78 FR 72123 - Request To Amend a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium

Science.gov (United States)

2013-12-02

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... manufacture HEU targets in Belgium. National Nuclear Security Uranium (HEU) uranium France for irradiation in... 5.8 kg of U- 235 contained in 6.2 kg uranium to a new cumulative total of 12.615 kg of U-235...

Unattended Monitoring of HEU Production in Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants using Automated Aerosol Collection and Laser-based Enrichment Assay

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anheier, Norman C.; Bushaw, Bruce A.

2010-01-01

Nuclear power is enjoying rapid growth as government energy policies and public demand shift toward low carbon energy production. Pivotal to the global nuclear power renaissance is the development and deployment of robust safeguards instrumentation that allows the limited resources of the IAEA to keep pace with the expansion of the nuclear fuel cycle. Undeclared production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) remains a primary proliferation concern for modern gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), due to their massive separative work unit (SWU) processing power and comparably short cascade equilibrium timescale. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing an unattended safeguards instrument, combining continuous aerosol particulate collection with uranium isotope assay, to provide timely detection of HEU production within a GCEP. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulates, followed by laser spectroscopy to characterize the uranium enrichment level. Our prior investigation demonstrated single-shot detection sensitivity approaching the femtogram range and relative isotope ratio uncertainty better than 10% using gadolinium as a surrogate for uranium. In this paper we present measurement results on standard samples containing traces of depleted, natural, and low enriched uranium, as well as measurements on aerodynamic size uranium particles mixed in background materials (e.g., dust, minerals, soils). Improvements and optimizations in the detection electronics, signal timing, calibration, and laser alignment have lead to significant improvements in detection sensitivity and enrichment accuracy, contributing to an overall reduction in the false alarm probability. The sample substrate media was also found to play a significant role in facilitating laser-induced vaporization and the production of energetic plasma conditions, resulting in ablation optimization and further improvements in the isotope abundance sensitivity.

Verification experiment on the downblending of high enriched uranium (HEU) at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Digital video surveillance of the HEU feed stations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martinez, R.L.; Tolk, K.; Whiting, N.; Castleberry, K.; Lenarduzzi, R.

1998-01-01

As part of a Safeguards Agreement between the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, was added to the list of facilities eligible for the application of IAEA safeguards. Currently, the facility is in the process of downblending excess inventory of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) from US defense related programs for commercial use. An agreement was reached between the US and the IAEA that would allow the IAEA to conduct an independent verification experiment at the Portsmouth facility, resulting in the confirmation that the HEU was in fact downblended. The experiment provided an opportunity for the DOE laboratories to recommend solutions/measures for new IAEA safeguards applications. One of the measures recommended by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and selected by the IAEA, was a digital video surveillance system for monitoring activity at the HEU feed stations. This paper describes the SNL implementation of the digital video system and its integration with the Load Cell Based Weighing System (LCBWS) from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The implementation was based on commercially available technology that also satisfied IAEA criteria for tamper protection and data authentication. The core of the Portsmouth digital video surveillance system was based on two Digital Camera Modules (DMC-14) from Neumann Consultants, Germany

Candidate processes for diluting the 235U isotope in weapons-capable highly enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Snider, J.D.

1996-02-01

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering its surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used to produce nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching uranium in the fissile 235 U isotope from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by diluting its concentration of the fissile 235 U isotope in a uranium blending process, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel

Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.

2007-01-01

It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) politics: An enigma wrapped up in a warhead and boxed in political chaos

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1993-01-01

It could be fairly said that while the Cold War arose in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and hostility, it is ending with an equal amount of confusion and uncertainty. More than a year has passed since the US and Russia signed a tentative HEU agreement in August 1992. Many of the details have been worked out, but major questions remain. And they're not just on the Russian side. The fine points of President Clinton's overall nuclear policy are only now beginning to emerge. In his first major foreign policy address, before the United Nations in late September, Clinton called for a worldwide ban on the production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. open-quotes Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations,close quotes said Clinton before the UN. open-quotes We will press for an international agreement that would ban production of these materials for weapons forever.close quotes As the veil lifts from Clinton's nuclear policy, it appears the Administration realizes that Russia may have more HEU than originally thought. That possibility has been confirmed by Minatom Minister Mikhailov's disclosures to the NUKEM Market Report, which brought a greater degree of certainty to estimates that had been floating around for some time. When the Bush Administration signed the HEU pact, it apparently thought the 500 metric tons comprised most of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. Now that the number appears higher, Clinton may propose to accelerate and enlarge the HEU deal. He is due to summit with Yeltsin, if Yeltsin survives, next spring. The 500-metric-ton deal may only be the first step

Minimizing civilian use of highly enriched uranium - FRM II and global developments

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Englert, Matthias [Oeko-Institut e.V., Darmstadt (Germany)

2016-07-01

The need to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civil nuclear applications is shrinking due to international efforts worldwide in the last three decades. Today low enriched uranium (LEU) that is not suitable for nuclear weapon purposes can be used instead in almost all civil applications. An overview of the current HEU use worldwide will be presented before focusing more on the use of HEU in research reactors and the conversion of existing reactors to LEU. Specifically interesting is the case of the German research reactor in Munich, the FRM-II. The reactor operates since ten years after intense national and international discussions over the use of weapon usable HEU to fuel the reactor. Since its construction the reactor is therefore obliged to convert to lower enrichment levels as soon as a suitable fuel becomes available. Despite huge international efforts to develop new fuels it is still not clear if and when the reactor can be converted.

Profile of World Uranium Enrichment Programs-2009

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughter, Mark D.

2009-01-01

It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor, whereas HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear reactor fuel can also be used to produce HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification techniques that ensure uranium is not diverted or enriched to HEU. There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 56 million kilogram separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22.5 million in gaseous diffusion and more than 33 million in gas centrifuge plants. Another 34 million SWU/year of capacity is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment technique of the future but has yet to be

Disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium: Draft environmental impact statement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-10-01

This document assesses the environmental impacts at four potential sites that may result from alternatives for the disposition of United States-origin weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) that has been or may be declared surplus to national defense or defense-related program needs. In addition to the no action alternative, it assesses four alternatives that would eliminate the weapons-usability of HEU by blending it with depleted uranium, natural uranium, or low-enriched uranium (LEU) to create low-enriched uranium, either as commercial reactor fuel feedstock or as low-level radioactive waste. The potential blending sites are DOE's Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; the Babcock ampersand Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; and the Nuclear Fuel Services Fuel Fabrication Plant in Erwin, Tennessee. Evaluations of impacts on site infrastructure, water resources, air quality and noise, socioeconomic resources, waste management, public and occupational health, and environmental justice for the potential blending sites are included in the assessment. The intersite transportation of nuclear and hazardous materials is also assessed. The preferred alternative is to blend down surplus HEU to LEU for maximum commercial use as reactor fuel feed which would likely be done at a combination of DOE and commercial sites

Use of highly enriched uranium at the FRM-II

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boening, K. [Forschungs-Neutronenquelle FRM-II, Technische Universitaet Muenchen, D-85747 Garching bei Muenchen (Germany)

2002-07-01

The new FRM-II research reactor in Munich, Germany, provides a high flux of thermal neutrons outside of the core at only 20 MW power. This is achieved by using a single compact, cylindrical fuel element with highly enriched uranium (HEU) which is cooled by light water and placed in the center of a large heavy water tank. The paper outlines the arguments which have led to this core concept and summarizes its performance. It also reports on alternative studies which have been performed for the case of low enriched uranium (LEU) and compares the data of the two concepts, with the conclusion that the FRM-II cannot be converted to LEU. A concept using medium enriched uranium (MEU) is described as well as plans to develop such a fuel element in the future. Finally, it is argued that the use of HEU fuel elements at the FRM-II does not - realistically -involve any risk of proliferation. (author)

Development of dissolution process for metal foil target containing low enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Srinivasan, B.; Hutter, J.C.; Johnson, G.K.; Vandegrift, G.F.

1994-01-01

About six times more low enriched uranium (LEU) metal is needed to produce the same quantity of 99 Mo as from a high enriched uranium (HEU) oxide target, under similar conditions of neutron irradiation. In view of this, the post-irradiation processing procedures of the LEU target are likely to be different from the Cintichem process procedures now in use for the HEU target. The authors have begun a systematic study to develop modified procedures for LEU target dissolution and 99 Mo separation. The dissolution studies include determination of the dissolution rate, chemical state of uranium in the solution, and the heat evolved in the dissolution reaction. From these results the authors conclude that a mixture of nitric and sulfuric acid is a suitable dissolver solution, albeit at higher concentration of nitric acid than in use for the HEU targets. Also, the dissolver vessel now in use for HEU targets is inadequate for the LEU target, since higher temperature and higher pressure will be encountered in the dissolution of LEU targets. The desire is to keep the modifications to the Cintichem process to a minimum, so that the switch from HEU to LEU can be achieved easily

Conversion of the Worcester Polytechnic Institute nuclear reactor to low enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Newton, T.H. Jr.

1991-01-01

The Training Reactor was converted to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) aluminide fuel in 1988 and 1989. Tests on the Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) core and LEU cores were performed and comparisons made. The testing consisted of critical loading, thermal neutron flux distribution, excess reactivity, regulating blade reactivity worth, and temperature coefficient of reactivity measurement. Comparisons between the LEU and HEU showed that the critical loading configurations were somewhat different with the HEU core consisting of 24 elements and the LEU core consisting of 21 1/3 elements with excess reactivities of 0.24% ΔK/K for the HEU and 0.16% for the LEU. Thermal neutron flux distributions showed similar trends in both the LEU and HEU cores. The regulating blade worth showed a larger LEU value due to thermal peaking in the blade region and temperature coefficients showed a more negative LEU value due to Doppler broadening. Low induced activity of the HEU fuel permitted shipment to the Westinghouse Savannah River Facility using DOT-6M type B containers on 8 August, 1989. (orig.)

Continuing investigations for technology assessment of 99Mo production from LEU [low enriched uranium] targets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Marshall, S.L.; Vissers, D.R.; Matos, J.E.

1987-01-01

Currently much of the world's supply of 99m Tc for medical purposes is produced from 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). This paper presents the results of our continuing studies on the effects of substituting low enriched uranium (LEU) for HEU in targets for the production of fission product 99 Mo. Improvements in the electrodeposition of thin films of uranium metal continue to increase the appeal for the substitution of LEU metal for HEU oxide films in cylindrical targets. The process is effective for targets fabricated from stainless steel or zircaloy. Included is a cost estimate for setting up the necessary equipment to electrodeposit uranium metal on cylindrical targets. Further investigations on the effect of LEU substitution on processing of these targets are also reported. Substitution of uranium silicides for the uranium-aluminium alloy or uranium aluminide dispersed fuel used in current target designs will allow the substitution of LEU for HEU in these targets with equivalent 99 Mo-yield per target and no change in target geometries. However, this substitution will require modifications in current processing steps due to 1) the insolubility of uranium silicides in alkaline solutions and 2) the presence of significant quantities of silicate in solution. Results to date suggest that substitution of LEU for HEU can be achieved. (Author)

Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Hans; Laucht, Juergen

1996-01-01

Since the RERTR meeting in 1990 at Newport/USA, NUKEM recommended that the research reactor community agree upon a worldwide unified technical specification for low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) since there existed numerous specifications both from suppliers/fabricators and research reactors. The target recommended by NUKEM is to arrive at a worldwide unified standard specification in order to facilitate supplies of LEU and HEU to fabricators for fabrication of research reactor fuel elements. In our paper presented at the RERTR meeting at Paris in September 1995, we pointed out that LEU and HEU supplied by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in the past was never 'virgin' material, i.e., it was mixed with reprocessed uranium. Our recommendation was to include this fact in the proposed unified specification. Since the RERTR meeting in 1995 progress on a unified standard specification has been made and we would like to provide more specific information about that in this paper. Furthermore, we will deal with the question whether there is a secure supply of LEU for converted research reactors. We list current and potential suppliers of LEU, noting however, that the DOE has for a number of years been unable to supply any LEU due to production problems. The future availability of LEU of U.S. origin is, of course, essential for those research reactor operators which have converted their reactors from HEU to LEU and which are intending to return spent fuel of U.S. origin to the U.S.A. (author)

Technical problems in case of utilizing uranium of medium enrichment for a research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kanda, Keiji; Shibata, Shun-ichi

1979-01-01

Usually, highly enriched uranium of 90 - 93% is used for research reactors, but the US government proposed the strong policy to use low enriched uranium of the uranium of medium enrichment in unavoidable case from the viewpoint of the resistance to nuclear proliferation in November, 1977. This policy is naturally applied to Japan also. The export of highly enriched uranium will be permitted only when the President approves it after the technical and economical evaluations by the government. The Kyoto University high flux reactor has the features which are not seen in other research reactors, such as medical irradiation, and it is hard to attain the objectives of researches unless HEU is used. The application for the export of HEU was accepted in February, 1978. The nuclear characteristics of the KUHFR when medium or low enriched uranium is used, the criticality experiment in the KUCA using the uranium of medium enrichment, and the burning test on the uranium fuel plates of medium enrichment are described. The research project to lower the degree of enrichment in the fuel for research and test reactors is expected to be continued down to less than 20%. The MEU of 45% enrichment will be actually used in 1983. (Kako, I.)

Use of Savannah River Site facilities for blend down of highly enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bickford, W.E.; McKibben, J.M.

1994-02-01

Westinghouse Savannah River Company was asked to assess the use of existing Savannah River Site (SRS) facilities for the conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). The purpose was to eliminate the weapons potential for such material. Blending HEU with existing supplies of depleted uranium (DU) would produce material with less than 5% U-235 content for use in commercial nuclear reactors. The request indicated that as much as 500 to 1,000 MT of HEU would be available for conversion over a 20-year period. Existing facilities at the SRS are capable of producing LEU in the form of uranium trioxide (UO 3 ) powder, uranyl nitrate [UO 2 (NO 3 ) 2 ] solution, or metal. Additional processing, and additional facilities, would be required to convert the LEU to uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) or uranium hexafluoride (UF 3 ), the normal inputs for commercial fuel fabrication. This study's scope does not include the cost for new conversion facilities. However, the low estimated cost per kilogram of blending HEU to LEU in SRS facilities indicates that even with fees for any additional conversion to UO 2 or UF 6 , blend-down would still provide a product significantly below the spot market price for LEU from traditional enrichment services. The body of the report develops a number of possible facility/process combinations for SRS. The primary conclusion of this study is that SRS has facilities available that are capable of satisfying the goals of a national program to blend HEU to below 5% U-235. This preliminary assessment concludes that several facility/process options appear cost-effective. Finally, SRS is a secure DOE site with all requisite security and safeguard programs, personnel skills, nuclear criticality safety controls, accountability programs, and supporting infrastructure to handle large quantities of special nuclear materials (SNM)

Neutronic performance of a 14 MW TRIGA reactor: LEU vs HEU fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Cornella, R.J.

1983-01-01

A primary objective of the US Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program is to develop means for replacing, wherever possible, currently used highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel ( 235 U enrichment > 90%) with low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel ( 235 U enrichment < 20%) without significantly degrading the performance of research and test reactors. The General Atomic Company has developed a low-enriched but high uranium content Er-U-ZrH/sub 1.6/ fuel to enable the conversion of TRIGA reactors (and others) from HEU to LEU. One possible application is to the water-moderated 14 MW TRIGA Steady State Reactor (SSR) at the Romanian Institute for Nuclear Power Reactors. The work reported here was undertaken for the purpose of comparing the neutronic performance of the SSR for HEU fuel with that for LEU fuel. In order to make these relative comparisons as valid as possible, identical methods and models were used for the neutronic calculations

Research reactor preparations for the air shipment of highly enriched uranium from Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bolshinsky, I.; Allen, K.J.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.; Paunoiu, C.; Ciocanescu, M.

2010-01-01

In June 2009 two air shipments transported both unirradiated (fresh) and irradiated (spent) Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear fuel from two research reactors in Romania to the Russian Federation (RF) for conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU). The Institute for Nuclear Research at Pitesti (SCN Pitesti) shipped 30.1 kg of HEU fresh fuel pellets to Dimitrovgrad, Russia and the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH) shipped 23.7 kilograms of HEU spent fuel assemblies from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to Ozersk, Russia. Both HEU shipments were coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) as part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), were managed in Romania by the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), and were conducted in cooperation with the Russian Federation State Corporation for Atomic Energy Rosatom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Both shipments were transported by truck to and from respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at secure nuclear facilities in Russia until the material is converted into low enriched uranium. These shipments resulted in Romania becoming the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the research reactor preparations and license approvals that were necessary to safely and securely complete these air shipments of nuclear fuel. (author)

Continuing investigations for technology assessment of 99Mo production from LEU [low enriched Uranium] targets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandergrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Marshall, S.L.; Vissers, D.R.; Matos, J.E.

1987-01-01

Currently much of the world's supply of /sup 99m/Tc for medical purposes is produced from 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). The need for /sup 99m/Tc is continuing to grow, especially in developing countries, where needs and national priorities call for internal production of 99 Mo. This paper presents the results of our continuing studies on the effects of substituting low enriched Uranium (LEU) for HEU in targets for the production of fission product 99 Mo. Improvements in the electrodeposition of thin films of uranium metal are reported. These improvements continue to increase the appeal for the substitution of LEU metal for HEU oxide films in cylindrical targets. The process is effective for targets fabricated from stainless steel or hastaloy. A cost estimate for setting up the necessary equipment to electrodeposit uranium metal on cylindrical targets is reported. Further investigations on the effect of LEU substitution on processing of these targets are also reported. Substitution of uranium silicides for the uranium-aluminum alloy or uranium aluminide dispersed fuel used in other current target designs will allow the substitution of LEU for HEU in these targets with equivalent 99 Mo-yield per target and no change in target geometries. However, this substitution will require modifications in current processing steps due to (1) the insolubility of uranium silicides in alkaline solutions and (2) the presence of significant quantities of silicate in solution. Results to date suggest that both concerns can be handled and that substitution of LEU for HEU can be achieved

Active interrogation of highly enriched uranium

Science.gov (United States)

Fairrow, Nannette Lea

Safeguarding special nuclear material (SNM) in the Department of Energy Complex is vital to the national security of the United States. Active and passive nondestructive assays are used to confirm the presence of SNM in various configurations ranging from waste to nuclear weapons. Confirmation measurements for nuclear weapons are more challenging because the design complicates the detection of a distinct signal for highly enriched uranium. The emphasis of this dissertation was to investigate a new nondestructive assay technique that provides an independent and distinct signal to confirm the presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Once completed and tested this assay method could be applied to confirmation measurements of nuclear weapons. The new system uses a 14-MeV neutron source for interrogation and records the arrival time of neutrons between the pulses with a high efficiency detection system. The data is then analyzed by the Feynman reduced variance method. The analysis determined the amount of correlation in the data and provided a unique signature of correlated fission neutrons. Measurements of HEU spheres were conducted at Los Alamos with the new system. Then, Monte Carlo calculations were performed to verify hypothesis made about the behavior of the neutrons in the experiment. Comparisons of calculated counting rates by the Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) were made with the experimental data to confirm that the measured response reflected the desired behavior of neutron interactions in the highly enriched uranium. In addition, MCNP calculations of the delayed neutron build-up were compared with the measured data. Based on the results obtained from this dissertation, this measurement method has the potential to be expanded to include mass determinations of highly enriched uranium. Although many safeguards techniques exist for measuring special nuclear material, the number of assays that can be used to confirm HEU in shielded systems is

Using low-enriched uranium in research reactors: The RERTR program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Travelli, A.

1994-01-01

The goal of the RERTR program is to minimize and eventually eliminate use of highway enriched uranium (HEU) in research and test reactors. The program has been very successful, and has developed low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel materials and designs which can be used effectively in approximately 90 percent of the research and test reactors which used HEU when the program began. This progress would not have been possible without active international cooperation among fuel developers, commercial vendors, and reactor operators. The new tasks which the RERTR program is undertaking at this time include development of new and better fuels that will allow use of LEU fuels in all research and test reactors; cooperation with Russian laboratories, which will make it possible to minimize and eventually eliminate use of HEU in research reactors throughout the world, irrespective of its origin; and development of an LEU-based process for the production of 99 Mo. Continuation and intensification of international cooperation are essential to the achievement of the ultimate goals of the RERTR program

78 FR 60928 - Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

Science.gov (United States)

2013-10-02

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Request To Amend a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant... manufacture HEU The Netherlands. National Nuclear Security Uranium uranium (17.1 targets in France... export from 9.4 kg of U-235 contained in 10.1 kg uranium to a new cumulative total of 17.1 kg of U-235...

Performance and economic penalties of some LEU [low enriched uranium] conversion options for the Australian Reactor HIFAR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCulloch, D.B.; Robinson, G.S.

1987-01-01

Performance calculations for the conversion of HIFAR to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel have been extended to a wide range of 235 U loadings per fuel element. Using a simple approximate algorithm for the likely costs of LEU compared with highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements, the increases in annual fuelling costs for LEU compared with HEU fuel are examined for a range of conversion options involving different performance penalties. No significant operational/safety problems were found for any of the options canvassed. (Author)

Converting targets and processes for fission-product molybdenum-99 from high- to low-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Aase, S.

1999-01-01

Most of the world's supply of 99 Mo is produced by the fissioning of 235 U in high-enriched uranium targets (HEU, generally 93% 235 U). To reduce nuclear-proliferation concerns, the U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor Program is working to convert the current HEU targets to low-enriched uranium (LEU, 235 U). Switching to LEU targets also requires modifying the separation processes. Current HEU processes can be classified into two main groups based on whether the irradiated target is dissolved in acid or base. Our program has been working on both fronts, with development of targets for acid-side processes being the furthest along. However, using an LEU metal foil target may allow the facile replacement of HEU for both acid and basic dissolution processes. Demonstration of the irradiation and 99 Mo separation processes for the LEU metal-foil targets is being done in cooperation with researchers at the Indonesian PUSPIPTEK facility. We are also developing LEU UO 2 /Al dispersion plates as substitutes for HEU UA1 x /A1 dispersion plates for base-side processes. Results show that conversion to LEU is technically feasible; working with producers is essential to lowering any economic penalty associated with conversion. (author)

Conversion of research and test reactors to low enriched uranium fuel: technical overview and program status

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roglans-Ribas, J.

2008-01-01

Many of the nuclear research and test reactors worldwide operate with high enriched uranium fuel. In response to worries over the potential use of HEU from research reactors in nuclear weapons, the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a program - the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) - in 1978 to develop the technology necessary to reduce the use of HEU fuel by converting research reactors to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The Reactor Conversion program is currently under the DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). 55 of the 129 reactors included in the scope have been already converted to LEU fuel or have shutdown prior to conversion. The major technical activities of the Conversion Program include: (1) the development of advanced LEU fuels; (2) conversion analysis and conversion support; and (3) technology development for the production of Molybdenum-99 (Mo 99 ) with LEU targets. The paper provides an overview of the status of the program, the technical challenges and accomplishments, and the role of international collaborations in the accomplishment of the Conversion Program objectives. Nuclear research and test reactors worldwide have been in operation for over 60 years. Many of these facilities operate with high enriched uranium fuel. In response to increased worries over the potential use of HEU from research reactors in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a program - the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) - in 1978 to develop the technology necessary to reduce the use of HEU fuel in research reactors by converting them to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The reactor conversion program was initially focused on U.S.-supplied reactors, but in the early 1990s it expanded and began to collaborate with Russian institutes with the objective of converting Russian supplied reactors to the use of LEU fuel.

Conversion and standardization of university reactor fuels using low-enrichment uranium - options and costs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harris, D.R.; Matos, J.E.; Young, H.H.

1985-01-01

The highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel used in twenty United States university reactors can be viewed as contributing to the risk of theft or diversion of weapons-useable material. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a policy statement expressing its concern and has published a proposed rule on limiting the use of HEU in NRC-licensed non-power reactors. The fuel options, functional impacts, licensing, and scheduling of conversion and standardization of these reactor fuels to use of low-enrichment uranium (LEU) have been assessed. The university reactors span a wide range in form and function, from medium-power intense neutron sources where HEU fuel may be required, to low-power training and research facilities where HEU fuel is unnecessary. Conversion provides an opportunity to standardize university reactor fuels and improve reactor utilization in some cases. The entire program is estimated to cost about $10 million and to last about five years. Planning for conversion and standardization is facilitated by the US Department of Energy. 20 refs., 1 tab

Conversion and standardization of university reactor fuels using low-enrichment uranium - Options and costs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harris, D.R.; Matos, J.E.; Young, H.H.

1985-01-01

The highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel used in twenty United States university reactors can be viewed as contributing to the risk of theft or diversion of weapons-useable material. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a policy statement expressing its concern and has published a proposed rule on limiting the use of HEU in NRC-licensed non-power reactors. The fuel options, functional impacts, licensing, and scheduling of conversion and standardization of these reactor fuels to use of low-enrichment uranium (LEU) have been assessed. The university reactors span a wide range in form and function, from medium-power intense neutron sources where HEU fuel may be required, to low-power training and research facilities where HEU fuel is unnecessary. Conversion provides an opportunity to standardize university reactor fuels and improve reactor utilization in some cases. The entire program is estimated to cost about $10 million and to last about five years. Planning for conversion and standardization is facilitated by the U.S. Department of Energy. (author)

HEU Transparency Implementation Program and its Radiation Safety Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Radev, R

2002-01-01

In February 1993, the Governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) signed a bilateral Agreement for the U.S. purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from 500 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons. The HEU Purchase Agreement serves important national security and nonproliferation policy imperatives for both countries since its implementation reduces the quantity of surplus Russian HEU that could be stolen and diverted for weapons use. In return, Russia receives much needed U.S. dollars over a 20-year delivery period. In 2001, Russia received over half a billion US dollars from the purchase of the LEU blended from 30 MT HEU. As part of this Agreement, transparency rights were agreed upon that provide confidence to both governments that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are being fulfilled. While the U.S. Department of State, in concert with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible negotiating transparency rights associated with this nuclear material, the NNSA is responsible for implementing those rights. These rights allow U.S. and R.F., personnel (called ''monitors'') to visit the processing facilities and observe the steps for processing the HEU into fuel for nuclear reactors. In this fashion, the processing of HEU to LEU is made ''transparent.'' For DOE, there are three transparency objectives: (1) that the HEU is extracted from nuclear weapons, (2) that this same HEU is oxidized, and (3) that the HEU is blended into LEU. For MINATOM, the transparency objective is: (1) that the LEU is fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors: The transparency is based on visits by designated transparency monitors (100 preapproved U.S. and Russian monitors) with specific rights to monitor and to access storage and processing areas to provide confidence that the nonproliferation goals

Implementation of the United States/Russian HEU Agreement: Current Status and Prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rutkowski, E

2003-01-01

During Calendar Year (CY) 2002, the Russian Federation (R.F.) delivered low enriched uranium (LEU) from the conversion and processing of 30 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade (90% 235 U assay) uranium. Through July 2003, the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) will have monitored the conversion of over 190 MT HEU into LEU. This total represents about 38 percent of the projected 500 MT HEU scheduled to be blended down through the year 2013 and is equivalent to the destruction of 7,600 nuclear devices. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) HEU-TIP monitors the processing of this HEU at four Russian uranium-processing plants. During CY 2002, United States (U.S.) personnel monitored this process for a total of 194 monitor-weeks by staffing a Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) located in Novouralsk, and through a series of five-day Special Monitoring Visits (SMV) to the four plants. U.S. monitor observations include the inventory of in-process containers, the observation of operations and non-destructive assay measurements (NDA) to determine 235 U enrichment, as well as the examination and validation of Russian Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) documents. In addition, the U.S. designed Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) installed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) in January 1999 monitored all HEU blended at that facility, which is about 50 percent of the HEU blended into LEU during CY 2002. Recently we installed a BDMS at the Electrochemical Plant (ECP) in Zelenogorsk and plans are underway to install a BDMS at the Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE) in Seversk in late 2004. On a very positive note, interpersonal interactions between U.S. and Russian technical experts continues to expand and have proven to be an important element of the transparency regime. On the tenth anniversary of the HEU Purchase Agreement, the Ministry of the R.F. for Atomic Energy (Minatom) also saluted the

Design Study for a Low-Enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2008

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Primm, Trent [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Jolly, Brian C [ORNL

2009-03-01

This report documents progress made during FY 2008 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. With axial and radial grading of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in reactor performance from the current level. Results of selected benchmark studies imply that calculations of LEU performance are accurate. Scoping experiments with various manufacturing methods for forming the LEU alloy profile are presented.

Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion Activities for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Renfro, David G [ORNL; Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Griffin, Frederick P [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL

2012-03-01

This report describes progress made during FY11 in ORNL activities to support converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum (UMo) alloy. With both radial and axial contouring of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current levels achieved with HEU fuel. Studies are continuing to demonstrate that the fuel thermal safety margins can be preserved following conversion. Studies are also continuing to update other aspects of the reactor steady state operation and accident response for the effects of fuel conversion. Technical input has been provided to Oregon State University in support of their hydraulic testing program. The HFIR conversion schedule was revised and provided to the GTRI program. In addition to HFIR conversion activities, technical support was provided directly to the Fuel Fabrication Capability program manager.

Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Conversion Activities for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Renfro, David G.; Cook, David Howard; Freels, James D.; Griffin, Frederick P.; Ilas, Germina; Sease, John D.; Chandler, David

2012-01-01

This report describes progress made during FY11 in ORNL activities to support converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum (UMo) alloy. With both radial and axial contouring of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current levels achieved with HEU fuel. Studies are continuing to demonstrate that the fuel thermal safety margins can be preserved following conversion. Studies are also continuing to update other aspects of the reactor steady state operation and accident response for the effects of fuel conversion. Technical input has been provided to Oregon State University in support of their hydraulic testing program. The HFIR conversion schedule was revised and provided to the GTRI program. In addition to HFIR conversion activities, technical support was provided directly to the Fuel Fabrication Capability program manager.

Comparison of the FRM-II HEU design with an alternative LEU design

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mo, S.C.; Hanan, N.A.; Matos, J.E.

2004-01-01

The FRM-II reactor design of the Technical University of Munich has a compact core that utilizes fuel plates containing highly-enriched uranium (HEU, 93%). This paper presents an alternative core design utilizing low-enriched uranium (LEU, 3 that provides nearly the same neutron flux for experiments as the HEU design, but has a less favourable fuel cycle economy. If an LEU fuel with a uranium density of 6.0 - 6.5 g/cm 3 . were developed, the alternative design would provide the same neutron flux and use the same number of cores per year as the HEU design. The results of this study show that there are attractive possibilities for using LEU fuel instead of HEU fuel in the FRM-II. Further optimization of the LEU design and near-term availability of LEU fuel with a uranium density greater than 4.8 g/cm 3 would enhance the performance of the LEU core. The REKIR Program is ready to exchange information with the Technical University of Munich to resolve any differences that may exist and to identify design modifications that would optimize reactor performance utilizing LEU fuel. (author)

Repository emplacement costs for Al-clad high enriched uranium spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McDonell, W.R.; Parks, P.B.

1994-01-01

A range of strategies for treatment and packaging of Al-clad high-enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuels to prevent or delay the onset of criticality in a geologic repository was evaluated in terms of the number of canisters produced and associated repository costs incurred. The results indicated that strategies in which neutron poisons were added to consolidated forms of the U-Al alloy fuel generally produced the lowest number of canisters and associated repository costs. Chemical processing whereby the HEU was removed from the waste form was also a low cost option. The repository costs generally increased for isotopic dilution strategies, because of the substantial depleted uranium added. Chemical dissolution strategies without HEU removal were also penalized because of the inert constituents in the final waste glass form. Avoiding repository criticality by limiting the fissile mass content of each canister incurred the highest repository costs

HEU to LEU conversion experience at the UMass-Lowell research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

White, John R.; Bobek, Leo M.

2005-01-01

The UMass-Lowell Research Reactor (UMLRR) operated safely with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for over 25 years. Having reached the end of core lifetime and due to proliferation concerns, the reactor was recently converted to low-enriched uranium silicide (LEU) fuel. The actual process for converting the UMLRR from HEU to LEU fuel covered a period of over 15 years. The conversion effort - from the initial conceptual design studies in the late 1980s to the final offsite shipment of the spent HEU fuel in August 2004 - was a unique experience for the faculty and staff of a small university research reactor. This paper gives a historical view of the process and it highlights several key milestones along the road to successful completion of this project. (author)

Highly enriched uranium, a dangerous substance that should be eliminated

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Schaper, Annette

2013-07-01

Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. While plutonium is radioactive and hazardous in handling, HEU is far less dangerous. Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect by technical means. Therefore, in comparison to plutonium, HEU is much easier to divert, smuggle and hide. Moreover, a crude nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed in a much simpler way than one made using plutonium. For these reasons, HEU is the material most wanted by terrorists. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for one explosive, but the quantities existing in the world add up to hundreds of tons. Due to the disarmament at the end of the Cold War, the NPT nuclear weapon states possess large quantities of HEU in excess of their needs for nuclear weapons. Therefore, these countries have not produced HEU for many years. Several international projects are working towards reducing the proliferation risks posed by HEU. The projects include the reduction of existing HEU by converting it to civilian reactor fuel that cannot be easily used for nuclear weapons. Other projects work towards reducing the number of countries and sites where HEU is stored by transferring it back to the countries of origin. And there are yet other projects which seek to minimize uses which would require new production of HEU. An international non-proliferation goal should be to eliminate all uses of HEU and thus to eliminate the need for any future production. Uses of HEU other than for nuclear weapons are as fuel in civilian research reactors, as base material for the production of special isotopes used in medical diagnostics, so-called medical targets and as fuel in military naval reactors. It is desirable to replace the HEU in all these applications with other materials and thus cease all HEU production forever. Use as fuel in civilian reactors has been greatly reduced during the last few decades. Within an international campaign, the Reduced Enrichment for

Highly enriched uranium, a dangerous substance that should be eliminated

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schaper, Annette

2013-01-01

Either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is needed to construct a nuclear weapon. While plutonium is radioactive and hazardous in handling, HEU is far less dangerous. Furthermore, it is more difficult to detect by technical means. Therefore, in comparison to plutonium, HEU is much easier to divert, smuggle and hide. Moreover, a crude nuclear explosive made of HEU can be constructed in a much simpler way than one made using plutonium. For these reasons, HEU is the material most wanted by terrorists. A few tens of kilograms are sufficient for one explosive, but the quantities existing in the world add up to hundreds of tons. Due to the disarmament at the end of the Cold War, the NPT nuclear weapon states possess large quantities of HEU in excess of their needs for nuclear weapons. Therefore, these countries have not produced HEU for many years. Several international projects are working towards reducing the proliferation risks posed by HEU. The projects include the reduction of existing HEU by converting it to civilian reactor fuel that cannot be easily used for nuclear weapons. Other projects work towards reducing the number of countries and sites where HEU is stored by transferring it back to the countries of origin. And there are yet other projects which seek to minimize uses which would require new production of HEU. An international non-proliferation goal should be to eliminate all uses of HEU and thus to eliminate the need for any future production. Uses of HEU other than for nuclear weapons are as fuel in civilian research reactors, as base material for the production of special isotopes used in medical diagnostics, so-called medical targets and as fuel in military naval reactors. It is desirable to replace the HEU in all these applications with other materials and thus cease all HEU production forever. Use as fuel in civilian reactors has been greatly reduced during the last few decades. Within an international campaign, the Reduced Enrichment for

Loading and initial start-up testing of the low-enrichment uranium core for the Ohio State University research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Talnagi, J.W.

1989-01-01

Conversion of the Ohio State University Research Reactor (OSURR) from high-enrichment uranium (HEU) fuel to low-enrichment uranium (LEU) fuel elements was begun in August 1985, with funding provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the university. Conversion of the OSURR from HEU to LEU fuel was successfully completed. The reactor is operational at 10-kW steady-state thermal power. Measurements of selected core parameters have been made and compared with predicted values and previous values for the HEU core. In general, measured results agree well with predicted performance, and minor changes have been detected in certain core parameters as a result of the change to LEU fuel. Future plans include additional core testing and a possible increase in operating power

The SLOWPOKE-2 reactor with low enrichment uranium oxide fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Townes, B.M.; Hilborn, J.W.

1985-06-01

A SLOWPOKE-2 reactor core contains less than 1 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the proliferation risk is very low. However, to overcome proliferation concerns a new low enrichment uranium (LEU) fuelled reactor core has been designed. This core contains approximately 180 fuel elements based on the Zircaloy-4 clad UOsub(2) CANDU fuel element, but with a smaller outside diameter. The physics characteristics of this new reactor core ensure the inherent safety of the reactor under all conceivable conditions and thus the basic SLOWPOKE safety philosophy which permits unattended operation is not affected

Production, inventories and HEU in the world uranium market: Production's vital role

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Underhill, D.H.

1997-01-01

This paper analyses recent uranium supply and demand relationship and projects supply through 2010. The extremely depressed record low market prices have led to the ongoing annual inventory drawdown of over 25,000 t U resulting from the current 45% world production shortfall. The policy of the European Union and anti-dumping related activities in the USA are restricting imports of uranium from CIS producers to a majority of the world's nuclear utilities. These factors are reducing low priced uranium supply and forcing buyers to again obtain more of their requirements from producers. It discusses how the sale of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) produced from of 550 t High Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Russia and Ukraine could potentially supply about 15% of world requirements through 2010. However, legislation currently being developed by the US Congress may ration the sale of this material, extending the LEU supply well into the next century. Nuclear generation capacity and its uranium requirements are projected to grow at about 1.5% through 2010. Demand for new uranium purchases is however, increasing at the much higher rate of 25-30% over the next 10-15 years. This increasing demand in the face of decreasing supply is resulting in a market recovery in which the spot price for non-CIS produced uranium has risen over 25% since October 1994. Prices will continue to increase as the market equilibrium shifts from a balance with alternative excess low priced supply to an equilibrium between production and demand. 19 refs, 14 figs, 2 tabs

Technology for down-blending weapons grade uranium into commercial reactor-usable uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arbital, J.G.; Snider, J.D.

1996-01-01

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating options for rendering surplus inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) incapable of being used in nuclear weapons. Weapons-capable HEU was earlier produced by enriching the uranium isotope 235 U from its natural occurring 0.71 percent isotopic concentration to at least 20 percent isotopic concentration. Now, by permanently diluting the concentration of the 235 U isotope, the weapons capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope re-enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. To the extent that can be economically and technically justified, the down-blended, low-enriched uranium product will be made suitable for use as commercial reactor fuel. Such down-blended uranium product can also be disposed of as waste if chemical or isotopic impurities preclude its use as reactor fuel. The DOE has evaluated three candidate processes for down blending surplus HEU. These candidate processes are: (1) uranium hexafluoride blending; (2) molten uranium metal blending; and (3) uranyl nitrate solution blending. This paper describes each of these candidate processes. It also compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each process with respect to: (1) the various forms and compounds of HEU comprising the surplus inventory, (2) the use of down-blended product as commercial reactor fuel, or (3) its disposal as waste

Accident Analyses for Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from Highly-Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stillman, J. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Feldman, E. E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Wilson, E. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States). Nuclear Engineering Div., Research and Test Reactor Dept.; Foyto, L. P. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Kutikkad, K. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; McKibben, J. C. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Peters, N. J. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Research Reactor; Cowherd, W. M. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). College of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Program; Rickman, B. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). College of Engineering, Nuclear Engineering Program

2014-12-01

This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the MURR Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering Program – College of Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support from the U. S. government. This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), the MURR Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering Program – College of Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support from the U. S. government. In the framework of non-proliferation policies, the international community presently aims to minimize the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. In this geopolitical context most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have started a program of conversion to the use of LEU fuel. A new type of LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and molybdenum (U-Mo) is expected to allow the conversion of U.S. domestic high performance reactors like MURR. This report presents the results of a study of core behavior under a set of accident conditions for MURR cores fueled with HEU U-Alx dispersion fuel or LEU monolithic U-Mo alloy fuel with 10 wt% Mo

Operational experience in the production of 131Molybdenum and 99Iodine with high and low uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bravo, C.; Cristini, Pablo R..; Novello, A.; Bronca, M.; Cestau, Daniel; Centurion, R.; Bavaro, R.; Cestau, J.; Gualda, E.; Bronca, P.; Carranza, Eduardo C.

2009-01-01

In 1992, in an effort to curtail use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), hoping to alleviate nuclear security concerns, United States passed the Schumer amendment to the Energy Policy Act. This legislation conditioned U.S. export of HEU to foreign companies, understanding that these companies would switch as soon as possible to Lowly Enriched Uranium (LEU). This paper describes 99 Mo production flow chart, characteristics of process cells, shielding, systems of manipulation at distance, cell ventilation system and the method for personal dose monitoring. Production evolution for the span of years 1998 to 2007 is given by indicators, keeping in mind enrichment proportion change. Evolution shown on the indicators is directly related to the application of Safety Culture concepts adopted by personnel. (author)

The NNSA global threat reduction initiative's efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium for medical isotope production

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Staples, Parrish

2010-01-01

The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI) is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI is a key organization for supporting domestic and global efforts to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian nuclear applications. GTRI implements the following activities in order to achieve its threat reduction and HEU minimization objectives: Converting domestic and international civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities from the use of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU); Demonstrating the viability of medical isotope production technologies that do not use HEU; Removing or disposing excess nuclear and radiological materials from civilian sites worldwide; and Protecting high-priority nuclear and radiological materials worldwide from theft and sabotage. This paper provides a brief overview on the recent developments and priorities for GTRI program activities in 2010, with a particular focus on GTRI's efforts to demonstrate the viability of non-HEU based medical isotope production technologies. (author)

How is uranium supply affecting enrichment?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Steve Kidd

2007-01-01

As a result of the enlivened uranium market, momentum has in turn picked up in the enrichment sector. What are the consequences of higher uranium prices? There is, of course, a link between uranium and enrichment supply to the extent that they are at least partial substitutes. On the enrichment supply side, the most obvious feature is the gradual replacement of the old gas diffusion facilities of Usec in the USA and EURODIF in France with more modern and economical centrifuge plants. Assuming Usec can overcome the financing and technical issues surrounding its plans, the last gas diffusion capacity should disappear around 2015 and the entire enrichment market should then be using centrifuges. On the commercial side, the key anticipated developments are mostly in Russia. Although there should still continue to be substantial quantities of surplus Russian HEU available for down blending in the period beyond 2013, it is now reasonable to expect that it will be mostly consumed by internal needs, to fuel Russian-origin reactors both at home and in export markets such as China and India. Finally, as a key sensitive area for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the enrichment sector is likely to be a central point of the new international arrangements which must be developed to support a buoyant nuclear sector throughout this century.

Neutronic analysis of the conversion of HEU to LEU fuel for a 5-MW MTR core

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pazirandeh, A.; Bartsch, G.

1987-01-01

In recent years, due to cessation of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel supply, practical steps have been taken to substitute HEU fuel in almost all research reactors by medium-enriched uranium or low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. In this study, a neutronic calculation of a 5-MW research reactor core fueled with HEU (93% 235 U) is presented. In order to assess the performance of the core with the LEU ( 235 U loadings were examined. The core consists of 22 standard fuel elements (SFEs) and 6 control fuel elements (CFEs). Each fuel elements has 18 curved plates of which two end plates are dummies. Initial 235 U content is 195 g 235 U/SFE and 9.7 g 235 U/CFE or /PFE. In all calculations the permitted changes to the fuel elements are (a) 18 active plates per SFE, (b) fuel plates assumed to be flat, and (c) 8 or 9 active plates per CFE

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Metal blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-09-01

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Blending HEU (highly enriched uranium) with less-enriched uranium to form LEU has been proposed as a disposition option. Five technologies are being assessed for blending HEU. This document provides data to be used in environmental impact analysis for the HEU-LEU disposition option that uses metal blending with an oxide waste product. It is divided into: mission and assumptions, conversion and blending facility descriptions, process descriptions and requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards discussion, and intersite transportation.

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Metal blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-09-01

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Blending HEU (highly enriched uranium) with less-enriched uranium to form LEU has been proposed as a disposition option. Five technologies are being assessed for blending HEU. This document provides data to be used in environmental impact analysis for the HEU-LEU disposition option that uses metal blending with an oxide waste product. It is divided into: mission and assumptions, conversion and blending facility descriptions, process descriptions and requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards discussion, and intersite transportation

Multilateral nonproliferation cooperation: US - Led effort to remove HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuels from the Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shelton, Thomas A.; Viebrock, James M.; Riedy, Alexander W.; Moses, Stanley D.; Bird, Helen M.

1998-01-01

This paper presents the efforts led by United States for removing HEU/LEU fresh and spent fuel from dhe Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland. These efforts are resulted from a plan approved by the United States Government, in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Georgia Governments to rapidly retrieve and transport circa 4.3 kilograms of enriched uranium. This material consisted largely of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and a small amount of low enriched uranium (LEU) fresh fuel, as well as about 800 grams of HEU/LEU-based spent fuel from a shutdown IR T-M research reactor on the outskirts of Table's, Georgia. The technical team lead by DOE consisted of HEU handling, packaging and transportation experts from the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant, managed and operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, and fuel handling and transportation experts from Nac International in Norcross, Georgia, United States

Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF 6 ) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ''transparency),'' and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed

Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1994-01-01

The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

Measurements of the HEU and LEU in-core spectra at the Ford Nuclear Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wehe, D K [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN (United States); King, J S; Lee, J C; Martin, W R [Department of Nuclear Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

1985-07-01

The Ford Nuclear Reactor (FNR) at the University of Michigan has been serving as the test site for a low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel whole-core demonstration. As part of the experimental program, the differential neutron spectrum has been measured in a high-enriched uranium (HEU) core and an LEU core. The HEU and LEU spectra were determined by unfolding the measured activities of foils that were irradiated in the reactor. When the HEU and LEU spectra are compared from meV to 10 MeV, significant differences between the two spectra are apparent below 10 eV. These are probably caused by the additional {sup 238}U resonance absorption in the LEU fuel. No measurable difference occurs in the shape of the spectra above MeV. (author)

Comparison of HEU and LEU neutron spectra in irradiation facilities at the Oregon State TRIGA® Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schickler, R.A.; Marcum, W.R.; Reese, S.R.

2013-01-01

Highlights: • The Oregon State TRIGA ® Reactor neutron spectra is characterized herein. • Neutron spectra between highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium cores are compared. • Discussion is given as to differences between HEU and LEU core spectra results and impact on experiments. -- Abstract: In 2008, the Oregon State TRIGA ® Reactor (OSTR) was converted from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel lifetime improvement plan (FLIP) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort was driven and supported by the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The basis behind the RERTR program's ongoing conversion effort is to reduce the nuclear proliferation risk of civilian research and test reactors. The original intent of the HEU FLIP fuel was to provide fuel to research reactors that could be utilized for many years before a necessary refueling cycle. As a research reactor, the OSTR provides irradiation facilities for a variety of applications, such as activation analysis, fission-track dating, commercial isotope production, neutron radiography, prompt gamma characterization, and many others. In order to accurately perform these research functions, several studies had been conducted on the HEU FLIP fuel core to characterize the neutron spectra in various experimental facilities of the OSTR (Tiyapun, 1997; Ashbaker, 2005). As useful as these analyses were, they are no longer valid due to the change in fuel composition and the resulting alteration of core performance characteristics. Additionally, the core configuration (fuel reconfiguration) was altered between the HEU and LEU cores. This study characterizes the neutron spectra in various experimental facilities within and around the current LEU core. It also compares the spectra to that which was yielded in the HEU core through use of Monte Carlo n-Particle 5 (MCNP5) and experimental adjustment via a least-squares technique. The quantification of

Criticality safety of storage barrels for enriched uranium fresh fuel at the RB research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, M. P.

1997-01-01

Study on criticality safety of fresh low and high enriched uranium (LEU and HEU) fuel elements in the storage/transport barrels at the RB research reactor is carried out by using the well-known MCNP computer code. It is shown that studied arrays of tightly closed fuel barrels, each entirely loaded with 100 fresh (HEU or LEU) fuel slugs, are far away from criticality, even in cases of an unexpected flooding by light water.(author)

Licensing considerations in converting NRC-licensed non-power reactors from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuels

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carter, R.E.

1985-01-01

During the mid-1970s, there was increasing concern with the possibility that highly enriched uranium (HEU), widely used in non-power reactors around the world, might be diverted from its intended peaceful uses. In 1982 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a policy statement that was intended to conform with the perceived international thinking, and that addressed the two relevant areas in which NRC has statutory responsibility, namely, export of special nuclear materials for non-USA non-power reactors, and the licensing of USA-based non-power reactors not owned by the Federal government. To further address the second area, NRC issued a proposed rule for public comment that would require all NRC-licensed non-power reactors using HEU to convert to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, unless they could demonstrate a unique purpose. Currently the NRC staff is revising the proposed rule. An underlying principle guiding the staff is that as long as a change in enrichment does not lead to safety-related reactor modifications, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question, the licensee could convert the core without prior NRC approval. At the time of writing this paper, a regulatory method of achieving this principle has not been finalized. (author)

Licensing considerations in converting NRC-licensed non-power reactors from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuels

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Carter, R E

1985-07-01

During the mid-1970s, there was increasing concern with the possibility that highly enriched uranium (HEU), widely used in non-power reactors around the world, might be diverted from its intended peaceful uses. In 1982 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a policy statement that was intended to conform with the perceived international thinking, and that addressed the two relevant areas in which NRC has statutory responsibility, namely, export of special nuclear materials for non-USA non-power reactors, and the licensing of USA-based non-power reactors not owned by the Federal government. To further address the second area, NRC issued a proposed rule for public comment that would require all NRC-licensed non-power reactors using HEU to convert to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, unless they could demonstrate a unique purpose. Currently the NRC staff is revising the proposed rule. An underlying principle guiding the staff is that as long as a change in enrichment does not lead to safety-related reactor modifications, and does not involve an unreviewed safety question, the licensee could convert the core without prior NRC approval. At the time of writing this paper, a regulatory method of achieving this principle has not been finalized. (author)

DESIGN STUDY FOR A LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM CORE FOR THE HIGH FLUX ISOTOPE REACTOR, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2010

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Freels, James D [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jolly, Brian C [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL; Renfro, David G [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL; Pinkston, Daniel [ORNL

2011-02-01

This report documents progress made during FY 2010 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. With axial and radial grading of the fuel foil and an increase in reactor power to 100 MW, calculations indicate that the HFIR can be operated with LEU fuel with no degradation in performance to users from the current level. Studies are reported of support to a thermal hydraulic test loop design, the implementation of finite element, thermal hydraulic analysis capability, and infrastructure tasks at HFIR to upgrade the facility for operation at 100 MW. A discussion of difficulties with preparing a fuel specification for the uranium-molybdenum alloy is provided. Continuing development in the definition of the fuel fabrication process is described.

Disposition of highly enriched uranium obtained from the Republic of Kazakhstan. Environmental assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-05-01

This EA assesses the potential environmental impacts associated with DOE's proposal to transport 600 kg of Kazakhstand-origin HEU from Y-12 to a blending site (B ampersand W Lynchburg or NFS Erwin), transport low-enriched UF6 blending stock from a gaseous diffusion plant to GE Wilmington and U oxide blending stock to the blending site, blending the HEU and uranium oxide blending stock to produce LEU in the form of uranyl nitrate, and transport the uranyl nitrate from the blending site to USEC Portsmouth

Overview of Russian HEU transparency issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kempf, C.R.; Bieniawski, A.

1993-01-01

The U.S. has signed an agreement with the Russian Federation for the purchase of 500 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) taken from dismantled nuclear weapons. The HEU will be blended down to low-enriched uranium and will be transported to the U.S. to be used by fuel fabricators to make fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Both the U.S. and Russia have been preparing to institute transparency measures to provide assurance that nonproliferation and arms control objectives specified in the agreement are met. This paper provides background information on the original agreement and on subsequent negotiations with the Russians, as well as discussion of technical aspects of developing transparency measures suited to the facilities and processes which are expected to be involved. Transparency has been defined as those agreed-upon measures which build confidence that arms control and non-proliferation objectives shared by the parties are met. Transparency is a departure from exhaustive, detailed arms control verification regimes of past agreements, which were based on a presumption of detecting transgressions as opposed to confirming compliance

Implementation of the United States-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement: Current Status and Prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

R.rutkowski, E; Armantrout, G; Mastal, E; Glaser, J; Benton, J

2004-01-01

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) monitors and provides assurance that Russian weapons-grade HEU is processed into low enriched uranium (LEU) under the transparency provisions of the 1993 United States (U.S.)-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement. Meeting the Agreement's transparency provisions is not just a program requirement; it is a legal requirement. The HEU Purchase Agreement requires transparency measures to be established to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are met. The Transparency concept has evolved into a viable program that consists of complimentary elements that provide necessary assurances. The key elements include: (1) monitoring by technical experts; (2) independent measurements of enrichment and flow; (3) nuclear material accountability documents from Russian plants; and (4) comparison of transparency data with declared processing data. In the interest of protecting sensitive information, the monitoring is neither full time nor invasive. Thus, an element of trust is required regarding declared operations that are not observed. U.S. transparency monitoring data and independent instrument measurements are compared with plant accountability records and other declared processing data to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the 1993 Agreement are being met. Similarly, Russian monitoring of U. S. storage and fuel fabrication operations provides assurance to the Russians that the derived LEU is being used in accordance with the Agreement. The successful implementation of the Transparency program enables the receipt of Russian origin LEU into the United States. Implementation of the 1993 Agreement is proceeding on schedule, with the permanent elimination of over 8,700 warhead equivalents of HEU. The successful implementation of the Transparency program has taken place over the last 10 years and has provided the

Isotope Enrichment Detection by Laser Ablation - Laser Absorption Spectrometry: Automated Environmental Sampling and Laser-Based Analysis for HEU Detection

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anheier, Norman C.; Bushaw, Bruce A.

2010-01-01

The global expansion of nuclear power, and consequently the uranium enrichment industry, requires the development of new safeguards technology to mitigate proliferation risks. Current enrichment monitoring instruments exist that provide only yes/no detection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) production. More accurate accountancy measurements are typically restricted to gamma-ray and weight measurements taken in cylinder storage yards. Analysis of environmental and cylinder content samples have much higher effectiveness, but this approach requires onsite sampling, shipping, and time-consuming laboratory analysis and reporting. Given that large modern gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) can quickly produce a significant quantity (SQ ) of HEU, these limitations in verification suggest the need for more timely detection of potential facility misuse. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing an unattended safeguards instrument concept, combining continuous aerosol particulate collection with uranium isotope assay, to provide timely analysis of enrichment levels within low enriched uranium facilities. This approach is based on laser vaporization of aerosol particulate samples, followed by wavelength tuned laser diode spectroscopy to characterize the uranium isotopic ratio through subtle differences in atomic absorption wavelengths. Environmental sampling (ES) media from an integrated aerosol collector is introduced into a small, reduced pressure chamber, where a focused pulsed laser vaporizes material from a 10 to 20-(micro)m diameter spot of the surface of the sampling media. The plume of ejected material begins as high-temperature plasma that yields ions and atoms, as well as molecules and molecular ions. We concentrate on the plume of atomic vapor that remains after the plasma has expanded and then cooled by the surrounding cover gas. Tunable diode lasers are directed through this plume and each isotope is detected by monitoring absorbance

CONCEPTUAL PROCESS DESCRIPTION FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM-MOLYBDENUM FUEL

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Daniel M. Wachs; Curtis R. Clark; Randall J. Dunavant

2008-02-01

The National Nuclear Security Agency Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is tasked with minimizing the use of high-enriched uranium (HEU) worldwide. A key component of that effort is the conversion of research reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. The GTRI Convert Fuel Development program, previously known as the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program was initiated in 1978 by the United States Department of Energy to develop the nuclear fuels necessary to enable these conversions. The program cooperates with the research reactors’ operators to achieve this goal of HEU to LEU conversion without reduction in reactor performance. The programmatic mandate is to complete the conversion of all civilian domestic research reactors by 2014. These reactors include the five domestic high-performance research reactors (HPRR), namely: the High Flux Isotope Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory, the National Bureau of Standards Reactor at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Missouri University Research Reactor at the University of Missouri–Columbia, and the MIT Reactor-II at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Characteristics for each of the HPRRs are given in Appendix A. The GTRI Convert Fuel Development program is currently engaged in the development of a novel nuclear fuel that will enable these conversions. The fuel design is based on a monolithic fuel meat (made from a uranium-molybdenum alloy) clad in Al-6061 that has shown excellent performance in irradiation testing. The unique aspects of the fuel design, however, necessitate the development and implementation of new fabrication techniques and, thus, establishment of the infrastructure to ensure adequate fuel fabrication capability. A conceptual fabrication process description and rough estimates of the total facility throughput are described in this document as a basis for

Report of the Working Party on the conversion of HIFAR to low enrichment uranium fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-06-01

This report states the effect on research reactor operations and applications of international and national political decisions relating to fuel enrichment. Technical work done in Australia and overseas to establish parameters for conversion of research reactors from High Enrichment Uranium (HEU) to Low Enrichment Uranium (LEU) have been considered in developing a strategy for HIFAR. The requirements of the research groups, isotope production group and reactor operating staff have been considered. For HIFAR to continue to provide the required facilities in support of the national need, it is concluded these should be no reduction of neutron flux

Passive Time Coincidence Measurements with HEU and DU Metal Castings

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McConchie, Seth M.; Hausladen, Paul; Mihalczo, John T.; Wright, Michael C.; Archer, Daniel E.

2008-01-01

A Department of Energy sponsored Oak Ridge National Laboratory/Y-12 National Security Complex program of passive time coincidence measurements has been initiated at Y-12 to evaluate the ability to determine the presence of high enriched uranium (HEU) and distinguish it from depleted uranium (DU). This program uses the Nuclear Materials Identification System (NMIS) without an active interrogation source. Previous passive NMIS measurements with Pu metal and Pu oxide have been successful in determining the Pu mass, assuming a known 240Pu content. The spontaneous fission of uranium metal is considerably lower than Pu and measurements of this type have been performed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This work presents results of measurements of HEU and DU metal castings using moderated 3He detectors.

Comparison of HEU and LEU neutron spectra in irradiation facilities at the Oregon State TRIGA{sup ®} Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Schickler, R.A., E-mail: robert.schickler@oregonstate.edu; Marcum, W.R., E-mail: wade.marcum@oregonstate.edu; Reese, S.R.

2013-09-15

Highlights: • The Oregon State TRIGA{sup ®} Reactor neutron spectra is characterized herein. • Neutron spectra between highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium cores are compared. • Discussion is given as to differences between HEU and LEU core spectra results and impact on experiments. -- Abstract: In 2008, the Oregon State TRIGA{sup ®} Reactor (OSTR) was converted from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel lifetime improvement plan (FLIP) fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This effort was driven and supported by the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The basis behind the RERTR program's ongoing conversion effort is to reduce the nuclear proliferation risk of civilian research and test reactors. The original intent of the HEU FLIP fuel was to provide fuel to research reactors that could be utilized for many years before a necessary refueling cycle. As a research reactor, the OSTR provides irradiation facilities for a variety of applications, such as activation analysis, fission-track dating, commercial isotope production, neutron radiography, prompt gamma characterization, and many others. In order to accurately perform these research functions, several studies had been conducted on the HEU FLIP fuel core to characterize the neutron spectra in various experimental facilities of the OSTR (Tiyapun, 1997; Ashbaker, 2005). As useful as these analyses were, they are no longer valid due to the change in fuel composition and the resulting alteration of core performance characteristics. Additionally, the core configuration (fuel reconfiguration) was altered between the HEU and LEU cores. This study characterizes the neutron spectra in various experimental facilities within and around the current LEU core. It also compares the spectra to that which was yielded in the HEU core through use of Monte Carlo n-Particle 5 (MCNP5) and experimental adjustment via a least

Radioactive Waste Issues related to Production of Fission-based Mo-99 by using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hassan, Muhmood ul; Ryu, Ho Jin [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

In order to produce fission-based Mo-99 from research reactors, two types of targets are being used and they are highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets with {sup 235}U enrichment more than 90wt% of {sup 235}U and low enriched uranium (LEU) targets with {sup 235}U enrichment less than 20wt% of {sup 235}U. It is worth noting that medium enriched uranium i.e. 36wt% of {sup 235}U as being used in South Africa is also regarded as non-LEU from a nuclear security point of view. In order to cope with the proliferation issues, international nuclear security policy is promoting the use of LEU targets in order to minimize the civilian use of HEU. It is noteworthy that Mo-99 yield of the LEU target is less than 20% of the HEU target, which requires approximately five times more LEU targets to be irradiated and consequently results in increased volume of waste. The waste generated from fission Mo-99 production can be mainly due to: target fabrication, assembling of target, irradiation in reactor and processing of irradiated targets. During the fission of U-235 in a reactor, a large number of radionuclides with different chemical and physical properties are formed. The waste produced from these practices may be a combination of low level waste (LLW) and intermediate level waste (ILW) comprised of all three types, i.e., solid, liquid and gas. Handling and treatment of the generated waste are dependent on its form and activity. In case of the large production facility, waste storage facility should be constructed in order to limit the radiation exposures of the workers and the environment. In this study, we discuss and compare mainly the radioactive waste generated by alkaline digestion of both HEU and LEU targets to assist in planning and deciding the choice of the technology with better arrangements for proper handling and disposal of generated waste. With the use of the LEU targets in Mo-99 production facility, significant increase in liquid and solid waste has been expected.

Past and present supply of enriched uranium for research reactors in the European Union

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, H.

2002-01-01

In the last decade research reactor operators have focused mainly on the issues of disposal of spent research reactor fuel and the development of high density fuels. The safe supply of fresh uranium did not receive as much attention. This is surprising since the United States - who was the main supplier for LEU and HEU since the late 1950's - stopped supplying non-US research reactors with enriched uranium a decade ago. The reason for this stop of supply is described in this paper. This paper explains how research reactors in the E U continued to operate during the last decade, in spite of the fact that their primary supply source had not provided LEU and HEU over the same period. (author)

Technical basis in support of the conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) core from highly-enriched to low-enriched uranium - core neutron physics

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stillman, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Feldman, E. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Foyto, L [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Kutikkad, K [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; McKibben, J C [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Peters, N. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States). Columbia Research Reactor; Stevens, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States)

2012-09-01

This report contains the results of reactor design and performance for conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Reactor Conversion Program at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the MURR Facility. The core conversion to LEU is being performed with financial support of the U. S. government.

31 CFR 540.317 - Uranium feed; natural uranium feed.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium feed; natural uranium feed... (Continued) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.317 Uranium feed; natural uranium feed. The...

Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

Accident Analyses for Conversion of the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) from Highly-Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stillman, J. A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Feldman, E. E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Jaluvka, D. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Wilson, E. H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Foyto, L. P. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); Kutikkad, K. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); McKibben, J. C. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States); Peters, N. J. [Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO (United States)

2017-02-01

This report contains the results of reactor accident analyses for the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The calculations were performed as part of the conversion from the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The analyses were performed by staff members in the Research and Test Reactor Department at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the MURR Facility. MURR LEU conversion is part of an overall effort to develop and qualify high-density fuel within the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor Conversion (USHPRR) program conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Material Management and Minimization (M³).

Safeguards considerations for uranium enrichment facilities, as applied to gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-03-01

The goals and objectives of IAEA safeguards as they are understood by the authors based on published documents are reviewed. These goals are then used to derive safeguards concerns, diversion strategies, and potential safeguards measures for four base cases, the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a diffusion plant, the diversion of low enriched uranium (LEU) at a diffusion plant, the diversion of HEU at a gas centrifuge plant, and the diversion of LEU at a gas centrifuge plant. Tables of estimated capabilities are given for each case, under the assumption that the inspector would have access: to the cascade perimeter at or after the start of operations, to the cascade perimeter throughout construction and operation, to the cascade perimeter during operation plus a one-time access to the cascade itself, to the cascade during construction but only its perimeter during operation, or to the cascade itself during construction and operation

Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Design with Two-Dimensional Grading for the High Flux Isotope Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Primm, Trent [ORNL

2011-05-01

An engineering design study of the conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel is ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The computational models developed during fiscal year 2010 to search for an LEU fuel design that would meet the requirements for the conversion and the results obtained with these models are documented and discussed in this report. Estimates of relevant reactor performance parameters for the LEU fuel core are presented and compared with the corresponding data for the currently operating HEU fuel core. The results obtained indicate that the LEU fuel design would maintain the current performance of the HFIR with respect to the neutron flux to the central target region, reflector, and beam tube locations under the assumption that the operating power for the reactor fueled with LEU can be increased from the current value of 85 MW to 100 MW.

Determination of Dancoff correction thermal utilization and thermal disadvantage factors of HEU and LEU cores of an MNSR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ofori, Y. T.

2013-07-01

Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1), an MNSR (Miniature Neutron Source Reactor) is to be converted from HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) to LEU (Low Enriched Uranium) fuel, along with all current MNSRs in various other countries. The purpose of the conversion is to minimize the use of HEU for non-proliferation of high-grade nuclear fuel. In this research work, a comparative study has been performed for the determination of the Dancoff, thermal utilization and thermal disadvantage factors of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and potential low enriched uranium (LEU) cores of GHARR-1. A one group transport theory and collision probability based methodologies was used to develop mathematical formulations for thermal utilization factor and thermal disadvantage factor assuming isotropic scattering. This methodology was implemented in a FORTRAN 95 based computer program THERMCALC, which uses Bessell and BesselK as subroutines developed to calculate the modified Bessel functions I n and K n respectively using the polynomial approximation method. Furthermore, a Dancoff correction factor of 0.1519 thermal utilization factor of 0.9767 and a thermal disadvantage factor of 1.894 were obtained for the 90.2% highly enriched Uranium core of GHARR-1. The results compare favorably with literature. Thus THERMCALC can be used as a reliable tool for the calculation of Dancoff, thermal utilization and disadvantage factors of MNSR cores. Other potential LEU cores; UO 2 (with different fuel meat densities and enrichments) and U 3 Si 2 have also been analysed. UO 2 with 12.6% of Uranium-235 was chosen as the most potential LEU core for the GHARR-1. (au)

Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

K. J. Allen; I. Bolshinsky; L. L. Biro; M. E. Budu; N. V. Zamfir; M. Dragusin

2010-07-01

Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world’s first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3rd country under the RRRFR program and the 14th country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment.

Air Shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Romania

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Allen, K.J.; Bolshinsky, I.; Biro, L.L.; Budu, M.E.; Zamfir, N.V.; Dragusin, M.

2010-01-01

Romania safely air shipped 23.7 kilograms of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel from the VVR-S research reactor at Magurele, Romania, to the Russian Federation in June 2009. This was the world's first air shipment of spent nuclear fuel transported in a Type B(U) cask under existing international laws without special exceptions for the air transport licenses. This shipment was coordinated by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR), part of the U.S. Department of Energy Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), in cooperation with the Romania National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN), the Horia Hulubei National Institute of Physics and Nuclear Engineering (IFIN-HH), and the Russian Federation State Corporation Rosatom. The shipment was transported by truck to and from the respective commercial airports in Romania and the Russian Federation and stored at a secure nuclear facility in Russia where it will be converted into low enriched uranium. With this shipment, Romania became the 3. country under the RRRFR program and the 14. country under the GTRI program to remove all HEU. This paper describes the work, equipment, and approvals that were required to complete this spent fuel air shipment. (authors)

Criticality safety evaluation for the Advanced Test Reactor enhanced low enriched uranium fuel elements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Montierth, Leland M. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

2016-07-19

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) convert program is developing a high uranium density fuel based on a low enriched uranium (LEU) uranium-molybdenum alloy. Testing of prototypic GTRI fuel elements is necessary to demonstrate integrated fuel performance behavior and scale-up of fabrication techniques. GTRI Enhanced LEU Fuel (ELF) elements based on the ATR-Standard Size elements (all plates fueled) are to be fabricated for testing in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). While a specific ELF element design will eventually be provided for detailed analyses and in-core testing, this criticality safety evaluation (CSE) is intended to evaluate a hypothetical ELF element design for criticality safety purposes. Existing criticality analyses have analyzed Standard (HEU) ATR elements from which controls have been derived. This CSE documents analysis that determines the reactivity of the hypothetical ELF fuel elements relative to HEU ATR elements and whether the existing HEU ATR element controls bound the ELF element. The initial calculations presented in this CSE analyzed the original ELF design, now referred to as Mod 0.1. In addition, as part of a fuel meat thickness optimization effort for reactor performance, other designs have been evaluated. As of early 2014 the most current conceptual designs are Mk1A and Mk1B, that were previously referred to as conceptual designs Mod 0.10 and Mod 0.11, respectively. Revision 1 evaluates the reactivity of the ATR HEU Mark IV elements for a comparison with the Mark VII elements.

Criticality safety evaluation for the Advanced Test Reactor enhanced low enriched uranium fuel elements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Montierth, Leland M.

2016-01-01

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) convert program is developing a high uranium density fuel based on a low enriched uranium (LEU) uranium-molybdenum alloy. Testing of prototypic GTRI fuel elements is necessary to demonstrate integrated fuel performance behavior and scale-up of fabrication techniques. GTRI Enhanced LEU Fuel (ELF) elements based on the ATR-Standard Size elements (all plates fueled) are to be fabricated for testing in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). While a specific ELF element design will eventually be provided for detailed analyses and in-core testing, this criticality safety evaluation (CSE) is intended to evaluate a hypothetical ELF element design for criticality safety purposes. Existing criticality analyses have analyzed Standard (HEU) ATR elements from which controls have been derived. This CSE documents analysis that determines the reactivity of the hypothetical ELF fuel elements relative to HEU ATR elements and whether the existing HEU ATR element controls bound the ELF element. The initial calculations presented in this CSE analyzed the original ELF design, now referred to as Mod 0.1. In addition, as part of a fuel meat thickness optimization effort for reactor performance, other designs have been evaluated. As of early 2014 the most current conceptual designs are Mk1A and Mk1B, that were previously referred to as conceptual designs Mod 0.10 and Mod 0.11, respectively. Revision 1 evaluates the reactivity of the ATR HEU Mark IV elements for a comparison with the Mark VII elements.

RUSSIAN-ORIGIN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL SHIPMENT FROM BULGARIA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kelly Cummins; Igor Bolshinsky; Ken Allen; Tihomir Apostolov; Ivaylo Dimitrov

2009-07-01

In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

Russian-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment From Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cummins, Kelly; Bolshinsky, Igor; Allen, Ken; Apostolov, Tihomir; Dimitrov, Ivaylo

2009-01-01

In July 2008, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IRT 2000 research reactor in Sofia, Bulgaria, operated by the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped 6.4 kilograms of Russian origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to the Russian Federation. The shipment, which resulted in the removal of all HEU from Bulgaria, was conducted by truck, barge, and rail modes of transport across two transit countries before reaching the final destination at the Production Association Mayak facility in Chelyabinsk, Russia. This paper describes the work, equipment, organizations, and approvals that were required to complete the spent fuel shipment and provides lessons learned that might assist other research reactor operators with their own spent nuclear fuel shipments.

Conversion of highly enriched uranium in thorium-232 based oxide fuel for light water reactors: MOX-T fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Vapirev, E I; Jordanov, T; Christoskov, I [Sofia Univ. (Bulgaria). Fizicheski Fakultet

1994-12-31

The idea of conversion of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from warheads without mixing it with natural uranium as well as the utilization of plutonium as fuel component is discussed. A nuclear fuel which is a mixture of 4% {sup 235}U (HEU) as a fissile isotope and 96 % {sup 232}Th (ThO{sub 2}) as a non-fissile isotope in a mixed oxide with thorium fuel is proposed. It is assumed that plutonium can also be used in the proposed fuel in a mixture with {sup 235}U. The following advantages of the use of HEU in LWRs in mixed {sup 235}U - Th fuel are pointed out: (1) No generation of long-living plutonium and americium isotopes (in case of reprocessing the high level radioactive wastes will contain only fission fragments and uranium); (2) The high conversion ratio of Th extends the expected burnup by approximately 1/3 without higher initial enrichment (the same initial enrichment simplifies the problem for compensation of the excess reactivity in the beginning with burnable poison and boric acid); (3) The high conversion ratio of Th allows the fuel utilization with less initial enrichment (by approx. 1/3) for the same burnup; thus less excess reactivity has to be compensated after reloading; in case of fuel reprocessing all fissile materials ({sup 235}U + {sup 233}U) could be chemically extracted. Irrespectively to the optimistic expectations outlined, further work including data on optimal loading and reloading schemes, theoretical calculations of thermal properties of {sup 235}U + Th fuel rods, manufacturing of several test fuel assemblies and investigations of their operational behaviour in a reactor core is still needed. 1 fig., 7 refs.

ADS with HEU in the Vinca Institute

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, M.; Sobolevsky, N.

2000-01-01

The 'Conceptual design of ADS' is a new project proposed in the Vin.a Institute for the next three years. In this paper, an option in the project - an idea of high-enriched uranium (HEU) - H 2 O low-flux ADS is shown. Preliminary results of design study and calculations of the beam-target interaction and neutronics of proposed sub-critical system are given. (author)

Moderator configuration options for a low-enriched uranium fueled Kilowatt-class Space Nuclear Reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

King, Jeffrey C.; Mencarini, Leonardo de Holanda; Guimaraes, Lamartine N. F.

2015-01-01

The Brazilian Air Force, through its Institute for Advanced Studies (Instituto de Estudos Avancados, IEAv/DCTA), and the Colorado School of Mines (CSM) are studying the feasibility of a space nuclear reactor with a power of 1-5 kW e and fueled with Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU). This type of nuclear reactor would be attractive to signatory countries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or commercial interests. A LEU-fueled space reactor would avoid the security concerns inherent with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel. As an initial step, the HEU-fueled Kilowatt Reactor Using Stirling Technology (KRUSTY) designed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory serves as a basis for a similar reactor fueled with LEU fuel. Using the computational code MCNP6 to predict the reactor neutronics performance, the size of the resulting reactor fueled with 19.75 wt% enriched uranium-10 wt% molybdenum alloy fuel is adjusted to match the excess reactivity of KRUSTY. Then, zirconium hydride moderator is added to the core to reduce the size of the reactor. This work presents the preliminary results of the computational modeling, with special emphasis on the comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous moderator systems, in terms of the core diameter required to meet a specific multiplication factor (k eff = 1.035). This comparison illustrates the impact of moderator configuration on the size and performance of a LEU-fueled kilowatt-class space nuclear reactor. (author)

Moderator configuration options for a low-enriched uranium fueled Kilowatt-class Space Nuclear Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

King, Jeffrey C., E-mail: kingjc@mines.edu [Nuclear Science and Engineering Program, Colorado School of Mines (CSM), Golden, CO (United States); Mencarini, Leonardo de Holanda; Guimaraes, Lamartine N. F., E-mail: guimaraes@ieav.cta.br, E-mail: mencarini@ieav.cta.br [Instituto de Estudos Avancados (IEAV), Sao Jose dos Campos, SP (Brazil). Divisao de Energia Nuclear

2015-07-01

The Brazilian Air Force, through its Institute for Advanced Studies (Instituto de Estudos Avancados, IEAv/DCTA), and the Colorado School of Mines (CSM) are studying the feasibility of a space nuclear reactor with a power of 1-5 kW{sub e} and fueled with Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU). This type of nuclear reactor would be attractive to signatory countries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or commercial interests. A LEU-fueled space reactor would avoid the security concerns inherent with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel. As an initial step, the HEU-fueled Kilowatt Reactor Using Stirling Technology (KRUSTY) designed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory serves as a basis for a similar reactor fueled with LEU fuel. Using the computational code MCNP6 to predict the reactor neutronics performance, the size of the resulting reactor fueled with 19.75 wt% enriched uranium-10 wt% molybdenum alloy fuel is adjusted to match the excess reactivity of KRUSTY. Then, zirconium hydride moderator is added to the core to reduce the size of the reactor. This work presents the preliminary results of the computational modeling, with special emphasis on the comparison between homogeneous and heterogeneous moderator systems, in terms of the core diameter required to meet a specific multiplication factor (k{sub eff} = 1.035). This comparison illustrates the impact of moderator configuration on the size and performance of a LEU-fueled kilowatt-class space nuclear reactor. (author)

Assessment of the effectiveness of personal visual observation as a safeguards measure in a uranium enrichment facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ohno, Fubito; Okamoto, Tsuyoshi; Yokochi, Akira; Nidaira, Kazuo

2003-01-01

In a centrifuge enrichment facility, a cascade that produces low enriched uranium is composed of a large number of UF 6 gas centrifuges interconnected with pipes. It is possible to divert the cascade to the illegal production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by changing the piping arrangement within the cascade. If integrated type centrifuges that contain a few tens of advanced centrifuges are introduced into the facility, the number of pipes will greatly decrease. The smaller the number of pipes, the less the labor required to change the piping arrangement. Because personal visual observation by an inspector is considered as one of measures against changing the piping arrangement, its effectiveness is assessed in this study. First, a model centrifuge enrichment facility that has a capacity of 2,400 ton-SWU/y is designed. In this model facility, integrated type centrifuges that contain advanced centrifuges are installed. Second, the diversion path analysis is carried out for the model facility under the assumption that a facility operator's goal is to produce 75 kg of HEU with 20% enrichment in a month. The analysis shows that, in our assumed diversion path, changes of the piping arrangement can be certainly detected by personal visual observation of a part of pipes connected with integrated type centrifuges that compose the cascade diverted to the HEU production. Finally, inspections in a cascade area are modeled as two-person noncooperative games between the inspector and the facility operator. As a result, it is found that all the cascades in the model facility will be investigated if the inspector can devote the inspection effort of 0.83 man-day per month to personal visual observation in the cascade area. Therefore, it is suggested that personal visual observation of the piping arrangement is worth carrying out in a uranium enrichment facility where integrated type centrifuges that contain advanced centrifuges are installed. (author)

Analysis of civilian processing programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-09-01

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than is the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This report provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate blending option to produce oxide for disposal. This the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) alternative will have two missions (1) convert HEU materials into HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend the HEU uranyl nitrate with depleted and natural assay uranyl nitrate to produce an oxide that can be stored until an acceptable disposal approach is available. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for disposal

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-09-01

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than is the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This report provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the uranyl nitrate hexahydrate blending option to produce oxide for disposal. This the Conversion and Blending Facility (CBF) alternative will have two missions (1) convert HEU materials into HEU uranyl nitrate (UNH) and (2) blend the HEU uranyl nitrate with depleted and natural assay uranyl nitrate to produce an oxide that can be stored until an acceptable disposal approach is available. The primary emphasis of this blending operation will be to destroy the weapons capability of large, surplus stockpiles of HEU. The blended LEU product can only be made weapons capable again by the uranium enrichment process. The blended LEU will be produced as a waste suitable for storage or disposal.

Unallocated Off-Specification Highly Enriched Uranium: Recommendations for Disposition

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bridges, D. N.; Boeke, S. G.; Tousley, D. R.; Bickford, W.; Goergen, C.; Williams, W.; Hassler, M.; Nelson, T.; Keck, R.; Arbital, J.

2002-02-27

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has made significant progress with regard to disposition planning for 174 metric tons (MTU) of surplus Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Approximately 55 MTU of this 174 MTU are ''offspec'' HEU. (''Off-spec'' signifies that the isotopic or chemical content of the material does not meet the American Society for Testing and Materials standards for commercial nuclear reactor fuel.) Approximately 33 of the 55 MTU have been allocated to off-spec commercial reactor fuel per an Interagency Agreement between DOE and the Tennessee Valley Authority (1). To determine disposition plans for the remaining {approx}22 MTU, the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (OFMD) and the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) co-sponsored this technical study. This paper represents a synopsis of the formal technical report (NNSA/NN-0014). The {approx} 22 MTU of off-spec HEU inventory in this study were divided into two main groupings: one grouping with plutonium (Pu) contamination and one grouping without plutonium. This study identified and evaluated 26 potential paths for the disposition of this HEU using proven decision analysis tools. This selection process resulted in recommended and alternative disposition paths for each group of HEU. The evaluation and selection of these paths considered criteria such as technical maturity, programmatic issues, cost, schedule, and environment, safety and health compliance. The primary recommendations from the analysis are comprised of 7 different disposition paths. The study recommendations will serve as a technical basis for subsequent programmatic decisions as disposition of this HEU moves into the implementation phase.

Nuclear characteristics evaluation for Kyoto University Research Reactor with low-enriched uranium core

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nakajima, Ken; Unesaki, Hironobu [Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute, Kumatori-cho Sennan-gun Osaka (Japan)

2008-07-01

A project to convert the fuel of Kyoto University Research Reactor (KUR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) is in progress as a part of RERTR program. Prior to the operation of LEU core, the nuclear characteristics of the core have been evaluated to confirm the safety operation. In the evaluation, nuclear parameters, such as the excess reactivity, shut down margin control rod worth, reactivity coefficients, were calculated, and they were compared with the safety limits. The results of evaluation show that the LEU core is able to satisfy the safety requirements for operation, i.e. all the parameters satisfy the safety limits. Consequently, it was confirmed that the LEU fuel core has the proper nuclear characteristics for the safety operation. (authors)

2009 Annual Health Physics Report for the HEU Transparency Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Radev, R.

2010-01-01

During the 2009 calendar year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided health physics support for the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program for external and internal radiation protection. LLNL also provided technical expertise related to BDMS radioactive sources and Russian radiation safety regulatory compliance. For the calendar year 2009, there were 159 person-trips that required dose monitoring of the U.S. monitors. Of the 159 person-trips, 149 person-trips were SMVs and 10 person-trips were Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) trips. There were 4 monitoring visits by TMO monitors to facilities other than UEIE and 10 to UEIE itself. LLNL's Hazard Control Department laboratories provided the dosimetry services for the HEU Transparency monitors. In 2009, the HEU Transparency activities in Russia were conducted in a radiologically safe manner for the HEU Transparency monitors in accordance with the expectations of the HEU Transparency staff, NNSA and DOE. The HEU Transparency Program now has over fifteen years of successful experience in developing and providing health and safety support in meeting its technical objectives.

Uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

This report looks at the following issues: How much Soviet uranium ore and enriched uranium are imported into the United States and what is the extent to which utilities flag swap to disguise these purchases? What are the U.S.S.R.'s enriched uranium trading practices? To what extent are utilities required to return used fuel to the Soviet Union as part of the enriched uranium sales agreement? Why have U.S. utilities ended their contracts to buy enrichment services from DOE?

A simple method for rapidly processing HEU from weapons returns

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McLean, W. II; Miller, P.E.

1994-01-01

A method based on the use of a high temperature fluidized bed for rapidly oxidizing, homogenizing and down-blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons is presented. This technology directly addresses many of the most important issues that inhibit progress in international commerce in HEU; viz., transaction verification, materials accountability, transportation and environmental safety. The equipment used to carry out the oxidation and blending is simple, inexpensive and highly portable. Mobile facilities to be used for point-of-sale blending and analysis of the product material are presented along with a phased implementation plan that addresses the conversion of HEU derived from domestic weapons and related waste streams as well as material from possible foreign sources such as South Africa or the former Soviet Union.

Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Mixed Oxide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mount, M.; O'Connell, W.; Cochran, C.; Rinard, P.; Dearborn, D.; Endres, E.

2002-01-01

As a follow-on to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler for measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide, a method has been developed to extend the use of the PAN shuffler to the measurement of HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. This method uses the current LLNL HEU oxide calibration algorithms, appropriately corrected for the mixed U-Pu oxide assay time, and recently developed PuO 2 calibration algorithms to yield the mass of 235 U present via differences between the expected count rate for the PuO 2 and the measured count rate of the mixed U-Pu oxide. This paper describes the LLNL effort to use PAN shuffler measurements of units of certified reference material (CRM) 149 (uranium (93% Enriched) Oxide - U 3 O 8 Standard for Neutron Counting Measurements) and CRM 146 (uranium Isotopic Standard for Gamma Spectrometry Measurements) and a selected set of LLNL PuO 2 -bearing containers in consort with Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to each to (1) establish and validate a correction to the HEU calibration algorithm for the mixed U-Pu oxide assay time, (2) develop a PuO 2 calibration algorithm that includes the effect of PuO 2 density (2.4 g/cm 3 to 4.8 g/cm 3 ) and container size (8.57 cm to 9.88 cm inside diameter and 9.60 cm to 13.29 cm inside height) on the PAN shuffler response, and (3) develop and validate the method for establishing the mass of 235 U present in an unknown of mixed U-Pu oxide.

Finding of no significant impact: Interim storage of enriched uranium above the maximum historical level at the Y-12 Plant Oak Ridge, Tennessee

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-0929, September, 1994). The EA evaluates the environmental effects of transportation, prestorage processing, and interim storage of bounding quantities of enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant over a ten-year period. The State of Tennessee and the public participated in public meetings and workshops which were held after a predecisional draft EA was released in February 1994, and after the revised pre-approval EA was issued in September 1994. Comments provided by the State and public have been carefully considered by the Department. As a result of this public process, the Department has determined that the Y-12 Plant-would store no more than 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and no more than 6 metric tons of low enriched uranium (LEU). The bounding storage quantities analyzed in the pre-approval EA are 500 metric tons of HEU and 7,105.9 metric tons of LEU. Based on-the analyses in the EA, as revised by the attachment to the Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), DOE has determined that interim storage of 500 metric tons of HEU and 6 metric tons of LEU at the Y-12 Plant does not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. Therefore, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is not required and the Department is issuing this FONSI

HEU Holdup Measurements on 321-M A-Lathe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dewberry, R.A.

2002-01-01

The Analytical Development Section of SRTC was requested by the Facilities Disposition Division (FDD) of the Savannah River Site to determine the holdup of enriched uranium in the 321-M facility as part of an overall deactivation project of the facility. The 321-M facility was used to fabricate enriched uranium fuel assemblies, lithium-aluminum target tubes, neptunium assemblies, and miscellaneous components for the production reactors. The results of the holdup assays are essential for determining compliance with the solid waste Waste Acceptance Criteria, Material Control and Accountability, and to meet criticality safety controls. Three measurement systems were used to determine highly enriched uranium (HEU) holdup. This report covers holdup measurements on the A-Lathe that was used to machine uranium-aluminum-alloy (U-Al). Our results indicated that the lathe contained more than the limits stated in the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) for the solid waste E-Area Vaults. Thus the lathe was decontaminated three times and assayed four times in order to bring the amounts of uranium to an acceptable content. This report will discuss the methodology, Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) measurements, and results of the U-235 holdup on the lathe

Preliminary investigations for technology assessment of 99Mo production from LEU [low enriched uranium] targets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Chaiko, D.J.; Heinrich, R.R.; Kucera, E.T.; Jensen, K.J.; Poa, D.S.; Varma, R.; Vissers, D.R.

1986-11-01

This paper presents the results of preliminary studies on the effects of substituting low enriched uranium (LEU) for highly enriched uranium (HEU) in targets for the production of fission product 99 Mo. Issues that were addressed are: (1) purity and yield of the 99 Mo//sup 99m/Tc product, (2) fabrication of LEU targets and related concerns, and (3) radioactive waste. Laboratory experimentation was part of the efforts for issues (1) and (2); thus far, radioactive waste disposal has only been addressed in a paper study. Although the reported results are still preliminary, there is reason to be optimistic about the feasibility of utilizing LEU targets for 99 Mo production. 37 refs., 1 fig., 5 tabs

Development of uranium metal targets for 99Mo production

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wiencek, T.C.; Hofman, G.L.

1993-10-01

A substantial amount of high enriched uranium (HEU) is used for the production of medical-grade 99 Mo. Promising methods of producing irradiation targets are being developed and may lead to the reduction or elimination of this HEU use. To substitute low enriched uranium (LEU) for HEU in the production of 99 Mo, the target material may be changed to uranium metal foil. Methods of fabrication are being developed to simplify assembly and disassembly of the targets. Removal of the uranium foil after irradiation without dissolution of the cladding is a primary goal in order to reduce the amount of liquid radioactive waste material produced in the process. Proof-of-concept targets have been fabricated. Destructive testing indicates that acceptable contact between the uranium foil and the cladding can be achieved. Thermal annealing tests, which simulate the cladding/uranium diffusion conditions during irradiation, are underway. Plans are being made to irradiate test targets

Heat-transfer analysis of the existing HEU and proposed LEU cores of Pakistan research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khan, L.A.; Nabbi, R.

1987-02-01

In connection with conversion of Pakistan Research Reactor (PARR) from the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel to the use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel, steady-state thermal hydraulic analysis of both existing HEU and proposed LEU cores has been carried out. Keeping in mind the possibility of power upgrading, the performance of proposed LEU core, under 10 MW operating conditions, has also been evaluated. Computer code HEATHYD has been used for this purpose. In order to verify the reliability of the code, IAEA benchmark 2 MW reactor was analyzed. The cooling parameters evaluated include: coolant velocity, critical velocity, pressure drop, temperature distribution in the core, heat fluxes at onset of nucleate boiling, flow instability and burnout and corresponding safety margins. From the results of the study it can be concluded that the conversion of the core to LEU fuel will result in higher safety margins, as compared to existing HEU core, mainly because the increased number of fuel plates in the proposed design will reduce the average heat flux significantly. Anyhow upgrading of the reactor power to 10 MW will need the flow rate to be adjusted between 850 to 900 m 3 /hr, to achieve reasonable safety margins, at least, comparable with the existing HEU core. (orig.)

Feasibility of Low Enriched Uranium Fuel for Space Nuclear Propulsion

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Venneri, Paolo; Kim, Yonghee [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2013-05-15

The purpose of this initial study is to create a baseline with which to perform further analysis and to build a solid understanding of the neutronic characteristics of a solid core for the nuclear thermal rocket. Once consistency with work done at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is established, this paper will provide a study of other fuel types, such as low and medium-enriched uranium fuels. This paper will examine how the implementation of each fuel type affects the multiplication factor of the reactor, and will then explore different possibilities for alterations needed to accommodate their successful usage. The reactor core analysis was done using the MCNP5 code. While this study has not shown that the SNRE can be easily retrofitted for low-enriched U fuel, it has made a detailed study of the SNRE, and identified the difficulties of the implementation of low-enriched fuels in small nuclear rockets. These difficulties are the need for additional moderation and fuel mass in order to achieve a critical mass. Neither of these is insurmountable. Future work includes finding the best method by which to increase the internal moderation of the reactor balanced with appropriate sizing to prevent neutron leakage. Both of these are currently being studied. This paper will present a study of the Small Nuclear Rocket Engine (SNRE) and the feasibility of using low enriched Uranium (LEU) instead of the traditional high enriched Uranium (HEU) fuels.

Thermal-hydraulic calculations for KUHFR with reduced enrichment uranium fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mishima, Kaichiro; Shibata, Toshikazu.

1982-01-01

This report provides the preliminary results of the thermal-hydraulic calculations to study the safety aspects in fueling the KUHFR with reduced enrichment uranium. The calculations were based on what was outlined in the Safety Analysis Report for the KUHFR and the guidebook for research reactor core conversion, IAEA-TECDOC-233, published by the International Atomic Energy Agency. No significant differences in the thermal-hydraulic operating conditions have been found between HEU and MEU fuels. However, in LEU cases, the combination of three factors - larger power peaking with LEU fuel, smaller thermal conductivity of U 3 O 8 -Al fuel with high uranium densities, and thicker fuel meat - resulted in higher maximum fuel and surface temperatures with the LEU oxide fuel. (author)

A feasibility study concerning the conversion of the TR-2 reactor from using highly enriched uranium to light enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aldemir, T.; Turgut, H.M.; Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, L.J.

1983-01-01

A study has been made of the feasibility of converting the 5-MW TR-2 reactor at CNAEM to use fuel with uranium enrichment of 3 O 8 -Al fuel meat with a uranium density in the range 2.3 to 3.0 g/cm 3 in the fuel meat with meat thickness varying between 0.9 and 1.00 mm, the number of plates in the LEU element being reduced from 23 in the HEU element to 19 to 20 to maintain adequate cooling. Fuels within this density range are expected to be commercially available within the next two years. From the results of the study it appears to be feasible to safely operate the TR-2 reactor using LEU fuel without increased fuel cycle costs or decreased performance using U 2 O 8 fuels with densities in the 2.3 to 3.0 gU/cm 3 range. (author)

Department of Energy, highly enriched uranium ES ampersand H vulnerability assessment, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory site assessment team report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

In accordance with the February 22, 1996 directive issued by Secretary of Energy O'Leary on the Vulnerability Assessment of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Storage, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory conducted an assessment of the site's HEU holdings and any associated vulnerabilities. The assessment was conducted between April 25 and May 24, 1996. The scope of this assessment, as defined in the Assessment Plan, included all HEU, and any spent fuel not evaluated in the Spent Fuel Vulnerability Assessment. Addressed in this assessment were all of the holdings at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) except any located at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) and the Naval Reactors Facility. Excluded from the assessment were those HEU holdings previously assessed in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventory and Vulnerability Site Assessment Report and any HEU holdings evaluated in the Plutonium Vulnerability Assessment Report

Uranium enrichment plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, D.C.; Gagne, R.W.

1978-01-01

The following topics are covered: the status of the Government's existing uranium enrichment services contracts, natural uranium requirements based on the latest contract information, uncertainty in predicting natural uranium requirements based on uranium enrichment contracts, and domestic and foreign demand assumed in enrichment planning

Active neutron and gamma-ray imaging of highly enriched uranium for treaty verification.

Science.gov (United States)

Hamel, Michael C; Polack, J Kyle; Ruch, Marc L; Marcath, Matthew J; Clarke, Shaun D; Pozzi, Sara A

2017-08-11

The detection and characterization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) presents a large challenge in the non-proliferation field. HEU has a low neutron emission rate and most gamma rays are low energy and easily shielded. To address this challenge, an instrument known as the dual-particle imager (DPI) was used with a portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator to detect neutrons and gamma rays from induced fission in HEU. We evaluated system response using a 13.7-kg HEU sphere in several configurations with no moderation, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) moderation, and tungsten moderation. A hollow tungsten sphere was interrogated to evaluate the response to a possible hoax item. First, localization capabilities were demonstrated by reconstructing neutron and gamma-ray images. Once localized, additional properties such as fast neutron energy spectra and time-dependent neutron count rates were attributed to the items. For the interrogated configurations containing HEU, the reconstructed neutron spectra resembled Watt spectra, which gave confidence that the interrogated items were undergoing induced fission. The time-dependent neutron count rate was also compared for each configuration and shown to be dependent on the neutron multiplication of the item. This result showed that the DPI is a viable tool for localizing and confirming fissile mass and multiplication.

Establishing a Cost Basis for Converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor from High Enriched to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Primm, Trent; Guida, Tracey

2010-01-01

Under the auspices of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program, the National Nuclear Security Administration/Department of Energy (NNSA/DOE) has, as a goal, to convert research reactors worldwide from weapons grade to non-weapons grade uranium. The High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) is one of the candidates for conversion of fuel from high enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). A well documented business model, including tasks, costs, and schedules was developed to plan the conversion of HFIR. Using Microsoft Project, a detailed outline of the conversion program was established and consists of LEU fuel design activities, a fresh fuel shipping cask, improvements to the HFIR reactor building, and spent fuel operations. Current-value costs total $76 million dollars, include over 100 subtasks, and will take over 10 years to complete. The model and schedule follows the path of the fuel from receipt from fuel fabricator to delivery to spent fuel storage and illustrates the duration, start, and completion dates of each subtask to be completed. Assumptions that form the basis of the cost estimate have significant impact on cost and schedule.

Sealing of process valves for the HEU downblending verification experiment at Portsmouth

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baldwin, G.T.; Bartberger, J.C.; Jenkins, C.D.; Perlinski, A.W.; Schoeneman, J.L.; Gordon, D.M.; Whiting, N.E.; Bonner, T.N.; Castle, J.M.

1998-01-01

At the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio, USA, excess inventory of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from US defense programs is being diluted to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for commercial use. The conversion is subject to a Verification Experiment overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Verification Experiment is making use of monitoring technologies developed and installed by several DOE laboratories. One of the measures is a system for sealing valves in the process piping, which secures the path followed by uranium hexafluoride gas (UF 6 ) from cylinders at the feed stations to the blend point, where the HEU is diluted with LEU. The Authenticated Item Monitoring System (AIMS) was the alternative proposed by Sandia National Laboratories that was selected by the IAEA. Approximately 30 valves were sealed by the IAEA using AIMS fiber-optic seals (AFOS). The seals employ single-core plastic fiber rated to 125 C to withstand the high-temperature conditions of the heated piping enclosures at Portsmouth. Each AFOS broadcasts authenticated seal status and state-of-health messages via a tamper-protected radio-frequency transmitter mounted outside of the heated enclosure. The messages are received by two collection stations, operated redundantly

A level-playing field for medical isotope production - How to phase-out reliance on HEU

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuperman, A.J.

1999-01-01

Two decades ago, civilian commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU) for use as targets in the production of medical isotopes was considered a relatively minor security concern for three reasons. First, the number of producers was small. Second, the amount of HEU involved was small. Third, the amount of HEU was dwarfed by the quantities of HEU in civilian commerce as fuel for nuclear research and test reactors. Now, however, all three variables have changed. First, as the use of medical isotopes has expanded rapidly, production programs are proliferating. Second, as the result of such new producers and the expansion of existing production facilities, the amounts of HEU involved are growing. Third, as the RERTR program has facilitated the phase-out of HEU as fuel in most research and test reactors, the quantities of HEU for isotope production have come to represent a significant percentage of global commerce in this weapons-usable material. Medical isotope producers in several states are cooperating with the RERTR program to convert to low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets within the next few years, and one already relies on LEU for isotope production. However, the three biggest isotope producers - in Canada and the European Union - continue to rely on HEU, creating a double-standard that endangers the goal of the RERTR program. Each of these three producers has expressed economic concerns about being put at a competitive disadvantage if it alone converts. This paper proposes forging a firmer international consensus that all present and future isotope producers should convert to LEU, and calls for codifying such a commitment in a statement of intent to be prepared by producers over the next year. With such a level playing field, no producer would need fear being put at a competitive disadvantage by conversion, or being stigmatized by pressure groups for continued reliance on HEU. The phase-out of all HEU commerce for isotope production could be achieved within about

2011 Annual Health Physics Report for the HEU transparency Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Radev, R.

2012-01-01

During the 2008 calendar year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided health physics support for the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program for external and internal radiation protection. They also provided technical expertise related to BDMS radioactive sources and Russian radiation safety regulatory compliance. For the calendar year 2008, there were 158 person-trips that required dose monitoring of the U.S. monitors. Of the 158 person-trips, 148 person-trips were SMVs and 10 person-trips were Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) trips. There were 6 monitoring visits by TMO monitors to facilities other than UEIE and 8 to UEIE itself. There were three monitoring visits (source changes) that were back-to-back with a total of 24 monitors. LLNL's Hazard Control Department laboratories provided the dosimetry services for the HEU Transparency monitors. In 2008, the HEU Transparency activities in Russia were conducted in a radiologically safe manner for the HEU Transparency monitors in accordance with the expectations of the HEU Transparency staff, NNSA and DOE. The HEU Transparency now has thirteen years of successful experience in developing and providing health and safety support in meeting its technical objectives.

31 CFR 540.309 - Natural uranium.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Natural uranium. 540.309 Section 540... FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.309 Natural uranium. The term natural uranium means uranium found in...

Uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

GAO was asked to address several questions concerning a number of proposed uranium enrichment bills introduced during the 100th Congress. The bill would have restructured the Department of Energy's uranium enrichment program as a government corporation to allow it to compete more effectively in the domestic and international markets. Some of GAO's findings discussed are: uranium market experts believe and existing market models show that the proposed DOE purchase of a $750 million of uranium from domestic producers may not significantly increase production because of large producer-held inventories; excess uranium enrichment production capacity exists throughout the world; therefore, foreign producers are expected to compete heavily in the United States throughout the 1990s as utilities' contracts with DOE expire; and according to a 1988 agreement between DOE's Offices of Nuclear Energy and Defense Programs, enrichment decommissioning costs, estimated to total $3.6 billion for planning purposes, will be shared by the commercial enrichment program and the government

Ion-induced gammas for photofission interrogation of HEU.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Doyle, Barney Lee (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM); Antolak, Arlyn J.; Morse, Daniel H.; Provencio, Paula Polyak (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM)

2006-03-01

High-energy photons and neutrons can be used to actively interrogate for heavily shielded special nuclear material (SNM), such as HEU (highly enriched uranium), by detecting prompt and/or delayed induced fission signatures. In this work, we explore the underlying physics for a new type of photon source that generates high fluxes of mono-energetic gamma-rays from low-energy (<500 keV) proton-induced nuclear reactions. The characteristic energies (4- to 18-MeV) of the gamma-rays coincide with the peak of the photonuclear cross section. The source could be designed to produce gamma-rays of certain selected energies, thereby improving the probability of detecting shielded HEU or providing a capability to determine enrichment inside sealed containers. The fundamental physics of such an interrogation source were studied in this LDRD through scaled ion accelerator experiments and radiation transport modeling. The data were used to assess gamma and neutron yields, background, and photofission-induced signal levels from several (p,{gamma}) target materials under consideration.

Calibration Tools for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Oxide and Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide with a Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mount, M; O'Connell, W; Cochran, C; Rinard, P

2003-01-01

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has completed an extensive effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler (Canberra Model JCC-92) for accountability measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide and HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. Earlier papers described the PAN shuffler calibration over a range of item properties by standards measurements and an extensive series of detailed simulation calculations. With a single normalization factor, the simulations agree with the HEU oxide standards measurements to within ±1.2% at one standard deviation. Measurement errors on mixed U-Pu oxide samples are in the ±2% to ±10% range, or ±20 g for the smaller items. The purpose of this paper is to facilitate transfer of the LLNL procedure and calibration algorithms to external users who possess an identical, or equivalent, PAN shuffler. Steps include (1) measurement of HEU standards or working reference materials (WRMs); (2) MCNP simulation calculations for the standards or WRMs and a range of possible masses in the same containers; (3) a normalization of the calibration algorithms using the standard or WRM measurements to account for differences in the 252 Cf source strength, the delayed-neutron nuclear data, effects of the irradiation protocol, and detector efficiency; and (4) a verification of the simulation series trends against like LLNL results. Tools include EXCEL/Visual Basic programs which pre- and post-process the simulations, control the normalization, and embody the calibration algorithms

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Oxide blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for commercial use

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-09-01

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the oxide blending HEU disposition option. This option provides for a yearly HEU throughput of 1 0 metric tons (MT) of uranium metal with an average U235 assay of 50% blended with 165 MT of natural assay triuranium octoxide (U 3 O 8 ) per year to produce 177 MT of 4% U235 assay U 3 O 8 , for LWR fuel. Since HEU exists in a variety of forms and not necessarily in the form to be blended, worst case scenarios for preprocessing prior to blending will be assumed for HEU feed streams

Uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rae, H.K.; Melvin, J.G.

1988-06-01

Canada is the world's largest producer and exporter of uranium, most of which is enriched elsewhere for use as fuel in LWRs. The feasibility of a Canadian uranium-enrichment enterprise is therefore a perennial question. Recent developments in uranium-enrichment technology, and their likely impacts on separative work supply and demand, suggest an opportunity window for Canadian entry into this international market. The Canadian opportunity results from three particular impacts of the new technologies: 1) the bulk of the world's uranium-enrichment capacity is in gaseous diffusion plants which, because of their large requirements for electricity (more than 2000 kW·h per SWU), are vulnerable to competition from the new processes; 2) the decline in enrichment costs increases the economic incentive for the use of slightly-enriched uranium (SEU) fuel in CANDU reactors, thus creating a potential Canadian market; and 3) the new processes allow economic operation on a much smaller scale, which drastically reduces the investment required for market entry and is comparable with the potential Canadian SEU requirement. The opportunity is not open-ended. By the end of the century the enrichment supply industry will have adapted to the new processes and long-term customer/supplier relationships will have been established. In order to seize the opportunity, Canada must become a credible supplier during this century

The Y-12 National Security Complex Foreign Research Reactor Uranium Supply Production

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nelson, T. [Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation Programs, B and W Y-12, L.L.C., Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States); Keller, A.P. [Disposition and Supply Programs, B and W Y-12, L.L.C., Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

2011-07-01

The Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Uranium Supply Program at the Y-12 National Security Complex supports the nonproliferation objectives of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) HEU Disposition, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), and the United States (U.S.) FRR Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Programs. The FRR Supply Program supports the important U.S. government nuclear nonproliferation commitment to serve as a reliable and cost-effective uranium supplier for those foreign research reactors that are converting or have converted to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel under the RERTR Program. The NNSA Y-12 Site Office maintains the prime contracts with foreign government agencies for the supply of LEU for their research reactors. The LEU is produced by down blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that has been declared surplus to the U.S. national defense needs. The down blending and sale of the LEU supports the Surplus HEU Disposition Program Record of Decision to make the HEU non-weapons usable and to recover the economic value of the uranium to the extent feasible. In addition to uranium metal feedstock for fuel fabrication, Y-12 can produce LEU in different forms to support new fuel development or target fabrication for medical isotope production. With production improvements and efficient delivery preparations, Y-12 continues to successfully support the global research reactor community. (author)

Derived enriched uranium market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rutkowski, E.

1996-01-01

The potential impact on the uranium market of highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapons dismantling in the Russian Federation and the USA is analyzed. Uranium supply, conversion, and enrichment factors are outlined for each country; inventories are also listed. The enrichment component and conversion components are expected to cause little disruption to uranium markets. The uranium component of Russian derived enriched uranium hexafluoride is unresolved; US legislation places constraints on its introduction into the US market

HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UNH blending alternative to produce LEU UNH for commercial use

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-09-01

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. The nuclear material is converted to a form that is more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UNH blending HEU disposition option. Process requirements, resource needs, employment needs, waste/emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed.

Automated instruments for in-line accounting of highly enriched uranium at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Russo, P.A.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Sandford, E.L.; Stephens, M.M.; Brumfield, T.L.; Smith, S.E.; McCullough, E.E.; Jeter, I.W.; Bowers, G.L.

1985-02-01

Two automated nondestructive assay instruments developed at Los Alamos in support of nuclear materials accounting needs are currently operating in-line at the Oak Ridge Y-12 facility for recovery of highly enriched uranium (HEU). One instrument provides the HEU inventory in the secondary solvent extraction system, and the other monitors HEU concentration in the secondary intermediate evaporator. Both instruments were installed in December 1982. Operational evaluation of these instruments was a joint effort of Y-12 and Los Alamos personnel. This evaluation included comparison of the solvent extraction system inventories with direct measurements performed on the dumped solution components of the solvent extraction system and comparison of concentration assay results with the external assays of samples withdrawn from the process. The function and design of the instruments and detailed results of the operational evaluation are reported

Impact of the use of low or medium enriched uranium on the masses of space nuclear reactor power systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-12-01

The design process for determining the mass increase for the substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for high-enriched uranium (HEU) in space nuclear reactor systems is an optimization process which must simultaneously consider several variables. This process becomes more complex whenever the reactor core operates on an in-core thermionic power conversion, in which the fissioning of the nuclear fuel is used to directly heat thermionic emitters, with the subsequent elimination of external power conversion equipment. The increased complexity of the optimization process for this type of system is reflected in the work reported herein, where considerably more information has been developed for the moderated in-core thermionic reactors

Uranium enrichment plans

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gagne, R.W.; Thomas, D.C.

1977-01-01

The status of existing uranium enrichment contracts in the US is reviewed and expected natural uranium requirements for existing domestic uranium enrichment contracts are evaluated. Uncertainty in natural uranium requirements associated with requirements-type and fixed-commitment type contracts is discussed along with implementation of variable tails assay

Study on usage of low enriched uranium Russian type fuel elements for design of an experimental ADS research reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, M.P.

2005-01-01

Conceptual design of an accelerator driven sub-critical experimental research reactor (ADSRR) was initiated in 1999 at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Serbia and Montenegro. Initial results of neutronic analyses of the proposed ADSRR-H were carried out by Monte Carlo based codes and available high-enriched uranium dioxide (HEU) dispersed Russian type TVR-S fuel elements (FE) placed in a lead matrix. Beam of charged particles (proton or deuteron) would be extracted from the high-energy channel H5B of the VINCY cyclotron of the TESLA Accelerator Installation. In 2002, the Vinca Institute has, in compliance with the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, returned fresh HEU TVR-S type FEs back to the Russian Federation. Since usage of HEU FEs in research reactors is not further recommended, a new study of an ADSRR-L conceptual design has initiated in Vinca Institute in last two years, based on assumed availability of low-enriched uranium (LEU) dispersed type TVR-S FEs. Initial results of numerical simulations of this new ADSRR-L, published for the first time in this paper, shows that such a small low neutron flux system can be used as an experimental - 'demonstration' - ADS with neutron characteristics similar to proposed well-known lead moderated and cooled power sub-critical ADS with intermediate neutron spectrum. Neutron spectrum characteristics of the ADSRR-L are compared to ones of the ADSRR-H with the same mass (7.7 g) of 235 U nuclide per TVR-S FE. (author)

Development of long-life low enrichment fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gietzen, A.J.; West, G.B.

1978-01-01

With only a few exceptions, TRIGA reactors have always used low-enriched-uranium (LEU) fuel with an enrichment of 19.9%. The exceptions have either been converted from the standard low-enriched fuel to the 70% enriched FLIP fuel in order to achieve extended lifetime, or are higher powered reactors which were designed for long life using 93%-enriched uranium during the time when the use and export of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was not restricted. The advent of international policies focusing attention on non-proliferation and safeguards made the HEU fuels obsolete. General Atomic immediately undertook a development effort (nearly two years ago) in order to be in a position to comply with these policies for all future export sales and also to provide a low-enriched alternative to fully enriched plate-type fuels. This important work was subsequently partially supported by the U. S. Department of Energy. The laboratory and production tests have shown that higher uranium densities can be achieved to compensate for reducing the enrichment to 20%, and that the fuels maintain the characteristics of the very thoroughly proven standard TRIGA fuels. In May of this year, General Atomic announced that these fuels were available for TRIGA reactors and for plate-type reactors with power levels up to 15 MW with GA's standard commercial warranty

Foreign research reactor uranium supply program: The Y-12 national security complex process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nelson, T.; Eddy, B.G.

2010-01-01

The Foreign Research Reactor (FRR) Uranium Supply Program at the Y-12 National Security Complex supports the nonproliferation objectives of the HEU Disposition Program, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, and the United States FRR Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Acceptance Program. The Y-12 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 Site Office maintains the prime contracts with foreign governments for the supply of Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) for their research reactors. The LEU is produced by down blending Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) that has been declared surplus to the U.S. national defense needs. The down blending and sale of the LEU supports the Surplus HEU Disposition Program Record of Decision to make the HEU non-weapons usable and to recover the economic value of the uranium to the extent feasible. This program supports the important U.S. government and nuclear nonproliferation commitment to serve as a reliable and cost-effective uranium supplier for those foreign research reactors that are converting or have converted to LEU fuel under the guidance of the NNSA RERTR Program. In conjunction with the FRR SNF Acceptance Program which supports the global nonproliferation efforts to disposition U.S.-origin HEU, the Y-12 FRR Uranium Supply Program can provide the LEU for the replacement fuel fabrication. In addition to feedstock for fuel fabrication, Y-12 supplies LEU for target fabrication for medical isotope production. The Y-12 process uses supply forecasting tools, production improvements and efficient delivery preparations to successfully support the global research reactor community

Irradiation tests of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Suripto, A.; Nasution, H.; Lufti-Amin, D.; Gogo, A.

1996-01-01

Most of the world's supply of 99 mTc for medical purposes is currently produced from the decay of 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high-enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) metal foils for the HEU UO 2 used in current target designs will allow equivalent 99 Mo yields with little change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal for uranium alloy and aluminide in other target designs will also allow the conversion of HEU to LEU. Several uranium-metal-foil targets have been fabricated at ANL and irradiated to prototypic burnup in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor. Postirradiation examination of the initial test indicated that design modifications were required to allow the irradiated foil to be removed for chemical processing. The latest test has shown good irradiation behavior, satisfactory dismantling and foil removal when the U-foil is separated from its containment by metallic, fission-recoil absorbing barriers. (author)

Irradiation tests of 99Mo isotope production targets employing uranium metal foils

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hofman, G.L.; Wiencek, T.C.; Wood, E.L.; Snelgrove, J.L.; Suripto, A.; Nasution, H.; Lufti-Amin, D.; Gogo, A.

1996-01-01

Most of the world's supply of 99m Tc for medical purposes is currently produced form the decay of 99 Mo derived from the fissioning of high-enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low-enriched uranium (LEU) metal foils for the HEU UO 2 used in current target designs will allow equivalent 99 Mo yields with little change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal for uranium alloy and aluminide in other target designs will also allow the conversion of HEU to LEU. Several uranium-metal-foil targets have been fabricated at ANL and irradiated to prototypic burnup in the Indonesian RSG-GAS reactor. Postirradiation examination of the initial test indicated that design modifications were required to allow the irradiated foil to be removed for chemical processing. The latest test has shown good irradiation behavior, satisfactory dismantling and foil removal when the U-foil is separated from its containment by metallic, fission-recoil absorbing barriers

HEU to LEU conversion and blending facility: Oxide blending alternative to produce LEU oxide for commercial use

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-09-01

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is examining options for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials. Disposition is a process of use or disposal of material that results in the material being converted to a form that is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the oxide blending HEU disposition option. This option provides for a yearly HEU throughput of 1 0 metric tons (MT) of uranium metal with an average U235 assay of 50% blended with 165 MT of natural assay triuranium octoxide (U{sub 3} O{sub 8}) per year to produce 177 MT of 4% U235 assay U{sub 3} O{sub 8}, for LWR fuel. Since HEU exists in a variety of forms and not necessarily in the form to be blended, worst case scenarios for preprocessing prior to blending will be assumed for HEU feed streams.

Design Study for a Low-enriched Uranium Core for the High Flux Isotope Reactor, Annual Report for FY 2007

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Primm, Trent [ORNL; Ellis, Ronald James [ORNL; Gehin, Jess C [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Miller, James Henry [ORNL; Sease, John D [ORNL

2007-11-01

This report documents progress made during fiscal year 2007 in studies of converting the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched uranium fuel (LEU). Conversion from HEU to LEU will require a change in fuel form from uranium oxide to a uranium-molybdenum alloy. A high volume fraction U/Mo-in-Al fuel could attain the same neutron flux performance as with the current, HEU fuel but materials considerations appear to preclude production and irradiation of such a fuel. A diffusion barrier would be required if Al is to be retained as the interstitial medium and the additional volume required for this barrier would degrade performance. Attaining the high volume fraction (55 wt. %) of U/Mo assumed in the computational study while maintaining the current fuel plate acceptance level at the fuel manufacturer is unlikely, i.e. no increase in the percentage of plates rejected for non-compliance with the fuel specification. Substitution of a zirconium alloy for Al would significantly increase the weight of the fuel element, the cost of the fuel element, and introduce an as-yet untried manufacturing process. A monolithic U-10Mo foil is the choice of LEU fuel for HFIR. Preliminary calculations indicate that with a modest increase in reactor power, the flux performance of the reactor can be maintained at the current level. A linearly-graded, radial fuel thickness profile is preferred to the arched profile currently used in HEU fuel because the LEU fuel media is a metal alloy foil rather than a powder. Developments in analysis capability and nuclear data processing techniques are underway with the goal of verifying the preliminary calculations of LEU flux performance. A conceptual study of the operational cost of an LEU fuel fabrication facility yielded the conclusion that the annual fuel cost to the HFIR would increase significantly from the current, HEU fuel cycle. Though manufacturing can be accomplished with existing technology

TRIGA low enrichment fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gietzen, A.

1993-01-01

Sixty TRIGA reactors have been sold and the earliest of these are now passing twenty years of operation. All of these reactors use the uranium zirconium hydride fuel (UZrH) which provides certain unique advantages arising out of its large prompt negative temperature coefficient, very low fission product release, and high temperature capability. Eleven of these Sixty reactors are conversions from plate fuel to TRIGA fuel which were made as a result of these advantages. With only a few exceptions, TRIGA reactors have always used low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel with an enrichment of 19.9%. The exceptions have either been converted from the standard low-enriched fuel to the 70% enriched FLIP fuel in order to achieve extended lifetime, or are higher powered reactors which were designed for long life using 93%-enriched uranium during the time when the use and export of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was not restricted. The advent of international policies focusing attention on nonproliferation and safeguards made the HEU fuels obsolete. General Atomic immediately undertook a development effort (nearly two years ago) in order to be in a position to comply with these policies for all future export sales and also to provide a low-enriched alternative to fully enriched plate-type fuels. This important work was subsequently partially supported by the U.S. Department of Energy. The laboratory and production tests have shown that higher uranium densities can be achieved to compensate for reducing the enrichment to 20%, and that the fuels maintain the characteristics of the very thoroughly proven standard TRIGA fuels. In May of 1978, General Atomic announced that these fuels were available for TRIGA reactors and for plate-type reactors with power levels up to 15 MW with General Atomic's standard commercial warranty

TRIGA low enrichment fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gietzen, A.

1993-01-01

Sixty TRIGA reactors have been sold and the earliest of these are now passing twenty years of operation. All of these reactors use the uranium-zirconium hydride fuel (UZrH) which provides certain unique advantages arising out of its large prompt negative temperature coefficient, very low fission product release, and high temperature capability. Eleven of these Sixty reactors are conversions from plate fuel to TRIGA fuel which were made as a result of these advantages. With only a few exceptions, TRIGA reactors have always used low-enriched-uranium (LEU) fuel with an enrichment of 19.9%. The exceptions have either been converted from the standard low-enriched fuel to the 70% enriched FLIP fuel in order to achieve extended lifetime, or are higher powered reactors which were designed for long life using 93%-enriched uranium during the time when the use and export of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was not restricted. The advent of international policies focusing attention on nonproliferation and safeguards made the HEU fuels obsolete. General Atomic immediately undertook a development effort (nearly two years ago) in order to be in a position to comply with these policies for all future export sales and also to provide a low-enriched alternative to fully enriched plate-type fuels. This important work was subsequently partially supported by the U.S. Department of Energy. The laboratory and production tests have shown that higher uranium densities can be achieved to compensate for reducing the enrichment to 20%, and that the fuels maintain the characteristics of the very thoroughly proven standard TRIGA fuels. In May of 1978, General Atomic announced that these fuels were available for TRIGA reactors and for plate-type reactors with power levels up to 15 MW with GA's standard commercial warranty

Uranium silicide activities at Babcock and Wilcox

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Noel, W.W.; Freim, J.B.

1983-01-01

Babcock and Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (NNFD) in conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is actively involved in the Reduced Enrichment Research Test Reactor (RERTR) Program to produce low enriched fuel elements for research reactors. B and W and ANL have undertaken a joint effort in which NNFD will fabricate two low enriched uranium (LEU), Oak Ridge Reactor (ORR) elements with uranium silicide fuel furnished by ANL. These elements are being fabricated for irradiation testing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Concurrently with this program, NNFD is developing and implementing the uranium silicide and uranium aluminide fuel fabrication technology. NNFD is fabricating the uranium silicide ORR elements in a two-phase program, Development and Production. To summarize: 1. Full size fuel plates can be made with U 3 SiAl but the fabricator must prevent oxidation of the compact prior to hot roll bonding; 2. Providing the ANL U 3 Si x irradiation results are successful, NNFD plans to provide two ORR elements during February 1983; 3. NNFD is developing and implementing U 3 Si x and UAI x fuel fabrication technology to be operational in 1983; 4. NNFD can supply U 3 O 8 high enriched uranium (HEU) or low enriched uranium (LEU) research reactor elements; 5. NNFD is capable of providing high quality, cost competitive LEU or HEU research reactor elements to meet the needs of the customer

HEU core conversion of Russian production reactors: a major threat to the international RERTR regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuperman, Alan J.; Leventhal, Paul L.

1998-01-01

This paper calls the attention for the major threat to the International Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, represented by the HEU core conversion of russian production reactors. This program aims to reduce and eventually eliminate international civilian commerce in nuclear weapons-usable, highly enriched uranium , and thereby significantly lower risks of the material being stolen or diverted by terrorist or states for producing nuclear weapons

Blueprint for domestic uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

The AEC advisory committee on domestic production of uranium enrichment has studied for more than a year how to achieve the domestic enrichment of uranium by the construction and operation of a commercial enriching plant using centrifugal separation method, and the report was submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission on August 18, 1980. Japan has depended wholly on overseas services for her uranium enrichment needs, but the development of domestic enrichment has been carried on in parallel. The AEC decided to construct a uranium enrichment pilot plant using centrifuges, and it has been forwarded as a national project. The plant is operated by the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. since 1979. The capacity of the plant will be raised to approximately 75 ton SWU a year. The centrifuges already operated have provided the first delivery of fuel of about 1 ton for the ATR ''Fugen''. The demand-supply balance of uranium enrichment service, the significance of the domestic enrichment of uranium, the evaluation of uranium enrichment technology, the target for domestic enrichment plan, the measures to promote domestic uranium enrichment, and the promotion of the construction of a demonstration plant are reported. (Kako, I.)

RERTR end-game: A win-win framework. Phasing out remaining global HEU commerce by conditionally and temporarily renewing U.S. exports of HEU

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kuperman, Alan J.; Leventhal, Paul L.

1997-01-01

The RERTR program stands on the brink of fulfilling its historic mission. However, a series of missteps and misunderstandings have recently raised the risk that defeat will be snatched from the jaws of victory. Perhaps the most serious threat to the RERTR regime is posed by France's pending import of 625 kilograms of bomb-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia, intended primarily to fuel its high-flux research reactor at the Institute Laue-Langevin in Grenoble, as well as its Orphee research reactor. As the first export of HEU from Russia to a facility outside the former Soviet bloc, this precedential transaction would establish Russia as a new global supplier of bomb-grade uranium, potentially setting the stage for a rise in international HEU commerce, rather than its phase-out as envisioned under the RERTR program. Apparently, France turned to Russia for supply of the fuel because the United States was perceived as unable or unwilling to continue supplying such fuel in the wake of the U.S. Energy Policy Act of 1992, which, pursuant to its so-called Schumer Amendment, places sharp restrictions on HEU exports. Unexplained delays in Russia's shipment of this material to France provide a fortuitous window of opportunity in which efforts can and should be made by France and the United States to resolve present differences in a manner beneficial to each, as well as in the interest of global security. This paper proposes an arrangement under which the United States would renew exports of HEU to France, in exchange for pledges from France enabling the export to comply with the principles and objectives of the RERTR program as embodied in U.S. law. In so doing, the arrangement would obviate the need for Russian HEU export, thereby avoiding its dangerous precedent. By enabling high quality scientific research to continue, while simultaneously helping to fulfill the RERTR program's original goal, such an arrangement would truly be a 'win-win' solution. (author)

ORSPHERE: CRITICAL, BARE, HEU(93.2)-METAL SPHERE

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Margaret A. Marshall

2013-09-01

In the early 1970’s Dr. John T. Mihalczo (team leader), J.J. Lynn, and J.R. Taylor performed experiments at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) with highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal (called Oak Ridge Alloy or ORALLOY) in an attempt to recreate GODIVA I results with greater accuracy than those performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1950’s (HEU-MET-FAST-001). The purpose of the Oak Ridge ORALLOY Sphere (ORSphere) experiments was to estimate the unreflected and unmoderated critical mass of an idealized sphere of uranium metal corrected to a density, purity, and enrichment such that it could be compared with the GODIVA I experiments. “The very accurate description of this sphere, as assembled, establishes it as an ideal benchmark for calculational methods and cross-section data files.” (Reference 1) While performing the ORSphere experiments care was taken to accurately document component dimensions (±0. 0001 in. for non-spherical parts), masses (±0.01 g), and material data The experiment was also set up to minimize the amount of structural material in the sphere proximity. A three part sphere was initially assembled with an average radius of 3.4665 in. and was then machined down to an average radius of 3.4420 in. (3.4425 in. nominal). These two spherical configurations were evaluated and judged to be acceptable benchmark experiments; however, the two experiments are highly correlated.

31 CFR 540.315 - Uranium-235 (U235).

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium-235 (U235). 540.315 Section... FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AGREEMENT ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.315 Uranium-235 (U235). The term uranium-235 or U235 means the fissile...

Promotion of uranium enrichment business

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurushima, Morihiro

1981-01-01

The Committee on Nuclear Power has studied on the basic nuclear power policy, establishing its five subcommittees, entrusted by the Ministry of Nternational Trade and Industry. The results of examination by the subcommittee on uranium enrichment business are given along with a report in this connection by the Committee. In order to establish the nuclear fuel cycle, the aspect of uranium enrichment is essential. The uranium enrichment by centrifugal process has proceeded steadily in Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. The following matters are described: the need for domestic uranium enrichment, the outlook for overseas enrichment services and the schedule for establishing domestic enrichment business, the current state of technology development, the position of the prototype enrichment plant, the course to be taken to establish enrichment business the main organization operating the prototype and commercial plants, the system of supplying centrifuges, the domestic conversion of natural uranium the subsidies for uranium enrichment business. (J.P.N.)

Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of fuel cycle programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. Reference annual mass flows and inventories for a representative 1,400 Mwe Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel cycle have been investigated for three cases: the 100 percent uranium oxide UO 2 fuel loading once through cycle, and the 33 percent mixed oxide MOX loading configuration for a first and second plutonium recycle. The analysis addresses fuel cycle developments; plutonium and uranium inventory and flow balances; nuclear fuel processing operations; UO 2 once-through and MOX first and second recycles; and the economic incentives to draw-down the excess separated plutonium stores. The preliminary analysis explores several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium arisings and HEU, and the consequences of the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments

Return of 80% highly enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, M.; Sotic, O.; Subotic, K.; Hopwood, W. Jr; Moses, S.; Wander, T.; Smirnov, A.; Kanashov, B.; Eshcherkin, A.; Efarov, S.; Olivieri, C.; Loghin, N. E.

2003-01-01

The transport of almost 50 kg of highly enriched (80%) uranium (HEU), in the form of fresh TVR-S fuel elements, from the Vin a Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Yugoslavia, to the Russian Federation for uranium reprocessing was carried out in August 2002. This act was a contribution of the Government of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible actions of terrorists against nuclear material that potentially would be usable for the production of nuclear weapons. Basic aspects of this complex operation, carried out mainly by transport teams of the Vinca Institute and of the Institute for Safe Transport of Nuclear Materials from Dimitrovgrad, Russian Federation, are described in this paper. A team of IAEA safety inspectors and experts from the DOE, USA, for transport and non-proliferation, supported the whole operation. (author)

Return of 80% highly enriched uranium fresh fuel from Yugoslavia to Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, M.; Sotic, O.; Subotic, K.; Hopwood, W. Jr; Moses, S.; Wander, T.; Smirnov, A.; Kanashov, B.; Eshcherkin, A.; Efarov, S.; Olivieri, C.; Loghin, N. E.

2003-01-01

The transport of almost 50 kg of highly enriched (80%) uranium (HEU), in the form of fresh TVR-S fuel elements, from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Yugoslavia, to the Russian Federation for uranium reprocessing was carried out in August 2002. This act was a contribution of the Government of the Federal Republics of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible actions of terrorists against nuclear material that potentially would be usable for the production of nuclear weapons. Basic aspects of this complex operation, carried out mainly by transport teams of the Vinca Institute and of the Institute for Safe Transport of Nuclear Materials from Dimitrovgrad, Russian Federation, are described in this paper. A team of IAEA safety inspectors and experts from the DOE, USA, for transport and non-proliferation, supported the whole operation. (author)

Uranium management activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jackson, D.; Marshall, E.; Sideris, T.; Vasa-Sideris, S.

2001-01-01

One of the missions of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Office (ORO) has been the management of the Department's uranium materials. This mission has been accomplished through successful integration of ORO's uranium activities with the rest of the DOE complex. Beginning in the 1980's, several of the facilities in that complex have been shut down and are in the decommissioning process. With the end of the Cold War, the shutdown of many other facilities is planned. As a result, inventories of uranium need to be removed from the Department facilities. These inventories include highly enriched uranium (HEU), low enriched uranium (LEU), normal uranium (NU), and depleted uranium (DU). The uranium materials exist in different chemical forms, including metals, oxides, solutions, and gases. Much of the uranium in these inventories is not needed to support national priorities and programs. (author)

Alternative dispositioning methods for HEU spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Krupa, J.F.; McKibben, J.M.; Parks, P.B.; DuPont, M.E.

1995-01-01

The United States has a strong policy on prevention of the international spread of nuclear weapons. This policy was announced in Presidential Directive PDD-13 and summarized in a White House press release September 27, 1993. Two cornerstones of this policy are: seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly- enriched uranium or plutonium; propose hor-ellipsis prohibiting the production of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside international safeguards. The Department of Energy is currently struggling to devise techniques that safely and efficiently dispose of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) while satisfying national non-proliferation policies. SRS plans and proposals for disposing of their SNF are safe and cost effective, and fully satisfy non-proliferation objectives

Orsphere: Physics Measurments For Bare, HEU(93.2)-Metal Sphere

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Marshall, Margaret A. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Bess, John D. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Briggs, J. Blair [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); White, Christine E. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Dyrda, James P. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Tancock, Nigel P. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Mihalczo, John [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

2015-03-01

In the early 1970s Dr. John T. Mihalczo (team leader), J.J. Lynn, and J.R. Taylor performed experiments at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) with highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal (called Oak Ridge Alloy or ORALLOY) in an attempt to recreate GODIVA I results with greater accuracy than those performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1950s (HEU-MET-FAST-001). The purpose of the Oak Ridge ORALLOY Sphere (ORSphere) experiments was to estimate the unreflected and unmoderated critical mass of an idealized sphere of uranium metal corrected to a density, purity, and enrichment such that it could be compared with the GODIVA I experiments. “The very accurate description of this sphere, as assembled, establishes it as an ideal benchmark for calculational methods and cross-section data files” (Reference 1). While performing the ORSphere experiments care was taken to accurately document component dimensions (±0.0001 inches), masses (±0.01 g), and material data. The experiment was also set up to minimize the amount of structural material in the sphere proximity. Two, correlated spheres were evaluated and judged to be acceptable as criticality benchmark experiments. This evaluation is given in HEU-MET-FAST-100. The second, smaller sphere was used for additional reactor physics measurements. Worth measurements (Reference 1, 2, 3 and 4), the delayed neutron fraction (Reference 3, 4 and 5) and surface material worth coefficient (Reference 1 and 2) are all measured and judged to be acceptable as benchmark data. The prompt neutron decay (Reference 6), relative fission density (Reference 7) and relative neutron importance (Reference 7) were measured, but are not evaluated. Information for the evaluation was compiled from References 1 through 7, the experimental logbooks 8 and 9 ; additional drawings and notes provided by the experimenter; and communication with the lead experimenter, John T. Mihalczo.

On the importance of ending the use of HEU in the nuclear fuel cycle: An updated assessment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glaser, Alexander; Hippel, Frank von

2002-01-01

The events of September 2001 have created a renewed urgency with regard to the disposition and future use and management of nuclear-weapons-usable materials. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) has received particular attention because it is relatively easy to use in a nuclear weapon and therefore an obvious candidate for diversion or theft by state or nonstate actors. The role of the RERTR program in this context and its contribution to global security can hardly be overemphasized. This article reviews existing or proposed activities to reduce the threat posed by HEU, how these activities are linked to the RERTR program, and outlines the most urgent steps to be taken to approach the ultimate objective of eliminating non-weapons HEU inventories in the world. (author)

Validation of COG10 and ENDFB6R7 on the Auk Workstation for General Application to Highly Enriched Uranium Systems

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Percher, Catherine G. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2011-08-08

The COG 10 code package1 on the Auk workstation is now validated with the ENBFB6R7 neutron cross section library for general application to highly enriched uranium (HEU) systems by comparison of the calculated keffective to the expected keffective of several relevant experimental benchmarks. This validation is supplemental to the installation and verification of COG 10 on the Auk workstation2.

Development of on-line uranium enrichment monitor of gaseous UF6 for uranium enrichment plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lu Xuesheng; Liu Guorong; Jin Huimin; Zhao Yonggang; Li Jinghuai; Hao Xueyuan; Ying Bin; Yu Zhaofei

2013-01-01

An on-line enrichment monitor was developed to measure the enrichment of UF 6 , flowing through the processing pipes in uranium enrichment plant. A Nal (Tl) detector was used to measure the count rates of the 185.7 keV γ-ray emitted from 235 U, and the total quantity of uranium was determined from thermodynamic characteristics of gaseous uranium hexafluoride. The results show that the maximum relative standard deviation is less than 1% when the measurement time is 120 s or more and the pressure is more than 2 kPa in the measurement chamber. Uranium enrichment of gaseous uranium hexafluoride in the output end of cascade can be monitored continuously by using the device. It should be effective for nuclear materials accountability verifications and materials balance verification at uranium enrichment plant. (authors)

United States uranium enrichment policies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roberts, R.W.

1977-01-01

ERDA's uranium enrichment program policies governing the manner in which ERDA's enrichment complex is being operated and expanded to meet customer requirements for separative work, research and development activities directed at providing technology alternatives for future enrichment capacity, and establishing the framework for additional domestic uranium enrichment capacity to meet the domestic and foreign nuclear industry's growing demand for enrichment services are considered. The ERDA enrichment complex consists of three gaseous diffusion plants located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio. Today, these plants provide uranium enrichment services for commercial nuclear power generation. These enrichment services are provided under contracts between the Government and the utility customers. ERDA's program involves a major pilot plant cascade, and pursues an advanced isotope separation technique for the late 1980's. That the United States must develop additional domestic uranium enrichment capacity is discussed

Department of Energy HEU ES and H vulnerability assessment, Savannah River Site, Site Assessment Team report. Revision 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geddes, R.L.; Barone, A.; Shook, H.E. Varner, C.E.; Rollins, R.

1996-01-01

This report fulfills the directive issued by the Secretary of Energy on February 22, 1996 to complete a comprehensive assessment of potential vulnerabilities associated with the management of highly enriched uranium (HEU) throughout the DOE complex. In a subsequent letter instruction, the DOE-SR Field Office formally directed WSRC to conduct an assessment of the HEU materials at SRS. The term ''ES and H vulnerabilities'' is defined for the purpose of this assessment to mean conditions or weaknesses that could lead to unnecessary or increased exposure of workers or the public to radiation or to HEU-associated chemical hazards, or to the release of radioactive materials to the environment. The assessment will identify and prioritize ES and H vulnerabilities, and will serve as an information base for identifying corrective actions for the safe management of HEU. Primary facilities that hold HEU at SRS are H-Canyon, K-Reactor assembly area, K, L, and P-Reactor disassembly basins, and the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF)

HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UF6 blending alternative to produce LEU UF6 for commercial use

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-09-01

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials; the nuclear material will be converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed; blending as UF 6 to produce a UF 6 product for commercial use is one of them. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UF 6 blending HEU disposition option. Resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed

Update on Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium Oxide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mount, M.; O'Connell, W.; Cochran, C.; Rinard, P.; Dearborn, D.; Endres, E.

2002-01-01

In October of 1999, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) began an effort to calibrate the LLNL passive-active neutron (PAN) drum shuffler for measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide. A single unit of certified reference material (CRM) 149 (Uranium (93% Enriched) Oxide - U 3 O 8 Standard for Neutron Counting Measurements) was used to (1) develop a mass calibration curve for HEU oxide in the nominal range of 393 g to 3144 g 235 U, and (2) perform a detailed axial and radial mapping of the detector response over a wide region of the PAN shuffler counting chamber. Results from these efforts were reported at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 4lSt Annual Meeting in July 2000. This paper describes subsequent efforts by LLNL to use a unit of CRM 146 (Uranium Isotopic Standard for Gamma Spectrometry Measurements) in consort with Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to CRM 149 and CRM 146 units and a selected set of containers with CRM 149-equivalent U 3 O 8 to (1) extend the low range of the reported mass calibration curve to 10 g 235 U, (2) evaluate the effect of U 3 O 8 density (2.4 g/cm 3 to 4.8 g/cm 3 ) and container size (5.24 cm to 12.17 cm inside diameter and 6.35 cm to 17.72 cm inside height) on the PAN shuffler response, and (3) develop mass calibration curves for U 3 O 8 enriched to 20.1 wt% 235 U and 52.5 wt% 235 U.

Comparison Of A Neutron Kinetics Parameter For A Polyethylene Moderated Highly Enriched Uranium System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McKenzie, IV, George Espy [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Goda, Joetta Marie [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Grove, Travis Justin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Sanchez, Rene Gerardo [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-04-17

This paper examines the comparison of MCNP® code’s capability to calculate kinetics parameters effectively for a thermal system containing highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Rossi-α parameter was chosen for this examination because it is relatively easy to measure as well as easy to calculate using MCNP®’s kopts card. The Rossi-α also incorporates many other parameters of interest in nuclear kinetics most of which are more difficult to precisely measure. The comparison looks at two different nuclear data libraries for comparison to the experimental data. These libraries are ENDF/BVI (.66c) and ENDF/BVII (.80c).

Beta activity of enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nambiar, P.P.V.J.; Ramachandran, V.

1975-01-01

Use of enriched uranium as reactor fuel necessitates its handling in various forms. For purposes of planning and organising radiation protection measures in enriched uranium handling facilities, it is necessary to have a basic knowledge of the radiation status of enriched uranium systems. The theoretical variations in beta activity and energy with U 235 enrichment are presented. Depletion is considered separately. Beta activity build up is also studied for two specific enrichments, in respect of which experimental values for specific alpha activity are available. (author)

Fast critical assembly safeguards: NDA methods for highly enriched uranium. Summary report, October 1978-September 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bellinger, F.O.; Winslow, G.H.

1980-12-01

Nondestructive assay (NDA) methods, principally passive gamma measurements and active neutron interrogation, have been studied for their safeguards effectiveness and programmatic impact as tools for making inventories of highly enriched uranium fast critical assembly fuel plates. It was concluded that no NDA method is the sole answer to the safeguards problem, that each of those emphasized here has its place in an integrated safeguards system, and that each has minimum facility impact. It was found that the 185-keV area, as determined with a NaI detector, was independent of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) plate irradiation history, though the random neutron driver methods used here did not permit accurate assay of irradiated plates. Containment procedures most effective for accurate assaying were considered, and a particular geometry is recommended for active interrogation by a random driver. A model, pertinent to that geometry, which relates the effects of multiplication and self-absorption, is described. Probabilities of failing to detect that plates are missing are examined

Uranium Enrichment, an overview

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Coates, J.H.

1994-01-01

This general presentation on uranium enrichment will be followed by lectures on more specific topics including descriptions of enrichment processes and assessments of the prevailing commercial and industrial situations. I shall therefore avoid as much as possible duplications with these other lectures, and rather dwell on: some theoretical aspects of enrichment in general, underlying the differences between statistical and selective processes, a review and comparison between enrichment processes, remarks of general order regarding applications, the proliferation potential of enrichment. It is noteworthy that enrichment: may occur twice in the LWR fuel cycle: first by enriching natural uranium, second by reenriching uranium recovered from reprocessing, must meet LWR requirements, and in particular higher assays required by high burn up fuel elements, bears on the structure of the entire front part of the fuel cycle, namely in the conversion/reconversion steps only involving UF 6 for the moment. (author). tabs., figs., 4 refs

Subcritical Neutron Multiplication Measurements of HEU Using Delayed Neutrons as the Driving Source

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hollas, C.L.; Goulding, C.A.; Myers, W.L.

1999-01-01

A new method for the determination of the multiplication of highly enriched uranium systems is presented. The method uses delayed neutrons to drive the HEU system. These delayed neutrons are from fission events induced by a pulsed 14-MeV neutron source. Between pulses, neutrons are detected within a medium efficiency neutron detector using 3 He ionization tubes within polyethylene enclosures. The neutron detection times are recorded relative to the initiation of the 14-MeV neutron pulse, and subsequently analyzed with the Feynman reduced variance method to extract singles, doubles and triples neutron counting rates. Measurements have been made on a set of nested hollow spheres of 93% enriched uranium, with mass values from 3.86 kg to 21.48 kg. The singles, doubles and triples counting rates for each uranium system are compared to calculations from point kinetics models of neutron multiplicity to assign multiplication values. These multiplication values are compared to those from MC NP K-Code calculations

Performance of an active well coincidence counter for HEU samples

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferrari, Francesca; Peerani, Paolo

2010-01-01

Neutron coincidence counting is the reference NDA technique used in nuclear safeguards to measure the mass of nuclear material in samples. For high-enriched uranium (HEU) samples active neutron interrogation is generally performed and the most common device used by nuclear inspectors is the Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC). Within her master thesis at the Polytechnic of Milan, the first author performed an intensive study on the characteristics and performances of the AWCC in order to assess the 235 U mass in HEU oxide samples at the PERLA laboratory of JRC. The work has been summarised in this paper that starts with the optimisation of the use of AWCC for nuclear safeguards, describing the calibration procedure, reporting results of a series of verification measurements, summarising the performances that can be obtained with this instruments during inspections at fuel production plants and concluding with the discussion of uncertainties related to these measurements.

Present state of development of uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

The pilot plant for uranium enrichment started the operation on September 12, 1979. The pilot plant has been constructed by the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. in Ningyo Pass, Okayama Prefecture. 7000 centrifugal separators will be installed by mid 1981, and yearly production of 70 t SWU is expected. The Uranium Enrichment Committee of Japan Atomic Industrial Forum has made the proposal on the method of forwarding the development of uranium enrichment in Japan to Atomic Energy Commission and related government offices in December, 1978. This survey summarized the trends of uranium enrichment in Japan and foreign countries and the problems about nuclear non-proliferation, and provides with the reference materials. The demand and supply of uranium enrichment in the world, the present states and plans in USA, Europe, USSR and others, the demand and supply of uranium enrichment and the measures for securing it in Japan, the present state and future plan of uranium enrichment project in Japan, the international regulation of uranium enrichment, the recent policy of USA and INFCE, and the trend of the regulation of utilizing enriched uranium are described. Moreover, the concept of separation works in uranium enrichment and the various technologies of separation are explained. (Kako, I.)

HEU to LEU Conversion and Blending Facility: UF{sub 6} blending alternative to produce LEU UF{sub 6} for commercial use

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-09-01

US DOE is examining options for disposing of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials and storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials; the nuclear material will be converted to a form more proliferation- resistant than the original form. Examining options for increasing the proliferation resistance of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is part of this effort. Five technologies for blending HEU will be assessed; blending as UF{sub 6} to produce a UF{sub 6} product for commercial use is one of them. This document provides data to be used in the environmental impact analysis for the UF{sub 6} blending HEU disposition option. Resource needs, employment needs, waste and emissions from plant, hazards, accident scenarios, and intersite transportation are discussed.

Preliminary Assessment of the Impact on Reactor Vessel dpa Rates Due to Installation of a Proposed Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Core in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Daily, Charles R. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2015-10-01

An assessment of the impact on the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) reactor vessel (RV) displacements-per-atom (dpa) rates due to operations with the proposed low enriched uranium (LEU) core described by Ilas and Primm has been performed and is presented herein. The analyses documented herein support the conclusion that conversion of HFIR to low-enriched uranium (LEU) core operations using the LEU core design of Ilas and Primm will have no negative impact on HFIR RV dpa rates. Since its inception, HFIR has been operated with highly enriched uranium (HEU) cores. As part of an effort sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), conversion to LEU cores is being considered for future HFIR operations. The HFIR LEU configurations analyzed are consistent with the LEU core models used by Ilas and Primm and the HEU balance-of-plant models used by Risner and Blakeman in the latest analyses performed to support the HFIR materials surveillance program. The Risner and Blakeman analyses, as well as the studies documented herein, are the first to apply the hybrid transport methods available in the Automated Variance reduction Generator (ADVANTG) code to HFIR RV dpa rate calculations. These calculations have been performed on the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Institutional Cluster (OIC) with version 1.60 of the Monte Carlo N-Particle 5 (MCNP5) computer code.

Reducing enrichment of fuel for research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kanda, Keiji; Matsuura, Shojiro.

1980-01-01

In research reactors, highly enriched uranium (HEU) is used as fuel for their purposes of operation. However, the United States strongly required in 1977 that these HEU should be replaced by low enrichment uranium (LEU) of 20% or less, or even in unavoidable cases, it should be replaced by medium enrichment uranium (MEU). INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation) which started its activity just at that time decided to discuss this problem in the research reactor group of No. 8 sectional committee. Japan has been able to forward the work, taking a leading part in the international opinion because she has taken the countermeasures quickly. INFCE investigated the problem along the lines of policy that the possibility of reducing the degree of enrichment should be limited to the degree in which the core structures and equipments of research reactors will be modified as little as possible, and the change of fuel element geometry will be done within the permissible thermohydrodynamic capacity, and concluded that it might be possible in near future to reduce the degree of enrichment to about 45% MEU, while the reduction to 20% LEU might require considerable research, development and verification. On the other hand, the joint researches by Kyoto University and ANL (Argonne National Laboratory) and by Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and ANL are being continued. IAEA has edited the guidebook (IAEA-TECDOC-233) for reducing the degree of enrichment for developing countries. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

Fuel depletion analyses for the HEU core of GHARR-1: Part II: Fission product inventory

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anim-Sampong, S.; Akaho, E.H.K.; Boadu, H.O.; Intsiful, J.D.K.; Osae, S.

1999-01-01

The fission product isotopic inventories have been estimated for a 90.2% highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel lattice cell of the Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1) using the WIMSD/4 transport lattice code. The results indicate a gradual decrease in the Xe 135 inventory, and saturation trend for Sm 149 , Cs 134 and Cs 135 inventories as the fuel is depleted to 10,000 MWd/tU. (author)

Coordination Between the HEU Transparency Program and the Material Protection, Control and Accountability Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glaser, J.; Hernandez, J.; Dougherty, D.; Bieniawski, A.; Cahalane, P.; Mastal, E.

2000-01-01

DOE sponsored programs such as Material Protection Control and Accountability (MPC and A) and implementation of the Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Program send US personnel into Russian nuclear facilities and receive Russian representatives from these programs. While there is overlap in the Russian nuclear facilities visited by these two programs, there had not been any formal mechanism to share information between them. Recently, an MPC and A/HEU Working Group was developed to facilitate the sharing of appropriate information and to address concerns expressed by Minatom and Russian facility personnel such as US visit scheduling conflicts. This paper discusses the goals of the Working Group and ways it has helped to allow the programs to work more efficiently with the Russian facilities

Why does the need of HEU for high flux research reactors remain?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Glaeser, W.

1991-01-01

It has shown that high performance high flux reactors need an ongoing supply of highly enriched uranium. The new fuel materials in their highly enriched version offer prospective for advanced and better neutron sources vital for the future of neutron research. This is another very attractive result of the RERTR programme. One-sided restriction would only provide marginal or no values for research. If we adopt the sometimes expressed views that high enriched RERTR developed fuel should only be made available when unique benefits to mankind could be obtained, then certainly basic research at the forefront belongs to this category. HEU would only pose theoretical difficulties, if it would remain under proper safeguards and obviously this is the way to be pursued. (orig.)

Report of the Subcommittee on Domestic Uranium Enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

A report by the Subcommittee on Domestic Uranium Enrichment to the Atomic Energy Commission is described; which covers the procedure of the domestic uranium enrichment by centrifugal process up to the commercial production, reviewing the current situation in this field. Domestic uranium enrichment is important in the aspects of securing stable enrichment service, establishing sound fuel cycle, and others. As the future target, the production around the year 2000 is set at 3,000 tons SWU per year at least. The business of uranium enrichment, which is now developed in the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, is to be carried out by private enterprise. The contents are as follows: demand and supply balance of uranium enrichment service, significance of domestic uranium enrichment, evaluation of centrifugal uranium enrichment technology, the target of domestic uranium enrichment, the policy of domestic uranium enrichment promotion. (J.P.N.)

31 CFR 540.316 - Uranium enrichment.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-07-01

... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Uranium enrichment. 540.316 Section 540.316 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) OFFICE OF... REGULATIONS General Definitions § 540.316 Uranium enrichment. The term uranium enrichment means the process of...

Operation of automated NDA instruments for in-line HEU accounting at Y-12

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Russo, P.A.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Sandford, E.L.; Jeter, I.W.; McCullough, E.; Bowers, G.L.

1983-01-01

Two automated nondestructive assay instruments developed at Los Alamos in support of nuclear materials accounting needs are currently operating in-line at the Y-12 Plant for recovery of highly enriched uranium. One instrument provides the HEU inventory in the secondary solvent extraction system, and the other monitors HEU concentration in the secondary intermediate evaporator. Both instruments were installed in December 1982. Operational evaluation of these instruments has been a joint effort of Y-12 and Los Alamos. This has included comparison of the solvent extraction system inventories with direct measurement performed on the dumped solution components of the solvent extraction system, as well as comparisons of concentration assay results with the external assays of samples withdrawn from the process. The function, design, and preliminary results of the operational evaluation are reported

Prospects and problems of uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Imai, Ryukichi

1974-01-01

The problem of uranium enrichment now concerns principally peaceful nuclear power generation. With the current oil crisis, energy resources assume unprecedented importance. However, the requirements for enriched uranium vary with the vicissitude of the world situation in nuclear power generation; the enterprise of uranium enrichment is related to economic aspect. The following matters are described: dimension of enrichment problem, political factors, changes in requirements, projects in each country, and strategy of enrichment in Japan. (Mori, K.)

Getting the plutonium disposition job done: the concept of a joint-venture disposition enterprise financed by additional sales of highly enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunn, M.

1996-01-01

The paper gives an outline of a concept which has the potential to provide both substantial financing needed for disposition of plutonium from excess nuclear weapons and the long-term management structure required to implement this effort. The three most important issues were underlined. First, it is urgent to modernize security and accounting systems for all weapon-usable nuclear materials, particularly from former Soviet Union. Second, excess plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) must be brought under international monitoring to ensure irreversibility of nuclear arms reduction. Third, quick move should be done towards actual disposition of excess plutonium and HEU. Technology already exists, but the key issues are how to get finance and manage this operation, particularly given its immense scope and controversial nature. An international joint venture 'Enterprise for nuclear Security' that would build and operate plutonium disposition facilities under stringent non-proliferation controls, financed through additional sales of HEU is a potentially promising approach to addressing the most difficult issues facing the disposition problem

Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors. Proceedings of the XVIII international meeting

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2004-07-01

Almost 50 papers presented were showing the status of the national programs related to conversion of research reactor cores from highly enriched (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel elements. Design of new fuel elements (uranium silicides) and safety related calculations were dealt with taking into account fuel cycle issues, meaning spent fuel storage and transportation. A number of presentations were devoted to Mo-99 production using LEU targets.

Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors. Proceedings of the XVIII international meeting

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

Almost 50 papers presented were showing the status of the national programs related to conversion of research reactor cores from highly enriched (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel elements. Design of new fuel elements (uranium silicides) and safety related calculations were dealt with taking into account fuel cycle issues, meaning spent fuel storage and transportation. A number of presentations were devoted to Mo-99 production using LEU targets

Fuel enrichment reduction for heavy water moderated research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCulloch, D.B.

1984-01-01

Twelve heavy-water-moderated research reactors of significant power level (5 MW to 125 MW) currently operate in a number of countries, and use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Most of these reactors could in principle be converted to use uranium of lower enrichment, subject in some cases to the successful development and demonstration of new fuel materials and/or fuel element designs. It is, however, generally accepted as desirable that existing fuel element geometry be retained unaltered to minimise the capital costs and licensing difficulties associated with enrichment conversion. The high flux Australian reactor, HIFAR, at Lucas Heights, Sydney is one of 5 Dido-class reactors in the above group. It operates at 10 MW using 80% 235 U HEU fuel. Theoretical studies of neutronic, thermohydraulic and operational aspects of converting HIFAR to use fuels of reduced enrichment have been made over a period. It is concluded that with no change of fuel element geometry and no penalty in the present HEU fuel cycle burn-up performance, conversion to MEU (nominally 45% 235 U) would be feasible within the limits of current fully qualified U-Al fuel materials technology. There would be no significant, adverse effects on safety-related parameters (e.g. reactivity coefficients) and only small penalties in reactor flux. Conversion to LEU (nominally 20% 235 U) a similar basis would require that fuel materials of about 2.3 g U cm -3 be fully qualified, and would depress the in-core thermal neutron flux by about 15 per cent relative to HEU fuelling. In qualitative terms, similar conclusions would be expected to hold for a majority of the above heavy water moderated reactors. (author)

AEC determines uranium enrichment policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1992-01-01

The Advisory Committee on Uranium Enrichment of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has submitted a report to AEC chairman concerning the promotion of the introduction of advanced material, high performance centrifuges to replace conventional metallic drum centrifuges, and the development of next generation advanced centrifuges. The report also called for the postponement until around 1997 of the decision whether the development should be continued or not on atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) processes, as well as the virtual freezing of the construction of a chemical process demonstration plant. The report was approved by the AEC chairman in August. The uranium enrichment service market in the world will continue to be characterized by oversupply. The domestic situation of uranium enrichment supply-demand trend, progress of the expansion of Rokkasho enrichment plant, the trend in the development of gas centrifuge process and the basic philosophy of commercializing domestic uranium enrichment are reported. (K.I.)

Development of empirical relation for isotope of uranium in enriched uranium matrix

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Srivastava, S.K.; Vidyasagar, D.; Jha, S.K.; Tripathi, R.M.

2018-01-01

Uranium enriched in 235 U is required in commercial light water reactors to produce a controlled nuclear reaction. Enrichment allows the 235 U isotopes to be increased from 0.71% to a range between 2% to 5% depending upon requirement. The enriched uranium in the form of sintered UO 2 pellet is used for any commercially operating boiling light water reactors. The enriched uranium fuel bundle surface swipes sample is being analysed to assess the tramp uranium as a quality control parameter. It is known that the 234 U isotope also enriched along with 235 U isotope in conventional gaseous diffusion enrichment process. The information about enrichment percentage of 234 U helps to characterize isotopic properties of enriched uranium. A few reports provide the empirical equation and graphs for finding out the specific activity, activity percentage, activity ratio of 234 U isotopes for enriched uranium. Most of them have not provided the reference for the data used and their source. An attempt has been made to model the relationship between 234 U and 235 U as a function of uranium enrichment at low level

Enrichment into the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rutkowski, E.

1995-01-01

This article discusses the future of the enrichment services market into the next century. It is estimated that demand for enrichment services will reach 31 million SWU by the end of the century and remain constant for the following 10 years. The current world enrichment capacity is 44 million SWU, or some 50% ahead of the demand. This oversupply is projected to continue into the next century, but in spite of this, several suppliers are planning new enrichment facilities. HEU as a source of enriched uranium is examined. Overall, long-term prices for enrichment services are expected to decline in the coming decade

A view from the top: US enrichment Corp.'s William H. Timbers, Jr

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Giltenan, E.

1993-01-01

Nick Timbers took over as the first Transition Manager of the US Enrichment Corporation upon its founding last July 1st. Although USEC is not involved in negotiating the HEU deal, the fledgling company will be in charge of actually buying and selling the resulting LEU. Whenever the deal is finally signed. After the politics and haggling are over, it will be up to Nick Timbers to make the deal work on the global uranium market. The view from USEC is resolute. No matter what shape the final HEU deal takes, Nick Timbers promises that USEC will remain a competitive supplier of enrichment services. Timbers pledges that any extra costs associated with the HEU deal will not be passed on to customers. He took time out from his recent busy schedule to share his thoughts on HEU and its aftermath

Uranium-enriched granites in Sweden

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilson, M.R.; Aakerblom, G.

1980-01-01

Granites with uranium contents higher than normal occur in a variety of geological settings in the Swedish Precambrian, and represent a variety of granite types and ages. They may have been generated by the anatexis of continental crust or processes occurring at a much greater depth. They commonly show enrichment in F, Sn, W and/or Mo. Only in one case is an important uranium mineralization thought to be directly related to a uranium-enriched granite, while the majority of epigenetic uranium mineralizations with economic potential are related to hydrothermal processes in areas where the bedrock is regionally uranium-enhanced. (author)

Uranium enriched granites in Sweden

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilson, M.R.; Aakerblom, G.

1980-01-01

Granites with uranium contents higher than normal occur in a variety of geological settings in the Swedish Precambrian, and represent a variety of granite types and ages. They may have been generated by (1) the anatexis of continental crust (2) processes occurring at a much greater depth. They commonly show enrichement in F, Sn, W and/or Mo. Only in one case is an important uranium mineralization thought to be directly related to a uranium-enriched granite, while the majority of epigenetic uranium mineralizations with economic potential are related to hydrothermal processes in areas where the bedrock is regionally uranium-enhanced. (Authors)

An Effort to Improve Uranium Foil Target Fabrication Technology by Single Roll Method

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sim, Moon Soo; Lee, Jong Hyeon [Chungnam National University, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Chang Kyu [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2012-05-15

Technetium-99({sup 99m}Tc) is the most commonly used radioisotope in nuclear medicine for diagnostic procedures. It is produced from the decay of its parent Mo-99, which is sent to the hospital or clinic in the form of a generator. Recently, all of the major providers of Mo-99 have used high-enrichment uranium (HEU) as a target material in a research and test reactor. As a part of a nonproliferation effort, the RERTR program has investigated the production of the fission isotope Mo-99 using low-enrichment uranium(LEU) instead of HEU since 1993, a parent nuclide of {sup 99m}Tc , which is a major isotope for a medical diagnosis. As uranium foils have been produced by the conventional method on a laboratory scale by a repetitive hot-rolling method with significant problems in foil quality, productivity and economic efficiency, attention has shifted to the planar flow casting(PFC) method. In KAERI, many experiments are performed using depleted uranium(DU).

Uranium Conversion & Enrichment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Karpius, Peter Joseph [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-02-06

The isotopes of uranium that are found in nature, and hence in ‘fresh’ Yellowcake’, are not in relative proportions that are suitable for power or weapons applications. The goal of conversion then is to transform the U₃O₈ yellowcake into UF₆. Conversion and enrichment of uranium is usually required to obtain material with enough ²³⁵U to be usable as fuel in a reactor or weapon. The cost, size, and complexity of practical conversion and enrichment facilities aid in nonproliferation by design.

Critical review of uranium resources and production capability to 2020

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-08-01

This report was prepared to assess the changing uranium supply and demand situation as well as the adequacy of uranium resources and the production capability to supply uranium concentrate to meet reactor demand through 2020. Uranium production has been meeting only 50 to 60 percent of the world requirements with the balance met from sale of excess inventory offered on the market at low prices. It is generally agreed by most specialists that the end of the excess inventory is approaching. With inventory no longer able to meet the production shortfall it is necessary to significantly expand uranium production to fill an increasing share of demand. Non-production supplies of uranium, such as the blending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) warheads to produce low enriched reactor fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel, are also expected to grow in importance as a fuel source. This analysis addresses three major concerns as follows: adequacy of resources to meet projected demand; adequacy of production capability to produce the uranium; and market prices to sustain production to fill demand. This analysis indicates uranium mine production to be the primary supply providing about 76 to 78 percent of cumulative needs through 2020. Alternative sources supplying the balance, in order of relative importance are: (1) low enriched uranium (LEU) blended from 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) Russian weapons, plus initial US Department of Energy (US DOE) stockpile sales (11 to 13%); (2) reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (6%) and; (3) utility and Russian stockpiles. Further this report gives uranium production profiles by countries: CIS producers (Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) and other producers (Australia, Canada, China, Gabon, Mongolia, Namibia, Niger, South Africa, United States of America)

Transition from HEU to LEU fuel in Romania's 14-MW TRIGA reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bretscher, M.M.; Snelgrove, J.L.

1995-01-01

The 14-MW TRIGA steady state reactor (SSR) located in Pitesti, Romania, first went critical in the fall of 1979. Initially, the core configuration for full power operation used 29 fuel clusters each containing a 5 x 5 square array of HEU U (10 wt% - ZrH - Er 2.8 wt%) fuel-moderator rods (1.295 cm o.d.) clad in Incoloy. With a total inventory of 35 HEU fuel clusters, burnup, considerations required a gradual expansion of the core from 29 to 32 and finally to 35 clusters before the reactor was shut down because of insufficient excess reactivity. At this time each of the original 29 fuel clusters had an average 235 U burnup in the range from 50 to 62%. Because of the U.S. policy regarding the export of highly enriched uranium, fresh HEU TRIGA replacement fuel is not available. After a number of safety-related measurements, the SSR is expected to resume full power operation in the near future using a mixed core containing five LEU TRIGA clusters of the same geometry as the original fuel but with fuel-moderator rods containing 45 wt% U (19.7% 235 U enrichment) and 1.1 wt% Er. Rods for 14 additional LEU fuel clusters will be fabricated by General Atomics. In support of the SSR mixed core operation numerous neutronic calculations have been performed. This paper presents some of the results of those calculations. (author)

Neutronic calculations for the conversion of the University of Florida Training Reactor from HEU to LEU fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dugan, E.T.; Diaz, N.J.; Kniedler, G.S.

1983-01-01

The University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) is located on the University of Florida campus in Gainesville, Florida. The reactor is the Argonaut type, heterogeneous in design and currently fueled with 93% enriched, uranium-aluminum alloy MTR plate-type fuel. Investigations are being performed to examine te feasibility of replacing the highly-enriched fuel of the current UFTR with 4.8% enriched, cylindrical pin SPERT fuel. The SPERT fuel is stainless steel clad and contains uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) pellets. On a broad spectrum, training reactor conversion from high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU) fueled facilities has been a continuing concern in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and significant work has been done in this area by the Argonne RERTR Program. The International Atomic Energy Agency cites three reasons for reactor conversion to low-enriched uranium. The main reason is the desire to reduce the proliferation potential of research reactor fuels. The second is to increase the assurance of continued fuel availability in the face of probable restrictions on the supply of highly-enriched uranium. The third reason is the possible reduction in requirements for physical security measures during fabrication, transportation, storage and use. This same IAEA report points out that the three reasons stated for the conversion of the fuel of research reactors are interrelated and cannot be considered individually. The concerns of the Nuclear Engineering Sciences Department at the University of Florida relating to the HEU fuel of the UFTR coincide with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The primary reason for going to low-enriched pin-type fuel is the concern with proliferation provoked by the highly-enriched plate fuel which has led to tighter security of nuclear facilities such as the UFTR. A second reason for changing to the pin-type fuel is because of difficulties that are being encountered in the supply of the

Neutronic calculations for the conversion of the University of Florida Training Reactor from HEU to LEU fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dugan, E T; Diaz, N J [Department of Nuclear Engineering Sciences, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL (United States); Kniedler, G S [Reactor Analysis Group, TVA, Chattanooga, TN (United States)

1983-09-01

The University of Florida Training Reactor (UFTR) is located on the University of Florida campus in Gainesville, Florida. The reactor is the Argonaut type, heterogeneous in design and currently fueled with 93% enriched, uranium-aluminum alloy MTR plate-type fuel. Investigations are being performed to examine te feasibility of replacing the highly-enriched fuel of the current UFTR with 4.8% enriched, cylindrical pin SPERT fuel. The SPERT fuel is stainless steel clad and contains uranium dioxide (UO{sub 2}) pellets. On a broad spectrum, training reactor conversion from high enrichment uranium (HEU) to low enrichment uranium (LEU) fueled facilities has been a continuing concern in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and significant work has been done in this area by the Argonne RERTR Program. The International Atomic Energy Agency cites three reasons for reactor conversion to low-enriched uranium. The main reason is the desire to reduce the proliferation potential of research reactor fuels. The second is to increase the assurance of continued fuel availability in the face of probable restrictions on the supply of highly-enriched uranium. The third reason is the possible reduction in requirements for physical security measures during fabrication, transportation, storage and use. This same IAEA report points out that the three reasons stated for the conversion of the fuel of research reactors are interrelated and cannot be considered individually. The concerns of the Nuclear Engineering Sciences Department at the University of Florida relating to the HEU fuel of the UFTR coincide with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The primary reason for going to low-enriched pin-type fuel is the concern with proliferation provoked by the highly-enriched plate fuel which has led to tighter security of nuclear facilities such as the UFTR. A second reason for changing to the pin-type fuel is because of difficulties that are being encountered in the supply of

Civilian inventories of plutonium and highly enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Albright, D.

1987-01-01

In the future, commercial laser isotope enrichment technologies, currently under development, could make it easier for national to produce highly enriched uranium secretly. The head of a US firm that is developing a laser enrichment process predicts that in twenty years, major utilities and small countries will have relatively small, on-site, laser-based uranium enrichment facilities. Although these plants will be designed for the production of low enriched uranium, they could be modified to produce highly enriched uranium, an option that raises the possibility of countries producing highly enriched uranium in small, easily hidden facilities. Against this background, most of this report describes the current and future quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the world, their forms, the facilities in which they are produced, stored, and used, and the extent to which they are transported. 5 figures, 10 tables

Uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-08-01

This paper reports that in 1990 the Department of Energy began a two-year project to illustrate the technical and economic feasibility of a new uranium enrichment technology-the atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) process. GAO believes that completing the AVLIS demonstration project will provide valuable information about the technical viability and cost of building an AVLIS plant and will keep future plant construction options open. However, Congress should be aware that DOE still needs to adequately demonstrate AVLIS with full-scale equipment and develop convincing cost projects. Program activities, such as the plant-licensing process, that must be completed before a plant is built, could take many years. Further, an updated and expanded uranium enrichment analysis will be needed before any decision is made about building an AVLIS plant. GAO, which has long supported legislation that would restructure DOE's uranium enrichment program as a government corporation, encourages DOE's goal of transferring AVLIS to the corporation. This could reduce the government's financial risk and help ensure that the decision to build an AVLIS plant is based on commercial concerns. DOE, however, has no alternative plans should the government corporation not be formed. Further, by curtailing a planned public access program, which would have given private firms an opportunity to learn about the technology during the demonstration project, DOE may limit its ability to transfer AVLIS to the private sector

Uranium enrichment in the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hill, J.H.; Parks, J.W.

1975-01-01

History, improvement programs, status of electrical power availability, demands for uranium enrichment, operating plan for the U. S. enriching facilities, working inventory of enriched uranium, possible factors affecting deviations in the operating plan, status of gaseous diffusion technology, status of U. S. gas centrifuge advances, transfer of enrichment technology, gaseous diffusion--gas centrifuge comparison, new enrichment capacity, U. S. separative work pricing, and investment in nuclear energy are discussed. (LK)

Uranium enrichment. Enrichment processes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Alexandre, M.; Quaegebeur, J.P.

2009-01-01

Despite the remarkable progresses made in the diversity and the efficiency of the different uranium enrichment processes, only two industrial processes remain today which satisfy all of enriched uranium needs: the gaseous diffusion and the centrifugation. This article describes both processes and some others still at the demonstration or at the laboratory stage of development: 1 - general considerations; 2 - gaseous diffusion: physical principles, implementation, utilisation in the world; 3 - centrifugation: principles, elementary separation factor, flows inside a centrifuge, modeling of separation efficiencies, mechanical design, types of industrial centrifuges, realisation of cascades, main characteristics of the centrifugation process; 4 - aerodynamic processes: vortex process, nozzle process; 5 - chemical exchange separation processes: Japanese ASAHI process, French CHEMEX process; 6 - laser-based processes: SILVA process, SILMO process; 7 - electromagnetic and ionic processes: mass spectrometer and calutron, ion cyclotron resonance, rotating plasmas; 8 - thermal diffusion; 9 - conclusion. (J.S.)

U.S. forms uranium enrichment corporation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seltzer, R.

1993-01-01

After almost 40 years of operation, the federal government is withdrawing from the uranium enrichment business. On July 1, the Department of Energy turned over to a new government-owned entity--the US Enrichment Corp. (USEC)--both the DOE enrichment plants at Paducah, Ky., and Portsmouth, Ohio, and domestic and international marketing of enriched uranium from them. Pushed by the inability of DOE's enrichment operations to meet foreign competition, Congress established USEC under the National Energy Policy Act of 1992, envisioning the new corporation as the first step to full privatization. With gross revenues of $1.5 billion in fiscal 1992, USEC would rank 275th on the Fortune 500 list of top US companies. USEC will lease from DOE the Paducah and Portsmouth facilities, built in the early 1950s, which use the gaseous diffusion process for uranium enrichment. USEC's stock is held by the US Treasury, to which it will pay annual dividends. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, which has operated Paducah since 1984 and Portsmouth since 1986 for DOE, will continue to operate both plants for USEC. Closing one of the two facilities will be studied, especially in light of a 40% world surplus of capacity over demand. USEC also will consider other nuclear-fuel-related ventures. USEC will produce only low-enriched uranium, not weapons-grade material. Indeed, USEC will implement a contract now being completed under which the US will purchase weapons-grade uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons and convert it into low-enriched uranium for power reactor fuel

Preliminary Accident Analyses for Conversion of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) from Highly Enriched to Low Enriched Uranium

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dunn, Floyd E. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Olson, Arne P. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Wilson, Erik H. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Sun, Kaichao S. [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Newton, Jr., Thomas H. [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States); Hu, Lin-wen [Massachusetts Inst. of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA (United States)

2013-09-30

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR-II) is a research reactor in Cambridge, Massachusetts designed primarily for experiments using neutron beam and in-core irradiation facilities. It delivers a neutron flux comparable to current LWR power reactors in a compact 6 MW core using Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel. In the framework of its non-proliferation policies, the international community presently aims to minimize the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. In this geopolitical context most research and test reactors, both domestic and international, have started a program of conversion to the use of LEU fuel. A new type of LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and molybdenum (U-Mo) is expected to allow the conversion of U.S. domestic high performance reactors like MITR. This report presents the preliminary accident analyses for MITR cores fueled with LEU monolithic U-Mo alloy fuel with 10 wt% Mo. Preliminary results demonstrate adequate performance, including thermal margin to expected safety limits, for the LEU accident scenarios analyzed.

Uranium enrichment techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hamdoun, N.A.

2007-01-01

This article includes an introduction about the isotopes of natural uranium, their existence and the difficulty of the separation between them. Then it goes to the details of a number of methods used to enrich uranium: Gaseous Diffusion method, Electromagnetic method, Jet method, Centrifugal method, Chemical method, Laser method and Plasma method.

Study on the radiotoxicology of enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zhu Shoupeng; Zheng Siying; Wang Guolin; Wang Chongdao; Cao Genfa

1987-12-01

A study on the retentive peculiarity of soluble enriched uranium UO 2 F 2 were observed after iv once or consecutive ip qd x 3d to Wistar male rats. The dynamic retention of radioactivity in the body showed that the enriched uranium UO 2 F 2 was chiefly localized in kidney, and then in skeleton and liver. The radioactivity of the enriched uranium UO 2 F 2 in skeleton rose steadily while the concentratoin in kidney and liver droped. When enriched uranium UO 2 F 2 was accumulated in organism, it caused chromosome aberrations on bone marrow cells. Results indicated that the chromosome aberration rates were elevated when the dose of the enriched uranium UO 2 F 2 was increased, at the same time, the cell division was depressed. Accumulation of insoluble enriched uranium U 3 O 8 in gastrointestinal tract was well described by a two exponential expression. Values of retention estimate for fast component, T 1 = 0.34 d, and for relatively long term component, T 2 = 4.05 d. The deposition of UO 2 F 2 in the intact skin was only 0.16 to 0.18% of the total contaminated UO 2 F 2 . Penetration of the enriched uranium UO 2 F 2 was dominantly increased in abraded skin. This value is about 25 to 32 times as compaired with that in intact skin. Retention of the enriched uranium UO 2 F 2 through abraded skins was dominantly localized in kidney and skeleton

HEU age determination by the activity ratio {sup 227}Th/{sup 235}U

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Li, Junjie; Zeng, Lina; Wu, Jian; Zheng, Chun; Li, Jiansheng, E-mail: lastljj@hotmail.com

2014-02-15

It is important to measure the age of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) assembly for authentication of the material in the frame of arms control inspections. A new non-destructive gamma spectrometric method for HEU age-dating is reported. This method relies on measuring the daughter/parent activity ratio {sup 227}Th/{sup 235}U by high-resolution gamma spectrometry. Only a narrow gamma range of energy of uranium from 230 keV to 242 keV will be used for analysis. The relative efficiency of every characteristic gamma ray changes in a small range because it has a near energy, which makes the results more accurate in theory. It provides a quick and reliable method for HEU age determination. Several gamma spectra of the same HEU assembly have been measured with different conditions (gain settings, distance and measurement time). When a branching ratio of 12.6% was chosen for the 235.96 keV line of {sup 227}Th, we obtained the activity ratios of (5.61 ± 0.40) × 10{sup −4}, (5.17 ± 0.39) × 10{sup −4}, (5.26 ± 0.39) × 10{sup −4}, (5.10 ± 0.35) × 10{sup −4}, (5.50 ± 0.44) × 10{sup −4} and (5.47 ± 0.42) × 10{sup −4}, respectively. These ratios correspond to ages of 52.2 ± 2.4 years, 49.7 ± 2.3 years, 50.1 ± 2.3 years, 49.3 ± 2.2 years, 51.6 ± 2.5 years and 51.5 ± 2.4 years, respectively, which are consistent with the known age of this material and the results of the U–Bi method.

Detection of uranium enrichment activities using environmental monitoring techniques

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Belew, W.L.; Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

1993-01-01

Uranium enrichment processes have the capability of producing weapons-grade material in the form of highly enriched uranium. Thus, detection of undeclared uranium enrichment activities is an international safeguards concern. The uranium separation technologies currently in use employ UF 6 gas as a separation medium, and trace quantities of enriched uranium are inevitably released to the environment from these facilities. The isotopic content of uranium in the vegetation, soil, and water near the plant site will be altered by these releases and can provide a signature for detecting the presence of enriched uranium activities. This paper discusses environmental sampling and analytical procedures that have been used for the detection of uranium enrichment facilities and possible safeguards applications of these techniques

Analysis on possible North Korea's uranium stock by using open source information

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Jung Hyun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2012-10-15

The gas centrifuge plant in Yongbyon is the only revealed uranium enrichment plant in North Korea. Yongbyon enrichment plant is believed producing only LEU below 5 percent uranium 235 for use as fuel in the LWR, as they said. But the plant could be easily converted to producing HEU for nuclear weapons. In this paper, we estimated the enrichment capability of the Yongbyon plant based on the known characteristics of its centrifuges and cascades. And then we developed the four possible uranium enrichment scenarios, to examine the future options that North Korea may use to enhance its enrichment capability. Finally, we suggested several key measures to stop North Korea from pursing its nuclear ambitions.

Long term assurance of supply of uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

After elaborating a number of key questions on uranium enrichment, the representatives of 10 countries and of the EC commission present their answers. Attention is paid to the assurance of uranium supply, to uranium enrichment, market trends and flexibility in enrichment agreements

Evaluation of the uranium enrichment demonstration plant project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sugitsue, Noritake

2001-01-01

In this report, the organization system of the uranium enrichment business is evaluated, based on the operation of the uranium enrichment demonstration plant. As a result, in uranium enrichment technology development or business, it was acknowledged that maintenance of the organization which has the Trinity of a research/engineering/operation was necessary in an industrialization stage by exceptional R and D cycle. Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (JNFL) set up the Rokkashomura Aomori Uranium Enrichment Research and Development Center in November 2000. As a result, the system that company directly engaged in engineering development was prepared. And results obtained in this place is expected toward certain establishment of the uranium enrichment business of Japan. (author)

Effect of reduced enrichment on the fuel cycle for research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Travelli, A.

1982-01-01

The new fuels developed by the RERTR Program and by other international programs for application in research reactors with reduced uranium enrichment (<20% EU) are discussed. It is shown that these fuels, combined with proper fuel-element design and fuel-management strategies, can provide at least the same core residence time as high-enrichment fuels in current use, and can frequently significantly extend it. The effect of enrichment reduction on other components of the research reactor fuel cycle, such as uranium and enrichment requirements, fuel fabrication, fuel shipment, and reprocessing are also briefly discussed with their economic implications. From a systematic comparison of HEU and LEU cores for the same reference research reactor, it is concluded that the new fuels have a potential for reducing the research reactor fuel cycle costs while reducing, at the same time, the uranium enrichment of the fuel

Current perspective of the uranium enrichment market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laughon, K.O.

1986-01-01

Over the past several years, developments in the uranium enrichment market have required the Department of Energy (DOE) to make a number of changes in the U.S. enrichment enterprise. These changes have been made to allow DOE to conduct our enrichment business so as to be more responsive to changing market forces. Needless to say, some of these changes have been difficult, but they have been necessary if they are to conduct a healthy and competitive uranium enrichment business in the United States. This paper discusses several topics, including: The Uranium Enrichment Market, Utility Services (US) Contracts, Reduced Prices, Incentive Pricing, Better Customer Services, and Advanced Technology. In addition to these topics, information is provided on the recent court action regarding the US Contracts and the viability finding on the uranium mining industry

The conversion of NRU from HEU to LEU fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sears, D.F.; Atfield, M.D.; Kennedy, I.C.

1990-01-01

The program at Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories (CRNL) to develop and test low-enriched uranium fuel (LEU, 3 Si, USiAl, USi Al and U 3 Si 2 (U-3.96 wt% Si; U-3.5 wt% Si-1.5 wt% AL; U-3.2 wt%; Si-3 wt% Al; U-7.3 wt% Si, respectively). Fuel elements were fabricated with uranium loadings suitable for NRU, 3.15 gU/cm 3 , and for NRX, 4.5 gU/cm 3 , and were irradiated under normal fuel-operating conditions. Eight experimental irradiations involving 100 mini-elements and 84 full-length elements (7X12-element rods) were completed to qualify the LEU fuel and the fabrication technology. Post irradiation examinations confirmed that the performance of the LEU fuel, and that of a medium enrichment uranium (MEU, 45% U-235) alloy fuel tested as a back-up, was comparable to the HEU fuel. The uranium silicide dispersion fuel swelling was approximately linear up to burnups exceeding NRU's design terminal burnup (80 at%). NRU was partially converted to LEU fuel when the first 31 prototype fuel rods manufactured with industrial scale production equipment were installed in the reactor. The rods were loaded in NRU at a fuelling rate of about two rods per week over the period 1988 September to December. This partial LEU core (one third of a full NRU core) has allowed the reactor engineers and physicists to evaluate the bulk effects of the LEU conversion on NRU operations. As expected, the irradiation is proceeding without incident

Uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mohrhauer, H.

1982-01-01

The separation of uranium isotopes in order to enrich the fuel for light water reactors with the light isotope U-235 is an important part of the nuclear fuel cycle. After the basic principals of isotope separation the gaseous diffusion and the centrifuge process are explained. Both these techniques are employed on an industrial scale. In addition a short review is given on other enrichment techniques which have been demonstrated at least on a laboratory scale. After some remarks on the present situation on the enrichment market the progress in the development and the industrial exploitation of the gas centrifuge process by the trinational Urenco-Centec organisation is presented. (orig.)

Some Main Results of Commissioning of the Dalat Research Reactor with Low Enriched Fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nguyen Nhi Dien; Luong Ba Vien; Pham Van Lam; Le Vinh Vinh; Huynh Ton Nghiem

2014-01-01

After completion of design calculation of the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor (DNRR) for conversion from high-enriched uranium fuel (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, the commissioning programme for DNRR with entire core loaded with LEU fuel was successfully carried out from 24 November 2011 to 13 January 2012. The experimental results obtained during the implementation of commissioning programme showed a good agreement with design calculations and affirmed that the DNRR with LEU core have met all safety and exploiting requirements. (author)

Review of uranium enrichment prospects in Canada, 1976

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Developments since 1971 which affect the prospects for uranium enrichment in Canada from the federal government point of view are reviewed. The market for enriched uranium to the year 2000 is similar to that projected in 1971. The committed enrichment capacity of the world will be sufficient until 1990. The Canadian uranium mining capability may be adequate to supply an enrichment plant, but the present reserves policy along with the currently known resources are likely to restrict exports of its products during the plant life. Prices for enriched uranium produced in Canada would be higher than those reported by other proposed new plants; however, newer enrichment techniques have some potential for cost reductions. Application of enrichment with U235 (or plutonium and U233/thorium) to CANDU offers some uranium resource conservation and possible slight power cost reductions. Construction of an enrichment plant in Canada to supply the export market is less attractive in 1976 than in 1971, but there is potential for such a business in the future. (L.L.)

Equations of state for enriched uranium and uranium alloy to 3500 MPa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bai Chaomao; Hai Yuying; Liu Jenlong; Li Zhenrong

1990-04-01

The volume compressions of 6 kinds of cast materials including enriched uranium, poor uranium, U-0.57 wt% Ti, U-0.33 wt% Nb, U-2.85 wt% Nb and U-7.5 wt% Nb-3.3 wt% Zr have been determined by monitoring piston displacements in a piston cylinder apparatus with double strengthening rings to 3500 MPa at room temperature. The dilation of the cylinder vessel and the press deformation were corrected by some experiments. The calculational data free from using the standard sample closed with used standard sample. The volume compressions of enriched uranium and poor uranium are nearly coincident. Pure uranium is more compressible than uranium alloys. These values of enriched uranium are in close agreement with values of Bridgman's pure uranium. The fitting coefficients of Bridgman's polynomial and Anderson's equation of state and isothermal bulk modules for the above materials are given

The isotopic enrichment of uranium in 1979

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baron, M.

1979-01-01

The Eurodif uranium enrichment plant built on the Tricastin site is described. The uranium isotope separation plants in service abroad are presented. The main characteristics of the international enrichment market are defined [fr

Enriched uranium recovery flowsheet improvements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Holt, D.L.

1986-01-01

Savannah River uses 7.5% TBP to recover and purify enriched uranium. Adequate decontamination from fission products is necessary to reduce personnel exposure and to ensure that the enriched uranium product meets specifications. Initial decontamination of the enriched uranium from the fission products is carried out in the 1A bank, 16 stages of mixer-settlers. Separation of the enriched uranium from the fission product, 95 Zr, has been adequate, but excessive solvent degradation caused by the long phase contact times in the mixer-settlers has limited the 95 Zr decontamination factor (DF). An experimental program is investigating the replacement of the current 1A bank with either centrifugal contactors or a combination of centrifugal contactors and mixer-settlers. Experimental work completed has compared laboratory-scale centrifugal contactors and mixer-settlers for 95 Zr removal efficiencies. Feed solutions spiked with actual plant solutions were used. The 95 Zr DF was significantly better in the mixer-settlers than in the centrifugal contactors. As a result of this experimental study, a hybrid equipment flowsheet has been proposed for plant use. The hybrid equipment flowsheet combines the advantages of both types of solvent extraction equipment. Centrifugal contactors would be utilized in the extraction and initial scrub sections, followed by additional scrub stages of mixer-settlers

Uranium enrichment. Technology, economics, capacity

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Voigt, W.R. Jr.; Saire, D.E.; Gestson, D.K.; Peske, S.E.; Vanstrum, P.R.

1983-01-01

Large-scale enrichment of uranium has now been carried out for 40 years. While the gaseous diffusion process was the original choice of several countries and continues today to provide the major component of the world production of separative work, the last two decades have witnessed the development of a number of alternative processes for enrichment. These processes, which are being studied and deployed around the world, offer a wide range of technical and economic characteristics which will be useful in assuring adequate capacity to meet projected reactor fuel market needs through the rest of this century at competitive prices. With present uncertainties in future enriched uranium needs, it is apparent that flexibility in the deployment and operation of any enrichment process will be one of the prime considerations for the future. More economical production of separative work not only can have a beneficial impact on reactor fuel costs, but also tends to conserve natural uranium resources. This paper reviews the world scene in the enrichment component of the fuel cycle, including existing or planned commercial-scale facilities and announced R+D efforts on various processes. (author)

Uranium enrichment: technology, economics, capacity

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Voigt, Jr., W. R.; Vanstrum, P. R.; Saire, D. E.; Gestson, D. K.; Peske, S. E.

1982-08-01

Large-scale enrichment of uranium has now been carried out for 40 years. While the gaseous diffusion process was the original choice of several countries and continues today to provide the major component of the world production of separative work, the last two decades have witnessed the development of a number of alternative processes for enrichment. These processes, which are being studied and deployed around the world, offer a wide range of technical and economic characteristics which will be useful in assuring adequate capacity to meet projected reactor fuel market needs through the rest of this century at competitive prices. With present uncertainties in future enriched uranium needs, it is apparent that flexibility in the deployment and operation of any enrichment process will be one of the prime considerations for the future. More economical production of separative work not only can have a beneficial impact on reactor fuel costs, but also tends to conserve natural uranium resources. This paper reviews the world scene in the enrichment component of the fuel cycle, including existing or planned commercial-scale facilities and announced R and D efforts on various processes.

Uranium enrichment: technology, economics, capacity

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Voigt, W.R. Jr.; Vanstrum, P.R.; Saire, D.E.; Gestson, D.K.; Peske, S.E.

1982-01-01

Large-scale enrichment of uranium has now been carried out for 40 years. While the gaseous diffusion process was the original choice of several countries and continues today to provide the major component of the world production of separative work, the last two decades have witnessed the development of a number of alternative processes for enrichment. These processes, which are being studied and deployed around the world, offer a wide range of technical and economic characteristics which will be useful in assuring adequate capacity to meet projected reactor fuel market needs through the rest of this century at competitive prices. With present uncertainties in future enriched uranium needs, it is apparent that flexibility in the deployment and operation of any enrichment process will be one of the prime considerations for the future. More economical production of separative work not only can have a beneficial impact on reactor fuel costs, but also tends to conserve natural uranium resources. This paper reviews the world scene in the enrichment component of the fuel cycle, including existing or planned commercial-scale facilities and announced R and D efforts on various processes

Calibration of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Passive-Active Neutron Drum Shuffler for Measurement of Highly Enriched Uranium in Oxides within DOE-STD-3013-2000 Containers

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mount, M E; O'Connell, W J

2005-01-01

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) uses the LLNL passive-active neutron drum (PAN) shuffler (Canberra Model JCC-92) for accountability measurement of highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide and HEU in mixed uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) oxide. In June 2002, at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management, LLNL reported on an extensive effort to calibrate this shuffler, based on standards measurements and extensive simulations, for HEU oxides and mixed U-Pu oxides in thin-walled primary and secondary containers. In August 2002, LLNL began to also use DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers for HEU oxide and mixed U-Pu oxide. These DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers are comprised of a stainless steel convenience can enclosed in welded stainless steel primary and secondary containers. Compared to the double thin-walled containers, the DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers have substantially thicker walls, and the density of materials in these containers was found to extend over a greater range (1.35 g/cm 3 to 4.62 g/cm 3 ) than foreseen for the double thin-walled containers. Further, the DOE-STD-3013-2000 Standard allows for oxides containing at least 30 wt% Pu plus U whereas the calibration algorithms for thin-walled containers were derived for virtually pure HEU or mixed U-Pu oxides. An initial series of Monte Carlo simulations of the PAN shuffler response to given quantities of HEU oxide and mixed U-Pu oxide in DOE-STD-3013-2000 containers was generated and compared with the response predicted by the calibration algorithms for thin-walled containers. Results showed a decrease on the order of 10% in the count rate, and hence a decrease in the calculated U mass for measured unknowns, with some varying trends versus U mass. Therefore a decision was made to develop a calibration algorithm for the PAN shuffler unique to the DOE-STD-3013-2000 container. This paper describes that effort and selected unknown item measurement results

Advances in uranium enrichment processes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rae, H.K.; Melvin, J.G.; Slater, J.B.

1986-05-01

Advances in gas centrifuges and development of the atomic vapour laser isotope separation process promise substantial reductions in the cost of enriched uranium. The resulting reduction in LWR fuel costs could seriously erode the economic advantage of CANDU, and in combination with LWR design improvements, shortened construction times and increased operational reliability could allow the LWR to overtake CANDU. CANDU's traditional advantages of neutron economy and high reliability may no longer be sufficient - this is the challenge. The responses include: combining neutron economy and dollar economy by optimizing CANDU for slightly enriched uranium fuel; developing cost-reducing improvements in design, manufacture and construction; and reducing the cost of heavy water. Technology is a renewable resource which must be continually applied to a product for it to remain competitive in the decades to come. Such innovation is a prerequisite to Canada increasing her share of the international market for nuclear power stations. The higher burn-up achievable with enriched fuel in CANDU can reduce the fuel cycle costs by 20 to 40 percent for a likely range of costs for yellowcake and separative work. Alternatively, some of the benefits of a higher fissile content can take the form of a cheaper reactor core containing fewer fuel channels and less heavy water, and needing only a single fuelling machine. An opportunity that is linked to this need to introduce an enriched uranium fuel cycle into CANDU is to build an enrichment business in Canada. This could offer greater value added to our uranium exports, security of supply for enriched CANDUs, technological growth in Canada and new employment opportunities. AECL has a study in progress to define this opportunity

Uranium enrichment plans and policies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schwennesen, J.L.

1981-01-01

Significant progress has been made in US efforts to expand its enrichment capacity. The Cascade Improvement Program (CIP) and Cascade Upgrading Program (CUP) are now complete at Oak Ridge and Paducah and almost complete at Portsmouth. Considerable progress has also been made in constructing the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP), and physical construction of the first process building is well under way. Current plans are to have two process buildings on-line by 1989 with the remaining six buildings to be added sequentially as needed to meet demand. The status of DOE enrichment services contracts is essentially unchanged from that reported at last year's seminar. The OUEA latest forecast of nuclear power growth, however, is considerably lower than reported last year, although a leveling trend is becoming apparent. The Variable Tails Assay Option (VTAO) of the AFC contract was made available for the third time for FY 1983. The DOE inventories of natural uranium still remain high. The Department of Energy will dispose of this material by using it for Government programs and for enrichment plant operations. It appears that Government inventories of uranium are adequate through at least the mid-1990s. It remains DOE policy not to dispose of its natural uranium stocks through direct sales in the marketplace, except for very small quantities or if an emergency situation would exist and all reasonable attempts had been made, without success, to obtain natural uranium from commercial sources. Finally, with regard to DOE plans on future transaction tails assays, it still appears likely that the current 0.20 percent uranium-235 reference tails assay will be maintained until well into the 1990s, at which time it might be increased up to 0.25 percent uranium-235

Some economic aspects of the low enriched uranium production

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-05-01

At the Technical Committee Meeting on Economics of Low Enriched Uranium 14 papers were presented. A separate abstract was prepared for each of these papers. The five technical sessions covered several economic aspects of uranium concentrates production, conversion into uranium hexafluoride and uranium enrichment and the recycling of U and Pu in LWR. Four Panel discussions were held to discuss the uranium market trends, the situation of conversion industry, the reprocessing and the uranium market, the future trends of enrichment and the economics of LWRs compared with other reactors. Refs, figs and tabs

Ningyo Toge uranium enrichment pilot plant comes into full

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-01-01

The uranium enrichment pilot plant of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation at Ningyo Toge went into full operation on March 26, 1982. This signifies that the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle in Japan, from uranium ore to enrichment, is only a step away from commercialization. On the same day, the pilot plant of uranium processing and conversion to UF 6 , the direct purification of uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride, began batch operation at the same works. The construction of the uranium enrichment pilot plant has been advanced in three stages: i.e. OP-1A with 1000 centrifuges, OP-1B with 3000 centrifuges and OP-2 with 3000 centrifuges. With a total of 7000 centrifuges, the pilot plant, the first enrichment plant in Japan, has now a capacity of supplying enriched uranium for six months operation of a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant. (J.P.N.)

Mixed core management: Use of 93% and 72% enriched uranium in the BR2 reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ponsard, B.

2000-01-01

The BR2 reactor, put into operation in 1963 and refurbished from July 1995 till April 1997, is a 100 MW high-flux Materials Testing Reactor, using 93% 235 U enriched uranium as standard fuel, light water as coolant and beryllium as moderator. The present operating regime consists of five irradiation cycles per year at an operating power between 50 and 70 MW; each cycle is characterized by 21 days operation. In the framework of a 'qualification programme', six 72% 235 U fuel elements fabricated with uranium recovered from the reprocessing of BR2 spent fuel at UKAEA-Dounreay have been successfully irradiated in the period 1994-1995 reaching a maximum mean burnup of 48% without the release of fission products. Since 1998, this type of fuel element is irradiated routinely together with standard 93% 235 U fuel elements in order to optimize the utilization of the available HEU inventory. The purpose of this paper is to present the strategy developed in order to optimize the mixed core management of the BR2 reactor. (author)

Uses for Uranium-233: What Should Be Kept for Future Needs?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Forsberg, C.W.; Lewis, L.C.

1999-01-01

Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been evaluating what fissile materials to keep for potential uses and what fissile materials to declare excess. There are three major fissile materials: high-enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and uranium-233 ( 233 U). Both HEU and plutonium were produced in large quantities for use in nuclear weapons and for reactor fuel. Uranium-233 was investigated for use in nuclear weapons and as a reactor fuel; however, it was never deployed in nuclear weapons or used commercially as a nuclear fuel. Uranium-233 has limited current uses, but it could have several future uses. Because of (1) the cost of storing 233 U and (2) arms control considerations, the U.S. government must decide how much of the existing 233 U inventory should be kept for future use and how much should be disposed of as waste. The objective of this report is to provide technical and economic input to make a use-or-dispose decision

NRC licensing of uranium enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moran, B.W.

1991-01-01

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is preparing a rule making that establishes the licensing requirements for low-enriched uranium enrichment plants. Although implementation of this rule making is timed to correspond with receipt of a license application for the Louisiana Energy Services centrifuge enrichment plant, the rule making is applicable to all uranium enrichment technologies. If ownership of the US gaseous diffusion plants and/or atomic vapor laser isotope separation is transferred to a private or government corporation, these plants also would be licensable under the new rule making. The Safeguards Studies Department was tasked by the NRC to provide technical assistance in support of the rule making and guidance preparation process. The initial and primary effort of this task involved the characterization of the potential safeguards concerns associated with a commercial enrichment plant, and the licensing issues associated with these concerns. The primary safeguards considerations were identified as detection of the loss of special nuclear material, detection of unauthorized production of material of low strategic significance, and detection of production of uranium enriched to >10% 235 U. The primary safeguards concerns identified were (1) large absolute limit of error associated with the material balance closing, (2) the inability to shutdown some technologies to perform a cleanout inventory of the process system, and (3) the flexibility of some technologies to produce higher enrichments. Unauthorized production scenarios were identified for some technologies that could prevent conventional material control and accounting programs from detecting the production and removal of 5 kg 235 U as highly enriched uranium. Safeguards techniques were identified to mitigate these concerns

The case for enrichment of uranium in Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

George, D.W.

1981-01-01

Information is presented on the number of nuclear power plants in operation and under construction and on the extent of the use of uranium. The case for enrichment of uranium in Australia is then considered in detail and the status of feasbility studies being carried out is discussed. Arguments to support an enrichment industry include: the need for additional enrichment capacity; added value; potential profitability; increased employment and industrial opportunities; and retention of depleted uranium

Airborne uranium, its concentration and toxicity in uranium enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thomas, J.; Mauro, J.; Ryniker, J.; Fellman, R.

1979-02-01

The release of uranium hexafluoride and its hydrolysis products into the work environment of a plant for enriching uranium by means of gas centrifuges is discussed. The maximum permissible mass and curie concentration of airborne uranium (U) is identified as a function of the enrichment level (i.e., U-235/total U), and chemical and physical form. A discussion of the chemical and radiological toxicity of uranium as a function of enrichment and chemical form is included. The toxicity of products of UF 6 hydrolysis in the atmosphere, namely, UO 2 F 2 and HF, the particle size of toxic particulate material produced from this hydrolysis, and the toxic effects of HF and other potential fluoride compounds are also discussed. Results of an investigation of known effects of humidity and temperature on particle size of UO 2 F 2 produced by the reaction of UF 6 with water vapor in the air are reported. The relationship of the solubility of uranium compounds to their toxic effects was studied. Identification and discussion of the standards potentially applicable to airborne uranium compounds in the working environment are presented. The effectiveness of High Efficiency Particulate (HEPA) filters subjected to the corrosive environment imposed by the presence of hydrogen fluoride is discussed

Comment on the contribution of S.C. Mo, N.A. Hanan and J.E. Matos: 'Comparison of the FRM-II HEU design with an alternative LEU design'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boening, K.

2004-01-01

The results of the reference paper, which came to our attention for the first time during this RERTR Meeting, are more or less consistent with neutronic data we have obtained earlier within the FRM-II project (i.e. with own calculations and extrapolations). However, a realistic comparison of the HEU design of the FR.M-II (HEU = highly enriched uranium, 93 % U-235) with an alternative LEU design (LEU = low enriched uranium, 20 % U-235) is only possible on the basis of identical assumptions on the input parameters and has to consider more than neutronic data only. Serious scientists and experts should not confuse the politicians with academic studies touching some aspects of the full story only. The comparison has shown that the performance and reliability of the FRM-II design, which uses HEU fuel, is so advantageous that it can not - not even approximately - be met by an alternative design using LEU fuel. A change of the FRM-II design from HEU to LEU fuel with the results as shown above - i.e. less performance, higher costs, more nuclear waste and higher risk potential, and all of this with a delay of at least 5 years this could never be justified. If a future development of more advanced fuels should allow us to achieve our scientific goals at the conditions as identified above also with uranium of reduced enrichment - there would be no objection to a corresponding later conversion. Activities to realize a new neutron source in Germany go back to the late 70's with the project of a new middle flux beam reactor (MSR), which was abandoned shortly later in favour of an ambitious new spallation neutron source (SNQ). After this project also having been terminated around 1985 because of too high costs and technological risks, the hopes of the German community of neutron scientists focussed on the FRM-II. If non-technical pressure would damage this project this would equally provide irreversible damage to the large and still prospering field of neutron research in Germany

Packaging and transportation of derived enriched uranium for the ''megatons to megawatts'' USA/Russia agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Darrough, E.; Ewing, L.; Ravenscroft, N.

1998-01-01

In January 1998 the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and Techsnabexport Co., Ltd (TENEX) of Russia celebrated the fourth anniversary of the signing of the 20-year contract between these two executive agents. USEC and TENEX are responsible for implementing the Government to-Government agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation for the purchase of uranium derived from dismantled nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union. This program, entitled 'Megatons to Megawatts', is the first time nuclear warheads have been turned into fuel as well as the first time a commercial contract has been used to implement such a program. As of the fourth anniversary, the equivalent of almost 1,200 nuclear warheads had been converted to fuel. USEC is responsible for making all of the arrangements to transport the Russian LEU derived from HEU--hence the term, derived enriched uranium (DEU)--from St Petersburg. Russia to the USEC plant near portsmouth, Ohio. Edlow International Company is working with USEC to implement the shipping campaign and is responsible for coordination of the port delivery within Russia, as well. The organization responsible for these shipments within Russia is IZOTOP. While the program has been a major new responsibility for USEC, the early years of the program prepared all parties for the future challenges such as increased numbers of shipments, additional originating sites in Russia and witnessing requirements in Russia. (authors)

NUCLEAR ISOTOPIC DILUTION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM BY DRY BLENDING VIA THE RM-2 MILL TECHNOLOGY

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rajamani, Raj K.; Latchireddi, Sanjeeva; Devrani, Vikas; Sethi, Harappan; Henry, Roger; Chipman, Nate

2003-01-01

DOE has initiated numerous activities to focus on identifying material management strategies to disposition various excess fissile materials. In particular the INEEL has stored 1,700 Kg of offspec HEU at INTEC in CPP-651 vault facility. Currently, the proposed strategies for dispositioning are (a) aqueous dissolution and down blending to LEU via facilities at SRS followed by shipment of the liquid LEU to NFS for fabrication into LWR fuel for the TVA reactors and (b) dilution of the HEU to 0.9% for discard as a waste stream that would no longer have a criticality or proliferation risk without being processed through some type of enrichment system. Dispositioning this inventory as a waste stream via aqueous processing at SRS has been determined to be too costly. Thus, dry blending is the only proposed disposal process for the uranium oxide materials in the CPP-651 vault. Isotopic dilution of HEU to typically less than 20% by dry blending is the key to solving the dispositioning issue (i.e., proliferation) posed by HEU stored at INEEL. RM-2 mill is a technology developed and successfully tested for producing ultra-fine particles by dry grinding. Grinding action in RM-2 mill produces a two million-fold increase in the number of particles being blended in a centrifugal field. In a previous study, the concept of achieving complete and adequate blending and mixing (i.e., no methods were identified to easily separate and concentrate one titanium compound from the other) in remarkably short processing times was successfully tested with surrogate materials (titanium dioxide and titanium mono-oxide) with different particle sizes, hardness and densities. In the current project, the RM-2 milling technology was thoroughly tested with mixtures of natural uranium oxide (NU) and depleted uranium oxide (DU) stock to prove its performance. The effects of mill operating and design variables on the blending of NU/DU oxides were evaluated. First, NU and DU both made of the same oxide

Future of uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hosmer, C.

1981-01-01

The increasing amount of separative work being done in government facilities to produce low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear utilities again raises the question: should this business-type, industrial function be burned over the private industry. The idea is being looked at by the Reagan administration, but faces problems of national security as well as from the unique nature of the business. This article suggests that a joint government-private venture combining enriching, reprocessing, and waste disposal could be the answer. Further, a separate entity using advanced laser technology to deplete existing uranium tails and lease them for fertile blankets in breeder reactors might earn substantial revenues to help reduce the national debt

Low-resolution gamma-ray measurements of uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Christiansen, A.; Cole, R.; Collins, M.L.

1996-01-01

Facilities that process special nuclear material perform periodic inventories. In bulk facilities that process low-enriched uranium, these inventories and their audits are based primarily on weight and enrichment measurements. Enrichment measurements determine the 211 U weight fraction of the uranium compound from the passive gamma-ray emissions of the sample. Both international inspectors and facility operators rely on the capability to make in-field gamma-ray measurements of uranium enrichment. These users require rapid, portable measurement capability. Some in-field measurements have been biased, forcing the inspectors to resort to high-resolution measurements or mass spectrometry to accomplish their goals

77 FR 14838 - General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC, Commercial Laser-Based Uranium Enrichment...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-03-13

... Laser Enrichment LLC, Commercial Laser-Based Uranium Enrichment Facility, Wilmington, North Carolina... a license to General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC (GLE or the applicant) to authorize construction of a laser-based uranium enrichment facility and possession and use of byproduct...

Highly Enriched Uranium Metal Cylinders Surrounded by Various Reflector Materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bernard Jones; J. Blair Briggs; Leland Monteirth

2007-01-01

A series of experiments was performed at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in 1958 to determine critical masses of cylinders of Oralloy (Oy) reflected by a number of materials. The experiments were all performed on the Comet Universal Critical Assembly Machine, and consisted of discs of highly enriched uranium (93.3 wt.% 235U) reflected by half-inch and one-inch-thick cylindrical shells of various reflector materials. The experiments were performed by members of Group N-2, particularly K. W. Gallup, G. E. Hansen, H. C. Paxton, and R. H. White. This experiment was intended to ascertain critical masses for criticality safety purposes, as well as to compare neutron transport cross sections to those obtained from danger coefficient measurements with the Topsy Oralloy-Tuballoy reflected and Godiva unreflected critical assemblies. The reflector materials examined in this series of experiments are as follows: magnesium, titanium, aluminum, graphite, mild steel, nickel, copper, cobalt, molybdenum, natural uranium, tungsten, beryllium, aluminum oxide, molybdenum carbide, and polythene (polyethylene). Also included are two special configurations of composite beryllium and iron reflectors. Analyses were performed in which uncertainty associated with six different parameters was evaluated; namely, extrapolation to the uranium critical mass, uranium density, 235U enrichment, reflector density, reflector thickness, and reflector impurities. In addition to the idealizations made by the experimenters (removal of the platen and diaphragm), two simplifications were also made to the benchmark models that resulted in a small bias and additional uncertainty. First of all, since impurities in core and reflector materials are only estimated, they are not included in the benchmark models. Secondly, the room, support structure, and other possible surrounding equipment were not included in the model. Bias values that result from these two simplifications were determined and associated

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's Return of Highly Enriched Uranium from Chile

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Messick, C.E.; Dickerson, S.L.; Greenberg, R.F. Jr. [U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington D.C. (United States); Andes, T.C. [Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2011-07-01

In March 2010, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Threat Reduction (GTRI), in collaboration with the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN), completed a shipment of 18.2 kilograms of non-U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) to the United States. The HEU was in the form of 71 aluminium-clad material test reactor (MTR) fuel elements and was the first GTRI Gap Program shipment that included non-U.S. origin irradiated nuclear fuel. Although shipments of research reactor fuels are not unique, this shipment served as a cornerstone to the first Presidential Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., in April 2010. Carrying out the shipment became critical when a severe earthquake struck Chile just one day before the shipment was to occur. As the fuel had already been packaged in casks and the ocean vessels were nearing the port, U.S. and Chilean officials decided that it was most imperative that the shipment continue as planned. After careful analysis of the situation, inspection of the transportation packages, roadways, and port services, the shipment team was able to make the shipment occur in a safe and secure manner. This paper describes the loading activities at both the RECH-1 and RECH-2 reactors as well as the transportation of the loaded casks to the port of departure. (author)

Characterization of Uranium-Bearing Material by Passive Non-Destructive Gamma Spectrometry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lakosi, L.; Zsigrai, J.; Nguyen, C.T.

2009-01-01

Characterization of nuclear materials is equally important in nuclear safeguards (inventory verification) and in nuclear security (revealing illicit trafficking). Analysis of materials is a key issue in both fields. Natural (NU), depleted (DU), low-enriched (LEU), and high-enriched uranium (HEU) samples were analysed by high resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS). Isotopic composition and total U-content of reactor fuel pellets and powder were determined. A unique HRGS method was developed for the first time for determining the production date of the material of unknown origin. Identifying reprocessed uranium proved to be possible by HRGS as well.

Disposition Options for Uranium-233

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Beahm, E.C.; Dole, L.R.; Forsberg, C.W.; Icenhour, A.S.; Storch, S.N.

1999-01-01

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Fissile Materials Disposition Program (MD), in support of the U.S. arms-control and nonproliferation policies, has initiated a program to disposition surplus weapons-usable fissile material by making it inaccessible and unattractive for use in nuclear weapons. Weapons-usable fissile materials include plutonium, high-enriched uranium (HEU), and uranium-233 (sup 233)U. In support of this program, Oak Ridge National Laboratory led DOE's contractor efforts to identify and characterize options for the long-term storage and disposal of excess (sup 233)U. Five storage and 17 disposal options were identified and are described herein

Reduced enrichment program for the FRM-II, status 2004

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roehrmoser, A.; Petry, W.; Boening, K; Wieschalla, N.

2005-01-01

The new research reactor FRM-II of the Technische Universitaet Muenchen (TUM) has been designed to provide a maximal thermal neutron flux at mere 20 MW power. The single element design uses silicide fuel of densities 3.0 and 1.5 g/cm 3 of highly enriched uranium (HEU, 93 % U-235). With the nuclear license, that was granted in May 2003, a condition was imposed to reduce the enrichment of FRM-II to medium enriched uranium (MEU) with not more than 50 % U-235 until the end of the year 2010. The TUM has established an international working group to meet this target. This paper presents the backgrounds and the results and plannings for the first of three 2 1/2 year periods to reach the conversion in time. (author)

The future cost of uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pouris, A.

1986-01-01

The cost of uranium enrichment is the most important factor determining the fuel cost of nuclear energy. This paper attempts to forecast the future direction of the price of separative work by examining the forces that determine it. It is argued that the interplay among the characteristics of enrichment technologies, the structure of the international market, and the balance of supply and demand determine the enrichment price. The analysis indicates that all forces point towards a price much lower than the current one. It is predicted that, depending on the technological advances, the price of separative work unit for uranium enrichment will range between $40 and $90 by the year 2000. (author)

The assisting system for uranium enrichment plant operation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nakazawa, Hiroaki; Yamamoto, Fumio

1990-01-01

We have been developing an operation assisting system, partially supported by AI system, for uranium enrichment plant. The AI system is a proto-type system aiming a final one which can be applied to any future large uranium enrichment plant and also not only to specific operational area but also to complex and multi-phenomenon operational area. An existing AI system, for example facility diagnostic system that utilizes the result of CCT analysis as knowledge base, has weakness in flexibility and potentiality. To build AI system, we have developed the most suitable knowledge representations using deep knowledge for each facility or operation of uranium enrichment plant. This paper describes our AI proto-type system adopting several knowledge representations that can represent an uranium enrichment plant's operation with deep knowledge. (author)

Criticality safety concerns of uranium deposits in cascade equipment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Plaster, M.J.

1996-01-01

The Paducah and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants enrich uranium in the 235 U isotope by diffusing gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) through a porous barrier. The UF 6 gaseous diffusion cascade utilized several thousand open-quotes stagesclose quotes of barrier to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU). Historically, Portsmouth has enriched the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant's product (typically 1.8 wt% 235 U) as well as natural enrichment feed stock up to 97 wt%. Due to the chemical reactivity of UF 6 , particularly with water, the formation of solid uranium deposits occur at a gaseous diffusion plant. Much of the equipment operates below atmospheric pressure, and deposits are formed when atmospheric air enters the cascade. Deposits may also be formed from UF 6 reactions with oil, UF 6 reactions with the metallic surfaces of equipment, and desublimation of UF 6 . The major deposits form as a result of moist air in leakage due to failure of compressor casing flanges, blow-off plates, seals, expansion joint convolutions, and instrument lines. This report describes criticality concerns and deposit disposition

Uranium enrichment: an overview

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cazalet, J.

1995-01-01

This paper is a general presentation of uranium enrichment processes and assessments of the prevailing commercial and industrial situations. It gives first some theoretical aspects of enrichment in general and explains the differences between statistical and selective processes in particular. Then a review of the different processes is made with a comparison between them. Finally, some general remarks concerning applications are given and the risks of proliferation related to enrichment are mentioned. (J.S.). 4 refs., 5 figs., 8 tabs

Assuaging Nuclear Energy Risks: The Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Myers, Astasia

2011-01-01

The recent nuclear renaissance has motivated many countries, especially developing nations, to plan and build nuclear power reactors. However, domestic low enriched uranium demands may trigger nations to construct indigenous enrichment facilities, which could be redirected to fabricate high enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The potential advantages of establishing multinational uranium enrichment sites are numerous including increased low enrichment uranium access with decreased nuclear proliferation risks. While multinational nuclear initiatives have been discussed, Russia is the first nation to actualize this concept with their Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC). This paper provides an overview of the historical and modern context of the multinational nuclear fuel cycle as well as the evolution of Russia's IUEC, which exemplifies how international fuel cycle cooperation is an alternative to domestic facilities.

Evaluation of economical at a uranium enrichment demonstration plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sugitsue, Noritake

2001-01-01

In this report, the economy of technical achievement apply in the uranium enrichment demonstration plant is evaluated. From the evaluation, it can be concluded that the expected purpose was achieved because there was a definite economic prospect to commercial plant. The benefit analysis of thirteen years operation of the uranium enrichment demonstration plant also provides a financial aspect of the uranium enrichment business. Therefore, the performance, price and reliability of the centrifuge is an important factor in the uranium enrichment business. And the continuous development of a centrifuge while considering balance with the development cost is necessary for the business in the future. (author)

Evaluating the effectiveness of dilution of the recovered uranium with depleted uranium and low-enriched uranium to obtain fuel for VVER reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Smirnov, A Yu; Sulaberidze, G A; Dudnikov, A A; Nevinitsa, V A

2016-01-01

The possibility of the recovered uranium enrichment in a cascade of gas centrifuges with three feed flows (depleted uranium, low-enriched uranium, recovered uranium) with simultaneous dilution of U-232,234,236 isotopes was shown. A series of numerical experiments were performed for different content of U-235 in low-enriched uranium. It has been demonstrated that the selected combination of diluents can simultaneously reduce the cost of separative work and the consumption of natural uranium, not only with respect to the previously used multi-flow cascade schemes, but also in comparison to the standard cascade for uranium enrichment. (paper)

Experiments with HEU (93.14 wt.%) metal annuli with internal graphite cylinder

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Liu, Xiaobo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Bess, John D. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Wehmann, Udo [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Mihalczo, John T. [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

2015-04-01

A variety of critical experiments were constructed of enriched uranium metal (oralloy ) during the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) in support of criticality safety operations at the Y-12 Plant. The purposes of these experiments included the evaluation of storage, casting, and handling limits for the Y-12 Plant and providing data for verification of calculation methods and cross-sections for nuclear criticality safety applications. These included solid cylinders of various diameters, annuli of various inner and outer diameters, two and three interacting cylinders of various diameters, and graphite and polyethylene reflected cylinders and annuli. Of the hundreds of delayed critical experiments, only three experimental configurations are described here. They are internal graphite reflected metal uranium assemblies with three different diameter HEU annuli (15-9 inches, 15-7 inches and 13-7 inches). These experiments can be found in Reference 1 and in their associated logbook

Uranium enrichment capacity: public versus private ownership

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fraser, J.T.

1977-01-01

Continual growth of conventional nuclear capacity requires an assured supply of enriched uranium and, hence, potential expansion of domestic uranium enrichment capacity. The question of ownership of new enrichment capacity, i.e., public or private, entails not only the social-opportunity costs of alternative investments but also technical parameters of uranium utilization and advanced reactor development. Inclusion of risk preferences in both the public and private sectors produces interesting results in terms of optimal investment strategies with respect to choice of technology and scale of investment. Utilization of a nuclear fuel cycle requirements process model allows explicit specification of production technology. Integration of process model output with a least-cost investment model permits flexibility in parametric analysis. Results indicate minimum incentive for Government subsidy of a private enrichment sector through 2000 given moderate to low nuclear growth assumptions. The long-run scenario, to 2020, exhibits potentially greater incentives for private enrichment investment

The evolution of the enriched uranium markets

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arnaiz, J.; Moleres, C.; Tarin, F.

2004-01-01

This paper deals with the evolution of the enriched uranium component markets (uranium concentrates, conversion and enrichment), starting with the situation of historically low prices that occurred during 2000. The situation that has been reached as on December 2003, when the concentrates and conversion markets were 44% and 70% (current US$) respectively, and the enrichment prices 30%, higher, is analysed. Finally, the negative impact of the 90's depressed prices, due to abundant alternative sources of uranium components, on the primary production of all three components and, as a conclusion, the impact of the new situation on the transport logistics, and the need of appropriate economic conditions to make the future primary production sustainable, is commented. (Author)

Uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-11-01

This paper analyzes under four different scenarios the adequacy of a $500 million annual deposit into a fund to pay for the cost of cleaning up the Department of Energy's (DOE) three aging uranium enrichment plants. These plants are located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio. In summary the following was found: A fixed annual $500 million deposit made into a cleanup fund would not be adequate to cover total expected cleanup costs, nor would it be adequate to cover expected decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) costs. A $500 million annual deposit indexed to an inflation rate would likely be adequate to pay for all expected cleanup costs, including D and D costs, remedial action, and depleted uranium costs

Production of Mo-99 using low-enriched uranium silicide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hutter, J.C.; Srinivasan, B.; Vicek, M.; Vandegrift, G.F.

1994-01-01

Over the last several years, uranium silicide fuels have been under development as low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets for Mo-99. The use of LEU silicide is aimed at replacing the UAl x alloy in the highly-enriched uranium dissolution process. A process to recover Mo-99 from low-enriched uranium silicide is being developed at Argonne National Laboratory. The uranium silicide is dissolved in alkaline hydrogen peroxide. Experiments performed to determine the optimum dissolution procedure are discussed, and the results of dissolving a portion of a high-burnup (>40%) U 3 Si 2 miniplate are presented. Future work related to Mo-99 separation and waste disposal are also discussed

Report of Sectional Committee on Industrialization of Uranium Enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

In order to accelerate the development and utilization of atomic energy which is the core of the substitute energies for petroleum, it is indispensable requirement to establish independent fuel cycle as the base. In particular, the domestic production of enriched uranium is necessary to eliminate the obstacles to secure the energy supply in Japan. The construction and operation of the pilot plant for uranium enrichment by centrifugal separation method have progressed smoothly, and the technical base for the domestic production of enriched uranium is being consolidated. For the time being, the service of uranium enrichment is given by USA and France, but it is expected that the short supply will arise around 1990. The start of operation of the uranium enrichment plant in Japan is scheduled around 1990, and the scale of the plant will be expanded stepwise thereafter. The scale of production is assumed as 3000 t SWU/year in 2000. Prior to this commercial plant, the prototype plant of up to 250 t SWU/year capacity will be operated in 1986, starting the production of centrifugal separators in 1983. The production line for centrifugal separators will have the capacity of up to 125 t SWU/year. The organization for operating these plants, the home production of natural uranium conversion, the uranium enrichment by chemical method and others are described. (Kako, I.)

ZPR-3 Assembly 11: A cylindrical sssembly of highly enriched uranium and depleted uranium with an average 235U enrichment of 12 atom % and a depleted uranium reflector

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lell, R.M.; McKnight, R.D.; Tsiboulia, A.; Rozhikhin, Y.

2010-01-01

Specificationsa and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3 Assembly 11 began in early January 1958, and the Assembly 11 program ended in late January 1958. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates and depleted uranium plates loaded into stainless steel drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of two columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, six columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) depleted uranium plates and one column of 1.0 in.-wide (25.4 mm) depleted uranium plates. The length of each column was 10 in. (254.0 mm) in each half of the core. The axial blanket consisted of 12 in. (304.8 mm) of depleted uranium behind the core. The thickness of the depleted uranium radial blanket was approximately 14 in. (355.6 mm), and the length of the radial blanket in each half of the matrix was 22 in. (558.8 mm). The assembly geometry approximated a right circular cylinder as closely as the square matrix tubes allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/11, the reference critical configuration was loading 10 which was critical on January 21, 1958. Subsequent loadings were very similar but less clean for criticality because there were modifications made to accommodate reactor physics measurements other than criticality. Accordingly, ZPR-3/11 loading 10 was selected as the only configuration for this benchmark. As documented below, it was determined to be acceptable as a criticality safety benchmark experiment. A very accurate transformation to a simplified model is needed to make any ZPR assembly a practical criticality-safety benchmark. There is simply too much geometric detail in an exact (as-built) model of a ZPR assembly, even a clean core such as ZPR-3/11 loading 10. The transformation must reduce the detail to a practical level without masking any of the important features of the critical

The Supply of Medical Radioisotopes. Market impacts of converting to low-enriched uranium targets for medical isotope production

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Westmacott, Chad; Cameron, Ron

2012-01-01

The reliable supply of molybdenum-99 ( 99 Mo) and its decay product, technetium-99m ( 99m Tc), is a vital component of modern medical diagnostic practices. At present, most of the global production of 99 Mo is from highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets. However, all major 99 Mo-producing countries have recently agreed to convert to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) targets to advance important non-proliferation goals, a decision that will have implications for the global supply chain of 99 Mo/ 99m Tc and the long-term supply reliability of these medical isotopes. This study provides the findings and analysis from an extensive examination of the 99 Mo/ 99m Tc supply chain by the OECD/NEA High-level Group on the Security of Supply of Medical Radioisotopes (HLG-MR). It presents a comprehensive evaluation of the potential impacts of converting to the use of LEU targets for 99 Mo production on the global 99 Mo/ 99m Tc market in terms of costs and available production capacity, and the corresponding implications for long-term supply reliability. In this context, the study also briefly discusses the need for policy action by governments in their efforts to ensure a stable and secure long-term supply of 99 Mo/ 99m Tc

Development of an On-Line Uranium Enrichment Monitor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xuesheng, L.; Guorong, L.; Yonggang, Z.; Xueyuan, H. X.-Y.

2015-01-01

An on-line enrichment monitor was developed to measure the enrichment of UF6 flowing through the processing pipes in centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. A NaI(Tl) detector was used to measure the count rates of the 186 keV gamma ray emitted from 235U, and the total quantity of uranium was determined from thermodynamic characteristics of gaseous uranium hexafluoride. The results show that the maximum relative standard deviation is less than 1% when the measurement time is 120 s or more and the pressure is more than 2 kPa in the measurement chamber. There are two working models for the monitor. The monitor works normally in the continuous model, When the gas's pressure in the pipe fluctuates greatly, it can work in the intermittent model, and the measurement result is very well. The background of the monitor can be measured automatically periodically. It can control automatically electromagnetic valves open and close, so as to change the gas's quantity in the chamber. It is a kind of unattended and remote monitor, all of data can be transfer to central control room. It should be effective for nuclear materials accountability verifications and materials balance verification at uranium enrichment plant by using the monitor to monitor Uranium enrichment of gaseous uranium hexafluoride in the output end of cascade continuously. (author)

EURODIF: the uranium enrichment by gaseous diffusion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rougeau, J.P.

1981-01-01

During the seventies the nuclear power programme had an extremely rapid growth rate which entailed to increase the world uranium enrichment capacity. EURODIF is the largest undertaking in this field. This multinational joint venture built and now operates and enrichment plant using the gaseous diffusion process at Tricastin (France). This plant is delivering low enriched uranium since two years and has contracted about 110 million SWU's till 1990. Description, current activity and prospects are given in the paper. (Author) [pt

The Mailbox Computer System for the IAEA verification experiment on HEU downblending at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aronson, A.L.; Gordon, D.M.

2000-01-01

IN APRIL 1996, THE UNITED STATES (US) ADDED THE PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT TO THE LIST OF FACILITIES ELIGIBLE FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS. AT THAT TIME, THE US PROPOSED THAT THE IAEA CARRY OUT A ''VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT'' AT THE PLANT WITH RESPECT TO DOOWNBLENDING OF ABOUT 13 METRIC TONS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) IN THE FORM OF URANIUM HEXAFLUROIDE (UF6). DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 1997 THROUGH JULY 1998, THE IAEA CARRIED OUT THE REQUESTED VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT. THE VERIFICATION APPROACH USED FOR THIS EXPERIMENT INCLUDED, AMONG OTHER MEASURES, THE ENTRY OF PROCESS-OPERATIONAL DATA BY THE FACILITY OPERATOR ON A NEAR-REAL-TIME BASIS INTO A ''MAILBOX'' COMPUTER LOCATED WITHIN A TAMPER-INDICATING ENCLOSURE SEALED BY THE IAEA

Experience with environmental sampling at gas centrifuge enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ekenstam, G. af; Bush, W.; Janov, J.; Kuhn, E.; Ryjinski, M.

2001-01-01

Environmental sampling has been used routinely by the IAEA since 1996 after the IAEA Board of Governors approved it in March 1995 as a new technique to strengthen safeguards and improve efficiency. In enrichment plants it is used to confirm that there has been no production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), or production of uranium at above the declared enrichment. The use of environmental sampling is based on the assumption that every process, no matter how leak tight, will release small amounts of process material to the environment. Even though these releases of nuclear material are extremely small in gas centrifuge enrichment plants, and well below levels of concern from a health physics and safety standpoint, they are detectable and their analysis provides an indication of the enrichment of the material that has been processed in the plant. The environmental samples at enrichment plants are collected by swiping selected areas of the plant with squares of cotton cloth (10x10 cm) from sampling kits prepared in ultra clean condition. The squares of cotton cloth sealed in plastic bags are sent for analysis to the Network Analytical Laboratories. The analysis includes the measurement of the uranium isotopic composition in uranium-containing particles by Thermal lonization Mass Spectroscopy (TIMS) or Secondary ION Mass Spectroscopy (SIMS). Since the implementation of environmental sampling, swipes have been collected from 240 sampling points at three gas centrifuge plants of URENCO, which have a total throughput of more than 8,000 tonnes of uranium per year. The particle analysis results generally reflected the known operational history of the plants and confirmed that they had only been operated to produce uranium with enrichment less than 5% 235 U. The information about the content of the minor isotopes 234 U and 236 U also indicates that depleted and recycled uranium were sometimes used as feed materials in some plants. An example is given of the TIMS particle

Safety criteria of uranium enrichment plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nardocci, A.C.; Oliveira Neto, J.M. de

1994-01-01

The applicability of nuclear reactor safety criteria applied to uranium enrichment plants is discussed, and a new criterion based on the soluble uranium compounds and hexafluoride chemical toxicities is presented. (L.C.J.A.). 21 refs, 4 tabs

IAEA Mission Sees High Commitment to Safety at Ghana's Research Reactor After HEU to LEU Fuel Conversion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2018-01-01

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts said the operator of Ghana’s research reactor has demonstrated a high commitment to safety following the conversion of the reactor core to use low enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel instead of high enriched uranium (HEU). The team also made recommendations for further safety enhancements. The Integrated Safety Assessment for Research Reactors (INSARR) team concluded a five-day mission today to assess the safety of the GHARR-1 research reactor, originally commissioned in 1994. The 30 kW reactor, operated by the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) at the National Nuclear Research Institute in the capital Accra, is used primarily for trace element analysis for industrial or agricultural purposes, research, education and training. In 2017, the reactor core was converted in a joint effort by Ghana, the United States and China, with assistance from the IAEA. The IAEA supported the operation to eliminate proliferation risks associated with HEU, while maintaining important scientific research. The team made recommendations for improvements to the GAEC, including: • Completing the revision of reactor safety and operating documents to reflect the results of the commissioning of the reactor after the core fuel conversion. • Enhancing the training and qualification programme for operating personnel. • Improving the capability for monitoring operational safety parameters under all conditions. • Strengthening radiation protection by establishing an effective radiation monitoring of workplace. The GAEC said it will request a follow-up INSARR mission by 2020.

Perspectives for the uranium enrichment in Brazil

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Senna, J.G.S.M.

1991-01-01

Through an analysis of the electrical energy future in Brazil, the needs for enriched uranium are discussed, and therefore the importance of developing local capability for self-production. A description of the production processes that are well established is given first, then the analysis itself is performed and finally a visualization of the International Market for enriched uranium is shown. (author)

Enriched uranium recovery at Los Alamos

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Herrick, C.C.

1984-01-01

Graphite casting scrap, fuel elements and nongraphite combustibles are calcined to impure oxides. These materials along with zircaloy fuel elements and refractory solids are leach-dissolved separately in HF-HNO 3 acid to solubilize the contained enriched uranium. The resulting slurry is filtered and the clear filtrate (to which mineral acid solutions bearing enriched uranium may be added) are passed through solvent extraction. The solvent extraction product is filtered, precipitated with H 2 O 2 and the precipitate calcined to U 3 O 8 . Metal is made from U 3 O 8 by conversion to UO 2 , hydrofluorination and reduction to metal. Throughput is 150 to 900 kg uranium per year depending on the type of scrap

Low Enrichment Uranium (LEU)-fueled SLOWPOKE-2 nuclear reactor simulation with the Monte-Carlo based MCNP 4A code

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pierre, J.R.M.

1996-01-01

Following the commissioning of the Low Enrichment Uranium (LEU) Fuelled SLOWPOKE-2 research reactor at the Royal Military College-College Militaire Royal (RMC-CMR), excess reactivity measurements were conducted over a range of temperature and power. The results showed a maximum excess reactivity of 3.37 mk at 33 o C. Several deterministic models using computer codes like WIMS-CRNL, CITATION, TRIVAC and DRAGON have been used to try to reproduce the excess reactivity and temperature trend of both the LEU and HEU SLOWPOKE-2 reactors. The best simulations had been obtained at Ecole Polytechnique de Montreal. They were able to reproduce the temperature trend of their HEU-fuelled reactor using TRIVAC calculations, but this model over-estimated the absolute value of the excess reactivity by 119 mk. Although calculations using DRAGON did not reproduce the temperature trend as well as TRIVAC, these calculations represented a significant improvement on the absolute value at 20 o C reducing the discrepancy to 13 mk. Given the advance in computer technology, a probabilistic approach was tried in this work, using the Monte-Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System MCNP 4A, to model the RMC-CMR SLOWPOKE-2 reactor.

Use of enriched uranium in Canada's power reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dormuth, K.W.; Jackson, D.P.

2011-01-01

Recent trends in Canadian nuclear power reactor design and proposed development of nuclear power in Canada have indicated the possibility that Canada will break with its tradition of natural uranium fuelled systems, designed for superior neutron economy and, hence, superior uranium utilization. For instance, the Darlington B new reactor project procurement process included three reactor designs, all employing enriched fuel, although a natural uranium reactor design was included at a late stage in the ensuing environmental assessment for the project as an alternative technology. An evaluation of the alternative designs should include an assessment of the environmental implications through the entire fuel cycle, which unfortunately is not required by the environmental assessment process. Examples of comparative environmental implications of the reactor designs throughout the fuel cycle indicate the importance of these considerations when making a design selection. As Canada does not have enrichment capability, a move toward the use of enriched fuel would mean that Canada would be exporting natural uranium and buying back enriched uranium with value added. From a waste management perspective, Canada would need to deal with mill, refinery, and conversion tailings, as well as with the used fuel from its own reactors, while the enrichment supplier would retain depleted uranium with some commercial value. On the basis of reasoned estimates based on publicly available information, it is expected that enrichment in Canada is likely to be more profitable than exporting natural uranium and buying back enriched uranium. Further, on the basis of environmental assessments for enrichment facilities in other countries, it is expected that an environmental assessment of a properly sited enrichment facility would result in approval. (author)

ZPR-3 Assembly 11 : A cylindrical sssembly of highly enriched uranium and depleted uranium with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 12 atom % and a depleted uranium reflector.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D.; Tsiboulia, A.; Rozhikhin, Y.; National Security; Inst. of Physics and Power Engineering

2010-09-30

Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specificationsa and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3 Assembly 11 began in early January 1958, and the Assembly 11 program ended in late January 1958. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates and depleted uranium plates loaded into stainless steel drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of two columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, six columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) depleted uranium plates and one column of 1.0 in.-wide (25.4 mm) depleted uranium plates. The length of each column was 10 in. (254.0 mm) in each half of the core. The axial blanket consisted of 12 in. (304.8 mm) of depleted uranium behind the core. The thickness of the depleted uranium radial blanket was approximately 14 in. (355.6 mm), and the length of the radial blanket in each half of the matrix was 22 in. (558.8 mm). The assembly geometry approximated a right circular cylinder as closely as the square matrix tubes allowed. According to the logbook and loading records for ZPR-3/11, the reference critical configuration was loading 10 which was critical on January 21, 1958. Subsequent loadings were very similar but less clean for criticality because there were modifications made to accommodate reactor physics measurements other than criticality. Accordingly, ZPR-3/11 loading 10 was selected as the only configuration for this benchmark. As documented below, it was determined to be acceptable as a criticality safety benchmark experiment. A very accurate transformation to a simplified model is needed to make any ZPR assembly a practical criticality-safety benchmark. There is simply too much geometric detail in an exact (as-built) model of a ZPR assembly, even a clean core such as ZPR-3/11 loading 10. The transformation must reduce the detail to a practical level without masking any of

Highly Enriched Uranium Metal Annuli and Cylinders with Polyethylene Reflectors and/or Internal Polyethylene Moderator

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tyler Sumner; J. Blair Briggs; Leland Montierth

2007-01-01

A variety of critical experiments were constructed of enriched uranium metal during the 1960s and 1970s at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility in support of criticality safety operations at the Y-12 Plant. The purposes of these experiments included the evaluation of storage, casting, and handling limits for the Y-12 Plant and providing data for verification of calculation methods and cross-sections for nuclear criticality safety applications. These included solid cylinders of various diameters, annuli of various inner and outer diameters, two and three interacting cylinders of various diameters, and graphite and polyethylene reflected cylinders and annuli. Of the hundreds of delayed critical experiments, experiments of uranium metal annuli with and without polyethylene reflectors and with the central void region either empty or filled with polyethylene were evaluated under ICSBEP Identifier HEU-MET-FAST-076. The outer diameter of the uranium annuli varied from 9 to 15 inches in two-inch increments. In addition, there were uranium metal cylinders with diameters varying from 7 to 15 inches with complete reflection and reflection on one flat surface to simulate floor reflection. Most of the experiments were performed between February 1964 and April 1964. Five partially reflected (reflected on the top only) experiments were assembled in November 1967, but are judged by the evaluators not to be of benchmark quality. Twenty-four of the twenty-five experiments have been determined to have fast spectra. The only exception has a mixed spectrum. Analyses were performed in which uncertainty associated with five different parameters associated with the uranium parts and three associated with the polyethylene parts was evaluated. Included were uranium mass, height, diameter, isotopic content, and impurity content and polyethylene mass, diameter, and impurity content. There were additional uncertainties associated with assembly alignment, support structure, and the value

Health and safety considerations for U.S. monitors in the Russian transparency program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boggs, C. J.

1998-01-01

In 1993 the US and the Russian Federation signed an agreement allowing the US to purchase highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia over a 20-year period. This Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement permits the purchase of 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons in the form of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use as power reactor fuel in the US. Under the HEU Agreement, the US and Russia are cooperating in a ''Transparency Program'' to ensure that arms control and nonproliferation objectives are being met. The Transparency Program measures, which are a departure from traditional, intrusive measures of verification, include sending individuals from the US to Russia to monitor the processing of the HEU

South Australia, uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-02-01

The Report sets out the salient data relating to the establishment of a uranium processing centre at Redcliff in South Australia. It is conceived as a major development project for the Commonwealth, the South Australian Government and Australian Industry comprising the refining and enrichment of uranium produced from Australian mines. Using the data currently available in respect of markets, demand, technology and possible financial return from overseas sales, the project could be initiated immediately with hexafluoride production, followed rapidly in stages by enrichment production using the centrifuge process. A conceptual development plan is presented, involving a growth pattern that would be closely synchronised with the mining and production of yellowcake. The proposed development is presented in the form of an eight-and-half-year programme. Costs in this Report are based on 1975 values, unless otherwise stated. (Author)

Uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heriot, I.D.

1988-01-01

After recalling the physical principles and the techniques of centrifuge enrichment the report describes the centrifuge enrichment programmes of the various countries concerned and compares this technology with other enrichment technologies like gaseous diffusion, laser, aerodynamic devices and chemical processes. The centrifuge enrichment process is said to be able to replace with advantage the existing enrichment facilities in the short and medium term. Future prospects of the process are also described, like recycled uranium enrichment and economic improvements; research and development needs to achieve the economic prospects are also indicated. Finally the report takes note of the positive aspect of centrifuge enrichment as far as safeguards and nuclear safety are concerned. 27 figs, 113 refs

The uranium enrichment industry and the SILEX process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldsworthy, M.

1999-01-01

Silex Systems Limited has been developing a new laser isotope separation process since 1992. The principle application of the SILEX Technology is Uranium Enrichment, the key step in the production of fuel for nuclear power plants. The Uranium Enrichment industry, today worth ∼ US$3.5 Billion p.a., is dominated by four major players, the largest being USEC with almost 40% of the market. In 1996, an agreement was signed between Silex and USEC to develop SILEX Technology for potential application to Uranium Enrichment. The SILEX process is a low cost, energy efficient scheme which may provide significant commercial advantage over current technology and competing laser processes. Silex is also investigating possible application to the enrichment of Silicon, Carbon and other materials. Significant markets may develop for such materials, particularly in the semiconductor industry

Uranium enrichment: heading for the abyss

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Norman, C.

1983-01-01

This article discusses the federal government's $2.3 billion a year business enriching uranium for nuclear power plants which is heading toward a major crisis. Due to miscalculations by the Department of Energy, it is caught with billions of dollars of construction in progress just as projected demand for enriched uranium is decreasing. At the center of the controversy is the Gas Centrifuge Plant at Portsmouth, Ohio - estimated to cost $10 billion dollars. A review of how DOE got into this situation and how they plan to solve it is presented

Determination of uranium enrichment by using gamma-spectrometric methods

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kutnyj, D.V.; Telegin, Yu.N.; Odejchuk, N.P.; Mikhailov, V.A.; Tovkanets, V.E.

2009-01-01

By using commercial analysis programs MGAU (LLNL, USA) and FRAM (LANL, USA) the summary error of gamma-spectrometric uranium enrichment measurements was investigated. Uranium samples with enrichments of 0,71; 4,46 and 20,1 % were measured. The coaxial high purity germanium detector (type GC) and the planar germanium detector (type LEGe) were used as gamma-radiation detectors. It was shown that experimental equipment and mathematical software available in NSC KIPT allow us to measure uranium enrichment by nondestructive method with accuracy of not worse than 2%.

How the radiologic and nuclear medical communities can improve nuclear security.

Science.gov (United States)

Kahn, Laura H; von Hippel, Frank

2007-04-01

Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is used to manufacture technetium-99m, the most widely used medical radioisotope in the world. Highly enriched uranium is also used to make nuclear bombs; 50 kg of HEU is enough to make a Hiroshima-type bomb. It is generally agreed that this technology is within the reach of a terrorist group; the main obstacle is acquiring HEU. Currently, as a legacy of the US and Soviet Atoms for Peace Program, there are civilian users of HEU in 40 countries, and about 1,000 kg are still being shipped each year. Unfortunately, the major international manufacturers of technetium-99m have been refusing to convert their production facilities to use low-enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb. Only 1% to 2% of the HEU is consumed in the process of producing technetium-99m. The remainder is accumulating in radioactive waste storage facilities. The radiologic and nuclear medical communities could make a tremendous contribution to a safer world by supporting the replacement of HEU with LEU in the production of technetium-99m. Low-enriched uranium is just as cost effective as HEU for the manufacture of technetium-99m and does not contribute to the risk for nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear fuel cycle head-end enriched uranium purification and conversion into metal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bonini, A.; Cabrejas, J.; Lio, L. de; Dell'Occhio, L.; Devida, C.; Dupetit, G.; Falcon, M.; Gauna, A.; Gil, D.; Guzman, G.; Neuringer, P.; Pascale, A.; Stankevicius, A.

1998-01-01

The CNEA (Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica - Argentina) operated two facilities at the Ezeiza Atomic Center which supply purified enriched uranium employed in the production of nuclear fuels. At one of those facilities, the Triple Height Laboratory scraps from the production of MTR type fuel elements (mainly out of specification U 3 O 8 plates or powder) are purified to nuclear grade. The purification is accomplished by a solvent extraction process. The other facility, the Enriched Uranium Laboratory produces 90% enriched uranium metal to be used in Mo 99 production (originally the uranium was used for the manufacture of MTR fuel elements made of aluminium-uranium alloy). This laboratory also provided metallic uranium with a lower enrichment (20%) for a first uranium-silicon testing fuel element, and in the near future it is going to recommence 20% enriched uranium related activities in order to provide the metal for the silicon-based fuel elements production (according to the policy of enrichment reduction for MTR reactors). (author)

10 CFR 70.23a - Hearing required for uranium enrichment facility.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Hearing required for uranium enrichment facility. 70.23a... MATERIAL License Applications § 70.23a Hearing required for uranium enrichment facility. The Commission... license for construction and operation of a uranium enrichment facility. The Commission will publish...

Criticality of mixtures of plutonium and high enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grolleau, E.; Lein, M.; Leka, G.; Maidou, B.; Klenov, P.

2003-01-01

This paper presents a criticality evaluation of moderated homogeneous plutonium-uranium mixtures. The fissile media studied are homogeneous mixtures of plutonium and high enriched uranium in two chemical forms: aqueous mixtures of metal and mixtures of nitrate solutions. The enrichment of uranium considered are 93.2wt.% 235 U and 100wt.% 235 U. The 240 Pu content in plutonium varies from 0wt.% 240 Pu to 12wt.% 240 Pu. The critical parameters (radii and masses of a 20 cm water reflected sphere) are calculated with the French criticality safety package CRISTAL V0. The comparison of the calculated critical parameters as a function of the moderator-to-fuel atomic ratio shows significant ranges in which high enriched uranium systems, as well as plutonium-uranium mixtures, are more reactive than plutonium systems. (author)

Preliminary Evaluation of Alternate Designs for HFIR Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Renfro, David [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Cook, David [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jain, Prashant [ORNL; Valentine, Jennifer [ORNL

2014-10-30

Engineering design studies of the feasibility of conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel are ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as part of an effort sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)/Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The fuel type selected by the program for the conversion of the five high-power research reactors in the U.S. that still use HEU fuel is a new U-Mo monolithic fuel. Studies by ORNL have previously indicated that HFIR can be successfully converted using the new fuel provided (1) the reactor power can be increased from 85 MW to 100 MW and (2) the fuel can be fabricated to a specific reference design. Fabrication techniques for the new fuel are under development by the program but are still immature, especially for the “complex” aspects of the HFIR fuel design. In FY 2012, the program underwent a major shift in focus to emphasize developing and qualifying processes for the fabrication of reliable and affordable LEU fuel. In support of this new focus and in an effort to ensure that the HFIR fuel design is as suitable for reliable fabrication as possible, ORNL undertook the present study to propose and evaluate several alternative design features. These features include (1) eliminating the fuel zone axial contouring in the previous reference design by substituting a permanent neutron absorber in the lower unfueled region of all of the fuel plates, (2) relocating the burnable neutron absorber from the fuel plates of the inner fuel element to the side plates of the inner fuel element (the fuel plates of the outer fuel element do not contain a burnable absorber), (3) relocating the fuel zone inside the fuel plate to be centered on the centerline of the depth of the plate, and (4) reshaping the radial contour of the relocated fuel zone to be symmetric about this centerline. The

Preliminary Evaluation of Alternate Designs for HFIR Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Renfro, David G [ORNL; Chandler, David [ORNL; Cook, David Howard [ORNL; Ilas, Germina [ORNL; Jain, Prashant K [ORNL; Valentine, Jennifer R [ORNL

2014-11-01

Engineering design studies of the feasibility of conversion of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel are ongoing at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as part of an effort sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)/Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The fuel type selected by the program for the conversion of the five high-power research reactors in the U.S. that still use HEU fuel is a new U-Mo monolithic fuel. Studies by ORNL have previously indicated that HFIR can be successfully converted using the new fuel provided (1) the reactor power can be increased from 85 MW to 100 MW and (2) the fuel can be fabricated to a specific reference design. Fabrication techniques for the new fuel are under development by the program but are still immature, especially for the complex aspects of the HFIR fuel design. In FY 2012, the program underwent a major shift in focus to emphasize developing and qualifying processes for the fabrication of reliable and affordable LEU fuel. In support of this new focus and in an effort to ensure that the HFIR fuel design is as suitable for reliable fabrication as possible, ORNL undertook the present study to propose and evaluate several alternative design features. These features include (1) eliminating the fuel zone axial contouring in the previous reference design by substituting a permanent neutron absorber in the lower unfueled region of all of the fuel plates, (2) relocating the burnable neutron absorber from the fuel plates of the inner fuel element to the side plates of the inner fuel element (the fuel plates of the outer fuel element do not contain a burnable absorber), (3) relocating the fuel zone inside the fuel plate to be centered on the centerline of the depth of the plate, and (4) reshaping the radial contour of the relocated fuel zone to be symmetric about this centerline. The present

Enriched uranium cycles in pressurized heavy water reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mazzola, A.

1994-01-01

A study was made on the substitution of natural uranium with enriched and on plutonium recycle in unmodified PHWRs (pressure vessel reactor). Results clearly show the usefulness of enriched fuel utilisation for both uranium ore consumption (savings of 30% around 1.3% enrichment) and decreasing fuel cycle coasts. This is also due to a better plutonium exploitation during the cycle. On the other hand plutonium recycle in these reactors via MOX-type fuel appears economically unfavourable under any condition

Safety analysis report for packaging, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, model DC-1 package with HEU oxide contents. Change pages for Rev.1

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-01-18

This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant for the Model DC-1 package with highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide contents has been prepared in accordance with governing regulations form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation and orders from the Department of energy. The fundamental safety requirements addressed by these regulations and orders pertain to the containment of radioactive material, radiation shielding, and nuclear subcriticality. This report demonstrates how these requirements are met.

Safety analysis report for packaging, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, model DC-1 package with HEU oxide contents. Change pages for Rev.1

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant for the Model DC-1 package with highly enriched uranium (HEU) oxide contents has been prepared in accordance with governing regulations form the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Transportation and orders from the Department of energy. The fundamental safety requirements addressed by these regulations and orders pertain to the containment of radioactive material, radiation shielding, and nuclear subcriticality. This report demonstrates how these requirements are met

Slightly enriched uranium fuel for a PHWR

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Notari, C.; Marajofsky, A.

1997-01-01

An improved fuel element design for a PHWR using slightly enriched uranium fuel is presented. It maintains the general geometric disposition of the currently used in the argentine NPP's reactors, replacing the outer ring of rods by rods containing annular pellets. Power density reduction is achieved with modest burnup losses and the void volume in the pellets can be used to balance these two opposite effects. The results show that with this new design, the fuel can be operated at higher powers without violating thermohydraulic limits and this means an improvement in fuel management flexibility, particularly in the transition from natural uranium to slightly enriched uranium cycle. (author)

Uranium enrichment services in the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jelinek, P.; Lenders, M.

1994-01-01

The United States of America is the world's largest market for uranium enrichment services. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian uranium is entering the world market on an increasing scale. The U.S. tries to protect its market and, in this connection, also the European market from excessive price drops by taking anti-dumping measures. In order to become more competitive, American companies have adapted modern enrichment techniques from Europe. European - U.S. joint ventures are to help, also technically and economically, to integrate military uranium, accumulating as a consequence of worldwide disarmament, into the commercial fuel cycle for the peaceful use of nuclear power. (orig.) [de

A comparison between thorium-uranium and low enrichment uranium cycles in the high temperature reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cerles, J M

1973-03-15

In a previous report, it was shown that the Uranium cycle could be used as well with multi-hole block (GGA type) as with tubular elements. Now, in a F.S.V. geometry, a comparison is made between Thorium cycle and Uranium cycle. This comparison will be concerned with the physical properties of the materials, the needs of natural Uranium, the fissile material inventory and, at last, an attempt of economical considerations. In this report the cycle will be characterizd by the fertile material. So, we write ''Thorium cycle'' for Highly Enriched Uranium - Thorium cycle and ''Uranium cycle'' for low Enrichment Uranium cycle.

Technical investigation of a pyrophoric event involving corrosion products from HEU ZPPR fuel plates

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Totemeier, T. C.

2000-01-01

A pyrophoric event recently occurred which involved corrosion products collected from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel plates used in the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR). This paper summarizes the event and its background, and presents the results of an investigation into its source and mechanism. The investigation focused on characterization of corrosion product samples similar to those involved in the event using thermo-gravimetric analysis (TGA). Burning curve TGA tests were performed to measure the ignition temperature and hydride fractions of corrosion products in several different conditions to assess the effects of passivation treatment and long-term storage on chemical reactivity. The hydride fraction and ignition temperature of the corrosion products were found to be strongly dependent on the corrosion extent of the source metal. The results indicate that the energy source for the event was a considerable quantity of uranium hydride present in the corrosion products, but the specific ignition mechanism could not be identified

Uranium enrichment: a vital new industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-10-01

The energy problem facing the nation and the need for nuclear power are pointed out. Uranium enrichment and the demand for it are discussed. Reasons for, and obstacles to, private enrichment are outlined. The President's plan (including the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act) is summarized

Calculation of mixed HEU-LEU cores for the HOR research reactor with the scale code system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leege, P.F.A. de; Gibcus, H.P.M.; Hoogenboom, J.E.; Vries, J.W. de

1997-01-01

The HOR reactor of Interfaculty Reactor Institute (IRI), Delft, The Netherlands, will be converted to use low enriched fuel (LEU) assemblies. As there are still many usable high enriched (HEU) fuel assemblies present, there will be a considerable reactor operation time with mixed cores with both HEU and LEU fuel assemblies. At IRI a comprehensive reactor physics code system and evaluated nuclear data is implemented for detailed core calculations. One of the backbones of the IRI code system is the well-known SCALE code system package. Full core calculations are performed with the diffusion theory code BOLD VENTURE, the nodal code SILWER, and the Monte Carlo code KENO Va. Results are displayed of a strategy from a HEU core to a mixed HEU-LEU core and eventually a LEU core. (author)

Criticality analysis in uranium enrichment plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Okamoto, Tsuyoshi; Kiyose, Ryohei

1977-01-01

In a large scale uranium enrichment plant, uranium inventory in cascade rooms is not very large in quantity, but the facilities dealing with the largest quantity of uranium in that process are the UF 6 gas supply system and the blending system for controlling the product concentration. When UF 6 spills out of these systems, the enriched uranium is accumulated, and the danger of criticality accident is feared. If a NaF trap is placed at the forestage of waste gas treatment system, plenty of UF 6 and HF are adsorbed together in the NaF trap. Thus, here is the necessity of checking the safety against criticality. Various assumptions were made to perform the computation surveying the criticality of the system composed of UF 6 and HF adsorbed on NaF traps with WIMS code (transport analysis). The minimum critical radius resulted in about 53 cm in case of 3.5% enriched fuel for light water reactors. The optimum volume ratio of fissile material in the double salt UF 6 .2NaF and NaF.HF is about 40 vol. %. While, criticality survey computation was also made for the annular NaF trap having the central cooling tube, and it was found that the effect of cooling tube radius did not decrease the multiplication factor up to the cooling tube radius of about 5 cm. (Wakatsuki, Y.)

The gas centrifuge, uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chapman, A.

1988-01-01

The author considers the consequences for controlling nuclear proliferation of the emergence of the gas centrifuge method for enriching uranium and succeeds in the difficult and delicate task of saying enough about gas centrifuge techniques for readers to judge, what may be involved in fully embracing gas centrifuge enrichment within the constraints of an anti-proliferation strategy, whilst at the same time saying nothing that could be construed as encouraging an interest in the gas centrifuge route to highly enriched uranium where none had before existed. (author)

Yalina booster subcritical assembly performance with low enriched uranium fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Talamo, Alberto; Gohar, Yousry

2011-01-01

The YALINA Booster facility is a subcritical assembly located in Minsk, Belarus. The facility has special features that result in fast and thermal neutron spectra in different zones. The fast zone of the assembly uses a lead matrix and uranium fuels with different enrichments: 90% and 36%, 36%, or 21%. The thermal zone of the assembly contains 10% enriched uranium fuel in a polyethylene matrix. This study discusses the performance of the three YALINA Booster configurations with the different fuel enrichments. In order to maintain the same subcriticality level in the three configurations, the number of fuel rods in the thermal zone is increased as the uranium fuel enrichment in the fast zone is decreased. The maximum number of fuel rods that can be loaded in the thermal zone is about 1185. Consequently, the neutron multiplication of the configuration with 21% enriched uranium fuel in the fast zone is enhanced by changing the position of the boron carbide and the natural uranium absorber rods, located between the fast and the thermal zones, to form an annular rather than a square arrangement. (author)

Yalina booster subcritical assembly performance with low enriched uranium fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Talamo, Alberto; Gohar, Yousry, E-mail: alby@anl.gov [Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, IL (United States)

2011-07-01

The YALINA Booster facility is a subcritical assembly located in Minsk, Belarus. The facility has special features that result in fast and thermal neutron spectra in different zones. The fast zone of the assembly uses a lead matrix and uranium fuels with different enrichments: 90% and 36%, 36%, or 21%. The thermal zone of the assembly contains 10% enriched uranium fuel in a polyethylene matrix. This study discusses the performance of the three YALINA Booster configurations with the different fuel enrichments. In order to maintain the same subcriticality level in the three configurations, the number of fuel rods in the thermal zone is increased as the uranium fuel enrichment in the fast zone is decreased. The maximum number of fuel rods that can be loaded in the thermal zone is about 1185. Consequently, the neutron multiplication of the configuration with 21% enriched uranium fuel in the fast zone is enhanced by changing the position of the boron carbide and the natural uranium absorber rods, located between the fast and the thermal zones, to form an annular rather than a square arrangement. (author)

Experiments of JRR-4 low-enriched-uranium-silicied fuel core

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hirane, Nobuhiko; Ishikuro, Yasuhiro; Nagadomi, Hideki; Yokoo, Kenji; Horiguchi, Hironori; Nemoto, Takumi; Yamamoto, Kazuyoshi; Yagi, Masahiro; Arai, Nobuyoshi; Watanabe, Shukichi; Kashima, Yoichi

2006-03-01

JRR-4, a light-water-moderated and cooled, swimming pool type research reactor using high-enriched uranium plate-type fuels had been operated from 1965 to 1996. In order to convert to low-enriched-uranium-silicied fuels, modification work had been carried out for 2 years, from 1996 to 1998. After the modification, start-up experiments were carried out to obtain characteristics of the low-enriched-uranium-silicied fuel core. The measured excess reactivity, reactor shutdown margin and the maximum reactivity addition rate satisfied the nuclear limitation of the safety report for licensing. It was confirmed that conversion to low-enriched-uranium-silicied fuels was carried out properly. Besides, the necessary data for reactor operation were obtained, such as nuclear, thermal hydraulic and reactor control characteristics. This report describes the results of start-up experiments and burnup experiments. The first criticality of low-enriched-uranium-silicied core was achieved on 14th July 1998, and the operation for joint-use has been carried out since 6th October 1998. (author)

The development of uranium foil farication technology utilizing twin roll method for Mo-99 irradiation target

CERN Document Server

Kim, C K; Park, H D

2002-01-01

MDS Nordion in Canada, occupying about 75% of global supply of Mo-99 isotope, has provided the irradiation target of Mo-99 using the rod-type UAl sub x alloys with HEU(High Enrichment Uranium). ANL (Argonne National Laboratory) through co-operation with BATAN in Indonesia, leading RERTR (Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors) program substantially for nuclear non-proliferation, has designed and fabricated the annular cylinder of uranium targets, and successfully performed irradiation test, in order to develop the fabrication technology of fission Mo-99 using LEU(Low Enrichment Uranium). As the uranium foils could be fabricated in laboratory scale, not in commercialized scale by hot rolling method due to significant problems in foil quality, productivity and economic efficiency, attention has shifted to the development of new technology. Under these circumstances, the invention of uranium foil fabrication technology utilizing twin-roll casting method in KAERI is found to be able to fabricate LEU or...

The Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter for Uranium Cylinder Assay

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Miller, Karen A.; Menlove, Howard O.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Marlow, Johanna B. [Safeguards Science and Technology Group (N-1), Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos (United States)

2011-12-15

As fuel cycle technology becomes more prevalent around the world, international safeguards have become increasingly important in verifying that nuclear materials have not been diverted. Uranium enrichment technology is a critical pathway to nuclear weapons development, making safeguards of enrichment facilities especially important. Independently-verifiable material accountancy is a fundamental measure in detecting diversion of nuclear materials. This paper is about a new instrument for uranium cylinder assay for enrichment plant safeguards called the Passive Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM). The measurement objective is to simultaneously verify uranium mass and enrichment in Uf6 cylinders. It can be used with feed, product, and tails cylinders. Here, we consider the enrichment range up to 5% {sup 235}U. The concept is to use the Doubles-to-Singles count rate to give a measure of the {sup 235}U enrichment and the Singles count rate to provide a measure of the total uranium mass. The cadmium ratio is an additional signature for the enrichment that is especially useful for feed and tails cylinders. PNEM is a {sup 3}He-based system that consists of two portable detector pods. Uranium enrichment in UF{sub 6} cylinders is typically determined using a gamma-ray-based method that only samples a tiny volume of the cylinder's content and requires knowledge of the cylinder wall thickness. The PNEM approach has several advantages over gamma-ray-based methods including a deeper penetration depth into the cylinder, meaning it can be used with heterogeneous isotopic mixtures of UF{sub 6}. In this paper, we describe a Monte Carlo modelling study where we have examined the sensitivity of the system to systematic uncertainties such as the distribution of UF{sub 6} within the cylinder. We also compare characterization measurements of the PNEM prototype to the expected measurements calculated with Monte Carlo simulations.

Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium. Options for an Action Agenda in Co-operation with the Russian Federation. Report submitted to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arbman, Gunnar; Calogero, Francesco; Martellini, Maurizio; Bremer Maerli, Morten; Nikitin, Alexander; Prawitz, Jan

2004-04-01

This study is of an exploratory nature. It provides preliminary assessments of issues of relevance for HEU elimination in Russia including: (a) technical issues concerning the HEU down-blending; uranium transparency and verification requirements; description of current Russian HEU locations; the HEU down-blending capacities, and the HEU logistics, and (b) various political and financial requirements and considerations. For future, practical project measures to be put in place, further investigations that deal with HEU logistics and handling are needed. Such studies - that obviously should include and engage key Russian actors - are possible, if they take legitimate Russian security and sensitivity concerns into consideration. Interestingly, there is a growing perception in Russia that large stocks of HEU are not required and that they could, in fact, constitute a source of danger

Enriched uranium sales: effect on supply industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersen, R.K.

1985-01-01

The subject is covered in sections: introduction (combined effect of low-enriched uranium (LEU) inventory sales and utility services enrichment contract terms); enrichment market overview; enrichment market dynamics; the reaction of the US Department of Energy; elimination of artificial demand; draw down of inventories; purchase and sale of LEU inventories; tails assay option; unfulfilled requirements for U 3 O 8 ; conclusions. (U.K.)

77 FR 51579 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

Science.gov (United States)

2012-08-24

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant.... Complex, July 30, 2012, August Uranium (93.35%). uranium-235 high-enriched 1, 2012, XSNM3726, 11006037. contained in 7.5 uranium in the kilograms uranium. form of broken metal to the Atomic Energy of Canada...

Automated assay of uranium solution concentration and enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Horley, E.C.; Gainer, K.; Hansen, W.J.; Kelley, T.A.; Parker, J.L.; Sampson, T.E.; Walton, G.; Jones, S.A.

1992-01-01

For the first time, the concentration and enrichment of uranium solutions can be measured in one step. We have developed a new instrument to automatically measure the concentration and enrichment of uranium solutions through the adaptation of a commercial robot. Two identical solution enrichment systems are being installed in the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. These automated systems will reduce radiation exposure to personnel and increase the reliability and repeatability of the measurements. Each robotic system can process up to 40 batch and 8 priority samples in an unattended mode. Both passive gamma-ray and x-ray fluorescence (XRF) analyses are performed to determine total uranium concentration and 235 U enrichment. Coded samples are read by a bar-code reader to determine measurement requirements, then assayed by either or both of the gamma-ray and XRF instruments. The robot moves the sample containers and operates all shield doors and shutters, reducing hardware complexity. If the robots is out of service, an operator can manually perform all operations

Standard specification for uranium hexafluoride enriched to less than 5 % 235U

CERN Document Server

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2010-01-01

1.1 This specification covers nuclear grade uranium hexafluoride (UF6) that either has been processed through an enrichment plant, or has been produced by the blending of Highly Enriched Uranium with other uranium to obtain uranium of any 235U concentration below 5 % and that is intended for fuel fabrication. The objectives of this specification are twofold: (1) To define the impurity and uranium isotope limits for Enriched Commercial Grade UF6 so that, with respect to fuel design and manufacture, it is essentially equivalent to enriched uranium made from natural UF6; and (2) To define limits for Enriched Reprocessed UF6 to be expected if Reprocessed UF6 is to be enriched without dilution with Commercial Natural UF6. For such UF6, special provisions, not defined herein, may be needed to ensure fuel performance and to protect the work force, process equipment, and the environment. 1.2 This specification is intended to provide the nuclear industry with a standard for enriched UF6 that is to be used in the pro...

Energy consumption of chemical uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miyake, T.; Takeda, K.; Obanawa, H.

1987-01-01

A quantitative study of chemical separation energy for enriching uranium-235 by the redox chromatography was conducted. Isotope exchange reactions between U 4+ -UO 2 2+ ions in the enrichment column are maintained by the redox reactions. The chemical separation energy is ultimately supplied by hydrogen and oxygen gas for regenerating redox agents. The redox energy for the isotope separation is theoretically predicted as a function of the dynamic enrichment factor observed in the chromatographic development of uranium adsorption band. Thermodynamic treatments of the equilibrium reactions implies and inverse redox reaction which can be enhanced by the chemical potential of the ion-exchange reaction of oxidant. Experimental results showed 30 to 90% recovery of the redox energy by the inverse reaction. These results will devise a simplified redox chromatography process where a number of columns in one module is reduced

Material control and accounting requirements for uranium enrichment facilities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ting, P.

1991-01-01

This paper reports that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has defined material control and accounting (MC and A) requirement for low-enriched uranium enrichment plants licensed under 10 CFR parts 40 and 70. Following detailed assessment of potential safeguards issues relevant to these facilities, a new MC and A rule was developed. The primary safeguards considerations are detection of the loss of special nuclear material, detection of clandestine production of special nuclear material of low strategic significance for unauthorized use or distribution, and detection of unauthorized production of uranium enriched to ≥10 wt % U-235. The primary safeguards concerns identified were the large absolute limit of error associated with the material balance closing, the inability to shutdown some uranium enrichment technologies to perform a cleanout inventory of the process system, and the flexibility of some of these technologies to produce higher enrichments. Unauthorized production scenarios were identified for some technologies that could circumvent the detection of the production and removal of 5 kilograms of U-235 as high-enriched uranium through conventional material control and accounting programs. Safeguards techniques, including the use of production and process control information, measurements, and technical surveillance, were identified to compensate for these concerns

Energy–angle correlation of neutrons and gamma-rays emitted from an HEU source

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Miloshevsky, G., E-mail: gennady@purdue.edu; Hassanein, A.

2014-06-01

Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) yield very unique fission signatures, namely correlated neutrons and gamma-rays. A major challenge is not only to detect, but also to rapidly identify and recognize SNM with certainty. Accounting for particle multiplicity and correlations is one of standard ways to detect SNM. However, many parameter data such as joint distributions of energy, angle, lifetime, and multiplicity of neutrons and gamma-rays can lead to better recognition of SNM signatures in the background radiation noise. These joint distributions are not well understood. The Monte Carlo simulations of the transport of neutrons and gamma-rays produced from spontaneous and interrogation-induced fission of SNM are carried out using the developed MONSOL computer code. The energy spectra of neutrons and gamma-rays from a bare Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) source are investigated. The energy spectrum of gamma-rays shows spectral lines by which HEU isotopes can be identified, while those of neutrons do not show any characteristic lines. The joint probability density function (JPDF) of the energy–angle association of neutrons and gamma-rays is constructed. Marginal probability density functions (MPDFs) of energy and angle are derived from JPDF. A probabilistic model is developed for the analysis of JPDF and MPDFs. This probabilistic model is used to evaluate mean values, standard deviations, covariance and correlation between the energy and angle of neutrons and gamma-rays emitted from the HEU source. For both neutrons and gamma-rays, it is found that the energy–angle variables are only weakly correlated.

Effects of enriched uranium on developing brain damage of neonatal rats

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gu Guixiong; Zhu Shoupeng; Wang Liuyi; Yang Shuqin; Zhu Lingli

2001-01-01

The model of irradiation-induced brain damage in vivo was settled first of all. The micro-auto-radiographic tracing showed that when the rat's brain at postnatal day after lateral ventricle injection with enriched uranium 235 U the radionuclides were mainly accumulated in the nucleus. At the same time autoradiographic tracks appeared in the cytoplasm and interval between cells. The effects of cerebrum exposure to alpha irradiation by enriched uranium on somatic growth and neuro-behavior development of neonatal rats were examined by determination of multiple parameters. In the growth and development of the neonatal rat's cerebrum exposure to enriched uranium, the somatic growth such as body weight and brain weight increase was lower significantly. The data indicated that the neonatal wistar rats having cerebrum exposure to alpha irradiation by enriched uranium showed delayed growth and abnormal neuro-behavior. The changes of neuron specific enolase (NSE), interleukin-1 β (IL- β), superoxide dismutase (SOD), and endothelin (ET) in cerebellum, cerebral cortex, hippocampus, diencephalons of the rat brain after expose to alpha irradiation by enriched uranium were examined with radioimmunoassay. The results showed that SOD and ET can be elevated by the low dose irradiation of enriched uranium, and can be distinctly inhibited by the high dose. The data in view of biochemistry indicated firstly that alpha irradiation from enriched uranium on the developing brain damage of neonatal rats were of sensibility, fragility and compensation in nervous cells

Effects of enriched uranium on developing brain damage of neonatal rats

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Guixiong, Gu; Shoupeng, Zhu; Liuyi, Wang; Shuqin, Yang; Lingli, Zhu [Suzhou Medical College, Suzhou (China)

2001-04-01

The model of irradiation-induced brain damage in vivo was settled first of all. The micro-auto-radiographic tracing showed that when the rat's brain at postnatal day after lateral ventricle injection with enriched uranium {sup 235}U the radionuclides were mainly accumulated in the nucleus. At the same time autoradiographic tracks appeared in the cytoplasm and interval between cells. The effects of cerebrum exposure to alpha irradiation by enriched uranium on somatic growth and neuro-behavior development of neonatal rats were examined by determination of multiple parameters. In the growth and development of the neonatal rat's cerebrum exposure to enriched uranium, the somatic growth such as body weight and brain weight increase was lower significantly. The data indicated that the neonatal wistar rats having cerebrum exposure to alpha irradiation by enriched uranium showed delayed growth and abnormal neuro-behavior. The changes of neuron specific enolase (NSE), interleukin-1 {beta} (IL- {beta}), superoxide dismutase (SOD), and endothelin (ET) in cerebellum, cerebral cortex, hippocampus, diencephalons of the rat brain after expose to alpha irradiation by enriched uranium were examined with radioimmunoassay. The results showed that SOD and ET can be elevated by the low dose irradiation of enriched uranium, and can be distinctly inhibited by the high dose. The data in view of biochemistry indicated firstly that alpha irradiation from enriched uranium on the developing brain damage of neonatal rats were of sensibility, fragility and compensation in nervous cells.

Transformations of highly enriched uranium into metal or oxide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nollet, P.; Sarrat, P.

1964-01-01

The enriched uranium workshops in Cadarache have a double purpose on the one hand to convert uranium hexafluoride into metal or oxide, and on the other hand to recover the uranium contained in scrap materials produced in the different metallurgical transformations. The principles that have been adopted for the design and safety of these workshops are reported. The nuclear safety is based on the geometrical limitations of the processing vessels. To establish the processes and the technology of these workshops, many studies have been made since 1960, some of which have led to original achievements. The uranium hexafluoride of high isotopic enrichment is converted either by injection of the gas into ammonia or by an original process of direct hydrogen reduction to uranium tetrafluoride. The uranium contained m uranium-zirconium metal scrap can be recovered by combustion with hydrogen chloride followed treatment of the uranium chloride by fluorine in order to obtain the uranium in the hexafluoride state. Recovery of the uranium contained m various scrap materials is obtained by a conventional refining process combustion of metallic scrap, nitric acid dissolution of the oxide, solvent purification by tributyl phosphate, ammonium diuranate precipitation, calcining, reduction and hydro fluorination into uranium tetrafluoride, bomb reduction by calcium and slag treatment. Two separate workshops operate along these lines one takes care of the uranium with an isotopic enrichment of up to 3 p. 100, the other handles the high enrichments. The handling of each step of this process, bearing in mind the necessity for nuclear safety, has raised some special technological problems and has led to the conception of new apparatus, in particular the roasting furnace for metal turnings, the nitric acid dissolution unit, the continuous precipitator and ever safe filter and dryer for ammonium diuranate, the reduction and hydro fluorination furnace and the slag recovery apparatus These are

Uranium enrichment by centrifuge in Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Watanabe, T.; Murase, T.

1977-01-01

The demand for enriched uranium is on the increase with nuclear power capacity in which the LWR predominates and is estimated to exceed the supply from the present facilities in the world in less than ten years. Therefore, the basic strategy for enriched uranium is investigated on the following three-point long-range program in Japan: 1. To continue negotiations to extend the current allocation by the long-term contract; 2. To seek active participation in international enrichment projects; and 3. To make efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology and to construct inland facilities. On this basis, a vigorous development program of gas centrigue process for industrialization was launched out in 1972 as a national project. Ever since substantial progress in this field has been made and development works have been increased year after year. At present, a concrete plan of a pilot plant is taking shape. Up to now, several types of centrifuges were developed, of which some were completed as prototype models, and subjected to life tests and also to extensive earthquake-resistivity tests for the characteristics of Japanese geological condition. An enrichment plant is composed of so many centrifuges that the installation and piping system of centrifuges is an important factor which has an effect on plant economy and reliability. Two types of the experimental cascade were constructed in Japan. One has been in operation since 1973, and the other since 1975. Valuable empirical data have been accumulated on cascade characteristics, maintenance scheme and so on. It will be important for the coming plants to have a flexibility to escalation of labor and energy cost, or to variation of the separative work requirement and further. An economic prospect of centrifuge enrichment process is presented

A PHWR with slightly enriched uranium about the first core

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Notari, C.

1997-01-01

Many different studies have been performed in Argentina regarding the use of slightly enriched uranium in the PHWR nuclear plants. These referred mainly to operating plants so that a transition had to be considered from the present natural uranium fuel cycle to the slightly enriched one. In this analysis, technical and economical arguments are presented which favor the use of a natural uranium initial core. The levelized fuel costs are shown to be practically insensitive to the first core and a fast transition is more influential than an initially enriched core. (author)

The supply of the European community countries with enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-02-01

A discussion is given of a survey regarding the supply of enriched uranium to the countries of the European Community. Costs of enriched uranium imports were not available but import values were calculated using world market prices. (R.L.)

Uranium enrichment: an evolving market

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Longenecker, J.; Witzel, R.

1997-01-01

With over half of the world uranium enrichment market uncommitted to any supplier early in the next century, competition is certain to be fierce. In the meantime the outlood remains unclear, with the market dominated by a number of developments -privatisation of the United States Enrichment Corp (USEC), increasing availability of Russian and US military inventories, the deployment of advanced technology and the closure of nuclear power plants due to deregulation. (author)

A disposition strategy for highly enriched, aluminum-based fuel from research and test reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McKibben, J.M.; Gould, T.H.; McDonell, W.R.; Bickford, W.E.

1994-01-01

The strategy proposed in this paper offers the Department of Energy an approach for disposing of aluminum-based, highly enriched uranium (HEU) spent fuels from foreign and domestic research reactors. The proposal is technically, socially, and economically sound. If implemented, it would advance US non-proliferation goals while also disposing of the spent fuel's waste by timely and proven methods using existing technologies and facilities at SRS without prolonged and controversial storage of the spent fuel. The fuel would be processed through 221-H. The radioactive fission products (waste) would be treated along with existing SRS high level waste by vitrifying it as borosilicate glass in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for disposal in the national geological repository. The HEU would be isotopically diluted, during processing, to low-enriched uranium (LEU) which can not be used to make weapons, thus eliminating proliferation concerns. The LEU can be sold to fabricators of either research reactor fuel or commercial power fuel. This proposed processing-LEU recycle approach has several important advantages over other alternatives, including: Lowest capital investment; lowest net total cost; quickest route to acceptable waste form and final geologic disposal; and likely lowest safety, health, and environmental impacts

Choice and utilization of slightly enriched uranium fuel for high performance research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cerles, J.M.; Schwartz, J.P.

1978-01-01

Problems relating to the replacement of highly enriched (90% or 93% U 235 ) uranium fuel: by moderately enriched (20% or 40% in U 235 ) metallic uranium fuel and slightly enriched (3% or 8% in U 235 ) uranium oxide fuel are discussed

Safety of uranium enrichment plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yonekawa, Shigeru; Morikami, Yoshio; Morita, Minoru; Takahashi, Tsukasa; Tokuyasu, Takashi.

1991-01-01

With respect to safety evaluation of the gas centrifuge enrichment facility, several characteristic problems are described as follows. Criticality safety in the cascade equipments can be obtained to maintain the enrichment of UF 6 below 5 %. External radiation dose equivalent rate of the 30B cylinder is low enough, the shield is not necessary. Penetration ratio of the two-stage HEPA filters for UF 6 aerosol is estimated at 10 -9 . From the experimental investigation, vacuum tightness is not damaged by destruction of gas centrifuge rotor. Carbon steel can be used for uranium enrichment equipments under the condition below 100degC. (author)

Development of Nitride Coating Using Atomic Layer Deposition for Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Powder

Science.gov (United States)

Bhattacharya, Sumit

High-performance research reactors require fuel that operates at high specific power and can withstand high fission density, but at relatively low temperatures. The design of the research reactor fuels is done for efficient heat emission, and consists of assemblies of thin-plates cladding made from aluminum alloy. The low-enriched fuels (LEU) were developed for replacing high-enriched fuels (HEU) for these reactors necessitates a significantly increased uranium density in the fuel to counterbalance the decrease in enrichment. One of the most promising new fuel candidate is U-Mo alloy, in a U-Mo/Al dispersion fuel form, due to its high uranium loading as well as excellent irradiation resistance performance, is being developed extensively to convert from HEU fuel to LEU fuel for high-performance research reactors. However, the formation of an interaction layer (IL) between U-Mo particles and the Al matrix, and the associated pore formation, under high heat flux and high burnup conditions, degrade the irradiation performance of the U-Mo/Al dispersion fuel. From the recent tests results accumulated from the surface engineering of low enriched uranium fuel (SELENIUM) and MIR reactor displayed that a surface barrier coating like physical vapor deposited (PVD) zirconium nitride (ZrN) can significantly reduce the interaction layer. The barrier coating performed well at low burn up but above a fluence rate of 5x 1021 ions/cm2 the swelling reappeared due to formation interaction layer. With this result in mind the objective of this research was to develop an ultrathin ZrN coating over particulate uranium-molybdenum nuclear fuel using a modified savannah 200 atomic layer deposition (ALD) system. This is done in support of the US Department of Energy's (DOE) effort to slow down the interaction at fluence rate and reach higher burn up for high power research reactor. The low-pressure Savannah 200 ALD system is modified to be designed as a batch powder coating system using the

The world market-situation for uranium and its enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lurf, G.

1977-01-01

The development of the uranium market is described as well as all pertinent facts which may have contributed to the strong rise in uranium prices of the past three years. The policies of countries which may in the future become major uranium exporters are discussed. For the conversion of uranium there is sufficient capacity. However, if construction of new plants is not started soon shortages could occur in the early 80ies. The market for enrichment has characterized in past years by substantial overcapacities. If new enrichment plants are constructed according to present schedules this overcapacity may prevail into the early 90ies. (orig.) [de

Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mueller, H. [NUKEM GmbH, Alzenau (Germany)

1997-08-01

Since the RERTR-meeting In Newport/USA in 1990 the author delivered a series of papers in connection with the fuel cycle for research reactors dealing with its front-end. In these papers the author underlined the need for unified specifications for enriched uranium metal suitable for the production of fuel elements and made proposals with regard to the re-use of in Europe reprocessed highly enriched uranium. With regard to the fuel cycle of research reactors the research reactor community was since 1989 more concentrating on the problems of its back-end since the USA stopped the acceptance of spent research reactor fuel on December 31, 1988. Now, since it is apparent that these back-end problem have been solved by AEA`s ability to reprocess and the preparedness of the USA to again accept physically spent research reactor fuel the author is focusing with this paper again on the front-end of the fuel cycle on the question whether there is at all a safe supply of low and high enriched uranium for research reactors in the future.

Supply of enriched uranium for research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, H.

1997-01-01

Since the RERTR-meeting In Newport/USA in 1990 the author delivered a series of papers in connection with the fuel cycle for research reactors dealing with its front-end. In these papers the author underlined the need for unified specifications for enriched uranium metal suitable for the production of fuel elements and made proposals with regard to the re-use of in Europe reprocessed highly enriched uranium. With regard to the fuel cycle of research reactors the research reactor community was since 1989 more concentrating on the problems of its back-end since the USA stopped the acceptance of spent research reactor fuel on December 31, 1988. Now, since it is apparent that these back-end problem have been solved by AEA's ability to reprocess and the preparedness of the USA to again accept physically spent research reactor fuel the author is focusing with this paper again on the front-end of the fuel cycle on the question whether there is at all a safe supply of low and high enriched uranium for research reactors in the future

Valence-associated uranium isotope fractionation of uranium enriched phosphate in a shallow aquifer, Lee County, Florida

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Weinberg, J.M.; Levine, B.R.; Cowart, J.B.

1993-01-01

The source of anomalously high concentrations of uranium, characterized by U-234/U-238 activity ratios significantly less than unity, in shallow groundwaters of Lee County, Florida, was investigated. Uranium in cores samples was separated into U(IV) and U(VI) oxidation state fractions, and uranium analyses were conducted by alpha spectrometry. Uranium mobility was also studied in selected leaching experiments. Results indicate that mobilization of unusually soluble uranium, present in uranium enriched phosphate of the Pliocene age Tamiami Formation at determined concentrations of up to 729 ppm, is the source for high uranium concentrations in groundwater. In leaching experiments, approximately one-third of the uranium present in the uranium enriched phosphate was mobilized into the aqueous phase. Results of previous investigations suggest that U-234, produced in rock by U-238 decay, is selectively oxidized to U(VI). The uranium enriched phosphate studied in this investigation is characterized by selective reduction of U-234, with a pattern of increasing isotopic fractionation with core depth. As a consequence, U-234/U-238 activity ratios greater than 1.0 in the U(IV) fraction, and less than 1.0 in the U(VI) fraction have developed in the rock phase. In leaching experiments, the U(VI) fraction from the rock was preferentially mobilized into the aqueous phase, suggesting that U-234/U-238 activity ratios of leaching groundwaters are strongly influenced by the isotopic characteristics of the U(VI) fraction of rock. It is suggested that preferential leaching of U(VI), present in selectivity reduced uranium enriched phosphate, is the source for low activity ratio groundwaters in Lee County

ZPR-3 Assembly 6F : A spherical assembly of highly enriched uranium, depleted uranium, aluminum and steel with an average {sup 235}U enrichment of 47 atom %.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lell, R. M.; McKnight, R. D; Schaefer, R. W.; Nuclear Engineering Division

2010-09-30

Assembly 6F (ZPR-3/6F), the final phase of the Assembly 6 program, simulated a spherical core with a thick depleted uranium reflector. ZPR-3/6F was designed as a fast reactor physics benchmark experiment with an average core {sup 235}U enrichment of approximately 47 at.%. Approximately 81.4% of the total fissions in this assembly occur above 100 keV, approximately 18.6% occur below 100 keV, and essentially none below 0.625 eV - thus the classification as a 'fast' assembly. This assembly is Fast Reactor Benchmark No. 7 in the Cross Section Evaluation Working Group (CSEWG) Benchmark Specifications and has historically been used as a data validation benchmark assembly. Loading of ZPR-3/6F began in late December 1956, and the experimental measurements were performed in January 1957. The core consisted of highly enriched uranium (HEU) plates, depleted uranium plates, perforated aluminum plates and stainless steel plates loaded into aluminum drawers, which were inserted into the central square stainless steel tubes of a 31 x 31 matrix on a split table machine. The core unit cell consisted of three columns of 0.125 in.-wide (3.175 mm) HEU plates, three columns of 0.125 in.-wide depleted uranium plates, nine columns of 0.125 in.-wide perforated aluminum plates and one column of stainless steel plates. The maximum length of each column of core material in a drawer was 9 in. (228.6 mm). Because of the goal to produce an approximately spherical core, core fuel and diluent column lengths generally varied between adjacent drawers and frequently within an individual drawer. The axial reflector consisted of depleted uranium plates and blocks loaded in the available space in the front (core) drawers, with the remainder loaded into back drawers behind the front drawers. The radial reflector consisted of blocks of depleted uranium loaded directly into the matrix tubes. The assembly geometry approximated a reflected sphere as closely as the square matrix tubes, the drawers and the

A premature demise for RERTR [Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors programme]?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rydell, R.J.

1990-01-01

A common commitment from France, Belgium, Germany and the US to eliminate highly enriched uranium from their research reactors is needed to help guard against this material falling into the wrong hands. In the US, an essential part of this commitment would be rekindling the weakened Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors programme (RERTR). This is an American initiative to develop low-enrichment uranium fuel for research reactors that have previously required weapons-usable material. Underway since 1978 at Argonne National Laboratory, RERTR has achieved some impressive results: the development of higher density, low enriched fuels that are suitable for use at over 90% of the world's research reactors; a net reduction of US exports of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the annual 700kg levels in the late 1970s to a 1990 level of just over 100kg; the encouragement of international scientific co-operation aimed at developing new fuels and facilitating the conversion of existing reactors to these fuels. However, in recent years, the US commitment to RERTR has been declining -budgets have fallen and advanced fuel development work has terminated. (author)

Standard specification for uranium metal enriched to more than 15 % and less Than 20 % 235U

CERN Document Server

American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

2000-01-01

1.1 This specification covers nuclear grade uranium metal that has either been processed through an enrichment plant, or has been produced by the blending of highly enriched uranium with other uranium, to obtain uranium of any 235U concentration below 20 % (and greater than 15 %) and that is intended for research reactor fuel fabrication. The scope of this specification includes specifications for enriched uranium metal derived from commercial natural uranium, recovered uranium, or highly enriched uranium. Commercial natural uranium, recovered uranium and highly enriched uranium are defined in Section 3. The objectives of this specification are to define the impurity and uranium isotope limits for commercial grade enriched uranium metal. 1.2 This specification is intended to provide the nuclear industry with a standard for enriched uranium metal which is to be used in the production of research reactor fuel. In addition to this specification, the parties concerned may agree to other appropriate conditions. ...

Correlation function measurement of uranium casting driven by tagged DT neutrons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Li Jiansheng; Ye Cenming; Xie Wenxiong; Huang Po; Zeng Liheng; Jin Yu; Xie Qilin; Zhang Yi

2013-01-01

integration of 4-kg HEU is 24.8%. The C 23 (τ) can demonstrate reliably the existence of HEU casting. The C 12 (τ) and C 13 (τ) values between HEU and DU casting with similar mass are different obviously. Conclusions: The spontaneous neutron decay constants of the components are stable, it can be used as an important parameter independently for the uranium casting verification. The correlation function C 23 (τ) is effective to judge the existence of uranium casting. By use of the integrations of the C 12 (τ), C 13 (τ) and C 23 (τ), the mass or enrichment of the uranium casting can be distinguished. (authors)

Uranium enrichment: investment options for the long term

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1983-01-01

The US government supplies a major portion of the enriched uranium used to fuel most of the nuclear power plants that furnish electricity in the free world. As manager of the US uranium enrichment concern, the Department of Energy (DOE) is investigating a number of technological choices to improve enrichment service and remain a significant world supplier. The Congress will ultimately select a strategy for federal investment in the uranium enrichment enterprise. A fundamental policy choice between possible future roles - that of the free world's main supplier of enrichment services, and that of a mainly domestic supplier - will underlie any investment decision the Congress makes. The technological choices are gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, and atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS). A base plan and four alternatives were examined by DOE and the Congressional Budget Office. In terms of total enterprise costs, Option IV, ultimately relying on advanced gas centrifuges for enrichment services, would offer the most economic approach, with costs over the full projection period totaling $123.5 billion. Option III, ultimately relying on AVLIS without gas centrifuge enrichment or gaseous diffusion, falls next in the sequence, with costs of $128.2 billion. Options I and II, involving combinations of the gas centrifuge and AVLIS technologies, follow closely with costs of $128.7 and $129.6 billion. The base plan has costs of $136.8 billion over the projection period. 1 figure, 22 tables

Long-term outlook for global natural uranium and uranium enrichment supply and demand situations after the impact of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matsuo, Yuhji; Murakami, Tomoko

2012-01-01

In this paper, the authors propose long-term projections of global nuclear power generation, uranium production, and uranium enrichment capacities by region, and estimate the trade flows of natural uranium and uranium enrichment activities in 2020 and 2035. In spite of the rapid nuclear power generation capacity growth expected especially in Asia, the natural uranium and uranium enrichment trade will not be tightened by 2020 due to the projected increase in both natural uranium production and uranium enrichment capacities, which may cause a drop in natural uranium and uranium enrichment prices. Thus, there is a great possibility that the current projects for capacity expansion will be delayed considerably. However, in the 'high-demand scenario', where nuclear expansion will be accelerated due to growing concerns about global warming and energy security issues, additional investments in uranium production and enrichment facilities will be needed by 2035. In Asia, the self-sufficiency ratio for both natural uranium supply and uranium enrichment activities will remain relatively low until 2035. However, the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index of natural uranium and uranium enrichment activity trade to Asia will be lowered considerably up to 2035, indicating that nuclear capacity expansion can contribute to enhancing energy security in Asia. (author)

Electrically Cooled Germanium System for Measurements of Uranium Enrichments in UF6 Cylinders

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dvornyak, P.; Koestlbauer, M.; Lebrun, A.; Murray, M.; Nizhnik, V.; Saidler, C.; Twomey, T.

2010-01-01

Measurements of Uranium enrichment in UF6 cylinders is a significant part of the IAEA Safeguards verification activities at enrichment and conversion plants. Nowadays, one of the main tools for verification of Uranium enrichment in UF6 cylinders used by Safeguards inspectors is the gamma spectroscopy system with HPGe detector cooled with liquid nitrogen. Electrically Cooled Germanium System (ECGS) is a new compact and portable high resolution gamma spectrometric system free from liquid nitrogen cooling, which can be used for the same safeguards applications. It consists of the ORTEC Micro-trans-SPEC HPGe Portable Spectrometer, a special tungsten collimator and UF6 enrichment measurement software. The enrichment of uranium is determined by of quantifying the area of the 185.7 keV peak provided that the measurement is performed with a detector viewing an infinite thickness of material. Prior starting the verification of uranium enrichment at the facility, the ECGS has to be calibrated with a sample of known uranium enrichment, material matrix, container wall thickness and container material. Evaluation of the ECGS capabilities was performed by carrying out a field test on actual enrichment verification of uranium in UF6 cylinder or other forms of uranium under infinite thickness conditions. The results of these evaluations allow to say that the use of ECGS will enhance practicality of the enrichment measurements and support unannounced inspection activities at enrichment and conversion plants. (author)

Uranium enrichment activities: the SILVA program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guyot, J.; Cazalet, J.; Camarcat, N.; Figuet, J.

1994-01-01

Through its commitment to a nuclear electricity generation policy, France holds today a specific position in the uranium enrichment market thanks to the modern multinational EURODIF gaseous diffusion plant. France has, altogether, a long-term goal in developing SILVA, a laser uranium enrichment process, based on the selective photo-ionization of U-235. After reviewing the fundamentals of SILVA (the laser system with copper vapor lasers and dye lasers and the separator system), a description of the general organization of the R and D program is provided going through basic research, subsystems assessment, production demonstrations and simulations (with the LACAN code), plant design and economics. The general schedule of SILVA is outlined, leading to the possible construction of a commercial plant. 7 figs., 11 refs

HEU and Leu FueL Shielding Comparative Study Applied for Spent Fuel Transport

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Margeanu, C.A.; Margeanu, S.; Barbos, D.

2009-01-01

INR Pitesti owns and operates a TRIGA dual-core Research Reactor for material testing, power reactor fuel and nuclear safety studies. The dual core concept involves the operation of a 14 MW TRIGA steady-state, high flux research and material testing reactor at one end of a large pool, and the independent operation of an annular-core pulsing reactor (TRIGA-ACPR) at the other end of the pool. The steady-state reactor is mostly used for long term testing of power reactor fuel components (pellets, pins, subassemblies and fuel assemblies) followed by post-irradiation examination. Following the general trend to replace the He fuel type (High Enriched Uranium) by Leu fuel type (Low Enriched Uranium), in the light of international agreements between IAEA and the states using He fuel in their nuclear reactors, Inr Past's have been accomplished the TRIGA research reactor core full conversion on May 2006. The He fuel repatriation in US in the frame of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Return Programme effectively started in 1999, the final stage being achieved in summer of 2008. Taking into account for the possible impact on the human and environment, in all activities associated to nuclear fuel cycle, the spent fuel or radioactive waste characteristics must be well known. Shielding calculations basic tasks consist in radiation doses calculation, in order to prevent any risks both for personnel protection and impact on the environment during the spent fuel manipulation, transport and storage. The paper is a comparative study of Leu and He fuel utilization effects for the shielding analysis during spent fuel transport. A comparison against the measured data for He spent fuel, available from the last stage of the spent fuel repatriation, is presented. All the geometrical and material data related on the spent fuel shipping cask were considered according to the Nac-Lt Cask approved model. The shielding analysis estimates radiation doses to shipping cask wall surface

Shipment of VINCA Institute's HEU fresh fuel to Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pesic, Milan; Sotic, Obrad

2002-01-01

This paper shows, for the first time, the basic data related to the recent shipment of the fresh HEU fuel elements from Yugoslavia back to Russia for uranium down blending. In this way, Yugoslavia gives its contribution to the RERTR program and to the world's joint efforts to prevent possible terrorist action against nuclear material potentially usable for production of nuclear weapons. (author)

Development of LEU targets for 99Mo production and their chemical processing status 1989

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vandegrift, G.F.; Kwok, J.D.; Chamberlain, D.B.; Hoh, J.C.; Streets, E.W.; Vogler, S.; Thresh, H.R.; Domagala, R.F.; Wiencek, T.C.; Matos, J.E.

1991-01-01

Most of the world's supply of Tc-99m for medical purposes is currently produced from Mo-99 derived from the fissioning of high enriched uranium (HEU). Substitution of low enriched uranium (LEU) silicide fuel for the HEU alloy and aluminide fuels used in current target designs will allow equivalent Mo-99 yields with no change in target geometries. Substitution of uranium metal will also allow the substitution of LEU for HEU. Efforts performed in 1989 focused on (1) fabrication of a uranium metal target by Hot Isostatic Pressing uranium metal foil to zirconium, (2) experimental investigation of the dissolution step for U 3 Si 2 targets, allowing us to present a conceptual design for the dissolution process and equipment, and (3) investigation of the procedures used to reclaim irradiated uranium from Mo-production targets, allowing us to further analyze the waste and by-product problems associated with the substitution of LEU for HEU. (orig.)

10 CFR 40.33 - Issuance of a license for a uranium enrichment facility.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Issuance of a license for a uranium enrichment facility... License Applications § 40.33 Issuance of a license for a uranium enrichment facility. (a) The Commission... the licensing of the construction and operation of a uranium enrichment facility. The Commission will...

Remote Handling Devices for Disposition of Enriched Uranium Reactor Fuel Using Melt-Dilute Process

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heckendorn, F.M.

2001-01-01

Remote handling equipment is required to achieve the processing of highly radioactive, post reactor, fuel for the melt-dilute process, which will convert high enrichment uranium fuel elements into lower enrichment forms for subsequent disposal. The melt-dilute process combines highly radioactive enriched uranium fuel elements with deleted uranium and aluminum for inductive melting and inductive stirring steps that produce a stable aluminum/uranium ingot of low enrichment

Nuclear threat initiative - Kazakhstan project on elimination of high-enriched uranium. 8 October 2005, Ust Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

Since its establishment in 2001, NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative) has made important contributions towards securing weapon-usable nuclear material and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, NTI pledged $1.15 million to the Agency?s Nuclear Security Fund, which has been used to achieve tangible nuclear security improvements: upgrades to physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear and radioactive material; urgently needed training in nuclear security for national officials; enhanced detection capabilities at border crossings; and improved national and international readiness for responding to terrorist acts. NTI has consistently sought to target its contributions to address areas of high priority. A primary point of focus has been to secure (and, where possible, eliminate) material that could be diverted for weapons purposes. In P roject Vinca , NTI committed $5 million in 2002 to help remove high enriched uranium fuel from a research reactor near Belgrade, for return to Russia. With support from Russia, the United States and NTI, seven transfers of fresh fuel back to Russia have been made since 2002 - a total of 112 kilograms of HEU. Current plans foresee further shipments of fresh HEU from another three countries in the next 15 months. The IAEA is also continuing to work on arrangements for the repatriation of spent research reactor fuel of Russian origin. In 2001, Sam Nunn and NTI president Charles Curtis approached the Kazakh Government to offer support for the safe transportation of the unused nuclear fuel from the shutdown BN-350 reactor - nearly 3000 kilograms - to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant JSC (UMP), where it could be dismantled and down-blended into LEU (NTI-Kazakhstan project). By the end of this year, 2897 kilograms of HEU - enough to produce dozens of nuclear bombs - will have been down-blended to LEU and placed in safe storage. Throughout the project, the IAEA has been implementing

Advanced uranium enrichment processes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Clerc, M.; Plurien, P.

1986-01-01

Three advanced Uranium enrichment processes are dealt with in the report: AVLIS (Atomic Vapour LASER Isotope Separation), MLIS (Molecular LASER Isotope Separation) and PSP (Plasma Separation Process). The description of the physical and technical features of the processes constitutes a major part of the report. If further presents comparisons with existing industrially used enrichment technologies, gives information on actual development programmes and budgets and ends with a chapter on perspectives and conclusions. An extensive bibliography of the relevant open literature is added to the different subjects discussed. The report was drawn up by the nuclear research Centre (CEA) Saclay on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities

URENCO. Uranium enrichment with advanced technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

URENCO Deutschland is a subsidiary of URENCO Enrichment Company Limited, an international enterprise founded in 1970 in the State Treaty of Almelo, which offers uranium enrichment for nuclear power plants all over the world with the use of advanced technology. URENCO facilities at present are operated in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, USA, and in Germany. The German URENCO location is Gronau, Westphalia, where cascades have been in operation since 1985 using centrifuge technology to enrich nuclear fuel to up to 5% uranium-235. The URENCO Group supplies nuclear power plants in Europe and overseas countries with a world market share, at present, of more than 25% with a rising tendency. The first uranium separation plant in Gronau (UTA-1) attained its full separation performance of 1,800 t USW/a in late 2005. In February 2005, construction and operation of another plant had been licensed, which can raise the aggregate capacity on site to 4,500 t USW per annum. Construction of the new plant (UTA-2) was begun in summer 2005. UTA-2 will use the latest, most powerful URENCO centrifuge. URENCO has more than 3,500 visitors a year at its German location alone, thus demonstrating its pro-active information policy and offering to the public a maximum of opportunities to acquire information by attending presentations and tours of the plant. (orig.)

Distribution of uranium supply and enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bamford, F.W.

1982-01-01

Uranium supply and demand is examined from the perspective of companies in the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) conversion business whose main interest is their sources of uranium supply and UF6 destinations because of transportation costs. Because of the variations in yellowcake transport, charges for conversion, and UF6 transport costs, most converters don't have standard prices. Companies try to look ahead to determine patterns of supplies and delivery points when they analyze the market and estimate future prices. Market analyses must take into account the purchasing policies of utilities around the world. The presentation shows North America supplying about 40% of world uranium, with about 13% of the enrichment done elsewhere. It also shows North American converters getting 53% of the business, but that will require importing uranium from outside North America. 6 tables

Uranium enrichment: a competitive market in the future?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Marques, Andre Ferreira; Honaiser, Eduardo Henrique Rangel [Centro Tecnologico da Marinha em Sao Paulo (CTMSP), Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil)]. E-mail: 20-1@ctemsp.mar.mil.br

2005-07-01

Uranium enrichment is the costly step in the nuclear fuel cycle. It has born as a an activity for the military in the 40s, financed by governments, such as the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union. Later, other major nations have joined them in the nuclear weapons development. The activity of enrichment was done in each country that developed nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapons countries, especially the US and Soviet Union, dictated the mined uranium market. In the 70s, with the growth of the commercial use of nuclear energy, uranium enrichment started to be treated as a market, which gradually have structured itself, strongly influenced by the historical background. Today, the market is an oligopoly of four major government-owned (or government-influenced) companies. In this paper, the trends in the enrichment market are identified, focusing on competitiveness. Through the conduction of a market analysis (past and future), and the study of the market structure evolution, a more competitive market is shown, but still influenced by the governmental participation. Competitiveness is dictated by government support, verticalization capacity, and, mainly by technological advantages. (author)

Uranium enrichment: a competitive market in the future?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marques, Andre Ferreira; Honaiser, Eduardo Henrique Rangel

2005-01-01

Uranium enrichment is the costly step in the nuclear fuel cycle. It has born as a an activity for the military in the 40s, financed by governments, such as the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union. Later, other major nations have joined them in the nuclear weapons development. The activity of enrichment was done in each country that developed nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapons countries, especially the US and Soviet Union, dictated the mined uranium market. In the 70s, with the growth of the commercial use of nuclear energy, uranium enrichment started to be treated as a market, which gradually have structured itself, strongly influenced by the historical background. Today, the market is an oligopoly of four major government-owned (or government-influenced) companies. In this paper, the trends in the enrichment market are identified, focusing on competitiveness. Through the conduction of a market analysis (past and future), and the study of the market structure evolution, a more competitive market is shown, but still influenced by the governmental participation. Competitiveness is dictated by government support, verticalization capacity, and, mainly by technological advantages. (author)

R and D on laser uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1986-01-01

An AEC Advisory Committee on Uranium Enrichment has completed investigations into the actual condition of laser isotope separation. The working group set up for the purpose has issued a report on the series of investigations made on its development and measures for promoting it. The report says that the development of the process in Japan is at a fundamental stage. Noting that further efforts are needed before its future can be predicted, the report proposes a cource of research and development for the immediate future. For the atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS), government organizations are engaged in data base buildup and conducting basis engineering tests, and Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute will consider the re-enrichment of uranium recovered from reprocessing. Non-governmental unions of researchers will promote the combination of copper-vapor laser and dye laser. For the molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS), the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research will take up studies with the cooperation of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. In chapters covering the philosophy of laser uranium enrichment technology development, the report deals with its significance, actual conditions and tasks, and goals and measures for its promotion. (Nogami, K.)

Status of the German AF-programme. Considerations with respect to INFCE recommendations and criteria[AF = Anreicherungsreduzierung in Forschungsreaktoren (Enrichment reduction in research reactors)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Thamm, Gerd H [Kernforschungsanlage Juelich GmbH, Research Reactor Division, Juelich (Germany)

1983-09-01

As is generally known, the INFCE studies carried out on a worldwide scale from 1977 to 1979 for research reactors using primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU 80% to 93% U-235) have led to the important recommendation that an effective reduction in the proliferation of weapons-usable nuclear material can be achieved by converting the fuel cycles from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU, U-235 enrichment 20%). Further recommendations made by INFCE to the effect of restricting or markedly reducing the stockpiles of HEU materials and diminishing the production of fissile materials due to irradiation in research reactors, however, have been given secondary attention in the course of development as compared to the first recommendation mentioned above. As a result of the INFCE studies, national programmes were initiated in various countries aiming at enrichment reduction in research reactors. Essential work in this connection was commenced above all in the USA (RERTR programme), in France, Japan and in the Federal Republic of Germany (AF programme). Added to this was an IAEA support programme intended primarily for developing and threshold countries. Essential conditions in the form of criteria were elaborated by the INFCE Working Group 8C in connection with the recommendation for enrichment reduction in research reactors. These criteria are: 1. The safety margins and fuel reliability should not be reduced by a conversion from HEU to LEU cycles. 2. Losses in reactor performance (e.g. the ratio of neutron flux available for experiments) to reactor power should not be more than marginal. 3. The cost of conversion for research reactors should be kept as low as possible. 4. Any increase in operating costs after conversion should not be more than marginal. The first three criteria mentioned have been given particular attention and have a good chance of being complied with in the current worldwide development activities for a conversion of research reactors to LEU fuel cycle

White Paper – Use of LEU for a Space Reactor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Poston, David Irvin [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Mcclure, Patrick Ray [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-08-11

Historically space reactors flown or designed for the U.S. and Russia used Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for fuel. HEU almost always produces a small and lighter reactor. Since mass increases launch costs or decreases science payloads, HEU was the natural choice. However in today’s environment, the proliferation of HEU has become a major concern for the U.S. government and hence a policy issue. In addition, launch costs are being reduced as the space community moves toward commercial launch vehicles. HEU also carries a heavy security cost to process, test, transport and launch. Together these issues have called for a re-investigation into space reactors the use Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel.

76 FR 72984 - Revised Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

Science.gov (United States)

2011-11-28

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Revised Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium The application for a license to export high-enriched Uranium has been revised as noted below. Notice... fabricate fuel France. Security Complex; October 18, Uranium (93.35%). uranium (174.0 elements in France...

75 FR 15743 - Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium

Science.gov (United States)

2010-03-30

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Application for a License To Export High-Enriched Uranium Pursuant to 10 CFR 110.70(c) ``Public notice of receipt of an application,'' please take notice that the...-Enriched 160.0 kilograms To fabricate fuel France. Complex, March 3, 2010. Uranium (93.35%). uranium (149...

Environmental Development Plan: uranium enrichment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-09-01

This Environmental Development Plan identifies and examines the environmental, health, safety, and socioeconomic concerns and corresponding requirements associated with the DOE research, development, demonstration, and operation of the Uranium Enrichment program, including the gaseous diffusion process, the centrifuge process, centrifuge rotor fabrication, and related research and development activities

Optimal set of selected uranium enrichments that minimizes blending consequences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nachlas, J.A.; Kurstedt, H.A. Jr.; Lobber, J.S. Jr.

1977-01-01

Identities, quantities, and costs associated with producing a set of selected enrichments and blending them to provide fuel for existing reactors are investigated using an optimization model constructed with appropriate constraints. Selected enrichments are required for either nuclear reactor fuel standardization or potential uranium enrichment alternatives such as the gas centrifuge. Using a mixed-integer linear program, the model minimizes present worth costs for a 39-product-enrichment reference case. For four ingredients, the marginal blending cost is only 0.18% of the total direct production cost. Natural uranium is not an optimal blending ingredient. Optimal values reappear in most sets of ingredient enrichments

77 FR 13367 - General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC, Proposed Laser-Based Uranium Enrichment...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-03-06

... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2009-0157] General Electric-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC, Proposed Laser-Based Uranium Enrichment Facility, Wilmington, NC AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory... Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed General Electric- Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment, LLC (GLE...

Multinational uranium enrichment in the Middle East

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahmad, Ali; Salahieh, Sidra; Snyder, Ryan

2017-01-01

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program while other Middle Eastern countries– Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates–are planning to build their own nuclear power plants to meet increasing electricity demands. Although the JCPOA restricts Iran's uranium enrichment program for 10–15 years, Iran's neighbors may choose to develop their own national enrichment programs giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. This paper argues that converting Iran's national enrichment program to a more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangement could offer significant economic benefits–reduced capital and operational costs–due to economies of scale and the utilization of more efficient enrichment technologies. In addition, the paper examines policy aspects related to financing, governance, and how multinational enrichment could fit into the political and security context of the Middle East. A multinational enrichment facility managed by regional and international partners would provide more assurance that it remains peaceful and could help build confidence between Iran and its neighbors to cooperate in managing other regional security challenges. - Highlights: • Freezing Iran's nuclear program is an opportunity to launch joint initiatives in ME. • A joint uranium enrichment program in the Middle East offers economic benefits. • Other benefits include improved nuclear security and transparency in the region.

Uranium enrichment. 1980 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-05-01

This report contains data and related information on the production of enriched uranium at the gaseous diffusion plants and an update on the construction and project control center for the gas centrifuge plant. Power usage at the gaseous diffusion plants is illustrated. The report contains several glossy color pictures of the plants and processes described. In addition to gaseous diffusion and the centrifuge process, three advanced isotope separation process are now being developed. The business operation of the enrichment plants is described; charts on revenue, balance sheets, and income statements are included

Criticality of moderated and undermoderated low-enriched uranium oxide systems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goebel, G.R.

1980-06-01

Uranium oxide was enriched to 4.46 wt % 235 U compacted to a density of 4.68 g/cm 3 . The uranium oxide was packed into cubical aluminum cans and water added to the oxide until an H/U atomic ratio of 0.77 was achieved. A 5 x 5 x 5 array of uranium oxide cans for the experiments were used when no plastic moderator material was placed between cans. High enriched uranium drivers were used to achieve criticality. Criticality was achieved for smaller arrays without a driver when 24.5 mm plastic moderator material was placed between the cans. Twelve critical experiments are reported, six in each reflector

Loss-of-Flow and Loss-of-Pressure Simulations of the BR2 Research Reactor with HEU and LEU Fuel

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Licht, J. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Bergeron, A. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Dionne, B. [Argonne National Lab. (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States); Sikik, E. [Belgian Nuclear Research Center (SCK-CEN), Mol (Belgium); Van den Branden, G. [Belgian Nuclear Research Center (SCK-CEN), Mol (Belgium); Koonen, E. [Belgian Nuclear Research Center (SCK-CEN), Mol (Belgium)

2016-01-01

Belgian Reactor 2 (BR2) is a research and test reactor located in Mol, Belgium and is primarily used for radioisotope production and materials testing. The Materials Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is supporting the conversion of the BR2 reactor from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel. The reactor core of BR2 is located inside a pressure vessel that contains 79 channels in a hyperboloid configuration. The core configuration is highly variable as each channel can contain a fuel assembly, a control or regulating rod, an experimental device, or a beryllium or aluminum plug. Because of this variability, a representative core configuration, based on current reactor use, has been defined for the fuel conversion analyses. The code RELAP5/Mod 3.3 was used to perform the transient thermal-hydraulic safety analyses of the BR2 reactor to support reactor conversion. The input model has been modernized relative to that historically used at BR2 taking into account the best modeling practices developed by Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and BR2 engineers.

Uranium enrichment management review. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ellett, J.D.; Rieke, W.B.; Simpson, J.W.; Sullivan, P.E.

1980-01-01

The uranium enrichment enterprise of the US Department of Energy (DOE) provides enriched nuclear fuel for private and government utilities domestically and abroad. The enterprise, in effect, provides a commercial service and represents a signficant business operation within the US government: more than $1 billion in revenues annually and future capital expenditures estimated at several billions of dollars. As a result, in May 1980, the Assistant Secretary for Resource Applications within DOE requested that a group of experienced business executives be assembled to review the operation, financing, and management of the uranium enrichment enterprise as a basis for advising the Secretary of Energy. The review group was specifically asked to focus on the management activities to which sound business practices could be applied. The group developed findings and recommendations in six areas: management of operations and construction; long-range planning; marketing of enrichment services; financial management; research and development; and general management. The chapters of this report present first the management review group's recommendations in the six areas evaluated and then the findings and issues in each area. An appendix provides the group's calendar of meetings. A list of major reference sources used in the course of the study is also included. 12 references

Long Range Active Detection of HEU Based on Thermal Neutron Multiplication

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Forman L.; Dioszegi I.; Salwen, C.; and Vanier, P.E.

2010-05-24

We report on the results of measurements of proton irradiation on a series of targets at Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL) Alternate Gradient Synchrotron Facility (AGS), in collaboration with LANL and SNL. We examined the prompt radiation environment in the tunnel for the DTRA-sponsored series (E 972), which investigated the penetration of air and subsequent target interaction of 4 GeV proton pulses. Measurements were made by means of an organic scintillator with a 500 MHz bandwidth system. We found that irradiation of a depleted uranium (DU) target resulted in a large gamma-ray signal in the 100-500 µsec time region after the proton flash when the DU was surrounded by polyethylene, but little signal was generated if it was surrounded by boron-loaded polyethylene. Subsequent Monte Carlo (MCNPX) calculations indicated that the source of the signal was consistent with thermal neutron capture in DU. The MCNPX calculations also indicated that if one were to perform the same experiment with a highly enriched uranium (HEU) target there would be a distinctive fast neutron yield in this 100-500 µsec time region from thermal neutron-induced fission. The fast neutrons can be recorded by the same direct current system and differentiated from gamma ray pulses in organic scintillator by pulse shape discrimination.

Mortality (1968-2008) in a French cohort of uranium enrichment workers potentially exposed to rapidly soluble uranium compounds.

Science.gov (United States)

Zhivin, Sergey; Guseva Canu, Irina; Samson, Eric; Laurent, Olivier; Grellier, James; Collomb, Philippe; Zablotska, Lydia B; Laurier, Dominique

2016-03-01

Until recently, enrichment of uranium for civil and military purposes in France was carried out by gaseous diffusion using rapidly soluble uranium compounds. We analysed the relationship between exposure to soluble uranium compounds and exposure to external γ-radiation and mortality in a cohort of 4688 French uranium enrichment workers who were employed between 1964 and 2006. Data on individual annual exposure to radiological and non-radiological hazards were collected for workers of the AREVA NC, CEA and Eurodif uranium enrichment plants from job-exposure matrixes and external dosimetry records, differentiating between natural, enriched and depleted uranium. Cause-specific mortality was compared with the French general population via standardised mortality ratios (SMR), and was analysed via Poisson regression using log-linear and linear excess relative risk models. Over the period of follow-up, 131 161 person-years at risk were accrued and 21% of the subjects had died. A strong healthy worker effect was observed: all causes SMR=0.69, 95% CI 0.65 to 0.74. SMR for pleural cancer was significantly increased (2.3, 95% CI 1.06 to 4.4), but was only based on nine cases. Internal uranium and external γ-radiation exposures were not significantly associated with any cause of mortality. This is the first study of French uranium enrichment workers. Although limited in statistical power, further follow-up of this cohort, estimation of internal uranium doses and pooling with similar cohorts should elucidate potential risks associated with exposure to soluble uranium compounds. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/

Uranium enrichment management review: summary of analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1981-01-01

In May 1980, the Assistant Secretary for Resource Applications within the Department of Energy requested that a group of experienced business executives be assembled to review the operation, financing, and management of the uranium enrichment enterprise as a basis for advising the Secretary of Energy. After extensive investigation, analysis, and discussion, the review group presented its findings and recommendations in a report on December 2, 1980. The following pages contain background material on which that final report was based. This report is arranged in chapters that parallel those of the uranium enrichment management review final report - chapters that contain summaries of the review group's discussion and analyses in six areas: management of operations and construction; long-range planning; marketing of enrichment services; financial management; research and development; and general management. Further information, in-depth analysis, and discussion of suggested alternative management practices are provided in five appendices

Uranium enrichment management review: summary of analysis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1981-01-01

In May 1980, the Assistant Secretary for Resource Applications within the Department of Energy requested that a group of experienced business executives be assembled to review the operation, financing, and management of the uranium enrichment enterprise as a basis for advising the Secretary of Energy. After extensive investigation, analysis, and discussion, the review group presented its findings and recommendations in a report on December 2, 1980. The following pages contain background material on which that final report was based. This report is arranged in chapters that parallel those of the uranium enrichment management review final report - chapters that contain summaries of the review group's discussion and analyses in six areas: management of operations and construction; long-range planning; marketing of enrichment services; financial management; research and development; and general management. Further information, in-depth analysis, and discussion of suggested alternative management practices are provided in five appendices.

Status report on the cost and availability of enriched uranium for research reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Hans; Laucht, Juergen

2005-01-01

Availability and price development of enriched uranium contained in fuel elements for research reactors plays an important role with regard to reliability and economic and planning reasons. The leading price factors of LEU (19.75% enriched uranium metal), are the contained natural uranium equivalent in the form of UF6 (feed component), the separative work of the enrichment (SWU), conversion of the enriched uranium into metal form and associated services, such as transportation. World market price of feed material for enrichment was more or less stable in the last decades. After very moderate feed price increases between 2001 and mid-2003, the price gained momentum and almost doubled in the short period between the 2nd half of 2003 and year-end 2004. (author)

Preliminary investigations on the use of uranium silicide targets for fission Mo-99 production

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cols, H.; Cristini, P.; Marques, R.

1997-08-01

The National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) of Argentine Republic owns and operates an installation for production of molybdenum-99 from fission products since 1985, and, since 1991, covers the whole national demand of this nuclide, carrying out a program of weekly productions, achieving an average activity of 13 terabecquerel per week. At present they are finishing an enlargement of the production plant that will allow an increase in the volume of production to about one hundred of terabecquerel. Irradiation targets are uranium/aluminium alloy with 90% enriched uranium with aluminium cladding. In view of international trends held at present for replacing high enrichment uranium (HEU) for enrichment values lower than 20 % (LEU), since 1990 the authors are in contact with the RERTR program, beginning with tests to adapt their separation process to new irradiation target conditions. Uranium silicide (U{sub 3}Si{sub 2}) was chosen as the testing material, because it has an uranium mass per volume unit, so that it allows to reduce enrichment to a value of 20%. CNEA has the technology for manufacturing miniplates of uranium silicide for their purposes. In this way, equivalent amounts of Molybdenum-99 could be obtained with no substantial changes in target parameters and irradiation conditions established for the current process with Al/U alloy. This paper shows results achieved on the use of this new target.

New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brim, Cornelia P.

2013-04-01

An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

Status of the RERTR [Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor] program in Argentina

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Giorsetti, D.R.

1987-01-01

The Argentine Atomic Energy Commission started in 1978 the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors in the field of reactor engineering; engineering, development and manufacturing of fuel elements and research reactors operators. This program was initiated with the conviction that it would contribute to the international efforts to reduce risks of nuclear weapons proliferation owing to an uncontrolled use of highly enriched uranium. It was intended to convert RA-3 reactor to make possible its operation with low enriched fuel (LEU), instead of high enriched fuel (HEU) and to develop manufacturing techniques for said LEU. Afterwards, this program was adapted to assist other countries in reactors conversion, development of the corresponding fuel elements and supply of fuel elements to other countries. (Author)

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The Director General has received a letter dated 16 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2008 [es

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009 [es

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2011 [es

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006 [es

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2012 [es

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010 [es

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 20 September 2012 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2011. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2011

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 14 October 2010 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2009. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2009

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The Director General has received a letter dated 16 July 2009 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2008. 2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2008

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The Secretariat has received a note verbale dated 2 July 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2012. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of the estimated amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2012

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of Highly Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Director General has received a Note Verbale dated 3 July 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in the enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/549 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2006. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil highly enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2006

Communication Received from Germany Concerning its Policies regarding the Management of Plutonium. Statements on the Management of Plutonium and of High Enriched Uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The Director General has received a note verbale dated 29 April 2011 from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the IAEA in enclosures of which the Government of Germany, in keeping with its commitment under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (contained in INFCIRC/5491 of 16 March 1998 and hereinafter referred to as the 'Guidelines'), and in accordance with Annexes B and C of the Guidelines, has made available annual figures for holdings of civil unirradiated plutonium and the estimated amounts of plutonium contained in spent civil reactor fuel as of 31 December 2010. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made available a statement of its annual figures for holdings of civil high enriched uranium (HEU) as of 31 December 2010 [fr