Evolutionary Game Theory and Leadership
Guastello, Stephen J.
2009-01-01
Comments on the article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. This article offers a fresh perspective on leaders, followers, and their possible origins in nonhuman and primitive human behavior patterns. The connections between group coordination, leadership, and game theory have some…
Evolutionary game theory and leadership.
Guastello, Stephen J
2009-01-01
Comments on the article Leadership, followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past by Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser. This article offers a fresh perspective on leaders, followers, and their possible origins in nonhuman and primitive human behavior patterns. The connections between group coordination, leadership, and game theory have some prior history (Guastello, 2002; Guastello, Bock, Caldwell, & Bond, 2005; Guastello & Bond, 2004, 2007; Guastello & Guastello, 1998), however, that suggests that some points made by Van Vugt et al. could have been more accurate. The current author provides some suggetions to the author to improve on the accuracy of this article. PsycINFO Database Record 2009 APA.
Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory
Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend
2009-01-01
We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative �tness (vector) function both locally and globally. By global (local) ray projection we mean a projection of the vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray
Evolutionary game theory: cells as players.
Hummert, Sabine; Bohl, Katrin; Basanta, David; Deutsch, Andreas; Werner, Sarah; Theissen, Günter; Schroeter, Anja; Schuster, Stefan
2014-12-01
In two papers we review game theory applications in biology below the level of cognitive living beings. It can be seen that evolution and natural selection replace the rationality of the actors appropriately. Even in these micro worlds, competing situations and cooperative relationships can be found and modeled by evolutionary game theory. Also those units of the lowest levels of life show different strategies for different environmental situations or different partners. We give a wide overview of evolutionary game theory applications to microscopic units. In this first review situations on the cellular level are tackled. In particular metabolic problems are discussed, such as ATP-producing pathways, secretion of public goods and cross-feeding. Further topics are cyclic competition among more than two partners, intra- and inter-cellular signalling, the struggle between pathogens and the immune system, and the interactions of cancer cells. Moreover, we introduce the theoretical basics to encourage scientists to investigate problems in cell biology and molecular biology by evolutionary game theory.
Evolutionary game theory and criticality
Mahmoodi, Korosh; Grigolini, Paolo
2017-01-01
We study a regular two-dimensional network of individuals playing the Prisonner’s Dilemma game with their neighbors, assigning to each individual the adoption of two different criteria to make a choice between cooperation and defection. For a fraction q social pressure generates criticality. When q = 0 a large incentive to cheat yields the extinction of cooperation and a modest one leads to the survival of cooperation. We show that for K={{K}\\text{c}} the adoption of a very small value of ɛ exerts a bias in favor of either cooperation or defection, as a form of criticality-induced intelligence, which leads the system to select either the cooperation or the defection branch, when K>{{K}\\text{c}} . Intermediate values of ɛ annihilated criticality-induced cognition and, as consequence, may favor defection choice even in the case when a wise payoff consideration is expected to yield the emergence of cooperation.
Modeling Poker Challenges by Evolutionary Game Theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Marco Alberto Javarone
2016-12-01
Full Text Available We introduce a model for studying the evolutionary dynamics of Poker. Notably, despite its wide diffusion and the raised scientific interest around it, Poker still represents an open challenge. Recent attempts for uncovering its real nature, based on statistical physics, showed that Poker in some conditions can be considered as a skill game. In addition, preliminary investigations reported a neat difference between tournaments and ‘cash game’ challenges, i.e., between the two main configurations for playing Poker. Notably, these previous models analyzed populations composed of rational and irrational agents, identifying in the former those that play Poker by using a mathematical strategy, while in the latter those playing randomly. Remarkably, tournaments require very few rational agents to make Poker a skill game, while ‘cash game’ may require several rational agents for not being classified as gambling. In addition, when the agent interactions are based on the ‘cash game’ configuration, the population shows an interesting bistable behavior that deserves further attention. In the proposed model, we aim to study the evolutionary dynamics of Poker by using the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, in order to get further insights on its nature, and for better clarifying those points that remained open in the previous works (as the mentioned bistable behavior. In particular, we analyze the dynamics of an agent population composed of rational and irrational agents, that modify their behavior driven by two possible mechanisms: self-evaluation of the gained payoff, and social imitation. Results allow to identify a relation between the mechanisms for updating the agents’ behavior and the final equilibrium of the population. Moreover, the proposed model provides further details on the bistable behavior observed in the ‘cash game’ configuration.
Towards a richer evolutionary game theory.
McNamara, John M
2013-11-06
Most examples of the application of evolutionary game theory to problems in biology involve highly simplified models. I contend that it is time to move on and include much more richness in models. In particular, more thought needs to be given to the importance of (i) between-individual variation; (ii) the interaction between individuals, and hence the process by which decisions are reached; (iii) the ecological and life-history context of the situation; (iv) the traits that are under selection, and (v) the underlying psychological mechanisms that lead to behaviour. I give examples where including variation between individuals fundamentally changes predicted outcomes of a game. Variation also selects for real-time responses, again resulting in changed outcomes. Variation can select for other traits, such as choosiness and social sensitivity. More generally, many problems involve coevolution of more than one trait. I identify situations where a reductionist approach, in which a game is isolated from is ecological setting, can be misleading. I also highlight the need to consider flexibility of behaviour, mental states and other issues concerned with the evolution of mechanism.
Bridging the gap between Schumpeterian competition and evolutionary game theory
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Andersen, Esben Sloth
This paper suggests that the analysis of Schumpeterian competition within the Nelson-Winter model should be complemented with evolutionary game theory. This model and its limitations for density-dependent Schumpeterian strategies are presented in terms of the equations of evolutionary dynamics....... Formulated as evolutionary games, the set of strategies can easily be extended from innovators and imitators to routinists, complementors, and mixers. All strategies are presented in relation to a modified version of the Hawk-Dove Game. In this setting, the possibility of coexistence of several Schumpeterian...... strategies is proved. This is an example of Schumpeterian competition within evolutionary game theory....
Strategic analysis in evolutionary genetics and the theory of games
Indian Academy of Sciences (India)
Unknown
This paper is written in memory of John Maynard Smith. In a brief survey it discusses essential aspects of how game theory in biology relates to its counterpart in eco- nomics, the major transition in game theory initiated by. Maynard Smith, the discrepancies between genetic and phenotypic models in evolutionary biology, ...
An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning
National Research Council Canada - National Science Library
Dario Madeo; Agostino Talarico; Alvaro Pascual-Leone; Chiara Mocenni; Emiliano Santarnecchi
2017-01-01
... conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN...
Evolutionary game theory: molecules as players.
Bohl, Katrin; Hummert, Sabine; Werner, Sarah; Basanta, David; Deutsch, Andreas; Schuster, Stefan; Theissen, Günter; Schroeter, Anja
2014-12-01
In this and an accompanying paper we review the use of game theoretical concepts in cell biology and molecular biology. This review focuses on the subcellular level by considering viruses, genes, and molecules as players. We discuss in which way catalytic RNA can be treated by game theory. Moreover, genes can compete for success in replication and can have different strategies in interactions with other genetic elements. Also transposable elements, or "jumping genes", can act as players because they usually bear different traits or strategies. Viruses compete in the case of co-infecting a host cell. Proteins interact in a game theoretical sense when forming heterodimers. Finally, we describe how the Shapley value can be applied to enzymes in metabolic pathways. We show that game theory can be successfully applied to describe and analyse scenarios at the molecular level resulting in counterintuitive conclusions.
Why Darwin would have loved evolutionary game theory.
Brown, Joel S
2016-09-14
Humans have marvelled at the fit of form and function, the way organisms' traits seem remarkably suited to their lifestyles and ecologies. While natural selection provides the scientific basis for the fit of form and function, Darwin found certain adaptations vexing or particularly intriguing: sex ratios, sexual selection and altruism. The logic behind these adaptations resides in frequency-dependent selection where the value of a given heritable phenotype (i.e. strategy) to an individual depends upon the strategies of others. Game theory is a branch of mathematics that is uniquely suited to solving such puzzles. While game theoretic thinking enters into Darwin's arguments and those of evolutionists through much of the twentieth century, the tools of evolutionary game theory were not available to Darwin or most evolutionists until the 1970s, and its full scope has only unfolded in the last three decades. As a consequence, game theory is applied and appreciated rather spottily. Game theory not only applies to matrix games and social games, it also applies to speciation, macroevolution and perhaps even to cancer. I assert that life and natural selection are a game, and that game theory is the appropriate logic for framing and understanding adaptations. Its scope can include behaviours within species, state-dependent strategies (such as male, female and so much more), speciation and coevolution, and expands beyond microevolution to macroevolution. Game theory clarifies aspects of ecological and evolutionary stability in ways useful to understanding eco-evolutionary dynamics, niche construction and ecosystem engineering. In short, I would like to think that Darwin would have found game theory uniquely useful for his theory of natural selection. Let us see why this is so. © 2016 The Author(s).
Why Darwin would have loved evolutionary game theory
2016-01-01
Humans have marvelled at the fit of form and function, the way organisms' traits seem remarkably suited to their lifestyles and ecologies. While natural selection provides the scientific basis for the fit of form and function, Darwin found certain adaptations vexing or particularly intriguing: sex ratios, sexual selection and altruism. The logic behind these adaptations resides in frequency-dependent selection where the value of a given heritable phenotype (i.e. strategy) to an individual depends upon the strategies of others. Game theory is a branch of mathematics that is uniquely suited to solving such puzzles. While game theoretic thinking enters into Darwin's arguments and those of evolutionists through much of the twentieth century, the tools of evolutionary game theory were not available to Darwin or most evolutionists until the 1970s, and its full scope has only unfolded in the last three decades. As a consequence, game theory is applied and appreciated rather spottily. Game theory not only applies to matrix games and social games, it also applies to speciation, macroevolution and perhaps even to cancer. I assert that life and natural selection are a game, and that game theory is the appropriate logic for framing and understanding adaptations. Its scope can include behaviours within species, state-dependent strategies (such as male, female and so much more), speciation and coevolution, and expands beyond microevolution to macroevolution. Game theory clarifies aspects of ecological and evolutionary stability in ways useful to understanding eco-evolutionary dynamics, niche construction and ecosystem engineering. In short, I would like to think that Darwin would have found game theory uniquely useful for his theory of natural selection. Let us see why this is so. PMID:27605503
Strategic analysis in evolutionary genetics and the theory of games
Indian Academy of Sciences (India)
Home; Journals; Journal of Genetics; Volume 84; Issue 1. Strategic analysis in evolutionary genetics and the theory of games. Peter Hammerstein. Perspectives Volume 84 Issue 1 April 2005 pp 7-12. Fulltext. Click here to view fulltext PDF. Permanent link: http://www.ias.ac.in/article/fulltext/jgen/084/01/0007-0012. Keywords.
THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND THE EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Sirghi Nicoleta
2013-07-01
Full Text Available The neoclassical theory of the firm deals with the pattern of perfect competition, within which the perfect information available to economic agents provides instant allocation of production factors and access to economic goods. The Austrian School (C. Menger, L. von Mises, Hayek, etc. supported the idea of minimal state intervention on the markets, bringing important conceptual developments on the theory of the firm. Hirschleifer (1982 put forward the model of social and institutional functioning, arguing that the game theory is able to predict the outcome of the collective behavior and the human characteristics necessary for building the respective institutions.The evolutionary theory provides the firm and the entrepreneur the recognition of the functions of innovation, of generating and exploiting information and of organizing and coordinating production. The evolutionary perspective of the firm assumes the existence of a body of knowledge that is acquired through and builds up the organizational memory, subsequently found in routines, all choices being made based on these routines (Nelson and Winter, 2002. The evolution of the firm is considered to be similar to natural selection, but unlike the classic market selection, the evolutionists suggest the existence of a plurality of selection media. The present research is structured as follows: a brief introduction into the theories of the firm, the second part of the paper analyzes the theories of the firm from an institutional, neo-institutional and evolutionary perspective. In the third part of the paper the evolutionary games are described and analyzed from the evolutionary perspective of the firm. The last part of the paper represents a study of the “hawk-dove” game dynamic replicator. The final conclusions of the paper show that the evolutionary theory brings valuable contributions to the foundation of explanations regarding economic phenomena, indicating new directions for advanced
Altruistic duality in evolutionary game theory
Cheon, Taksu
2003-11-01
A game-theoretic dynamical model of social preference and enlightened self-interest is formulated. Existence of symmetry and duality in the game matrices with altruistic social preference is revealed. The model quantitatively describes the dynamical evolution of altruism in prisoner's dilemma and the regime change in prey-predator dynamics.
Evolutionary game theory as a framework for studying biological invasions.
Pintor, Lauren M; Brown, Joel S; Vincent, Thomas L
2011-04-01
Although biological invasions pose serious threats to biodiversity, they also provide the opportunity to better understand interactions between the ecological and evolutionary processes structuring populations and communities. However, ecoevolutionary frameworks for studying species invasions are lacking. We propose using game theory and the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as a conceptual framework for integrating the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of invasions. We suggest that the pathways by which a recipient community may have no ESS provide mechanistic hypotheses for how such communities may be vulnerable to invasion and how invaders can exploit these vulnerabilities. We distinguish among these pathways by formalizing the evolutionary contexts of the invader relative to the recipient community. We model both the ecological and the adaptive dynamics of the interacting species. We show how the ESS concept provides new mechanistic hypotheses for when invasions result in long- or short-term increases in biodiversity, species replacement, and subsequent evolutionary changes.
Game Theory-Inspired Evolutionary Algorithm for Global Optimization
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Guanci Yang
2017-09-01
Full Text Available Many approaches that model specific intelligent behaviors perform excellently in solving complex optimization problems. Game theory is widely recognized as an important tool in many fields. This paper introduces a game theory-inspired evolutionary algorithm for global optimization (GameEA. A formulation to estimate payoff expectations is provided, which is a mechanism to make a player become a rational decision-maker. GameEA has one population (i.e., set of players and generates new offspring only through an imitation operator and a belief-learning operator. An imitation operator adopts learning strategies and actions from other players to improve its competitiveness and applies these strategies to future games where one player updates its chromosome by strategically copying segments of gene sequences from a competitor. Belief learning refers to models in which a player adjusts his/her strategies, behavior or chromosomes by analyzing the current history information to improve solution quality. Experimental results on various classes of problems show that GameEA outperforms the other four algorithms on stability, robustness, and accuracy.
Statistical physics and computational methods for evolutionary game theory
Javarone, Marco Alberto
2018-01-01
This book presents an introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) which is an emerging field in the area of complex systems attracting the attention of researchers from disparate scientific communities. EGT allows one to represent and study several complex phenomena, such as the emergence of cooperation in social systems, the role of conformity in shaping the equilibrium of a population, and the dynamics in biological and ecological systems. Since EGT models belong to the area of complex systems, statistical physics constitutes a fundamental ingredient for investigating their behavior. At the same time, the complexity of some EGT models, such as those realized by means of agent-based methods, often require the implementation of numerical simulations. Therefore, beyond providing an introduction to EGT, this book gives a brief overview of the main statistical physics tools (such as phase transitions and the Ising model) and computational strategies for simulating evolutionary games (such as Monte Carlo algor...
Evidence Combination From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective.
Deng, Xinyang; Han, Deqiang; Dezert, Jean; Deng, Yong; Shyr, Yu
2016-09-01
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory is a primary methodology for multisource information fusion because it is good at dealing with uncertain information. This theory provides a Dempster's rule of combination to synthesize multiple evidences from various information sources. However, in some cases, counter-intuitive results may be obtained based on that combination rule. Numerous new or improved methods have been proposed to suppress these counter-intuitive results based on perspectives, such as minimizing the information loss or deviation. Inspired by evolutionary game theory, this paper considers a biological and evolutionary perspective to study the combination of evidences. An evolutionary combination rule (ECR) is proposed to help find the most biologically supported proposition in a multievidence system. Within the proposed ECR, we develop a Jaccard matrix game to formalize the interaction between propositions in evidences, and utilize the replicator dynamics to mimick the evolution of propositions. Experimental results show that the proposed ECR can effectively suppress the counter-intuitive behaviors appeared in typical paradoxes of evidence theory, compared with many existing methods. Properties of the ECR, such as solution's stability and convergence, have been mathematically proved as well.
The stability concept of evolutionary game theory a dynamic approach
1992-01-01
These Notes grew from my research in evolutionary biology, specifically on the theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS theory), over the past ten years. Personally, evolutionary game theory has given me the opportunity to transfer my enthusiasm for abstract mathematics to more practical pursuits. I was fortunate to have entered this field in its infancy when many biologists recognized its potential but were not prepared to grant it general acceptance. This is no longer the case. ESS theory is now a rapidly expanding (in both applied and theoretical directions) force that no evolutionary biologist can afford to ignore. Perhaps, to continue the life-cycle metaphor, ESS theory is now in its late adolescence and displays much of the optimism and exuberance of this exciting age. There are dangers in writing a text about a theory at this stage of development. A comprehensive treatment would involve too many loose ends for the reader to appreciate the central message. On the other hand, the current central m...
Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Ricardo Azevedo Araujo
2014-01-01
Full Text Available In this paper the existence and stability of equilibriums in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model displays multiple equilibriums and it is shown that the Nash equilibriums of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibrium in the game theory evolutionary set up. A complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labour market is provided.
Integrating Evolutionary Game Theory into Mechanistic Genotype-Phenotype Mapping.
Zhu, Xuli; Jiang, Libo; Ye, Meixia; Sun, Lidan; Gragnoli, Claudia; Wu, Rongling
2016-05-01
Natural selection has shaped the evolution of organisms toward optimizing their structural and functional design. However, how this universal principle can enhance genotype-phenotype mapping of quantitative traits has remained unexplored. Here we show that the integration of this principle and functional mapping through evolutionary game theory gains new insight into the genetic architecture of complex traits. By viewing phenotype formation as an evolutionary system, we formulate mathematical equations to model the ecological mechanisms that drive the interaction and coordination of its constituent components toward population dynamics and stability. Functional mapping provides a procedure for estimating the genetic parameters that specify the dynamic relationship of competition and cooperation and predicting how genes mediate the evolution of this relationship during trait formation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning.
Madeo, Dario; Talarico, Agostino; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro; Mocenni, Chiara; Santarnecchi, Emiliano
2017-11-22
Our brain is a complex system of interconnected regions spontaneously organized into distinct networks. The integration of information between and within these networks is a continuous process that can be observed even when the brain is at rest, i.e. not engaged in any particular task. Moreover, such spontaneous dynamics show predictive value over individual cognitive profile and constitute a potential marker in neurological and psychiatric conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN), able to capture brain's interregional dynamics by balancing emulative and non-emulative attitudes among brain regions. This results in the net behavior of nodes composing resting-state networks identified using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), determining their moment-to-moment level of activation and inhibition as expressed by positive and negative shifts in BOLD fMRI signal. By spontaneously generating low-frequency oscillatory behaviors, the EGN model is able to mimic functional connectivity dynamics, approximate fMRI time series on the basis of initial subset of available data, as well as simulate the impact of network lesions and provide evidence of compensation mechanisms across networks. Results suggest evolutionary game theory on networks as a new potential framework for the understanding of human brain network dynamics.
Conlin, Peter L; Chandler, Josephine R; Kerr, Benjamin
2014-10-01
In this review, we demonstrate how game theory can be a useful first step in modeling and understanding interactions among bacteria that produce and resist antibiotics. We introduce the basic features of evolutionary game theory and explore model microbial systems that correspond to some classical games. Each game discussed defines a different category of social interaction with different resulting population dynamics (exclusion, coexistence, bistability, cycling). We then explore how the framework can be extended to incorporate some of the complexity of natural microbial communities. Overall, the game theoretical perspective helps to guide our expectations about the evolution of some forms of antibiotic resistance and production because it makes clear the precise nature of social interaction in this context. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods.
Adami, Christoph; Schossau, Jory; Hintze, Arend
2016-12-01
Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic settings such as finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, stochastic decisions, communication between agents, and spatial interactions, require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. While highlighting standard mathematical results, we compare those to agent-based methods that can go beyond the limitations of equations and simulate the complexity of heterogeneous populations and an ever-changing set of interactors. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread (for example in the weak selection-strong mutation limit), but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations. Copyright Â© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Swami Iyer
Full Text Available The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.
Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy
2014-01-01
The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.
Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy
2014-01-01
The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games. PMID:24709851
The ecology of cancer from an evolutionary game theory perspective.
Pacheco, Jorge M; Santos, Francisco C; Dingli, David
2014-08-06
The accumulation of somatic mutations, to which the cellular genome is permanently exposed, often leads to cancer. Analysis of any tumour shows that, besides the malignant cells, one finds other 'supporting' cells such as fibroblasts, immune cells of various types and even blood vessels. Together, these cells generate the microenvironment that enables the malignant cell population to grow and ultimately lead to disease. Therefore, understanding the dynamics of tumour growth and response to therapy is incomplete unless the interactions between the malignant cells and normal cells are investigated in the environment in which they take place. The complex interactions between cells in such an ecosystem result from the exchange of information in the form of cytokines- and adhesion-dependent interactions. Such processes impose costs and benefits to the participating cells that may be conveniently recast in the form of a game pay-off matrix. As a result, tumour progression and dynamics can be described in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT), which provides a convenient framework in which to capture the frequency-dependent nature of ecosystem dynamics. Here, we provide a tutorial review of the central aspects of EGT, establishing a relation with the problem of cancer. Along the way, we also digress on fitness and of ways to compute it. Subsequently, we show how EGT can be applied to the study of the various manifestations and dynamics of multiple myeloma bone disease and its preceding condition known as monoclonal gammopathy of undetermined significance. We translate the complex biochemical signals into costs and benefits of different cell types, thus defining a game pay-off matrix. Then we use the well-known properties of the EGT equations to reduce the number of core parameters that characterize disease evolution. Finally, we provide an interpretation of these core parameters in terms of what their function is in the ecosystem we are describing and generate
National Research Council Canada - National Science Library
Archetti, M
2013-01-01
.... I use evolutionary game theory to model collective interactions between cancer cells, to analyse the dynamics of the production of growth factors and the effect of therapies that reduce their amount...
The Phenotypic Gambit: Selective Pressures and ESS Methodology in Evolutionary Game Theory
Rubin, Hannah
2016-01-01
The ‘phenotypic gambit,’ the assumption that we can ignore genetics and look at the fitness of phenotypes to determine the expected evolutionary dynamics of a population, is often used in evolutionary game theory. However, as this paper will show, an overlooked genotype to phenotype map can
Asymmetric Evolutionary Games.
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Alex McAvoy
2015-08-01
Full Text Available Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.
Asymmetric Evolutionary Games.
McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph
2015-08-01
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their strategies. In nature, however, the microscopic interactions between players are nearly always asymmetric due to environmental effects, differing baseline characteristics, and other possible sources of heterogeneity. To model these phenomena, we introduce into evolutionary game theory two broad classes of asymmetric interactions: ecological and genotypic. Ecological asymmetry results from variation in the environments of the players, while genotypic asymmetry is a consequence of the players having differing baseline genotypes. We develop a theory of these forms of asymmetry for games in structured populations and use the classical social dilemmas, the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game, for illustrations. Interestingly, asymmetric games reveal essential differences between models of genetic evolution based on reproduction and models of cultural evolution based on imitation that are not apparent in symmetric games.
A study of driver's route choice behavior based on evolutionary game theory.
Jiang, Xiaowei; Ji, Yanjie; Du, Muqing; Deng, Wei
2014-01-01
This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. A simulated network with two alternative routes and one variable message sign is built to illustrate the analytic method. We assume that the drivers in the transportation system are bounded rational, and the traffic information they receive is incomplete. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers' route choice decision-making behaviors. Here we conclude that the traffic information plays an important role in the route choice behavior. The driver's route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results also demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver's route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent.
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Game Theory is a collection of short interviews based on 5 questions presented to some of the most influential and prominent scholars in game theory. We hear their views on game theory, its aim, scope, use, the future direction of game theory and how their work fits in these respects....
Orlando, Paul A.; Gatenby, Robert A.; Brown, Joel S.
2012-01-01
Chemotherapy for metastatic cancer commonly fails due to evolution of drug resistance in tumor cells. Here, we view cancer treatment as a game in which the oncologists choose a therapy and tumors “choose” an adaptive strategy. We propose the oncologist can gain an upper hand in the game by choosing treatment strategies that anticipate the adaptations of the tumor. In particular, we examine the potential benefit of exploiting evolutionary tradeoffs in tumor adaptations to therapy. We analyze a math model where cancer cells face tradeoffs in allocation of resistance to two drugs. The tumor “chooses” its strategy by natural selection and the oncologist chooses her strategy by solving a control problem. We find that when tumor cells perform best by investing resources to maximize response to one drug the optimal therapy is a time-invariant delivery of both drugs simultaneously. However, if cancer cells perform better using a generalist strategy allowing resistance to both drugs simultaneously, then the optimal protocol is a time varying solution in which the two drug concentrations negatively covary. However, drug interactions can significantly alter these results. We conclude that knowledge of both evolutionary tradeoffs and drug interactions is crucial in planning optimal chemotherapy schedules for individual patients. PMID:23197192
Liao, David; Tlsty, Thea D
2014-08-06
Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Alessandro Ferrarini
2015-03-01
Full Text Available Game theory, also known as interactive decision theory, is an umbrella term for the logical side of decision science, including both human and non-human events. In this paper a new game theory model is introduced in order to tame complex human events like soccer matches. Soccer-Decoder is a math algorithm recently introduced in order to simulate soccer matches by merging together 3 scientific methods: game theory, differential calculus and stochastic simulations. The philosophy behind Soccer-Decoder is that even very complex real world events, when turned into their irreducible essence, can be understood and predicted. In this work, Soccer-Decoder is combined with Evolutionary Network Control in order to provide a proficient tool to decide the most proper game strategies for determining winning strategies in soccer events. An illustrative example is given. The ratio behind this work is that even very complex real world events can be simulated and then controlled when using appropriate scientific tools.
Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Collaborative Sensing Model in Emergency CRAHNs
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Sasirekha GVK
2012-01-01
Full Text Available Game theory has been a tool of choice for modeling dynamic interactions between autonomous systems. Cognitive radio ad hoc networks (CRAHNs constituted of autonomous wireless nodes are a natural fit for game theory-based modeling. The game theory-based model is particularly suitable for “collaborative spectrum sensing” where each cognitive radio senses the spectrum and shares the results with other nodes such that the targeted sensing accuracy is achieved. Spectrum sensing in CRAHNs, especially when used in emergency scenarios such as disaster management and military applications, needs to be not only accurate and resource efficient, but also adaptive to the changing number of users as well as signal-to-noise ratios. In addition, spectrum sensing mechanism must also be proactive, fair, and tolerant to security attacks. Existing work in collaborative spectrum sensing has mostly been confined to resource efficiency in static systems using request-based reactive sensing resulting in high latencies. In this paper, evolutionary game theory (EGT is used to model the behavior of the emergency CRAHNS, providing an efficient model for collaborative spectrum sensing. The resulting implementation model is adaptive to the changes in its environment such as signal-to-noise ratio and number of users in the network. The analytical and simulation models presented validate the system design and the desired performance.
Study on Cooperative Mechanism of Prefabricated Producers Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
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Tongyao Feng
2017-01-01
Full Text Available Good cooperation mechanism is an important guarantee for the advancement of industrialization construction. To strengthen the partnership between producers, we analyze the behavior evolution trend of both parties using an evolutionary game theory. Based on the original model, the mechanism of coordination and cooperation between prefabricated producers is explained under the condition of punishment and incentive. The results indicate that stable evolutionary strategies exist under both cooperation and noncooperation, and the evolutionary results are influenced by the initial proportion of both decision-making processes. The government can support the production enterprises to establish a solid partnership through effective punishment and incentive mechanisms to reduce the initial cost in the supply chain of prefabricated construction, resulting in a win-win situation.
The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory.
Sample, Christine; Allen, Benjamin
2017-11-01
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large population size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the [Formula: see text] limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population limit, and the [Formula: see text] limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal mathematical definitions of the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits are provided. Applying these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be favored over a neutral mutation, are different in the [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] limits. However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one strategy to be favored over another.
Essays on nonlinear evolutionary game dynamics
Ochea, M.I.
2010-01-01
Evolutionary game theory has been viewed as an evolutionary repair of rational actor game theory in the hope that a population of boundedly rational players may attain convergence to classic rational solutions, such as the Nash Equilibrium, via some learning or evolutionary process. In this thesis
Dufwenberg, Martin
2011-03-01
Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence each other. I discuss the nature of game-theoretic analysis, the history of game theory, why game theory is useful for understanding human psychology, and why game theory has played a key role in the recent explosion of interest in the field of behavioral economics. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 167-173 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.119 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
How to Love the Bomb: Trying to solve the prisoner's dilemma with evolutionary game theory
Castela, Vasco
Economists traditionally see altruistic acts as irrational. However, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a rational player can do worse than a moral player. The rules of the game imply that one cannot defend one's best interest if one tries to. Game theory has struggled to explain how an agent could have access to the strategically best outcome without behaving irrationally, but with little success. Can a complex systems approach do better?. Peter Danielson, using Evolutionary Game Theory, has avoided some of the assumptions of Game Theory by using a complexity approach to reframe the problem, and offers a solution of sorts. According to Danielson, the foundations of altruism are mechanisms of deterrence that rely on credible threat - we are nice for fear of retaliation. He is both right and wrong. It will be argued that utilitarian, consequentialist principles must have been at work to create the conditions for altruistic acts to be performed. It is wrong to expect, however, that the same reasons are the reasons for action. In order for a model of genuine altruism to be possible, an extra cog must be inserted in the mechanism of causality in order to distance moral action from its strategic advantages. If emotions fulfill this role, we can tell a story in which it is rational to act on altruistic motivations and materially advantageous to hold such motivations. Moral sentiments can be seen as a tool designed by evolution to help optimize cooperation in a social environment. The proposed account integrates the Humean theory of motivation with Robert Frank's commitment model and Aristotle's views on moral education, keeping an adequate story of how it can be in our material interest to be moral without having to renounce to the existence of genuine acts of altruism.
Wang, Zhen; Kokubo, Satoshi; Jusup, Marko; Tanimoto, Jun
2015-09-01
While comprehensive reviews of the literature, by gathering in one place most of the relevant information, undoubtedly steer the development of every scientific field, we found that the comments in response to a review article can be as informative as the review itself, if not more. Namely, reading through the comments on the ideas expressed in Ref. [1], we could identify a number of pressing problems for evolutionary game theory, indicating just how much space there still is for major advances and breakthroughs. In an attempt to bring a sense of order to a multitude of opinions, we roughly classified the comments into three categories, i.e. those concerned with: (i) the universality of scaling in heterogeneous topologies, including empirical dynamic networks [2-8], (ii) the universality of scaling for more general game setups, such as the inclusion of multiple strategies and external features [4,9-11], and (iii) experimental confirmations of the theoretical developments [2,12,13].
Structural symmetry in evolutionary games
McAvoy, Alex; Hauert, Christoph
2015-01-01
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a randomly occurring mutant will fixate in the population. However, in a structured population, this fixation probability may depend on where the mutant arises. Moreover, the fixation probability is just one quantity by which one can measure the success of a mutant; fixation time, for instance, is another. We define a notion of homogeneity for evolutionary games that captures what it means for two single-mutant states, i.e. two configurations of a single mutant in an otherwise-monomorphic population, to be ‘evolutionarily equivalent’ in the sense that all measures of evolutionary success are the same for both configurations. Using asymmetric games, we argue that the term ‘homogeneous’ should apply to the evolutionary process as a whole rather than to just the population structure. For evolutionary matrix games in graph-structured populations, we give precise conditions under which the resulting process is homogeneous. Finally, we show that asymmetric matrix games can be reduced to symmetric games if the population structure possesses a sufficient degree of symmetry. PMID:26423436
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Seyed Hootan Eskafi
2015-04-01
Full Text Available In recent years, supply chain management is known as the key factor for achieving competitive advantage. Better customer service, revenue improvement and cost reduction are the results of this philosophy. Organizations can manage the performance of their firms by appropriate goal setting, identifying criteria and continuous performance measurement, which creates a good view for the business circumstances. Developing and defining appropriate indicators at different levels of chain is necessary for implementing a performance measurement system. In this study, we propose a new method to determine the measurement indicators and strategies of the company in term of balanced scorecard. The study is a combination of balanced scorecard, path analysis, evolutionary game theory and cooperative game theory for strategic planning. The study offers an appropriate program for future activities of organizations and determines the present status of the firm. The implementation of the proposed method is introduced for a food producer and the results are analyzed.
Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games
Nowak, Martin A.; Sigmund, Karl
2004-02-01
Darwinian dynamics based on mutation and selection form the core of mathematical models for adaptation and coevolution of biological populations. The evolutionary outcome is often not a fitness-maximizing equilibrium but can include oscillations and chaos. For studying frequency-dependent selection, game-theoretic arguments are more appropriate than optimization algorithms. Replicator and adaptive dynamics describe short- and long-term evolution in phenotype space and have found applications ranging from animal behavior and ecology to speciation, macroevolution, and human language. Evolutionary game theory is an essential component of a mathematical and computational approach to biology.
Zomorrodi, Ali R; Segrè, Daniel
2017-11-16
Metabolite exchanges in microbial communities give rise to ecological interactions that govern ecosystem diversity and stability. It is unclear, however, how the rise of these interactions varies across metabolites and organisms. Here we address this question by integrating genome-scale models of metabolism with evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we use microbial fitness values estimated by metabolic models to infer evolutionarily stable interactions in multi-species microbial "games". We first validate our approach using a well-characterized yeast cheater-cooperator system. We next perform over 80,000 in silico experiments to infer how metabolic interdependencies mediated by amino acid leakage in Escherichia coli vary across 189 amino acid pairs. While most pairs display shared patterns of inter-species interactions, multiple deviations are caused by pleiotropy and epistasis in metabolism. Furthermore, simulated invasion experiments reveal possible paths to obligate cross-feeding. Our study provides genomically driven insight into the rise of ecological interactions, with implications for microbiome research and synthetic ecology.
Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory.
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Alessandro Di Stefano
Full Text Available Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human cooperation emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolutionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis, allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscopically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in human cooperation.
Quantifying the Role of Homophily in Human Cooperation Using Multiplex Evolutionary Game Theory.
Di Stefano, Alessandro; Scatà, Marialisa; La Corte, Aurelio; Liò, Pietro; Catania, Emanuele; Guardo, Ermanno; Pagano, Salvatore
2015-01-01
Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human cooperation emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolutionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis, allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscopically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in human cooperation.
Ma, Zhanshan (Sam)
Competition, cooperation and communication are the three fundamental relationships upon which natural selection acts in the evolution of life. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is a 'marriage' between game theory and Darwin's evolution theory; it gains additional modeling power and flexibility by adopting population dynamics theory. In EGT, natural selection acts as optimization agents and produces inherent strategies, which eliminates some essential assumptions in traditional game theory such as rationality and allows more realistic modeling of many problems. Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and Sir Philip Sidney (SPS) games are two well-known examples of EGT, which are formulated to study cooperation and communication, respectively. Despite its huge success, EGT exposes a certain degree of weakness in dealing with time-, space- and covariate-dependent (i.e., dynamic) uncertainty, vulnerability and deception. In this paper, I propose to extend EGT in two ways to overcome the weakness. First, I introduce survival analysis modeling to describe the lifetime or fitness of game players. This extension allows more flexible and powerful modeling of the dynamic uncertainty and vulnerability (collectively equivalent to the dynamic frailty in survival analysis). Secondly, I introduce agreement algorithms, which can be the Agreement algorithms in distributed computing (e.g., Byzantine Generals Problem [6][8], Dynamic Hybrid Fault Models [12]) or any algorithms that set and enforce the rules for players to determine their consensus. The second extension is particularly useful for modeling dynamic deception (e.g., asymmetric faults in fault tolerance and deception in animal communication). From a computational perspective, the extended evolutionary game theory (EEGT) modeling, when implemented in simulation, is equivalent to an optimization methodology that is similar to evolutionary computing approaches such as Genetic algorithms with dynamic populations [15][17].
Evolutionary potential games on lattices
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Szabó, György, E-mail: szabo@mfa.kfki.hu; Borsos, István, E-mail: borsos@mfa.kfki.hu
2016-04-05
Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the “equilibrium state” by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.
Evolutionary Games and Social Conventions
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Hansen, Pelle Guldborg
2007-01-01
Some thirty years ago Lewis published his Convention: A Philosophical Study (Lewis, 2002). This laid the foundation for a game-theoretic approach to social conventions, but became more famously known for its seminal analysis of common knowledge; the concept receiving its canonical analysis...... in Aumann (1976) and which, together with the assumptions of perfect rationality, came to be defining of classical game theory. However, classical game theory is currently undergoing severe crisis as a tool for exploring social phenomena; a crisis emerging from the problem of equilibrium selection around......-defined metaphors of individual learning and social imitation processes, from which a revised theory of convention may be erected (see Sugden 2004, Binmore 1993 and Young 1998). This paper makes a general argument in support of the evolutionary turn in the theory of convention by a progressive exposition of its...
National Research Council Canada - National Science Library
Arora, Srishti; Singh, Prabhjot; Gupta, Ashok Ji
2016-01-01
... with contrary motives contend with each other. Various solutions basedon Game theory have been recently proposed which dealt with security aspects of wireless sensor networks(WSNs). However, th...
The puzzle of partial migration: Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary game theory perspectives.
De Leenheer, Patrick; Mohapatra, Anushaya; Ohms, Haley A; Lytle, David A; Cushing, J M
2017-01-07
We consider the phenomenon of partial migration which is exhibited by populations in which some individuals migrate between habitats during their lifetime, but others do not. First, using an adaptive dynamics approach, we show that partial migration can be explained on the basis of negative density dependence in the per capita fertilities alone, provided that this density dependence is attenuated for increasing abundances of the subtypes that make up the population. We present an exact formula for the optimal proportion of migrants which is expressed in terms of the vital rates of migrant and non-migrant subtypes only. We show that this allocation strategy is both an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) as well as a convergence stable strategy (CSS). To establish the former, we generalize the classical notion of an ESS because it is based on invasion exponents obtained from linearization arguments, which fail to capture the stabilizing effects of the nonlinear density dependence. These results clarify precisely when the notion of a "weak ESS", as proposed in Lundberg (2013) for a related model, is a genuine ESS. Secondly, we use an evolutionary game theory approach, and confirm, once again, that partial migration can be attributed to negative density dependence alone. In this context, the result holds even when density dependence is not attenuated. In this case, the optimal allocation strategy towards migrants is the same as the ESS stemming from the analysis based on the adaptive dynamics. The key feature of the population models considered here is that they are monotone dynamical systems, which enables a rather comprehensive mathematical analysis. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Inactivation of tumor suppressor genes and cancer therapy: An evolutionary game theory approach.
Khadem, Heydar; Kebriaei, Hamed; Veisi, Zahra
2017-06-01
Inactivation of alleles in tumor suppressor genes (TSG) is one of the important issues resulting in evolution of cancerous cells. In this paper, the evolution of healthy, one and two missed allele cells is modeled using the concept of evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics. The proposed model also takes into account the interaction rates of the cells as designing parameters of the system. Different combinations of the equilibrium points of the parameterized nonlinear system is studied and categorized into some cases. In each case, the interaction rates' values are suggested in a way that the equilibrium points of the replicator dynamics are located on an appropriate region of the state space. Based on the suggested interaction rates, it is proved that the system doesn't have any undesirable interior equilibrium point as well. Therefore, the system will converge to the desirable region, where there is a scanty level of cancerous cells. In addition, the proposed conditions for interaction rates guarantee that, when a trajectory of the system reaches the boundaries, then it will stay there forever which is a desirable property since the equilibrium points have been already located on the boundaries, appropriately. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the suggestions in the elimination of the cancerous cells in different scenarios. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Mattei, Tobias A
2014-06-01
The theoretical concepts developed in the target article, in which the author proposes a new paradigm of cultural evolution based not on the individuals' characteristics, but rather on more global collective properties described as "group-traits" (which emerge when a group of individuals exhibit both differentiation and organization), may have a broader scientific impact that transcend the boundaries of social and evolutionary psychology, paving the way for the emergence of macro-neuroeconomics and social evolutionary game theory.
Evolutionary Game Theory and Social Learning Can Determine How Vaccine Scares Unfold
Bauch, Chris T.; Bhattacharyya, Samit
2012-01-01
Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) autism vaccine scare in Britain. A “free rider” effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty). Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence—up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis—including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts. PMID:22496631
Evolutionary game theory and social learning can determine how vaccine scares unfold.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Chris T Bauch
Full Text Available Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR autism vaccine scare in Britain. A "free rider" effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior. Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares, and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England & Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty. Under some circumstances, the model can predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence--up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis--including specific qualitative features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population's response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist mitigation efforts.
Altruistic behavior pays, or the importance of fluctuations in evolutionary game theory
Sánchez, Angel; Cuesta, José A.; Roca, Carlos P.
2005-07-01
Human behavior is one of the main problems for evolution, as it is often the case that human actions are disadvantageous for the self and advantageous for other people. Behind this puzzle are our beliefs about rational behavior, based on game theory. Here we show that by going beyond the standard game-theoretical conventions, apparently altruistic behavior can be understood as self-interested. We discuss in detail an example related to the so called Ultimatum game and illustrate the appearance of altruistic behavior induced by fluctuations. In addition, we claim that in general settings, fluctuations play a very relevant role, and we support this claim by considering a completely different example, namely the Stag-Hunt game.
Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)
Hanauske, Matthias
2011-02-14
The evolution of socio-economic systems depend on the interdependent decision processes of its underlying system components. The mathematical model to describe the strategic decision of players within a socio-economic game is ''game theory''. ''Quantum game theory'' is a mathematical and conceptual amplification of classical game theory. The space of all conceivable decision paths is extended from the purely rational, measurable space in the Hilbert-space of complex numbers - which is the mathematical space where quantum theory is formulated. By the concept of a potential entanglement of the imaginary quantum strategy parts, it is possible to include cooperate decision path, caused by cultural or moral standards. If this strategy entanglement is large enough, then additional Nash equilibria can occur, previously present dominant strategies could become nonexistent and new evolutionary stable strategies do appear for some game classes. Within this PhD thesis the main results of classical and quantum games are summarized and all of the possible game classes of evolutionary (2 player)-(2 strategy) games are extended to quantum games. It is shown that the quantum extension of classical games with an underlying dilemma-like structure give different results, if the strength of strategic entanglement is above a certain barrier. After the German summary and the introduction paper, five different applications of the theory are discussed within the thesis. (orig.)
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Tian, Yihui; Govindan, Kannan; Zhu, Qinghua
2014-01-01
In this study, a system dynamics (SD) model is developed to guide the subsidy policies to promote the diffusion of green supply chain management (GSCM) in China. The relationships of stakeholders such as government, enterprises and consumers are analyzed through evolutionary game theory. Finally......, the GSCM diffusion process is simulated by the model with a case study on Chinese automotive manufacturing industry. The results show that the subsidies for manufacturers are better than that for consumers to promote GSCM diffusion, and the environmental awareness is another influential key factor....
Han, The Anh
2013-01-01
This original and timely monograph describes a unique self-contained excursion that reveals to the readers the roles of two basic cognitive abilities, i.e. intention recognition and arranging commitments, in the evolution of cooperative behavior. This book analyses intention recognition, an important ability that helps agents predict others’ behavior, in its artificial intelligence and evolutionary computational modeling aspects, and proposes a novel intention recognition method. Furthermore, the book presents a new framework for intention-based decision making and illustrates several ways in which an ability to recognize intentions of others can enhance a decision making process. By employing the new intention recognition method and the tools of evolutionary game theory, this book introduces computational models demonstrating that intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation within populations of self-regarding agents. Finally, the book describes how commitment provides a pathway to the evol...
Mean-Potential Law in Evolutionary Games
Nałecz-Jawecki, Paweł; Miekisz, Jacek
2018-01-01
The Letter presents a novel way to connect random walks, stochastic differential equations, and evolutionary game theory. We introduce a new concept of a potential function for discrete-space stochastic systems. It is based on a correspondence between one-dimensional stochastic differential equations and random walks, which may be exact not only in the continuous limit but also in finite-state spaces. Our method is useful for computation of fixation probabilities in discrete stochastic dynamical systems with two absorbing states. We apply it to evolutionary games, formulating two simple and intuitive criteria for evolutionary stability of pure Nash equilibria in finite populations. In particular, we show that the 1 /3 law of evolutionary games, introduced by Nowak et al. [Nature, 2004], follows from a more general mean-potential law.
Steidinger, Brian S; Bever, James D
2014-06-01
Evolutionary theory predicts that mutualisms based on the reciprocal exchange of costly services should be susceptible to exploitation by cheaters. Consistent with theory, both cheating and discrimination against cheaters are ubiquitous features of mutualisms. Several recent studies have confirmed that host species differ in the extent that they are able to discriminate against cheaters, suggesting that cheating may be stabilized by the existence of susceptible hosts (dubbed "givers"). We use an evolutionary game-theoretical approach to demonstrate how discriminating and giver hosts associating with mutualist and cheater partners can coexist. Discriminators drive the proportion of cheaters below a critical threshold, at which point there is no benefit to investing resources into discrimination. This promotes givers, who benefit from mutualists but allow cheater populations to rebound. We then apply this model to the plant-mycorrhizal mutualism and demonstrate it is one mechanism for generating host-specific responses to mycorrhizal fungal species necessary to generate negative plant-soil feedbacks. Our model makes several falsifiable, qualitative predictions for plant-mycorrhizal population dynamics across gradients of soil phosphorus availability and interhost differences in ability to discriminate. Finally, we suggest applications and limitations of the model with regard to coexistence in specific biological systems.
Games, theory and applications
Thomas, L C
2011-01-01
Anyone with a knowledge of basic mathematics will find this an accessible and informative introduction to game theory. It opens with the theory of two-person zero-sum games, two-person non-zero sum games, and n-person games, at a level between nonmathematical introductory books and technical mathematical game theory books. Succeeding sections focus on a variety of applications - including introductory explanations of gaming and meta games - that offer nonspecialists information about new areas of game theory at a comprehensible level. Numerous exercises appear with full solutions, in addition
Evolutionary Information Theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Mark Burgin
2013-04-01
Full Text Available Evolutionary information theory is a constructive approach that studies information in the context of evolutionary processes, which are ubiquitous in nature and society. In this paper, we develop foundations of evolutionary information theory, building several measures of evolutionary information and obtaining their properties. These measures are based on mathematical models of evolutionary computations, machines and automata. To measure evolutionary information in an invariant form, we construct and study universal evolutionary machines and automata, which form the base for evolutionary information theory. The first class of measures introduced and studied in this paper is evolutionary information size of symbolic objects relative to classes of automata or machines. In particular, it is proved that there is an invariant and optimal evolutionary information size relative to different classes of evolutionary machines. As a rule, different classes of algorithms or automata determine different information size for the same object. The more powerful classes of algorithms or automata decrease the information size of an object in comparison with the information size of an object relative to weaker4 classes of algorithms or machines. The second class of measures for evolutionary information in symbolic objects is studied by introduction of the quantity of evolutionary information about symbolic objects relative to a class of automata or machines. To give an example of applications, we briefly describe a possibility of modeling physical evolution with evolutionary machines to demonstrate applicability of evolutionary information theory to all material processes. At the end of the paper, directions for future research are suggested.
Indian Academy of Sciences (India)
Let us move further and introduce temporal structures into our games. Our next story is that of two compulsive bargainers. Kavi and Satya try to divide Rs.100 which ..... about inflation. Hence, we need to devalue the payoffs we receive in the future. This is what is known as the discount factor. We can now easily see that for ...
de Bruin, B.P.
2005-01-01
Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals
Evolutionary games in the multiverse.
Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Traulsen, Arne
2010-03-23
Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players with any number of strategies , there can be at most isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.
An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Revision-Resistant Motivations and Strategic Reasoning
National Research Council Canada - National Science Library
DeLancey, Craig
2008-01-01
Strong reciprocity and other forms of cooperation with non-kin in large groups and in one-time social interactions is difficult to explain with traditional economic or with simple evolutionary accounts...
Evolutionary Game Theory-Based Evaluation of P2P File-Sharing Systems in Heterogeneous Environments
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Yusuke Matsuda
2010-01-01
Full Text Available Peer-to-Peer (P2P file sharing is one of key technologies for achieving attractive P2P multimedia social networking. In P2P file-sharing systems, file availability is improved by cooperative users who cache and share files. Note that file caching carries costs such as storage consumption and processing load. In addition, users have different degrees of cooperativity in file caching and they are in different surrounding environments arising from the topological structure of P2P networks. With evolutionary game theory, this paper evaluates the performance of P2P file sharing systems in such heterogeneous environments. Using micro-macro dynamics, we analyze the impact of the heterogeneity of user selfishness on the file availability and system stability. Further, through simulation experiments with agent-based dynamics, we reveal how other aspects, for example, synchronization among nodes and topological structure, affect the system performance. Both analytical and simulation results show that the environmental heterogeneity contributes to the file availability and system stability.
Coevolution of Artificial Agents Using Evolutionary Computation in Bargaining Game
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Sangwook Lee
2015-01-01
Full Text Available Analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issue in the field of game theory. This paper investigates the interaction and coevolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation (EC in the bargaining game. In particular, the game performance with regard to payoff through the interaction and coevolution of agents is studied. We present three kinds of EC based agents (EC-agent participating in the bargaining game: genetic algorithm (GA, particle swarm optimization (PSO, and differential evolution (DE. The agents’ performance with regard to changing condition is compared. From the simulation results it is found that the PSO-agent is superior to the other agents.
Malekian, Negin; Habibi, Jafar; Zangooei, Mohammad Hossein; Aghakhani, Hojjat
2016-11-01
There are many cells with various phenotypic behaviors in cancer interacting with each other. For example, an apoptotic cell may induce apoptosis in adjacent cells. A living cell can also protect cells from undergoing apoptosis and necrosis. These survival and death signals are propagated through interaction pathways between adjacent cells called gap junctions. The function of these signals depends on the cellular context of the cell receiving them. For instance, a receiver cell experiencing a low level of oxygen may interpret a received survival signal as an apoptosis signal. In this study, we examine the effect of these signals on tumor growth. We make an evolutionary game theory component in order to model the signal propagation through gap junctions. The game payoffs are defined as a function of cellular context. Then, the game theory component is integrated into an agent-based model of tumor growth. After that, the integrated model is applied to ductal carcinoma in situ, a type of early stage breast cancer. Different scenarios are explored to observe the impact of the gap junction communication and parameters of the game theory component on cancer progression. We compare these scenarios by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test succeeds in proving a significant difference between the tumor growth of the model before and after considering the gap junction communication. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test also proves that the tumor growth significantly depends on the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis. In this study, the gap junction communication is modeled by using evolutionary game theory to illustrate its role at early stage cancers such as ductal carcinoma in situ. This work indicates that the gap junction communication and the oxygen threshold of turning survival signals into apoptosis can notably affect cancer progression. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
Karlin, Anna R
2016-01-01
This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields, such as computer science, economics, social choice, biology, and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. Game theory's influence is felt in a wide range of disciplines, and the authors deliver masterfully on the challenge of presenting both the breadth and coherence of its underlying ...
Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games
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Stamatios Katsikas
2016-10-01
Full Text Available We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game.
Passivity analysis of higher order evolutionary dynamics and population games
Mabrok, Mohamed
2017-01-05
Evolutionary dynamics describe how the population composition changes in response to the fitness levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work established a connection between passivity theory and certain classes of population games, namely so-called “stable games”. In particular, it was shown that a combination of stable games and (an analogue of) passive evolutionary dynamics results in stable convergence to Nash equilibrium. This paper considers the converse question of necessary conditions for evolutionary dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all generalized stable games. Using methods from robust control analysis, we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to construct a generalized stable game that results in instability. The results are illustrated on selected evolutionary dynamics with particular attention to replicator dynamics, which are also shown to be lossless, a special class of passive systems.
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of minimum-effort coordination games
Li, Kun; Wang, Long
2016-01-01
The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the predictions of classic game theory. In the framework of classic game theory, any common effort level is a strict and trembling hand perfect Nash equilibrium, so that no desideratum is provided for selecting among them. Behavior experiments, however, show that the effort levels employed by subjects are inversely related to the effort costs. Here, we combine coalescence theory and evolutionary game theory to investigate this game in finite populations. Both analytic results and individual-based simulations show that effort costs play a key role in the evolution of contribution levels, which is in good agreement with those observed experimentally. Besides well-mixed populations, set structured populations, where the population structure itself is a consequence of the evolutio...
Strategy selection in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks.
Tan, Shaolin; Feng, Shasha; Wang, Pei; Chen, Yao
2014-11-01
Evolutionary game theory provides an appropriate tool for investigating the competition and diffusion of behavioral traits in biological or social populations. A core challenge in evolutionary game theory is the strategy selection problem: Given two strategies, which one is favored by the population? Recent studies suggest that the answer depends not only on the payoff functions of strategies but also on the interaction structure of the population. Group interactions are one of the fundamental interactive modes within populations. This work aims to investigate the strategy selection problem in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks. In detail, the strategy selection conditions are obtained for some typical networks with group interactions. Furthermore, the obtained conditions are applied to investigate selection between cooperation and defection in populations. The conditions for evolution of cooperation are derived for both the public goods game and volunteer's dilemma game. Numerical experiments validate the above analytical results.
Barron, E N
2013-01-01
An exciting new edition of the popular introduction to game theory and its applications The thoroughly expanded Second Edition presents a unique, hands-on approach to game theory. While most books on the subject are too abstract or too basic for mathematicians, Game Theory: An Introduction, Second Edition offers a blend of theory and applications, allowing readers to use theory and software to create and analyze real-world decision-making models. With a rigorous, yet accessible, treatment of mathematics, the book focuses on results that can be used to
Shor, Mikhael
2003-01-01
States making game theory relevant and accessible to students is challenging. Describes the primary goal of GameTheory.net is to provide interactive teaching tools. Indicates the site strives to unite educators from economics, political and computer science, and ecology by providing a repository of lecture notes and tests for courses using…
Evolutionary Theory under Fire.
Lewin, Roger
1980-01-01
Summarizes events of a conference on evolutionary biology in Chicago entitled: "Macroevolution." Reviews the theory of modern synthesis, a term used to explain Darwinism in terms of population biology and genetics. Issues presented at the conference are discussed in detail. (CS)
Wolpert, David H.
2005-01-01
Probability theory governs the outcome of a game; there is a distribution over mixed strat.'s, not a single "equilibrium". To predict a single mixed strategy must use our loss function (external to the game's players. Provides a quantification of any strategy's rationality. Prove rationality falls as cost of computation rises (for players who have not previously interacted). All extends to games with varying numbers of players.
Evolutionary stability for matrix games under time constraints.
Garay, József; Csiszár, Villő; Móri, Tamás F
2017-02-21
Game theory focuses on payoffs and typically ignores time constraints that play an important role in evolutionary processes where the repetition of games can depend on the strategies, too. We introduce a matrix game under time constraints, where each pairwise interaction has two consequences: both players receive a payoff and they cannot play the next game for a specified time duration. Thus our model is defined by two matrices: a payoff matrix and an average time duration matrix. Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionary stability is extended to this class of games. We illustrate the effect of time constraints by the well-known prisoner's dilemma game, where additional time constraints can ensure the existence of unique evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), both pure and mixed, or the coexistence of two pure ESS. Our general results may be useful in several fields of biology where evolutionary game theory is applied, principally in ecological games, where time constraints play an inevitable role. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium
Wang, Zhen; Wang, Lin; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž
2015-05-01
Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and evolutionary game theory.
Evolutionary theory and teleology.
O'Grady, R T
1984-04-21
The order within and among living systems can be explained rationally by postulating a process of descent with modification, effected by factors which are extrinsic or intrinsic to the organisms. Because at the time Darwin proposed his theory of evolution there was no concept of intrinsic factors which could evolve, he postulated a process of extrinsic effects--natural selection. Biological order was thus seen as an imposed, rather than an emergent, property. Evolutionary change was seen as being determined by the functional efficiency (adaptedness) of the organism in its environment, rather than by spontaneous changes in intrinsically generated organizing factors. The initial incompleteness of Darwin's explanatory model, and the axiomatization of its postulates in neo-Darwinism, has resulted in a theory of functionalism, rather than structuralism. As such, it introduces an unnecessary teleology which confounds evolutionary studies and reduces the usefulness of the theory. This problem cannot be detected from within the neo-Darwinian paradigm because the different levels of end-directed activity--teleomatic, teleonomic, and teleological--are not recognized. They are, in fact, considered to influence one another. The theory of nonequilibrium evolution avoids these problems by returning to the basic principles of biological order and developing a structuralist explanation of intrinsically generated change. Extrinsic factors may affect the resultant evolutionary pattern, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for evolution to occur.
Paleoanthropology and evolutionary theory.
Tattersall, Ian
2012-01-01
Paleoanthropologists of the first half of the twentieth century were little concerned either with evolutionary theory or with the technicalities and broader implications of zoological nomenclature. In consequence, the paleoanthropological literature of the period consisted largely of a series of descriptions accompanied by authoritative pronouncements, together with a huge excess of hominid genera and species. Given the intellectual flimsiness of the resulting paleoanthropological framework, it is hardly surprising that in 1950 the ornithologist Ernst Mayr met little resistance when he urged the new postwar generation of paleoanthropologists to accept not only the elegant reductionism of the Evolutionary Synthesis but a vast oversimplification of hominid phylogenetic history and nomenclature. Indeed, the impact of Mayr's onslaught was so great that even when developments in evolutionary biology during the last quarter of the century brought other paleontologists to the realization that much more has been involved in evolutionary histories than the simple action of natural selection within gradually transforming lineages, paleoanthropologists proved highly reluctant to follow. Even today, paleoanthropologists are struggling to reconcile an intuitive realization that the burgeoning hominid fossil record harbors a substantial diversity of species (bringing hominid evolutionary patterns into line with that of other successful mammalian families), with the desire to cram a huge variety of morphologies into an unrealistically minimalist systematic framework. As long as this theoretical ambivalence persists, our perception of events in hominid phylogeny will continue to be distorted.
Barron, E N
2008-01-01
A fundamental introduction to modern game theory from a mathematical viewpoint. Game theory arises in almost every fact of human and inhuman interaction since oftentimes during these communications objectives are opposed or cooperation is viewed as an option. From economics and finance to biology and computer science, researchers and practitioners are often put in complex decision-making scenarios, whether they are interacting with each other or working with evolving technology and artificial intelligence. Acknowledging the role of mathematics in making logical and advantageous decisions, Game
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Aarseth, Espen
2012-01-01
In this article I present a narrative theory of games, building on standard narra-tology, as a solution to the conundrum that has haunted computer game studies from the start: How to approach software that combines games and stories?......In this article I present a narrative theory of games, building on standard narra-tology, as a solution to the conundrum that has haunted computer game studies from the start: How to approach software that combines games and stories?...
Chaotic Characteristics and Application of Cooperative Game and Evolutionary Game
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Yujing Yang
2014-01-01
Full Text Available According to a dynamical multiteam Cournot game in exploitation of a renewable resource, a new dynamic Cournot duopoly game model with team players in exploitation of a renewable resource is built up in this paper. Based on the theory of bifurcations of dynamical systems, the stability of the system is studied and the local stable region of Nash equilibrium point is obtained. The effect of the output adjustment speed parameters and the weight parameter of the system on the dynamic characteristics of the system are researched. The complexity of the system is described via the bifurcation diagrams, the Lyapunov exponents, the phase portrait, the time history diagram, and the fractal dimension. Furthermore, the chaos control of the system is realized by the parameter adjustment method. At last, an evolutionary game as a special dynamic system is constructed and analyzed which is more useful and helpful in application. The derived results have very important theoretical and practical values for the renewable resource market and companies.
Static and evolutionary quantum public goods games
Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)
Liao Zeyang; Qin Gan; Hu Lingzhi; Li Songjian; Xu Nanyang [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Du Jiangfeng [Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Science at Microscale and Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 (China); Fachbereich Physik, Universitaet Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund (Germany)], E-mail: djf@ustc.edu.cn
2008-05-12
We apply the continuous-variable quantization scheme to quantize public goods game and find that new pure strategy Nash equilibria emerge in the static case. Furthermore, in the evolutionary public goods game, entanglement can also contribute to the persistence of cooperation under various population structures without altruism, voluntary participation, and punishment.
Modeling evolutionary games in populations with demographic structure
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Li, Xiang-Yi; Giaimo, Stefano; Baudisch, Annette
2015-01-01
Classic life history models are often based on optimization algorithms, focusing on the adaptation of survival and reproduction to the environment, while neglecting frequency dependent interactions in the population. Evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, studies frequency dependent strategy...... interactions, but usually omits life history and the demographic structure of the population. Here we show how an integration of both aspects can substantially alter the underlying evolutionary dynamics. We study the replicator dynamics of strategy interactions in life stage structured populations. Individuals...
Mathematical game theory and applications
Mazalov, Vladimir
2014-01-01
An authoritative and quantitative approach to modern game theory with applications from diverse areas including economics, political science, military science, and finance. Explores areas which are not covered in current game theory texts, including a thorough examination of zero-sum game.Provides introductory material to game theory, including bargaining, parlour games, sport, networking games and dynamic games.Explores Bargaining models, discussing new result such as resource distributions, buyer-seller instructions and reputation in bargaining models.Theoretical results are presented along
Indian Academy of Sciences (India)
Home; Journals; Resonance – Journal of Science Education; Volume 9; Issue 3. Introduction to Game Theory. S Ramasubramanian. Book Review Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2004 pp 81-81. Fulltext. Click here to view fulltext PDF. Permanent link: http://www.ias.ac.in/article/fulltext/reso/009/03/0081-0081. Author Affiliations.
Some Results on Ethnic Conflicts Based on Evolutionary Game Simulation
Qin, Jun; Wu, Hongrun; Liu, Yuhang; Tong, Xiaonian; Zheng, Bojin
2014-01-01
The force of the ethnic separatism, essentially origining from negative effect of ethnic identity, is damaging the stability and harmony of multiethnic countries. In order to eliminate the foundation of the ethnic separatism and set up a harmonious ethnic relationship, some scholars have proposed a viewpoint: ethnic harmony could be promoted by popularizing civic identity. However, this viewpoint is discussed only from a philosophical prospective and still lack supports of scientific evidences. Because ethic group and ethnic identity are products of evolution and ethnic identity is the parochialism strategy under the perspective of game theory, this paper proposes an evolutionary game simulation model to study the relationship between civic identity and ethnic conflict based on evolutionary game theory. The simulation results indicate that: 1) the ratio of individuals with civic identity has a positive association with the frequency of ethnic conflicts; 2) ethnic conflict will not die out by killing all ethni...
Game theory a nontechnical introduction
Davis, Morton D
1997-01-01
""A lucid and penetrating development of game theory that will appeal to the intuition . . . a most valuable contribution."" - Douglas R. Hofstadter Fascinating, accessible introduction to enormously important intellectual system with numerous applications to social, economic, political problems. Newly revised edition offers overview of game theory, then lucid coverage of the two-person zero-sum game with equilibrium points; the general, two-person zero-sum game; utility theory; other topics. Problems at start of each chapter.
van Damme, E.E.C.
1995-01-01
This paper surveys some recent developments in (non-cooperative) game theory and provides an outlook on the near future of that theory. In particular, attention is focused on the limitations inherent in normative game theory and on attempts to construct a behavioral version of the theory that
Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs.
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Jorge Peña
2016-08-01
Full Text Available There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering.
Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs.
Peña, Jorge; Wu, Bin; Arranz, Jordi; Traulsen, Arne
2016-08-01
There has been much interest in studying evolutionary games in structured populations, often modeled as graphs. However, most analytical results so far have only been obtained for two-player or linear games, while the study of more complex multiplayer games has been usually tackled by computer simulations. Here we investigate evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs updated with a Moran death-Birth process. For cycles, we obtain an exact analytical condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection, given in terms of the payoffs of the game and a set of structure coefficients. For regular graphs of degree three and larger, we estimate this condition using a combination of pair approximation and diffusion approximation. For a large class of cooperation games, our approximations suggest that graph-structured populations are stronger promoters of cooperation than populations lacking spatial structure. Computer simulations validate our analytical approximations for random regular graphs and cycles, but show systematic differences for graphs with many loops such as lattices. In particular, our simulation results show that these kinds of graphs can even lead to more stringent conditions for the evolution of cooperation than well-mixed populations. Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that the complexity arising from many-player interactions and spatial structure can be captured by pair approximation in the case of random graphs, but that it need to be handled with care for graphs with high clustering.
Extrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games
Wu, Bin; García, Julián; Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne
2013-01-01
In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By “qualitatively valid” we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies . In particular, rank changes are almost certain for , which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection. PMID:24339769
Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Bin Wu
Full Text Available In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By "qualitatively valid" we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies [Formula: see text]. In particular, rank changes are almost certain for [Formula: see text], which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection.
Evolutionary Theories of Detection
Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)
Fitch, J P
2005-04-29
Current, mid-term and long range technologies for detection of pathogens and toxins are briefly described in the context of performance metrics and operational scenarios. Predictive (evolutionary) and speculative (revolutionary) assessments are given with trade-offs identified, where possible, among competing performance goals.
Social dilemmas in multistrategy evolutionary potential games
Szabó, György; Bunth, Gergely
2018-01-01
The nature of social dilemmas is studied in n -strategy evolutionary potential games on a square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions and the logit rule. For symmetric games with symmetric payoff matrices there are no dilemmas because of the coincidence of individual and common interests. The dilemmas are caused by the antisymmetric parts of the self- and cross-dependent payoff components if it modifies the preferred Nash equilibrium. The contentment of players and the emergence of dilemmas in the preferred Nash equilibria are illustrated on some two-dimensional cross sections of the parameter space.
Evolutionary Minority Game with searching behavior
Zhang, Wei; Sun, Yuxin; Feng, Xu; Xiong, Xiong
2015-10-01
In this paper, we determine the impact of searching behavior on the evolutionary minority game (EMG). We introduce searching behavior in two ways: optimal neighbor searching and global searching. Our study investigates the distribution equilibriums of probabilities that agents follow a given strategy and on system performance of the game. The results indicate that the distribution equilibriums of the probabilities are different with searching behavior, as opposed to without searching behavior. The system performance becomes worse after adding the searching behavior. Additionally, we test other variables in a standard EMG with and without searching behavior.
McCain, Roger A
2015-01-01
This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.
Bone remodeling as a spatial evolutionary game.
Ryser, Marc D; Murgas, Kevin A
2017-04-07
Bone remodeling is a complex process involving cell-cell interactions, biochemical signaling and mechanical stimuli. Early models of the biological aspects of remodeling were non-spatial and focused on the local dynamics at a fixed location in the bone. Several spatial extensions of these models have been proposed, but they generally suffer from two limitations: first, they are not amenable to analysis and are computationally expensive, and second, they neglect the role played by bone-embedded osteocytes. To address these issues, we developed a novel model of spatial remodeling based on the principles of evolutionary game theory. The analytically tractable framework describes the spatial interactions between zones of bone resorption, bone formation and quiescent bone, and explicitly accounts for regulation of remodeling by bone-embedded, mechanotransducing osteocytes. Using tools from the theory of interacting particle systems we systematically classified the different dynamic regimes of the spatial model and identified regions of parameter space that allow for global coexistence of resorption, formation and quiescence, as observed in physiological remodeling. In coexistence scenarios, three-dimensional simulations revealed the emergence of sponge-like bone clusters. Comparison between spatial and non-spatial dynamics revealed substantial differences and suggested a stabilizing role of space. Our findings emphasize the importance of accounting for spatial structure and bone-embedded osteocytes when modeling the process of bone remodeling. Thanks to the lattice-based framework, the proposed model can easily be coupled to a mechanical model of bone loading. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Fujiwara-Greve, Takako
2015-01-01
This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) probl...
Adaptive Topographies and Equilibrium Selection in an Evolutionary Game
Osinga, Hinke M.; Marshall, James A. R.
2015-01-01
It has long been known in the field of population genetics that adaptive topographies, in which population equilibria maximise mean population fitness for a trait regardless of its genetic bases, do not exist. Whether one chooses to model selection acting on a single locus or multiple loci does matter. In evolutionary game theory, analysis of a simple and general game involving distinct roles for the two players has shown that whether strategies are modelled using a single ‘locus’ or one ‘locus’ for each role, the stable population equilibria are unchanged and correspond to the fitness-maximising evolutionary stable strategies of the game. This is curious given the aforementioned population genetical results on the importance of the genetic bases of traits. Here we present a dynamical systems analysis of the game with roles detailing how, while the stable equilibria in this game are unchanged by the number of ‘loci’ modelled, equilibrium selection may differ under the two modelling approaches. PMID:25706762
Dynamic Properties of Evolutionary Multi-player Games in Finite Populations
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Bin Wu
2013-05-01
Full Text Available William D. Hamilton famously stated that “human life is a many person game and not just a disjoined collection of two person games”. However, most of the theoretical results in evolutionary game theory have been developed for two player games. In spite of a multitude of examples ranging from humans to bacteria, multi-player games have received less attention than pairwise games due to their inherent complexity. Such complexities arise from the fact that group interactions cannot always be considered as a sum of multiple pairwise interactions. Mathematically, multi-player games provide a natural way to introduce non-linear, polynomial fitness functions into evolutionary game theory, whereas pairwise games lead to linear fitness functions. Similarly, studying finite populations is a natural way of introducing intrinsic stochasticity into population dynamics. While these topics have been dealt with individually, few have addressed the combination of finite populations and multi-player games so far. We are investigating the dynamical properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations. Properties of the fixation probability and fixation time, which are relevant for rare mutations, are addressed in well mixed populations. For more frequent mutations, the average abundance is investigated in well mixed as well as in structured populations. While the fixation properties are generalizations of the results from two player scenarios, addressing the average abundance in multi-player games gives rise to novel outcomes not possible in pairwise games.
Foundations of game theory noncooperative games
Vorob’ev, Nicolai N
1994-01-01
The English edition differs only slightly from the Russian original. The main struc tural difference is that all the material on the theory of finite noncooperative games has been collected in Chapter 2, with renumbering of the material of the remain ing chapters. New sections have been added in this chapter: devoted to general questions of equilibrium theory in nondegenerate games, subsections 3.9-3.17, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr.; and § 4, by A.G. Chernyakov; and § 5, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr., on the computational complexity of the process of finding equilibrium points in finite games. It should also be mentioned that subsections 3.12-3.14 in Chapter 1 were written by E.B. Yanovskaya especially for the Russian edition. The author regrets that the present edition does not reflect the important game-theoretical achievements presented in the splendid monographs by E. van Damme (on the refinement of equilibrium principles for finite games), as well as those by J.e. Harsanyi and R. Selten, and by W. Giith and B. Ka...
Game theory and experimental games the study of strategic interaction
Colman, Andrew M
1982-01-01
Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction is a critical survey of the essential ideas of game theory and the findings of empirical research on strategic interaction. Some experiments using lifelike simulations of familiar kinds of strategic interactions are presented, and applications of game theory to the study of voting, the theory of evolution, and moral philosophy are discussed.Comprised of 13 chapters, this volume begins with an informal definition of game theory and an outline of the types of social situations to which it applies. Games of skill, games of cha
Dixit, Avinash
2005-01-01
The author suggests methods for teaching game theory at an introductory level, using interactive games to be played in the classroom or in computer clusters, clips from movies to be screened and discussed, and excerpts from novels and historical books to be read and discussed.
The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games.
Shubik, Martin
2002-01-01
Discusses the use of lightly controlled games, primarily in classes in game theory. Considers the value of such games from the viewpoint of both teaching and experimentation and discusses context; control; pros and cons of games in teaching; experimental games; and games in class, including cooperative game theory. (Author/LRW)
Impact of Roles Assignation on Heterogeneous Populations in Evolutionary Dictator Game
Deng, Xinyang; Liu, Qi; Sadiq, Rehan; Deng, Yong
2014-11-01
The evolution of cooperation is a hot and challenging topic in the field of evolutionary game theory. Altruistic behavior, as a particular form of cooperation, has been widely studied by the ultimatum game but not by the dictator game, which provides a more elegant way to identify the altruistic component of behaviors. In this paper, the evolutionary dictator game is applied to model the real motivations of altruism. A degree-based regime is utilized to assess the impact of the assignation of roles on evolutionary outcome in populations of heterogeneous structure with two kinds of strategic updating mechanisms, which are based on Darwin's theory of evolution and punctuated equilibrium, respectively. The results show that the evolutionary outcome is affected by the role assignation and that this impact also depends on the strategic updating mechanisms, the function used to evaluate players' success, and the structure of populations.
Introduction: games and subcultural theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Marco Benoit Carbone
2014-03-01
Full Text Available This issue of GAME Journal offers a recognition and a series of case studies on video games from the point of view of subcultural theory. Game studies have hitherto focused little on their object from this perspective, which offers a theoretical frame for the historical and ever growing complexity of the audiences involved with the medium of the video game. The study of subcultures on the other hand has a long standing and complex tradition which culminates in what has been recently defined as the “post-subcultural” theoretical scenario.
Eco-evolutionary feedbacks, adaptive dynamics and evolutionary rescue theory.
Ferriere, Regis; Legendre, Stéphane
2013-01-19
Adaptive dynamics theory has been devised to account for feedbacks between ecological and evolutionary processes. Doing so opens new dimensions to and raises new challenges about evolutionary rescue. Adaptive dynamics theory predicts that successive trait substitutions driven by eco-evolutionary feedbacks can gradually erode population size or growth rate, thus potentially raising the extinction risk. Even a single trait substitution can suffice to degrade population viability drastically at once and cause 'evolutionary suicide'. In a changing environment, a population may track a viable evolutionary attractor that leads to evolutionary suicide, a phenomenon called 'evolutionary trapping'. Evolutionary trapping and suicide are commonly observed in adaptive dynamics models in which the smooth variation of traits causes catastrophic changes in ecological state. In the face of trapping and suicide, evolutionary rescue requires that the population overcome evolutionary threats generated by the adaptive process itself. Evolutionary repellors play an important role in determining how variation in environmental conditions correlates with the occurrence of evolutionary trapping and suicide, and what evolutionary pathways rescue may follow. In contrast with standard predictions of evolutionary rescue theory, low genetic variation may attenuate the threat of evolutionary suicide and small population sizes may facilitate escape from evolutionary traps.
Essays on Behavioural Game Theory
Birkeland, Sigbjørn
2011-01-01
Game theory is the standard method in economics used to analyse situations where people or firms interact, for example, auctions, bargaining, cooperation, markets with a small number of firms, and many other social dilemmas such as the provision of public goods. Behavioural game theory is an approach to economics that uses psychological regularities to suggest ways to weaken rationality assumptions and extend the motivational basis for economic behaviour (Camerer, 2003). The th...
Models in cooperative game theory
Branzei, Rodica; Tijs, Stef
2008-01-01
This book investigates models in cooperative game theory in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to cooperate with infinite many different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multi-choice game describes the intermediate case in which each player may have a fixed number of activity levels. Different set and one-point solution concepts for these games are presented. The properties of these solution concepts and their interrelations on several classes of crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games are studied. Applications of the investigated models to many economic situations are indicated as well. The second edition is highly enlarged and contains new results and additional sections in the different chapters as well as one new chapter.
Game theory and plant ecology.
McNickle, Gordon G; Dybzinski, Ray
2013-04-01
The fixed and plastic traits possessed by a plant, which may be collectively thought of as its strategy, are commonly modelled as density-independent adaptations to its environment. However, plant strategies may also represent density- or frequency-dependent adaptations to the strategies used by neighbours. Game theory provides the tools to characterise such density- and frequency-dependent interactions. Here, we review the contributions of game theory to plant ecology. After briefly reviewing game theory from the perspective of plant ecology, we divide our review into three sections. First, game theoretical models of allocation to shoots and roots often predict investment in those organs beyond what would be optimal in the absence of competition. Second, game theoretical models of enemy defence suggest that an individual's investment in defence is not only a means of reducing its own tissue damage but also a means of deflecting enemies onto competitors. Finally, game theoretical models of trade with mutualistic partners suggest that the optimal trade may reflect competition for access to mutualistic partners among plants. In short, our review provides an accessible entrance to game theory that will help plant ecologists enrich their research with its worldview and existing predictions. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/CNRS.
Introduction to the theory of games
McKinsey, John C C
1952-01-01
One of the classic early monographs on game theory, this comprehensive overview illustrates the theory's applications to situations involving conflicts of interest, including economic, social, political, and military contexts. Contents include a survey of rectangular games; a method of approximating the value of a game; games in extensive form and those with infinite strategies; distribution functions; Stieltjes integrals; the fundamental theorem for continuous games; separable games; games with convex payoff functions; applications to statistical inference; and much more. Appropriate for adva
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium
Wang, Zhen; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaz
2015-01-01
Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies. We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations. The focus is on coupling th...
Evolutionary stability in continuous nonlinear public goods games.
Molina, Chai; Earn, David J D
2017-01-01
We investigate a type of public goods games played in groups of individuals who choose how much to contribute towards the production of a common good, at a cost to themselves. In these games, the common good is produced based on the sum of contributions from all group members, then equally distributed among them. In applications, the dependence of the common good on the total contribution is often nonlinear (e.g., exhibiting synergy or diminishing returns). To date, most theoretical and experimental studies have addressed scenarios in which the set of possible contributions is discrete. However, in many real-world situations, contributions are continuous (e.g., individuals volunteering their time). The "n-player snowdrift games" that we analyze involve continuously varying contributions. We establish under what conditions populations of contributing (or "cooperating") individuals can evolve and persist. Previous work on snowdrift games, using adaptive dynamics, has found that what we term an "equally cooperative" strategy is locally convergently and evolutionarily stable. Using static evolutionary game theory, we find conditions under which this strategy is actually globally evolutionarily stable. All these results refer to stability to invasion by a single mutant. We broaden the scope of existing stability results by showing that the equally cooperative strategy is locally stable to potentially large population perturbations, i.e., allowing for the possibility that mutants make up a non-negligible proportion of the population (due, for example, to genetic drift, environmental variability or dispersal).
Multiple explanations in Darwinian evolutionary theory.
Bock, Walter J
2010-03-01
Variational evolutionary theory as advocated by Darwin is not a single theory, but a bundle of related but independent theories, namely: (a) variational evolution; (b) gradualism rather than large leaps; (c) processes of phyletic evolution and of speciation; (d) causes for the formation of varying individuals in populations and for the action of selective agents; and (e) all organisms evolved from a common ancestor. The first four are nomological-deductive explanations and the fifth is historical-narrative. Therefore evolutionary theory must be divided into nomological and historical theories which are both testable against objective empirical observations. To be scientific, historical evolutionary theories must be based on well corroborated nomological theories, both evolutionary and functional. Nomological and general historical evolutionary theories are well tested and must be considered as strongly corroborated scientific theories. Opponents of evolutionary theory are concerned only with historical evolutionary theories, having little interest in nomological theory. Yet given a well corroborated nomological evolutionary theory, historical evolutionary theories follow automatically. If understood correctly, both forms of evolutionary theories stand on their own as corroborated scientific theories and should not be labeled as facts.
Game theory decisions, interaction and evolution
Webb, James N
2007-01-01
This introduction to game theory is written from a mathematical perspective. Its primary purpose is to be a first course for undergraduate students of mathematics, but it also contains material which will be of interest to advanced students or researchers in biology and economics. The outstanding feature of the book is that it provides a unified account of three types of decision problem: Situations involving a single decision-maker: in which a sequence of choices is to be made in "a game against nature". This introduces the basic ideas of optimality and decision processes. Classical game theory: in which the interactions of two or more decision-makers are considered. This leads to the concept of the Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary game theory: in which the changing structure of a population of interacting decision makers is considered. This leads to the ideas of evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics. An understanding of basic calculus and probability is assumed but no prior knowledge of gam...
Chen, Bor-Sen; Yeh, Chin-Hsun
2017-12-01
We review current static and dynamic evolutionary game strategies of biological networks and discuss the lack of random genetic variations and stochastic environmental disturbances in these models. To include these factors, a population of evolving biological networks is modeled as a nonlinear stochastic biological system with Poisson-driven genetic variations and random environmental fluctuations (stimuli). To gain insight into the evolutionary game theory of stochastic biological networks under natural selection, the phenotypic robustness and network evolvability of noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies are discussed from a stochastic Nash game perspective. The noncooperative strategy can be transformed into an equivalent multi-objective optimization problem and is shown to display significantly improved network robustness to tolerate genetic variations and buffer environmental disturbances, maintaining phenotypic traits for longer than the cooperative strategy. However, the noncooperative case requires greater effort and more compromises between partly conflicting players. Global linearization is used to simplify the problem of solving nonlinear stochastic evolutionary games. Finally, a simple stochastic evolutionary model of a metabolic pathway is simulated to illustrate the procedure of solving for two evolutionary game strategies and to confirm and compare their respective characteristics in the evolutionary process. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Trust Dynamics in WSNs: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Shigen Shen
2016-01-01
Full Text Available A sensor node (SN in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs can decide whether to collaborate with others based on a trust management system (TMS by making a trust decision. In this paper, we study the trust decision and its dynamics that play a key role to stabilize the whole network using evolutionary game theory. When SNs are making their decisions to select action Trust or Mistrust, a WSNs trust game is created to reflect their utilities. An incentive mechanism bound with one SN’s trust degree is incorporated into this trust game and effectively promotes SNs to select action Trust. The replicator dynamics of SNs’ trust evolution, illustrating the evolutionary process of SNs selecting their actions, are given. We then propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies can be attained under different parameter values, which supply theoretical foundations to devise a TMS for WSNs. Moreover, we can find out the conditions that will lead SNs to choose action Trust as their final behavior. In this manner, we can assure WSNs’ security and stability by introducing a trust mechanism to satisfy these conditions. Experimental results have confirmed the proposed theorems and the effects of the incentive mechanism.
Modeling evolutionary games in populations with demographic structure.
Li, Xiang-Yi; Giaimo, Stefano; Baudisch, Annette; Traulsen, Arne
2015-09-07
Classic life history models are often based on optimization algorithms, focusing on the adaptation of survival and reproduction to the environment, while neglecting frequency dependent interactions in the population. Evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, studies frequency dependent strategy interactions, but usually omits life history and the demographic structure of the population. Here we show how an integration of both aspects can substantially alter the underlying evolutionary dynamics. We study the replicator dynamics of strategy interactions in life stage structured populations. Individuals have two basic strategic behaviours, interacting in pairwise games. A player may condition behaviour on the life stage of its own, or that of the opponent, or the matching of life stages between both players. A strategy is thus defined as the set of rules that determines a player׳s life stage dependent behaviours. We show that the diversity of life stage structures and life stage dependent strategies can promote each other, and the stable frequency of basic strategic behaviours can deviate from game equilibrium in populations with life stage structures. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with heterogenous structures.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Wes Maciejewski
2014-04-01
Full Text Available Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections between individuals are more conducive to the spread of cooperative behaviours. In this article we show that such a conclusion largely depends on the individual-level interactions that take place. In particular, averaging payoffs garnered through game interactions rather than accumulating the payoffs can altogether remove the cooperative advantage of heterogeneous graphs while such a difference does not affect the outcome on homogeneous structures. In addition, the rate at which game interactions occur can alter the evolutionary outcome. Less interactions allow heterogeneous graphs to support more cooperation than homogeneous graphs, while higher rates of interactions make homogeneous and heterogeneous graphs virtually indistinguishable in their ability to support cooperation. Most importantly, we show that common measures of evolutionary advantage used in homogeneous populations, such as a comparison of the fixation probability of a rare mutant to that of the resident type, are no longer valid in heterogeneous populations. Heterogeneity causes a bias in where mutations occur in the population which affects the mutant's fixation probability. We derive the appropriate measures for heterogeneous populations that account for this bias.
CERN. Geneva
2014-01-01
This lecture series will present the main directions of Algorithmic Game Theory, a new field that has emerged in the last two decades at the interface of Game Theory and Computer Science, because of the unprecedented growth in size, complexity, and impact of the Internet and the Web. These include the price of anarchy (what is the impact of selfishness on a system of competing entities), computational complexity (can the market find a reasonable solution), mechanisms and auctions (what incentives to give to selfish individuals).
CERN. Geneva
2014-01-01
This lecture series will present the main directions of Algorithmic Game Theory, a new field that has emerged in the last two decades at the interface of Game Theory and Computer Science, because of the unprecedented growth in size, complexity, and impact of the Internet and the Web. These include the price of anarchy (what is the impact of selfishness on a system of competing entities), computational complexity (can the market find a reasonable solution), mechanisms and auctions (what incentives to give to selfish individuals).
Evolutionary Theories of Aging and Longevity
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Leonid A. Gavrilov
2002-01-01
Full Text Available The purpose of this article is to provide students and researchers entering the field of aging studies with an introduction to the evolutionary theories of aging, as well as to orient them in the abundant modern scientific literature on evolutionary gerontology. The following three major evolutionary theories of aging are discussed: 1 the theory of programmed death suggested by August Weismann, 2 the mutation accumulation theory of aging suggested by Peter Medawar, and 3 the antagonistic pleiotropy theory of aging suggested by George Williams. We also discuss a special case of the antagonistic pleiotropy theory, the disposable soma theory developed by Tom Kirkwood and Robin Holliday. The theories are compared with each other as well as with recent experimental findings. At present the most viable evolutionary theories are the mutation accumulation theory and the antagonistic pleiotropy theory; these theories are not mutually exclusive, and they both may become a part of a future unifying theory of aging.
Evolutionary Theories of Aging and Longevity
Gavrilov, Leonid A.; Gavrilova, Natalia S.
2002-01-01
The purpose of this article is to provide students and researchers entering the field of aging studies with an introduction to the evolutionary theories of aging, as well as to orient them in the abundant modern scientific literature on evolutionary gerontology. The following three major evolutionary theories of aging are discussed: 1) the theory of programmed death suggested by August Weismann, 2) the mutation accumulation theory of aging suggested by Peter Medawar, and 3) the antagonistic p...
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Jensen, Frank; Frost, Hans Staby; Thøgersen, Thomas Talund
2015-01-01
in 2010 and that the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands reached a bargaining solution in 2014 cannot be explained by simple cooperative game theory. However, actual behavior during the mackerel crisis can be explained by opportunity costs, including alternative fishing possibilities and regulations, rather...
Indian Academy of Sciences (India)
Home; Journals; Resonance – Journal of Science Education; Volume 3; Issue 7. Game Theory - Nash Equilibrium. P G Babu. General Article Volume 3 Issue 7 July 1998 pp 53- ... Author Affiliations. P G Babu1. Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research Gen. A K Vaidya Marg Goregaon(East) Mumbai 400 065, India.
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Co-opetition Relationship between Regional Logistics Nodes
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
D.Z. Wang
2014-04-01
Full Text Available The evolutionary game of co-opetition relationship between regional logistics nodes is studied in this paper. A replicator dynamic model is built to obtain the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS of the game. Then, according to the status and level of logistics nodes, the symmetric and asymmetric game models based on evolutionary game theory are proposed, respectively. The former is used to analyze the changing trends of co-opetition relationship between logistics nodes from a same layer of a logistics network. While the latter can be used to deal with the relationship forecasting problems between logistics nodes from different layers. The result of the case study reveals that the proposed models have good practicability and accuracy in dealing with the relationship forecasting problems within a regional logistics network.
Historical change and evolutionary theory.
Masters, Roger D
2007-09-01
Despite advances in fields like genetics, evolutionary psychology, and human behavior and evolution--which generally focus on individual or small group behavior from a biological perspective--evolutionary biology has made little impact on studies of political change and social history. Theories of natural selection often seem inapplicable to human history because our social behavior is embedded in language (which makes possible the concepts of time and social identity on which what we call "history" depends). Peter Corning's Holistic Darwinism reconceptualizes evolutionary biology, making it possible to go beyond the barriers separating the social and natural sciences. Corning focuses on two primary processes: "synergy" (complex multivariate interactions at multiple levels between a species and its environment) and "cybernetics" (the information systems permitting communication between individuals and groups over time). Combining this frame of reference with inclusive fitness theory, it is possible to answer the most important (and puzzling) question in human history: How did a species that lived for millennia in hunter-gatherer bands form centralized states governing large populations of non-kin (including multi-ethnic empires as well as modern nation-states)? The fragility and contemporary ethnic violence in Kenya and the Congo should suffice as evidence that these issues need to be taken seriously. To explain the rise and fall of states as well as changes in human laws and customs--the core of historical research--it is essential to show how the provision of collective goods can overcome the challenge of self-interest and free-riding in some instances, yet fail to do so in others. To this end, it is now possible to consider how a state providing public goods can--under circumstances that often include effective leadership--contribute to enhanced inclusive fitness of virtually all its members. Because social behavior needs to adapt to ecology, but ecological
Evolutionary theories of aging and longevity.
Gavrilov, Leonid A; Gavrilova, Natalia S
2002-02-07
The purpose of this article is to provide students and researchers entering the field of aging studies with an introduction to the evolutionary theories of aging, as well as to orient them in the abundant modern scientific literature on evolutionary gerontology. The following three major evolutionary theories of aging are discussed: 1) the theory of programmed death suggested by August Weismann, 2) the mutation accumulation theory of aging suggested by Peter Medawar, and 3) the antagonistic pleiotropy theory of aging suggested by George Williams. We also discuss a special case of the antagonistic pleiotropy theory, the disposable soma theory developed by Tom Kirkwood and Robin Holliday. The theories are compared with each other as well as with recent experimental findings. At present the most viable evolutionary theories are the mutation accumulation theory and the antagonistic pleiotropy theory; these theories are not mutually exclusive, and they both may become a part of a future unifying theory of aging. Evolutionary theories of aging are useful because they open new opportunities for further research by suggesting testable predictions, but they have also been harmful in the past when they were used to impose limitations on aging studies. At this time, the evolutionary theories of aging are not ultimate completed theories, but rather a set of ideas that themselves require further elaboration and validation. This theoretical review article is written for a wide readership.
Game theory a very short introduction
Binmore, Ken
2007-01-01
Games are played everywhere: from economics and online auctions to social interactions, and game theory is about how to play such games in a rational way, and how to maximize their outcomes. This VSI reveals, without mathematical equations, the insights the theory can bring to everything from how to play poker optimally to the sex ratio among bees. - ;Games are everywhere: Drivers manoeuvring in heavy traffic are playing a driving game. Bargain hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning game. A firm negotiating next year's wage is playing a bargaining game. The opposing candidates in an
Reducible and nonsensical uses of game theory
de Bruin, B.P.
The mathematical tools of game theory are frequently used in the social sciences and economic consultancy. But how do they explain social phenomena and support prescriptive judgments? And is the use of game theory really necessary? I analyze the logical form of explanatory and prescriptive game
Game Engagement Theory and Adult Learning
Whitton, Nicola
2011-01-01
One of the benefits of computer game-based learning is the ability of certain types of game to engage and motivate learners. However, theories of learning and engagement, particularly in the sphere of higher education, typically fail to consider gaming engagement theory. In this article, the author examines the principles of engagement from games…
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Rose, Caspar
2016-01-01
This article shows how game theory can be applied to model good faith mathematically using an example of a classic legal dispute related to rei vindicato. The issue is whether an owner has a legal right to his good if a person has bought it in good faith by using updated probabilities. The articl...... illustrates that a rule of where good faith is irrelevant Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer....
Theory of games and statistical decisions
Blackwell, David
1954-01-01
Evaluating statistical procedures through decision and game theory, as first proposed by Neyman and Pearson and extended by Wald, is the goal of this problem-oriented text in mathematical statistics. First-year graduate students in statistics and other students with a background in statistical theory and advanced calculus will find a rigorous, thorough presentation of statistical decision theory treated as a special case of game theory.The work of Borel, von Neumann, and Morgenstern in game theory, of prime importance to decision theory, is covered in its relevant aspects: reduction of games
Theory of games and statistical decisions
Blackwell, David A
1979-01-01
Evaluating statistical procedures through decision and game theory, as first proposed by Neyman and Pearson and extended by Wald, is the goal of this problem-oriented text in mathematical statistics. First-year graduate students in statistics and other students with a background in statistical theory and advanced calculus will find a rigorous, thorough presentation of statistical decision theory treated as a special case of game theory.The work of Borel, von Neumann, and Morgenstern in game theory, of prime importance to decision theory, is covered in its relevant aspects: reduction of games
Evolutionary theory in letters to the editor.
Silva, Eric Orion; Lowe, Clayton Cory
2015-05-01
This research note presents the results of a content analysis of 234 letters to the editors that discuss evolutionary theory and were published in American newspapers. We find that letters to the editor both support and hinder the cause of teaching evolutionary theory in American secondary schools. On the one hand, anti-evolutionary theory messages are marginalized in the letters section. This marginalization signals a low level of legitimacy for creationism. It might also contribute to the sense of tension that sustains creationist identities. On the other hand, relatively few letters explicitly note the fact that scientists or the scientific community accept evolution. Interestingly, the obscuration of the scientific community's support for evolutionary theory occurs both in letters supporting and opposing evolutionary theory. © The Author(s) 2014.
Analysis of Knowledge-Sharing Evolutionary Game in University Teacher Team
Huo, Mingkui
2013-01-01
The knowledge-sharing activity is a major drive force behind the progress and innovation of university teacher team. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article analyzes the knowledge-sharing process model of this team, studies the influencing mechanism of various factors such as knowledge aggregate gap, incentive coefficient and risk…
Four classes of interactions for evolutionary games.
Szabó, György; Bodó, Kinga S; Allen, Benjamin; Nowak, Martin A
2015-08-01
The symmetric four-strategy games are decomposed into a linear combination of 16 basis games represented by orthogonal matrices. Among these basis games four classes can be distinguished as it is already found for the three-strategy games. The games with self-dependent (cross-dependent) payoffs are characterized by matrices consisting of uniform rows (columns). Six of 16 basis games describe coordination-type interactions among the strategy pairs and three basis games span the parameter space of the cyclic components that are analogous to the rock-paper-scissors games. In the absence of cyclic components the game is a potential game and the potential matrix is evaluated. The main features of the four classes of games are discussed separately and we illustrate some characteristic strategy distributions on a square lattice in the low noise limit if logit rule controls the strategy evolution. Analysis of the general properties indicates similar types of interactions at larger number of strategies for the symmetric matrix games.
The Price Equation, Gradient Dynamics, and Continuous Trait Game Theory.
Lehtonen, Jussi
2018-01-01
A recent article convincingly nominated the Price equation as the fundamental theorem of evolution and used it as a foundation to derive several other theorems. A major section of evolutionary theory that was not addressed is that of game theory and gradient dynamics of continuous traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Deriving fundamental results in these fields under the unifying framework of the Price equation illuminates similarities and differences between approaches and allows a simple, unified view of game-theoretical and dynamic concepts. Using Taylor polynomials and the Price equation, I derive a dynamic measure of evolutionary change, a condition for singular points, the convergence stability criterion, and an alternative interpretation of evolutionary stability. Furthermore, by applying the Price equation to a multivariable Taylor polynomial, the direct fitness approach to kin selection emerges. Finally, I compare these results to the mean gradient equation of quantitative genetics and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics.
Explaining games the epistemic programme in game theory
de Bruin, Boudewijn
2010-01-01
The first monograph on the philosophy of game theory, this is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to assess the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy.
Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games
Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick
2012-01-01
By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures. PMID:22970237
Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games.
Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick
2012-01-01
By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, "games on graphs" study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner's dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner's dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures.
Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Jorge Peña
Full Text Available By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, "games on graphs" study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner's dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner's dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures.
Towards a mechanistic foundation of evolutionary theory.
Doebeli, Michael; Ispolatov, Yaroslav; Simon, Burt
2017-02-15
Most evolutionary thinking is based on the notion of fitness and related ideas such as fitness landscapes and evolutionary optima. Nevertheless, it is often unclear what fitness actually is, and its meaning often depends on the context. Here we argue that fitness should not be a basal ingredient in verbal or mathematical descriptions of evolution. Instead, we propose that evolutionary birth-death processes, in which individuals give birth and die at ever-changing rates, should be the basis of evolutionary theory, because such processes capture the fundamental events that generate evolutionary dynamics. In evolutionary birth-death processes, fitness is at best a derived quantity, and owing to the potential complexity of such processes, there is no guarantee that there is a simple scalar, such as fitness, that would describe long-term evolutionary outcomes. We discuss how evolutionary birth-death processes can provide useful perspectives on a number of central issues in evolution.
Evolutionary Snowdrift Game Incorporating Costly Punishment
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Yap Yee Jiun
2012-01-01
-watak, a, ß, dan nisbah faedah-kos r dalam SG, sistem tiga watak ini berkembang sama ada kepada keadaan mantap yang hanya terdiri daripada karekter C dan P atau hanya karekter C dan D dalam populasi gabungan sempurna. Situasi sebelumnya mempamerkan peningkatan dalam kerjasama berkaitan dengan SG, manakala yang sebelumnya mirip dengan SG. Dinamik dalam mendapatkan pelbagai keadaan mantap didapati adalah berbeza. Secara terperincinya, kunci utama dalam keadaan mantap dan dinamik diperolehi melalui simulasi yang diperolehi daripada satu set persamaan perbezaan. Kepekaan terhadap permulaan pembahagian watak dikaji dengan menggambarkan aliran dalam portrait fasa dan menganalisa sifat titik-titik tetap. Analisa juga menggambarkan fungsi karekter-P dalam menghalang suatu sistem daripada dicerobohi agen karekter-D. Bermula dengan satu populasi yang hanya terdiri daripada agen C & D, karekter-D bertujuan menyerang sistem yang tidak mampu bertahan apabila pecahan permulaan agen P melebihi r/ß. Model, didefinisikan sebagai algoritma simulasi, boleh secara amnya menggabungkan banyak aspek menarik, seperti di dalam populasi rangkaian.KEYWORDS: evolutionary; snowdrift game; well-mixed population
Wang, Yaqun
2017-03-01
The authors are to be congratulated for a thought-provoking article [1], which reviews the epigenetic game theory (epiGame) that utilizes differential equations to study the epigenetic control of embryo development. It is a novel application of evolutionary game theory and provides biology researchers with useful methodologies to address scientific questions related to biological coordination of competition and cooperation.
Evolutionary Game between Commensal and Pathogenic Microbes in Intestinal Microbiota
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Amy Wu
2016-09-01
Full Text Available The human intestinal microbiota plays a fundamental role in host health and is associated with many diseases when the homeostasis is disturbed. Although recent achievements in metagenomic sequencing have begun to reveal the variety of microbial composition associated with healthy and disease states, species-specific interactions and systematic dynamics still pose a great challenge to resolve the complexity of human microbiota. Using Clostridium difficile infection in human intestinal microbiota as an example, we apply evolutionary game theory to gain a fundamental understanding of the phenotypic variability and dynamic progression of microbiota. Here, microbiota dynamics are determined by the frequency-dependent fitness of each phenotypic population in the presence of the others. More specifically, the fitness is a function of phenotypic composition of the microbiota. We show how the phenotypic variability of microbiota can be explained by game theoretical approach. Knowledge of this study provides a new perspective in administrating antibiotic when dealing with pathogenic invasion. Instead of solely targeting to pathogens, therapies should aim at the whole ecosystem by reducing the fitness of pathogens compared to that of commensal microbes. In this case, the system will eradicate the pathogens by itself.
Game Theory in the Social Studies Classroom
Vesperman, Dean Patrick; Clark, Chris H.
2016-01-01
This article explores using game theory in social studies classrooms as a heuristic to aid students in understanding strategic decision making. The authors provide examples of several simple games teachers can use. Next, we address how to help students design their own simple (2 × 2) games.
A Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model of Modular Production Network
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Wei He
2016-01-01
Full Text Available As a new organization mode of production in the 21st century, modular production network is deemed extensively to be a source of competitiveness for lead firms in manufacturing industries. However, despite the abundant studies on the modular production network, there are very few studies from a dynamic perspective to discuss the conditions on which a modular production network develops. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the development of modular production network. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of member enterprises in a modular production network. Furthermore, by using NetLogo software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the effectiveness of the model. From the model, we can find that the final stable equilibrium strategy is related to such factors as the initial cost, the extra payoff, the cooperation willingness of both parties, the cooperation efforts, and the proportion each party can get from the extra payoff. To encourage the cooperation of production integrator and modular supplier, some suggestions are also provided.
Online game-enhanced teaching in game theory
Badeau-Mahmoud, Sonia; Deloche, Regis; Koscielniak, Thierry
2014-01-01
Introducing digital educational games into class lessons can generate engagement, interactivity, and motivation. It can also result in an active participation of the students in the classroom. To achieve this goal, one teaching strategy is to use online digital games in teaching and learning situations. In our case, we wanted to test this strategy in an economics course, especially in a Game Theory lesson. We set up an experiment in two different lessons: the “Economie expérimentale” (...
Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games
Östling, Robert; Wang, Joseph Tao-yi; Chou, Eileen; Camerer, Colin F.
2007-01-01
Game theory is usually difficult to test precisely in the field because predictions typically depend sensitively on features that are not controlled or observed. We conduct one such test using field data from the Swedish lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game. In the LUPI game, players pick positive integers and whoever chose the lowest unique number wins a fixed prize. Theoretical equilibrium predictions are derived assuming Poisson- distributed uncertainty about the numbe...
Game theory and environmental disputes
Lambert, Alan
1983-09-01
The courts have provided the traditional battleground for conflicts between environmental interest groups and those whose actions in some way have an adverse impact on the environment The judicial process is a time-consuming one in which all sides usually must concede to some points. Environmental disputes involve complex scientific issues which the court system is not set up to comprehend, so that the process gives the parties to a dispute the sense of having lost control of their own destinies. An increasing number of parties to environmental disputes are turning to negotiation, or mediation, as an alternative in which they can be active parties in the settlement-making process rather than the victims of a court-imposed solution When do the parties to a dispute choose a negotiated settlement over a court battle? To what extent does each party make the concessions necessary to reach an agreement? These questions can be answered by the game theory that provides a model for analyzing the negotiation process. This paper will apply game theory to two environmental conflict cases A series of questions pertinent to the analysis of all environmental disputes will be raised
Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King
National Research Council Canada - National Science Library
Chaitanya S. Gokhale; Arne Traulsen
2012-01-01
.... However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size.
Game theory as a conceptual framework for managing insect pests.
Brown, Joel S; Staňková, Kateřina
2017-06-01
For over 100 years it has been recognized that insect pests evolve resistance to chemical pesticides. More recently, managers have advocated restrained use of pesticides, crop rotation, the use of multiple pesticides, and pesticide-free sanctuaries as resistance management practices. Game theory provides a conceptual framework for combining the resistance strategies of the insects and the control strategies of the pest manager into a unified conceptual and modelling framework. Game theory can contrast an ecologically enlightened application of pesticides with an evolutionarily enlightened one. In the former case the manager only considers ecological consequences whereas the latter anticipates the evolutionary response of the pests. Broader applications of this game theory approach include anti-biotic resistance, fisheries management and therapy resistance in cancer. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Invisible hand effect in an evolutionary minority game model
Sysi-Aho, Marko; Saramäki, Jari; Kaski, Kimmo
2005-03-01
In this paper, we study the properties of a minority game with evolution realized by using genetic crossover to modify fixed-length decision-making strategies of agents. Although the agents in this evolutionary game act selfishly by trying to maximize their own performances only, it turns out that the whole society will eventually be rewarded optimally. This “invisible hand” effect is what Adam Smith over two centuries ago expected to take place in the context of free market mechanism. However, this behaviour of the society of agents is realized only under idealized conditions, where all agents are utilizing the same efficient evolutionary mechanism. If on the other hand part of the agents are adaptive, but not evolutionary, the system does not reach optimum performance, which is also the case if part of the evolutionary agents form a uniformly acting “cartel”.
Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Mohamed S. Abdalzaher
2016-06-01
Full Text Available We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs.
Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey.
Abdalzaher, Mohamed S; Seddik, Karim; Elsabrouty, Maha; Muta, Osamu; Furukawa, Hiroshi; Abdel-Rahman, Adel
2016-06-29
We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs) from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs.
Game Theory Meets Wireless Sensor Networks Security Requirements and Threats Mitigation: A Survey
Abdalzaher, Mohamed S.; Seddik, Karim; Elsabrouty, Maha; Muta, Osamu; Furukawa, Hiroshi; Abdel-Rahman, Adel
2016-01-01
We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs) from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and disseminated nature of WSNs, malicious attacks can be modeled effectively using game theory. In this study, we survey the different game-theoretic defense strategies for WSNs. We present a taxonomy of the game theory approaches based on the nature of the attack, whether it is caused by an external attacker or it is the result of an internal node acting selfishly or maliciously. We also present a general trust model using game theory for decision making. We, finally, identify the significant role of evolutionary games for WSNs security against intelligent attacks; then, we list several prospect applications of game theory to enhance the data trustworthiness and node cooperation in different WSNs. PMID:27367700
Evolutionary Theories in Environmental and Resource Economics: Approaches and Applications
van den Bergh, J.C.J.M.; Gowdy, J.M.
2000-01-01
Recent advances in evolutionary theory have important implications for environmental economics. A short overview is offered of evolutionary thinking in economics. Subsequently, major concepts and approaches in evolutionary biology and evolutionary economics are presented and compared. Attention is
Evolutionary theory and the naturalist fallacy
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Grodal, Torben Kragh
2008-01-01
The article is an invited response to a target article by Joseph Carroll entitled "An evolutionary paradigm for literary study". It argues that the target article misuse the fact that works of art are based on adaptations that were fitness-enhancing in the era of evolutionary adaptations to claim...... that great work of art are also automatically fitness-enhancing in the present day environment, at that there are simple correllations between whether a work of art has a high aesthetic value and whether it is fitness-enhancing or not. Keywords : Evolutionary aesthetics, film theory, literary theory...
Russian contributions to game theory and equilibrium theory
Driessen, Theo S H; Van der Laan, G; Vasilev, V V
2006-01-01
The research of Soviet scientists within the field of game theory, starting around 1965 under the supervision of N. N. Vorob'ev, one of the leading experts in the field, has resulted in many high-level publications. The purpose of this book is to report about the highly qualified research by Russian game theorists during the two decades 1968 - 1988 to the international readership. The book contains a collection of contributions in game theory and the related field of equilibrium theory which never had been published in English before. A short historical survey about the development of game theory in the USSR before 1990 is given in the introduction.
Cognitive Hierarchy Theory and Two-Person Games
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Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
2017-01-01
Full Text Available The outcome of many social and economic interactions, such as stock-market transactions, is strongly determined by the predictions that agents make about the behavior of other individuals. Cognitive hierarchy theory provides a framework to model the consequences of forecasting accuracy that has proven to fit data from certain types of game theory experiments, such as Keynesian beauty contests and entry games. Here, we focus on symmetric two-player-two-action games and establish an algorithm to find the players’ strategies according to the cognitive hierarchy approach. We show that the snowdrift game exhibits a pattern of behavior whose complexity grows as the cognitive levels of players increases. In addition to finding the solutions up to the third cognitive level, we demonstrate, in this theoretical frame, two new properties of snowdrift games: (i any snowdrift game can be characterized by only a parameter, its class; (ii they are anti-symmetric with respect to the diagonal of the pay-off’s space. Finally, we propose a model based on an evolutionary dynamics that captures the main features of the cognitive hierarchy theory.
Near-Minimal Node Control of Networked Evolutionary Games
Riehl, James Robert; Cao, Ming
2014-01-01
We investigate a problem related to the controllability of networked evolutionary games, first presenting an algorithm that computes a near-minimal set of nodes to drive all nodes in a tree network to a desired strategy, and then briefly discussing an algorithm that works for arbitrary networks
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Chalkiadakis, Georgios; Wooldridge, Michael
2011-01-01
Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representation
Rapoport, Anatol
1999-01-01
Clear, accessible treatment of mathematical models for resolving conflicts in politics, economics, war, business, and social relationships. Topics include strategy, game tree and game matrix, and much more. Minimal math background required. 1970 edition.
Mathematical Methods of Game and Economic Theory
Aubin, J-P
1982-01-01
This book presents a unified treatment of optimization theory, game theory and a general equilibrium theory in economics in the framework of nonlinear functional analysis. It not only provides powerful and versatile tools for solving specific problems in economics and the social sciences but also serves as a unifying theme in the mathematical theory of these subjects as well as in pure mathematics itself.
Game Theory and Social Psychology: Conformity Games
Alessio, Danielle; Kilgour, D. Marc
2011-11-01
Game models can contribute to understanding of how social biases and pressures to conform can lead to puzzling behaviour in social groups. A model of the psychological biases false uniqueness and false consensus is set out. The model predicts the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, which is well-studied in social psychology, showing how it arises as a result of the prevalence of false uniqueness and the desire to conform. An efficient method is developed for finding Nash equilibria of the model under certain restrictions.
Testability of evolutionary game dynamics based on experimental economics data
Wang, Yijia; Chen, Xiaojie; Wang, Zhijian
2017-11-01
Understanding the dynamic processes of a real game system requires an appropriate dynamics model, and rigorously testing a dynamics model is nontrivial. In our methodological research, we develop an approach to testing the validity of game dynamics models that considers the dynamic patterns of angular momentum and speed as measurement variables. Using Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) games as an example, we illustrate the geometric patterns in the experiment data. We then derive the related theoretical patterns from a series of typical dynamics models. By testing the goodness-of-fit between the experimental and theoretical patterns, we show that the validity of these models can be evaluated quantitatively. Our approach establishes a link between dynamics models and experimental systems, which is, to the best of our knowledge, the most effective and rigorous strategy for ascertaining the testability of evolutionary game dynamics models.
The Evolutionary Theory of Depression.
Gałecki, Piotr; Talarowska, Monika
2017-05-13
The evolutionary success of Homo sapiens is attributed to the following two factors: the upright body posture (which freed our hands and allowed unconstrained operation of various objects) and intensive development of the frontal lobes, mainly the Broca area of the brain. Underlining the uniqueness of the human brain, we often forget about the fact that the frontal lobes - the most developed part of the brain - are at the same time our greatest weakness, exposed to the action of damaging factors in our evolving environment. Is depression the cost of evolution?
Applying evolutionary psychology to a serious game about children's interpersonal conflict.
Ingram, Gordon P D; Campos, Joana; Hondrou, Charline; Vasalou, Asimina; Martinho, Carlos; Joinson, Adam
2012-12-20
This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9-12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK) aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.
Applying Evolutionary Psychology to a Serious Game about Children's Interpersonal Conflict
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Gordon P. D. Ingram
2012-12-01
Full Text Available This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9–12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.
Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders.
Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan
2015-01-01
Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.
Game Theory Paradigm: A New Tool for Investigating Social Dysfunction in Major Depressive Disorders
Wang, Yun; Yang, Liu-Qing; Li, Shu; Zhou, Yuan
2015-01-01
Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modeling offers a new tool for investigating social-interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD. PMID:26441689
Game theory paradigm: a new tool for investigating social dysfunction in major depressive disorders
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Yun eWang
2015-09-01
Full Text Available Social dysfunction is a prominent source of distress and disability in patients with major depressive disorder (MDD but is commonly omitted from current clinical studies, although some researchers propose an evolutionary strategy to understand these negative outcomes. Limited knowledge about the neural basis of social dysfunction in MDD results from traditional paradigms, which lack insights into social interactions. Game theoretical modelling offers a new tool for investigating social interaction impairments in neuropsychiatric disorders. This review first introduces three widely-used games from game theory and the major behavioral and neuroimaging findings obtained using these games in healthy populations. We also address the factors that modulate behaviors in games and their neural bases. We then summarize the current findings obtained by using these games in depressed patients and discuss the clinical implications of these abnormal game behaviors. Finally, we briefly discuss future prospects that may further elucidate the clinical use of a game theory paradigm in MDD.
Evolutionary swarm neural network game engine for Capture Go.
Cai, Xindi; Venayagamoorthy, Ganesh K; Wunsch, Donald C
2010-03-01
Evaluation of the current board position is critical in computer game engines. In sufficiently complex games, such a task is too difficult for a traditional brute force search to accomplish, even when combined with expert knowledge bases. This motivates the investigation of alternatives. This paper investigates the combination of neural networks, particle swarm optimization (PSO), and evolutionary algorithms (EAs) to train a board evaluator from zero knowledge. By enhancing the survivors of an EA with PSO, the hybrid algorithm successfully trains the high-dimensional neural networks to provide an evaluation of the game board through self-play. Experimental results, on the benchmark game of Capture Go, demonstrate that the hybrid algorithm can be more powerful than its individual parts, with the system playing against EA and PSO trained game engines. Also, the winning results of tournaments against a Hill-Climbing trained game engine confirm that the improvement comes from the hybrid algorithm itself. The hybrid game engine is also demonstrated against a hand-coded defensive player and a web player. Copyright 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Traffic Games: Modeling Freeway Traffic with Game Theory.
Cortés-Berrueco, Luis E; Gershenson, Carlos; Stephens, Christopher R
2016-01-01
We apply game theory to a vehicular traffic model to study the effect of driver strategies on traffic flow. The resulting model inherits the realistic dynamics achieved by a two-lane traffic model and aims to incorporate phenomena caused by driver-driver interactions. To achieve this goal, a game-theoretic description of driver interaction was developed. This game-theoretic formalization allows one to model different lane-changing behaviors and to keep track of mobility performance. We simulate the evolution of cooperation, traffic flow, and mobility performance for different modeled behaviors. The analysis of these results indicates a mobility optimization process achieved by drivers' interactions.
Zhang, Yuan-Ming; Zhang, Yinghao; Guo, Mingyue
2017-03-01
Wang's et al. article [1] is the first to integrate game theory (especially evolutionary game theory) with epigenetic modification of zygotic genomes. They described and assessed a modeling framework based on evolutionary game theory to quantify, how sperms and oocytes interact through epigenetic processes, to determine embryo development. They also studied the internal mechanisms for normal embryo development: 1) evolutionary interactions between DNA methylation of the paternal and maternal genomes, and 2) the application of game theory to formulate and quantify how different genes compete or cooperate to regulate embryogenesis through methylation. Although it is not very comprehensive and profound regarding game theory modeling, this article bridges the gap between evolutionary game theory and the epigenetic control of embryo development by powerful ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The epiGame framework includes four aspects: 1) characterizing how epigenetic game theory works by the strategy matrix, in which the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis, are described by the cooperation and competition mechanisms, 2) quantifying the game that the direction and degree of P-M interactions over embryo development can be explained by the sign and magnitude of interaction parameters in model (2), 3) modeling epigenetic interactions within the morula, especially for two coupled nonlinear ODEs, with explicit functions in model (4), which provide a good fit to the observed data for the two sexes (adjusted R2 = 0.956), and 4) revealing multifactorial interactions in embryogenesis from the coupled ODEs in model (2) to triplet ODEs in model (6). Clearly, this article extends game theory from evolutionary game theory to epigenetic game theory.
Theory Of Games And Research Company'S Nature
Mimo Draskovic
2005-01-01
Company is complicate economic category and particular institute of contemporary economic system. In western economic science has been formulated different views on the nature of company. Theory of games has been arise in as alternative theoretical concept in evolution of research company's nature. There has been wide time interval between first (Cournot 1838) and next pioneer's attempt (Bertrand 1883, Edgeworth 1925) in appliance theory of games in analyse of economic problems. All those att...
Extinction dynamics from metastable coexistences in an evolutionary game
Park, Hye Jin; Traulsen, Arne
2017-10-01
Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics can lead to stable coexistences of different types. Stochasticity, however, drives the loss of such coexistences. This extinction is usually accompanied by population size fluctuations. We investigate the most probable extinction trajectory under such fluctuations by mapping a stochastic evolutionary model to a problem of classical mechanics using the Wentzel-Kramers-Brillouin (WKB) approximation. Our results show that more abundant types in a coexistence may be more likely to go extinct first, in good agreement with previous results. The distance between the coexistence and extinction points is not a good predictor of extinction either. Instead, the WKB method correctly predicts the type going extinct first.
Endosymbiosis and its implications for evolutionary theory
O’Malley, Maureen A.
2015-01-01
Historically, conceptualizations of symbiosis and endosymbiosis have been pitted against Darwinian or neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. In more recent times, Lynn Margulis has argued vigorously along these lines. However, there are only shallow grounds for finding Darwinian concepts or population genetic theory incompatible with endosymbiosis. But is population genetics sufficiently explanatory of endosymbiosis and its role in evolution? Population genetics “follows” genes, is replication-ce...
Using Human Evolution to Teach Evolutionary Theory
Besterman, Hugo; La Velle, Linda Baggott
2007-01-01
This paper discusses some traditional approaches to the teaching of evolutionary theory at pre-university level, criticising in particular some of the more commonly used models and exemplars. Curricular demands are described and an alternative approach is suggested, using the emerging story of human evolution. Recent discoveries help to illustrate…
Self-organization of nodes in mobile ad hoc networks using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Janusz Kusyk
2011-07-01
Full Text Available In this paper, we present a distributed and scalable evolutionary game played by autonomous mobile ad hoc network (MANET nodes to place themselves uniformly over a dynamically changing environment without a centralized controller. A node spreading evolutionary game, called NSEG, runs at each mobile node, autonomously makes movement decisions based on localized data while the movement probabilities of possible next locations are assigned by a forced-based genetic algorithm (FGA. Because FGA takes only into account the current position of the neighboring nodes, our NSEG, combining FGA with game theory, can find better locations. In NSEG, autonomous node movement decisions are based on the outcome of the locally run FGA and the spatial game set up among it and the nodes in its neighborhood. NSEG is a good candidate for the node spreading class of applications used in both military tasks and commercial applications. We present a formal analysis of our NSEG to prove that an evolutionary stable state is its convergence point. Simulation experiments demonstrate that NSEG performs well with respect to network area coverage, uniform distribution of mobile nodes, and convergence speed.
Toward a general evolutionary theory of oncogenesis.
Ewald, Paul W; Swain Ewald, Holly A
2013-01-01
We propose an evolutionary framework, the barrier theory of cancer, which is based on the distinction between barriers to oncogenesis and restraints. Barriers are defined as mechanisms that prevent oncogenesis. Restraints, which are more numerous, inhibit but do not prevent oncogenesis. Processes that compromise barriers are essential causes of cancer; those that interfere with restraints are exacerbating causes. The barrier theory is built upon the three evolutionary processes involved in oncogenesis: natural selection acting on multicellular organisms to mold barriers and restraints, natural selection acting on infectious organisms to abrogate these protective mechanisms, and oncogenic selection which is responsible for the evolution of normal cells into cancerous cells. The barrier theory is presented as a first step toward the development of a general evolutionary theory of cancer. Its attributes and implications for intervention are compared with those of other major conceptual frameworks for understanding cancer: the clonal diversification model, the stem cell theory and the hallmarks of cancer. The barrier theory emphasizes the practical value of distinguishing between essential and exacerbating causes. It also stresses the importance of determining the scope of infectious causation of cancer, because individual pathogens can be responsible for multiple essential causes in infected cells.
Spatial Evolutionary Games of Interaction among Generic Cancer Cells
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Bach, Lars Arve; Sumpter, David J.T.; Alsner, Jan
2003-01-01
Evolutionary game models of cellular interactions have shown that heterogeneity in the cellular genotypic composition is maintained through evolution to stable coexistence of growth-promoting and non-promoting cell types. We generalise these mean-field models and relax the assumption of perfect m...... at a cellular level. This study thus points a new direction towards more plausible spatial tumour modelling and the understanding of cancerous growth....
Changes of behavior tendency in the evolutionary minority game
Zhang, Yu-Xia; Liang, Wen-Yao; Liu, Xue-Mei
2014-11-01
It is by now well established that the agents change from extreme behavior to confusion when the situation changed from easy time to depression in the evolutionary minority game. However in this letter we explore the dynamics of evolving population with negative values of the reward, and demonstrate that the one-time phase change is a little part. In particular, we show the changes of behavior tendency and reveal the underlying dynamics of the changes.
Eco-Evolutionary Theory and Insect Outbreaks.
Páez, David J; Dukic, Vanja; Dushoff, Jonathan; Fleming-Davies, Arietta; Dwyer, Greg
2017-06-01
Eco-evolutionary theory argues that population cycles in consumer-resource interactions are partly driven by natural selection, such that changes in densities and changes in trait values are mutually reinforcing. Evidence that the theory explains cycles in nature, however, is almost nonexistent. Experimental tests of model assumptions are logistically impractical for most organisms, while for others, evidence that population cycles occur in nature is lacking. For insect baculoviruses in contrast, tests of model assumptions are straightforward, and there is strong evidence that baculoviruses help drive population cycles in many insects, including the gypsy moth that we study here. We therefore used field experiments with the gypsy moth baculovirus to test two key assumptions of eco-evolutionary models of host-pathogen population cycles: that reduced host infection risk is heritable and that it is costly. Our experiments confirm both assumptions, and inserting parameters estimated from our data into eco-evolutionary insect-outbreak models gives cycles closely resembling gypsy moth outbreak cycles in North America, whereas standard models predict unrealistic stable equilibria. Our work shows that eco-evolutionary models are useful for explaining outbreaks of forest insect defoliators, while widespread observations of intense selection on defoliators in nature and of heritable and costly resistance in defoliators in the lab together suggest that eco-evolutionary dynamics may play a general role in defoliator outbreaks.
Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Mokshay Madiman
2008-05-01
Full Text Available Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such as distributed estimation problems for sensor networks. Cooperative game theory allows one to understand aspects of all these problems from a fresh and unifying perspective that treats users as players in a game, sometimes leading to new insights. At the heart of these analyses are fundamental dualities that have been long studied in the context of cooperative games; for information theoretic purposes, these are dualities between information inequalities on the one hand and properties of rate, capacity, or other resource allocation regions on the other.
Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Madiman Mokshay
2008-01-01
Full Text Available Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such as distributed estimation problems for sensor networks. Cooperative game theory allows one to understand aspects of all these problems from a fresh and unifying perspective that treats users as players in a game, sometimes leading to new insights. At the heart of these analyses are fundamental dualities that have been long studied in the context of cooperative games; for information theoretic purposes, these are dualities between information inequalities on the one hand and properties of rate, capacity, or other resource allocation regions on the other.
Gaming mindsets: implicit theories in serious game learning.
Lee, Yu-Hao; Heeter, Carrie; Magerko, Brian; Medler, Ben
2012-04-01
Individuals' beliefs about the malleability of their abilities may predict their response and outcome in learning from serious games. Individuals with growth mindsets believe their abilities can develop with practice and effort, whereas individuals with fixed mindsets believe their abilities are static and cannot improve. This study uses survey and gameplay server data to examine the implicit theory of intelligence in the context of serious game learning. The findings show that growth mindset players performed better than fixed mindset players, their mistakes did not affect their attention to the game, and they read more learning feedback than fixed mindset players. In addition, growth mindset players were more likely to actively seek difficult challenges, which is often essential to self-directed learning. General mindset measurements and domain-specific measurements were also compared. These findings suggest that players' psychological attributes should be considered when designing and applying serious games.
Promotion of cooperation in evolutionary game dynamics with local information.
Liu, Xuesong; Pan, Qiuhui; He, Mingfeng
2018-01-21
In this paper, we propose a strategy-updating rule driven by local information, which is called Local process. Unlike the standard Moran process, the Local process does not require global information about the strategic environment. By analyzing the dynamical behavior of the system, we explore how the local information influences the fixation of cooperation in two-player evolutionary games. Under weak selection, the decreasing local information leads to an increase of the fixation probability when natural selection does not favor cooperation replacing defection. In the limit of sufficiently large selection, the analytical results indicate that the fixation probability increases with the decrease of the local information, irrespective of the evolutionary games. Furthermore, for the dominance of defection games under weak selection and for coexistence games, the decreasing of local information will lead to a speedup of a single cooperator taking over the population. Overall, to some extent, the local information is conducive to promoting the cooperation. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Xing, Yuanzhi; Deng, Xiaoyi
2017-11-01
The paper first has defined the concepts of green supply chain management and evolution game theory, and pointed out the characteristics of green supply chain management in construction. The main participants and key links of the construction green supply chain management are determined by constructing the organization framework. This paper established the evolutionary game model between construction enterprises and recycling enterprises for the green supply chain closed-loop structure. The waste recycling evolutionary stability equilibrium solution is obtained to explore the principle and effective scope of government policy intervention. This paper put forward the relevant countermeasures to the green supply chain management in construction recycling stage from the government point of view. The conclusion has reference value and guidance to the final product construction enterprises, recycling enterprises and the government during green supply chain.
Human nature, cultural diversity and evolutionary theory.
Plotkin, Henry
2011-02-12
Incorporating culture into an expanded theory of evolution will provide the foundation for a universal account of human diversity. Two requirements must be met. The first is to see learning as an extension of the processes of evolution. The second is to understand that there are specific components of human culture, viz. higher order knowledge structures and social constructions, which give rise to culture as invented knowledge. These components, which are products of psychological processes and mechanisms, make human culture different from the forms of shared knowledge observed in other species. One serious difficulty for such an expanded theory is that social constructions may not add to the fitness of all humans exposed to them. This may be because human culture has existed for only a relatively short time in evolutionary terms. Or it may be that, as some maintain, adaptation is a limited, even a flawed, aspect of evolutionary theory.
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation
Szabó, György; Hauert, Christoph
2002-12-01
Voluntary participation in public good games has recently been demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to avoid deadlocks in states of mutual defection and to promote persistent cooperative behavior. Apart from cooperators and defectors a third strategical type is considered: the risk averse loners who are unwilling to participate in the social enterprise and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type of cyclic dominance of the three strategies. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the effects of voluntary participation crucially depend on the underlying population structure. While leading to homogeneous states of all loners in well-mixed populations, we demonstrate that cyclic dominance produces self-organizing patterns on square lattices but leads to different types of oscillatory behavior on random regular graphs: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic, or increasing oscillations occur. These Monte Carlo simulations are complemented by predictions from pair approximation reproducing the results for random regular graphs particularly well.
Dynamic games theory and applications
Haurie, Alain
2005-01-01
Dynamic games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in modeling competitive and conflict situations to study the behavior of players (decision-makers) and to predict the outcome of such situations in many areas including engineering, economics, management science, military, biology, and political science. This collection of articles by established researchers is an excellent reference covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in both cooperative and non-cooperative games.
Hauke Brunkhorst: Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary Perspectives
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Kjær, Poul F.
2015-01-01
Book review of: Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions. Evolutionary Perspective / by Hauke Brunkhorst (London: Bloomsbury, 2014, 471 pp.)......Book review of: Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions. Evolutionary Perspective / by Hauke Brunkhorst (London: Bloomsbury, 2014, 471 pp.)...
Ding, Fei; Liu, Yun; Li, Yong
In this paper, a new model of opinion formation within the framework of evolutionary game theory is presented. The model simulates strategic situations when people are in opinion discussion. Heterogeneous agents adjust their behaviors to the environment during discussions, and their interacting strategies evolve together with opinions. In the proposed game, we take into account payoff discount to join a discussion, and the situation that people might drop out of an unpromising game. Analytical and emulational results show that evolution of opinion and strategy always tend to converge, with utility threshold, memory length, and decision uncertainty parameters influencing the convergence time. The model displays different dynamical regimes when we set differently the rule when people are at a loss in strategy.
European Conference on Game Theory & Networking Games and Management
Mazalov, Vladimir
2016-01-01
This contributed volume contains fourteen papers based on selected presentations from the European Conference on Game Theory SING11-GTM 2015, held at Saint Petersburg State University in July 2015, and the Networking Games and Management workshop, held at the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Petrozvavodsk, Russia, also in July 2015. These papers cover a wide range of topics in game theory, including recent advances in areas with high potential for future work, as well as new developments on classical results. Some of these include A new approach to journal ranking using methods from social choice theory; A differential game of a duopoly in which two firms are competing for market share in an industry with network externalities; The impact of information propagation in the model of tax audits; A voting model in which the results of previous votes can affect the process of coalition formation in a decision-making body; The Selten-Szidarovsky technique for the analysis of Nash equil...
Endosymbiosis and its implications for evolutionary theory
O’Malley, Maureen A.
2015-01-01
Historically, conceptualizations of symbiosis and endosymbiosis have been pitted against Darwinian or neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. In more recent times, Lynn Margulis has argued vigorously along these lines. However, there are only shallow grounds for finding Darwinian concepts or population genetic theory incompatible with endosymbiosis. But is population genetics sufficiently explanatory of endosymbiosis and its role in evolution? Population genetics “follows” genes, is replication-centric, and is concerned with vertically consistent genetic lineages. It may also have explanatory limitations with regard to macroevolution. Even so, asking whether population genetics explains endosymbiosis may have the question the wrong way around. We should instead be asking how explanatory of evolution endosymbiosis is, and exactly which features of evolution it might be explaining. This paper will discuss how metabolic innovations associated with endosymbioses can drive evolution and thus provide an explanatory account of important episodes in the history of life. Metabolic explanations are both proximate and ultimate, in the same way genetic explanations are. Endosymbioses, therefore, point evolutionary biology toward an important dimension of evolutionary explanation. PMID:25883268
Endosymbiosis and its implications for evolutionary theory.
O'Malley, Maureen A
2015-08-18
Historically, conceptualizations of symbiosis and endosymbiosis have been pitted against Darwinian or neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. In more recent times, Lynn Margulis has argued vigorously along these lines. However, there are only shallow grounds for finding Darwinian concepts or population genetic theory incompatible with endosymbiosis. But is population genetics sufficiently explanatory of endosymbiosis and its role in evolution? Population genetics "follows" genes, is replication-centric, and is concerned with vertically consistent genetic lineages. It may also have explanatory limitations with regard to macroevolution. Even so, asking whether population genetics explains endosymbiosis may have the question the wrong way around. We should instead be asking how explanatory of evolution endosymbiosis is, and exactly which features of evolution it might be explaining. This paper will discuss how metabolic innovations associated with endosymbioses can drive evolution and thus provide an explanatory account of important episodes in the history of life. Metabolic explanations are both proximate and ultimate, in the same way genetic explanations are. Endosymbioses, therefore, point evolutionary biology toward an important dimension of evolutionary explanation.
Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory
Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.; Roorda, Berend
2008-01-01
We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global ray-projection
Game theory and strategy in medical training.
Blake, Amy; Carroll, Bryan T
2016-11-01
This paper analyses how game theory can provide a framework for understanding the strategic decision-making that occurs in everyday scenarios in medical training and practice, and ultimately serves as a tool for improving the work environment and patient care. Game theory has been applied to a variety of fields outside of its native economics, but has not been thoroughly studied in the context of health care provision. The paper discusses four of the most common 'games' and applies each to a scenario in medicine to provide new insight on the incentives and drivers for certain types of behaviour and a deeper understanding of why certain results are valued more strongly than others. Using game theory as an integrative tool, in conjunction with good judgement and a sound knowledge base, trainees and physicians can work to better recognise where competing priorities exist, understand the motivations and interactions of the various players, and learn to adjust their approaches in order to 'change the game' when their preferred outcome is not the most likely one. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and The Association for the Study of Medical Education.
Reputation, Game Theory and Entrepreneurial Sustainability
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Juan Pineiro-Chousa
2016-11-01
Full Text Available Abstract: This manuscript provides a novel approach to reputational management as a driver of entrepreneurial sustainability, using game theory to integrate three dimensions of reputation. First, if the entrepreneur perceives reputation as a risk source, the analysis is framed as a prisoner’s dilemma schema that is solved by protecting against reputational threats from entrepreneurial sustainability. Second, if the entrepreneur perceives reputation as a competitive advantage, the analysis is framed as an innovator’s dilemma that is solved by getting reputational opportunities from entrepreneurial sustainability. Third, if reputation is perceived as a strategic asset, the analysis is framed as a coordination game schema that results in the development of a reputational intelligence skill that has the potential to become crucial for success in entrepreneurial sustainability. Consequently, this manuscript provides an original multidisciplinary analysis of reputational management by relating well-known theoretical results from game theory to organizational realities.
Forthcoming Issue on Game Theory and Political Economy
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
William D. Ferguson
2013-09-01
Full Text Available Game theory offers a rigorous set of concepts, relationships, and models that invite myriad applications to problems of political economy. Indeed, game theory can serve as a fundamental modeling technique that can bridge microfoundations of political and economic exchanges, with developmental processes and macro implications related to growth and distribution. Applications can range from localized interactions within workplaces, firms, political organizations, and community groups; to intermediate-level market, industry, community, or inter-organizational transactions; to encompassing national, regional, population, or global interactions. At any of these levels, game models can illustrate strategic responses of economic or political actors (individuals or organizations to specifiable conditions concerning any or all of the following: prevailing social context—notably informal institutions (such as social norms and formal institutions (such as mutually understood laws and regulations; available information (complete or not; accessible or strategically manipulated; agents’ motivations (material and/or social; and even levels of rationality—substantive (full cognition or bounded (limited cognition. Applicable models may operate on the basis of given institutional context and preference orientations or may explore associated developmental processes, including adaptive social learning. Of particular interest are representations of one or more of the myriad social dilemmas (or collective-action problems that inhabit political economy, associated exercises or distributions of power, and/or representations of potential resolutions to such dilemmas—perhaps with policy implications. Accordingly, this forthcoming issue of Economies seeks game-theoretic models based on classical, evolutionary, behavioral, or epistemic game theory that can be applied to one or more problems in political economy.
Game Theory-Conventions and Knowledge
Indian Academy of Sciences (India)
Home; Journals; Resonance – Journal of Science Education; Volume 3; Issue 8. Game Theory - Conventions and Knowledge. P G Babu. General Article Volume 3 Issue 8 ... Author Affiliations. P G Babu1. Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research Gen. A K Vaidya Marg Goregaon(East) Mumbai 400 065, India.
Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King
Gokhale, Chaitanya S.; Traulsen, Arne
2012-01-01
Coevolution of two species is typically thought to favour the evolution of faster evolutionary rates helping a species keep ahead in the Red Queen race, where ‘it takes all the running you can do to stay where you are’. In contrast, if species are in a mutualistic relationship, it was proposed that the Red King effect may act, where it can be beneficial to evolve slower than the mutualistic species. The Red King hypothesis proposes that the species which evolves slower can gain a larger share of the benefits. However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size. PMID:22977149
Mutualism and evolutionary multiplayer games: revisiting the Red King.
Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Traulsen, Arne
2012-11-22
Coevolution of two species is typically thought to favour the evolution of faster evolutionary rates helping a species keep ahead in the Red Queen race, where 'it takes all the running you can do to stay where you are'. In contrast, if species are in a mutualistic relationship, it was proposed that the Red King effect may act, where it can be beneficial to evolve slower than the mutualistic species. The Red King hypothesis proposes that the species which evolves slower can gain a larger share of the benefits. However, the interactions between the two species may involve multiple individuals. To analyse such a situation, we resort to evolutionary multiplayer games. Even in situations where evolving slower is beneficial in a two-player setting, faster evolution may be favoured in a multiplayer setting. The underlying features of multiplayer games can be crucial for the distribution of benefits. They also suggest a link between the evolution of the rate of evolution and group size.
Information theory, evolutionary innovations and evolvability.
Wagner, Andreas
2017-12-05
How difficult is it to 'discover' an evolutionary adaptation or innovation? I here suggest that information theory, in combination with high-throughput DNA sequencing, can help answer this question by quantifying a new phenotype's information content. I apply this framework to compute the phenotypic information associated with novel gene regulation and with the ability to use novel carbon sources. The framework can also help quantify how DNA duplications affect evolvability, estimate the complexity of phenotypes and clarify the meaning of 'progress' in Darwinian evolution.This article is part of the themed issue 'Process and pattern in innovations from cells to societies'. © 2017 The Author(s).
Are ecological and evolutionary theories scientific?
Murray, B G
2001-05-01
Scientists observe nature, search for generalizations, and provide explanations for why the world is as it is. Generalizations are of two kinds. The first are descriptive and inductive, such as Boyle's Law. They are derived from observations and therefore refer to observables (in this case, pressure and volume). The second are often imaginative and form the axioms of a deductive theory, such as Newton's Laws of Motion. They often refer to unobservables (e.g. inertia and gravitation). Biology has many inductive generalizations (e.g. Bergmann's Rule and 'all cells arise from preexisting cells') but few, if any, recognized universal laws and virtually no deductive theory. Many biologists and philosophers of biology have agreed that predictive theory is inappropriate in biology, which is said to be more complex than physics, and that one can have nonpredictive explanations, such as the neo-Darwinian Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection. Other philosophers dismiss nonpredictive, explanatory theories, including evolutionary 'theory', as metaphysics. Most biologists do not think of themselves as philosophers or give much thought to the philosophical basis of their research. Nevertheless, their philosophy shows in the way they do research. The plethora of ad hoc (i.e. not universal) hypotheses indicates that biologists are reluctant inductivists in that the search for generalization does not have a high priority. Biologists test their hypotheses by verification. Theoretical physicists, in contrast, are deductive unifiers and test their explanatory hypotheses by falsification. I argue that theoretical biology (concerned with unobservables, such as fitness and natural selection) is not scientific because it lacks universal laws and predictive theory. In order to make this argument, I review the differences between verificationism and falsificationism, induction and deduction, and descriptive and explanatory laws. I show how these differ with a specific example of a
Linking metacommunity theory and symbiont evolutionary ecology.
Mihaljevic, Joseph R
2012-06-01
Processes that occur both within and between hosts can influence the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of symbionts, a broad term that includes parasitic and disease-causing organisms. Metacommunity theory can integrate these local- and regional-scale dynamics to explore symbiont community composition patterns across space. In this article I emphasize that symbionts should be incorporated into the metacommunity concept. I highlight the utility of metacommunity theory by discussing practical and general benefits that emerge from considering symbionts in a metacommunity framework. Specifically, investigating the local and regional drivers of symbiont community and metacommunity structure will lead to a more holistic understanding of symbiont ecology and evolution and could reveal novel insights into the roles of symbiont communities in mediating host health. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Empirical verification of evolutionary theories of aging.
Kyryakov, Pavlo; Gomez-Perez, Alejandra; Glebov, Anastasia; Asbah, Nimara; Bruno, Luigi; Meunier, Carolynne; Iouk, Tatiana; Titorenko, Vladimir I
2016-10-25
We recently selected 3 long-lived mutant strains of Saccharomyces cerevisiae by a lasting exposure to exogenous lithocholic acid. Each mutant strain can maintain the extended chronological lifespan after numerous passages in medium without lithocholic acid. In this study, we used these long-lived yeast mutants for empirical verification of evolutionary theories of aging. We provide evidence that the dominant polygenic trait extending longevity of each of these mutants 1) does not affect such key features of early-life fitness as the exponential growth rate, efficacy of post-exponential growth and fecundity; and 2) enhances such features of early-life fitness as susceptibility to chronic exogenous stresses, and the resistance to apoptotic and liponecrotic forms of programmed cell death. These findings validate evolutionary theories of programmed aging. We also demonstrate that under laboratory conditions that imitate the process of natural selection within an ecosystem, each of these long-lived mutant strains is forced out of the ecosystem by the parental wild-type strain exhibiting shorter lifespan. We therefore concluded that yeast cells have evolved some mechanisms for limiting their lifespan upon reaching a certain chronological age. These mechanisms drive the evolution of yeast longevity towards maintaining a finite yeast chronological lifespan within ecosystems.
An Evolutionary Model of Cooperation, Fairness and Altruistic Punishment in Public Good Games
Hetzer, Moritz; Sornette, Didier
2013-01-01
We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment. PMID:24260101
Linking Pedagogical Theory of Computer Games to their Usability
Ang, Chee Siang; Avni, Einav; Zaphiris, Panayiotis
2008-01-01
This article reviews a range of literature of computer games and learning theories and attempts to establish a link between them by proposing a typology of games which we use as a new usability measure for the development of guidelines for game-based learning. First, we examine game literature in order to understand the key elements that…
The Evolutionary Linguist's Divining-rod: Restrictive Theory
African Journals Online (AJOL)
KATEVG
The Evolutionary Linguist's Divining-rod: Restrictive Theory 51 course, to be complemented by a theory which characterizes – in an equally constrained way – the products of adaptation by natural selection. Indeed, on certain theories of evolutionary processes an entity is considered an exaptation if it lacks the properties of ...
DEFENSE RESOURCES MANAGEMENT USING GAME THEORY
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Marian NEDELCU
2014-04-01
Full Text Available Game theory provides a number of analytical tools designed to assist in developing a more comprehensive understanding of phenomena emerging when decision makers interact. A game describes the strategic interactions between players who act guided by their interests and with the consciousness that their actions affect each other. The basic entity in all game theory models is the player. A player may be understood as an individual, group of individuals or any kind of organization, even countries or alliances facing decisions-making challenges and opportunities. In this respect, the concept providing the dimensions and variables informing on the planning “game” elements required for an optimal defense resource allocation is that of ‘capabilities’. The model developed in this paper is focused on allocations of the available defense resources over the assumed capabilities in order to achieve the best response to national security. I consider as a game the competition between strategic decision-makers involved in defense resource management and the threats to the national security.
Communication scheme based on evolutionary spatial 2×2 games
Ziaukas, Pranas; Ragulskis, Tautvydas; Ragulskis, Minvydas
2014-06-01
A visual communication scheme based on evolutionary spatial 2×2 games is proposed in this paper. Self-organizing patterns induced by complex interactions between competing individuals are exploited for hiding and transmitting secret visual information. Properties of the proposed communication scheme are discussed in details. It is shown that the hiding capacity of the system (the minimum size of the detectable primitives and the minimum distance between two primitives) is sufficient for the effective transmission of digital dichotomous images. Also, it is demonstrated that the proposed communication scheme is resilient to time backwards, plain image attacks and is highly sensitive to perturbations of private and public keys. Several computational experiments are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed communication scheme.
Happiness, Morality, and Game Theory
Luca Zarri
2006-01-01
This book is a welcome consolidation and extension of the recent expanding debates on happiness and economics. Happiness and economics, as a new field for research, is now of pivotal interest particularly to welfare economists and psychologists. This Handbook provides an unprecedented forum for discussion of the economic issues relating to happiness. It reviews the more recent literature and offers the interested reader an insight into the vast scope of the field in terms of the theory, its a...
Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Tao, Yi
2017-03-01
The evolutionary significance of the interaction between paternal and maternal genomes in fertilized zygotes is a very interesting and challenging question. Wang et al. developed the concept of epigenetic game theory, and they try to use this concept to explain the interaction between paternal and maternal genomes in fertilized zygotes [1]. They emphasize that the embryogenesis can be considered as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. More specifically, they integrate game theory to model the pattern of coordination of paternal genome and maternal genomes mediated by DNA methylation dynamics, and they called this epigenetic game theory.
An Analysis of Stochastic Game Theory for Multiagent Reinforcement Learning
National Research Council Canada - National Science Library
Bowling, Michael
2000-01-01
.... In this paper we contribute a comprehensive presentation of the relevant techniques for solving stochastic games from both the game theory community and reinforcement learning communities. We examine the assumptions and limitations of these algorithms, and identify similarities between these algorithms, single agent reinforcement learners, and basic game theory techniques.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Rui QIN
2015-10-01
Full Text Available This article tries to analyze the characteristics of the accounting standard for business enterprises, which is based on the idea of evolutionary game, in order to build a game model between stakeholders, and to conduct the simulation of the game model with NetLogo software. It shows the performance of all participants in the course of the game in a dynamic process, and the simulation results are analyzed, accordingly.
Qin, Rui; Zhaoquan JIAN
2015-01-01
This article tries to analyze the characteristics of the accounting standard for business enterprises, which is based on the idea of evolutionary game, in order to build a game model between stakeholders, and to conduct the simulation of the game model with NetLogo software. It shows the performance of all participants in the course of the game in a dynamic process, and the simulation results are analyzed, accordingly.
Hsu, Fei-Man; Chen, Pao-Yang
2017-03-01
Von Neumann and Morgenstern published the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944, describing game theory as a model in which intelligent rational decision-makers manage to find their best strategies in conflict, cooperative or other mutualistic relationships to acquire the greatest benefit [1]. This model was subsequently incorporated in ecology to simulate the ;fitness; of a species during natural selection, designated evolutionary game theory (EGT) [2]. Wang et al. proposed ;epiGame;, taking paternal and maternal genomes as ;intelligent; players that compete, cooperate or both during embryogenesis to maximize the fitness of the embryo [3]. They further extended game theory to an individual or single cell environment. During early zygote development, DNA methylation is reprogrammed such that the paternal genome is demethylated before the maternal genome. After the reset, the blastocyst is re-methylated during embryogenesis. At that time, the paternal and maternal genomes have a conflict of interest related to the expression of their own genes. The proposed epiGame models such interactive regulation between the parental genomes to reach a balance for embryo development (equation (2)).
The Depressed Brain: An Evolutionary Systems Theory.
Badcock, Paul B; Davey, Christopher G; Whittle, Sarah; Allen, Nicholas B; Friston, Karl J
2017-03-01
Major depression is a debilitating condition characterised by diverse neurocognitive and behavioural deficits. Nevertheless, our species-typical capacity for depressed mood implies that it serves an adaptive function. Here we apply an interdisciplinary theory of brain function to explain depressed mood and its clinical manifestations. Combining insights from the free-energy principle (FEP) with evolutionary theorising in psychology, we argue that depression reflects an adaptive response to perceived threats of aversive social outcomes (e.g., exclusion) that minimises the likelihood of surprising interpersonal exchanges (i.e., those with unpredictable outcomes). We suggest that psychopathology typically arises from ineffectual attempts to alleviate interpersonal difficulties and/or hyper-reactive neurobiological responses to social stress (i.e., uncertainty), which often stems from early experience that social uncertainty is difficult to resolve. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Selective evolutionary generation systems: Theory and applications
Menezes, Amor A.
This dissertation is devoted to the problem of behavior design, which is a generalization of the standard global optimization problem: instead of generating the optimizer, the generalization produces, on the space of candidate optimizers, a probability density function referred to as the behavior. The generalization depends on a parameter, the level of selectivity, such that as this parameter tends to infinity, the behavior becomes a delta function at the location of the global optimizer. The motivation for this generalization is that traditional off-line global optimization is non-resilient and non-opportunistic. That is, traditional global optimization is unresponsive to perturbations of the objective function. On-line optimization methods that are more resilient and opportunistic than their off-line counterparts typically consist of the computationally expensive sequential repetition of off-line techniques. A novel approach to inexpensive resilience and opportunism is to utilize the theory of Selective Evolutionary Generation Systems (SECS), which sequentially and probabilistically selects a candidate optimizer based on the ratio of the fitness values of two candidates and the level of selectivity. Using time-homogeneous, irreducible, ergodic Markov chains to model a sequence of local, and hence inexpensive, dynamic transitions, this dissertation proves that such transitions result in behavior that is called rational; such behavior is desirable because it can lead to both efficient search for an optimizer as well as resilient and opportunistic behavior. The dissertation also identifies system-theoretic properties of the proposed scheme, including equilibria, their stability and their optimality. Moreover, this dissertation demonstrates that the canonical genetic algorithm with fitness proportional selection and the (1+1) evolutionary strategy are particular cases of the scheme. Applications in three areas illustrate the versatility of the SECS theory: flight
Fixation probabilities of evolutionary coordination games on two coupled populations
Zhang, Liye; Ying, Limin; Zhou, Jie; Guan, Shuguang; Zou, Yong
2016-09-01
Evolutionary forces resulted from competitions between different populations are common, which change the evolutionary behavior of a single population. In an isolated population of coordination games of two strategies (e.g., s1 and s2), the previous studies focused on determining the fixation probability that the system is occupied by only one strategy (s1) and their expectation times, given an initial mixture of two strategies. In this work, we propose a model of two interdependent populations, disclosing the effects of the interaction strength on fixation probabilities. In the well-mixing limit, a detailed linear stability analysis is performed, which allows us to find and to classify the different equilibria, yielding a clear picture of the bifurcation patterns in phase space. We demonstrate that the interactions between populations crucially alter the dynamic behavior. More specifically, if the coupling strength is larger than some threshold value, the critical initial density of one strategy (s1) that corresponds to fixation is significantly delayed. Instead, the two populations evolve to the opposite state of all (s2) strategy, which are in favor of the red queen hypothesis. We delineate the extinction time of strategy (s1) explicitly, which is an exponential form. These results are validated by systematic numerical simulations.
Pre-Game-Theory Based Information Technology (GAMBIT) Study
National Research Council Canada - National Science Library
Polk, Charles
2003-01-01
.... The generic GAMBIT scenario has been characterized as Dynamic Hierarchical Gaming (DHG). Game theory is not yet ready to fully support analysis of DHG, though existing partial analysis suggests that a full treatment is practical in the midterm...
Game theory, social choice and ethics
1979-01-01
There are problems to whose solution I would attach an infinitely greater import ancf! than to those of mathematics, for example touching ethics, or our relation to God, or conceming our destiny and our future; but their solution lies wholly beyond us and completely outside the province 0 f science. J. F. C. Gauss For a1l his prescience in matters physical and mathematieal, the great Gauss apparently did not foresee one development peculiar to OUT own time. The development I have in mind is the use of mathematical reasoning - in partieu lar the axiomatic method - to explicate alternative concepts of rationality and morality. The present bipartite collection of essays (Vol. 11, Nos. 2 and 3 of this journal) is entitled 'Game Theory, Social Choiee, and Ethics'. The eight papers represent state-of-the-art research in formal moral theory. Their intended aim is to demonstrate how the methods of game theory, decision theory, and axiomatic social choice theory can help to illuminate ethical questions central not...
Lin, XuXun; Yuan, PengCheng
2018-01-01
In this research we consider commuters' dynamic learning effect by modeling the trip mode choice behavior from a new perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory. We explore the behavior pattern of different types of commuters and study the evolution path and equilibrium properties under different traffic conditions. We further establish a dynamic parking charge optimal control (referred to as DPCOC) model to alter commuters' trip mode choice while minimizing the total social cost. Numerical tests show. (1) Under fixed parking fee policy, the evolutionary results are completely decided by the travel time and the only method for public transit induction is to increase the parking charge price. (2) Compared with fixed parking fee policy, DPCOC policy proposed in this research has several advantages. Firstly, it can effectively turn the evolutionary path and evolutionary stable strategy to a better situation while minimizing the total social cost. Secondly, it can reduce the sensitivity of trip mode choice behavior to traffic congestion and improve the ability to resist interferences and emergencies. Thirdly, it is able to control the private car proportion to a stable state and make the trip behavior more predictable for the transportation management department. The research results can provide theoretical basis and decision-making references for commuters' mode choice prediction, dynamic setting of urban parking charge prices and public transit induction.
LTE Load Balancing dengan Skenario Game Theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Nila Putri Mardela
2013-09-01
Full Text Available Adanya multi user yang meminta untuk dilayani dengan baik dalam kondisi apapun terutama dalam kondisi cell yang congested tentunya menjadi hal yang sangat penting untuk diperhatikan dalam sistem komunikasi wireless termasuk dalam hal ini untuk teknologi Long Term Evolution (LTE sehingga diperlukan suatu proses dalam jaringan yang dapat menanggulangi permintaan user ini. Proses yang dapat dilakukan adalah dengan load balancing. Untuk memodelkan interaksi dari elemen jaringan yang melakukan load balancing , maka dibutuhkan suatu teknik atau skenario sehingga dicapai suatu keputusan yang rasional untuk dilakukannya load balancing. Teknik yang dapat digunakan adalah skenario game theory. Dalam tugas akhir yang berjudul LTE Load Balancing dengan Skenario Game Theory ini diusulkan metode Load Balancing Cooperative Game pada LTE dimana setiap tindakan yang dilakukan dalam rangka load balancing didasarkan terhadap nilai utilitas yang akan didapatkan, dan setiap eNB berhak memilih tindakan yang memiliki nilai utilitas maksimum. Efek dari load balancing yang diinginkan adalah penurunan jumlah drop call sebagai indikasi peningkatan layanan dan peningkatan utilitas eNB sebagai indikasi pengoptimalan utilitas bandwidth yang tidak terpakai. Dengan menerapkan LTE Load Balancing dengan Skenario Game Theory ini maka dapat dicapai penurunan jumlah drop call sebesar 92,33%, peningkatan utilitas eNB penolong sebesar 41,24%, dan 0,249% untuk peningkatan utilitas eNB congested yang meminta bantuan. Apabila dalam skema handover user dari eNB cell sumber yang congested ke eNB cell tetangga yang tidak congested ditambahkan syarat bahwa RSRP user dari eNB cell tetangga lebih besar dari pada eNB cell sumber maka penurunan drop call yang dicapai adalah sebesar 37,12%, peningkatan utilitas eNB penolong adalah sebesar 9,375%, dan peningkatan utilitas eNB congested yang meminta bantuan adalah sebesar 0,249%.
Games as Actors - Interaction, Play, Design, and Actor Network Theory
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Jessen, Jari Due; Jessen, Carsten
2014-01-01
data from a study of board games , computer games, and exergames, we conclude that games are actors that produce experiences by exercising power over the user’ s abilities, for example their cognitive functions. Games are designed to take advantage of the characteristics of the human players......When interacting with computer games, users are forced to follow the rules of the game in return for the excitement, joy, fun, or other pursued experiences. In this paper, we investigate how games a chieve these experiences in the perspective of Actor Network Theory (ANT). Based on a qualitative...
Fuentes, Agustin; Kissel, Marc
2016-01-01
Richerson et al. provide a much needed roadmap for assessing cultural group selection (CGS) theory and for applying it to understanding variation between contemporary human groups. However, the current proposal lacks connection to relevant evidence from the human evolutionary record and requires a better integration with contemporary evolutionary theory. The article also misapplies the F st statistic.
Niche construction in evolutionary theory: the construction of an ...
Indian Academy of Sciences (India)
MANAN GUPTA
2017-07-06
Jul 6, 2017 ... one-locus population genetic representation of the evo- lutionary process with evolutionary theory. In particular, the proponents of NCT seems to completely neglect quan- titative genetic thinking in evolutionary theory. Overall, we show that much of the published literature on NCT is not only unnecessarily ...
Evolutionary Theory as a Guide to Socioscientific Decision-Making
Sadler, Troy D.
2005-01-01
Evolutionary theory serves as the fundamental cornerstone to all life science; yet students frequently possess misconceptions regarding evolution or resist learning the idea altogether. This study, which emerged from a larger project focused on informal reasoning, explores how college students' conceptions of evolutionary theory affect their…
Evolutionary idealism: a philosophical foundation for holistic nursing theory.
Sarter, B
1987-01-01
The philosophical tradition of evolutionary idealism is explored as an appropriate metaphysical foundation for holistic nursing science. Some implications of this tradition for theory development, testing, and practice are identified. It is suggested that evolutionary idealism can form an appropriate philosophical foundation for nursing theory development.
Game Theory in water resources management
Katsanevaki, Styliani Maria; Varouchakis, Emmanouil; Karatzas, George
2015-04-01
Rural water management is a basic requirement for the development of the primary sector and involves the exploitation of surface/ground-water resources. Rational management requires the study of parameters that determine their exploitation mainly environmental, economic and social. These parameters reflect the influence of irrigation on the aquifer behaviour and on the level-streamflow of nearby rivers as well as on the profit from the farming activity for the farmers' welfare. The question of rural water management belongs to the socio-political problems, since the factors involved are closely related to user behaviour and state position. By applying Game Theory one seeks to simulate the behaviour of the system 'surface/ground-water resources to water-users' with a model based on a well-known game, "The Prisoner's Dilemma" for economic development of the farmers without overexploitation of the water resources. This is a game of two players that have been extensively studied in Game Theory, economy and politics because it can describe real-world cases. The present proposal aims to investigate the rural water management issue that is referred to two competitive small partnerships organised to manage their agricultural production and to achieve a better profit. For the farmers' activities water is required and ground-water is generally preferable because consists a more stable recourse than river-water which in most of the cases in Greece are of intermittent flow. If the two farmer groups cooperate and exploit the agreed water quantities they will gain equal profits and benefit from the sustainable availability of the water recourses (p). If both groups overexploitate the resource to maximize profit, then in the medium-term they will incur a loss (g), due to the water resources reduction and the increase of the pumping costs. If one overexploit the resource while the other use the necessary required, then the first will gain great benefit (P), and the second will
Network Security Validation Using Game Theory
Papadopoulou, Vicky; Gregoriades, Andreas
Non-functional requirements (NFR) such as network security recently gained widespread attention in distributed information systems. Despite their importance however, there is no systematic approach to validate these requirements given the complexity and uncertainty characterizing modern networks. Traditionally, network security requirements specification has been the results of a reactive process. This however, limited the immunity property of the distributed systems that depended on these networks. Security requirements specification need a proactive approach. Networks' infrastructure is constantly under attack by hackers and malicious software that aim to break into computers. To combat these threats, network designers need sophisticated security validation techniques that will guarantee the minimum level of security for their future networks. This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to security requirements validation. An introduction to game theory is presented along with an example that demonstrates the application of the approach.
Using game theory to improve safety within chemical industrial parks
Reniers, Genserik
2013-01-01
Though the game-theoretic approach has been vastly studied and utilized in relation to economics of industrial organizations, it has hardly been used to tackle safety management in multi-plant chemical industrial settings. Using Game Theory for Improving Safety within Chemical Industrial Parks presents an in-depth discussion of game-theoretic modelling which may be applied to improve cross-company prevention and -safety management in a chemical industrial park. By systematically analyzing game-theoretic models and approaches in relation to managing safety in chemical industrial parks, Using Game Theory for Improving Safety within Chemical Industrial Parks explores the ways game theory can predict the outcome of complex strategic investment decision making processes involving several adjacent chemical plants. A number of game-theoretic decision models are discussed to provide strategic tools for decision-making situations. Offering clear and straightforward explanations of methodologies, Using Game Theor...
A simulation game for nonlinear control theory education
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Rune Haugom
2007-04-01
Full Text Available In this paper a computer game implemented as an applet for use in a graduate course in nonlinear control theory is described, and the learning value of the game is substantiated using different learning theories and theories related to ICT. The case study of the applet is a mass-damper-spring system with a nonlinear spring characteristic, and a game with a highscore list has been made out of the system to stimulate student competition and motivation.
New paradigms of Game Theory from globalization
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Francisco Javier Esquivel
2015-06-01
Full Text Available Games Theory constitutes a model by means every player tries to predict what they will make the other players in reply to his own actions, and to optimize the result of the above mentioned actions in his benefit knowing that the others are thinking to about the same form. The development of the theory supposed a boom after the World War II, which happened of analyzing exclusively competitive behaviors to considering situations with competitive and cooperative characteristics. Nevertheless, the advance of the humanity and the disappearance of both geopolitical blocks have eliminated the balance of power and have produced the emergence of a world the most based on the exclusive conquest of the power. This has originated the model change and dilemmas, happening from the most cooperative models (Prisoner’s Dilemma or from the models of the Cold War (Dilemma of the Gallina up to reaching the dilemmas of the Leader or of the Hero. This change of paradigm owes to the extension of the globalization, which originates an immeasurable loss of economic, social, political power, of human rights, which they have affected negatively to the poor people. In this paper is studied the change of paradigm caused by the consequences of the globalization and the geopolitical transformations in a monopolar world, analyzing the consequences on the basis of the Theory of Games.
The Evolving Theory of Evolutionary Radiations.
Simões, M; Breitkreuz, L; Alvarado, M; Baca, S; Cooper, J C; Heins, L; Herzog, K; Lieberman, B S
2016-01-01
Evolutionary radiations have intrigued biologists for more than 100 years, and our understanding of the patterns and processes associated with these radiations continues to grow and evolve. Recently it has been recognized that there are many different types of evolutionary radiation beyond the well-studied adaptive radiations. We focus here on multifarious types of evolutionary radiations, paying special attention to the abiotic factors that might trigger diversification in clades. We integrate concepts such as exaptation, species selection, coevolution, and the turnover-pulse hypothesis (TPH) into the theoretical framework of evolutionary radiations. We also discuss other phenomena that are related to, but distinct from, evolutionary radiations that have relevance for evolutionary biology. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
Hilbe, Christian; Wu, Bin; Traulsen, Arne; Nowak, Martin A.
2015-01-01
Repetition is one of the key mechanisms to maintain cooperation. In long-term relationships, in which individuals can react to their peers׳ past actions, evolution can promote cooperative strategies that would not be stable in one-shot encounters. The iterated prisoner׳s dilemma illustrates the power of repetition. Many of the key strategies for this game, such as ALLD, ALLC, Tit-for-Tat, or generous Tit-for-Tat, share a common property: players using these strategies enforce a linear relationship between their own payoff and their co-player׳s payoff. Such strategies have been termed zero-determinant (ZD). Recently, it was shown that ZD strategies also exist for multiplayer social dilemmas, and here we explore their evolutionary performance. For small group sizes, ZD strategies play a similar role as for the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma: extortionate ZD strategies are critical for the emergence of cooperation, whereas generous ZD strategies are important to maintain cooperation. In large groups, however, generous strategies tend to become unstable and selfish behaviors gain the upper hand. Our results suggest that repeated interactions alone are not sufficient to maintain large-scale cooperation. Instead, large groups require further mechanisms to sustain cooperation, such as the formation of alliances or institutions, or additional pairwise interactions between group members. PMID:25843220
Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.
Hilbe, Christian; Wu, Bin; Traulsen, Arne; Nowak, Martin A
2015-06-07
Repetition is one of the key mechanisms to maintain cooperation. In long-term relationships, in which individuals can react to their peers׳ past actions, evolution can promote cooperative strategies that would not be stable in one-shot encounters. The iterated prisoner׳s dilemma illustrates the power of repetition. Many of the key strategies for this game, such as ALLD, ALLC, Tit-for-Tat, or generous Tit-for-Tat, share a common property: players using these strategies enforce a linear relationship between their own payoff and their co-player׳s payoff. Such strategies have been termed zero-determinant (ZD). Recently, it was shown that ZD strategies also exist for multiplayer social dilemmas, and here we explore their evolutionary performance. For small group sizes, ZD strategies play a similar role as for the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma: extortionate ZD strategies are critical for the emergence of cooperation, whereas generous ZD strategies are important to maintain cooperation. In large groups, however, generous strategies tend to become unstable and selfish behaviors gain the upper hand. Our results suggest that repeated interactions alone are not sufficient to maintain large-scale cooperation. Instead, large groups require further mechanisms to sustain cooperation, such as the formation of alliances or institutions, or additional pairwise interactions between group members. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.
Using Game Theory Techniques and Concepts to Develop Proprietary Models for Use in Intelligent Games
Christopher, Timothy Van
2011-01-01
This work is about analyzing games as models of systems. The goal is to understand the techniques that have been used by game designers in the past, and to compare them to the study of mathematical game theory. Through the study of a system or concept a model often emerges that can effectively educate students about making intelligent decisions…
Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit Quantal Response Dynamics in Game Theory
Zhuang, Qian; Di, Zengru; Wu, Jinshan
2014-01-01
Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be classified into stable (SQREs) and unstable (USQREs) equilibriums. This extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs) to evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games, including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those experiments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better predictive power than QREs and NEs. PMID:25157502
Stability of mixed-strategy-based iterative logit quantal response dynamics in game theory.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Qian Zhuang
Full Text Available Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be classified into stable (SQREs and unstable (USQREs equilibriums. This extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs to evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games, including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those experiments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better predictive power than QREs and NEs.
The Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge and the Divine Mystery
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Juan Manuel Pérez Asseff
2016-02-01
Full Text Available Here we intend to suggest a point of contact between science and religion - from the perspective of the evolutionary theory of knowledge in relation to the religious category of Mystery. The evolutionary theory of knowledge is an epistemological approach which integrates the fields of the evolutionary theory, neuroscience and philosophy. With it, it is possible to place the reflection on the nature of human knowledge under the light of the historical evolutionary conscience. This could generate a bridge between science and faith because it allows us to see how the human opening to the mystery dimension is possible once we have acquired an evolutionary and contingent awareness of our own existence.
Game theory: applications for surgeons and the operating room environment.
McFadden, David W; Tsai, Mitchell; Kadry, Bassam; Souba, Wiley W
2012-11-01
Game theory is an economic system of strategic behavior, often referred to as the "theory of social situations." Very little has been written in the medical literature about game theory or its applications, yet the practice of surgery and the operating room environment clearly involves multiple social situations with both cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors. A comprehensive review was performed of the medical literature on game theory and its medical applications. Definitive resources on the subject were also examined and applied to surgery and the operating room whenever possible. Applications of game theory and its proposed dilemmas abound in the practicing surgeon's world, especially in the operating room environment. The surgeon with a basic understanding of game theory principles is better prepared for understanding and navigating the complex Operating Room system and optimizing cooperative behaviors for the benefit all stakeholders. Copyright © 2012 Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.
Interface of Computation, Game Theory, and Economics (Dagstuhl Seminar 13161)
Hart, Sergiu; Tardos, Éva; von Stengel, Bernhard
2013-01-01
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 13161 "Interface of Computation, Game Theory, and Economics". The workshop was strongly interdisciplinary, on the leading edge of current topics generally connected to algorithmic game theory: Mechanism design and auctions, interactions in networks, social models, and dynamics and equilibrium in games and markets. We summarize these topics, give the talk abstracts, and comment on experiences related to the organization ...
Game Theory and its Relationship with Linear Programming Models ...
African Journals Online (AJOL)
Game theory, a branch of operations research, has been successfully applied to solve various categories of problems arising from human decisions making characterized by the complexity of situations and the limits of individual processing abilities. This paper shows that game theory and linear programming problem are ...
On the Relevance of Game Theory in Strategic Thinking
African Journals Online (AJOL)
The author reviews some of the applicable literature and shows how game theory can be used to predict the outcome ... Therefore, the aim of this paper is to show to what extent game theory is relevant in the study and ..... the ship carrying nuclear waste is not likely to follow its optimal strategy, the South African. 48. Scientia ...
On the Relevance of Game Theory in Strategic Thinking ...
African Journals Online (AJOL)
The author reviews some of the applicable literature and shows how game theory can be used to predict the outcome of a strategy, explain why a particular outcome to a strategy has occurred, investigate strategy and prescribe certain rules for the making of a strategy. He concludes that game theory can aid decision makers ...
An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling
Kane, Patrick; Zollman, Kevin J. S.
2015-01-01
The handicap principle has come under significant challenge both from empirical studies and from theoretical work. As a result, a number of alternative explanations for honest signaling have been proposed. This paper compares the evolutionary plausibility of one such alternative, the “hybrid equilibrium,” to the handicap principle. We utilize computer simulations to compare these two theories as they are instantiated in Maynard Smith’s Sir Philip Sidney game. We conclude that, when both types of communication are possible, evolution is unlikely to lead to handicap signaling and is far more likely to result in the partially honest signaling predicted by hybrid equilibrium theory. PMID:26348617
An Evolutionary Comparison of the Handicap Principle and Hybrid Equilibrium Theories of Signaling.
Kane, Patrick; Zollman, Kevin J S
2015-01-01
The handicap principle has come under significant challenge both from empirical studies and from theoretical work. As a result, a number of alternative explanations for honest signaling have been proposed. This paper compares the evolutionary plausibility of one such alternative, the "hybrid equilibrium," to the handicap principle. We utilize computer simulations to compare these two theories as they are instantiated in Maynard Smith's Sir Philip Sidney game. We conclude that, when both types of communication are possible, evolution is unlikely to lead to handicap signaling and is far more likely to result in the partially honest signaling predicted by hybrid equilibrium theory.
Just Society as a Fair Game: John Rawls and Game Theory in the 1950s.
Gališanka, Andrius
2017-01-01
I explore the influence of game theory on the political philosopher John Rawls as a way of analyzing the character of his democratic thought. Recent narratives bring Rawls closer to direct democracy as a result of game theory's influence. I argue that game theory prompted creative, organic developments in Rawls's political framework rather than shaping it. It prompted Rawls to emphasize autonomy and fairness, leading him to the analogy between a just society and a fair game. And it prompted thought experiments that analyzed our considered judgments. This was an idealized analysis unconnected to the vision of direct democracy.
Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks
Yong, Xi
2016-01-01
The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems. PMID:27118882
The Game Theory, Morality and the ’Game of Life’
Amaresh Das; Biruk Alemayehu
2013-01-01
Game theory as long as it is a study of interdependent rational, choice, can be used to explain, to predict and evaluate human, behavior in contexts where the outcome of action depends on, what other agents choose to do. Game theory can be made, relevant to ethics and can be used in moral and political, philosophy, including economics, business and public policy, areas.
Evolutionary games combining two or three pair coordinations on a square lattice
Király, Balázs; Szabó, György
2017-10-01
We study multiagent logit-rule-driven evolutionary games on a square lattice whose pair interactions are composed of a maximal number of nonoverlapping elementary coordination games describing Ising-type interactions between just two of the available strategies. Using Monte Carlo simulations we investigate the macroscopic noise-level-dependent behavior of the two- and three-pair games and the critical properties of the continuous phase transtitions these systems exhibit. The four-strategy game is shown to be equivalent to a system that consists of two independent and identical Ising models.
Game Theory, Conditional Preferences, and Social Influence
Stirling, Wynn C.; Felin, Teppo
2013-01-01
Neoclassical noncooperative game theory is based on a simple, yet powerful synthesis of mathematical and logical concepts: unconditional and immutable preference orderings and individual rationality. Although this structure has proven useful for characterizing competitive multi-player behavior, its applicability to scenarios involving complex social relationships is problematic. In this paper we directly address this limitation by the introduction of a conditional preference structure that permits players to modulate their preference orderings as functions of the preferences of other players. Embedding this expanded preference structure in a formal and graphical framework provides a systematic approach for characterizing a complex society. The result is an influence network that allows conditional preferences to propagate through the community, resulting in an emergent social model which characterizes all of the social relationships that exist and which leads to solution concepts that account for both group and individual interests. The Ultimatum game is presented as an example of how social influence can be modeled with conditional preferences. PMID:23451078
Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Feng Zhang
Full Text Available Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism, thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.
Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games.
Zhang, Feng; Hui, Cang
2011-01-01
Unveiling the origin and forms of cooperation in nature poses profound challenges in evolutionary ecology. The prisoner's dilemma game is an important metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation. We here classified potential mechanisms for cooperation evolution into schemes of frequency- and density-dependent selection, and focused on the density-dependent selection in the ecological prisoner's dilemma games. We found that, although assortative encounter is still the necessary condition in ecological games for cooperation evolution, a harsh environment, indicated by a high mortality, can foster the invasion of cooperation. The Hamilton rule provides a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by ensuring an enhanced relatedness between players in low-density populations. Incorporating ecological dynamics into evolutionary games opens up a much wider window for the evolution of cooperation, and exhibits a variety of complex behaviors of dynamics, such as limit and heteroclinic cycles. An alternative evolutionary, or rather succession, sequence was proposed that cooperation first appears in harsh environments, followed by the invasion of defection, which leads to a common catastrophe. The rise of cooperation (and altruism), thus, could be much easier in the density-dependent ecological games than in the classic frequency-dependent evolutionary games.
Models in cooperative game theory crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games
Branzei, Rodica; Tijs, Stef
2005-01-01
This book investigates models in cooperative game theory in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in coperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to cooperate with infinite many different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multi-choice game describes the intermediate case in which each player may have a fixed number of activity levels. Different set and one-point solution concepts for these games are presented. The propertie
An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to Multi-Sector Coordination and Self-Organization
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Fernando P. Santos
2016-04-01
Full Text Available Coordination games provide ubiquitous interaction paradigms to frame human behavioral features, such as information transmission, conventions and languages as well as socio-economic processes and institutions. By using a dynamical approach, such as Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT, one is able to follow, in detail, the self-organization process by which a population of individuals coordinates into a given behavior. Real socio-economic scenarios, however, often involve the interaction between multiple co-evolving sectors, with specific options of their own, that call for generalized and more sophisticated mathematical frameworks. In this paper, we explore a general EGT approach to deal with coordination dynamics in which individuals from multiple sectors interact. Starting from a two-sector, consumer/producer scenario, we investigate the effects of including a third co-evolving sector that we call public. We explore the changes in the self-organization process of all sectors, given the feedback that this new sector imparts on the other two.
Analysis of Students' Arguments on Evolutionary Theory
Basel, Nicolai; Harms, Ute; Prechtl, Helmut
2013-01-01
A qualitative exploratory study was conducted to reveal students' argumentation skills in the context of the topic of evolution. Transcripts from problem-centred interviews on secondary students' beliefs about evolutionary processes of adaptation were analysed using a content analysis approach. For this purpose two categorical systems were…
Testing evolutionary theories of discriminative grandparental investment
Kaptijn, R.; Thomése, F.; Liefbroer, A.C.; Silverstein, M.
2013-01-01
This study tests two evolutionary hypotheses on grandparental investments differentiated by the child's sex: the paternity uncertainty hypothesis and the Trivers–Willard hypothesis. Data are from two culturally different countries: the Dutch Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam (n=2375) and the
Potential game theory applications in radio resource allocation
Lã, Quang Duy; Soong, Boon-Hee
2016-01-01
This book offers a thorough examination of potential game theory and its applications in radio resource management for wireless communications systems and networking. The book addresses two major research goals: how to identify a given game as a potential game, and how to design the utility functions and the potential functions with certain special properties in order to formulate a potential game. After proposing a unifying mathematical framework for the identification of potential games, the text surveys existing applications of this technique within wireless communications and networking problems found in OFDMA 3G/4G/WiFi networks, as well as next-generation systems such as cognitive radios and dynamic spectrum access networks. Professionals interested in understanding the theoretical aspect of this specialized field will find Potential Game Theory a valuable resource, as will advanced-level engineering students. It paves the way for extensive and rigorous research exploration on a topic whose capacity for...
Hense, Jan; Mandl, Heinz
2012-01-01
This conceptual paper aims to clarify the theoretical underpinnings of game based learning (GBL) and learning with digital learning games (DLGs). To do so, it analyses learning of game related skills and contents, which occurs constantly during playing conventional entertainment games, from three perspectives: learning theory, emotion theory, and…
Essentials of Game Theory A Concise Multidisciplinary Introduction
Leyton-Brown, Kevin
2008-01-01
Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self-interested agents. The audience for game theory has grown dramatically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professional interest in game theory is likely to require. Such a text would minimize notation, ruthlessly focus on essentials, and yet not sacrifice rigor. This Synthes
Spatial interaction models facility location using game theory
D'Amato, Egidio; Pardalos, Panos
2017-01-01
Facility location theory develops the idea of locating one or more facilities by optimizing suitable criteria such as minimizing transportation cost, or capturing the largest market share. The contributions in this book focus an approach to facility location theory through game theoretical tools highlighting situations where a location decision is faced by several decision makers and leading to a game theoretical framework in non-cooperative and cooperative methods. Models and methods regarding the facility location via game theory are explored and applications are illustrated through economics, engineering, and physics. Mathematicians, engineers, economists and computer scientists working in theory, applications and computational aspects of facility location problems using game theory will find this book useful.
Continual Online Evolutionary Planning for In-Game Build Order Adaptation in StarCraft
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Justesen, Niels Orsleff; Risi, Sebastian
2017-01-01
able to switch between predefined strategies, which makes it hard to adapt to new situations. This paper introduces an evolutionary-based method to overcome this challenge, called Continual Online Evolutionary Planning (COEP), which is able to perform in-game adaptive build-order planning. COEP...... was added to an open source StarCraft bot called UAlbertaBot and is able to outperform the built-in bots in the game as well as being competitive against a number of scripted opening strategies. The COEP augmented bot can change its build order dynamically and quickly adapt to the opponent’s strategy.......The real-time strategy game StarCraft has become an important benchmark for AI research as it poses a complex environment with numerous challenges. An important strategic aspect in this game is to decide what buildings and units to produce. StarCraft bots playing in AI competitions today are only...
Exploring social influence on evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games in networks
Zong, Hengshan; Jia, Guozhu; Cheng, Yang
2015-11-01
Though numerous studies demonstrate the importance of social influence in deciding individual decision-making process in networks, little has been done to explore its impact on players’ behavioral patterns in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs). This study investigates how social influenced strategy updating rules may affect the final equilibrium of game dynamics. The results show that weak social influence usually inhibits cooperation, while strong social influence has a mediating effect. The impacts of network structure and the existence of rebels in social influence scenarios are also tested. The paper provides a comprehensive interpretation on social influence effects on evolutionary PDGs in networks.
A theory of game trees, based on solution trees
W.H.L.M. Pijls (Wim); A. de Bruin (Arie); A. Plaat (Aske)
1996-01-01
textabstractIn this paper a complete theory of game tree algorithms is presented, entirely based upon the notion of a solution tree. Two types of solution trees are distinguished: max and min solution trees respectively. We show that most game tree algorithms construct a superposition of a max and a
Game Theory and Educational Policy: Private Education Legislation in China
Law, Wing-Wah; Pan, Su-Yan
2009-01-01
This article presents a game theory analysis of legislating private education in China, based on set of primary and secondary documents related to this issue. The article argues that shaping educational legislation is a dynamic, repeated game of negotiation, cooperation, and/or competition on multiple occasions among various interested actors,…
Formulated linear programming problems from game theory and its ...
African Journals Online (AJOL)
... using the primal and symmetric dual linear programming problem and its numerical illustration of the super linear programming problem using TORA package. Keywords: Game theory, linear programming, zero sum game, TORA package, computer. International Journal of Natural and Applied Sciences, 6(4): 413 - 422, ...
A mini-review of the evolutionary theories of aging.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
2001-02-01
Full Text Available This article reviews some studies testing evolutionary theories of aging and shows that they are not always confirmed. Nevertheless, many gerontologists consider now that these theories provide a general explanation of the aging process. In such conditions, we may wonder whether time has come to provisionally accept these theories in order to redirect the research efforts of gerontologists towards other directions, such as the search for new means to modulate the aging process.
Economic Game Theory to Model the Attenuation of Virulence of an Obligate Intracellular Bacterium.
Tago, Damian; Meyer, Damien F
2016-01-01
Diseases induced by obligate intracellular pathogens have a large burden on global human and animal health. Understanding the factors involved in the virulence and fitness of these pathogens contributes to the development of control strategies against these diseases. Based on biological observations, a theoretical model using game theory is proposed to explain how obligate intracellular bacteria interact with their host. The equilibrium in such a game shows that the virulence and fitness of the bacterium is host-triggered and by changing the host's defense system to which the bacterium is confronted, an evolutionary process leads to an attenuated strain. Although, the attenuation procedure has already been conducted in practice in order to develop an attenuated vaccine (e.g., with Ehrlichia ruminantium), there was a lack of understanding of the theoretical basis behind this process. Our work provides a model to better comprehend the existence of different phenotypes and some underlying evolutionary mechanisms for the virulence of obligate intracellular bacteria.
Introduction to the theory of cooperative games
Peleg, Bezalel; Peleg, Bezalel
2007-01-01
This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.
The cooperative game theory of networks and hierarchies
Gilles, Robert P
2010-01-01
This book details standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. It covers the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential.
The Correlation between Game Theory and International Trade
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Simona-Valeria TOMA
2012-08-01
Full Text Available The Correlation between Game Theory and International TradeAbstract:Game theory, in its most basic form, considers two or more players and analyses the different strategies that they can use and the effect that these strategies will have on each player. International trade allows countries to use better their resources (labor, technology or capital. Since countries have different capital or natural resources, some of them will produce a good more efficiently than others and therefore could sell it cheaper than other countries. By using game theory in international trade we could determine if the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model is correct and what would be the best specialization for each country. The aim of this paper is to test if game theory could be successfully used in a thorough analysis of international trade specialization.
Video Game Characters. Theory and Analysis
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Felix Schröter
2014-06-01
Full Text Available This essay develops a method for the analysis of video game characters based on a theoretical understanding of their medium-specific representation and the mental processes involved in their intersubjective construction by video game players. We propose to distinguish, first, between narration, simulation, and communication as three modes of representation particularly salient for contemporary video games and the characters they represent, second, between narrative, ludic, and social experience as three ways in which players perceive video game characters and their representations, and, third, between three dimensions of video game characters as ‘intersubjective constructs’, which usually are to be analyzed not only as fictional beings with certain diegetic properties but also as game pieces with certain ludic properties and, in those cases in which they function as avatars in the social space of a multiplayer game, as representations of other players. Having established these basic distinctions, we proceed to analyze their realization and interrelation by reference to the character of Martin Walker from the third-person shooter Spec Ops: The Line (Yager Development 2012, the highly customizable player-controlled characters from the role-playing game The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim (Bethesda 2011, and the complex multidimensional characters in the massively multiplayer online role-playing game Star Wars: The Old Republic (BioWare 2011-2014.
Examining Student-Designed Games through Suits' Theory of Games
Casey, Ashley; Hastie, Peter; Jump, Steve
2016-01-01
This paper documents how a unit of student-designed games can create a more meaningful version of physical education (PE) for disengaged students, a version that enhances the educational legitimacy of the subject matter by affording it worth in and of itself rather than being justified for other, extrinsic or instrumental reasons. Furthermore, it…
Applied Hypergame Theory for Network Defense
2013-06-01
themselves. The investigation of the competition between species has given rise to evolutionary game theory. Even evolutionary game theory itself has evolved...to be applied to economics, sociology, and anthropology [7]. Application of game theory principles can be used wherever there is a contest over...Murad Mehmet Bayraktar. “Game Theory and Intrusion Detection Systems”, 2006. ISA 767-Secure E-Commerce. [7] Alexander, J. McKenzie. “ Evolutionary
Testing evolutionary theories of discriminative grandparental investment.
Kaptijn, Ralf; Thomese, Fleur; Liefbroer, Aart C; Silverstein, Merril
2013-05-01
This study tests two evolutionary hypotheses on grandparental investments differentiated by the child's sex: the paternity uncertainty hypothesis and the Trivers-Willard hypothesis. Data are from two culturally different countries: the Dutch Longitudinal Aging Study Amsterdam (n=2375) and the Chinese Anhui Survey (n=4026). In the Netherlands, grandparental investments are biased towards daughters' children, which is in accordance with the paternity uncertainty hypothesis. But in China, grandparental investments are biased towards sons' children, which is in conflict with the paternity uncertainty hypothesis. This study found no support for the Trivers-Willard hypothesis. These results raise doubts over the relevance of paternity uncertainty as an explanation of a grandparental investment bias towards daughters' children that is often found in Western populations. The results suggest that discriminative grandparental investments are better understood as the outcome of cultural prescriptions and economic motives.
Towards an evolutionary theory of language.
Nowak, M A.; Komarova, N L.
2001-07-01
Language is a biological trait that radically changed the performance of one species and the appearance of the planet. Understanding how human language came about is one of the most interesting tasks for evolutionary biology. Here we discuss how natural selection can guide the emergence of some basic features of human language, including arbitrary signs, words, syntactic communication and grammar. We show how natural selection can lead to the duality of patterning of human language: sequences of phonemes form words; sequences of words form sentences. Finally, we present a framework for the population dynamics of grammar acquisition, which allows us to study the cultural evolution of grammar and the biological evolution of universal grammar.
N-person game theory concepts and applications
Rapoport, Anatol
2013-01-01
N-person game theory provides a logical framework for analyzing contests in which there are more than two players or sets of conflicting interests-anything from a hand of poker to the tangled web of international relations. In this sequel to his Two-Person Game Theory, Dr. Rapoport provides a fascinating and lucid introduction to the theory, geared towards readers with little mathematical background but with an appetite for rigorous analysis.Following an introduction to the necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), in Part I the author presents basic concepts and models, including
Evolutionary Theory's Increasing Role in Personality and Social Psychology
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Gregory D. Webster
2007-01-01
Full Text Available Has the emergence of evolutionary psychology had an increasing impact on personality and social psychological research published over the past two decades? If so, is its growing influence substantially different from that of other emerging psychological areas? These questions were addressed in the present study by conducting a content analysis of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP from 1985 to 2004 using the PsycINFO online abstract database. Specifically, keyword searches for “evol*” or “Darwin*” revealed that the percentage of JPSP articles drawing on evolutionary theory was modest, but increased significantly between 1985 and 2004. To compare the growing impact of evolutionary psychology with other psychological areas, similar keywords searches were performed in JPSP for emotion and motivation, judgment and decision making, neuroscience and psychophysiology, stereotyping and prejudice, and terror management theory. The increase in evolutionary theory in JPSP over time was practically equal to the mean increase over time for the other five areas. Thus, evolutionary psychology has played an increasing role in shaping personality and social psychological research over the past 20 years, and is growing at a rate consistent with other emerging psychological areas.
An experimental investigation of evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors game
Hoffman, Moshe; Suetens, Sigrid; Gneezy, U.; Nowak, Martin A.
2015-01-01
Game theory describes social behaviors in humans and other biological organisms. By far, the most powerful tool available to game theorists is the concept of a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is motivated by perfect rationality. NE specifies a strategy for everyone, such that no one would benefit by
An experimental investigation of evolutionary dynamics in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game
Hoffman, M.; Suetens, S.; Gneezy, U.; Nowak, M.A.
2015-01-01
Game theory describes social behaviors in humans and other biological organisms. By far, the most powerful tool available to game theorists is the concept of a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is motivated by perfect rationality. NE specifies a strategy for everyone, such that no one would benefit by
Non-Payoff Monotonic Dynamics in an Evolutionary Game of Courtship
Chacoma, Andrés; Zanette, Damián H
2015-01-01
We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by self-esteem, turns out to be non-payoff monotonic. This property gives rise to nontrivial evolution in the players' strategies, which we study both numerically and analytically.
Evolutionary economic theories of sustainable development
Mulder, P.; van den Bergh, J.C.J.M.
2001-01-01
Sustainable development has become the dominant concept in the study of interactions between the economy and the biophysical environment, as well as a generally accepted goal of environmental policy. So far, economists have predominantly applied standard or neo-classical theory to environmental
Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition
Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M.; Wu, Rongling
2017-03-01
Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention.
Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition.
Wang, Qian; Gosik, Kirk; Xing, Sujuan; Jiang, Libo; Sun, Lidan; Chinchilli, Vernon M; Wu, Rongling
2017-03-01
Epigenetic reprogramming is thought to play a critical role in maintaining the normal development of embryos. How the methylation state of paternal and maternal genomes regulates embryogenesis depends on the interaction and coordination of the gametes of two sexes. While there is abundant research in exploring the epigenetic interactions of sperms and oocytes, a knowledge gap exists in the mechanistic quantitation of these interactions and their impact on embryo development. This review aims at formulating a modeling framework to address this gap through the integration and synthesis of evolutionary game theory and the latest discoveries of the epigenetic control of embryo development by next-generation sequencing. This framework, named epigenetic game theory or epiGame, views embryogenesis as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. By implementing a system of ordinary differential equations, epiGame quantifies the pattern and relative magnitude of the methylation effects on embryogenesis by the mechanisms of cooperation and competition. epiGame may gain new insight into reproductive biology and can be potentially applied to design personalized medicines for genetic disorder intervention. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Niche construction in evolutionary theory: the construction of an ...
Indian Academy of Sciences (India)
2017-07-06
Jul 6, 2017 ... niche construction; standard evolutionary theory; coevolution; natural selection; philosophy of biology; post-truth. ... Jakkur, Bengaluru 560 064, India; Department of Biological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research Mohali, Knowledge City, Sector 81, SAS Nagar, P.O. Manauli, Mohali ...
A Conceptual Analysis of Evolutionary Theory for Teacher Education
van Dijk, Esther M.; Reydon, Thomas A. C.
2010-01-01
In this paper we present a schematic overview of the central concepts in evolutionary theory, setting them off against the background of widespread misconceptions about them. Our aim is to provide high school teachers with (1) an overview of those particular concepts that they can expect students to have difficulties with, (2) a comparison of…
Differential susceptibility to the environment: an evolutionary--neurodevelopmental theory.
Ellis, Bruce J; Boyce, W Thomas; Belsky, Jay; Bakermans-Kranenburg, Marian J; van Ijzendoorn, Marinus H
2011-02-01
Two extant evolutionary models, biological sensitivity to context theory (BSCT) and differential susceptibility theory (DST), converge on the hypothesis that some individuals are more susceptible than others to both negative (risk-promoting) and positive (development-enhancing) environmental conditions. These models contrast with the currently dominant perspective on personal vulnerability and environmental risk: diathesis stress/dual risk. We review challenges to this perspective based on emerging theory and data from the evolutionary, developmental, and health sciences. These challenges signify the need for a paradigm shift in conceptualizing Person x Environment interactions in development. In this context we advance an evolutionary--neurodevelopmental theory, based on DST and BSCT, of the role of neurobiological susceptibility to the environment in regulating environmental effects on adaptation, development, and health. We then outline current thinking about neurogenomic and endophenotypic mechanisms that may underpin neurobiological susceptibility, summarize extant empirical research on differential susceptibility, and evaluate the evolutionary bases and implications of BSCT and DST. Finally, we discuss applied issues including methodological and statistical considerations in conducting differential susceptibility research; issues of ecological, cultural, and racial--ethnic variation in neurobiological susceptibility; and implications of differential susceptibility for designing social programs. We conclude that the differential susceptibility paradigm has far-reaching implications for understanding whether and how much child and adult development responds, for better and for worse, to the gamut of species-typical environmental conditions.
Evolutionary theory as a tool for predicting extinction risk.
Gallagher, Austin J; Hammerschlag, Neil; Cooke, Steven J; Costa, Daniel P; Irschick, Duncan J
2015-02-01
Timely and proactive wildlife conservation requires strategies for determining which species are most at the greatest threat of extinction. Here, we suggest that evolutionary theory, particularly the concept of specialization, can be a useful tool to inform such assessments and may greatly aid in our ability to predict the vulnerabilities of species to anthropogenic impacts. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Moral calculations game theory, logic, and human frailty
Mérő, László
1998-01-01
Are people ever rational? Consider this: You auction off a one-dollar bill to the highest bidder, but you set the rules so that the second highest bidder also has to pay the amount of his last bid, even though he gets nothing. Would people ever enter such an auction? Not only do they, but according to Martin Shubik, the game's inventor, the average winning bid (for a dollar, remember) is $3.40. Many winners report that they bid so high only because their opponent "went completely crazy." This game lies at the intersection of three subjects of eternal fascination: human psychology, morality, and John von Neumann's game theory. Hungarian game-theorist Laszlo Mero introduces us to the basics of game theory, including such concepts as zero-sum games, Prisoner's Dilemma and the origins of altruism; shows how game theory is applicable to fields ranging from physics to politics; and explores the role of rational thinking in the context of many different kinds of thinking. This fascinating, urbane book will interest ...
Using Evolutionary Theory to Guide Mental Health Research.
Durisko, Zachary; Mulsant, Benoit H; McKenzie, Kwame; Andrews, Paul W
2016-03-01
Evolutionary approaches to medicine can shed light on the origins and etiology of disease. Such an approach may be especially useful in psychiatry, which frequently addresses conditions with heterogeneous presentation and unknown causes. We review several previous applications of evolutionary theory that highlight the ways in which psychiatric conditions may persist despite and because of natural selection. One lesson from the evolutionary approach is that some conditions currently classified as disorders (because they cause distress and impairment) may actually be caused by functioning adaptations operating "normally" (as designed by natural selection). Such conditions suggest an alternative illness model that may generate alternative intervention strategies. Thus, the evolutionary approach suggests that psychiatry should sometimes think differently about distress and impairment. The complexity of the human brain, including normal functioning and potential for dysfunctions, has developed over evolutionary time and has been shaped by natural selection. Understanding the evolutionary origins of psychiatric conditions is therefore a crucial component to a complete understanding of etiology. © The Author(s) 2016.
Evolutionary, Iterative Optimum-Optimorum Theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Adriana NĂSTASE
2010-12-01
Full Text Available The performing of the aerodynamical, global optimized (GO shape of flying configurations(FCs leads to an enlarged variational problem with free boundaries. The optimum-optimorum theorywas developed by the author in order to solve this enlarged variational problem, inside of a class ofFCs, with some chosen common properties. This theory was used for the inviscid GO shape of threemodels with high aerodynamical performances, namely: ADELA (a delta wing alone and of twointegrated wing-fuselage FCs FADET I and FADET II, flying in supersonic flow. The refinement ofthe optimization strategy, in form of an evolutive, iterative optimum-optimorum theory, is herepresented. The inviscid GO shape of FC, represents now only the first step of this iterative method. Acomputational checking of this shape is made by using new hybrid analytical-numerical solutions forthe Navier-Stokes layer. The total drag coefficient (including friction is computed and a weakinteraction aerodynamics/ structure, via new and/or modified constraints is proposed. Up the secondstep of iteration process, a migration in the drag functional and in the constraints is performed.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Qing Sun
2015-01-01
Full Text Available Social networks are formed by individuals, in which personalities, utility functions, and interaction rules are made as close to reality as possible. Taking the competitive product-related information as a case, we proposed a game-theoretic model for competitive information dissemination in social networks. The model is presented to explain how human factors impact competitive information dissemination which is described as the dynamic of a coordination game and players’ payoff is defined by a utility function. Then we design a computational system that integrates the agent, the evolutionary game, and the social network. The approach can help to visualize the evolution of % of competitive information adoption and diffusion, grasp the dynamic evolution features in information adoption game over time, and explore microlevel interactions among users in different network structure under various scenarios. We discuss several scenarios to analyze the influence of several factors on the dissemination of competitive information, ranging from personality of individuals to structure of networks.
Modeling Routinization in Games: An Information Theory Approach
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Wallner, Simon; Pichlmair, Martin; Hecher, Michael
2015-01-01
-time, discrete-space Markov chains and information theory to measure the actual error between the dynamically trained models and the player interaction. Preliminary research supports the hypothesis that Markov chains can be effectively used to model routinization in games. A full study design is presented......Routinization is the result of practicing until an action stops being a goal-directed process. This paper formulates a definition of routinization in games based on prior research in the fields of activity theory and practice theory. Routinization is analyzed using the formal model of discrete...
Design games : A conceptual framework for dynamic evolutionary design
Sönmez, N.O.; Erdem, A.
2014-01-01
Most evolutionary computation (EC) applications in design fields either assume simplified, static, performance-oriented procedures for design or focus on well-defined sub-problems, to be able to impose problem-solving and optimization schemes on design tasks, which render known EC techniques
Route Choice Model Based on Game Theory for Commuters
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Licai Yang
2016-06-01
Full Text Available The traffic behaviours of commuters may cause traffic congestion during peak hours. Advanced Traffic Information System can provide dynamic information to travellers. Due to the lack of timeliness and comprehensiveness, the provided information cannot satisfy the travellers’ needs. Since the assumptions of traditional route choice model based on Expected Utility Theory conflict with the actual situation, a route choice model based on Game Theory is proposed to provide reliable route choice to commuters in actual situation in this paper. The proposed model treats the alternative routes as game players and utilizes the precision of predicted information and familiarity of traffic condition to build a game. The optimal route can be generated considering Nash Equilibrium by solving the route choice game. Simulations and experimental analysis show that the proposed model can describe the commuters’ routine route choice decisionexactly and the provided route is reliable.
Basanta, David; Scott, Jacob G.; Rockne, Russ; Swanson, Kristin R.; Anderson, Alexander R. A.
2011-02-01
Recent advances in clinical medicine have elucidated two significantly different subtypes of glioblastoma which carry very different prognoses, both defined by mutations in isocitrate dehydrogenase-1 (IDH-1). The mechanistic consequences of this mutation have not yet been fully clarified, with conflicting opinions existing in the literature; however, IDH-1 mutation may be used as a surrogate marker to distinguish between primary and secondary glioblastoma multiforme (sGBM) from malignant progression of a lower grade glioma. We develop a mathematical model of IDH-1 mutated secondary glioblastoma using evolutionary game theory to investigate the interactions between four different phenotypic populations within the tumor: autonomous growth, invasive, glycolytic, and the hybrid invasive/glycolytic cells. Our model recapitulates glioblastoma behavior well and is able to reproduce two recent experimental findings, as well as make novel predictions concerning the rate of invasive growth as a function of vascularity, and fluctuations in the proportions of phenotypic populations that a glioblastoma will experience under different microenvironmental constraints.
Non-cooperative game theory in biology and cooperative reasoning in humans.
Kabalak, Alihan; Smirnova, Elena; Jost, Jürgen
2015-06-01
The readiness for spontaneous cooperation together with the assumptions that others share this cooperativity has been identified as a fundamental feature that distinguishes humans from other animals, including the great apes. At the same time, cooperativity presents an evolutionary puzzle because non-cooperators do better in a group of cooperators. We develop here an analysis of the process leading to cooperation in terms of rationality concepts, game theory and epistemic logic. We are, however, not attempting to reconstruct the actual evolutionary process. We rather want to provide the logical structure underlying cooperation in order to understand why cooperation is possible and what kind of reasoning and beliefs would lead to cooperative decision-making. Game theory depends on an underlying common belief in non-cooperative rationality of the players, and cooperativity similarly can utilize a common belief in cooperative rationality as its basis. We suggest a weaker concept of rational decision-making in games that encompasses both types of decision-making. We build this up in stages, starting from simple optimization, then using anticipation of the reaction of others, to finally arrive at reflexive and cooperative reasoning. While each stage is more difficult than the preceding, importantly, we also identify a reduction of complexity achieved by the consistent application of higher stage reasoning.
"Depletion": A Game with Natural Rules for Teaching Reaction Rate Theory.
Olbris, Donald J.; Herzfeld, Judith
2002-01-01
Depletion is a game that reinforces central concepts of reaction rate theory through simulation. Presents the game with a set of follow-up questions suitable for either a quiz or discussion. Also describes student reaction to the game. (MM)
APPLICATION OF GAME THEORY TO OPTIMIZATION OF OUTPUT
Obloga V. V.; Chernenko T. A.
2015-01-01
The article is devoted to modeling and analysis of gaming schemes in game theory to optimize production. The following scheme was designed for organizations engaged in production of seasonal items. To improve the economic viability of production of the three available types of products we offer using pure strategies. We have given the desire to maximize profit organization under the conditions when consumers seek to minimize their costs, and we simulate realistic market conditions. Theoretica...
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Tom R. Burns
2017-09-01
Full Text Available This article draws on earlier work in social system theorizing and analysis—in particular, the theory of social rule systems. On the basis of this foundational work, its aim is to systematically link theories of social groups and organizations, on the one hand, and social science game and interaction theory, on the other hand. Rule system theory has contributed to significant features of group theory and social science game theory. It is a cultural-institutional approach to conceptualizing group systems and games. We explore how groups and their particular games can be effectively described, analyzed, and compared—and their similarities and differences identified on a systematic basis. For illustrative purposes, we present a selection of several ideal types of groups: a military unit, a terrorist group, a recreational or social group, a research group, and a business entity, each of whom has a distinct rule configuration making for particular “rules of the game” and game patterns of interaction and outcome.
An IUR evolutionary game model on the patent cooperate of Shandong China
Liu, Mengmeng; Ma, Yinghong; Liu, Zhiyuan; You, Xuemei
2017-06-01
Organizations of industries and university & research institutes cooperate to meet their respective needs based on social contacts, trust and share complementary resources. From the perspective of complex network together with the patent data of Shandong province in China, a novel evolutionary game model on patent cooperation network is presented. Two sides in the game model are industries and universities & research institutes respectively. The cooperation is represented by a connection when a new patent is developed together by the two sides. The optimal strategy of the evolutionary game model is quantified by the average positive cooperation probability p ¯ and the average payoff U ¯ . The feasibility of this game model is simulated on the parameters such as the knowledge spillover, the punishment, the development cost and the distribution coefficient of the benefit. The numerical simulations show that the cooperative behaviors are affected by the variation of parameters. The knowledge spillover displays different behaviors when the punishment is larger than the development cost or less than it. Those results indicate that reasonable punishment would improve the positive cooperation. The appropriate punishment will be useful to enhance the big degree nodes positively cooperate with industries and universities & research institutes. And an equitable plan for the distribution of cooperative profits is half-and-half distribution strategy for the two sides in game.
Mai, Yazong
2017-12-01
In the context of the upcoming implementation of the environmental tax policy, there is a need for a focus on the relationship between government regulation and corporate emissions. To achieve the real effect of environmental tax policy, government need to regulate the illegal emissions of enterprises. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper analyses the strategic set of government regulators and polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy. By using the evolutionary game model, the utility function and payoff matrix of the both sides are constructed, and the evolutionary analysis and strategy adjustment of the environmental governance target and the actual profit of the stakeholders are carried out. Thus, the wrong behaviours could be corrected so that the equilibrium of the evolutionary system can be achieved gradually, which could also get the evolutionary stable strategies of the government and the polluting enterprises in the implementation of environmental tax policy.
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Toft-Nielsen, Claus; Krogager, Stinne Gunder Strøm
2015-01-01
This article investigates digital game play (gaming) as a specific media field (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 72), in which especially gaming capital (Consalvo, 2007) functions as a theoretical lens. We aim to analyse the specific practices that constitute and are constituted in and around gaming....... This multitude of practices is theoretically qualified by the second generation of practice theorists, including (Bruchler & Postill, 2010; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2008; Warde, 2005). The empirical data are drawn from qualitative studies of gamers and gaming practices (focus groups as well as participant...... observations), and function as exemplary cases that illustrate our theoretical arguments. Our purpose is to analytically operationalize field theory, by means of practice theory, to enhance our understanding of digital games as new media and the specific contexts and media practices herein....
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Claus Toft-Nielsen
2015-05-01
Full Text Available This article investigates digital game play (gaming as a specific media field (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 72, in which especially gaming capital (Consalvo, 2007 functions as a theoretical lens. We aim to analyse the specific practices that constitute and are constituted in and around gaming. This multitude of practices is theoretically qualified by the second generation of practice theorists, including (Bruchler & Postill, 2010; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 2008; Warde, 2005. The empirical data are drawn from qualitative studies of gamers and gaming practices (focus groups as well as participant observations, and function as exemplary cases that illustrate our theoretical arguments. Our purpose is to analytically operationalize field theory, by means of practice theory, to enhance our understanding of digital games as new media and the specific contexts and media practices herein.
Computer Game Theories for Designing Motivating Educational Software: A Survey Study
Ang, Chee Siang; Rao, G. S. V. Radha Krishna
2008-01-01
The purpose of this study is to evaluate computer game theories for educational software. We propose a framework for designing engaging educational games based on contemporary game studies which includes ludology and narratology. Ludology focuses on the study of computer games as play and game activities, while narratology revolves around the…
Academic Training Lecture | Game Theory | 8 - 9 May
2014-01-01
Game Theory (1 & 2), by Elias Koutsoupias (Professor of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK). Thursday 8 May and Friday 9 May from 11 a.m. to 12 a.m. CERN (500-1-001 - Main Auditorium) Description: This lecture series will present the main directions of Algorithmic Game Theory, a new field that has emerged in the last two decades at the interface of Game Theory and Computer Science, because of the unprecedented growth in size, complexity, and impact of the Internet and the Web. These include the price of anarchy (what is the impact of selfishness on a system of competing entities), computational complexity (can the market find a reasonable solution), mechanisms and auctions (what incentives to give to selfish individuals). See the Indico page here.
Game theory and cost allocation problems
Tijs, S.H.; Driessen, Theo
1986-01-01
Problems of allocating joint costs in a reasonable way arise in many practical situations where people decide to work together to save costs. Cost allocation methods based on game theoretical concepts take into account the strategic aspects of cost allocation situations. We give a survey of cost
Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games.
Pichugin, Yuriy; Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Garcia, Julián; Traulsen, Arne; Rainey, Paul B
2015-12-21
The evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations has received much attention, but little is known about the effects of different modes of migration of individuals between groups. Here, we have incorporated four different modes of migration that differ in the degree of coordination among the individuals. For each mode of migration, we identify the set of multiplayer games in which the cooperative strategy has higher fixation probability than defection. The comparison shows that the set of games under which cooperation may evolve generally expands depending upon the degree of coordination among the migrating individuals. Weak altruism can evolve under all modes of individual migration, provided that the benefit to cost ratio is high enough. Strong altruism, however, evolves only if the mode of migration involves coordination of individual actions. Depending upon the migration frequency and degree of coordination among individuals, conditions that allow selection to work at the level of groups can be established. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
McDowell, J J; Calvin, Olivia L; Hackett, Ryan; Klapes, Bryan
2017-07-01
Two competing predictions of matching theory and an evolutionary theory of behavior dynamics, and one additional prediction of the evolutionary theory, were tested in a critical experiment in which human participants worked on concurrent schedules for money (Dallery et al., 2005). The three predictions concerned the descriptive adequacy of matching theory equations, and of equations describing emergent equilibria of the evolutionary theory. Tests of the predictions falsified matching theory and supported the evolutionary theory. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Bacteria and game theory: the rise and fall of cooperation in spatially heterogeneous environments.
Lambert, Guillaume; Vyawahare, Saurabh; Austin, Robert H
2014-08-06
One of the predictions of game theory is that cooperative behaviours are vulnerable to exploitation by selfish individuals, but this result seemingly contradicts the survival of cooperation observed in nature. In this review, we will introduce game theoretical concepts that lead to this conclusion and show how the spatial competition dynamics between microorganisms can be used to model the survival and maintenance of cooperation. In particular, we focus on how Escherichia coli bacteria with a growth advantage in stationary phase (GASP) phenotype maintain a proliferative phenotype when faced with overcrowding to gain a fitness advantage over wild-type populations. We review recent experimental approaches studying the growth dynamics of competing GASP and wild-type strains of E. coli inside interconnected microfabricated habitats and use a game theoretical approach to analyse the observed inter-species interactions. We describe how the use of evolutionary game theory and the ideal free distribution accurately models the spatial distribution of cooperative and selfish individuals in spatially heterogeneous environments. Using bacteria as a model system of cooperative and selfish behaviours may lead to a better understanding of the competition dynamics of other organisms-including tumour-host interactions during cancer development and metastasis.
The microbiome beyond the horizon of ecological and evolutionary theory.
Koskella, Britt; Hall, Lindsay J; Metcalf, C Jessica E
2017-11-01
The ecological and evolutionary study of community formation, diversity, and stability is rooted in general theory and reinforced by decades of system-specific empirical work. Deploying these ideas to study the assembly, complexity, and dynamics of microbial communities living in and on eukaryotes has proved seductive, but challenging. The success of this research endeavour depends on our capacity to observe and characterize the distributions, abundances, and functional traits of microbiota, representing an array of technical and analytical challenges. Furthermore, a number of unique characteristics of microbial species, such as horizontal gene transfer, the production of public goods, toxin and antibiotic production, rapid evolution, and feedbacks between the microbiome and its host, are not easily accommodated by current ecological and evolutionary theory. Here we highlight potential pitfalls in the application of existing theoretical tools without careful consideration of the unique complexities of the microbiome, focusing particularly on the issue of human health, and anchoring our discussion in existing empirical evidence.
López Alonso, Diego; Ortiz-Rodríguez, Isabel M
2017-04-21
Some researchers support the belief that man evolved philandering behavior because of the greater reproductive success of promiscuous males. According to this idea, deserting behavior from the man should be expected along with null paternal involvement in offspring care. Paradoxically however, the average offspring investment in the human male is far higher than that of any other male mammal, including other primates. In our work, we have addressed this conundrum by employing evolutionary game theory, using objective payoffs instead of, as are commonly used, arbitrary payoffs. Payoffs were computed as reproductive successes by a model based on trivial probabilities, implemented within the Barreto's Population Dynamics Toolbox (2014). The evolution of the parent conflict was simulated by a game with two players (the woman and the man). First, a simple game was assayed with two strategies, 'desert-unfaithful' and 'care-faithful'. Then, the game was played with a third mixed strategy, 'care-unfaithful'. The two-strategy game results were mainly determined by the offspring survival rate (s) and the non-paternity rate (z), with remaining factors playing a secondary role. Starting from two empirical estimates for both rates (s = 0.617 and z = 0.033) and decreasing the offspring mortality from near 0.4 to 0.1, the results were consistent with a win for the 'care-faithful' strategy. The 'desert-unfaithful' strategy only won at unrealistically high non-paternity rates (z>0.2). When three-strategy games were played, the mixed strategy of 'care-unfaithful' man could win the game in some less frequent cases. Regardless of the number of game strategies, 'care' fathers always won. These results strongly suggest that offspring mortality was the key factor in the evolution of paternal investment within the Homo branch. The 'care-faithful' strategy would have been the main strategy in human evolution but 'care-unfaithful' men did evolve at a lesser frequency. It can therefore be
Mathematical programming and game theory for decision making
Bapat, R B; Das, A K; Parthasarathy, T
2008-01-01
This edited book presents recent developments and state-of-the-art review in various areas of mathematical programming and game theory. It is a peer-reviewed research monograph under the ISI Platinum Jubilee Series on Statistical Science and Interdisciplinary Research. This volume provides a panoramic view of theory and the applications of the methods of mathematical programming to problems in statistics, finance, games and electrical networks. It also provides an important as well as timely overview of research trends and focuses on the exciting areas like support vector machines, bilevel pro
A Game Theory Approach for Product Specialization in International Trade
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Ioana-Veronica ALEXA
2011-11-01
Full Text Available Game theory, in its most basic form, considers two players and analyses the different strategies that they can use and the effect that these strategies will have on each player. International trade allows countries to use better their resources (labor, technology or capital. Since countries have different capital or natural resources, some of them will produce a good more efficiently than others and therefore could sell it cheaper than other countries. By using game theory in international trade we could determine if the H-O-S model is correct and what would be the best specialization for each country.
Cognitive hierarchy theory and two-person games
Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos; Moreno, Yamir
2016-01-01
The outcome of many social and economic interactions, such as stock-market transactions, is strongly determined by the predictions that agents make about the behavior of other individuals. Cognitive Hierarchy Theory provides a framework to model the consequences of forecasting accuracy that has proven to fit data from certain types of game theory experiments, such as Keynesian Beauty Contests and Entry Games. Here, we focus on symmetric two-players-two-actions games and establish an algorithm to find the players' strategies according to the Cognitive Hierarchy Approach. We show that the Snowdrift Game exhibits a pattern of behavior whose complexity grows as the cognitive levels of players increases. In addition to finding the solutions up to the third cognitive level, we demonstrate, in this theoretical frame, two new properties of snowdrift games: i) any snowdrift game can be characterized by only a parameter -- its class, ii) they are anti-symmetric with respect to the diagonal of the pay-off's space. Final...
Mean-field approximations of fixation time distributions of evolutionary game dynamics on graphs
Ying, Li-Min; Zhou, Jie; Tang, Ming; Guan, Shu-Guang; Zou, Yong
2018-02-01
The mean fixation time is often not accurate for describing the timescales of fixation probabilities of evolutionary games taking place on complex networks. We simulate the game dynamics on top of complex network topologies and approximate the fixation time distributions using a mean-field approach. We assume that there are two absorbing states. Numerically, we show that the mean fixation time is sufficient in characterizing the evolutionary timescales when network structures are close to the well-mixing condition. In contrast, the mean fixation time shows large inaccuracies when networks become sparse. The approximation accuracy is determined by the network structure, and hence by the suitability of the mean-field approach. The numerical results show good agreement with the theoretical predictions.
Older partner selection promotes the prevalence of cooperation in evolutionary games.
Yang, Guoli; Huang, Jincai; Zhang, Weiming
2014-10-21
Evolutionary games typically come with the interplays between evolution of individual strategy and adaptation to network structure. How these dynamics in the co-evolution promote (or obstruct) the cooperation is regarded as an important topic in social, economic, and biological fields. Combining spatial selection with partner choice, the focus of this paper is to identify which neighbour should be selected as a role to imitate during the process of co-evolution. Age, an internal attribute and kind of local piece of information regarding the survivability of the agent, is a significant consideration for the selection strategy. The analysis and simulations presented, demonstrate that older partner selection for strategy imitation could foster the evolution of cooperation. The younger partner selection, however, may decrease the level of cooperation. Our model highlights the importance of agent׳s age on the promotion of cooperation in evolutionary games, both efficiently and effectively. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Vaccination and the theory of games
Bauch, Chris T.; Earn, David J. D.
2004-01-01
Voluntary vaccination policies for childhood diseases present parents with a subtle challenge: if a sufficient proportion of the population is already immune, either naturally or by vaccination, then even the slightest risk associated with vaccination will outweigh the risk from infection. As a result, individual self-interest might preclude complete eradication of a vaccine-preventable disease. We show that a formal game theoretical analysis of this problem leads to new insights that help to...
The Application of Gaming Theory in Health Care.
Elzein, Ashley; Drenkard, Karen; Deyo, Patricia; Swartwout, Ellen
2015-01-01
As the US health care system moves rapidly toward a population health management focus in communities and care settings, the chief nursing officer has an opportunity to lead innovation efforts for patient care. One innovative strategy for use to influence patient behavior change, ongoing clinical education, and prelicensure education is the application of gaming theory into learning strategies. With the ever-increasing emphasis the general public is placing on social media and online gaming, there has been a significant push by the health sector in recent years to harness this medium for use in health management, education, and behavior change. A number of organizations and insurers have dedicated significant resources to researching and developing games and apps to help patients manage diseases, track self-management activities, and motivate behavior change for healthy lifestyles. This article shares information about gaming theory and its application to health care including a review of the science behind the theory, the use of technology, and gaming education strategies for both patients and clinicians.
Playing Multi-Action Adversarial Games: Online Evolutionary Planning versus Tree Search
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Justesen, Niels; Mahlmann, Tobias; Risi, Sebastian
2017-01-01
We address the problem of playing turn-based multi-action adversarial games, which include many strategy games with extremely high branching factors as players take multiple actions each turn. This leads to the breakdown of standard tree search methods, including Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS......), as they become unable to reach a sufficient depth in the game tree. In this paper, we introduce Online Evolutionary Planning (OEP) to address this challenge, which searches for combinations of actions to perform during a single turn guided by a fitness function that evaluates the quality of a particular state...... of plans more efficiently than any of the tested tree search methods as it has a relative advantage when the number of actions per turn increases....
Metric clusters in evolutionary games on scale-free networks.
Kleineberg, Kaj-Kolja
2017-12-01
The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas in structured populations has been studied extensively in recent years. Whereas many theoretical studies have found that a heterogeneous network of contacts favors cooperation, the impact of spatial effects in scale-free networks is still not well understood. In addition to being heterogeneous, real contact networks exhibit a high mean local clustering coefficient, which implies the existence of an underlying metric space. Here we show that evolutionary dynamics in scale-free networks self-organize into spatial patterns in the underlying metric space. The resulting metric clusters of cooperators are able to survive in social dilemmas as their spatial organization shields them from surrounding defectors, similar to spatial selection in Euclidean space. We show that under certain conditions these metric clusters are more efficient than the most connected nodes at sustaining cooperation and that heterogeneity does not always favor-but can even hinder-cooperation in social dilemmas.
Review of game theory applications for situation awareness
Blasch, Erik; Shen, Dan; Pham, Khanh D.; Chen, Genshe
2015-05-01
Game theoretical methods have been used for spectral awareness, space situational awareness (SSA), cyber situational awareness (CSA), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance situation awareness (ISA). Each of these cases, awareness is supported by sensor estimation for assessment and the situation is determined from the actions of multiple players. Game theory assumes rational actors in a defined scenario; however, variations in social, cultural and behavioral factors include the dynamic nature of the context. In a dynamic data-driven application system (DDDAS), modeling must include both the measurements but also how models are used by different actors with different priorities. In this paper, we highlight the applications of game theory by reviewing the literature to determine the current state of the art and future needs. Future developments would include building towards knowledge awareness with information technology (e.g., data aggregation, access, indexing); multiscale analysis (e.g., space, time, and frequency), and software methods (e.g., architectures, cloud computing, protocols).
Evolution and development: some insights from evolutionary theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
DAVID JEAN R.
2001-01-01
Full Text Available Developmental biology and evolutionary biology are both mature integrative disciplines which started in the 19th century and then followed parallel and independent scientific pathways. Recently, a genetical component has stepped into both disciplines (developmental genetics and evolutionary genetics pointing out the need for future convergent maturation. Indeed, the Evo-Devo approach is becoming popular among developmental biologists, based on the facts that distant groups share a common ancestry, that precise phylogenies can be worked out and that homologous genes often play similar roles during the development of very different organisms. In this essay, I try to show that the real future of Evo-Devo thinking is still broader. The evolutionary theory is a set of diverse concepts which can and should be used in any biological field. Evolutionary thinking trains to ask « why » questions and to provide logical and plausible answers. It can shed some light on a diversity of general problems such as how to distinguish homologies from analogies, the costs and benefits of multicellularity, the origin of novel structures (e.g. the head, or the evolution of sexual reproduction. In the next decade, we may expect a progressive convergence between developmental genetics and quantitative genetics.
A novel classification system for evolutionary aging theories.
Trindade, Lucas S; Aigaki, Toshiro; Peixoto, Alexandre A; Balduino, Alex; Mânica da Cruz, Ivana B; Heddle, Jonathan G
2013-01-01
Theories of lifespan evolution are a source of confusion amongst aging researchers. After a century of aging research the dispute over whether the aging process is active or passive persists and a comprehensive and universally accepted theoretical model remains elusive. Evolutionary aging theories primarily dispute whether the aging process is exclusively adapted to favor the kin or exclusively non-adapted to favor the individual. Interestingly, contradictory data and theories supporting both exclusively programmed and exclusively non-programmed theories continue to grow. However, this is a false dichotomy; natural selection favors traits resulting in efficient reproduction whether they benefit the individual or the kin. Thus, to understand the evolution of aging, first we must understand the environment-dependent balance between the advantages and disadvantages of extended lifespan in the process of spreading genes. As described by distinct theories, different niches and environmental conditions confer on extended lifespan a range of fitness values varying from highly beneficial to highly detrimental. Here, we considered the range of fitness values for extended lifespan and develop a fitness-based framework for categorizing existing theories. We show that all theories can be classified into four basic types: secondary (beneficial), maladaptive (neutral), assisted death (detrimental), and senemorphic aging (varying between beneficial to detrimental). We anticipate that this classification system will assist with understanding and interpreting aging/death by providing a way of considering theories as members of one of these classes rather than consideration of their individual details.
Group decisions in biodiversity conservation: implications from game theory.
Frank, David M; Sarkar, Sahotra
2010-05-27
Decision analysis and game theory have proved useful tools in various biodiversity conservation planning and modeling contexts. This paper shows how game theory may be used to inform group decisions in biodiversity conservation scenarios by modeling conflicts between stakeholders to identify Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. These are cases in which each agent pursuing individual self-interest leads to a worse outcome for all, relative to other feasible outcomes. Three case studies from biodiversity conservation contexts showing this feature are modeled to demonstrate how game-theoretical representation can inform group decision-making. The mathematical theory of games is used to model three biodiversity conservation scenarios with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria: (i) a two-agent case involving wild dogs in South Africa; (ii) a three-agent raptor and grouse conservation scenario from the United Kingdom; and (iii) an n-agent fish and coral conservation scenario from the Philippines. In each case there is reason to believe that traditional mechanism-design solutions that appeal to material incentives may be inadequate, and the game-theoretical analysis recommends a resumption of further deliberation between agents and the initiation of trust--and confidence--building measures. Game theory can and should be used as a normative tool in biodiversity conservation contexts: identifying scenarios with Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria enables constructive action in order to achieve (closer to) optimal conservation outcomes, whether by policy solutions based on mechanism design or otherwise. However, there is mounting evidence that formal mechanism-design solutions may backfire in certain cases. Such scenarios demand a return to group deliberation and the creation of reciprocal relationships of trust.
GIS AND GAME THEORY FOR WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
N. Ganjali
2017-11-01
Full Text Available In this study, aspects of Game theory and its application on water resources management combined with GIS techniques are detailed. First, each term is explained and the advantages and limitations of its aspect is discussed. Then, the nature of combinations between each pair and literature on the previous studies are given. Several cases were investigated and results were magnified in order to conclude with the applicability and combination of GIS- Game Theory- Water Resources Management. It is concluded that the game theory is used relatively in limited studies of water management fields such as cost/benefit allocation among users, water allocation among trans-boundary users in water resources, water quality management, groundwater management, analysis of water policies, fair allocation of water resources development cost and some other narrow fields. Also, Decision-making in environmental projects requires consideration of trade-offs between socio-political, environmental, and economic impacts and is often complicated by various stakeholder views. Most of the literature on water allocation and conflict problems uses traditional optimization models to identify the most efficient scheme while the Game Theory, as an optimization method, combined GIS are beneficial platforms for agent based models to be used in solving Water Resources Management problems in the further studies.
GIS and Game Theory for Water Resource Management
Ganjali, N.; Guney, C.
2017-11-01
In this study, aspects of Game theory and its application on water resources management combined with GIS techniques are detailed. First, each term is explained and the advantages and limitations of its aspect is discussed. Then, the nature of combinations between each pair and literature on the previous studies are given. Several cases were investigated and results were magnified in order to conclude with the applicability and combination of GIS- Game Theory- Water Resources Management. It is concluded that the game theory is used relatively in limited studies of water management fields such as cost/benefit allocation among users, water allocation among trans-boundary users in water resources, water quality management, groundwater management, analysis of water policies, fair allocation of water resources development cost and some other narrow fields. Also, Decision-making in environmental projects requires consideration of trade-offs between socio-political, environmental, and economic impacts and is often complicated by various stakeholder views. Most of the literature on water allocation and conflict problems uses traditional optimization models to identify the most efficient scheme while the Game Theory, as an optimization method, combined GIS are beneficial platforms for agent based models to be used in solving Water Resources Management problems in the further studies.
Perspective of Game Theory in Education for Sustainable Development
Ahrens, A.; Zascerinska, J.
2012-01-01
The sustainable development of society has attracted a lot of research efforts. A strategic aspect to the society's evolution is introduced by the game theory (Fernandez, 2011, p. 1). The research question is as follows: how to organize the process of teaching and learning in education for sustainable development? The aim of the research is to…
Social decision-making: Insights from game theory and neuroscience
Sanfey, A.G.
2007-01-01
By combining the models and tasks of Game Theory with modern psychological and neuroscientific methods, the neuroeconomic approach to the study of social decision-making has the potential to extend our knowledge of brain mechanisms involved in social decisions and to advance theoretical models of
Collaboration in classical political economy and noncooperative game theory.
McCain, Roger A
2014-06-01
This commentary suggests (1) that there are precedents for Smaldino's "collaboration" in the history of economic thought before 1900 and (2) that the distinction of collaboration from what is thought of as cooperation in game theory is less clear than Smaldino suggests.
Cultural evolutionary theory: How culture evolves and why it matters.
Creanza, Nicole; Kolodny, Oren; Feldman, Marcus W
2017-07-24
Human cultural traits-behaviors, ideas, and technologies that can be learned from other individuals-can exhibit complex patterns of transmission and evolution, and researchers have developed theoretical models, both verbal and mathematical, to facilitate our understanding of these patterns. Many of the first quantitative models of cultural evolution were modified from existing concepts in theoretical population genetics because cultural evolution has many parallels with, as well as clear differences from, genetic evolution. Furthermore, cultural and genetic evolution can interact with one another and influence both transmission and selection. This interaction requires theoretical treatments of gene-culture coevolution and dual inheritance, in addition to purely cultural evolution. In addition, cultural evolutionary theory is a natural component of studies in demography, human ecology, and many other disciplines. Here, we review the core concepts in cultural evolutionary theory as they pertain to the extension of biology through culture, focusing on cultural evolutionary applications in population genetics, ecology, and demography. For each of these disciplines, we review the theoretical literature and highlight relevant empirical studies. We also discuss the societal implications of the study of cultural evolution and of the interactions of humans with one another and with their environment.
Defending Against Advanced Persistent Threats Using Game-Theory.
Rass, Stefan; König, Sandra; Schauer, Stefan
2017-01-01
Advanced persistent threats (APT) combine a variety of different attack forms ranging from social engineering to technical exploits. The diversity and usual stealthiness of APT turns them into a central problem of contemporary practical system security, since information on attacks, the current system status or the attacker's incentives is often vague, uncertain and in many cases even unavailable. Game theory is a natural approach to model the conflict between the attacker and the defender, and this work investigates a generalized class of matrix games as a risk mitigation tool for an advanced persistent threat (APT) defense. Unlike standard game and decision theory, our model is tailored to capture and handle the full uncertainty that is immanent to APTs, such as disagreement among qualitative expert risk assessments, unknown adversarial incentives and uncertainty about the current system state (in terms of how deeply the attacker may have penetrated into the system's protective shells already). Practically, game-theoretic APT models can be derived straightforwardly from topological vulnerability analysis, together with risk assessments as they are done in common risk management standards like the ISO 31000 family. Theoretically, these models come with different properties than classical game theoretic models, whose technical solution presented in this work may be of independent interest.
Backbones of evolutionary history test biodiversity theory for microbes.
O'Dwyer, James P; Kembel, Steven W; Sharpton, Thomas J
2015-07-07
Identifying the ecological and evolutionary mechanisms that determine biological diversity is a central question in ecology. In microbial ecology, phylogenetic diversity is an increasingly common and relevant means of quantifying community diversity, particularly given the challenges in defining unambiguous species units from environmental sequence data. We explore patterns of phylogenetic diversity across multiple bacterial communities drawn from different habitats and compare these data to evolutionary trees generated using theoretical models of biodiversity. We have two central findings. First, although on finer scales the empirical trees are highly idiosyncratic, on coarse scales the backbone of these trees is simple and robust, consistent across habitats, and displays bursts of diversification dotted throughout. Second, we find that these data demonstrate a clear departure from the predictions of standard neutral theories of biodiversity and that an alternative family of generalized models provides a qualitatively better description. Together, these results lay the groundwork for a theoretical framework to connect ecological mechanisms to observed phylogenetic patterns in microbial communities.
[Symbiogenesis and Synthetic Evolutionary Theory: The Third Synthesis].
Provoro, N A; Tikhonovich, I A; Vorobyov, N I
2015-06-01
Integration of the concepts of symbiogenesis and synthetic evolutionary theory is the main path for the development of evolutionary biology. It is based on the analysis of cooperative adaptations that evolve under the impact of symbiotic-specific selective pressures responsible for the formation of super-species hereditary systems--metagenomes, symbiogenomes, and hologenomes. The genetic integration of nonrelated organisms (symbiogenesis) is determined by the inheritance of microsymbionts by hosts resulted in the complication of mutualistic interactions according to the scheme: pleiotropic symbiosis --> mutual partner's exploitation --> interspecies altruism. This evolution may result in the loss of genetic individuality in microsymbionts; this loss is expressed as a deep reduction in their genomes. A significant number of these may be exported to the host, resulting in the transformation of symbiotic systems into novel, genetically integral organisms.
Fixation of strategies with the Moran and Fermi processes in evolutionary games
Liu, Xuesong; He, Mingfeng; Kang, Yibin; Pan, Qiuhui
2017-10-01
A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite population was built. It combines the standard Moran and Fermi rules with two strategies cooperation and defection. We obtain the expressions of fixation probabilities and fixation times. The one-third rule which has been found in the frequency dependent Moran process also holds for our model. We obtain the conditions of strategy being an evolutionarily stable strategy in our model, and then make a comparison with the standard Moran process. Besides, the analytical results show that compared with the standard Moran process, fixation occurs with higher probabilities under a prisoner's dilemma game and coordination game, but with lower probabilities under a coexistence game. The simulation result shows that the fixation time in our mixed process is lower than that in the standard Fermi process. In comparison with the standard Moran process, fixation always takes more time on average in spatial populations, regardless of the game. In addition, the fixation time decreases with the growth of the number of neighbors.
Yang, Bo; Li, Xiao-Teng; Chen, Wei; Liu, Jian; Chen, Xiao-Song
2016-10-01
Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents v, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model. Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 11121403 and 11504384
Functional Interdependence Theory: An Evolutionary Account of Social Situations.
Balliet, Daniel; Tybur, Joshua M; Van Lange, Paul A M
2017-11-01
Social interactions are characterized by distinct forms of interdependence, each of which has unique effects on how behavior unfolds within the interaction. Despite this, little is known about the psychological mechanisms that allow people to detect and respond to the nature of interdependence in any given interaction. We propose that interdependence theory provides clues regarding the structure of interdependence in the human ancestral past. In turn, evolutionary psychology offers a framework for understanding the types of information processing mechanisms that could have been shaped under these recurring conditions. We synthesize and extend these two perspectives to introduce a new theory: functional interdependence theory (FIT). FIT can generate testable hypotheses about the function and structure of the psychological mechanisms for inferring interdependence. This new perspective offers insight into how people initiate and maintain cooperative relationships, select social partners and allies, and identify opportunities to signal social motives.
Integrating Health Behavior Theory and Design Elements in Serious Games
Fleming, Theresa; Lucassen, Mathijs FG; Bridgman, Heather; Stasiak, Karolina; Shepherd, Matthew; Orpin, Peter
2015-01-01
Background Internet interventions for improving health and well-being have the potential to reach many people and fill gaps in service provision. Serious gaming interfaces provide opportunities to optimize user adherence and impact. Health interventions based in theory and evidence and tailored to psychological constructs have been found to be more effective to promote behavior change. Defining the design elements which engage users and help them to meet their goals can contribute to better informed serious games. Objective To elucidate design elements important in SPARX, a serious game for adolescents with depression, from a user-centered perspective. Methods We proposed a model based on an established theory of health behavior change and practical features of serious game design to organize ideas and rationale. We analyzed data from 5 studies comprising a total of 22 focus groups and 66 semistructured interviews conducted with youth and families in New Zealand and Australia who had viewed or used SPARX. User perceptions of the game were applied to this framework. Results A coherent framework was established using the three constructs of self-determination theory (SDT), autonomy, competence, and relatedness, to organize user perceptions and design elements within four areas important in design: computer game, accessibility, working alliance, and learning in immersion. User perceptions mapped well to the framework, which may assist developers in understanding the context of user needs. By mapping these elements against the constructs of SDT, we were able to propose a sound theoretical base for the model. Conclusions This study’s method allowed for the articulation of design elements in a serious game from a user-centered perspective within a coherent overarching framework. The framework can be used to deliberately incorporate serious game design elements that support a user’s sense of autonomy, competence, and relatedness, key constructs which have been found
A deeper integration of Selfish Goal Theory and modern evolutionary psychology.
Conroy-Beam, Daniel; Buss, David M
2014-04-01
Conceptually integrating Selfish Goal Theory with modern evolutionary psychology amplifies theoretical power. Inconsistency, a key principle of Selfish Goal Theory, illustrates this insight. Conflicting goals of seeking sexual variety and successful mate retention furnish one example. Siblings have evolved goals to cooperate and compete, a second example. Integrating Selfish Goal Theory with evolutionary theory can explain much inconsistent goal-directed behavior.
Game theory in the death galaxy: interaction of cancer and stromal cells in tumour microenvironment.
Wu, Amy; Liao, David; Tlsty, Thea D; Sturm, James C; Austin, Robert H
2014-08-06
Preventing relapse is the major challenge to effective therapy in cancer. Within the tumour, stromal (ST) cells play an important role in cancer progression and the emergence of drug resistance. During cancer treatment, the fitness of cancer cells can be enhanced by ST cells because their molecular signalling interaction delays the drug-induced apoptosis of cancer cells. On the other hand, competition among cancer and ST cells for space or resources should not be ignored. We explore the population dynamics of multiple myeloma (MM) versus bone marrow ST cells by using an experimental microecology that we call the death galaxy, with a stable drug gradient and connected microhabitats. Evolutionary game theory is a quantitative way to capture the frequency-dependent nature of interactive populations. Therefore, we use evolutionary game theory to model the populations in the death galaxy with the gradients of pay-offs and successfully predict the future densities of MM and ST cells. We discuss the possible clinical use of such analysis for predicting cancer progression.
International conference on dynamical systems and game theory
Peixoto, Mauricio Matos; Rand, David A J; Dynamics, Games and Science II
2011-01-01
"Dynamics, Games and Science I and II" are a selection of surveys and research articles written by leading researchers in mathematics and its applications to the sciences. The majority of the contributions are on dynamical systems and game theory, focusing either on some of their most fundamental and theoretical developments or on their applications to modeling in biology, economics, engineering, finances and psychology. The aim of these books is to present cutting-edge research in these areas that can encourage graduate students and researchers in mathematics to develop them further
Practical example of game theory application for production route selection
Olender, M.; Krenczyk, D.
2017-08-01
The opportunity which opens before manufacturers on the dynamic market, especially before those from the sector of the small and medium-sized enterprises, is associated with the use of the virtual organizations concept. The planning stage of such organizations could be based on supporting decision-making tasks using the tools and formalisms taken from the game theory. In the paper the model of the virtual manufacturing network, along with the practical example of decision-making situation as two person game and the decision strategies with an analysis of calculation results are presented.
Survey on nonlocal games and operator space theory
Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)
Palazuelos, Carlos, E-mail: cpalazue@mat.ucm.es [Instituto de Ciencias Matemáticas (ICMAT), Facultad de Ciencias Matemáticas, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid (Spain); Vidick, Thomas, E-mail: vidick@cms.caltech.edu [Department of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125 (United States)
2016-01-15
This review article is concerned with a recently uncovered connection between operator spaces, a noncommutative extension of Banach spaces, and quantum nonlocality, a striking phenomenon which underlies many of the applications of quantum mechanics to information theory, cryptography, and algorithms. Using the framework of nonlocal games, we relate measures of the nonlocality of quantum mechanics to certain norms in the Banach and operator space categories. We survey recent results that exploit this connection to derive large violations of Bell inequalities, study the complexity of the classical and quantum values of games and their relation to Grothendieck inequalities, and quantify the nonlocality of different classes of entangled states.
A quantitative evolutionary theory of adaptive behavior dynamics.
McDowell, J J
2013-10-01
The idea that behavior is selected by its consequences in a process analogous to organic evolution has been discussed for over 100 years. A recently proposed theory instantiates this idea by means of a genetic algorithm that operates on a population of potential behaviors. Behaviors in the population are represented by numbers in decimal integer (phenotypic) and binary bit string (genotypic) forms. One behavior from the population is emitted at random each time tick, after which a new population of potential behaviors is constructed by recombining parent behavior bit strings. If the emitted behavior produced a benefit to the organism, then parents are chosen on the basis of their phenotypic similarity to the emitted behavior; otherwise, they are chosen at random. After parent behavior recombination, the population is subjected to a small amount of mutation by flipping random bits in the population's bit strings. The behavior generated by this process of selection, reproduction, and mutation reaches equilibrium states that conform to every empirically valid equation of matching theory, exactly and without systematic error. These equations are known to describe the behavior of many vertebrate species, including humans, in a variety of experimental, naturalistic, natural, and social environments. The evolutionary theory also generates instantaneous dynamics and patterns of preference change in constantly changing environments that are consistent with the dynamics of live-organism behavior. These findings support the assertion that the world of behavior we observe and measure is generated by evolutionary dynamics. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved
A test of evolutionary policing theory with data from human societies.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Rolf Kümmerli
Full Text Available In social groups where relatedness among interacting individuals is low, cooperation can often only be maintained through mechanisms that repress competition among group members. Repression-of-competition mechanisms, such as policing and punishment, seem to be of particular importance in human societies, where cooperative interactions often occur among unrelated individuals. In line with this view, economic games have shown that the ability to punish defectors enforces cooperation among humans. Here, I examine a real-world example of a repression-of-competition system, the police institutions common to modern human societies. Specifically, I test evolutionary policing theory by comparing data on policing effort, per capita crime rate, and similarity (used as a proxy for genetic relatedness among citizens across the 26 cantons of Switzerland. This comparison revealed full support for all three predictions of evolutionary policing theory. First, when controlling for policing efforts, crime rate correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens. This is in line with the prediction that high similarity results in higher levels of cooperative self-restraint (i.e. lower crime rates because it aligns the interests of individuals. Second, policing effort correlated negatively with the similarity among citizens, supporting the prediction that more policing is required to enforce cooperation in low-similarity societies, where individuals' interests diverge most. Third, increased policing efforts were associated with reductions in crime rates, indicating that policing indeed enforces cooperation. These analyses strongly indicate that humans respond to cues of their social environment and adjust cheating and policing behaviour as predicted by evolutionary policing theory.
Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey
Shi, Hai-Yan; Wang, Wan-Liang; Kwok, Ngai-Ming; Chen, Sheng-Yong
2012-01-01
Game theory (GT) is a mathematical method that describes the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. In particular, the theory has been proven very useful in the design of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). This article surveys the recent developments and findings of GT, its applications in WSNs, and provides the community a general view of this vibrant research area. We first introduce the typical formulation of GT in the WSN application domain. The roles of GT are described that include routing protocol design, topology control, power control and energy saving, packet forwarding, data collection, spectrum allocation, bandwidth allocation, quality of service control, coverage optimization, WSN security, and other sensor management tasks. Then, three variations of game theory are described, namely, the cooperative, non-cooperative, and repeated schemes. Finally, existing problems and future trends are identified for researchers and engineers in the field. PMID:23012533
Game Theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Ngai-Ming Kwok
2012-07-01
Full Text Available Game theory (GT is a mathematical method that describes the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. In particular, the theory has been proven very useful in the design of wireless sensor networks (WSNs. This article surveys the recent developments and findings of GT, its applications in WSNs, and provides the community a general view of this vibrant research area. We first introduce the typical formulation of GT in the WSN application domain. The roles of GT are described that include routing protocol design, topology control, power control and energy saving, packet forwarding, data collection, spectrum allocation, bandwidth allocation, quality of service control, coverage optimization, WSN security, and other sensor management tasks. Then, three variations of game theory are described, namely, the cooperative, non-cooperative, and repeated schemes. Finally, existing problems and future trends are identified for researchers and engineers in the field.
Game theory for Wireless Sensor Networks: a survey.
Shi, Hai-Yan; Wang, Wan-Liang; Kwok, Ngai-Ming; Chen, Sheng-Yong
2012-01-01
Game theory (GT) is a mathematical method that describes the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. In particular, the theory has been proven very useful in the design of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). This article surveys the recent developments and findings of GT, its applications in WSNs, and provides the community a general view of this vibrant research area. We first introduce the typical formulation of GT in the WSN application domain. The roles of GT are described that include routing protocol design, topology control, power control and energy saving, packet forwarding, data collection, spectrum allocation, bandwidth allocation, quality of service control, coverage optimization, WSN security, and other sensor management tasks. Then, three variations of game theory are described, namely, the cooperative, non-cooperative, and repeated schemes. Finally, existing problems and future trends are identified for researchers and engineers in the field.
Game theory in models of pedestrian room evacuation.
Bouzat, S; Kuperman, M N
2014-03-01
We analyze the pedestrian evacuation of a rectangular room with a single door considering a lattice gas scheme with the addition of behavioral aspects of the pedestrians. The movement of the individuals is based on random and rational choices and is affected by conflicts between two or more agents that want to advance to the same position. Such conflicts are solved according to certain rules closely related to the concept of strategies in game theory, cooperation and defection. We consider game rules analogous to those from the Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, with payoffs associated to the probabilities of the individuals to advance to the selected site. We find that, even when defecting is the rational choice for any agent, under certain conditions, cooperators can take advantage from mutual cooperation and leave the room more rapidly than defectors.
A novel analytical method for evolutionary graph theory problems.
Shakarian, Paulo; Roos, Patrick; Moores, Geoffrey
2013-02-01
Evolutionary graph theory studies the evolutionary dynamics of populations structured on graphs. A central problem is determining the probability that a small number of mutants overtake a population. Currently, Monte Carlo simulations are used for estimating such fixation probabilities on general directed graphs, since no good analytical methods exist. In this paper, we introduce a novel deterministic framework for computing fixation probabilities for strongly connected, directed, weighted evolutionary graphs under neutral drift. We show how this framework can also be used to calculate the expected number of mutants at a given time step (even if we relax the assumption that the graph is strongly connected), how it can extend to other related models (e.g. voter model), how our framework can provide non-trivial bounds for fixation probability in the case of an advantageous mutant, and how it can be used to find a non-trivial lower bound on the mean time to fixation. We provide various experimental results determining fixation probabilities and expected number of mutants on different graphs. Among these, we show that our method consistently outperforms Monte Carlo simulations in speed by several orders of magnitude. Finally we show how our approach can provide insight into synaptic competition in neurology. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.
Improving Preschoolers' Theory of Mind Skills with Digital Games: A Training Study
Nikolayev, Mariya
2015-01-01
This single-subject research study examined functional relation between digital games enriched with voice-overs and theory of mind (ToM) when game play was either followed or not followed by a discussion focused on the game's content. The study employed multiple baseline design across participants to evaluate the effects of games with mental state…
Chimpanzee choice rates in competitive games match equilibrium game theory predictions.
Martin, Christopher Flynn; Bhui, Rahul; Bossaerts, Peter; Matsuzawa, Tetsuro; Camerer, Colin
2014-06-05
The capacity for strategic thinking about the payoff-relevant actions of conspecifics is not well understood across species. We use game theory to make predictions about choices and temporal dynamics in three abstract competitive situations with chimpanzee participants. Frequencies of chimpanzee choices are extremely close to equilibrium (accurate-guessing) predictions, and shift as payoffs change, just as equilibrium theory predicts. The chimpanzee choices are also closer to the equilibrium prediction, and more responsive to past history and payoff changes, than two samples of human choices from experiments in which humans were also initially uninformed about opponent payoffs and could not communicate verbally. The results are consistent with a tentative interpretation of game theory as explaining evolved behavior, with the additional hypothesis that chimpanzees may retain or practice a specialized capacity to adjust strategy choice during competition to perform at least as well as, or better than, humans have.
Ball game watching theory in the teaching site
Liu, Shugang; Li, Xiufang; Chuang, Chin-Jung
2017-08-01
Lecturing is a common approach in the traditional teaching site. In this paper, we bring a modern model "ball game watching theory" to explain the situation in the classroom. The reason why the audiences going to the court is to enjoy the atmosphere, and it is also the reason why student joining to the class. A successful class running is to create studious atmosphere. However, once the teacher does the demo in the class, the multimedia tool must be used to show the details, as the big display working in the court. The key moment is recorded and the details are magnified. when teaching aids are demonstrated, the multimedia tool plays an important role. The attention of students walks between the teacher and the display. In this ball game watching theory, the demonstrate experience is like the ball game, and the teacher works as an anchor. By following the demonstration proceeding, students build the knowledge by themselves. In addition, the demonstration must be designed to be interesting in order to make the class proceed fluently. The similarity between the ball game watching and the class will be discussed. Finally we suggest a modern class design which can raise learner motivation and achievement.
Electromagnetic game modeling through Tensor Analysis of Networks and Game Theory
Maurice, Olivier; Reineix, Alain; Lalléchère, Sébastien
2014-10-01
A complex system involves events coming from natural behaviors. Whatever is the complicated face of machines, they are still far from the complexity of natural systems. Currently, economy is one of the rare science trying to find out some ways to model human behavior. These attempts involve game theory and psychology. Our purpose is to develop a formalism able to take in charge both game and hardware modeling. We first present the Tensorial Analysis of Networks, used for the material part of the system. Then, we detail the mathematical objects defined in order to describe the evolution of the system and its gaming side. To illustrate the discussion we consider the case of a drone whose electronic can be disturbed by a radar field, but this drone must fly as near as possible close to this radar.
Analysis of Urban Car Owners Commute Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Model
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Huawei Gong
2015-01-01
Full Text Available With the aggravation of the traffic congestion in the city, car owners will have to give up commuting with private cars and take the public transportation instead. The paper uses the replication dynamic mechanism to simulate the learning and adjustment mechanism of the automobile owners commuting mode selection. The evolutionary stable strategy is used to describe the long-term evolution of competition game trend. Finally we simulate equilibrium and stability of an evolution of the game under a payoff imbalance situation. The research shows that a certain proportion of car owners will choose public transit under the pressure of public transport development and heavy traffic, and the proportion will be closely related to the initial conditions and urban transportation development policy.
A game theory analysis of green infrastructure stormwater management policies
William, Reshmina; Garg, Jugal; Stillwell, Ashlynn S.
2017-09-01
Green stormwater infrastructure has been demonstrated as an innovative water resources management approach that addresses multiple challenges facing urban environments. However, there is little consensus on what policy strategies can be used to best incentivize green infrastructure adoption by private landowners. Game theory, an analysis framework that has historically been under-utilized within the context of stormwater management, is uniquely suited to address this policy question. We used a cooperative game theory framework to investigate the potential impacts of different policy strategies used to incentivize green infrastructure installation. The results indicate that municipal regulation leads to the greatest reduction in pollutant loading. However, the choice of the "best" regulatory approach will depend on a variety of different factors including politics and financial considerations. Large, downstream agents have a disproportionate share of bargaining power. Results also reveal that policy impacts are highly dependent on agents' spatial position within the stormwater network, leading to important questions of social equity and environmental justice.
Ensemble method: Community detection based on game theory
Zhang, Xia; Xia, Zhengyou; Xu, Shengwu; Wang, J. D.
2014-08-01
Timely and cost-effective analytics over social network has emerged as a key ingredient for success in many businesses and government endeavors. Community detection is an active research area of relevance to analyze online social network. The problem of selecting a particular community detection algorithm is crucial if the aim is to unveil the community structure of a network. The choice of a given methodology could affect the outcome of the experiments because different algorithms have different advantages and depend on tuning specific parameters. In this paper, we propose a community division model based on the notion of game theory, which can combine advantages of previous algorithms effectively to get a better community classification result. By making experiments on some standard dataset, it verifies that our community detection model based on game theory is valid and better.
Dynamics of prebiotic RNA reproduction illuminated by chemical game theory.
Yeates, Jessica A M; Hilbe, Christian; Zwick, Martin; Nowak, Martin A; Lehman, Niles
2016-05-03
Many origins-of-life scenarios depict a situation in which there are common and potentially scarce resources needed by molecules that compete for survival and reproduction. The dynamics of RNA assembly in a complex mixture of sequences is a frequency-dependent process and mimics such scenarios. By synthesizing Azoarcus ribozyme genotypes that differ in their single-nucleotide interactions with other genotypes, we can create molecules that interact among each other to reproduce. Pairwise interplays between RNAs involve both cooperation and selfishness, quantifiable in a 2 × 2 payoff matrix. We show that a simple model of differential equations based on chemical kinetics accurately predicts the outcomes of these molecular competitions using simple rate inputs into these matrices. In some cases, we find that mixtures of different RNAs reproduce much better than each RNA type alone, reflecting a molecular form of reciprocal cooperation. We also demonstrate that three RNA genotypes can stably coexist in a rock-paper-scissors analog. Our experiments suggest a new type of evolutionary game dynamics, called prelife game dynamics or chemical game dynamics. These operate without template-directed replication, illustrating how small networks of RNAs could have developed and evolved in an RNA world.
A Study on Standard Competition with Network Effect Based on Evolutionary Game Model
Wang, Ye; Wang, Bingdong; Li, Kangning
Owing to networks widespread in modern society, standard competition with network effect is now endowed with new connotation. This paper aims to study the impact of network effect on standard competition; it is organized in the mode of "introduction-model setup-equilibrium analysis-conclusion". Starting from a well-structured model of evolutionary game, it is then extended to a dynamic analysis. This article proves both theoretically and empirically that whether or not a standard can lead the market trends depends on the utility it would bring, and the author also discusses some advisable strategies revolving around the two factors of initial position and border break.
The evolutionary analysis of the ultimatum game based on the net-profit decision
Wang, Lu; Ye, Shun-qiang; Jones, Michael C.; Ye, Ye; Wang, Meng; Xie, Neng-gang
2015-07-01
In an ultimatum game where competitive pressures and alternating roles exist, we suppose that players make their decisions based on the net profit of their own. Here we conduct a behavioral experiment in a selection examination, and then we establish a model and study the evolution of strategies on square lattices. In this model, we specify a player's strategy with two parameters: offer level α ∈ [ 0 , 1) and net profit acceptance level β ∈ [ - 1 , 1) . Evolutionary results show that individuals characterized by fairness (α → 0.5) and moderate kindness (β kindness rather than fairness increases the average payoff of the whole population. Moreover, we conclude that the emergence of kindness is promoted by the spatial structure, and eventually the evolutionary advantage is gained by kindness.
An evolutionary inspection game with labour unions on small-world networks
Kamal, Salahuddin M.; Al-Hadeethi, Yas; Abolaban, Fouad A.; Al-Marzouki, Fahd M.; Perc, Matjaž
2015-03-01
We study an evolutionary inspection game where agents can chose between working and shirking. The evolutionary process is staged on a small-world network, through which agents compare their incomes and, based on the outcome, decide which strategy to adopt. Moreover, we introduce union members that have certain privileges, of which the extent depends on the bargaining power of the union. We determine how the union affects the overall performance of the firm that employs the agents, and what are its influences on the employees. We find that, depending on its bargaining power, the union has significant leverage to deteriorate the productivity of a firm, and consequently also to lower the long-run benefits of the employees.
The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Sloth, Birgitte
1993-01-01
We consider the problem of modeling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts used by the "theory of voting." It is demonstrated that one can avoid using very refined solution...... concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modeled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him...
The bounds of reason game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences
Gintis, Herbert
2014-01-01
Game theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences-from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. However, as The Bounds of Reason demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. Herbert Gintis shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a handicapped enterprise. This edition has been thoroughly revised and updated. Reinvigorati
Genetic Models in Evolutionary Game Theory: The Evolution of Altruism
Rubin, Hannah
2015-01-01
While prior models of the evolution of altruism have assumed that organisms reproduce asexually, this paper presents a model of the evolution of altruism for sexually reproducing organisms using Hardy–Weinberg dynamics. In this model, the presence of reciprocal altruists allows the population to
Paul Samuelson's critique and equilibirum concepts in evolutionary game theory
Joosten, Reinoud A.M.G.
2009-01-01
We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global ray-projection
Economic game theory to model the attenuation of virulence of an obligate intracellular bacterium
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Damian Tago
2016-08-01
Full Text Available Diseases induced by obligate intracellular pathogens have a large burden on global human and animal health. Understanding the factors involved in the virulence and fitness of these pathogens contributes to the development of control strategies against these diseases. Based on biological observations, a theoretical model using game theory is proposed to explain how obligate intracellular bacteria interact with their host. The equilibrium in such a game shows that the virulence and fitness of the bacterium is host-triggered and by changing the host’s defense system to which the bacterium is confronted, an evolutionary process leads to an attenuated strain. Although, the attenuation procedure has already been conducted in practice in order to develop an attenuated vaccine (e.g. with Ehrlichia ruminantium, there was a lack of understanding of the theoretical basis behind this process. Our work provides a model to better comprehend the existence of different phenotypes and some underlying evolutionary mechanisms for the virulence of obligate intracellular bacteria.
Synthesis of robust nonlinear autopilots using differential game theory
Menon, P. K. A.
1991-01-01
A synthesis technique for handling unmodeled disturbances in nonlinear control law synthesis was advanced using differential game theory. Two types of modeling inaccuracies can be included in the formulation. The first is a bias-type error, while the second is the scale-factor-type error in the control variables. The disturbances were assumed to satisfy an integral inequality constraint. Additionally, it was assumed that they act in such a way as to maximize a quadratic performance index. Expressions for optimal control and worst-case disturbance were then obtained using optimal control theory.
Advances in dynamic and mean field games theory, applications, and numerical methods
Viscolani, Bruno
2017-01-01
This contributed volume considers recent advances in dynamic games and their applications, based on presentations given at the 17th Symposium of the International Society of Dynamic Games, held July 12-15, 2016, in Urbino, Italy. Written by experts in their respective disciplines, these papers cover various aspects of dynamic game theory including mean-field games, stochastic and pursuit-evasion games, and computational methods for dynamic games. Topics covered include Pedestrian flow in crowded environments Models for climate change negotiations Nash Equilibria for dynamic games involving Volterra integral equations Differential games in healthcare markets Linear-quadratic Gaussian dynamic games Aircraft control in wind shear conditions Advances in Dynamic and Mean-Field Games presents state-of-the-art research in a wide spectrum of areas. As such, it serves as a testament to the continued vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinar...
Gaming the System: A Game Theory Analysis of Theater Airborne ISR
2014-02-13
the inevitability of future military operations, there is an obvious need to maximize the utility of every ISR sortie. Numerous and distinguished ISR...investigate the utility of the assets allocated. 35 How then was success measured? The answer lies in the assessments process. Assessment As...Winter 2002-03): 102-108. Heap, Shaun Hargreaves, and Yanis Varoufakis. 1995. Game Theory: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge, 1995. eBook
Should the model for risk-informed regulation be game theory rather than decision theory?
Bier, Vicki M; Lin, Shi-Woei
2013-02-01
Risk analysts frequently view the regulation of risks as being largely a matter of decision theory. According to this view, risk analysis methods provide information on the likelihood and severity of various possible outcomes; this information should then be assessed using a decision-theoretic approach (such as cost/benefit analysis) to determine whether the risks are acceptable, and whether additional regulation is warranted. However, this view ignores the fact that in many industries (particularly industries that are technologically sophisticated and employ specialized risk and safety experts), risk analyses may be done by regulated firms, not by the regulator. Moreover, those firms may have more knowledge about the levels of safety at their own facilities than the regulator does. This creates a situation in which the regulated firm has both the opportunity-and often also the motive-to provide inaccurate (in particular, favorably biased) risk information to the regulator, and hence the regulator has reason to doubt the accuracy of the risk information provided by regulated parties. Researchers have argued that decision theory is capable of dealing with many such strategic interactions as well as game theory can. This is especially true in two-player, two-stage games in which the follower has a unique best strategy in response to the leader's strategy, as appears to be the case in the situation analyzed in this article. However, even in such cases, we agree with Cox that game-theoretic methods and concepts can still be useful. In particular, the tools of mechanism design, and especially the revelation principle, can simplify the analysis of such games because the revelation principle provides rigorous assurance that it is sufficient to analyze only games in which licensees truthfully report their risk levels, making the problem more manageable. Without that, it would generally be necessary to consider much more complicated forms of strategic behavior (including
Games in the Arctic: applying game theory insights to Arctic challenges
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Scott Cole
2014-08-01
Full Text Available We illustrate the benefits of game theoretic analysis for assisting decision-makers in resolving conflicts and other challenges in a rapidly evolving region. We review a series of salient Arctic issues with global implications—managing open-access fisheries, opening Arctic areas for resource extraction and ensuring effective environmental regulation for natural resource extraction—and provide insights to help reach socially preferred outcomes. We provide an overview of game theoretic analysis in layman's terms, explaining how game theory can help researchers and decision-makers to better understand conflicts, and how to identify the need for, and improve the design of, policy interventions. We believe that game theoretic tools are particularly useful in a region with a diverse set of players ranging from countries to firms to individuals. We argue that the Arctic Council should take a more active governing role in the region by, for example, dispersing information to “players” in order to alleviate conflicts regarding the management of common-pool resources such as open-access fisheries and natural resource extraction. We also identify side payments—that is, monetary or in-kind compensation from one party of a conflict to another—as a key mechanism for reaching a more biologically, culturally and economically sustainable Arctic future. By emphasizing the practical insights generated from an academic discipline, we present game theory as an influential tool in shaping the future of the Arctic—for individual researchers, for inter-disciplinary research and for policy-makers themselves.
Against matching theory: predictions of an evolutionary theory of behavior dynamics.
McDowell, J J; Calvin, Nicholas T
2015-05-01
A selectionist theory of adaptive behavior dynamics instantiates the idea that behavior evolves in response to selection pressure from the environment in the form of resource acquisition or threat escape or avoidance. The theory is implemented by a computer program that creates an artificial organism and animates it with a population of potential behaviors. The population undergoes selection, recombination, and mutation across generations, or ticks of time, which produces a continuous stream of behavior that can be studied as if it were the behavior of a live organism. Novel predictions of the evolutionary theory can be compared to predictions of matching theory in a critical experiment that arranges concurrent schedules with reinforcer magnitudes that vary across conditions in one component of the schedules but not the other. Matching theory and the evolutionary theory make conflicting predictions about the outcome of this critical experiment, such that the results must disconfirm at least one of the theories. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Exploring Voluntary Vaccinating Behaviors using Evolutionary N-person Threshold Games.
Shi, Benyun; Wang, Weihao; Qiu, Hongjun; Chen, Yu-Wang; Peng, Shaoliang
2017-11-27
Understanding individuals' voluntary vaccinating behaviors plays essential roles in making vaccination policies for many vaccinepreventable diseases. Usually, individuals decide whether to vaccinate through evaluating the relative cost of vaccination and infection according to their own interests. Mounting evidence shows that the best vaccine coverage level for the population as a whole can hardly be achieved due to the effects of herd immunity. In this paper, taking into consideration the herd immunity threshold, we present an evolutionary N-person threshold game, where individuals can dynamically adjust their vaccinating strategies and their payoffs depend nonlinearly on whether or not the herd immunity threshold is reached. First, in well-mixed populations, we analyze the relationships at equilibrium among the fraction of vaccinated individuals, the population size, the basic reproduction number and the relative cost of vaccination and infection. Then, we carry out simulations on four types of complex networks to explore the evolutionary dynamics of the N-person threshold game in structured populations. Specifically, we investigate the effects of disease severity and population structure on the vaccine coverage for different relative costs of vaccination and infection. The results and findings can offer new insight into designing incentive-based vaccination policies for disease intervention and control.
Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games.
Rauch, Joseph; Kondev, Jane; Sanchez, Alvaro
2017-02-01
Microbial populations often rely on the cooperative production of extracellular 'public goods' molecules. The cooperative nature of public good production may lead to minimum viable population sizes, below which populations collapse. In addition, 'cooperator' public goods producing individuals face evolutionary competition from non-producing mutants, or 'freeloaders'. Thus, public goods cooperators should be resilient not only to the invasion of freeloaders, but also to ecological perturbations that may push their populations below a sustainable threshold. Through a mathematical analysis of the Ecological Public Goods Game, we show that game parameters that improve the cooperating population's stability to freeloader invasion also lead to a low ecological resilience. Complex regulatory strategies mimicking those used by microbes in nature may allow cooperators to beat this trade-off and become evolutionarily stable to invading freeloaders while at the same time maximizing their ecological resilience. Our results thus identify the coupling between resilience to evolutionary and ecological challenges as a key factor for the long-term viability of public goods cooperators. © 2017 The Author(s).
Game Theory and Risk-Based Levee System Design
Hui, R.; Lund, J. R.; Madani, K.
2014-12-01
Risk-based analysis has been developed for optimal levee design for economic efficiency. Along many rivers, two levees on opposite riverbanks act as a simple levee system. Being rational and self-interested, land owners on each river bank would tend to independently optimize their levees with risk-based analysis, resulting in a Pareto-inefficient levee system design from the social planner's perspective. Game theory is applied in this study to analyze decision making process in a simple levee system in which the land owners on each river bank develop their design strategies using risk-based economic optimization. For each land owner, the annual expected total cost includes expected annual damage cost and annualized construction cost. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is identified and compared to the social planner's optimal distribution of flood risk and damage cost throughout the system which results in the minimum total flood cost for the system. The social planner's optimal solution is not feasible without appropriate level of compensation for the transferred flood risk to guarantee and improve conditions for all parties. Therefore, cooperative game theory is then employed to develop an economically optimal design that can be implemented in practice. By examining the game in the reversible and irreversible decision making modes, the cost of decision making myopia is calculated to underline the significance of considering the externalities and evolution path of dynamic water resource problems for optimal decision making.
Multi-Robot Searching using Game-Theory Based Approach
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Yan Meng
2008-11-01
Full Text Available This paper proposes a game-theory based approach in a multi–target searching using a multi-robot system in a dynamic environment. It is assumed that a rough priori probability map of the targets' distribution within the environment is given. To consider the interaction between the robots, a dynamic-programming equation is proposed to estimate the utility function for each robot. Based on this utility function, a cooperative nonzero-sum game is generated, where both pure Nash Equilibrium and mixed-strategy Equilibrium solutions are presented to achieve an optimal overall robot behaviors. A special consideration has been taken to improve the real-time performance of the game-theory based approach. Several mechanisms, such as event-driven discretization, one-step dynamic programming, and decision buffer, have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity. The main advantage of the algorithm lies in its real-time capabilities whilst being efficient and robust to dynamic environments.
Extreme Selection Unifies Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite and Infinite Populations.
Della Rossa, Fabio; Dercole, Fabio; Vicini, Cristina
2017-05-01
We show that when selection is extreme-the fittest strategy always reproduces or is imitated-the unequivalence between the possible evolutionary game scenarios in finite and infinite populations resolves, in the sense that the three generic outcomes-dominance, coexistence, and mutual exclusion-emerge in well-mixed populations of any size. We consider the simplest setting of a 2-player-2-strategy symmetric game and the two most common microscopic definitions of strategy spreading-the frequency-dependent Moran process and the imitation process by pairwise comparison-both in the case allowing any intensity of selection. We show that of the seven different invasion and fixation scenarios that are generically possible in finite populations-fixation being more or less likely to occur and rapid compared to the neutral game-the three that are possible in large populations are the same three that occur for sufficiently strong selection: (1) invasion and fast fixation of one strategy; (2) mutual invasion and slow fixation of one strategy; (3) no invasion and no fixation. Moreover (and interestingly), in the limit of extreme selection 2 becomes mutual invasion and no fixation, a case not possible for finite intensity of selection that better corresponds to the deterministic case of coexistence. In the extreme selection limit, we also derive the large population deterministic limit of the two considered stochastic processes.
Probabilistic theory of mean field games with applications I mean field FBSDEs, control, and games
Carmona, René
2018-01-01
This two-volume book offers a comprehensive treatment of the probabilistic approach to mean field game models and their applications. The book is self-contained in nature and includes original material and applications with explicit examples throughout, including numerical solutions. Volume I of the book is entirely devoted to the theory of mean field games without a common noise. The first half of the volume provides a self-contained introduction to mean field games, starting from concrete illustrations of games with a finite number of players, and ending with ready-for-use solvability results. Readers are provided with the tools necessary for the solution of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of the McKean-Vlasov type at the core of the probabilistic approach. The second half of this volume focuses on the main principles of analysis on the Wasserstein space. It includes Lions' approach to the Wasserstein differential calculus, and the applications of its results to the analysis of stochastic...
Optimal threshold estimation for binary classifiers using game theory.
Sanchez, Ignacio Enrique
2016-01-01
Many bioinformatics algorithms can be understood as binary classifiers. They are usually compared using the area under the receiver operating characteristic ( ROC) curve. On the other hand, choosing the best threshold for practical use is a complex task, due to uncertain and context-dependent skews in the abundance of positives in nature and in the yields/costs for correct/incorrect classification. We argue that considering a classifier as a player in a zero-sum game allows us to use the minimax principle from game theory to determine the optimal operating point. The proposed classifier threshold corresponds to the intersection between the ROC curve and the descending diagonal in ROC space and yields a minimax accuracy of 1-FPR. Our proposal can be readily implemented in practice, and reveals that the empirical condition for threshold estimation of "specificity equals sensitivity" maximizes robustness against uncertainties in the abundance of positives in nature and classification costs.
Wu, Song
2017-03-01
Qian Wang et al. present an interesting framework, named epigenetic game theory, for modeling sex-based epigenetic dynamics during embryogenesis from a new viewpoint of evolutionary game theory [1]. That is, epigenomes of sperms and oocytes may coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to affect the fitness of embryos. The work uses a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to describe longitudinal trajectories of DNA methylation levels in both parental and maternal gametes and their dependence on each other. The insights gained from this review, i.e. dynamic methylation profiles and their interaction are potentially important to many fields, such as biomedicine and agriculture.
Gummerum, Michaela; Hanoch, Yaniv; Keller, Monika
2008-01-01
Game theory has been one of the most prominent theories in the social sciences, influencing diverse academic disciplines such as anthropology, biology, economics, and political science. In recent years, economists have employed game theory to investigate behaviors relating to fairness, reciprocity, and trust. Surprisingly, this research has not…
Behavioral variability in an evolutionary theory of behavior dynamics.
Popa, Andrei; McDowell, J J
2016-03-01
McDowell's evolutionary theory of behavior dynamics (McDowell, 2004) instantiates populations of behaviors (abstractly represented by integers) that evolve under the selection pressure of the environment in the form of positive reinforcement. Each generation gives rise to the next via low-level Darwinian processes of selection, recombination, and mutation. The emergent patterns can be analyzed and compared to those produced by biological organisms. The purpose of this project was to explore the effects of high mutation rates on behavioral variability in environments that arranged different reinforcer rates and magnitudes. Behavioral variability increased with the rate of mutation. High reinforcer rates and magnitudes reduced these effects; low reinforcer rates and magnitudes augmented them. These results are in agreement with live-organism research on behavioral variability. Various combinations of mutation rates, reinforcer rates, and reinforcer magnitudes produced similar high-level outcomes (equifinality). These findings suggest that the independent variables that describe an experimental condition interact; that is, they do not influence behavior independently. These conclusions have implications for the interpretation of high levels of variability, mathematical undermatching, and the matching theory. The last part of the discussion centers on a potential biological counterpart for the rate of mutation, namely spontaneous fluctuations in the brain's default mode network. © 2016 Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
Ciocci, Argante; Viti, Andrea; Terzi, Alberto; Bertolaccini, Luca
2015-11-01
Game theory is a formal way to analyze the interactions among groups of subjects who behave each other. It has historically been of great interest in the economic fields in which decisions are made in a competitive environment. Game theory has fascinating potential if applied in the medical science. Few papers have been written about the application of game theory in surgery. The majority of scenarios of game theory in surgery fall into two main groups: cooperative and no cooperative games.
Game theory in communication networks cooperative resolution of interactive networking scenarios
Antoniou, Josephina
2012-01-01
A mathematical tool for scientists and researchers who work with computer and communication networks, Game Theory in Communication Networks: Cooperative Resolution of Interactive Networking Scenarios addresses the question of how to promote cooperative behavior in interactive situations between heterogeneous entities in communication networking scenarios. It explores network design and management from a theoretical perspective, using game theory and graph theory to analyze strategic situations and demonstrate profitable behaviors of the cooperative entities. The book promotes the use of Game T
Jointly Optimal Design for MIMO Radar Frequency-Hopping Waveforms Using Game Theory
2016-04-01
Jointly Optimal Design for MIMO Radar Frequency-Hopping Waveforms Using Game Theory KEYONG HAN, Student Member, IEEE ARYE NEHORAI, Fellow, IEEE...matrices that result in improved performance over that of separate designs. We propose a game theory framework for the joint design. First, we present...badly when the function evaluation is expensive. In recent years, game theory has been used to solve multiobjective design problems, especially for
How Cultural Evolutionary Theory Can Inform Social Psychology and Vice Versa
Mesoudi, Alex
2009-01-01
Cultural evolutionary theory is an interdisciplinary field in which human culture is viewed as a Darwinian process of variation, competition, and inheritance, and the tools, methods, and theories developed by evolutionary biologists to study genetic evolution are adapted to study cultural change. It is argued here that an integration of the…
Information Theory - The Bridge Connecting Bounded Rational Game Theory and Statistical Physics
Wolpert, David H.
2005-01-01
A long-running difficulty with conventional game theory has been how to modify it to accommodate the bounded rationality of all red-world players. A recurring issue in statistical physics is how best to approximate joint probability distributions with decoupled (and therefore far more tractable) distributions. This paper shows that the same information theoretic mathematical structure, known as Product Distribution (PD) theory, addresses both issues. In this, PD theory not only provides a principle formulation of bounded rationality and a set of new types of mean field theory in statistical physics; it also shows that those topics are fundamentally one and the same.
Using Developmental Theory: When Not to Play Telephone Games
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Sara Nora Ross
2008-06-01
Full Text Available As a powerful way to help understand the behaviors of people and social groupings of all kinds, developmental stage theory attracts attention and use outside of purely academic environments. These uses take the form of written materials and many kinds of interventions. The level of accuracy of developmental theory information generated and used outside of academe demonstrates wide variety. This variety is reflected in materials and interventions. The information used in materials and interventions becomes increasingly distorted as it becomes further removed from original theoretical sources. This has major implications for the ethics and expertise issues that are inherent in applied developmental theory. A classification scheme of information-use behaviors, many of which contribute to distortion processes, is used to code actual cases of creating and disseminating distorted developmental theory information, invoking the metaphor of telephone games. Case evidence indicates that casual, illustrative figures in a 2006 book by Wilber were used by others for various serious and theoretical purposes, and resulted in major distortions of developmental theory. Wilber’s figures represent problematic issues and errors, including distortion of theory, if they are used—as they indeed were—for any purpose more serious than his original purpose. Stemming from those issues and errors, a highly distorted picture of cognitive development and a pseudo-version of Commons and Richards’ Model of Hierarchical Complexity theory emerged, telephone game-like, in the cases discussed. Errors were widely propagated on the internet. Because outside of academe, specialized expertise in developmental theory is difficult to acquire, the sub-field of applied developmental theory requires not only accurate information but also strong communication ethics to govern behaviors of information providers. Such providers need to protect themselves at the same time they protect
Emergence and maintenance of menopause in humans: A game theory model.
Thouzeau, Valentin; Raymond, Michel
2017-10-07
Menopause, the permanent cessation of ovulation, occurs in women well before the end of their expected life span. Several adaptive hypotheses have been proposed to solve this evolutionary puzzle, each based on a possible fitness benefit derived from an early reproductive senescence, but no consensus has emerged. The construction of a game theory model allowed us to jointly study the main adaptive hypotheses in emergence and maintenance of menopause. Four classical hypotheses on the benefits of menopause were considered (decreased maternal mortality, increased grandmothering, decreased conflict over reproductive resources between older and younger females, and changes in their relatedness) plus a fifth one derived from a possible pleiotropic trade-off. Interestingly, the conditions for the emergence of menopause are more restrictive than those for its maintenance due to the social and familial changes induced by the occurrence of non-reproductive older women. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Game Theory Models for Multi-Robot Patrolling of Infrastructures
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Erik Hernández
2013-03-01
Full Text Available This work is focused on the problem of performing multi-robot patrolling for infrastructure security applications in order to protect a known environment at critical facilities. Thus, given a set of robots and a set of points of interest, the patrolling task consists of constantly visiting these points at irregular time intervals for security purposes. Current existing solutions for these types of applications are predictable and inflexible. Moreover, most of the previous work has tackled the patrolling problem with centralized and deterministic solutions and only few efforts have been made to integrate dynamic methods. Therefore, one of the main contributions of this work is the development of new dynamic and decentralized collaborative approaches in order to solve the aforementioned problem by implementing learning models from Game Theory. The model selected in this work that includes belief-based and reinforcement models as special cases is called Experience-Weighted Attraction. The problem has been defined using concepts of Graph Theory to represent the environment in order to work with such Game Theory techniques. Finally, the proposed methods have been evaluated experimentally by using a patrolling simulator. The results obtained have been compared with previous available approaches.
The logic of social sharing: an evolutionary game analysis of adaptive norm development.
Tatsuya, Tatsuya; Takezawa, Masanori; Hastie, Reid
2003-01-01
Although norms can potentially serve useful constructs to understand human minds, being fundamentally social in evolutionary as well as cultural senses, there are as yet no useful psychological theories of adaptive norm development. This article provides an illustrative model about how a norm emerges in a society. We focus on the "communal-sharing norm" in primordial societies, a norm designating uncertain resources as common properties to be shared with other members. Based on anthropological findings, we develop a theory about how the communal-sharing norm emerges and is maintained. Then, using evolutionary computer simulations, we test several hypotheses about the conditions under which the norm will dominate social resource sharing. We further test behavioral implications of the norm, demonstrating that uncertainty involved in resource acquisition is a key factor that triggers the psychology of sharing even in highly industrialized societies. Finally, we discuss the importance of norm construct for analyzing the dynamic relation between minds and society.
Multispectral iris recognition based on group selection and game theory
Ahmad, Foysal; Roy, Kaushik
2017-05-01
A commercially available iris recognition system uses only a narrow band of the near infrared spectrum (700-900 nm) while iris images captured in the wide range of 405 nm to 1550 nm offer potential benefits to enhance recognition performance of an iris biometric system. The novelty of this research is that a group selection algorithm based on coalition game theory is explored to select the best patch subsets. In this algorithm, patches are divided into several groups based on their maximum contribution in different groups. Shapley values are used to evaluate the contribution of patches in different groups. Results show that this group selection based iris recognition
Game theory for dynamic spectrum sharing cognitive radio
Raoof, Omar
2013-01-01
This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University on 21 June 2010. ‘Game Theory’ is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. The theory is based on a set of tools that have been developed in order to assist with the modelling and analysis of individual, independent decision makers. These actions potentially affect any decisions, which are made by other competitors. Therefore, it is well suited and capable of addressing the various is...
Using Developmental Theory: When Not to Play Telephone Games
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Sara Nora Ross
2008-06-01
Full Text Available As a powerful way to help understand the behaviors of people and socialgroupings of all kinds, developmental stage theory attracts attention and use outside ofpurely academic environments. These uses take the form of written materials and manykinds of interventions. The level of accuracy of developmental theory informationgenerated and used outside of academe demonstrates wide variety. This variety isreflected in materials and interventions. The information used in materials andinterventions becomes increasingly distorted as it becomes further removed from originaltheoretical sources. This has major implications for the ethics and expertise issues that areinherent in applied developmental theory. A classification scheme of information-usebehaviors, many of which contribute to distortion processes, is used to code actual casesof creating and disseminating distorted developmental theory information, invoking themetaphor of telephone games. Case evidence indicates that casual, illustrative figures in a2006 book by Wilber were used by others for various serious and theoretical purposes,and resulted in major distortions of developmental theory. Wilber’s figures representproblematic issues and errors, including distortion of theory, if they are used—as theyindeed were—for any purpose more serious than his original purpose. Stemming fromthose issues and errors, a highly distorted picture of cognitive development and a pseudoversionof Commons and Richards’ Model of Hierarchical Complexity theory emerged,telephone game-like, in the cases discussed. Errors were widely propagated on theinternet. Because outside of academe, specialized expertise in developmental theory isdifficult to acquire, the sub-field of applied developmental theory requires not onlyaccurate information but also strong communication ethics to govern behaviors ofinformation providers. Such providers need to protect themselves at the same time theyprotect and inform consumers of
Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Nowak, Martin A.; Tarnita, Corina E.; Antal, Tibor
2010-01-01
Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces. PMID:20008382
“I am a rogue night elf”: Avatars, gaming and The Big Bang Theory
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Theo Plothe
2014-03-01
Full Text Available CBS’s The Big Bang Theory (TBBT frequently exhibits elements of video games and gaming culture. The author uses subculture theory to consider the representation of video games, gamers, and their avatars within popular culture. This paper investigates the representation of avatars within the characterization of gaming subculture on the TBBT. The author performed a content analysis of the program’s six seasons, examining the relationship between the show’s video game playing characters and their avatars. This investigation found that almost half of the scenes that contained video gaming activities contained some aspect of avatars. TBBT reifies gaming as a subculture through the relationship between the characters and their avatars. Examining the representation of these relationships is essential to understanding the representation of the gaming subculture in the mass media and within culture at large.
Li, Xiang; Cao, Lang
2009-12-01
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in studying the role of costly punishment in promoting altruistic behaviors among selfish individuals. Rejections in ultimatum bargaining as a metaphor exemplify costly punishment, where the division of a sum of resources proposed by one side may be rejected by the other side, and both sides get nothing. Under a setting of the network of contacts among players, we find that the largest Laplacian eigenvalue of the network determines the critical division of players’ proposals, below which pure punishers who never accept any offers will emerge as a phase transition in the system. The critical division of offers that predicts the emergence of costly punishment is termed as the selfishness tolerance of a network within evolutionary ultimatum game, and extensive numerical simulations on the data of the science collaboration network, and computer-generated small-world/scale-free networks support the analytical findings.
Periaux, Jacques; Lee, Dong Seop Chris
2015-01-01
Many complex aeronautical design problems can be formulated with efficient multi-objective evolutionary optimization methods and game strategies. This book describes the role of advanced innovative evolution tools in the solution, or the set of solutions of single or multi disciplinary optimization. These tools use the concept of multi-population, asynchronous parallelization and hierarchical topology which allows different models including precise, intermediate and approximate models with each node belonging to the different hierarchical layer handled by a different Evolutionary Algorithm. The efficiency of evolutionary algorithms for both single and multi-objective optimization problems are significantly improved by the coupling of EAs with games and in particular by a new dynamic methodology named “Hybridized Nash-Pareto games”. Multi objective Optimization techniques and robust design problems taking into account uncertainties are introduced and explained in detail. Several applications dealing with c...
Measuring the Acceptance of Evolutionary Theory in Texas 2-Year Colleges
Brown, Jack; Scott, Joyce A.
2016-01-01
Evolutionary theory is the central unifying theory of the life sciences. However, acceptance and understanding of the theory have been found to be lacking in the general public, high school, and university populations. Prior research has linked low acceptance of the theory to a poor knowledge base in evolution, to the nature of science, and to…
Regularity theory for mean-field game systems
Gomes, Diogo A; Voskanyan, Vardan
2016-01-01
Beginning with a concise introduction to the theory of mean-field games (MFGs), this book presents the key elements of the regularity theory for MFGs. It then introduces a series of techniques for well-posedness in the context of mean-field problems, including stationary and time-dependent MFGs, subquadratic and superquadratic MFG formulations, and distinct classes of mean-field couplings. It also explores stationary and time-dependent MFGs through a series of a-priori estimates for solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi and Fokker-Planck equation. It shows sophisticated a-priori systems derived using a range of analytical techniques, and builds on previous results to explain classical solutions. The final chapter discusses the potential applications, models and natural extensions of MFGs. As MFGs connect common problems in pure mathematics, engineering, economics and data management, this book is a valuable resource for researchers and graduate students in these fields.
Regularity Theory for Mean-Field Game Systems
Gomes, Diogo A.
2016-09-14
Beginning with a concise introduction to the theory of mean-field games (MFGs), this book presents the key elements of the regularity theory for MFGs. It then introduces a series of techniques for well-posedness in the context of mean-field problems, including stationary and time-dependent MFGs, subquadratic and superquadratic MFG formulations, and distinct classes of mean-field couplings. It also explores stationary and time-dependent MFGs through a series of a-priori estimates for solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi and Fokker-Planck equation. It shows sophisticated a-priori systems derived using a range of analytical techniques, and builds on previous results to explain classical solutions. The final chapter discusses the potential applications, models and natural extensions of MFGs. As MFGs connect common problems in pure mathematics, engineering, economics and data management, this book is a valuable resource for researchers and graduate students in these fields.
Applying Game Theory in 802.11 Wireless Networks
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Tomas Cuzanauskas
2015-07-01
Full Text Available IEEE 802.11 is one of the most popular wireless technologies in recent days. Due to easiness of adaption and relatively low cost the demand for IEEE 802.11 devices is increasing exponentially. IEEE works in two bands 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz, these bands are known as ISM band. The unlicensed bands are managed by authority which set simple rules to follow when using unlicensed bands, the rules includes requirements as maximum power, out-of-band emissions control as well as interference mitigation. However these rules became outdated as IEEE 802.11 technology is emerging and evolving in hours the rules aren’t well suited for current capabilities of IEEE 802.11 devices. In this article we present game theory based algorithm for IEEE 802.11 wireless devices, we will show that by using game theory it’s possible to achieve better usage of unlicensed spectrum as well as partially decline CSMA/CA. Finally by using this approach we might relax the currently applied maximum power rules for ISM bands, which enable IEEE 802.11 to work on longer distance and have better propagation characteristics.
[Migraine and evolutionary theory: paths for a clinical approach].
Alvaro-Gonzalez, L C
2016-10-01
Migraine is a very common disorder with a raising incidence. The theory of evolution allow us to explain the emergence of the disorder, due to the advantages that the overreactivity to stimulus provided to ancestral groups of Homo sapiens, and a greater presence of the disorder in modern societies, based in the interactions with external factors. Herein we analyze these points. Design of organisms and their responses to environmental factors emerge to improve survival. Thus pain and headache can be contemplated as homeostatic and adaptative responses. Below 10% of the population has no experience with headache and the migrainous phenotype is quite frequent in secondary headaches and in syndromic forms of migraine. These features can be understood under the next undergrounds: specific neurophysiological data (lack of habituation, sensibilization and low preactivation), genetic features (polygenic disorder with the implication of many gens with a low penetrance, that interact with the environment and are shared with comorbid disorders such as depression and anxiety); and environmental interactions in modern societies (increase in the number of estrogenic cycles and particularly overexposition to stress). A feature that was an evolutionary advantage has been transformed in a highly prevalent and disabling disorder in modern societies. It is the result of the interaction with internal (estrogenic cycles) and external (stress) stimuli. As a consequence, it becomes a mismatch disorder. The effects appear in childhood through epigenetics. Therefore, therapeutic interventions would yield greater benefits if whole populations were included in educative interventions incorporating these aspects.
Toward major evolutionary transitions theory 2.0.
Szathmáry, Eörs
2015-08-18
The impressive body of work on the major evolutionary transitions in the last 20 y calls for a reconstruction of the theory although a 2D account (evolution of informational systems and transitions in individuality) remains. Significant advances include the concept of fraternal and egalitarian transitions (lower-level units like and unlike, respectively). Multilevel selection, first without, then with, the collectives in focus is an important explanatory mechanism. Transitions are decomposed into phases of origin, maintenance, and transformation (i.e., further evolution) of the higher level units, which helps reduce the number of transitions in the revised list by two so that it is less top-heavy. After the transition, units show strong cooperation and very limited realized conflict. The origins of cells, the emergence of the genetic code and translation, the evolution of the eukaryotic cell, multicellularity, and the origin of human groups with language are reconsidered in some detail in the light of new data and considerations. Arguments are given why sex is not in the revised list as a separate transition. Some of the transitions can be recursive (e.g., plastids, multicellularity) or limited (transitions that share the usual features of major transitions without a massive phylogenetic impact, such as the micro- and macronuclei in ciliates). During transitions, new units of reproduction emerge, and establishment of such units requires high fidelity of reproduction (as opposed to mere replication).
Robust Estimation of Evolutionary Distances with Information Theory.
Cao, Minh Duc; Allison, Lloyd; Dix, Trevor I; Bodén, Mikael
2016-05-01
Methods for measuring genetic distances in phylogenetics are known to be sensitive to the evolutionary model assumed. However, there is a lack of established methodology to accommodate the trade-off between incorporating sufficient biological reality and avoiding model overfitting. In addition, as traditional methods measure distances based on the observed number of substitutions, their tend to underestimate distances between diverged sequences due to backward and parallel substitutions. Various techniques were proposed to correct this, but they lack the robustness against sequences that are distantly related and of unequal base frequencies. In this article, we present a novel genetic distance estimate based on information theory that overcomes the above two hurdles. Instead of examining the observed number of substitutions, this method estimates genetic distances using Shannon's mutual information. This naturally provides an effective framework for balancing model complexity and goodness of fit. Our distance estimate is shown to be approximately linear to elapsed time and hence is less sensitive to the divergence of sequence data and compositional biased sequences. Using extensive simulation data, we show that our method 1) consistently reconstructs more accurate phylogeny topologies than existing methods, 2) is robust in extreme conditions such as diverged phylogenies, unequal base frequencies data, and heterogeneous mutation patterns, and 3) scales well with large phylogenies. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Molecular Biology and Evolution. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
Games microbes play: The game theory behind cooperative sucrose metabolism in yeast
Gore, Jeff
2010-03-01
The origin of cooperation is a central challenge to our understanding of evolution. Microbial interactions can be manipulated in ways that animal interactions cannot, thus leading to growing interest in microbial models of cooperation and competition. In order for the budding yeast S. cerevisiae to grow on sucrose, the disaccharide must first be hydrolyzed by the enzyme invertase. This hydrolysis reaction is performed outside of the cytoplasm in the periplasmic space between the plasma membrane and the cell wall. Here we demonstrate that the vast majority (˜99%) of the monosaccharides created by sucrose hydrolysis diffuse away before they can be imported into the cell, thus making invertase production and secretion a cooperative behavior [1]. A mutant cheater strain that does not produce invertase is able to take advantage of and invade a population of wildtype cooperator cells. However, over a wide range of conditions, the wildtype cooperator can also invade a population of cheater cells. Therefore, we observe coexistence between the two strains in well-mixed culture at steady state resulting from the fact that rare strategies outperform common strategies---the defining features of what game theorists call the snowdrift game. A simple model of the cooperative interaction incorporating nonlinear benefits explains the origin of this coexistence. Glucose repression of invertase expression in wildtype cells produces a strategy which is optimal for the snowdrift game---wildtype cells cooperate only when competing against cheater cells. In disagreement with recent theory [2], we find that spatial structure always aids the evolution of cooperation in our experimental snowdrift game. [4pt] [1] Gore, J., Youk, H. & van Oudenaarden, A., Nature 459, 253 -- 256 (2009) [0pt] [2] Hauert, C. & Doebeli, M., Nature 428, 643 -- 646 (2004)
Recidivism and rehabilitation of criminal offenders: a carrot and stick evolutionary game.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Bijan Berenji
Full Text Available Motivated by recent efforts by the criminal justice system to treat and rehabilitate nonviolent offenders rather than focusing solely on their punishment, we introduce an evolutionary game theoretic model to study the effects of "carrot and stick" intervention programs on criminal recidivism. We use stochastic simulations to study the evolution of a population where individuals may commit crimes depending on their past history, surrounding environment and, in the case of recidivists, on any counseling, educational or training programs available to them after being punished for their previous crimes. These sociological factors are embodied by effective parameters that determine the decision making probabilities. Players may decide to permanently reform or continue engaging in criminal activity, eventually reaching a state where they are considered incorrigible. Depending on parameter choices, the outcome of the game is a society with a majority of virtuous, rehabilitated citizens or incorrigibles. Since total resources may be limited, we constrain the combined punishment and rehabilitation costs per crime to be fixed, so that increasing one effort will necessarily decrease the other. We find that the most successful strategy in reducing crime is to optimally allocate resources so that after being punished, criminals experience impactful intervention programs, especially during the first stages of their return to society. Excessively harsh or lenient punishments are less effective. We also develop a system of coupled ordinary differential equations with memory effects to give a qualitative description of our simulated societal dynamics. We discuss our findings and sociological implications.
SIS evolutionary game model and multi-agent simulation of an infectious disease emergency.
Yang, Fan; Yang, Qing; Liu, Xingxing; Wang, Pan
2015-01-01
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) infectious disease outbreaks are hazardous events. However, if governments sectors do not adequately supervise such outbreaks, these infectious diseases could spread significantly, resulting in large economic losses and social issues. In this paper, an evolutionary game and simulation model based on the interactions between strategies and states was proposed, and the game between the public and government sectors and its impact on epidemic situations was discussed. Replicator dynamics equations and the multi-agent model simulation were used for analysis. According to replicator dynamics equations as well as the multi-agent model simulation, the public all eventually adopted the mobility strategy. In addition, the supervision strength of the governmental sectors was equal to 0 after the strength fluctuated at a low level under the trigger strategy. Ultimately, the entire public shifted to the S state throughout the course of the emergency. Social order was maintained and social loss was controlled to a certain extent in the final analysis.
Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games
Szabo, Gyorgy; 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.015
2011-01-01
Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect income from symmetric two-person two-strategy (called cooperation and defection) games with their nearest neighbors. During the elementary steps of evolution a randomly chosen player modifies her strategy in order to maximize stochastically her utility function composed from her own and the co-players' income with weight factors $1-Q$ and Q. These models are studied within a wide range of payoff parameters using Monte Carlo simulations for noisy strategy updates and by spatial stability analysis in the low noise limit. For fraternal players ($Q=1/2$) the system evolves into ordered arrangements of strategies in the low noise limit in a way providing optimum payoff for the whole society. Dominance of defectors, representing the "tragedy of the commons", is found within the region...
Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Solution for Virtual Routers with Padding Misbehavior in Cloud Computing
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Xia-an Bi
2015-01-01
Full Text Available With the development of cloud computing and virtualization, a physical router can be multiplexed as a large number of virtual routers. TCP-based interactive applications have an incentive to improve their performance by padding “junk packets” into the network among real communication packets. This padding misbehavior will upgrade short TCP flows from “mice” to “elephants” and consequently lead to network congestion and breakdown. This paper presents a detailed solution and analysis for describing the normal behavior and padding misbehavior of virtual routers. In particular, a system model for analyzing behavior of virtual routers is based on evolutionary game model, and, through analyzing the stability of the equilibrium points, the stable point is the solution to the problem. The clear evolutionary path of network applications with the normal behavior and padding misbehavior is analyzed by the corresponding graph. Then this paper gives the behavior control suggestions to effectively restrain the padding misbehavior and maintain stable high-throughputs of the router. The simulation results demonstrate that our solution can effectively restrain the padding misbehavior and maintain stable high-throughputs of the router simultaneously compared with the classical queue management.
Wu, Kai; Liu, Jing; Wang, Shuai
2016-11-01
Evolutionary games (EG) model a common type of interactions in various complex, networked, natural and social systems. Given such a system with only profit sequences being available, reconstructing the interacting structure of EG networks is fundamental to understand and control its collective dynamics. Existing approaches used to handle this problem, such as the lasso, a convex optimization method, need a user-defined constant to control the tradeoff between the natural sparsity of networks and measurement error (the difference between observed data and simulated data). However, a shortcoming of these approaches is that it is not easy to determine these key parameters which can maximize the performance. In contrast to these approaches, we first model the EG network reconstruction problem as a multiobjective optimization problem (MOP), and then develop a framework which involves multiobjective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA), followed by solution selection based on knee regions, termed as MOEANet, to solve this MOP. We also design an effective initialization operator based on the lasso for MOEA. We apply the proposed method to reconstruct various types of synthetic and real-world networks, and the results show that our approach is effective to avoid the above parameter selecting problem and can reconstruct EG networks with high accuracy.
Qiao Yan; Zhai Yunkai
2017-01-01
Regional medical service collaboration is an effective way to solve the problem of uneven distribution of medical resources in China. This paper analyzes the cooperative relationship between the main bodies of the regional medical service from the point of view of game theory and uses the “prisoner’s dilemma” model in game theory to analyze the cooperative game relationship between medical institutions in the region. Then it obtains the Nash equilibrium condition, and puts forward the strateg...
Isaacs, Rufus
1999-01-01
Definitive work draws on game theory, calculus of variations, and control theory to solve an array of problems: military, pursuit and evasion, athletic contests, many more. Detailed examples, formal calculations. 1965 edition.
Using Game Theory and the Bible to Build Critical Thinking Skills
McCannon, Bryan C.
2007-01-01
The author describes a course designed to build the critical thinking skills of undergraduate economics students. The course introduces and uses game theory to study the Bible. Students gain experience using game theory to formalize events and, by drawing parallels between the Bible and common economic concepts, illustrate the pervasiveness of…
Williams, Miriam F.
2012-01-01
The author uses game theoretical models to identify technical communication breakdowns encountered during the notoriously confusing Texas Two-Step voting and caucusing process. Specifically, the author uses narrative theory and game theory to highlight areas where caucus participants needed instructions to better understand the rules of the game…
"Evolutionary Theory Seems so Easy": Reply to Lucal and Hanson
Machalek, Richard; Martin, Michael W.
2010-01-01
As the authors stated early in their article (Machalek and Martin 2010), evolutionary ideas have been gaining traction in the work of a growing number of sociologists in recent years. Much of their thinking derives from work inspired by sociobiology. However, many sociologists are critical of and unreceptive to incorporating evolutionary biology…
When theory trumps ideology: Lessons from evolutionary psychology.
Tybur, Joshua M; Navarrete, Carlos David
2015-01-01
Evolutionary psychologists are personally liberal, just as social psychologists are. Yet their research has rarely been perceived as liberally biased--if anything, it has been erroneously perceived as motivated by conservative political agendas. Taking a closer look at evolutionary psychologists might offer the broader social psychology community guidance in neutralizing some of the biases Duarte et al. discuss.
System of marketing deciding support based on game theory
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Gordana Dukić
2008-12-01
Full Text Available Quantitative methods and models can be applied in numerous spheres of marketing deciding. The choice of optimal strategy in product advertising is one of the problems that the marketing-management often meets. The use of models developed within the framework of game theory makes significantly easier to find out the solutions of conflict situations that appear herewith. The system of deciding support presented in this work is based on the supposition that two opposed sides take part in the game. With the aim of deciding process promotion, the starting model incorporates computer simulation of percentile changes in the market share that represent elements of payment matrix. The supposition is that the random variables that represent them follow the normal division. It is necessary to carry out the evaluation of their parameters because of relevant data. Information techniques, computer and the adequate program applications take the special position in solving and analysis of the suggested model. This kind of their application represents the basic characteristic of the deciding support system.
Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, G H
2015-01-01
One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer's utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider.
Bridging developmental systems theory and evolutionary psychology using dynamic optimization.
Frankenhuis, Willem E; Panchanathan, Karthik; Clark Barrett, H
2013-07-01
Interactions between evolutionary psychologists and developmental systems theorists have been largely antagonistic. This is unfortunate because potential synergies between the two approaches remain unexplored. This article presents a method that may help to bridge the divide, and that has proven fruitful in biology: dynamic optimization. Dynamic optimization integrates developmental systems theorists' focus on dynamics and contingency with the 'design stance' of evolutionary psychology. It provides a theoretical framework as well as a set of tools for exploring the properties of developmental systems that natural selection might favor, given particular evolutionary ecologies. We also discuss limitations of the approach. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
An educational video game for nutrition of young people: Theory and design.
Ledoux, Tracey; Griffith, Melissa; Thompson, Debbe; Nguyen, Nga; Watson, Kathy; Baranowski, Janice; Buday, Richard; Abdelsamad, Dina; Baranowski, Tom
2016-08-01
Playing Escape from DIAB (DIAB) and Nanoswarm (NANO), epic video game adventures, increased fruit and vegetable consumption among a multi-ethnic sample of 10-12 year old children during pilot testing. Key elements of both games were educational mini-games embedded in the overall game that promoted knowledge acquisition regarding diet, physical activity and energy balance. 95-100% of participants demonstrated mastery of these mini-games suggesting knowledge acquisition. This article describes the process of designing and developing the educational mini-games. A secondary purpose was to explore the experience of children while playing the games. The educational games were based on Social Cognitive and Mastery Learning Theories. A multidisciplinary team of behavioral nutrition, PA, and video game experts designed, developed, and tested the mini-games. Alpha testing revealed children generally liked the mini-games and found them to be reasonably challenging. Process evaluation data from pilot testing revealed almost all participants completed nearly all educational mini-games in a reasonable amount of time suggesting feasibility of this approach. Future research should continue to explore the use of video games in educating children to achieve healthy behavior changes.
An educational video game for nutrition of young people: Theory and design
Ledoux, Tracey; Griffith, Melissa; Thompson, Debbe; Nguyen, Nga; Watson, Kathy; Baranowski, Janice; Buday, Richard; Abdelsamad, Dina; Baranowski, Tom
2016-01-01
Background Playing Escape from DIAB (DIAB) and Nanoswarm (NANO), epic video game adventures, increased fruit and vegetable consumption among a multi-ethnic sample of 10–12 year old children during pilot testing. Key elements of both games were educational mini-games embedded in the overall game that promoted knowledge acquisition regarding diet, physical activity and energy balance. 95–100% of participants demonstrated mastery of these mini-games suggesting knowledge acquisition. Aim This article describes the process of designing and developing the educational mini-games. A secondary purpose was to explore the experience of children while playing the games. Method The educational games were based on Social Cognitive and Mastery Learning Theories. A multidisciplinary team of behavioral nutrition, PA, and video game experts designed, developed, and tested the mini-games. Results Alpha testing revealed children generally liked the mini-games and found them to be reasonably challenging. Process evaluation data from pilot testing revealed almost all participants completed nearly all educational mini-games in a reasonable amount of time suggesting feasibility of this approach. Conclusions Future research should continue to explore the use of video games in educating children to achieve healthy behavior changes. PMID:27547019
The Relationship between College Zoology Students' Beliefs about Evolutionary Theory and Religion.
Sinclair, Anne; And Others
1997-01-01
Researchers administered surveys to college zoology students prior to, and immediately following a study of evolutionary theory, to assess their understanding and acceptance of evidence supporting the theory. Results showed students had many misconceptions about the theory. Their beliefs interfered with their ability to objectively view scientific…
The Bus Station Spacing Optimization Based on Game Theory
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Changjiang Zheng
2015-01-01
Full Text Available With the development of city, the problem of traffic is becoming more and more serious. Developing public transportation has become the key to solving this problem in all countries. Based on the existing public transit network, how to improve the bus operation efficiency, and reduce the residents transit trip cost has become a simple and effective way to develop the public transportation. Bus stop spacing is an important factor affecting passengers’ travel time. How to set up bus stop spacing has become the key to reducing passengers’ travel time. According to comprehensive traffic survey, theoretical analysis, and summary of urban public transport characteristics, this paper analyzes the impact of bus stop spacing on passenger in-bus time cost and out-bus time cost and establishes in-bus time and out-bus time model. Finally, the paper gets the balance best station spacing by introducing the game theory.
Complex adaptive systems and game theory: An unlikely union
Hadzikadic, M.; Carmichael, T.; Curtin, C.
2010-01-01
A Complex Adaptive System is a collection of autonomous, heterogeneous agents, whose behavior is defined with a limited number of rules. A Game Theory is a mathematical construct that assumes a small number of rational players who have a limited number of actions or strategies available to them. The CAS method has the potential to alleviate some of the shortcomings of GT. On the other hand, CAS researchers are always looking for a realistic way to define interactions among agents. GT offers an attractive option for defining the rules of such interactions in a way that is both potentially consistent with observed real-world behavior and subject to mathematical interpretation. This article reports on the results of an effort to build a CAS system that utilizes GT for determining the actions of individual agents. ?? 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity, 16,24-42, 2010.
A short review of game theory for neurosurgeons.
Steiger, H-J; Steiger, U R
2011-02-01
Neurosurgery and medicine in general are increasingly dominated by economic factors and considerations. Physicians themselves have partially adopted economic terminology, although they rarely have a profound knowledge of economics. Today game theory is one of the most important factors driving microeconomics, which is the competition for limited resources within a small group of individuals. The purpose of this article is to give a short introduction to game theory and its application to the healthcare system. The Prisoner's Dilemma considers strategies between two persons. In the classic version two burglars are caught. Each could confess and be released from jail if the other does not confess--who will then get a long term in prison. If both confess, both get an intermediate time in jail, and if no one confesses, both get a mild sentence. Wanting to be released from jail, they both confess and get the intermediate term in prison. This remarkable result, initially described by John von Neumann in 1928 and showing that individually rational actions can result in both persons becoming worse off, had a great impact on modern social science. Other scenarios are more complex. The Nash Equilibrium is a wider concept. If there is a set of strategies with the property that no player can benefit by changing his strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged, then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the Nash Equilibrium. Another concept particularly important in sociology is the Pareto criterion. If no one can be made better off without making somebody else worse off, then that outcome is Pareto optimal. Respecting these basic principles is a necessary precondition for successful deals and cooperative projects. © Georg Thieme Verlag KG Stuttgart · New York.
The ‘Hawk-Dove’ Game and the Speed of the Evolutionary Process in Small Heterogeneous Populations
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Bernhard Voelkl
2010-05-01
Full Text Available I study the speed of the evolutionary process on small heterogeneous graphs using the Hawk-Dove game. The graphs are based on empirical observation data of grooming interactions in 81 primate groups. Analytic results for the star graph have revealed that irregular graphs can slow down the evolutionary process by increasing the mean time to absorption. Here I show that the same effects can be found for graphs representing natural animal populations which are much less heterogeneous than star graphs. Degree variance has proven to be a good predictor for the mean time to absorption also for these graphs.
Investigating the Learning-Theory Foundations of Game-Based Learning: A Meta-Analysis
Wu, W-H.; Hsiao, H-C.; Wu, P-L.; Lin, C-H.; Huang, S-H.
2012-01-01
Past studies on the issue of learning-theory foundations in game-based learning stressed the importance of establishing learning-theory foundation and provided an exploratory examination of established learning theories. However, we found research seldom addressed the development of the use or failure to use learning-theory foundations and…
Inverse game theory: learning the nature of a game through play
Stocco, Gabriel F.; Cybenko, George
2012-06-01
Real world adversarial dynamics such as those encountered in Computer and Network security require models which allow for both imperfect and incomplete information. Recently game theoretic models and specically signaling games have been at the forefront of interest for modeling these scenarios. We propose a modication of signaling games, a type of Bayesian game, which we believe can serve as a model for these scenarios. By incorporating real world data into the model, these games could allow interested parties to learn the true nature of the game that they are already playing - though without the rulebook.
Brem, Sarah K.; Ranney, Michael; Schindel, Jennifer
2003-03-01
Evolutionary science has consequences for individuals and society, ranging from the way we interpret human behavior to our notions of spirituality and the purpose of our existence. Popular portrayals of evolution depict a paradoxical theory, a source of knowledge and human connections, but also a threat to our humanity and freedom. Using quantitative and qualitative methodology, we examined how college-educated adults (n = 135) from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds perceive the impact of evolutionary theory on individuals and society. We identified a continuum of perspectives, ranging from strong creationist to strong evolutionist. Using the model of knowledge as an ecology (Demastes, Good, & Peebles, Science Education, 79, 637-666, 1995; Nardi & O'Day, Information ecologies: Using technology with heart, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999), we examined the relationships among participants' beliefs, their perceptions regarding the social and personal impact of evolutionary theory, their prior exposure to and knowledge of evolutionary theory, and their opinions regarding the teaching of evolution. Evolutionists and creationists differed in their prior exposure to evolutionary theory, and their opinions about some aspects of teaching, but showed striking similarities regarding perceived impact. All groups viewed the consequences of accepting evolutionary principles in a way that might be considered undesirable: increased selfishness and racism, decreased spirituality, and a decreased sense of purpose and self-determination. From a science education perspective, this one-sided interpretation is troublesome because it runs counter to the available evidence and theories in evolutionary science, and we consider ways of fostering more balanced presentation and appraisal of evolutionary theory.
Wang, Wen-Xu; Lai, Ying-Cheng; Armbruster, Dieter
2011-09-01
We study catastrophic behaviors in large networked systems in the paradigm of evolutionary games by incorporating a realistic "death" or "bankruptcy" mechanism. We find that a cascading bankruptcy process can arise when defection strategies exist and individuals are vulnerable to deficit. Strikingly, we observe that, after the catastrophic cascading process terminates, cooperators are the sole survivors, regardless of the game types and of the connection patterns among individuals as determined by the topology of the underlying network. It is necessary that individuals cooperate with each other to survive the catastrophic failures. Cooperation thus becomes the optimal strategy and absolutely outperforms defection in the game evolution with respect to the "death" mechanism. Our results can be useful for understanding large-scale catastrophe in real-world systems and in particular, they may yield insights into significant social and economical phenomena such as large-scale failures of financial institutions and corporations during an economic recession.
Grey game theory and its applications in economic decision-making
Fang, Zhigeng; Shi, Hongxing; Lin, Yi
2016-01-01
To make the best decisions, you need the best information. However, because most issues in game theory are grey, nearly all recent research has been carried out using a simplified method that considers grey systems as white ones. This often results in a forecasting function that is far from satisfactory when applied to many real situations. Grey Game Theory and Its Applications in Economic Decision Making introduces classic game theory into the realm of grey system theory with limited knowledge. The book resolves three theoretical issues: A game equilibrium of grey game A reasonable explanation for the equilibrium of a grey matrix of static nonmatrix game issues based on incomplete information The Centipede Game paradox, which has puzzled theory circles for a long time and greatly enriched and developed the core methods of subgame Nash perfect equilibrium analysis as a result The book establishes a grey matrix game model based on pure and mixed strategies. The author proposes the concepts of grey saddle p...
Han, Dun; Sun, Mei
2016-02-01
In this paper, we explore an evolutionary vaccination game in the modified activity driven network by considering the closeness. We set a closeness parameter p which is used to describe the way of connection between two individuals. The simulation results show that the closeness p may have an active role in weakening both the spreading of epidemic and the vaccination. Besides, when vaccination is not allowed, the final recovered density increases with the value of the ratio of the infection rate to the recovery rate λ / μ. However, when vaccination is allowed the final density of recovered individual first increases and then decreases with the value of λ / μ. Two variables are designed to identify the relation between the individuals' activities and their states. The results draw that both recovered and vaccinated frequency increase with the increase of the individuals' activities. Meanwhile, the immune fee has less impact on the individuals' vaccination than the closeness. While the λ / μ is in a certain range, with the increase of the value of λ / μ, the recovered frequency of the whole crowds reduces. Our results, therefore, reveal the fact that the best of intentions may lead to backfire.
An evolutionary game for the diffusion of rumor in complex networks
Li, Dandan; Ma, Jing; Tian, Zihao; Zhu, Hengmin
2015-09-01
In this paper, we investigate the rumor diffusion process according to the evolutionary game framework. By using three real social network datasets, we find that increasing the judgment ability of individuals could curb the diffusion of rumor effectively. Under the same level of punishment cost, there are more spreaders in the network that has larger average degree. Moreover, the punishment fraction has more significant impact than the risk coefficient on the controlling of rumor diffusion. There exist some optimal risk coefficients and punishment fractions that could help more people refusing to spread rumor. In addition, the effect of the tie strength on the final fraction of spreaders is investigated. The results indicate that the rumor can be suppressed soon if the individuals preferentially select the neighbor either weaker or stronger ties persistently to update their strategy. However, choosing neighbor blindly may promote the spread of rumor. Finally, by comparing three kinds of punishment mechanisms, we show that taking the lead in punishing the higher degree nodes is the most effective measure to reduce the coverage of rumor.
Applications of multi-criteria and game theory approaches manufacturing and logistics
Hennet, Jean-Claude; Tiwari, Manoj
2014-01-01
Aligning the latest practices, innovations and case studies with academic frameworks and theories, the broad area of multi-criteria and game theory applications in manufacturing and logistics is covered in comprehensive details. Part 1 presents ‘multi-criteria applications’ and includes chapters on logistics with a focus on vehicle routing problems, a multi-objective decision making approach to select the best storage policy and an exploratory study to predict the most important factors that can lead to successful mobile supply chain management adoption for manufacturing firms. Part 2 covers ‘game theory applications’ and encompasses the process of forming a coalition within a corporate network to the problem of integrating inventory and distribution optimization together with game theory to effectively manage supply networks. Providing a forum to investigate, exchange novel ideas and disseminate knowledge covering the broad area of multi-criteria and game theory applications in manufacturing and l...
Non-cooperative stochastic differential game theory of generalized Markov jump linear systems
Zhang, Cheng-ke; Zhou, Hai-ying; Bin, Ning
2017-01-01
This book systematically studies the stochastic non-cooperative differential game theory of generalized linear Markov jump systems and its application in the field of finance and insurance. The book is an in-depth research book of the continuous time and discrete time linear quadratic stochastic differential game, in order to establish a relatively complete framework of dynamic non-cooperative differential game theory. It uses the method of dynamic programming principle and Riccati equation, and derives it into all kinds of existence conditions and calculating method of the equilibrium strategies of dynamic non-cooperative differential game. Based on the game theory method, this book studies the corresponding robust control problem, especially the existence condition and design method of the optimal robust control strategy. The book discusses the theoretical results and its applications in the risk control, option pricing, and the optimal investment problem in the field of finance and insurance, enriching the...
Risk-Averse Evolutionary Game Model of Aviation Joint Emergency Response
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Wei Pan
2016-01-01
Full Text Available We study effects of risk-averse attitude of both participators in aviation joint emergency response on the coevolution of cooperation mechanisms and individual preferences between airport and nonprofit organization. First, based on the current aviation joint emergency mechanism in China, we put forward two mechanisms to select the joint nonprofit organization, including reputation cooperation and bidding competition. Meanwhile, we consider two preferences including altruism and selfishness. Then we build replicator dynamics equations using the theory of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR taking risk aversion attitude into account. Finally, we introduce the factor of government and give all participators some suggestions. We show that the risk-averse attitude of the other game participator affects the one participator’s decision and the effects subject to some parameters.
Two books in one: natural history and evolutionary theory.
Simms, E L
1998-08-01
Evolutionary Ecology across Three Trophic Levels: Goldenrods, Gallmakers and Natural Enemies by W.G. Abrahamson and A.E. Weis Princeton University Press, Monographs in Population Biology, 1997. $29.95/£24.95 hbk (xiii+456 pages) ISBN 0 691 01208 3.
Bridging Developmental Systems Theory and Evolutionary Psychology Using Dynamic Optimization
Frankenhuis, Willem E.; Panchanathan, Karthik; Clark Barrett, H.
2013-01-01
Interactions between evolutionary psychologists and developmental systems theorists have been largely antagonistic. This is unfortunate because potential synergies between the two approaches remain unexplored. This article presents a method that may help to bridge the divide, and that has proven fruitful in biology: dynamic optimization. Dynamic…
Deontic Reasoning with Emotional Content: Evolutionary Psychology or Decision Theory?
Perham, Nick; Oaksford, Mike
2005-01-01
Three experiments investigated the contrasting predictions of the evolutionary and decision-theoretic approaches to deontic reasoning. Two experiments embedded a hazard management (HM) rule in a social contract scenario that should lead to competition between innate modules. A 3rd experiment used a pure HM task. Threatening material was also…
Simulating serious games: a discrete-time computational model based on cognitive flow theory
Westera, Wim
2017-01-01
This paper presents a computational model for simulating how people learn from serious games. While avoiding the combinatorial explosion of a games micro-states, the model offers a meso-level pathfinding approach, which is guided by cognitive flow theory and various concepts from learning sciences.
The naturalist view of Universal Darwinism: an application to the evolutionary theory of the firm
Stoelhorst, J.W.; Finch, J.; Orillard, M.
2005-01-01
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to recent efforts to ground evolutionary theory in economics in the principles of Universal Darwinism. The paper contrasts two views of evolution, based on the Ultra-Darwinian and Naturalist theory of biological evolution, both of which are consistent with
Holmquist, R.
1978-01-01
The random evolutionary hits (REH) theory of evolutionary divergence, originally proposed in 1972, is restated with attention to certain aspects of the theory that have caused confusion. The theory assumes that natural selection and stochastic processes interact and that natural selection restricts those codon sites which may fix mutations. The predicted total number of fixed nucleotide replacements agrees with data for cytochrome c, a-hemoglobin, beta-hemoglobin, and myoglobin. The restatement analyzes the magnitude of possible sources of errors and simplifies calculational methodology by supplying polynomial expressions to replace tables and graphs.
Evolutionary theories of aging. 2. The need not to close the debate.
Le Bourg, E; Beugnon, G
1999-01-01
Keller and Genoud [Gerontology 1999;45: 336-338] consider that a previous article of Le Bourg [Gerontology 1998;44:345-348] is an inappropriate criticism of evolutionary theories of aging and offer a refutation of this article. We answer that the article was not devoted to the criticism of evolutionary theories of aging but, rather, to the sometimes fast tackling of these theories on what is observed in the wild. Furthermore, we answer to the specific points contained in the Keller and Genoud's article (longevity of ants, reproduction in mammals, and the case of the human species). The debate about evolutionary theories of aging is not closed: it would be an error to try to do it before a consensus has been reached. Copyright 1999 S. Karger AG, Basel
Haagsma, M.C.; King, Daniel L.; Pieterse, Marcel E.; Peters, O.
2013-01-01
Although excessive video gaming has been linked to a range of psychological problems in young people, there have been few systematic attempts to conceptualize problem gaming using established psychological theory. The aim of this study was to examine problematic game use (PGU) using the Theory of
Haagsma, M.C.; King, D.L.; Pieterse, M.E.; Peters, O.
2013-01-01
Although excessive video gaming has been linked to a range of psychological problems in young people, there have been few systematic attempts to conceptualize problem gaming using established psychological theory. The aim of this study was to examine problematic game use (PGU) using the Theory of
Haagsma, Maria C.; King, Daniel L.; Pieterse, Marcel E.; Peters, Oscar
2013-01-01
Although excessive video gaming has been linked to a range of psychological problems in young people, there have been few systematic attempts to conceptualize problem gaming using established psychological theory. The aim of this study was to examine problematic game use (PGU) using the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). A two-wave, six-month…
Wan, Chin-Sheng; Chiou, Wen-Bin
2006-06-01
Obviously, the negative impact of online games has received much attention as well as having become a popular research topic. This research explored, from flow theory and humanistic needs theory, the psychological motivations of Taiwanese adolescents who are addicted to online games. The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate the relationship between players' flow state and their online games addiction. The results indicated that flow state was negatively correlated with addictive inclination and it was not a significant predictor for players' subsequent additive inclination. Findings also revealed that the addicts' flow state was significantly lower than the nonaddicts. Thus, flow state might not be the key psychological mechanism of players' addiction. In Study 2, the results showed that the psychological needs of players of online games were close to the two-factor theory which depicts satisfaction and dissatisfaction dimensions. Addicted players' need-gratification was similar to the feature of dissatisfactory factor. That is, the absence of playing online games is more likely to generate sense of dissatisfaction; the addicts' compulsive use of online games seems to stem from the relief of dissatisfaction rather than the pursuit of satisfaction. In contrast, online games tend to provide the nonaddicts with a sense of satisfaction rather than a sense of dissatisfaction.
Global Search and Local Ascent for Large Cournot Games
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Maria Sarasan
2010-12-01
Full Text Available Equilibria detection in large games is a fundamental problem in computational game theory. A memetic algorithm, Global Search and Local Ascent (GSLA, is proposed. GSLA's performance is evaluated by means of numerical experiments within the framework of a Cournot game involving up to 100 players and by comparison with an evolutionary multiobjective optimization algorithm adapted for Nash equilibria detection.
Sie, Rory
2012-01-01
Sie, R. L. L. (2012). COalitions in COOperation Networks (COCOON): Social Network Analysis and Game Theory to Enhance Cooperation Networks (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). September, 28, 2012, Open Universiteit in the Netherlands (CELSTEC), Heerlen, The Netherlands.
Barrett, Nathaniel F
2010-01-01
Cognitive science of the last half-century has been dominated by the computational theory of mind and its picture of thought as information processing. Taking this picture for granted, the most prominent evolutionary theories of religion of the last fifteen years have sought to understand human religiosity as the product or by-product of universal information processing mechanisms that were adaptive in our ancestral environment. The rigidity of such explanations is at odds with the highly context-sensitive nature of historical studies of religion, and thus contributes to the apparent tug-of-war between scientific and humanistic perspectives. This essay argues that this antagonism stems in part from a deep flaw of computational theory, namely its notion of information as pre-given and context-free. In contrast, non-computational theories that picture mind as an adaptive, interactive process in which information is jointly constructed by organism and environment offer an alternative approach to an evolutionary understanding of human religiosity, one that is compatible with historical studies and amenable to a wide range of inquiries, including some limited kinds of theological inquiry.
Inductive game theory and the dynamics of animal conflict.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Simon DeDeo
2010-05-01
Full Text Available Conflict destabilizes social interactions and impedes cooperation at multiple scales of biological organization. Of fundamental interest are the causes of turbulent periods of conflict. We analyze conflict dynamics in an monkey society model system. We develop a technique, Inductive Game Theory, to extract directly from time-series data the decision-making strategies used by individuals and groups. This technique uses Monte Carlo simulation to test alternative causal models of conflict dynamics. We find individuals base their decision to fight on memory of social factors, not on short timescale ecological resource competition. Furthermore, the social assessments on which these decisions are based are triadic (self in relation to another pair of individuals, not pairwise. We show that this triadic decision making causes long conflict cascades and that there is a high population cost of the large fights associated with these cascades. These results suggest that individual agency has been over-emphasized in the social evolution of complex aggregates, and that pair-wise formalisms are inadequate. An appreciation of the empirical foundations of the collective dynamics of conflict is a crucial step towards its effective management.
Why flying dogs are rare: A general theory of luck in evolutionary transitions.
Fleming, Leonore; Brandon, Robert
2015-02-01
There is a worry that the 'major transitions in evolution' represent an arbitrary group of events. This worry is warranted, and we show why. We argue that the transition to a new level of hierarchy necessarily involves a nonselectionist chance process. Thus any unified theory of evolutionary transitions must be more like a general theory of fortuitous luck, rather than a rigid formulation of expected events. We provide a systematic account of evolutionary transitions based on a second-order regularity of chance events, as stipulated by the ZFEL (Zero Force Evolutionary Law). And in doing so, we make evolutionary transitions explainable and predictable, and so not entirely contingent after all. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Archetti, M
2015-04-01
The Warburg effect, a switch from aerobic energy production to anaerobic glycolysis, promotes tumour proliferation and motility by inducing acidification of the tumour microenvironment. Therapies that reduce acidity could impair tumour growth and invasiveness. I analysed the dynamics of cell proliferation and of resistance to therapies that target acidity, in a population of cells, under the Warburg effect. The dynamics of mutant cells with increased glycolysis and motility has been assessed in a multi-player game with collective interactions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. Perturbations of the level of acidity in the microenvironment have been used to simulate the effect of therapies that target glycolysis. The non-linear effects of glycolysis induce frequency-dependent clonal selection leading to coexistence of glycolytic and non-glycolytic cells within a tumour. Mutants with increased motility can invade such a polymorphic population and spread within the tumour. While reducing acidity may produce a sudden reduction in tumour cell proliferation, frequency-dependent selection enables it to adapt to the new conditions and can enable the tumour to restore its original levels of growth and invasiveness. The acidity produced by glycolysis acts as a non-linear public good that leads to coexistence of cells with high and low glycolysis within the tumour. Such a heterogeneous population can easily adapt to changes in acidity. Therapies that target acidity can only be effective in the long term if the cost of glycolysis is high, that is, under non-limiting oxygen concentrations. Their efficacy, therefore, is reduced when combined with therapies that impair angiogenesis. © 2015 The Authors Cell Proliferation Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Evolutionary emergence of angiogenesis in avascular tumors using a spatial public goods game.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Javad Salimi Sartakhti
Full Text Available Natural selection in cancer often results in the emergence of increasingly malignant tumor cells that display many if not all of the hallmarks of cancer. One of the most important traits acquired during cancer progression is angiogenesis. Tumor cells capable of secreting pro-angiogenic factors can be seen as cooperators where the improved oxygenation, nutrient delivery and waste disposal resulting from angiogenesis could be seen as a public good. Under this view, the relatively costly secretion of molecular signals required to orchestrate angiogenesis would be undertaken exclusively by cooperating tumor cells but the benefits of angiogenesis would be felt by neighboring tumor cells regardless of their contribution to the process. In this work we detail a mathematical model to better understand how clones capable of secreting pro-angiogenic factors can emerge in a tumor made of non-cooperative tumor cells. Given the importance of the spatial configuration of the tumor in determining the efficacy of the secretion of pro-angiogenic factors as well as the benefits of angiogenesis we have developed a spatial game theoretic approach where interactions and public good diffusion are described by graphs. The results show that structure of the population affects the evolutionary dynamics of the pro-angiogenic clone. Specifically, when the benefit of angiogenesis is represented by sigmoid function with regards to the number of pro-angiogenic clones then the probability of the coexistence of pro-angiogenic and angiogenesis-neutral clones increases. Our results demonstrate that pro-angiogenic clone equilibrates into clusters that appear from surrounding vascular tissues towards the center of tumor. These clusters appear notably less dense after anti-angiogenic therapy.
Topics in mathematical economics and game theory essays in honor of Robert J. Aumann
Wooders, Myrna H
1999-01-01
Since the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics. This volume provides a collection
Games Theory, Television and Leisure: An Adolescent Study
Hendry, L. B.; Thornton D. J. E.
1976-01-01
Sutton-Smith's games typologies were applied to television viewing preferences in order to construct a television classification based on Sutton-Smith's three types, and ascertain whether or not 204 adolescents designated as potents, strategists, and fortunists could be distinguished in terms of their games involvement, attitudes to sport, and…
Turkay, Selen; Hoffman, Daniel; Kinzer, Charles K.; Chantes, Pantiphar; Vicari, Christopher
2014-01-01
Researchers have argued that an effort should be made to raise teachers' and parents' awareness of the potentially positive educational benefits of playing video games (e.g., see Baek, 2008). One part of this effort should be to increase understanding of how video games can be situated within teachers' existing goals and knowledge…
Tyc, Katarzyna M; Herwald, Sanna E; Hogan, Jennifer A; Pierce, Jessica V; Klipp, Edda; Kumamoto, Carol A
2016-03-01
The fungal pathogen Candida albicans colonizes the gastrointestinal (GI) tract of mammalian hosts as a benign commensal. However, in an immunocompromised host, the fungus is capable of causing life-threatening infection. We previously showed that the major transcription factor Efg1p is differentially expressed in GI-colonizing C. albicans cells dependent on the host immune status. To understand the mechanisms that underlie this host-dependent differential gene expression, we utilized mathematical modeling to dissect host-pathogen interactions. Specifically, we used principles of evolutionary game theory to study the mechanism that governs dynamics of EFG1 expression during C. albicans colonization. Mathematical modeling predicted that down-regulation of EFG1 expression within individual fungal cells occurred at different average rates in different hosts. Rather than using relatively transient signaling pathways to adapt to a new environment, we demonstrate that C. albicans overcomes the host defense strategy by modulating the activity of diverse fungal histone modifying enzymes that control EFG1 expression. Based on our modeling and experimental results we conclude that C. albicans cells sense the local environment of the GI tract and respond to differences by altering EFG1 expression to establish optimal survival strategies. We show that the overall process is governed via modulation of epigenetic regulators of chromatin structure.
Dühring, Sybille; Ewald, Jan; Germerodt, Sebastian; Kaleta, Christoph; Dandekar, Thomas; Schuster, Stefan
2017-07-01
The release of fungal cells following macrophage phagocytosis, called non-lytic expulsion, is reported for several fungal pathogens. On one hand, non-lytic expulsion may benefit the fungus in escaping the microbicidal environment of the phagosome. On the other hand, the macrophage could profit in terms of avoiding its own lysis and being able to undergo proliferation. To analyse the causes of non-lytic expulsion and the relevance of macrophage proliferation in the macrophage-Candida albicans interaction, we employ Evolutionary Game Theory and dynamic optimization in a sequential manner. We establish a game-theoretical model describing the different strategies of the two players after phagocytosis. Depending on the parameter values, we find four different Nash equilibria and determine the influence of the systems state of the host upon the game. As our Nash equilibria are a direct consequence of the model parameterization, we can depict several biological scenarios. A parameter region, where the host response is robust against the fungal infection, is determined. We further apply dynamic optimization to analyse whether macrophage mitosis is relevant in the host-pathogen interaction of macrophages and C. albicans For this, we study the population dynamics of the macrophage-C. albicans interactions and the corresponding optimal controls for the macrophages, indicating the best macrophage strategy of switching from proliferation to attacking fungal cells. © 2017 The Author(s).
The current status of REH theory. [Random Evolutionary Hits in biological molecular evolution
Holmquist, R.; Jukes, T. H.
1981-01-01
A response is made to the evaluation of Fitch (1980) of REH (random evolutionary hits) theory for the evolutionary divergence of proteins and nucleic acids. Correct calculations for the beta hemoglobin mRNAs of the human, mouse and rabbit in the absence and presence of selective constraints are summarized, and it is shown that the alternative evolutionary analysis of Fitch underestimates the total fixed mutations. It is further shown that the model used by Fitch to test for the completeness of the count of total base substitutions is in fact a variant of REH theory. Considerations of the variance inherent in evolutionary estimations are also presented which show the REH model to produce no more variance than other evolutionary models. In the reply, it is argued that, despite the objections raised, REH theory applied to proteins gives inaccurate estimates of total gene substitutions. It is further contended that REH theory developed for nucleic sequences suffers from problems relating to the frequency of nucleotide substitutions, the identity of the codons accepting silent and amino acid-changing substitutions, and estimate uncertainties.
GAME THEORY: MINIMISING THE COST OF CAPITAL VS. MAXIMISING THE RETURN OF INVESTORS
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Mihaela Brindusa Tudose
2014-12-01
Full Text Available The application of game theory to financial transactions focuses on two categories of stakeholders: users of financing (firms and providers of financing (investors. The core of game theory consists in the strategy that a partner is able to build starting from the possible decisions of the other partner (each party having opposing interests. In fact, we deal here with a cooperative game in which both opponents seek to maximise their own chances of winning. The article aims to highlight the manner in which mathematical game theory is transposed in the field of corporate finance by balancing the firm’s objectives (maximising market value by minimising the cost of raising capital and the investors’ objectives (maximising returns on investments. The intended novelty of this paper lies in developing a model for optimising a firm’s financial structure and assessing it in terms of investors’ interests.
Research on Evolutionary Mechanism of Agile Supply Chain Network via Complex Network Theory
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Nai-Ru Xu
2016-01-01
Full Text Available The paper establishes the evolutionary mechanism model of agile supply chain network by means of complex network theory which can be used to describe the growth process of the agile supply chain network and analyze the complexity of the agile supply chain network. After introducing the process and the suitability of taking complex network theory into supply chain network research, the paper applies complex network theory into the agile supply chain network research, analyzes the complexity of agile supply chain network, presents the evolutionary mechanism of agile supply chain network based on complex network theory, and uses Matlab to simulate degree distribution, average path length, clustering coefficient, and node betweenness. Simulation results show that the evolution result displays the scale-free property. It lays the foundations of further research on agile supply chain network based on complex network theory.
The challenge of video games to media effect theory
Malliet, Steven
2007-01-01
Research on the effects of video game play has mainly been focusing on topics such as agression, violence and hostility. This is undoubtedly related to the countless social and political debates that have been held on the harmful impact of this new medium. From a social-psychological point of view, researchers have frequently observed that, up to 15 minutes after having played a game of action, one is more excited or aroused than in the case one had not played that game. Concerning the long-t...
Evolutionary rescue: linking theory for conservation and medicine.
Alexander, Helen K; Martin, Guillaume; Martin, Oliver Y; Bonhoeffer, Sebastian
2014-12-01
Evolutionary responses that rescue populations from extinction when drastic environmental changes occur can be friend or foe. The field of conservation biology is concerned with the survival of species in deteriorating global habitats. In medicine, in contrast, infected patients are treated with chemotherapeutic interventions, but drug resistance can compromise eradication of pathogens. These contrasting biological systems and goals have created two quite separate research communities, despite addressing the same central question of whether populations will decline to extinction or be rescued through evolution. We argue that closer integration of the two fields, especially of theoretical understanding, would yield new insights and accelerate progress on these applied problems. Here, we overview and link mathematical modelling approaches in these fields, suggest specific areas with potential for fruitful exchange, and discuss common ideas and issues for empirical testing and prediction.
Action being character: a promising perspective on the solution concept of game theory.
Deng, Kuiying; Chu, Tianguang
2011-05-09
The inconsistency of predictions from solution concepts of conventional game theory with experimental observations is an enduring question. These solution concepts are based on the canonical rationality assumption that people are exclusively self-regarding utility maximizers. In this article, we think this assumption is problematic and, instead, assume that rational economic agents act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities, which turns out to be a natural extension of the canonical rationality assumption. Implicit utility is defined by a player's character to reflect his personal weighting between cooperative, individualistic, and competitive social value orientations. The player who actually faces an implicit game chooses his strategy based on the common belief about the character distribution for a general player and the self-estimation of his own character, and he is not concerned about which strategies other players will choose and will never feel regret about his decision. It is shown by solving five paradigmatic games, the Dictator game, the Ultimatum game, the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the Public Goods game, and the Battle of the Sexes game, that the framework of implicit game and its corresponding solution concept, implicit equilibrium, based on this alternative assumption have potential for better explaining people's actual behaviors in social decision making situations.
The Ultimatum Game and Expected Utility Maximization – In View of Attachment Theory
Almakias, Shaul; Weiss, Avi
2010-01-01
In this paper we import a mainstream psycholgical theory, known as attachment theory, into economics and show the implications of this theory for economic behavior by individuals in the ultimatum bargaining game. Attachment theory examines the psychological tendency to seek proximity to another person, to feel secure when that person is present, and to feel anxious when that person is absent. An individual's attachment style can be classified along two-dimensional axes, one representing attac...
Replicator dynamics for optional public good games
DEFF Research Database (Denmark)
Hauert, C.; De Monte, Silvia; Hofbauer, J.
2002-01-01
The public goods game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner's dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. Since the dominant strategy is to defect, both classical and evolutionary game theory predict the asocial outcome that no player contributes to the public goods. In contr...
Teaching Prospect Theory with the "Deal or No Deal" Game Show
Baker, Ardith; Bittner, Teresa; Makrigeorgis, Christos; Johnson, Gloria; Haefner, Joseph
2010-01-01
Recent evidence indicates that decision makers are more sensitive to potential losses than gains. Loss aversion psychology has led behavioural economists to look beyond expected utility by developing "prospect theory." We demonstrate this theory using the "Deal or No Deal" game show.
MONOPOLY and Critical Theory: Gaming in a Class on the Sociology of Deviance
Paino, Maria; Chin, Jeffrey
2011-01-01
In this article, the authors demonstrate how they modified a well-known game to use it as an educational simulation to help students understand difficult material, specifically critical theory. The goals for the simulation focus on improving the comprehension levels of critical theory for students in a course on the Sociology of Deviance, although…
Cryer, Patricia
1988-01-01
Develops models for participants' behaviors in games, simulations, and workshops based on Catastrophe Theory and Herzberg's two-factor theory of motivation. Examples are given of how these models can be used, both for describing and understanding the behaviors of individuals, and for eliciting insights into why participants behave as they do. (11…
Bevilacqua, Andy
2017-01-01
Recent upgrades to cognitive load theory suggest that evolutionary processes have shaped the way that working memory processes cultural and social information. According to evolutionarily educational psychologists, some forms of information are processed with lower working memory loads than other forms. The former are evolutionarily salient and…
Brem, Sarah K.; Ranney, Michael; Schindel, Jennifer
2003-01-01
Examines how college-educated adults (n=135) from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds perceive the impact of evolutionary theory on individuals and society. Identifies a continuum of perspectives ranging from strong creationist to strong evolutionist. Reports differences between evolutionists and creationists in their prior exposure to…
Sheppard, Carol A.; Prischmann, Deirdre A.
2003-01-01
Develops activities based on pedagogical research that indicate that student engagement and comprehension are enhanced by methodologies that promote active participation, critical thinking, and an interdisciplinary, contextualist approach to teach evolutionary theory to students in an upper-division, capstone course. Provides critical thinking…
Schlomer, Gabriel L.; Del Giudice, Marco; Ellis, Bruce J.
2011-01-01
Decades of research demonstrate that conflict shapes and permeates a broad range of family processes. In the current article, we argue that greater insight, integration of knowledge, and empirical achievement in the study of family conflict can be realized by utilizing a powerful theory from evolutionary biology that is barely known within…
Nieswandt, Martina; Bellomo, Katherine
2009-01-01
This qualitative study analyzed grade 12 biology students' answers to written extended-response questions that describe hypothetical scenarios of animals' evolution. We investigated whether these type of questions are suitable for students (n = 24) to express a meaningful understanding of evolutionary theory. Meaningful understanding is comprised…
Ludwig von Bertalanffy Forerunner of Evolutionary Systems Theory
Wolfgang, Hofkirchner
2005-01-01
Ludwig von Bertalanffy is known as founding father of the General System Theory (GST). When Ludwig von Bertalanffy created his GST amidst the last century, he was able to overcome the deep cleft between the controversial theoretical approaches to biology - mechanicism and vitalism. He did so by formulating laws of organisation ruling biota and after generalising them he successfully applied them to different domains such as medicine, psychology, psychotherapy. Methodologically, Bertalanffy re...
An evolutionary model of cooperation, fairness and altruistic punishment in public good games
National Research Council Canada - National Science Library
Hetzer, Moritz; Sornette, Didier
2013-01-01
We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective...
Health Behavior Theory in Physical Activity Game Apps: A Content Analysis.
Payne, Hannah E; Moxley, Victor Ba; MacDonald, Elizabeth
2015-07-13
Physical activity games developed for a mobile phone platform are becoming increasingly popular, yet little is known about their content or inclusion of health behavior theory (HBT). The objective of our study was to quantify elements of HBT in physical activity games developed for mobile phones and to assess the relationship between theoretical constructs and various app features. We conducted an analysis of exercise and physical activity game apps in the Apple App Store in the fall of 2014. A total of 52 apps were identified and rated for inclusion of health behavior theoretical constructs using an established theory-based rubric. Each app was coded for 100 theoretical items, containing 5 questions for 20 different constructs. Possible total theory scores ranged from 0 to 100. Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations were used to describe the HBT score and association with selected app features, respectively. The average HBT score in the sample was 14.98 out of 100. One outlier, SuperBetter, scored higher than the other apps with a score of 76. Goal setting, self-monitoring, and self-reward were the most-reported constructs found in the sample. There was no association between either app price and theory score (P=.5074), or number of gamification elements and theory score (P=.5010). However, Superbetter, with the highest HBT score, was also the most expensive app. There are few content analyses of serious games for health, but a comparison between these findings and previous content analyses of non-game health apps indicates that physical activity mobile phone games demonstrate higher levels of behavior theory. The most common theoretical constructs found in this sample are known to be efficacious elements in physical activity interventions. It is unclear, however, whether app designers consciously design physical activity mobile phone games with specific constructs in mind; it may be that games lend themselves well to inclusion of theory and any
Health Behavior Theory in Physical Activity Game Apps: A Content Analysis
Moxley, Victor BA; MacDonald, Elizabeth
2015-01-01
Background Physical activity games developed for a mobile phone platform are becoming increasingly popular, yet little is known about their content or inclusion of health behavior theory (HBT). Objective The objective of our study was to quantify elements of HBT in physical activity games developed for mobile phones and to assess the relationship between theoretical constructs and various app features. Methods We conducted an analysis of exercise and physical activity game apps in the Apple App Store in the fall of 2014. A total of 52 apps were identified and rated for inclusion of health behavior theoretical constructs using an established theory-based rubric. Each app was coded for 100 theoretical items, containing 5 questions for 20 different constructs. Possible total theory scores ranged from 0 to 100. Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations were used to describe the HBT score and association with selected app features, respectively. Results The average HBT score in the sample was 14.98 out of 100. One outlier, SuperBetter, scored higher than the other apps with a score of 76. Goal setting, self-monitoring, and self-reward were the most-reported constructs found in the sample. There was no association between either app price and theory score (P=.5074), or number of gamification elements and theory score (P=.5010). However, Superbetter, with the highest HBT score, was also the most expensive app. Conclusions There are few content analyses of serious games for health, but a comparison between these findings and previous content analyses of non-game health apps indicates that physical activity mobile phone games demonstrate higher levels of behavior theory. The most common theoretical constructs found in this sample are known to be efficacious elements in physical activity interventions. It is unclear, however, whether app designers consciously design physical activity mobile phone games with specific constructs in mind; it may be that games lend
Sinclair, Anne; Baldwin, Beatrice
An anonymous 12-item, multiple-choice questionnaire was administered to 218 southern college, introductory zoology students prior to and following a study of evolutionary theory to assess their understanding and acceptance of the credibility of the evidence supporting the theory. Key topics addressed were the history of evolutionary thought, basic…
Gillie, Lynn; Bizub, Anne L.
2012-01-01
The study of evolutionary theory and fieldwork in animal behavior is enriched when students leave the classroom so they may test their abilities to think and act like scientists. This article describes a course on evolutionary theory and animal behavior that blended on campus learning with field experience in the United States and in Ecuador and…
The game of science: A grounded theory of the Cafe Scientifique experience
Rabe, Lisa A.
Science Cafes are independent groups organized throughout the world for discussion of scientific topics. Little is known about the nature of this informal learning environment. A grounded-theory study was conducted to determine what attendees perceived as the essential qualities of the Cafe Scientifique experience in one science Cafe in the Western United States. Interviews with 12 attendees were transcribed and analyzed using ATLAS-ti. Concept maps and a grounded theory describing the essential characteristics were created. Member checking was used during theory generation. Findings are described in the context of a game metaphor, whereby scientific discussion at the Cafe is viewed as an intellectual game. The grounded theory describes the game of science being played at Cafe Scientifique involving attendees as players, social norms as rules for the game, an expert as the steward of truth, topics as the content for game play, interaction as playing of the game, and intellectual stimulation as the prize for playing. During the game, ideas were identified through a short presentation followed by a question-and-answer session. During this exchange, attendees heard about, analyzed, synthesized, and applied new information. As a result of the game play, players won a prize---intellectual stimulation. The Cafe Scientifique phenomenon provides insight into informal adult education. This study suggests the need for additional study of intellectual play in adult education, the role of curiosity and desire to explore new ways of thinking, and the developmental drive in adults to seek intellectual stimulation. The essential characteristics of Cafe Scientifique may be transferable to other informal adult-education settings.
Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)
Jing Chen
2013-01-01
Full Text Available Due to high efficiency and good scalability, hierarchical hybrid P2P architecture has drawn more and more attention in P2P streaming research and application fields recently. The problem about super peer selection, which is the key problem in hybrid heterogeneous P2P architecture, is becoming highly challenging because super peers must be selected from a huge and dynamically changing network. A distributed super peer selection (SPS algorithm for hybrid heterogeneous P2P streaming system based on evolutionary game is proposed in this paper. The super peer selection procedure is modeled based on evolutionary game framework firstly, and its evolutionarily stable strategies are analyzed. Then a distributed Q-learning algorithm (ESS-SPS according to the mixed strategies by analysis is proposed for the peers to converge to the ESSs based on its own payoff history. Compared to the traditional randomly super peer selection scheme, experiments results show that the proposed ESS-SPS algorithm achieves better performance in terms of social welfare and average upload rate of super peers and keeps the upload capacity of the P2P streaming system increasing steadily with the number of peers increasing.