Reneaud, J.M. [Eurodif Production, Pierrelatte (France)
Risk of overfilling exists on different equipments of Georges BESSE Plant: cylinders, desublimers and intermediate tanks. The preventive measures are composed of technical devices: desublimers weighing, load monitoring alarms, automatic controls ... and procedures, training, safety organization. In thirteen years of operation, some incidents have occurred but none of them has caused any personal injuries. They are related and discussed. The main factors involved in the Sequoyah fuel facility accident on 1/4/1986 have been analyzed and taken into account.
... uranium, from Areva Resources Canada, Inc. (Areva Resources) in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada, to Eurodif Production in Pierrelatte, France. The material, which is currently located at Areva Resources... programs in the United States and France. The material was originally obtained by Areva Resources from the...
weapons program which the Shah started before the revolution. His suc- cessor, Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa (religious edict) in 1995 that considered...Eurodif was founded as a joint venture of Belgium, France, Iran, Italy, and Spain. The Shah invested $1 billion in the company. This invest- ment made...www.washingtonmonthly.com; and Reza Marashi, “America’s Real Iran Problem,” The New York Times, November 10, 2011. 8 Barack Obama, “Transcript of Obama’s
Recently a controversy has broken out about the EDF's exports of depleted uranium to Russia. This depleted uranium comes from 2 sources: the tailings of uranium enrichment (from EURODIF plant) and the recycling of spent fuels (from La Hague plant). Depleted uranium is sent to Russia to be enriched by centrifugation process, this enrichment generates new depleted uranium that is kept by Russia, enriched uranium is sent back to France. As it is stipulated in all enrichment contracts the company that operates the enrichment keeps the depleted material, it is the case of Tenex the Russian company. This depleted uranium can not be considered as a waste because it is stored to be used as fuel for future fast reactors. (A.C.)
The purpose of this supporting analysis is to provide a foundation for developing a model, an international or multinational institution capable of accomodating the back end of the fuel cycle, while meeting US nonproliferation goals. The analysis is based on a review of selected, defunct and extant institutions which, although not necessarily concerned with nonproliferation, have faced a trade-off between acceptability and effectiveness in meeting their objectives. Discussion of the various institutions is divided into three categories: international organizations, multinational consortia, and cartels or producer associations. Examples of international organizations include the International Seabed Authority, Intelsat, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The International Seabed Authority is discussed. Multinational consortia are organizations that have been developed primarily to meet common commercial objectives. Membership includes at least three member nations. Examples include the Scandinavian Airline System (SAS), URENCO, Unilever, Royal Dutch Shell, Eurochemic, Eurodif, Euratom, European Coal and Steel Community, and Serena. Cartels or producer associations are multinational agreements that restrict market forces; viz, production, market share, customers or prices. Examples include the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Fifth International Tin Agreement (ITA), as well as agreements governing diamonds and uranium, bauxite and coffee. OPEC, CIPEC and ITA are discussed.
This complementary safety assessment analyses the robustness of the Areva part of the Tricastin nuclear site to extreme situations such as those that led to the Fukushima accident. This study includes the following facilities: Areva NC Pierrelatte, EURODIF production, Comurhex Pierrelatte, Georges Besse II plant and Socatri. Robustness is the ability for the plant to withstand events beyond which the plant was designed. Robustness is linked to safety margins but also to the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accidental sequence. Moreover, safety is not only a matter of design or engineered systems but also a matter of organizing: task organization (including subcontracting) as well as the setting of emergency plans or the inventory of nuclear materials are taken into consideration in this assessment. This report is divided into 10 main chapters: 1) the feedback experience of the Fukushima accident; 2) description of the site and its surroundings; 3) featuring of the site's activities and installations; 4) accidental sequences; 5) protection from earthquakes; 6) protection from floods; 7) protection from other extreme natural disasters; 8) the loss of electrical power and of the heat sink; 9) the management of severe accidents; and 10) subcontracting policy. This analysis has identified 5 main measures to be taken to limit the risks linked to natural disasters: -) continuing the program for replacing the current conversion plant and the enrichment plant; -) renewing the storage of hydrofluoric acid at the de-fluorination workshop; -) assessing the seismic behaviour of some parts of the de-fluorination workshop and of the fluorine fabrication workshop; -) improving the availability of warning and information means in case of emergency; and -) improving the means to mitigate accidental gaseous releases. (A.C.)
This 4. European forum of radiation protection sciences was the occasion for nuclear professionals to share their experience and to present the tools and techniques implemented in dismantling operations in the respect of radiation protection rules. This document brings together the abstracts and the available presentations given at this forum: 1 - Dismantling organisation and management - regulations: dismantling environment (A. Gay, Areva NC); Dismantling at the CEA (Ph. Guiberteau, DEN-Saclay); Optimisation of future dismantlement at the design and operation stage of facilities (P. Poncet, Areva); Action of the labour Ministry for workers radiation protection (T. Lahaye, DGT); 2 - Dismantling experience feedbacks 1: Radiation protection and dismantlement at Marcoule (J. Chardin, Areva NC); INB 106 dismantling (N. Pauwels, UDIL); Dismantling wastes management and valorisation of ALS and Saturne accelerators at Saclay (C. Salmon, CEA-Saclay); Chooz power plant deconstruction (L. Bardou, EDF); 3-4 - Dismantling projects: Phenix power plant dismantling (C. Beretti, CEA-Marcoule); Radiological characterization impact on the DGB project (H.C. Turbatte, F. Lemperiere, DGB Eurodif); Contribution of scientific calculations to reactor dismantling studies (A. Van Lauwe, CEA-Saclay); Acceptance committee of radiological cleansing companies (S. Faure, DPSN); Externalizing of the radiation protection skilled person (J.P. Piferrer, ATSR); International network of radiation protection professionals (G. Abela, EDF); 5 - Dismantling experience feedback 2: gloveboxes dismounting at La Hague plant (R. Choquet, P. Mougnard, Areva NC); Nuclear submarines dismantling in Russia (C. Deregel, Topp-Decide); Radioactive waste management of CERN accelerators (Y. Algoet, CERN); Nuclear facilities decommissioning (M. Berton, CEA, B. Marc, DRIM Sogeris); Asbestos removal in radiological environment (R. Blanc, Areva NC); 6-7-8 - Tools and methods: Aspilaser, decontamination by laser ablation (F
process for the processing of industrial effluents; 6 - membrane reactors: membrane catalytic reactors: extraction, isobutane dehydrogenation and xylenes isomerization; selective oxidation of n-butane, water treatment by gas-liquid processes; selectiveness improvement of the butadiene selective hydrogenation with the use of a membrane reactor; comparison of the efficiency of three catalytic reactors for the destruction of VOCs; 7 - gases and vapors separation: a new generation of particulate filters with catalyst impregnation for DeNox function; use of membranes for uranium enrichment: example of the EURODIF plant; inorganic membranes for integration in power generation cycles and hydrogen production; treatment of natural gas with Air Liquide-MEDAL hollow fiber membranes; 8 - liquids separation: nano-filtration in organic environment: state-of-the-art; recycling of organic compounds by inverse osmosis and seawater sulfate removing by nano-filtration; use of organic and mineral membranes in chemistry; membrane separation in chemicals manufacture; advantages and drawbacks of different membrane systems for the treatment of industrial water; concentration and recovery of organic pigments using ceramic membranes; 9 - membranes, processes and simulation: industrial experience with hybrid distillation - pervaporation or vapor permeation applications; electro-dialysis integration in amines and glycol solutions purification processes; integration of MFI membranes in the light gasoline isomerization process. (J.S.)