Games of life and death: antibiotic resistance and production through the lens of evolutionary game theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Conlin, Peter L; Chandler, Josephine R; Kerr, Benjamin

2014-10-01

In this review, we demonstrate how game theory can be a useful first step in modeling and understanding interactions among bacteria that produce and resist antibiotics. We introduce the basic features of evolutionary game theory and explore model microbial systems that correspond to some classical games. Each game discussed defines a different category of social interaction with different resulting population dynamics (exclusion, coexistence, bistability, cycling). We then explore how the framework can be extended to incorporate some of the complexity of natural microbial communities. Overall, the game theoretical perspective helps to guide our expectations about the evolution of some forms of antibiotic resistance and production because it makes clear the precise nature of social interaction in this context. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Statistical physics and computational methods for evolutionary game theory

CERN Document Server

Javarone, Marco Alberto

2018-01-01

This book presents an introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) which is an emerging field in the area of complex systems attracting the attention of researchers from disparate scientific communities. EGT allows one to represent and study several complex phenomena, such as the emergence of cooperation in social systems, the role of conformity in shaping the equilibrium of a population, and the dynamics in biological and ecological systems. Since EGT models belong to the area of complex systems, statistical physics constitutes a fundamental ingredient for investigating their behavior. At the same time, the complexity of some EGT models, such as those realized by means of agent-based methods, often require the implementation of numerical simulations. Therefore, beyond providing an introduction to EGT, this book gives a brief overview of the main statistical physics tools (such as phase transitions and the Ising model) and computational strategies for simulating evolutionary games (such as Monte Carlo algor...

Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods.

Science.gov (United States)

Adami, Christoph; Schossau, Jory; Hintze, Arend

2016-12-01

Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic settings such as finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, stochastic decisions, communication between agents, and spatial interactions, require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. While highlighting standard mathematical results, we compare those to agent-based methods that can go beyond the limitations of equations and simulate the complexity of heterogeneous populations and an ever-changing set of interactors. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread (for example in the weak selection-strong mutation limit), but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning.

Science.gov (United States)

Madeo, Dario; Talarico, Agostino; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro; Mocenni, Chiara; Santarnecchi, Emiliano

2017-11-22

Our brain is a complex system of interconnected regions spontaneously organized into distinct networks. The integration of information between and within these networks is a continuous process that can be observed even when the brain is at rest, i.e. not engaged in any particular task. Moreover, such spontaneous dynamics show predictive value over individual cognitive profile and constitute a potential marker in neurological and psychiatric conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN), able to capture brain's interregional dynamics by balancing emulative and non-emulative attitudes among brain regions. This results in the net behavior of nodes composing resting-state networks identified using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), determining their moment-to-moment level of activation and inhibition as expressed by positive and negative shifts in BOLD fMRI signal. By spontaneously generating low-frequency oscillatory behaviors, the EGN model is able to mimic functional connectivity dynamics, approximate fMRI time series on the basis of initial subset of available data, as well as simulate the impact of network lesions and provide evidence of compensation mechanisms across networks. Results suggest evolutionary game theory on networks as a new potential framework for the understanding of human brain network dynamics.

Mean-Potential Law in Evolutionary Games

Science.gov (United States)

Nałecz-Jawecki, Paweł; Miekisz, Jacek

2018-01-01

The Letter presents a novel way to connect random walks, stochastic differential equations, and evolutionary game theory. We introduce a new concept of a potential function for discrete-space stochastic systems. It is based on a correspondence between one-dimensional stochastic differential equations and random walks, which may be exact not only in the continuous limit but also in finite-state spaces. Our method is useful for computation of fixation probabilities in discrete stochastic dynamical systems with two absorbing states. We apply it to evolutionary games, formulating two simple and intuitive criteria for evolutionary stability of pure Nash equilibria in finite populations. In particular, we show that the 1 /3 law of evolutionary games, introduced by Nowak et al. [Nature, 2004], follows from a more general mean-potential law.

Polymorphic Evolutionary Games.

Science.gov (United States)

Fishman, Michael A

2016-06-07

In this paper, I present an analytical framework for polymorphic evolutionary games suitable for explicitly modeling evolutionary processes in diploid populations with sexual reproduction. The principal aspect of the proposed approach is adding diploid genetics cum sexual recombination to a traditional evolutionary game, and switching from phenotypes to haplotypes as the new game׳s pure strategies. Here, the relevant pure strategy׳s payoffs derived by summing the payoffs of all the phenotypes capable of producing gametes containing that particular haplotype weighted by the pertinent probabilities. The resulting game is structurally identical to the familiar Evolutionary Games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998. Cambridge University Press), and can be analyzed in terms of an established analytical framework for such games. And these results can be translated into the terms of genotypic, and whence, phenotypic evolutionary stability pertinent to the original game. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Integrating Evolutionary Game Theory into Mechanistic Genotype-Phenotype Mapping.

Science.gov (United States)

Zhu, Xuli; Jiang, Libo; Ye, Meixia; Sun, Lidan; Gragnoli, Claudia; Wu, Rongling

2016-05-01

Natural selection has shaped the evolution of organisms toward optimizing their structural and functional design. However, how this universal principle can enhance genotype-phenotype mapping of quantitative traits has remained unexplored. Here we show that the integration of this principle and functional mapping through evolutionary game theory gains new insight into the genetic architecture of complex traits. By viewing phenotype formation as an evolutionary system, we formulate mathematical equations to model the ecological mechanisms that drive the interaction and coordination of its constituent components toward population dynamics and stability. Functional mapping provides a procedure for estimating the genetic parameters that specify the dynamic relationship of competition and cooperation and predicting how genes mediate the evolution of this relationship during trait formation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Evolutionary quantum game theory in the context of socio-economic systems; Evolutionaere Quanten-Spieltheorie im Kontext sozio-oekonomischer Systeme

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hanauske, Matthias

2011-02-14

The evolution of socio-economic systems depend on the interdependent decision processes of its underlying system components. The mathematical model to describe the strategic decision of players within a socio-economic game is ''game theory''. ''Quantum game theory'' is a mathematical and conceptual amplification of classical game theory. The space of all conceivable decision paths is extended from the purely rational, measurable space in the Hilbert-space of complex numbers - which is the mathematical space where quantum theory is formulated. By the concept of a potential entanglement of the imaginary quantum strategy parts, it is possible to include cooperate decision path, caused by cultural or moral standards. If this strategy entanglement is large enough, then additional Nash equilibria can occur, previously present dominant strategies could become nonexistent and new evolutionary stable strategies do appear for some game classes. Within this PhD thesis the main results of classical and quantum games are summarized and all of the possible game classes of evolutionary (2 player)-(2 strategy) games are extended to quantum games. It is shown that the quantum extension of classical games with an underlying dilemma-like structure give different results, if the strength of strategic entanglement is above a certain barrier. After the German summary and the introduction paper, five different applications of the theory are discussed within the thesis. (orig.)

The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Sample, Christine; Allen, Benjamin

2017-11-01

Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large population size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the [Formula: see text] limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population limit, and the [Formula: see text] limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal mathematical definitions of the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits are provided. Applying these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be favored over a neutral mutation, are different in the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits. However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one strategy to be favored over another.

Evolutionary Games and Social Conventions

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hansen, Pelle Guldborg

2007-01-01

-defined metaphors of individual learning and social imitation processes, from which a revised theory of convention may be erected (see Sugden 2004, Binmore 1993 and Young 1998). This paper makes a general argument in support of the evolutionary turn in the theory of convention by a progressive exposition of its...... in Aumann (1976) and which, together with the assumptions of perfect rationality, came to be defining of classical game theory. However, classical game theory is currently undergoing severe crisis as a tool for exploring social phenomena; a crisis emerging from the problem of equilibrium selection around......Some thirty years ago Lewis published his Convention: A Philosophical Study (Lewis, 2002). This laid the foundation for a game-theoretic approach to social conventions, but became more famously known for its seminal analysis of common knowledge; the concept receiving its canonical analysis...

Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tongyao Feng

2017-01-01

Full Text Available Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.

Evolutionary game theory: molecules as players.

Science.gov (United States)

Bohl, Katrin; Hummert, Sabine; Werner, Sarah; Basanta, David; Deutsch, Andreas; Schuster, Stefan; Theissen, Günter; Schroeter, Anja

2014-12-01

In this and an accompanying paper we review the use of game theoretical concepts in cell biology and molecular biology. This review focuses on the subcellular level by considering viruses, genes, and molecules as players. We discuss in which way catalytic RNA can be treated by game theory. Moreover, genes can compete for success in replication and can have different strategies in interactions with other genetic elements. Also transposable elements, or "jumping genes", can act as players because they usually bear different traits or strategies. Viruses compete in the case of co-infecting a host cell. Proteins interact in a game theoretical sense when forming heterodimers. Finally, we describe how the Shapley value can be applied to enzymes in metabolic pathways. We show that game theory can be successfully applied to describe and analyse scenarios at the molecular level resulting in counterintuitive conclusions.

Evolutionary potential games on lattices

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Szabó, György, E-mail: szabo@mfa.kfki.hu; Borsos, István, E-mail: borsos@mfa.kfki.hu

2016-04-05

Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the “equilibrium state” by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.

Evolutionary potential games on lattices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Szabó, György; Borsos, István

2016-01-01

Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the “equilibrium state” by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.

Evolutionary potential games on lattices

Science.gov (United States)

Szabó, György; Borsos, István

2016-04-01

Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the "equilibrium state" by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.

Passivity and Evolutionary Game Dynamics

KAUST Repository

Park, Shinkyu; Shamma, Jeff S.; Martins, Nuno C.

2018-01-01

This paper investigates an energy conservation and dissipation -- passivity -- aspect of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity using the state-space representation of the models, and we devise systematic methods to examine passivity and to identify properties of passive dynamic models. Based on the methods, we describe how passivity is connected to stability in population games and illustrate stability of passive dynamic models using numerical simulations.

Passivity and Evolutionary Game Dynamics

KAUST Repository

Park, Shinkyu

2018-03-21

This paper investigates an energy conservation and dissipation -- passivity -- aspect of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory. We define a notion of passivity using the state-space representation of the models, and we devise systematic methods to examine passivity and to identify properties of passive dynamic models. Based on the methods, we describe how passivity is connected to stability in population games and illustrate stability of passive dynamic models using numerical simulations.

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in minimum-effort coordination games

Science.gov (United States)

Li, Kun; Cong, Rui; Wang, Long

2016-08-01

The minimum-effort coordination game draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the predictions of classical game theory. Here, we combine evolutionary game theory and coalescence theory to investigate this game in finite populations. Both analytic results and individual-based simulations show that effort costs play a key role in the evolution of contribution levels, which is in good agreement with those observed experimentally. Besides well-mixed populations, set structured populations have also been taken into consideration. Therein we find that large number of sets and moderate migration rate greatly promote effort levels, especially for high effort costs.

Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games

KAUST Repository

Mabrok, Mohamed

2017-01-05

Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population games, namely so-called “stable games”. In particular, it was shown that a combination of stable games and (an analogue of) passive evolutionary dynamics results in stable convergence to Nash equilibrium. This paper considers the converse question of necessary conditions for evolutionary dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all generalized stable games. Using methods from robust control analysis, we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to construct a generalized stable game that results in instability. The results are illustrated on selected evolutionary dynamics with particular attention to replicator dynamics, which are also shown to be lossless, a special class of passive systems.

Epigenetic game theory and its application in plants. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Yuan-Ming; Zhang, Yinghao; Guo, Mingyue

2017-03-01

Wang's et al. article [1] is the first to integrate game theory (especially evolutionary game theory) with epigenetic modification of zygotic genomes. They described and assessed a modeling framework based on evolutionary game theory to quantify, how sperms and oocytes interact through epigenetic processes, to determine embryo development. They also studied the internal mechanisms for normal embryo development: 1) evolutionary interactions between DNA methylation of the paternal and maternal genomes, and 2) the application of game theory to formulate and quantify how different genes compete or cooperate to regulate embryogenesis through methylation. Although it is not very comprehensive and profound regarding game theory modeling, this article bridges the gap between evolutionary game theory and the epigenetic control of embryo development by powerful ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The epiGame framework includes four aspects: 1) characterizing how epigenetic game theory works by the strategy matrix, in which the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis, are described by the cooperation and competition mechanisms, 2) quantifying the game that the direction and degree of P-M interactions over embryo development can be explained by the sign and magnitude of interaction parameters in model (2), 3) modeling epigenetic interactions within the morula, especially for two coupled nonlinear ODEs, with explicit functions in model (4), which provide a good fit to the observed data for the two sexes (adjusted R2 = 0.956), and 4) revealing multifactorial interactions in embryogenesis from the coupled ODEs in model (2) to triplet ODEs in model (6). Clearly, this article extends game theory from evolutionary game theory to epigenetic game theory.

Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games.

Science.gov (United States)

Argasinski, K; Broom, M

2013-10-01

In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of "costs" and "benefits", there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure "benefit" or "cost"? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic "cost" versus "benefits", is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of trade-offs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk-Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced.

Evolutionary dynamics of a smoothed war of attrition game.

Science.gov (United States)

Iyer, Swami; Killingback, Timothy

2016-05-07

In evolutionary game theory the War of Attrition game is intended to model animal contests which are decided by non-aggressive behavior, such as the length of time that a participant will persist in the contest. The classical War of Attrition game assumes that no errors are made in the implementation of an animal׳s strategy. However, it is inevitable in reality that such errors must sometimes occur. Here we introduce an extension of the classical War of Attrition game which includes the effect of errors in the implementation of an individual׳s strategy. This extension of the classical game has the important feature that the payoff is continuous, and as a consequence admits evolutionary behavior that is fundamentally different from that possible in the original game. We study the evolutionary dynamics of this new game in well-mixed populations both analytically using adaptive dynamics and through individual-based simulations, and show that there are a variety of possible outcomes, including simple monomorphic or dimorphic configurations which are evolutionarily stable and cannot occur in the classical War of Attrition game. In addition, we study the evolutionary dynamics of this extended game in a variety of spatially and socially structured populations, as represented by different complex network topologies, and show that similar outcomes can also occur in these situations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Evolutionary games under incompetence.

Science.gov (United States)

Kleshnina, Maria; Filar, Jerzy A; Ejov, Vladimir; McKerral, Jody C

2018-02-26

The adaptation process of a species to a new environment is a significant area of study in biology. As part of natural selection, adaptation is a mutation process which improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species. Here, we investigate this process by combining the idea of incompetence with evolutionary game theory. In the sense of evolution, incompetence and training can be interpreted as a special learning process. With focus on the social side of the problem, we analyze the influence of incompetence on behavior of species. We introduce an incompetence parameter into a learning function in a single-population game and analyze its effect on the outcome of the replicator dynamics. Incompetence can change the outcome of the game and its dynamics, indicating its significance within what are inherently imperfect natural systems.

Coevolution of Artificial Agents Using Evolutionary Computation in Bargaining Game

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sangwook Lee

2015-01-01

Full Text Available Analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issue in the field of game theory. This paper investigates the interaction and coevolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation (EC in the bargaining game. In particular, the game performance with regard to payoff through the interaction and coevolution of agents is studied. We present three kinds of EC based agents (EC-agent participating in the bargaining game: genetic algorithm (GA, particle swarm optimization (PSO, and differential evolution (DE. The agents’ performance with regard to changing condition is compared. From the simulation results it is found that the PSO-agent is superior to the other agents.

Economics and Mathematical Theory of Games

OpenAIRE

Ajda Fosner

2012-01-01

The theory of games is a branch of applied mathematics that is used in economics, management, and other social sciences. Moreover, it is used also in military science, political science, international relations, computer science, evolutionary biology, and ecology. It is a field of mathematics in which games are studied. The aim of this article is to present matrix games and the game theory. After the introduction, we will explain the methodology and give some examples. We will show applicatio...

Evolutionary Game Theory and Leadership

Science.gov (United States)

Guastello, Stephen J.

2009-01-01

Comments on the article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. This article offers a fresh perspective on leaders, followers, and their possible origins in nonhuman and primitive human behavior patterns. The connections between group coordination, leadership, and game theory have some…

Designing a performance measurement system for supply chain using balanced scorecard, path analysis, cooperative game theory and evolutionary game theory: A Case Study

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Seyed Hootan Eskafi

2015-04-01

Full Text Available In recent years, supply chain management is known as the key factor for achieving competitive advantage. Better customer service, revenue improvement and cost reduction are the results of this philosophy. Organizations can manage the performance of their firms by appropriate goal setting, identifying criteria and continuous performance measurement, which creates a good view for the business circumstances. Developing and defining appropriate indicators at different levels of chain is necessary for implementing a performance measurement system. In this study, we propose a new method to determine the measurement indicators and strategies of the company in term of balanced scorecard. The study is a combination of balanced scorecard, path analysis, evolutionary game theory and cooperative game theory for strategic planning. The study offers an appropriate program for future activities of organizations and determines the present status of the firm. The implementation of the proposed method is introduced for a food producer and the results are analyzed.

Game Theory - Its Applications to Ethical Decision Making

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Cavagnetto Stefano

2014-01-01

Full Text Available The application of game theory according to Hargreaves-Heap and Varonfakis (1995 to understand human behaviour, and in particular ethical behaviour, is a valuable development, as game theory has gradually become one of the key frameworks to assist us in the understanding of social sciences. Esther (1982 and Aumann and Hart (1992 show that there are several studies that indicate the importance of a game theoretic framework in advancing our understanding of social behaviour and evolutionary sciences. Although the application of game theory in the above areas has largely been not formalised, its application in the fields of ethical conduct and human behaviour is at present developed in several respects with the gradual assistance of advances in related areas such as evolutionary biology and our understanding of group social behaviour.

Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games

Science.gov (United States)

Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick

2012-01-01

By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures. PMID:22970237

A system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory for green supply chain management diffusion among Chinese manufacturers

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Tian, Yihui; Govindan, Kannan; Zhu, Qinghua

2014-01-01

In this study, a system dynamics (SD) model is developed to guide the subsidy policies to promote the diffusion of green supply chain management (GSCM) in China. The relationships of stakeholders such as government, enterprises and consumers are analyzed through evolutionary game theory. Finally...

Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games

Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

Křivan, Vlastimil; Cressman, R.

2017-01-01

Roč. 416, MAR 07 (2017), s. 199-207 ISSN 0022-5193 EU Projects: European Commission(XE) 690817 - FourCmodelling Institutional support: RVO:60077344 Keywords : evolutionary game theory * Hawk-Dove game * pair formation Subject RIV: EH - Ecology, Behaviour OBOR OECD: Ecology Impact factor: 2.113, year: 2016 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103

Dilemma strength as a framework for advancing evolutionary game theory. Reply to comments on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games"

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Zhen; Kokubo, Satoshi; Jusup, Marko; Tanimoto, Jun

2015-09-01

While comprehensive reviews of the literature, by gathering in one place most of the relevant information, undoubtedly steer the development of every scientific field, we found that the comments in response to a review article can be as informative as the review itself, if not more. Namely, reading through the comments on the ideas expressed in Ref. [1], we could identify a number of pressing problems for evolutionary game theory, indicating just how much space there still is for major advances and breakthroughs. In an attempt to bring a sense of order to a multitude of opinions, we roughly classified the comments into three categories, i.e. those concerned with: (i) the universality of scaling in heterogeneous topologies, including empirical dynamic networks [2-8], (ii) the universality of scaling for more general game setups, such as the inclusion of multiple strategies and external features [4,9-11], and (iii) experimental confirmations of the theoretical developments [2,12,13].

Adaptive Topographies and Equilibrium Selection in an Evolutionary Game

Science.gov (United States)

Osinga, Hinke M.; Marshall, James A. R.

2015-01-01

It has long been known in the field of population genetics that adaptive topographies, in which population equilibria maximise mean population fitness for a trait regardless of its genetic bases, do not exist. Whether one chooses to model selection acting on a single locus or multiple loci does matter. In evolutionary game theory, analysis of a simple and general game involving distinct roles for the two players has shown that whether strategies are modelled using a single ‘locus’ or one ‘locus’ for each role, the stable population equilibria are unchanged and correspond to the fitness-maximising evolutionary stable strategies of the game. This is curious given the aforementioned population genetical results on the importance of the genetic bases of traits. Here we present a dynamical systems analysis of the game with roles detailing how, while the stable equilibria in this game are unchanged by the number of ‘loci’ modelled, equilibrium selection may differ under the two modelling approaches. PMID:25706762

Research on Information Sharing Mechanism of Network Organization Based on Evolutionary Game

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Lin; Liu, Gaozhi

2018-02-01

This article first elaborates the concept and effect of network organization, and the ability to share information is analyzed, secondly introduces the evolutionary game theory, network organization for information sharing all kinds of limitations, establishes the evolutionary game model, analyzes the dynamic evolution of network organization of information sharing, through reasoning and evolution. The network information sharing by the initial state and two sides of the game payoff matrix of excess profits and information is the information sharing of cost and risk sharing are the influence of network organization node information sharing decision.

Optimality and stability of symmetric evolutionary games with applications in genetic selection.

Science.gov (United States)

Huang, Yuanyuan; Hao, Yiping; Wang, Min; Zhou, Wen; Wu, Zhijun

2015-06-01

Symmetric evolutionary games, i.e., evolutionary games with symmetric fitness matrices, have important applications in population genetics, where they can be used to model for example the selection and evolution of the genotypes of a given population. In this paper, we review the theory for obtaining optimal and stable strategies for symmetric evolutionary games, and provide some new proofs and computational methods. In particular, we review the relationship between the symmetric evolutionary game and the generalized knapsack problem, and discuss the first and second order necessary and sufficient conditions that can be derived from this relationship for testing the optimality and stability of the strategies. Some of the conditions are given in different forms from those in previous work and can be verified more efficiently. We also derive more efficient computational methods for the evaluation of the conditions than conventional approaches. We demonstrate how these conditions can be applied to justifying the strategies and their stabilities for a special class of genetic selection games including some in the study of genetic disorders.

Evolutionary game theory for physical and biological scientists. I. Training and validating population dynamics equations.

Science.gov (United States)

Liao, David; Tlsty, Thea D

2014-08-06

Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.

How to Love the Bomb: Trying to solve the prisoner's dilemma with evolutionary game theory

Science.gov (United States)

Castela, Vasco

Economists traditionally see altruistic acts as irrational. However, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a rational player can do worse than a moral player. The rules of the game imply that one cannot defend one's best interest if one tries to. Game theory has struggled to explain how an agent could have access to the strategically best outcome without behaving irrationally, but with little success. Can a complex systems approach do better?. Peter Danielson, using Evolutionary Game Theory, has avoided some of the assumptions of Game Theory by using a complexity approach to reframe the problem, and offers a solution of sorts. According to Danielson, the foundations of altruism are mechanisms of deterrence that rely on credible threat - we are nice for fear of retaliation. He is both right and wrong. It will be argued that utilitarian, consequentialist principles must have been at work to create the conditions for altruistic acts to be performed. It is wrong to expect, however, that the same reasons are the reasons for action. In order for a model of genuine altruism to be possible, an extra cog must be inserted in the mechanism of causality in order to distance moral action from its strategic advantages. If emotions fulfill this role, we can tell a story in which it is rational to act on altruistic motivations and materially advantageous to hold such motivations. Moral sentiments can be seen as a tool designed by evolution to help optimize cooperation in a social environment. The proposed account integrates the Humean theory of motivation with Robert Frank's commitment model and Aristotle's views on moral education, keeping an adequate story of how it can be in our material interest to be moral without having to renounce to the existence of genuine acts of altruism.

Integrating evolutionary game theory into an agent-based model of ductal carcinoma in situ: Role of gap junctions in cancer progression.

Science.gov (United States)

Malekian, Negin; Habibi, Jafar; Zangooei, Mohammad Hossein; Aghakhani, Hojjat

2016-11-01

There are many cells with various phenotypic behaviors in cancer interacting with each other. For example, an apoptotic cell may induce apoptosis in adjacent cells. A living cell can also protect cells from undergoing apoptosis and necrosis. These survival and death signals are propagated through interaction pathways between adjacent cells called gap junctions. The function of these signals depends on the cellular context of the cell receiving them. For instance, a receiver cell experiencing a low level of oxygen may interpret a received survival signal as an apoptosis signal. In this study, we examine the effect of these signals on tumor growth. We make an evolutionary game theory component in order to model the signal propagation through gap junctions. The game payoffs are defined as a function of cellular context. Then, the game theory component is integrated into an agent-based model of tumor growth. After that, the integrated model is applied to ductal carcinoma in situ, a type of early stage breast cancer. Different scenarios are explored to observe the impact of the gap junction communication and parameters of the game theory component on cancer progression. We compare these scenarios by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test succeeds in proving a significant difference between the tumor growth of the model before and after considering the gap junction communication. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test also proves that the tumor growth significantly depends on the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis. In this study, the gap junction communication is modeled by using evolutionary game theory to illustrate its role at early stage cancers such as ductal carcinoma in situ. This work indicates that the gap junction communication and the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis can notably affect cancer progression. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Large fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Assaf, Michael; Mobilia, Mauro

2010-01-01

We study large fluctuations in evolutionary games belonging to the coordination and anti-coordination classes. The dynamics of these games, modeling cooperation dilemmas, is characterized by a coexistence fixed point separating two absorbing states. We are particularly interested in the problem of fixation that refers to the possibility that a few mutants take over the entire population. Here, the fixation phenomenon is induced by large fluctuations and is investigated by a semiclassical WKB (Wentzel–Kramers–Brillouin) theory generalized to treat stochastic systems possessing multiple absorbing states. Importantly, this method allows us to analyze the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics beyond the weak selection limit often considered in previous works. We accurately compute, including pre-exponential factors, the probability distribution function in the long-lived coexistence state and the mean fixation time necessary for a few mutants to take over the entire population in anti-coordination games, and also the fixation probability in the coordination class. Our analytical results compare excellently with extensive numerical simulations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our treatment is superior to the Fokker–Planck approximation when the selection intensity is finite

Evolutionary game theory meets social science: is there a unifying rule for human cooperation?

Science.gov (United States)

Rosas, Alejandro

2010-05-21

Evolutionary game theory has shown that human cooperation thrives in different types of social interactions with a PD structure. Models treat the cooperative strategies within the different frameworks as discrete entities and sometimes even as contenders. Whereas strong reciprocity was acclaimed as superior to classic reciprocity for its ability to defeat defectors in public goods games, recent experiments and simulations show that costly punishment fails to promote cooperation in the IR and DR games, where classic reciprocity succeeds. My aim is to show that cooperative strategies across frameworks are capable of a unified treatment, for they are governed by a common underlying rule or norm. An analysis of the reputation and action rules that govern some representative cooperative strategies both in models and in economic experiments confirms that the different frameworks share a conditional action rule and several reputation rules. The common conditional rule contains an option between costly punishment and withholding benefits that provides alternative enforcement methods against defectors. Depending on the framework, individuals can switch to the appropriate strategy and method of enforcement. The stability of human cooperation looks more promising if one mechanism controls successful strategies across frameworks. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Game theory decisions, interaction and evolution

CERN Document Server

Webb, James N

2007-01-01

This introduction to game theory is written from a mathematical perspective. Its primary purpose is to be a first course for undergraduate students of mathematics, but it also contains material which will be of interest to advanced students or researchers in biology and economics. The outstanding feature of the book is that it provides a unified account of three types of decision problem: Situations involving a single decision-maker: in which a sequence of choices is to be made in "a game against nature". This introduces the basic ideas of optimality and decision processes. Classical game theory: in which the interactions of two or more decision-makers are considered. This leads to the concept of the Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary game theory: in which the changing structure of a population of interacting decision makers is considered. This leads to the ideas of evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics. An understanding of basic calculus and probability is assumed but no prior knowledge of gam...

Stochastic noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies of a population of biological networks under natural selection.

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Bor-Sen; Yeh, Chin-Hsun

2017-12-01

We review current static and dynamic evolutionary game strategies of biological networks and discuss the lack of random genetic variations and stochastic environmental disturbances in these models. To include these factors, a population of evolving biological networks is modeled as a nonlinear stochastic biological system with Poisson-driven genetic variations and random environmental fluctuations (stimuli). To gain insight into the evolutionary game theory of stochastic biological networks under natural selection, the phenotypic robustness and network evolvability of noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies are discussed from a stochastic Nash game perspective. The noncooperative strategy can be transformed into an equivalent multi-objective optimization problem and is shown to display significantly improved network robustness to tolerate genetic variations and buffer environmental disturbances, maintaining phenotypic traits for longer than the cooperative strategy. However, the noncooperative case requires greater effort and more compromises between partly conflicting players. Global linearization is used to simplify the problem of solving nonlinear stochastic evolutionary games. Finally, a simple stochastic evolutionary model of a metabolic pathway is simulated to illustrate the procedure of solving for two evolutionary game strategies and to confirm and compare their respective characteristics in the evolutionary process. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Some results on ethnic conflicts based on evolutionary game simulation

Science.gov (United States)

Qin, Jun; Yi, Yunfei; Wu, Hongrun; Liu, Yuhang; Tong, Xiaonian; Zheng, Bojin

2014-07-01

The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially originating from the negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a harmonious ethnic relationship, some scholars have proposed a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing civic identity. However, this viewpoint is discussed only from a philosophical prospective and still lacks support of scientific evidences. Because ethnic group and ethnic identity are products of evolution and ethnic identity is the parochialism strategy under the perspective of game theory, this paper proposes an evolutionary game simulation model to study the relationship between civic identity and ethnic conflict based on evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicate that: (1) the ratio of individuals with civic identity has a negative association with the frequency of ethnic conflicts; (2) ethnic conflict will not die out by killing all ethnic members once for all, and it also cannot be reduced by a forcible pressure, i.e., increasing the ratio of individuals with civic identity; (3) the average frequencies of conflicts can stay in a low level by promoting civic identity periodically and persistently.

Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Zhen; Wang, Lin; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

2015-05-01

Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and evolutionary game theory.

Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Rongwu Lu

2018-01-01

Full Text Available Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution. Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis, this article studies replicator dynamics of the evolutionary model to make an optimization analysis of the behaviors of those interested parties and the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions. The results show how the charge of supervision of government department and inspection of coal mine enterprise impact the efficiency of safety management and the effect of constraint measures and incentive and other measures in safety management.

Applications and extensions of epigenetic game theory. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Yaqun

2017-03-01

The authors are to be congratulated for a thought-provoking article [1], which reviews the epigenetic game theory (epiGame) that utilizes differential equations to study the epigenetic control of embryo development. It is a novel application of evolutionary game theory and provides biology researchers with useful methodologies to address scientific questions related to biological coordination of competition and cooperation.

Analysis of Knowledge-Sharing Evolutionary Game in University Teacher Team

Science.gov (United States)

Huo, Mingkui

2013-01-01

The knowledge-sharing activity is a major drive force behind the progress and innovation of university teacher team. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article analyzes the knowledge-sharing process model of this team, studies the influencing mechanism of various factors such as knowledge aggregate gap, incentive coefficient and risk…

Understanding herding based on a co-evolutionary model for strategy and game structure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wang, Tao; Huang, Keke; Cheng, Yuan; Zheng, Xiaoping

2015-01-01

Highlights: •We model herding effect in emergency from perspective of evolutionary game theory. •Rational subpopulation survives only when the game parameter is significantly large. •Herding effect may arise if the relative rewarding for rational agents is small. •Increasing the relative rewarding for rational agents will prevent herding effect. •The evolution result is unstable if the game parameter approaches critical points. -- Abstract: So far, there has been no conclusion on the mechanism for herding, which is often discussed in the academia. Assuming escaping behavior of individuals in emergency is rational rather than out of panic according to recent findings in social psychology, we investigate the behavioral evolution of large crowds from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Specifically, evolution of the whole population divided into two subpopulations, namely the co-evolution of strategy and game structure, is numerically simulated based on the game theoretical models built and the evolutionary rule designed, and a series of phenomena including extinction of one subpopulation and herding effect are predicted in the proposed framework. Furthermore, if the rewarding for rational agents becomes significantly larger than that for emotional ones, herding effect will disappear. It is exciting that some phase transition points with interesting properties for the system can be found. In addition, our model framework is able to explain the fact that it is difficult for mavericks to prevail in society. The current results of this work will be helpful in understanding and restraining herding effect in real life

Applying Evolutionary Psychology to a Serious Game about Children's Interpersonal Conflict

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gordon P. D. Ingram

2012-12-01

Full Text Available This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9–12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

Applying evolutionary psychology to a serious game about children's interpersonal conflict.

Science.gov (United States)

Ingram, Gordon P D; Campos, Joana; Hondrou, Charline; Vasalou, Asimina; Martinho, Carlos; Joinson, Adam

2012-12-20

This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9-12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK) aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

Genome-driven evolutionary game theory helps understand the rise of metabolic interdependencies in microbial communities.

Science.gov (United States)

Zomorrodi, Ali R; Segrè, Daniel

2017-11-16

Metabolite exchanges in microbial communities give rise to ecological interactions that govern ecosystem diversity and stability. It is unclear, however, how the rise of these interactions varies across metabolites and organisms. Here we address this question by integrating genome-scale models of metabolism with evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we use microbial fitness values estimated by metabolic models to infer evolutionarily stable interactions in multi-species microbial "games". We first validate our approach using a well-characterized yeast cheater-cooperator system. We next perform over 80,000 in silico experiments to infer how metabolic interdependencies mediated by amino acid leakage in Escherichia coli vary across 189 amino acid pairs. While most pairs display shared patterns of inter-species interactions, multiple deviations are caused by pleiotropy and epistasis in metabolism. Furthermore, simulated invasion experiments reveal possible paths to obligate cross-feeding. Our study provides genomically driven insight into the rise of ecological interactions, with implications for microbiome research and synthetic ecology.

Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Alessandro Di Stefano

Full Text Available Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human cooperation emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolutionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis, allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscopically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in human cooperation.

The ecology of cancer from an evolutionary game theory perspective.

Science.gov (United States)

Pacheco, Jorge M; Santos, Francisco C; Dingli, David

2014-08-06

The accumulation of somatic mutations, to which the cellular genome is permanently exposed, often leads to cancer. Analysis of any tumour shows that, besides the malignant cells, one finds other 'supporting' cells such as fibroblasts, immune cells of various types and even blood vessels. Together, these cells generate the microenvironment that enables the malignant cell population to grow and ultimately lead to disease. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of tumour growth and response to therapy is incomplete unless the interactions between the malignant cells and normal cells are investigated in the environment in which they take place. The complex interactions between cells in such an ecosystem result from the exchange of information in the form of cytokines- and adhesion-dependent interactions. Such processes impose costs and benefits to the participating cells that may be conveniently recast in the form of a game pay-off matrix. As a result, tumour progression and dynamics can be described in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT), which provides a convenient framework in which to capture the frequency-dependent nature of ecosystem dynamics. Here, we provide a tutorial review of the central aspects of EGT, establishing a relation with the problem of cancer. Along the way, we also digress on fitness and of ways to compute it. Subsequently, we show how EGT can be applied to the study of the various manifestations and dynamics of multiple myeloma bone disease and its preceding condition known as monoclonal gammopathy of undetermined significance. We translate the complex biochemical signals into costs and benefits of different cell types, thus defining a game pay-off matrix. Then we use the well-known properties of the EGT equations to reduce the number of core parameters that characterize disease evolution. Finally, we provide an interpretation of these core parameters in terms of what their function is in the ecosystem we are describing and generate

Evolutionary Stable Strategy

Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

Home; Journals; Resonance – Journal of Science Education; Volume 21; Issue 9. Evolutionary Stable Strategy: Application of Nash Equilibrium in Biology. General Article Volume 21 Issue 9 September 2016 pp 803- ... Keywords. Evolutionary game theory, evolutionary stable state, conflict, cooperation, biological games.

Cognitive Hierarchy Theory and Two-Person Games

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Carlos Gracia-Lázaro

2017-01-01

Full Text Available The outcome of many social and economic interactions, such as stock-market transactions, is strongly determined by the predictions that agents make about the behavior of other individuals. Cognitive hierarchy theory provides a framework to model the consequences of forecasting accuracy that has proven to fit data from certain types of game theory experiments, such as Keynesian beauty contests and entry games. Here, we focus on symmetric two-player-two-action games and establish an algorithm to find the players’ strategies according to the cognitive hierarchy approach. We show that the snowdrift game exhibits a pattern of behavior whose complexity grows as the cognitive levels of players increases. In addition to finding the solutions up to the third cognitive level, we demonstrate, in this theoretical frame, two new properties of snowdrift games: (i any snowdrift game can be characterized by only a parameter, its class; (ii they are anti-symmetric with respect to the diagonal of the pay-off’s space. Finally, we propose a model based on an evolutionary dynamics that captures the main features of the cognitive hierarchy theory.

Extrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Bin; García, Julián; Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne

2013-01-01

In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By “qualitatively valid” we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies . In particular, rank changes are almost certain for , which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection. PMID:24339769

Environmental Policy and Technology Diffusion under Imperfect Competition. An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

De Vries, F.P.

2003-05-01

The analysis of the thesis centers around the diffusion incentives of different environmental policy instruments. Emission taxation, subsidies per unit of emission reduction, marketable emission permits and marketable emission credits will be discussed and compared to each other on how they affect the diffusion of an environmentally benign technology. The analysis is conducted within an applied evolutionary game theoretical framework. An extensive discussion of evolutionary game theory can be found in chapter 2. Chapter 3 reviews classical diffusion models: the epidemic, probit and classic game theoretical model. Then we shift our attention to general evolutionary diffusion models, followed by an outline of the use of evolutionary game theory as a tool for analyzing technology diffusion. The purpose of the chapter is to illustrate the main differences between the various models. Relevant parts of economic theory are reviewed in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 contains a survey and interpretive assessment of the current literature dealing with the impact of environmental policy instruments on the adoption and diffusion of a pollution abatement technology. The chapter illustrates and criticizes the static character of the most influential models. In chapter 2 it will become apparent that an evolutionary analysis is quite appealing when markets axe characterized by perfect competition. Enhanced competitiveness forces firms to produce efficiently in order to avoid elimination. However, in imperfect competitive markets competition is limited to only a small number of firms. Since the central market structure in this thesis is that of imperfect competition, chapter 5 examines the literature on evolutionary game models applied to these type of markets. The survey reveals that the literature focuses on determining whether the evolutionary game models generate output equilibria identical to the traditional static Cournot and Bertrand models or to other output levels. Chapter 6

Game theory

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hendricks, Vincent F.

Game Theory is a collection of short interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the most influential and prominent scholars in game theory. We hear their views on game theory, its aim, scope, use, the future direction of game theory and how their work fits in these respects....

Application of evolutionary games to modeling carcinogenesis.

Science.gov (United States)

Swierniak, Andrzej; Krzeslak, Michal

2013-06-01

We review a quite large volume of literature concerning mathematical modelling of processes related to carcinogenesis and the growth of cancer cell populations based on the theory of evolutionary games. This review, although partly idiosyncratic, covers such major areas of cancer-related phenomena as production of cytotoxins, avoidance of apoptosis, production of growth factors, motility and invasion, and intra- and extracellular signaling. We discuss the results of other authors and append to them some additional results of our own simulations dealing with the possible dynamics and/or spatial distribution of the processes discussed.

Cancer treatment as a game: integrating evolutionary game theory into the optimal control of chemotherapy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orlando, Paul A; Gatenby, Robert A; Brown, Joel S

2012-01-01

Chemotherapy for metastatic cancer commonly fails due to evolution of drug resistance in tumor cells. Here, we view cancer treatment as a game in which the oncologists choose a therapy and tumors ‘choose’ an adaptive strategy. We propose the oncologist can gain an upper hand in the game by choosing treatment strategies that anticipate the adaptations of the tumor. In particular, we examine the potential benefit of exploiting evolutionary tradeoffs in tumor adaptations to therapy. We analyze a math model where cancer cells face tradeoffs in allocation of resistance to two drugs. The tumor ‘chooses’ its strategy by natural selection and the oncologist chooses her strategy by solving a control problem. We find that when tumor cells perform best by investing resources to maximize response to one drug the optimal therapy is a time-invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, if cancer cells perform better using a generalist strategy allowing resistance to both drugs simultaneously, then the optimal protocol is a time varying solution in which the two drug concentrations negatively covary. However, drug interactions can significantly alter these results. We conclude that knowledge of both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interactions is crucial in planning optimal chemotherapy schedules for individual patients. (paper)

Cancer treatment as a game: integrating evolutionary game theory into the optimal control of chemotherapy

Science.gov (United States)

Orlando, Paul A.; Gatenby, Robert A.; Brown, Joel S.

2012-12-01

Chemotherapy for metastatic cancer commonly fails due to evolution of drug resistance in tumor cells. Here, we view cancer treatment as a game in which the oncologists choose a therapy and tumors ‘choose’ an adaptive strategy. We propose the oncologist can gain an upper hand in the game by choosing treatment strategies that anticipate the adaptations of the tumor. In particular, we examine the potential benefit of exploiting evolutionary tradeoffs in tumor adaptations to therapy. We analyze a math model where cancer cells face tradeoffs in allocation of resistance to two drugs. The tumor ‘chooses’ its strategy by natural selection and the oncologist chooses her strategy by solving a control problem. We find that when tumor cells perform best by investing resources to maximize response to one drug the optimal therapy is a time-invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, if cancer cells perform better using a generalist strategy allowing resistance to both drugs simultaneously, then the optimal protocol is a time varying solution in which the two drug concentrations negatively covary. However, drug interactions can significantly alter these results. We conclude that knowledge of both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interactions is crucial in planning optimal chemotherapy schedules for individual patients.

Simulation of producers behaviour in the electricity market by evolutionary games

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Menniti, Daniele; Pinnarelli, Anna; Sorrentino, Nicola [Department of Electronic, Computer and System Science, University of Calabria (Italy)

2008-03-15

Simulation of the electricity market participant's behaviour is important for producers and consumers to determine their bidding strategies and for regulating the market rules. In literature, for this aim a lot of papers suggest to use the well-known theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately they cannot be applied in an easy way when a multi-players game has to be considered to simulate the operation of the electricity market. In this paper, the authors suggest to use the new theory of evolutionary games and the concept of near Nash equilibrium to simulate the electricity market in the presence of more than two producers. In particular, an opportune genetic algorithm has been developed; from the results reported in the paper, it is clear that this algorithm can be usefully utilised. (author)

Simulation of producers behaviour in the electricity market by evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Menniti, Daniele; Pinnarelli, Anna; Sorrentino, Nicola

2008-01-01

Simulation of the electricity market participant's behaviour is important for producers and consumers to determine their bidding strategies and for regulating the market rules. In literature, for this aim a lot of papers suggest to use the well-known theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately they cannot be applied in an easy way when a multi-players game has to be considered to simulate the operation of the electricity market. In this paper, the authors suggest to use the new theory of evolutionary games and the concept of near Nash equilibrium to simulate the electricity market in the presence of more than two producers. In particular, an opportune genetic algorithm has been developed; from the results reported in the paper, it is clear that this algorithm can be usefully utilised. (author)

Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey.

Science.gov (United States)

Abdalzaher, Mohamed S; Seddik, Karim; Elsabrouty, Maha; Muta, Osamu; Furukawa, Hiroshi; Abdel-Rahman, Adel

2016-06-29

We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs) from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs.

Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mohamed S. Abdalzaher

2016-06-01

Full Text Available We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs.

Game theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Dufwenberg, Martin

2011-03-01

Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence each other. I discuss the nature of game-theoretic analysis, the history of game theory, why game theory is useful for understanding human psychology, and why game theory has played a key role in the recent explosion of interest in the field of behavioral economics. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 167-173 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.119 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Price Equation, Gradient Dynamics, and Continuous Trait Game Theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Lehtonen, Jussi

2018-01-01

A recent article convincingly nominated the Price equation as the fundamental theorem of evolution and used it as a foundation to derive several other theorems. A major section of evolutionary theory that was not addressed is that of game theory and gradient dynamics of continuous traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Deriving fundamental results in these fields under the unifying framework of the Price equation illuminates similarities and differences between approaches and allows a simple, unified view of game-theoretical and dynamic concepts. Using Taylor polynomials and the Price equation, I derive a dynamic measure of evolutionary change, a condition for singular points, the convergence stability criterion, and an alternative interpretation of evolutionary stability. Furthermore, by applying the Price equation to a multivariable Taylor polynomial, the direct fitness approach to kin selection emerges. Finally, I compare these results to the mean gradient equation of quantitative genetics and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics.

Evolutionary games in the multiverse.

Science.gov (United States)

Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Traulsen, Arne

2010-03-23

Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players with any number of strategies , there can be at most isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.

Game theory and its applications in the social and biological sciences

CERN Document Server

Colman, Andrew M; Humphreys, Peter; Negrine, Ralph

2013-01-01

Andrew Coleman provides an accessible introduction to the fundamentals of mathematical gaming and other major applications in social psychology, decision theory, economics, politics, evolutionary biology, philosophy, operational research and sociology.

Game theory in epigenetic reprogramming. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Hsu, Fei-Man; Chen, Pao-Yang

2017-03-01

Von Neumann and Morgenstern published the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944, describing game theory as a model in which intelligent rational decision-makers manage to find their best strategies in conflict, cooperative or other mutualistic relationships to acquire the greatest benefit [1]. This model was subsequently incorporated in ecology to simulate the ;fitness; of a species during natural selection, designated evolutionary game theory (EGT) [2]. Wang et al. proposed ;epiGame;, taking paternal and maternal genomes as ;intelligent; players that compete, cooperate or both during embryogenesis to maximize the fitness of the embryo [3]. They further extended game theory to an individual or single cell environment. During early zygote development, DNA methylation is reprogrammed such that the paternal genome is demethylated before the maternal genome. After the reset, the blastocyst is re-methylated during embryogenesis. At that time, the paternal and maternal genomes have a conflict of interest related to the expression of their own genes. The proposed epiGame models such interactive regulation between the parental genomes to reach a balance for embryo development (equation (2)).

Evolutionary Games with Randomly Changing Payoff Matrices

Science.gov (United States)

Yakushkina, Tatiana; Saakian, David B.; Bratus, Alexander; Hu, Chin-Kun

2015-06-01

Evolutionary games are used in various fields stretching from economics to biology. In most of these games a constant payoff matrix is assumed, although some works also consider dynamic payoff matrices. In this article we assume a possibility of switching the system between two regimes with different sets of payoff matrices. Potentially such a model can qualitatively describe the development of bacterial or cancer cells with a mutator gene present. A finite population evolutionary game is studied. The model describes the simplest version of annealed disorder in the payoff matrix and is exactly solvable at the large population limit. We analyze the dynamics of the model, and derive the equations for both the maximum and the variance of the distribution using the Hamilton-Jacobi equation formalism.

Spatial effect on stochastic dynamics of bistable evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

So, Kohaku H Z; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Kato, Takeo

2014-01-01

We consider the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable evolutionary games (coordination games), and examine how they are affected by spatial structure. A semiclassical approximation based on a path integral method is applied to stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with and without spatial structure, and the lifetimes of the metastable states are evaluated. It is shown that the population dependence of the lifetimes is qualitatively different in these two models. Our result indicates that spatial structure can accelerate the transitions between metastable states. (paper)

Development of a population of cancer cells: Observation and modeling by a Mixed Spatial Evolutionary Games approach.

Science.gov (United States)

Świerniak, Andrzej; Krześlak, Michał; Student, Sebastian; Rzeszowska-Wolny, Joanna

2016-09-21

Living cells, like whole living organisms during evolution, communicate with their neighbors, interact with the environment, divide, change their phenotypes, and eventually die. The development of specific ways of communication (through signaling molecules and receptors) allows some cellular subpopulations to survive better, to coordinate their physiological status, and during embryonal development to create tissues and organs or in some conditions to become tumors. Populations of cells cultured in vitro interact similarly, also competing for space and nutrients and stimulating each other to better survive or to die. The results of these intercellular interactions of different types seem to be good examples of biological evolutionary games, and have been the subjects of simulations by the methods of evolutionary game theory where individual cells are treated as players. Here we present examples of intercellular contacts in a population of living human cancer HeLa cells cultured in vitro and propose an evolutionary game theory approach to model the development of such populations. We propose a new technique termed Mixed Spatial Evolutionary Games (MSEG) which are played on multiple lattices corresponding to the possible cellular phenotypes which gives the possibility of simulating and investigating the effects of heterogeneity at the cellular level in addition to the population level. Analyses performed with MSEG suggested different ways in which cellular populations develop in the case of cells communicating directly and through factors released to the environment. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A new concept: Epigenetic game theory. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Tao, Yi

2017-03-01

The evolutionary significance of the interaction between paternal and maternal genomes in fertilized zygotes is a very interesting and challenging question. Wang et al. developed the concept of epigenetic game theory, and they try to use this concept to explain the interaction between paternal and maternal genomes in fertilized zygotes [1]. They emphasize that the embryogenesis can be considered as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. More specifically, they integrate game theory to model the pattern of coordination of paternal genome and maternal genomes mediated by DNA methylation dynamics, and they called this epigenetic game theory.

Game theory as a conceptual framework for managing insect pests.

Science.gov (United States)

Brown, Joel S; Staňková, Kateřina

2017-06-01

For over 100 years it has been recognized that insect pests evolve resistance to chemical pesticides. More recently, managers have advocated restrained use of pesticides, crop rotation, the use of multiple pesticides, and pesticide-free sanctuaries as resistance management practices. Game theory provides a conceptual framework for combining the resistance strategies of the insects and the control strategies of the pest manager into a unified conceptual and modelling framework. Game theory can contrast an ecologically enlightened application of pesticides with an evolutionarily enlightened one. In the former case the manager only considers ecological consequences whereas the latter anticipates the evolutionary response of the pests. Broader applications of this game theory approach include anti-biotic resistance, fisheries management and therapy resistance in cancer. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation.

Science.gov (United States)

Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István; Hoffman, Moshe; Frederickson, Megan E; Pierce, Naomi E; Yu, Douglas W

2011-12-01

We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice in the absence of signalling. Applications range from ant-plants to microbiomes. (2) Contract theory distinguishes two longstanding but weakly differentiated explanations of host response to defectors: host sanctions and partner fidelity feedback. Host traits that selectively punish misbehaving symbionts are parsimoniously interpreted as pre-adaptations. Yucca-moth and legume-rhizobia mutualisms are argued to be examples of partner fidelity feedback. (3) The theory of public goods shows that cooperation in multi-player interactions can evolve in the absence of assortment, in one-shot social dilemmas among non-kin. Applications include alarm calls in vertebrates and exoenzymes in microbes. 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/CNRS.

Prediction of stock markets by the evolutionary mix-game model

Science.gov (United States)

Chen, Fang; Gou, Chengling; Guo, Xiaoqian; Gao, Jieping

2008-06-01

This paper presents the efforts of using the evolutionary mix-game model, which is a modified form of the agent-based mix-game model, to predict financial time series. Here, we have carried out three methods to improve the original mix-game model by adding the abilities of strategy evolution to agents, and then applying the new model referred to as the evolutionary mix-game model to forecast the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index. The results show that these modifications can improve the accuracy of prediction greatly when proper parameters are chosen.

Introduction to game theory

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

无

2003-01-01

The basic ideas of game theory were originated from the problems of maximum and minimum given by J.Yon Neumann in 1928. Later, wars accelerated the study of game theory, there are many developments that contributed to the advancement of game theory, many problems of optimum appeared in economic development process. Scientists applied mathematic methods to studying game theory to make the theory more profound and perfect. The axiomatic structure of game theory was nearly complete in 1944. The path of the development of game theory started from finite to infinite, from two players to many players, from expressing gains with quantity to showing the ending of game theory with abstract result, and from certainty problems to random problems. Thus development of game theory is closely related to the economic development. In recent years, the research on the non-differentiability of Shapley value posed by Belgian Mertens is one of the advanced studies in game theory.

Static and evolutionary quantum public goods games

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Liao Zeyang; Qin Gan; Hu Lingzhi; Li Songjian; Xu Nanyang [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Du Jiangfeng [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Fachbereich Physik, Universitaet Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund (Germany)], E-mail: djf@ustc.edu.cn

2008-05-12

We apply the continuous-variable quantization scheme to quantize public goods game and find that new pure strategy Nash equilibria emerge in the static case. Furthermore, in the evolutionary public goods game, entanglement can also contribute to the persistence of cooperation under various population structures without altruism, voluntary participation, and punishment.

Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Altrock, Philipp M; Traulsen, Arne

2009-01-01

In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy A performs better than strategy B, strategy A will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single mutant will sooner or later take over the entire population or go extinct. We analyze the mean exit times (or average fixation times) associated with this process. We show analytically that these times depend on the payoff matrix of the game in an amazingly simple way under weak selection, i.e. strong stochasticity: the payoff difference Δπ is a linear function of the number of A individuals i, Δπ=u i+v. The unconditional mean exit time depends only on the constant term v. Given that a single A mutant takes over the population, the corresponding conditional mean exit time depends only on the density dependent term u. We demonstrate this finding for two commonly applied microscopic evolutionary processes.

The puzzle of partial migration: Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary game theory perspectives.

Science.gov (United States)

De Leenheer, Patrick; Mohapatra, Anushaya; Ohms, Haley A; Lytle, David A; Cushing, J M

2017-01-07

We consider the phenomenon of partial migration which is exhibited by populations in which some individuals migrate between habitats during their lifetime, but others do not. First, using an adaptive dynamics approach, we show that partial migration can be explained on the basis of negative density dependence in the per capita fertilities alone, provided that this density dependence is attenuated for increasing abundances of the subtypes that make up the population. We present an exact formula for the optimal proportion of migrants which is expressed in terms of the vital rates of migrant and non-migrant subtypes only. We show that this allocation strategy is both an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as well as a convergence stable strategy (CSS). To establish the former, we generalize the classical notion of an ESS because it is based on invasion exponents obtained from linearization arguments, which fail to capture the stabilizing effects of the nonlinear density dependence. These results clarify precisely when the notion of a "weak ESS", as proposed in Lundberg (2013) for a related model, is a genuine ESS. Secondly, we use an evolutionary game theory approach, and confirm, once again, that partial migration can be attributed to negative density dependence alone. In this context, the result holds even when density dependence is not attenuated. In this case, the optimal allocation strategy towards migrants is the same as the ESS stemming from the analysis based on the adaptive dynamics. The key feature of the population models considered here is that they are monotone dynamical systems, which enables a rather comprehensive mathematical analysis. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Games, theory and applications

CERN Document Server

Thomas, L C

2011-01-01

Anyone with a knowledge of basic mathematics will find this an accessible and informative introduction to game theory. It opens with the theory of two-person zero-sum games, two-person non-zero sum games, and n-person games, at a level between nonmathematical introductory books and technical mathematical game theory books. Succeeding sections focus on a variety of applications - including introductory explanations of gaming and meta games - that offer nonspecialists information about new areas of game theory at a comprehensible level. Numerous exercises appear with full solutions, in addition

Intention recognition, commitment and their roles in the evolution of cooperation from artificial intelligence techniques to evolutionary game theory models

CERN Document Server

Han, The Anh

2013-01-01

This original and timely monograph describes a unique self-contained excursion that reveals to the readers the roles of two basic cognitive abilities, i.e. intention recognition and arranging commitments, in the evolution of cooperative behavior. This book analyses intention recognition, an important ability that helps agents predict others’ behavior, in its artificial intelligence and evolutionary computational modeling aspects, and proposes a novel intention recognition method. Furthermore, the book presents a new framework for intention-based decision making and illustrates several ways in which an ability to recognize intentions of others can enhance a decision making process. By employing the new intention recognition method and the tools of evolutionary game theory, this book introduces computational models demonstrating that intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation within populations of self-regarding agents. Finally, the book describes how commitment provides a pathway to the evol...

Combining evolutionary game theory and network theory to analyze human cooperation patterns

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scatà, Marialisa; Di Stefano, Alessandro; La Corte, Aurelio; Liò, Pietro; Catania, Emanuele; Guardo, Ermanno; Pagano, Salvatore

2016-01-01

Highlights: • We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of human cooperation in a social network. • We introduce the concepts of “Critical Mass”, centrality measure and homophily. • The emergence of cooperation is affected by the spatial choice of the “Critical Mass”. • Our findings show that homophily speeds up the convergence towards cooperation. • Centrality and “Critical Mass” spatial choice partially offset the impact of homophily. - Abstract: As natural systems continuously evolve, the human cooperation dilemma represents an increasingly more challenging question. Humans cooperate in natural and social systems, but how it happens and what are the mechanisms which rule the emergence of cooperation, represent an open and fascinating issue. In this work, we investigate the evolution of cooperation through the analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of behaviours within the social network, where nodes can choose to cooperate or defect following the classical social dilemmas represented by Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games. To this aim, we introduce a sociological concept and statistical estimator, “Critical Mass”, to detect the minimum initial seed of cooperators able to trigger the diffusion process, and the centrality measure to select within the social network. Selecting different spatial configurations of the Critical Mass nodes, we highlight how the emergence of cooperation can be influenced by this spatial choice of the initial core in the network. Moreover, we target to shed light how the concept of homophily, a social shaping factor for which “birds of a feather flock together”, can affect the evolutionary process. Our findings show that homophily allows speeding up the diffusion process and make quicker the convergence towards human cooperation, while centrality measure and thus the Critical Mass selection, play a key role in the evolution showing how the spatial configurations can create some hidden patterns, partially

Statistical mechanics of spatial evolutionary games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miekisz, Jacek

2004-01-01

We discuss the long-run behaviour of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We use concepts and techniques of statistical mechanics to study game-theoretic models. In order to obtain results in the case of the so-called potential games, we analyse the thermodynamic limit of the appropriate models of interacting particles

Game theory, alive

CERN Document Server

Karlin, Anna R

2016-01-01

This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields, such as computer science, economics, social choice, biology, and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. Game theory's influence is felt in a wide range of disciplines, and the authors deliver masterfully on the challenge of presenting both the breadth and coherence of its underlying ...

Evolutionary Game Model Study of Construction Green Supply Chain Management under the Government Intervention

Science.gov (United States)

Xing, Yuanzhi; Deng, Xiaoyi

2017-11-01

The paper first has defined the concepts of green supply chain management and evolution game theory, and pointed out the characteristics of green supply chain management in construction. The main participants and key links of the construction green supply chain management are determined by constructing the organization framework. This paper established the evolutionary game model between construction enterprises and recycling enterprises for the green supply chain closed-loop structure. The waste recycling evolutionary stability equilibrium solution is obtained to explore the principle and effective scope of government policy intervention. This paper put forward the relevant countermeasures to the green supply chain management in construction recycling stage from the government point of view. The conclusion has reference value and guidance to the final product construction enterprises, recycling enterprises and the government during green supply chain.

Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Poncela, Julia; Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus; Moreno, Yamir [Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, E-50009 Zaragoza (Spain); Traulsen, Arne [Emmy-Noether Group for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Ploen (Germany)], E-mail: traulsen@evolbio.mpg.de

2009-08-15

We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful in the past. The latter depends on the dynamics of strategies in the game, which we implement following the so-called Fermi rule such that the limits of weak and strong strategy selection can be explored. Our framework allows to address general evolutionary games. With only two parameters describing the preferential attachment and the intensity of selection, we describe a wide range of network structures and evolutionary scenarios. Our results show that even for moderate payoff preferential attachment, over represented hubs arise. Interestingly, we find that while the networks are growing, high levels of cooperation are attained, but the same network structure does not promote cooperation as a static network. Therefore, the mechanism of payoff preferential attachment is different to those usually invoked to explain the promotion of cooperation in static, already-grown networks.

Evolutionary game dynamics in a growing structured population

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poncela, Julia; Gomez-Gardenes, Jesus; Moreno, Yamir; Traulsen, Arne

2009-01-01

We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful in the past. The latter depends on the dynamics of strategies in the game, which we implement following the so-called Fermi rule such that the limits of weak and strong strategy selection can be explored. Our framework allows to address general evolutionary games. With only two parameters describing the preferential attachment and the intensity of selection, we describe a wide range of network structures and evolutionary scenarios. Our results show that even for moderate payoff preferential attachment, over represented hubs arise. Interestingly, we find that while the networks are growing, high levels of cooperation are attained, but the same network structure does not promote cooperation as a static network. Therefore, the mechanism of payoff preferential attachment is different to those usually invoked to explain the promotion of cooperation in static, already-grown networks.

Evolution of Cooperation in Evolutionary Games for Heterogeneous Interactions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qian Xiaolan; Yang Junzhong

2012-01-01

When a population structure is modelled as a square lattice, the cooperation may be improved for an evolutionary prisoner dilemma game or be inhibited for an evolutionary snowdrift game. In this work, we investigate cooperation in a population on a square lattice where the interaction among players contains both prisoner dilemma game and snowdrift game. The heterogeneity in interaction is introduced to the population in two different ways: the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every player (HCP) or the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every link between any two players (HCL). The resonant enhancement of cooperation in the case of HCP is observed while the resonant inhibition of cooperation in the case of HCL is prominent. The explanations on the enhancement or inhibition of cooperation are presented for these two cases. (general)

Multidimensional extended spatial evolutionary games.

Science.gov (United States)

Krześlak, Michał; Świerniak, Andrzej

2016-02-01

The goal of this paper is to study the classical hawk-dove model using mixed spatial evolutionary games (MSEG). In these games, played on a lattice, an additional spatial layer is introduced for dependence on more complex parameters and simulation of changes in the environment. Furthermore, diverse polymorphic equilibrium points dependent on cell reproduction, model parameters, and their simulation are discussed. Our analysis demonstrates the sensitivity properties of MSEGs and possibilities for further development. We discuss applications of MSEGs, particularly algorithms for modelling cell interactions during the development of tumours. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review

Science.gov (United States)

Szolnoki, Attila; Mobilia, Mauro; Jiang, Luo-Luo; Szczesny, Bartosz; Rucklidge, Alastair M.; Perc, Matjaž

2014-01-01

Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance is also at the heart of predator–prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth of marine sessile organisms and competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when the competing strategies are three or more, regardless of the particularities of the game. Here, we review recent advances on the rock–paper–scissors (RPS) and related evolutionary games, focusing, in particular, on pattern formation, the impact of mobility and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and zero-dimensional RPS models and the application of the complex Ginzburg–Landau equation, and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale ecological systems. Directions for future research, related, for example, to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules and invasion reversals owing to multi-point interactions, are also outlined. PMID:25232048

Game theory in philosophy

NARCIS (Netherlands)

de Bruin, B.P.

2005-01-01

Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals

Invisible hand effect in an evolutionary minority game model

Science.gov (United States)

Sysi-Aho, Marko; Saramäki, Jari; Kaski, Kimmo

2005-03-01

In this paper, we study the properties of a minority game with evolution realized by using genetic crossover to modify fixed-length decision-making strategies of agents. Although the agents in this evolutionary game act selfishly by trying to maximize their own performances only, it turns out that the whole society will eventually be rewarded optimally. This “invisible hand” effect is what Adam Smith over two centuries ago expected to take place in the context of free market mechanism. However, this behaviour of the society of agents is realized only under idealized conditions, where all agents are utilizing the same efficient evolutionary mechanism. If on the other hand part of the agents are adaptive, but not evolutionary, the system does not reach optimum performance, which is also the case if part of the evolutionary agents form a uniformly acting “cartel”.

An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Moritz Hetzer

Full Text Available We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment.

An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games.

Science.gov (United States)

Hetzer, Moritz; Sornette, Didier

2013-01-01

We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment.

Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Zhen; Kokubo, Satoshi; Jusup, Marko; Tanimoto, Jun

2015-09-01

Why would natural selection favor the prevalence of cooperation within the groups of selfish individuals? A fruitful framework to address this question is evolutionary game theory, the essence of which is captured in the so-called social dilemmas. Such dilemmas have sparked the development of a variety of mathematical approaches to assess the conditions under which cooperation evolves. Furthermore, borrowing from statistical physics and network science, the research of the evolutionary game dynamics has been enriched with phenomena such as pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organization. Numerous advances in understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior over the last few decades have recently been distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and network reciprocity. However, when social viscosity is introduced into a population via any of the reciprocity mechanisms, the existing scaling parameters for the dilemma strength do not yield a unique answer as to how the evolutionary dynamics should unfold. Motivated by this problem, we review the developments that led to the present state of affairs, highlight the accompanying pitfalls, and propose new universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength. We prove universality by showing that the conditions for an ESS and the expressions for the internal equilibriums in an infinite, well-mixed population subjected to any of the five reciprocity mechanisms depend only on the new scaling parameters. A similar result is shown to hold for the fixation probability of the different strategies in a finite, well-mixed population. Furthermore, by means of numerical simulations, the same scaling parameters are shown to be effective even if the evolution of cooperation is considered on the spatial networks (with the exception of highly heterogeneous setups). We close the discussion by suggesting promising directions for future research

Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Feng Zhang

Full Text Available Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism, thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.

Cycle frequency in standard Rock-Paper-Scissors games: Evidence from experimental economics

Science.gov (United States)

Xu, Bin; Zhou, Hai-Jun; Wang, Zhijian

2013-10-01

The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a widely used model system in game theory. Evolutionary game theory predicts the existence of persistent cycles in the evolutionary trajectories of the RPS game, but experimental evidence has remained to be rather weak. In this work, we performed laboratory experiments on the RPS game and analyzed the social-state evolutionary trajectories of twelve populations of N=6 players. We found strong evidence supporting the existence of persistent cycles. The mean cycling frequency was measured to be 0.029±0.009 period per experimental round. Our experimental observations can be quantitatively explained by a simple non-equilibrium model, namely the discrete-time logit dynamical process with a noise parameter. Our work therefore favors the evolutionary game theory over the classical game theory for describing the dynamical behavior of the RPS game.

Co-Evolution of Opinion and Strategy in Persuasion Dynamics:. AN Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

Science.gov (United States)

Ding, Fei; Liu, Yun; Li, Yong

In this paper, a new model of opinion formation within the framework of evolutionary game theory is presented. The model simulates strategic situations when people are in opinion discussion. Heterogeneous agents adjust their behaviors to the environment during discussions, and their interacting strategies evolve together with opinions. In the proposed game, we take into account payoff discount to join a discussion, and the situation that people might drop out of an unpromising game. Analytical and emulational results show that evolution of opinion and strategy always tend to converge, with utility threshold, memory length, and decision uncertainty parameters influencing the convergence time. The model displays different dynamical regimes when we set differently the rule when people are at a loss in strategy.

Chemical evolutionary games.

Science.gov (United States)

Aristotelous, Andreas C; Durrett, Richard

2014-05-01

Inspired by the use of hybrid cellular automata in modeling cancer, we introduce a generalization of evolutionary games in which cells produce and absorb chemicals, and the chemical concentrations dictate the death rates of cells and their fitnesses. Our long term aim is to understand how the details of the interactions in a system with n species and m chemicals translate into the qualitative behavior of the system. Here, we study two simple 2×2 games with two chemicals and revisit the two and three species versions of the one chemical colicin system studied earlier by Durrett and Levin (1997). We find that in the 2×2 examples, the behavior of our new spatial model can be predicted from that of the mean field differential equation using ideas of Durrett and Levin (1994). However, in the three species colicin model, the system with diffusion does not have the coexistence which occurs in the lattices model in which sites interact with only their nearest neighbors. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Game theory and experimental games the study of strategic interaction

CERN Document Server

Colman, Andrew M

1982-01-01

Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction is a critical survey of the essential ideas of game theory and the findings of empirical research on strategic interaction. Some experiments using lifelike simulations of familiar kinds of strategic interactions are presented, and applications of game theory to the study of voting, the theory of evolution, and moral philosophy are discussed.Comprised of 13 chapters, this volume begins with an informal definition of game theory and an outline of the types of social situations to which it applies. Games of skill, games of cha

Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

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Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Cheng, Hongyan; Li, Yuting; Yang, Junzhong

2010-11-01

We investigate the effects of double-dealing behavior on cooperation in evolutionary games. Each individual in a population has two attributes: character and action. One's action may be consistent with one's character or not. We provide analytical results by a mean-field description of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs). Moreover, we give numerical results on different networks, ranging from square lattices to scale-free networks (SFNs). Two important conclusions have been drawn from the results on SFNs. Firstly, if only non-influential individuals (those with low degrees) have chances of becoming double-dealers, cooperation is certain to deteriorate. Secondly, when influential individuals (those with high degrees) adopt double-dealing behavior moderately, cooperation would be enhanced, which is in opposition to the traditional belief. These results help us to understand better the social phenomenon of the existence of double-dealers. In addition to the PDG, other types of games including the snowdrift game, the stag-hunt game and the harmony game have also been studied on our model. The results for these three games are also presented, which are consistent with the results for the PDG qualitatively. Furthermore, we consider our model under the co-evolution framework, in which the probability of an individual changing into a double-dealer and the individual strategy both could evolve during the evolutionary process.

Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks

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Yong, Xi

2016-01-01

The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems. PMID:27118882

Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders.

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Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan

2015-01-01

Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.

Game theory paradigm: a new tool for investigating social dysfunction in major depressive disorders

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Yun eWang

2015-09-01

Full Text Available Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modelling offers a new tool for investigating social interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely-used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.

Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan

2015-01-01

Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD. PMID:26441689

Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism

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Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David R.

2015-08-01

Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We study a competitive Lotka-Volterra model, with number fluctuations, that accounts for natural population growth and encompasses interaction scenarios typical of evolutionary games. We show that, in an appropriate limit, the model describes standard evolutionary games with both genetic drift and overall population size fluctuations. However, there are also regimes where a varying population size can strongly influence the evolutionary dynamics. We focus on the strong mutualism scenario and demonstrate that standard evolutionary game theory fails to describe our simulation results. We then analytically and numerically determine fixation probabilities as well as mean fixation times using matched asymptotic expansions, taking into account the population size degree of freedom. These results elucidate the interplay between population dynamics and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

Evolutionary dynamics with fluctuating population sizes and strong mutualism.

Science.gov (United States)

Chotibut, Thiparat; Nelson, David R

2015-08-01

Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We study a competitive Lotka-Volterra model, with number fluctuations, that accounts for natural population growth and encompasses interaction scenarios typical of evolutionary games. We show that, in an appropriate limit, the model describes standard evolutionary games with both genetic drift and overall population size fluctuations. However, there are also regimes where a varying population size can strongly influence the evolutionary dynamics. We focus on the strong mutualism scenario and demonstrate that standard evolutionary game theory fails to describe our simulation results. We then analytically and numerically determine fixation probabilities as well as mean fixation times using matched asymptotic expansions, taking into account the population size degree of freedom. These results elucidate the interplay between population dynamics and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Evaluation of P2P File-Sharing Systems in Heterogeneous Environments

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Yusuke Matsuda

2010-01-01

Full Text Available Peer-to-Peer (P2P file sharing is one of key technologies for achieving attractive P2P multimedia social networking. In P2P file-sharing systems, file availability is improved by cooperative users who cache and share files. Note that file caching carries costs such as storage consumption and processing load. In addition, users have different degrees of cooperativity in file caching and they are in different surrounding environments arising from the topological structure of P2P networks. With evolutionary game theory, this paper evaluates the performance of P2P file sharing systems in such heterogeneous environments. Using micro-macro dynamics, we analyze the impact of the heterogeneity of user selfishness on the file availability and system stability. Further, through simulation experiments with agent-based dynamics, we reveal how other aspects, for example, synchronization among nodes and topological structure, affect the system performance. Both analytical and simulation results show that the environmental heterogeneity contributes to the file availability and system stability.

Forthcoming Issue on Game Theory and Political Economy

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

William D. Ferguson

2013-09-01

Full Text Available Game theory offers a rigorous set of concepts, relationships, and models that invite myriad applications to problems of political economy. Indeed, game theory can serve as a fundamental modeling technique that can bridge microfoundations of political and economic exchanges, with developmental processes and macro implications related to growth and distribution. Applications can range from localized interactions within workplaces, firms, political organizations, and community groups; to intermediate-level market, industry, community, or inter-organizational transactions; to encompassing national, regional, population, or global interactions. At any of these levels, game models can illustrate strategic responses of economic or political actors (individuals or organizations to specifiable conditions concerning any or all of the following: prevailing social context—notably informal institutions (such as social norms and formal institutions (such as mutually understood laws and regulations; available information (complete or not; accessible or strategically manipulated; agents’ motivations (material and/or social; and even levels of rationality—substantive (full cognition or bounded (limited cognition. Applicable models may operate on the basis of given institutional context and preference orientations or may explore associated developmental processes, including adaptive social learning. Of particular interest are representations of one or more of the myriad social dilemmas (or collective-action problems that inhabit political economy, associated exercises or distributions of power, and/or representations of potential resolutions to such dilemmas—perhaps with policy implications. Accordingly, this forthcoming issue of Economies seeks game-theoretic models based on classical, evolutionary, behavioral, or epistemic game theory that can be applied to one or more problems in political economy.

Mathematical game theory and applications

CERN Document Server

Mazalov, Vladimir

2014-01-01

An authoritative and quantitative approach to modern game theory with applications from diverse areas including economics, political science, military science, and finance. Explores areas which are not covered in current game theory texts, including a thorough examination of zero-sum game.Provides introductory material to game theory, including bargaining, parlour games, sport, networking games and dynamic games.Explores Bargaining models, discussing new result such as resource distributions, buyer-seller instructions and reputation in bargaining models.Theoretical results are presented along

Non-cooperative game theory in biology and cooperative reasoning in humans.

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Kabalak, Alihan; Smirnova, Elena; Jost, Jürgen

2015-06-01

The readiness for spontaneous cooperation together with the assumptions that others share this cooperativity has been identified as a fundamental feature that distinguishes humans from other animals, including the great apes. At the same time, cooperativity presents an evolutionary puzzle because non-cooperators do better in a group of cooperators. We develop here an analysis of the process leading to cooperation in terms of rationality concepts, game theory and epistemic logic. We are, however, not attempting to reconstruct the actual evolutionary process. We rather want to provide the logical structure underlying cooperation in order to understand why cooperation is possible and what kind of reasoning and beliefs would lead to cooperative decision-making. Game theory depends on an underlying common belief in non-cooperative rationality of the players, and cooperativity similarly can utilize a common belief in cooperative rationality as its basis. We suggest a weaker concept of rational decision-making in games that encompasses both types of decision-making. We build this up in stages, starting from simple optimization, then using anticipation of the reaction of others, to finally arrive at reflexive and cooperative reasoning. While each stage is more difficult than the preceding, importantly, we also identify a reduction of complexity achieved by the consistent application of higher stage reasoning.

Zero-determinant strategy: An underway revolution in game theory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hao Dong; Rong Zhi-Hai; Zhou Tao

2014-01-01

Repeated games describe situations where players interact with each other in a dynamic pattern and make decisions according to outcomes of previous stage games. Very recently, Press and Dyson have revealed a new class of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies for the repeated games, which can enforce a fixed linear relationship between expected payoffs of two players, indicating that a smart player can control her unwitting co-player's payoff in a unilateral way [Proc. Acad. Natl. Sci. USA 109, 10409 (2012)]. The theory of ZD strategies provides a novel viewpoint to depict interactions among players, and fundamentally changes the research paradigm of game theory. In this brief survey, we first introduce the mathematical framework of ZD strategies, and review the properties and constrains of two specifications of ZD strategies, called pinning strategies and extortion strategies. Then we review some representative research progresses, including robustness analysis, cooperative ZD strategy analysis, and evolutionary stability analysis. Finally, we discuss some significant extensions to ZD strategies, including the multi-player ZD strategies, and ZD strategies under noise. Challenges in related research fields are also listed. (topical review - statistical physics and complex systems)

Game theory : Noncooperative games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

van Damme, E.E.C.; Wright, J.

2015-01-01

We describe noncooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core. We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as well as

The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games.

Science.gov (United States)

Shubik, Martin

2002-01-01

Discusses the use of lightly controlled games, primarily in classes in game theory. Considers the value of such games from the viewpoint of both teaching and experimentation and discusses context; control; pros and cons of games in teaching; experimental games; and games in class, including cooperative game theory. (Author/LRW)

Game theory an introduction

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Barron, E N

2013-01-01

An exciting new edition of the popular introduction to game theory and its applications The thoroughly expanded Second Edition presents a unique, hands-on approach to game theory. While most books on the subject are too abstract or too basic for mathematicians, Game Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition offers a blend of theory and applications, allowing readers to use theory and software to create and analyze real-world decision-making models. With a rigorous, yet accessible, treatment of mathematics, the book focuses on results that can be used to

A Graphical Evolutionary Game Approach to Social Learning

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Cao, Xuanyu; Liu, K. J. Ray

2017-06-01

In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning method is proposed. In the proposed game-theoretic method, agents only need to communicate their binary decisions rather than the real-valued beliefs with their neighbors, which endows the method with low communication complexity. Under mean field approximations, we theoretically analyze the steady state equilibria of the game and show that the evolutionarily stable states (ESSs) coincide with the decisions of the benchmark centralized detector. Numerical experiments are implemented to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic learning method.

Inactivation of tumor suppressor genes and cancer therapy: An evolutionary game theory approach.

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Khadem, Heydar; Kebriaei, Hamed; Veisi, Zahra

2017-06-01

Inactivation of alleles in tumor suppressor genes (TSG) is one of the important issues resulting in evolution of cancerous cells. In this paper, the evolution of healthy, one and two missed allele cells is modeled using the concept of evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics. The proposed model also takes into account the interaction rates of the cells as designing parameters of the system. Different combinations of the equilibrium points of the parameterized nonlinear system is studied and categorized into some cases. In each case, the interaction rates' values are suggested in a way that the equilibrium points of the replicator dynamics are located on an appropriate region of the state space. Based on the suggested interaction rates, it is proved that the system doesn't have any undesirable interior equilibrium point as well. Therefore, the system will converge to the desirable region, where there is a scanty level of cancerous cells. In addition, the proposed conditions for interaction rates guarantee that, when a trajectory of the system reaches the boundaries, then it will stay there forever which is a desirable property since the equilibrium points have been already located on the boundaries, appropriately. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the suggestions in the elimination of the cancerous cells in different scenarios. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit Quantal Response Dynamics in Game Theory

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Zhuang, Qian; Di, Zengru; Wu, Jinshan

2014-01-01

Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be classified into stable (SQREs) and unstable (USQREs) equilibriums. This extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs) to evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games, including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those experiments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better predictive power than QREs and NEs. PMID:25157502

Multi-objective optimization of an arch dam shape under static loads using an evolutionary game method

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Meng, Rui; Cheong, Kang Hao; Bao, Wei; Wong, Kelvin Kian Loong; Wang, Lu; Xie, Neng-gang

2018-06-01

This article attempts to evaluate the safety and economic performance of an arch dam under the action of static loads. The geometric description of a crown cantilever section and the horizontal arch ring is presented. A three-objective optimization model of arch dam shape is established based on the arch dam volume, maximum principal tensile stress and total strain energy. The evolutionary game method is then applied to obtain the optimal solution. In the evolutionary game technique, a novel and more efficient exploration method of the game players' strategy space, named the 'sorting partition method under the threshold limit', is presented, with the game profit functions constructed according to both competitive and cooperative behaviour. By way of example, three optimization goals have all shown improvements over the initial solutions. In particular, the evolutionary game method has potentially faster convergence. This demonstrates the preliminary proof of principle of the evolutionary game method.

Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Fitness-Dependent Wright-Fisher Process with Noise

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Quan Ji; Wang Xianjia

2011-01-01

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright-Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2x2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player's rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner's dilemma games (PDG) and the snowdrift games (SG). We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments. (general)

Game Theory .net.

Science.gov (United States)

Shor, Mikhael

2003-01-01

States making game theory relevant and accessible to students is challenging. Describes the primary goal of GameTheory.net is to provide interactive teaching tools. Indicates the site strives to unite educators from economics, political and computer science, and ecology by providing a repository of lecture notes and tests for courses using…

Memory boosts turn taking in evolutionary dilemma games.

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Tao; Chen, Zhigang; Yang, Lei; Zou, You; Luo, Juan

2015-05-01

Spontaneous turn taking phenomenon can be observed in many self-organized systems, and the mechanism is unclear. This paper tries to model it by evolutionary dilemma games with memory mechanism. Prisoner's dilemma, Snowdrift (including Leader and Hero) and Stag-hunt games are unified on an extended S-T plane. Agents play game with all the others and make decision by the last game histories. The experiments find that when agents remember last 2-step histories or more, a kind of cooperative turn taking (CAD) bursts at the area of Snowdrift game with restriction of S + T > 2R and S ≠ T, while the consistent strategy (DorC) gathers on the line of S + T > 2R and S = T. We also find that the system's fitness ratio greatly improved with 2-step memory. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Game theory a nontechnical introduction

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Davis, Morton D

1997-01-01

""A lucid and penetrating development of game theory that will appeal to the intuition . . . a most valuable contribution."" - Douglas R. Hofstadter Fascinating, accessible introduction to enormously important intellectual system with numerous applications to social, economic, political problems. Newly revised edition offers overview of game theory, then lucid coverage of the two-person zero-sum game with equilibrium points; the general, two-person zero-sum game; utility theory; other topics. Problems at start of each chapter.

A Narrative Theory of Games

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Aarseth, Espen

2012-01-01

In this article I present a narrative theory of games, building on standard narra-tology, as a solution to the conundrum that has haunted computer game studies from the start: How to approach software that combines games and stories?......In this article I present a narrative theory of games, building on standard narra-tology, as a solution to the conundrum that has haunted computer game studies from the start: How to approach software that combines games and stories?...

Non-cooperative game theory

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Fujiwara-Greve, Takako

2015-01-01

This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) probl...

Game equilibrium models I evolution and game dynamics

CERN Document Server

1991-01-01

There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to charac...

Games Superheroes Play: Teaching Game Theory with Comic Book Favorites

Science.gov (United States)

O'Roark, Brian; Grant, William

2018-01-01

The valuable insights of game theory sometimes remain out of reach for students who are overwhelmed by the subject's complexity. Comic book applications of game theory, with superheroes as players, can facilitate enthusiasm and classroom interaction to enhance the learning of game theory. Drawing from content in superhero movies and books, the…

Explaining games the epistemic programme in game theory

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de Bruin, Boudewijn

2010-01-01

The first monograph on the philosophy of game theory, this is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to assess the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy.

Game theory : The next stage

NARCIS (Netherlands)

van Damme, E.E.C.

1995-01-01

This paper surveys some recent developments in (non-cooperative) game theory and provides an outlook on the near future of that theory. In particular, attention is focused on the limitations inherent in normative game theory and on attempts to construct a behavioral version of the theory that

Preferential selection based on strategy persistence and memory promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Yuanming; Huang, Changwei; Dai, Qionglin

2018-06-01

Strategy imitation plays a crucial role in evolutionary dynamics when we investigate the spontaneous emergence of cooperation under the framework of evolutionary game theory. Generally, when an individual updates his strategy, he needs to choose a role model whom he will learn from. In previous studies, individuals choose role models randomly from their neighbors. In recent works, researchers have considered that individuals choose role models according to neighbors' attractiveness characterized by the present network topology or historical payoffs. Here, we associate an individual's attractiveness with the strategy persistence, which characterizes how frequently he changes his strategy. We introduce a preferential parameter α to describe the nonlinear correlation between the selection probability and the strategy persistence and the memory length of individuals M into the evolutionary games. We investigate the effects of α and M on cooperation. Our results show that cooperation could be promoted when α > 0 and at the same time M > 1, which corresponds to the situation that individuals are inclined to select their neighbors with relatively higher persistence levels during the evolution. Moreover, we find that the cooperation level could reach the maximum at an optimal memory length when α > 0. Our work sheds light on how to promote cooperation through preferential selection based on strategy persistence and a limited memory length.

Exploring social influence on evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games in networks

Science.gov (United States)

Zong, Hengshan; Jia, Guozhu; Cheng, Yang

2015-11-01

Though numerous studies demonstrate the importance of social influence in deciding individual decision-making process in networks, little has been done to explore its impact on players’ behavioral patterns in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs). This study investigates how social influenced strategy updating rules may affect the final equilibrium of game dynamics. The results show that weak social influence usually inhibits cooperation, while strong social influence has a mediating effect. The impacts of network structure and the existence of rebels in social influence scenarios are also tested. The paper provides a comprehensive interpretation on social influence effects on evolutionary PDGs in networks.

Evolutionary game theory and social learning can determine how vaccine scares unfold.

Science.gov (United States)

Bauch, Chris T; Bhattacharyya, Samit

2012-01-01

Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) autism vaccine scare in Britain. A "free rider" effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty). Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence--up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis--including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts.

Quantum evolutionary stable strategies of 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sun, Z.W.

2009-01-01

Quantum evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) of games are considered as stable solutions to population games on molecular level. The distributive diagram of 2-player, 2-strategy (2 x 2) symmetric games is brought out to get a convenient way of looking for their quantum ESSs. It is found that transpositions, related to the parameters in classical payoff and those of initial quantum states, may occur when games are quantized. Conditions for transpositions are given in two tables. One can easily find quantum ESSs of a 2 x 2 symmetric game according to its transposition. This paper also draws an overall outline of NEs and ESSs of this kind of game.

Foundations of game theory noncooperative games

CERN Document Server

Vorob’ev, Nicolai N

1994-01-01

The English edition differs only slightly from the Russian original. The main struc­ tural difference is that all the material on the theory of finite noncooperative games has been collected in Chapter 2, with renumbering of the material of the remain­ ing chapters. New sections have been added in this chapter: devoted to general questions of equilibrium theory in nondegenerate games, subsections 3.9-3.17, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr.; and § 4, by A.G. Chernyakov; and § 5, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr., on the computational complexity of the process of finding equilibrium points in finite games. It should also be mentioned that subsections 3.12-3.14 in Chapter 1 were written by E.B. Yanovskaya especially for the Russian edition. The author regrets that the present edition does not reflect the important game-theoretical achievements presented in the splendid monographs by E. van Damme (on the refinement of equilibrium principles for finite games), as well as those by J.e. Harsanyi and R. Selten, and by W. Giith and B. Ka...

Dependence theory via game theory

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Grossi, D.; Turrini, P.

2011-01-01

In the multi-agent systems community, dependence theory and game theory are often presented as two alternative perspectives on the analysis of social interaction. Up till now no research has been done relating these two approaches. The unification presented provides dependence theory with the sort

Introduction to the theory of games

CERN Document Server

McKinsey, John C C

1952-01-01

One of the classic early monographs on game theory, this comprehensive overview illustrates the theory's applications to situations involving conflicts of interest, including economic, social, political, and military contexts. Contents include a survey of rectangular games; a method of approximating the value of a game; games in extensive form and those with infinite strategies; distribution functions; Stieltjes integrals; the fundamental theorem for continuous games; separable games; games with convex payoff functions; applications to statistical inference; and much more. Appropriate for adva

Predictive Game Theory

Science.gov (United States)

Wolpert, David H.

2005-01-01

Probability theory governs the outcome of a game; there is a distribution over mixed strat.'s, not a single "equilibrium". To predict a single mixed strategy must use our loss function (external to the game's players. Provides a quantification of any strategy's rationality. Prove rationality falls as cost of computation rises (for players who have not previously interacted). All extends to games with varying numbers of players.

Heterogeneous update mechanisms in evolutionary games: Mixing innovative and imitative dynamics

Science.gov (United States)

Amaral, Marco Antonio; Javarone, Marco Alberto

2018-04-01

Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows the introduction of elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase space. Often, these processes are strongly related, since an innovation can trigger the evolution, and the latter can provide the optimal conditions for the emergence of innovations. Both processes can be studied by using the framework of evolutionary game theory, where evolution constitutes an intrinsic mechanism. At the same time, the concept of innovation requires an opportune mathematical representation. Notably, innovation can be modeled as a strategy, or it can constitute the underlying mechanism that allows agents to change strategy. Here, we analyze the second case, investigating the behavior of a heterogeneous population, composed of imitative and innovative agents. Imitative agents change strategy only by imitating that of their neighbors, whereas innovative ones change strategy without the need for a copying source. The proposed model is analyzed by means of analytical calculations and numerical simulations in different topologies. Remarkably, results indicate that the mixing of mechanisms can be detrimental to cooperation near phase transitions. In those regions, the spatial reciprocity from imitative mechanisms is destroyed by innovative agents, leading to the downfall of cooperation. Our investigation sheds some light on the complex dynamics emerging from the heterogeneity of strategy revision methods, highlighting the role of innovation in evolutionary games.

Game Theory An Introduction

CERN Document Server

Barron, E N

2008-01-01

A fundamental introduction to modern game theory from a mathematical viewpoint. Game theory arises in almost every fact of human and inhuman interaction since oftentimes during these communications objectives are opposed or cooperation is viewed as an option. From economics and finance to biology and computer science, researchers and practitioners are often put in complex decision-making scenarios, whether they are interacting with each other or working with evolving technology and artificial intelligence. Acknowledging the role of mathematics in making logical and advantageous decisions, Game

An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Sector Coordination and Self-Organization

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Fernando P. Santos

2016-04-01

Full Text Available Coordination games provide ubiquitous interaction paradigms to frame human behavioral features, such as information transmission, conventions and languages as well as socio-economic processes and institutions. By using a dynamical approach, such as Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT, one is able to follow, in detail, the self-organization process by which a population of individuals coordinates into a given behavior. Real socio-economic scenarios, however, often involve the interaction between multiple co-evolving sectors, with specific options of their own, that call for generalized and more sophisticated mathematical frameworks. In this paper, we explore a general EGT approach to deal with coordination dynamics in which individuals from multiple sectors interact. Starting from a two-sector, consumer/producer scenario, we investigate the effects of including a third co-evolving sector that we call public. We explore the changes in the self-organization process of all sectors, given the feedback that this new sector imparts on the other two.

Playing Multi-Action Adversarial Games: Online Evolutionary Planning versus Tree Search

OpenAIRE

Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Risi, Sebastian; Togelius, Julian

2017-01-01

We address the problem of playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games, which include many strategy games with extremely high branching factors as players take multiple actions each turn. This leads to the breakdown of standard tree search methods, including Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), as they become unable to reach a sufficient depth in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce Online Evolutionary Planning (OEP) to address this challenge, which searches for combinations of actions ...

Game theory and plant ecology.

Science.gov (United States)

McNickle, Gordon G; Dybzinski, Ray

2013-04-01

The fixed and plastic traits possessed by a plant, which may be collectively thought of as its strategy, are commonly modelled as density-independent adaptations to its environment. However, plant strategies may also represent density- or frequency-dependent adaptations to the strategies used by neighbours. Game theory provides the tools to characterise such density- and frequency-dependent interactions. Here, we review the contributions of game theory to plant ecology. After briefly reviewing game theory from the perspective of plant ecology, we divide our review into three sections. First, game theoretical models of allocation to shoots and roots often predict investment in those organs beyond what would be optimal in the absence of competition. Second, game theoretical models of enemy defence suggest that an individual's investment in defence is not only a means of reducing its own tissue damage but also a means of deflecting enemies onto competitors. Finally, game theoretical models of trade with mutualistic partners suggest that the optimal trade may reflect competition for access to mutualistic partners among plants. In short, our review provides an accessible entrance to game theory that will help plant ecologists enrich their research with its worldview and existing predictions. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/CNRS.

Game theory and fish wars

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Jensen, Frank; Frost, Hans Staby; Thøgersen, Thomas Talund

2015-01-01

of the mackerel crisis is based on a statistical estimation of relevant functional relations, and the behavior of the players is explained using a fully specified empirical model. Simple, non-cooperative game theory shows that all players have an incentive to act non-cooperatively, a result that is robust......Simple non-cooperative and cooperative game theory is used to explore the crisis involving the European Union (EU), Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands regarding the size and relative allocation of total allowable catches (TACs) in the mackerel fishery in the Northeast Atlantic. The analysis...... to changes in basic assumptions regarding demand and cost functions. Thus, using the estimated parameters and functions, simple, non-cooperative game theory cannot explain the cooperative behavior of EU and Norway during the mackerel crisis. Simple cooperative game theory shows that no player has...

Spatial evolutionary games with weak selection.

Science.gov (United States)

Nanda, Mridu; Durrett, Richard

2017-06-06

Recently, a rigorous mathematical theory has been developed for spatial games with weak selection, i.e., when the payoff differences between strategies are small. The key to the analysis is that when space and time are suitably rescaled, the spatial model converges to the solution of a partial differential equation (PDE). This approach can be used to analyze all [Formula: see text] games, but there are a number of [Formula: see text] games for which the behavior of the limiting PDE is not known. In this paper, we give rules for determining the behavior of a large class of [Formula: see text] games and check their validity using simulation. In words, the effect of space is equivalent to making changes in the payoff matrix, and once this is done, the behavior of the spatial game can be predicted from the behavior of the replicator equation for the modified game. We say predicted here because in some cases the behavior of the spatial game is different from that of the replicator equation for the modified game. For example, if a rock-paper-scissors game has a replicator equation that spirals out to the boundary, space stabilizes the system and produces an equilibrium.

Evolutionary game theory and criticality

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Mahmoodi, Korosh; Grigolini, Paolo

2017-01-01

We study a regular two-dimensional network of individuals playing the Prisonner’s Dilemma game with their neighbors, assigning to each individual the adoption of two different criteria to make a choice between cooperation and defection. For a fraction q  incentive to cheat yields the extinction of cooperation and a modest one leads to the survival of cooperation. We show that for K={{K}\\text{c}} the adoption of a very small value of ɛ exerts a bias in favor of either cooperation or defection, as a form of criticality-induced intelligence, which leads the system to select either the cooperation or the defection branch, when K>{{K}\\text{c}} . Intermediate values of ɛ annihilated criticality-induced cognition and, as consequence, may favor defection choice even in the case when a wise payoff consideration is expected to yield the emergence of cooperation.

Some Analytical Properties of the Model for Stochastic Evolutionary Games in Finite Populations with Non-uniform Interaction Rate

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Quan Ji; Wang Xianjia

2013-01-01

Traditional evolutionary games assume uniform interaction rate, which means that the rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. But in some systems, especially biological systems, the players interact with each other discriminately. Taylor and Nowak (2006) were the first to establish the corresponding non-uniform interaction rate model by allowing the interaction rates to depend on strategies. Their model is based on replicator dynamics which assumes an infinite size population. But in reality, the number of individuals in the population is always finite, and there will be some random interference in the individuals' strategy selection process. Therefore, it is more practical to establish the corresponding stochastic evolutionary model in finite populations. In fact, the analysis of evolutionary games in a finite size population is more difficult. Just as Taylor and Nowak said in the outlook section of their paper, ''The analysis of non-uniform interaction rates should be extended to stochastic game dynamics of finite populations''. In this paper, we are exactly doing this work. We extend Taylor and Nowak's model from infinite to finite case, especially focusing on the infiuence of non-uniform connection characteristics on the evolutionary stable state of the system. We model the strategy evolutionary process of the population by a continuous ergodic Markov process. Based on the limit distribution of the process, we can give the evolutionary stable state of the system. We make a complete classification of the symmetric 2 × 2 games. For each case game, the corresponding limit distribution of the Markov-based process is given when noise intensity is small enough. In contrast with most literatures in evolutionary games using the simulation method, all our results obtained are analytical. Especially, in the dominant-case game, coexistence of the two strategies may become evolutionary stable states in our model. This result can be

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE MARKET COMPETITION

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

SIRGHI Nicoleta

2014-12-01

Full Text Available Evolutionary theory study of processes that transform economy for firms, institutions, industries, employment, production, trade and growth within, through the actions of diverse agents from experience and interactions, using evolutionary methodology. Evolutionary theory analyses the unleashing of a process of technological and institutional innovation by generating and testing a diversity of ideas which discover and accumulate more survival value for the costs incurred than competing alternatives.This paper presents study the behavior of the firms on the market used the evolutionary theory.The paper is to present in full the developments that have led to the re-assessment of theories of firms starting from the criticism on Coase's theory based on the lack of testable hypotheses and on non-operative definition of transaction costs. In the literature in the field studies on firms were allotted a secondary place for a long period of time, to date the new theories of the firm hold a dominant place in the firms’ economic analysis. In an article, published in 1937, Ronald H. Coase identified the main sources of the cost of using the market mechanism. The firms theory represent a issue intensively studied in the literature in the field, regarding the survival, competitiveness and innovation of firm on the market. The research of Nelson and Winter, “An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change” (1982 is the starting point for a modern literature in the field which considers the approach of the theory of the firm from an evolutionary perspective. Nelson and Winter have shown that the “orthodox” theory, is objectionable primarily by the fact that the hypothesis regarding profit maximization has a normative character and is not valid in any situation. Nelson and Winter reconsidered their microeconomic analysis showing that excessive attention should not be paid to market equilibrium but rather to dynamic processes resulting from irreversible

Game theory a very short introduction

CERN Document Server

Binmore, Ken

2007-01-01

Games are played everywhere: from economics and online auctions to social interactions, and game theory is about how to play such games in a rational way, and how to maximize their outcomes. This VSI reveals, without mathematical equations, the insights the theory can bring to everything from how to play poker optimally to the sex ratio among bees. - ;Games are everywhere: Drivers manoeuvring in heavy traffic are playing a driving game. Bargain hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning game. A firm negotiating next year's wage is playing a bargaining game. The opposing candidates in an

Towards a Population Dynamics Theory for Evolutionary Computing: Learning from Biological Population Dynamics in Nature

Science.gov (United States)

Ma, Zhanshan (Sam)

In evolutionary computing (EC), population size is one of the critical parameters that a researcher has to deal with. Hence, it was no surprise that the pioneers of EC, such as De Jong (1975) and Holland (1975), had already studied the population sizing from the very beginning of EC. What is perhaps surprising is that more than three decades later, we still largely depend on the experience or ad-hoc trial-and-error approach to set the population size. For example, in a recent monograph, Eiben and Smith (2003) indicated: "In almost all EC applications, the population size is constant and does not change during the evolutionary search." Despite enormous research on this issue in recent years, we still lack a well accepted theory for population sizing. In this paper, I propose to develop a population dynamics theory forEC with the inspiration from the population dynamics theory of biological populations in nature. Essentially, the EC population is considered as a dynamic system over time (generations) and space (search space or fitness landscape), similar to the spatial and temporal dynamics of biological populations in nature. With this conceptual mapping, I propose to 'transplant' the biological population dynamics theory to EC via three steps: (i) experimentally test the feasibility—whether or not emulating natural population dynamics improves the EC performance; (ii) comparatively study the underlying mechanisms—why there are improvements, primarily via statistical modeling analysis; (iii) conduct theoretical analysis with theoretical models such as percolation theory and extended evolutionary game theory that are generally applicable to both EC and natural populations. This article is a summary of a series of studies we have performed to achieve the general goal [27][30]-[32]. In the following, I start with an extremely brief introduction on the theory and models of natural population dynamics (Sections 1 & 2). In Sections 4 to 6, I briefly discuss three

Game theory and public policy

CERN Document Server

McCain, Roger A

2015-01-01

This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.

Calculating evolutionary dynamics in structured populations.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Charles G Nathanson

2009-12-01

Full Text Available Evolution is shaping the world around us. At the core of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The outcome of an evolutionary process depends on population structure. Here we provide a general formula for calculating evolutionary dynamics in a wide class of structured populations. This class includes the recently introduced "games in phenotype space" and "evolutionary set theory." There can be local interactions for determining the relative fitness of individuals, but we require global updating, which means all individuals compete uniformly for reproduction. We study the competition of two strategies in the context of an evolutionary game and determine which strategy is favored in the limit of weak selection. We derive an intuitive formula for the structure coefficient, sigma, and provide a method for efficient numerical calculation.

Multiscale structure in eco-evolutionary dynamics

Science.gov (United States)

Stacey, Blake C.

In a complex system, the individual components are neither so tightly coupled or correlated that they can all be treated as a single unit, nor so uncorrelated that they can be approximated as independent entities. Instead, patterns of interdependency lead to structure at multiple scales of organization. Evolution excels at producing such complex structures. In turn, the existence of these complex interrelationships within a biological system affects the evolutionary dynamics of that system. I present a mathematical formalism for multiscale structure, grounded in information theory, which makes these intuitions quantitative, and I show how dynamics defined in terms of population genetics or evolutionary game theory can lead to multiscale organization. For complex systems, "more is different," and I address this from several perspectives. Spatial host--consumer models demonstrate the importance of the structures which can arise due to dynamical pattern formation. Evolutionary game theory reveals the novel effects which can result from multiplayer games, nonlinear payoffs and ecological stochasticity. Replicator dynamics in an environment with mesoscale structure relates to generalized conditionalization rules in probability theory. The idea of natural selection "acting at multiple levels" has been mathematized in a variety of ways, not all of which are equivalent. We will face down the confusion, using the experience developed over the course of this thesis to clarify the situation.

Continual Online Evolutionary Planning for In-Game Build Order Adaptation in StarCraft

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Justesen, Niels Orsleff; Risi, Sebastian

2017-01-01

able to switch between predefined strategies, which makes it hard to adapt to new situations. This paper introduces an evolutionary-based method to overcome this challenge, called Continual Online Evolutionary Planning (COEP), which is able to perform in-game adaptive build-order planning. COEP......The real-time strategy game StarCraft has become an important benchmark for AI research as it poses a complex environment with numerous challenges. An important strategic aspect in this game is to decide what buildings and units to produce. StarCraft bots playing in AI competitions today are only...... was added to an open source StarCraft bot called UAlbertaBot and is able to outperform the built-in bots in the game as well as being competitive against a number of scripted opening strategies. The COEP augmented bot can change its build order dynamically and quickly adapt to the opponent’s strategy....

Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M.; Wu, Rongling

2017-03-01

Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention.

Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making.

Science.gov (United States)

Toupo, Danielle F P; Strogatz, Steven H; Cohen, Jonathan D; Rand, David G

2015-07-01

We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model in which agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions in which having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition and suggest necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.

Evolutionary game dynamics of controlled and automatic decision-making

Science.gov (United States)

Toupo, Danielle F. P.; Strogatz, Steven H.; Cohen, Jonathan D.; Rand, David G.

2015-07-01

We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model in which agents who make decisions using either automatic or controlled processing compete with each other for survival. Agents using automatic processing act quickly and so are more likely to acquire resources, but agents using controlled processing are better planners and so make more effective use of the resources they have. Using the replicator equation, we characterize the conditions under which automatic or controlled agents dominate, when coexistence is possible and when bistability occurs. We then extend the replicator equation to consider feedback between the state of the population and the environment. Under conditions in which having a greater proportion of controlled agents either enriches the environment or enhances the competitive advantage of automatic agents, we find that limit cycles can occur, leading to persistent oscillations in the population dynamics. Critically, however, these limit cycles only emerge when feedback occurs on a sufficiently long time scale. Our results shed light on the connection between evolution and human cognition and suggest necessary conditions for the rise and fall of rationality.

Evolutionary games combining two or three pair coordinations on a square lattice

Science.gov (United States)

Király, Balázs; Szabó, György

2017-10-01

We study multiagent logit-rule-driven evolutionary games on a square lattice whose pair interactions are composed of a maximal number of nonoverlapping elementary coordination games describing Ising-type interactions between just two of the available strategies. Using Monte Carlo simulations we investigate the macroscopic noise-level-dependent behavior of the two- and three-pair games and the critical properties of the continuous phase transtitions these systems exhibit. The four-strategy game is shown to be equivalent to a system that consists of two independent and identical Ising models.

Game theory in the death galaxy: interaction of cancer and stromal cells in tumour microenvironment.

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Amy; Liao, David; Tlsty, Thea D; Sturm, James C; Austin, Robert H

2014-08-06

Preventing relapse is the major challenge to effective therapy in cancer. Within the tumour, stromal (ST) cells play an important role in cancer progression and the emergence of drug resistance. During cancer treatment, the fitness of cancer cells can be enhanced by ST cells because their molecular signalling interaction delays the drug-induced apoptosis of cancer cells. On the other hand, competition among cancer and ST cells for space or resources should not be ignored. We explore the population dynamics of multiple myeloma (MM) versus bone marrow ST cells by using an experimental microecology that we call the death galaxy, with a stable drug gradient and connected microhabitats. Evolutionary game theory is a quantitative way to capture the frequency-dependent nature of interactive populations. Therefore, we use evolutionary game theory to model the populations in the death galaxy with the gradients of pay-offs and successfully predict the future densities of MM and ST cells. We discuss the possible clinical use of such analysis for predicting cancer progression.

An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling

Science.gov (United States)

Kane, Patrick; Zollman, Kevin J. S.

2015-01-01

The handicap principle has come under significant challenge both from empirical studies and from theoretical work. As a result, a number of alternative explanations for honest signaling have been proposed. This paper compares the evolutionary plausibility of one such alternative, the “hybrid equilibrium,” to the handicap principle. We utilize computer simulations to compare these two theories as they are instantiated in Maynard Smith’s Sir Philip Sidney game. We conclude that, when both types of communication are possible, evolution is unlikely to lead to handicap signaling and is far more likely to result in the partially honest signaling predicted by hybrid equilibrium theory. PMID:26348617

Scaling behavior can be tricky: Comment on "Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games" by Z. Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Hui, Pak Ming; Xu, Chen

2015-09-01

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful tool for studying the emergence of cooperation among competing individuals [1]. Popularly studied games include the prisoner's dilemma [2], snowdrift game [3] and stag hunt game [4]. They have been extensively studied for the extent of cooperative behavior under different dilemma strengths. Generally, the games can be defined by a 2 × 2 matrix and thus four payoff elements, T, R, P, and S, for the possible payoffs to players when they use pure strategies against each other. Detailed definitions of the four payoffs are given in the review by Wang et al. [5]. For simplicity, it is often the case that fewer parameters are invoked, e.g. a single parameter [3] and more generally two parameters [6]. Generally speaking, reducing the number of parameters has the effect of restricting the system to a certain subspace of the unreduced case. In addition, the spatial structures, such as a well-mixed population or a population forming a complex network, that govern the competing relationship and environment of the agents, and the evolutionary rules, that govern how agents update their strategies, are vital in determining how cooperation evolves, as well documented in the references of [5].

Game Engagement Theory and Adult Learning

Science.gov (United States)

Whitton, Nicola

2011-01-01

One of the benefits of computer game-based learning is the ability of certain types of game to engage and motivate learners. However, theories of learning and engagement, particularly in the sphere of higher education, typically fail to consider gaming engagement theory. In this article, the author examines the principles of engagement from games…

A Test of Evolutionary Policing Theory with Data from Human Societies

Science.gov (United States)

Kümmerli, Rolf

2011-01-01

In social groups where relatedness among interacting individuals is low, cooperation can often only be maintained through mechanisms that repress competition among group members. Repression-of-competition mechanisms, such as policing and punishment, seem to be of particular importance in human societies, where cooperative interactions often occur among unrelated individuals. In line with this view, economic games have shown that the ability to punish defectors enforces cooperation among humans. Here, I examine a real-world example of a repression-of-competition system, the police institutions common to modern human societies. Specifically, I test evolutionary policing theory by comparing data on policing effort, per capita crime rate, and similarity (used as a proxy for genetic relatedness) among citizens across the 26 cantons of Switzerland. This comparison revealed full support for all three predictions of evolutionary policing theory. First, when controlling for policing efforts, crime rate correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens. This is in line with the prediction that high similarity results in higher levels of cooperative self-restraint (i.e. lower crime rates) because it aligns the interests of individuals. Second, policing effort correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens, supporting the prediction that more policing is required to enforce cooperation in low-similarity societies, where individuals' interests diverge most. Third, increased policing efforts were associated with reductions in crime rates, indicating that policing indeed enforces cooperation. These analyses strongly indicate that humans respond to cues of their social environment and adjust cheating and policing behaviour as predicted by evolutionary policing theory. PMID:21909429

A test of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies.

Science.gov (United States)

Kümmerli, Rolf

2011-01-01

In social groups where relatedness among interacting individuals is low, cooperation can often only be maintained through mechanisms that repress competition among group members. Repression-of-competition mechanisms, such as policing and punishment, seem to be of particular importance in human societies, where cooperative interactions often occur among unrelated individuals. In line with this view, economic games have shown that the ability to punish defectors enforces cooperation among humans. Here, I examine a real-world example of a repression-of-competition system, the police institutions common to modern human societies. Specifically, I test evolutionary policing theory by comparing data on policing effort, per capita crime rate, and similarity (used as a proxy for genetic relatedness) among citizens across the 26 cantons of Switzerland. This comparison revealed full support for all three predictions of evolutionary policing theory. First, when controlling for policing efforts, crime rate correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens. This is in line with the prediction that high similarity results in higher levels of cooperative self-restraint (i.e. lower crime rates) because it aligns the interests of individuals. Second, policing effort correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens, supporting the prediction that more policing is required to enforce cooperation in low-similarity societies, where individuals' interests diverge most. Third, increased policing efforts were associated with reductions in crime rates, indicating that policing indeed enforces cooperation. These analyses strongly indicate that humans respond to cues of their social environment and adjust cheating and policing behaviour as predicted by evolutionary policing theory.

A test of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Rolf Kümmerli

Full Text Available In social groups where relatedness among interacting individuals is low, cooperation can often only be maintained through mechanisms that repress competition among group members. Repression-of-competition mechanisms, such as policing and punishment, seem to be of particular importance in human societies, where cooperative interactions often occur among unrelated individuals. In line with this view, economic games have shown that the ability to punish defectors enforces cooperation among humans. Here, I examine a real-world example of a repression-of-competition system, the police institutions common to modern human societies. Specifically, I test evolutionary policing theory by comparing data on policing effort, per capita crime rate, and similarity (used as a proxy for genetic relatedness among citizens across the 26 cantons of Switzerland. This comparison revealed full support for all three predictions of evolutionary policing theory. First, when controlling for policing efforts, crime rate correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens. This is in line with the prediction that high similarity results in higher levels of cooperative self-restraint (i.e. lower crime rates because it aligns the interests of individuals. Second, policing effort correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens, supporting the prediction that more policing is required to enforce cooperation in low-similarity societies, where individuals' interests diverge most. Third, increased policing efforts were associated with reductions in crime rates, indicating that policing indeed enforces cooperation. These analyses strongly indicate that humans respond to cues of their social environment and adjust cheating and policing behaviour as predicted by evolutionary policing theory.

Online game-enhanced teaching in game theory

OpenAIRE

Badeau-Mahmoud, Sonia; Deloche, Regis; Koscielniak, Thierry

2014-01-01

Introducing digital educational games into class lessons can generate engagement, interactivity, and motivation. It can also result in an active participation of the students in the classroom. To achieve this goal, one teaching strategy is to use online digital games in teaching and learning situations. In our case, we wanted to test this strategy in an economics course, especially in a Game Theory lesson. We set up an experiment in two different lessons: the “Economie expérimentale” (...

Evolutionary theory and the naturalist fallacy

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Grodal, Torben Kragh

2008-01-01

that great work of art are also automatically fitness-enhancing in the present day environment, at that there are simple correllations between whether a work of art has a high aesthetic value and whether it is fitness-enhancing or not.  Keywords :  Evolutionary aesthetics, film theory, literary theory......The article is an invited response to a target article by Joseph Carroll entitled "An evolutionary paradigm for literary study". It argues that the target article  misuse the fact that works of art are based on adaptations that were fitness-enhancing in the era of evolutionary adaptations to claim...

Evolutionary dynamics of division of labor games with selfish agents

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Jianlei; Li, Qiaoyu; Zhang, Chunyan

2017-11-01

The division of labor is one of the most basic and widely studied aspects of collective behavior in natural systems. Studies of division of labor are concerned with the integration of the individual worker behavior into a colony level task organization and with the question of how the regulation of the division of labor may contribute to the colony efficiency. This paper investigates the evolution of the division of labor with three strategies by employing the evolutionary game theory. Thus, these available strategies are, respectively, strategy A (performing task A), strategy B (performing task B), and strategy D (not performing any task but only free riding others' contributions). And, two typical networks (i.e., BA scale-free network and lattice network) are employed here for describing the interaction structure among agents. The theoretical analysis together with simulation results reveal that the division of labor can evolve and leads to players that differ in their tendency to take on a given task. The conditions under which the division of labor evolves depend on the costs for performing the task, the benefits led by performing the task, and the interaction structures among the players who are involved with division of labor games.

European Conference on Game Theory & Networking Games and Management

CERN Document Server

Mazalov, Vladimir

2016-01-01

This contributed volume contains fourteen papers based on selected presentations from the European Conference on Game Theory SING11-GTM 2015, held at Saint Petersburg State University in July 2015, and the Networking Games and Management workshop, held at the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Petrozvavodsk, Russia, also in July 2015. These papers cover a wide range of topics in game theory, including recent advances in areas with high potential for future work, as well as new developments on classical results. Some of these include A new approach to journal ranking using methods from social choice theory; A differential game of a duopoly in which two firms are competing for market share in an industry with network externalities; The impact of information propagation in the model of tax audits; A voting model in which the results of previous votes can affect the process of coalition formation in a decision-making body; The Selten-Szidarovsky technique for the analysis of Nash equil...

Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity

Science.gov (United States)

Amaral, Marco A.; Wardil, Lucas; Perc, Matjaž; da Silva, Jafferson K. L.

2016-04-01

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two different games. While in well-mixed populations the random mixture of the two games is always equivalent to the average single game, in structured populations this is not always the case. We show that the outcome is, in fact, strongly dependent on the distance of separation of the two games in the parameter space. Effectively, this distance introduces payoff heterogeneity, and the average game is returned only if the heterogeneity is small. For higher levels of heterogeneity the distance to the average game grows, which often involves the promotion of cooperation. The presented results support preceding research that highlights the favorable role of heterogeneity regardless of its origin, and they also emphasize the importance of the population structure in amplifying facilitators of cooperation.

Sequential interactions-in which one player plays first and another responds-promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games.

Science.gov (United States)

Laird, Robert A

2018-05-21

Cooperation is a central topic in evolutionary biology because (a) it is difficult to reconcile why individuals would act in a way that benefits others if such action is costly to themselves, and (b) it underpins many of the 'major transitions of evolution', making it essential for explaining the origins of successively higher levels of biological organization. Within evolutionary game theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games are the main theoretical constructs used to study the evolution of cooperation in dyadic interactions. In single-shot versions of these games, wherein individuals play each other only once, players typically act simultaneously rather than sequentially. Allowing one player to respond to the actions of its co-player-in the absence of any possibility of the responder being rewarded for cooperation or punished for defection, as in simultaneous or sequential iterated games-may seem to invite more incentive for exploitation and retaliation in single-shot games, compared to when interactions occur simultaneously, thereby reducing the likelihood that cooperative strategies can thrive. To the contrary, I use lattice-based, evolutionary-dynamical simulation models of single-shot games to demonstrate that under many conditions, sequential interactions have the potential to enhance unilaterally or mutually cooperative outcomes and increase the average payoff of populations, relative to simultaneous interactions-benefits that are especially prevalent in a spatially explicit context. This surprising result is attributable to the presence of conditional strategies that emerge in sequential games that can't occur in the corresponding simultaneous versions. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Game Theory in Wireless Ad-Hoc Opportunistic Radios

OpenAIRE

Mumtaz, Shahid; Gameiro, Atilio

2010-01-01

Emerging research in game theory based power control applied to ad hoc opportunist networks shows much promise to help understand the complex interactions between OR nodes in this highly dynamic and distributed environment. Also, the employment of game theory in modeling dynamic situations for opportunist ad hoc networks where OR nodes have incomplete information has led to the application of largely unexplored games such as games of imperfect monitoring. Ad hoc security using game theory is ...

Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition.

Science.gov (United States)

Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M; Wu, Rongling

2017-03-01

Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Bacteria and game theory: the rise and fall of cooperation in spatially heterogeneous environments.

Science.gov (United States)

Lambert, Guillaume; Vyawahare, Saurabh; Austin, Robert H

2014-08-06

One of the predictions of game theory is that cooperative behaviours are vulnerable to exploitation by selfish individuals, but this result seemingly contradicts the survival of cooperation observed in nature. In this review, we will introduce game theoretical concepts that lead to this conclusion and show how the spatial competition dynamics between microorganisms can be used to model the survival and maintenance of cooperation. In particular, we focus on how Escherichia coli bacteria with a growth advantage in stationary phase (GASP) phenotype maintain a proliferative phenotype when faced with overcrowding to gain a fitness advantage over wild-type populations. We review recent experimental approaches studying the growth dynamics of competing GASP and wild-type strains of E. coli inside interconnected microfabricated habitats and use a game theoretical approach to analyse the observed inter-species interactions. We describe how the use of evolutionary game theory and the ideal free distribution accurately models the spatial distribution of cooperative and selfish individuals in spatially heterogeneous environments. Using bacteria as a model system of cooperative and selfish behaviours may lead to a better understanding of the competition dynamics of other organisms-including tumour-host interactions during cancer development and metastasis.

Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory

CERN Document Server

Chalkiadakis, Georgios; Wooldridge, Michael

2011-01-01

Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representation

Reducible and nonsensical uses of game theory

NARCIS (Netherlands)

de Bruin, B.P.

The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game

Economic Game Theory to Model the Attenuation of Virulence of an Obligate Intracellular Bacterium.

Science.gov (United States)

Tago, Damian; Meyer, Damien F

2016-01-01

Diseases induced by obligate intracellular pathogens have a large burden on global human and animal health. Understanding the factors involved in the virulence and fitness of these pathogens contributes to the development of control strategies against these diseases. Based on biological observations, a theoretical model using game theory is proposed to explain how obligate intracellular bacteria interact with their host. The equilibrium in such a game shows that the virulence and fitness of the bacterium is host-triggered and by changing the host's defense system to which the bacterium is confronted, an evolutionary process leads to an attenuated strain. Although, the attenuation procedure has already been conducted in practice in order to develop an attenuated vaccine (e.g., with Ehrlichia ruminantium), there was a lack of understanding of the theoretical basis behind this process. Our work provides a model to better comprehend the existence of different phenotypes and some underlying evolutionary mechanisms for the virulence of obligate intracellular bacteria.

A network growth model based on the evolutionary ultimatum game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Deng, L L; Zhou, G G; Cai, J H; Wang, C; Tang, W S

2012-01-01

In this paper, we provide a network growth model with incorporation into the ultimatum game dynamics. The network grows on the basis of the payoff-oriented preferential attachment mechanism, where a new node is added into the network and attached preferentially to nodes with higher payoffs. The interplay between the network growth and the game dynamics gives rise to quite interesting dynamical behaviors. Simulation results show the emergence of altruistic behaviors in the ultimatum game, which is affected by the growing network structure. Compared with the static counterpart case, the levels of altruistic behaviors are promoted. The corresponding strategy distributions and wealth distributions are also presented to further demonstrate the strategy evolutionary dynamics. Subsequently, we turn to the topological properties of the evolved network, by virtue of some statistics. The most studied characteristic path length and the clustering coefficient of the network are shown to indicate their small-world effect. Then the degree distributions are analyzed to clarify the interplay of structure and evolutionary dynamics. In particular, the difference between our growth network and the static counterpart is revealed. To explain clearly the evolved networks, the rich-club ordering and the assortative mixing coefficient are exploited to reveal the degree correlation. (paper)

Game Theory (2/2)

CERN Document Server

CERN. Geneva

2014-01-01

This lecture series will present the main directions of Algorithmic Game Theory, a new field that has emerged in the last two decades at the interface of Game Theory and Computer Science, because of the unprecedented growth in size, complexity, and impact of the Internet and the Web. These include the price of anarchy (what is the impact of selfishness on a system of competing entities), computational complexity (can the market find a reasonable solution), mechanisms and auctions (what incentives to give to selfish individuals).

Game Theory (1/2)

CERN Document Server

CERN. Geneva

2014-01-01

This lecture series will present the main directions of Algorithmic Game Theory, a new field that has emerged in the last two decades at the interface of Game Theory and Computer Science, because of the unprecedented growth in size, complexity, and impact of the Internet and the Web. These include the price of anarchy (what is the impact of selfishness on a system of competing entities), computational complexity (can the market find a reasonable solution), mechanisms and auctions (what incentives to give to selfish individuals).

Essays in game theory and natural resource management

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Pham Do, K.H.

2003-01-01

This thesis presents a collection of essays in game theory with applications to environmental resource problems and their management. A major focus of these essays is related to coalitional games in which several classes of games, their properties and solution concepts are studied. Game theory is

Evolutionary Artificial Neural Network Weight Tuning to Optimize Decision Making for an Abstract Game

Science.gov (United States)

2010-03-01

EVOLUTIONARY ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK WEIGHT TUNING TO OPTIMIZE DECISION MAKING FOR AN ABSTRACT...AFIT/GCS/ENG/10-06 EVOLUTIONARY ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK WEIGHT TUNING TO OPTIMIZE DECISION MAKING FOR AN ABSTRACT GAME THESIS Presented...35 14: Diagram of pLoGANN’s Artificial Neural Network and

Networks and learning in game theory

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kets, W.

2008-01-01

This work concentrates on two topics, networks and game theory, and learning in games. The first part of this thesis looks at network games and the role of incomplete information in such games. It is assumed that players are located on a network and interact with their neighbors in the network.

Cooperative Evolutionary Game and Applications in Construction Supplier Tendency

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Qianqian Shi

2018-01-01

Full Text Available Major construction projects have a great influence on the national economy and society, wherein cooperative relationship between construction suppliers plays an increasingly significant role in the overall supply chain system. However, the relationships between suppliers are noncontractual, multistage, dynamic, and complicated. To gain a deeper insight into the suppliers’ cooperative relationships, an evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation tendency of multisuppliers. A replicator dynamic system is further formulated to investigate the evolutionary stable strategies of multisuppliers. Then, fourteen “when-then” type scenarios are concluded and classified into six different evolutionary tracks. Meanwhile, the critical influencing factors are identified. The results show that the suppliers’ production capacity, owner-supplier contract, and the owner’s incentive mechanism influence the cooperation tendency of suppliers directly. The managerial implications contribute to insightful references for a more stable cooperative relationship between the owner and suppliers.

A dynamic parking charge optimal control model under perspective of commuters' evolutionary game behavior

Science.gov (United States)

Lin, XuXun; Yuan, PengCheng

2018-01-01

In this research we consider commuters' dynamic learning effect by modeling the trip mode choice behavior from a new perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory. We explore the behavior pattern of different types of commuters and study the evolution path and equilibrium properties under different traffic conditions. We further establish a dynamic parking charge optimal control (referred to as DPCOC) model to alter commuters' trip mode choice while minimizing the total social cost. Numerical tests show. (1) Under fixed parking fee policy, the evolutionary results are completely decided by the travel time and the only method for public transit induction is to increase the parking charge price. (2) Compared with fixed parking fee policy, DPCOC policy proposed in this research has several advantages. Firstly, it can effectively turn the evolutionary path and evolutionary stable strategy to a better situation while minimizing the total social cost. Secondly, it can reduce the sensitivity of trip mode choice behavior to traffic congestion and improve the ability to resist interferences and emergencies. Thirdly, it is able to control the private car proportion to a stable state and make the trip behavior more predictable for the transportation management department. The research results can provide theoretical basis and decision-making references for commuters' mode choice prediction, dynamic setting of urban parking charge prices and public transit induction.

An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Courtois, P. [CIRED and University of Paris, Paris (France); Pereau, J.C. [OEP, University of Marne-la-Vallee, Marne-la-Vallee (France); Tazdait, T. [CIRED and OEP, University of Marne-la-Vallee, Marne-la-Vallee (France)

2001-10-01

We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours.

An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courtois, P.; Pereau, J.C.; Tazdait, T.

2001-10-01

We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours

Spatial evolutionary games of interaction among generic cancer cells

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bach, L.A.; Sumpter, D.J.T.; Alsner, J.

2003-01-01

Evolutionary game models of cellular interactions have shown that heterogeneity in the cellular genotypic composition is maintained through evolution to stable coexistence of growth-promoting and non-promoting cell types. We generalise these mean-field models and relax the assumption of perfect m...... at a cellular level. This study thus points a new direction towards more plausible spatial tumour modelling and the understanding of cancerous growth....

Spatial interaction models facility location using game theory

CERN Document Server

D'Amato, Egidio; Pardalos, Panos

2017-01-01

Facility location theory develops the idea of locating one or more facilities by optimizing suitable criteria such as minimizing transportation cost, or capturing the largest market share. The contributions in this book focus an approach to facility location theory through game theoretical tools highlighting situations where a location decision is faced by several decision makers and leading to a game theoretical framework in non-cooperative and cooperative methods. Models and methods regarding the facility location via game theory are explored and applications are illustrated through economics, engineering, and physics. Mathematicians, engineers, economists and computer scientists working in theory, applications and computational aspects of facility location problems using game theory will find this book useful.

Falsification of matching theory and confirmation of an evolutionary theory of behavior dynamics in a critical experiment.

Science.gov (United States)

McDowell, J J; Calvin, Olivia L; Hackett, Ryan; Klapes, Bryan

2017-07-01

Two competing predictions of matching theory and an evolutionary theory of behavior dynamics, and one additional prediction of the evolutionary theory, were tested in a critical experiment in which human participants worked on concurrent schedules for money (Dallery et al., 2005). The three predictions concerned the descriptive adequacy of matching theory equations, and of equations describing emergent equilibria of the evolutionary theory. Tests of the predictions falsified matching theory and supported the evolutionary theory. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Older partner selection promotes the prevalence of cooperation in evolutionary games.

Science.gov (United States)

Yang, Guoli; Huang, Jincai; Zhang, Weiming

2014-10-21

Evolutionary games typically come with the interplays between evolution of individual strategy and adaptation to network structure. How these dynamics in the co-evolution promote (or obstruct) the cooperation is regarded as an important topic in social, economic, and biological fields. Combining spatial selection with partner choice, the focus of this paper is to identify which neighbour should be selected as a role to imitate during the process of co-evolution. Age, an internal attribute and kind of local piece of information regarding the survivability of the agent, is a significant consideration for the selection strategy. The analysis and simulations presented, demonstrate that older partner selection for strategy imitation could foster the evolution of cooperation. The younger partner selection, however, may decrease the level of cooperation. Our model highlights the importance of agent׳s age on the promotion of cooperation in evolutionary games, both efficiently and effectively. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Evolutionary games played by multi-agent system with different memory capacity

Science.gov (United States)

Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan

2015-06-01

The evolution of cooperation is still an enigma. Resolution of cooperative dilemma is a hot topic as a perplexing interdisciplinary project, and has captured wide attention of researchers from many disciplines as a multidisciplinary field. Our main concern is the design of a networked evolutionary game model in which players show difference in memory capability. The idea of different memory capacities has its origin on the pervasive individual heterogeneity of real agents in nature. It is concluded that this proposed multiple memory capacity stimulates cooperation in lattice-structured populations. The networking effect is also investigated via a scale free network which is associated with the heterogeneous populations structure. Interestingly, results suggest that the effectiveness of a heterogeneous network at fostering cooperation is reduced in the presence of individual memory here. A thorough inquiry in the coevolutionary dynamics of individual memory and spatial structure in evolutionary games is planned for the immediate future.

Mean-field approximations of fixation time distributions of evolutionary game dynamics on graphs

Science.gov (United States)

Ying, Li-Min; Zhou, Jie; Tang, Ming; Guan, Shu-Guang; Zou, Yong

2018-02-01

The mean fixation time is often not accurate for describing the timescales of fixation probabilities of evolutionary games taking place on complex networks. We simulate the game dynamics on top of complex network topologies and approximate the fixation time distributions using a mean-field approach. We assume that there are two absorbing states. Numerically, we show that the mean fixation time is sufficient in characterizing the evolutionary timescales when network structures are close to the well-mixing condition. In contrast, the mean fixation time shows large inaccuracies when networks become sparse. The approximation accuracy is determined by the network structure, and hence by the suitability of the mean-field approach. The numerical results show good agreement with the theoretical predictions.

Toward a general evolutionary theory of oncogenesis.

Science.gov (United States)

Ewald, Paul W; Swain Ewald, Holly A

2013-01-01

We propose an evolutionary framework, the barrier theory of cancer, which is based on the distinction between barriers to oncogenesis and restraints. Barriers are defined as mechanisms that prevent oncogenesis. Restraints, which are more numerous, inhibit but do not prevent oncogenesis. Processes that compromise barriers are essential causes of cancer; those that interfere with restraints are exacerbating causes. The barrier theory is built upon the three evolutionary processes involved in oncogenesis: natural selection acting on multicellular organisms to mold barriers and restraints, natural selection acting on infectious organisms to abrogate these protective mechanisms, and oncogenic selection which is responsible for the evolution of normal cells into cancerous cells. The barrier theory is presented as a first step toward the development of a general evolutionary theory of cancer. Its attributes and implications for intervention are compared with those of other major conceptual frameworks for understanding cancer: the clonal diversification model, the stem cell theory and the hallmarks of cancer. The barrier theory emphasizes the practical value of distinguishing between essential and exacerbating causes. It also stresses the importance of determining the scope of infectious causation of cancer, because individual pathogens can be responsible for multiple essential causes in infected cells.

Population Games, Stable Games, and Passivity

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Michael J. Fox

2013-10-01

Full Text Available The class of “stable games”, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a “passive” dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.

On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend

2011-01-01

We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman

Restoring Fun to Game Theory

Science.gov (United States)

Dixit, Avinash

2005-01-01

The author suggests methods for teaching game theory at an introductory level, using interactive games to be played in the classroom or in computer clusters, clips from movies to be screened and discussed, and excerpts from novels and historical books to be read and discussed.

Evolutionary competition between boundedly rational behavioral rules in oligopoly games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cerboni Baiardi, Lorenzo; Lamantia, Fabio; Radi, Davide

2015-01-01

In this paper, we propose an evolutionary model of oligopoly competition where agents can select between different behavioral rules to make decisions on productions. We formalize the model as a general class of evolutionary oligopoly games and then we consider an example with two specific rules, namely Local Monopolistic Approximation and Gradient dynamics. We provide several results on the global dynamic properties of the model, showing that in some cases the attractor of the system may belong to an invariant plane where only one behavioral rule is adopted (monomorphic state). The attractors on the invariant planes can be either strong attractors or weak attractors. However, we also explain why the system can be in a state of Evolutionary Stable Heterogeneity, where it is more profitable for the agents to employ both heuristics in the long term (polymorphic state).

Introduction: games and subcultural theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Marco Benoit Carbone

2014-03-01

Full Text Available This issue of GAME Journal offers a recognition and a series of case studies on video games from the point of view of subcultural theory. Game studies have hitherto focused little on their object from this perspective, which offers a theoretical frame for the historical and ever growing complexity of the audiences involved with the medium of the video game. The study of subcultures on the other hand has a long standing and complex tradition which culminates in what has been recently defined as the “post-subcultural” theoretical scenario.

Playing Multi-Action Adversarial Games: Online Evolutionary Planning versus Tree Search

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Risi, Sebastian

2017-01-01

We address the problem of playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games, which include many strategy games with extremely high branching factors as players take multiple actions each turn. This leads to the breakdown of standard tree search methods, including Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS......), as they become unable to reach a sufficient depth in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce Online Evolutionary Planning (OEP) to address this challenge, which searches for combinations of actions to perform during a single turn guided by a fitness function that evaluates the quality of a particular state....... We compare OEP to different MCTS variations that constrain the exploration to deal with the high branching factor in the turn-based multi-action game Hero Academy. While the constrained MCTS variations outperform the vanilla MCTS implementation by a large margin, OEP is able to search the space...

Psychology of Game Playing: Introduction to a Special Issue

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Andrew M. Colman

2015-12-01

Full Text Available Game theory has focused attention on different problems at different times in its history. Currently, attention is devoted to investigating how human decision makers with bounded rationality choose strategies in interactive decisions. Behavioral economics, and more generally experimental games, have appeared in the literature with accelerating frequency since 1990, and this cannot continue indefinitely without a proportional expansion of journal space. This Special Issue includes contributions to behavioral economics, experimental games, and evolutionary game theory, using theoretical, experimental, and agent-based modeling techniques.

Game theory and its role in determining optimal policies and strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers : (Application of differential game theory and stackelberg games)

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Mahmoudinia, D.; Esfahani, Rahim Dalali; Engwerda, Jacob; Dastjerdi, R.B.

2016-01-01

In this study, we follow several purpose. In the first section, the game theory concept and the formation of its fundamental concepts is examined. After that, we investigate that how von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) and john Nash (1950-1953) works, caused the formation of modern game theory. Then, we

Randomness and arbitrary coordination in the reactive ultimatum game

Science.gov (United States)

da Silva, Roberto; Valverde, Pablo; Lamb, Luis C.

2016-07-01

Darwin's theory of evolution - as introduced in game theory by Maynard Smith - is not the only important evolutionary aspect in an evolutionary dynamics, since complex interdependencies, competition, and growth should be modeled by, for example, reactive aspects. In the ultimatum game, the reciprocity and the fifty-fifty partition seems to be a deviation from rational behavior of the players under the light of Nash equilibrium. Such equilibrium emerges, for example, from the punishment of the responder who generally tends to refuse unfair proposals. In the iterated version of the game, the proposers are able to improve their proposals by adding a value thus making fairer proposals. Such evolutionary aspects are not properly Darwinian-motivated, but they are endowed with a fundamental aspect: they reflect their actions according to value of the offers. Recently, a reactive version of the ultimatum game where acceptance occurs with fixed probability was proposed. In this paper, we aim at exploring this reactive version of the ultimatum game where the acceptance by players depends on the offer. In order to do so, we analyze two situations: (i) mean field and (ii) we consider players inserted within the networks with arbitrary coordination. We then show that the reactive aspect, here studied, thus far not analyzed in the evolutionary game theory literature can unveil an essential feature for the convergence to fifty-fifty split. Moreover we also analyze populations under four different polices ranging from a highly conservative to a moderate one, with respect to the decision in changing the proposal based on acceptances. We show that the idea of gaining less more times added to the reciprocity of the players is highly relevant to the concept of ;healthy; societies population bargaining.

Moral calculations game theory, logic, and human frailty

CERN Document Server

Mérő, László

1998-01-01

Are people ever rational? Consider this: You auction off a one-dollar bill to the highest bidder, but you set the rules so that the second highest bidder also has to pay the amount of his last bid, even though he gets nothing. Would people ever enter such an auction? Not only do they, but according to Martin Shubik, the game's inventor, the average winning bid (for a dollar, remember) is $3.40. Many winners report that they bid so high only because their opponent "went completely crazy." This game lies at the intersection of three subjects of eternal fascination: human psychology, morality, and John von Neumann's game theory. Hungarian game-theorist Laszlo Mero introduces us to the basics of game theory, including such concepts as zero-sum games, Prisoner's Dilemma and the origins of altruism; shows how game theory is applicable to fields ranging from physics to politics; and explores the role of rational thinking in the context of many different kinds of thinking. This fascinating, urbane book will interest ...

Traffic Games: Modeling Freeway Traffic with Game Theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Cortés-Berrueco, Luis E; Gershenson, Carlos; Stephens, Christopher R

2016-01-01

We apply game theory to a vehicular traffic model to study the effect of driver strategies on traffic flow. The resulting model inherits the realistic dynamics achieved by a two-lane traffic model and aims to incorporate phenomena caused by driver-driver interactions. To achieve this goal, a game-theoretic description of driver interaction was developed. This game-theoretic formalization allows one to model different lane-changing behaviors and to keep track of mobility performance. We simulate the evolution of cooperation, traffic flow, and mobility performance for different modeled behaviors. The analysis of these results indicates a mobility optimization process achieved by drivers' interactions.

Making Decisions about an Educational Game, Simulation or Workshop: A 'Game Theory' Perspective.

Science.gov (United States)

Cryer, Patricia

1988-01-01

Uses game theory to help practitioners make decisions about educational games, simulations, or workshops whose outcomes depend to some extent on chance. Highlights include principles for making decisions involving risk; elementary laws of probability; utility theory; and principles for making decisions involving uncertainty. (eight references)…

The Correlation between Game Theory and International Trade

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Simona-Valeria TOMA

2012-08-01

Full Text Available The Correlation between Game Theory and International TradeAbstract:Game theory, in its most basic form, considers two or more players and analyses the different strategies that they can use and the effect that these strategies will have on each player. International trade allows countries to use better their resources (labor, technology or capital. Since countries have different capital or natural resources, some of them will produce a good more efficiently than others and therefore could sell it cheaper than other countries. By using game theory in international trade we could determine if the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model is correct and what would be the best specialization for each country. The aim of this paper is to test if game theory could be successfully used in a thorough analysis of international trade specialization.

Essentials of Game Theory A Concise Multidisciplinary Introduction

CERN Document Server

Leyton-Brown, Kevin

2008-01-01

Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents. The audience for game theory has grown dramatically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professional interest in game theory is likely to require. Such a text would minimize notation, ruthlessly focus on essentials, and yet not sacrifice rigor. This Synthes

Just Society as a Fair Game: John Rawls and Game Theory in the 1950s.

Science.gov (United States)

Gališanka, Andrius

2017-01-01

I explore the influence of game theory on the political philosopher John Rawls as a way of analyzing the character of his democratic thought. Recent narratives bring Rawls closer to direct democracy as a result of game theory's influence. I argue that game theory prompted creative, organic developments in Rawls's political framework rather than shaping it. It prompted Rawls to emphasize autonomy and fairness, leading him to the analogy between a just society and a fair game. And it prompted thought experiments that analyzed our considered judgments. This was an idealized analysis unconnected to the vision of direct democracy.

An introduction to game-theoretic modelling

CERN Document Server

Mesterton-Gibbons, Mike

2000-01-01

This is an introduction to game theory and applications with an emphasis on self-discovery from the perspective of a mathematical modeller. The book deals in a unified manner with the central concepts of both classical and evolutionary game theory. The key ideas are illustrated throughout by a wide variety of well-chosen examples of both human and non-human behavior, including car pooling, price fixing, food sharing, sex allocation and competition for territories or oviposition sites. There are numerous exercises with solutions.

N-person game theory concepts and applications

CERN Document Server

Rapoport, Anatol

2013-01-01

N-person game theory provides a logical framework for analyzing contests in which there are more than two players or sets of conflicting interests-anything from a hand of poker to the tangled web of international relations. In this sequel to his Two-Person Game Theory, Dr. Rapoport provides a fascinating and lucid introduction to the theory, geared towards readers with little mathematical background but with an appetite for rigorous analysis.Following an introduction to the necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), in Part I the author presents basic concepts and models, including

Game theory and power theory : a critical comparison

OpenAIRE

Balzer, Wolfgang

1992-01-01

Social actions can be formulated in the frame of game theory or in a frame using, and foccussing on, the notion of power. The two frames are described and clarified. The comparison of theories from these two branches are evaluated from the point of theory of science.

Natural games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anttila, Jani; Annila, Arto

2011-01-01

A course of a game is formulated as a physical process that will consume free energy in the least time. Accordingly, the rate of entropy increase is the payoff function that will subsume all forms of free energy that motivate diverse decisions. Also other concepts of game theory are related to their profound physical counterparts. When the physical portrayal of behavior is mathematically analyzed, the course of a game is found to be inherently unpredictable because each move affects motives in the future. Despite the non-holonomic character of the natural process, the objective of consuming free energy in the least time will direct an extensive-form game toward a Lyapunov-stable point that satisfies the minimax theorem. -- Highlights: → Behavior in the context of game theory is described as a natural process. → The rate of entropy increase, derived from statistical physics of open systems, is identified as the payoff function. → Entropy as the payoff function also clarifies motives of collaboration and subjective nature of decision making. → Evolutionary equation of motion that accounts for the course of a game is inherently unpredictable.

Game Theory in the Social Studies Classroom

Science.gov (United States)

Vesperman, Dean Patrick; Clark, Chris H.

2016-01-01

This article explores using game theory in social studies classrooms as a heuristic to aid students in understanding strategic decision making. The authors provide examples of several simple games teachers can use. Next, we address how to help students design their own simple (2 × 2) games.

Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process.

Science.gov (United States)

Quan, Ji; Liu, Wei; Chu, Yuqing; Wang, Xianjia

2017-11-23

Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not be stochastically stable. In this paper, a model of voluntary public goods game with punishment is studied in a stochastic situation. Unlike the existing model, we describe the evolutionary process of strategies in the population as a generalized quasi-birth-and-death process. And we investigate the stochastic stable equilibrium (SSE) instead. By numerical experiments, we get all possible SSEs of the system for any combination of parameters, and investigate the influence of parameters on the probabilities of the system to select different equilibriums. It is found that in the stochastic situation, the introduction of the punishment and non-participation strategies can change the evolutionary dynamics of the system and equilibrium of the game. There is a large range of parameters that the system selects the cooperative states as its SSE with a high probability. This result provides us an insight and control method for the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game in stochastic situations.

Models in cooperative game theory

CERN Document Server

Branzei, Rodica; Tijs, Stef

2008-01-01

This book investigates models in cooperative game theory in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to cooperate with infinite many different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multi-choice game describes the intermediate case in which each player may have a fixed number of activity levels. Different set and one-point solution concepts for these games are presented. The properties of these solution concepts and their interrelations on several classes of crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games are studied. Applications of the investigated models to many economic situations are indicated as well. The second edition is highly enlarged and contains new results and additional sections in the different chapters as well as one new chapter.

Evolutionary optimization and game strategies for advanced multi-disciplinary design applications to aeronautics and UAV design

CERN Document Server

Periaux, Jacques; Lee, Dong Seop Chris

2015-01-01

Many complex aeronautical design problems can be formulated with efficient multi-objective evolutionary optimization methods and game strategies. This book describes the role of advanced innovative evolution tools in the solution, or the set of solutions of single or multi disciplinary optimization. These tools use the concept of multi-population, asynchronous parallelization and hierarchical topology which allows different models including precise, intermediate and approximate models with each node belonging to the different hierarchical layer handled by a different Evolutionary Algorithm. The efficiency of evolutionary algorithms for both single and multi-objective optimization problems are significantly improved by the coupling of EAs with games and in particular by a new dynamic methodology named “Hybridized Nash-Pareto games”. Multi objective Optimization techniques and robust design problems taking into account uncertainties are introduced and explained in detail. Several applications dealing with c...

Evolution of fairness and coalition formation in three-person ultimatum games.

Science.gov (United States)

Nishimura, Takeshi; Okada, Akira; Shirata, Yasuhiro

2017-05-07

We consider the evolution of fairness and coalition formation in a three-person ultimatum game in which the coalition value depends on its size. Traditional game theory, which assumes selfish and rational players, predicts the largest and efficient coalition with a proposer exploiting most of the total value. In a stochastic evolutionary model (the frequency-dependent Moran process with mutations) where players make errors in estimating the payoffs and strategies of others, evolutionary selection favors the formation of a two-person subcoalition under weak selection and in the low mutation limit if and only if its coalition value exceeds a high proportion (0.7) of that of the largest coalition. Proposers offer 30-35% of the subcoalition value to a coalition member, excluding a non-member. Multilateral bargaining is critically different from the bilateral one. Coalition-forming behavior may cause economic inefficiency and social exclusion. Stochastic evolutionary game theory thus provides theoretical support to explain the behavior of human subjects in economic experiments of a three-person ultimatum game. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Models in cooperative game theory crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games

CERN Document Server

Branzei, Rodica; Tijs, Stef

2005-01-01

This book investigates models in cooperative game theory in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in coperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to cooperate with infinite many different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multi-choice game describes the intermediate case in which each player may have a fixed number of activity levels. Different set and one-point solution concepts for these games are presented. The propertie

Literary study and evolutionary theory : A review essay.

Science.gov (United States)

Carroll, J

1998-09-01

Several recent books have claimed to integrate literary study with evolutionary biology. All of the books here considered, except Robert Storey's, adopt conceptions of evolutionary theory that are in some way marginal to the Darwinian adaptationist program. All the works attempt to connect evolutionary study with various other disciplines or methodologies: for example, with cultural anthropology, cognitive psychology, the psychology of emotion, neurobiology, chaos theory, or structuralist linguistics. No empirical paradigm has yet been established for this field, but important steps have been taken, especially by Storey, in formulating basic principles, identifying appropriate disciplinary connections, and marking out lines of inquiry. Reciprocal efforts are needed from biologists and social scientists.

An evolutionary-game model of tumour-cell interactions: possible relevance to gene therapy

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bach, L.A.; Bentzen, S.M.; Alsner, Jan

2001-01-01

Evolutionary games have been applied as simple mathematical models of populations where interactions between individuals control the dynamics. Recently, it has been proposed to use this type of model to describe the evolution of tumour cell populations with interactions between cells. We extent...

Towards a mechanistic foundation of evolutionary theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Doebeli, Michael; Ispolatov, Yaroslav; Simon, Burt

2017-02-15

Most evolutionary thinking is based on the notion of fitness and related ideas such as fitness landscapes and evolutionary optima. Nevertheless, it is often unclear what fitness actually is, and its meaning often depends on the context. Here we argue that fitness should not be a basal ingredient in verbal or mathematical descriptions of evolution. Instead, we propose that evolutionary birth-death processes, in which individuals give birth and die at ever-changing rates, should be the basis of evolutionary theory, because such processes capture the fundamental events that generate evolutionary dynamics. In evolutionary birth-death processes, fitness is at best a derived quantity, and owing to the potential complexity of such processes, there is no guarantee that there is a simple scalar, such as fitness, that would describe long-term evolutionary outcomes. We discuss how evolutionary birth-death processes can provide useful perspectives on a number of central issues in evolution.

Game theory: applications for surgeons and the operating room environment.

Science.gov (United States)

McFadden, David W; Tsai, Mitchell; Kadry, Bassam; Souba, Wiley W

2012-11-01

Game theory is an economic system of strategic behavior, often referred to as the "theory of social situations." Very little has been written in the medical literature about game theory or its applications, yet the practice of surgery and the operating room environment clearly involves multiple social situations with both cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors. A comprehensive review was performed of the medical literature on game theory and its medical applications. Definitive resources on the subject were also examined and applied to surgery and the operating room whenever possible. Applications of game theory and its proposed dilemmas abound in the practicing surgeon's world, especially in the operating room environment. The surgeon with a basic understanding of game theory principles is better prepared for understanding and navigating the complex Operating Room system and optimizing cooperative behaviors for the benefit all stakeholders. Copyright © 2012 Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.

Game theory and strategy in medical training.

Science.gov (United States)

Blake, Amy; Carroll, Bryan T

2016-11-01

This paper analyses how game theory can provide a framework for understanding the strategic decision-making that occurs in everyday scenarios in medical training and practice, and ultimately serves as a tool for improving the work environment and patient care. Game theory has been applied to a variety of fields outside of its native economics, but has not been thoroughly studied in the context of health care provision. The paper discusses four of the most common 'games' and applies each to a scenario in medicine to provide new insight on the incentives and drivers for certain types of behaviour and a deeper understanding of why certain results are valued more strongly than others. Using game theory as an integrative tool, in conjunction with good judgement and a sound knowledge base, trainees and physicians can work to better recognise where competing priorities exist, understand the motivations and interactions of the various players, and learn to adjust their approaches in order to 'change the game' when their preferred outcome is not the most likely one. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and The Association for the Study of Medical Education.

Fixation of strategies with the Moran and Fermi processes in evolutionary games

Science.gov (United States)

Liu, Xuesong; He, Mingfeng; Kang, Yibin; Pan, Qiuhui

2017-10-01

A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite population was built. It combines the standard Moran and Fermi rules with two strategies cooperation and defection. We obtain the expressions of fixation probabilities and fixation times. The one-third rule which has been found in the frequency dependent Moran process also holds for our model. We obtain the conditions of strategy being an evolutionarily stable strategy in our model, and then make a comparison with the standard Moran process. Besides, the analytical results show that compared with the standard Moran process, fixation occurs with higher probabilities under a prisoner's dilemma game and coordination game, but with lower probabilities under a coexistence game. The simulation result shows that the fixation time in our mixed process is lower than that in the standard Fermi process. In comparison with the standard Moran process, fixation always takes more time on average in spatial populations, regardless of the game. In addition, the fixation time decreases with the growth of the number of neighbors.

Formulated linear programming problems from game theory and its ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Formulated linear programming problems from game theory and its computer implementation using Tora package. ... Game theory, a branch of operations research examines the various concepts of decision ... AJOL African Journals Online.

Gaming mindsets: implicit theories in serious game learning.

Science.gov (United States)

Lee, Yu-Hao; Heeter, Carrie; Magerko, Brian; Medler, Ben

2012-04-01

Individuals' beliefs about the malleability of their abilities may predict their response and outcome in learning from serious games. Individuals with growth mindsets believe their abilities can develop with practice and effort, whereas individuals with fixed mindsets believe their abilities are static and cannot improve. This study uses survey and gameplay server data to examine the implicit theory of intelligence in the context of serious game learning. The findings show that growth mindset players performed better than fixed mindset players, their mistakes did not affect their attention to the game, and they read more learning feedback than fixed mindset players. In addition, growth mindset players were more likely to actively seek difficult challenges, which is often essential to self-directed learning. General mindset measurements and domain-specific measurements were also compared. These findings suggest that players' psychological attributes should be considered when designing and applying serious games.

Using Self-Adaptive Evolutionary Algorithms to Evolve Dynamism-Oriented Maps for a Real Time Strategy Game

OpenAIRE

Lara-Cabrera, Raúl; Cotta, Carlos; Fernández Leiva, Antonio J.

2013-01-01

This work presents a procedural content generation system that uses an evolutionary algorithm in order to generate interesting maps for a real-time strategy game, called Planet Wars. Interestingness is here captured by the dynamism of games (i.e., the extent to which they are action-packed). We consider two different approaches to measure the dynamism of the games resulting from these generated maps, one based on fluctuations in the resources controlled by either player and another one based ...

Game Theory and its Relationship with Linear Programming Models ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Game Theory and its Relationship with Linear Programming Models. ... This paper shows that game theory and linear programming problem are closely related subjects since any computing method devised for ... AJOL African Journals Online.

Evolutionary robotics simulations help explain why reciprocity is rare in nature.

Science.gov (United States)

André, Jean-Baptiste; Nolfi, Stefano

2016-09-12

The relative rarity of reciprocity in nature, contrary to theoretical predictions that it should be widespread, is currently one of the major puzzles in social evolution theory. Here we use evolutionary robotics to solve this puzzle. We show that models based on game theory are misleading because they neglect the mechanics of behavior. In a series of experiments with simulated robots controlled by artificial neural networks, we find that reciprocity does not evolve, and show that this results from a general constraint that likely also prevents it from evolving in the wild. Reciprocity can evolve if it requires very few mutations, as is usually assumed in evolutionary game theoretic models, but not if, more realistically, it requires the accumulation of many adaptive mutations.

Using game theory to improve safety within chemical industrial parks

CERN Document Server

Reniers, Genserik

2013-01-01

Though the game-theoretic approach has been vastly studied and utilized in relation to economics of industrial organizations, it has hardly been used to tackle safety management in multi-plant chemical industrial settings. Using Game Theory for Improving Safety within Chemical Industrial Parks presents an in-depth discussion of game-theoretic modelling which may be applied to improve cross-company prevention and -safety management in a chemical industrial park.   By systematically analyzing game-theoretic models and approaches in relation to managing safety in chemical industrial parks, Using Game Theory for Improving Safety within Chemical Industrial Parks explores the ways game theory can predict the outcome of complex strategic investment decision making processes involving several adjacent chemical plants. A number of game-theoretic decision models are discussed to provide strategic tools for decision-making situations.   Offering clear and straightforward explanations of methodologies, Using Game Theor...

Evolutionary Theory's Increasing Role in Personality and Social Psychology

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gregory D. Webster

2007-01-01

Full Text Available Has the emergence of evolutionary psychology had an increasing impact on personality and social psychological research published over the past two decades? If so, is its growing influence substantially different from that of other emerging psychological areas? These questions were addressed in the present study by conducting a content analysis of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP from 1985 to 2004 using the PsycINFO online abstract database. Specifically, keyword searches for “evol*” or “Darwin*” revealed that the percentage of JPSP articles drawing on evolutionary theory was modest, but increased significantly between 1985 and 2004. To compare the growing impact of evolutionary psychology with other psychological areas, similar keywords searches were performed in JPSP for emotion and motivation, judgment and decision making, neuroscience and psychophysiology, stereotyping and prejudice, and terror management theory. The increase in evolutionary theory in JPSP over time was practically equal to the mean increase over time for the other five areas. Thus, evolutionary psychology has played an increasing role in shaping personality and social psychological research over the past 20 years, and is growing at a rate consistent with other emerging psychological areas.

From genes to games: cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive.

Science.gov (United States)

Traulsen, Arne; Reed, Floyd A

2012-04-21

Evolutionary change can be described on a genotypic level or a phenotypic level. Evolutionary game theory is typically thought of as a phenotypic approach, although it is frequently argued that it can also be used to describe population genetic evolution. Interpreting the interaction between alleles in a diploid genome as a two player game leads to interesting alternative perspectives on genetic evolution. Here we focus on the case of meiotic drive and illustrate how meiotic drive can be directly and precisely interpreted as a social dilemma, such as the prisoners dilemma or the snowdrift game, in which the drive allele takes more than its fair share. Resistance to meiotic drive can lead to the well understood cyclic dominance found in the rock-paper-scissors game. This perspective is well established for the replicator dynamics, but there is still considerable ground for mutual inspiration between the two fields. For example, evolutionary game theorists can benefit from considering the stochastic evolutionary dynamics arising from finite population size. Population geneticists can benefit from game theoretic tools and perspectives on genetic evolution. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The Application of Gaming Theory in Health Care.

Science.gov (United States)

Elzein, Ashley; Drenkard, Karen; Deyo, Patricia; Swartwout, Ellen

2015-01-01

As the US health care system moves rapidly toward a population health management focus in communities and care settings, the chief nursing officer has an opportunity to lead innovation efforts for patient care. One innovative strategy for use to influence patient behavior change, ongoing clinical education, and prelicensure education is the application of gaming theory into learning strategies. With the ever-increasing emphasis the general public is placing on social media and online gaming, there has been a significant push by the health sector in recent years to harness this medium for use in health management, education, and behavior change. A number of organizations and insurers have dedicated significant resources to researching and developing games and apps to help patients manage diseases, track self-management activities, and motivate behavior change for healthy lifestyles. This article shares information about gaming theory and its application to health care including a review of the science behind the theory, the use of technology, and gaming education strategies for both patients and clinicians.

Studies in the Theory of Quantum Games

Science.gov (United States)

Iqbal, Azhar

2005-03-01

Theory of quantum games is a new area of investigation that has gone through rapid development during the last few years. Initial motivation for playing games, in the quantum world, comes from the possibility of re-formulating quantum communication protocols, and algorithms, in terms of games between quantum and classical players. The possibility led to the view that quantum games have a potential to provide helpful insight into working of quantum algorithms, and even in finding new ones. This thesis analyzes and compares some interesting games when played classically and quantum mechanically. A large part of the thesis concerns investigations into a refinement notion of the Nash equilibrium concept. The refinement, called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), was originally introduced in 1970s by mathematical biologists to model an evolving population using techniques borrowed from game theory. Analysis is developed around a situation when quantization changes ESSs without affecting corresponding Nash equilibria. Effects of quantization on solution-concepts other than Nash equilibrium are presented and discussed. For this purpose the notions of value of coalition, backwards-induction outcome, and subgame-perfect outcome are selected. Repeated games are known to have different information structure than one-shot games. Investigation is presented into a possible way where quantization changes the outcome of a repeated game. Lastly, two new suggestions are put forward to play quantum versions of classical matrix games. The first one uses the association of De Broglie's waves, with travelling material objects, as a resource for playing a quantum game. The second suggestion concerns an EPR type setting exploiting directly the correlations in Bell's inequalities to play a bi-matrix game.

On the Relevance of Game Theory in Strategic Thinking ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

On the Relevance of Game Theory in Strategic Thinking. ... The author reviews some of the applicable literature and shows how game theory can be used to predict the outcome of a strategy, explain why a ... AJOL African Journals Online.

How cultural evolutionary theory can inform social psychology and vice versa.

Science.gov (United States)

Mesoudi, Alex

2009-10-01

Cultural evolutionary theory is an interdisciplinary field in which human culture is viewed as a Darwinian process of variation, competition, and inheritance, and the tools, methods, and theories developed by evolutionary biologists to study genetic evolution are adapted to study cultural change. It is argued here that an integration of the theories and findings of mainstream social psychology and of cultural evolutionary theory can be mutually beneficial. Social psychology provides cultural evolution with a set of empirically verified microevolutionary cultural processes, such as conformity, model-based biases, and content biases, that are responsible for specific patterns of cultural change. Cultural evolutionary theory provides social psychology with ultimate explanations for, and an understanding of the population-level consequences of, many social psychological phenomena, such as social learning, conformity, social comparison, and intergroup processes, as well as linking social psychology with other social science disciplines such as cultural anthropology, archaeology, and sociology.

An Analysis of Stochastic Game Theory for Multiagent Reinforcement Learning

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Bowling, Michael

2000-01-01

.... In this paper we contribute a comprehensive presentation of the relevant techniques for solving stochastic games from both the game theory community and reinforcement learning communities. We examine the assumptions and limitations of these algorithms, and identify similarities between these algorithms, single agent reinforcement learners, and basic game theory techniques.

Potential game theory applications in radio resource allocation

CERN Document Server

Lã, Quang Duy; Soong, Boon-Hee

2016-01-01

This book offers a thorough examination of potential game theory and its applications in radio resource management for wireless communications systems and networking. The book addresses two major research goals: how to identify a given game as a potential game, and how to design the utility functions and the potential functions with certain special properties in order to formulate a potential game. After proposing a unifying mathematical framework for the identification of potential games, the text surveys existing applications of this technique within wireless communications and networking problems found in OFDMA 3G/4G/WiFi networks, as well as next-generation systems such as cognitive radios and dynamic spectrum access networks. Professionals interested in understanding the theoretical aspect of this specialized field will find Potential Game Theory a valuable resource, as will advanced-level engineering students. It paves the way for extensive and rigorous research exploration on a topic whose capacity for...

Evolutionary stability concepts in a stochastic environment

Science.gov (United States)

Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Li, Cong; Lessard, Sabin; Tao, Yi

2017-09-01

Over the past 30 years, evolutionary game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy have been not only extensively developed and successfully applied to explain the evolution of animal behaviors, but also widely used in economics and social sciences. Nonetheless, the stochastic dynamical properties of evolutionary games in randomly fluctuating environments are still unclear. In this study, we investigate conditions for stochastic local stability of fixation states and constant interior equilibria in a two-phenotype model with random payoffs following pairwise interactions. Based on this model, we develop the concepts of stochastic evolutionary stability (SES) and stochastic convergence stability (SCS). We show that the condition for a pure strategy to be SES and SCS is more stringent than in a constant environment, while the condition for a constant mixed strategy to be SES is less stringent than the condition to be SCS, which is less stringent than the condition in a constant environment.

The evolutionary ecology of molecular replicators.

Science.gov (United States)

Nee, Sean

2016-08-01

By reasonable criteria, life on the Earth consists mainly of molecular replicators. These include viruses, transposons, transpovirons, coviruses and many more, with continuous new discoveries like Sputnik Virophage. Their study is inherently multidisciplinary, spanning microbiology, genetics, immunology and evolutionary theory, and the current view is that taking a unified approach has great power and promise. We support this with a new, unified, model of their evolutionary ecology, using contemporary evolutionary theory coupling the Price equation with game theory, studying the consequences of the molecular replicators' promiscuous use of each others' gene products for their natural history and evolutionary ecology. Even at this simple expository level, we can make a firm prediction of a new class of replicators exploiting viruses such as lentiviruses like SIVs, a family which includes HIV: these have been explicitly stated in the primary literature to be non-existent. Closely connected to this departure is the view that multicellular organism immunology is more about the management of chronic infections rather than the elimination of acute ones and new understandings emerging are changing our view of the kind of theatre we ourselves provide for the evolutionary play of molecular replicators. This study adds molecular replicators to bacteria in the emerging field of sociomicrobiology.

Quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ichikawa, Tsubasa; Tsutsui, Izumi; Cheon, Taksu

2008-01-01

We present a novel formulation of quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition, which has the merit that the entanglement of quantum strategies is manifestly quantified. We apply this formulation to 2-player, 2-strategy symmetric games and obtain a complete set of quantum Nash equilibria. Apart from those available with the maximal entanglement, these quantum Nash equilibria are extensions of the Nash equilibria in classical game theory. The phase structure of the equilibria is determined for all values of entanglement, and thereby the possibility of resolving the dilemmas by entanglement in the game of Chicken, the Battle of the Sexes, the Prisoners' Dilemma, and the Stag Hunt, is examined. We find that entanglement transforms these dilemmas with each other but cannot resolve them, except in the Stag Hunt game where the dilemma can be alleviated to a certain degree

Theoretical Approaches in Evolutionary Ecology: Environmental Feedback as a Unifying Perspective.

Science.gov (United States)

Lion, Sébastien

2018-01-01

Evolutionary biology and ecology have a strong theoretical underpinning, and this has fostered a variety of modeling approaches. A major challenge of this theoretical work has been to unravel the tangled feedback loop between ecology and evolution. This has prompted the development of two main classes of models. While quantitative genetics models jointly consider the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of a focal population, a separation of timescales between ecology and evolution is assumed by evolutionary game theory, adaptive dynamics, and inclusive fitness theory. As a result, theoretical evolutionary ecology tends to be divided among different schools of thought, with different toolboxes and motivations. My aim in this synthesis is to highlight the connections between these different approaches and clarify the current state of theory in evolutionary ecology. Central to this approach is to make explicit the dependence on environmental dynamics of the population and evolutionary dynamics, thereby materializing the eco-evolutionary feedback loop. This perspective sheds light on the interplay between environmental feedback and the timescales of ecological and evolutionary processes. I conclude by discussing some potential extensions and challenges to our current theoretical understanding of eco-evolutionary dynamics.

Game Theory: An Application to Tanners and 'Pomo' Wholesalers in ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Game Theory: An Application to Tanners and 'Pomo' Wholesalers in Hides Marketing Competition in Nigeria. ... Agricultural economics is an applied social science so game theory was applied practically from a ... AJOL African Journals Online.

Academic Training Lecture | Game Theory | 8 - 9 May

CERN Multimedia

2014-01-01

Game Theory (1 & 2), by Elias Koutsoupias (Professor of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK).   Thursday 8 May and Friday 9 May from 11 a.m. to 12 a.m. CERN (500-1-001 - Main Auditorium) Description: This lecture series will present the main directions of Algorithmic Game Theory, a new field that has emerged in the last two decades at the interface of Game Theory and Computer Science, because of the unprecedented growth in size, complexity, and impact of the Internet and the Web. These include the price of anarchy (what is the impact of selfishness on a system of competing entities), computational complexity (can the market find a reasonable solution), mechanisms and auctions (what incentives to give to selfish individuals). See the Indico page here.

Epigenetic battle of the sexes. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Wu, Song

2017-03-01

Qian Wang et al. present an interesting framework, named epigenetic game theory, for modeling sex-based epigenetic dynamics during embryogenesis from a new viewpoint of evolutionary game theory [1]. That is, epigenomes of sperms and oocytes may coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to affect the fitness of embryos. The work uses a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to describe longitudinal trajectories of DNA methylation levels in both parental and maternal gametes and their dependence on each other. The insights gained from this review, i.e. dynamic methylation profiles and their interaction are potentially important to many fields, such as biomedicine and agriculture.

Should the model for risk-informed regulation be game theory rather than decision theory?

Science.gov (United States)

Bier, Vicki M; Lin, Shi-Woei

2013-02-01

Risk analysts frequently view the regulation of risks as being largely a matter of decision theory. According to this view, risk analysis methods provide information on the likelihood and severity of various possible outcomes; this information should then be assessed using a decision-theoretic approach (such as cost/benefit analysis) to determine whether the risks are acceptable, and whether additional regulation is warranted. However, this view ignores the fact that in many industries (particularly industries that are technologically sophisticated and employ specialized risk and safety experts), risk analyses may be done by regulated firms, not by the regulator. Moreover, those firms may have more knowledge about the levels of safety at their own facilities than the regulator does. This creates a situation in which the regulated firm has both the opportunity-and often also the motive-to provide inaccurate (in particular, favorably biased) risk information to the regulator, and hence the regulator has reason to doubt the accuracy of the risk information provided by regulated parties. Researchers have argued that decision theory is capable of dealing with many such strategic interactions as well as game theory can. This is especially true in two-player, two-stage games in which the follower has a unique best strategy in response to the leader's strategy, as appears to be the case in the situation analyzed in this article. However, even in such cases, we agree with Cox that game-theoretic methods and concepts can still be useful. In particular, the tools of mechanism design, and especially the revelation principle, can simplify the analysis of such games because the revelation principle provides rigorous assurance that it is sufficient to analyze only games in which licensees truthfully report their risk levels, making the problem more manageable. Without that, it would generally be necessary to consider much more complicated forms of strategic behavior (including

Solving the Sophistication-Population Paradox of Game Refinement Theory

OpenAIRE

Xiong , Shuo; Tiwary , Parth ,; Iida , Hiroyuki

2016-01-01

Part 4: Short Papers; International audience; A mathematical model of game refinement was proposed based on uncertainty of game outcome. This model has been shown to be useful in measuring the entertainment element in the domains such as boardgames and sport games. However, game refinement theory has not been able to explain the correlation between the popularity of a game and the game refinement value. This paper introduces another aspect in the study of game entertainment, the concept of “a...

The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences

CERN Document Server

Gintis, Herbert

2014-01-01

Game theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences-from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. However, as The Bounds of Reason demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. Herbert Gintis shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a handicapped enterprise. This edition has been thoroughly revised and updated. Reinvigorati

Game theory, social choice and ethics

CERN Document Server

1979-01-01

There are problems to whose solution I would attach an infinitely greater import­ ancf! than to those of mathematics, for example touching ethics, or our relation to God, or conceming our destiny and our future; but their solution lies wholly beyond us and completely outside the province 0 f science. J. F. C. Gauss For a1l his prescience in matters physical and mathematieal, the great Gauss apparently did not foresee one development peculiar to OUT own time. The development I have in mind is the use of mathematical reasoning - in partieu­ lar the axiomatic method - to explicate alternative concepts of rationality and morality. The present bipartite collection of essays (Vol. 11, Nos. 2 and 3 of this journal) is entitled 'Game Theory, Social Choiee, and Ethics'. The eight papers represent state-of-the-art research in formal moral theory. Their intended aim is to demonstrate how the methods of game theory, decision theory, and axiomatic social choice theory can help to illuminate ethical questions central not...

Modeling Routinization in Games: An Information Theory Approach

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Wallner, Simon; Pichlmair, Martin; Hecher, Michael

2015-01-01

Routinization is the result of practicing until an action stops being a goal-directed process. This paper formulates a definition of routinization in games based on prior research in the fields of activity theory and practice theory. Routinization is analyzed using the formal model of discrete......-time, discrete-space Markov chains and information theory to measure the actual error between the dynamically trained models and the player interaction. Preliminary research supports the hypothesis that Markov chains can be effectively used to model routinization in games. A full study design is presented...

When Reputation Enforces Evolutionary Cooperation in Unreliable MANETs.

Science.gov (United States)

Tang, Changbing; Li, Ang; Li, Xiang

2015-10-01

In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network functions rely on cooperation of self-interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel which results from loss of packets and noisy observation of transmissions. We propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet forwarding strategies in both structured and unstructured MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies and derive the threshold of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary game theoretic solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds the critical condition. In addition, the network throughput performance of our proposed strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy.

Learning "in" or "with" Games? Quality Criteria for Digital Learning Games from the Perspectives of Learning, Emotion, and Motivation Theory

Science.gov (United States)

Hense, Jan; Mandl, Heinz

2012-01-01

This conceptual paper aims to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of game based learning (GBL) and learning with digital learning games (DLGs). To do so, it analyses learning of game related skills and contents, which occurs constantly during playing conventional entertainment games, from three perspectives: learning theory, emotion theory, and…

Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Science.gov (United States)

Du, Wen-Bo; Cao, Xian-Bin; Liu, Run-Ran; Wang, Zhen

2012-09-01

Considering the inertia of individuals in real life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia: with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society.

GIS and Game Theory for Water Resource Management

Science.gov (United States)

Ganjali, N.; Guney, C.

2017-11-01

In this study, aspects of Game theory and its application on water resources management combined with GIS techniques are detailed. First, each term is explained and the advantages and limitations of its aspect is discussed. Then, the nature of combinations between each pair and literature on the previous studies are given. Several cases were investigated and results were magnified in order to conclude with the applicability and combination of GIS- Game Theory- Water Resources Management. It is concluded that the game theory is used relatively in limited studies of water management fields such as cost/benefit allocation among users, water allocation among trans-boundary users in water resources, water quality management, groundwater management, analysis of water policies, fair allocation of water resources development cost and some other narrow fields. Also, Decision-making in environmental projects requires consideration of trade-offs between socio-political, environmental, and economic impacts and is often complicated by various stakeholder views. Most of the literature on water allocation and conflict problems uses traditional optimization models to identify the most efficient scheme while the Game Theory, as an optimization method, combined GIS are beneficial platforms for agent based models to be used in solving Water Resources Management problems in the further studies.

Pre-Game-Theory Based Information Technology (GAMBIT) Study

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Polk, Charles

2003-01-01

.... The generic GAMBIT scenario has been characterized as Dynamic Hierarchical Gaming (DHG). Game theory is not yet ready to fully support analysis of DHG, though existing partial analysis suggests that a full treatment is practical in the midterm...

An evolutionary theory of human motivation.

Science.gov (United States)

Bernard, Larry C; Mills, Michael; Swenson, Leland; Walsh, R Patricia

2005-05-01

The authors review psychology's historical, competing perspectives on human motivation and propose a new comprehensive theory. The new theory is based on evolutionary principles as proposed by C. Darwin (1859) and modified by W. D. Hamilton (1964, 1996), R. L. Trivers (1971, 1972), and R. Dawkins (1989). The theory unifies biological, behavioral, and cognitive approaches to motivation. The theory is neuropsychological and addresses conscious and nonconscious processes that underlie motivation, emotion, and self-control. The theory predicts a hierarchical structure of motives that are measurable as individual differences in human behavior. These motives are related to social problem domains (D. B. Bugental, 2000; D. T. Kenrick, N. P. Li, & J. Butner, 2003), and each is hypothesized to solve a particular problem of human inclusive fitness.

Games as Actors - Interaction, Play, Design, and Actor Network Theory

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Jessen, Jari Due; Jessen, Carsten

2014-01-01

When interacting with computer games, users are forced to follow the rules of the game in return for the excitement, joy, fun, or other pursued experiences. In this paper, we investigate how games a chieve these experiences in the perspective of Actor Network Theory (ANT). Based on a qualitative......, and by doing so they create in humans what in modern play theory is known as a “state of play”...

Classical and quantum contents of solvable game theory on Hilbert space

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cheon, Taksu; Tsutsui, Izumi

2006-01-01

A simple and general formulation of the quantum game theory is presented, accommodating all possible strategies in the Hilbert space for the first time. The theory is solvable for the two strategy quantum game, which is shown to be equivalent to a family of classical games supplemented by quantum interference. Our formulation gives a clear perspective to understand why and how quantum strategies outmaneuver classical strategies. It also reveals novel aspects of quantum games such as the stone-scissor-paper phase sub-game and the fluctuation-induced moderation

Using Evolutionary Theory to Guide Mental Health Research.

Science.gov (United States)

Durisko, Zachary; Mulsant, Benoit H; McKenzie, Kwame; Andrews, Paul W

2016-03-01

Evolutionary approaches to medicine can shed light on the origins and etiology of disease. Such an approach may be especially useful in psychiatry, which frequently addresses conditions with heterogeneous presentation and unknown causes. We review several previous applications of evolutionary theory that highlight the ways in which psychiatric conditions may persist despite and because of natural selection. One lesson from the evolutionary approach is that some conditions currently classified as disorders (because they cause distress and impairment) may actually be caused by functioning adaptations operating "normally" (as designed by natural selection). Such conditions suggest an alternative illness model that may generate alternative intervention strategies. Thus, the evolutionary approach suggests that psychiatry should sometimes think differently about distress and impairment. The complexity of the human brain, including normal functioning and potential for dysfunctions, has developed over evolutionary time and has been shaped by natural selection. Understanding the evolutionary origins of psychiatric conditions is therefore a crucial component to a complete understanding of etiology. © The Author(s) 2016.

Games in the Arctic: applying game theory insights to Arctic challenges

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Scott Cole

2014-08-01

Full Text Available We illustrate the benefits of game theoretic analysis for assisting decision-makers in resolving conflicts and other challenges in a rapidly evolving region. We review a series of salient Arctic issues with global implications—managing open-access fisheries, opening Arctic areas for resource extraction and ensuring effective environmental regulation for natural resource extraction—and provide insights to help reach socially preferred outcomes. We provide an overview of game theoretic analysis in layman's terms, explaining how game theory can help researchers and decision-makers to better understand conflicts, and how to identify the need for, and improve the design of, policy interventions. We believe that game theoretic tools are particularly useful in a region with a diverse set of players ranging from countries to firms to individuals. We argue that the Arctic Council should take a more active governing role in the region by, for example, dispersing information to “players” in order to alleviate conflicts regarding the management of common-pool resources such as open-access fisheries and natural resource extraction. We also identify side payments—that is, monetary or in-kind compensation from one party of a conflict to another—as a key mechanism for reaching a more biologically, culturally and economically sustainable Arctic future. By emphasizing the practical insights generated from an academic discipline, we present game theory as an influential tool in shaping the future of the Arctic—for individual researchers, for inter-disciplinary research and for policy-makers themselves.

Game Theory in water resources management

Science.gov (United States)

Katsanevaki, Styliani Maria; Varouchakis, Emmanouil; Karatzas, George

2015-04-01

Rural water management is a basic requirement for the development of the primary sector and involves the exploitation of surface/ground-water resources. Rational management requires the study of parameters that determine their exploitation mainly environmental, economic and social. These parameters reflect the influence of irrigation on the aquifer behaviour and on the level-streamflow of nearby rivers as well as on the profit from the farming activity for the farmers' welfare. The question of rural water management belongs to the socio-political problems, since the factors involved are closely related to user behaviour and state position. By applying Game Theory one seeks to simulate the behaviour of the system 'surface/ground-water resources to water-users' with a model based on a well-known game, "The Prisoner's Dilemma" for economic development of the farmers without overexploitation of the water resources. This is a game of two players that have been extensively studied in Game Theory, economy and politics because it can describe real-world cases. The present proposal aims to investigate the rural water management issue that is referred to two competitive small partnerships organised to manage their agricultural production and to achieve a better profit. For the farmers' activities water is required and ground-water is generally preferable because consists a more stable recourse than river-water which in most of the cases in Greece are of intermittent flow. If the two farmer groups cooperate and exploit the agreed water quantities they will gain equal profits and benefit from the sustainable availability of the water recourses (p). If both groups overexploitate the resource to maximize profit, then in the medium-term they will incur a loss (g), due to the water resources reduction and the increase of the pumping costs. If one overexploit the resource while the other use the necessary required, then the first will gain great benefit (P), and the second will

Chimpanzee choice rates in competitive games match equilibrium game theory predictions.

Science.gov (United States)

Martin, Christopher Flynn; Bhui, Rahul; Bossaerts, Peter; Matsuzawa, Tetsuro; Camerer, Colin

2014-06-05

The capacity for strategic thinking about the payoff-relevant actions of conspecifics is not well understood across species. We use game theory to make predictions about choices and temporal dynamics in three abstract competitive situations with chimpanzee participants. Frequencies of chimpanzee choices are extremely close to equilibrium (accurate-guessing) predictions, and shift as payoffs change, just as equilibrium theory predicts. The chimpanzee choices are also closer to the equilibrium prediction, and more responsive to past history and payoff changes, than two samples of human choices from experiments in which humans were also initially uninformed about opponent payoffs and could not communicate verbally. The results are consistent with a tentative interpretation of game theory as explaining evolved behavior, with the additional hypothesis that chimpanzees may retain or practice a specialized capacity to adjust strategy choice during competition to perform at least as well as, or better than, humans have.

Analysis of safety supervision effect on coal mine using game theory

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Zhou Min; Xiao Zhong-hai [China University of Mining & Technology, Xuzhou (China). School of Management

2006-07-01

A two-phase game model was constructed based on economic game theory to improve the inefficient supervision conditions of coalmining enterprises' safety production. The inner mechanism of safety supervision system was carefully studied. The strategy set of the dynamic game-theory relations between colliery proprietor and safety supervision department and the strict competitive game-theory relations between safety supervision department and workers at the production line was analyzed. The conditions of achieving the dominant-strategy equilibrium were revealed. Upon this basis, the possible solution set of safety benefit distribution for the cooperative game-theory of triple party was obtained and the effective and cooperative fair solution was formed. Finally, conclusions are drawn as follows: the combination of necessary penalty to supervisors and operators with the fair distribution of safety benefits can realize the zero-defect of operational violation, so that the violation behavior can be completely avoided. 10 refs., 7 figs.

Game theory in communication networks cooperative resolution of interactive networking scenarios

CERN Document Server

Antoniou, Josephina

2012-01-01

A mathematical tool for scientists and researchers who work with computer and communication networks, Game Theory in Communication Networks: Cooperative Resolution of Interactive Networking Scenarios addresses the question of how to promote cooperative behavior in interactive situations between heterogeneous entities in communication networking scenarios. It explores network design and management from a theoretical perspective, using game theory and graph theory to analyze strategic situations and demonstrate profitable behaviors of the cooperative entities. The book promotes the use of Game T

The Effects of Sacred Value Networks Within an Evolutionary, Adversarial Game

Science.gov (United States)

McCalla, Scott G.; Short, Martin B.; Brantingham, P. Jeffrey

2013-05-01

The effects of personal relationships and shared ideologies on levels of crime and the formation of criminal coalitions are studied within the context of an adversarial, evolutionary game first introduced in Short et al. (Phys. Rev. E 82:066114, 2010). Here, we interpret these relationships as connections on a graph of N players. These connections are then used in a variety of ways to define each player's "sacred value network"—groups of individuals that are subject to special consideration or treatment by that player. We explore the effects on the dynamics of the system that these networks introduce, through various forms of protection from both victimization and punishment. Under local protection, these networks introduce a new fixed point within the game dynamics, which we find through a continuum approximation of the discrete game. Under more complicated, extended protection, we numerically observe the emergence of criminal coalitions, or "gangs". We also find that a high-crime steady state is much more frequent in the context of extended protection networks, in both the case of Erdős-Rényi and small world random graphs.

Applications of multi-criteria and game theory approaches manufacturing and logistics

CERN Document Server

Hennet, Jean-Claude; Tiwari, Manoj

2014-01-01

Aligning the latest practices, innovations and case studies with academic frameworks and theories, the broad area of multi-criteria and game theory applications in manufacturing and logistics is covered in comprehensive details. Part 1 presents ‘multi-criteria applications’ and includes chapters on  logistics with a focus on vehicle routing problems, a multi-objective decision making approach to select the best storage policy and an exploratory study to predict the most important factors that can lead to successful mobile supply chain management adoption for manufacturing firms. Part 2 covers ‘game theory applications’ and encompasses the process of forming a coalition within a corporate network to the problem of integrating inventory and distribution optimization together with game theory to effectively manage supply networks. Providing a forum to investigate, exchange novel ideas and disseminate knowledge covering the broad area of multi-criteria and game theory applications in manufacturing and l...

Active Learning with Monty Hall in a Game Theory Class

Science.gov (United States)

Brokaw, Alan J.; Merz, Thomas E.

2004-01-01

The authors describe a game that students can play on the first day of a game theory class. The game introduces the 4 essential elements of any game and is designed so that its sequel, also played on the first day of class, has students playing the well-known Monty Hall game, which raises the question: Should you switch doors? By implementing a…

Health Behavior Theory in Physical Activity Game Apps: A Content Analysis.

Science.gov (United States)

Payne, Hannah E; Moxley, Victor Ba; MacDonald, Elizabeth

2015-07-13

Physical activity games developed for a mobile phone platform are becoming increasingly popular, yet little is known about their content or inclusion of health behavior theory (HBT). The objective of our study was to quantify elements of HBT in physical activity games developed for mobile phones and to assess the relationship between theoretical constructs and various app features. We conducted an analysis of exercise and physical activity game apps in the Apple App Store in the fall of 2014. A total of 52 apps were identified and rated for inclusion of health behavior theoretical constructs using an established theory-based rubric. Each app was coded for 100 theoretical items, containing 5 questions for 20 different constructs. Possible total theory scores ranged from 0 to 100. Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations were used to describe the HBT score and association with selected app features, respectively. The average HBT score in the sample was 14.98 out of 100. One outlier, SuperBetter, scored higher than the other apps with a score of 76. Goal setting, self-monitoring, and self-reward were the most-reported constructs found in the sample. There was no association between either app price and theory score (P=.5074), or number of gamification elements and theory score (P=.5010). However, Superbetter, with the highest HBT score, was also the most expensive app. There are few content analyses of serious games for health, but a comparison between these findings and previous content analyses of non-game health apps indicates that physical activity mobile phone games demonstrate higher levels of behavior theory. The most common theoretical constructs found in this sample are known to be efficacious elements in physical activity interventions. It is unclear, however, whether app designers consciously design physical activity mobile phone games with specific constructs in mind; it may be that games lend themselves well to inclusion of theory and any

Mathematical Methods of Game and Economic Theory

CERN Document Server

Aubin, J-P

1982-01-01

This book presents a unified treatment of optimization theory, game theory and a general equilibrium theory in economics in the framework of nonlinear functional analysis. It not only provides powerful and versatile tools for solving specific problems in economics and the social sciences but also serves as a unifying theme in the mathematical theory of these subjects as well as in pure mathematics itself.

Game Theory of Tumor–Stroma Interactions in Multiple Myeloma: Effect of Nonlinear Benefits

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Javad Salimi Sartakhti

2018-05-01

Full Text Available Cancer cells and stromal cells often exchange growth factors with paracrine effects that promote cell growth: a form of cooperation that can be studied by evolutionary game theory. Previous models have assumed that interactions between cells are pairwise or that the benefit of a growth factor is a linear function of its concentration. Diffusible factors, however, affect multiple cells and generally have nonlinear effects, and these differences are known to have important consequences for evolutionary dynamics. Here, we study tumor–stroma paracrine signaling using a model with multiplayer collective interactions in which growth factors have nonlinear effects. We use multiple myeloma as an example, modelling interactions between malignant plasma cells, osteoblasts, and osteoclasts. Nonlinear benefits can lead to results not observed in linear models, including internal mixed stable equilibria and cyclical dynamics. Models with linear effects, therefore, do not lead to a meaningful characterization of the dynamics of tumor–stroma interactions. To understand the dynamics and the effect of therapies it is necessary to estimate the shape of the benefit functions experimentally and parametrize models based on these functions.

Using Game Theory Techniques and Concepts to Develop Proprietary Models for Use in Intelligent Games

Science.gov (United States)

Christopher, Timothy Van

2011-01-01

This work is about analyzing games as models of systems. The goal is to understand the techniques that have been used by game designers in the past, and to compare them to the study of mathematical game theory. Through the study of a system or concept a model often emerges that can effectively educate students about making intelligent decisions…

Cooperation in two-dimensional mixed-games

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amaral, Marco A; Silva, Jafferson K L da; Wardil, Lucas

2015-01-01

Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two individuals is uniformly drawn from a sample of two different games. Using the master equation approach we show that the random mixture of two games is equivalent to play the average game when (i) the strategies are statistically independent of the game distribution and (ii) the transition rates are linear functions of the payoffs. We also use Monte-Carlo simulations in a two-dimensional lattice and mean-field techniques to investigate the scenario when the two above conditions do not hold. We find that even outside of such conditions, several quantities characterizing the mixed-games are still the same as the ones obtained in the average game when the two games are not very different. (paper)

Implementation of quantum game theory simulations using Python

Science.gov (United States)

Madrid S., A.

2013-05-01

This paper provides some examples about quantum games simulated in Python's programming language. The quantum games have been developed with the Sympy Python library, which permits solving quantum problems in a symbolic form. The application of these methods of quantum mechanics to game theory gives us more possibility to achieve results not possible before. To illustrate the results of these methods, in particular, there have been simulated the quantum battle of the sexes, the prisoner's dilemma and card games. These solutions are able to exceed the classic bottle neck and obtain optimal quantum strategies. In this form, python demonstrated that is possible to do more advanced and complicated quantum games algorithms.

Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games

KAUST Repository

Mabrok, Mohamed; Shamma, Jeff S.

2017-01-01

Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population

Nash evolutionary algorithms : Testing problem size in reconstruction problems in frame structures

OpenAIRE

Greiner, D.; Periaux, Jacques; Emperador, J.M.; Galván, B.; Winter, G.

2016-01-01

The use of evolutionary algorithms has been enhanced in recent years for solving real engineering problems, where the requirements of intense computational calculations are needed, especially when computational engineering simulations are involved (use of finite element method, boundary element method, etc). The coupling of game-theory concepts in evolutionary algorithms has been a recent line of research which could enhance the efficiency of the optimum design procedure and th...

Gaming practices in everyday life. An analytical operationalization of field theory by means of practice theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Claus Toft-Nielsen

2015-05-01

Full Text Available This article investigates digital game play (gaming as a specific media field (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 72, in which especially gaming capital (Consalvo, 2007 functions as a theoretical lens. We aim to analyse the specific practices that constitute and are constituted in and around gaming. This multitude of practices is theoretically qualified by the second generation of practice theorists, including (Bruchler & Postill, 2010; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2008; Warde, 2005. The empirical data are drawn from qualitative studies of gamers and gaming practices (focus groups as well as participant observations, and function as exemplary cases that illustrate our theoretical arguments. Our purpose is to analytically operationalize field theory, by means of practice theory, to enhance our understanding of digital games as new media and the specific contexts and media practices herein.

Gaming practices in everyday life. An analytical operationalization of field theory by means of practice theory

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Toft-Nielsen, Claus; Krogager, Stinne Gunder Strøm

2015-01-01

This article investigates digital game play (gaming) as a specific media field (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 72), in which especially gaming capital (Consalvo, 2007) functions as a theoretical lens. We aim to analyse the specific practices that constitute and are constituted in and around gaming....... This multitude of practices is theoretically qualified by the second generation of practice theorists, including (Bruchler & Postill, 2010; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2008; Warde, 2005). The empirical data are drawn from qualitative studies of gamers and gaming practices (focus groups as well as participant...... observations), and function as exemplary cases that illustrate our theoretical arguments. Our purpose is to analytically operationalize field theory, by means of practice theory, to enhance our understanding of digital games as new media and the specific contexts and media practices herein....

Decision and game theory in management with intuitionistic fuzzy sets

CERN Document Server

Li, Deng-Feng

2014-01-01

The focus of this book is on establishing theories and methods of both decision and game analysis in management using intuitionistic fuzzy sets. It proposes a series of innovative theories, models and methods such as the representation theorem and extension principle of intuitionistic fuzzy sets, ranking methods of intuitionistic fuzzy numbers, non-linear and linear programming methods for intuitionistic fuzzy multi-attribute decision making and (interval-valued) intuitionistic fuzzy matrix games. These theories and methods form the theory system of intuitionistic fuzzy decision making and games, which is not only remarkably different from those of the traditional, Bayes and/or fuzzy decision theory but can also provide an effective and efficient tool for solving complex management problems. Since there is a certain degree of inherent hesitancy in real-life management, which cannot always be described by the traditional mathematical methods and/or fuzzy set theory, this book offers an effective approach to us...

Despotism, democracy, and the evolutionary dynamics of leadership and followership.

Science.gov (United States)

Van Vugt, Mark

2009-01-01

Responds to comments made by George B. Graen and Stephen J. Guastello on the current author's article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. In the original article my co-authors and I proposed a new way of thinking about leadership, informed by evolutionary (neo-Darwinian) theory. In the first commentary, Graen noted that we ignored a number of recently developed psychological theories of leadership that take into account the leader-follower relationship, most notably LMX theory. LMX theory asserts that leadership effectiveness and team performance are affected by the quality of working relationships between superior and subordinates. Because the original article primarily dealt with questions about the origins of leadership--the phylogenetic and evolutionary causes--we had to be concise in our review of proximate psychological theories of leadership. In the second commentary, Guastello concurred with the importance of an evolutionary game analysis for studying leadership but disagreed with certain details of our analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Computer Game Theories for Designing Motivating Educational Software: A Survey Study

Science.gov (United States)

Ang, Chee Siang; Rao, G. S. V. Radha Krishna

2008-01-01

The purpose of this study is to evaluate computer game theories for educational software. We propose a framework for designing engaging educational games based on contemporary game studies which includes ludology and narratology. Ludology focuses on the study of computer games as play and game activities, while narratology revolves around the…

The faith dynamic in creationism and evolutionary theory

OpenAIRE

Jackson, Edgar Basil

2012-01-01

This study attempts to examine evolutionary theory and creationism objectively without engaging in an apology for or a criticism of either. It compares the presuppositions and assumptions of both systems, and examines the role of faith in religion and in the scientific theory of evolution. After discussing the nature of the scientific method and the development of the theory of evolution, the study explores the dichotomy of faith and reason, the ways in which these operate in theories of int...

Group decisions in biodiversity conservation: implications from game theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Frank, David M; Sarkar, Sahotra

2010-05-27

Decision analysis and game theory have proved useful tools in various biodiversity conservation planning and modeling contexts. This paper shows how game theory may be used to inform group decisions in biodiversity conservation scenarios by modeling conflicts between stakeholders to identify Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. These are cases in which each agent pursuing individual self-interest leads to a worse outcome for all, relative to other feasible outcomes. Three case studies from biodiversity conservation contexts showing this feature are modeled to demonstrate how game-theoretical representation can inform group decision-making. The mathematical theory of games is used to model three biodiversity conservation scenarios with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria: (i) a two-agent case involving wild dogs in South Africa; (ii) a three-agent raptor and grouse conservation scenario from the United Kingdom; and (iii) an n-agent fish and coral conservation scenario from the Philippines. In each case there is reason to believe that traditional mechanism-design solutions that appeal to material incentives may be inadequate, and the game-theoretical analysis recommends a resumption of further deliberation between agents and the initiation of trust--and confidence--building measures. Game theory can and should be used as a normative tool in biodiversity conservation contexts: identifying scenarios with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria enables constructive action in order to achieve (closer to) optimal conservation outcomes, whether by policy solutions based on mechanism design or otherwise. However, there is mounting evidence that formal mechanism-design solutions may backfire in certain cases. Such scenarios demand a return to group deliberation and the creation of reciprocal relationships of trust.

Group decisions in biodiversity conservation: implications from game theory.

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

David M Frank

Full Text Available BACKGROUND: Decision analysis and game theory have proved useful tools in various biodiversity conservation planning and modeling contexts. This paper shows how game theory may be used to inform group decisions in biodiversity conservation scenarios by modeling conflicts between stakeholders to identify Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. These are cases in which each agent pursuing individual self-interest leads to a worse outcome for all, relative to other feasible outcomes. Three case studies from biodiversity conservation contexts showing this feature are modeled to demonstrate how game-theoretical representation can inform group decision-making. METHODOLOGY AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The mathematical theory of games is used to model three biodiversity conservation scenarios with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria: (i a two-agent case involving wild dogs in South Africa; (ii a three-agent raptor and grouse conservation scenario from the United Kingdom; and (iii an n-agent fish and coral conservation scenario from the Philippines. In each case there is reason to believe that traditional mechanism-design solutions that appeal to material incentives may be inadequate, and the game-theoretical analysis recommends a resumption of further deliberation between agents and the initiation of trust--and confidence--building measures. CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE: Game theory can and should be used as a normative tool in biodiversity conservation contexts: identifying scenarios with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria enables constructive action in order to achieve (closer to optimal conservation outcomes, whether by policy solutions based on mechanism design or otherwise. However, there is mounting evidence that formal mechanism-design solutions may backfire in certain cases. Such scenarios demand a return to group deliberation and the creation of reciprocal relationships of trust.

Analysis of Urban Car Owners Commute Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Huawei Gong

2015-01-01

Full Text Available With the aggravation of the traffic congestion in the city, car owners will have to give up commuting with private cars and take the public transportation instead. The paper uses the replication dynamic mechanism to simulate the learning and adjustment mechanism of the automobile owners commuting mode selection. The evolutionary stable strategy is used to describe the long-term evolution of competition game trend. Finally we simulate equilibrium and stability of an evolution of the game under a payoff imbalance situation. The research shows that a certain proportion of car owners will choose public transit under the pressure of public transport development and heavy traffic, and the proportion will be closely related to the initial conditions and urban transportation development policy.

Health Behavior Theory in Physical Activity Game Apps: A Content Analysis

Science.gov (United States)

Moxley, Victor BA; MacDonald, Elizabeth

2015-01-01

Background Physical activity games developed for a mobile phone platform are becoming increasingly popular, yet little is known about their content or inclusion of health behavior theory (HBT). Objective The objective of our study was to quantify elements of HBT in physical activity games developed for mobile phones and to assess the relationship between theoretical constructs and various app features. Methods We conducted an analysis of exercise and physical activity game apps in the Apple App Store in the fall of 2014. A total of 52 apps were identified and rated for inclusion of health behavior theoretical constructs using an established theory-based rubric. Each app was coded for 100 theoretical items, containing 5 questions for 20 different constructs. Possible total theory scores ranged from 0 to 100. Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations were used to describe the HBT score and association with selected app features, respectively. Results The average HBT score in the sample was 14.98 out of 100. One outlier, SuperBetter, scored higher than the other apps with a score of 76. Goal setting, self-monitoring, and self-reward were the most-reported constructs found in the sample. There was no association between either app price and theory score (P=.5074), or number of gamification elements and theory score (P=.5010). However, Superbetter, with the highest HBT score, was also the most expensive app. Conclusions There are few content analyses of serious games for health, but a comparison between these findings and previous content analyses of non-game health apps indicates that physical activity mobile phone games demonstrate higher levels of behavior theory. The most common theoretical constructs found in this sample are known to be efficacious elements in physical activity interventions. It is unclear, however, whether app designers consciously design physical activity mobile phone games with specific constructs in mind; it may be that games lend

Mathematical programming and game theory for decision making

CERN Document Server

Bapat, R B; Das, A K; Parthasarathy, T

2008-01-01

This edited book presents recent developments and state-of-the-art review in various areas of mathematical programming and game theory. It is a peer-reviewed research monograph under the ISI Platinum Jubilee Series on Statistical Science and Interdisciplinary Research. This volume provides a panoramic view of theory and the applications of the methods of mathematical programming to problems in statistics, finance, games and electrical networks. It also provides an important as well as timely overview of research trends and focuses on the exciting areas like support vector machines, bilevel pro

Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Du Wenbo; Cao Xianbin; Liu Runran; Wang Zhen

2012-01-01

Considering the inertia of individuals in real life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia: with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society. (interdisciplinary physics and related areas of science and technology)

Structure coefficients and strategy selection in multiplayer games.

Science.gov (United States)

McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph

2016-01-01

Evolutionary processes based on two-player games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Snowdrift Game are abundant in evolutionary game theory. These processes, including those based on games with more than two strategies, have been studied extensively under the assumption that selection is weak. However, games involving more than two players have not received the same level of attention. To address this issue, and to relate two-player games to multiplayer games, we introduce a notion of reducibility for multiplayer games that captures what it means to break down a multiplayer game into a sequence of interactions with fewer players. We discuss the role of reducibility in structured populations, and we give examples of games that are irreducible in any population structure. Since the known conditions for strategy selection, otherwise known as [Formula: see text]-rules, have been established only for two-player games with multiple strategies and for multiplayer games with two strategies, we extend these rules to multiplayer games with many strategies to account for irreducible games that cannot be reduced to those simpler types of games. In particular, we show that the number of structure coefficients required for a symmetric game with [Formula: see text]-player interactions and [Formula: see text] strategies grows in [Formula: see text] like [Formula: see text]. Our results also cover a type of ecologically asymmetric game based on payoff values that are derived not only from the strategies of the players, but also from their spatial positions within the population.

Group Decisions in Biodiversity Conservation: Implications from Game Theory

OpenAIRE

Frank, David M.; Sarkar, Sahotra

2010-01-01

Background Decision analysis and game theory [1], [2] have proved useful tools in various biodiversity conservation planning and modeling contexts [3]?[5]. This paper shows how game theory may be used to inform group decisions in biodiversity conservation scenarios by modeling conflicts between stakeholders to identify Pareto?inefficient Nash equilibria. These are cases in which each agent pursuing individual self?interest leads to a worse outcome for all, relative to other feasible outcomes....

Aspiration dynamics of multi-player games in finite populations.

Science.gov (United States)

Du, Jinming; Wu, Bin; Altrock, Philipp M; Wang, Long

2014-05-06

On studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer. In the latter case, individuals adjust their strategies based on a comparison of their pay-offs from the evolutionary game to a value they aspire, called the level of aspiration. Unlike imitation processes of pairwise comparison, aspiration-driven updates do not require additional information about the strategic environment and can thus be interpreted as being more spontaneous. Recent work has mainly focused on understanding how aspiration dynamics alter the evolutionary outcome in structured populations. However, the baseline case for understanding strategy selection is the well-mixed population case, which is still lacking sufficient understanding. We explore how aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics under imperfect rationality influence the average abundance of a strategy in multi-player evolutionary games with two strategies. We analytically derive a condition under which a strategy is more abundant than the other in the weak selection limiting case. This approach has a long-standing history in evolutionary games and is mostly applied for its mathematical approachability. Hence, we also explore strong selection numerically, which shows that our weak selection condition is a robust predictor of the average abundance of a strategy. The condition turns out to differ from that of a wide class of imitation dynamics, as long as the game is not dyadic. Therefore, a strategy favoured under imitation dynamics can be disfavoured under aspiration dynamics. This does not require any population structure, and thus highlights the intrinsic difference between imitation and aspiration dynamics.

Game theory and mercosul

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Romeu Costa Ribeiro Bastos

2011-06-01

Full Text Available The processes of regional integration has aroused great interest in the field of International Relations since the 1950s, however, there has been renovated enthusiasm especially in the 1980s, in view of the successful experience of European Union and the creation of Mercosur. This article aims at analyzing the positions of Brazil and Argentina within Mercosur, using the instruments supplied by the Game Theory.

Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I: Theory. An Introduction

OpenAIRE

Corchon, Luis; Marini, Marco A.

2017-01-01

We introduce here the first volume of Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization: Theory, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, by describing its main aim and its basic structure.

Goal-based dictator game

Science.gov (United States)

Zaibidi, Nerda Zura; Ibrahim, Adyda; Abidin, Norhaslinda Zainal

2014-12-01

A considerable number of studies have been conducted to study fairness issues using two-player game. Dictator Game is one of the two-player games that receive much attention. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary approach to the Dictator Game by using Goal programming to build a model of human decision-making for cooperation. The model is formulated based on the theories of cognitive neuroscience that is capable in capturing a more realistic fairness concerns between players in the games. We show that fairness will evolve by taking into account players' aspirations and preferences explicitly in terms of profit and fairness concerns. The model is then simulated to investigate any possible effective strategy for people in economics to deal with fairness coalition. Parallels are drawn between the approach and concepts of human decision making from the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychology. The proposed model is also able to help decision makers to plan or enhance the effective strategies for business purposes.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Regulation and Enterprise Emission from the Perspective of Environmental Tax

Science.gov (United States)

Mai, Yazong

2017-12-01

In the context of the upcoming implementation of the environmental tax policy, there is a need for a focus on the relationship between government regulation and corporate emissions. To achieve the real effect of environmental tax policy, government need to regulate the illegal emissions of enterprises. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper analyses the strategic set of government regulators and polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy. By using the evolutionary game model, the utility function and payoff matrix of the both sides are constructed, and the evolutionary analysis and strategy adjustment of the environmental governance target and the actual profit of the stakeholders are carried out. Thus, the wrong behaviours could be corrected so that the equilibrium of the evolutionary system can be achieved gradually, which could also get the evolutionary stable strategies of the government and the polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy.

Morals matter in economic games.

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Felix C Brodbeck

Full Text Available Contrary to predictions from Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory, when making economic decisions in interpersonal situations, people take the interest of others into account and express various forms of solidarity, even in one-shot interactions with anonymous strangers. Research in other-regarding behavior is dominated by behavioral economical and evolutionary biological approaches. Psychological theory building, which addresses mental processes underlying other-regarding behavior, is rare. Based on Relational Models Theory (RMT, [1] and Relationship Regulation Theory (RRT, [2] it is proposed that moral motives influence individuals' decision behavior in interpersonal situations via conscious and unconscious (automatic processes. To test our propositions we developed the 'Dyadic Solidarity Game' and its solitary equivalent, the 'Self-Insurance Game'. Four experiments, in which the moral motives "Unity" and "Proportionality" were manipulated, support the propositions made. First, it was shown that consciously activated moral motives (via framing of the overall goal of the experiment and unconsciously activated moral motives (via subliminal priming influence other-regarding behavior. Second, this influence was only found in interpersonal, not in solitary situations. Third, by combining the analyses of the two experimental games the extent to which participants apply the Golden Rule ("treat others how you wish to be treated" could be established. Individuals with a "Unity" motive treated others like themselves, whereas individuals with a "Proportionality" motive gave others less then they gave themselves. The four experiments not only support the assumption that morals matter in economic games, they also deliver new insights in how morals matter in economic decision making.

Morals matter in economic games.

Science.gov (United States)

Brodbeck, Felix C; Kugler, Katharina G; Reif, Julia A M; Maier, Markus A

2013-01-01

Contrary to predictions from Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory, when making economic decisions in interpersonal situations, people take the interest of others into account and express various forms of solidarity, even in one-shot interactions with anonymous strangers. Research in other-regarding behavior is dominated by behavioral economical and evolutionary biological approaches. Psychological theory building, which addresses mental processes underlying other-regarding behavior, is rare. Based on Relational Models Theory (RMT, [1]) and Relationship Regulation Theory (RRT, [2]) it is proposed that moral motives influence individuals' decision behavior in interpersonal situations via conscious and unconscious (automatic) processes. To test our propositions we developed the 'Dyadic Solidarity Game' and its solitary equivalent, the 'Self-Insurance Game'. Four experiments, in which the moral motives "Unity" and "Proportionality" were manipulated, support the propositions made. First, it was shown that consciously activated moral motives (via framing of the overall goal of the experiment) and unconsciously activated moral motives (via subliminal priming) influence other-regarding behavior. Second, this influence was only found in interpersonal, not in solitary situations. Third, by combining the analyses of the two experimental games the extent to which participants apply the Golden Rule ("treat others how you wish to be treated") could be established. Individuals with a "Unity" motive treated others like themselves, whereas individuals with a "Proportionality" motive gave others less then they gave themselves. The four experiments not only support the assumption that morals matter in economic games, they also deliver new insights in how morals matter in economic decision making.

Teaching Public Goods Theory with a Classroom Game

Science.gov (United States)

Pickhardt, Michael

2005-01-01

The author extends the work of Holt and Laury (1997) on a simple noncomputerized card game for teaching the essential aspects of public goods theory. He suggests a course of several lectures and discusses the behavior of subjects in various game sessions. Among other things, the results provide experimental evidence with respect to the private…

RECENT THEORIES OF THE FIRM: A CRITICAL APPROACH

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Pacala Anca

2012-07-01

Full Text Available Besides the classical theories of the firms as complete or incomplete contract theories, in the last decades there were developed some new theories bringing new perspectives and approaches. Among these new perspectives we are presenting in this paper the evolutionary theory of the firm, the importance of resources and knowledge, and game theory. According to evolutionary theory the most important element for a firm is the company itself and its specific assets (physical and human. Evolutionist theories, in their diversity, are interested in issues such as the effects of changes in the long run within the firms, in terms of products, processes, decisions, analysis of the determinants of success. Resource and knowledge -based theories try to find a common point between transactions and organizational management analysis, focusing on development issues within companies, the importance of business strategy and achieving competitive advantages. Finally, cooperative game theory sees the firm as a coalition of various parts that compose it, emphasizing the importance of cooperative relations between employees and shareholders, risk sharing and effective collective skills, knowledge and funds using.

Emergence and maintenance of menopause in humans: A game theory model.

Science.gov (United States)

Thouzeau, Valentin; Raymond, Michel

2017-10-07

Menopause, the permanent cessation of ovulation, occurs in women well before the end of their expected life span. Several adaptive hypotheses have been proposed to solve this evolutionary puzzle, each based on a possible fitness benefit derived from an early reproductive senescence, but no consensus has emerged. The construction of a game theory model allowed us to jointly study the main adaptive hypotheses in emergence and maintenance of menopause. Four classical hypotheses on the benefits of menopause were considered (decreased maternal mortality, increased grandmothering, decreased conflict over reproductive resources between older and younger females, and changes in their relatedness) plus a fifth one derived from a possible pleiotropic trade-off. Interestingly, the conditions for the emergence of menopause are more restrictive than those for its maintenance due to the social and familial changes induced by the occurrence of non-reproductive older women. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Good Faith and Game Theory

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Rose, Caspar

2016-01-01

This article shows how game theory can be applied to model good faith mathematically using an example of a classic legal dispute related to rei vindicato. The issue is whether an owner has a legal right to his good if a person has bought it in good faith by using updated probabilities. The article...

Route Choice Model Based on Game Theory for Commuters

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Licai Yang

2016-06-01

Full Text Available The traffic behaviours of commuters may cause traffic congestion during peak hours. Advanced Traffic Information System can provide dynamic information to travellers. Due to the lack of timeliness and comprehensiveness, the provided information cannot satisfy the travellers’ needs. Since the assumptions of traditional route choice model based on Expected Utility Theory conflict with the actual situation, a route choice model based on Game Theory is proposed to provide reliable route choice to commuters in actual situation in this paper. The proposed model treats the alternative routes as game players and utilizes the precision of predicted information and familiarity of traffic condition to build a game. The optimal route can be generated considering Nash Equilibrium by solving the route choice game. Simulations and experimental analysis show that the proposed model can describe the commuters’ routine route choice decisionexactly and the provided route is reliable.

Defending Against Advanced Persistent Threats Using Game-Theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Rass, Stefan; König, Sandra; Schauer, Stefan

2017-01-01

Advanced persistent threats (APT) combine a variety of different attack forms ranging from social engineering to technical exploits. The diversity and usual stealthiness of APT turns them into a central problem of contemporary practical system security, since information on attacks, the current system status or the attacker's incentives is often vague, uncertain and in many cases even unavailable. Game theory is a natural approach to model the conflict between the attacker and the defender, and this work investigates a generalized class of matrix games as a risk mitigation tool for an advanced persistent threat (APT) defense. Unlike standard game and decision theory, our model is tailored to capture and handle the full uncertainty that is immanent to APTs, such as disagreement among qualitative expert risk assessments, unknown adversarial incentives and uncertainty about the current system state (in terms of how deeply the attacker may have penetrated into the system's protective shells already). Practically, game-theoretic APT models can be derived straightforwardly from topological vulnerability analysis, together with risk assessments as they are done in common risk management standards like the ISO 31000 family. Theoretically, these models come with different properties than classical game theoretic models, whose technical solution presented in this work may be of independent interest.

Attribution models and the Cooperative Game Theory

OpenAIRE

Cano Berlanga, Sebastian; Vilella, Cori

2017-01-01

The current paper studies the attribution model used by Google Analytics. Precisely, we use the Cooperative Game Theory to propose a fair distribution of the revenues among the considered channels, in order to facilitate the cooperation and to guarantee stability. We define a transferable utility convex cooperative game from the observed frequencies and we use the Shapley value to allocate the revenues among the di erent channels. Furthermore, we evaluate the impact of an advertising...

"Depletion": A Game with Natural Rules for Teaching Reaction Rate Theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Olbris, Donald J.; Herzfeld, Judith

2002-01-01

Depletion is a game that reinforces central concepts of reaction rate theory through simulation. Presents the game with a set of follow-up questions suitable for either a quiz or discussion. Also describes student reaction to the game. (MM)

An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Revision-Resistant Motivations and Strategic Reasoning

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

DeLancey, Craig

2008-01-01

.... In Ultimatum Games, for example. humans tend in one-shot anonymous interactions towards equal distributions of goods at high individual cost, often encouraged through retributive actions that result in significant personal cost...

Using Game Theory and the Bible to Build Critical Thinking Skills

Science.gov (United States)

McCannon, Bryan C.

2007-01-01

The author describes a course designed to build the critical thinking skills of undergraduate economics students. The course introduces and uses game theory to study the Bible. Students gain experience using game theory to formalize events and, by drawing parallels between the Bible and common economic concepts, illustrate the pervasiveness of…

Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mark Alfano

2018-04-01

Full Text Available Ethics is a field in which the gap between words and actions looms large. Game theory and the empirical methods it inspires look at behavior instead of the lip service people sometimes pay to norms. We believe that this special issue comprises several illustrations of the fruitful application of this approach to ethics.

Offspring mortality was a determinant factor in the evolution of paternal investment in humans: An evolutionary game approach.

Science.gov (United States)

López Alonso, Diego; Ortiz-Rodríguez, Isabel M

2017-04-21

Some researchers support the belief that man evolved philandering behavior because of the greater reproductive success of promiscuous males. According to this idea, deserting behavior from the man should be expected along with null paternal involvement in offspring care. Paradoxically however, the average offspring investment in the human male is far higher than that of any other male mammal, including other primates. In our work, we have addressed this conundrum by employing evolutionary game theory, using objective payoffs instead of, as are commonly used, arbitrary payoffs. Payoffs were computed as reproductive successes by a model based on trivial probabilities, implemented within the Barreto's Population Dynamics Toolbox (2014). The evolution of the parent conflict was simulated by a game with two players (the woman and the man). First, a simple game was assayed with two strategies, 'desert-unfaithful' and 'care-faithful'. Then, the game was played with a third mixed strategy, 'care-unfaithful'. The two-strategy game results were mainly determined by the offspring survival rate (s) and the non-paternity rate (z), with remaining factors playing a secondary role. Starting from two empirical estimates for both rates (s = 0.617 and z = 0.033) and decreasing the offspring mortality from near 0.4 to 0.1, the results were consistent with a win for the 'care-faithful' strategy. The 'desert-unfaithful' strategy only won at unrealistically high non-paternity rates (z>0.2). When three-strategy games were played, the mixed strategy of 'care-unfaithful' man could win the game in some less frequent cases. Regardless of the number of game strategies, 'care' fathers always won. These results strongly suggest that offspring mortality was the key factor in the evolution of paternal investment within the Homo branch. The 'care-faithful' strategy would have been the main strategy in human evolution but 'care-unfaithful' men did evolve at a lesser frequency. It can therefore be

Using experimental game theory to transit human values to ethical AI

OpenAIRE

Wang, Yijia; Wan, Yan; Wang, Zhijian

2017-01-01

Knowing the reflection of game theory and ethics, we develop a mathematical representation to bridge the gap between the concepts in moral philosophy (e.g., Kantian and Utilitarian) and AI ethics industry technology standard (e.g., IEEE P7000 standard series for Ethical AI). As an application, we demonstrate how human value can be obtained from the experimental game theory (e.g., trust game experiment) so as to build an ethical AI. Moreover, an approach to test the ethics (rightness or wrongn...

The Explanatory Value of Inclusive Fitness for Evolutionary Theory

OpenAIRE

Rubin, Hannah

2017-01-01

At the heart of evolutionary theory is the concept of 'fitness', which is, standardly, an organism's reproductive success. Many evolutionary theorists argue, however, that to explain the evolution of social traits, such as altruism, we must use a different notion of fitness. This 'inclusive fitness', which includes the reproductive success of relatives, is seen as indispensable for studying social evolution. Recently, however, both biologists and philosophers have critically scrutinized its s...

Spatial Evolutionary Games of Interaction among Generic Cancer Cells

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bach, Lars Arve; Sumpter, David J.T.; Alsner, Jan

2003-01-01

Evolutionary game models of cellular interactions have shown that heterogeneity in the cellular genotypic composition is maintained through evolution to stable coexistence of growth-promoting and non-promoting cell types. We generalise these mean-field models and relax the assumption of perfect...... mixing of cells by instead implementing an individual-based model that includes the stochastic and spatial effects likely to occur in tumours. The scope for coexistence of genotypic strategies changed with the inclusion of explicit space and stochasticity. The spatial models show some interesting...... deviations from their mean-field counterparts, for example the possibility of altruistic (paracrine) cell strategies to thrive. Such effects can however, be highly sensitive to model implementation and the more realistic models with semi-synchronous and stochastic updating do not show evolution of altruism...

Historical change and evolutionary theory.

Science.gov (United States)

Masters, Roger D

2007-09-01

Despite advances in fields like genetics, evolutionary psychology, and human behavior and evolution--which generally focus on individual or small group behavior from a biological perspective--evolutionary biology has made little impact on studies of political change and social history. Theories of natural selection often seem inapplicable to human history because our social behavior is embedded in language (which makes possible the concepts of time and social identity on which what we call "history" depends). Peter Corning's Holistic Darwinism reconceptualizes evolutionary biology, making it possible to go beyond the barriers separating the social and natural sciences. Corning focuses on two primary processes: "synergy" (complex multivariate interactions at multiple levels between a species and its environment) and "cybernetics" (the information systems permitting communication between individuals and groups over time). Combining this frame of reference with inclusive fitness theory, it is possible to answer the most important (and puzzling) question in human history: How did a species that lived for millennia in hunter-gatherer bands form centralized states governing large populations of non-kin (including multi-ethnic empires as well as modern nation-states)? The fragility and contemporary ethnic violence in Kenya and the Congo should suffice as evidence that these issues need to be taken seriously. To explain the rise and fall of states as well as changes in human laws and customs--the core of historical research--it is essential to show how the provision of collective goods can overcome the challenge of self-interest and free-riding in some instances, yet fail to do so in others. To this end, it is now possible to consider how a state providing public goods can--under circumstances that often include effective leadership--contribute to enhanced inclusive fitness of virtually all its members. Because social behavior needs to adapt to ecology, but ecological

The role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas: an evolutionary game theoretical view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Basanta, David; Scott, Jacob G; Anderson, Alexander R A; Rockne, Russ; Swanson, Kristin R

2011-01-01

Recent advances in clinical medicine have elucidated two significantly different subtypes of glioblastoma which carry very different prognoses, both defined by mutations in isocitrate dehydrogenase-1 (IDH-1). The mechanistic consequences of this mutation have not yet been fully clarified, with conflicting opinions existing in the literature; however, IDH-1 mutation may be used as a surrogate marker to distinguish between primary and secondary glioblastoma multiforme (sGBM) from malignant progression of a lower grade glioma. We develop a mathematical model of IDH-1 mutated secondary glioblastoma using evolutionary game theory to investigate the interactions between four different phenotypic populations within the tumor: autonomous growth, invasive, glycolytic, and the hybrid invasive/glycolytic cells. Our model recapitulates glioblastoma behavior well and is able to reproduce two recent experimental findings, as well as make novel predictions concerning the rate of invasive growth as a function of vascularity, and fluctuations in the proportions of phenotypic populations that a glioblastoma will experience under different microenvironmental constraints

The role of IDH1 mutated tumour cells in secondary glioblastomas: an evolutionary game theoretical view

Science.gov (United States)

Basanta, David; Scott, Jacob G.; Rockne, Russ; Swanson, Kristin R.; Anderson, Alexander R. A.

2011-02-01

Recent advances in clinical medicine have elucidated two significantly different subtypes of glioblastoma which carry very different prognoses, both defined by mutations in isocitrate dehydrogenase-1 (IDH-1). The mechanistic consequences of this mutation have not yet been fully clarified, with conflicting opinions existing in the literature; however, IDH-1 mutation may be used as a surrogate marker to distinguish between primary and secondary glioblastoma multiforme (sGBM) from malignant progression of a lower grade glioma. We develop a mathematical model of IDH-1 mutated secondary glioblastoma using evolutionary game theory to investigate the interactions between four different phenotypic populations within the tumor: autonomous growth, invasive, glycolytic, and the hybrid invasive/glycolytic cells. Our model recapitulates glioblastoma behavior well and is able to reproduce two recent experimental findings, as well as make novel predictions concerning the rate of invasive growth as a function of vascularity, and fluctuations in the proportions of phenotypic populations that a glioblastoma will experience under different microenvironmental constraints.

Epigenetic information in gametes: Gaming from before fertilization. Comment on ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

Science.gov (United States)

Shi, Junchao; Zhang, Xudong; Liu, Ying; Chen, Qi

2017-03-01

In their interesting article [1] Wang et al. proposed a mathematical model based on evolutionary game theory [2] to tackle the fundamental question in embryo development, that how sperm and egg interact with each other, through epigenetic processes, to form a zygote and direct successful embryo development. This work is based on the premise that epigenetic reprogramming (referring to the erasure and reconstruction of epigenetic marks, such as DNA methylation and histone modifications) after fertilization might be of paramount importance to maintain the normal development of embryos, a premise we fully agree, given the compelling experimental evidence reported [3]. Wang et al. have specifically chosen to employ the well-studied DNA methylation reprogramming process during mammalian early embryo development, as a basis to develop their mathematical model, namely epigenetic game theory (epiGame). They concluded that the DNA methylation pattern in mammalian early embryo could be formulated and quantified, and their model can be further used to quantify the interactions, such as competition and/or cooperation of expressed genes that maximize the fitness of embryos. The efforts by Wang et al. in quantitatively and systematically analyzing the beginning of life apparently hold value and represent a novel direction for future embryo development research from both theoretical and experimental biologists. On the other hand, we see their theory still at its infancy, because there are plenty more parameters to consider and there are spaces for debates, such as the cases of haploid embryo development [4]. Here, we briefly comment on the dynamic process of epigenetic reprogramming that goes beyond DNA methylation, a dynamic interplay that involves histone modifications, non-coding RNAs, transposable elements et al., as well as the potential input of the various types of 'hereditary' epigenetic information in the gametes - a game that has started before the fertilization.

An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Revision-Resistant Motivations and Strategic Reasoning

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

DeLancey, Craig

2008-01-01

Strong reciprocity and other forms of cooperation with non-kin in large groups and in one-time social interactions is difficult to explain with traditional economic or with simple evolutionary accounts...

The combination of system dynamics and game theory in analyzing oligopoly markets

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ali Mohammadi

2016-04-01

Full Text Available In this paper, we present a hybrid method of game theory and dynamic systems to study the behavior of firms in an oligopoly market. The aim of this study is to build a model for an oligopoly game on the basis of feedback loops and system dynamics approach and to solve the resulted problems under some special conditions where traditional game theory methods are unable to handle. The method includes a combination of qualitative methods including interviews with industry experts to prepare the model and quantitative methods of system dynamics, simulation methodologies and game theory. The results indicate that competitive behavior and the important parameters such as volume of demand, interest rates and price fluctuation will be stabilized after a transition period.

Non-cooperative stochastic differential game theory of generalized Markov jump linear systems

CERN Document Server

Zhang, Cheng-ke; Zhou, Hai-ying; Bin, Ning

2017-01-01

This book systematically studies the stochastic non-cooperative differential game theory of generalized linear Markov jump systems and its application in the field of finance and insurance. The book is an in-depth research book of the continuous time and discrete time linear quadratic stochastic differential game, in order to establish a relatively complete framework of dynamic non-cooperative differential game theory. It uses the method of dynamic programming principle and Riccati equation, and derives it into all kinds of existence conditions and calculating method of the equilibrium strategies of dynamic non-cooperative differential game. Based on the game theory method, this book studies the corresponding robust control problem, especially the existence condition and design method of the optimal robust control strategy. The book discusses the theoretical results and its applications in the risk control, option pricing, and the optimal investment problem in the field of finance and insurance, enriching the...

A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Maes, Michael; Nax, Heinrich H.

2016-01-01

‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a

Application of Game Theory Approaches in Routing Protocols for Wireless Networks

Science.gov (United States)

Javidi, Mohammad M.; Aliahmadipour, Laya

2011-09-01

An important and essential issue for wireless networks is routing protocol design that is a major technical challenge due to the function of the network. Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic interactions among multiple decision makers and the results of researches show that applied game theory in routing protocol lead to improvement the network performance through reduce overhead and motivates selfish nodes to collaborate in the network. This paper presents a review and comparison for typical representatives of routing protocols designed that applied game theory approaches for various wireless networks such as ad hoc networks, mobile ad hoc networks and sensor networks that all of them lead to improve the network performance.

Mitigating Free Riding in Peer-To-Peer Networks: Game Theory ...

African Journals Online (AJOL)

Mitigating Free Riding in Peer-To-Peer Networks: Game Theory Approach. ... In this paper, we model the interactions between peers as a modified gift giving game and proposed an utility exchange incentive ... AJOL African Journals Online.

Why Shops Close Again : An Evolutionary Perspective on the Deregulation of Shopping Hours

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Kosfeld, M.

1999-01-01

This paper introduces a new perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We study a retail economy where shopping hours have been deregulated recently. It is argued that first, the deregulation leads to a coordination problem between store owners

Quantum Uncertainty and Decision-Making in Game Theory

Science.gov (United States)

Asano, M.; Ohya, M.; Tanaka, Y.; Khrennikov, A.; Basieva, I.

2011-01-01

Recently a few authors pointed to a possibility to apply the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to cognitive psychology, in particular, to games of the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) type.6_18 In this paper, we discuss the problem of rationality in game theory and point out that the quantum uncertainty is similar to the uncertainty of knowledge, which a player feels subjectively in his decision-making.

Review of game theory applications for situation awareness

Science.gov (United States)

Blasch, Erik; Shen, Dan; Pham, Khanh D.; Chen, Genshe

2015-05-01

Game theoretical methods have been used for spectral awareness, space situational awareness (SSA), cyber situational awareness (CSA), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance situation awareness (ISA). Each of these cases, awareness is supported by sensor estimation for assessment and the situation is determined from the actions of multiple players. Game theory assumes rational actors in a defined scenario; however, variations in social, cultural and behavioral factors include the dynamic nature of the context. In a dynamic data-driven application system (DDDAS), modeling must include both the measurements but also how models are used by different actors with different priorities. In this paper, we highlight the applications of game theory by reviewing the literature to determine the current state of the art and future needs. Future developments would include building towards knowledge awareness with information technology (e.g., data aggregation, access, indexing); multiscale analysis (e.g., space, time, and frequency), and software methods (e.g., architectures, cloud computing, protocols).

Evolutionary stability of mixed strategies on graphs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li, Yan; Liu, Xinsheng; Claussen, Jens Christian

2016-01-01

Up to the present time, the study of evolutionary dynamics mostly focused on pure strategy games in finite discrete strategy space, either in well-mixed or structured populations. In this paper, we study mixed strategy games in continuous strategy space on graphs of degree k . Each player is arranged on a vertex of the graph. The edges denote the interaction between two individuals. In the limit of weak selection, we first derive the payoff functions of two mixed strategies under three different updating rules, named birth–death, death–birth and imitation. Then we obtain the conditions for a strategy being a continuously stable strategy (CSS), and we also confirm that the equilibrium distribution corresponding to the CSS is neighborhood attracting and strongly uninvadable. Finally, we apply our theory to the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game to obtain possible CSS. Simulations are performed for the two special games and the results are well consistent with the conclusions we made. (paper)

Contributions to Pursuit-Evasion Game Theory

Science.gov (United States)

Oyler, Dave Wilson

is developed that requires minimal information and highlights a limitation of dominance regions. These contributions extend pursuit-evasion game theory to a number of games that have not previously been solved, and in some cases, the solutions presented are more amenable to implementation than previous methods.

Some Links Between Game Theory and Decision Theory in Economics

OpenAIRE

Dominika Crnjac; Goran Martinovic

2009-01-01

Certain optimal strategies based upon game theory are given in this paper. A decision-making function and a risk function are explained. Decision-making criteria are applied for determining best decision-making functions with respect to a specific criterion. Special attention is given to the minimax criterion.

Psychological motives and online games addiction: a test of flow theory and humanistic needs theory for Taiwanese adolescents.

Science.gov (United States)

Wan, Chin-Sheng; Chiou, Wen-Bin

2006-06-01

Obviously, the negative impact of online games has received much attention as well as having become a popular research topic. This research explored, from flow theory and humanistic needs theory, the psychological motivations of Taiwanese adolescents who are addicted to online games. The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate the relationship between players' flow state and their online games addiction. The results indicated that flow state was negatively correlated with addictive inclination and it was not a significant predictor for players' subsequent additive inclination. Findings also revealed that the addicts' flow state was significantly lower than the nonaddicts. Thus, flow state might not be the key psychological mechanism of players' addiction. In Study 2, the results showed that the psychological needs of players of online games were close to the two-factor theory which depicts satisfaction and dissatisfaction dimensions. Addicted players' need-gratification was similar to the feature of dissatisfactory factor. That is, the absence of playing online games is more likely to generate sense of dissatisfaction; the addicts' compulsive use of online games seems to stem from the relief of dissatisfaction rather than the pursuit of satisfaction. In contrast, online games tend to provide the nonaddicts with a sense of satisfaction rather than a sense of dissatisfaction.

Evolutionary theory of ageing and the problem of correlated Gompertz parameters.

Science.gov (United States)

Burger, Oskar; Missov, Trifon I

2016-11-07

The Gompertz mortality model is often used to evaluate evolutionary theories of ageing, such as the Medawar-Williams' hypothesis that high extrinsic mortality leads to faster ageing. However, fits of the Gompertz mortality model to data often find the opposite result that mortality is negatively correlated with the rate of ageing. This negative correlation has been independently discovered in several taxa and is known in actuarial studies of ageing as the Strehler-Mildvan correlation. We examine the role of mortality selection in determining late-life variation in susceptibility to death, which has been suggested to be the cause of this negative correlation. We demonstrate that fixed-frailty models that account for heterogeneity in frailty do not remove the correlation and that the correlation is an inherent statistical property of the Gompertz distribution. Linking actuarial and biological rates of ageing will continue to be a pressing challenge, but the Strehler-Mildvan correlation itself should not be used to diagnose any biological, physiological, or evolutionary process. These findings resolve some key tensions between theory and data that affect evolutionary and biological studies of ageing and mortality. Tests of evolutionary theories of ageing should include direct measures of physiological performance or condition. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

On the Evolutionary Stability of Bargaining Inefficiency

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Poulsen, Anders

This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game tough behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary select...

Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang Bo; Li Xiao-Teng; Chen Xiao-Song; Chen Wei; Liu Jian

2016-01-01

Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model. (paper)

Integrating Health Behavior Theory and Design Elements in Serious Games.

Science.gov (United States)

Cheek, Colleen; Fleming, Theresa; Lucassen, Mathijs Fg; Bridgman, Heather; Stasiak, Karolina; Shepherd, Matthew; Orpin, Peter

2015-01-01

Internet interventions for improving health and well-being have the potential to reach many people and fill gaps in service provision. Serious gaming interfaces provide opportunities to optimize user adherence and impact. Health interventions based in theory and evidence and tailored to psychological constructs have been found to be more effective to promote behavior change. Defining the design elements which engage users and help them to meet their goals can contribute to better informed serious games. To elucidate design elements important in SPARX, a serious game for adolescents with depression, from a user-centered perspective. We proposed a model based on an established theory of health behavior change and practical features of serious game design to organize ideas and rationale. We analyzed data from 5 studies comprising a total of 22 focus groups and 66 semistructured interviews conducted with youth and families in New Zealand and Australia who had viewed or used SPARX. User perceptions of the game were applied to this framework. A coherent framework was established using the three constructs of self-determination theory (SDT), autonomy, competence, and relatedness, to organize user perceptions and design elements within four areas important in design: computer game, accessibility, working alliance, and learning in immersion. User perceptions mapped well to the framework, which may assist developers in understanding the context of user needs. By mapping these elements against the constructs of SDT, we were able to propose a sound theoretical base for the model. This study's method allowed for the articulation of design elements in a serious game from a user-centered perspective within a coherent overarching framework. The framework can be used to deliberately incorporate serious game design elements that support a user's sense of autonomy, competence, and relatedness, key constructs which have been found to mediate motivation at all stages of the change

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on the network with punishment and opportunistic partner switching

Science.gov (United States)

Takesue, H.

2018-02-01

Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative mechanisms, including partner switching. In this study, we investigate the combined effect of punishment and partner switching in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games conducted on a network. In the model, agents are located on the network and participate in the prisoner's dilemma games with punishment. In addition, they can opportunistically switch interaction partners to improve their payoff. Our Monte Carlo simulation showed that a large frequency of punishers is required to suppress defectors when the frequency of partner switching is low. In contrast, cooperation is the most abundant strategy when the frequency of partner switching is high regardless of the strength of punishment. Interestingly, cooperators become abundant not because they avoid the cost of inflicting punishment and earn a larger average payoff per game but rather because they have more numerous opportunities to be referred to as a role agent by defectors. Our results imply that the fluidity of social relationships has a profound effect on the adopted strategy in maintaining cooperation.

The game theory in thoracic surgery: from the intuitions of Luca Pacioli to the operating rooms management.

Science.gov (United States)

Ciocci, Argante; Viti, Andrea; Terzi, Alberto; Bertolaccini, Luca

2015-11-01

Game theory is a formal way to analyze the interactions among groups of subjects who behave each other. It has historically been of great interest in the economic fields in which decisions are made in a competitive environment. Game theory has fascinating potential if applied in the medical science. Few papers have been written about the application of game theory in surgery. The majority of scenarios of game theory in surgery fall into two main groups: cooperative and no cooperative games.

A Game Theory Based Solution for Security Challenges in CRNs

Science.gov (United States)

Poonam; Nagpal, Chander Kumar

2018-03-01

Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are being envisioned to drive the next generation Ad hoc wireless networks due to their ability to provide communications resilience in continuously changing environments through the use of dynamic spectrum access. Conventionally CRNs are dependent upon the information gathered by other secondary users to ensure the accuracy of spectrum sensing making them vulnerable to security attacks leading to the need of security mechanisms like cryptography and trust. However, a typical cryptography based solution is not a viable security solution for CRNs owing to their limited resources. Effectiveness of trust based approaches has always been, in question, due to credibility of secondary trust resources. Game theory with its ability to optimize in an environment of conflicting interests can be quite a suitable tool to manage an ad hoc network in the presence of autonomous selfish/malevolent/malicious and attacker nodes. The literature contains several theoretical proposals for augmenting game theory in the ad hoc networks without explicit/detailed implementation. This paper implements a game theory based solution in MATLAB-2015 to secure the CRN environment and compares the obtained results with the traditional approaches of trust and cryptography. The simulation result indicates that as the time progresses the game theory performs much better with higher throughput, lower jitter and better identification of selfish/malicious nodes.

On the Relevance of Game Theory in Strategic Thinking

African Journals Online (AJOL)

be used to predict the outcome of a strategy, explain why a particular outcome to a strategy ... concludes that game theory can aid decision makers at all levels in formulating quality strategies. In fact .... Also, for our argument, we assume that the USA has a free enterprise .... pay-offs based on the 2x2 game we find that.

Improving Preschoolers' Theory of Mind Skills with Digital Games: A Training Study

Science.gov (United States)

Nikolayev, Mariya

2015-01-01

This single-subject research study examined functional relation between digital games enriched with voice-overs and theory of mind (ToM) when game play was either followed or not followed by a discussion focused on the game's content. The study employed multiple baseline design across participants to evaluate the effects of games with mental state…

Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey

Science.gov (United States)

Shi, Hai-Yan; Wang, Wan-Liang; Kwok, Ngai-Ming; Chen, Sheng-Yong

2012-01-01

Game theory (GT) is a mathematical method that describes the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. In particular, the theory has been proven very useful in the design of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). This article surveys the recent developments and findings of GT, its applications in WSNs, and provides the community a general view of this vibrant research area. We first introduce the typical formulation of GT in the WSN application domain. The roles of GT are described that include routing protocol design, topology control, power control and energy saving, packet forwarding, data collection, spectrum allocation, bandwidth allocation, quality of service control, coverage optimization, WSN security, and other sensor management tasks. Then, three variations of game theory are described, namely, the cooperative, non-cooperative, and repeated schemes. Finally, existing problems and future trends are identified for researchers and engineers in the field. PMID:23012533

Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ngai-Ming Kwok

2012-07-01

Full Text Available Game theory (GT is a mathematical method that describes the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. In particular, the theory has been proven very useful in the design of wireless sensor networks (WSNs. This article surveys the recent developments and findings of GT, its applications in WSNs, and provides the community a general view of this vibrant research area. We first introduce the typical formulation of GT in the WSN application domain. The roles of GT are described that include routing protocol design, topology control, power control and energy saving, packet forwarding, data collection, spectrum allocation, bandwidth allocation, quality of service control, coverage optimization, WSN security, and other sensor management tasks. Then, three variations of game theory are described, namely, the cooperative, non-cooperative, and repeated schemes. Finally, existing problems and future trends are identified for researchers and engineers in the field.

Diversity of neighborhoods promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

Science.gov (United States)

Ma, Yongjuan; Lu, Jun; Shi, Lei

2017-02-01

Explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important and interesting problems in a myriad of disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, statistical physics, social science and economics Up to now, there have been a great number of works aiming to this issue with the help of evolutionary game theory. However, vast majority of existing literatures simply assume that the interaction neighborhood and replacement neighborhood are symmetric, which seems inconsistent with real-world cases. In this paper, we consider the asymmetrical neighborhood: player of type A, whose factor is controlled by a parameter τ, has four interaction neighbors and four replacement neighbors, while player of type B, whose factor is controlled by a parameter 1 - τ, possess eight interaction neighbors and four replacement neighbors. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we found that middle τ can make the cooperation reach the highest level While for this finding, its robustness can be further validated in more games.

A review of game theory approach to cyber security risk management

African Journals Online (AJOL)

A review of game theory approach to cyber security risk management. ... This paper presents a review of game theoretic-based model for cyber security risk management. Specifically, issues on ... AJOL African Journals Online. HOW TO USE ...

A cooperative game theory approach to transmission planning in power systems

Science.gov (United States)

Contreras, Javier

The rapid restructuring of the electric power industry from a vertically integrated entity into a decentralized industry has given rise to complex problems. In particular, the transmission component of the electric power system requires new methodologies to fully capture this emerging competitive industry. Game theory models are used to model strategic interactions in a competitive environment. This thesis presents a new decentralized framework to study the transmission network expansion problem using cooperative game theory. First, the players and the rules of the game are defined. Second, a coalition formation scheme is developed. Finally, the optimized cost of expansion is allocated based on the history of the coalition formation.

When Child Development Meets Economic Game Theory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Investigating Social Development

Science.gov (United States)

Gummerum, Michaela; Hanoch, Yaniv; Keller, Monika

2008-01-01

Game theory has been one of the most prominent theories in the social sciences, influencing diverse academic disciplines such as anthropology, biology, economics, and political science. In recent years, economists have employed game theory to investigate behaviors relating to fairness, reciprocity, and trust. Surprisingly, this research has not…

Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and application to club theory: the side payments case

OpenAIRE

Kovalenkov, Alexander; Wooders, Myrna Holtz

2002-01-01

In a series of papers (Kovalenkov and Wooders 2001a, Games and Economic Behavior, 2001b, Mathematics of Operations Research, and 1997, Journal of Economic Theory to appear), the authors have developed the framework of parameterized collections of games and also that of parameterized collections of economies with clubs. These papers apply to collections of games with nontransferable utility and similarly to economies with clubs and general preferences. The game theoretic framework encompasses ...

Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

Science.gov (United States)

Yang, Bo; Li, Xiao-Teng; Chen, Wei; Liu, Jian; Chen, Xiao-Song

2016-10-01

Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model. Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 11121403 and 11504384

On the Evolutionary Stability of 'Tough' Bargaining Behavior

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Poulsen, Anders

2003-01-01

This paper investigates whether 'tough' bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionary stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long as th...

Game Theory and Educational Policy: Private Education Legislation in China

Science.gov (United States)

Law, Wing-Wah; Pan, Su-Yan

2009-01-01

This article presents a game theory analysis of legislating private education in China, based on set of primary and secondary documents related to this issue. The article argues that shaping educational legislation is a dynamic, repeated game of negotiation, cooperation, and/or competition on multiple occasions among various interested actors,…

The influence of tie strength on evolutionary games on networks: An empirical investigation

Science.gov (United States)

Buesser, Pierre; Peña, Jorge; Pestelacci, Enea; Tomassini, Marco

2011-11-01

Extending previous work on unweighted networks, we present here a systematic numerical investigation of standard evolutionary games on weighted networks. In the absence of any reliable model for generating weighted social networks, we attribute weights to links in a few ways supported by empirical data ranging from totally uncorrelated to weighted bipartite networks. The results of the extensive simulation work on standard complex network models show that, except in a case that does not seem to be common in social networks, taking the tie strength into account does not change in a radical manner the long-run steady-state behavior of the studied games. Besides model networks, we also included a real-life case drawn from a coauthorship network. In this case also, taking the weights into account only changes the results slightly with respect to the raw unweighted graph, although to draw more reliable conclusions on real social networks many more cases should be studied as these weighted networks become available.

Gender and Evolutionary Theory in Workplace Health Promotion

Science.gov (United States)

Björklund, Erika; Wright, Jan

2017-01-01

Objective: Ideas from evolutionary theories are increasingly taken up in health promotion. This article seeks to demonstrate how such a trend has the potential to embed essentialist and limiting stereotypes of women and men in health promotion practice. Design: We draw on material gathered for a larger ethnographic study that examined how…

Game Theory and Technical Communication: Interpreting the Texas Two-Step through Harsanyi Transformation

Science.gov (United States)

Williams, Miriam F.

2012-01-01

The author uses game theoretical models to identify technical communication breakdowns encountered during the notoriously confusing Texas Two-Step voting and caucusing process. Specifically, the author uses narrative theory and game theory to highlight areas where caucus participants needed instructions to better understand the rules of the game…

“I am a rogue night elf”: Avatars, gaming and The Big Bang Theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Theo Plothe

2014-03-01

Full Text Available CBS’s The Big Bang Theory (TBBT frequently exhibits elements of video games and gaming culture. The author uses subculture theory to consider the representation of video games, gamers, and their avatars within popular culture. This paper investigates the representation of avatars within the characterization of gaming subculture on the TBBT. The author performed a content analysis of the program’s six seasons, examining the relationship between the show’s video game playing characters and their avatars. This investigation found that almost half of the scenes that contained video gaming activities contained some aspect of avatars. TBBT reifies gaming as a subculture through the relationship between the characters and their avatars. Examining the representation of these relationships is essential to understanding the representation of the gaming subculture in the mass media and within culture at large.

Econophysics: from Game Theory and Information Theory to Quantum Mechanics

Science.gov (United States)

Jimenez, Edward; Moya, Douglas

2005-03-01

Rationality is the universal invariant among human behavior, universe physical laws and ordered and complex biological systems. Econophysics isboth the use of physical concepts in Finance and Economics, and the use of Information Economics in Physics. In special, we will show that it is possible to obtain the Quantum Mechanics principles using Information and Game Theory.

On the inclusion of macroscopic theory in Monte Carlo simulation using game theory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tatarkiewicz, J.

1980-01-01

This paper presents the inclusion of macroscopic damage theory into Monte Carlo particle-range simulation using game theory. A new computer code called RADDI was developed on the basis of this inclusion. Results of Monte Carlo damage simulation after 6.3 MeV proton bombardment of silicon are compared with experimental data of Bulgakov et al. (orig.)

Game theory application to operation control and pricing in deregulated power systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yokoyama, G.R.

2000-01-01

Rapid move to a market-based electric power industry will significantly change electric utility operations. In this paper, we consider economic load dispatching rules in power systems under competitive environment when independent power producers (IPPs) are introduced and analyze their economic consequences by using game theory. An electric utility and IPPs are included in the model as players of the game where IPPs enter into the game firstly as a group, and secondly as individually. The utility and IPPs intend to maximize their own profit. We mainly use the Stackelberg strategy game theory and Nash equilibrium solution to analyze the negotiation process between the electric utility and IPPS, since it is widely recognized as rational decisions for competitive markets in terms of axiom. (author)

The Genetic Precursors and the Advantageous and Disadvantageous Sequelae of Inhibited Temperament: An Evolutionary Perspective

Science.gov (United States)

Davies, Patrick T.; Cicchetti, Dante; Hentges, Rochelle F.; Sturge-Apple, Melissa L.

2013-01-01

Guided by evolutionary game theory (Korte, Koolhaas, Wingfield, & McEwen, 2005), this study aimed to identify the genetic precursors and the psychosocial sequelae of inhibited temperament in a sociodemographically disadvantaged and racially diverse sample (N = 201) of 2-year-old children who experienced elevated levels of domestic violence.…

A game theory perspective on environmental assessment: What games are played and what does this tell us about decision making rationality and legitimacy?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bond, Alan [School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia (United Kingdom); Research Unit for Environmental Sciences and Management, North-West University (South Africa); Pope, Jenny [Integral Sustainability (Australia); Research Unit for Environmental Sciences and Management, North-West University (South Africa); Morrison-Saunders, Angus [Murdoch University (Australia); Research Unit for Environmental Sciences and Management, North-West University (South Africa); Retief, Francois [Research Unit for Environmental Sciences and Management, North-West University (South Africa)

2016-02-15

Game theory provides a useful theoretical framework to examine the decision process operating in the context of environmental assessment, and to examine the rationality and legitimacy of decision-making subject to Environmental Assessment (EA). The research uses a case study of the Environmental Impact Assessment and Sustainability Appraisal processes undertaken in England. To these are applied an analytical framework, based on the concept of decision windows to identify the decisions to be assessed. The conditions for legitimacy are defined, based on game theory, in relation to the timing of decision information, the behaviour type (competitive, reciprocal, equity) exhibited by the decision maker, and the level of public engagement; as, together, these control the type of rationality which can be brought to bear on the decision. Instrumental rationality is based on self-interest of individuals, whereas deliberative rationality seeks broader consensus and is more likely to underpin legitimate decisions. The results indicate that the Sustainability Appraisal process, conducted at plan level, is better than EIA, conducted at project level, but still fails to provide conditions that facilitate legitimacy. Game theory also suggests that Sustainability Appraisal is likely to deliver ‘least worst’ outcomes rather than best outcomes when the goals of the assessment process are considered; this may explain the propensity of such ‘least worst’ decisions in practise. On the basis of what can be learned from applying this game theory perspective, it is suggested that environmental assessment processes need to be redesigned and better integrated into decision making in order to guarantee the legitimacy of the decisions made. - Highlights: • Decision legitimacy is defined in terms of game theory. • Game theory is applied to EIA and SA decision windows. • Game theory suggests least worst outcomes prevail. • SA is more likely to be perceived legitimate than EIA.

A game theory perspective on environmental assessment: What games are played and what does this tell us about decision making rationality and legitimacy?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bond, Alan; Pope, Jenny; Morrison-Saunders, Angus; Retief, Francois

2016-01-01

Game theory provides a useful theoretical framework to examine the decision process operating in the context of environmental assessment, and to examine the rationality and legitimacy of decision-making subject to Environmental Assessment (EA). The research uses a case study of the Environmental Impact Assessment and Sustainability Appraisal processes undertaken in England. To these are applied an analytical framework, based on the concept of decision windows to identify the decisions to be assessed. The conditions for legitimacy are defined, based on game theory, in relation to the timing of decision information, the behaviour type (competitive, reciprocal, equity) exhibited by the decision maker, and the level of public engagement; as, together, these control the type of rationality which can be brought to bear on the decision. Instrumental rationality is based on self-interest of individuals, whereas deliberative rationality seeks broader consensus and is more likely to underpin legitimate decisions. The results indicate that the Sustainability Appraisal process, conducted at plan level, is better than EIA, conducted at project level, but still fails to provide conditions that facilitate legitimacy. Game theory also suggests that Sustainability Appraisal is likely to deliver ‘least worst’ outcomes rather than best outcomes when the goals of the assessment process are considered; this may explain the propensity of such ‘least worst’ decisions in practise. On the basis of what can be learned from applying this game theory perspective, it is suggested that environmental assessment processes need to be redesigned and better integrated into decision making in order to guarantee the legitimacy of the decisions made. - Highlights: • Decision legitimacy is defined in terms of game theory. • Game theory is applied to EIA and SA decision windows. • Game theory suggests least worst outcomes prevail. • SA is more likely to be perceived legitimate than EIA.

The Relationship between College Zoology Students' Beliefs about Evolutionary Theory and Religion.

Science.gov (United States)

Sinclair, Anne; And Others

1997-01-01

Researchers administered surveys to college zoology students prior to, and immediately following a study of evolutionary theory, to assess their understanding and acceptance of evidence supporting the theory. Results showed students had many misconceptions about the theory. Their beliefs interfered with their ability to objectively view scientific…

Information Theory - The Bridge Connecting Bounded Rational Game Theory and Statistical Physics

Science.gov (United States)

Wolpert, David H.

2005-01-01

A long-running difficulty with conventional game theory has been how to modify it to accommodate the bounded rationality of all red-world players. A recurring issue in statistical physics is how best to approximate joint probability distributions with decoupled (and therefore far more tractable) distributions. This paper shows that the same information theoretic mathematical structure, known as Product Distribution (PD) theory, addresses both issues. In this, PD theory not only provides a principle formulation of bounded rationality and a set of new types of mean field theory in statistical physics; it also shows that those topics are fundamentally one and the same.

Game theory: Parts I and II - with 88 solved exercises. An open access textbook

OpenAIRE

Bonanno, Giacomo

2015-01-01

This is a draft of the first half of an open access textbook on game theory. I hope to complete the entire book by the end of 2015. After teaching game theory (at both the undergraduate and graduate level) at the University of California, Davis for 25 years, I decided to organize all my teaching material in a textbook. There are many excellent textbooks in game theory and there is hardly any need for a new one. However, there are two distinguishing features of this textbook: (1) it is open ac...

What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?

Science.gov (United States)

Ito, Hiromu; Katsumata, Yuki; Hasegawa, Eisuke; Yoshimura, Jin

2016-01-01

In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strategies: (1) the interpretation based on the utility criterion derived from expected utility theory and (2) the interpretation based on the quantitative criterion (amount of gain) derived from validity in the empirical context. A dynamic decision theory has recently been developed in which dynamic utility is a conditional (state) variable that is a function of the current wealth of a decision maker. We applied dynamic utility to the equal division in dove-dove contests in the hawk-dove game. Our results indicate that under the utility criterion, the half-share of utility becomes proportional to a player's current wealth. Our results are consistent with studies of the sense of fairness in animals, which indicate that the quantitative criterion has greater validity than the utility criterion. We also find that traditional analyses of repeated games must be reevaluated.

Games of multicellularity.

Science.gov (United States)

Kaveh, Kamran; Veller, Carl; Nowak, Martin A

2016-08-21

Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay together after reproduction. They reach complexes of a certain size, n, before producing single cells again. The cells within a complex derive payoff from an evolutionary game by interacting with each other. The reproductive rate of cells is proportional to their payoff. We consider all two-strategy games. We study deterministic evolutionary dynamics with mutations, and derive exact conditions for selection to favor one strategy over another. Our main result has the same symmetry as the well-known sigma condition, which has been proven for stochastic game dynamics and weak selection. For a maximum complex size of n=2 our result holds for any intensity of selection. For n≥3 it holds for weak selection. As specific examples we study the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games. Our model advances theoretical work on multicellularity by allowing for frequency-dependent interactions within groups. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The cooperative game theory of networks and hierarchies

CERN Document Server

Gilles, Robert P

2010-01-01

This book details standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. It covers the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential.

Modelling the host-pathogen interactions of macrophages and Candida albicans using Game Theory and dynamic optimization.

Science.gov (United States)

Dühring, Sybille; Ewald, Jan; Germerodt, Sebastian; Kaleta, Christoph; Dandekar, Thomas; Schuster, Stefan

2017-07-01

The release of fungal cells following macrophage phagocytosis, called non-lytic expulsion, is reported for several fungal pathogens. On one hand, non-lytic expulsion may benefit the fungus in escaping the microbicidal environment of the phagosome. On the other hand, the macrophage could profit in terms of avoiding its own lysis and being able to undergo proliferation. To analyse the causes of non-lytic expulsion and the relevance of macrophage proliferation in the macrophage- Candida albicans interaction, we employ Evolutionary Game Theory and dynamic optimization in a sequential manner. We establish a game-theoretical model describing the different strategies of the two players after phagocytosis. Depending on the parameter values, we find four different Nash equilibria and determine the influence of the systems state of the host upon the game. As our Nash equilibria are a direct consequence of the model parameterization, we can depict several biological scenarios. A parameter region, where the host response is robust against the fungal infection, is determined. We further apply dynamic optimization to analyse whether macrophage mitosis is relevant in the host-pathogen interaction of macrophages and C. albicans For this, we study the population dynamics of the macrophage- C. albicans interactions and the corresponding optimal controls for the macrophages, indicating the best macrophage strategy of switching from proliferation to attacking fungal cells. © 2017 The Author(s).

Rough Set Theory Based Fuzzy TOPSIS on Serious Game Design Evaluation Framework

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Chung-Ho Su

2013-01-01

Full Text Available This study presents a hybrid methodology for solving the serious game design evaluation in which evaluation criteria are based on meaningful learning, ARCS motivation, cognitive load, and flow theory (MACF by rough set theory (RST and experts’ selection. The purpose of this study tends to develop an evaluation model with RST based fuzzy Delphi-AHP-TOPSIS for MACF characteristics. Fuzzy Delphi method is utilized for selecting the evaluation criteria, Fuzzy AHP is used for analyzing the criteria structure and determining the evaluation weight of criteria, and Fuzzy TOPSIS is applied to determine the sequence of the evaluations. A real case is also used for evaluating the selection of MACF criteria design for four serious games, and both the practice and evaluation of the case could be explained. The results show that the playfulness (C24, skills (C22, attention (C11, and personalized (C35 are determined as the four most important criteria in the MACF selection process. And evaluation results of case study point out that Game 1 has the best score overall (Game 1 > Game 3 > Game 2 > Game 4. Finally, proposed evaluation framework tends to evaluate the effectiveness and the feasibility of the evaluation model and provide design criteria for relevant multimedia game design educators.

A Game Theory Approach for Product Specialization in International Trade

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Ioana-Veronica ALEXA

2011-11-01

Full Text Available Game theory, in its most basic form, considers two players and analyses the different strategies that they can use and the effect that these strategies will have on each player. International trade allows countries to use better their resources (labor, technology or capital. Since countries have different capital or natural resources, some of them will produce a good more efficiently than others and therefore could sell it cheaper than other countries. By using game theory in international trade we could determine if the H-O-S model is correct and what would be the best specialization for each country.

The ABCs of an evolutionary education science: The academic, behavioral, and cultural implications of an evolutionary approach to education theory and practice

Science.gov (United States)

Kauffman, Rick, Jr.

Calls for improving research-informed policy in education are everywhere. Yet, while there is an increasing trend towards science-based practice, there remains little agreement over which of the sciences to consult and how to organize a collective effort between them. What Education lacks is a general theoretical framework through which policies can be constructed, implemented, and assessed. This dissertation submits that evolutionary theory can provide a suitable framework for coordinating educational policies and practice, and can provide the entire field of education with a clearer sense of how to better manage the learning environment. This dissertation explores two broad paths that outline the conceptual foundations for an Evolutionary Education Science: "Teaching Evolution" and "Using Evolution to Teach." Chapter 1 introduces both of these themes. After describing why evolutionary science is best suited for organizing education research and practice, Chapter 1 proceeds to "teach" an overview of the "evolutionary toolkit"---the mechanisms and principles that underlie the modern evolutionary perspective. The chapter then employs the "toolkit" in examining education from an evolutionary perspective, outlining the evolutionary precepts that can guide theorizing and research in education, describing how educators can "use evolution to teach.". Chapters 2-4 expand on this second theme. Chapters 2 and 3 describe an education program for at-risk 9th and 10th grade students, the Regents Academy, designed entirely with evolutionary principles in mind. The program was rigorously assessed in a randomized control design and has demonstrated success at improving students' academic performance (Chapter 2) and social & behavioral development (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 examines current teaching strategies that underlie effective curriculum-instruction-assessment practices and proposes a framework for organizing successful, evidence-based strategies for neural

Topological chaos of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular networks.

Science.gov (United States)

Jin, Weifeng; Chen, Fangyue

2016-02-21

The spatial version of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on infinitely large regular lattice with purely deterministic strategies and no memories among players is investigated in this paper. Based on the statistical inferences, it is pertinent to confirm that the frequency of cooperation for characterizing its macroscopic behaviors is very sensitive to the initial conditions, which is the most practically significant property of chaos. Its intrinsic complexity is then justified on firm ground from the theory of symbolic dynamics; that is, this game is topologically mixing and possesses positive topological entropy on its subsystems. It is demonstrated therefore that its frequency of cooperation could not be adopted by simply averaging over several steps after the game reaches the equilibrium state. Furthermore, the chaotically changing spatial patterns via empirical observations can be defined and justified in view of symbolic dynamics. It is worth mentioning that the procedure proposed in this work is also applicable to other deterministic spatial evolutionary games therein. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Probabilistic theory of mean field games with applications

CERN Document Server

Carmona, René

2018-01-01

This two-volume book offers a comprehensive treatment of the probabilistic approach to mean field game models and their applications. The book is self-contained in nature and includes original material and applications with explicit examples throughout, including numerical solutions. Volume I of the book is entirely devoted to the theory of mean field games without a common noise. The first half of the volume provides a self-contained introduction to mean field games, starting from concrete illustrations of games with a finite number of players, and ending with ready-for-use solvability results. Readers are provided with the tools necessary for the solution of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of the McKean-Vlasov type at the core of the probabilistic approach. The second half of this volume focuses on the main principles of analysis on the Wasserstein space. It includes Lions' approach to the Wasserstein differential calculus, and the applications of its results to the analysis of stochastic...

GAME THEORY: MINIMISING THE COST OF CAPITAL VS. MAXIMISING THE RETURN OF INVESTORS

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Mihaela Brindusa Tudose

2014-12-01

Full Text Available The application of game theory to financial transactions focuses on two categories of stakeholders: users of financing (firms and providers of financing (investors. The core of game theory consists in the strategy that a partner is able to build starting from the possible decisions of the other partner (each party having opposing interests. In fact, we deal here with a cooperative game in which both opponents seek to maximise their own chances of winning. The article aims to highlight the manner in which mathematical game theory is transposed in the field of corporate finance by balancing the firm’s objectives (maximising market value by minimising the cost of raising capital and the investors’ objectives (maximising returns on investments. The intended novelty of this paper lies in developing a model for optimising a firm’s financial structure and assessing it in terms of investors’ interests.

What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?

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Hiromu Ito

Full Text Available In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs for decision-making strategies: (1 the interpretation based on the utility criterion derived from expected utility theory and (2 the interpretation based on the quantitative criterion (amount of gain derived from validity in the empirical context. A dynamic decision theory has recently been developed in which dynamic utility is a conditional (state variable that is a function of the current wealth of a decision maker. We applied dynamic utility to the equal division in dove-dove contests in the hawk-dove game. Our results indicate that under the utility criterion, the half-share of utility becomes proportional to a player's current wealth. Our results are consistent with studies of the sense of fairness in animals, which indicate that the quantitative criterion has greater validity than the utility criterion. We also find that traditional analyses of repeated games must be reevaluated.

What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?

Science.gov (United States)

Hasegawa, Eisuke; Yoshimura, Jin

2016-01-01

In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strategies: (1) the interpretation based on the utility criterion derived from expected utility theory and (2) the interpretation based on the quantitative criterion (amount of gain) derived from validity in the empirical context. A dynamic decision theory has recently been developed in which dynamic utility is a conditional (state) variable that is a function of the current wealth of a decision maker. We applied dynamic utility to the equal division in dove-dove contests in the hawk-dove game. Our results indicate that under the utility criterion, the half-share of utility becomes proportional to a player’s current wealth. Our results are consistent with studies of the sense of fairness in animals, which indicate that the quantitative criterion has greater validity than the utility criterion. We also find that traditional analyses of repeated games must be reevaluated. PMID:27487194

Quantum game theory

Science.gov (United States)

Stohler, Michael Lehman

2002-01-01

Non-cooperative quantum games have received much attention recently. This thesis defines and divides current works into two major categories of gaming techniques with close attention paid to Nash equilibria, form and possibilities for the payoff functions, and the benefits of using a quantum strategy. In addition to comparing and contrasting these techniques, new applications and calculations are discussed. Finally, the techniques are expanded into 3 x 3 games which allows the study of non-transitive strategies in quantum games.

Ensemble method: Community detection based on game theory

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Zhang, Xia; Xia, Zhengyou; Xu, Shengwu; Wang, J. D.

2014-08-01

Timely and cost-effective analytics over social network has emerged as a key ingredient for success in many businesses and government endeavors. Community detection is an active research area of relevance to analyze online social network. The problem of selecting a particular community detection algorithm is crucial if the aim is to unveil the community structure of a network. The choice of a given methodology could affect the outcome of the experiments because different algorithms have different advantages and depend on tuning specific parameters. In this paper, we propose a community division model based on the notion of game theory, which can combine advantages of previous algorithms effectively to get a better community classification result. By making experiments on some standard dataset, it verifies that our community detection model based on game theory is valid and better.

Evolution and development: some insights from evolutionary theory

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DAVID JEAN R.

2001-01-01

Full Text Available Developmental biology and evolutionary biology are both mature integrative disciplines which started in the 19th century and then followed parallel and independent scientific pathways. Recently, a genetical component has stepped into both disciplines (developmental genetics and evolutionary genetics pointing out the need for future convergent maturation. Indeed, the Evo-Devo approach is becoming popular among developmental biologists, based on the facts that distant groups share a common ancestry, that precise phylogenies can be worked out and that homologous genes often play similar roles during the development of very different organisms. In this essay, I try to show that the real future of Evo-Devo thinking is still broader. The evolutionary theory is a set of diverse concepts which can and should be used in any biological field. Evolutionary thinking trains to ask « why » questions and to provide logical and plausible answers. It can shed some light on a diversity of general problems such as how to distinguish homologies from analogies, the costs and benefits of multicellularity, the origin of novel structures (e.g. the head, or the evolution of sexual reproduction. In the next decade, we may expect a progressive convergence between developmental genetics and quantitative genetics.

New pillars of evolutionary theory in the light of genomics

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lopez Carrascal, Camilo Ernesto

2011-01-01

The evolutionist theory proposed by Darwin is one of the fundamental pillars in biology. Darwin's theory was solidified with the modern synthesis of evolutionary biology thanks to the rediscovery of Mendel's work, which laid the genetic basis of heredity. In recent years, great progress has been acquired in the sequencing and analyses of complete genomes, which have provided several elements to discuss some Darwinists tenets of evolution. The evidence of gene duplication and whole-genome duplication, the horizontal gene transfer and the endosymbiosis process question the idea that evolution proceeds through the gradual accumulation of infinitesimally small random changes. The new evidence of neutral selection on the genomics context reveals other mechanisms of evolution not necessarily related with the idea of progress or with an adaptationist program as was originally stated by the Darwin's theory. in this paper, I present these and other concepts such as gene regulation, molecular mechanisms of development and some environmental aspects (epigenesis and phenotypic plasticity) as starting points to think in the necessity to update the evolutionary theory which in my opinion should be more inclusive, pluralistic and consistent with our current knowledge.

Business Strategy in Mexican Beer Industry: A Case Applying Game Theory

OpenAIRE

José G. Vargas-Hernández; Armando Francisco Cambroni-de-Anda

2012-01-01

In this paper the two major breweries in Mexico, Grupo Modelo and Cuauhtémoc Moctezuma Brewering Company (Cervecería Cuahtemoc-Moctezuma) are analyzed which already have long formed part of an oligopoly because these two companies account for more than 99% of beer market in this country. All this analysis is made from the perspective of game theory. The main objective is to analyze the effects of competition and advertising from one to another brewer from a standpoint of game theory. This ana...

Evolutionary Snowdrift Game Incorporating Costly Punishment

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Yap Yee Jiun

2012-01-01

-watak, a, ß, dan nisbah faedah-kos r dalam SG, sistem tiga watak ini berkembang sama ada kepada keadaan mantap yang hanya terdiri daripada karekter C dan P atau hanya karekter C dan D dalam populasi gabungan sempurna. Situasi sebelumnya mempamerkan peningkatan dalam kerjasama berkaitan dengan SG, manakala yang sebelumnya mirip dengan SG. Dinamik dalam mendapatkan pelbagai keadaan mantap didapati adalah berbeza. Secara terperincinya, kunci utama dalam keadaan mantap dan dinamik diperolehi melalui simulasi yang diperolehi daripada satu set persamaan perbezaan. Kepekaan terhadap permulaan pembahagian watak dikaji dengan menggambarkan aliran dalam portrait fasa dan menganalisa sifat titik-titik tetap. Analisa juga menggambarkan fungsi karekter-P dalam menghalang suatu sistem daripada dicerobohi agen karekter-D.  Bermula dengan satu populasi yang hanya terdiri daripada agen C & D, karekter-D bertujuan menyerang sistem yang tidak mampu bertahan apabila pecahan permulaan agen P melebihi r/ß. Model, didefinisikan sebagai algoritma simulasi, boleh secara amnya menggabungkan banyak aspek menarik, seperti di dalam populasi rangkaian.KEYWORDS: evolutionary; snowdrift game; well-mixed population

Cultural evolutionary theory: How culture evolves and why it matters.