WorldWideScience

Sample records for ed safety requirements

  1. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  3. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  4. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2009 ed. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This publication establishes the regulations that are applied to the transport of radioactive material by all modes of transport on land, water or in the air, including transport that is incidental to the use of the radioactive material. The objective and scope of the regulations are described in detail as well as the range of their application. The publication provides requirements useful to governments, regulators, operators of nuclear and radiation facilities, carriers, users of radiation sources and cargo handling personnel. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Definitions; 3. General provisions; 4. Activity limits and classification; 5. Requirements and controls for transport; 6. Requirements for radioactive materials and for packagings and packages; 7. Test procedures; 8. Approval and administrative requirements; Annex I: Summary of approval and prior notification requirements; Annex II: Conversion factors and prefixes.

  5. Occupational safety manual. 4. rev. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skiba, R.

    1979-01-01

    With the rapid technical development and increasing life expectancy, protection against occupational hazards has become a central economic and social problem. Consultants and others responsible for occupational safety should not only be interested in their work but also have sufficient basic knowledge. The complex subject is presented in a simplified and easily comprehensible manner, with particular regard to the practical side. The book is at the same time a textbook for basic training and a reference manual for the working practice. (orig./HP) [de

  6. Basic requirements for personnel monitoring. 1980 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This Code of Practice sets forth the objectives of an adequate system of personnel monitoring for radiation workers. It covers individual dosimetry, including internal radiation monitoring, and area monitoring to the extent required for the assessment of individual radiation doses. The responsibilities of authorities for organizing monitoring of radiation workers are discussed, together with brief descriptions of monitoring methods and the rules governing their application. The general principles to be considered in selecting instrumentation and the appropriate monitoring techniques are described, as well as calibration techniques, methods of data handling and record keeping. Current concepts and recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, as presented in ICRP Publication No.26, have been incorporated. New developments in techniques and instruments have been reflected, and several sections such as calibration and record keeping have been elaborated. The bibliography has been updated and new annexes added.

  7. ED accreditation update. Physicians, medical staff may report safety concerns without fear of disciplinary action.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-11-01

    Educating your staff about The Joint Commission's requirements for concerns about hospital safety and quality of care requires the ED manager to set a tone of openness and cooperation, while at the same time emphasizing your department's role in addressing such concerns: * The ED should be the first place that staff members communicate quality and safety concerns. It is only when a problem is not addressed that they should take the issue to hospital administration and, if necessary, The Joint Commission. * A single event should not trigger a report to The Joint Commission, unless it is unusually serious. Otherwise, only a series of events should trigger a report. * Reassure your staff that you care about what is reported and will act quickly on it. Educate your staff about the reporting forms, and follow up with random audits to ensure compliance.

  8. Range Flight Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Loftin, Charles E.; Hudson, Sandra M.

    2018-01-01

    The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide the technical requirements for the NPR 8715.5, Range Flight Safety Program, in regards to protection of the public, the NASA workforce, and property as it pertains to risk analysis, Flight Safety Systems (FSS), and range flight operations. This standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers, including Component Facilities and Technical and Service Support Centers, and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement. This standard may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory or to other contractors, grant recipients, or parties to agreements to the extent specified or referenced in their contracts, grants, or agreements, when these organizations conduct or participate in missions that involve range flight operations as defined by NPR 8715.5.1.2.2 In this standard, all mandatory actions (i.e., requirements) are denoted by statements containing the term “shall.”1.3 TailoringTailoring of this standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements.

  9. Safety of Research Reactors. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The main objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to provide a basis for safety and a basis for safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Another objective is to establish requirements on aspects relating to regulatory control, the management of safety, site evaluation, design, operation and decommissioning. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives. This Safety Requirements publication is intended for use by organizations engaged in the site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, operation and decommissioning of research reactors as well as by regulatory bodies

  10. Linking Safety Analysis to Safety Requirements

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hansen, Kirsten Mark

    Software for safety critical systems must deal with the hazards identified by safety analysistechniques: Fault trees, event trees,and cause consequence diagrams can be interpreted as safety requirements and used in the design activity. We propose that the safety analysis and the system design use...

  11. White paper on nuclear safety in 1993. 1993 ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    When the development and utilization of nuclear power are advanced, the securing of safety is the prerequisite. The Nuclear Safety Commission has promoted the various important measures which become the basis for securing the safety, such as the execution of strict safety examination, the preparation and perfection of the guidelines which are used for safety examination, the holding of public hearings, the investigation of failures and troubles, and the reflection of the obtained learnings to the countermeasures for securing the safety. Since nuclear power facilities contain radioactive substances, the prevention of their abnormal release to surrounding environment is the fundamental of securing the safety. The policy of coping with severe accidents was determined after Three Mile Island accident and Chernobyl accident, and the concrete investigation is carried out. In this year, the abandonment of radioactive waste in ocean by Russia was a large problem. In this book, the Nuclear Safety Commission in the last one year and the securing of safety related to the utilization of plutonium for power reactors are reported. Various related materials are attached. (K.I.)

  12. IAEA safety glossary. Terminology used in nuclear safety and radiation protection. 2007 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    In developing and establishing standards of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, clear communication on scientific and technical concepts is essential. The principles, requirements and recommendations that are established and explained in the IAEA's safety standards and elaborated upon in other publications must be clearly expressed. To this end, this Safety Glossary defines and explains technical terms used in IAEA safety standards and other safety related publications, and provides information on their usage. The primary purpose of the Safety Glossary is to harmonize terminology and usage in the IAEA safety standards for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, and in their application. Once definitions of terms have been established, they are, in general, intended to be observed in safety standards and other safety related publications and in the work of the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security generally. The achievement of consistently high quality in its publications contributes to the authority and credibility of the IAEA, and thus to its influence and effectiveness. High quality in publications and documents is achieved not only by review to ensure that the relevant requirements are met, but also by managing their preparation so as to achieve high quality in their drafting. The Safety Glossary provides guidance primarily for the drafters and reviewers of safety standards, including IAEA technical officers and consultants and bodies for the endorsement of safety standards. The Safety Glossary is also a source of information for users of IAEA safety standards and other safety and security related IAEA publications and for other IAEA staff - notably writers, editors, translators, revisers and interpreters. Users of the Safety Glossary, in particular drafters of national

  13. IAEA safety glossary. Terminology used in nuclear safety and radiation protection. 2007 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-06-01

    In developing and establishing standards of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, clear communication on scientific and technical concepts is essential. The principles, requirements and recommendations that are established and explained in the IAEA's safety standards and elaborated upon in other publications must be clearly expressed. To this end, this Safety Glossary defines and explains technical terms used in IAEA safety standards and other safety related publications, and provides information on their usage. The primary purpose of the Safety Glossary is to harmonize terminology and usage in the IAEA safety standards for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, and in their application. Once definitions of terms have been established, they are, in general, intended to be observed in safety standards and other safety related publications and in the work of the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security generally. The achievement of consistently high quality in its publications contributes to the authority and credibility of the IAEA, and thus to its influence and effectiveness. High quality in publications and documents is achieved not only by review to ensure that the relevant requirements are met, but also by managing their preparation so as to achieve high quality in their drafting. The Safety Glossary provides guidance primarily for the drafters and reviewers of safety standards, including IAEA technical officers and consultants and bodies for the endorsement of safety standards. The Safety Glossary is also a source of information for users of IAEA safety standards and other safety and security related IAEA publications and for other IAEA staff - notably writers, editors, translators, revisers and interpreters. Users of the Safety Glossary, in particular drafters of national

  14. IAEA safety glossary. Terminology used in nuclear safety and radiation protection. 2007 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    In developing and establishing standards of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, clear communication on scientific and technical concepts is essential. The principles, requirements and recommendations that are established and explained in the IAA's safety standards and elaborated upon in other publications must be clearly expressed. To this end, this Safety Glossary defines and explains technical terms used in IAEA safety standards and other safety related publications, and provides information on their usage. The primary purpose of the Safety Glossary is to harmonize terminology and usage in the IAEA safety standards for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation, and in their application. Once definitions of terms have been established, they are, in general, intended to be observed in safety standards and other safety related publications and in the work of the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security generally. The achievement of consistently high quality in its publications contributes to the authority and credibility of the IAEA, and thus to its influence and effectiveness. High quality in publications and documents is achieved not only by review to ensure that the relevant requirements are met, but also by managing their preparation so as to achieve high quality in their drafting. The Safety Glossary provides guidance primarily for the drafters and reviewers of safety standards, including IAEA technical officers and consultants and bodies for the endorsement of safety standards. The Safety Glossary is also a source of information for users of IAEA safety standards and other safety and security related IAEA publications and for other IAEA staff - notably writers, editors, translators, revisers and interpreters. Users of the Safety Glossary, in particular drafters of national

  15. The development of safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jorel, M.

    2009-01-01

    This document describes the safety approach followed in France for the design of nuclear reactors. This safety approach is based on safety principles from which stem safety requirements that set limiting values for specific parameters. The improvements in computerized simulation, the use of more adequate new materials, a better knowledge of the concerned physical processes, the changes in the reactor operations (higher discharge burnups for instance) have to be taken into account for the definition of safety criteria and the setting of limiting values. The developments of the safety criteria linked to the risks of cladding failure and loss of primary coolant are presented. (A.C.)

  16. Basic safety standards for radiation protection. 1982 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency, the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organisation and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD have undertaken to provide jointly a world-wide basis for harmonized and up-to-date radiation protection standards. The new Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection are based upon the latest recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) which are essentially contained in its Publication No.26. These new Basic Safety Standards have been elaborated by an Advisory Group of Experts which met in Vienna from 10-14 October 1977, from 23-27 October 1978 and from 1-12 December 1980 under the joint auspices of the IAEA, ILO, WHO and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. Comments on the draft Basic Safety Standards received from Member States and relevant organizations were taken into account by the Advisory Group in the process of preparation of the revised Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, which are published by the IAEA on behalf of the four sponsoring organizations. One of the main features of this revision is an increased emphasis on the recommendation to keep all exposures to ionizing radiation as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account; consequently, radiation protection should not only apply the basic dose limits but also comply with this recommendation. Detailed guidance is given to assist those who have to decide on the implementation of this recommendation in particular cases. Another important feature is the recommendation of a more coherent method for achieving consistency in limiting risks to health, irrespective of whether the risk is of uniform or non-uniform exposure of the body.

  17. Contrast media. Safety issues and ESUR guidelines. 2. rev. ed.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomsen, Henrik S. [Copenhagen University Hospital, Herlev (Denmark). Dept. of Diagnostic Radiology; Copenhagen Univ., Herlev (Denmark). Dept. of Diagnostic Sciences; Webb, Judith A.W. (eds.) [St. Bartholomew' s Hospital London Univ. (United Kingdom). Dept. of Radiology

    2009-07-01

    In 1994 the European Society of Urogenital Radiology (ESUR) set up a committee to consider the safety of contrast media used for diagnostic imaging. Subsequently the committee questioned members, reviewed the literature, proposed guidelines and discussed these proposals with participants at the annual symposia of the society. The end result of this work was the successful first edition of this book, published in 2006. This second edition not only updates the previous edition, but also contains some completely new chapters, for example on gadolinium-based contrast agents, meta-analyses in contrast media research and various regulatory issues. Comprehensive consideration is given to the many different safety issues relating to iodinated, MR, ultrasound and barium contrast media. The text includes chapters on both acute and delayed non-renal adverse reactions and on renal adverse reactions. All those questions frequently raised in radiological practice are addressed, and the well-known ESUR guidelines on contrast media are included. This book, presented in a handy, easy to use format, provides an invaluable, unique and unparalleled source of information on the safety issues relating to contrast media. (orig.)

  18. Contrast media. Safety issues and ESUR guidelines. 3. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomsen, Henrik S.; Webb, Judith A.W.

    2014-01-01

    Fully updates the previous edition and includes new chapters on various complex topics. Represents a unique and unparalleled source of information on the many safety issues relating to different contrast media. Includes chapters on acute and delayed non-renal adverse reactions and on renal adverse reactions. Presented in a handy, easy-to-use format. In 1994 the European Society of Urogenital Radiology (ESUR) set up a committee to consider the safety of contrast media used for diagnostic imaging. Subsequently the committee questioned ESUR members, reviewed the literature, proposed guidelines, and discussed these proposals with participants at the annual symposia of the society. The end result of this work was the successful first edition of this book, published in 2006, which was followed by an equally successful second edition in 2009. This third edition not only fully updates the previous edition, but also includes new chapters on complex topics such as use of contrast media in children and practical aspects of off-label contrast media use. The authorship includes members, past members, and non-members of the Contrast Media Safety Committee.

  19. Contrast media. Safety issues and ESUR guidelines. 2. rev. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomsen, Henrik S.; Copenhagen Univ., Herlev; Webb, Judith A.W.

    2009-01-01

    In 1994 the European Society of Urogenital Radiology (ESUR) set up a committee to consider the safety of contrast media used for diagnostic imaging. Subsequently the committee questioned members, reviewed the literature, proposed guidelines and discussed these proposals with participants at the annual symposia of the society. The end result of this work was the successful first edition of this book, published in 2006. This second edition not only updates the previous edition, but also contains some completely new chapters, for example on gadolinium-based contrast agents, meta-analyses in contrast media research and various regulatory issues. Comprehensive consideration is given to the many different safety issues relating to iodinated, MR, ultrasound and barium contrast media. The text includes chapters on both acute and delayed non-renal adverse reactions and on renal adverse reactions. All those questions frequently raised in radiological practice are addressed, and the well-known ESUR guidelines on contrast media are included. This book, presented in a handy, easy to use format, provides an invaluable, unique and unparalleled source of information on the safety issues relating to contrast media. (orig.)

  20. Traceability of Software Safety Requirements in Legacy Safety Critical Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.

    2007-01-01

    How can traceability of software safety requirements be created for legacy safety critical systems? Requirements in safety standards are imposed most times during contract negotiations. On the other hand, there are instances where safety standards are levied on legacy safety critical systems, some of which may be considered for reuse for new applications. Safety standards often specify that software development documentation include process-oriented and technical safety requirements, and also require that system and software safety analyses are performed supporting technical safety requirements implementation. So what can be done if the requisite documents for establishing and maintaining safety requirements traceability are not available?

  1. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  2. Safety of magnetic fusion facilities: Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    This Standard identifies safety requirements for magnetic fusion facilities. Safety functions are used to define outcomes that must be achieved to ensure that exposures to radiation, hazardous materials, or other hazards are maintained within acceptable limits. Requirements applicable to magnetic fusion facilities have been derived from Federal law, policy, and other documents. In addition to specific safety requirements, broad direction is given in the form of safety principles that are to be implemented and within which safety can be achieved

  3. Safety of Research Reactors. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements for all main areas of safety for research reactors, with particular emphasis on requirements for design and operation. It explains the safety objectives and concepts that form the basis for safety and safety assessment for all stages in the lifetime of a research reactor. Technical and administrative requirements for the safety of new research reactors are established in accordance with these objectives and concepts, and they are to be applied to the extent practicable for existing research reactors. The safety requirements established in this publication for the management of safety and regulatory supervision apply to site evaluation, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning, operation (including utilization and modification), and planning for decommissioning of research reactors (including critical assemblies and subcritical assemblies). The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies and other organizations with responsibilities in these areas and in safety analysis, verification and review, and the provision of technical support.

  4. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  5. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. To be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. And to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  6. Safety of nuclear power plants: Operation. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The safety of a nuclear power plant is ensured by means of its proper siting, design, construction and commissioning, followed by the proper management and operation of the plant. In a later phase, proper decommissioning is required. This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1). The purpose of this revision was: to restructure Safety Series No. 50-C-O (Rev. 1) in the light of the basic objectives, concepts and principles in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations; to be consistent with the requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources; and to reflect current practice and new concepts and technical developments. Guidance on fulfillment of these Safety Requirements may be found in the appropriate Safety Guides relating to plant operation. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements which, in the light of experience and the present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. These requirements are governed by the basic objectives, concepts and principles that are presented in the Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations. This publication deals with matters specific to the safe operation of land based stationary thermal neutron nuclear power plants, and also covers their commissioning and subsequent decommissioning

  7. Building competence in radiation protection and the safe use of radiation sources. Safety guide (Spanish ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide makes recommendations concerning the building of competence in protection and safety within a national radiation protection infrastructure and provides guidance for setting up the structure for a national strategy. It relates to the training and assessment of qualification of new personnel and the retraining of existing personnel in order to develop and maintain appropriate levels of competence. It provides the necessary guidance to meet the requirements laid down in Safety Series No. 115, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Responsibilities for building competence in protection and safety; 3. Education, training and work experience; 4. A national strategy for building competence in protection and safety.

  8. Building competence in radiation protection and the safe use of radiation sources. Safety guide (Arabic ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Guide makes recommendations concerning the building of competence in protection and safety within a national radiation protection infrastructure and provides guidance for setting up the structure for a national strategy. It relates to the training and assessment of qualification of new personnel and the retraining of existing personnel in order to develop and maintain appropriate levels of competence. It provides the necessary guidance to meet the requirements laid down in Safety Series No. 115, International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Responsibilities for building competence in protection and safety; 3. Education, training and work experience; 4. A national strategy for building competence in protection and safety.

  9. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    his Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  10. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  11. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  12. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factors, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.

  13. Leadership and Management for Safety. General Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements that support Principle 3 of the Fundamental Safety Principles in relation to establishing, sustaining and continuously improving leadership and management for safety and an integrated management system. It emphasizes that leadership for safety, management for safety, an effective management system and a systemic approach (i.e. an approach in which interactions between technical, human and organizational factors are duly considered) are all essential to the specification and application of adequate safety measures and to the fostering of a strong safety culture. Leadership and an effective management system will integrate safety, health, environmental, security, quality, human-and-organizational factor, societal and economic elements. The management system will ensure the fostering of a strong safety culture, regular assessment of performance and the application of lessons from experience. The publication is intended for use by regulatory bodies, operating organizations (registrants and licensees) and other organizations concerned with facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks

  14. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The present publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), issued in 1988). It takes account of developments relating to the safety of nuclear power plants since the Code on Design was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication, The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the present revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear power plants. It is recognized that technology and scientific knowledge advance, and nuclear safety and what is considered adequate protection are not static entities. Safety requirements change with these developments and this publication reflects the present consensus. This Safety Requirements publication takes account of the developments in safety requirements by, for example, including the consideration of severe accidents in the design process. Other topics that have been given more detailed attention include management of safety, design management, plant ageing and wearing out effects, computer based safety systems, external and internal hazards, human factors, feedback of operational experience, and safety assessment and verification. This publication establishes safety requirements that define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to safety functions and the associated structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants. It is expected that this publication will be used primarily for land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat production applications (such as district heating or desalination). It is recognized that in the case of

  15. Safety of nuclear power plants: Design. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The present publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), issued in 1988). It takes account of developments relating to the safety of nuclear power plants since the Code on Design was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication, The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the present revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for nuclear safety are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear power plants. It is recognized that technology and scientific knowledge advance, and nuclear safety and what is considered adequate protection are not static entities. Safety requirements change with these developments and this publication reflects the present consensus. This Safety Requirements publication takes account of the developments in safety requirements by, for example, including the consideration of severe accidents in the design process. Other topics that have been given more detailed attention include management of safety, design management, plant ageing and wearing out effects, computer based safety systems, external and internal hazards, human factors, feedback of operational experience, and safety assessment and verification. This publication establishes safety requirements that define the elements necessary to ensure nuclear safety. These requirements are applicable to safety functions and the associated structures, systems and components, as well as to procedures important to safety in nuclear power plants. It is expected that this publication will be used primarily for land based stationary nuclear power plants with water cooled reactors designed for electricity generation or for other heat production applications (such as district heating or desalination). It is recognized that in the case of

  16. Requirements of safety and reliability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    The safety strategy for nuclear power plants is characterized by the fact that the high level of safety was attained not as a result of experience, but on the basis of preventive accident analyses and the findings derived from such analyses. Although, in these accident analyses, the deterministic approach is predominant it is supplemented by reliability analyses. The accidents analyzed in nuclear licensing procedures cover a wide spectrum from minor incidents to the design basis accidents which determine the design of the safety devices. The initial and boundary conditions, which are essential for accident analyses, and the determination of the loads occuring in various states during regular operation and in accidents flow into the design of the individual systems and components. The inevitable residual risk and its origins are discussed. (orig./HP) [de

  17. Probabilistic safety analysis of radiation treatments with linear accelerator (Spanish Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-02-01

    This publication addresses the issue of accidental exposures of radiotherapy patients and how to avoid them. More proactive approaches are required to anticipate and thus avoid situations that could lead to accidental exposures. In this context, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Ibero American Forum of Radiation and Nuclear and Safety Regulatory Agencies (the FORO) have applied proactive methods, such as probabilistic safety assessment to radiotherapy treatments with accelerators. The methodology and results of this exercise are described in this publication.

  18. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to all types of radioactive waste disposal facility. It is linked to the fundamental safety principles for each disposal option and establishes a set of strategic requirements that must be in place before facilities are developed. Consideration is also given to the safety of existing facilities developed prior to the establishment of present day standards. The requirements will be complemented by Safety Guides that will provide guidance on good practice for meeting the requirements for different types of waste disposal facility. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of people and the environment; 3. Safety requirements for planning for the disposal of radioactive waste; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of a disposal facility; 5. Assurance of safety; 6. Existing disposal facilities; Appendices.

  19. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    In accordance with the section 26 of the Finnish Radiation Act (592/91) the safety requirements to be taken into account in planning laboratories and other premises, which affect safety in the use of radioactive materials, are confirmed by the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. The guide specifies the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive materials are used or stored as unsealed sources. There are also some general instructions concerning work procedures in a radionuclide laboratory

  20. Safety design requirements for safety systems and components of JSFR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubo, Shigenobu; Shimakawa, Yoshio; Yamano, Hidemasa; Kotake, Shoji

    2011-01-01

    Safety design requirements for JSFR were summarized taking the development targets of the FaCT project and design feature of JSFR into account. The related safety principle and requirements for Monju, CRBRP, PRISM, SPX, LWRs, IAEA standards, goals of GIF, basic principle of INPRO etc. were also taken into account so that the safety design requirements can be a next-generation global standard. The development targets for safety and reliability are set based on those of FaCT, namely, ensuring safety and reliability equal to future LWR and related fuel cycle facilities. In order to achieve these targets, the defence-in-depth concept is used as the basic safety design principle. General features of the safety design requirements are 1) Achievement of higher reliability, 2) Achievement of higher inspectability and maintainability, 3) Introduction of passive safety features, 4) Reduction of operator action needs, 5) Design consideration against Beyond Design Basis Events, 6) In-Vessel Retention of degraded core materials, 7) Prevention and mitigation against sodium chemical reactions, and 8) Design against external events. The current specific requirements for each system and component are summarized taking the basic design concept of JSFR into account, which is an advanced loop-type large-output power plant with a mixed-oxide-fuelled core. (author)

  1. Site evaluation for nuclear installations. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication supersedes the Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Siting, which was issued in 1988 as Safety Series No. 50-C-S (Rev. 1). It takes account of developments relating to site evaluations for nuclear installations since the Code on Siting was last revised. These developments include the issuing of the Safety Fundamentals publication on The Safety of Nuclear Installations, and the revision of various safety standards and other publications relating to safety. Requirements for site evaluation are intended to ensure adequate protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation arising from nuclear installations. It is recognized that there are steady advances in technology and scientific knowledge, in nuclear safety and in what is considered adequate protection. Safety requirements change with these advances and this publication reflects the present consensus among States. This Safety Requirements publication was prepared under the IAEA programme on safety standards for nuclear installations. It establishes requirements and provides criteria for ensuring safety in site evaluation for nuclear installations. The Safety Guides on site evaluation listed in the references provide recommendations on how to meet the requirements established in this Safety Requirements publication. The objective of this publication is to establish the requirements for the elements of a site evaluation for a nuclear installation so as to characterize fully the site specific conditions pertinent to the safety of a nuclear installation. The purpose is to establish requirements for criteria, to be applied as appropriate to site and site-installation interaction in operational states and accident conditions, including those that could lead to emergency measures for: (a) Defining the extent of information on a proposed site to be presented by the applicant; (b) Evaluating a proposed site to ensure that the site

  2. Safety of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific reference include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. The safety objective, concepts and safety principles; 3. Legal framework and regulatory supervision; 4. The management system and verification of safety; 5. Siting of the facility; 6. Design of the facility; 7. Construction of the facility; 8. Commissioning of the facility; 9. Operation of the facility; 10. Decommissioning of the facility; Appendix I: Requirements specific to uranium fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix II: Requirements specific to mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; Appendix III: Requirements specific to conversion facilities and enrichment facilities

  3. Meeting the maglev system's safety requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pierick, K

    1983-12-01

    The author shows how the safety requirements of the maglev track system derive from the general legal conditions for the safety of tracked transport. It is described how their compliance beyond the so-called ''development-accompanying'' and ''acceptance-preparatory'' safety work can be assured for the Transrapid test layout (TVE) now building in Emsland and also for later application as public transport system in Germany within the meaning of the General Railway Act.

  4. Public requirement to demonstrate safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Green, P.

    1991-01-01

    To many working within Government or industry, public concern over the disposal of radioactive waste is misplaced and has arisen out of an irrational and unscientific fear of technology, or even science in general. Members of the public, it is argued, are concerned because they do not understand the size of the risk in question. From the industry's point of view, the risk arising from the disposal of radioactive waste is ''negligible when compared to other everyday risks of life. Furthermore, any public exposure that may arise, either soon after closure of a facility or in the far future would comply with internationally accepted safety standards. In this context, the continuing concern over disposal of radioactive waste is viewed as evidence of the irrational and unscientific attitude of the public. The assessment and regulation of risk from waste disposal therefore is presented as a purely scientific question. Some of these issues are examined and public concern is shown not to be irrational but to be based upon legitimate questions over current waste management policy. An important question is not just ''how safe is safe, but who decides and how?''. (Author)

  5. Canister Storage Building (CSB) Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors with specific examples. Logical connectors are used in Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TSRs are AND and OR. The physical arrangement of these connectors constitutes logical conventions with specific meanings

  6. Environmental and Source Monitoring for Purposes of Radiation Protection. Safety Guide (Spanish ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide international guidance, coherent with contemporary radiation protection principles and IAEA safety requirements, on the strategy of monitoring in relation to: (a) control of radionuclide discharges under practice conditions, and (b) intervention, such as in cases of nuclear or radiological emergencies or past contamination of areas with long lived radionuclides. Three categories of monitoring are discussed: monitoring at the source of the discharge (source monitoring), monitoring in the environment (environmental monitoring) and monitoring of individual exposure in emergencies (individual monitoring). The Safety Guide also provides general guidance on assessment of the doses to critical groups of the population due to the presence of radioactive materials or radiation fields in the environment both from routine operation of nuclear and other related facilities (practice) and from nuclear or radiological emergencies and past contamination of areas with long lived radionuclides (intervention). The dose assessments are based on the results of source monitoring, environmental monitoring, individual monitoring or their combinations. This Safety Guide is primarily intended for use by national regulatory bodies and other agencies involved in national systems of radiation monitoring, as well as by operators of nuclear installations and other facilities where natural or human made radionuclides are treated and monitored. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Meeting regulatory requirements for monitoring in practices and interventions; 3. Responsibilities for monitoring; 4. Generic aspects of monitoring programmes; 5. Programmes for monitoring in practices and interventions; 6. Technical conditions for monitoring procedures; 7. Considerations in dose assessment; 8. Interpretation of monitoring results; 9. Quality assurance; 10. Recording of results; 11. Education and training; Glossary.

  7. Safety requirements applicable to the SMART design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seul, Kwang Won; Kim, Wee Kyong; Kim, Hho Jung

    1999-01-01

    The 330 MW thermal power of integral reactor, named SMART (System integrated Modular Advanced ReacTor), is under development at KAERI for seawater desalination application and electricity generation. The final product of nuclear desalination plant (NDP) is electricity and fresh water. Thus, in addition to the protection of the public around the plant facility from the possible release of radioactive materials, the fresh water should be prevented from radioactivity contamination. In this study, to ensure the safety of SMART reactor in the early stage of design development, the safety requirements applicable to the SMART design were investigated, based on the current regulatory requirements for the existing NPPs and the advanced light water reactor (LWR) designs. The interface requirements related to the desalination facility were also investigated, based on the recent IAEA research activities pertaining to the NDP. As a result, it was found that the current regulatory requirements and guidance for the existing NPPs and advanced LWR designs are applicable to the SMART design and its safety evaluation. However, the safety requirements related to the SMART-specific design and the desalination plant are needed to develop in the future to assure the safety of the SMART reactor

  8. TWRS safety SSCs: Requirements and characteristics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith-Fewell, M.A.

    1997-01-01

    Safety Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) have been identified from hazard and accident analyses. These analyses were performed to support the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Basis for Interim Operation (BID). The text identifies and evaluates the SSCs and their supporting SSCs to show that they either prevent the occurrence of the accident or mitigate the consequences of the accident to below the acceptance guidelines. The requirements for the SSCs to fulfill these tasks are described

  9. Geological disposal of radioactive waste. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication is concerned with providing protection to people and the environment from the hazards associated with waste management activities related to disposal, i.e. hazards that could arise during the operating period and following closure. It sets out the protection objectives and criteria for geological disposal and establishes the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of this disposal option, consistent with the established principles of safety for radioactive waste management. It is intended for use by those involved in radioactive waste management and in making decisions in relation to the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities, especially those concerned with the related regulatory aspects. This publication contains 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. The safety requirements for geological disposal; 4. Requirements for the development, operation and closure of geological disposal facilities; Appendix: Assurance of compliance with the safety objective and criteria; Annex I: Geological disposal and the principles of radioactive waste management; Annex II: Principles of radioactive waste management

  10. Fire safety requirements for electrical cables towards nuclear reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raju, M.R.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Electrical power supply forms a very important part of any nuclear reactor. Power supplies have been categorized in to class I, II, III and IV from reliability point. The safety related equipment are provided with highly reliable power supply to achieve the safety of very high order. Vast network of cables in a nuclear reactor are grouped and segregated to ensure availability of power to at least one group under all anticipated occurrences. Since fire can result in failures leading to unavailability of power caused by common cause, both passive and active fire protection methods are adopted in addition to fire detection system. The paper describes the requirement for passive fire protection to electrical cables viz. fire barrier and fire breaks. The paper gives an account of the tests required to standardize the products. Fire safety implementation for cables in research reactors is described

  11. Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities. Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication covers the broad scope of requirements for fuel cycle facilities that, in light of the experience and present state of technology, must be satisfied to ensure safety for the lifetime of the facility. Topics of specific relevance include aspects of nuclear fuel generation, storage, reprocessing and disposal

  12. Experience gained in enhancing operational safety at ComEd`s nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Elias, D [Commonwealth Edison Co. (United States)

    1997-09-01

    The following aspects of experience gained in enhancing operational safety at Comed`s nuclear power plants are discussed: nuclear safety policy; centralization/decentralization; typical nuclear operating organization; safety review boards; human performance enhancement; elements of effective nuclear oversight.

  13. Experience gained in enhancing operational safety at ComEd's nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elias, D.

    1997-01-01

    The following aspects of experience gained in enhancing operational safety at Comed's nuclear power plants are discussed: nuclear safety policy; centralization/decentralization; typical nuclear operating organization; safety review boards; human performance enhancement; elements of effective nuclear oversight

  14. Manual on safety aspects of the design and equipment of hot laboratories. 1981 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This manual covers the general principles of planning and design of areas inside laboratories according to the varying potential radiation and contamination hazards; enclosures for radioactive material containment; viewing and lighting systems and various types of manipulators; transfer and transport of radioactive materials within the laboratories; air cleaning and ventilation systems, with particular reference to IAEA Safety Series No.17; techniques for controlling air pollution from the operation of nuclear facilities; various radioactive waste disposal systems; criticality control; fire protection; personnel monitoring, including changing-room monitoring and protective clothing; standardization and automation; and administrative controls. Although alpha, beta, gamma technologies have developed separately, equipment used in radioactive work is common to many operations. There is a step change in technology between work with uranium and plutonium and between work with plutonium and other transuranics; with plutonium one enters the field of alpha, beta, gamma technology. This manual reports the basic requirements and gives reference to more sophisticated techniques available. It is not concerned with work on a commercial scale. Other publications of interest in this context, for instance IAEA Safety Series No.39, are referenced for more detailed information.

  15. Nuclear fuels with high burnup: safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phuc Tran Dai

    2016-01-01

    Vietnam authorities foresees to build 3 reactors from Russian design (VVER AES 2006) by 2030. In order to prepare the preliminary report on safety analysis the Vietnamese Agency for Radioprotection and Safety has launched an investigation on the behaviour of nuclear fuels at high burnups (up to 60 GWj/tU) that will be those of the new plants. This study deals mainly with the behaviour of the fuel assemblies in case of loss of coolant (LOCA). It appears that for an average burnup of 50 GWj/tU and for the advanced design of the fuel assembly (cladding and materials) safety requirements are fulfilled. For an average burnup of 60 GWj/tU, a list of issues remains to be assessed, among which the impact of clad bursting or the hydrogen embrittlement of the advanced zirconium alloys. (A.C.)

  16. Safety requirements for the Pu carriers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, H.

    1993-01-01

    Ministry of Transport of Japan has now set about studying requirements for Pu carriers to ensure safety. It was first studied what the basic concept of safe carriage of Pu should be, and the basic ideas have been worked out. Next the requirements for the Pu carriers were studied based on the above. There are at present no international requirements of construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers, but MOT of Japan has so far required special construction and equipment for the nuclear-material carriers which carry a large amount of radioactive material, such as spent fuel or low level radioactive waste, corresponding to the level of the respective potential hazard. The requirements of construction and equipment of the Pu carriers have been established considering the difference in heat generation between Pu and spent fuel, physical protection, and so forth, in addition to the above basic concept. (J.P.N.)

  17. Nuclear safety and radiation protection report of EdF's Tricastin operational hot base nuclear facilities (BCOT) - 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    This safety report was established under the article 21 of the French law no. 2006-686 of June 13, 2006 relative to nuclear safety and information transparency. It presents, first, the Tricastin operational hot base facility (INB no. 157, Bollene, Vaucluse (FR)), a nuclear workshop for storage and maintenance and qualification operations on some EdF equipments. Then, the nuclear safety and radiation protection measures taken regarding the facility are reviewed: nuclear safety definition, radiation protection of intervening parties, safety and radiation protection improvement paths, crisis management, external and internal controls, technical situation of facilities, administrative procedures in progress. The incidents and accidents which occurred in 2010, if some, are reported as well as the effluents discharge in the environment. Finally, The radioactive materials and wastes generated by the facility is presented and sorted by type of waste, quantities and type of conditioning. The document concludes with a glossary and a list of recommendations from the Committees for health, safety and working conditions. (J.S.)

  18. Nuclear safety review requirements for launch approval

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sholtis, J.A. Jr.; Winchester, R.O.

    1992-01-01

    Use of nuclear power systems in space requires approval which is preceded by extensive safety analysis and review. This careful study allows an informed risk-benefit decision at the highest level of our government. This paper describes the process as it has historically been applied to U.S. isotopic power systems. The Ulysses mission, launched in October 1990, is used to illustrate the process. Expected variations to deal with reactor-power systems are explained

  19. Management of Radioactive Waste from the Mining and Milling of Ores. Safety Guide (Spanish ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on the safe management of radioactive waste resulting from the mining and milling of ores, with the purpose of protecting workers, the public and the environment from the consequences of these activities. It supplements Safety Standards Series No. WS-R-1, Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Administrative, legal and regulatory framework; 3. Protection of human health and the environment; 4. Strategy for waste management; 5. Safety considerations in different phases of operations; 6. Safety assessment; 7. Quality assurance; 8. Monitoring and surveillance; 9. Institutional control for the post-closure phase.

  20. Risk based limits for Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    OSR limits are designed to protect the assumptions made in the facility safety analysis in order to preserve the safety envelope during facility operation. Normally, limits are set based on ''worst case conditions'' without regard to the likelihood (frequency) of a credible event occurring. In special cases where the accident analyses are based on ''time at risk'' arguments, it may be desirable to control the time at which the facility is at risk. A methodology has been developed to use OSR limits to control the source terms and the times these source terms would be available, thus controlling the acceptable risk to a nuclear process facility. The methodology defines a new term ''gram-days''. This term represents the area under a source term (inventory) vs time curve which represents the risk to the facility. Using the concept of gram-days (normalized to one year) allows the use of an accounting scheme to control the risk under the inventory vs time curve. The methodology results in at least three OSR limits: (1) control of the maximum inventory or source term, (2) control of the maximum gram-days for the period based on a source term weighted average, and (3) control of the maximum gram-days at the individual source term levels. Basing OSR limits on risk based safety analysis is feasible, and a basis for development of risk based limits is defensible. However, monitoring inventories and the frequencies required to maintain facility operation within the safety envelope may be complex and time consuming

  1. Technical safety requirements control level verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  2. Technical safety requirements control level verification; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    STEWART, J.L.

    1999-01-01

    A Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) control level verification process was developed for the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) TSRs at the Hanford Site in Richland, WA, at the direction of the US. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The objective of the effort was to develop a process to ensure that the TWRS TSR controls are designated and managed at the appropriate levels as Safety Limits (SLs), Limiting Control Settings (LCSs), Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), Administrative Controls (ACs), or Design Features. The TSR control level verification process was developed and implemented by a team of contractor personnel with the participation of Fluor Daniel Hanford, Inc. (FDH), the Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) integrating contractor, and RL representatives. The team was composed of individuals with the following experience base: nuclear safety analysis; licensing; nuclear industry and DOE-complex TSR preparation/review experience; tank farm operations; FDH policy and compliance; and RL-TWRS oversight. Each TSR control level designation was completed utilizing TSR control logic diagrams and TSR criteria checklists based on DOE Orders, Standards, Contractor TSR policy, and other guidance. The control logic diagrams and criteria checklists were reviewed and modified by team members during team meetings. The TSR control level verification process was used to systematically evaluate 12 LCOs, 22 AC programs, and approximately 100 program key elements identified in the TWRS TSR document. The verification of each TSR control required a team consensus. Based on the results of the process, refinements were identified and the TWRS TSRs were modified as appropriate. A final report documenting key assumptions and the control level designation for each TSR control was prepared and is maintained on file for future reference. The results of the process were used as a reference in the RL review of the final TWRS TSRs and control suite. RL

  3. Measures taken to improve nuclear safety on EdF PWRs in operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kus, J.-P.; Norvez, G.

    1993-01-01

    In parallel with its major nuclear programme (56 PWR units in service or under construction), France has developed an original philosophy in the field of Nuclear Safety. This comprehensive philosophy ensures a fine balance and coordination between design and operation, it provides a methodology to design, construct and operate a safe nuclear plant. Actual experience is then continuously compared to the initial expectation and the methodology refined whenever necessary. This methodology is fully applied to the new 1400 MWe plant series presently under construction. The essential elements are also backfitted into all previous units, thereby giving them an equivalent level of safety. The French PWR park can therefore be considered as very homogeneous with regard to its safety level, regarding both its design and operation. (author)

  4. 78 FR 46560 - Pipeline Safety: Class Location Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-01

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part... class location requirements for gas transmission pipelines. Section 5 of the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory... and, with respect to gas transmission pipeline facilities, whether applying IMP requirements to...

  5. Safety in the design and use of gamma and electron irradiation facilities. 2. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    Radioisotopes which emit gamma radiation and high-energy electron beam generators have been used in industry, medicine and research for many years in the UK and throughout the world. Their main application has been in medical product sterilisation, various food treatments, plastics curing and polymerisation, semiconductor manufacture and gemstone irradiation to bring about colour changes. The radiation safety of these applications is the subject of this guidance

  6. Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2012 Ed.). Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-06-15

    This Safety Guide provides recommendations and guidance on achieving and demonstrating compliance with IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2012 Edition), which establishes the requirements to be applied to the national and international transport of radioactive material. Transport is deemed to comprise all operations and conditions associated with and involved in the movement of radioactive material, including the design, fabrication and maintenance of packaging, and the preparation, consigning, handling, carriage, storage in transit and receipt at the final destination of packages. This publication supersedes IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.1 Rev. 1, which was issued in 2008.

  7. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt... standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the

  8. Balanced nuclear and cytoplasmic activities of EDS1 are required for a complete plant innate immune response.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ana V García

    2010-07-01

    Full Text Available An important layer of plant innate immunity to host-adapted pathogens is conferred by intracellular nucleotide-binding/oligomerization domain-leucine rich repeat (NB-LRR receptors recognizing specific microbial effectors. Signaling from activated receptors of the TIR (Toll/Interleukin-1 Receptor-NB-LRR class converges on the nucleo-cytoplasmic immune regulator EDS1 (Enhanced Disease Susceptibility1. In this report we show that a receptor-stimulated increase in accumulation of nuclear EDS1 precedes or coincides with the EDS1-dependent induction and repression of defense-related genes. EDS1 is capable of nuclear transport receptor-mediated shuttling between the cytoplasm and nucleus. By enhancing EDS1 export from inside nuclei (through attachment of an additional nuclear export sequence (NES or conditionally releasing EDS1 to the nucleus (by fusion to a glucocorticoid receptor (GR in transgenic Arabidopsis we establish that the EDS1 nuclear pool is essential for resistance to biotrophic and hemi-biotrophic pathogens and for transcriptional reprogramming. Evidence points to post-transcriptional processes regulating receptor-triggered accumulation of EDS1 in nuclei. Changes in nuclear EDS1 levels become equilibrated with the cytoplasmic EDS1 pool and cytoplasmic EDS1 is needed for complete resistance and restriction of host cell death at infection sites. We propose that coordinated nuclear and cytoplasmic activities of EDS1 enable the plant to mount an appropriately balanced immune response to pathogen attack.

  9. IRIS guidelines. 2014 ed. Integrated Review of Infrastructure for Safety (IRIS) for self-assessment when establishing the safety infrastructure for a nuclear power programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment, and therefore represent what all Member States should achieve, whilst recognizing the ultimate responsibility of each State to ensure safety when implementing a nuclear power programme. IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-16, entitled Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme was published in order to provide recommendations, presented in the form of sequential actions, on meeting safety requirements progressively during the initial three phases of the development of safety, as described in INSAG-22, Nuclear Safety Infrastructure for a National Nuclear Power Programme Supported by the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles. To that end, the 200 safety related actions, which are proposed by SSG-16, constitute a roadmap to establish a foundation for promoting a high level of safety over the entire lifetime of the nuclear power plant. These actions reflect international consensus on good practice in order to achieve full implementation of IAEA safety standards. The IAEA has developed a methodology and tool, the Integrated Review of Infrastructure for Safety (IRIS), to assist States in undertaking self-assessment with respect to SSG-16 recommendations when establishing the safety infrastructure for a nuclear power programme, and to develop an action plan for improvement. The IRIS methodology and the associated tool are fully compatible with the IAEA safety standards and are also used, when appropriate, in the preparation of review missions, such as the Integrated Regulatory Review Service and advisory missions. The present guidelines describe the IRIS methodology for self-assessment against SSG-16 recommendations. Through IRIS implementation, every organization concerned with nuclear safety may gain proper awareness and engage in a continuous progressive process to develop the effective national

  10. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements. Volume 1 and 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

  11. Tank Farms Technical Safety Requirements [VOL 1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    CASH, R.J.

    2000-12-28

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) define the acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, basis thereof, and controls to ensure safe operation during authorized activities, for facilities within the scope of the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

  12. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998. Guide to the Australian radiation protection and nuclear safety licensing framework. 1. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    The purpose of this guide is to provide information to Commonwealth entities who may require a license under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (ARPANS) Act 1998 to enable them to posses, have control of, use, operate or dispose of radiation sources. The guide describes to which agencies and what activities require licensing. It also addresses general administrative and legal matters such as appeal procedures, ongoing licensing requirements, monitoring and compliance. Applicants are advised to consult the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 and accompanying Regulations when submitting applications

  13. Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998. Guide to the Australian radiation protection and nuclear safety licensing framework; 1. ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-03-01

    The purpose of this guide is to provide information to Commonwealth entities who may require a license under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (ARPANS) Act 1998 to enable them to posses, have control of, use, operate or dispose of radiation sources. The guide describes to which agencies and what activities require licensing. It also addresses general administrative and legal matters such as appeal procedures, ongoing licensing requirements, monitoring and compliance. Applicants are advised to consult the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 and accompanying Regulations when submitting applications

  14. Regulatory Safety Requirements for Operating Nuclear Installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gubela, W.

    2017-01-01

    The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) is established in terms of the National Nuclear Regulator Act (Act No 47 of 1999) and its mandate and authority are conferred through sections 5 and 7 of this Act, setting out the NNR's objectives and functions, which include exercising regulatory control over siting, design, construction etc of nuclear installations through the granting of nuclear authorisations. The NNR's responsibilities embrace all those actions aimed at providing the public with confidence and assurance that the risks arising from the production of nuclear energy remain within acceptable safety limits -> Therefore: Set fundamental safety standards, conducting pro-active safety assessments, determining licence conditions and obtaining assurance of compliance. The promotional aspects of nuclear activities in South Africa are legislated by the Nuclear Energy Act (Act No 46 of 1999). The NNR approach to regulations of nuclear safety and security take into consideration, amongst others, the potential hazards associated with the facility or activity, safety related programmes, the importance of the authorisation holder's safety related processes as well as the need to exercise regulatory control over the technical aspects such as of the design and operation of a nuclear facility in ensuring nuclear safety and security. South Africa does not have national nuclear industry codes and standards. The NNR is therefore non-prescriptive as it comes to the use of industry codes and standards. Regulatory framework (current) provide for the protection of persons, property, and environment against nuclear damage, through Licensing Process: Safety standards; Safety assessment; Authorisation and conditions of authorisation; Public participation process; Compliance assurance; Enforcement

  15. The main requirements of the International Basic Safety Standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Webb, G.A.M.

    1998-01-01

    The main requirements of the new international basic safety standards are discussed, including such topics as health effects of ionizing radiations, the revision of basic safety standards, the requirements for radiation protection practices, the requirements for intervention,and the field of regulatory infrastructures. (A.K.)

  16. Site safety requirements for high level waste disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Weiming; Wang Ju

    2006-01-01

    This paper outlines the content, status and trend of site safety requirements of International Atomic Energy Agency, America, France, Sweden, Finland and Japan. Site safety requirements are usually represented as advantageous vis-a-vis disadvantagous conditions, and potential advantage vis-a-vis disadvantage conditions, respectively in aspects of geohydrology, geochemistry, lithology, climate and human intrusion etc. Study framework and steps of site safety requirements for China are discussed under the view of systems science. (authors)

  17. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility interim operational safety requirements

    CERN Document Server

    Covey, L I

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSRs) for the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt and inspection of cesium and strontium capsules from private irradiators; decontamination of the capsules and equipment; surveillance of the stored capsules; and maintenance activities. Controls required for public safety, significant defense-in-depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines (EGs) are included.

  18. Supplement to safety analysis report. 306-W building operations safety requirement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richey, C.R.

    1979-08-01

    The operations safety requirements (OSRs) presented in this report define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management control needed for safely conducting operations with radioactive materials in the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 306-W building. The safety requirements are organized in five sections. Safety limits are safety-related process variables that are observable and measurable. Limiting conditions cover: equipment and technical conditions and characteristics of the facility and operations necessary for continued safe operation. Surveillance requirements prescribe the requirements for checking systems and components that are essential to safety. Equipment design controls require that changes to process equipment and systems be independently checked and approved to assure that the changes will have no adverse effect on safety. Administrative controls describe and discuss the organization and administrative systems and procedures to be used for safe operation of the facility. Details of the implementation of the operations safety requirements are prescribed by internal PNL documents such as criticality safety specifications and radiation work procedures

  19. Discussion of important safety requirements for new nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Lin; Jia Xiang; Yan Tianwen; Li Wenhong; Li Chun

    2014-01-01

    This paper presents the analysis of several important safety requirements and improvement direction. Technical view of security goals on site safety evaluation, internal and external events fortification, serious accident prevention and mitigation, as well as the core, containment system and instrument control system design and engineering optimization, and etc are indicated. It will be useful for new plant design, construction and safety improvement. (authors)

  20. Philosophy and safety requirements for land-based nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kellermann, Otto

    1978-01-01

    The main ideas of safety philosophy for land-based nuclear installations are presented together with their background of protection goals. Today's requirements for design and quality assurance are deductively shown. Finally a proposition is made for a new balancing of safety philosophy according to the high safety level that nuclear installations have reached

  1. Investigation on regulatory requirements for radiation safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Eun Ok; Choi, Yoon Seok; Cho, Dae Hyung

    2013-01-01

    NRC recognizes that efficient management of radiation safety plan is an important factor to achieve radiation safety service. In case of Korea, the contents to perform the actual radiation safety management are legally contained in radiation safety management reports based on the Nuclear Safety Act. It is to prioritize the importance of safety regulations in each sector in accordance with the current situation of radiation and radioactive isotopes-used industry and to provide a basis for deriving safety requirements and safety regulations system maintenance by the priority of radiation safety management regulations. It would be helpful to achieve regulations to conform to reality based on international standards if consistent safety requirements is developed for domestic users, national standards and international standards on the basis of the results of questions answered by radiation safety managers, who lead on-site radiation safety management, about the priority of important factors in radioactive sources use, sales, production, moving user companies, to check whether derived configuration requirements for radiation safety management are suitable for domestic status

  2. The ED-inpatient dashboard: Uniting emergency and inpatient clinicians to improve the efficiency and quality of care for patients requiring emergency admission to hospital.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Staib, Andrew; Sullivan, Clair; Jones, Matt; Griffin, Bronwyn; Bell, Anthony; Scott, Ian

    2017-06-01

    Patients who require emergency admission to hospital require complex care that can be fragmented, occurring in the ED, across the ED-inpatient interface (EDii) and subsequently, in their destination inpatient ward. Our hospital had poor process efficiency with slow transit times for patients requiring emergency care. ED clinicians alone were able to improve the processes and length of stay for the patients discharged directly from the ED. However, improving the efficiency of care for patients requiring emergency admission to true inpatient wards required collaboration with reluctant inpatient clinicians. The inpatient teams were uninterested in improving time-based measures of care in isolation, but they were motivated by improving patient outcomes. We developed a dashboard showing process measures such as 4 h rule compliance rate coupled with clinically important outcome measures such as inpatient mortality. The EDii dashboard helped unite both ED and inpatient teams in clinical redesign to improve both efficiencies of care and patient outcomes. © 2016 Australasian College for Emergency Medicine and Australasian Society for Emergency Medicine.

  3. Patient safety climate strength: a concept that requires more attention

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ginsburg, Liane; Gilin Oore, Debra

    2016-01-01

    Background When patient safety climate (PSC) surveys are used in healthcare, reporting typically focuses on PSC level (mean or per cent positive scores). This paper explores how an additional focus on PSC strength can enhance the utility of PSC survey data. Setting and participants 442 care providers from 24 emergency departments (EDs) across Canada. Methods We use anonymised data from the Can-PSCS PSC instrument collected in 2011 as part of the Qmentum accreditation programme. We examine differences in climate strength across EDs using the Rwg(j) and intraclass correlation coefficients measures of inter-rater agreement. Results Across the six survey dimensions, median Rwg(j) was sufficiently high to support shared climate perceptions (0.64–0.83), but varied widely across the 24 ED units. We provide an illustrative example showing vastly different climate strength (Rwg(j) range=0.17–0.86) for units with an equivalent level of PSC (eg, climate mean score=3). Conclusions Most PSC survey results focus solely on climate level. To facilitate improvement in PSC, we advocate a simple, holistic safety climate profile including three metrics: climate level (using mean or per cent positive climate scores), climate strength (using the Rwg(j), or SD as a proxy) and the shape of the distribution (using histograms to see the distribution of scores within units). In PSC research, we advocate paying attention to climate strength as an important variable in its own right. Focusing on PSC level and strength can further understanding of the extent to which PSC is a key variable in the domain of patient safety. PMID:26453636

  4. Schedules of Provisions of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 Ed.). Safety Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This Safety Guide is issued in support of Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1, 2009 Edition). It lists the paragraph numbers of the Transport Regulations that are relevant for specified types of consignment, classified according to their UN numbers. It does not provide additional recommendations. The intended users are consignors and consignees, carriers, shippers, regulators, and end users involved in the transport of radioactive material. A person or organization intending to transport a particular type of consignment of radioactive material must meet requirements in all sections of the Transport Regulations. This Safety Guide aids users by providing a listing of the relevant requirements of the Transport Regulations for each type of radioactive material, package or shipment. Once a consignor has classified the radioactive material to be shipped, the appropriate UN number can be assigned and the paragraph numbers of the requirements that apply for the shipment can be found in the corresponding schedule

  5. IAEA safety requirements for safety assessment of fuel cycle facilities and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, G.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorises the Agency to establish standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property. In that respect, the IAEA has established a Safety Fundamentals publication which contains ten safety principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. A number of these principles require safety assessments to be carried out as a means of evaluating compliance with safety requirements for all nuclear facilities and activities and to determine the measures that need to be taken to ensure safety. The safety assessments are required to be carried out and documented by the organisation responsible for operating the facility or conducting the activity, are to be independently verified and are to be submitted to the regulatory body as part of the licensing or authorisation process. In addition to the principles of the Safety Fundamentals, the IAEA establishes requirements that must be met to ensure the protection of people and the environment and which are governed by the principles in the Safety Fundamentals. The IAEA's Safety Requirements publication 'Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities', establishes the safety requirements that need to be fulfilled in conducting and maintaining safety assessments for the lifetime of facilities and activities, with specific attention to defence in depth and the requirement for a graded approach to the application of these safety requirements across the wide range of fuel cycle facilities and activities. Requirements for independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the operating organisation, including the requirement for the safety assessment to be periodically reviewed and updated are also covered. For many fuel cycle facilities and activities, environmental impact assessments and non-radiological risk assessments will be required. The

  6. High-Speed Maglev Trains; German Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1991-12-31

    This document is a translation of technology-specific safety requirements developed : for the German Transrapid Maglev technology. These requirements were developed by a : working group composed of representatives of German Federal Railways (DB), Tes...

  7. Requirements Engineering for Software Integrity and Safety

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leveson, Nancy G.

    2002-01-01

    Requirements flaws are the most common cause of errors and software-related accidents in operational software. Most aerospace firms list requirements as one of their most important outstanding software development problems and all of the recent, NASA spacecraft losses related to software (including the highly publicized Mars Program failures) can be traced to requirements flaws. In light of these facts, it is surprising that relatively little research is devoted to requirements in contrast with other software engineering topics. The research proposed built on our previous work. including both criteria for determining whether a requirements specification is acceptably complete and a new approach to structuring system specifications called Intent Specifications. This grant was to fund basic research on how these ideas could be extended to leverage innovative approaches to the problems of (1) reducing the impact of changing requirements, (2) finding requirements specification flaws early through formal and informal analysis, and (3) avoiding common flaws entirely through appropriate requirements specification language design.

  8. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's financial guarantee requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferch, R.

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety and Control Act gives the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) the legal authority to require licensees to provide financial guarantees in order to meet the purposes of the Act. CNSC policy and guidance with regard to financial guarantees is outlined, and the current status of financial guarantee requirements as applied to various CNSC licensees is described. (author)

  9. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  10. Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. General Safety Requirements Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    There are a large number of facilities and activities around the world in which radioactive material is produced, handled and stored. This Safety Requirements publication presents international consensus requirements for the management of radioactive waste prior to its disposal. It provides the safety imperatives on the basis of which facilities can be designed, operated and regulated. The publication is supported by a number of Safety Guides that provide up to date recommendations and guidance on best practices for management of particular types of radioactive waste, for storage of radioactive waste, for assuring safety by developing safety cases and supporting safety assessments, and for applying appropriate management systems. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of human health and the environment; 3. Responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 4. Steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste; 5. Development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and activities; Annex: Predisposal management of radioactive waste and the fundamental safety principles.

  11. Analyzing Software Requirements Errors in Safety-Critical, Embedded Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lutz, Robyn R.

    1993-01-01

    This paper analyzes the root causes of safety-related software errors in safety-critical, embedded systems. The results show that software errors identified as potentially hazardous to the system tend to be produced by different error mechanisms than non- safety-related software errors. Safety-related software errors are shown to arise most commonly from (1) discrepancies between the documented requirements specifications and the requirements needed for correct functioning of the system and (2) misunderstandings of the software's interface with the rest of the system. The paper uses these results to identify methods by which requirements errors can be prevented. The goal is to reduce safety-related software errors and to enhance the safety of complex, embedded systems.

  12. Operating safety requirements for the intermediate level liquid waste system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-07-01

    The operation of the Intermediate Level Liquid Waste (ILW) System, which is described in the Final Safety Analysis, consists of two types of operations, namely: (1) the operation of a tank farm which involves the storage and transportation through pipelines of various radioactive liquids; and (2) concentration of the radioactive liquids by evaporation including rejection of the decontaminated condensate to the Waste Treatment Plant and retention of the concentrate. The following safety requirements in regard to these operations are presented: safety limits and limiting control settings; limiting conditions for operation; and surveillance requirements. Staffing requirements, reporting requirements, and steps to be taken in the event of an abnormal occurrence are also described

  13. Safety design guides for seismic requirements for CANDU 9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Duk Su; Chang, Woo Hyun; Lee, Nam Young; A. C. D. Wright

    1996-03-01

    This safety design guide for seismic requirements for CANDU 9 describes the seismic design philosophy, defines the applicable earthquakes and identifies the structures and systems requiring seismic qualification to ensure that the essential safety function can be adequately satisfied following earthquake. The detailed requirements for structures, systems and components which must be seismically qualified are specified in the Appendix. The change status of the regulatory requirements, code and standards should be traced and this safety design guide shall be updated accordingly. 1 fig., (Author) .new

  14. Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jeevarajan, Judith A.; Darcy, Eric C.

    2014-01-01

    This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.

  15. Operational and safety requirement of radiation facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zulkafli Ghazali

    2007-01-01

    Gamma and electron irradiation facilities are the most common industrial sources of ionizing radiation. They have been used for medical, industrial and research purposes since the 1950s. Currently there are more than 160 gamma irradiation facilities and over 600 electron beam facilities in operation worldwide. These facilities are either used for the sterilization of medical and pharmaceutical products, the preservation of foodstuffs, polymer synthesis and modification, or the eradication of insect infestation. Irradiation with electron beam, gamma ray or ultra violet light can also destroy complex organic contaminants in both liquid and gaseous waste. EB systems are replacing traditional chemical sterilization methods in the medical supply industry. The ultra-violet curing facility, however, has found more industrial application in printing and furniture industries. Gamma and electron beam facilities produce very high dose rates during irradiation, and thus there is a potential of accidental exposure in the irradiation chamber which can be lethal within minutes. Although, the safety record of this industry has been relatively very good, there have been fatalities recorded in Italy (1975), Norway (1982), El Salvador (1989) and Israel (1990). Precautions against uncontrolled entry into irradiation chamber must therefore be taken. This is especially so in the case of gamma irradiation facilities those contain large amounts of radioactivity. If the mechanism for retracting the source is damaged, the source may remain exposed. This paper will, to certain extent, describe safety procedure and system being installed at ALURTRON, Nuclear Malaysia to eliminate accidental exposure of electron beam irradiation. (author)

  16. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The guide lays down the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive substances are used or stored as unsealed sources. In addition, some general instructions concerning work in radionuclide laboratories are set out

  17. Radiation safety requirements for radionuclide laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-01

    The guide lays down the requirements for laboratories and storage rooms in which radioactive substances are used or stored as unsealed sources. In addition, some general instructions concerning work in radionuclide laboratories are set out.

  18. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  19. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  20. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It takes into account developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis and risk informed decision making processes. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication

  1. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  2. Generic Safety Requirements for Developing Safe Insulin Pump Software

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Yi; Jetley, Raoul; Jones, Paul L; Ray, Arnab

    2011-01-01

    Background The authors previously introduced a highly abstract generic insulin infusion pump (GIIP) model that identified common features and hazards shared by most insulin pumps on the market. The aim of this article is to extend our previous work on the GIIP model by articulating safety requirements that address the identified GIIP hazards. These safety requirements can be validated by manufacturers, and may ultimately serve as a safety reference for insulin pump software. Together, these two publications can serve as a basis for discussing insulin pump safety in the diabetes community. Methods In our previous work, we established a generic insulin pump architecture that abstracts functions common to many insulin pumps currently on the market and near-future pump designs. We then carried out a preliminary hazard analysis based on this architecture that included consultations with many domain experts. Further consultation with domain experts resulted in the safety requirements used in the modeling work presented in this article. Results Generic safety requirements for the GIIP model are presented, as appropriate, in parameterized format to accommodate clinical practices or specific insulin pump criteria important to safe device performance. Conclusions We believe that there is considerable value in having the diabetes, academic, and manufacturing communities consider and discuss these generic safety requirements. We hope that the communities will extend and revise them, make them more representative and comprehensive, experiment with them, and use them as a means for assessing the safety of insulin pump software designs. One potential use of these requirements is to integrate them into model-based engineering (MBE) software development methods. We believe, based on our experiences, that implementing safety requirements using MBE methods holds promise in reducing design/implementation flaws in insulin pump development and evolutionary processes, therefore improving

  3. Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication applies to the disposal of radioactive waste of all types by means of emplacement in designed disposal facilities, subject to the necessary limitations and controls being placed on the disposal of the waste and on the development, operation and closure of facilities. The classification of radioactive waste is discussed. This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements to provide assurance of the radiation safety of the disposal of radioactive waste, in the operation of a disposal facility and especially after its closure. The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. This is achieved by setting requirements on the site selection and evaluation and design of a disposal facility, and on its construction, operation and closure, including organizational and regulatory requirements.

  4. OSHA safety requirements for hazardous chemicals in the workplace.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dohms, J

    1992-01-01

    This article outlines the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements set forth by the Hazard Communication Standard, which has been in effect for the healthcare industry since 1987. Administrators who have not taken concrete steps to address employee health and safety issues relating to hazardous chemicals are encouraged to do so to avoid the potential of large fines for cited violations. While some states administer their own occupational safety and health programs, they must adopt standards and enforce requirements that are at least as effective as federal requirements.

  5. Design requirements of communication architecture of SMART safety system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, H. Y.; Kim, D. H.; Sin, Y. C.; Lee, J. Y.

    2001-01-01

    To develop the communication network architecture of safety system of SMART, the evaluation elements for reliability and performance factors are extracted from commercial networks and classified the required-level by importance. A predictable determinacy, status and fixed based architecture, separation and isolation from other systems, high reliability, verification and validation are introduced as the essential requirements of safety system communication network. Based on the suggested requirements, optical cable, star topology, synchronous transmission, point-to-point physical link, connection-oriented logical link, MAC (medium access control) with fixed allocation are selected as the design elements. The proposed architecture will be applied as basic communication network architecture of SMART safety system

  6. Cold Vacuum Drying (CVD) Facility Technical Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    KRAHN, D.E.

    2000-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls required to ensure safe operation during receipt of multi-canister overpacks (MCOs) containing spent nuclear fuel. removal of free water from the MCOs using the cold vacuum drying process, and inerting and testing of the MCOs before transport to the Canister Storage Building. Controls required for public safety, significant defense in depth, significant worker safety, and for maintaining radiological and toxicological consequences below risk evaluation guidelines are included

  7. A comparison of the difference of requirements between functional safety and nuclear safety controllers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chen, C.K.; Lee, C.L.; Shyu, S.S. [Inst. of Nuclear Energy Research, Taoyuan, Taiwan (China)

    2014-07-01

    In order to establish self-reliant capabilities of nuclear I&C systems in Taiwan, Taiwan's Nuclear I&C System (TNICS) project had been established by Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER). A Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) safety controller (SCS-2000) has been completed and gone through the IEC 61508 Safety Integrity Level 3 (SIL3) certification of Functional Safety for industries. Based on the certification processes, the difference of requirements between Functional Safety and Nuclear Safety controllers in term of hardware and software are addressed in this study. Besides, the measures used to determine and verify the reliability of the safety control system design are presented. (author)

  8. Safety Design Approach for the Development of Safety Requirements for Design of Commercial HTGR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohashi, Hirofumi; Sato, Hiroyuki; Nakagawa, Shigeaki; Tachibana, Yukio; Nishihara, Tetsuo; Yan, Xing; Sakaba, Nariaki; Kunitomi, Kazuhiko

    2014-01-01

    The research committee on “Safety requirements for HTGR design” was established in 2013 under the Atomic Energy Society of Japan to develop the draft safety requirements for the design of commercial High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactors (HTGRs), which incorporate the HTGR safety features demonstrated using the High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR), lessons learned from the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and requirements for the integration of the hydrogen production plants. The safety design approach for the commercial HTGRs which is a basement of the safety requirements is determined prior to the development of the safety requirements. The safety design approaches for the commercial HTGRs are to confine the radioactive materials within the coated fuel particles not only during normal operation but also during accident conditions, and the integrity of the coated fuel particles and other requiring physical barriers are protected by the inherent and passive safety features. This paper describes the main topics of the research committee, the safety design approaches and the safety functions of the commercial HTGRs determined in the research committee. (author)

  9. 41 CFR 128-1.8006 - Seismic Safety Program requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Seismic Safety Program requirements. 128-1.8006 Section 128-1.8006 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1-INTRODUCTION 1.80-Seismic Safety Program...

  10. Safety assessment requirements for onsite transfers of radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Opperman, E.K.; Jackson, E.J.; Eggers, A.G.

    1992-05-01

    This document contains the requirements for developing a safety assessment document for an onsite package containing radioactive material. It also provides format and content guidance to establish uniformity in the safety assessment documentation and to ensure completeness of the information provided

  11. New requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Misak, J.

    2005-01-01

    In this presentation author presents new requirements on safety of nuclear power plants according to the IAEA safety standards. It is concluded that: - New set of IAEA Safety Standards is close to completion: around 40 standards for NPPs; - Different interpretation of IAEA Safety Standards at present: best world practices instead of previous 'minimum common denominator'; - A number of safety improvements required for NPPs; - Requirements related to BDBAs and severe accidents are the most demanding due to degradation of barriers: hardware modifications and accident management; - Large variety between countries in implementation of accident management programmes: from minimum to major hardware modifications; -Distinction between existing and new NPPs is essential from the point of view of the requirements; WWER 440 reactors have potential to reflect IAEA Safety Standards for existing NPPs; relatively low reactor power offers broader possibilities

  12. Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility Interim Operational Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BENECKE, M.W.

    2000-01-01

    The Interim Operational Safety Requirements for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) Facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management of administrative controls to ensure safe operation of the facility

  13. Requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The requirements of radiation protection and safety for nuclear medicine services are established. The norms is applied to activities related to the radiopharmaceuticals for therapeutics and 'in vivo' diagnostics purposes. (M.C.K.) [pt

  14. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  15. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication is a revision of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-2, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, and has been extended to cover the commissioning stage. It describes the requirements to be met to ensure the safe commissioning, operation, and transition from operation to decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Over recent years there have been developments in areas such as long term operation of nuclear power plants, plant ageing, periodic safety review, probabilistic safety analysis review and risk informed decision making processes. It became necessary to revise the IAEA’s Safety Requirements in these areas and to correct and/or improve the publication on the basis of feedback from its application by both the IAEA and its Member States. In addition, the requirements are governed by, and must apply, the safety objective and safety principles that are established in the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Fundamental Safety Principles. A review of Safety Requirements publications, initiated in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan, revealed no significant areas of weakness but resulted in a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation. These are contained in the present publication.

  16. Requirements to be met by a safety philosophy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hahn, L.

    1990-01-01

    The author's assessment of the use of safety philosophies is that, since 'safety philosophers' still are not certain whether a safety philosophy ought to be applicable to just one, particular technology, or rather to a variety of different technologies, there is reason to state that the required ethical, philosophical and political foundations to build a safety philosophy on are still missing. And this, the author presumes, is one of the reasons why our society to a far extent is incapable of acting, faced not only with the nuclear issue, but also with the present and future ecological challenge. (orig./DG) [de

  17. Quality assurance requirements for the computer software and safety analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husarecek, J.

    1992-01-01

    The requirements are given as placed on the development, procurement, maintenance, and application of software for the creation or processing of data during the design, construction, operation, repair, maintenance and safety-related upgrading of nuclear power plants. The verification and validation processes are highlighted, and the requirements put on the software documentation are outlined. The general quality assurance principles applied to safety analyses are characterized. (J.B.). 1 ref

  18. Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Guide (Russian Ed.)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Safety Guide presents a coherent set of generic criteria (expressed numerically in terms of radiation dose) that form a basis for developing the operational levels needed for decision making concerning protective and response actions. The set of generic criteria addresses the requirements established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2 for emergency preparedness and response, including lessons learned from responses to past emergencies, and provides an internally consistent foundation for the application of radiation protection. The publication also proposes a basis for a plain language explanation of the criteria for the public and for public officials. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Basic considerations; 3. Framework for emergency response criteria; 4. Guidance values for emergency workers; 5. Operational criteria; Appendix I: Dose concepts and dosimetric quantities; Appendix II: Examples of default oils for deposition, individual monitoring and contamination of food, milk and water; Appendix III: Development of EALs and example EALs for light water reactors; Appendix IV: Observables at the scene of a nuclear or radiological emergency.

  19. HTR-PM Safety requirement and Licensing experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Fu; Zhang Zuoyi; Dong Yujie; Wu Zongxin; Sun Yuliang

    2014-01-01

    HTR-PM is a 200MWe modular pebble bed high temperature reactor demonstration plant which is being built in Shidao Bay, Weihai, Shandong, China. The main design parameters of HTR-PM were fixed in 2006, the basic design was completed in 2008. The review of Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) of HTR-PM was started in April 2008, completed in September 2009. In general, HTR- PM design complies with the current safety requirement for nuclear power plant in China, no special standards are developed for modular HTR. Anyway, Chinese Nuclear Safety Authority, together with the designers, developed some dedicated design criteria for key systems and components and published the guideline for the review of safety analysis report of HTR-PM, based on the experiences from licensing of HTR-10 and new development of nuclear safety. The probabilistic safety goal for HTR-PM was also defined by the safety authority. The review of HTR-PM PSAR lasted for one and a half years, with 3 dialogues meetings and 8 topics meetings, with more than 2000 worksheets and answer sheets. The heavily discussed topics during the PSAR review process included: the requirement for the sub-atmospheric ventilation system, the utilization of PSA in design process, the scope of beyond design basis accidents, the requirement for the qualification of TRISO coating particle fuel, and etc. Because of the characteristics of first of a kind for the demonstration plant, the safety authority emphasized the requirement for the experiment and validation, the PSAR was licensed with certain licensing conditions. The whole licensing process was under control, and was re-evaluated again after Fukushima accident to be shown that the design of HTR-PM complies with current safety requirement. This is a good example for how to license a new reactor. (author)

  20. International standardization of safety requirements for fast reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-06-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is conducting the FaCT (Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development) project in cooperation with Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) and Mitsubishi FBR systems inc. (MFBR), where an advanced loop-type fast reactor named JSFR (Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor) is being developed. It is important to develop software technologies (a safety guideline, safety design criteria, safety design standards etc.) of FBRs as well as hardware ones (a reactor plant itself) in order to address prospective worldwide utilization of FBR technology. Therefore, it is expected to establish a rational safety guideline applicable to the JSFR and harmonized with national nuclear-safety regulations as well, including Japan, the United States and the European Union. This report presents domestic and international status of safety guideline development for sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), results of comparative study for safety requirements provided in existing documents and a proposal for safety requirements of future SFRs with a roadmap for their refinement and worldwide utilization. (author)

  1. Radiation safety requirements for training of users of diagnostic X ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Background. Globally, the aim of requirements regarding the use and ownership of diagnostic medical X-ray equipment is to limit radiation by abiding by the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle. The ignorance of radiographers with regard to radiation safety requirements, however, is currently a cause of ...

  2. Safety Requirements and Modern Technical Requirements in Human Information Systems in Amman Hotels

    OpenAIRE

    Farouq Ahmad Alazzam; Sattam Rakan Allahawiah; Mohammad Nayef Alsarayreh; Kafa Hmoud Abdallah al Nawaiseh

    2015-01-01

    This study aimed to demonstrate the availability of Safety requirements and modern technical requirements in human information systems in Amman hotels. an the most important results of this study is the availability of security and safety requirements in human information systems In Amman hotels and The adequacy of the information that it provided .and show that all departments are not connected by appropriate and effective communication networks in adequate form . Also sophisticated operatin...

  3. Predisposal management of radioactive waste. General safety requirements. Pt. 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish, the requirements that must be satisfied in the predisposal management of radioactive waste. This publication sets out the objectives, criteria and requirements for the protection of human health and the environment that apply to the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and shutdown of facilities for the predisposal management of radioactive waste, and the requirements that must be met to ensure the safety of such facilities and activities. This Safety Requirements publication applies to the predisposal management of radioactive waste of all types and covers all the steps in its management from its generation up to its disposal, including its processing (pretreatment, treatment and conditioning), storage and transport. Such waste may arise from the commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; the use of radionuclides in medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education; the processing of materials that contain naturally occurring radionuclides; and the remediation of contaminated areas. The introduction of the document (Section 1) informs about its objective, scope and structure. The protection of human health and the environment is considered in Section 2 of this publication. Section 3 establishes requirements for the responsibilities associated with the predisposal management of radioactive waste. Requirements for the principal approaches to and the elements of the predisposal management of radioactive waste are established in Section 4. Section 5 establishes requirements for the safe development and operation of predisposal radioactive waste management facilities and safe conduct of activities. The Annex presents a discussion of the consistency of the safety requirements established in this publication with the fundamental safety principles

  4. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  5. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  6. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  7. The Management System for Facilities and Activities. Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for management systems that integrate safety, health, security, quality assurance and environmental objectives. A successful management system ensures that nuclear safety matters are not dealt with in isolation but are considered within the context of all these objectives. The aim of this publication is to assist Member States in establishing and implementing effective management systems that integrate all aspects of managing nuclear facilities and activities in a coherent manner. It details the planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that all these requirements are satisfied. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Management system; 3. Management responsibility; 4. Resource management; 5. Process implementation; 6. Measurement, assessment and improvement.

  8. Recommended general safety requirements for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    This report presents recommendations for a set of general safety requirements that could form the basis for the licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic Energy Control Board. In addition to a number of recommended deterministic requirements the report includes criteria for the acceptability of the design of such plants based upon the calculated probability and consequence (in terms of predicted radiation dose to members of the public) of potential fault sequences. The report also contains a historical review of nuclear safety principles and practices in Canada

  9. Safety integrity requirements for computer based I ampersand C systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thuy, N.N.Q.; Ficheux-Vapne, F.

    1997-01-01

    In order to take into account increasingly demanding functional requirements, many instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems in nuclear power plants are implemented with computers. In order to ensure the required safety integrity of such equipment, i.e., to ensure that they satisfactorily perform the required safety functions under all stated conditions and within stated periods of time, requirements applicable to these equipment and to their life cycle need to be expressed and followed. On the other hand, the experience of the last years has led EDF (Electricite de France) and its partners to consider three classes of systems and equipment, according to their importance to safety. In the EPR project (European Pressurized water Reactor), these classes are labeled E1A, E1B and E2. The objective of this paper is to present the outline of the work currently done in the framework of the ETC-I (EPR Technical Code for I ampersand C) regarding safety integrity requirements applicable to each of the three classes. 4 refs., 2 figs

  10. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models will

  11. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1, Revision 1 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered. A review of Safety Requirements publications was commenced in 2011 following the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The review revealed no significant areas of weakness and resulted in just a small set of amendments to strengthen the requirements and facilitate their implementation, which are contained in the present publication.

  12. Fuel supply shutdown facility interim operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besser, R.L.; Brehm, J.R.; Benecke, M.W.; Remaize, J.A.

    1995-01-01

    These Interim Operational Safety Requirements (IOSR) for the Fuel Supply Shutdown (FSS) facility define acceptable conditions, safe boundaries, bases thereof, and management or administrative controls to ensure safe operation. The IOSRs apply to the fuel material storage buildings in various modes (operation, storage, surveillance)

  13. Safety related requirements on future nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niehaus, F.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear power has the potential to significantly contribute to the future energy supply. However, this requires continuous improvements in nuclear safety. Technological advancements and implementation of safety culture will achieve a safety level for future reactors of the present generation of a probability of core-melt of less than 10 -5 per year, and less than 10 -6 per year for large releases of radioactive materials. There are older reactors which do not comply with present safety thinking. The paper reviews findings of a recent design review of WWER 440/230 plants. Advanced evolutionary designs might be capable of reducing the probability of significant off-site releases to less than 10 -7 per year. For such reactors there are inherent limitations to increase safety further due to the human element, complexity of design and capability of the containment function. Therefore, revolutionary designs are being explored with the aim of eliminating the potential for off-site releases. In this context it seems to be advisable to explore concepts where the ultimate safety barrier is the fuel itself. (orig.) [de

  14. UK experience of safety requirements for thermal reactor stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, R.R.; Dale, G.C.; Tweedy, J.N.

    1977-01-01

    The paper summarises the development of safety requirements since the first of the Generating Boards' Magnox reactors commenced operation in 1962 and includes A.G.R. safety together with the preparation of S.G.H.W.R. design safety criteria. It outlines the basic principles originally adopted and shows how safety assessment is a continuing process throughout the life of a reactor. Some description is given of the continuous effort over the years to obtain increased safety margins for existing and new reactors, taking into account the construction and operating experience, experimental information, and more sophisticated computer-aided design techniques which have become available. The main safeguards against risks arising from the Generating Boards' reactors are the achievement of high standards of design, construction and operation, in conjunction with comprehensive fault analyses to ensure that adequate protective equipment is provided. The most important analyses refer to faults which can lead to excessive fuel element temperatures arising from an increase in power or a reduction in cooling capacity. They include the possibility of unintended control rod withdrawal at power or at start-up, coolant flow failure, pressure circuit failure, loss of boiler feed water, and failure of electric power. The paper reviews the protective equipment, and the policy for reactor safety assessments which include application of maximum credible accident philosophy and later the limited use of reliability and probability methods. Some of the Generating Boards' reactors are now more than half way through their planned working lives and during this time safety protective equipment has occasionally been brought into operation, often for spurious reasons. The general performance, of safety equipment is reviewed particularly for incidents such as main turbo-alternator trip, circulator failure, fuel element failures and other similar events, and some problems which have given rise to

  15. Safety and regulatory requirements of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, S.V.; Bhardwaj, S.A.

    2000-01-01

    A pre-requisite for a nuclear power program in any country is well established national safety and regulatory requirements. These have evolved for nuclear power plants in India with participation of the regulatory body, utility, research and development (R and D) organizations and educational institutions. Prevailing international practices provided a useful base to develop those applicable to specific system designs for nuclear power plants in India. Their effectiveness has been demonstrated in planned activities of building up the nuclear power program as well as with unplanned activities, like those due to safety related incidents etc. (author)

  16. Technical Safety Requirements for the Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF)

    CERN Document Server

    Mahn, J A E M J G

    2003-01-01

    This document provides the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Sandia National Laboratories Gamma Irradiation Facility (GIF). The TSR is a compilation of requirements that define the conditions, the safe boundaries, and the administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous materials. These requirements constitute an agreement between DOE and Sandia National Laboratories management regarding the safe operation of the Gamma Irradiation Facility.

  17. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ''Unreviewed Safety Questions,'' DOE 5480.22, ''Technical Safety Requirements,'' and DOE 5480.23, ''Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.'' WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ''Safety Basis'' for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules

  18. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  19. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Arabic Edition)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  20. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  1. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  2. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered

  3. Development of photovoltaic array and module safety requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1982-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations likely to be used in residential, intermediate, and large-scale applications were identified and developed. The National Electrical Code and Building Codes were reviewed with respect to present provisions which may be considered to affect the design of photovoltaic modules. Limited testing, primarily in the roof fire resistance field was conducted. Additional studies and further investigations led to the development of a proposed standard for safety for flat-plate photovoltaic modules and panels. Additional work covered the initial investigation of conceptual approaches and temporary deployment, for concept verification purposes, of a differential dc ground-fault detection circuit suitable as a part of a photovoltaic array safety system.

  4. Safety research needs for Russian-designed reactors. Requirements situation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, R. Allan; Holmstrom, Heikki; Reocreux, Michel; Schulz, Helmut; Liesch, Klaus; Santarossa, Giampiero; Hayamizu, Yoshitaka; Asmolov, Vladimir; Bolshov, Leonid; Strizhov, Valerii; Bougaenko, Sergei; Nikitin, Yuri N.; Proklov, Vladimir; Potapov, Alexandre; Kinnersly, Stephen R.; Voronin, Leonid M.; Honekamp, John R.; Frescura, Gianni M.; Maki, Nobuo; Reig, Javier; ); Bekjord, Eric S.; Rosinger, Herbert E.

    1998-01-01

    integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - VVER severe accident research should focus on validation of codes for accident management procedures, and on extension and qualification of an appropriate data base for materials properties and their interactions. - RBMK thermal-hydraulic research is needed to improve the technical basis for further development of RBMK safety criteria. - Assessment of the integrity of the RBMK primary coolant circuit, and especially the fuel channel, requires urgent research. Methods of assessing RBMK pressure boundary integrity must be verified, and material property data bases extended. - RBMK severe accident research should focus on prevention of accidents and Accident Management for cases of loss of heat sink and Beyond Design-Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accidents. For these purposes, simple physical models and parametric codes need development and should be systematically used in plant specific analysis. Recommendations; - A Safety Research Strategic Plan should be developed. Such a plan sets goals, defines products, and describes when and how work will be done, including determination of research priorities. - Key players, including regulators, operators, plant designers and researchers should be involved in developing and implementing this plan and its execution and applying the results. - International cooperation in safety research should be encouraged for purposes of improving quality, preventing technical isolation and cost sharing. - New approaches, such as technical fora for specific technical topics, should be established to make safety research information in OECD countries available to researchers working on the safety of Russian-designed reactors

  5. Regulatory requirements and administrative practice in safety of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Servant, J.

    1977-01-01

    This paper reviews the current situation of the France regulatory rules and procedures dealing with the safety of the main nuclear facilities and, more broadly, the nuclear security. First, the author outlines the policy of the French administration which requires that the licensee responsible for an installation has to demonstrate that all possible measures are taken to ensure a sufficient level of safety, from the early stage of the project to the end of the operation of the plant. Thus, the administration performs the assessment on a case-by-case basis, of the safety of each installation before granting a nuclear license. On the other hand, the administration settles overall safety requirements for specific categories of installations or components, which determine the ultimate safety performances, but avoid, as far as possible, to detail the technical specifications to be applied in order to comply with these goals. This approach, which allows the designers and the licensees to rely upon sound codes and standards, gains the advantage of a great flexibility without imparing the nuclear safety. The author outlines the licensing progress for the main categories of installations: nuclear power plants of the PWR type, fast breeders, uranium isotope separation plants, and irradiated fuel processing plants. Emphasis is placed on the most noteworthy points: standardization of projects, specific risks of each site, problems of advanced type reactors, etc... The development of the technical regulations is presented with emphasis on the importance of an internationally concerned action within the nuclear international community. The second part of this paper describes the France operating experience of nuclear installations from the safety point of view. Especially, the author examines the technical and administrative utilization of data from safety significant incidents in reactors and plants, and the results of the control performed by the nuclear installations

  6. Recommended safety objectives, principles and requirements for mini-reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-05-01

    Canadian and international publications containing objectives, principles and requirements for the safety of nuclear facilities in general and nuclear power plants in particular have been reviewed for their relevance to mini-reactors. Most of the individual recommendations, sometimes with minor wording changes, are applicable to mini-reactors. However, some prescriptive requirements for the shutdown, emergency core cooling and containment systems of power reactors are considered inappropriate for mini-reactors. The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety favours a generally non-prescriptive approach whereby the applicant for a mini-reactor license is free to propose any means of satisfying the fundamental objectives, but must convince the regulatory agency to that effect. To do so, a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) would be the favoured procedure. A generic PSA for all mini-reactors of the same design would be acceptable. Notwithstanding this non-prescriptive approach, the ACNS considers that it would be prudent to require the existence of at least one independent shutdown system and two physically independent locations from which the reactor can be shut down and the shutdown condition monitored, and to require provision for an assumed loss of integrity of the primary cooling system's boundary unless convincing arguments to the contrary are presented. The ACNS endorses in general the objectives and fundamental principles proposed by the interorganizational Small Reactor Criteria working group, and intends to review and comment on the documents on specific applications to be issued by that working group

  7. DARHT: INTEGRATION OF AUTHORIZATION BASIS REQUIREMENTS AND WORKER SAFETY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MC CLURE, D. A.; NELSON, C. A.; BOUDRIE, R. L.

    2001-01-01

    This document describes the results of consensus agreements reached by the DARHT Safety Planning Team during the development of the update of the DARHT Safety Analysis Document (SAD). The SAD is one of the Authorization Basis (AB) Documents required by the Department prior to granting approval to operate the DARHT Facility. The DARHT Safety Planning Team is lead by Mr. Joel A. Baca of the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office (DOE/AL). Team membership is drawn from the Department of Energy Albuquerque Operations Office, the Department of Energy Los Alamos Area Office (DOE/LAAO), and several divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Revision 1 of the DARHT SAD had been written as part of the process for gaining approval to operate the Phase 1 (First Axis) Accelerator. Early in the planning stage for the required update of the SAD for the approval to operate both Phase 1 and Phase 2 (First Axis and Second Axis) DARHT Accelerator, it was discovered that a conflict existed between the Laboratory approach to describing the management of facility and worker safety

  8. Long term safety requirements and safety indicators for the assessment of underground radioactive waste repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vovk, Ivan

    1998-01-01

    This presentation defines: waste disposal, safety issues, risk estimation; describes the integrated waste disposal process including quality assurance program. Related to actinides inventory it shows the main results of calculated activity obtained by deterministic estimation. It includes the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards and requirements; features related to site, design and waste package characteristics, as technical long term safety criteria for radioactive waste disposal facilities. Fundamental concern regarding the safety of radioactive waste disposal systems is their radiological impact on human beings and the environment. Safety requirements and criteria for judging the level of safety of such systems have been developed and there is a consensus among the international community on their basis within the well-established system of radiological protection. So far, however, little experience has been gained in applying long term safety criteria to actual disposal systems; consequently, there is an international debate on the most appropriate nature and form of the criteria to be used, taking into account the uncertainties involved. Emerging from the debate is the increasing conviction that the combined use of a variety of indicators would be advantageous in addressing the issue of reasonable assurance in the different time frames involved and in supporting the safety case for any particular repository concept. Indicators including risk, dose, radionuclide concentration, transit time, toxicity indices, fluxes at different points within the system, and barrier performance have all been identified as potentially relevant. Dose and risk are the indicators generally seen as most fundamental, as they seek directly to describe the radiological impact of a disposal system, and these are the ones that have been incorporated into most national standards to date. There are, however, certain problems in applying them. Application of a variety of different indicators

  9. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON REGULATIONS AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUADRICYCLES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ana Pavlovic

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In recent years, a new class of compact vehicles has been emerging and wide-spreading all around Europe: the quadricycle. These four-wheeled motor vehicles, originally derived from motorcycles, are a small and fuel-efficient mean of transportation used in rural or urban areas as an alternative to motorbikes or city cars. In some countries, they are also endorsed by local authorities and institutions which support small and environmentally-friendly vehicles. In this paper, several general considerations on quadricycles will be provided including the vehicle classification, evolution of regulations (as homologation, driver licence, emissions, etc, technical characteristics, safety requirements, most relevant investigations, and other additional useful information (e.g. references, links. It represents an important and actual topic of investigation for designers and manufacturers considering that the new EU regulation on the approval and market surveillance of quadricycles will soon enter in force providing conclusive requirements for functional safety environmental protection of these promising vehicles.

  10. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI action plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, a program was established whereby an annual NUREG report would be published on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was compiled and reported in three NUREG volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). This annual NUREG report combines these volumes into a single report and provides updated information as of September 30, 1991. The data contained in these NUREG reports are a product of the NRC's Safety Issues Management System (SIMS) database, which is maintained by the Project Management Staff in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and by NRC regional personnel. This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan Requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, and GSIs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  11. Specification of advanced safety modeling requirements (Rev. 0).

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fanning, T. H.; Tautges, T. J.

    2008-06-30

    The U.S. Department of Energy's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership has lead to renewed interest in liquid-metal-cooled fast reactors for the purpose of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and making more efficient use of future repository capacity. However, the U.S. has not designed or constructed a fast reactor in nearly 30 years. Accurate, high-fidelity, whole-plant dynamics safety simulations will play a crucial role by providing confidence that component and system designs will satisfy established design limits and safety margins under a wide variety of operational, design basis, and beyond design basis transient conditions. Current modeling capabilities for fast reactor safety analyses have resulted from several hundred person-years of code development effort supported by experimental validation. The broad spectrum of mechanistic and phenomenological models that have been developed represent an enormous amount of institutional knowledge that needs to be maintained. Complicating this, the existing code architectures for safety modeling evolved from programming practices of the 1970s. This has lead to monolithic applications with interdependent data models which require significant knowledge of the complexities of the entire code in order for each component to be maintained. In order to develop an advanced fast reactor safety modeling capability, the limitations of the existing code architecture must be overcome while preserving the capabilities that already exist. To accomplish this, a set of advanced safety modeling requirements is defined, based on modern programming practices, that focuses on modular development within a flexible coupling framework. An approach for integrating the existing capabilities of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code into the SHARP framework is provided in order to preserve existing capabilities while providing a smooth transition to advanced modeling capabilities. In doing this, the advanced fast reactor safety models

  12. Responsibility for the Violation of Ecological Safety Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Selivanovskaya, J. I.; Gilmutdinova, I.

    2018-01-01

    The article deals with the problems of responsibility for the violation of ecological safety requirements from the point of view of sustainable development of the state. Such types of responsibility as property, disciplinary, financial, administrative and criminal responsibility in the area are analysed. Suggestions on the improvement of legislation are put forward. Among other things it is suggested to introduce criminal sanctions against legal bodies (enterprises) for ecological crimes with punishments in the form of fines, suspension or discontinuation of activities.

  13. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  14. Safety assessment for facilities and activities. General safety requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF 6 ; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  15. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are installed; (i

  16. Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The Safety Fundamentals publication, Fundamental Safety Principles, establishes principles for ensuring the protection of workers, the public and the environment, now and in the future, from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.? read more The objective of this Safety Requirements publication is to establish the generally applicable requirements to be fulfilled in safety assessment for facilities and activities, with special attention paid to defence in depth, quantitative analyses and the application of a graded approach to the ranges of facilities and of activities that are addressed. The publication also addresses the independent verification of the safety assessment that needs to be carried out by the originators and users of the safety assessment. This publication is intended to provide a consistent and coherent basis for safety assessment across all facilities and activities, which will facilitate the transfer of good practices between organizations conducting safety assessments and will assist in enhancing the confidence of all interested parties that an adequate level of safety has been achieved for facilities and activities. The requirements, which are derived from the Fundamental Safety Principles, relate to any human activity that may cause people to be exposed to radiation risks arising from facilities and activities, as follows: Facilities includes: (a) Nuclear power plants; (b) Other reactors (such as research reactors and critical assemblies); (c) Enrichment facilities and fuel fabrication facilities; (d) Conversion facilities used to generate UF6; (e) Storage and reprocessing plants for irradiated fuel; (f) Facilities for radioactive waste management where radioactive waste is treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of; (g) Any other places where radioactive materials are produced, processed, used, handled or stored; (h) Irradiation facilities for medical, industrial, research and other purposes, and any places where radiation generators are

  17. Safety requirements and safety experience of nuclear facilities in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schnurer, H.L.

    1977-01-01

    Peaceful use of nuclear energy within the F.R.G. is rapidly growing. The Energy Programme of the Federal Government forecasts a capacity of up to 50.000 MW in 1985. Whereas most of this capacity will be of the LWR-Type, other activities are related to LMFBR - and HTGR - development, nuclear ships, and facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle. Safety of nuclear energy is the pacemaker for the realization of nuclear programmes and projects. Due to a very high population - and industrialisation density, safety has the priority before economical aspects. Safety requirements are therefore extremely stringent, which will be shown for the legal, the technical as well as for the organizational area. They apply for each nuclear facility, its site and the nuclear energy system as a whole. Regulatory procedures differ from many other countries, assigning executive power to state authorities, which are supervised by the Federal Government. Another particularity of the regulatory process is the large scope of involvement of independent experts within the licensing procedures. The developement of national safety requirements in different countries generates a necessity to collaborate and harmonize safety and radiation protection measures, at least for facilities in border areas, to adopt international standards and to assist nuclear developing countries. However, different nationally, regional or local situations might raise problems. Safety experience with nuclear facilities can be concluded from the positive construction and operation experience, including also a few accidents and incidents and the conclusions, which have been drawn for the respective factilities and others of similar design. Another tool for safety assessments will be risk analyses, which are under development by German experts. Final, a scope of future problems and developments shows, that safety of nuclear installations - which has reached a high performance - nevertheless imposes further tasks to be solved

  18. 47 CFR 80.305 - Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety Convention.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... and the Safety Convention. 80.305 Section 80.305 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFETY AND SPECIAL RADIO SERVICES STATIONS IN THE MARITIME SERVICES Safety Watch Requirements and Procedures Ship Station Safety Watches § 80.305 Watch requirements of the Communications Act and the Safety...

  19. Hazard analysis & safety requirements for small drone operations : to what extent do popular drones embed safety?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimichailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-01-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this paper presents: (1) a set of safety

  20. EPR meets the next generation PWR safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bouteille, Francois; Czech, Juergen; Sloan, Sandra

    2006-01-01

    At the origin was the common decision in 1989 of Framatome and Siemens to cooperate to design a Nuclear Island which meets the future needs of utilities. EDF and a group of main German Utilities joined this effort in 1991 and from that point were completely involved in the progress of the work. Compliance of the EPR with the European Utility Requirements (EUR) was verified to ensure a large acceptability of the design by other participating utilities. In addition, the entire process was backed up to the end of 1998 by the French and the German Safety Authorities which engaged into a long-lasting cooperation to define common requirements applicable to future Nuclear Power Plants. Upon signature of the Olkiluoto 3 contract, STUK, the Finnish safety and radiation authority, began reviewing the design of the EPR. Upon the favorable recommendation of STUK, the Finnish government delivered a Construction License for the Olkiluoto 3 NPP on February 17, 2005. Following the positive conclusion of the political debate in France with regard to nuclear energy, EDF will also submit a request to start the construction of an EPR on the Flamanville site. In the US, the first steps in view of a Design Certification by the NRC have been taken. These three independent decisions make the EPR the leading first generation 3+ design under construction. Important safety functions are assured by separate systems in a straightforward operating mode. Four separate, redundant trains for all safety systems are installed in four separate layout division for which a strict separation is ensured so that common mode failure, for example due to internal hazards, can be ruled out. A reduction in common mode failure potential is also obtained by design rules ensuring the systematic application of functional diversity. A four train-redundancy for the major safety systems provides flexibility in adapting the design to maintenance requirements, thus contributing to reduce the outage duration. Additional

  1. Safety requirements for long term operation of NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Houdre, T.; Osouf, N.; Juvin, J.-C.

    2012-01-01

    In the future, the reactors operating at present will run alongside reactors of the EPR type or their equivalent, designed for a significantly higher level of safety. This raises the question of the acceptability of continued operation of reactors beyond 40 years when there is an available technology that is safer. Two objectives are therefore imperative. First, a re-evaluation of the safety level in the light of that required of EPR type reactors or their equivalent is necessary, with proposals to bring about significant and relevant improvements to the reactors. R and D work in France and elsewhere is already indicating orientations that could lead to answers, and improvements that would provide significant reductions in release in case of severe accident are being studied. Second, strict compliance of the reactors with the applicable regulations must be demonstrated. At the same time, ageing and obsolescence of the equipment will have to be managed. Where these two points are concerned, ASN expects far-reaching proposals from the licensee. With a view to a request for continued operation beyond 40 years, ASN has referred the matter to the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors which will meet at the end of 2011 to establish the safety requirements for reactors at their fourth ten-yearly outage. (author)

  2. Safety requirements for a nuclear power plant electric power system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fouad, L F; Shinaishin, M A

    1988-06-15

    This work aims at identifying the safety requirements for the electric power system in a typical nuclear power plant, in view of the UNSRC and the IAEA. Description of a typical system is provided, followed by a presentation of the scope of the information required for safety evaluation of the system design and performance. The acceptance and design criteria that must be met as being specified by both regulatory systems, are compared. Means of implementation of such criteria as being described in the USNRC regulatory guides and branch technical positions on one hand and in the IAEA safety guides on the other hand are investigated. It is concluded that the IAEA regulations address the problems that may be faced with in countries having varying grid sizes ranging from large stable to small potentially unstable ones; and that they put emphasis on the onsite standby power supply. Also, in this respect the Americans identify the grid as the preferred power supply to the plant auxiliaries, while the IAEA leaves the possibility that the preferred power supply could be either the grid or the unit main generator depending on the reliability of each. Therefore, it is found that it is particularly necessary in this area of electric power supplies to deal with the IAEA and the American sets of regulations as if each complements and not supplements the other. (author)

  3. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D. T. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2014-04-16

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  4. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D. T.

    2014-01-01

    This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

  5. Requirements on the provisional safety analyses and technical comparison of safety measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-04-01

    decide on the provision of a design license for a repository site for SMA and another one for HAA, or for a common site for both SMA and HAA. The present report concerns the second step and recapitulates the assertions of SGT on the provisional safety analyses and on the safety technical comparison. It establishes the specific requirements of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) on provisional safety and the safety technical comparison. Further, it defines the extent and content of the safety technical documentation necessary for step 2

  6. [Storage of plant protection products in farms: minimum safety requirements].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dutto, Moreno; Alfonzo, Santo; Rubbiani, Maristella

    2012-01-01

    Failure to comply with requirements for proper storage and use of pesticides in farms can be extremely hazardous and the risk of accidents involving farm workers, other persons and even animals is high. There are still wide differences in the interpretation of the concept of "securing or making safe", by workers in this sector. One of the critical points detected, particularly in the fruit sector, is the establishment of an adequate storage site for plant protection products. The definition of "safe storage of pesticides" is still unclear despite the recent enactment of Legislative Decree 81/2008 regulating health and work safety in Italy. In addition, there are no national guidelines setting clear minimum criteria for storage of plant protection products in farms. The authors, on the basis of their professional experience and through analysis of recent legislation, establish certain minimum safety standards for storage of pesticides in farms.

  7. Safety-related requirements for photovoltaic modules and arrays

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levins, A.; Smoot, A.; Wagner, R.

    1984-01-01

    Safety requirements for photovoltaic module and panel designs and configurations for residential, intermediate, and large scale applications are investigated. Concepts for safety systems, where each system is a collection of subsystems which together address the total anticipated hazard situation, are described. Descriptions of hardware, and system usefulness and viability are included. A comparison of these systems, as against the provisions of the 1984 National Electrical Code covering photovoltaic systems is made. A discussion of the Underwriters Laboratory UL investigation of the photovoltaic module evaluated to the provisions of the proposed UL standard for plat plate photovoltaic modules and panels is included. Grounding systems, their basis and nature, and the advantages and disadvantages of each are described. The meaning of frame grounding, circuit groundings, and the type of circuit ground are covered.

  8. Evaluation and qualification of novel control techniques with safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gossner, S.; Wach, D.

    1985-01-01

    The paper discusses the questions related to the assessment and qualification of new I and C-systems. The tasks of nuclear power plant I and Cs as well as the efficiency of the new techniques are reflected. Problems with application of new I and Cs and the state of application in Germany and abroad are addressed. Starting from the essential differencies between conventional and new I and C-systems it is evaluated, if and in which way existing safety requirements can be met and to what extent new requirements need to be formulated. An overall concept has to be developed comprising the definition of graded requirement profiles for design and qualification. Associated qualification procedures and tools have to be adapted, developed and tuned upon each other. (orig./HP) [de

  9. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  10. Legal and governmental infrastructure for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This publication establishes requirements for legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safety of nuclear facilities, the safe use of sources of ionizing radiation, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. Thus, it covers development of the legal framework for establishing a regulatory body and other actions to achieve effective regulatory control of facilities and activities. Other responsibilities are also covered, such as those for developing the necessary support for safety, involvement in securing third party liability and emergency preparedness

  11. The actual development of European aviation safety requirements in aviation medicine: prospects of future EASA requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Siedenburg, J

    2009-04-01

    Common Rules for Aviation Safety had been developed under the aegis of the Joint Aviation Authorities in the 1990s. In 2002 the Basic Regulation 1592/2002 was the founding document of a new entity, the European Aviation Safety Agency. Areas of activity were Certification and Maintenance of aircraft. On 18 March the new Basic Regulation 216/2008, repealing the original Basic Regulation was published and applicable from 08 April on. The included Essential Requirements extended the competencies of EASA inter alia to Pilot Licensing and Flight Operations. The future aeromedical requirements will be included as Annex II in another Implementing Regulation on Personnel Licensing. The detailed provisions will be published as guidance material. The proposals for these provisions have been published on 05 June 2008 as NPA 2008- 17c. After public consultation, processing of comments and final adoption the new proposals may be applicable form the second half of 2009 on. A transition period of four year will apply. Whereas the provisions are based on Joint Aviation Requirement-Flight Crew Licensing (JAR-FCL) 3, a new Light Aircraft Pilot Licence (LAPL) project and the details of the associated medical certification regarding general practitioners will be something new in aviation medicine. This paper consists of 6 sections. The introduction outlines the idea of international aviation safety. The second section describes the development of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), the first step to common rules for aviation safety in Europe. The third section encompasses a major change as next step: the foundation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the development of its rules. In the following section provides an outline of the new medical requirements. Section five emphasizes the new concept of a Leisure Pilot Licence. The last section gives an outlook on ongoing rulemaking activities and the opportunities of the public to participate in them.

  12. Nuclear safety requirements for operation licensing of Egyptian research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahmed, E.E.M.; Rahman, F.A.

    2000-01-01

    From the view of responsibility for health and nuclear safety, this work creates a framework for the application of nuclear regulatory rules to ensure safe operation for the sake of obtaining or maintaining operation licensing for nuclear research reactors. It has been performed according to the recommendations of the IAEA for research reactor safety regulations which clearly states that the scope of the application should include all research reactors being designed, constructed, commissioned, operated, modified or decommissioned. From that concept, the present work establishes a model structure and a computer logic program for a regulatory licensing system (RLS code). It applies both the regulatory inspection and enforcement regulatory rules on the different licensing process stages. The present established RLS code is then applied to the Egyptian Research Reactors, namely; the first ET-RR-1, which was constructed and still operating since 1961, and the second MPR research reactor (ET-RR-2) which is now in the preliminary operation stage. The results showed that for the ET-RR-1 reactor, all operational activities, including maintenance, in-service inspection, renewal, modification and experiments should meet the appropriate regulatory compliance action program. Also, the results showed that for the new MPR research reactor (ET-RR-2), all commissioning and operational stages should also meet the regulatory inspection and enforcement action program of the operational licensing safety requirements. (author)

  13. Safety requirements and feedback of commonly used material handling equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pathak, M.K.

    2009-01-01

    Different types of cranes, hoists, chain pulley blocks are the most commonly used material handling equipment in industry along with attachments like chains, wire rope slings, d-shackles, etc. These equipment are used at work for transferring loads from one place to another and attachments are used for anchoring, fixing or supporting the load. Selection of the correct equipment, identification of the equipment planning of material handling operation, examination/testing of the equipment, education and training of the persons engaged in operation of the material handling equipment can reduce the risks to safety of people in workplace. Different safety systems like boom angle indicator, overload tripping device, limit switches, etc. should be available in the cranes for their safe use. Safety requirement for safe operation of material handling equipment with emphasis on different cranes and attachments particularly wire rope slings and chain slings have been brought out in this paper. An attempt has also been made to bring out common nature of deficiencies observed during regulatory inspection carried out by AERB. (author)

  14. 78 FR 65427 - Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-31

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0097] Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Liquefied Petroleum Gas and Utility Liquefied Petroleum Gas Pipeline Systems AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration...

  15. Supervision of nuclear safety - IAEA requirements, accepted solutions, trends

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jurkowski, M.

    2007-01-01

    Ten principles of the nuclear safety, based on the IAEA's standards are presented. Convention on Nuclear Safety recommends for nuclear safety landscape, the control transparency, culture safety, legal framework and knowledge preservation. Examples of solutions accepted in France, Finland, and Czech Republic are discussed. New trends in safety fundamentals and Integration Regulatory Review are presented

  16. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D

    2008-09-11

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  17. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D.

    2008-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment (LLNL 2007). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment are shown in the B695 Segment DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained waste. Furthermore, a Waste Packaging Unit will be permitted to treat hazardous and mixed waste. RHWM generally processes LLW with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (i.e., much less than 100 n

  18. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-07-15

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  19. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2017-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning.

  20. Decommissioning of Facilities. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 6 (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Decommissioning is the last step in the lifetime management of a facility. It must also be considered during the design, construction, commissioning and operation of facilities. This publication establishes requirements for the safe decommissioning of a broad range of facilities: nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, facilities for processing naturally occurring radioactive material, former military sites, and relevant medical, industrial and research facilities. It addresses all the aspects of decommissioning that are required to ensure safety, aspects such as roles and responsibilities, strategy and planning for decommissioning, conduct of decommissioning actions and termination of the authorization for decommissioning. It is intended for use by those involved in policy development, regulatory control and implementation of decommissioning

  1. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  2. Radiation protection and safety of radiation sources: International basic safety standards. General safety requirements. Pt. 3 (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  3. Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. General Safety Requirements. Pt. 3 (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This publication is the new edition of the International Basic Safety Standards. The edition is co-sponsored by seven other international organizations — European Commission (EC/Euratom), FAO, ILO, OECD/NEA, PAHO, UNEP and WHO. It replaces the interim edition that was published in November 2011 and the previous edition of the International Basic Safety Standards which was published in 1996. It has been extensively revised and updated to take account of the latest finding of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The publication details the requirements for the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources. All circumstances of radiation exposure are considered

  4. 42 CFR 3.210 - Required disclosure of patient safety work product to the Secretary.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Required disclosure of patient safety work product... HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL PROVISIONS PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS AND PATIENT SAFETY WORK PRODUCT Confidentiality and Privilege Protections of Patient Safety Work Product § 3.210 Required disclosure of patient...

  5. Technical safety requirements for the Annular Core Research Reactor Facility (ACRRF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boldt, K.R.; Morris, F.M.; Talley, D.G.; McCrory, F.M.

    1998-01-01

    The Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document is prepared and issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.22, Technical Safety Requirements. The bases for the TSR are established in the ACRRF Safety Analysis Report issued in compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The TSR identifies the operational conditions, boundaries, and administrative controls for the safe operation of the facility

  6. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Russian Edition); Bezopasnost' atomnykh ehlektrostantsij: proektirovanie. Konkretnye trebovaniya bezopasnosti

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  7. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larson, H L

    2007-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  8. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 612 (A612) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2006). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., drum crushing, size reduction, and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A612 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A612 fenceline is approximately 220 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A612 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage

  9. Safety requirements and radiological protection for ore installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-06-01

    This norm establishes the safety and radiological protection requirements for mining installations which manipulates, process and storing ores, raw materials, steriles, slags and wastes containing radionuclides of the uranium and thorium natural series, simultaneously or separated, and which can cause undue exposures to the public and workers, at anytime of the functioning or pos operational stage. This norm applies to the mining installations activities, suspended or which have ceased their activities before the issue date of this norm, destined to the mining, physical, chemical and metallurgical processing, and the industrialization of raw materials and residues containing associated radionuclides from the natural series of uranium and thorium, including the stages of implantation, operation and decommissioning of the installation

  10. SARIS Guidelines. 2014 Ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA fundamental safety principles provide the basis for IAEA safety standards and IAEA related programmes. IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment, and therefore represent what all regulators should achieve. These standards, in particular IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1, Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety, provide the basics for establishing, maintaining and continuously improving the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. Additional IAEA requirements and guidance, such as the IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3 (Interim), Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, and IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3, The Management System for Facilities and Activities, are also used to establish and develop the national infrastructure for safety and for establishing and implementing a management system. Assessment of the regulatory framework for safety with respect to the IAEA safety standards can be made either through an external review or through internal self-assessment. Self-assessment offers a mechanism by which an organization can assess its performance against established standards and models and thereby identify areas for improvement. The IAEA has developed a methodology and tool for Self-assessment of the Regulatory Infrastructure for Safety (SARIS), to assist States in undertaking self-assessment of their national safety framework in accordance with the requirements and recommendations of the IAEA safety standards, and to develop an action plan for improvement. The IAEA self-assessment methodology and the associated tools are fully compatible with the IAEA safety standards and are also used in the preparation for regulatory review missions, such as the Integrated Regulatory Review Service and advisory missions. These guidelines have been developed to

  11. NSPWG-recommended safety requirements and guidelines for SEI nuclear propulsion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, A.C.; Lee, J.H.; McCulloch, W.H.; Sawyer, J.C. Jr.; Bari, R.A.; Brown, N.W.; Cullingford, H.S.; Hardy, A.C.; Remp, K.; Sholtis, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    An Interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top- level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and safeguards. Guidelines were recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight trajectory and mission abort, space debris and meteoroids, and ground test safety. In this paper the specific requirements and guidelines will be discussed

  12. Regulatory framework and safety requirements for new (gen III) reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mourlon, Sophie

    2014-01-01

    Sophie Mourlon, ASN Deputy General Director, described the international process to enhance safety between local safety authorities through organizations such as WENRA. Then she explained to the participants the regulatory issues for the next generation of NPPs

  13. Special safety requirements applied to Brazilian nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lepecki, W.P.S.; Hamel, H.J.E.; Koenig, N.; Vieira, P.C.R.; Fritzsche, J.C.

    1981-01-01

    Some safety aspects of the Angra 2 and 3 nuclear power plants are presented. An analysis of the civil and mechanical project of these nuclear power plant having in view a safety analysis is done. (E.G.) [pt

  14. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laycak, D.T.

    2010-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2009). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas, consisting

  15. Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laycak, D T

    2008-06-16

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the 'Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities' (DSA) (LLNL 2008). The analysis presented therein determined that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts from other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are located in two portions of the LLNL main site. A625 is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL. The A625 fenceline is approximately 225 m west of Greenville Road. The DWTF Storage Area, which includes Building 693 (B693), Building 696 Radioactive Waste Storage Area (B696R), and associated yard areas and storage areas within the yard, is located in the northeast quadrant of LLNL in the DWTF complex. The DWTF Storage Area fenceline is approximately 90 m west of Greenville Road. A625 and the DWTF Storage Area are subdivided into various facilities and storage areas

  16. La costruzione di edifici in muratura di pietra: aspetti sinergici tra prevenzione sismica, prestazioni acustiche ed energetiche - The construction of stone masonry buildings: synergy aspects between seismic safety, acoustic and energy performances

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alessandro Schiavi

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available Le murature portanti realizzate con materiali lapidei naturali possono costituire una risorsa per la ricostruzione di aree devastate da eventi sismici nella misura in cui si chieda di recuperare,oltre ad una maggiore sicurezza antisismica, anche un’identità storico-tipologica e tecnologica del tessuto urbano, unitamente alla possibilità di rilanciare le attività edilizie artigianali delle economie locali, altrimenti tagliate fuori dal processo di ricostruzione spesso basato sull’importazione di tecniche costruttive avulse dal contesto in cui si affermano.Se da un lato l’emergenza impone l’uso di sistemi costruttivi a secco solitamente basati su legno e acciaio, che consentono in tempi rapidi di dare ricovero a persone e cose, appare tuttavia evidente chequeste, unitamente al cemento armato,non possono essere imposte come la soluzione valida ovunque e comunque per la ricostruzione di antichi borghi completamente distrutti,dei quali deve essere tramandata la memoria storica anche in base alle recenti direttive ministeriali. Nella memoria si indagano sinteticamente le tecnologie costruttive in muratura ammesse dalle normative antisismiche, alla luce del fatto chele stesse offrono interessanti prestazioni acustiche ed energetiche, grazie all’elevata massa ed inerzia termica, aspetti anch’essi oggetto di specifiche normative cogenti. --- Natural stone masonry is a fundamental resource for buildings reconstruction or renovation in areas devastated by seismic events, in order to recover the historical-typological identity of Central Italy urban landscape. As a matter of facts, this kind of building material,united with the new seismic safety technologies, allows to relaunch local handcrafts, otherwise cut off from the reconstruction process based on foreign constructive techniques. Whereas, on the one hand, emergency requires the use of wood and steel building systems or reinforced concrete, allowing rapid provision of shelter to people

  17. Investigational new drug safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products and safety reporting requirements for bioavailability and bioequivalence studies in humans. Final rule.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is amending its regulations governing safety reporting requirements for human drug and biological products subject to an investigational new drug application (IND). The final rule codifies the agency's expectations for timely review, evaluation, and submission of relevant and useful safety information and implements internationally harmonized definitions and reporting standards. The revisions will improve the utility of IND safety reports, reduce the number of reports that do not contribute in a meaningful way to the developing safety profile of the drug, expedite FDA's review of critical safety information, better protect human subjects enrolled in clinical trials, subject bioavailability and bioequivalence studies to safety reporting requirements, promote a consistent approach to safety reporting internationally, and enable the agency to better protect and promote public health.

  18. What Isn't Working and New Requirements. The Need to Harmonize Safety and Security Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flory, D.

    2011-01-01

    The year 2011 marks the 50th anniversary of the first IAEA regulations governing the transport of radioactive material. However transport safety at the IAEA obviously predates this, since the regulations took time to develop. In 1957, GC. 1/1 already states: 'The Agency should undertake studies with a view to the establishment of regulations relating to the international transportation of radioactive materials. ...'. And goes further: 'The transport of radioisotopes and radiation sources has brought to light many problems and involves the need for uniform packaging and shipping regulations ... facilitate the acceptance of such materials by sea and air carriers'. This conference reiterates the challenge given then through the sub-title 'The next fifty years - Creating a Safe, Secure and Sustainable Framework'. Looking back, we can see that the sustainable framework was a goal in 1957, where radioactive material could be transported should it be desired. Since these early days we have added to safety the need to ensure security. However we still see the same calls today to eradicate denial of shipment, which might suggest we have not progressed. But the picture today is very different - we have today well established requirements for safe transport of radioactive material, and the recommendations for security in transport are coming of age for all radioactive materials. The outstanding issue would seem to be harmonisation, not just between safety and security in IAEA documents, but also harmonisation between Member States.

  19. JET-ISX-B beryllium limiter experiment safety analysis report and operational safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edmonds, P.H.

    1985-09-01

    An experiment to evaluate the suitability of beryllium as a limiter material has been completed on the ISX-B tokamak. The experiment consisted of two phases: (1) the initial operation and characterization in the ISX experiment, and a period of continued operation to the specified surface fluence (10 22 atoms/cm 2 ) of hydrogen ions; and (2) the disassembly, decontamination, or disposal of the ISX facility. During these two phases of the project, the possibility existed for beryllium and/or beryllium oxide powder to be produced inside the vacuum vessel. Beryllium dust is a highly toxic material, and extensive precautions are required to prevent the release of the beryllium into the experimental work area and to prevent the contamination of personnel working on the device. Details of the health hazards associated with beryllium and the appropriate precautions are presented. Also described in appendixes to this report are the various operational safety requirements for the project

  20. A new approach to determine the environmental qualification requirements for the safety related equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hasnaoui, C.; Parent, G.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of the environmental qualification of safety related equipment is to ensure that the plant defense-in-depth is not compromised by common mode failures following design basis accidents with a harsh environment. A new approach based on safety functions has been developed to determine what safety-related equipment is required to function during and after a design basis accident, as well as their environmental qualification requirements. The main feature of this approach is to use auxiliary safety functions established from safety requirements as credited in the safety analyses. This approach is undertaken in three steps: identification of the auxiliary safety functions of each main safety function; determination of the main equipment groups required for each auxiliary safety function; and review of the safety analyses for design basis accidents in order to determine the credited auxiliary safety functions and their mission times for each accident scenario. Some of the benefits of the proposed approach for the determination of the safety environmental qualification requirements are: a systematic approach for the review of safety analyses based on a safety function check list, and the insurance, with the availability of the safety functions, that Gentilly-2 defense-in-depth would not be compromised by design basis accidents with a harsh environment. (author)

  1. Data concentrator requirements for a safety parameter display system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brewer, C.R.

    1983-01-01

    To comply with NUREG 0696 several nuclear plants are being fitted with new facilities and data systems; specifically a Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operational Facility (EOF), and Backup Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Computer System (ERCS) and Nuclear Data Link (NDL). The TSC, OSC, and EOF are physical locations while the SPDS, ERCS, and NDL are Systems. The SPDS and ERCS are usually separate and independent systems, however, they may share a common front end data acquisition system that acquires and sends SPDS related data to both the SPDS and to the ERCS. In the situation just described an SPDS system must depend upon input data from a source that is SPDS host computer independent. To achieve this independence the front end data acquisition system may employ a concept of intelligent distributed processing. This concept essentially takes functional capabilities that were once found only in realtime host computers and distributes it to front end data acquisition systems. Thus by expanding the functionality of the data acquisition system in a manner that provides more capability, independence from the computer vendor, links to multiple computer systems, processing power and redundancy, the concept of a data concentrator evolved. This paper will define this new distributed functionality, and its related requirements. It will also examine different system configuration approaches

  2. Regulatory considerations for computational requirements for nuclear criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bidinger, G.H.

    1995-01-01

    As part of its safety mission, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approves the use of computational methods as part of the demonstration of nuclear criticality safety. While each NRC office has different criteria for accepting computational methods for nuclear criticality safety results, the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) approves the use of specific computational methods and methodologies for nuclear criticality safety analyses by specific companies (licensees or consultants). By contrast, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation approves codes for general use. Historically, computational methods progressed from empirical methods to one-dimensional diffusion and discrete ordinates transport calculations and then to three-dimensional Monte Carlo transport calculations. With the advent of faster computational ability, three-dimensional diffusion and discrete ordinates transport calculations are gaining favor. With the proper user controls, NMSS has accepted any and all of these methods for demonstrations of nuclear criticality safety

  3. Requirement and prospect of nuclear data activities for nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimura, Itsuro

    2000-01-01

    Owing to continuous efforts by the members of JNDC (Japanese Nuclear Data Committee) and Nuclear Data Center in JAERI (Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute), several superb evaluated nuclear data files, such as JENDL, FP (fission product) yields and decay heat, have been compiled in Japan and opened to the world. However, they are seldom adopted in safety design and safety evaluation of light water reactors and are hardly found in related safety regulatory guidelines and standards except the decay heat. In this report, shown are a few examples of presently used nuclear data in the safety design and the safety evaluation of PWRs (pressurized water reactors) and so forth. And then, several procedures are recommended in order to enhance more utilization of Japanese evaluated nuclear data files for nuclear safety. (author)

  4. Conducting organizational safety reviews - requirements, methods and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reiman, T.; Oedewald, P.; Wahlstroem, B.; Rollenhagen, C.; Kahlbom, U.

    2008-03-01

    Organizational safety reviews are part of the safety management process of power plants. They are typically performed after major reorganizations, significant incidents or according to specified review programs. Organizational reviews can also be a part of a benchmarking between organizations that aims to improve work practices. Thus, they are important instruments in proactive safety management and safety culture. Most methods that have been used for organizational reviews are based more on practical considerations than a sound scientific theory of how various organizational or technical issues influence safety. Review practices and methods also vary considerably. The objective of this research is to promote understanding on approaches used in organizational safety reviews as well as to initiate discussion on criteria and methods of organizational assessment. The research identified a set of issues that need to be taken into account when planning and conducting organizational safety reviews. Examples of the issues are definition of appropriate criteria for evaluation, the expertise needed in the assessment and the organizational motivation for conducting the assessment. The study indicates that organizational safety assessments involve plenty of issues and situations where choices have to be made regarding what is considered valid information and a balance has to be struck between focus on various organizational phenomena. It is very important that these choices are based on a sound theoretical framework and that these choices can later be evaluated together with the assessment findings. The research concludes that at its best, the organizational safety reviews can be utilised as a source of information concerning the changing vulnerabilities and the actual safety performance of the organization. In order to do this, certain basic organizational phenomena and assessment issues have to be acknowledged and considered. The research concludes with recommendations on

  5. Conducting organizational safety reviews - requirements, methods and experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reiman, T.; Oedewald, P.; Wahlstroem, B. [Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT (Finland); Rollenhagen, C. [Royal Institute of Technology, KTH, (Sweden); Kahlbom, U. [RiskPilot (Sweden)

    2008-03-15

    Organizational safety reviews are part of the safety management process of power plants. They are typically performed after major reorganizations, significant incidents or according to specified review programs. Organizational reviews can also be a part of a benchmarking between organizations that aims to improve work practices. Thus, they are important instruments in proactive safety management and safety culture. Most methods that have been used for organizational reviews are based more on practical considerations than a sound scientific theory of how various organizational or technical issues influence safety. Review practices and methods also vary considerably. The objective of this research is to promote understanding on approaches used in organizational safety reviews as well as to initiate discussion on criteria and methods of organizational assessment. The research identified a set of issues that need to be taken into account when planning and conducting organizational safety reviews. Examples of the issues are definition of appropriate criteria for evaluation, the expertise needed in the assessment and the organizational motivation for conducting the assessment. The study indicates that organizational safety assessments involve plenty of issues and situations where choices have to be made regarding what is considered valid information and a balance has to be struck between focus on various organizational phenomena. It is very important that these choices are based on a sound theoretical framework and that these choices can later be evaluated together with the assessment findings. The research concludes that at its best, the organizational safety reviews can be utilised as a source of information concerning the changing vulnerabilities and the actual safety performance of the organization. In order to do this, certain basic organizational phenomena and assessment issues have to be acknowledged and considered. The research concludes with recommendations on

  6. Hand-held ultrasound serving three EDs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-02-01

    Having a portable ultrasound available to your ED will enable you to perform scans during the nighttime hours, instead of having patients wait for several hours until the radiology department opens. Additional time can be saved by having a technologist read the scans, which frees your ED physicians for other duties. Having ED docs contact the technologist directly, rather than going through a resident, also saves valuable time. Arriving at a diagnosis more quickly provides a boost to patient safety.

  7. Discussion on several important safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yan Tianwen; Li Jigen; Zhang Lin; Feng Youcai; Jia Xiang; Li Wenhong

    2013-01-01

    Post the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Chinese government raised higher safety goals and safety requirements for the new nuclear power plant to be constructed. The paper expounded the important indicators of safety requirements and the aspects of safety modification that had been developed for the new NPPs. It also discussed and analyzed the main fields required by the new NPPs safety requirements in the safety goals, safety evaluation of sites, defenses of internal and external events, severe accident prevention and mitigation, design of reactor core, containment system and I and C system, and optimization of engineering measure, which gave some references to the design, construction and safety modifications of new NPPs in China. (authors)

  8. Requirement for Pectin Methyl Esterase and Preference for Fragmented over Native Pectins for Wall-associated Kinase-activated, EDS1/PAD4-dependent Stress Response in Arabidopsis*

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kohorn, Bruce D.; Kohorn, Susan L.; Saba, Nicholas J.; Martinez, Victoriano Meco

    2014-01-01

    The wall-associated kinases (WAKs) have a cytoplasmic protein kinase domain that spans the plasma membrane and binds pectin in the extracellular matrix of plants. WAKs are required for cell expansion during Arabidopsis seedling development but are also an integral part of the response to pathogens and stress that present oligogalacturonides (OGs), which subsequently bind to WAKs and activate a MPK6 (mitogen-activated protein kinase)-dependent pathway. It was unclear how WAKs distinguish native pectin polymers and OGs to activate one or the other of these two pathways. A dominant allele of WAK2 constitutively activates the stress response, and we show here that the effect is dependent upon EDS1 and PAD4, transcriptional activators involved in the pathogen response. Moreover, the WAK2 dominant allele is suppressed by a null allele of a pectin methyl esterase (PME3) whose activity normally leads to cross-linking of pectins in the cell wall. Although OGs activate a transcriptional response in wild type, the response is enhanced in a pme3/pme3 null, consistent with a competition by OG and native polymers for activation of WAKs. This provides a plausible mechanism for WAKs to distinguish an expansion from a stress pathway. PMID:24855660

  9. Requirement for pectin methyl esterase and preference for fragmented over native pectins for wall-associated kinase-activated, EDS1/PAD4-dependent stress response in Arabidopsis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kohorn, Bruce D; Kohorn, Susan L; Saba, Nicholas J; Martinez, Victoriano Meco

    2014-07-04

    The wall-associated kinases (WAKs) have a cytoplasmic protein kinase domain that spans the plasma membrane and binds pectin in the extracellular matrix of plants. WAKs are required for cell expansion during Arabidopsis seedling development but are also an integral part of the response to pathogens and stress that present oligogalacturonides (OGs), which subsequently bind to WAKs and activate a MPK6 (mitogen-activated protein kinase)-dependent pathway. It was unclear how WAKs distinguish native pectin polymers and OGs to activate one or the other of these two pathways. A dominant allele of WAK2 constitutively activates the stress response, and we show here that the effect is dependent upon EDS1 and PAD4, transcriptional activators involved in the pathogen response. Moreover, the WAK2 dominant allele is suppressed by a null allele of a pectin methyl esterase (PME3) whose activity normally leads to cross-linking of pectins in the cell wall. Although OGs activate a transcriptional response in wild type, the response is enhanced in a pme3/pme3 null, consistent with a competition by OG and native polymers for activation of WAKs. This provides a plausible mechanism for WAKs to distinguish an expansion from a stress pathway. © 2014 by The American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Inc.

  10. Regulatory requirements for demonstration of the achieved safety level at the Mochovce NPP before commissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lipar, M.

    1997-01-01

    A review of regulatory requirements for demonstration of the achieved safety level at the Mochovce NPP before commissioning is given. It contains licensing steps in Slovakia during commissioning; Status and methodology of Mochovce safety analysis report; Mochovce NPP safety enhancement program; Regulatory body policy towards Mochovce NPP safety enhancement; Recent development in Mochovce pre-operational safety enhancement program review and assessment process; Licensing steps in Slovakia during commissioning

  11. EDS operator and control software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ott, L.L.

    1985-04-01

    The Enrichment Diagnostic System (EDS) was developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to acquire, display and analyze large quantities of transient data for a real-time Advanced Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) experiment. Major topics discussed in this paper are the EDS operator interface (SHELL) program, the data acquisition and analysis scheduling software, and the graphics software. The workstation concept used in EDS, the software used to configure a user's workstation, and the ownership and management of a diagnostic are described. An EDS diagnostic is a combination of hardware and software designed to study specific aspects of the process. Overall system performance is discussed from the standpoint of scheduling techniques, evaluation tools, optimization techniques, and program-to-program communication methods. EDS is based on a data driven design which keeps the need to modify software to a minimum. This design requires a fast and reliable data base management system. A third party data base management product, Berkeley Software System Database, written explicitly for HP1000's, is used for all EDS data bases. All graphics is done with an in-house graphics product, Device Independent Graphics Library (DIGLIB). Examples of devices supported by DIGLIB are: Versatec printer/plotters, Raster Technologies Graphic Display Controllers, and HP terminals (HP264x and HP262x). The benefits derived by using HP hardware and software as well as obstacles imposed by the HP environment are presented in relation to EDS development and implementation

  12. Legal requirements concerning the technical safety of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nolte, R.

    1984-01-01

    A short survey on nuclear risks and the nuclear safety conception is followed by the attempted clear definition of the semantic import of section 7, sub-section (2), No. 3 of the Atomic Energy Act. There are first beginnings of a concretization of the state-of-the-art in science and technology, i.e. all kinds of sub-legislative regulations such as the regulations of the Radiation Protection Ordinance which show scientific substance, guidelines issued by the Ministers, as well as codes for practice set up by various technical bodies and standardization associations, all of which are designed to compensate for this loop hole in the legislation. This study goes to examine to what extent administration and jurisdiction may take into account such codes of practice for the concretization of the legal requirements, and whether they are even binding on those executing the law. Only the respective regulations of the Radiation Protection Ordinance have a binding effect. All other guidelines and codes of practice are not legally binding per se, nor are they capable of being legally permitted by being referred to in terms of legal norms or by the self-commitment of those executing the law. Any attempt of using them, as the basis of a prime facie evidence or as an anticipating expertise, at least evidentarily for the concretization will have to fail owing to their evaluating character and to the fact that they may interfere in sociological conflict. An exception may be a case where a clear distinction can be made as to what extent the contents of such codes of practice is related to scientific and technological findings or to decisions based on evaluations. In such a case, a prima facil evicdence for the conformity of the regulation in question with the state-of-the-art in science and technology may be considered, which would easy the concretization of Art. 7 II Section 3 of the Atomic Law. (orig./HSCH) [de

  13. 77 FR 75439 - Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-20

    ...] Guidances for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for Investigational New Drug Applications and Bioavailability/Bioequivalence Studies, and a Small Entity Compliance Guide; Availability... Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE Studies'' and ``Safety Reporting Requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  14. 10 CFR 76.87 - Technical safety requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ...: (1) Effects of natural phenomena; (2) Building and process ventilation and offgas; (3) Criticality...; (8) Environmental protection; (9) Packaging and transporting nuclear materials; (10) Accident analysis; (11) Chemical safety; (12) Sharing of facilities, structures, systems and components; (13...

  15. Reactivity requirements and safety systems for heavy water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kati, S.L.; Rustagi, R.S.

    1977-01-01

    The natural uranium fuelled pressurised heavy water reactors are currently being installed in India. In the design of nuclear reactors, adequate attention has to be given to the safety systems. In recent years, several design modifications having bearing on safety, in the reactor processes, protective and containment systems have been made. These have resulted either from new trends in safety and reliability standards or as a result of feed-back from operating reactors of this type. The significant areas of modifications that have been introduced in the design of Indian PHWR's are: sophisticated theoretical modelling of reactor accidents, reactivity control, two independent fast acting systems, full double containment and improved post-accident depressurisation and building clean-up. This paper brings out the evolution of design of safety systems for heavy water reactors. A short review of safety systems which have been used in different heavy water reactors, of varying sizes, has been made. In particular, the safety systems selected for the latest 235 MWe twin reactor unit station in Narora, in Northern India, have been discussed in detail. Research and Development efforts made in this connection are discussed. The experience of design and operation of the systems in Rajasthan and Kalpakkam reactors has also been outlined

  16. Safety evaluations required in the safety regulations for Monju and the validity confirmation of safety evaluation methods

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    The purposes of this study are to perform the safety evaluations of the fast breeder reactor 'Monju' and to confirm the validity of the safety evaluation methods. In JFY 2012, the following results were obtained. As for the development of safety evaluation methods needed in the safety examination achieved for the reactor establishment permission, development of the analysis codes, such as a core damage analysis code, were carried out according to the plan. As for the development of the safety evaluation method needed for the risk informed safety regulation, the quantification technique of the event tree using the Continuous Markov chain Monte Carlo method (CMMC method) were studied. (author)

  17. Small nuclear reactor safety design requirements for autonomous operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kozier, K.S.; Kupca, S.

    1997-01-01

    Small nuclear power reactors offer compelling safety advantages in terms of the limited consequences that can arise from major accident events and the enhanced ability to use reliable, passive means to eliminate their occurrence by design. Accordingly, for some small reactor designs featuring a high degree of safety autonomy, it may be-possible to delineate a ''safety envelope'' for a given set of reactor circumstances within which safe reactor operation can be guaranteed without outside intervention for time periods of practical significance (i.e., days or weeks). The capability to operate a small reactor without the need for highly skilled technical staff permanently present, but with continuous remote monitoring, would aid the economic case for small reactors, simplify their use in remote regions and enhance safety by limiting the potential for accidents initiated by inappropriate operator action. This paper considers some of the technical design options and issues associated with the use of small power reactors in an autonomous mode for limited periods. The focus is on systems that are suitable for a variety of applications, producing steam for electricity generation, district heating, water desalination and/or marine propulsion. Near-term prospects at low power levels favour the use of pressurized, light-water-cooled reactor designs, among which those having an integral core arrangement appear to offer cost and passive-safety advantages. Small integral pressurized water reactors have been studied in many countries, including the test operation of prototype systems. (author)

  18. 75 FR 60129 - Draft Guidance for Industry and Investigators on Safety Reporting Requirements for...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-29

    ...., Bldg. 51, rm. 2201, Silver Spring, MD 20993-0002; or the Office of Communication, Outreach, and...'s ability to review critical safety information, improve safety monitoring of human drug and..., will represent the Agency's current thinking on safety reporting requirements for INDs and BA/BE...

  19. 42 CFR 9.10 - Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and... SANCTUARY SYSTEM § 9.10 Occupational Health and Safety Program (OHSP) and biosafety requirements. (a) How are employee Occupational Health and Safety Program risks and concerns addressed? The sanctuary shall...

  20. Evaluation of safety, an unavoidable requirement in the applications of ionizing radiations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jova Sed, Luis Andres

    2013-01-01

    The safety assessments should be conducted as a means to evaluate compliance with safety requirements (and thus the application of fundamental safety principles) for all facilities and activities in order to determine the measures to be taken to ensure safety. It is an essential tool in decision making. For long time we have linked the safety assessment to nuclear facilities and not to all practices involving the use of ionizing radiation in daily life. However, the main purpose of the safety assessment is to determine if it has reached an appropriate level of safety for an installation or activity and if it has fulfilled the objectives of safety and basic safety criteria set by the designer, operating organization and the regulatory body under the protection and safety requirements set out in the International Basic safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. This paper presents some criteria and personal experiences with the new international recommendations on this subject and its practical application in the region and demonstrates the importance of this requirement. Reflects the need to train personnel of the operator and the regulatory body in the proportional application of this requirement in practice with ionizing radiation

  1. Hazard Analysis and Safety Requirements for Small Drone Operations: To What Extent Do Popular Drones Embed Safety?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Plioutsias, Anastasios; Karanikas, Nektarios; Chatzimihailidou, Maria Mikela

    2018-03-01

    Currently, published risk analyses for drones refer mainly to commercial systems, use data from civil aviation, and are based on probabilistic approaches without suggesting an inclusive list of hazards and respective requirements. Within this context, this article presents: (1) a set of safety requirements generated from the application of the systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) technique on a generic small drone system; (2) a gap analysis between the set of safety requirements and the ones met by 19 popular drone models; (3) the extent of the differences between those models, their manufacturers, and the countries of origin; and (4) the association of drone prices with the extent they meet the requirements derived by STPA. The application of STPA resulted in 70 safety requirements distributed across the authority, manufacturer, end user, or drone automation levels. A gap analysis showed high dissimilarities regarding the extent to which the 19 drones meet the same safety requirements. Statistical results suggested a positive correlation between drone prices and the extent that the 19 drones studied herein met the safety requirements generated by STPA, and significant differences were identified among the manufacturers. This work complements the existing risk assessment frameworks for small drones, and contributes to the establishment of a commonly endorsed international risk analysis framework. Such a framework will support the development of a holistic and methodologically justified standardization scheme for small drone flights. © 2017 Society for Risk Analysis.

  2. Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hill, Janice L.; Baggs, Rhoda

    2007-01-01

    Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety requirements. Technical requirements are those such as "must work" and "must not work" functions in the system. Process-Oriented requirements are software engineering and safety management process requirements. Address the system perspective and some cover just software in the system > NASA-STD-8719.13B Software Safety Standard is the current standard of interest. NASA programs/projects will have their own set of safety requirements derived from the standard. Safety Cases: a) Documented demonstration that a system complies with the specified safety requirements. b) Evidence is gathered on the integrity of the system and put forward as an argued case. [Gardener (ed.)] c) Problems occur when trying to meet safety standards, and thus make retrospective safety cases, in legacy safety-critical computer systems.

  3. Meeting the next generation PWR safety requirements: The EPR Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salhi, Othman

    2008-01-01

    The development process pursued the harmonization of technical solutions and the integration of all the lessons learned from earlier nuclear plants built by both vendors. As far as safety more specifically is concerned, the basic choice for the EPR was to adopt an evolutionary approach based on experience feedback from the reactors built by Areva, which at the time already amounted to nearly 100. This philosophy makes today's Areva EPR the natural descendant of the most advanced French N4 and German Konvoi power reactors currently in operation. EPR design choices affecting safety were motivated by a continuous quest for higher levels of safety. A two-fold approach was followed: 1. improvement of the measures aimed at further reducing the already very low probability of core melt 2. incorporation of measures aimed at further limiting the consequences of a severe accident, in the knowledge that its probability of occurrence has been considerably reduced. Through its filiations with French N4 and German Konvoi power reactors, the EPR benefits from the uninterrupted, evolutionary innovation process that has supported the development of PWRs since their introduction into the market place. This is especially true for safety where the EPR brings a unique combination of both tried and tested and innovative features that further improve the prevention of severe accidents and their mitigation

  4. Environmental and Personal Safety: No Vision Required. Practice Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bozeman, Laura A.

    2004-01-01

    Personal safety is an important issue for all people, regardless of their physical capabilities. For people with visual impairments (that is, those who are blind or have low vision), real concerns exist regarding their vulnerability to crime and their greater risk of attack. With a nationwide increase in crime in the United States, "Three out of…

  5. 76 FR 5494 - Pipeline Safety: Mechanical Fitting Failure Reporting Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-02-01

    ... style'' fittings ( provides no explanation or e.g. stab, nut follower, bolted). justification for the...-RELATED CONDITION REPORTS 0 1. The authority citation for part 191 continues to read as follows: Authority... OF NATURAL AND OTHER GAS BY PIPELINE: MINIMUM FEDERAL SAFETY STANDARDS 0 3. The authority citation...

  6. Inform@ed space

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bjerrum, Peter; Olsen, Kasper Nefer

    2001-01-01

    Inform@ed space Sensorial Perception And Computer Enchancement - bidrag til Nordisk Arkitekturforskningsforenings IT-konference, AAA april 2001.......Inform@ed space Sensorial Perception And Computer Enchancement - bidrag til Nordisk Arkitekturforskningsforenings IT-konference, AAA april 2001....

  7. Preparation, review, and approval of implementation plans for nuclear safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    This standard describes an acceptable method to prepare, review, and approve implementation plans for DOE Nuclear Safety requirements. DOE requirements are identified in DOE Rules, Orders, Notices, Immediate Action Directives, and Manuals

  8. 45 CFR 98.41 - Health and safety requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... establishment of any new or additional requirements if existing requirements comply with the requirements of the... as grandparents, great grandparents, siblings (if living in a separate residence), aunts, and uncles... care providers” does not include grandparents, great grandparents, siblings (if such providers live in...

  9. Safety and licensing requirements in the Republic of South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, D.M.; Langford, E.L.

    1986-01-01

    The principles for licensing of nuclear installations in South Africa are based on the control of mortality risk to the operators of an installation and the population resident in the vicinity of the site. This paper describes the development of this safety philosophy, and the nuclear licensing process used in this country. The structure of the nuclear regulatory function is briefly described, including the respective roles of the Atomic Energy Corporation, Licencing Branch and the Council for Nuclear Safety. The development of risk criteria and quantitative release magnitude-probability criteria for radioactive material is outlined. Tasks that have to be undertaken by a potential waste disposal site licensee before a site licence is issued are described. Once the facility is commissioned periodic monitoring procedures will have to be adopted throughout the lifetime of the facility. The scope of typical monitoring activities is outlined and the ongoing analyses to be performed and the records to be kept are discussed

  10. Diversity requirements for safety critical software-based automation systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korhonen, J.; Pulkkinen, U.; Haapanen, P.

    1998-03-01

    System vendors nowadays propose software-based systems even for the most critical safety functions in nuclear power plants. Due to the nature and mechanisms of influence of software faults new methods are needed for the safety and reliability evaluation of these systems. In the research project 'Programmable automation systems in nuclear power plants (OHA)' various safety assessment methods and tools for software based systems are developed and evaluated. This report first discusses the (common cause) failure mechanisms in software-based systems, then defines fault-tolerant system architectures to avoid common cause failures, then studies the various alternatives to apply diversity and their influence on system reliability. Finally, a method for the assessment of diversity is described. Other recently published reports in OHA-report series handles the statistical reliability assessment of software based (STUK-YTO-TR 119), usage models in reliability assessment of software-based systems (STUK-YTO-TR 128) and handling of programmable automation in plant PSA-studies (STUK-YTO-TR 129)

  11. Development of High-Level Safety Requirements for a Pyroprocessing Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Seok Jun; Jo, Woo Jin; You, Gil Sung; Choung, Won Myung; Lee, Ho Hee; Kim, Hyun Min; Jeon, Hong Rae; Ku, Jeong Hoe; Lee, Hyo Jik [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing a pyroproceesing technology to reduce the waste volume and recycle some elements. The pyroprocessing includes several treatment processes which are related with not only radiological and physical but also chemical and electrochemical properties. Thus, it is of importance to establish safety design requirements considering all the aspects of those properties for a reliable pyroprocessing facility. In this study, high-level requirements are presented in terms of not only radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, and seismic safety but also confinement and chemical safety for the unique characteristics of a pyroprocessing facility. Several high-level safety design requirements such as radiation protection, nuclear criticality, fire protection, seismic, confinement, and chemical processing were presented for a pyroprocessing facility. The requirements must fulfill domestic and international safety technology standards for a nuclear facility. Furthermore, additional requirements should be considered for the unique electrochemical treatments in a pyroprocessing facility.

  12. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-01-01

    These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S ampersand H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules

  13. Nuclear power plant's safety and risk (requirements of safety and reliability)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franzen, L.F.

    1977-01-01

    Starting out from the given safety objectives as they have evolved during the past few years and from the present legal and regulatory provisions for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the hazards involved in regular operation, accidents and emergency situations are discussed. In compliance with the positive safety balance of nuclear power plants in the FRG, special attention is focused on the preventive safety analysis within the frame of the nuclear licensing procedure. Reference is made to the beginnings of a comprehensive hazard concept for an unbiased plant assessment. Emergency situations are discussed from the point of view of general hazard comparisons. (orig.) [de

  14. Construction safety program for the National Ignition Facility Appendix A: Safety Requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cerruti, S.J.

    1997-01-14

    These rules apply to all LLNL employees, non-LLNL employees (including contract labor, supplemental labor, vendors, personnel matrixed/assigned from other National Laboratories, participating guests, visitors and students) and construction contractors/subcontractors. The General Safety and Health rules shall be used by management to promote accident prevention through indoctrination, safety and health training and on-the-job application. As a condition for contracts award, all contractors and subcontractors and their employees must certify on Form S & H A-1 that they have read and understand, or have been briefed and understand, the National Ignition Facility OCIP Project General Safety Rules.

  15. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department`s enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion.

  16. Enforcement handbook: Enforcement of DOE nuclear safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    This Handbook provides detailed guidance and procedures to implement the General Statement of DOE Enforcement Policy (Enforcement Policy or Policy). A copy of this Enforcement Policy is included for ready reference in Appendix D. The guidance provided in this Handbook is qualified, however, by the admonishment to exercise discretion in determining the proper disposition of each potential enforcement action. As discussed in subsequent chapters, the Enforcement and Investigation Staff will apply a number of factors in assessing each potential enforcement situation. Enforcement sanctions are imposed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy for the purpose of promoting public and worker health and safety in the performance of activities at DOE facilities by DOE contractors (and their subcontractors and suppliers) who are indemnified under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act. These indemnified contractors, and their suppliers and subcontractors, will be referred to in this Handbook collectively as DOE contractors. It should be remembered that the purpose of the Department's enforcement policy is to improve nuclear safety for the workers and the public, and this goal should be the prime consideration in exercising enforcement discretion

  17. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-12-01

    This report is to provide a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs), Generic Safety Issues(GSIs), and other Multiplant Actions (MPAs) that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. An additional purpose of this NUREG report is to serve as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues up until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  18. Romania - NPP PLiM Between Regulatory Requirement / Oversight and Operator Safety / Financial Interest

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goicea, Lucian

    2012-01-01

    Cernavoda Unit 1 PLiM started in the first third of its design life, to develop as regulatory requirements of the components of standards and programmes and to benefit by earlier implementation of the measures for achieving maximum operating life. CNCAN regulatory present approach on the utility PLiM combines the regulatory requirements on management system, ageing management provisions of periodic safety review, detailed technical requirements of ageing programmes and different techniques focusing only on safety issues. (author)

  19. Does unbelted safety requirement affect protection for belted occupants?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hu, Jingwen; Klinich, Kathleen D; Manary, Miriam A; Flannagan, Carol A C; Narayanaswamy, Prabha; Reed, Matthew P; Andreen, Margaret; Neal, Mark; Lin, Chin-Hsu

    2017-05-29

    Federal regulations in the United States require vehicles to meet occupant performance requirements with unbelted test dummies. Removing the test requirements with unbelted occupants might encourage the deployment of seat belt interlocks and allow restraint optimization to focus on belted occupants. The objective of this study is to compare the performance of restraint systems optimized for belted-only occupants with those optimized for both belted and unbelted occupants using computer simulations and field crash data analyses. In this study, 2 validated finite element (FE) vehicle/occupant models (a midsize sedan and a midsize SUV) were selected. Restraint design optimizations under standardized crash conditions (U.S.-NCAP and FMVSS 208) with and without unbelted requirements were conducted using Hybrid III (HIII) small female and midsize male anthropomorphic test devices (ATDs) in both vehicles on both driver and right front passenger positions. A total of 10 to 12 design parameters were varied in each optimization using a combination of response surface method (RSM) and genetic algorithm. To evaluate the field performance of restraints optimized with and without unbelted requirements, 55 frontal crash conditions covering a greater variety of crash types than those in the standardized crashes were selected. A total of 1,760 FE simulations were conducted for the field performance evaluation. Frontal crashes in the NASS-CDS database from 2002 to 2012 were used to develop injury risk curves and to provide the baseline performance of current restraint system and estimate the injury risk change by removing the unbelted requirement. Unbelted requirements do not affect the optimal seat belt and airbag design parameters in 3 out of 4 vehicle/occupant position conditions, except for the SUV passenger side. Overall, compared to the optimal designs with unbelted requirements, optimal designs without unbelted requirements generated the same or lower total injury risks for

  20. Correct safety requirements during the life cycle of heating plants; Korrekta saekerhetskrav under vaermeanlaeggningars livscykel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tegehall, Jan; Hedberg, Johan [Swedish National Testing and Research Inst., Boraas (Sweden)

    2006-10-15

    The safety of old steam boilers or hot water generators is in principle based on electromechanical components which are generally easy to understand. The use of safety-PLC is a new and flexible way to design a safe system. A programmable system offers more degrees of freedom and consequently new problems may arise. As a result, new standards which use the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) concept for the level of safety have been elaborated. The goal is to define a way of working to handle requirements on safety in control systems of heat and power plants. SIL-requirements are relatively new within the domain and there is a need for guidance to be able to follow the requirements. The target of this report is the people who work with safety questions during new construction, reconstruction, or modification of furnace plants. In the work, the Pressure Equipment Directive, 97/23/EC, as well as standards which use the SIL concept have been studied. Additionally, standards for water-tube boilers have been studied. The focus has been on the safety systems (safety functions) which are used in water-tube boilers for heat and power plants; other systems, which are parts of these boilers, have not been considered. Guidance has been given for the aforementioned standards as well as safety requirements specification and risk analysis. An old hot water generator and a relatively new steam boiler have been used as case studies. The design principles and safety functions of the furnaces have been described. During the risk analysis important hazards were identified. A method for performing a risk analysis has been described and the appropriate content of a safety requirements specification has been defined. If a heat or power plant is constructed, modified, or reconstructed, a safety life cycle shall be followed. The purpose of the safety life cycle is to plan, describe, document, perform, check, test, and validate that everything is correctly done. The components of the safety

  1. Ferrocyanide Safety Program: Data requirements for the ferrocyanide safety issue developed through the data quality objectives (DQO) process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buck, J.W.; Anderson, C.M.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Toth, J.J.; Turner, P.J.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Meacham, J.E.

    1993-12-01

    This document records the data quality objectives (DQO) process applied to the Ferrocyanide Waste Tank Safety Issue at the Hanford Site by the Pacific Northwest Laboratory and Westinghouse Hanford Company. Specifically, the major recommendations and findings from this Ferrocyanide DQO process are presented so that decision makers can determine the type, quantity, and quality of data required for addressing tank safety issues. The decision logic diagrams and error tolerance equations also are provided. Finally, the document includes the DQO sample-size formulas for determining specific tank sampling requirements

  2. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yun, Y. C. [LG-EDS Systems, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S. [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2000-05-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage.

  3. Information Management system of the safety regulatory requirements and guidance for the Korea next generation reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yun, Y. C.; Lee, J. H.; Lee, H. C.; Lee, J. S.

    2000-01-01

    In order to achieve the safety of the Korea Next Generation Reactors (KNGR), the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety has carried out the Safety and Regulatory Requirements and Guidance (SRRG) development program from 1992 such as establishment of the SRRG hierarchy, development of technical requirements and guidance, and consideration of new licensing system. The SRRG hierarchy for the KNGR was consisted of five tiers; Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, General Safety Criteria, Specific Safety Requirements and Safety Regulatory Guides. The developed SRRG have been compared the criteria in 10CFR and Reg. Guide in the U.S.A and the IAEA documents for assuring internationally acceptable level of the SRRG. To improve the efficiency and accuracy of SRRG development, the construction of database system was required in the course of development. Therefore, the Information Management System of SRRG for the KNGR has been developed which enables developers to quickly and accurately seek and systematically manage whole contexts of the SRRG, reference requirements, and current atomic energy regulation rules. Moreover, through homepage whose URL is 'http://kngr.kins.re.kr', the concerned persons and public can acquire the information related with SRRG and KNGR project, and post his/her thought to the opinion forum in the homepage

  4. Requirements to amend the main influence factors on the safety culture after fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farcasiu, M.; Nitoi, M.

    2015-01-01

    The paper presents a general model that provides a framework for the safety culture assessment, creating the possibility to identify factors that can significantly influence the safety culture. The main safety culture influence factors (SCIF) used by model are the following: regulatory environment, organizational environment, worker characteristics, socio-political environment, national culture, organization history, business and technological characteristics. After the analysis of the deficiencies and weaknesses of SCIFc in evolution of the Fukushima accident, some issues that may become necessities and requirements to change and improve both the safety culture and safety of the nuclear installations were highlighted. For each influence factor were identified some requirements to amend. The results will emphasize the necesity of the human - technology - organization system assessment. Hence it was demonstrated that the safety culture results from the interaction of individuals with technology and with the organization. (authors)

  5. Safety requirements expected to the prototype fast breeder reactor 'Monju'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-11-01

    In July 2013, Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has enforced new regulatory requirements in consideration of severe accidents for the commercial light water reactors (LWR) and also prototype power generation reactors such as the sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR) of 'Monju' based on TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident (hereinafter referred to as '1F accident') occurred in March 2011. Although the regulatory requirements for SFR will be revised by NRA with consideration for public comments, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) set up 'Advisory Committee on Monju Safety Requirements' consisting of fast breeder reactor (FBR) and safety assessment experts in order to establish original safety requirements expected to the prototype FBR 'Monju' considering severe accidents with knowledge from JAEA as well as scientific and technical insights from the experts. This report summarizes the safety requirements expected to Monju discussed by the committee. (author)

  6. Risk and safety requirements for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kowalski, Marek L; Ansotegui, Ignacio; Aberer, Werner

    2016-01-01

    One of the major concerns in the practice of allergy is related to the safety of procedures for the diagnosis and treatment of allergic disease. Management (diagnosis and treatment) of hypersensitivity disorders involves often intentional exposure to potentially allergenic substances (during skin...... attempted to present general requirements necessary to assure the safety of these procedures. Following review of available literature a group of allergy experts within the World Allergy Organization (WAO), representing various continents and areas of allergy expertise, presents this report on risk...... associated with diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology and proposes a consensus on safety requirements for performing procedures in allergy offices. Optimal safety measures including appropriate location, type and required time of supervision, availability of safety equipment, access...

  7. Current trends in codal requirements for safety in operation of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srivasista, K.; Shah, Y.K.; Gupta, S.K.

    2006-01-01

    The Code of practice on safety in nuclear power plant operation states the requirements to be met during operation of a nuclear power plant for assuring safety. Among various stages of authorization, regulatory body issues authorization for operation of a nuclear power plant, monitors and enforces regulatory requirements. The responsible organization shall have overall responsibility and the plant management shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring safe and efficient operation of its nuclear power plants. A set of codal requirements covering technical and administrative aspects are mandatory for the plant management to implement to ensure that the nuclear power plant is operated in accordance with the design intent. Requirements on operating procedures and instructions establish operation and maintenance, inspection and testing of the plant in a planned and systematic way. The requirements on emergency preparedness programme establish with a reasonable assurance that, in the event of an emergency situation, appropriate measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences. Commissioning requirements verify performance criteria during commissioning to ensure that the design intent and QA requirements are met. Several modifications in systems important to safety required during operation of a nuclear power plant are regulated. However new operational codal requirements arising out of periodic safety review, operational experience feedback, life management, probabilistic safety assessment, physical security, safety convention and obligations and decommissioning are not covered in the present code of practice for safety in nuclear power plant operation. Codal provisions on 'Review by operating organization on aspects of design having implications on operability' are also required to be addressed. The merits in developing such a methodology include acceptance of the design by operating organization, ensuring maintainability, proper layout etc. in the new designs

  8. The safety of food products requires X-ray testing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lardiere, C.

    2017-01-01

    Food safety through standards and regulations imposes food products to be tested for the presence of alien elements. So far metal detectors have been used to detect metal parts, now they have been progressively replaced with X-ray scanners that allow the detection of a lot more contaminants. The improvement of algorithms for image processing combined with the availability of ever more powerful PC have led to the routine use of X-ray testing on industrial processes. Technological progress has made X-ray testing more efficient: while previously a power of 500 W was necessary to cross a 10 cm thickness of water, now only 100 W is necessary. The main advantage of X-ray testing is to be able to test food even packed in metal containers and to detect if the container is deformed. Another advantages is to be able to detect a lot of elements like pieces of glass, small stones or bits of bones. The minimal size to be detected is 0.5 mm for stainless steels and 2 mm for glass or bones. Usually metal detectors are set at the end of the production line just before packaging but in some cases they can be included in the line in order to protect the next machine that intervenes to process the food. (A.C.)

  9. Meteorological aspects of the reactor safety study requiring further study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slinn, W.G.N.

    1981-01-01

    Simple and approximate methods are used in a search for meteorological features that dominate estimates of reactor-accident consequences, and that require more accurate descriptions if consequence estimates are to be more realistic. By considering variations in the source term, it is seen that accidents involving containment-vessel failure dominate both the mean and variance of the distribution of consequences, although this conclusion is subject to uncertainties about plume rise. Research is recommended on the behavior of horizontal, sonic jets, with heat transfer to the ground, and especially during stable atmospheric conditions. Diffusion with fumigation and lofting require further study; use of K-theory and National Weather Service data should be vigorously pursued. Conditional upon an accident occurring, precipitation scavenging appears to dominate the variance of the consequences

  10. Usage of information safety requirements in improving tube bending process

    Science.gov (United States)

    Livshitz, I. I.; Kunakov, E.; Lontsikh, P. A.

    2018-05-01

    This article is devoted to an improvement of the technological process's analysis with the information security requirements implementation. The aim of this research is the competition increase analysis in aircraft industry enterprises due to the information technology implementation by the example of the tube bending technological process. The article analyzes tube bending kinds and current technique. In addition, a potential risks analysis in a tube bending technological process is carried out in terms of information security.

  11. 49 CFR 1106.3 - Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Actions for which Safety Integration Plan is required. 1106.3 Section 1106.3 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued... TRANSPORTATION BOARD CONSIDERATION OF SAFETY INTEGRATION PLANS IN CASES INVOLVING RAILROAD CONSOLIDATIONS...

  12. 45 CFR 1356.30 - Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive home providers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... licensing file for that foster or adoptive family must contain documentation which verifies that safety... 45 Public Welfare 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safety requirements for foster care and adoptive... ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, AND CHILD AND...

  13. 78 FR 2797 - Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-01-14

    ... Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles; Draft Environmental Assessment for Rulemaking To Establish Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles; Proposed Rules #0;#0;Federal Register...-0148] RIN 2127-AK93 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Minimum Sound Requirements for Hybrid and...

  14. Modeling the Non-functional Requirements in the Context of Usability, Performance, Safety and Security

    OpenAIRE

    Sadiq, Mazhar

    2007-01-01

    Requirement engineering is the most significant part of the software development life cycle. Until now great emphasis has been put on the maturity of the functional requirements. But with the passage of time it reveals that the success of software development does not only pertain to the functional requirements rather non-functional requirements should also be taken into consideration. Among the non-functional requirements usability, performance, safety and security are considered important. ...

  15. Defence-in-depth and development of safety requirements for advanced nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.; Gasparini, M.

    2002-01-01

    The paper addresses a general approach for the preparation of the design safety requirements using the IAEA Safety Objectives and the strategy of defence-in-depth. It proposes a general method (top-down approach) to prepare safety requirements for a given kind of reactor using the IAEA requirements for nuclear power plants as a starting point through a critical interpretation and application of the strategy of defence-in-depth. The IAEA has recently developed a general methodology for screening the defence-in-depth of nuclear power plants starting from the fundamental safety objectives as proposed in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals. This methodology may provide a useful tool for the preparation of safety requirements for the design and operation of any kind of reactor. Currently the IAEA is preparing the technical basis for the development of safety requirements for Modular High Temperature Gas Reactors, with the aim of showing the viability of the method. A draft TECDOC has been prepared and circulated among several experts for comments. This paper is largely based on the content of the draft TECDOC. (authors)

  16. Lithuanian requirements for ageing management of systems and components important to safety of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramanauskiene, A.

    2000-01-01

    In this paper the Lithuanian requirements for ageing management of systems and components important to safety of Ignalina nuclear power plant (two RBMK-1500 water-cooled graphite moderated channel-type power reactors) are presented

  17. “The Safety of Tourist” - Required Community Standard

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Olguta Ludmila Benescu

    2010-06-01

    be forgotten which would attract tourists.The Romanian State, in order to have had an attractive and profitable tourism it must turn into a leading provider of safety.

  18. Dimensioning of emergency condensers in accordance with safety requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Palavecino, C [SIEMENS, Energieerzeugung, Offenbach (Germany)

    1996-12-01

    The emergency condensers are heat exchangers consisting of a parallel arrangement of horizontal U-tubes between two common heads. The tope header is connected via piping to the reactor vessel steam space, while the lower header is connected to the reactor vessel below the reactor vessel water level. The heat exchangers are located in a pool filled with cold water. The emergency condensers and the reactor vessel thus form a system of communicating pipes. At normal reactor water level, the emergency condensers are flooded with cold, non-flowing water. No heat transfer takes place in this condition. If there is a drop in the reactor water level, the heat exchanging surfaces are gradually uncovered and the incoming steam condenses on the cold surfaces. The cold condensate in returned to the reactor vessel. In this way, heat is removed from the reactor vessel and water simultaneously supplied to the reactor vessel. This means that the emergency condensers function as a heat removal system while at the same time serving as HP and LP coolant injection systems. The emergency condensers operate with the highest possible degree of passivity imaginable, namely through a drop in the reactor vessel water level alone, requiring neither control systems nor power supply. The design of the emergency condensers must meet the requirements dictated by the thermal and the hydraulic conditions. Taking into consideration a redundancy degree of N + 2, a specific thermal rating of 63 MW per emergency condenser results for a reactor with an output of 2778 MW. The total performance of the emergency condenser system in thus 252 MW, or 9.1% of reactor output. The probability of failure of the emergency condenser of Siemens SWR 1000 is approximately 10{sup -4} per demand, while that of the older emergency condenser designs is approximately 2 to 3 x 10{sup -3} per demand. (author). 7 figs, 2 tabs.

  19. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements; unresolved safety issues; generic safety issues; other multiplant action issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. This third annual NUREG report, Supplement 3, presents updated information as of September 30, 1993. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  20. Status of safety issues at licensed power plants: TMI Action Plan requirements, unresolved safety issues, generic safety issues, other multiplant action issues. Supplement 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-12-01

    As part of ongoing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to ensure the quality and accountability of safety issue information, the NRC established a program for publishing an annual report on the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of safety issues in major NRC requirements areas. This information was initially compiled and reported in three NUREG-series volumes. Volume 1, published in March 1991, addressed the status of Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements. Volume 2, published in May 1991, addressed the status of unresolved safety issues (USIs). Volume 3, published in June 1991, addressed the implementation and verification status of generic safety issues (GSIs). The first annual supplement, which combined these volumes into a single report and presented updated information as of September 30, 1991, was published in December 1991. The second annual supplement, which provided updated information as of September 30, 1992, was published in December 1992. Supplement 2 also provided the status of licensee implementation and NRC verification of other multiplant action (MPA) issues not related to TMI Action Plan requirements, USIs, or GSIs. Supplement 3 gives status as of September 30, 1993. This annual report, Supplement 4, presents updated information as of September 30, 1994. This report gives a comprehensive description of the implementation and verification status of TMI Action Plan requirements, safety issues designated as USIs, GSIs, and other MPAs that have been resolved and involve implementation of an action or actions by licensees. This report makes the information available to other interested parties, including the public. Additionally, this report serves as a follow-on to NUREG-0933, ''A Prioritization of Generic Safety Issues,'' which tracks safety issues until requirements are approved for imposition at licensed plants or until the NRC issues a request for action by licensees

  1. User requirements in the area of safety of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycle installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuczera, B.; Juhn, P.E.; Fukuda, K.; )

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Against the background of already existing IAEA and INSAC publications in the area of safety, in the framework of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) a set of user requirements for the safety of future nuclear installations has been established. Five top-level requirements are expected to apply to any type of innovative design. They should foster an increased level of safety that is transparent to and fully accepted by the general public. The approach to future reactor safety includes two complementary strategies: increased emphasis on inherent safety characteristics and enhancement of defense in depth. As compared to existing plants, the effectiveness of preventing measures should be highly enhanced, resulting in fewer mitigation measures. The targets and possible approaches of each of the five levels of defense developed for innovative reactor designs are outlined in the paper

  2. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition. This

  3. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition. This

  4. Eurosafe 2006 radioactive waste management: long term safety requirements and societal expectations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    The EUROSAFE Forum is part of the EUROSAFE approach, which consists of two further elements: the EUROSAFE Tribune and the EUROSAFE web site. The general aim of EUROSAFE is to contribute to fostering the convergence of technical nuclear safety practices in a broad European context. This is done by providing technical safety and research organisations, safety authorities, power utilities, the rest of the industry and non-governmental organisations mainly from the European Union and East-European countries, and international organisations with a platform for the presentation of recent analyses and R and D in the field of nuclear safety, to share experiences, exchange technical and scientific opinions, and conduct debates on key issues in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The EUROSAFE Forum 2006 focuses on 'Radioactive Waste Management: Long Term Safety Requirements and Societal Expectations' from the point of view of the authorities, TSOs and industry and presents the latest work in nuclear installation safety and research, waste management, radiation safety as well as nuclear material and nuclear facilities security carried out by GRS, IRSN, AVN and their partners in the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe. A high level of nuclear safety is a priority for Europe. The technical safety organisations play an important role in contributing to that objective through appropriate approaches to major safety issues as part of their assessments and research activities. The challenges to nuclear safety are international. Changes in underlying technologies such as instrumentation and control, the impact of electricity market deregulation, demands for improved safety and safety management, the ageing of nuclear facilities, waste management, maintaining and improving scientific and technical knowledge, and the need for greater transparency - these are all issues where the value of an international approach is gaining increasing recognition

  5. Statement on safety requirements concerning the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-12-01

    This report published by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI investigates the safety requirements with respect to the long-term operation of the Muehleberg nuclear power station in Switzerland. Relevant international requirements and Swiss legal stipulations concerning the long-term operation of the power station are stated. The management of aging processes is looked at. The regular verification of the integrity of various plant components such as containments, piping, steam generation system, etc. is looked at in detail. The state-of-the-art concerning deterministic accident analyses and refitting technology are discussed, as are automated safety systems. The applicable laws, decrees and guidelines are listed in appendices

  6. Meeting up-to-date safety requirements in the Russian NPP projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tepkyan, G. O.; Yashkin, A. V.

    2014-01-01

    Safety features in Russian NPP designs are implemented by the combination of active and passive safety systems • Russian NPP designs are in compliance with up-to-date international and European safety requirements and refer to Generation III+ • Russian state-of-the-art designs have already implemented some design solutions, which take into account “post-Fukushima” requirements. Russian NPP design principles have been approved during the European discussions in spring 2012, including the IAEA extraordinary session addressed to Fukushima NPP accident

  7. Guide for reviewing safety analysis reports for packaging: Review of quality assurance requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moon, D.W.

    1988-10-01

    This review section describes quality assurance requirements applying to design, purchase, fabrication, handling, shipping, storing, cleaning, assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of components of packaging which are important to safety. The design effort, operation's plans, and quality assurance requirements should be integrated to achieve a system in which the independent QA program is not overly stringent and the application of QA requirements is commensurate with safety significance. The reviewer must verify that the applicant's QA section in the SARP contains package-specific QA information required by DOE Orders and federal regulations that demonstrate compliance. 8 refs

  8. Excellence and safety in surgery require excellent and safe tutoring.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ferrarese, Alessia; Buccelli, Claudio; Addeo, Giuseppe; Capasso, Emanuele; Conti, Adelaide; Amato, Maurizio; Compagna, Rita; Niola, Massimo; Martino, Valter

    2016-01-01

    The surgical education in Italy has always been a very important issue. The aim of this article is to bring together the feedback of the definitions of the various components of the learning scheme and to evaluate the importance of the legal point. In March 2016 we performed a literature review. We have also examinated the internet pages of the Italian Department of Education, Health and Medical Order. In Italy the tutor had an unclear role from a legal point of view. He is the person who must be able to perform a specific procedure with expert technical and who must know how to stop the student if this is about to perform a dangerous maneuver. In Italy the ability to work for the trainee is limited in all reality, it depends on several factors including the increase of numbers of medical-legal disputes, the timing, the commitment it requires mentoring and a lack of mentors. In surgery, the problem is greater because of the increasingly of medico-legal implications that we are after surgical procedure. It would be necessary to define a role of the tutor in a regular protocol and a proper assessment of his performance.

  9. Introduction of the Amendment of IAEA Safety Requirements Reflected Lessons Learned from Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahn, Sang-Kyu; Ahn, Hyung-Joon; Kim, Sun-Hae; Cheong, Jae-Hak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The following five Safety Requirements publications were amended: Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1, 2010), Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (NS-R-3, 2003), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1, 2012), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (SSR-2/2, 2011), and Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4, 2009). Figure 1 shows IAEA Safety Standards Categories Major amendments of five Safety Requirements publications were introduced and analyzed in this study. The five IAEA safety requirements publications which are GSR Part 1 and 4, NS-R-3 and SSR-2/1 and 2, were amended to reflect the lesson learned from the Fukushima accident and other operating experiences. Specially, 36 provisions were modified and the new 29 provision with 1 requirement (No. 67: Emergency response facilities on the site) of the SSR-2/1 were established. Since the Fukushima accident happened, a new word, design extension conditions (DECs) which cover substantially the beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), including severe accident conditions, was created and more elaborated by the world nuclear experts. Design extension conditions could include conditions in events without significant fuel degradation and conditions with core melting. Figure 2 shows the range of the DECs. The amendment of the five IAEA safety requirements publications are focused at the prevention of initiating events, which would lead to the DECs, and mitigation of the consequences of DECs by the enhanced defense in depth principle. The following examples of the IAEA requirements to prevent the initiating events are: margins for withstanding external events; margins for avoiding cliff edge effects; safety assessment for multiple facilities or activities at a single site; safety assessment in cases where resources at a facility are shared; consideration of the potential occurrence of events in combination; establishing levels of hazard

  10. Modeling of requirement specification for safety critical real time computer system using formal mathematical specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sankar, Bindu; Sasidhar Rao, B.; Ilango Sambasivam, S.; Swaminathan, P.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Real time computer systems are increasingly used for safety critical supervision and control of nuclear reactors. Typical application areas are supervision of reactor core against coolant flow blockage, supervision of clad hot spot, supervision of undesirable power excursion, power control and control logic for fuel handling systems. The most frequent cause of fault in safety critical real time computer system is traced to fuzziness in requirement specification. To ensure the specified safety, it is necessary to model the requirement specification of safety critical real time computer systems using formal mathematical methods. Modeling eliminates the fuzziness in the requirement specification and also helps to prepare the verification and validation schemes. Test data can be easily designed from the model of the requirement specification. Z and B are the popular languages used for modeling the requirement specification. A typical safety critical real time computer system for supervising the reactor core of prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) against flow blockage is taken as case study. Modeling techniques and the actual model are explained in detail. The advantages of modeling for ensuring the safety are summarized

  11. Lessons learned - development of the tritium facilities 5480.23 safety analysis report and technical safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cappucci, A.J. Jr.; Bowman, M.E.; Goff, L.

    1997-01-01

    A review was performed which identified open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes from the development of the 5480.23 Tritium Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Tritium Facilities (TF). The open-quotes Lessons Learnedclose quotes were based on an evaluation of the use of the SRS procedures, processes, and work practices which contributed to the success or lack thereof. This review also identified recommendations and suggestions for improving the development of SARs and TSRs at SRS. The 5480.23 SAR describes the site for the TF, the various process systems in the process buildings, a complete hazards and accident analysis of the most significant hazards affecting the nearby offsite population, and the selection of safety systems, structures, and components to protect both the public and site workers. It also provides descriptions of important programs and processes which add defense in depth to public and worker protection

  12. Requirements and international co-operation in nuclear safety for evolutionary light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnino, A.

    1999-01-01

    The principles of safety are now well known and implemented world-wide, leading to a situation of harmonisation in accordance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Future reactors are expected not only to meet current requirements but to go beyond the safety level presently accepted. To this end, technical safety requirements, as defined by the IAEA document Safety Fundamentals, need be duly considered in the design, the risks to workers and population must be decreased, a stable, transparent and objective regulatory process, including an international harmonisation with respect to licensing of new reactors, must be developed, and the issue of public acceptance must be addressed. Well-performing existing installations are seen as a prerequisite for an improved public acceptability; there should be no major accidents, the results from safety performance indicators must be unquestionable, and compliance with internationally harmonised criteria is essential. Economical competitiveness is another factor that influences the acceptability; the costs for constructing the plant, for its operation and maintenance, for the fuel cycle, and for the final decommissioning are of paramount importance. Plant simplification, longer fuel cycles, life extension are appealing options, but safety will have first priority. The IAEA can play an important role in this field, by providing peer reviews by teams of international experts and assistance to Member States on the use of its safety standards. (author)

  13. Impact of New Radiation Safety Standards on Licensing Requirements of Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strohal, P.; Subasic, D.; Valcic, I.

    1996-01-01

    As the outcomes of the newly introduced safety philosophies, new and more strict safety design requirements for nuclear installation are expected to be introduced. New in-depth defence measures should be incorporated into the design and operation procedure for a nuclear installation, to compensate for potential failures in protection or safety measures. The new requirements will also apply to licensing of NPP's operation as well as to licensing of nuclear sites, especially for radioactive waste disposal sites. This paper intends to give an overview of possible impacts of new internationally agreed basic safety standards with respect to NPP and related technologies. Recently issued new basic safety standards for radiation protection are introducing some new safety principles which may have essential impact on future licensing requirements regarding nuclear power plants and radioactive waste installations. These new standards recognize exposures under normal conditions ('practices') and intervention conditions. The term interventions describes the human activities that seek to reduce the existing radiation exposure or existing likelihood of incurring exposure which is not part of a controlled practice. The other new development in safety standards is the introduction of so called potential exposure based on the experience gained from a number of radiation accidents. This exposure is not expected to be delivered with certainty but it may result from an accident at a source or owing to an event or sequence of events of a probabilistic nature, including equipment failures and operating errors. (author)

  14. 10 CFR 73.58 - Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... requirements for nuclear power reactors. (a) Each operating nuclear power reactor licensee with a license... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors. 73.58 Section 73.58 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF...

  15. Occupational safety and health in the Universities: fulfilling the fundamental requirement of OSHA and AELA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ismail Bahari

    2000-01-01

    This paper discusses the result of a survey among the universities to looks at whether such basic similarities in requirements by both Acts actually help in fulfilling and integrating the fundamental requirement of OSHA, Malaysian Occupational Safety and Health Act and AELA, Malaysian Atomic Energy Licensing Act especially through self-regulation

  16. 78 FR 47015 - Software Requirement Specifications for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-02

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [NRC-2012-0195] Software Requirement Specifications for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission... issuing a revised regulatory guide (RG), revision 1 of RG 1.172, ``Software Requirement Specifications for...

  17. Safety requirements to the operation of hydropower plants; Sicherheit beim Betrieb von Wasserkraftwerken

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lux, Reinhard [Berufsgenossenschaft Energie Textil Elektro Medienerzeugnisse (BG ETEM), Koeln (Germany)

    2011-07-01

    Employers have to take into account various safety and health requirements relating to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of hydropower plants. Especially the diversity of the hydropower plant components requires the consideration of different safety and health aspects. In 2011 the ''Fachausschuss Elektrotechnik'' (expert committee electro-technics) of the institution for statutory accident insurance and prevention presented a new ''BG-Information'' dealing with ''Safe methods operating hydropower plants''. The following article gives an introduction into the conception and the essential requirements of this new BG-Information. (orig.)

  18. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  19. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  20. Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency. General Safety Requirements (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    This publication, jointly sponsored by the FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, INTERPOL, OECD/NEA, PAHO, CTBTO, UNEP, OCHA, WHO and WMO, is the new edition establishing the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency which takes into account the latest experience and developments in the area. It supersedes the previous edition of the Safety Requirements for emergency preparedness and response, Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, which was published in 2002. This publication establishes the requirements for ensuring an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, irrespective of its cause. These Safety Requirements are intended to be used by governments, emergency response organizations, other authorities at the local, regional and national levels, operating organizations and the regulatory body as well as by relevant international organizations at the international level.

  1. Specification of safety requirements for waste packages with respect to practicable quality control measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruendler, D.; Wurtinger, W.

    1987-01-01

    Waste packages for disposal in a repository in the Federal Republic of Germany have to meet safety requirements derived from site specific safety analyses. The examination of the waste packages with regard to compliance with these requirements is the main objective of quality control measures. With respect to quality control the requirements have to be specified in a way that practicable control measures can be applied. This is dealt with for the quality control of the activity inventory and the quality control of the waste form. The paper discusses the determination of the activity of hard-to-measure radionuclides and the specification of safety related requirements for the waste form and the packaging using typical examples

  2. Criticality Safety Evaluation of Standard Criticality Safety Requirements #1-520 g Operations in PF-4

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yamanaka, Alan Joseph Jr. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-10-13

    Guidance has been requested from the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (NCSD) regarding processes that involve 520 grams of fissionable material or less. This Level-3 evaluation was conducted and documented in accordance with NCS-AP-004 (Ref. 1), formerly NCS-GUIDE-01. This evaluation is being written as a generic evaluation for all operations that will be able to operate using a 520-gram mass limit. Implementation for specific operations will be performed using a Level 1 CSED, which will confirm and document that this CSED can be used for the specific operation as discussed in NCS-MEMO-17-007 (Ref. 2). This Level 3 CSED updates and supersedes the analysis performed in NCS-TECH-14-014 (Ref. 3).

  3. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand.

  4. Software Safety Analysis of Digital Protection System Requirements Using a Qualitative Formal Method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jang-Soo; Kwon, Kee-Choon; Cha, Sung-Deok

    2004-01-01

    The safety analysis of requirements is a key problem area in the development of software for the digital protection systems of a nuclear power plant. When specifying requirements for software of the digital protection systems and conducting safety analysis, engineers find that requirements are often known only in qualitative terms and that existing fault-tree analysis techniques provide little guidance on formulating and evaluating potential failure modes. A framework for the requirements engineering process is proposed that consists of a qualitative method for requirements specification, called the qualitative formal method (QFM), and a safety analysis method for the requirements based on causality information, called the causal requirements safety analysis (CRSA). CRSA is a technique that qualitatively evaluates causal relationships between software faults and physical hazards. This technique, extending the qualitative formal method process and utilizing information captured in the state trajectory, provides specific guidelines on how to identify failure modes and the relationship among them. The QFM and CRSA processes are described using shutdown system 2 of the Wolsong nuclear power plants as the digital protection system example

  5. Development of NPP Safety Requirements into Kenya's Grid Codes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ndirangu, Nguni James; Koo, Chang Choong

    2015-01-01

    As presently drafted, Kenya's grid codes do not contain any NPP requirements. Through case studies of selected grid codes, this paper will study frequency, voltage and fault ride through requirements for NPP connection and operation, and offer recommendation of how these requirements can be incorporated in the Kenya's grid codes. Voltage and frequency excursions in Kenya's grid are notably frequently outside the generic requirement and the values observed by the German and UK grid codes. Kenya's grid codes require continuous operation for ±10% of nominal voltage and 45.0 to 52Hz on the grid which poses safety issues for an NPP. Considering stringent NPP connection to grid and operational safety requirements, and the importance of the TSO to NPP safety, more elaborate requirements need to be documented in the Kenya's grid codes. UK and Germany have a history of meeting high standards of nuclear safety and it is therefore recommended that format like the one in Table 1 to 3 should be adopted. Kenya's Grid code considering NPP should have: • Strict rules for voltage variation, that is, -5% to +10% of the nominal voltage • Strict rules for frequency variation, that is, 48Hz to 52Hz of the nominal frequencyand

  6. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dey, M.

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements

  7. Workshop on Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety: Proceedings

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dey, M. [Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (United States). Div. of Safety Issue Resolution; Arsenault, F.; Patterson, M.; Gaal, M. [SCIENTECH, Inc., Rockville, MD (United States)

    1993-09-01

    These are the proceedings of the Public Workshop on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission`s Program for Elimination of Requirements Marginal to Safety. The workshop was held at the Holiday Inn, Bethesda, on April 27 and 28, 1993. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for public and industry input to the program. The workshop addressed the institutionalization of the program to review regulations with the purpose of eliminating those that are marginal. The objective is to avoid the dilution of safety efforts. One session was devoted to discussion of the framework for a performance-based regulatory approach. In addition, panelists and attendees discussed scope, schedules and status of specific regulatory items: containment leakage testing requirements, fire protection requirements, requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment, requests for information under 10CFR50.54(f), requirements for combustible gas control systems, and quality assurance requirements.

  8. TechEdSat

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — TechEdSat is a 1U CubeSat built by San Jose State University in partnership with NASA Ames Research Center and AAC Microtec. Its mission is to evaluate Space...

  9. A study to develop the domestic functional requirements of the specific safety systems of CANDU

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Man Woong [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Taejon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Jae Young; Park, Kun Chul [Handong Global Univ., Pohang (Korea, Republic of)] (and others)

    2003-03-15

    The present research has been made to develop and review critically the functional requirements of the specific safety systems of CANDU such as SDS-1, SDS2, ECCS, and containment. Based on R documents for this, a systematic study was made to develop the domestic regulation statements. Also, the conventional laws are carefully reviewed to see the compatibility to CANDU. Also, the safety assessment method for CANDU was studied by reviewing C documents and recommendation of IAEA. Through the present works, the vague policy in the CANDU safety regulation is cleaning up in a systematic form and a new frame to measure the objective risk of nuclear power plants was developed.

  10. A study to develop the domestic functional requirements of the specific safety systems of CANDU

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Man Woong; Lee, Jae Young; Bang, Kwang Hyun [Handong Global Univ., Pohang (Korea, Republic of)] (and others)

    2001-03-15

    The present research has been made to develop and review critically the functional requirements of the specific safety systems of CANDU such as SOS-1, SOS-2, ECCS and containment. Based on R documents for this, a systematic study was made to develop the domestic regulation statements. Also, the conventional laws are carefully reviewed to see the compatibility to CANDU. Also, the safety assessment method for CANDU was studied by reviewing C documents and recommendation of IAEA. Through the present works, the vague policy in the CANDU safety regulation is cleaning up in a systematic form and a new frame to measure the objective risk of nuclear power plants was developed.

  11. A Safety and Health Guide for Vocational Educators. Incorporating Requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Relevant Pennsylvania Requirements with Particular Emphasis for Those Concerned with Cooperative Education and Work Study Programs. Volume 15. Number 1.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wahl, Ray

    Intended as a guide for vocational educators to incorporate the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970) and the requirements of various Pennsylvania safety and health regulations with their cooperative vocational programs, the first chapter of this document presents the legal implications of these safety and health…

  12. What Isn’t Working and New Requirements. The Need to Harmonize Safety and Security Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flory, D.

    2016-01-01

    This paper sets out the key issues for consideration at the transport conference. It will introduce each of the aspects of the framework for safe, secure and sustainable transport, building on the description of the existing situation presented in Session 1A. It will discuss purpose of the IAEA framework, and examine the scientific basis, the IAEA recommendations and requirements, the UN interface, the use of conventions, national implementation, industry compliance, communication and information, response and restoration. It will also look at the activities and related requirements outside of transport which could influence the transport frameworks either in a positive or negative manner. (author)

  13. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. Specific Safety Requirements (Spanish Edition); Seguridad de las centrales nucleares: Diseno. Requisitos de seguridad especificos

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-04-15

    This publication is a revision of Safety Requirements No. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design. It establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants and elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. It will be useful for organizations involved in the design, manufacture, construction, modification, maintenance, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants, as well as for regulatory bodies. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.

  14. Probabilistic safety analysis of DC power supply requirements for nuclear power plants. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baranowsky, P.W.; Kolaczkowski, A.M.; Fedele, M.A.

    1981-04-01

    A probabilistic safety assessment was performed as part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission generic safety task A-30, Adequacy of Safety Related DC Power Supplies. Event and fault tree analysis techniques were used to determine the relative contribution of DC power related accident sequences to the total core damage probability due to shutdown cooling failures. It was found that a potentially large DC power contribution could be substantially reduced by augmenting the minimum design and operational requirements. Recommendations included (1) requiring DC power divisional independence, (2) improved test, maintenance, and surveillance, and (3) requiring core cooling capability be maintained following the loss of one DC power bus and a single failure in another system

  15. Safety requirements laid down in the Atomic Energy Law and in the Law on Immission Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hansmann, K.

    1981-01-01

    The paper deals with safety requirements relating to installations, laid down in the Atomic Energy Law and in the Law on Immission Control. Actually it is a matter of how the safety requirements of sect. 7 of the Atomic Energy Law can be compared with those laid down in the sections 5 and 6 of the Federal Act for the Protection Against Nuisances. In the process, three comparative levels are examined: 1. The normative conditions concerning the licencability of hazardous installations, 2. those demands that go way beyond that in order to reduce residual risks, and 3. the licensing authorities' scope of discretion. (orig./HP) [de

  16. Nuclear safety requirements for upgrading the National Repository for Radioactive Wastes-Baita Bihor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vladescu, Gabriela; Necula, Daniela

    2000-01-01

    The upgrading project of National Repository for Radioactive Wastes-Baita Bihor is based on the integrated concept of nuclear safety. Its ingredients are the following: A. The principles of nuclear safety regarding the management of radioactive wastes and radioprotection; B. Safety objectives for final disposal of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes; C. Safety criteria for final disposal of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes; D. Assessment of safety criteria fulfillment for final disposal of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes. Concerning the nuclear safety in radioactive waste management the following issues are considered: population health protection, preventing transfrontier contamination, future generation radiation protection, national legislation, control of radioactive waste production, interplay between radioactive waste production and management, radioactive waste repository safety. The safety criteria of final disposal of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes are discussed by taking into account the geological and hydrogeological configuration, the physico-chemical and geochemical characteristics, the tectonics and seismicity conditions, extreme climatic potential events at the mine location. Concerning the requirements upon the repository, the following aspects are analyzed: the impact on environment, the safety system reliability, the criticality control, the filling composition to prevent radioactive leakage, the repository final sealing, the surveillance. Concerning the radioactive waste, specific criteria taken into account are the radionuclide content, the chemical composition and stability, waste material endurance to heat and radiation. The waste packaging criteria discussed are the mechanical endurance, materials toughness and types as related to deterioration caused by handling, transportation, storing or accidents. Fulfillment of safety criteria is assessed by scenarios analyses and analyses of

  17. Safety and environmental requirements and design targets for TIBER-II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piet, S.J.

    1987-09-01

    A consistent set of safety and environmental requirements and design targets was proposed and adopted for the TIBER-II (Tokamak Ignition/Burn Experimental Reactor) design effort. TIBER-II is the most recent US version of a fusion experimental test reactor (ETR). These safety and environmental design targets were one contribution of the Fusion Safety Program in the TIBER-II design effort. The other contribution, safety analyses, is documented in the TIBER-II design report. The TIBER-II approach, described here, concentrated on logical development of, first, a complete and consistent set of safety and environmental requirements that are likely appropriate for an ETR, and, second, an initial set of design targets to guide TIBER-II. Because of limited time in the TIBER-II design effort, the iterative process only included one iteration - one set of targets and one design. Future ETR design efforts should therefore build on these design targets and the associated safety analyses. 29 refs., 5 figs., 3 tabs

  18. General Approaches and Requirements on Safety and Security of Radioactive Materials Transport in Russian Federation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ershov, V.N.; Buchel'nikov, A.E.; Komarov, S.V.

    2016-01-01

    Development and implementation of safety and security requirements for transport of radioactive materials in the Russian Federation are addressed. At the outset it is worth noting that the transport safety requirements implemented are in full accordance with the IAEA's ''Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2009 Edition)''. However, with respect to security requirements for radioactive material transport in some cases the Russian Federation requirements for nuclear material are more stringent compared to IAEA recommendations. The fundamental principles of safety and security of RM managements, recommended by IAEA documents (publications No. SF-1 and GOV/41/2001) are compared. Its correlation and differences concerning transport matters, the current level and the possibility of harmonization are analysed. In addition a reflection of the general approaches and concrete transport requirements is being evaluated. Problems of compliance assessment, including administrative and state control problems for safety and security provided at internal and international shipments are considered and compared. (author)

  19. Safety requirements in the design of research reactors: A Canadian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, A.G.; Langman, V.J.

    2000-01-01

    In Canada, the formal development of safety requirements for the design of research reactors in general began under an inter-organizational Small Reactor Criteria Committee. This committee developed safety and licensing criteria for use by several small reactor projects in their licensing discussions with the Atomic Energy Control Board. The small reactor projects or facilities represented included the MAPLE-X10 reactor, the proposed SES-10 heating reactor and its prototype, the SDR reactor at the Whiteshell Laboratories, the Korea Multipurpose Research Reactor (a.k.a., HANARO) in Korea, the SCORE project, and the McMaster University Nuclear Reactor. The top level set of criteria which form a safety philosophy and serve as a framework for more detailed developments was presented at an IAEA Conference in 1989. AECL continued this work to develop safety principles and design criteria for new small reactors. The first major application of this work has been to the design, safety analysis and licensing of the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors for the MDS Nordion Medical Isotope Reactor Project. This paper provides an overview of the safety principles and design criteria. Examples of an implementation of these safety principles and design criteria are drawn from the work to design the MAPLE 1 and 2 reactors. (author)

  20. International review on safety requirements for the prototype fast breeder reactor “Monju”

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-01-01

    In response to the lessons learned from the serious nuclear accidents at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations, an advisory committee, which was set up by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, issued the report “Safety Requirements Expected to the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju” taking into account the SFR specific safety characteristics in July 2014. The report was reviewed by the leading international experts on SFR safety from five countries and one international organization in order to obtain independent and objective evaluation. The international review comments on each subsection were collected and compiled, and then a summary of results was derived through the discussion at the review meeting and individual feedbacks. As a result the basic concept for prevention of severe accidents and mitigation of their consequences of Monju is appropriate in consideration of SFR specific safety characteristics, and is in accordance with international common understanding. (author)

  1. 25 Years of Community Activities towards Harmonization of Nuclear Safety Criteria and Requirements - Achievements and Prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lillington, J.N.; Turland, B.D.; Haste, T.J.; Seiler, J.M.; Carretero, A.; Perez, T.; Geutges, A.; Van Hienen, J.F.A.; Jehee, J.N.T.; Sehgal, B.R.; Mattila, L.; Holmstrom, H.; Karwat, H.; Maroti, L.; Toth, I.; Husarcek, J.

    2001-10-01

    The main objective was to advise the EC on future challenges and opportunities in terms of enhanced co-operation in the area of nuclear safety and harmonization of safety requirements and practices in an enlarged European Union. The activities were divided into 3 sub-tasks as follows: part A, to prepare an analysis, synthesis and assessment of the main achievements from Community activities related to the Resolutions on the technological problems of nuclear safety of 1975 and 1992, with due consideration for related research activities; part B, to prepare an overview of safety philosophies and practices in EU Member States, taking account of their specific national practices in terms of legal framework, type and age of operating nuclear reactors; part C, to provide elements of a strategy for future activities in the frame of the Council Resolutions, with particular attention to the context of enlargement of the EU. (author)

  2. International review on safety requirements for the prototype fast breeder reactor “Monju” (Translated document)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-02-01

    In response to the lessons learned from the serious nuclear accidents at the TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations, an advisory committee, which was set up by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, issued the report “Safety Requirements Expected to the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Monju” taking into account the SFR specific safety characteristics in July 2014. The report was reviewed by the leading international experts on SFR safety from five countries and one international organization in order to obtain independent and objective evaluation. The international review comments on each subsection were collected and compiled, and then a summary of results was derived through the discussion at the review meeting and individual feedbacks. As a result the basic concept for prevention of severe accidents and mitigation of their consequences of Monju is appropriate in consideration of SFR specific safety characteristics, and is in accordance with international common understanding. (author)

  3. Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cotton, William B.; Hilb, Robert; Koczo, Stefan, Jr.; Wing, David J.

    2016-01-01

    A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

  4. Identifying environmental safety and health requirements for an Environmental Restoration Management Contractor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beckman, W.H.; Cossel, S.C.; Alhadeff, N.; Lindamood, S.B.; Beers, J.A.

    1993-10-01

    The purpose of the Standards/Requirements Identification Program, developed partially in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 90-2, was to identify applicable requirements that established the Environmental Restoration Management Contractor's (ERMC) responsibilities and authorities under the Environmental Restoration Management Contract, determine the adequacy of these requirements, ascertain a baseline level of compliance with them, and implement a maintenance program that would keep the program current as requirements or compliance levels change. The resultant Standards/Requirements Identification Documents (S/RIDs) consolidate the applicable requirements. These documents govern the development of procedures and manuals to ensure compliance with the requirements. Twenty-four such documents, corresponding with each functional area identified at the site, are to be issued. These requirements are included in the contractor's management plan

  5. Preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    This Safety Requirements publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency. The fulfilment of these requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency. These requirements are intended to be applied by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and assigning responsibilities. The requirements apply to all those practices and sources that have the potential for causing radiation exposure or environmental radioactive contamination warranting an emergency intervention and that are: (a) Used in a State that chooses to adopt the requirements or that requests any of the sponsoring organizations to provide for the application of the requirements. (B) Used by States with the assistance of the FAO, IAEA, ILO, PAHO, OCHA or WHO in compliance with applicable national rules and regulations. (C) Used by the IAEA or which involve the use of materials, services, equipment, facilities and non-published information made available by the IAEA or at its request or under its control or supervision. Or (d) Used under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement whereby the parties request the IAEA to provide for the application of the requirements. The requirements also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to make an emergency intervention in a State that adopts the requirements. The types of practices and sources covered by these requirements include: fixed and mobile nuclear reactors. Facilities for the mining and processing of radioactive ores. Facilities for fuel reprocessing and other fuel cycle facilities. Facilities for the management of radioactive waste. The transport of radioactive material. Sources of radiation used in

  6. Economics of the specification 6M safety re-evaluation and regulatory requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopper, C.M.

    1985-01-01

    The objective of this work was to examine the potential economic impact of the DOT Specification 6M criticality safety re-evaluation and regulatory requirements. The examination was based upon comparative analyses of current authorized fissile material load limits for the 6M, current Federal regulations (and interpretations) limiting the contents of Type B fissile material packages, limiting aggregates of fissile material packages, and recent proposed fissile material mass limits derived from specialized criticality safety analyses of the 6M package. The work examines influences on cost in transportation, handling, and storage of fissile materials. Depending upon facility throughput requirements (and assumed incremental costs of fissile material packaging, storage, and transport), operating, facility storage capacity, and transportation costs can be reduced significantly. As an example of the pricing algorithm application based upon reasonable cost influences, the magnitude of the first year cost reductions could extend beyond four times the cost of the packaging nuclear criticality safety re-evaluation. 1 tab

  7. Assessment of the impact of dipped guideways on urban rail transit systems: Ventilation and safety requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    1982-01-01

    The ventilation and fire safety requirements for subway tunnels with dipped profiles between stations as compared to subway tunnels with level profiles were evaluated. This evaluation is based upon computer simulations of a train fire emergency condition. Each of the tunnel configurations evaluated was developed from characteristics that are representative of modern transit systems. The results of the study indicate that: (1) The level tunnel system required about 10% more station cooling than dipped tunnel systems in order to meet design requirements; and (2) The emergency ventilation requirements are greater with dipped tunnel systems than with level tunnel systems.

  8. MicroED data collection and processing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hattne, Johan; Reyes, Francis E.; Nannenga, Brent L.; Shi, Dan; Cruz, M. Jason de la [Janelia Research Campus, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Ashburn, VA 20147 (United States); Leslie, Andrew G. W. [Medical Research Council Laboratory of Molecular Biology, Cambridge (United Kingdom); Gonen, Tamir, E-mail: gonent@janelia.hhmi.org [Janelia Research Campus, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Ashburn, VA 20147 (United States)

    2015-07-01

    The collection and processing of MicroED data are presented. MicroED, a method at the intersection of X-ray crystallography and electron cryo-microscopy, has rapidly progressed by exploiting advances in both fields and has already been successfully employed to determine the atomic structures of several proteins from sub-micron-sized, three-dimensional crystals. A major limiting factor in X-ray crystallography is the requirement for large and well ordered crystals. By permitting electron diffraction patterns to be collected from much smaller crystals, or even single well ordered domains of large crystals composed of several small mosaic blocks, MicroED has the potential to overcome the limiting size requirement and enable structural studies on difficult-to-crystallize samples. This communication details the steps for sample preparation, data collection and reduction necessary to obtain refined, high-resolution, three-dimensional models by MicroED, and presents some of its unique challenges.

  9. Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material, 2005 edition. Safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This publication includes amendments to the 1996 Edition (As Amended 2003) arising from the second cycle of the biennial review and revision process, as agreed by the Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC) at its ninth meeting in March 2004, as endorsed by the Commission on Safety Standards at its meeting in June 2004 and as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in November 2004. Although this publication is identified as a new edition, there are no changes that affect the administrative and approval requirements in Section VIII. The fields covered are General Provisions (radiation protection; emergency response; quality assurance; compliance assurance; non-compliance; special arrangement and training); Activity Limits and Materials Restrictions, Requirement and Controls for Transport , Requirements for Radioactive Materials and for Packagings and Packages, Test Procedures, Approval and Administrative Requirements

  10. PREFACE: EDS2010 Preface

    Science.gov (United States)

    Heggie, Malcolm I.

    2011-03-01

    The biennial international conference on Extended Defects in Semiconductors started in 1978 with a meeting in Hünfeld, Germany. Subsequent meetings rotated between Poland, France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia and Italy, culminating in EDS2004 in Chernogolovka, EDS2006 in Halle and EDS2008 in Poitiers. EDS2010 was held at the University of Sussex at Brighton, UK from September 19th to 24th. An extension of the tabulation of this history, which first appeared on the EDS2006 website, is given in the attached PDF. It is with sadness that we note one of the founders of the series, Prof. Dr Helmut Alexander, passed away on 3 December 2009 and we were proud to dedicate EDS2010 to his memory. It has become a tradition to make an award in his name, and this year it was made to Ivan Isacov for his poster "Electrical levels of dislocation networks in p- and n-type silicon". A short and warm celebration of Prof. Dr Alexander's life by his friends and colleagues, Prof. Drs Helmut Gottschalk, Eicke Weber and Wolfgang Schröter, is included in this volume. The conference was a forum for the state-of-the-art of investigation and modelling of extended defects in semiconductors. Scientists from universities, research institutes and industry made contributions to a deeper understanding of extended defects, their interaction with point defects and their role in the development of semiconductor technology. The remit of the conference included extended defects, nanostructures, nanoparticles, quantum dots and interfaces within semiconducting materials ranging from narrow to wide band gaps, including graphene-derived materials and diamond. Scientific interests range from defect geometry, electronic structure, dynamics, spectroscopy, microscopy, reactions and chemistry to introduction mechanisms, such as implantation and strained layers and the operation of devices such as integrated circuits, heterostructures, and solar cells. The organisers were confronted with a long period between

  11. 76 FR 64 - Safety and Health Requirements Related to Camp Cars

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-03

    .... Water uses such as personal oral hygiene, drinking, food washing, preparation, cooking, cleaning of the... of Sec. 228.325 to ensure that the food service is safe and sanitary. FRA will hold the railroad... proposed section sets forth requirements regarding the safety of heating, cooking, ventilation, air...

  12. Safety Design Requirements for The Interior Architecture of Scientific Research Laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElDib, A.A.

    2014-01-01

    The paper discusses one of the primary objectives of interior architecture design of research laboratories (specially those using radioactive materials) where it should provide a safe, accessible environment for laboratory personnel to conduct their work. A secondary objective is to allow for maximum flexibility for safe research. Therefore, health and safety hazards must be anticipated and carefully evaluated so that protective measures can be incorporated into the interior architectural design of these facilities wherever possible. The interior architecture requirements discussed in this paper illustrate some of the basic health and safety design features required for new and remodeled laboratories.The paper discusses one of the primary objectives of interior architecture design of research laboratories (specially those using radioactive materials) where it should provide a safe, accessible environment for laboratory personnel to conduct their work. A secondary objective is to allow for maximum flexibility for safe research. Therefore, health and safety hazards must be anticipated and carefully evaluated so that protective measures can be incorporated into the interior architectural design of these facilities wherever possible. The interior architecture requirements discussed in this paper illustrate some of the basic health and safety design features required for new and remodeled laboratories.

  13. 49 CFR 214.507 - Required safety equipment for new on-track roadway maintenance machines.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... maintenance machines. 214.507 Section 214.507 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation... Roadway Maintenance Machines and Hi-Rail Vehicles § 214.507 Required safety equipment for new on-track roadway maintenance machines. (a) Each new on-track roadway maintenance machine shall be equipped with: (1...

  14. Plant design and layout of the different buildings with respect to safety, operational and maintenance requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebich, H.

    1981-01-01

    The descriptions and pictures in this lecture show that the arrangement of the buildings and the location of components and systems are based on proven ideas with the aim to fulfil safety, operational and maintenance requirements also from the point of view of plant layout. (orig.)

  15. 78 FR 28987 - Revisions to Transportation Safety Requirements and Harmonization With International Atomic...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-05-16

    .... 115, ``International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the... paragraph 107(f) of TS-R-1, which addresses non-radioactive solid objects with radioactive substances..., ``Radiation protection--Sealed radioactive sources-- General requirements and classification,'' Second Edition...

  16. A Review of Safety and Design Requirements of the Artificial Pancreas

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Blauw, Helga; Keith-Hynes, Patrick; Koops, Robin; DeVries, J. Hans

    2016-01-01

    As clinical studies with artificial pancreas systems for automated blood glucose control in patients with type 1 diabetes move to unsupervised real-life settings, product development will be a focus of companies over the coming years. Directions or requirements regarding safety in the design of an

  17. Structural Design Requirements and Factors of Safety for Spaceflight Hardware: For Human Spaceflight. Revision A

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bernstein, Karen S.; Kujala, Rod; Fogt, Vince; Romine, Paul

    2011-01-01

    This document establishes the structural requirements for human-rated spaceflight hardware including launch vehicles, spacecraft and payloads. These requirements are applicable to Government Furnished Equipment activities as well as all related contractor, subcontractor and commercial efforts. These requirements are not imposed on systems other than human-rated spacecraft, such as ground test articles, but may be tailored for use in specific cases where it is prudent to do so such as for personnel safety or when assets are at risk. The requirements in this document are focused on design rather than verification. Implementation of the requirements is expected to be described in a Structural Verification Plan (SVP), which should describe the verification of each structural item for the applicable requirements. The SVP may also document unique verifications that meet or exceed these requirements with NASA Technical Authority approval.

  18. A Review of Safety and Design Requirements of the Artificial Pancreas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blauw, Helga; Keith-Hynes, Patrick; Koops, Robin; DeVries, J Hans

    2016-11-01

    As clinical studies with artificial pancreas systems for automated blood glucose control in patients with type 1 diabetes move to unsupervised real-life settings, product development will be a focus of companies over the coming years. Directions or requirements regarding safety in the design of an artificial pancreas are, however, lacking. This review aims to provide an overview and discussion of safety and design requirements of the artificial pancreas. We performed a structured literature search based on three search components-type 1 diabetes, artificial pancreas, and safety or design-and extended the discussion with our own experiences in developing artificial pancreas systems. The main hazards of the artificial pancreas are over- and under-dosing of insulin and, in case of a bi-hormonal system, of glucagon or other hormones. For each component of an artificial pancreas and for the complete system we identified safety issues related to these hazards and proposed control measures. Prerequisites that enable the control algorithms to provide safe closed-loop control are accurate and reliable input of glucose values, assured hormone delivery and an efficient user interface. In addition, the system configuration has important implications for safety, as close cooperation and data exchange between the different components is essential.

  19. Considerations on the Application of the IAEA Safety Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-05-01

    Revised to take into consideration findings from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, has introduced some new concepts with respect to the earlier safety standard published in the year 2000. The preparation of SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) was carried out with constant and intense involvement of IAEA Member States, but some new requirements, because of the novelty of the concepts introduced and the complexity of the issues, are not always interpreted in a unique way. The IAEA is confident that a complete clarification and a full understanding of the new requirements will be available when the supporting safety guides for design and safety assessment of nuclear power plants are prepared. The IAEA expects that the effort devoted to the preparation of this publication, which received input and comments from several Member States and experts, will also facilitate and harmonize the preparation or revision of these supporting standards

  20. A PLC generic requirements and specification for safety-related applications in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, Jea Bok; Lee, C. K.; Lee, D. Y.

    2001-12-01

    This report presents the requirements and specification to be applied to the generic qualification of programmable Logic Controller(PLC), which is being developed as part of the KNICS project, 'Development of the Digital Reactor Safety Systems' of which purpose is the application to safety-related instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants. This report defines the essential and critical characteristics that shall be included as part of a PLC design for safety-related application. The characteristics include performance, reliability, accuracy, the overall response time from an input to the PLC exceeding it trip condition to the resulting outputs, and the specification of processors and memories in digital controller. It also specifies the quality assurance process for software development, dealing with executive software, firmware, application software tools for developing the application software, and human machine interface(HMI). In addition, this report reviews the published standards and guidelines that are required for the PLC development and the quality assurance processes such as environment requirements, seismic withstand requirements, EMI/RFI withstand requirements, and isolation test

  1. Construction products performances and basic requirements for fire safety of facades in energy rehabilitation of buildings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Laban Mirjana Đ.

    2015-01-01

    Full Text Available Construction product means any product or kit which is produced and placed on the market for incorporation in a permanent manner in construction works, or parts thereof, and the performance of which has an effect on the performance of the construction works with respect to the basic requirements for construction works. Safety in case of fire and Energy economy and heat retention represent two among seven basic requirements which building has to meet according to contemporary technical rules on planning and construction. Performances of external walls building materials (particularly reaction to fire could significantly affect to fire spread on the façade and other building parts. Therefore, façade shaping and materialization in building renewal process, has to meet the fire safety requirement, as well as the energy requirement. Brief survey of fire protection regulations development in Serbia is presented in the paper. Preventive measures for fire risk reduction in building façade energy renewal are proposed according to contemporary fire safety requirements.

  2. Data requirements for the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue developed through the data quality objectives process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meacham, J.E.; Cash, R.J.; Dukelow, G.T.; Babad, H.; Buck, J.W.; Anderson, C.M.; Pulsipher, B.A.; Toth, J.J.; Turner, P.J.

    1994-08-01

    This document records the data quality objectives (DQO) process applied to the Ferrocyanide Safety Issue at the Hanford Site. Specifically, the major recommendations and findings from this Ferrocyanide DQO process are presented. The decision logic diagrams and decision error tolerances also are provided. The document includes the DQO sample-size formulas for determining specific tank sampling requirements, and many of the justifications for decision thresholds and decision error tolerances are briefly described. More detailed descriptions are presented in other Ferrocyanide Safety Program companion documents referenced in this report. This is a living document, and the assumptions contained within will be refined as more data from sampling and characterization become available

  3. Qualification of Simulation Software for Safety Assessment of Sodium Cooled Fast Reactors. Requirements and Recommendations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brown, Nicholas R. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Pointer, William David [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Sieger, Matt [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Flanagan, George F. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Moe, Wayne [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); HolbrookINL, Mark [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2016-04-01

    The goal of this review is to enable application of codes or software packages for safety assessment of advanced sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) designs. To address near-term programmatic needs, the authors have focused on two objectives. First, the authors have focused on identification of requirements for software QA that must be satisfied to enable the application of software to future safety analyses. Second, the authors have collected best practices applied by other code development teams to minimize cost and time of initial code qualification activities and to recommend a path to the stated goal.

  4. Rpi-blb2-Mediated Hypersensitive Cell Death Caused by Phytophthora infestans AVRblb2 Requires SGT1, but not EDS1, NDR1, Salicylic Acid-, Jasmonic Acid-, or Ethylene-Mediated Signaling

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sang-Keun Oh

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available Potato Rpi-blb2 encodes a protein with a coiled-coil-nucleotide binding site and leucine-rich repeat (CC-NBS-LRR motif that recognizes the Phytophthora infestans AVRblb2 effector and triggers hypersensitive cell death (HCD. To better understand the components required for Rpi-blb2-mediated HCD in plants, we used virus-induced gene silencing to repress candidate genes in Rpi-blb2-transgenic Nicotiana benthamiana plants and assayed the plants for AVRblb2 effector. Rpi-blb2 triggers HCD through NbSGT1-mediated pathways, but not NbEDS1- or NbNDR1-mediated pathways. In addition, the role of salicylic acid (SA, jasmonic acid (JA, and ethylene (ET in Rpi-blb2-mediated HCD were analyzed by monitoring of the responses of NbICS1-, NbCOI1-, or NbEIN2-silenced or Rpi-blb2::NahG-transgenic plants. Rpi-blb2-mediated HCD in response to AVRblb2 was not associated with SA accumulation. Thus, SA affects Rpi-blb2-mediated resistance against P. infestans, but not Rpi-blb2-mediated HCD in response to AVRblb2. Additionally, JA and ET signaling were not required for Rpi-blb2-mediated HCD in N. benthamiana. Taken together, these findings suggest that NbSGT1 is a unique positive regulator of Rpi-blb2-mediated HCD in response to AVRblb2, but EDS1, NDR1, SA, JA, and ET are not required.

  5. Erectile Dysfunction (ED)

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Talking to Your Kids About VirginityTalking to Your Kids About Sex Home Diseases and Conditions Erectile Dysfunction (ED) Condition ... Well-Being Mental Health Sex and Birth Control Sex and Sexuality Birth Control ... and Toddlers Kids and Teens Pregnancy and Childbirth Women Men Seniors ...

  6. Education and training requirements in the revised European Basic Safety Standards Directive

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mundigl, S.

    2009-01-01

    The European Commission is currently developing a modified European Basic Safety Standards Directive covering two major objectives: the consolidation of existing European Radiation Protection legislation, and the revision of the European Basic Safety Standards. The consolidation will merge the following five Directives into one single Directive: the Basic Safety Standards Directive, the Medical Exposures Directive, the Public Information Directive, the Outside Workers Directive, and the Directive on the Control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources. The revision of the European Basic Safety Standards will take account of the latest recommendations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and shall improve clarity of the requirements where appropriate. It is planned to introduce more binding requirements on natural radiation sources, on criteria for clearance, and on the cooperation between Member States for emergency planning and response, as well as a graded approach for regulatory control. One additional goal is to achieve greater harmonisation between the European BSS and the international BSS. Following a recommendation from the Article 31 Group of Experts, the current draft of the modified BSS will highlight the importance of education and training by dedicating a specific title to radiation protection education, training and information. This title will include a general requirement on the Member States to ensure the establishment of an adequate legislative and administrative framework for providing appropriate radiation protection education, training and information. In addition, there will be specific requirements on training in the medical field, on information and training of workers in general, of workers potentially exposed to orphan sources, and to emergency workers. The revised BSS directive will include requirements on the competence of a radiation protection expert (RPE) and of a radiation protection

  7. Safety Culture: A Requirement for New Business Models — Lessons Learned from Other High Risk Industries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kecklund, L.

    2016-01-01

    Technical development and changes on global markets affects all high risk industries creating opportunities as well as risks related to the achievement of safety and business goals. Changes in legal and regulatory frameworks as well as in market demands create a need for major changes. Several high risk industries are facing a situation where they have to develop new business models. Within the transportation domain, e.g., aviation and railways, there is a growing concern related to how the new business models may affects safety issues. New business models in aviation and railways include extensive use of outsourcing and subcontractors to reduce costs resulting in, e.g., negative changes in working conditions, work hours, employment conditions and high turnover rates. The energy sector also faces pressures to create new business models for transition to renewable energy production to comply with new legal and regulatory requirements and to make best use of new reactor designs. In addition, large scale phase out and decommissioning of nuclear facilities have to be managed by the nuclear industry. Some negative effects of new business models have already arisen within the transportation domain, e.g., the negative effects of extensive outsourcing and subcontractor use. In the railway domain the infrastructure manager is required by European and national regulations to assure that all subcontractors are working according to the requirements in the infrastructure managers SMS (Safety Management System). More than ten levels of subcontracts can be working in a major infrastructure project making the system highly complex and thus difficult to control. In the aviation domain, tightly coupled interacting computer networks supplying airport services, as well as air traffic control, are managed and maintained by several different companies creating numerous interfaces which must be managed by the SMS. There are examples where a business model with several low

  8. Point-of-Care Ultrasonography for Evaluation of Acute Dyspnea in the ED.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zanobetti, Maurizio; Scorpiniti, Margherita; Gigli, Chiara; Nazerian, Peiman; Vanni, Simone; Innocenti, Francesca; Stefanone, Valerio T; Savinelli, Caterina; Coppa, Alessandro; Bigiarini, Sofia; Caldi, Francesca; Tassinari, Irene; Conti, Alberto; Grifoni, Stefano; Pini, Riccardo

    2017-06-01

    Acute dyspnea is a common symptom in the ED. The standard approach to dyspnea often relies on radiologic and laboratory results, causing excessive delay before adequate therapy is started. Use of an integrated point-of-care ultrasonography (PoCUS) approach can shorten the time needed to formulate a diagnosis, while maintaining an acceptable safety profile. Consecutive adult patients presenting with dyspnea and admitted after ED evaluation were prospectively enrolled. The gold standard was the final diagnosis assessed by two expert reviewers. Two physicians independently evaluated the patient; a sonographer performed an ultrasound evaluation of the lung, heart, and inferior vena cava, while the treating physician requested traditional tests as needed. Time needed to formulate the ultrasound and the ED diagnoses was recorded and compared. Accuracy and concordance of the ultrasound and the ED diagnoses were calculated. A total of 2,683 patients were enrolled. The average time needed to formulate the ultrasound diagnosis was significantly lower than that required for ED diagnosis (24 ± 10 min vs 186 ± 72 min; P = .025). The ultrasound and the ED diagnoses showed good overall concordance (κ = 0.71). There were no statistically significant differences in the accuracy of PoCUS and the standard ED evaluation for the diagnosis of acute coronary syndrome, pneumonia, pleural effusion, pericardial effusion, pneumothorax, and dyspnea from other causes. PoCUS was significantly more sensitive for the diagnosis of heart failure, whereas a standard ED evaluation performed better in the diagnosis of COPD/asthma and pulmonary embolism. PoCUS represents a feasible and reliable diagnostic approach to the patient with dyspnea, allowing a reduction in time to diagnosis. This protocol could help to stratify patients who should undergo a more detailed evaluation. Copyright © 2017 American College of Chest Physicians. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  9. 78 FR 42889 - Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Utility LP-Gas and LPG Pipeline Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-18

    ... DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 192 [Docket No. PHMSA-2013-0097] Pipeline Safety: Reminder of Requirements for Utility LP-Gas and LPG Pipeline Systems AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), DOT. ACTION...

  10. 78 FR 55230 - Safety and Environmental Management System Requirements for Vessels on the U.S. Outer Continental...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-09-10

    ...\\ including the regulation of workplace safety and health.\\2\\ The Coast Guard's regulatory authority extends... 147 [Docket No. USCG-2012-0779] RIN 1625-AC05 Safety and Environmental Management System Requirements... a vessel-specific Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS) that incorporates the management...

  11. Risk and safety requirements for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology: World Allergy Organization Statement

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marek L. Kowalski

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available Abstract One of the major concerns in the practice of allergy is related to the safety of procedures for the diagnosis and treatment of allergic disease. Management (diagnosis and treatment of hypersensitivity disorders involves often intentional exposure to potentially allergenic substances (during skin testing, deliberate induction in the office of allergic symptoms to offending compounds (provocation tests or intentional application of potentially dangerous substances (allergy vaccine to sensitized patients. These situations may be associated with a significant risk of unwanted, excessive or even dangerous reactions, which in many instances cannot be completely avoided. However, adverse reactions can be minimized or even avoided if a physician is fully aware of potential risk and is prepared to appropriately handle the situation. Information on the risk of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergic diseases has been accumulated in the medical literature for decades; however, except for allergen specific immunotherapy, it has never been presented in a systematic fashion. Up to now no single document addressed the risk of the most commonly used medical procedures in the allergy office nor attempted to present general requirements necessary to assure the safety of these procedures. Following review of available literature a group of allergy experts within the World Allergy Organization (WAO, representing various continents and areas of allergy expertise, presents this report on risk associated with diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in allergology and proposes a consensus on safety requirements for performing procedures in allergy offices. Optimal safety measures including appropriate location, type and required time of supervision, availability of safety equipment, access to specialized emergency services, etc. for various procedures have been recommended. This document should be useful for allergists with already established

  12. Edible safety requirements and assessment standards for agricultural genetically modified organisms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deng, Pingjian; Zhou, Xiangyang; Zhou, Peng; Du, Zhong; Hou, Hongli; Yang, Dongyan; Tan, Jianjun; Wu, Xiaojin; Zhang, Jinzhou; Yang, Yongcun; Liu, Jin; Liu, Guihua; Li, Yonghong; Liu, Jianjun; Yu, Lei; Fang, Shisong; Yang, Xiaoke

    2008-05-01

    This paper describes the background, principles, concepts and methods of framing the technical regulation for edible safety requirement and assessment of agricultural genetically modified organisms (agri-GMOs) for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in the People's Republic of China. It provides a set of systematic criteria for edible safety requirements and the assessment process for agri-GMOs. First, focusing on the degree of risk and impact of different agri-GMOs, we developed hazard grades for toxicity, allergenicity, anti-nutrition effects, and unintended effects and standards for the impact type of genetic manipulation. Second, for assessing edible safety, we developed indexes and standards for different hazard grades of recipient organisms, for the influence of types of genetic manipulation and hazard grades of agri-GMOs. To evaluate the applicability of these criteria and their congruency with other safety assessment systems for GMOs applied by related organizations all over the world, we selected some agri-GMOs (soybean, maize, potato, capsicum and yeast) as cases to put through our new assessment system, and compared our results with the previous assessments. It turned out that the result of each of the cases was congruent with the original assessment.

  13. Requirements of radiation and safety protection for NORM in petroleum and gas facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machavane, Edna Felicina Lisboa

    2017-01-01

    The work establishes radiation protection and safety requirements for NORM in oil and gas installations, enabling the National Atomic Energy Agency to draw up regulations on NORM. A bibliographic review and measurement of oil sludge activity concentrations was carried out to reach the objective. Significant amounts of NORM originating from reservoir rock are encountered during production, maintenance and decommissioning. The oil and gas industry operates in all climates and environments including the most arduous conditions and is continually challenged to achieve high operating efficiency while maintaining a high standard of safety and control - this includes the need to maintain control over exposure as well as protecting the public and the environment through the proper management of tailings that may be radiologically and chemically hazardous. The main objective of this work was not only to present the main radiological protection and safety requirements for NORM in oil and gas installations, but also to guide the competent governmental authorities of the Republic of Mozambique, that the installation of a radiometry laboratory and elaboration of NORM regulations involve a great control of radiological safety. The regulatory authority is responsible for authorizing facilities for the storage of radioactive waste, including the storage of contaminated tailings. It is recommended that studies of this kind be made to analyze the concentration of naturally occurring radioisotope activity. (author)

  14. Development of the switch requirements and architecture of a safety data communication system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, K.I.; Lee, J.K.; Park, H.Y.; Koo, I.S.

    2004-12-01

    In accordance with digitalising the Instrumentation and Control(I and C) systems in the integral reactor, a communication network is required for effective information exchanges between the different equipment, an enhancement of the design flexibility, a simple installation and cost reduction. Generally, a communication network consists of a topology, the protocol, a communication medium, an interconnection device, etc. In this report, the development methods of switch and the architecture of a Safety Data Communication System(SDCS) are investigated and analyzed. In this report, the design requirements for switch are presented, which are the essential requirements to develop the switch in a SDCS of the SMART-P. To establish these requirements, the evaluation and analysis of the design and implementation method of the COTS switches, the architecture of SDCS and the design requirements of a SDCS were performed. At the detail design stage, these requirements will be used for the top-tier requirements, especially the design target and design basis. To develop the detail design requirements in the future, more quantitative and qualitative analyses are required. In the case of selecting the COTS switch and developing the switch, these requirements will also be used for the evaluation guide

  15. Development of the switch requirements and architecture of a safety data communication system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, K.I.; Lee, J.K.; Park, H.Y.; Koo, I.S

    2004-12-01

    In accordance with digitalising the Instrumentation and Control(I and C) systems in the integral reactor, a communication network is required for effective information exchanges between the different equipment, an enhancement of the design flexibility, a simple installation and cost reduction. Generally, a communication network consists of a topology, the protocol, a communication medium, an interconnection device, etc. In this report, the development methods of switch and the architecture of a Safety Data Communication System(SDCS) are investigated and analyzed. In this report, the design requirements for switch are presented, which are the essential requirements to develop the switch in a SDCS of the SMART-P. To establish these requirements, the evaluation and analysis of the design and implementation method of the COTS switches, the architecture of SDCS and the design requirements of a SDCS were performed. At the detail design stage, these requirements will be used for the top-tier requirements, especially the design target and design basis. To develop the detail design requirements in the future, more quantitative and qualitative analyses are required. In the case of selecting the COTS switch and developing the switch, these requirements will also be used for the evaluation guide.

  16. Information requirements of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's safety, environmental health, and occupational medicine programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    Whyte, A. A.

    1978-01-01

    A survey of the internal and external reporting and recordkeeping procedures of these programs was conducted and the major problems associated with them are outlined. The impact of probable future requirements on existing information systems is evaluated. This report also presents the benefits of combining the safety and health information systems into one computerized system and recommendations for the development and scope of that system.

  17. Ectodermal dysplasia (ED) syndrome.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chee, Siew-Yin; Wanga, Chung-Hsing; Lina, Wei-De; Tsaia, Fuu-Jen

    2014-01-01

    Ectodermal dysplasia (ED) syndrome comprises a large, heterogeneous group of inherited disorders that are defined by primary defects in the development of 2 or more tissues derived from the embryonic ectoderm. The tissues primarily involved are the skin and its appendages (including hair follicles, eccrine glands, sebaceous glands, nails) and teeth. The clinical features include sparse hair, abnormal or missing teeth, and an inability to sweat due to lack of sweat glands. One such case report of ectodermal dysplasia is presented here.

  18. Proposal for basic safety requirements regarding the disposal of high-level radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    A working group commissioned to prepare proposals for basic safety requirements for the storage and transport of radioactive waste prepared its report to the Danish Agency of Environmental Protection. The proposals include: radiation protection requirements, requirements concerning the properties of high-level waste units, the geological conditions of the waste disposal location, the supervision of waste disposal areas. The proposed primary requirements for safety evaluation of the disposal of high-level waste in deep geological formations are of a general nature, not being tied to specific assumptions regarding the waste itself, the geological and other conditions at the place of disposal, and the technical methods of disposal. It was impossible to test the proposals for requirements on a working repository. As no country has, to the knowledge of the working group, actually disposed of hifg-level radioactive waste or approved of plans for such disposal. Methods for evaluating the suitability of geological formations for waste disposal, and background material concerning the preparation of these proposals for basic safety requirements relating to radiation, waste handling and geological conditions are reviewed. Appended to the report is a description of the phases of the fuel cycle that are related to the storage of spent fuel and the disposal of high-level reprocessing waste in a salt formation. It should be noted that the proposals of the working group are not limited to the disposal of reprocessed fuel, but also include the direct disposal of spent fuel as well as disposal in geological formations other than salt. (EG)

  19. Innovative nuclear reactor - Indian approach to meet user requirements for safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saha, D.; Sinha, R.K.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: For sustainable development of nuclear energy, a number of key issues are to be addressed. It should be economically competitive; it must address the issues related to nuclear safety, proliferation resistance, environmental impact, waste disposal and cross cutting issues like social and infra-structural aspects. To compete successfully in the long term, in the highly competitive energy market and to overcome other challenges, it is necessary to introduce innovative reactor and fuel cycle concepts. Indian Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is one such innovative reactor. To guide the research and development activities related to innovative concepts, user requirements are to be formulated. User requirements covering various aspects of sustainable development are being formulated at both national and international levels. One such international project involved in the formulation of user requirements is the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). This paper deals with INPRO user requirements for safety and Indian approach to meet these requirements through AHWR

  20. Safety of High Speed Magnetic Levitation Transportation Systems - Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Safety Requirements for Application to U.S. Maglev Systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    1993-09-01

    This report presents the results of a systematic review of the safety requirements selected for the German Transrapid : electromagnetic (EMS) type maglev system to determine their applicability and completeness with respect to the : construction and ...

  1. Probabilistic approaches to LCO's and surveillance requirements for standby safety systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lofgren, E.V.; Varcolik, F.

    1982-11-01

    Results are presented for a comprehensive analysis of risk-based methods for establishing Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements for on-line test and repair of nuclear power plant safety system components. Limiting Conditions for Operation refers to the legal constraint on safety system component outage times that are imposed by the NRC as part of the reactor operating license. Generally, when a safety system component is removed for repair or test for a period of time there is a period of increased vulnerability concerning the probability that the affected safety system will be available to mitigate an accident. This period of increased vulnerability exists until the component is restored to service. The constraint on the duration of this period, the allowed outage time (AOT), is the aspect of LCOs that is of interest here. In particular, methods are reviewed and developed that relate measures of risk to the AOT. Only by explicitly relating risk to AOT can outage times be constrained by placing limits on risk. Methods developed for relating risk measures to outage times are presented. The review and analysis of risk related methods for establishing LCOs are described

  2. Requirement analysis of the safety-critical software implementation for the nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Hoon Seon; Jung, Jae Cheon; Kim, Jae Hack; Nam, Sang Ku; Kim, Hang Bae

    2005-01-01

    The safety critical software shall be implemented under the strict regulation and standards along with hardware qualification. In general, the safety critical software has been implemented using functional block language (FBL) and structured language like C in the real project. Software design shall comply with such characteristics as; modularity, simplicity, minimizing the use of sub-routine, and excluding the interrupt logic. To meet these prerequisites, we used the computer-aided software engineering (CASE) tool to substantiate the requirements traceability matrix that were manually developed using Word processors or Spreadsheets. And the coding standard and manual have been developed to confirm the quality of software development process, such as; readability, consistency, and maintainability in compliance with NUREG/CR-6463. System level preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is performed by analyzing preliminary safety analysis report (PSAR) and FMEA document. The modularity concept is effectively implemented for the overall module configurations and functions using RTP software development tool. The response time imposed on the basis of the deterministic structure of the safety-critical software was measured

  3. Safety requirements and options for a large size fast neutron reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cogne, F.; Megy, J.; Robert, E.; Benmergui, A.; Villeneuve, J.

    1977-01-01

    Starting from the experience gained in the safety evaluation of the PHENIX reactor, and from results already obtained in the safety studies on fast neutron reactors, the French regulatory bodies have defined since 1973 what could be the requirements and the recommendations in the matter of safety for the first large size ''prototype'' fast neutron power plant of 1200 MWe. Those requirements and recommendations, while not being compulsory due to the evolution of this type of reactors, will be used as a basis for the technical regulation that will be established in France in this field. They define particularly the care to be taken in the following areas which are essential for safety: the protection systems, the primary coolant system, the prevention of accidents at the core level, the measures to be taken with regard to the whole core accident and to the containment, the protection against sodium fires, and the design as a function of external aggressions. In applying these recommendations, the CREYS-MALVILLE plant designers have tried to achieve redundancy in the safety related systems and have justified the safety of the design with regard to the various involved phenomena. In particular, the extensive research made at the levels of the fuel and of the core instrumentation makes it possible to achieve the best defence to avoid the development of core accidents. The overall examination of the measures taken, from the standpoint of prevention and surveyance as well as from the standpoint of means of action led the French regulatory bodies to propose the construction permit of the CREYS MALVILLE plant, provided that additional examinations by the regulatory bodies be made during the construction of the plant on some technological aspects not fully clarified at the authorization time. The conservatism of the corresponding requirements should be demonstrated prior to the commissioning of the power plant. To pursue a programme on reactors of this type, or even more

  4. Radioactivity: Risks - safety. 2. rev. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grupe, H.

    1991-01-01

    This revised and updated version of the report first published in 1987 by Karlsruhe Nuclear Center has been prepared by scientists of the Center who are experts in nuclear science and technology. The idea was to fulfill the so-to-speak ''creditor's'' obligation in the public debate about nuclear energy and its hazards, and to provide the general public not so familiar with the subject matter with information and insight for better understanding, hoping that the general public on their part will fulfill their ''debtor's'' obligation by trying to get properly informed. Chapters 1 and 6 of the report have been revised and brought up to date, while chapter 3 has been fully re-written, taking as a main source of reference the 1989 publication of Phase B of the German Risk Study on nuclear power plant. Chapters 2 and 5 are new in this report, dealing with less broadly known applications of radioactive substances in science, medicine and technology, and with the radiological situation in Germany after the Chernobyl reactor accident. (orig./DG) [de

  5. A study on the primary requirement for the safety of the Wolsong tritium removal facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, K. H.; Lee, K. J.; Jeong, C. W.

    2001-01-01

    Owing to the using a heavy water as a moderator and a coolant in Heavy water reactor, A large mount of tritium is produced due to a reaction of deuterium with neutron in the reactor and some of tritium is released to the environment. In Wolsong, 4 units (CANDU-600 type) Heavy water reactor is in operation. And the generated amount of tritium is increased with the increase of operational year of the Wolsong nuclear reactor. Decommissioning of the Wolsong unit 1 is expected to start at 2013. Before 2013, to reduce the workers internal radiation doses and environmental release of tritium, Tritium Removal Facility (TRF) is required and should be operated. Wolsong TRF (WTRF) is under developing stage by Korea Electric Power Corporation(KEPCO)and scheduled to start operation about 2006. Once the facility begins operation it can be contributed to the greatly reduction of tritium release to the environment and worker's expose. In this situation, study about the safety assessment method and regulatory requirement is essential for safety insurance of WTRF. And this helps the safety acquirement, successful operation and reliance of WTRF

  6. Evaluation of safety requirements of erbium laser equipment used in dentistry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braga, Flavio Hamilton

    2002-01-01

    The erbium laser (Er:YAG) has been used in several therapeutic processes. Erbium lasers, however, operate with energies capable to produce lesions in biological tissues. Aiming the safe use, the commercialization of therapeutic laser equipment is controlled in Brazil, where the equipment should comply with quality and safety requirement prescribed in technical regulations. The objective of this work is to evaluate the quality and safety requirements of a commercial therapeutic erbium laser according to Brazilian regulations, and to discuss a risk control program intended to minimize the accidental exposition at dangerous laser radiation levels. It was verified that the analyzed laser can produce lesions in the skin and eyes, when exposed to laser radiation at distances smaller than 80 cm by 10 s or more. In these conditions, the use of protection glasses is recommended to the personnel that have access to the laser operation ambient. It was verified that the user's training and the presence of a target indicator are fundamental to avoid damages in the skin and buccal cavity. It was also verified that the knowledge and the correct use of the equipment safety devices, and the application of technical and administrative measures is efficient to minimize the risk of dangerous expositions to the laser radiation. (author)

  7. Identifying environmental safety and health requirements for the Fernald Environmental Restoration Management Corporation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beckman, W.H.; Cossel, S.C.; Alhadeff, N.; Lindamood, S.B.; Beers, J.A.

    1994-01-01

    This presentation will describe the Fernald Environmental Restoration Management Corporation's (FERMCO) Standards/Requirements Identification Documents (S/RlDs) Program, the unique process used to implement it, and the status of the program. We will also discuss the lessons learned as the program was implemented. The Department of Energy (DOE) established the Fernald site to produce uranium metals for the nation's defense programs in 1953. In 1989, DOE suspended production and, in 1991, the mission of the site was formally changed to one of environmental cleanup and restoration. The site was renamed the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP). FERMCO's mission is to provide safe, early, and least-cost final clean-up of the site in compliance with all regulations and commitments. DOE has managed nuclear facilities primarily through its oversight of Management and Operating contractors. Comprehensive nuclear industry standards were absent when most DOE sites were first established, Management and Operating contractors had to apply existing non-nuclear industry standards and, in many cases, formulate new technical standards. Because it was satisfied with the operation of its facilities, DOE did not incorporate modern practices and standards as they became available. In March 1990, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued Recommendation 90-2, which called for DOE to identify relevant standards and requirements, conduct adequacy assessments of requirements in protecting environmental, public, and worker health and safety, and determine the extent to which the requirements are being implemented. The Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Office of DOE embraced the recommendation for facilities under its control. Strict accountability requirements made it essential that FERMCO and DOE clearly identify applicable requirements necessary, determine the requirements' adequacy, and assess FERMCO's level of compliance

  8. Firefighter safety for PV systems: Overview of future requirements and protection systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Spataru, Sergiu; Sera, Dezso; Blaabjerg, Frede

    2013-01-01

    for operators during maintenance or fire-fighting. One of the solutions is individual module shutdown by short-circuiting or disconnecting each PV module from the PV string. However, currently no standards have been adopted either for implementing or testing these methods, or doing an evaluation of the module...... shutdown procedures. This paper gives an overview on the most recent fire - and firefighter safety requirements for PV systems, with focus on system and module shutdown systems. Several solutions are presented, analyzed and compared by considering a number of essential characteristics, including......An important and highly discussed safety issue for photovoltaic systems is that, as long as they are illuminated, a high voltage is present at the PV string terminals and cables between the string and inverters, independent of the state of the inverter's dc disconnection switch, which poses a risk...

  9. Use of a Graded Approach in the Application of the Safety Requirements for Research Reactors. Specific Safety Guide

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2011-11-15

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt? standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the conventions

  10. Technical Support Section Instrument Support Program for nuclear and nonnuclear facilities with safety requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adkisson, B.P.; Allison, K.L.

    1995-01-01

    This document describes requirements, procedures, and supervisory responsibilities of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Instrumentation and Controls (I ampersand C) Division's Technical Support Section (TSS) for instrument surveillance and maintenance in nonreactor nuclear facilities having identified Operational Safety Requirements (OSRs) or Limiting Conditions Document (LCDs). Implementation of requirements comply with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Orders 5480.5, 5480.22, and 5481.1B; Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), Policy Procedure ESS-FS-201; and ORNL SPP X-ESH-15. OSRs and LCDs constitute an agreement or contract between DOE and the facility operating management regarding the safe operation of the facility. One basic difference between OSRs and LCDs is that violation of an OSR is considered a Category II occurrence, whereas violation of an LCD requirement is considered a Category III occurrence (see Energy Systems Standard ESS-OP-301 and ORNL SPP X-GP-13). OSRs are required for high- and moderate-hazard nuclear facilities, whereas the less-rigorous LCDs are required for low-hazard nuclear facilities and selected open-quotes generally acceptedclose quotes operations. Hazard classifications are determined through a hazard screening process, which each division conducts for its facilities

  11. Plant design and layout of the different buildings with respect to safety, operational and maintenance requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Linder, C.

    1981-01-01

    Design and layout of the buildings of a nuclear power plant are governed by the safety requirements regarding nearby population as called for by government regulations as well as by operational and maintenance requirements called for by the power utilities in order to assure smooth operation and easy service conditions. The lecture will focus on the different functional circumstances to be considered, their relative importance, criteria to be applied, pertinent regulations etc. and also give examples on the solutions to the above requirements. Main topics to be covered will be those circumstances that impose the highest demands on the civil engineering layout and design: airplane impact, earthquake, loss of coolant accident, pipe whipping, fuel cask transfer, annual overhaul, leak detection etc. (orig./RW)

  12. Safety requirements, facility user needs, and reactor concepts for a new Broad Application Test Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryskamp, J.M.; Liebenthal, J.L.; Denison, A.B.; Fletcher, C.D.

    1992-07-01

    This report describes the EG ampersand G Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program (LDRD) Broad Application Test Reactor (BATR) Project that was conducted in fiscal year 1991. The scope of this project was divided into three phases: a project process definition phase, a requirements development phase, and a preconceptual reactor design and evaluation phase. Multidisciplinary teams of experts conducted each phase. This report presents the need for a new test reactor, the project process definition, a set of current and projected regulatory compliance and safety requirements, a set of facility user needs for a broad range of projected testing missions, and descriptions of reactor concepts capable of meeting these requirements. This information can be applied to strategic planning to provide the Department of Energy with management options

  13. ON THE IMPACT OF FLIGHT SAFETY CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ON THE AERODYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vladimir I. Shevyakov

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available The article considers the issue of aerodynamics efficiency implementation taking into account certification requirements for flight safety. Aerodynamics efficiency means high aerodynamic performance (depending on the airplane size, aerodynamic performance in cruise flight, high aerodynamic performance at takeoff, as well as lift performance at landing.The author estimated the impact on aerodynamics efficiency of both the requirements for aerodynamics performance and requirements for aircraft systems, noncompliance with which may result in significant change of expected operating conditions. It was shown that the use of supercritical wing profiles may result in flight mode limitations due to failure of the required buffeting capacities. It does not allow engaging all the advantages of aerodynamics layout and requires special design solutions to prevent such cases.There were reviewed certification requirements for flight level pressure altitude accuracy and icing conditions warning sysytem. The research presented the methods of aerodynamic efficiency increase by meeting the requirements for reduced vertical separation minima flights and in icing conditions, including requirements for air data probes. Reduced vertical separation minima flight requirements are met by means of efficient air data probes location. Theoretical methods of flow calculation determine areas on the airplane skin surface where static probes minimize errors depending on angle-of-attack and sideslip. It was shown that if certification requirements are not met and in case of flight out of reduced vertical separation minima area, aerodynamics efficiency is significantly reduced and fuel consumption can be increased by 10% and higher. Suggested approaches implementation allows increasing commercial airplanes competitiveness.

  14. Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    A brief account of activities carried out by the Nuclear power plants Jaslovske Bohunice in 1997 is presented. These activities are reported under the headings: (1) Nuclear safety; (2) Industrial and health safety; (3) Radiation safety; and Fire protection

  15. Preparation of safety regulatory requirements for new technology like digital system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ito, Juichiro; Takita, Masami

    2011-01-01

    The current regulatory requirements on digital instrumentation and control system have been reviewed by JNES, considering international trend discussed in DICWG (Digital Instrumentation and Control Working Group) of MDEP (Multinational Design Evaluation Program). MDEP DICWG held in OECD/NEA (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency) gives the opportunity to identify the convergence of applicable standards. The working group's activities include: identifying and prioritising the member countries' challenges, practices, and needs regarding standards and regulatory guidance regarding digital instrumentation and control; identifying areas of importance and needs for convergence of existing standards and guidance or development of new standards; sharing of information; and identifying common positions among the member countries for areas of particular importance and need. The DICWG drafted common positions on specific issues which are based on the existing standards, national regulatory guidance, best practices, and group inputs using an agreed upon process and framework. Five general common positions are under discussion in this fiscal year. Simplicity in Design, Software Common Cause Failures, Software Tools, Data communication, Verification and Validation throughout the life cycle of safety systems using digital computers. In addition, the technical evaluation of standards of the Japan Electric Association about digital system for safety was made to support NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency). (author)

  16. I Failed the edTPA

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kuranishi, Adam; Oyler, Celia

    2017-01-01

    In this article, co-written by a teacher and a professor, the authors examine possible explanations for why Adam (first author), a New York City public school special educator, failed the edTPA, a teacher performance assessment required by all candidates for state certification. Adam completed a yearlong teaching residency where he was the special…

  17. Relationship between general safety requirements and safety culture in the improvement of safe operation of I.N.R. TRIGA reactor facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ciocanescu, M.; Preda, M.; Chiritescu, M.; Dumitru, M.

    1996-01-01

    Acquiring of the basic principles of ''safety culture'' by a large number of profesionals in the nuclear field drew the attention of the decision factors in the INR managerial structure, who decided to promote certain practical actions at each level in order to improve nuclear safety. Starting from the ''Republican Standards for Nuclear Safety'' issued by CSEN in 1975, where general safety criteria are defined for nuclear reactors and NPPs, the specialists at the TRIGA reactor originated and implemented a coherent and secure system to ensure nuclear safety over all steps of nuclear activities: research, conception, execution, commissioning and operation. This system has been continuosly corrected so that now it is completely integrated in a modern safety system. The paper presents the way in which a modern system for nuclear safety at the TRIGA reactor has been implemented and developed, in accordance to specific criteria and requirements imposed by related National Regulations and with the principles of safety culture. Starting from the definition of specific responsabilities, there are presented the internal stipulations and practical actions at all levels in order to enhance nuclear safety. (orig.)

  18. Requirements and analysis of electromagnetic compatibility of safety-related instrumentation and control system in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Sujuan

    2002-01-01

    The state-of-the-art instrumentation and control system and the influence of their application to the electromagnetic compatibility is analyzed. Based on the present situation of nuclear safety in China and relevant experiences from other countries, the author tries to probe into the requirements and test methods about how safety-related instrument and control system to accommodate electromagnetic interference, radio-frequency interference and power surges in the environments of nuclear power plant so as to develop Chinese safety standards

  19. Considerations in the development of safety requirements for innovative reactors: Application to modular high temperature gas cooled reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-08-01

    Member States of the IAEA have frequently requested this organization to assess, at the conceptual stage, the safety of the design of nuclear reactors that rely on a variety of technologies and are of a high degree of innovation. However, to date, for advanced and innovative reactors and for reactors with characteristics that are different from those of existing light water reactors, widely accepted design standards and rules do not exist. This TECDOC is an outcome of the efforts deployed by the IAEA to develop a general approach for assessing the safety of the design of advanced and innovative reactors, and of all reactors in general including research reactors, with characteristics that differ from those of light water reactors. This publication puts forward a method for safety assessment that is based on the well established and accepted principle of defence in depth. The need to develop a general approach for assessing the safety of the design of reactors that applies to all kinds of advanced reactors was emphasized by the request to the IAEA by South Africa to review the safety of the South African pebble bed modular reactor. This reactor, as other modular high temperature gas cooled reactors (MHTGRs), adopts very specific design features such as the use of coated particle fuel. The characteristics of the fuel deeply affect the design and the safety of the plant, thereby posing several challenges to traditional safety assessment methods and to the application of existing safety requirements that have been developed primarily for water reactors. In this TECDOC, the MHTGR has been selected as a case study to demonstrate the viability of the method proposed. The approach presented is based on an extended interpretation of the concept of defence in depth and its link with the general safety objectives and fundamental safety functions as set out in 'Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design', IAEA Safety Standards No. NS-R.1, issued by the IAEA in 2000. The objective

  20. Safety requirements of the BMU to be met in final storage of heat-producing waste: An evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomauske, Bruno

    2009-01-01

    On August 12, 2008, The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) published a draft of July 29, 2008 of the ''Safety Requirements to Be Met in Final Storage of Heat-producing Radioactive Waste.'' As announced by the BMU, these safety requirements are to bring up to the state of the art the safety criteria of 1983. Over a couple of years, efforts had been made to adapt the criteria to the internationally accepted standard as demanded by the Advisory Committees on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) and Radiation Protection (SSK). There is no waste management concept underlying the safety requirements. As a consequence, the draft should be withdrawn by the Federal Ministry for the Environment and replaced by a version revised from scratch and offering assured quality. (orig./GL)

  1. Heat transfer and friction correlations required to describe steam--water behavior in nuclear safety studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solbrig, C.W.; McFadden, J.H.; Lyczkowski, R.W.; Hughes, E.D.

    1975-01-01

    The description of two-phase flow is important in nuclear safety studies. Recent two-phase flow descriptions are based upon unequal phase velocities and unequal phase temperatures (UVUT) theories with interphase interaction terms. These theories are more mechanistic than homogeneous theories and require more and different types of correlations than homogeneous theories. The UVUT theories require correlations (or models) which describe wall and interphase mass transfer, friction, momentum transfer, and heat transfer for all flow regimes and heat transfer regimes. A set of correlations is presented in this paper which can be used with UVUT theories. These correlations cover the complete range of parameters needed and in all cases are expected to yield reasonable numbers. (U.S.)

  2. CriticalEd

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kjellberg, Caspar Mølholt; Meredith, David

    2014-01-01

    . Since the comments are not input sequentially, with regard to position, but in arbitrary order, this list must be sorted by copy/pasting the rows into place—an error-prone and time-consuming process. Scholars who produce critical editions typically use off-the-shelf music notation software......The best text method is commonly applied among music scholars engaged in producing critical editions. In this method, a comment list is compiled, consisting of variant readings and editorial emendations. This list is maintained by inserting the comments into a document as the changes are made......, consisting of a Sibelius plug-in, a cross-platform application, called CriticalEd, and a REST-based solution, which handles data storage/retrieval. A prototype has been tested at the Danish Centre for Music Publication, and the results suggest that the system could greatly improve the efficiency...

  3. Transient data acquisition techniques under EDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Telford, S.

    1985-06-01

    This paper is the first of a series which describes the Enrichment Diagnostic System (EDS) developed for the MARS project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Although EDS was developed for use on AVLIS, the functional requirements, overall design, and specific techniques are applicable to any experimental data acquisition system involving large quantities of transient data. In particular this paper will discuss the techniques and equipment used to do the data acquisition. Included are what types of hardware are used and how that hardware (CAMAC, digital oscilloscopes) is interfaced to the HP computers. In this discussion the author will address the problems encountered and the solutions used, as well as the performance of the instrument/computer interfaces. The second topic the author will discuss is how the acquired data is associated to graphics and analysis portions of EDS through efficient real time data bases. This discussion will include how the acquired data is folded into the overall structure of EDS providing the user immediate access to raw and analyzed data. By example you will see how easily a new diagnostic can be added to the EDS structure without modifying the other parts of the system. 8 figs

  4. Study of In-Pile test facility for fast reactor safety research: performance requirements and design features

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nonaka, N.; Kawatta, N.; Niwa, H.; Kondo, S.; Maeda, K

    1996-12-31

    This paper describes a program and the main design features of a new in-pile safety facility SERAPH planned for future fast reactor safety research. The current status of R and D on technical developments in relation to the research objectives and performance requirements to the facility design is given.

  5. New safety and security requirements for the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials in Hungary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katona, T.; Horvath, K.; Safar, J.

    2016-01-01

    In addition to the promulgation of mode-specific regulations of international transport of dangerous goods, some Hungarian governmental and ministerial decrees impose further conditions upon the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. One of these ministerial decrees on the transport, carriage and packaging of radioactive materials is under revision and it will require • approval of emergency response plan (including security and safety contingency plan); • report on transport incidents and accidents for classifying them in accordance with the INES scale; • the competent authority to request experts’ support for the approval of package designs, radioactive material designs and shipments. Regarding the security of the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials a new Hungarian governmental decree and a related guidance are about to be published which will supply additional requirements in the field of the transport security especially concerning radioactive materials, implementing - among others - IAEA recommendations of the NSS No9 and No14. The main and relevant features of the Hungarian nuclear regulatory system and the details of both new decrees regarding the safety and security issues of transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials will be discussed. (author)

  6. 46 CFR 53.05-1 - Safety valve requirements for steam boilers (modifies HG-400 and HG-401).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safety valve requirements for steam boilers (modifies HG-400 and HG-401). 53.05-1 Section 53.05-1 Shipping COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY... requirements for steam boilers (modifies HG-400 and HG-401). (a) The pressure relief valve requirements and the...

  7. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (French Edition); Cadre gouvernemental, legislatif et reglementaire de la surete. Prescriptions generales de surete. Partie 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-11-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  8. Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety. General Safety Requirements. Part 1 (Spanish Edition); Marco gubernamental, juridico y regulador para la seguridad. Requisitos de Seguridad Generales. Parte 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-11-15

    The objective of this publication is to establish requirements in respect of the governmental, legal and regulatory framework for safety. It covers the essential aspects of the framework for establishing a regulatory body and taking other actions necessary to ensure the effective regulatory control of facilities and activities utilized for peaceful purposes. Other responsibilities and functions, such as liaison within the global safety regime and on support services for safety (including radiation protection), emergency preparedness and response, nuclear security, and the State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material, are also covered.

  9. Use of FPGA and CPLD in nuclear reactor safety systems and its regulatory review requirements for reactor safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roy, Suvadip; Biswas, Animesh; Pradhan, S.K.

    2015-01-01

    Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) and Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLD) is being used widely in safety critical and safety related systems in nuclear power plans like in trip logic units, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation decision logic and neutronic signal processing for their reprogrammability feature and compact design. These HDL Programmable devices (HPD) are complex devices consisting of both hardware and software which is used to implement the logic on the FPGA. It is observed that these Programmable devices suffer from various modes of failure and the major failures in these devices are due to Single Event Upset (SEU), where a highly energetic ionizing radiation may lead to device failure which can even occur in radiologically benign environment. Other failures can occur during steps of developing the hardware using software tools like during Synthesis and placement and routing of the desired hardware. Here a study on use of such devices in Nuclear Reactors, study on mode of failures of these devices, way to tackle such failure and development of review guidelines for review of such devices used in safety critical and safety related systems with special emphasis on choice of software tools, way to mitigate effects of SEU and simulation and hardware testing results to be reviewed by regulatory body during design safety review is done. (author)

  10. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larson, H L

    2007-01-01

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment of the DWTF. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment of the DWTF (LLNL 2004). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment of the DWTF is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment of the DWTF (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment of the DWTF are shown in the B695 Segment of the DWTF DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment of the DWTF include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating low-level waste (LLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained LLW. A permit modification for B696S was submitted to DTSC in January 2004 to store and treat hazardous and mixed

  11. Technical Safety Requirements for the B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Larson, H L

    2007-09-07

    This document contains Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division's B695 Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The TSRs constitute requirements regarding the safe operation of the B695 Segment of the DWTF. The TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the B695 Segment of the DWTF (LLNL 2004). The analysis presented there determined that the B695 Segment of the DWTF is a low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 3, nonreactor nuclear facility. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits as well as controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard analyses. Furthermore, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls section of the TSRs. The B695 Segment of the DWTF (B695 and the west portion of B696) is a waste treatment and storage facility located in the northeast quadrant of the LLNL main site. The approximate area and boundary of the B695 Segment of the DWTF are shown in the B695 Segment of the DWTF DSA. Activities typically conducted in the B695 Segment of the DWTF include container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. B695 is used to store and treat radioactive, mixed, and hazardous waste, and it also contains equipment used in conjunction with waste processing operations to treat various liquid and solid wastes. The portion of the building called Building 696 Solid Waste Processing Area (SWPA), also referred to as B696S in this report, is used primarily to manage solid radioactive waste. Operations specific to the SWPA include sorting and segregating low-level waste (LLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste, lab-packing, sampling, and crushing empty drums that previously contained LLW. A permit modification for B696S was submitted to DTSC in January 2004 to store and treat hazardous and

  12. Request for Naval Reactors Comment on Proposed PROMETHEUS Space Flight Nuclear Reactor High Tier Reactor Safety Requirements and for Naval Reactors Approval to Transmit These Requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D. Kokkinos

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this letter is to request Naval Reactors comments on the nuclear reactor high tier requirements for the PROMETHEUS space flight reactor design, pre-launch operations, launch, ascent, operation, and disposal, and to request Naval Reactors approval to transmit these requirements to Jet Propulsion Laboratory to ensure consistency between the reactor safety requirements and the spacecraft safety requirements. The proposed PROMETHEUS nuclear reactor high tier safety requirements are consistent with the long standing safety culture of the Naval Reactors Program and its commitment to protecting the health and safety of the public and the environment. In addition, the philosophy on which these requirements are based is consistent with the Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group recommendations on space nuclear propulsion safety (Reference 1), DOE Nuclear Safety Criteria and Specifications for Space Nuclear Reactors (Reference 2), the Nuclear Space Power Safety and Facility Guidelines Study of the Applied Physics Laboratory

  13. 30 CFR 250.806 - Safety and pollution prevention equipment quality assurance requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safety and pollution prevention equipment... Gas Production Safety Systems § 250.806 Safety and pollution prevention equipment quality assurance... install only certified safety and pollution prevention equipment (SPPE) in wells located on the OCS. SPPE...

  14. Implications of safety requirements for the treatment of THMC processes in geological disposal systems for radioactive waste

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Frédéric Bernier

    2017-06-01

    Full Text Available The mission of nuclear safety authorities in national radioactive waste disposal programmes is to ensure that people and the environment are protected against the hazards of ionising radiations emitted by the waste. It implies the establishment of safety requirements and the oversight of the activities of the waste management organisation in charge of implementing the programme. In Belgium, the safety requirements for geological disposal rest on the following principles: defence-in-depth, demonstrability and the radiation protection principles elaborated by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP. Applying these principles requires notably an appropriate identification and characterisation of the processes upon which the safety functions fulfilled by the disposal system rely and of the processes that may affect the system performance. Therefore, research and development (R&D on safety-relevant thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC issues is important to build confidence in the safety assessment. This paper points out the key THMC processes that might influence radionuclide transport in a disposal system and its surrounding environment, considering the dynamic nature of these processes. Their nature and significance are expected to change according to prevailing internal and external conditions, which evolve from the repository construction phase to the whole heating–cooling cycle of decaying waste after closure. As these processes have a potential impact on safety, it is essential to identify and to understand them properly when developing a disposal concept to ensure compliance with relevant safety requirements. In particular, the investigation of THMC processes is needed to manage uncertainties. This includes the identification and characterisation of uncertainties as well as for the understanding of their safety-relevance. R&D may also be necessary to reduce uncertainties of which the magnitude does not allow

  15. Radiation safety requirements for radioactive waste management in the framework of a quality management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salgado, M.M.; Benitez, J.C.; Pernas, R.; Gonzalez, N.

    2007-01-01

    The Center for Radiation Protection and Hygiene (CPHR) is the institution responsible for the management of radioactive wastes generated from nuclear applications in medicine, industry and research in Cuba. Radioactive Waste Management Service is provided at a national level and it includes the collection and transportation of radioactive wastes to the Centralized Waste Management Facilities, where they are characterized, segregated, treated, conditioned and stored. A Quality Management System, according to the ISO 9001 Standard has been implemented for the RWM Service at CPHR. The Management System includes the radiation safety requirements established for RWM in national regulations and in the Licence's conditions. The role of the Regulatory Body and the Radiation Protection Officer in the Quality Management System, the authorization of practices, training and personal qualification, record keeping, inspections of the Regulatory Body and internal inspection of the Radiation Protection Officer, among other aspects, are described in this paper. The Quality Management System has shown to be an efficient tool to demonstrate that adequate measures are in place to ensure the safety in radioactive waste management activities and their continual improvement. (authors)

  16. Preparation of safety regulatory requirements for new technology like digital system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    The current regulatory requirements on digital instrumentation and control system have been reviewed by JNES, considering international trend discussed in DICWG of MDEP. MDEP DICWG held in OECD/NEA gives the opportunity to identify the convergence of applicable standards. The working group's activities include: identifying and prioritising the member countries' challenges, practices, and needs regarding standards and regulatory guidance on digital instrumentation and control; identifying areas of importance and needs for convergence of existing standards and guidance or development of new standards; sharing of information; and identifying common positions among the member countries for areas of particular importance and need. The DICWG drafted common positions on specific issues which are based on the existing standards, national regulatory guidance, best practices, and group inputs using an agreed process and framework. The following four general common positions have been discussed in this fiscal year. The Treatment of Common Cause Failure Resulting from Software within Digital Safety Systems, The Treatment of Hardware Description Language(HDL) Programmed Devices for Use in Nuclear Safety System, Factory Acceptance Test and Site Acceptance Test, The Use of Automatic Tests to Perform Surveilance for Digital Systems. (author)

  17. Framework conditions and requirements to ensure the technical functional safety of reprocessed medical devices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kraft, Marc

    2008-09-03

    Testing and restoring technical-functional safety is an essential part of medical device reprocessing. Technical functional tests have to be carried out on the medical device in the course of the validation of reprocessing procedures. These ensure (in addition to the hygiene tests) that the reprocessing procedure is suitable for the medical device. Functional tests are, however, also a part of reprocessing procedures. As a stage in the reprocessing, they ensure for the individual medical device that no damage or other changes limit the performance. When determining which technical-functional tests are to be carried out, the current technological standard has to be taken into account in the form of product-specific and process-oriented norms. Product-specific norms primarily define safety-relevant requirements. The risk management method described in DIN EN ISO 14971 is the basis for recognising hazards; the likelihood of such hazards arising can be minimised through additional technical-functional tests, which may not yet have been standardised. Risk management is part of a quality management system, which must be bindingly certified for manufacturers and processors of critical medical devices with particularly high processing demands by a body accredited by the competent authority.

  18. Preparation of safety regulatory requirements for new technology like digital system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The current regulatory requirements on digital instrumentation and control system have been reviewed by JNES, considering international trend discussed in DICWG of MDEP. MDEP DICWG held in OECD/NEA gives the opportunity to identify the convergence of applicable standards. The working group's activities include: identifying and prioritising the member countries' challenges, practices, and needs regarding standards and regulatory guidance on digital instrumentation and control; identifying areas of importance and needs for convergence of existing standards and guidance or development of new standards; sharing of information; and identifying common positions among the member countries for areas of particular importance and need. The DICWG drafted common positions on specific issues which are based on the existing standards, national regulatory guidance, best practices, and group inputs using an agreed process and framework. The following two general common positions are discussed and to be issued in this fiscal year. Verification and Validation throughout the life cycle of safety systems using digital computers. The Impact of Cyber Security Features on Digital I and C Safety Systems. (author)

  19. Developments of radiation safety requirements for the management of radiation devices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Hee Seock; Choi, Jin Ho; Cheong, Yuon Young

    2002-03-01

    The approach of the risk-informed regulatory options was studied to develop the radiation safety requirements for the managements for radiation devices. The task analysis, exposure, accident scenario development, risk analysis, and systematic approach for regulatory options was considered in full, based on the NRC report, 'NUREG/CR-6642', and the translation of its core part was conducted for ongoing research. In this methodology, the diamond tree that includes human factors, etc, additionally with normal event tree, was used. According to the analysis results of this approach, the risk analysis and the development of regulatory options were applied for the electron linear accelerators and the qualitative results were obtained. Because the field user groups were participated in this study could contribute to the basis establishment of the risk-informed regulation policy through securing consensus and inducing particle interests. It will make an important role of establishing the detail plan of ongoing research

  20. Utilization of the safety functional analysis techniques to optimize the separation requirements in case of fire

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alvarez, L.M.

    1983-01-01

    The present philosophy for the fire protection of the safe shutdown capability in nuclear power plants is based on the separation of the safety-related systems in different fire areas in such a way that the redundant systems are not subject to damage from a single fire risk. The purpose ofthis paper is to show the experience gained in the application of a symmetric method of analysis to minimize the number of fire barriers being compatible with the regulatory requirements and with capability of achieving and maintaining the safe plant shutdown in the event of a fire. As a conclusion of the analysis, the separation criteria for the divisions involved in the safe plant shutdown are obtained

  1. Developments of radiation safety requirements for the management of radiation devices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Hee Seock [Pohang Accelerator Lab, Pohang (Korea, Republic of); Choi, Jin Ho [Gachun University of Medicine and science, Incheon (Korea, Republic of); Cheong, Yuon Young [Asan Medical Center, Seoul (Korea, Republic of)] (and others)

    2002-03-15

    The approach of the risk-informed regulatory options was studied to develop the radiation safety requirements for the managements for radiation devices. The task analysis, exposure, accident scenario development, risk analysis, and systematic approach for regulatory options was considered in full, based on the NRC report, 'NUREG/CR-6642', and the translation of its core part was conducted for ongoing research. In this methodology, the diamond tree that includes human factors, etc, additionally with normal event tree, was used. According to the analysis results of this approach, the risk analysis and the development of regulatory options were applied for the electron linear accelerators and the qualitative results were obtained. Because the field user groups were participated in this study could contribute to the basis establishment of the risk-informed regulation policy through securing consensus and inducing particle interests. It will make an important role of establishing the detail plan of ongoing research.

  2. Safety requirement of the nuclear power plants, after TMI-2 accident and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirhabibi, N.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, E.

    1985-01-01

    Based on the lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident and other research and developments, many improvements have been required for the design, manufacturing and operation of nuclear power plants in recent years. These requirements have already been implemented to the plants in operation and considered as new safety requirements for new plants. In the present paper these requirements and their possible implementation on Bushehr NPP are discussed. (Author)

  3. EDS becoms CERN Openlab contributor

    CERN Multimedia

    2007-01-01

    "EDS announced that it has become an official contributor to CERN openlab. The purpose of the joint project beteween CERN and EDS is to carry out research and development in the field of monitoring, management and operation of grid services." (1 page)

  4. Nuclear electricity. 5. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hore-Lacy, I.

    1999-01-01

    This new edition is updated, expanded and in a larger format than its predecessors. Also it is a joint undertaking with Canada, rather than simply an Australian perspective. It has a much expanded chapter on nuclear wastes and reprocessing, as well as more on the advanced reactors which are now coming into service. It also discusses nuclear reactor safety and safeguards issues. A final chapter looks at Australian and Canadian uranium mining

  5. SAFETY

    CERN Multimedia

    Niels Dupont

    2013-01-01

    CERN Safety rules and Radiation Protection at CMS The CERN Safety rules are defined by the Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection Unit (HSE Unit), CERN’s institutional authority and central Safety organ attached to the Director General. In particular the Radiation Protection group (DGS-RP1) ensures that personnel on the CERN sites and the public are protected from potentially harmful effects of ionising radiation linked to CERN activities. The RP Group fulfils its mandate in collaboration with the CERN departments owning or operating sources of ionising radiation and having the responsibility for Radiation Safety of these sources. The specific responsibilities concerning "Radiation Safety" and "Radiation Protection" are delegated as follows: Radiation Safety is the responsibility of every CERN Department owning radiation sources or using radiation sources put at its disposition. These Departments are in charge of implementing the requi...

  6. Describing and analyzing effects of international differences in food safety requirements -the case of the EU versus US-

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bremmers, H.J.; Meulen, van der B.M.J.; Poppe, K.J.; Wijnands, J.H.M.

    2010-01-01

    Abstract This paper compares SPS-requirements of the USA and of the EU from the perspective of the processing establishment, and analyzes the consequences of differences for national as well as firm policies. Differences in safety requirements may impede the competitiveness of the food industry.

  7. Design safety improvements of Kozloduy NPP to meet the modern safety requirements towards the old generation PWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hinovski, M.P.; Sabinov, S.

    2001-01-01

    Activities related to safety improvement of Kozloduy NPP units, started at the end of 1970s included seismic resistance upgrading, fire safety improvement, reliable heat final absorber etc. During the last 10 years the approach was systematized and improved. Units 1 to 4 are of great interest; therefore here we will discuss these units only. As a result of studies and analyses performed at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, problems related to the safety were identified and complex of technical measures was developed and planned. A considerable part of these measures has already been implemented, and the rest will be performed during the next years. Activities were performed by stages, and at the moment the last stage is under way. It shall be finished by the year 2003. The number of the measures is quite large to describe them here in full scope -- during the first stage of the safety program (1991-1993) were developed and analyzed more than 4200 documents and more than 160 measures were executed. During the second and third stages more than 300 important improvements were realized. In the frame of the program, financed by EBRD, 10 new systems with great importance were implemented and 8 systems were significantly modified. The main measures are described below. (author)

  8. 78 FR 20454 - Safety Zones; Annual Events Requiring Safety Zones in the Captain of the Port Lake Michigan Zone

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-04-05

    ... Zone. The last three entries within this rule have been added for races in the Chicago, IL area and on... written--Celebrate Americafest/Fire over the Fox. This event has historically involved both a fireworks... day of the event. To ensure the safety of the Celebrate Americafest/Fire over the Fox event in its...

  9. Generic requirements specification for qualifying a commercially available PLC for safety-related applications in nuclear power plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ostenso, A.; May, R.

    1996-12-01

    This is a specification for qualifying a commercially available PLC for application to safety systems in nuclear power plants. The specifications are suitable for evaluating a particular PLC product line as a platform for safety-related applications, establishing a suitable qualification test program, and confirming that the manufacturer has a quality assurance program that is adequate for safety-related applications or is sufficiently complete that, with a reasonable set of compensatory actions, it can be brought into conformance. The specification includes requirements for: (1) quality assurance measures applied to the qualification activities, (2) documentation to support the qualification, and (3) documentation to provide the information needed for applying the qualified PLC platform to a specific application. The specifications are designed to encompass a broad range of safety applications; however, qualifying a particular platform for a different range of applications can be accomplished by appropriate adjustments to the requirements

  10. 33 CFR 96.240 - What functional requirements must a safety management system meet?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... a safety management system meet? 96.240 Section 96.240 Navigation and Navigable Waters COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY VESSEL OPERATING REGULATIONS RULES FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS Company and Vessel Safety Management Systems § 96.240 What functional...

  11. Needs, requirements and challenges for technical support to nuclear safety authority

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Madonna, A.; Orsini, G.

    2010-01-01

    To face the very broad range of technical matters on which the regulatory and licensing activity are based, and related research and development activity, the Nuclear Safety Authorities (NSA) may need to rely upon external technical and scientific support. In providing technical support to NSA, the experience shows, from one side, the importance to have technical support organizations (TSO) with recognized competence, independence and appropriate regulatory view, and from the other side, the importance to have within the NSAs well developed management and technical capability to address, coordinate and use the results of the external technical support. Retaining the NSA the full responsibility for the final decision. Under which conditions and modus operandi the external support shall be provided in order to comply with requirements of being independent, competent and timely provided, fulfilling the administrative procedures, is the subject of attention and consideration of TSO function today. The Italian regulatory body is currently going to be institutionally re-established according to new law approved in 2009 /1/ and it needs to be resourced and fully organized with necessary capacities in the nearest future. The perspective of a new nuclear program, recently launched by the government, with significant incoming tasks for regulation and licensing, against the existing limited resources, let foresee a substantial potential need for technical support and advice. ITER-Consult (Ltd), created in 2003 in Italy, has well developed capabilities to provide independent technical evaluation and support to NSAs, to maintain safety culture and updated knowledge, to transfer know how and to establish international cooperation and networking. This mission is guided assuming as values the independence, the professional competence, the transparency, the credibility and the establishment of respectful relationship with the partners. Challenges exist for funding and operational

  12. An effective technique for the software requirements analysis of NPP safety-critical systems, based on software inspection, requirements traceability, and formal specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koo, Seo Ryong; Seong, Poong Hyun; Yoo, Junbeom; Cha, Sung Deok; Yoo, Yeong Jae

    2005-01-01

    A thorough requirements analysis is indispensable for developing and implementing safety-critical software systems such as nuclear power plant (NPP) software systems because a single error in the requirements can generate serious software faults. However, it is very difficult to completely analyze system requirements. In this paper, an effective technique for the software requirements analysis is suggested. For requirements verification and validation (V and V) tasks, our technique uses software inspection, requirement traceability, and formal specification with structural decomposition. Software inspection and requirements traceability analysis are widely considered the most effective software V and V methods. Although formal methods are also considered an effective V and V activity, they are difficult to use properly in the nuclear fields as well as in other fields because of their mathematical nature. In this work, we propose an integrated environment (IE) approach for requirements, which is an integrated approach that enables easy inspection by combining requirement traceability and effective use of a formal method. The paper also introduces computer-aided tools for supporting IE approach for requirements. Called the nuclear software inspection support and requirements traceability (NuSISRT), the tool incorporates software inspection, requirement traceability, and formal specification capabilities. We designed the NuSISRT to partially automate software inspection and analysis of requirement traceability. In addition, for the formal specification and analysis, we used the formal requirements specification and analysis tool for nuclear engineering (NuSRS)

  13. Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This annual report of the Senior Inspector for the Nuclear Safety, analyses the nuclear safety at EDF for the year 1999 and proposes twelve subjects of consideration to progress. Five technical documents are also provided and discussed concerning the nuclear power plants maintenance and safety (thermal fatigue, vibration fatigue, assisted control and instrumentation of the N4 bearing, 1300 MW reactors containment and time of life of power plants). (A.L.B.)

  14. 33 CFR 96.320 - What is involved to complete a safety management audit and when is it required to be completed?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... Safety Management (ISM) Code by Administrations. (3) Make sure the audit is carried out by a team of... safety management audit and when is it required to be completed? 96.320 Section 96.320 Navigation and... SAFE OPERATION OF VESSELS AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS How Will Safety Management Systems Be...

  15. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. 2012 Edition. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-07-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt' standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the conventions

  16. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. 2012 Edition. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-03-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt' standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the conventions

  17. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. 2012 Edition. Specific Safety Requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-10-15

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt... standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the

  18. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. 2012 Edition. Specific Safety Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt... standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the

  19. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. 2012 Edition. Specific Safety Requirements (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to ''establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property'' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the

  20. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. 2012 Edition. Specific Safety Requirements (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt' standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the conventions

  1. Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. 2012 Edition. Specific Safety Requirements (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to 'establish or adopt' standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property' - standards that the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which States can apply by means of their regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. The IAEA does this in consultation with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned. A comprehensive set of high quality standards under regular review is a key element of a stable and sustainable global safety regime, as is the IAEA's assistance in their application. The IAEA commenced its safety standards programme in 1958. The emphasis placed on quality, fitness for purpose and continuous improvement has led to the widespread use of the IAEA standards throughout the world. The Safety Standards Series now includes unified Fundamental Safety Principles, which represent an international consensus on what must constitute a high level of protection and safety. With the strong support of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its standards. Standards are only effective if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services encompass design, siting and engineering safety, operational safety, radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive material and safe management of radioactive waste, as well as governmental organization, regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations. These safety services assist Member States in the application of the standards and enable valuable experience and insights to be shared. Regulating safety is a national responsibility, and many States have decided to adopt the IAEA's standards for use in their national regulations. For parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the conventions

  2. Early Engagement of Safety and Mission Assurance Expertise Using Systems Engineering Tools: A Risk-Based Approach to Early Identification of Safety and Assurance Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Darpel, Scott; Beckman, Sean

    2016-01-01

    Decades of systems engineering practice have demonstrated that the earlier the identification of requirements occurs, the lower the chance that costly redesigns will needed later in the project life cycle. A better understanding of all requirements can also improve the likelihood of a design's success. Significant effort has been put into developing tools and practices that facilitate requirements determination, including those that are part of the model-based systems engineering (MBSE) paradigm. These efforts have yielded improvements in requirements definition, but have thus far focused on a design's performance needs. The identification of safety & mission assurance (S&MA) related requirements, in comparison, can occur after preliminary designs are already established, yielding forced redesigns. Engaging S&MA expertise at an earlier stage, facilitated by the use of MBSE tools, and focused on actual project risk, can yield the same type of design life cycle improvements that have been realized in technical and performance requirements.

  3. Development of safety-related regulatory requirements for nuclear power in developing countries. Key issue paper no. 4

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han, K.I.

    2000-01-01

    In implementing a national nuclear power program, balanced regulatory requirements are necessary to ensure nuclear safety and cost competitive nuclear power, and to help gain public acceptance. However, this is difficult due to the technology-intensive nature of the nuclear regulatory requirements, the need to reflect evolving technology and the need for cooperation among multidisciplinary technical groups. This paper suggests approaches to development of balanced nuclear regulatory requirements in developing countries related to nuclear power plant safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management along with key technical regulatory issues. It does not deal with economic or market regulation of electric utilities using nuclear power. It suggests that national regulatory requirements be developed using IAEA safety recommendations as guidelines and safety requirements of the supplier country as a main reference after careful planning, manpower buildup and thorough study of international and supplier country's regulations. Regulation making is not recommended before experienced manpower has been accumulated. With an option that the supplier country's regulations may be used in the interim, the lack of complete national regulatory requirements should not deter introduction of nuclear power in developing countries. (author)

  4. CME1003Pg023ED

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Chantel

    resistance alone or severe defects in ... skeletal muscle and liver, decreased ... weight loss through calorie-restrict- ed diets .... carbohydrate and lipid metabolism.12 ... and a variable effect on low-density ... months of therapy.18 Comparison.

  5. SJP0704Pg001ED

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Enrique

    and an updated overview of newer research in this field. It also gives practical ... schizophrenia, manic episodes, major depressive disorder sec- ondary to schizophrenia ..... of Cerebral Disorder. 3rd ed. London: Blackwell Science, 1998. 16.

  6. Ionizing radiations in aseptic bottling: a comparison between technologies and safety requirements [beverages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bottani, E.; Rizzo, R.; Vignali, G.

    2006-01-01

    Ionizing radiations, commonly adopted in the medical field, are recently experiencing a wide diffusion in industrials applications. One of the most widespread uses of ionizing radiations refers to foodstuffs and packaging sterilization. In the aseptic bottling area, the application of this technology on polymeric caps is quickly developing. In such application, sterilization could be obtained with beta-rays, generated by an electron beam, or with gamma-rays, emitted by a radioactive source. After a brief explanation of physical properties of ionizing radiations, the aim of this paper is to discuss the use of radiations in aseptic bottling. Based on results available in literature, radiations effects on treated materials are discussed, as well as safety requirements aiming at reducing risks related to radiation exposure. Finally, sterilization plants with gamma and beta radiation are compared, with the aim of examining functioning principles and management complexity. As a result of the comparison between the two technologies, the electron beam (beta-rays) adoption for caps sterilization process proves to be preferable [it

  7. Encyclopaedia of occupational health and safety. V. 1 The body, health care, management and policy. V. 2 Hazards. V. 3 Industries and occupations. V. 4 Guides, indexes, directory. 4. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stellman, J.M.

    1998-01-01

    The Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety is the authoritative source of information on all aspects of the multidisciplinary field of occupational safety and health; including ionizing radiation. The four volumes of the revised and expanded fourth edition have been arranged in parts and chapters which correspond to the various disciplines comprising the field of occupational safety and health

  8. Utility requirements for safety in the passive advanced light-water reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marston, T.U.; Layman, W.H.; Bockhold, G. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    The objective of the passive plant design is to use passive systems to replace all the active engineered safety systems presently used in light-water reactors. The benefits derived from such an approach to safety design are multiple. First, it is expected that a passive design approach will significantly simplify the overall plant design, including a reduction in the number of components, and reduce the operation and maintenance burden. Second, it is expected that the overall safety and reliability of the passive systems will be improved over active systems, which will result in extremely low risk to public health and safety. Third, challenges to the operating staff will be minimized during transient and emergency conditions, which will reduce the uncertainty associated with human behavior. Finally, it is expected that reliance on passive safety features will lead to a better understanding by the general public and recognition that a major improvement in public safety has been achieved

  9. Safety of power transformers, power supplies, reactors and similar products - Part 1: General requirements and tests

    CERN Document Server

    International Electrotechnical Commission. Geneva

    1998-01-01

    This International Standard deals with safety aspects of power transformers, power supplies, reactors and similar products such as electrical, thermal and mechanical safety. This standard covers the following types of dry-type transformers, power supplies, including switch mode power supplies, and reactors, the windings of which may be encapsulated or non-encapsulated. It has the status of a group safety publication in accordance with IEC Guide 104.

  10. Schedules of Provisions of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2005 Ed.). Safety Guide (Spanish Edition); Listas de disposiciones del reglamento del OIEA para el transporte seguro de materiales radiactivos (Edicion de 2005 corregida)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-12-15

    The IAEA's Statute authorizes the Agency to establish safety standards to protect health and minimize danger to life and property - standards which the IAEA must use in its own operations, and which a State can apply by means of its regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety. A comprehensive body of safety standards under regular review, together with the IAEA's assistance in their application, has become a key element in a global safety regime. In the mid-1990s, a major overhaul of the IAEA's safety standards programme was initiated, with a revised oversight committee structure and a systematic approach to updating the entire corpus of standards. The new standards that have resulted are of a high calibre and reflect best practices in Member States. With the assistance of the Commission on Safety Standards, the IAEA is working to promote the global acceptance and use of its safety standards. Safety standards are only effective, however, if they are properly applied in practice. The IAEA's safety services - which range in scope from engineering safety, operational safety, and radiation, transport and waste safety to regulatory matters and safety culture in organizations - assist Member States in applying the standards and appraise their effectiveness. These safety services enable valuable insights to be shared and I continue to urge all Member States to make use of them. Regulating nuclear and radiation safety is a national responsibility, and many Member States have decided to adopt the IAEA's safety standards for use in their national regulations. For the contracting parties to the various international safety conventions, IAEA standards provide a consistent, reliable means of ensuring the effective fulfilment of obligations under the conventions. The standards are also applied by designers, manufacturers and operators around the world to enhance nuclear and radiation safety in power generation, medicine, industry, agriculture, research and education

  11. 75 FR 69648 - Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-15

    ... interpretative posture weakens the safety structure the rule is designed to hold firmly in place. 10 CFR Part 830... Basis Documents, and notes that the Safety Basis Approval Authority may prescribe interim controls and... managers ``are expected to carefully evaluate situations that fall short of expectations and only provide...

  12. 75 FR 74022 - Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-30

    ... posture weakens the safety structure the rule is designed to hold firmly in place. 10 CFR Part 830 imposes... Basis Documents, and notes that the Safety Basis Approval Authority may prescribe interim controls and... managers ``are expected to carefully evaluate situations that fall short of expectations and only provide...

  13. 12 CFR Appendix A to Part 1720 - Policy Guidance; Minimum Safety and Soundness Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS Pt. 1720, App. A... effectively and to model the effect of differing interest rate scenarios on the Enterprise's financial... are implemented effectively, and that the Enterprise's organization structure and assignment of...

  14. Technical safety requirements (TSR) for waste receiving and processing (WRAP) facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weidert, J.R.

    1997-01-01

    The scope of this TSR document is based on the WRAP Final Safety Analysis Report (HNF-SD-W026-SAR-002) and supporting documents. The administrative controls set forth in this TSR document are derived from the WRAP Final Safety Analysis Report

  15. Safety requirements to be met in final storage of heat-producing waste an evaluation of the BMU draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomauske, B.

    2008-01-01

    The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on August 12, 2008 published a July 29, 2008 draft of the ''Safety Requirements to Be Met in Final Storage of Heat-producing Radioactive Waste.'' As announced by the BMU, these safety requirements are to bring up to the state of the art the safety criteria of 1983. Over a couple of years, efforts had been made to adapt the criteria to the internationally accepted standard as demanded by the Advisory Committees on Reactor Safeguards (RSK) and Radiation Protection (SSK). The main changes made by the BMU are the introduction of a phased procedure in building repositories. A phased plans approval procedure under the Atomic Energy Act has been foreseen by the Ministry for this purpose. In addition, the draft provides for the introduction of a risk-based goal of protection. To ensure retrievability of the waste, the casks are to have a demonstrated service life of 500 years. The BMU draft safety requirements are unable to bring the safety criteria of 1983 up to the current state of the art. Here are the key points of criticism: - A risk-based goal of protection is introduced. The yardstick to be applied is to be defined in a guideline yet to be elaborated. As a consequence, the draft lacks substance. - As in licensing of nuclear facilities, the licensing procedure provides for a phased plans approval procedure for exploration. This analogy does not exist, as exploration is not the first phase of the plant to be built but a measure which is a precondition for obtaining a permit for construction and operation. - The information contained in the draft indicates that, contrary to international recommendations, it tightens the goal of protection by more than one order of magnitude. - The requirements to be met by the casks because of retrievability impose constraints on solutions optimized for safety in emplacement technology. - The risk-based approach is not mature and is

  16. Thermodynamics. 7. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dietzel, F.; Wagner, W.

    1998-01-01

    The forms of energy 'intrinsic energy, enthalpy and heat' are dealt with in detail. The difference between work due to change of volume and technical work is clearly stressed. The problems of equivalence between thermal energy and mechanical energy and the limits of convertibility of the two forms of energy are treated in detail. In the sections dealing with the cycles of thermal engines and machines as well as in the section on water vhe section on water vapor and its application in the steam power process only small changes were required. The book contains 80 mathematical examples, 135 figures and diagrams as well as 12 tables with materials data. (orig.) [de

  17. Overall requirements for an advanced underground coal extraction system. [environment effects, miner health and safety, production cost, and coal conservation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Goldsmith, M.; Lavin, M. L.

    1980-01-01

    Underground mining systems suitable for coal seams expoitable in the year 2000 are examined with particular relevance to the resources of Central Appalachia. Requirements for such systems may be summarized as follows: (1) production cost; (2)miner safety; (3) miner health; (4) environmental impact; and (5) coal conservation. No significant trade offs between production cost and other performance indices were found.

  18. Efficacy and safety of intravenous secukinumab in noninfectious uveitis requiring steroid-sparing immunosuppressive therapy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Letko, Erik; Yeh, Steven; Foster, C Stephen; Pleyer, Uwe; Brigell, Mitchell; Grosskreutz, Cynthia L

    2015-05-01

    Secukinumab, a fully human anti-interleukin-17A monoclonal antibody, exhibited promising activity in a proof-of-concept study when administered in intravenous (IV) doses to patients with active, chronic, noninfectious uveitis. This study compared the efficacy and safety of different IV and subcutaneous (SC) doses of secukinumab in patients with noninfectious uveitis. Multicenter, randomized, double-masked, dose-ranging, phase 2 clinical trial. Thirty-seven patients with active noninfectious intermediate uveitis, posterior uveitis, or panuveitis who required corticosteroid-sparing immunosuppressive therapy. Patients were randomized to secukinumab 300 mg SC every 2 weeks for 4 doses, secukinumab 10 mg/kg IV every 2 weeks for 4 doses, or secukinumab 30 mg/kg IV every 4 weeks for 2 doses. Intravenous or SC saline was administered to maintain masking. Efficacy was assessed on day 57 (2-4 weeks after last dose). Percentage of patients with treatment response, defined as (1) at least a 2-grade reduction in vitreous haze score or trace or absent vitreous haze in the study eye without an increase in corticosteroid dose and without uveitis worsening or (2) reduction in corticosteroid dosages to prespecified levels without uveitis worsening. Percentage of patients with remission, defined as anterior chamber cell and vitreous haze scores of 0 or 0.5+ in both eyes without corticosteroid therapy or uveitis worsening. Secukinumab 30 mg/kg IV and 10 mg/kg IV, compared with the 300 mg SC dose, produced higher responder rates (72.7% and 61.5% vs. 33.3%, respectively) and remission rates (27.3% and 38.5% vs. 16.7%, respectively). Statistical and clinical superiority for the 30 mg/kg IV dose compared with the 300 mg SC dose was established in a Bayesian probability model. Other measures, including time to response onset, change in visual acuity, and change in vitreous haze score, showed numeric trends favoring IV dosing. Secukinumab, administered in IV or SC formulations, appeared

  19. 30 Years of NRWG activities towards harmonization of nuclear safety criteria and requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-11-01

    This report describes the work performed and the results achieved by the NRWG since its creation in 1972 to advise the Commission on nuclear safety matters (safety methodologies, criteria, standards, postulated accidents inside the nuclear installations, natural hazards, man-made hazards, training of personnel and use of simulator, ALARA policy to reduce the doses to the personnel and the public, emergency planning, defence in depth and integrity of the successive barriers between the radioactive products and the environment, radiological consequences of postulated accidents, probabilistic safety analysis, severe accidents analysis and management. The report also lists a number of technical subjects where NRWG has played a leading role. (author)

  20. 1E Qualification of Electrical Equipment - Requirement for Safety Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Geambasu, C.; Segarceanu, D.; Albu, J.

    2002-01-01

    The paper presents the qualification methods of the safety related equipment according to the safety class 1E. There are presented the qualification principles, procedure and documents, emphasis being laid on the qualification approach by type tests. This approach assumes the equipment test under both normal and accident conditions (design basis events) simulating the operational conditions and covers the largest part of electrical equipment from a nuclear power plant.The safety related equipment is to be qualified is subjected to a sequential test that will be detailed in the paper. (author)

  1. Safety Requirements / Design Criteria for SFR. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yllera, Javier

    2013-01-01

    After the Fukushima event (March 2011) the IAEA has started an action to review and revise, if necessary, all Safety Standards to take into consideration the lessons learned from the accident. The Safety Standards that need to be revised have been identified. A Prioritization Approach has been established: The first priority is to review safety guides applicable for NPPs and spent fuel storage with focus on the measures for the prevention and mitigation of severe accident due to external hazards - ● Regulatory framework, Safety assessment, Management system, Radiation protection and Emergency Preparedness and response; ● Sitting, Design, Operation of NPPs ● Decommissioning and Waste Management. Original sources for lessons learned: IAE fact Finding Mission, Japan´s report to the Ministerial Conference, INSAG Report, etc. Later, other lesson sources considered

  2. The increased use of radiation requires enhanced activities regarding radiation safety control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Yun Jong; Lee, Jin Woo; Jeong, Gyo Seong

    2015-01-01

    More recently, companies that have obtained permission to use radioactive materials or radiation device and registered radiation workers have increased by 10% and 4% respectively. The increased use of radiation could have an effect on radiation safety control. However, there is not nearly enough manpower and budget compared to the number of workers and facilities. This paper will suggest a counteroffer thought analyzing pending issues. The results of this paper indicate that there are 47 and 31.3 workers per radiation protection officer in educational and research institutes, respectively. There are 20.1 persons per RPO in hospitals, even though there are 2 RPOs appointed. Those with a special license as a radioisotope handler were ruled out as possible managers because medical doctors who have a special license for radioisotope handling normally have no experience with radiation safety. The number of staff members and budget have been insufficient for safety control at most educational and research institutes. It is necessary to build an optimized safety control system for effective Radiation Safety Control. This will reduce the risk factor of safety, and a few RPOs can be supplied for efficiency and convenience

  3. The increased use of radiation requires enhanced activities regarding radiation safety control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Yun Jong; Lee, Jin Woo; Jeong, Gyo Seong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Jeongeup (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    More recently, companies that have obtained permission to use radioactive materials or radiation device and registered radiation workers have increased by 10% and 4% respectively. The increased use of radiation could have an effect on radiation safety control. However, there is not nearly enough manpower and budget compared to the number of workers and facilities. This paper will suggest a counteroffer thought analyzing pending issues. The results of this paper indicate that there are 47 and 31.3 workers per radiation protection officer in educational and research institutes, respectively. There are 20.1 persons per RPO in hospitals, even though there are 2 RPOs appointed. Those with a special license as a radioisotope handler were ruled out as possible managers because medical doctors who have a special license for radioisotope handling normally have no experience with radiation safety. The number of staff members and budget have been insufficient for safety control at most educational and research institutes. It is necessary to build an optimized safety control system for effective Radiation Safety Control. This will reduce the risk factor of safety, and a few RPOs can be supplied for efficiency and convenience.

  4. Characterising non-urgent users of the emergency department (ED): A retrospective analysis of routine ED data.

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Keeffe, Colin; Mason, Suzanne; Jacques, Richard; Nicholl, Jon

    2018-01-01

    The pressures of patient demand on emergency departments (EDs) continue to be reported worldwide, with an associated negative impact on ED crowding and waiting times. It has also been reported that a proportion of attendances to EDs in different international systems could be managed in settings such as primary care. This study used routine ED data to define, measure and profile non-urgent ED attendances that were suitable for management in alternative, non-emergency settings. We undertook a retrospective analysis of three years of Hospital Episode and Statistics Accident Emergency (HES A&E) data for one large region in England, United Kingdom (April 1st 2011 to March 31st 2014). Data was collected on all adult (>16 years) ED attendances from each of the 19 EDs in the region. A validated process based definition of non-urgent attendance was refined for this study and applied to the data. Using summary statistics non-urgent attenders were examined by variables hypothesised to influence them as follows: age at arrival, time of day and day of week and mode of arrival. Odds ratios were calculated to compare non-urgent attenders between groups. There were 3,667,601 first time attendances to EDs, of which 554,564 were defined as non-urgent (15.1%). Non-urgent attendances were significantly more likely to present out of hours than in hours (OR = 1.19, 95% CI: 1.18 to 1.20, Paged 16-44) compared to those aged 45-64 (odds ratio: 1.42, 95% CI: 1.41 to 1.43, Puse the ED to obtain healthcare that could be provided in a less urgent setting and also more likely to do this out of hours. Alternative services are required to manage non-urgent demand, currently being borne by the ED and the ambulance service, particularly in out of hours.

  5. Development of U.S. Government General Technical Requirements for UAS Flight Safety Systems Utilizing the Iridium Satellite Constellation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Murray, Jennifer; Birr, Richard

    2010-01-01

    This slide presentation reviews the development of technical requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) utilization of the Iridium Satellite Constellation to provide flight safety. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) required an over-the-horizon communication standard to guarantee flight safety before permitting widespread UAS flights in the National Air Space (NAS). This is important to ensure reliable control of UASs during loss-link and over-the-horizon scenarios. The core requirement was to utilize a satellite system to send GPS tracking data and other telemetry from a flight vehicle down to the ground. Iridium was chosen as the system because it is one of the only true satellite systems that has world wide coverage, and the service has a highly reliable link margin. The Iridium system, the flight modems, and the test flight are described.

  6. Comparison of Survival and Safety Requirements in European Union for Recreational Craft Inspections. A Spanish Case Study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    J. Torralbo

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available Statistical data shows that a large number of maritime accidents are related to recreational craft. For instance, in Spain, more than fifty percent of the emergencies are related to pleasure boats at sea. Recreational craft marketed in the EU must comply with harmonized technical safety and environmental requirements defined by Directive 94/25/EC, as amended in 2003. On 28 December 2013, the new recreational craft directive 2013/53/EU was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. EU Member States have until 18 January 2016 to amend their national legislation and transpose the new directive. The current directive 94/25/EC as amended by directive 2003/44/EC will be repealed on 18 January 2016, after the full application of the new text. Although this directive, there is not a clear coordination and equivalence among the EU countries according to the survival and safety equipment compulsory for recreational crafts. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare the types of survey / inspections to be carried in pleasure craft (non-commercial use, periodicity and required safety equipment in some member states of the European Union. A case study of Spain is presented. From the results obtained, we can make clear that in the European Union there is a lack of coordination in this area and indicate the need to unify a common pattern in inspections and survival and safety requirements of recreational boats in the EU.

  7. Classification of the railway accident in accordance with the requirement of the safety analysis of transporting spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wu Tao

    1993-01-01

    Based on the analysis of the difference between the accident severity categorization used in the Ministry of Railway and that used in the safety analysis of the transporting spent fuel, a method used for the classification of the railway accident in accordance with the requirement of the safety analysis of transporting spent fuel is suggested. The method classifies the railway accidents into 10 scenarios and make it possible to scale the accident through directly using the data documented by the Ministry of Railway without any additional effort

  8. The Training Requirements for the Workers a Legal Instrument to Ensure the Safety Use of the Ionizing Radiation Sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosca, G.; Coroianu, A.; Stanescu, G.

    2009-01-01

    Recognizing the need for a graded and commensurate with the practice associated risk approach, the Romanian Regulatory Authority developed the legal framework for defining the roles, duties and responsibilities for the radiation workers (RWs) and the radiological safety officer (RPO). The licensee is responsible to provide for the RWs basic knowledge and understanding of radiation proprieties, good knowledge of the local rules and the operational radiation protection methods and the safety features of the devices, on the job training under the supervision of a RPO or a qualified expert (RPE). Every 5 years the participation to a refresher course is required

  9. Regional Energy Deployment System (ReEDS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Short, W.; Sullivan, P.; Mai, T.; Mowers, M.; Uriarte, C.; Blair, N.; Heimiller, D.; Martinez, A.

    2011-12-01

    The Regional Energy Deployment System (ReEDS) is a deterministic optimization model of the deployment of electric power generation technologies and transmission infrastructure throughout the contiguous United States into the future. The model, developed by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Strategic Energy Analysis Center, is designed to analyze the critical energy issues in the electric sector, especially with respect to potential energy policies, such as clean energy and renewable energy standards or carbon restrictions. ReEDS provides a detailed treatment of electricity-generating and electrical storage technologies and specifically addresses a variety of issues related to renewable energy technologies, including accessibility and cost of transmission, regional quality of renewable resources, seasonal and diurnal generation profiles, variability of wind and solar power, and the influence of variability on the reliability of the electrical grid. ReEDS addresses these issues through a highly discretized regional structure, explicit statistical treatment of the variability in wind and solar output over time, and consideration of ancillary services' requirements and costs.

  10. Software safety analysis on the model specified by NuSCR and SMV input language at requirements phase of software development life cycle using SMV

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koh, Kwang Yong; Seong, Poong Hyun

    2005-01-01

    Safety-critical software process is composed of development process, verification and validation (V and V) process and safety analysis process. Safety analysis process has been often treated as an additional process and not found in a conventional software process. But software safety analysis (SSA) is required if software is applied to a safety system, and the SSA shall be performed independently for the safety software through software development life cycle (SDLC). Of all the phases in software development, requirements engineering is generally considered to play the most critical role in determining the overall software quality. NASA data demonstrate that nearly 75% of failures found in operational software were caused by errors in the requirements. The verification process in requirements phase checks the correctness of software requirements specification, and the safety analysis process analyzes the safety-related properties in detail. In this paper, the method for safety analysis at requirements phase of software development life cycle using symbolic model verifier (SMV) is proposed. Hazard is discovered by hazard analysis and in other to use SMV for the safety analysis, the safety-related properties are expressed by computation tree logic (CTL)

  11. Regulatory requirements for radiation safety in the design of a new Finish NPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alm-Lytz, Kirsi; Vilkamo, Olli [Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK, PO Box 14, Laippatie 4, 00881 Helsinki (Finland)

    2004-07-01

    There are two operating nuclear power plants in Finland, two BWR units at Olkiluoto site and two PWR units at Loviisa site. These reactors were commissioned between 1977 and 1981. The total electricity capacity in Finland is about 15 GW. In 2003, nuclear power plants generated one fourth of Finland's electricity. Despite of the diversity of the electricity generation methods, Finland is highly dependent on imported energy. Electricity consumption is estimated to increase and the demand for extra capacity has been estimated at about 2500-3000 MW by 2010. It should also be taken into account that a considerable proportion of the production capacity constructed in the 1970's must be replaced with production capacity of new power plants in the near future. In practice, the climate politics commitments made by Finland exclude coal power. Therefore, the capacity can be increased significantly only by natural gas, nuclear power and biofuels. The paper presents the following issues: Licensing a new nuclear power plant in Finland; FIN5 Project at STUK; Work planning and a tool for requirement management; Radiation safety related YVL guides; Collective dose target; On-site habitability during accident situation. Habitability was evaluated on the basis of the calculated dose rate levels, the occupancy times and the dose limits. Radiation hazard was classified into three parts, i.e., possible direct radiation from the containment, air contamination and systems carrying radioactive air or water. The results showed that direct radiation from the containment is generally adequately shielded but penetrations and hatches have to be separately analysed and the radiation dose levels near them are usually rather high. Skyshine radiation from the reactor containment is a special feature at the Loviisa NPP and the nearby area outside the buildings might have very limited access for the first hours after the accident. The skyshine effect is not usually relevant hazard in

  12. Outline of the requirements of application of computer based instrumentation and control systems in the systems important to safety on Bohunice NPPs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bacurik, J.

    1997-01-01

    The most important regulatory requirements and issues are described related to the review, evaluation and assessment of computer-based safety-related IandC systems, with emphasis on safety instrumentation and control. These aspects include safety classification and categorization of IandC, ranking of applicable codes and standards, design evaluation on the system level, and software assessment. (author)

  13. Functional safety requirements of the propulsion and power supply equipment of the MAGLEV system; Umgang mit funktionalen Sicherheitsanforderungen bei Antrieb und Energieversorgung der Magnetbahn

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stephan, A. [IFB Inst. fuer Bahntechnik GmbH, Dresden (Germany)

    2008-07-01

    In the Transrapid high-speed MAGLEV railway system, the operating control subsystem provides for the higher-level safety function. Within the system also selected components of the stationary linear-motor drive have important safety functions. Under the approval procedure, the safety-relevant functions must be certified. This makes specific requirements on the development and integration of the components used. (orig.)

  14. Development of the environmental qualification safety requirement matrix for the containment system of in-service CANDU reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chun, R.M.; Low, J.; Sobolewski, J.

    1994-01-01

    Over the last several years, Ontario Hydro Nuclear (OHN) has placed increasing emphasis on environmental qualification (EQ) at its Pickering and Bruce NGS A and B nuclear generating stations (NGSs). The program currently underway (at the time of the conference) builds upon the experience gained from the extensive Darlington NGS EQ experience and from EQ programs conducted by other utilities. Some of the major steps of the OHN EQ program include: defining Safety Requirement Matrices (SRMs), establishing environmental conditions, developing an EQ List, conducting an EQ Assessment and maintaining Operational EQ Assurance during the plant life. The SRM identifies safety related components, their required safety functions and their mission times for each postulated design basis accident (DBA). This is a critical step, as the SRM defines the equipment that requires assurance of EQ and precise requirements must be provided to ensure a cost effective EQ program. This paper describes the development of the SRMs for the containment system of the Bruce stations. The introductory section briefly discusses how the industry has dealt with equipment qualification as it has evolved and the role of the SRMs in the OHN EQ Program. In Section 2, the preparation of the SRM is described along with the applicable ground rules used. The results of the application of the SRM preparation guidelines to the containment system are discussed in Section 3. A summary of the major findings and conclusions is presented. 3 refs., 3 figs

  15. Development of Occupational Safety and Health Requirement Management System (OSHREMS Software Using Adobe Dreamweaver CS5 for Building Construction Project

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Abas Nor Haslinda

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The construction industry sector is considered as being risky with frequent and high accident rate. According to Social Security Organization (SOCSO, the construction accidents has arisen from time to time. Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB has developed the Safety and Health Assessment System in Construction (SHASSIC for evaluating the performance of a contractor in construction project by setting out the safety and health management and practices, however the requirement checklist provided is not comprehensive. Therefore, this study aims to develop a software system for facilitating OSH in building construction project, namely OSH requirements management system (OSHREMS, using Adobe Dreamweaver CS5 and Sublime Text as PHP editor. The results from a preliminary study which was conducted through interviews showed that, the respondents were only implementing the basic requirements that comply with legislations, with the absence of appropriate and specific guideline in ensuring occupational safety and health (OSH at the workplace. The tool will be benefits for contractors and other parties to effectively manage the OSH requirements for their projects based on project details.

  16. Mitigating Higher Ed Cyber Attacks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rogers, Gary; Ashford, Tina

    2015-01-01

    In this presentation we will discuss the many and varied cyber attacks that have recently occurred in the higher ed community. We will discuss the perpetrators, the victims, the impact and how these institutions have evolved to meet this threat. Mitigation techniques and defense strategies will be covered as will a discussion of effective security…

  17. Preparation of the requirements for the safety regulation related to human and organizational factors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2013-08-15

    The outline of the project in the current fiscal year is to investigate and analyze issues associated with Human and Organizational Factors involved in incidents of nuclear facilities, and to study and develop evaluation methods of these countermeasures. The guideline to evaluate licensee's safety culture and root cause analysis (RCA) had been developed for further improving safety on nuclear power plants at 2007. These guidelines have been used at regulatory inspection since that time. Based on experience of using these existing guidelines, some activities for improving guidelines are now under investigation; these are selecting candidate quantitative indicators for safety culture evaluation and researching good practices for RCA issues. JNES implemented human factor analysis about 18 domestic events including the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident. (author)

  18. Safe Handling of Snakes in an ED Setting.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cockrell, Melanie; Swanson, Kristofer; Sanders, April; Prater, Samuel; von Wenckstern, Toni; Mick, JoAnn

    2017-01-01

    Efforts to improve consistency in management of snakes and venomous snake bites in the emergency department (ED) can improve patient and staff safety and outcomes, as well as improve surveillance data accuracy. The emergency department at a large academic medical center identified an opportunity to implement a standardized process for snake disposal and identification to reduce staff risk exposure to snake venom from snakes patients brought with them to the ED. A local snake consultation vendor and zoo Herpetologist assisted with development of a process for snake identification and disposal. All snakes have been identified and securely disposed of using the newly implemented process and no safety incidents have been reported. Other emergency department settings may consider developing a standardized process for snake disposal using listed specialized consultants combined with local resources and suppliers to promote employee and patient safety. Copyright © 2017 Emergency Nurses Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  19. Evaluation of a Patient Perspective Module in a Required Medication Safety and Quality Course at a College of Pharmacy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jessica N Battaglia

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Objectives: To develop and evaluate the impact of a module discussing the patient's perspective on medication errors in a required medication safety course at a college of pharmacy. Methods: Students were required to read Josie's Story, a true story written by a mother after her daughter died from a medical error, and attend an in-class discussion regarding the book. A questionnaire, which employed a pre-post retrospective method and extracted items from the Caring Ability Inventory, was then administered to measure the change in students' perceptions of patient care. Additional questions gathered students' perceptions of the assignment, their personal experiences with the topic, and the importance of medication safety. Results: 120 out of 138 students (response rate = 87% completed the questionnaire. 56% of students indicated they would be more likely to speak with a patient directly about a medication error after reading the book, whereas only 3% were less likely, and 42% indicated they were just as likely. Most students (59% reported that they felt more motivated to learn about medication safety after reading Josie's Story. Implications: This course previously addressed strategies to prevent medication errors. Successfully adding a component that introduces how a medication error impacted a patient and her family may help motivate students to recognize the importance and need for a culture of safety, personalize how medication errors impact patients, and provide a venue for students to gain patient centeredness and caring skills.   Type: Original Research

  20. Evaluation of a Patient Perspective Module in a Required Medication Safety and Quality Course at a College of Pharmacy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jessica N. Battaglia

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Objectives: To develop and evaluate the impact of a module discussing the patient’s perspective on medication errors in a required medication safety course at a college of pharmacy. Methods: Students were required to read Josie’s Story, a true story written by a mother after her daughter died from a medical error, and attend an in-class discussion regarding the book. A questionnaire, which employed a pre-post retrospective method and extracted items from the Caring Ability Inventory, was then administered to measure the change in students’ perceptions of patient care. Additional questions gathered students’ perceptions of the assignment, their personal experiences with the topic, and the importance of medication safety. Results: 120 out of 138 students (response rate = 87% completed the questionnaire. 56% of students indicated they would be more likely to speak with a patient directly about a medication error after reading the book, whereas only 3% were less likely, and 42% indicated they were just as likely. Most students (59% reported that they felt more motivated to learn about medication safety after reading Josie’s Story. Implications: This course previously addressed strategies to prevent medication errors. Successfully adding a component that introduces how a medication error impacted a patient and her family may help motivate students to recognize the importance and need for a culture of safety, personalize how medication errors impact patients, and provide a venue for students to gain patient centeredness and caring skills.

  1. 78 FR 14309 - Implementation of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act Provision Requiring FDA To Establish...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-05

    ... FDA's Product Tracing Web page at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FSMA/ucm270851.htm . This... Submit a Report to Congress for the Improvement of Tracking and Tracing of Food; Request for Comments and... Institute of Food Technologists (IFT) to execute product tracing pilot projects as described in the FDA Food...

  2. Radiation legacy of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site in the light of requirements ensuring radiation safety performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Logachev, V.A.; Logacheva, L.A.

    2005-01-01

    Peculiarities of nuclear tests radiation legacy at the Semipalatinsk test site (STS) are shown in the light of performance of requirements ensuring radiation safety, decrease radiation contamination levels in environment and minimize exposure of radiation for population residing contaminated areas by radioactive fallout. The paper provides data on characterization of peculiarities of the STS operation legacy based on review of archival data of the former 3-d General Administration under USSR Ministry of Health. (author)

  3. WORLD EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION LAND USE AND PROTECTIONTAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REQUIREMENTS OF ECOLOGICAL SAFETY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    l. Sviridova

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available Studied global trends of public administration land use and protection. In particular, zemleohoronni measures in the developed world are implemented through rural development policy, based on the conduct of the common agricultural policy, the creation of funds to support farmers, provide technical assistance, development of national programs and future development plans. For the European Union development policy documents on the development of land areas for 5-10 years - the overall trend. Land management activities are conducted in foreign countries on the basis of approved design documentation for land management different direction. Found that the use of land and resource potential in the world is subject to the requirements of environmental safety. Agrarian relations in these countries are based on incentive levers, with direct execution of the rules of use and protection of land. By 2020, the strategy of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union provides funding for joint agricultural market, direct subsidies to farmers and stimulate agricultural development. Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union for its activities fully demonstrates the ability of European economies to maintain the same level of development. State administration of environmental impact on the economic interests of the tenure or land use in countries with market economies include: tax exemptions (to make environmentally oriented activities, soft loans (available on interest rates for environmental investments, subsidies (for the implementation of environmental programs and subsidies (for growing products without pesticides entities. It is proved that the system of economic instruments in environmental policy Ukraine needs to improve, because it is poorly developed. Experience in other countries shows that as we strengthen land management tools (instruments for land administration, and its supporting tools to succeed in the system of rational land use

  4. Comparative study of legal limits of safety requirements for nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schattke, Herbert.

    1983-01-01

    This paper makes a detailed analysis of safety philosophies and principles of radiological protection at international and national levels according to a standardised plan for purposes of comparison. It describes the relevant regulations of the IAEA, OECD/NEA and Euratom and those of the US, UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany. The author points out that the ICRP recommendations are the guidelines in the radiation protection field. (NEA) [fr

  5. STATE-MANDATED FOOD SAFETY CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTAURANTS: A 2002 REVIEW OF STATES

    OpenAIRE

    Schilling, Brian J.; O'Connor, Jack; Hendrickson, Veronica

    2003-01-01

    The Food and Drug Administration publishes a Standard Food Code which individual states either ratify, or amend and ratify, as the State Food Code. New Jersey has not adopted any revisions to the FDA Standard Food Code since 1993. Currently, the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services is considering the implementation of a mandatory food safety certification program for all of the state's foodservice establishments beginning in April 2003. Foodservice businesses serving "high risk...

  6. Review of Nuclear Criticality Safety Requirements Implementation for Hanford Tank Farms Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DEFIGH PRICE, C.

    2000-01-01

    In November 1999, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy directed a series of actions to strengthen the Department's ongoing nuclear criticality safety programs. A Review Plan describing lines of inquiry for assessing contractor programs was included. The Office of River Protection completed their assessment of the Tank Farm Contractor program in May 2000. This document supports that assessment by providing a compliance statement for each line of inquiry

  7. SAFETY

    CERN Multimedia

    M. Plagge, C. Schaefer and N. Dupont

    2013-01-01

    Fire Safety – Essential for a particle detector The CMS detector is a marvel of high technology, one of the most precise particle measurement devices we have built until now. Of course it has to be protected from external and internal incidents like the ones that can occur from fires. Due to the fire load, the permanent availability of oxygen and the presence of various ignition sources mostly based on electricity this has to be addressed. Starting from the beam pipe towards the magnet coil, the detector is protected by flooding it with pure gaseous nitrogen during operation. The outer shell of CMS, namely the yoke and the muon chambers are then covered by an emergency inertion system also based on nitrogen. To ensure maximum fire safety, all materials used comply with the CERN regulations IS 23 and IS 41 with only a few exceptions. Every piece of the 30-tonne polyethylene shielding is high-density material, borated, boxed within steel and coated with intumescent (a paint that creates a thick co...

  8. SAFETY

    CERN Multimedia

    C. Schaefer and N. Dupont

    2013-01-01

      “Safety is the highest priority”: this statement from CERN is endorsed by the CMS management. An interpretation of this statement may bring you to the conclusion that you should stop working in order to avoid risks. If the safety is the priority, work is not! This would be a misunderstanding and misinterpretation. One should understand that “working safely” or “operating safely” is the priority at CERN. CERN personnel are exposed to different hazards on many levels on a daily basis. However, risk analyses and assessments are done in order to limit the number and the gravity of accidents. For example, this process takes place each time you cross the road. The hazard is the moving vehicle, the stake is you and the risk might be the risk of collision between both. The same principle has to be applied during our daily work. In particular, keeping in mind the general principles of prevention defined in the late 1980s. These principles wer...

  9. Analysis of compatibility of current Czech initial documentation in the area of technical assurance of nuclear safety with the requirements of the EUR document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zdebor, J.; Zdebor, R.; Kratochvil, L.

    2001-11-01

    The publication is structured as follows: Description of existing documentation. General requirements, goals, principles and design principles: Documents being compared; Method of comparison; Results and partial evaluation of comparison of requirements between EUR and Czech regulations (basic goals and safety philosophy; quantitative safety objectives; basic design requirements; extended design requirements; external and internal threats; technical requirements; site conditions); Summary of the comparison of safety requirements. Comparison of requirements for the systems: Requirements for the nuclear reactor unit systems; Barrier systems (fuel system; reactor cooling system; containment system); Remaining systems (control systems; protection systems; coolant makeup and purification system; residual heat removal system; emergency cooling system; power systems); Common technical requirements for systems (technical requirements for systems; internal and external events). (P.A.)

  10. T-book. 3. ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The main objective of the T-book is to provide reliability data for the unavailability computations that are done for each component that is considered in the compulsory, probabilistic safety assessments of nuclear power plants. The failure characteristics presented in the T-book are primarily based on the failure reports stored in the central database ATV and the Licensee Event Reports delivered to the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). This T-book comprises only critical failures, i.e. failures that stop the function of components or lead to repair, and includes data up to the operating year 1987, or totally 108 reactor years. Along with the successive editions of the T-book there has been a continuous work to improve the methods for the statistical inference, required to derive the reliability parameters from the operational data in the database. In the developed approach called Bayes empirical Bayes, also the parameter of the uncertainty distributions are estimated in a Bayesian way. Moreover, the potential class of gamma distributions is expanded by mixing with a noninformative part, just to stress the real uncertainty and to allow for statistical outliers. Another new feature in this edition, of great interest in the community of nuclear safety analysts, is the application of the q+λt model, where q is derived form failures occurring at the demand occasion while λ characterises failure mechanisms that are active during the standby time. This model is applicable on component groups where several test intervals are represented in the operational data. This English edition of the T-book 3 has been brought forward in response to the growing interest outside the Nordic countries. (22 figs., 58 tabs., 7 refs.)

  11. MANY MEN USED ED TREATMENT WITHOUT THEIR PARTNERS’ KNOWLEDGE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tan HM

    2007-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper aimed to identify and explore the understanding and perception of erectile dysfunction (ED using exploratory qualitative approaches. This study was conducted in Klang Valley, Malaysia. Purposive sampling was used to recruit 17 urban men aged 40-75 years. A semi-structural interview guide was used to explore men’s understanding of ED, impacts on their well-being and experiences with treatments. The focus groups revealed that ED was perceived to be an important loss in men’s lives as sexual performance was closely related to manhood. The men associated ED with a loss of masculinity and self-esteem. Men’s understanding of ED treatments was restricted to phophodiesterase type 5 inhibitors (PDE-5 inhibitors and traditional therapies. Although PDE-5 inhibitors were perceived to be effective, they were concerned about their safety and costs. Some of the men have learned to cope with ED rather than to seek help, particularly among older men, who attributed their decreased sexual capacities and erection difficulties to aging, and therefore conditioned themselves to accepting it. In contrast, younger men who have erectile difficulties are considered as ‘abnormal’, and are more likely to seek help and receive treatment for their sexual problem. Men’s knowledge of and experience with modern treatments of ED were mainly associated with PDE-5 inhibitors. Their perception towards PDE-5 inhibitors was largely influenced by personal experience, information from mass media and friends. The high cost and fear of side effects were two main deterrents in the use of PDE-5 inhibitors. Many men had conceded their use of PDE-5 inhibitors without their partners’ knowledge. They worried that their partners would view the matter with suspicion and mistrust.

  12. Cabaña ED

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lorena Troncoso Valencia

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Este proyecto denominado Cabaña Ed, de la arquitecta chilena Lorena Troncoso Valencia, es parte de una serie de obras emplazadas en la comuna de Pinto, Región de Ñuble de Chile. Zona de frondosa vegetación de árboles autóctonos y con fugas visuales hacia la cordillera de los Andes. La Cabaña Ed, donde predomina el uso de la madera, se integra muy sutilmente con ese entorno natural. Cabin ED, by the Chilean architect Lorena Troncoso Valencia, is part of a series of works located in the commune of Pinto, Ñuble Region, Chile. This area is characterized by lush vegetation of native trees and visual towards the Andes leaks. In this project the use of wood predominates, which is subtly integrated with the natural environment. In the edition of REVISTARQUIS 11, another project of the architect, located in that same zone of tourist development was presented.

  13. Ed Watson 1940-2006

    CERN Multimedia

    2006-01-01

    Ed Watson arrived at CERN in March 1973 to work on digital electronics and CAMAC systems under Bob Dobinson, after many years at Rolls Royce in Scotland. He joined the European Muon Collaboration in 1976, where he played a major role in the design, deployment and running of its data acquisition system (DAQ) with David Botterill, Bob Dobinson, and Vicky White. The CAMAC-ROMULUS system was by far the largest and most advanced of its time, and it became a defining standard for DAQ systems for years to come. Ed was deeply involved in the detailed planning of the control rooms and the experiment cabling, as well as sharing the responsibility for the CAMAC readout system. He had a real talent for trouble shooting and played a vital part in supporting the experiment throughout its lifetime. He offered great moral support to the younger members of the collaboration and helped them a great deal with their work. The EMC had a wonderful social life to which Ed was a major contributor - who can forget its barbecues?  In...

  14. Ed Watson - 1940-2006

    CERN Multimedia

    2006-01-01

    Ed Watson passed away suddenly on 1 August in Geneva, he was 66. He leaves his wife and two children. Ed Watson arrived at CERN in March 1973 to work on digital electronics and CAMAC systems under Bob Dobinson, after many years at Rolls Royce in Scotland. He joined the European Muon Collaboration in 1976, where he played a major role in the design, deployment and running of its data acquisition system (DAQ) with David Botterill, Bob Dobinson, and Vicky White. The CAMAC-ROMULUS system was by far the largest and most advanced of its time, and it became a defining standard for DAQ systems for years to come. Ed was deeply involved in the detailed planning of the control rooms and the experiment cabling, as well as sharing the responsibility for the CAMAC readout system. He had a real talent for trouble shooting and played a vital part in supporting the experiment throughout its lifetime. He offered great moral support to the younger members of the collaboration and helped them a great deal with their work. The...

  15. Key natural analogue input required to build a safety case for direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Japan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKinley, I.G.; Hardie, S.M.L.; Klein, E. [MCM Consulting, Baden-Dättwil (Switzerland); Kawamura, H. [Obayashi Corporation, Nuclear Facilities Division, Tokyo (Japan); Beattie, T.M. [MCM Consulting, Bristol (United Kingdom)

    2015-06-15

    Natural analogues have been previously used to support the safety case for direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel, but the focus of such work was very dependent on the key barriers of specific national disposal concepts. Investigations of the feasibility of such disposal in Japan are at an early stage but, nevertheless, it is clear that building a robust safety case will be very challenging and would benefit from focused support from natural analogue studies—both in terms of developing/testing required models and, as importantly, presenting safety arguments to a wide range of stakeholders. This paper identifies key analogues that support both longevity and spread of failure times of massive steel overpacks, the effectiveness of buffering of radiolytic oxidants and the chemical and physical mechanisms retarding release of radionuclides from the engineered barriers. It is concluded that, for countries like Japan where performance needs to be assessed as realistically as possible, natural analogues can complement the existing laboratory and theoretical knowledge base and contribute towards development of a robust safety case. (authors)

  16. Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, P.M.S.

    1987-01-01

    Aspects of fission reactors are considered - control, heat removal and containment. Brief descriptions of the reactor accidents at the SL-1 reactor (1961), Windscale (1957), Browns Ferry (1975), Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) are given. The idea of inherently safe reactor designs is discussed. Safety assessment is considered under the headings of preliminary hazard analysis, failure mode analysis, event trees, fault trees, common mode failure and probabalistic risk assessments. These latter can result in a series of risk distributions linked to specific groups of fault sequences and specific consequences. A frequency-consequence diagram is shown. Fatal accident incidence rates in different countries including the United Kingdom for various industries are quoted. The incidence of fatal cancers from occupational exposure to chemicals is tabulated. Human factors and the acceptability of risk are considered. (U.K.)

  17. Questioning the Role of Requirements Engineering in the Causes of Safety-Critical Software Failures

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, C. W.; Holloway, C. M.

    2006-01-01

    Many software failures stem from inadequate requirements engineering. This view has been supported both by detailed accident investigations and by a number of empirical studies; however, such investigations can be misleading. It is often difficult to distinguish between failures in requirements engineering and problems elsewhere in the software development lifecycle. Further pitfalls arise from the assumption that inadequate requirements engineering is a cause of all software related accidents for which the system fails to meet its requirements. This paper identifies some of the problems that have arisen from an undue focus on the role of requirements engineering in the causes of major accidents. The intention is to provoke further debate within the emerging field of forensic software engineering.

  18. Evaluation of the Cable Types for Safety Requirements during Fire Conditions in Nuclear Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-kattan, W.A.

    2015-01-01

    In Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), the fire in cables causes many dangerous events in electrical or mechanical operations causing a nuclear reactor melt down. Main Control Room (MCR) in nuclear power plants have therefore, special concern in the fire protection systems. The Nuclear International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted the use of risk-informed and performance based methods for fire protection. These methods affirm the relevant needs to develop realistic methods to quantify the risk of fire to NPPs safety. The recent electrical cable testing has been carried out to provide empirical data on the failure modes and likelihood of fire-induced damage. In this thesis, will use fire modeling to develop fire probabilistic safety assessment to estimate the likelihood of fire induced cable damage given a specified fire profile. The objective of this work is to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the most recent fire-induced circuit failure due to different cables type that used inside the NPPs by simulation using fire modeling. One of this work scope is to suggest a suitable cable insulation material especially in case of the thermal failure thresholds, for developing the electrical cable thermal fragility distributions and evaluate parameters that influence fire-induced circuit failure modes. The main control room is implementing using the CFAST (fire simulation package). The simulation results represent the full development fire temperature and heat flux as well as the output gases. The results can be used as the basic parameters of the cables comparison and then evaluation.The importance of these results are not only for evaluating the cables but one can efficiently use them to improve the whole NPPs safety levels. The gases results of the fire simulation inside the room are oxygen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and hydrogen chloride. These gases are being used lot achieving the healthy protection of NPPs. Finally, one can measure the healthy environment

  19. Comparison of the Safety Critical Software V and V Requirements for the Research Reactor Instrumentation and Control System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Joo, Sungmoon; Suh, Yong-Suk; Park, Cheol [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    This study was motivated by a research reactor project where the owner of the project and the equipment vendors are from two different standards frameworks. This paper reviews two major standards frameworks - NRC-IEEE and IAEA-IEC - and the software classification schemes as a background, then discuss the V and V issue. The purpose of this paper is by no means to solve the cross-standards-framework qualification issue, but, rather, is to remind the stakeholders of research reactor projects. V and V are also essential for the approval from regulatory bodies. As standards define or recommend consolidated engineering practices, methods, or criteria, V and V activities for software qualification are not exceptional. Within a standards framework, usually, the processes for the qualification of safety-critical software are well-established such that the safety is maximized while minimizing the compromises in software quality, safety, and reliability. When, however, multiple standards frameworks are involved in a research reactor project, it is difficult for equipment vendors to implement appropriate V and V activities as there is no unified view on this cross-standards-framework qualification issue yet. There are two major standards frameworks for safety-critical software development in nuclear industry. Unfortunately different safety classifications for software and thus different requirements for qualification are in place. What makes things worse is that (i) there are ambiguities in the standards and rooms for each stakeholders’ interpretation, and (ii) there is no one-to-one mapping between the associated V and V methods and activities. These may put the stakeholders of research reactor projects in trouble.

  20. Comparison of the Safety Critical Software V and V Requirements for the Research Reactor Instrumentation and Control System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joo, Sungmoon; Suh, Yong-Suk; Park, Cheol

    2016-01-01

    This study was motivated by a research reactor project where the owner of the project and the equipment vendors are from two different standards frameworks. This paper reviews two major standards frameworks - NRC-IEEE and IAEA-IEC - and the software classification schemes as a background, then discuss the V and V issue. The purpose of this paper is by no means to solve the cross-standards-framework qualification issue, but, rather, is to remind the stakeholders of research reactor projects. V and V are also essential for the approval from regulatory bodies. As standards define or recommend consolidated engineering practices, methods, or criteria, V and V activities for software qualification are not exceptional. Within a standards framework, usually, the processes for the qualification of safety-critical software are well-established such that the safety is maximized while minimizing the compromises in software quality, safety, and reliability. When, however, multiple standards frameworks are involved in a research reactor project, it is difficult for equipment vendors to implement appropriate V and V activities as there is no unified view on this cross-standards-framework qualification issue yet. There are two major standards frameworks for safety-critical software development in nuclear industry. Unfortunately different safety classifications for software and thus different requirements for qualification are in place. What makes things worse is that (i) there are ambiguities in the standards and rooms for each stakeholders’ interpretation, and (ii) there is no one-to-one mapping between the associated V and V methods and activities. These may put the stakeholders of research reactor projects in trouble

  1. ORNL implementation of new health and safety requirements (DOE Order 5480.11)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abercrombie, J.S.

    1988-01-01

    New mandates in radiological protection outlined in DOE Order 5480. 11, include changes in the methodology for determining total radiation dose, ALARA program accountability, monitoring requirements, and standards for public entrance into controlled areas. The new order places distinct requirements concerning training at all DOE facilities. Radiation protection training requirements are addressed, including the effective communication of operations changes to all employees. This paper details the endeavors underway at ORNL in designing, developing, and delivering the training required by the new mandates. Strategies taken to reach the intended goals are explained. Efforts involve the design and implementation of the above mentioned radiation protection programs, a job-specific ALARA instructional package, and a Risk-Based Philosophy program matched to operational changes. 4 refs., 5 tabs

  2. Special features of the safety concept and design requirements applied for Angra-2 and 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1980-01-01

    The special features and requirements which have been applied by NUCLEN (Nuclebras Engenharia S/A) for Angra 2 and Angra 3 and which depart somewhat from the KWU (Kraftwerk Union) standard plant, are presented. (E.G.) [pt

  3. Evaluation of the Ventilation and Air Cleaning System Design Concepts for Safety Requirements during Fire Conditions in Nuclear Applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rashad, S.; El-Fawal, M.; Kandil, M.

    2013-01-01

    The ventilation and air cleaning system in the nuclear or radiological installations is one of the essential nuclear safety concerns. It is responsible for confining the radioactive materials involved behind suitable barriers during normal and abnormal conditions. It must be designed to prevent the release of harmful products (radioactive gases, or airborne radioactive materials) from the system or facility, impacting the public or workers, and doing environmental damage. There are two important safety functions common to all ventilation and air cleaning system in nuclear facilities. They are: a) the requirements to maintain the pressure of the ventilated volume below that of surrounding, relatively non-active areas, in order to inhibit the spread of contamination during normal and abnormal conditions, and b) the need to treat the ventilated gas so as to minimize the release of any radioactive or toxic materials. Keeping the two important safety functions is achieved by applying the fire protection for the ventilation system to achieve safety and adequate protection in nuclear applications facilities during fire and accidental criticality conditions.The main purpose of this research is to assist ventilation engineers and experts in nuclear installations for safe operation and maintaining ventilation and air cleaning system during fire accident in nuclear facilities. The research focuses on fire prevention and protection of the ventilation systems in nuclear facilities. High-Efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are extremely susceptible to damage when exposed to the effects of fire, smoke, and water; it is the intent of this research to provide the designer with the experience gained over the years from hard lessons learned in protecting HEPA filters from fire. It describes briefly and evaluates the design safety features, constituents and working conditions of ventilation and air cleaning system in nuclear and radioactive industry.This paper provides and

  4. Fracture toughness requirements of reactor vessel material in evaluation of the safety analysis report of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Widia Lastana Istanto

    2011-01-01

    Fracture toughness requirements of reactor vessel material that must be met by applicants for nuclear power plants construction permit has been investigated in this paper. The fracture toughness should be described in the Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) document that will be evaluated by the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN). Because BAPETEN does not have a regulations or standards/codes regarding the material used for the reactor vessel, especially in the fracture toughness requirements, then the acceptance criteria that applied to evaluate the fracture toughness of reactor vessel material refers to the regulations/provisions from the countries that have been experienced in the operation of nuclear power plants, such as from the United States, Japan and Korea. Regulations and standards used are 10 CFR Part 50, ASME and ASTM. Fracture toughness of reactor vessel materials are evaluated to ensure compliance of the requirements and provisions of the Regulatory Body and the applicable standards, such as ASME or ASTM, in order to assure a reliability and integrity of the reactor vessels as well as providing an adequate safety margin during the operation, testing, maintenance, and postulated accident conditions over the reactor vessel lifetime. (author)

  5. Fire safety requirements for electric cables and lines in deep coal mines

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Herms, C D

    1982-01-07

    In the case of a mine fire, an additional hazard from combustible cable material is likely to arise only in those few areas of the mine where special circumstances might help the fire to spread along the cables. It is more important to preserve the functional integrity of cables in the outbye roads which are affected by fire gases then at the actual seat of the fire. Mine cables with better fire-resistant properties should be made from materials which do not propagate fires, do not release burning drops, develop the lowest possible fume density and/or will permanently resist gas temperatures of 200 to 300/sup 0/C. Fire test specifications should be defined for such special cables, based on corresponding draft VDE directives. In proposing these measures the proviso is made then improvement in safety can be clearly demonstrated.

  6. AdvancED Flex 4

    CERN Document Server

    Tiwari, Shashank; Schulze, Charlie

    2010-01-01

    AdvancED Flex 4 makes advanced Flex 4 concepts and techniques easy. Ajax, RIA, Web 2.0, mashups, mobile applications, the most sophisticated web tools, and the coolest interactive web applications are all covered with practical, visually oriented recipes. * Completely updated for the new tools in Flex 4* Demonstrates how to use Flex 4 to create robust and scalable enterprise-grade Rich Internet Applications.* Teaches you to build high-performance web applications with interactivity that really engages your users.* What you'll learn Practiced beginners and intermediate users of Flex, especially

  7. Cuban experience in verification of the execution of the safety requirements during the transport of radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quevedo Garcia, J.R.; Lopez Forteza, Y.

    2001-01-01

    The Cuban Regulatory Authority has paid special attention to the verification of the execution of the safety requirements during the transport of radioactive material in the country. With this purpose, the Authority has followed a consequent policy based on supplementary demands to those collections in the juridical mark settled down in 1987 in the sphere of transport of radioactive substances. In the work the technical approaches are exposed kept in mind when establishing the one referred politics, the current situation is characterized, the results are evaluated obtained in correspondence with the pursued objectives and the essential aspects are exposed to keep in mind for the adopted politics ulterior development. (author)

  8. Compliance of SLAC's Laser Safety Program with OSHA Requirements for the Control of Hazardous Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woods, M.

    2009-01-01

    SLAC's COHE program requires compliance with OSHA Regulation 29CFR1910.147, 'The control of hazardous energy (lockout/tagout)'. This regulation specifies lockout/tagout requirements during service and maintenance of equipment in which the unexpected energization or start up of the equipment, or release of stored energy, could cause injury to workers. Class 3B and Class 4 laser radiation must be considered as hazardous energy (as well as electrical energy in associated equipment, and other non-beam energy hazards) in laser facilities, and therefore requires careful COHE consideration. This paper describes how COHE is achieved at SLAC to protect workers against unexpected Class 3B or Class 4 laser radiation, independent of whether the mode of operation is normal, service, or maintenance

  9. Revision of the energy conservation requirements in the manufactured home construction and safety standards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Conner, C C; Lee, A D; Lucas, R G; Taylor, Z T

    1992-02-01

    Thermal requirements were developed for manufactured (mobile) homes in response to legislation requiring the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to revise its thermal standards for manufactured homes. A life-cycle cost minimization from the home owner's perspecetive was used to establish an optimum in a large number of cities for several prototype homes. The development of the economic, financial, and energy conservation measure parameters input into the life-cycle cost analysis was documented. The optimization results were aggregated to zones which were expressed as a maximum overall home U-value (thermal transmittance) requirement. The revised standard's costs, benefits, and net value to the consumer were quantified. 50 refs.

  10. The Nuremberg Code subverts human health and safety by requiring animal modeling

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Greek Ray

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background The requirement that animals be used in research and testing in order to protect humans was formalized in the Nuremberg Code and subsequent national and international laws, codes, and declarations. Discussion We review the history of these requirements and contrast what was known via science about animal models then with what is known now. We further analyze the predictive value of animal models when used as test subjects for human response to drugs and disease. We explore the use of animals for models in toxicity testing as an example of the problem with using animal models. Summary We conclude that the requirements for animal testing found in the Nuremberg Code were based on scientifically outdated principles, compromised by people with a vested interest in animal experimentation, serve no useful function, increase the cost of drug development, and prevent otherwise safe and efficacious drugs and therapies from being implemented.

  11. 76 FR 67073 - Safety and Health Requirements Related to Camp Cars

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-10-31

    ...)(1) requires that pathways not immediately accessible to occupants should be illuminated at all times... amending its regulations regarding construction of employee sleeping quarters. In particular, FRA's... 49 U.S.C. 21106(a)(2) against beginning construction or reconstruction of employee sleeping quarters...

  12. Isotopic dilution requirements for 233U criticality safety in processing and disposal facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elam, K.R.; Forsberg, C.W.; Hopper, C.M.; Wright, R.Q.

    1997-11-01

    The disposal of excess 233 U as waste is being considered. Because 233 U is a fissile material, one of the key requirements for processing 233 U to a final waste form and disposing of it is to avoid nuclear criticality. For many processing and disposal options, isotopic dilution is the most feasible and preferred option to avoid nuclear criticality. Isotopic dilution is dilution of fissile 233 U with nonfissile 238 U. The use of isotopic dilution removes any need to control nuclear criticality in process or disposal facilities through geometry or chemical composition. Isotopic dilution allows the use of existing waste management facilities, that are not designed for significant quantities of fissile materials, to be used for processing and disposing of 233 U. The amount of isotopic dilution required to reduce criticality concerns to reasonable levels was determined in this study to be ∼ 0.66 wt% 233 U. The numerical calculations used to define this limit consisted of a homogeneous system of silicon dioxide (SiO 2 ), water (H 2 O), 233 U, and depleted uranium (DU) in which the ratio of each component was varied to determine the conditions of maximum nuclear reactivity. About 188 parts of DU (0.2 wt% 235 U) are required to dilute 1 part of 233 U to this limit in a water-moderated system with no SiO 2 present. Thus, for the US inventory of 233 U, several hundred metric tons of DU would be required for isotopic dilution

  13. 75 FR 72877 - Pipeline Safety: Updates to Pipeline and Liquefied Natural Gas Reporting Requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-26

    ... pipeline facilities that could result in $50,000 damage (the value of a typical residential meter set is a... and to establish a volumetric basis for reporting unexpected or unintentional gas loss. 3. Require... every effort to assure that the outcome of this rulemaking will minimize the need for any future changes...

  14. Real time analysis under EDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneberk, D.

    1985-07-01

    This paper describes the analysis component of the Enrichment Diagnostic System (EDS) developed for the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation Program (AVLIS) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Four different types of analysis are performed on data acquired through EDS: (1) absorption spectroscopy on laser-generated spectral lines, (2) mass spectrometer analysis, (3) general purpose waveform analysis, and (4) separation performance calculations. The information produced from this data includes: measures of particle density and velocity, partial pressures of residual gases, and overall measures of isotope enrichment. The analysis component supports a variety of real-time modeling tasks, a means for broadcasting data to other nodes, and a great degree of flexibility for tailoring computations to the exact needs of the process. A particular data base structure and program flow is common to all types of analysis. Key elements of the analysis component are: (1) a fast access data base which can configure all types of analysis, (2) a selected set of analysis routines, (3) a general purpose data manipulation and graphics package for the results of real time analysis. Each of these components are described with an emphasis upon how each contributes to overall system capability. 3 figs

  15. Account of requirements for modernization in VPBER-600 enhanced safety reactor instrumentation and control system development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shashkin, S.L.; Pobedonostsev, A.B.; Drumov, V.V.; Chudin, A.G.

    1993-01-01

    Nuclear power plant (NPP) with VPBER-600 reactor is a station of new generation. The specified term of reactor plant operation is 60 years and taking into account that the proposed term of starting the first power unit is on the turn of centuries one can definitely state that for Russia conditions VPBER-600 is a plant of 21 century. Such far removed term for NPP now in the stage of development as it can seem does not put the problems of modernization as first order tasks. But open-quotes...who does not think about future lives in the past.close quotes It is that the NPP instrumentation and control (I ampersand C) systems are in the most degree subjected to the influence of factors which favor their modifications. These factors can be arbitrarily divided into two groups: (1) inner factors, i.e. changes (failures, aging, etc) in I ampersand C components as well as changes dictated by technological reasons (change of equipment composition, control algorithms, operation modes); (2) outer factors, i.e. intensive development of information technologies and rapid improvement of electronic components. This presentation addresses the problem of modernization of the safety instrumentation for this next generation facility, and the research effort it will entail. The system is designed to allow for modernization, and the relatively easy adoption of new instrumentation and technology as it becomes available

  16. Strategy of severe accident physical modeling in view of recent requirements to safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bolshov, L.A.

    1994-01-01

    Nuclear power destiny in various states including Russia is not free from questions. Where there is plenty of non-expensive natural gas or coal in a country, the competition of nuclear power with other power sources is especially intense. Until one considers the economic efficiency or environmental impact of the normally operating plant, the estimate of the proponents favorite choice may be rather optimistic in many cases. As soon as safety aspects of nuclear power are concerned it is necessary to answer very significant questions about the dangers resulting from severe accidents. TMI and, to a greater extent, Chernobyl, demonstrated the other aspect of the severe accident problem. It serves no purpose to dwell upon the inadequate reaction of the population on the radiation problem. It is of little use to try to prove that the health consequences of the Chernobyl or some other radiation accident are substantially overestimated. To make an advance one must substantially reduce the severe accident risk. Besides that is is necessary to give a convincing proof that such a reduction has really been made

  17. A review of the literature pertaining to the efficacy, safety, educational requirements, uses and usage of mechanical adjusting devices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Taylor, Shane H; Arnold, Nicole D; Biggs, Lesley; Colloca, Christopher J; Mierau, Dale R; Symons, Bruce P; Triano, John J

    2004-01-01

    Over the past decade, mechanical adjusting devices (MADs) were a major source of debate within the Chiropractors’ Association of Saskatchewan (CAS). Since Saskatchewan was the only jurisdiction in North America to prohibit the use of MADs, the CAS established a committee in 2001 to review the literature on MADs. The committee evaluated the literature on the efficacy, safety, and uses of moving stylus instruments within chiropractic practice, and the educational requirements for chiropractic practice. Following the rating criteria for the evaluation of evidence, as outlined in the Clinical Guidelines for Chiropractic Practice in Canada (1994), the committee reviewed 55 articles – all of which pertained to the Activator. Of the 55 articles, 13 were eliminated from the final study. Of the 42 remaining articles, 6 were rated as class 1 evidence; 11 were rated as class 2 evidence and 25 were rated as class 3 evidence. In this article – the second in a series of two – we review the results of uses and usage, safety and educational requirements. Of the 30 articles designated under the category of usage, 3 were rated as Class 1 evidence; 9 studies were classified as Class 2 evidence and 18 were rated as Class 3 evidence. Overall the committee reached consensus that in clinical practice, there is broad application of these procedures. A minority report was written arguing that the reviewer was unable to reach a conclusion about the use of the Activator Instrument other than it is used as a clinical and research tool. Of the 16 studies that dealt either explicitly or implicitly with safety, 4 were Class 1 evidence; 3 were Class 2 evidence and 9 were Class 3 evidence. Overall the committee reached consensus that the evidence supports that the Activator instrument is safe and has no more relative risk than do manual HVLA procedures. A minority report was written arguing that there is no evidence either to support or refute the view that MAD is safe. Of the 5 studies

  18. [Optimal intravascular brachytherapy: safety and radiation protection, reliability and precision guaranteed by guidelines, recommendations and regulatory requirements].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Quast, Ulrich; Kaulich, Theodor W; Lorenz, Joachim

    2002-02-01

    The success of intravascular brachytherapy relies entirely on the interdisciplinary approach. Interventional cardiologists, radiation oncologists and medical physicists must form a team from day 1. All members of the team need special knowledge and regular training in the field of vascular radiation therapy. Optimization of intravascular brachytherapy requires the use of standardized methods of dose specification, recording and reporting. This also implies using standardized methods of source calibration in terms of absorbed dose to water and having methods for simple internal control of the dosimetric quantities of new or replaced sources. Guidance is offered by international recommendations (AAPM TG 60, DGMP Report 16, NCS and EVA GEC-ESTRO). LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION--WHAT'S NEW?: In Europe, new legal requirements on radiation protection issues have to be fulfilled. For Germany, the revised "Strahlenschutzverordnung" has been released recently. Nearly all organizational and medical processes are affected. For intravascular brachytherapy, several changes of requirements have to be considered. However, to follow these requirements does not cause serious problems. DGMP REPORT 16: GUIDELINES FOR MEDICAL PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF INTRAVASCULAR BRACHYTHERAPY: Evaluation of clinical results by comparison of intravascular brachytherapy treatment parameters is possible only if the prescribed dose and the applied dose distribution are reported clearly, completely and uniformly. The DGMP guidelines thus recommend to prescribe the dose to water at the system related reference point PRef at 2 mm radial distance for intracoronary application (and at 5 mm for peripheral vessels). The mean dose at 1 mm tissue depth (respectively at 2 mm) should be reported in addition. To safely define the planning target volume from the injured length, safety margins of at least 5 mm (10 mm) have to be taken into account on both ends. Safety margins have also to be considered for

  19. IEEE standard requirements for reliability analysis in the design and operation of safety systems for nuclear power generating stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    The purpose of this standard is to provide uniform, minimum acceptable requirements for the performance of reliability analyses for safety-related systems found in nuclear-power generating stations, but not to define the need for an analysis. The need for reliability analysis has been identified in other standards which expand the requirements of regulations (e.g., IEEE Std 379-1972 (ANSI N41.2-1972), ''Guide for the Application of the Single-Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection System,'' which describes the application of the single-failure criterion). IEEE Std 352-1975, ''Guide for General Principles of Reliability Analysis of Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems,'' provides guidance in the application and use of reliability techniques referred to in this standard

  20. Technical safety requirements for the South Tank Farm remediation project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Platfoot, J.H.

    1999-01-01

    The South Tank Farm (STF) is a series of six, 170,000-gal underground, domed storage tanks that were placed into service in 1943. The tanks were constructed of a concrete mixture known as gunite. They were used as a portion of the Liquid LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW) System for the collection, neutralization, storage, and transfer of the aqueous portion of the radioactive and/or hazardous chemical wastes produced as part of normal facility operations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Although the last of the tanks was taken out of service in 1986, they have been shown by structural analysis to continue to be structurally sound. An attempt was made in 1983 to empty the tanks; however, removal of all the sludge from the tanks was not possible with the equipment and schedule available. Since removal of the liquid waste in 1983, liquid continues to accumulate within the tanks. The in-leakage is believed to be the result of groundwater dripping into the tanks around penetrations in the domes. The tanks are currently being maintained under a Surveillance and Maintenance Program, which includes activities such as level monitoring, vegetation control, High Efficiency Particulate Air filter leakage requirement testing/replacement, sign erection/repair, pump-out of excess liquids, and instrument calibration/maintenance. A technique known as confined sluicing, which uses a high-pressure, low-volume water jet integrated with a jet pump, will be used to remove the sludge. The Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are those operational requirements that specify the operating limits and surveillance requirements, the basis thereof, safety boundaries, and the management of administrative controls necessary to ensure the safe operation of the STF remediation project. Effective implementation of TSRs will limit to acceptable levels the risks to the public and workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive or other hazardous material

  1. IEEE Std 600: IEEE trial-use standard requirements for organizations that conduct qualification testing of safety systems equipment for use in nuclear power generating stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1992-01-01

    The purpose of this standard is to provide requirements for establishing a program for conducting qualification tests of safety systems equipment used in nuclear power generating stations. Compliance with the requirements of this standard does not assure the adequacy of the qualification tests performed. This standard applies to organizations that conduct qualification tests on equipment that has a definable safety function and is an identifiable part of a safety system for use in nuclear power generating stations. It requires a technical program, a quality assurance program, and a demonstrated ability to meet specified technical requirements. It does not apply to materials tests, production tests, normal performance testing, qualification by analysis, qualification by operating experience, or reliability tests such as diesel-generator multiple start tests. The intent of this standard is to achieve greater consistency, reliability, and reproducibility of test results and to provide adequate control of qualification testing of safety systems equipment

  2. Criticality safety requirements for transporting EBR-II fuel bottles stored at INTEC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lell, R. M.; Pope, C. L.

    2000-01-01

    Two carrier/shipping cask options are being developed to transport bottles of EBR-II fuel elements stored at INTEC. Some fuel bottles are intact, but some have developed leaks. Reactivity control requirements to maintain subcriticality during the hypothetical transport accident have been examined for both transport options for intact and leaking bottles. Poison rods, poison sleeves, and dummy filler bottles were considered; several possible poison materials and several possible dummy filler materials were studied. The minimum number of poison rods or dummy filler bottles has been determined for each carrier for transport of intact and leaking bottles

  3. Cognitive Connected Vehicle Information System Design Requirement for Safety: Role of Bayesian Artificial Intelligence

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ata Khan

    2013-04-01

    Full Text Available Intelligent transportation systems (ITS are gaining acceptance around the world and the connected vehicle component of ITS is recognized as a high priority research and development area in many technologically advanced countries. Connected vehicles are expected to have the capability of safe, efficient and eco-driving operations whether these are under human control or in the adaptive machine control mode of operations. The race is on to design the capability to operate in connected traffic environment. The operational requirements can be met with cognitive vehicle design features made possible by advances in artificial intelligence-supported methodology, improved understanding of human factors, and advances in communication technology. This paper describes cognitive features and their information system requirements. The architecture of an information system is presented that supports the features of the cognitive connected vehicle. For better focus, information processing capabilities are specified and the role of Bayesian artificial intelligence is defined for data fusion. Example applications illustrate the role of information systems in integrating intelligent technology, Bayesian artificial intelligence, and abstracted human factors. Concluding remarks highlight the role of the information system and Bayesian artificial intelligence in the design of a new generation of cognitive connected vehicle.

  4. Regulatory Guide 1.79 safety injection recirculation test requirements, fact or fiction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roberts, J.K.

    1976-01-01

    The overwhelming concern of the general public in this day of state nuclear initiatives is the basic question, ''is nuclear power safe.'' Much of this concern has focused on the emergency core cooling systems. This public attention spotlights the testing organization's responsibility during startup of proving the operation and reliability of the emergency core cooling systems. The standard established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for testing emergency core cooling systems is Regulatory Guide 1.79 ''Preoperational Testing of Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Pressurized Water Reactors''. The nuclear industry must satisfy the testing requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.79 to meet their responsibility to the public; and to prevent future embarrassment when questioned on the adequacy of emergency core cooling systems

  5. New EdF's three challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lepetit, V.

    2005-01-01

    The opening of 15% of Electricite de France (EdF) capital to the private sector will allow the first world electric utility to raise 7 billions of euros of cash flow. EdF will have also to face the new European situation: a strained market, several consolidations to come and many competitors to deal with. EdF has to re-launch its production tool and to reinforce its interconnection capacities if it wants to stay the number one of power exports in Europe. The integration of Edison company (Italy) by EdF gives access to new gas capacities but other resources have to be found if EdF wants to enlarge its gas offer. A new concentration era is foreseen in Europe and EdF will have to seize the economic growth opportunities in particular in Europe and China. (J.S.)

  6. SED-ED, a workflow editor for computational biology experiments written in SED-ML.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adams, Richard R

    2012-04-15

    The simulation experiment description markup language (SED-ML) is a new community data standard to encode computational biology experiments in a computer-readable XML format. Its widespread adoption will require the development of software support to work with SED-ML files. Here, we describe a software tool, SED-ED, to view, edit, validate and annotate SED-ML documents while shielding end-users from the underlying XML representation. SED-ED supports modellers who wish to create, understand and further develop a simulation description provided in SED-ML format. SED-ED is available as a standalone Java application, as an Eclipse plug-in and as an SBSI (www.sbsi.ed.ac.uk) plug-in, all under an MIT open-source license. Source code is at https://sed-ed-sedmleditor.googlecode.com/svn. The application itself is available from https://sourceforge.net/projects/jlibsedml/files/SED-ED/.

  7. Nuclear data for fission reactor core design and safety analysis: Requirements and status of accuracy of nuclear data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rowlands, J.L.

    1984-01-01

    The types of nuclear data required for fission reactor design and safety analysis, and the ways in which the data are represented and approximated for use in reactor calculations, are summarised first. The relative importance of different items of nuclear data in the prediction of reactor parameters is described and ways of investigating the accuracy of these data by evaluating related integral measurements are discussed. The use of sensitivity analysis, together with estimates of the uncertainties in nuclear data and relevant integral measurements, in assessing the accuracy of prediction of reactor parameters is described. The inverse procedure for deciding nuclear data requirements from the target accuracies for prediction of reactor parameters follows on from this. The need for assessments of the uncertainties in nuclear data evaluations and the form of the uncertainty information is discussed. The status of the accuracies of predictions and nuclear data requirements are then summarised. The reactor parameters considered include: (a) Criticality conditions, conversion and burn-up effects. (b) Energy production and deposition, decay heating, irradiation damage, dosimetry and induced radioactivity. (c) Kinetics characteristics and control, including temperature, power and coolant density coefficients, delayed neutrons and control absorbers. (author)

  8. Critical evaluation of safety and radiological protection requirements adopted for the transport of uranium and thorium ores and concentrates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mezrahi, Arnaldo; Crispim, Verginia R.

    2009-01-01

    This work evaluates in a critical way the safety and radiological protection recommendations established by the International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA and adopted national and internationally, for the transport of uranium and thorium ores and concentrates, known according the transport regulations, as being of the Low Specific Activity Material Type-I, LSA-I, basing on more realistic scenarios than the presently existent, aiming at the determination of maximum exposure levels of radiation as well as the maximal contents of those materials in packages and conveyance. A general overview taking into account the scenarios foreseen by the regulations of the IAEA pointed out for a need of a better justification of the requirements edited by the Agency or should be used to support a request of revision of those regulations, national and internationally adopted, in the pertinent aspects to the transport of uranium and thorium ores and concentrates. (author)

  9. Safety requirements and radiological protection for ore installations; Requisitos de seguranca e protecao radiologica para instalacoes minero-industriais

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-06-15

    This norm establishes the safety and radiological protection requirements for mining installations which manipulates, process and storing ores, raw materials, steriles, slags and wastes containing radionuclides of the uranium and thorium natural series, simultaneously or separated, and which can cause undue exposures to the public and workers, at anytime of the functioning or pos operational stage. This norm applies to the mining installations activities, suspended or which have ceased their activities before the issue date of this norm, destined to the mining, physical, chemical and metallurgical processing, and the industrialization of raw materials and residues containing associated radionuclides from the natural series of uranium and thorium, including the stages of implantation, operation and decommissioning of the installation.

  10. Unstandardized Responses to a "Standardized" Test: The edTPA as Gatekeeper and Curriculum Change Agent

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ledwell, Katherine; Oyler, Celia

    2016-01-01

    We examine edTPA (a teacher performance assessment) implementation at one private university during the first year that our state required this exam for initial teaching certification. Using data from semi-structured interviews with 19 teacher educators from 12 programs as well as public information on edTPA pass rates, we explore whether the…

  11. Wind Turbine Generator System Safety and Function Test Report for the Entegrity EW50 Wind Turbine

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, J.; Huskey, A.; Jager, D.; Hur, J.

    2012-11-01

    This report summarizes the results of a safety and function test that NREL conducted on the Entegrity EW50 wind turbine. This test was conducted in accordance with the International Electrotechnical Commissions' (IEC) standard, Wind Turbine Generator System Part 2: Design requirements for small wind turbines, IEC 61400-2 Ed.2.0, 2006-03.

  12. Occupational stress in the ED: a systematic literature review.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Basu, Subhashis; Qayyum, Hasan; Mason, Suzanne

    2017-07-01

    Occupational stress is a major modern health and safety challenges. While the ED is known to be a high-pressure environment, the specific organisational stressors which affect ED staff have not been established. We conducted a systematic review of literature examining the sources of organisational stress in the ED, their link to adverse health outcomes and interventions designed to address them. A narrative review of contextual factors that may contribute to occupational stress was also performed. All articles written in English, French or Spanish were eligible for conclusion. Study quality was graded using a modified version of the Newcastle-Ottawa Scale. Twenty-five full-text articles were eligible for inclusion in our systematic review. Most were of moderate quality, with two low-quality and two high-quality studies, respectively. While high demand and low job control were commonly featured, other studies demonstrated the role of insufficient support at work, effort-reward imbalance and organisational injustice in the development of adverse health and occupational outcomes. We found only one intervention in a peer-reviewed journal evaluating a stress reduction programme in ED staff. Our review provides a guide to developing interventions that target the origins of stress in the ED. It suggests that those which reduce demand and increase workers' control over their job, improve managerial support, establish better working relationships and make workers' feel more valued for their efforts could be beneficial. We have detailed examples of successful interventions from other fields which may be applicable to this setting. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.

  13. Using Telemedicine to Address Crowding in the ED.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guss, Benjamin; Mishkin, David; Sharma, Rahul

    2016-11-01

    Some health systems are piloting telemedicine solutions in the ED to address crowding and decrease patient wait times. One new program, implemented at the Lisa Perry Emergency Center at New York Presbyterian (NYP) Weill Cornell Medical Center in New York, involves offering low-acuity patients the option of visiting an off-site physician via telemedicine hookup. Administrators note that the approach can get patients in and out of the ED within 30 minutes, and patients have thus far been highly satisfied with the approach. However, an earlier telemedicine program piloted at the University of San Diego Health System’s (UCSD) Hillcrest Hospital in 2013 got bogged down due to administrative and insurance reimbursement hurdles, although the approach showed enough promise that there is interest in restarting the program. In the NYP program, patients are identified as appropriate candidates for the program at triage. They can opt to be seen remotely or through traditional means in the ED’s fast-track section. Administrators note that patients with complex problems requiring extensive workups are not suitable for the telemedicine approach. The most challenging aspect of implementing a successful telemedicine program in the ED is getting the workflows right, according to administrators. An earlier ED-based telemedicine program piloted at UCSD ran into difficulties because the model required the involvement of two physicians, and some insurers did not want to pay for the telemedicine visits. However, patients were receptive.

  14. Development and application of a living probabilistic safety assessment tool: Multi-objective multi-dimensional optimization of surveillance requirements in NPPs considering their ageing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kančev, Duško; Čepin, Marko; Gjorgiev, Blaže

    2014-01-01

    The benefits of utilizing the probabilistic safety assessment towards improvement of nuclear power plant safety are presented in this paper. Namely, a nuclear power plant risk reduction can be achieved by risk-informed optimization of the deterministically-determined surveillance requirements. A living probabilistic safety assessment tool for time-dependent risk analysis on component, system and plant level is developed. The study herein focuses on the application of this living probabilistic safety assessment tool as a computer platform for multi-objective multi-dimensional optimization of the surveillance requirements of selected safety equipment seen from the aspect of the risk-informed reasoning. The living probabilistic safety assessment tool is based on a newly developed model for calculating time-dependent unavailability of ageing safety equipment within nuclear power plants. By coupling the time-dependent unavailability model with a commercial software used for probabilistic safety assessment modelling on plant level, the frames of the new platform i.e. the living probabilistic safety assessment tool are established. In such way, the time-dependent core damage frequency is obtained and is further on utilized as first objective function within a multi-objective multi-dimensional optimization case study presented within this paper. The test and maintenance costs are designated as the second and the incurred dose due to performing the test and maintenance activities as the third objective function. The obtained results underline, in general, the usefulness and importance of a living probabilistic safety assessment, seen as a dynamic probabilistic safety assessment tool opposing the conventional, time-averaged unavailability-based, probabilistic safety assessment. The results of the optimization, in particular, indicate that test intervals derived as optimal differ from the deterministically-determined ones defined within the existing technical specifications

  15. VDMA contribution to functional safety of turbomachinery. Required risk reduction by safety functions for steam turbines; VDMA-Beitrag zur Funktionalen Sicherheit von Turbomaschinen. Notwendige Risikoreduktion durch Schutzfunktionen fuer Dampfturbinen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wuest, Bernhard [Alstom Power Systems GmbH, Mannheim (Germany); Zelinger, Matthias [VDMA Power Systems, Frankfurt am Main (Germany); Havemann, Juergen [Siemens AG, Muelheim an der Ruhr (Germany). Energy Sector; Potten, Christian [MAN Diesel und Turbo SE, Oberhausen (Germany)

    2011-07-01

    Turbomachinery in power plants and industrial plants has to satisfy high safety standards. To meet these requirements, mechanical, hydraulic and electromechanical components have been used, most of them well-established already for decades. In recent years new standards for functional safety have been developed which address different target groups (IEC 61 528/511 for process industry IEC 62061 and ISO 13849 for mechanical engineering). The Working Panel 'Functional Safety of Turbomachinery' of VDMA defines rules for turbomachinery that will be presented with their background. (orig.)

  16. The Impact of "ED" on Educational Research.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Florio, David H.

    1980-01-01

    The purposes, structure, and component parts of the newly formed Department of Education (ED) organizations from which educational research programs will be administered are discussed. As the climate surrounding ED changes, opportunities to take advantage of the elevated status of research will be presented. (Author/RL)

  17. ED pharmacist monitoring of provider antibiotic selection aids appropriate treatment for outpatient UTI.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lingenfelter, Erin; Drapkin, Zachary; Fritz, Kelly; Youngquist, Scott; Madsen, Troy; Fix, Megan

    2016-08-01

    We sought to determine whether an emergency department (ED) pharmacist could aid in the monitoring and correction of inappropriate empiric antibiotic selection for urinary tract infections in an outpatient ED population. Urine cultures with greater than 100 000 CFU/mL bacteria from the University of Utah Emergency Department over 1 year (October 2011-Sept 2012) were identified using our electronic medical record system. Per ED protocol, an ED pharmacist reviews all cultures and performs a chart review of patient symptoms, diagnosis, and discharge antibiotics to determine whether the treatment was appropriate. A retrospective review of this process was performed to identify how often inappropriate treatment was recognized and intervened on by an ED pharmacist. Of the 180 cultures included, a total of 42 (23%) of empiric discharge treatments were considered inappropriate and required intervention. In 35 (83%) of 42 patients, the ED pharmacist was able to contact the patient and make appropriate changes; the remaining 7 patients were unable to be contacted, and no change could be made in their treatment. A chart review of all urine cultures with greater than 100 000 CFU/mL performed by an ED pharmacist helped identify inappropriate treatment in 23% of patients discharged to home with the diagnosis of urinary tract infection. Of these patients who had received inappropriate treatment, an ED pharmacist was able to intervene in 83% of cases. These data highlight the role of ED pharmacists in improving patient care after discharge. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  18. Improvements related with the safety required by the Argentine Regulatory Authority to the Atucha I Nuclear Central

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Calvo, J.; Michelin, C.; Navarro, R.; Waldman, R.

    2006-01-01

    The Argentinean Nuclear Regulation Authority (ARN) verified the existence of changes in the state of some internal components of the reactor of the Atucha I Nuclear Power station that, of continuing in the time, it could take to an inconvenient degradation for the safety operation of the installation. In consequence, to the effects of preventing that reach this situation, at the end of 1999, the ARN required to the Responsible Entity for the operation of this power station the implementation of an important improvements program in the internal components of the reactor. Additionally, and based on the results of the Probabilistic Safety analysis, it was added the one mentioned improvements program the implementation of an alternative cooling system of the reactor core denominated Second Drain of Heat, due to it was determined that, for some accidental sequences, their performance would reduce considerably the probability of damage to the core. The concretion of the improvements program implied to the Responsible Entity the realization of an important quantity of engineering studies, tests and specific inspections that allowed to carry out changes on the control bars of the reactor and its guide tubes; the coolant channels; the sensors of neutron flow; and diverse components of the primary and moderator systems. On the other hand also it was implemented the system Second Drain of Heat, what represents a considerable effort to make compatible the instrumentation and control of last generation, with the instrumentation and existent control systems in the power station. Also, it was requested to be carried out an integrity of the pressure recipient for to demonstrate the existence of an acceptable margin for the difference among the acceptable limit temperatures and of ductile/fragile transition of the material for all the possible accidental scenarios during the useful life of the reactor. (Author)

  19. Integration of radiation protection in occupational health and safety managementsystems - legal requirements and practical realization at the example of the Fraunhofer occupational health and safety management system FRAM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lambotte, S.; Severitt, S.; Weber, U.

    2002-01-01

    The protection of the employees, the people and the environment for the effects of radiation is regulated by numerous laws and rules set by the government and the occupational accident insurances. Primarily these rules apply for the responsibles, normally the employer, as well as for the safety officers. Occupational safety management systems can support these people to carry out their tasks and responsibilities effectively. Also, a systematic handling of the organisation secures that the numerous duties of documentation, time-checking of the proof-lists and dates are respected. Further more, the legal certainty for the responsibles and safety officers will be raised and the occupational, environment, radiation and health protection will be promoted. At the example of the Fraunhofer occupational safety management system (FrAM) it is demonstrated, how radiation protection (ionizing radiation) can be integrated in a progressive intranet supported management system. (orig.)

  20. Current state of nuclear fuel cycles in nuclear engineering and trends in their development according to the environmental safety requirements

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vislov, I. S.; Pischulin, V. P.; Kladiev, S. N.; Slobodyan, S. M.

    2016-08-01

    The state and trends in the development of nuclear fuel cycles in nuclear engineering, taking into account the ecological aspects of using nuclear power plants, are considered. An analysis of advantages and disadvantages of nuclear engineering, compared with thermal engineering based on organic fuel types, was carried out. Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) reprocessing is an important task in the nuclear industry, since fuel unloaded from modern reactors of any type contains a large amount of radioactive elements that are harmful to the environment. On the other hand, the newly generated isotopes of uranium and plutonium should be reused to fabricate new nuclear fuel. The spent nuclear fuel also includes other types of fission products. Conditions for SNF handling are determined by ecological and economic factors. When choosing a certain handling method, one should assess these factors at all stages of its implementation. There are two main methods of SNF handling: open nuclear fuel cycle, with spent nuclear fuel assemblies (NFAs) that are held in storage facilities with their consequent disposal, and closed nuclear fuel cycle, with separation of uranium and plutonium, their purification from fission products, and use for producing new fuel batches. The development of effective closed fuel cycles using mixed uranium-plutonium fuel can provide a successful development of the nuclear industry only under the conditions of implementation of novel effective technological treatment processes that meet strict requirements of environmental safety and reliability of process equipment being applied. The diversity of technological processes is determined by different types of NFA devices and construction materials being used, as well as by the composition that depends on nuclear fuel components and operational conditions for assemblies in the nuclear power reactor. This work provides an overview of technological processes of SNF treatment and methods of handling of nuclear fuel