges

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Risi, Sebastian; Togelius, Julian

    2015-01-01

    This paper surveys research on applying neuroevolution (NE) to games. In neuroevolution, artificial neural networks are trained through evolutionary algorithms, taking inspiration from the way biological brains evolved. We analyse the application of NE in games along five different axes, which...... are the role NE is chosen to play in a game, the different types of neural networks used, the way these networks are evolved, how the fitness is determined and what type of input the network receives. The article also highlights important open research challenges in the field....

  8. Game engines: a survey

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    A. Andrade

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available Due to hardware limitations at the origin of the video game industry, each new game was generally coded from the ground up. Years later, from the evolution of hardware and the need for quick game development cycles, spawned the concept of game engine. A game engine is a reusable software layer allowing the separation of common game concepts from the game assets (levels, graphics, etc.. This paper surveys fourteen different game engines relevant today, ranging from the industry-level to the newcomer-friendlier ones.

  9. Games, theory and applications

    CERN Document Server

    Thomas, L C

    2011-01-01

    Anyone with a knowledge of basic mathematics will find this an accessible and informative introduction to game theory. It opens with the theory of two-person zero-sum games, two-person non-zero sum games, and n-person games, at a level between nonmathematical introductory books and technical mathematical game theory books. Succeeding sections focus on a variety of applications - including introductory explanations of gaming and meta games - that offer nonspecialists information about new areas of game theory at a comprehensible level. Numerous exercises appear with full solutions, in addition

  10. The mathematics of games

    CERN Document Server

    Beasley, John D

    2006-01-01

    ""Mind-exercising and thought-provoking.""-New ScientistIf playing games is natural for humans, analyzing games is equally natural for mathematicians. Even the simplest of games involves the fundamentals of mathematics, such as figuring out the best move or the odds of a certain chance event. This entertaining and wide-ranging guide demonstrates how simple mathematical analysis can throw unexpected light on games of every type-games of chance, games of skill, games of chance and skill, and automatic games.Just how random is a card shuffle or a throw of the dice? Is bluffing a valid poker strat

  11. Naming analog clocks conceptually facilitates naming digital clocks

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Meeuwissen, M.H.W.; Roelofs, A.P.A.; Levelt, W.J.M.

    2004-01-01

    Naming digital clocks (e.g., 2:45, say "quarter to three") requires conceptual operations on the minute and hour information displayed in the input for producing the correct relative time expression. The interplay of these conceptual operations was investigated using a repetition priming paradigm.

  12. Orthogonally Evolved AI to Improve Difficulty Adjustment in Video Games

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hintze, Arend; Olson, Randal; Lehman, Joel Anthony

    2016-01-01

    Computer games are most engaging when their difficulty is well matched to the player's ability, thereby providing an experience in which the player is neither overwhelmed nor bored. In games where the player interacts with computer-controlled opponents, the difficulty of the game can be adjusted...... not only by changing the distribution of opponents or game resources, but also through modifying the skill of the opponents. Applying evolutionary algorithms to evolve the artificial intelligence that controls opponent agents is one established method for adjusting opponent difficulty. Less-evolved agents...... (i.e. agents subject to fewer generations of evolution) make for easier opponents, while highly-evolved agents are more challenging to overcome. In this publication we test a new approach for difficulty adjustment in games: orthogonally evolved AI, where the player receives support from collaborating...

  13. Design of Game Space

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kristiansen, Erik

    2011-01-01

    Playing games of any kind, from tennis to board games, it is easy to notice that games are configured in space, often using stripes or a kind of map on a board. Some games are clearly performed within this marked border, while it may be difficult to pinpoint such a visual border in a game like hide....... This makes sense, but also demands that play and non-play can be easily separated. I will examine how games make use of space, and show that the magic circle not only is a viable, though criticized, concept but should be understood as a spatial concept. In order to do this several games are examined, leading...... to introduce a spatial model of the game performance comprising a primary and secondary game space. I will show how new game genres can profit from using this model when designing new games....

  14. Epigenetic game theory and its application in plants. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yuan-Ming; Zhang, Yinghao; Guo, Mingyue

    2017-03-01

    Wang's et al. article [1] is the first to integrate game theory (especially evolutionary game theory) with epigenetic modification of zygotic genomes. They described and assessed a modeling framework based on evolutionary game theory to quantify, how sperms and oocytes interact through epigenetic processes, to determine embryo development. They also studied the internal mechanisms for normal embryo development: 1) evolutionary interactions between DNA methylation of the paternal and maternal genomes, and 2) the application of game theory to formulate and quantify how different genes compete or cooperate to regulate embryogenesis through methylation. Although it is not very comprehensive and profound regarding game theory modeling, this article bridges the gap between evolutionary game theory and the epigenetic control of embryo development by powerful ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The epiGame framework includes four aspects: 1) characterizing how epigenetic game theory works by the strategy matrix, in which the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis, are described by the cooperation and competition mechanisms, 2) quantifying the game that the direction and degree of P-M interactions over embryo development can be explained by the sign and magnitude of interaction parameters in model (2), 3) modeling epigenetic interactions within the morula, especially for two coupled nonlinear ODEs, with explicit functions in model (4), which provide a good fit to the observed data for the two sexes (adjusted R2 = 0.956), and 4) revealing multifactorial interactions in embryogenesis from the coupled ODEs in model (2) to triplet ODEs in model (6). Clearly, this article extends game theory from evolutionary game theory to epigenetic game theory.

  15. An Evolutionary Perspective on the Crabtree Effect

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Thomas ePfeiffer

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available The capability to ferment sugars into ethanol is a key metabolic trait of yeasts. Crabtree-positive yeasts use fermentation even in the presence of oxygen, where they could, in principle, rely on the respiration pathway. This is surprising because fermentation has a much lower ATP yield than respiration (2 ATP vs. approximately 18 ATP per glucose. While genetic events in the evolution of the Crabtree effect have been identified, the selective advantages provided by this trait remain controversial. In this review we analyse explanations for the emergence of the Crabtree effect from an evolutionary and game-theoretical perspective. We argue that an increased rate of ATP production is likely the most important factor behind the emergence of the Crabtree effect.

  16. Evolutionary global optimization, manifolds and applications

    CERN Document Server

    Aguiar e Oliveira Junior, Hime

    2016-01-01

    This book presents powerful techniques for solving global optimization problems on manifolds by means of evolutionary algorithms, and shows in practice how these techniques can be applied to solve real-world problems. It describes recent findings and well-known key facts in general and differential topology, revisiting them all in the context of application to current optimization problems. Special emphasis is put on game theory problems. Here, these problems are reformulated as constrained global optimization tasks and solved with the help of Fuzzy ASA. In addition, more abstract examples, including minimizations of well-known functions, are also included. Although the Fuzzy ASA approach has been chosen as the main optimizing paradigm, the book suggests that other metaheuristic methods could be used as well. Some of them are introduced, together with their advantages and disadvantages. Readers should possess some knowledge of linear algebra, and of basic concepts of numerical analysis and probability theory....

  17. The standard set game of a cooperative game

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bumb, A.F.; Hoede, C.

    2003-01-01

    We show that for every cooperative game a corresponding set game can be defined, called the standard set game. Values for set games can be applied to this standard game and determine allocations for the cooperative game. On the other hand, notions for cooperative games, like the Shapley value, the

  18. Game of Life Music

    Science.gov (United States)

    Miranda, Eduardo R.; Kirke, Alexis

    At the time when the first author was post-graduate student, in the evenings he used to entertain himself with the equipment in the electronic music studio at the University of York until dawn. It must have been around three o'clock in the morning of a rather cold winter night in the late 1980s, when he connected his Atari 1040ST computer to a synthesizer to test the first prototype of a system, which he was developing for his thesis. The system, named CAMUS (short for Cellular Automata Music), implemented a method that he invented to render music from the behaviour of the Game of Life (GoL) cellular automata (CA).

  19. Moving eyes and naming objects

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Meulen, F.F. van der

    2001-01-01

    The coordination between eye movements and speech was examined while speakers were naming objects. Earlier research has shown that eye movements reflect on the underlying visual attention. Also, eye movements were found to reflect upon not only the visual and conceptual processing of an object, but

  20. Can You Say My Name?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Erz, Antonia; Christensen, Bo T.

    affect their judgments of people and objects. We extend this research by investigating the effect of phonological fluency on recognition and recall of novel non-word brand names in three laboratory experiments. The results provide us with a more fine-grained idea of fluency effects on memory of non...

  1. African names for American plants

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Andel, van T.R.

    2015-01-01

    African slaves brought plant knowledge to the New World, sometimes applying it to related plants they found there and sometimes bringing Old World plants with them. By tracing the linguistic parallels between names for plants in African languages and in communities descended from African slaves,

  2. Academy named after newsreader's wife.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-24

    AN ADMIRAL nurse academy named in honour of Bonnie Suchet, the wife of former newsreader John Suchet, has opened. The 'virtual' academy, set up by charity dementia UK, Canterbury Christ Church University and the Avante Partnership, will provide continuing professional development and a networking environment for n nurses through its website. Ms Suchet has Alzheimer's disease and is in a care home.

  3. Evolutionary constrained optimization

    CERN Document Server

    Deb, Kalyanmoy

    2015-01-01

    This book makes available a self-contained collection of modern research addressing the general constrained optimization problems using evolutionary algorithms. Broadly the topics covered include constraint handling for single and multi-objective optimizations; penalty function based methodology; multi-objective based methodology; new constraint handling mechanism; hybrid methodology; scaling issues in constrained optimization; design of scalable test problems; parameter adaptation in constrained optimization; handling of integer, discrete and mix variables in addition to continuous variables; application of constraint handling techniques to real-world problems; and constrained optimization in dynamic environment. There is also a separate chapter on hybrid optimization, which is gaining lots of popularity nowadays due to its capability of bridging the gap between evolutionary and classical optimization. The material in the book is useful to researchers, novice, and experts alike. The book will also be useful...

  4. Verified Gaming

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kiniry, Joseph Roland; Zimmerman, Daniel

    2011-01-01

    ---falls every year and any mention of mathematics in the classroom seems to frighten students away. So the question is: How do we attract new students in computing to the area of dependable software systems? Over the past several years at three universities we have experimented with the use of computer games......In recent years, several Grand Challenges (GCs) of computing have been identified and expounded upon by various professional organizations in the U.S. and England. These GCs are typically very difficult problems that will take many hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of man-years to solve. Researchers...

  5. Abstract of Dynamic Range: When Game Design and Narratives Unite

    OpenAIRE

    Arsenault, Dominic

    2005-01-01

    This paper proposes a tool and methodology for measuring the degree of freedom given to a player in any resource-driven game (that is, any game in which managing resources is an integral part of the gameplay). This concept, which I call the Dynamic Range, can be used namely to evaluate a given game system’s potential for developing emergent narratives, as defined by Henry Jenkins in his publication Game Design as Narrative Architecture. While Jenkins places at the heart of the creation of nar...

  6. Importance of tie strengths in the prisoner's dilemma game on social networks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xu, Bo; Liu, Lu; You, Weijia

    2011-01-01

    Though numerous researches have shown that tie strengths play a key role in the formation of collective behavior in social networks, little work has been done to explore their impact on the outcome of evolutionary games. In this Letter, we studied the effect of tie strength in the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by using online social network datasets. The results show that the fraction of cooperators has a non-trivial dependence on tie strength. Weak ties, just like previous researches on epidemics and information diffusion have shown, play a key role by the maintenance of cooperators in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. -- Highlights: → Tie strength is used to measure heterogeneous influences of different pairs of nodes. → Weak ties play a role in maintaining cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games. → Micro-dynamics of nodes are illustrated to explain the conclusion.

  7. Importance of tie strengths in the prisoner's dilemma game on social networks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xu, Bo, E-mail: xubosuper@163.com [Department of Information Systems, School of Economics and Management, Beihang University (China); Liu, Lu; You, Weijia [Department of Information Systems, School of Economics and Management, Beihang University (China)

    2011-06-13

    Though numerous researches have shown that tie strengths play a key role in the formation of collective behavior in social networks, little work has been done to explore their impact on the outcome of evolutionary games. In this Letter, we studied the effect of tie strength in the dynamics of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by using online social network datasets. The results show that the fraction of cooperators has a non-trivial dependence on tie strength. Weak ties, just like previous researches on epidemics and information diffusion have shown, play a key role by the maintenance of cooperators in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. -- Highlights: → Tie strength is used to measure heterogeneous influences of different pairs of nodes. → Weak ties play a role in maintaining cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games. → Micro-dynamics of nodes are illustrated to explain the conclusion.

  8. Odysseus «by any other/by no name» chez Polyphemos

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yoël L. Arbeitman

    1995-12-01

    Full Text Available Thesis: It is an accepted fact that name-games in Heroic Age Hebrew and Greek texts (archaic loci embedded in the long-redacted Biblical and Homeric texts held veritable significance in the period when the respective actions occurred. When in Ex. 2: 22 Moses names his First Born Son «Gēršōm», «because I was a resident-alien in a Land-Not-Mine», the implicatum is gēr šām «resident alien there» and any reader, knowing Hebrew, would recognize this second level word-game, one very serious. On the other hand, the translations of the LXX, the Vulgata, and Targum Onqelos are superb in meaning (semantically, but make the name aetiogies in vain, for they don't concern themselves with struggling to bring them across, an essential part of translation. But we are not concerned with translations in such word-games, only with the Urtext. Nevertheless in the Urtext of Odysseia IX, the names which the protagonist gives his inhospitable host, are apparently unmotivated. The author proposes very strong double motivation for the one form, viz. Oútis, the alternate form Mḗtis being automatically generated grammatically. As opposed to the biblical exx., knowledge of languages beyond that of the Greek Urtext is required to understand the name-games involved.

  9. Introduction to Evolutionary Algorithms

    CERN Document Server

    Yu, Xinjie

    2010-01-01

    Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are becoming increasingly attractive for researchers from various disciplines, such as operations research, computer science, industrial engineering, electrical engineering, social science, economics, etc. This book presents an insightful, comprehensive, and up-to-date treatment of EAs, such as genetic algorithms, differential evolution, evolution strategy, constraint optimization, multimodal optimization, multiobjective optimization, combinatorial optimization, evolvable hardware, estimation of distribution algorithms, ant colony optimization, particle swarm opti

  10. Naming names: the first women taxonomists in mycology

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sara Maroske

    2018-03-01

    Full Text Available The transition from amateur to professional in natural history is generally regarded as having taken place in the nineteenth century, but landmark events such as the 1917 appointment of mycologist Johanna Westerdijk (1883–1961 as the first female professor in the Netherlands indicate that the pattern of change for women was more varied and delayed than for men. We investigate this transition in mycology, and identify only 43 women in the Western World who published scientific mycological literature pre-1900, of whom twelve published new fungal taxa. By charting the emergence of these women over time, and comparing the output of self-taught amateurs and university graduates, we establish the key role of access to higher education in female participation in mycology. Using a suite of strategies, six of the self-taught amateurs managed to overcome their educational disadvantages and name names — Catharina Dörrien (the first to name a fungal taxon, Marie-Anne Libert, Mary Elizabeth Banning, Élise-Caroline Bommer, Mariette Rousseau, and Annie Lorrain Smith. By 1900, the professional era for women in mycology was underway, and increasing numbers published new taxa. Parity with male colleagues in recognition and promotion, however, remains an ongoing issue. Key words: Amateurs, Fungi, Gender studies, History of science, Plant pathology

  11. Why Darwin would have loved evolutionary game theory

    OpenAIRE

    Brown, Joel S.

    2016-01-01

    Humans have marvelled at the fit of form and function, the way organisms' traits seem remarkably suited to their lifestyles and ecologies. While natural selection provides the scientific basis for the fit of form and function, Darwin found certain adaptations vexing or particularly intriguing: sex ratios, sexual selection and altruism. The logic behind these adaptations resides in frequency-dependent selection where the value of a given heritable phenotype (i.e. strategy) to an individual dep...

  12. A security mechanism based on evolutionary game in fog computing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sun, Yan; Lin, Fuhong; Zhang, Nan

    2018-02-01

    Fog computing is a distributed computing paradigm at the edge of the network and requires cooperation of users and sharing of resources. When users in fog computing open their resources, their devices are easily intercepted and attacked because they are accessed through wireless network and present an extensive geographical distribution. In this study, a credible third party was introduced to supervise the behavior of users and protect the security of user cooperation. A fog computing security mechanism based on human nervous system is proposed, and the strategy for a stable system evolution is calculated. The MATLAB simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can reduce the number of attack behaviors effectively and stimulate users to cooperate in application tasks positively.

  13. Genetic Models in Evolutionary Game Theory: The Evolution of Altruism

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Rubin, Hannah

    2015-01-01

    While prior models of the evolution of altruism have assumed that organisms reproduce asexually, this paper presents a model of the evolution of altruism for sexually reproducing organisms using Hardy–Weinberg dynamics. In this model, the presence of reciprocal altruists allows the population to

  14. Evolutionary Game for Mining Pool Selection in Blockchain Networks

    OpenAIRE

    Liu, Xiaojun; Wang, Wenbo; Niyato, Dusit; Zhao, Narisa; Wang, Ping

    2017-01-01

    In blockchain networks adopting the proof-of-work schemes, the monetary incentive is introduced by the Nakamoto consensus protocol to guide the behaviors of the full nodes (i.e., block miners) in the process of maintaining the consensus about the blockchain state. The block miners have to devote their computation power measured in hash rate in a crypto-puzzle solving competition to win the reward of publishing (a.k.a., mining) new blocks. Due to the exponentially increasing difficulty of the ...

  15. A security mechanism based on evolutionary game in fog computing

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yan Sun

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available Fog computing is a distributed computing paradigm at the edge of the network and requires cooperation of users and sharing of resources. When users in fog computing open their resources, their devices are easily intercepted and attacked because they are accessed through wireless network and present an extensive geographical distribution. In this study, a credible third party was introduced to supervise the behavior of users and protect the security of user cooperation. A fog computing security mechanism based on human nervous system is proposed, and the strategy for a stable system evolution is calculated. The MATLAB simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can reduce the number of attack behaviors effectively and stimulate users to cooperate in application tasks positively.

  16. Individual mobility promotes punishment in evolutionary public goods games.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cong, Rui; Zhao, Qianchuan; Li, Kun; Wang, Long

    2017-10-25

    In explaining the pressing issue in biology and social sciences how cooperation emerges in a population of self-interested individuals, researchers recently pay intensive attentions to the role altruistic punishment plays. However, as higher-order cooperators, survival of punishers is puzzling due to their extra cost in regulating norm violators. Previous works have highlighted the importance of individual mobility in promoting cooperation. Yet its effect on punishers remains to be explored. In this work we incorporate this feature into modeling the behavior of punishers, who are endowed with a choice between leaving current place or staying and punishing defectors. Results indicate that optimal mobility level of punishers is closely related to the cost of punishing. For considerably large cost, there exists medium tendency of migration which favors the survival of punishers. This holds for both the direct competition between punishers and defectors and the case where cooperators are involved, and can also be observed when various types of punishers with different mobility tendencies fight against defectors simultaneously. For cheap punishment, mobility does not provide with punishers more advantage even when they are initially rare. We hope our work provide more insight into understanding the role individual mobility plays in promoting public cooperation.

  17. Convergence analysis and control of evolutionary matrix-game dynamics

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ramazi, Pouria

    2017-01-01

    Networks of decision-making individuals with simple dynamics may give rise to complex and seemingly unpredictable collective behaviors which may have negative consequences such as traffic jams and market crashes or positive outcomes such as volunteer disaster relief and free-market stabilization.

  18. Evolutionary mysteries in meiosis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lenormand, Thomas; Engelstädter, Jan; Johnston, Susan E; Wijnker, Erik; Haag, Christoph R

    2016-10-19

    Meiosis is a key event of sexual life cycles in eukaryotes. Its mechanistic details have been uncovered in several model organisms, and most of its essential features have received various and often contradictory evolutionary interpretations. In this perspective, we present an overview of these often 'weird' features. We discuss the origin of meiosis (origin of ploidy reduction and recombination, two-step meiosis), its secondary modifications (in polyploids or asexuals, inverted meiosis), its importance in punctuating life cycles (meiotic arrests, epigenetic resetting, meiotic asymmetry, meiotic fairness) and features associated with recombination (disjunction constraints, heterochiasmy, crossover interference and hotspots). We present the various evolutionary scenarios and selective pressures that have been proposed to account for these features, and we highlight that their evolutionary significance often remains largely mysterious. Resolving these mysteries will likely provide decisive steps towards understanding why sex and recombination are found in the majority of eukaryotes.This article is part of the themed issue 'Weird sex: the underappreciated diversity of sexual reproduction'. © 2016 The Author(s).

  19. A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Maes, Michael; Nax, Heinrich H.

    2016-01-01

    ‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a

  20. Adaptive Game Level Creation through Rank-based Interactive Evolution

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Liapis, Antonios; Martínez, Héctor Pérez; Togelius, Julian

    2013-01-01

    as fitness functions for the optimization of the generated content. The preference models are built via ranking-based preference learning, while the content is generated via evolutionary search. The proposed method is evaluated on the creation of strategy game maps, and its performance is tested using...