WorldWideScience

Sample records for dupic process safeguards

  1. Technology development for DUPIC process safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, J S; Kim, H D; Lee, Y G; Kang, H Y; Cha, H R; Byeon, K H; Park, Y S; Choi, H N [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-07-01

    As the strategy for DUPIC(Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactor) process safeguards, the neutron detection method was introduced to account for nuclear materials in the whole DUPIC process by selectively measuring spontaneous fission neutron signals from {sup 244}Cm. DSNC was designed and manufactured to measure the account of curium in the fuel bundle and associated process samples in the DUPIC fuel cycle. The MCNP code had response profile along the length of the CANDU type fuel bundle. It was found experimentally that the output signal variation due to the overall azimuthal asymmetry was less than 0.2%. The longitudinal detection efficiency distribution at every position including both ends was kept less than 2% from the average value. Spent fuel standards almost similar to DUPIC process material were fabricated from a single spent PWR fuel rod and the performance verification of the DSNC is in progress under very high radiation environment. The results of this test will be eventually benchmarked with other sources such as code simulation, chemical analysis and gamma analysis. COREMAS-DUPIC has been developed for the accountability management of nuclear materials treated by DUPIC facility. This system is able to track the controlled nuclear materials maintaining the material inventory in near-real time and to generate the required material accountability records and reports. Concerning the containment and surveillance technology, a focused R and D effort is given to the development of unattended continuous monitoring system. Currently, the component technologies of radiation monitoring and surveillance have been established, and continued R and D efforts are given to the integration of the components into automatic safeguards diagnostics. (author).

  2. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, H. D.; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I.

    2002-05-01

    DUPIC safeguards R and D in the second phase has focused on the development of nuclear material measurement system and its operation and verification, the development of nuclear material control and accounting system, and the development of remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system. Of them, the nuclear material measurement system was authenticated from IAEA and officially used for IAEA and domestic safeguards activities in DFDF. It was also verified that the system could be used for quality control of DUPIC process. It is recognised that the diagnostic software using neural network and remote and unmanned containment/surveillance system developed here could be key technologies to go into remote and near-real time monitoring system. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear fuel cycles like MOX and pyroprocessing facility as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material

  3. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  4. Development of DUPIC safeguards neutron counter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Young Gil; Cha, Hong Ryul; Kim, Ho Dong; Hong, Jong Sook; Kang, Hee Young

    1999-08-01

    KAERI, in cooperation with LANL, developed DSNC (DUPIC Safeguards Neutron Counter) for safeguards implementing on DUPIC process which is under development by KAERI for direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DSNC is a well-type neutron coincidence counter with substantial shielding to protect system from high gamma radiation of spent fuel. General development procedures in terms of design, manufacturing, fabrication, cold and hot test, performance test for DSNC authentication by KAERI-IAEA-LANL are described in this report. It is expected that the techniques related DSNC development and associated neutron detection and evaluation method could be applied for safeguards improvement. (Author). 20 refs., 16 tabs. 98 figs.

  5. Technology development of nuclear material safeguards for DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, Hee Young; Lee, Young Gil; Byeon, Kee Ho; Park, Young Soo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Park, Ho Joon; Lee, Byung Doo; Chung, Sang Tae; Choi, Hyung Rae; Park, Hyun Soo

    1997-07-01

    During the second phase of research and development program conducted from 1993 to 1996, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. By securing in advance a optimized safeguards system with domestically developed hardware and software, it will contribute not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author). 27 refs., 13 tabs., 89 figs.

  6. Proceedings of DUPIC fuel workshop 97

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-07-01

    The researchers discuss the technical aspects of DUPIC fuel fabrication in the workshop as follows; (1) The DUPIC fuel development program in KAERI (2) AECL`s progress in developing the DUPIC fuel fabrication process (3) Mechanical decladding (4) Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept (5) Assessment of DUPIC fuel compatibility with CANDU-6 (6) The development of combination software for spent PWR fuel to fabricate the homogeneous DUPIC fuel (7) Thermodynamic properties of the DUPIC fuel and its performance (8) Captural properties of cesium and ruthenium (9) A secondary fuel removal process : Plasma processing (10) Technology development for DUPIC process safeguards.

  7. Proceedings of DUPIC fuel workshop 97

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-07-01

    The researchers discuss the technical aspects of DUPIC fuel fabrication in the workshop as follows; 1) The DUPIC fuel development program in KAERI 2) AECL's progress in developing the DUPIC fuel fabrication process 3) Mechanical decladding 4) Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept 5) Assessment of DUPIC fuel compatibility with CANDU-6 6) The development of combination software for spent PWR fuel to fabricate the homogeneous DUPIC fuel 7) Thermodynamic properties of the DUPIC fuel and its performance 8) Captural properties of cesium and ruthenium 9) A secondary fuel removal process : Plasma processing 10) Technology development for DUPIC process safeguards

  8. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology; development of web based nuclear material accounting program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, J. T.; Choi, S. H.; Choi, S. J. [Kongju National University, Kongju (Korea)

    2002-04-01

    The purpose of this project is to develop the web-based digital image processing system with the client/server architecture based on TCP/IP to be able to search and manage image data at the remote place. This system provides a nuclear facility with the ability to track the movement of nuclear material and to control and account nuclear material at anywhere and anytime. Also, this system will be helpful to increase the efficiency of safeguards affairs. The developed web-based digital image processing system for tracking the movement of nuclear material and MC and A can be applied to DUPIC facility. The result of this project will eventually contribute to similar nuclear facilities as well as the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards. In addition, it will be helpful to enhance international confidence build-up in the peaceful use of spent fuel material. 15 refs., 33 figs., 4 tabs. (Author)

  9. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Persiani, P K [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-07-01

    The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

  10. DUPIC nuclear fuel manufacturing and process technology development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Park, J. J.; Lee, J. W.

    2000-05-01

    In this study, DUPIC fuel fabrication technology and the active fuel laboratory were developed for the study of spent nuclear fuel. A new nuclear fuel using highly radioactive nuclear materials can be studied at the active fuel laboratory. Detailed DUPIC fuel fabrication process flow was developed considering the manufacturing flow, quality control process and material accountability. The equipment layout of about twenty DUPIC equipment at IMEF M6 hot cell was established for the minimization of the contamination during DUPIC processes. The characteristics of the SIMFUEL powder and pellets was studied in terms of milling conditions. The characteristics of DUPIC powder and pellet was studied by using 1 kg of spent PWR fuel at PIEF nr.9405 hot cell. The results were used as reference process conditions for following DUPIC fuel fabrication at IMEF M6. Based on the reference fabrication process conditions, the main DUPIC pellet fabrication campaign has been started at IMEF M6 using 2 kg of spent PWR fuel since 2000 January. As of March 2000, about thirty DUPIC pellets were successfully fabricated

  11. DUPIC nuclear fuel manufacturing and process technology development

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Park, J. J.; Lee, J. W. [and others

    2000-05-01

    In this study, DUPIC fuel fabrication technology and the active fuel laboratory were developed for the study of spent nuclear fuel. A new nuclear fuel using highly radioactive nuclear materials can be studied at the active fuel laboratory. Detailed DUPIC fuel fabrication process flow was developed considering the manufacturing flow, quality control process and material accountability. The equipment layout of about twenty DUPIC equipment at IMEF M6 hot cell was established for the minimization of the contamination during DUPIC processes. The characteristics of the SIMFUEL powder and pellets was studied in terms of milling conditions. The characteristics of DUPIC powder and pellet was studied by using 1 kg of spent PWR fuel at PIEF nr.9405 hot cell. The results were used as reference process conditions for following DUPIC fuel fabrication at IMEF M6. Based on the reference fabrication process conditions, the main DUPIC pellet fabrication campaign has been started at IMEF M6 using 2 kg of spent PWR fuel since 2000 January. As of March 2000, about thirty DUPIC pellets were successfully fabricated.

  12. Radioactive waste management of experimental DUPIC fuel fabrication process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, H. H.; Park, J. J.; Shin, J. M.; Yang, M. S.; Hong, K. P.

    2001-01-01

    The concept of DUPIC(Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU Reactors) is a dry processing technology to manufacture CANDU compatible DUPIC fuel from spent PWR fuel material. Real spent PWR fuel was used in IMEF M6 hot cell to carry out DUPIC experiment. Afterwards, about 200 kg-U of spent PWR fuel is supposed to be used till 2006. This study has been conducted in some hot cells of PIEF and M6 cell of IMEF. There are various forms of nuclear material such as rod cut, powder, green pellet, sintered pellet, fabrication debris, fuel rod, fuel bundle, sample, and process waste produced from various manufacturing experiment of DUPIC fuel. After completing test, the above nuclear wastes and test equipment etc. will be classified as radioactive waste, transferred to storage facility and managed rigorously according to domestic and international laws until the final management policy is determined. It is desirable to review management options in advance for radioactive waste generated from manufacturing experiment of DUPIC nuclear fuel as well as residual nuclear material and dismantled equipment. This paper includes basic plan for DUPIC radwaste, arising source and estimated amount of radioactive waste, waste classification and packing, transport cask, transport procedures

  13. Analysis of radwaste material management options for experimental DUPIC fuel fabrication process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, H. H.; Park, J. J.; Yang, M. S.; Kim, K. H.; Shin, J. M.; Lee, H. S.; Ko, W. I.; Lee, J. W.; Yim, S. P.; Hong, D. H.; Lee, J. Y.; Baik, S. Y.; Song, W. S.; Yoo, B. O.; Lee, E. P.; Kang, I. S. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    2000-03-01

    This report is desirable to review management options in advance for radioactive waste generated from manufacturing experiment of DUPIC nuclear fuel as well as residual nuclear material and dismantled equipment. This report was written for helping researchers working in related facilities to DUPIC project understanding management of DUPIC radioactive waste as well as fellows in DUPIC project. Also, it will be used as basic material to prove transparency and safeguardability of DUPIC fuel cycle. In order to meet these purposes, this report includes basic experiment plan for manufacturing DUPIC nuclear fuel, outlines for DUPIC manufacturing facility and equipment, arising source and estimated amount of radioactive waste, waste classification and packing, transport cask, transport procedures. 15 refs., 31 figs., 11 tabs. (Author)

  14. The DUPIC fuel development program in KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, M S; Park, H S [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-07-01

    This study describes the DUPIC fuel development program in KAERI as follows; Burning spent PWR fuel again in CANDU by DUPIC, Compatibility with existing CANDU system, Feasibility of DUPIC fuel fabrication, Waste reduction, Safeguard ability, Economics of DUPIC fuel cycle, The DUPIC fuel development program, and International prospective. 5 refs., 10 figs.

  15. Analysis of nuclear material flow for experimental DUPIC fuel fabrication process at DFDF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, H. H.; Park, J. J.; Shin, J. M.; Lee, J. W.; Yang, M. S.; Baik, S. Y.; Lee, E. P.

    1999-08-01

    This report describes facilities necessary for manufacturing experiment for DUPIC fuel, manufacturing process and equipment. Nuclear material flows among facilities, in PIEF and IMEF, for irradiation test, for post examination of DUPIC fuel, for quality control, for chemical analysis and for treatment of radioactive waste have been analyzed in details. This may be helpful for DUPIC project participants and facility engineers working in related facilities to understand overall flow for nuclear material and radioactive waste. (Author). 14 refs., 15 tabs., 41 figs

  16. Analysis of nuclear material flow for experimental DUPIC fuel fabrication process at DFDF

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, H. H.; Park, J. J.; Shin, J. M.; Lee, J. W.; Yang, M. S.; Baik, S. Y.; Lee, E. P

    1999-08-01

    This report describes facilities necessary for manufacturing experiment for DUPIC fuel, manufacturing process and equipment. Nuclear material flows among facilities, in PIEF and IMEF, for irradiation test, for post examination of DUPIC fuel, for quality control, for chemical analysis and for treatment of radioactive waste have been analyzed in details. This may be helpful for DUPIC project participants and facility engineers working in related facilities to understand overall flow for nuclear material and radioactive waste. (Author). 14 refs., 15 tabs., 41 figs.

  17. A study on the manufacturing and processing technologies of DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Park, J.J.; Lee, J.W.; Kim, S.S.; Yim, S.P.; Kim, J.H.; Kim, K.H.; Na, S.H.; Kim, W.K.; Kang, K.H.; Shin, J.M.; Lee, D.Y.; Cho, K.H.; Lee, Y.S.; Sohn, J.S.; Kim, M.J.

    1999-06-01

    In this study, DUPIC fuel fabrication technologies are developed, characteristics of fuel materials are studied, and characterization experiments for DUPIC powder and pellets are performed at PIEF. SIMFUEL powder and pellets are made of UO 2 mixed with the simulated fission products of spent fuel. Both characteristics of SIMFUEL powder and micro-structure of pellets are analyzed. End cap of DUPIC fuel rod is sealed with laser welding technique. Optimum welding condition is analyzed with results of Micro-hardness, mechanical and metallographic tests. Micro-focus x-ray inspection technique is studied to fine fine defects. DUPIC processes are improved by making OREOX process be multi-functional and by adopting rol compacting process. At PIEF, characterization experiments for DUPIC powder and pellet are performed. The equipment for experiments have been installed at PIEF no. 9405 hot cell, and its process parameters are established. (author). 7 refs., 7 tabs., 37 figs

  18. Estimation of radiation exposure for hot cell workers during DUPIC fuel fabrication process in IMEF M6 cell

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Yong Bum; Baek, Sang Yeol; Park, Dae Kyu

    1997-06-01

    DUPIC(Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU) fuel cycle to utilize the PWR spent fuel in fabricating CANDU fuel, which is expected to reduce not only the total amount of high level radwastes but the energy sources is underway. IMEF M6 cell to be used as DUPIC fuel fabrication facility is refurbished and retrofitted. Radiation exposure for the hot cell worker by dispersion of the radioactive materials during the DUPIC process were estimated on the basis of the hot cell design information. According to the estimation results, DUPIC fuel fabrication process could be run without any severe impacts to the hot cell workers when the ventilation system to maintain the sufficient pressure difference between hotcell and working area and radiation monitoring system is supports the hot cell operation properly. (author). 4 tabs., 6 figs.

  19. Nuclear material accountability system in DUPIC facility (I)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, W. I.; Kim, H. D.; Byeon, K. H.; Song, D. Y.; Lee, B. D.; Hong, J. S.; Yang, M. S.

    1999-01-01

    KAERI(Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) has developed a nuclear material accountability system for DUPIC(Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU) fuel cycle process. The software development for the material accountability started with a general model software, so-called CoreMAS(Core Material Accountability System), at the beginning of 1998. The development efforts have been focused on the DUPIC safeguards system, and in addition, improved to meet Korean safeguards requirements under domestic laws and regulations. The software being developed as a local area network-based accountability system with multi-user environment is able to track and control nuclear material flow within a facility and inter-facility. In addition, it could be operated in a near-real time manner and also able to generate records and reports as necessary for facility operator and domestic and international inspector. This paper addresses DMAS(DUPIC Material Accountability System) being developed by KAERI and simulation in a small-scale DUPIC process for the verification of the software performance and for seeking further works

  20. Development of the manufacture and process for DUPIC fuel elements; development of the quality evaluation techniques for end cap welds of DUPIC fuel elements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Sang Tae; Choi, Myong Seon; Yang, Hyun Tae; Kim, Dong Gyun; Park, Jin Seok; Kim, Jin Ho [Yeungnam University, Kyongsan (Korea)

    2002-04-01

    The objective of this research is to set up the quality evaluation techniques for end cap welds of DUPIC fuel element. High temperature corrosion test and the SCC test for Zircaloy-4 were performed, and also the possibility of the ultrasonic test technique was verified for the quality evaluation and control of the laser welds in the DUPIC fuel rod end cap. From the evaluation of corrosion properties with measuring the weight gain and observing oxide film of the specimen that had been in the circumstance of steam(400 .deg. C, 1,500 psi) by max. 70 days later, the weight gain of the welded specimens was larger than original tube and the weight increasing rate increased with the exposed days. For the Development of techniques for ultrasonic test, semi-auto ultrasonic test system has been made based on immersion pulse-echo technique using spherically concentrated ultrasonic beam. Subsequently, developed ultrasonic test technique is quite sensible to shape of welds in the inside and outside of tube as well as crack, undercut and expulsion, and also this ultrasonic test, together with metallurgical fracture test, has good reliance as enough to be used for control method of welding process. 43 refs., 47 figs., 8 tabs. (Author)

  1. AECL's progress in DUPIC fuel development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, J.D.; Ryz, M.A.; Lee, J.W.

    1997-01-01

    Previous papers described progress in choosing a fabrication route for the DUPIC (Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU) fuel cycle [1], details of the OREOX (Oxidation Reduction of Oxide fuel) process, and preliminary results of out-cell and small-scale in-cell experiments [2]. AECL's project to develop the DUPIC fuel cycle has now progressed to the stage of fabricating DUPIC fuel elements for irradiation testing in a research reactor. Because of the high radiation fields around the spent PWR fuel, all work is being done in hot cells. The equipment used for fabrication of the DUPIC fuel elements is described in this paper. The commissioning, in-cell installation and current status of the fabrication process are also described and plans for the completion of this phase of the DUPIC project are outlined. The goal of this phase of the project is demonstration of the technical feasibility of the DUPIC fuel cycle. (author)

  2. The DUPIC alternative for backend fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J.S.; Yang, M.S.; Park, H.S.; Boczar, P.; Sullivan, J.; Gadsby, R.D.

    1997-01-01

    The DUPIC fuel cycle was conceived as an alternative to the conventional fuel cycle backed options, with a view to multiple benefits expectable from burning spent PWR fuel again in CANDU reactors. It is based on the basic idea that the bulk of spent PWR fuel can be directly refabricated into a reusable fuel for CANDU of which high efficiency in neutron utilization would exhaustively burn the fissile remnants in the spent PWR fuel to a level below that of natural uranium. Such ''burn again'' strategy of the DUPIC fuel cycle implies that the spent PWR fuel will become CANDU fuel of higher burnup with relevant benefits such as spent PWR fuel disposition, saving of natural uranium fuel, etc. A salient feature of the DUPIC fuel cycle is neither the fissile content nor the bulk radioactivity is separated from the DUPIC mass flow which must be contained and shielded all along the cycle. This feature can be considered as a factor of proliferation resistance by deterrence against access to sensitive materials. It means also the requirement for remote systems technologies for DUPIC fuel operation. The conflicting aspects between better safeguardability and harder engineering problems of the radioactive fuel operation may be the important reason why the decades' old concept, since INFCE, of ''hot'' fuel cycle has not been pursued with much progress. In this context, the DUPIC fuel cycle could be a live example for development of proliferation resistant fuel cycle. As the DUPIC fuel cycle looks for synergism of fuel linkage from PWR to CANDU (or in broader sense LWR to HWR), Korea occupies a best position for DUPIC exercise with her unique strategy of reactor mix of both reactor types. But the DUPIC benefits can be extended to global bonus, expectable from successful development of the technology. (author)

  3. Safeguards planning in a plant design process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinrich, L.A.

    1977-01-01

    The safeguards efforts for the partitioning fuel cycle are considered. Included in the discussion are the organization of the safeguards study, the development of safeguards criteria, the expression of these criteria as requirements for facility design, and some preliminary details of the implementation of these requirements in facility and process layout

  4. Development of the fabrication technology of the simulated DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Kweon Ho; Yang, M. S.; Bae, K. K. and others

    2000-06-01

    It is important to get basic data to analysis physical properties, behavior in reactor and performance of the DUPIC fuel because physical properties of the DUPIC fuel is different from the commercial UO 2 fuel. But what directly measures physical properties et al. of DUPIC fuel being resinterred simulated spent fuel through OREOX process is very difficult in laboratory owing to its high level radiation. Then fabrication of simulated DUPIC fuel is needed to measure its properties. In this study, processes on powder treatment, OREOX, compaction and sintering to fabricate simulated DUPIC fuel using simulated spent fuel are discribed. To fabricate simulated DUPIC fuel, the powder from 3 times OREOX and 5 times attrition milling simulated spent fuel is compacted with 1.3 ton/cm 2 . Pellets are sintered in 100% H 2 atmosphere over 10 h at 1800 deg C. Sintered densities of pellets are 10.2-10.5 g/cm 3

  5. Fabrication of simulated DUPIC fuel

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kang, Kweon Ho; Song, Ki Chan; Park, Hee Sung; Moon, Je Sun; Yang, Myung Seung

    2000-12-01

    Simulated DUPIC fuel provides a convenient way to investigate the DUPIC fuel properties and behavior such as thermal conductivity, thermal expansion, fission gas release, leaching, and so on without the complications of handling radioactive materials. Several pellets simulating the composition and microstructure of DUPIC fuel are fabricated by resintering the powder, which was treated through OREOX process of simulated spent PWR fuel pellets, which had been prepared from a mixture of UO2 and stable forms of constituent nuclides. The key issues for producing simulated pellets that replicate the phases and microstructure of irradiated fuel are to achieve a submicrometre dispersion during mixing and diffusional homogeneity during sintering. This study describes the powder treatment, OREOX, compaction and sintering to fabricate simulated DUPIC fuel using the simulated spent PWR fuel. The homogeneity of additives in the powder was observed after attrition milling. The microstructure of the simulated spent PWR fuel agrees well with the other studies. The leading structural features observed are as follows: rare earth and other oxides dissolved in the UO2 matrix, small metallic precipitates distributed throughout the matrix, and a perovskite phase finely dispersed on grain boundaries.

  6. DUPIC facility engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, J S; Choi, J W; Go, W I; Kim, H D; Song, K C; Jeong, I H; Park, H S; Im, C S; Lee, H M; Moon, K H; Hong, K P; Lee, K S; Suh, K S; Kim, E K; Min, D K; Lee, J C; Chun, Y B; Paik, S Y; Lee, E P; Yoo, G S; Kim, Y S; Park, J C

    1997-09-01

    In the early stage of the project, a comprehensive survey was conducted to identify the feasibility of using available facilities and of interface between those facilities. It was found out that the shielded cell M6 interface between those facilities. It was found out that the shielded cell M6 of IMEF could be used for the main process experiments of DUPIC fuel fabrication in regard to space adequacy, material flow, equipment layout, etc. Based on such examination, a suitable adapter system for material transfer around the M6 cell was engineered. Regarding the PIEF facility, where spent PWR fuel assemblies are stored in an annex pool, disassembly devices in the pool are retrofitted and spent fuel rod cutting and shipping system to the IMEF are designed and built. For acquisition of casks for radioactive material transport between the facilities, some adaptive refurbishment was applied to the available cask (Padirac) based on extensive analysis on safety requirements. A mockup test facility was newly acquired for remote test of DUPIC fuel fabrication process equipment prior to installation in the M6 cell of the IMEF facility. (author). 157 refs., 57 tabs., 65 figs.

  7. DUPIC facility engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J. S.; Choi, J. W.; Go, W. I.; Kim, H. D.; Song, K. C.; Jeong, I. H.; Park, H. S.; Im, C. S.; Lee, H. M.; Moon, K. H.; Hong, K. P.; Lee, K. S.; Suh, K. S.; Kim, E. K.; Min, D. K.; Lee, J. C.; Chun, Y. B.; Paik, S. Y.; Lee, E. P.; Yoo, G. S.; Kim, Y. S.; Park, J. C.

    1997-09-01

    In the early stage of the project, a comprehensive survey was conducted to identify the feasibility of using available facilities and of interface between those facilities. It was found out that the shielded cell M6 interface between those facilities. It was found out that the shielded cell M6 of IMEF could be used for the main process experiments of DUPIC fuel fabrication in regard to space adequacy, material flow, equipment layout, etc. Based on such examination, a suitable adapter system for material transfer around the M6 cell was engineered. Regarding the PIEF facility, where spent PWR fuel assemblies are stored in an annex pool, disassembly devices in the pool are retrofitted and spent fuel rod cutting and shipping system to the IMEF are designed and built. For acquisition of casks for radioactive material transport between the facilities, some adaptive refurbishment was applied to the available cask (Padirac) based on extensive analysis on safety requirements. A mockup test facility was newly acquired for remote test of DUPIC fuel fabrication process equipment prior to installation in the M6 cell of the IMEF facility. (author). 157 refs., 57 tabs., 65 figs

  8. Implementing The Safeguards-By-Design Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J. Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D.; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC and A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  9. DUPIC facility engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, J. J.; Lee, H. H.; Kim, K. H.

    2002-03-01

    With starting DUPIC fuel fabrication experiment by using spent fuels, 1) operation and refurbishment for DFDF (DUPIC fuel development facility), and 2) operation and improvement of transportation equipment for radioactive materials between facilities became the objectives of this study. This report describes objectives of the project, necessities, state of related technology, R and D scope, R and D results, proposal for application etc

  10. DUPIC fuel compatibility assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Rho, G. H.; Park, J. W. [and others

    2000-03-01

    The purpose of this study is to assess the compatibility of DUPIC(Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU Reactors) fuel with the current CANDU 6 reactor, which is one of the technology being developed to utilize the spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. The phase 1 study of this project includes the feasibility analysis on applicability of the current core design method, the feasibility analysis on operation of the DUPIC fuel core, the compatibility analysis on individual reactor system, the sensitivity analysis on the fuel composition, and the economic analysis on DUPIC fuel cycle. The results of the validation calculations have confirmed that the current core analysis system is acceptable for the feasibility study of the DUPIC fuel compatibility analysis. The results of core simulations have shown that both natural uranium and DUPIC fuel cores are almost the same from the viewpoint of the operational performance. For individual reactor system including reactively devices, the functional requirements of each system are satisfied in general. However, because of the pronounced power flattening in the DUPIC core, the radiation damage on the critical components increases, which should be investigated more in the future. The DUPIC fuel composition heterogeneity dose not to impose any serious effect on the reactor operation if the fuel composition is adjusted. The economics analysis has been performed through conceptual design studies on the DUPIC fuel fabrication, fuel handling in a plant, and spent fuel disposal, which has shown that the DUPIC fuel cycle is comparable to the once-trough fuel cycle considering uncertainties associated with unit costs of the fuel cycle components. The results of Phase 1 study have shown that it is feasible to use the DUPIC fuel in CANDU reactors without major changes in hardware. However further studies are required to confirm the safety of the reactor under accident condition.

  11. DUPIC fuel compatibility assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Rho, G. H.; Park, J. W. and others

    2000-03-01

    The purpose of this study is to assess the compatibility of DUPIC(Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU Reactors) fuel with the current CANDU 6 reactor, which is one of the technology being developed to utilize the spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. The phase 1 study of this project includes the feasibility analysis on applicability of the current core design method, the feasibility analysis on operation of the DUPIC fuel core, the compatibility analysis on individual reactor system, the sensitivity analysis on the fuel composition, and the economic analysis on DUPIC fuel cycle. The results of the validation calculations have confirmed that the current core analysis system is acceptable for the feasibility study of the DUPIC fuel compatibility analysis. The results of core simulations have shown that both natural uranium and DUPIC fuel cores are almost the same from the viewpoint of the operational performance. For individual reactor system including reactively devices, the functional requirements of each system are satisfied in general. However, because of the pronounced power flattening in the DUPIC core, the radiation damage on the critical components increases, which should be investigated more in the future. The DUPIC fuel composition heterogeneity dose not to impose any serious effect on the reactor operation if the fuel composition is adjusted. The economics analysis has been performed through conceptual design studies on the DUPIC fuel fabrication, fuel handling in a plant, and spent fuel disposal, which has shown that the DUPIC fuel cycle is comparable to the once-trough fuel cycle considering uncertainties associated with unit costs of the fuel cycle components. The results of Phase 1 study have shown that it is feasible to use the DUPIC fuel in CANDU reactors without major changes in hardware. However further studies are required to confirm the safety of the reactor under accident condition

  12. Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

    1995-01-01

    The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world's nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards

  13. DUPIC fuel fabrication using spent PWR fuels at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Yang, Myung Seung; Ko, Won Il and others

    2000-12-01

    This document contains DUPIC fuel cycle R and D activities to be carried out for 5 years beyond the scope described in the report KAERI/AR-510/98, which was attached to Joint Determination for Post-Irradiation Examination of irradiated nuclear fuel, by MOST and US Embassy in Korea, signed on April 8, 1999. This document is purposely prepared as early as possible to have ample time to review that the over-all DUPIC activities are within the scope and contents in compliance to Article 8(C) of ROK-U.S. cooperation agreement, and also maintain the current normal DUPIC project without interruption. Manufacturing Program of DUPIC Fuel in DFDF and Post Irradiation Examination of DUPIC Fuel are described in Chapter I and Chapter II, respectively. In Chapter III, safeguarding procedures in DFDF and on-going R and D on DUPIC safeguards such as development of nuclear material accounting system and development of containment/surveillance system are described in details.

  14. Decontamination chamber for the maintenance of DUPIC nuclear fuel fabrication and process equipment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, K. H.; Park, J. J.; Yang, M. S.; Lee, H. H.; Shin, J. M

    2000-10-01

    This report presents the decontamination chamber of being capable of decontaminating and maintaining DUPIC nuclear fuel fabrication equipment contaminated in use. The decontamination chamber is a closed room in which contaminated equipment can be isolated from a hot-cell, be decontaminated and be reparired. This chamber can prevent contamination from spreading over the hot-cell, and it can also be utilized as a part of the hot-cell after maintenance work. The developed decontamination chamber has mainly five sub-modules - a horizontal module for opening and closing a ceil of the chamber, a vertical module for opening and closing a side of the chamber, a subsidiary door module for enforcing the vertical opening/closing module, a rotary module for rotating contaminated equipment, and a grasping module for holding a decontamination device. Such sub-modules were integrated and installed in the M6 hot-cell of the IMEF at the KAERI. The mechanical design considerations of each modules and the arrangement with hot-cell facility, remote operation and manipulation of the decontamination chamber are also described.

  15. Decontamination chamber for the maintenance of DUPIC nuclear fuel fabrication and process equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, K. H.; Park, J. J.; Yang, M. S.; Lee, H. H.; Shin, J. M.

    2000-10-01

    This report presents the decontamination chamber of being capable of decontaminating and maintaining DUPIC nuclear fuel fabrication equipment contaminated in use. The decontamination chamber is a closed room in which contaminated equipment can be isolated from a hot-cell, be decontaminated and be reparired. This chamber can prevent contamination from spreading over the hot-cell, and it can also be utilized as a part of the hot-cell after maintenance work. The developed decontamination chamber has mainly five sub-modules - a horizontal module for opening and closing a ceil of the chamber, a vertical module for opening and closing a side of the chamber, a subsidiary door module for enforcing the vertical opening/closing module, a rotary module for rotating contaminated equipment, and a grasping module for holding a decontamination device. Such sub-modules were integrated and installed in the M6 hot-cell of the IMEF at the KAERI. The mechanical design considerations of each modules and the arrangement with hot-cell facility, remote operation and manipulation of the decontamination chamber are also described

  16. Computerization of the safeguards analysis decision process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1990-01-01

    This paper reports that safeguards regulations are evolving to meet new demands for timeliness and sensitivity in detecting the loss or unauthorized use of sensitive nuclear materials. The opportunities to meet new rules, particularly in bulk processing plants, involve developing techniques which use modern, computerized process control and information systems. Using these computerized systems in the safeguards analysis involves all the challenges of the man-machine interface experienced in the typical process control application and adds new dimensions to accuracy requirements, data analysis, and alarm resolution in the regulatory environment

  17. Cost evaluation of a commercial-scale DUPIC fuel fabrication facility (Part I) -Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ko, Won Il; Choi, Hang Bok; Yang, Myung Seung [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

    1999-08-01

    A conceptual design of a commercial scale DUPIC fuel fabrication facility was initiated to provide some insights into the costs associated with construction, operation, and decommissioning. The primary conclusion of this report is that it is feasible to design, license, construct, test, and operate a facility that will process 400 MTHE/yr of spent PWR fuel and reconfigure the fuel into CANDU fuel bundles at a reasonable unit cost of the fuel material. Although DUPIC fuel fabrication by vibropacking method is clearly cheaper than that of the pellet method, the feasibility of vibropac technology for DUPIC fuel fabrication and use of vibroac fuel in CANDU reactors may has to be studied in depth in order to use as an alternative to the conventional pellet fuel method. Especially, there are some questions on meeting the CANDU requirements in thermal and mechanical terms as well as density of fuel. Wherever possible, this report used representative costs of currently available technologies as the bases for cost estimation. It should also be noted that the conceptual design and cost information contained in this report was extracted from the public domain and general open literature. Later studies have to focus on other important areas of concern such as safety, security, safeguards, process optimization etc. 7 figs., 6 tabs. (Author)

  18. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

  19. Recent Progress on the DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Technology at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jung-Won Lee; Ho-Jin Ryu; Geun-Il Park; Kee-Chan Song

    2008-01-01

    Since 1991, KAERI has been developing the DUPIC fuel cycle technology. The concept of a direct use of spent PWR fuel in Candu reactors (DUPIC) is based on a dry processing method to re-fabricate Candu fuel from spent PWR fuel without any intentional separation of the fissile materials and fission products. A DUPIC fuel pellet was successfully fabricated and the DUPIC fuel element fabrication processes were qualified on the basis of a Quality Assurance program. Consequently, the DUPIC fuel fabrication technology was verified and demonstrated on a laboratory-scale. Recently, the fuel discharge burn-up of PWRs has been extended to reduce the amount of spent fuel and the fuel cycle costs. Considering this trend of extending the fuel burn-up in PWRs, the DUPIC fuel fabrication technology should be improved to process high burn-up spent fuels. Particularly the release behavior of cesium from the pellet prepared with a high burn-up spent fuel was assessed. an improved DUPIC fuel fabrication technology was experimentally established with a fuel burn-up of 65,000 MWd/tU. (authors)

  20. Remote helium leak test of the DUPIC fuel rod

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, W. K; Kim, S. S.; Lim, S. P.; Lee, J. W.; Yang, M. S.

    1998-01-01

    DUPIC(Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactor) is one of dry reprocessing fuel cycles to reuse irradiated PWR fuel in CANDU power plant. DUPIC fuel is so radioactive that DUPIC fuel is remotely fabricated at hot cell such as IMEF hot cell in which radiation is shielded and remote operation is possible. In this study, Helium leakage has been tested for the simulated DUPIC fuel rod manufactured by Nd:YAG laser end-cap welding at simulated hot cell. The remote inspection technique has been developed to evaluate the soundness of DUPIC fuel fabricated through new processes. Vacuum chamber has been developed to be remotely operated by manipulators at hot cell. As the result of remote test, Helium leakage of DUPIC fuel rod is around background level, CANDU specification has been satisfied. In the result of the study, remote test has been successfully performed at the simulated hot cell, and the soundness of DUPIC fuel rod welded by Nd:YAG laser has been confirmed

  1. Comparison of DUPIC fuel composition heterogeneity control methods

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Ko, Won Il [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

    1999-08-01

    A method to reduce the fuel composition heterogeneity effect on the core performance parameters has been studied for the DUPIC fuel which is made of spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels by a dry refabrication process. This study focuses on the reactivity control method which uses either slightly enriched, depleted, or natural uranium to minimize the cost rise effect on the manufacturing of DUPIC fuel, when adjusting the excess reactivity of the spent PWR fuel. In order to reduce the variation of isotopic composition of the DUPIC fuel, the inter-assembly mixing operation was taken three times. Then, three options have been considered: reactivity control by slightly enriched and depleted uranium, reactivity control by natural uranium for high reactivity spent PWR fuels, and reactivity control by natural uranium for linear reactivity spent PWR fuels. The results of this study have shown that the reactivity of DUPIC fuel can be tightly controlled with the minimum amount of fresh uranium feed. For the reactivity control by slightly enriched and depleted uranium, all the spent PWR fuels can be utilized as the DUPIC fuel and the fraction of fresh uranium feed is 3.4% on an average. For the reactivity control by natural uranium, about 88% of spent PWR fuel can be utilized as the DUPIC fuel when the linear reactivity spent PWR fuels are used, and the amount of natural uranium feed needed to control the DUPIC fuel reactivity is negligible. 13 refs., 6 figs., 16 tabs. (Author)

  2. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-01-01

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  3. Irradiation test plan of the simulated DUPIC fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bae, Ki Kwang; Yang, M. S.; Kim, B. K. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

    1999-11-01

    Simulated DUPIC fuel had been irradiated from Aug. 4, 1999 to Oct. 4 1999, in order to produce the data of its in-core behavior, to verify the design of DUPIC non-instrumented capsule developed, and to ensure the irradiation requirements of DUPIC fuel at HANARO. The welding process was certified for manufacturing the mini-element, and simulated DUPIC fuel rods were manufactured with simulated DUPIC pellets through examination and test. The non-instrumented capsule for a irradiation test of DUPIC fuel has been designed and manufactured referring to the design specification of the HANARO fuel. This is to be the design basis of the instrumented capsule under consideration. The verification experiment, whether the capsule loaded in the OR4 hole meet the HANARO requirements under the normal operation condition, as well as the structural analysis was carried out. The items for this experiment were the pressure drop test, vibration test, integrity test, et. al. It was noted that each experimental result meet the HANARO operational requirements. For the safety analysis of the DUPIC non-instrumented capsule loaded in the HANARO core, the nuclear/mechanical compatibility, thermodynamic compatibility, integrity analysis of the irradiation samples according to the reactor condition as well as the safety analysis of the HANARO were performed. Besides, the core reactivity effects were discussed during the irradiation test of the DUPIC capsule. The average power of each fuel rod in the DUPIC capsule was calculated, and maximal linear power reflecting the axial peaking power factor from the MCNP results was evaluated. From these calculation results, the HANARO core safety was evaluated. At the end of this report, similar overseas cases were introduced. 9 refs., 16 figs., 10 tabs. (Author)

  4. Development of manufacturing equipment and QC equipment for DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Park, J.J.; Lee, J.W.; Kim, S.S.; Yim, S.P.; Kim, J.H.; Kim, K.H.; Na, S.H.; Kim, W.K.; Shin, J.M.; Lee, D.Y.; Cho, K.H.; Lee, Y.S.; Sohn, J.S.; Kim, M.J.

    1999-05-01

    In this study, DUPIC powder and pellet fabrication equipment, welding system, QC equipment, and fission gas treatment are developed to fabricate DUPIC fuel at IMEF M6 hot cell. The systems are improved to be suitable for remote operation and maintenance with the manipulator at hot cell. Powder and pellet fabrication equipment have been recently developed. The systems are under performance test to check remote operation and maintenance. Welding chamber and jigs are designed and developed to remotely weld DUPIC fuel rod with manipulators at hot cell. Remote quality control equipment are being tested for analysis and inspection of DUPIC fuel characteristics at hot cell. And trapping characteristics is analyzed for cesium and ruthenium released under oxidation/reduction and sintering processes. The design criteria and process flow diagram of fission gas treatment system are prepared incorporating the experimental results. The fission gas treatment system has been successfully manufactured. (Author). 33 refs., 14 tabs., 91 figs

  5. Safeguardability of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Li, T. K. (Tien K.); Lee, S. Y. (Sang Yoon); Burr, Tom; Russo, P. A. (Phyllis A.); Menlove, Howard O.; Kim, H. D.; Ko, W. I. (Won Il); Park, S. W.; Park, H. S.

    2004-01-01

    The Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has been developing this technology since 1977 for the purpose of spent fuel management and is planning to perform a lab-scale demonstration in 2006. By using of this technology, a significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel is expected, which would lighten the burden of final disposal in terms of disposal size, safety and economics. In the framework of collaboration agreement to develop the safeguards system for the ACP, a joint study on the safeguardability of the ACP technology has been performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the KAERI since 2002. In this study, the safeguardability of the ACP technology was examined for the pilot-scale facility. The process and material flows were conceptually designed, and the uncertainties in material accounting were estimated with international target values.

  6. Process monitoring for reprocessing plant safeguards: a summary review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, H.T.; Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.

    1986-10-01

    Process monitoring is a term typically associated with a detailed look at plant operating data to determine plant status. Process monitoring has been generally associated with operational control of plant processes. Recently, process monitoring has been given new attention for a possible role in international safeguards. International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) Task C.59 has the goal to identify specific roles for process monitoring in international safeguards. As the preliminary effort associated with this task, a review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts mentioned concepts and a few specific applications. None were comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report summarizes the basic elements that must be developed in a comprehensive process monitoring application for safeguards. It then summarizes the significant efforts that have been documented in the literature with respect to the basic elements that were addressed

  7. Modeling and simulation for process and safeguards system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutmacher, R.G.; Kern, E.A.; Duncan, D.R.; Benecke, M.W.

    1983-01-01

    A computer modeling and simulation approach that meets the needs of both the process and safeguards system designers is described. The results have been useful to Westinghouse Hanford Company process designers in optimizing the process scenario and operating scheme of the Secure Automated Fabrication line. The combined process/measurements model will serve as the basis for design of the safeguards system. Integration of the process design and the safeguards system design should result in a smoothly operating process that is easier to safeguard

  8. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

  9. Process monitoring in modern safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01

    From the safeguards standpoint, regulatory requirements are finally moving into the modern world of communication and information processing. Gone are the days when the accountant with the green eye shade and arm bands made judgments on the material balance a month after the balance was closed. The most recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) orders have very strict standards for timeliness and sensitivity to loss or removal of material. The latest regulations recognize that plant operators have a lot of information on and control over the location and movement of material within their facilities. This information goes beyond that traditionally reported under accountability requirements. These new regulations allow facility operators to take credit for many of the more informal process controls

  10. DUPIC facility engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, J. J.; Lee, H. H.; Kim, K. H. and others

    2000-03-01

    The objectives of this study are (1) the refurbishment for PIEF(Post Irradiation Examination Facility) and M6 hot-cell in IMEF(Irradiated Material Examination Facility), (2) the establishment of the compatible facility for DUPIC fuel fabrication experiments which is licensed by government organization, and (3) the establishment of the transportation system and transportation cask for nuclear material between facilities. The report for this project describes following contents, such as objectives, necessities, scope, contents, results of current step, R and D plan in future and etc.

  11. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  12. Irradiation and performance evaluation of DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bae, Ki Kwang; Yang, M. S.; Song, K. C.

    2000-05-01

    The objectives of the project is to establish the performance evaluation system for the experimental verification of DUPIC fuel. The scope and content for successful accomplishment of the phase 1 objectives is established as follows : irradiation test of DUPIC fuel at HANARO using a noninstrument capsule, study on the characteristics of DUPIC pellets, development of the analysis technology on the thermal behaviour of DUPIC fuel, basic design of a instrument capsule. The R and D results of the phase 1 are summarized as follows : - Performance analysis technology development of DUPIC fuel by model development for DUPIC fuel, review on the extendability of code(FEMAXI-IV, FRAPCON-3, ELESTRESS). - Study on physical properties of DUPIC fuel by design and fabrication of the equipment for measuring the thermal property. - HANARO irradiation test of simulated DUPIC fuel by the noninstrument capsule development. - PIE and result analysis

  13. Irradiation and performance evaluation of DUPIC fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bae, Ki Kwang; Yang, M S; Song, K C [and others

    2000-05-01

    The objectives of the project is to establish the performance evaluation system for the experimental verification of DUPIC fuel. The scope and content for successful accomplishment of the phase 1 objectives is established as follows : irradiation test of DUPIC fuel at HANARO using a noninstrument capsule, study on the characteristics of DUPIC pellets, development of the analysis technology on the thermal behaviour of DUPIC fuel, basic design of a instrument capsule. The R and D results of the phase 1 are summarized as follows : - Performance analysis technology development of DUPIC fuel by model development for DUPIC fuel, review on the extendability of code(FEMAXI-IV, FRAPCON-3, ELESTRESS). - Study on physical properties of DUPIC fuel by design and fabrication of the equipment for measuring the thermal property. - HANARO irradiation test of simulated DUPIC fuel by the noninstrument capsule development. - PIE and result analysis.

  14. Transmutation of DUPIC spent fuel in the hyper system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Y.H.; Song, T.Y.

    2005-01-01

    In this paper, the transmutation of TRUs of the DUPIC (Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU) spent fuel has been studied with the HYPER system, which is an LBE-cooled ADS. The DUPIC concept is a synergistic combination of PWRs and CANDUs, in which PWR spent fuels are directly re-utilized in CANDU reactors after a very simple re-fabrication process. In the DUPIC-HYPER fuel cycle, TRUs are recovered by using a pyro-technology and they are incinerated in a metallic fuel form of U-TRU-Zr. The objective of this study is to investigate the TRU transmutation potential of the HYPER core for the DUPIC-HYPER fuel cycle. All the previously-developed HYPER core design concepts were retained except that fuel is composed of TRU from the DUPIC spent fuel. In order to reduce the burnup reactivity swing, a B 4 C burnable absorber is used. The HYPER core characteristics have been analyzed with the REBUS-3/DIF3D code system. (authors)

  15. Comparison of DUPIC fuel composition heterogeneity control methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Ko, Won Il

    1999-08-01

    A method to reduce the fuel composition heterogeneity effect on the core performance parameters has been studied for the DUPIC fuel which is made of spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels by a dry refabrication process. This study focuses on the reactivity control method which uses either slightly enriched, depleted, or natural uranium to minimize the cost rise effect on the manufacturing of DUPIC fuel, when adjusting the excess reactivity control by slightly enriched and depleted uranium, reactivity control by natural uranium for high reactivity spent PWR fuels, and reactivity control by natural uranium for linear reactivity spent PWR fuels. The results of this study have shown that the reactivity control by slightly enriched and depleted uranium, all the spent PWR fuels can be utilized as the DUPIC fuel and the fraction of fresh uranium feed is 3.4% on an average. For the reactivity control by natural uranium, about 88% of spent PWR fuel can be utilized as the DUPIC fuel when the linear reactivity spent PWR fuels are used, and the amount of natural uranium feed needed to control the DUPIC fuel reactivity is negligible. (author). 13 refs., 16 tabs., 6 figs

  16. Process data in safeguards at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1988-01-01

    The desire to improve timeliness and sensitivity of material control and accounting capabilities is the basis for evaluation and upgrade of regulatory requirements throughout the nuclear industry. Improvements invariably require better measurement capabilities and more frequent measurements. Operating plants typically include a broad range of measurements and equipment devoted to process control. How can these measurements be used to benefit safeguards? A part of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory has focused on the use of process data for safeguards. This report discusses recent safeguards demonstrations and current activities in a test facility at Oak Ridge

  17. Assessment of Process Monitoring Techniques for Pyro processing Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Y. E.; Kim, C. M.; Yim, M. S. [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    PM technologies can be used to inspect normal/off-normal operation with various data obtained from facility operations in real time to meet safeguards objectives. To support the use of PM technologies for the purpose of pyroprocessing safeguards, this study aims at identifying technologies that could be useful for PM purposes and evaluating their applicability to a pyroprocessing facility. This paper describes the development of the assessment criteria to evaluate the practicality of candidate technologies for PM based on a variety of requirements and considerations. By using the developed assessment criteria, application of technologies in the oxide reduction process was assessed as a test case example. Research is necessary to validate the criteria according to the needs of each unit process, perhaps based on expert elicitation and/or international collaboration with other expert organization(s). These advanced assessment criteria will serve a useful guideline for selecting appropriate candidate PM technologies for pyroprocessing safeguards. Based on the results of using these evaluation criteria, the optimum technologies can be successfully selected for use at a large scale pyroprocessing facility.

  18. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  19. Thermodynamic properties of the DUPIC fuel and its performance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Kwang Heon; Kim, Hee Moon [Kyung Hee Univ., Seoul (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-07-01

    This study describes thermodynamic properties of DUPIC fuel and performance. In initial state, DUPIC fuel which contains fissile materials is different from general nuclear fuel. So this study analyzed oxygen potential, thermal conductivity and specific heat of the DUPIC fuel.

  20. Development of equipment for fabricating DUPIC fuel powder

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ki Ho; Yang, M. S.; Park, J. J.; Lee, J. W.; Kim, J. H.; Cho, K. H.; Lee, D. Y.; Lee, Y. S.; Na, S. H

    1999-06-01

    The powder fabrication processes, as the first stage of manufacturing DUPIC (Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU) fuel, consist of the slitting of spent PWR fuel rods, REOX (Oxidation and REduction of Oxide Fuels) processing to produce the powder feedstock, the milling of the produced powder, the granulation of the milled powder, and the mixing of the granulated powder with pressing lubricants. All these processes should be conducted by remote means in a hot-cell environment where the direct human access is limited to the strictest minimum due to the high radioactivity. This report describe the development of the equipment for fabricating DUPIC fuel powder. These equipment are Slitting Machine, Oxidation and Reduction (OREOX) Furnace, Mill, Roll Compactor, and Mixer. Remote design concept was applied to all the equipment for use in the M6 hot-cell of the IMEF. Mechanical design considerations and capabilities of the equipment for remote operation and maintenance are presented. First prototypes were developed and installed in the DUPIC full scale mock-up and tested using a master-slave manipulator. Redesign and reconstruction were made on each equipment based on mock-up test results. The remote technology acquired through this research was utilized in developing other equipment for DUPIC fuel fabrication, thereby improving safety and increasing productivity. This technology could also be extended to the area of remote handling equipment development for use in hazardous environments. (author). 14 refs., 9 tabs., 21 figs.

  1. Development of equipment for fabricating DUPIC fuel powder

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ki Ho; Yang, M. S.; Park, J. J.; Lee, J. W.; Kim, J. H.; Cho, K. H.; Lee, D. Y.; Lee, Y. S.; Na, S. H.

    1999-06-01

    The powder fabrication processes, as the first stage of manufacturing DUPIC (Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU) fuel, consist of the slitting of spent PWR fuel rods, REOX (Oxidation and REduction of Oxide Fuels) processing to produce the powder feedstock, the milling of the produced powder, the granulation of the milled powder, and the mixing of the granulated powder with pressing lubricants. All these processes should be conducted by remote means in a hot-cell environment where the direct human access is limited to the strictest minimum due to the high radioactivity. This report describe the development of the equipment for fabricating DUPIC fuel powder. These equipment are Slitting Machine, Oxidation and Reduction (OREOX) Furnace, Mill, Roll Compactor, and Mixer. Remote design concept was applied to all the equipment for use in the M6 hot-cell of the IMEF. Mechanical design considerations and capabilities of the equipment for remote operation and maintenance are presented. First prototypes were developed and installed in the DUPIC full scale mock-up and tested using a master-slave manipulator. Redesign and reconstruction were made on each equipment based on mock-up test results. The remote technology acquired through this research was utilized in developing other equipment for DUPIC fuel fabrication, thereby improving safety and increasing productivity. This technology could also be extended to the area of remote handling equipment development for use in hazardous environments. (author). 14 refs., 9 tabs., 21 figs

  2. Safeguards System for the Advanced Spent Fuel Conditioning Process Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ho-dong; Lee, T.H.; Yoon, J.S.; Park, S.W; Lee, S.Y.; Li, T.K.; Menlove, H.; Miller, M.C.; Tolba, A.; Zarucki, R.; Shawky, S.; Kamya, S.

    2007-01-01

    The advanced spent fuel conditioning process (ACP) which is a part of a pyro-processing has been under development at Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) since 1997 to tackle the problem of an accumulation of spent fuel. The concept is to convert spent oxide fuel into a metallic form in a high temperature molten salt in order to reduce the heat energy, volume, and radioactivity of a spent fuel. Since the inactive tests of the ACP have been successfully implemented to confirm the validity of the electrolytic reduction technology, a lab-scale hot test will be undertaken in a couple of years to validate the concept. For this purpose, the KAERI has built the ACP Facility (ACPF) at the basement of the Irradiated Material Examination Facility (IMEF) of KAERI, which already has a reserved hot-cell area. Through the bilateral arrangement between US Department of Energy (DOE) and Korean Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for safeguards R and D, the KAERI has developed elements of safeguards system for the ACPF in cooperation with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The reference safeguards design conditions and equipment were established for the ACPF. The ACPF safeguards system has many unique design specifications because of the particular characteristics of the pyro-process materials and the restrictions during a facility operation. For the material accounting system, a set of remote operation and maintenance concepts has been introduced for a non-destructive assay (NDA) system. The IAEA has proposed a safeguards approach to the ACPF for the different operational phases. Safeguards measures at the ACPF will be implemented during all operational phases which include a 'Cold Test', a 'Hot Test' and at the end of a 'Hot test'. Optimization of the IAEA's inspection efforts was addressed by designing an effective safeguards approach that relies on, inter alia, remote monitoring using cameras, installed NDA instrumentation, gate monitors and seals

  3. DUPIC fuel cycle economics assessment (1)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, H. B.; Roh, G. H.; Kim, D. H.

    1999-04-01

    This is a state-of-art report that describes the current status of the DUPIC fuel cycle economics analysis conducted by the DUPIC fuel compatibility assessment group of the DUPIC fuel development project. For the DUPIC fuel cycle economics analysis, the DUPIC fuel compatibility assessment group has organized the 1st technical meeting composed of 8 domestic specialists from government, academy, industry, etc. and a foreign specialist of hot-cell design from TRI on July 16, 1998. This report contains the presentation material of the 1st technical meeting, published date used for the economics analysis and opinions of participants, which could be utilized for further DUPIC fuel cycle and back-end fuel cycle economics analyses. (author). 11 refs., 7 charts

  4. A study on manufacturing and quality control technology of DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Park, H. S.; Lee, Y. W.

    1997-09-01

    A series of experiments are performed to verify the manufacturability of DUPIC fuel and its performance by use of HANARO test reactor. Major works performed during this research period are : analysis of manufacturing process of DUPIC fuel, fabrication technology development such as development of disassembly and decladding method of spent PWR fuel, study on the OREOX process using simulated high burnup fuel, weldability of end cap weld, and development of fabrication equipment including the conceptual and detailed design of DUPIC equipment mainly for the powder preparation, pelletization and fuel element fabrication. A study on the material properties of DUPIC fuel and performance analysis method using irradiation of test fuel was also performed. (author). 91 refs., 274 tabs., 254 figs

  5. A study on manufacturing and quality control technology of DUPIC fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Park, H. S.; Lee, Y. W. [and others

    1997-09-01

    A series of experiments are performed to verify the manufacturability of DUPIC fuel and its performance by use of HANARO test reactor. Major works performed during this research period are : analysis of manufacturing process of DUPIC fuel, fabrication technology development such as development of disassembly and decladding method of spent PWR fuel, study on the OREOX process using simulated high burnup fuel, weldability of end cap weld, and development of fabrication equipment including the conceptual and detailed design of DUPIC equipment mainly for the powder preparation, pelletization and fuel element fabrication. A study on the material properties of DUPIC fuel and performance analysis method using irradiation of test fuel was also performed. (author). 91 refs., 274 tabs., 254 figs.

  6. Modeling report of DYMOND code (DUPIC version)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Joo Hwan; Yacout, Abdellatif M.

    2003-04-01

    The DYMOND code employs the ITHINK dynamic modeling platform to assess the 100-year dynamic evolution scenarios for postulated global nuclear energy parks. Firstly, DYMOND code has been developed by ANL(Argonne National Laboratory) to perform the fuel cycle analysis of LWR once-through and LWR-FBR mixed plant. Since the extensive application of DYMOND code has been requested, the first version of DYMOND has been modified to adapt the DUPIC, MSR and RTF fuel cycle. DYMOND code is composed of three parts; the source language platform, input supply and output. But those platforms are not clearly distinguished. This report described all the equations which were modeled in the modified DYMOND code (which is called as DYMOND-DUPIC version). It divided into five parts;Part A deals model in reactor history which is included amount of the requested fuels and spent fuels. Part B aims to describe model of fuel cycle about fuel flow from the beginning to the end of fuel cycle. Part C is for model in re-processing which is included recovery of burned uranium, plutonium, minor actinide and fission product as well as the amount of spent fuels in storage and disposal. Part D is for model in other fuel cycle which is considered the thorium fuel cycle for MSR and RTF reactor. Part E is for model in economics. This part gives all the information of cost such as uranium mining cost, reactor operating cost, fuel cost etc

  7. Modeling report of DYMOND code (DUPIC version)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Joo Hwan [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of); Yacout, Abdellatif M [Argonne National Laboratory, Ilinois (United States)

    2003-04-01

    The DYMOND code employs the ITHINK dynamic modeling platform to assess the 100-year dynamic evolution scenarios for postulated global nuclear energy parks. Firstly, DYMOND code has been developed by ANL(Argonne National Laboratory) to perform the fuel cycle analysis of LWR once-through and LWR-FBR mixed plant. Since the extensive application of DYMOND code has been requested, the first version of DYMOND has been modified to adapt the DUPIC, MSR and RTF fuel cycle. DYMOND code is composed of three parts; the source language platform, input supply and output. But those platforms are not clearly distinguished. This report described all the equations which were modeled in the modified DYMOND code (which is called as DYMOND-DUPIC version). It divided into five parts;Part A deals model in reactor history which is included amount of the requested fuels and spent fuels. Part B aims to describe model of fuel cycle about fuel flow from the beginning to the end of fuel cycle. Part C is for model in re-processing which is included recovery of burned uranium, plutonium, minor actinide and fission product as well as the amount of spent fuels in storage and disposal. Part D is for model in other fuel cycle which is considered the thorium fuel cycle for MSR and RTF reactor. Part E is for model in economics. This part gives all the information of cost such as uranium mining cost, reactor operating cost, fuel cost etc.

  8. Evaluation of the Centerline Temperature for the Irradiated DUPIC Pellet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Chang Je; Lee, Cheol Yong; Kang, Kweon Ho; Song, Kee Chan

    2007-01-01

    The DUPIC (Direct Use of spent PWR fuels In a CANDU reactor) fuel has a proliferation-resistant property and provides an efficient utilization of a spent fuel through a direct fabrication with the OREOX process in which most of the fission products remain and some volatile elements such as Xe, Kr, Cs, and I are reduced significantly. It is expected that the performance of the DUPIC fuel exhibits different behavior when compared with the fresh uranium oxide fuel. To evaluate the performance of the DUPIC fuel, total five irradiation tests have been performed in the HANARO reactor since May 2000. Recently, the fifth irradiation test of the DUPIC fuel was successfully completed for a total of three cycles from March 2006 to July 2006. The important characteristics of the first irradiation test are a high power test and a validation of a remote assembly of an irradiation rig. The second irradiation test was instrumented with a SPND (self-powered neutron detector) first for a typical CANDU burnup test. The third test was an extensive irradiation test of the second test and the total burnup was estimated as 6,700 MWd/tU. The forth test was a remote instrumented test of the pellet centerline temperature and the inlet and outlet coolant temperatures. The first remote instrumentation test was achieved with our own technology. The fifth test was a remote-instrumented test of the pellet centerline temperature by extending the technology of the forth irradiation test. In this paper, a DUPIC fuel performance code (KAOS, KAERI Advanced Oxide fuel performance code System) was used to compare the main simulation results of the irradiation tests in the HANARO

  9. Safeguards material control at licensed processing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cleland, L.L.; Johnson, W.A.; Maimoni, A.; Sacks, I.J.; Spogen, L.R.

    1977-01-01

    This report is a review of presentations made by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory at the NRC Office of Regulatory Research contractors review held in Bethesda, Maryland, on February 2-3, 1977. An overview of LLL's approach in assisting the NRC in its creation of Performance Based Regulations and attendant compliance testing is presented. This approach consists of the development of a hierarchy of safeguards functions, a set of measures for these functions, and a usable assessment approach. A summary of progress based on present project status is then given. A complete hierarchy of functions has been developed by LLL and is presented along with a description of the physical measures and mathematical aggregation requirements. Next, a discussion of the need for expansion of currently available data required for portions of MC system detailed evaluation is given. LLL's assessment approach is outlined in a preliminary step-by-step assessment procedure. The basic requirements, in addition to specific NRC criteria, for assessment include the development of various tools and procedures. These tools and procedures and their methodology requirements are discussed in detail and examples given

  10. Automatic image processing as a means of safeguarding nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kahnmeyer, W.; Willuhn, K.; Uebel, W.

    1985-01-01

    Problems involved in computerized analysis of pictures taken by automatic film or video cameras in the context of international safeguards implementation are described. They include technical ones as well as the need to establish objective criteria for assessing image information. In the near future automatic image processing systems will be useful in verifying the identity and integrity of IAEA seals. (author)

  11. Current status of process monitoring for IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koroyasu, M.

    1987-06-01

    Based on literature survey, this report tries to answer some of the following questions on process monitoring for safeguards purposes of future large scale reprocessing plants: what is process monitoring, what are the basic elements of process monitoring, what kinds of process monitoring are there, what are the basic problems of process monitoring, what is the relationship between process monitoring and near-real-time materials accountancy, what are actual results of process monitoring tests and what should be studied in future. A brief description of Advanced Safeguards Approaches proposed by the four states (France, U.K., Japan and U.S.A.), the approach proposed by the U.S.A., the description of the process monitoring, the main part of the report published as a result of one of the U.S. Support Programmes for IAEA Safeguards and an article on process monitoring presented at an IAEA Symposium held in November 1986 are given in the annexes. 24 refs, 20 figs, tabs

  12. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  13. Safeguards inventory and process monitoring regulatory comparison

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cavaluzzi, Jack M. [Texas A & M Univ., College Station, TX (United States); Gibbs, Philip W. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2013-06-27

    Detecting the theft or diversion of the relatively small amount of fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon given the normal operating capacity of many of today’s running nuclear production facilities is a difficult task. As throughput increases, the ability of the Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) Program to detect the material loss decreases because the statistical measurement uncertainty also increases. The challenge faced is the ability of current accounting, measurement, and material control programs to detect small yet significant losses under some regulatory approaches can decrease to the point where it is extremely low if not practically non-existent at normal operating capacities. Adding concern to this topic is that there are variations among regulatory bodies as far as what is considered a Significant Quantity (SQ). Some research suggests that thresholds should be lower than those found in any current regulation which if adopted would make meeting detection goals even more difficult. This paper reviews and compares the current regulatory requirements for the MA elements related to physical inventory, uncertainty of the Inventory Difference (ID), and Process Monitoring (PM) in the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Rosatom of the Russian Federation and the Chinese Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA) of China. The comparison looks at how the regulatory requirements for the implementation of various MA elements perform across a range of operating capacities in example facilities.

  14. Status and Prospect of Safeguards By Design for Pyroprocessing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ho-Dong; Shin, H.S.; Ahn, S.K.

    2010-01-01

    The concept of Safeguards-By-Design (SBD), which is proposed and developed by the United States and the IAEA, is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental consideration for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. The application of a SBD concept is of importance especially for developmental nuclear facilities which have new technological features and relevant challenges to their safeguards approach. At this point of time, the examination of the applicability of SBD on a pyroprocessing facility, which has been being developed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), would be meaningful. The ROK developed a safeguards system with the concept of SBD for Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) and DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) before the SBD concept was formally suggested. Currently. The PRIDE (PyRoprocess Integrated Inactive Demonstration) facility for the demonstration of pyroprocess using 10 ton of non-radioactive nuclear materials per year is being constructed in the ROK. The safeguards system for the facility has been designed in cooperation with a facility designer from the design phase, and the safeguards system would be established according to the future construction schedule. In preparing the design of Engineering Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), which will use spent fuels in an engineering scale and be constructed in 2016, a research on the safeguards system for this facility is also being conducted. In this connection, a project to support for development of safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility has been carried out by KAERI in cooperation with KINAC and the IAEA through an IAEA Member State Support Program (MSSP). When this MSSP project is finished in August, 2011, a safeguards system model and safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility would be established. Maximizing these early experiences and results, a safeguards system of ESPF based on the concept of SBD would be designed and

  15. Irradiation test and performance evaluation of DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Song, K. C.; Moon, J. S.

    2002-05-01

    The objective of the project is to establish the performance evaluation system of DUPIC fuel during the Phase II R and D. In order to fulfil this objectives, irradiation test of DUPIC fuel was carried out in HANARO using the non-instrumented and SPND-instrumented rig. Also, the analysis on the in-reactor behavior analysis of DUPIC fuel, out-pile test using simulated DUPIC fuel as well as performance and integrity assessment in a commercial reactor were performed during this Phase. The R and D results of the Phase II are summarized as follows : - Performance evaluation of DUPIC fuel via irradiation test in HANARO - Post irradiation examination of irradiated fuel and performance analysis - Development of DUPIC fuel performance code (modified ELESTRES) considering material properties of DUPIC fuel - Irradiation behavior and integrity assessment under the design power envelope of DUPIC fuel - Foundamental technology development of thermal/mechanical performance evaluation using ANSYS (FEM package)

  16. Endurance test of DUPIC irradiation test rig-003

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moon, J.S; Yang, M.S.; Lee, C.Y.; Ryu, J.S.; Jeon, H.G

    2001-04-01

    This report presents the pressure drop, vibration and endurance test results for DUPIC Irradiation Test Rig-003 which was design and fabricated by KAERI. From the pressure drop and vibration test results, it is verified that DUPIC Irradiation Test Rig-003 satisfied the limit conditions of HANARO. And, remarkable wear is not observed in DUPIC Irradiation Test Rig-003 during 40 endurance test days.

  17. Endurance test for DUPIC capsule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, Heung June; Bae, K. K.; Lee, C. Y.; Park, J. M.; Ryu, J. S.

    1999-07-01

    This report presents the pressure drop, vibration and endurance test results for mini-plate fuel rig which were designed fabricately by KAERI. From the pressure drop test results, it is noted that the flow rate across the capsule corresponding to the pressure drop of 200 kPa is measured to be about 9.632 kg/sec. Vibration frequency for the capsule ranges from 14 to 18.5 Hz. RMS (Root Mean Square) displacement for the fuel rig is less than 14 μm, and the maximum displacement is less than 54 μm. Based on the endurance test results, the appreciable fretting wear for the DUPIC capsule was not detected. Oxidation on the support tube is observed, also tiny trace of wear between contact points observed. (author). 4 refs., 10 tabs., 45 figs

  18. Integrated safeguards and security for a highly automated process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Hunteman, W.J.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1993-01-01

    Before the cancellation of the New Production Reactor Programs for the production of tritium, the reactors and associated processing were being designed to contain some of the most highly automated and remote systems conceived for a Department of Energy facility. Integrating safety, security, materials control and accountability (MC and A), and process systems at the proposed facilities would enhance the overall information and protection-in-depth available. Remote, automated fuel handling and assembly/disassembly techniques would deny access to the nuclear materials while upholding ALARA principles but would also require the full integration of all data/information systems. Such systems would greatly enhance MC and A as well as facilitate materials tracking. Physical protection systems would be connected with materials control features to cross check activities and help detect and resolve anomalies. This paper will discuss the results of a study of the safeguards and security benefits achieved from a highly automated and integrated remote nuclear facility and the impacts that such systems have on safeguards and computer and information security

  19. Safety analysis of DUPIC fuel development facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, H. H.; Park, J. J.; Shin, J. M.; Yang, M. S.; Baek, S. Y.; Ahn, J. Y.

    2001-01-01

    Various experimental facilities are necessary in order to perform experimental verification for development of DUPIC fuel fabrication technology. In special, since highly radioactive material such as spent PWR fuel is used for this experiment, DUPIC fuel fabrication has to be performed in hot cell by remote handling. Therefore, it should be provided with proper engineering requirement and safety. M6 hot cell of IMEF which is to used for DUPIC fuel fabrication experiment was constructed as an α-γ hot cell for material examination of small amount of high-burnup fuel. The characteristics and amount of spent fuel for DUPIC fuel fabrication experiment will be different from the original design criteria. Therefore, the increased amount of spent fuel and different characteristics of experiment result in not only change of shielding and enviornmental evaluation results but new requirement of nuclear criticality evaluation. Therefore, this study includes evaluation of shielding, environmental effect and nuclear criticality in case that IMEF M6 hot cell is used for DUPIC fuel fabrication

  20. Economic Analysis on Direct Use of Spent Pressurized Water Reactor Fuel in CANDU Reactors - IV: DUPIC Fuel Cycle Cost

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Won Il; Choi, Hangbok; Yang, Myung Seung

    2001-01-01

    This study examines the economics of the DUPIC fuel cycle using unit costs of fuel cycle components estimated based on conceptual designs. The fuel cycle cost (FCC) was calculated by a deterministic method in which reference values of fuel cycle components are used. The FCC was then analyzed by a Monte Carlo simulation to get the uncertainty of the FCC associated with the unit costs of the fuel cycle components. From the deterministic analysis on the equilibrium fuel cycle model, the DUPIC FCC was estimated to be 6.21 to 6.34 mills/kW.h for DUPIC fuel options, which is a little smaller than that of the once-through FCC by 0.07 to 0.27 mills/kW.h. Considering the uncertainty (0.40 to 0.44 mills/kW.h) of the FCC estimated by the Monte Carlo simulation method, the cost difference between the DUPIC and once-through fuel cycle is negligible. On the other hand, the material balance calculation has shown that the DUPIC fuel cycle can save natural uranium resources by ∼20% and reduce the spent fuel arising by ∼65% compared with the once-through fuel cycle. In conclusion, the DUPIC fuel cycle is comparable with the once-through fuel cycle from the viewpoint of FCC. In the future, it should be important to consider factors such as the environmental benefit owing to natural uranium savings, the capability of reusing spent pressurized water reactor fuel, and the safeguardability of the fuel cycle when deciding on an advanced nuclear fuel cycle option

  1. The 3rd irradiation test plan of DUPIC fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Song, K. C.; Park, J. H. and others

    2001-05-01

    The objective of the 3rd irradiation test of DUPIC fuel at the HANARO is to estimate the in-core behaviour of a DUPIC pellet that is irradiated up to more than average burnup of CANDU fuel. The irradiation of DUPIC fuel is planned to start at May 21, 2001, and will be continued at least for 8 months. The burnup of DUPIC fuel through this irradiation test is thought to be more than 7,000 MWd/tHE. The DUPIC irradiation rig instrumented with three SPN detectors will be used to accumulate the experience for the instrumented irradiation and to estimate the burnup of irradiated DUPIC fuel more accurately. Under normal operating condition, the maximum linear power of DUPIC fuel was estimated as 55.06 kW/m, and the centerline temperature of a pellet was calculated as 2510 deg C. In order to assess the integrity of DUPIC fuel under the accident condition postulated at the HANARO, safety analyses on the locked rotor and reactivity insertion accidents were carried out. The maximum centerline temperature of DUPIC fuel was estimated 2590 deg C and 2094 deg C for each accident, respectively. From the results of the safety analysis, the integrity of DUPIC fuel during the HANARO irradiation test will be secured. The irradiated DUPIC fuel will be transported to the IMEF. The post-irradiation examinations are planned to be performed at the PIEF and IMEF.

  2. CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leonard, R.S.; Evans, J.C.

    1987-01-01

    This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

  3. The DUPIC alternative for backend fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J.S.; Choi, J.W.; Park, H.S.; Boczar, P.; Sullivan, J.; Gadsby, R.D.

    1997-01-01

    From the early nineties, a research programme, called DUPIC (Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU) has been undertaken in an international exercise involving Korea, Canada, the U.S. and later the IAEA. The basic idea of this fuel cycle alternative is that the spent fuel from LWR contains enough fissile remnant to be burnt again in CANDUs thanks to its excellent neutron economy. A systematic R and D plan has now gained a full momentum to verify experimentally the DUPIC fuel cycle concept. 4 refs

  4. DUPIC fuel performance from reactor physics viewpoint

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, H.; Rhee, B.W.; Park, H.

    1995-01-01

    A preliminary study was performed for the evaluation of Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) parameters of nominal DUPIC fuel in CANDU reactor. For the reference 2-bundle shift refueling scheme, the predicted ramped power and power increase of the 43-element DUPIC fuel in the equilibrium core are below the SCC thresholds of CANDU natural uranium fuel. For 4-bundle shift refueling scheme, the envelope of element ramped power and power increase upon refueling are 8% and 44% higher than those of 2-bundle shift refueling scheme on the average, respectively, and both schemes are not expected to cause SCC failures. (author)

  5. Application of Safeguards-by-Design to a Reactor Design Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitlock, J.J.

    2010-01-01

    The application of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) to a reactor design process is described. The SBD concept seeks to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards by incorporating the needs of safeguards at an early stage of reactor design. Understanding and accommodating safeguards in the design process requires a set of 'design requirements for safeguards'; however, such requirements (a) do not traditionally exist, and (b) must exist alongside other more traditional design requirements based upon compliance and operational goals. In the absence of design requirements, a 'Design Guide' for safeguards was created, consisting of recommendations based on best practices. To acquire an understanding of safeguards requirements at the design level, a systematic accounting of diversion pathways was required. However, because of the crowded field of other design requirements, this process needed a methodology that was also flexible in interpretation. The GenIV Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR and PP) methodology (Rev.5, 2005) was chosen for this exercise. The PR and PP methodology is a general approach and therefore it was necessary to restrict its application; in effect, turning 'off' various options so as to simplify the process. The results of this exercise were used to stimulate discussions with the design team and initiate changes that accommodate safeguards without negatively impacting other design requirements. The process yielded insights into the effective application of SBD, and highlighted issues that must be resolved for effective incorporation of an 'SBD culture' within the design process. (author)

  6. Compatibility analysis of DUPIC fuel (part5) - DUPIC fuel cycle economics analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Won Il; Choi, Hang Bok; Yang, Myung Seung

    2000-08-01

    This study examines the economics of the DUPIC fuel cycle using unit costs of fuel cycle components estimated based on conceptual designs. The fuel cycle cost (FCC) was calculated by a deterministic method in which reference values of fuel cycle components are used. The FCC was then analyzed by a Monte Carlo simulation to get the uncertainty of the FCC associated with the unit costs of the fuel cycle components. From the deterministic analysis on the one-batch equilibrium fuel cycle model, the DUPIC FCC was estimated to be 6.55-6.72 mills/kWh for proposed DUPIC fuel options, which is a little smaller than that of the once-through FCC by 0.04-0.28 mills/kWh. Considering the uncertainty (0.45-0.51 mills/kWh) of the FCC estimated by the Monte Carlo simulation method, the cost difference between the DUPIC and once-through fuel cycle is negligible. On the other hand, the material balance calculation has shown that the DUPIC fuel cycle can save natural uranium resources by -20% and reduce the spent fuel arising by -65%, compared with the once-through fuel cycle. In conclusion, the DUPIC fuel cycle possesses a strong advantage over the once-through fuel cycle from the viewpoint of the environmental effect

  7. Compatibility analysis of DUPIC fuel (part5) - DUPIC fuel cycle economics analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ko, Won Il; Choi, Hang Bok; Yang, Myung Seung

    2000-08-01

    This study examines the economics of the DUPIC fuel cycle using unit costs of fuel cycle components estimated based on conceptual designs. The fuel cycle cost (FCC) was calculated by a deterministic method in which reference values of fuel cycle components are used. The FCC was then analyzed by a Monte Carlo simulation to get the uncertainty of the FCC associated with the unit costs of the fuel cycle components. From the deterministic analysis on the one-batch equilibrium fuel cycle model, the DUPIC FCC was estimated to be 6.55-6.72 mills/kWh for proposed DUPIC fuel options, which is a little smaller than that of the once-through FCC by 0.04-0.28 mills/kWh. Considering the uncertainty (0.45-0.51 mills/kWh) of the FCC estimated by the Monte Carlo simulation method, the cost difference between the DUPIC and once-through fuel cycle is negligible. On the other hand, the material balance calculation has shown that the DUPIC fuel cycle can save natural uranium resources by -20% and reduce the spent fuel arising by -65%, compared with the once-through fuel cycle. In conclusion, the DUPIC fuel cycle possesses a strong advantage over the once-through fuel cycle from the viewpoint of the environmental effect.

  8. Compatibility analysis of DUPIC fuel (part 3) - radiation physics analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Chun Soo; Bae, Dae Seok; Kim, Kyung Su; Park, Byung Yun; Koh, Young Kown

    2000-04-01

    As a part of the compatibility analysis of DUPIC fuel in CANDU reactors, the radiation physics calculations have been performed for the CANDU primary shielding system, thermal shield, radiation damage, transportation cask and storage. At first, the primary shield system was assessed for the DUPIC fuel core, which has shown that the dose rates and heat deposition rates through the primary shield of the DUPIC fuel core are not much different from those of natural uranium core because the power levels on the core periphery are similar for both cores. Secondly, the radiation effects on the critical components and the themal shields were assessed when the DUPIC fuel is loaded in CANDU reactors. Compared with the displacement per atom (DPA) of the critical component for natural uranium core, that for the DUPIC fuel core was increased by -30% for the innermost groove and the weld points and by -10% for the corner of the calandria subshells and annular plates in the calandria, respectivdely. Finally, the feasibility study of the DUPIC fuel handling was performed, which has shown that all handling and inspection of the DUPIC fuel bundles be done remotely and behind a shielding wall. For the transportation of the DUPIC fuel, the preliminary study has shown that there shold be no technical problem th design a transportation cask for the fresh and spent DUPIC fuel bundles. For the storage of the fresh and spent DUPIC fuels, there is no the criticality safety problem unless the fuel bundle geometry is destroyed

  9. Compatibility analysis of DUPIC fuel (part 3) - radiation physics analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Chun Soo; Bae, Dae Seok; Kim, Kyung Su; Park, Byung Yun; Koh, Young Kown

    2000-04-01

    As a part of the compatibility analysis of DUPIC fuel in CANDU reactors, the radiation physics calculations have been performed for the CANDU primary shielding system, thermal shield, radiation damage, transportation cask and storage. At first, the primary shield system was assessed for the DUPIC fuel core, which has shown that the dose rates and heat deposition rates through the primary shield of the DUPIC fuel core are not much different from those of natural uranium core because the power levels on the core periphery are similar for both cores. Secondly, the radiation effects on the critical components and the themal shields were assessed when the DUPIC fuel is loaded in CANDU reactors. Compared with the displacement per atom (DPA) of the critical component for natural uranium core, that for the DUPIC fuel core was increased by -30% for the innermost groove and the weld points and by -10% for the corner of the calandria subshells and annular plates in the calandria, respectivdely. Finally, the feasibility study of the DUPIC fuel handling was performed, which has shown that all handling and inspection of the DUPIC fuel bundles be done remotely and behind a shielding wall. For the transportation of the DUPIC fuel, the preliminary study has shown that there shold be no technical problem th design a transportation cask for the fresh and spent DUPIC fuel bundles. For the storage of the fresh and spent DUPIC fuels, there is no the criticality safety problem unless the fuel bundle geometry is destroyed.

  10. Progress of the DUPIC fuel compatibility analysis (I) - reactor physics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Jeong, Chang Joon; Roh, Gyu Hong; Rhee, Bo Wook; Park, Jee Won

    2003-12-01

    Since 1992, the direct use of spent pressurized water reactor fuel in CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors (DUPIC) has been studied as an alternative to the once-through fuel cycle. The DUPIC fuel cycle study is focused on the technical feasibility analysis, the fabrication of DUPIC fuels for irradiation tests and the demonstration of the DUPIC fuel performance. The feasibility analysis was conducted for the compatibility of the DUPIC fuel with existing CANDU-6 reactors from the viewpoints of reactor physics, reactor safety, fuel cycle economics, etc. This study has summarized the intermediate results of the DUPIC fuel compatibility analysis, which includes the CANDU reactor physics design requirements, DUPIC fuel core physics design method, performance of the DUPIC fuel core, regional overpower trip setpoint, and the CANDU primary shielding. The physics analysis showed that the CANDU-6 reactor can accommodate the DUPIC fuel without deteriorating the physics design requirements by adjusting the fuel management scheme if the fissile content of the DUPIC fuel is tightly controlled.

  11. The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Synetos, Sotiris

    2013-01-01

    Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  12. Status and Prospect of Safeguards By Design for the Pyroprocessing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hodong; Shin, H.S.; Ahn, S.K.

    2010-01-01

    The concept of Safeguards-By-Design (SBD), which is proposed and developed by the United States and the IAEA, is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental consideration for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. The application of a SBD concept is of importance especially for developmental nuclear facilities which have new technological features and relevant challenges to their safeguards approach. At this point of time, the examination of the applicability of SBD on a pyroprocessing facility, which has been being developed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), would be meaningful. The ROK developed a safeguards system with the concept of SBD for Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) and DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) before the SBD concept was formally suggested. Currently. The PRIDE (PyRoprocess Integrated Inactive Demonstration) facility for the demonstration of pyroprocess using 10 ton of non-radioactive nuclear materials per year is being constructed in the ROK. The safeguards system for the facility has been designed in cooperation with a facility designer from the design phase, and the safeguards system would be established according to the future construction schedule. In preparing the design of Engineering Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), which will use spent fuels in an engineering scale and be constructed in 2016, a research on the safeguards system for this facility is also being conducted. In this connection, a project to support for development of safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility has been carried out by KAERI in cooperation with KINAC and the IAEA through an IAEA Member State Support Program (MSSP). When this MSSP project is finished in August, 2011, a safeguards system model and safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility would be established. Maximizing these early experiences and results, a safeguards system of ESPF based on the concept of SBD would be designed and

  13. Post irradiation test report of irradiated DUPIC simulated fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Jung, I. H.; Moon, J. S. and others

    2001-12-01

    The post-irradiation examination of irradiated DUPIC (Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU Reactors) simulated fuel in HANARO was performed at IMEF (Irradiated Material Examination Facility) in KAERI during 6 months from October 1999 to March 2000. The objectives of this post-irradiation test are i) the integrity of the capsule to be used for DUPIC fuel, ii) ensuring the irradiation requirements of DUPIC fuel at HANARO, iii) performance verification in-core behavior at HANARO of DUPIC simulated fuel, iv) establishing and improvement the data base for DUPIC fuel performance verification codes, and v) establishing the irradiation procedure in HANARO for DUPIC fuel. The post-irradiation examination performed are γ-scanning, profilometry, density, hardness, observation the microstructure and fission product distribution by optical microscope and electron probe microanalyser (EPMA)

  14. Burnable poison option for DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Cupta, H. P.

    1996-08-01

    The mechanisms of positive coolant void reactivity of CANDU natural uranium and DUPIC fuel have been studied. The design study of DUPIC fuel was performed using the burnable poison material in the center pin to reduce the coolant void reactivity. The amount of burnable poison was determined such that the prompt inverse period of DUPIC fuel upon full coolant voiding is the same as that of natural uranium fuel at equilibrium burnup. A parametric study on various burnable poisons has shown that natural dysprosium has more merit over other materials because it uniformly controls the void reactivity throughout the burnup with reasonable amount of poison. Additional studies on the option of using scattering or absorber material in the center pin position and the option using variable fuel density were performed. In any case of option using variable fuel density were performed. In any case of options to reduce the void reactivity, it was found that either the discharge burnup and/or the relative linear pin power are sacrificed. A preliminary study was performed for the evaluation of reference DUPIC fuel performance especially represented by Stress Corrosion Cracking(SCC) parameters which is mainly influenced by the refueling operations. For the reference 2-bundle shift refueling scheme, the predicted ramped power and power increment of the reference DUPIC fuel are below the SCC thresholds of CANDU natural uranium fuel. For a 4-bundle shift refueling scheme, the envelopes of element ramped power and power increment upon refueling are 8% and 44% higher than those of a 2-bundle shift refueling scheme on the average, respectively, but still have margins to the failure thresholds of natural uranium fuel. 23 tabs., 25 figs., 20 refs. (Author)

  15. The process monitoring computer system an integrated operations and safeguards surveillance system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liester, N.A.

    1995-01-01

    The use of the Process Monitoring Computer System (PMCS) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) relating to Operations and Safeguards concerns is discussed. Measures taken to assure the reliability of the system data are outlined along with the measures taken to assure the continuous availability of that data for use within the ICPP. The integration of process and safeguards information for use by the differing organizations is discussed. The PMCS successfully demonstrates the idea of remote Safeguards surveillance and the need for sharing of common information between different support organizations in an operating plant

  16. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  17. Understanding national and international safeguards: an evolutionary process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    1983-01-01

    Domestic and international safeguards have been evolving and will continue to evolve. in the case of the United States, the concern was to protect the classified materials, at first. Then attention focussed on material accounting, then on measures to promptly detect theft by individuals with access, and later on physical protection to ward-off armed terrorists. The objective of the IAEA has always been to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not being diverted from the peaceful facilities that are under safeguards. The evolution has taken place in deciding how to provide this assurance, and in the definition of specific safeguards goals. In both cases the technology needed to meet the goals has improved due to R and D and to experience. A plea is made for more cooperation betwen those who develop and manage the policies, those who develop safeguards techniques, and those who are subject to national and IAEA safeguards. Some illustrations of the evolution of policies, inadequate coordination and general progress are given

  18. Thermal expansion of UO2 and simulated DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ho Kang, Kweon; Jin Ryu, Ho; Chan Song, Kee; Seung Yang, Myung

    2002-01-01

    The lattice parameters of simulated DUPIC fuel and UO 2 were measured from room temperature to 1273 K using neutron diffraction to investigate the thermal expansion and density variation with temperature. The lattice parameter of simulated DUPIC fuel is lower than that of UO 2 , and the linear thermal expansion of simulated DUPIC fuel is higher than that of UO 2 . For the temperature range from 298 to 1273 K, the average linear thermal expansion coefficients for UO 2 and simulated DUPIC fuel are 10.471x10 -6 and 10.751x10 -6 K -1 , respectively

  19. Assessment of DUPIC fuel compatibility with CANDU-6

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, H B; Roh, G H; Jeong, C J; Rhee, B W; Choi, J W [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-07-01

    The compatibility of DUPIC fuel with the existing CANDU reactor was assessed. The technical issues of DUPIC fuel compatibility were chosen based on the CANDU physics design requirements and inherent characteristics of DUPIC fuel. The compatibility was assessed for the reference DUPIC fuel composition which was determined to reduce the composition heterogeneity and improve the spent PWR fuel utilization. Preliminary studies on a CANDU core loaded with DUPIC fuel have shown that the nominal power distribution is flatter than that of a natural uranium core when a 2-bundle shift refueling scheme is used, which reduces the reactivity worths of devices in the core and, therefore, the performance of reactivity devices was assessed. The safety of the core was assessed by a LOCA simulation and it was found that the power pulse upon LOCA can be maintained below that in the natural uranium core when a poison material is used in the DUPIC fuel. For the feasibility of handling DUPIC fuel in the plant, it will be necessary to introduce new equipment to load the DUPIC fuel in the refueling magazine. The radiation effect of DUPIC fuel on both the reactor hardware and the environment will require a quantitative analysis later. (author).

  20. Preliminary assessment on compatibility of DUPIC fuel with CANDU-6

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Hang-Bok; Roh, G.H.; Jeong, C.J.; Rhee, B.W.; Choi, J.W.; Boss, C.R.

    1997-01-01

    The compatibility of DUPIC fuel with the existing CANDU-6 reactor was assessed. The technical issues of DUPIC fuel compatibility were chosen based on the CANDU physics design requirements and inherent characteristics of DUPIC fuel. The compatibility was assessed for the reference DUPIC fuel composition which was determined to reduce the composition heterogeneity and improve the spent PWR fuel utilization. Preliminary studies on a CANDU core loaded with DUPIC fuel have shown that the nominal power distribution is flatter than that of a natural uranium core when a 2-bundle shift refueling scheme is used, which reduces the reactivity worths of devices in the core and, therefore, the performance of reactivity devices was assessed. The safety of the core was assessed by a LOCA simulation and it was found that the power pulse upon LOCA can be maintained below that in the natural uranium core when a poison material is used in the DUPIC fuel. For the feasibility of handling DUPIC fuel in the plant, it will be necessary to introduce new equipment to load the DUPIC fuel in the refueling magazine. The radiation effect of DUPIC fuel on both the reactor hardware and the environment will be qualitatively analyzed later. (author)

  1. Thermal expansion study of simulated DUPIC fuel using neutron diffraction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Kweon Ho; Ryu, H. J.; Bae, J. H.; Kim, H. S.; Song, K. C.; Yang, M. S.; Choi, Y. N.; Han, Y. S.; Oh, H. S.

    2001-07-01

    The lattice parameters of simulated DUPIC fuel and UO2 were measured from room temperature to 1273 K using neutron diffraction to investigate the thermal expansion and density variation with temperature. The lattice parameter of simulated DUPIC fuel is lower than that of UO2 and the linear thermal expansion of simulated DUPIC fuel is higher than that of UO2. For the temperature range from 298 to 1273 K, the average linear thermal expansion coefficients for UO2 and simulated DUPIC fuel are 10.471 ''10-6 and 10.751 ''10-6 K-1, respectively

  2. Advances in the Processing of VHR Optical Imagery in Support of Safeguards Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Niemeyer, I.; Listner, C.; Canty, M.

    2015-01-01

    Under the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) complementing the safeguards agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, commercial satellite imagery, preferably acquired by very high-resolution (VHR) satellite sensors, is an important source of safeguards-relevant information. Satellite imagery can assist in the evaluation of site declarations, design information verification, the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities, and the preparation of inspections or other visits. With the IAEA's Geospatial Exploitation System (GES), satellite imagery and other geospatial information such as site plans of nuclear facilities are available for a broad range of inspectors, analysts and country officers. The demand for spatial information and new tools to analyze this data is growing, together with the rising number of nuclear facilities under safeguards worldwide. Automated computer-driven processing of satellite imagery could therefore add a big value in the safeguards verification process. These could be, for example, satellite imagery pre-processing algorithms specially developed for new sensors, tools for pixel or object-based image analysis, or geoprocessing tools that generate additional safeguards-relevant information. In the last decade procedures for automated (pre-) processing of satellite imagery have considerably evolved. This paper aims at testing some pixel-based and object-based procedures for automated change detection and classification in support of safeguards verification. Taking different nuclear sites as examples, these methods will be evaluated and compared with regard to their suitability to (semi-) automatically extract safeguards-relevant information. (author)

  3. Dry process fuel performance technology development

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kang, Kweon Ho; Kim, K. W.; Kim, B. K. (and others)

    2006-06-15

    The objective of the project is to establish the performance evaluation system of DUPIC fuel during the Phase III R and D. In order to fulfil this objectives, property model development of DUPIC fuel and irradiation test was carried out in Hanaro using the instrumented rig. Also, the analysis on the in-reactor behavior analysis of DUPIC fuel, out-pile test using simulated DUPIC fuel as well as performance and integrity assessment in a commercial reactor were performed during this Phase. The R and D results of the Phase III are summarized as follows: Fabrication process establishment of simulated DUPIC fuel for property measurement, Property model development for the DUPIC fuel, Performance evaluation of DUPIC fuel via irradiation test in Hanaro, Post irradiation examination of irradiated fuel and performance analysis, Development of DUPIC fuel performance code (KAOS)

  4. Dry process fuel performance technology development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Kweon Ho; Kim, K. W.; Kim, B. K.

    2006-06-01

    The objective of the project is to establish the performance evaluation system of DUPIC fuel during the Phase III R and D. In order to fulfil this objectives, property model development of DUPIC fuel and irradiation test was carried out in Hanaro using the instrumented rig. Also, the analysis on the in-reactor behavior analysis of DUPIC fuel, out-pile test using simulated DUPIC fuel as well as performance and integrity assessment in a commercial reactor were performed during this Phase. The R and D results of the Phase III are summarized as follows: Fabrication process establishment of simulated DUPIC fuel for property measurement, Property model development for the DUPIC fuel, Performance evaluation of DUPIC fuel via irradiation test in Hanaro, Post irradiation examination of irradiated fuel and performance analysis, Development of DUPIC fuel performance code (KAOS)

  5. Analysis of environmental friendliness of DUPIC fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Won Il; Kim, Ho Dong

    2001-07-01

    Some properties of irradiated DUPIC fuels are compared with those of other fuel cycles. It was indicated that the toxicity of the DUPIC option based on 1 GWe-yr is much smaller than those of other fuel cycle options, and is just about half the order of magnitude of other fuel cycles. From the activity analysis of 99 Tc and 237 Np, which are important to the long-term transport of fission products stored in geologic media, the DUPIC option, was being contained only about half of those other options. It was found from the actinide content estimation that the MOX option has the lowest plutonium arising based on 1 GWe-year and followed by the DUPIC option. However, fissile Pu content generated in the DUPIC fuel was the lowest among the fuel cycle options. From the analysis of radiation barrier in proliferation resistance aspect, the fresh DUPIC fuel can play a radiation barrier part, better than CANDU spent fuels as well as fresh MOX fuel. It is indicated that the DUPIC fuel cycle has the excellent resistance to proliferation, compared with an existing reprocessing option and CANDU once-through option. In conclusions, DUPIC fuel cycle would have good properties on environmental effect and proliferation resistance, compared to other fuel cycle cases

  6. The processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    The framework of safeguard activities of the IAEA from the viewpoint of informanagement is described. As methodology, major sources of information are, member state supplied information, information obtained by the Agency through its verification activity, and open source information. Software tools are provided to retrieve and to filter information for storage. Organizational structure of the Agency's information activities, and the changing roles of the inspectors are also described. (Yamamoto, A.)

  7. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  8. Multi-Level Policy Dialogues, Processes, and Actions: Challenges and Opportunities for National REDD+ Safeguards Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pamela Jagger

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available REDD+ social safeguards have gained increasing attention in numerous forums. This paper reviews the evolution of multi-level policy dialogues, processes, and actions related to REDD+ social safeguards (e.g., Cancun Safeguards 1–5 among policy makers, civil society organizations, and within the media in Brazil, Indonesia and Tanzania, three countries with well advanced REDD+ programs. We find that progress on core aspects of social safeguards is uneven across the three countries. Brazil is by far the most advanced having drafted a REDD+ social safeguards policy. Both Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from progress made by strong sub-national entities in the operationalization of REDD+ safeguards including free prior and informed consent (FPIC, participation, and benefit sharing. Tanzania has weakly articulated how social safeguards will be operationalized and has a more top-down approach. We conclude that in all three countries, measuring, reporting and verifying progress on social safeguards is likely to be a complex issue. Stakeholders with vested interests in REDD+ social safeguards operate in polycentric rather than nested systems, suggesting that aggregation of information from local to national-scale will be a challenge. However, polycentric systems are also likely to support more transparent and comprehensive safeguards systems. Clear direction from the international community and financing for REDD+ safeguard MRV is essential if REDD+ social safeguards are to be meaningfully integrated into forest-based climate mitigation strategies.

  9. The option study of air shipment of DUPIC fuel elements to Canada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, H. H.; Park, J. J.; Shin, J. M.; Kim, J. H.; Yang, M. S.; Koo, J. H.

    2003-01-01

    KAERI developed a DUPIC nuclear fuel with the refabrication of spent PWR fuel discharged from domestic nuclear power plant by a dry process at M6 hot-cell in IMEF. To verify the performance of DUPIC nuclear fuel, irradiation test at operating conditions of commercially operating power plant is essential. Since the HANARO research reactor of KAERI does not have Fuel Test Loop(FTL) for irradiating nuclear fuel under high temperature and high pressure conditions, DUPIC fuel cannot be irradiated in the FTL of HANARO until about 2008. In the 13-th PRM among Korea, Canada, USA and IAEA, AECL proposed that KAERI fabricated DUPIC fuel can be irradiated in the FTL of the NRU research reactor without charge of neutrons. The transportation quantity of DUPIC fuel to Canada is 10 elements(about 6 kg). This transportation package is classified as the 7-th class according to 'recommendation on the transport of dangerous goods' made by the United Nations. Air shipment was investigated as a promising option because it is generally understood that air shipment is more appropriate than ship shipment for transportation of small quantity of nuclear materials from the perspectives of cost and transportation period. In case of air shipment, the IATA regulations have been more intensified since the July of 2001. To make matters worse, it becomes more difficult to get the ratification of corresponding authorities due to 9.11 terror. It was found that at present there is no proper air transportation cask for DUPIC fuel. So, air transportation is considered to be impossible. An alternative of using the exemption limit of fissile material was reviewed. Its results showed that in case of going via USA territory, approvals from US DOT should be needed. The approvals include shipping and cask approvals on technical cask testing. Furthermore, since passes through territories of Japan and Russia have to be done in case of using a regular air cargo from Korea to Canada, approvals from Russia and

  10. Progress of the DUPIC Fuel Compatibility Analysis (IV) - Fuel Performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Ryu, Ho Jin; Roh, Gyu Hong; Jeong, Chang Joon; Park, Chang Je; Song, Kee Chan; Lee, Jung Won

    2005-10-01

    This study describes the mechanical compatibility of the direct use of spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel in Canada deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors (DUPIC) fuel, when it is loaded into a CANDU reactor. The mechanical compatibility can be assessed for the fuel management, primary heat transport system, fuel channel, and the fuel handling system in the reactor core by both the experimental and analytic methods. Because the physical dimensions of the DUPIC fuel bundle adopt the CANDU flexible (CANFLEX) fuel bundle design which has already been demonstrated for a commercial use in CANDU reactors, the experimental compatibility analyses focused on the generation of material property data and the irradiation tests of the DUPIC fuel, which are used for the computational analysis. The intermediate results of the mechanical compatibility analysis have shown that the integrity of the DUPIC fuel is mostly maintained under the high power and high burnup conditions even though some material properties like the thermal conductivity is a little lower compared to the uranium fuel. However it is required to slightly change the current DUPIC fuel design to accommodate the high internal pressure of the fuel element. It is also strongly recommended to perform more irradiation tests of the DUPIC fuel to accumulate a database for the demonstration of the DUPIC fuel performance in the CANDU reactor

  11. Progress of the DUPIC Fuel Compatibility Analysis (IV) - Fuel Performance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Ryu, Ho Jin; Roh, Gyu Hong; Jeong, Chang Joon; Park, Chang Je; Song, Kee Chan; Lee, Jung Won

    2005-10-15

    This study describes the mechanical compatibility of the direct use of spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel in Canada deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors (DUPIC) fuel, when it is loaded into a CANDU reactor. The mechanical compatibility can be assessed for the fuel management, primary heat transport system, fuel channel, and the fuel handling system in the reactor core by both the experimental and analytic methods. Because the physical dimensions of the DUPIC fuel bundle adopt the CANDU flexible (CANFLEX) fuel bundle design which has already been demonstrated for a commercial use in CANDU reactors, the experimental compatibility analyses focused on the generation of material property data and the irradiation tests of the DUPIC fuel, which are used for the computational analysis. The intermediate results of the mechanical compatibility analysis have shown that the integrity of the DUPIC fuel is mostly maintained under the high power and high burnup conditions even though some material properties like the thermal conductivity is a little lower compared to the uranium fuel. However it is required to slightly change the current DUPIC fuel design to accommodate the high internal pressure of the fuel element. It is also strongly recommended to perform more irradiation tests of the DUPIC fuel to accumulate a database for the demonstration of the DUPIC fuel performance in the CANDU reactor.

  12. Development of data acquisition and processing software based on MS-Windows 3.X for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tan Yajun

    1996-01-01

    The development method of data acquisition and processing software based on MS-Windows 3.X for safeguards is presented. The paper describes the design methods of graphical user interface (GUI), multiwindow and multitask-based spectrum graph display, data acquisition and processing and the application of object-oriented programming (OOP). Using the package, an effective prototype design path can be found for MS-Windows-based software. The methods and programs have been applied in some safeguard non-destructive assay system

  13. 32 CFR Appendix D to Part 323 - Word Processing Center (WPC) Safeguards

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... DEFENSE (CONTINUED) PRIVACY PROGRAM DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY PRIVACY PROGRAM Pt. 323, App. D Appendix D to... (WPCs) operating independent of the customer's function. However, managers of word processing systems... addressed. C. Safeguarding Information During Receipt. 1. The word processing manager will establish...

  14. Develpment of quality assurance manual for fabrication of DUPIC fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Young Gun; Lee, J. W.; Kim, S. S. and others

    2001-09-01

    The Quality Assurance Manual for the fabrication of DUPIC fuel with high quality was developed. The Quality Assurance Policy established by this manual is to assure that the DUPIC fuel element supplied to customer conform to the specified requirements of customer, applicable codes and standards. The management of KAERI is committed to implementation and maintenance of the program described by this manual. This manual describes the quality assurance program for DUPIC fuel fabrication to comply with CAN3-Z299.2-85 to the extent as needed and appropriate. This manual describes the methods which DUPIC Fuel Development Team(DFDT) personnel must follow to achieve and assure high quality of our product. This manual also describes the quality management system applicable to the activities performed at DFDT.

  15. Develpment of quality assurance manual for fabrication of DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Young Gun; Lee, J. W.; Kim, S. S. and others

    2001-09-01

    The Quality Assurance Manual for the fabrication of DUPIC fuel with high quality was developed. The Quality Assurance Policy established by this manual is to assure that the DUPIC fuel element supplied to customer conform to the specified requirements of customer, applicable codes and standards. The management of KAERI is committed to implementation and maintenance of the program described by this manual. This manual describes the quality assurance program for DUPIC fuel fabrication to comply with CAN3-Z299.2-85 to the extent as needed and appropriate. This manual describes the methods which DUPIC Fuel Development Team(DFDT) personnel must follow to achieve and assure high quality of our product. This manual also describes the quality management system applicable to the activities performed at DFDT

  16. The dupic fuel cycle synergism between LWR and HWR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J.S.; Yang, M.S.; Park, H.S.; Lee, H.H.; Kim, K.P.; Sullivan, J.D.; Boczar, P.G.; Gadsby, R.D.

    1999-01-01

    The DUPIC fuel cycle can be developed as an alternative to the conventional spent fuel management options of direct disposal or plutonium recycle. Spent LWR fuel can be burned again in a HWR by direct refabrication into CANDU-compatible DUPIC fuel bundles. Such a linkage between LWR and HWR can result in a multitude of synergistic effects, ranging from savings of natural uranium to reductions in the amount of spent fuel to be buried in the earth, for a given amount of nuclear electricity generated. A special feature of the DUPIC fuel cycle is its compliance with the 'Spent Fuel Standard' criteria for diversion resistance, throughout the entire fuel cycle. The DUPIC cycle thus has a very high degree of proliferation resistance. The cost penalty due to this technical factor needs to be considered in balance with the overall benefits of the DUPIC fuel cycle. The DUPIC alternative may be able to make a significant contribution to reducing spent nuclear fuel burial in the geosphere, in a manner similar to the contribution of the nuclear energy alternative in reducing atmospheric pollution from fossil fuel combustion. (author)

  17. A sensitivity study on neutronic properties of DUPIC fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Roh, Gyu Hong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1999-12-31

    A sensitivity study has been done to determine the composition of DUPIC fuel from the viewpoint of neutronics fuel design. The spent PWR fuel compositions were generated and fissile contents adjusted by blending fresh uranium after mixing two spent PWR fuel assemblies. The {sup 239}Pu and {sup 235}U enrichments of DUPIC fuel were adjusted by controlling the amount of fresh uranium feed and the ratio of slightly enriched and depleted uranium in the feed uranium. Based on the material balance calculation, it is recommended that DUPIC fuel composition be such that spent PWR fuel utilization is more than 90%. A sensitivity study on the temperature reactivity coefficient of DUPIC fuel and shown that it is desirable to increase the {sup 239}Pu and {sup 235}U contents to reduce both the fuel and coolant temperature coefficients. On the other hand, refueling simulations of the DUPIC core have shown that the channel power peaking factor, which is a measure of the reactor trip margin, increases with the total fissile content. Considering these neutronic characteristics of the DUPIC fuel, it is recommended to have enrichments of 0.45 and 1.00 wt% for {sup 239}Pu and {sup 235}U, respectively. 3 refs., 2 tabs. (Author)

  18. Environmental sensitivity studies for Gen-IV roadmap DUPIC scenario

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Chang Joon

    2004-03-01

    The environmental effect of the DUPIC (Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU Reactors) fuel cycle, which is considered as one of the partial recycle scenario in Gen-IV roadmap, has been analyzed by using the dynamic analysis method. Through the parametric calculations for the DUPIC fuel cycle deployment time and the fraction of the DUPIC reactors, the environmental effects of the fuel cycle for important parameters such as the amount of spent fuel and the combined amounts of plutonium and minor actinides were estimated and compared to those of the once-through LWR fuel cycle. The results of the sensitivity calculations showed that an early deployment of the DUPIC fuel cycle with a high DUPIC reactor fraction can reduce the accumulation of spent fuel by up to 40%. More important is the associated reduction in the combined amount of plutonium and minor actinides, which may reduce the key repository parameter (long term decay heat). Therefore it is expected that favorable environmental effects will be the outcome of the implementation of the DUPIC fuel cycle

  19. A sensitivity study on neutronic properties of DUPIC fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Hang Bok; Roh, Gyu Hong [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1998-12-31

    A sensitivity study has been done to determine the composition of DUPIC fuel from the viewpoint of neutronics fuel design. The spent PWR fuel compositions were generated and fissile contents adjusted by blending fresh uranium after mixing two spent PWR fuel assemblies. The {sup 239}Pu and {sup 235}U enrichments of DUPIC fuel were adjusted by controlling the amount of fresh uranium feed and the ratio of slightly enriched and depleted uranium in the feed uranium. Based on the material balance calculation, it is recommended that DUPIC fuel composition be such that spent PWR fuel utilization is more than 90%. A sensitivity study on the temperature reactivity coefficient of DUPIC fuel and shown that it is desirable to increase the {sup 239}Pu and {sup 235}U contents to reduce both the fuel and coolant temperature coefficients. On the other hand, refueling simulations of the DUPIC core have shown that the channel power peaking factor, which is a measure of the reactor trip margin, increases with the total fissile content. Considering these neutronic characteristics of the DUPIC fuel, it is recommended to have enrichments of 0.45 and 1.00 wt% for {sup 239}Pu and {sup 235}U, respectively. 3 refs., 2 tabs. (Author)

  20. Using Process Load Cell Information for IAEA Safeguards at Enrichment Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laughter, Mark D.; Whitaker, J. Michael; Howell, John

    2010-01-01

    Uranium enrichment service providers are expanding existing enrichment plants and constructing new facilities to meet demands resulting from the shutdown of gaseous diffusion plants, the completion of the U.S.-Russia highly enriched uranium downblending program, and the projected global renaissance in nuclear power. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducts verification inspections at safeguarded facilities to provide assurance that signatory States comply with their treaty obligations to use nuclear materials only for peaceful purposes. Continuous, unattended monitoring of load cells in UF 6 feed/withdrawal stations can provide safeguards-relevant process information to make existing safeguards approaches more efficient and effective and enable novel safeguards concepts such as information-driven inspections. The IAEA has indicated that process load cell monitoring will play a central role in future safeguards approaches for large-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plants. This presentation will discuss previous work and future plans related to continuous load cell monitoring, including: (1) algorithms for automated analysis of load cell data, including filtering methods to determine significant weights and eliminate irrelevant impulses; (2) development of metrics for declaration verification and off-normal operation detection ('cylinder counting,' near-real-time mass balancing, F/P/T ratios, etc.); (3) requirements to specify what potentially sensitive data is safeguards relevant, at what point the IAEA gains on-site custody of the data, and what portion of that data can be transmitted off-site; (4) authentication, secure on-site storage, and secure transmission of load cell data; (5) data processing and remote monitoring schemes to control access to sensitive and proprietary information; (6) integration of process load cell data in a layered safeguards approach with cross-check verification; (7) process mock-ups constructed to provide simulated load

  1. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  2. Preliminary assessment of safeguardability on the concepture design of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sang Yoon; Ha, Jang Ho; Ko, Won Il; Song, Dae Yong; Kim, Ho Dong

    2003-04-01

    In this report, a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP (Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process) was conducted with Los Alamos National Laboratory. The proposed ACP concept is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuels into metal forms, which can achieve significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel to be stored and disposed of. For the safeguardability analysis of the ACP facility, sub-processes and their KMPs (Key Measurement Points) were defined first, and then their material flows were analyzed. Finally, the standard deviation of the Inventory Difference (ID) value of the facility was estimated with assumption by assuming international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods and their uncertainty. From the preliminary calculation, we concluded that if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility, the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met. In the second phase of this study, further study on sensitivity analyses considering various factors such as measurement errors, facility capacities, MBA periods etc. may be needed

  3. Preliminary assessment of safeguardability on the concepture design of advanced spent fuel conditioning process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Sang Yoon; Ha, Jang Ho; Ko, Won Il; Song, Dae Yong; Kim, Ho Dong

    2003-04-01

    In this report, a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP (Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process) was conducted with Los Alamos National Laboratory. The proposed ACP concept is an electrometallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuels into metal forms, which can achieve significant reduction of the volume and heat load of spent fuel to be stored and disposed of. For the safeguardability analysis of the ACP facility, sub-processes and their KMPs (Key Measurement Points) were defined first, and then their material flows were analyzed. Finally, the standard deviation of the Inventory Difference (ID) value of the facility was estimated with assumption by assuming international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods and their uncertainty. From the preliminary calculation, we concluded that if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility, the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met. In the second phase of this study, further study on sensitivity analyses considering various factors such as measurement errors, facility capacities, MBA periods etc. may be needed.

  4. Advanced-safeguards systems development for chemical-processing plants. Final report for FY 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartan, F.O.

    1981-04-01

    The program is installing a computer system to test and evaluate process monitoring as a new Safeguards function to supplement the usual physical security and accountability functions. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) provide information via a data acquisition system to a Safeguards analysis computer. The monitoring function can significantly enhance current material control (accountability) and containment surveillance capabilities for domestic and international Safeguards uses. Installation of sensors and instruments in the ICPP was more than 75% complete in FY-1980. Installation work was halted at the request of ICPP operations near the end of the year to eliminate possible conflict with instrument calibrations prior to plant startup. Some improvements to the computer hardware were made during FY-1980. Sensor and instrument development during FY-1980 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications. Pressure transducers, pressure switches, a bubble flowmeter, and load cells were tested; an ultrasonic liquid-in-line sensor was developed and tested. Work on the portable, isotope-ratio mass spectrometer led to the comparison of the HP quadrupole instrument with a small magnetic instrument and to the selection of the quadrupole

  5. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Coles, Garill A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-11-09

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  6. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  7. The use of safeguards data for process purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnes, J.W.

    1987-01-01

    Nuclear materials accounting is an important part of nuclear fuel cycle operations. It provides assurance that nuclear material is present and at its proper location. The materials accounting system can also provide information that is useful to operations. A modern materials control and accounting (MC ampersand A) system can monitor equipment performance, holdup accumulation, and operational safety. A modern MC ampersand A operation can provide information on process systems where measurements do not exist or are impractical. The operational benefits of an integrated process control/near-real-time materials accounting system are many. Computerized MC ampersand A systems available in modern process plants allow closure of material balances on individual material movements or process operations. Frequent closures on sub-materials balance areas or individual process vessels localize and identify process problems in a timely manner. The MC ampersand A system has been used to monitor process equipment performance and detect the unplanned loss of material when the normal process control systems were incapable of detecting problems

  8. Advanced safeguards systems development for chemical processing plants. Final report for Fiscal Year 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.E.

    1980-01-01

    A computer system is being installed by INEL to test and evaluate safeguards monitoring concepts in an operating nuclear fuel processing plant. Safeguards development sensors and instruments installed in the ICPP provide plant information to a computer data acquisition and analysis system. Objective of the system is to collect data from process and safeguards sensors and show how this data can be analyzed to detect diversion operations or improper plant operation, and to test the performance of the monitoring devices. Approximately one-third of the installation designs and one-eighth of the installations were completed in FY 1979. The ICPP processing schedule for FY 1980 permits installation of the remaining monitoring devices before process startup in the fourth quarter of FY 1980. All computer hardware was delivered and checked out in FY 1979. Computer software system designs were completed with the majority of the programming scheduled for FY 1980. Sensor and instrument development in FY 1979 emphasized device testing for ICPP monitoring applications

  9. Designing new nuclear chemical processing plants for safeguards accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprouse, K.M.

    1987-01-01

    New nuclear chemical processing plants will be required to develop material accountability control limits from measurement error propagation analysis rather than historical inventory difference data as performed in the past. In order for measurement error propagation methods to be viable alternatives, process designers must ensure that two nondimensional accountability parameters are maintained below 0.1. These parameters are ratios between the material holdup increase and the variance in inventory difference measurement uncertainty. Measurement uncertainty data for use in error propagation analysis is generally available in the open literature or readily derived from instrument calibration data. However, nuclear material holdup data has not been adequately developed for use in the material accountability design process. Long duration development testing on isolated unit operations is required to generate this necessary information

  10. A safeguards case study of the Nuclear Materials and equipment corporation uranium processing plant Apollo, Pennsylvania. Appendix B with proprietary information removed. Staff technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altman, W.; Hockert, J.; Quinn, E.

    1980-04-01

    The report characterizes the Atomic Energy Commission safeguards requirements and the safeguards systems and procedures in place at the Nuclear Materials and Equipment (NUMEC) uranium processing plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania during the spring of 1964. Based upon this characterization, a list of safeguards weaknesses which would be considered deficiencies under 1979 requirements is developed. Appendixes A and B to the report provide a detailed characterization of AEC safeguards requirements as well as a side by side comparison of NUMEC's safeguards program in 1964 with the safeguards program currently required of a comparable licensed facility

  11. Compatibility analysis of DUPIC fuel(4) - thermal hydraulic analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Jee Won; Chae, Kyung Myung; Choi, Hang Bok

    2000-07-01

    Thermal-hydraulic compatibility of the DUPIC fuel bundle in the CANDU reactor has been studied. The critical channel power, the critical power ratio, the channel exit quality and the channel flow are calculated for the DUPIC and the standard fuels by using the NUCIRC code. The physical models and associated parametric values for the NUCIRC analysis of the fuels are also presented. Based upon the slave channel analysis, the critical channel power and the critical power ratios have been found to be very similar for the two fuel types. The same dryout model is used in this study for the standard and the DUPIC fuel bundles. To assess the dryout characteristics of the DUPIC fuel bundle, the ASSERT-PV code has been used for the subchannel analysis. Based upon the results of the subchannel analysis, it is found that the dryout location and the power for the two fuel types are indeed very similar. This study shows that thermal performance of the DUPIC fuel is not significantly different from that of the standard fuel.

  12. In-process hold-up as a measure of safeguards significance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamlin, A.G.

    1983-01-01

    This paper examines the use of the in-process hold-up itself, as a measure of safeguards significance. It is argued that for any process plant it is possible to define design limits for in-process hold-up, outside which the plant will not operate, or will operate in a detectably abnormal manner. It follows, therefore, that if the in-process hold-up can be derived at frequent intervals by input/output analysis from the start of the campaign, the only diversion that can be made from it during that campaign is limited to the quantity necessary to move the apparent in-process hold-up from its normal operating condition to the upper limiting condition. It also follows that detection of this diversion is as positive for protracted diversion as for abrupt diversion. If that part of the in-process inventory that is only measurable by input/output analysis has an upper operating limit that differs from its normal operating limit by less than a significant safeguards quantity of the material in question, the IAEA's criteria for both quantity and timeliness can be met by a combination of input/output analysis to determine in-process hold-up during the campaign, together with a material balance over the campaign. The paper examines the possibility of applying this measure to process plants in general, discusses means of minimizing the in-process inventory that must be determined by input/output analysis, and the performance required of the input and output analysis. It concludes that with current precision of measurement and with one input and one output batch per day, each measured, the method would be satisfactory for a campaign lasting nearly a year and involving 6 tonnes of plutonium. The paper examines the considerable advantages in verification that would arise from limiting safeguards analyses to the two points of input and output. (author)

  13. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  14. A study on the radioactive waste management for DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chun, Kwan Sik; Park, H. S.; Park, J. J.; Kim, J. H.; Cho, Y. H.; Shin, J. M.; Kim, Y. K.; Kim, J. S.; Kim, J. G.; Park, S. D.; Suh, M. Y.; Sohn, S. C.; Song, B. C.; Lee, C. H.; Jeon, Y. S.; Jo, K. S.; Jee, K. Y.; Jee, C. S.; Han, S. H.

    1997-09-01

    Part 1: The characteristics if the radioactive wastes coming from the DUPIC fuel manufacturing process were analyzed and evaluated. The gross {alpha}-activity and {alpha}-, {gamma}-spectrum of irradiated zircaloy specimens form KORI unit 1 were analyzed. In order to develop the trapping media of radioactive ruthenium oxides, trapping behavior of volatilized ruthenium oxides on various metal oxides or carbonates was analyzed. Fly ash was selected as a trapping materials for gaseous cesium. And reaction characteristics of CsNO{sub 3} and CsI with fly ash have been investigated. Also, trapping material were performed to test fly ash filter for removal of gaseous cesium under the air and hydrogen atmosphere. The applicability of fly ash to the vitrification of the spent filter was analyzed in the aspects of predictability, leachability. Good quality of Borosilicate glass was formed using Cesium spent filter. Offgas treatment system of DUPIC fuel manufacturing facility was designed and constructed in order to trap of gaseous radioactive waste from 100 batch of OREOXA furnace (the capacity : 500 g/batch). Part II: To develop chemical analysis techniques necessary for understanding chemical properties of the highly radioactive materials related to the development of DUPIC fuel cycle technology, the following basic studies were performed : dissolution of SIMFUEL (simulated fuel), determination of uranium by potentiometry and UV/Vis absorption spectrophotometry, separation of PWR spent fuel, group separation of fission products from uranium, individual separation for analysis of actinides, determination of free acid in a artificial dissolved solution of PWR spent fuel, group separation of fission products form uranium, individual separation of Sm from a mixed rare earth elements and measurement of its isotopes by TI-mass spectrometry, and characteristics of detectors in inductively coupled plasma atomic emission spectrometer (ICP-AES) suitable for analysis of trace fission

  15. A study on the radioactive waste management for DUPIC fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chun, Kwan Sik; Park, H. S.; Park, J. J.; Kim, J. H.; Cho, Y. H.; Shin, J. M.; Kim, Y. K.; Kim, J. S.; Kim, J. G.; Park, S. D.; Suh, M. Y.; Sohn, S. C.; Song, B. C.; Lee, C. H.; Jeon, Y. S.; Jo, K. S.; Jee, K. Y.; Jee, C. S.; Han, S. H.

    1997-09-01

    Part 1: The characteristics if the radioactive wastes coming from the DUPIC fuel manufacturing process were analyzed and evaluated. The gross α-activity and α-, γ-spectrum of irradiated zircaloy specimens form KORI unit 1 were analyzed. In order to develop the trapping media of radioactive ruthenium oxides, trapping behavior of volatilized ruthenium oxides on various metal oxides or carbonates was analyzed. Fly ash was selected as a trapping materials for gaseous cesium. And reaction characteristics of CsNO 3 and CsI with fly ash have been investigated. Also, trapping material were performed to test fly ash filter for removal of gaseous cesium under the air and hydrogen atmosphere. The applicability of fly ash to the vitrification of the spent filter was analyzed in the aspects of predictability, leachability. Good quality of Borosilicate glass was formed using Cesium spent filter. Offgas treatment system of DUPIC fuel manufacturing facility was designed and constructed in order to trap of gaseous radioactive waste from 100 batch of OREOXA furnace (the capacity : 500 g/batch). Part II: To develop chemical analysis techniques necessary for understanding chemical properties of the highly radioactive materials related to the development of DUPIC fuel cycle technology, the following basic studies were performed : dissolution of SIMFUEL (simulated fuel), determination of uranium by potentiometry and UV/Vis absorption spectrophotometry, separation of PWR spent fuel, group separation of fission products from uranium, individual separation for analysis of actinides, determination of free acid in a artificial dissolved solution of PWR spent fuel, group separation of fission products form uranium, individual separation of Sm from a mixed rare earth elements and measurement of its isotopes by TI-mass spectrometry, and characteristics of detectors in inductively coupled plasma atomic emission spectrometer (ICP-AES) suitable for analysis of trace fission products. (author

  16. Effect of DUPIC cycle on CANDU reactor safety parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mohamed, Nader M. A. [Atomic Energy Authority, ETRR-2, Cairo (Egypt); Badawi, Alya [Dept. of Nuclear and Radiation Engineering, Alexandria University, Alexandria (Egypt)

    2016-10-15

    Although, the direct use of spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel in CANda Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors (DUPIC) cycle is still under investigation, DUPIC cycle is a promising method for uranium utilization improvement, for reduction of high level nuclear waste, and for high degree of proliferation resistance. This paper focuses on the effect of DUPIC cycle on CANDU reactor safety parameters. MCNP6 was used for lattice cell simulation of a typical 3,411 MWth PWR fueled by UO{sub 2} enriched to 4.5w/o U-235 to calculate the spent fuel inventories after a burnup of 51.7 MWd/kgU. The code was also used to simulate the lattice cell of CANDU-6 reactor fueled with spent fuel after its fabrication into the standard 37-element fuel bundle. It is assumed a 5-year cooling time between the spent fuel discharges from the PWR to the loading into the CANDU-6. The simulation was carried out to calculate the burnup and the effect of DUPIC fuel on: (1) the power distribution amongst the fuel elements of the bundle; (2) the coolant void reactivity; and (3) the reactor point-kinetics parameters.

  17. Composition heterogeneity analysis for DUPIC fuel(I) - Statistical analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Hang Bok [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

    1999-08-01

    The fuel composition heterogeneity effect on reactor performance parameters was assessed by refueling simulations for three DUPIC fuel options of fuel composition heterogeneity control: the fissile content adjustment, the reactivity control by slightly enriched and depleted uranium, and the reactivity control by natural uranium. For each DUPIC fuel option, the simulations were performed using 30 heterogeneous fuel types which were determined by the agglomerative hierarchical clustering method. The heterogeneity effect was considered during the refueling simulation by randomly selecting fuel types for the refueling operation. The refueling simulations of the heterogeneous core have shown that the key performance parameters such as the maximum channel power (MCP), maximum bundle power (MBP), and channel power peaking factor (CPPF) are close to those of the core that has single fuel type. For the three DUPIC fuel options, the uncertainties of MCP, MBP, and CPPF due to the fuel composition heterogeneity are less than 0.6, 1.5 and 0.8%, respectively, including the uncertainty of the group-average fuel property. This study has shown that the three DUPIC fuel options reduces the composition heterogeneity effectively and the zone power control system has a sufficient margin to adjust the perturbations cased by the fuel composition heterogeneity. 15 refs., 28 figs.,10 tabs. (Author)

  18. Fabrication of Non-instrumented capsule for DUPIC simulated fuel irradiation test in HANARO

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, B.G.; Kang, Y.H.; Park, S.J.; Shin, Y.T. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea)

    1999-10-01

    In order to develope DUPIC nuclear fuel, the irradiation test for simulated DUPIC fuel was planed using a non-instrumented capsule in HANARO. Because DUPIC fuel is highly radioactive material the non-instrumented capsule for an irradiation test of simulated DUPIC fuel in HANARO was designed to remotely assemble and disassemble in hot cell. And then, according to the design requirements the non-instrumented DUPIC capsule was successfully manufactured. Also, the manufacturing technologies of the non-instrumented capsule for irradiating the nuclear fuel in HANARO were established, and the basic technology for the development of the instrumented capsule technology was accumulated. This report describes the manufacturing of the non-instrumented capsule for simulated DUPIC fuel. And, this report will be based to develope the instrumented capsule, which will be utilized to irradiate the nuclear fuel in HANARO. 26 refs., 4 figs. (Author)

  19. A study on the creep characteristics of simulated DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Kweon Ho; Ryu, H. J.; Kim, H. S.; Song, K. C.; Yang, M. S.; Na, S.

    2001-09-01

    Compression creep test was performed using simulated DUPIC fuel in the temperature range from 1773 to 1973 K under the stress range of 21 - 60 MPa. Creep rate and the activation energy were obtained. The activation energy for creep was 649.35 - 675.94 kJ/mol at the low stress region, where creep mechanism was controlled by diffusion. On the other hand, the activation energy at high stress region was 750.68 - 792.18 kJ/mol, where creep mechanism was controlled by dislocation motion. The activation energy for dislocation creep was higher than that for diffusion creep. The activation energy of reference simulated DUPIC fuel was higher than that of UO2

  20. Assessment of reactivity devices for CANDU-6 with DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Chang Joon; Choi, Hang Bok

    1998-01-01

    Reactivity device characteristics for a CANDU-6 reactor loaded with DUPIC fuel have been assessed. A transport code WIMS-AECL and a three-dimensional diffusion code RFSP were used for the lattice parameter generation and the core calculation, respectively. Three major reactivity devices have been assessed for their inherent functions. For the zone controller system, damping capability for spatial oscillation was investigated. The restart capability of the adjuster system was investigated. The shim operation and power stepback calculation were also performed to confirm the compatibility of the current adjuster rod system. The mechanical control absorber was assessed for the capability to compensate the temperature reactivity feedback following a power reduction. This study has shown that the current reactivity device systems retain their functions when used in a DUPIC fuel CANDU reactor

  1. A study on the direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors -Development of DUPIC fuel on manufacturing and quality control technology-

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Park, Hyun Soo; Lee, Yung Woo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-07-01

    Oxidation/reduction process was established after analysis of the effect of process parameter on the sintering behavior using SIMFUEL. Process equipment was studied more detail and some of process equipment items were designed and procured. The chemical analysing method of fission products and fissile content in DUPIC fuel was studied and the behavior and the characteristics of fission products in fuel was also done. Requirement for irradiation in HANARO was analysed to prepare performance evaluation. 100 figs, 48 tabs, 170 refs. (Author).

  2. A study on the direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors -Development of DUPIC fuel on manufacturing and quality control technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Park, Hyun Soo; Lee, Yung Woo

    1995-07-01

    Oxidation/reduction process was established after analysis of the effect of process parameter on the sintering behavior using SIMFUEL. Process equipment was studied more detail and some of process equipment items were designed and procured. The chemical analysing method of fission products and fissile content in DUPIC fuel was studied and the behavior and the characteristics of fission products in fuel was also done. Requirement for irradiation in HANARO was analysed to prepare performance evaluation. 100 figs, 48 tabs, 170 refs. (Author)

  3. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  4. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2011-01-01

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  5. The nuclear safeguards system and the process of global governance accountability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles, E-mail: xavier@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Coordenacao Geral de Planejamento e Avaliacao

    2011-07-01

    Due to rising energy costs and climate concerns, nuclear energy is again being seriously considered as an energy source for several countries. Along with the resurgence of nuclear energy comes the concern of the world if these countries will develop their programs for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If on one hand the growth potential of nuclear energy should not be stifled, on the other hand it is imperative that a climate of mutual trust is developed, respecting the right of each country to develop its nuclear program without taking a climate of mistrust to a possible 'intention' behind the pursuit of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mechanisms of accountability of global governance are institutionalized at the institutional architecture of the international process of nuclear safeguards, more specifically to the nuclear fuel cycle, so that abuses of power in this sphere does not happen, both by countries that aspire to develop projects nuclear, and by the suppliers of technology. In this context, the case study of Brazil and Argentina gained importance, because these two countries have a single binational organization of nuclear safeguards in the world: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC. In the theoretical question, the paper tries to understand what happens with the process of legitimacy and authority of the organizations of global governance by analyzing the degree of publicness and constrictiveness. This work intends to focus on the role of ABACC as an interstate institution of accountability, which has a key role to control the nation States of Brazil and Argentina regarding the appropriate use of nuclear material used in their programs, and analyze how this Agency behaves within of tension legitimacy-authority, taking into account existing studies on accountability in global governance. (author)

  6. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  7. A uranium enrichment facility safeguards technology based on the separation nozzle process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Weppner, J.; Didier, H.J.

    1979-01-01

    Under the Trilateral Agreement between Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany and the IAEA an enrichment plant operating on the basis of the separation nozzle process, will be safeguarded under INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. For nuclear materials balancing purposes the plant has been subdivided into 17 key measuring points to assess the nuclear material flow and the nuclear material inventory. Preliminary studies have indicated that the balancing accuracy required for safeguards purposes cannot be achieved by only using the foreseen in-plant measuring systems, since considerable quantities of enriched uranium cannot be covered in this way. This fraction will merely be estimated by the operator and thus cannot be verified by the inspection authorities. The plant components, whose inventories could not be verified in the first estimate of the balancing accuracy referred to above by means of the in-plant measuring systems, also include the low-temperature separators of the cascade shoulder and the product. Assessing and verifying the inventories of these key measuring points is particularly important because of the enrichment (some 3% 235 U for the product) and the relatively large inventory and, hence, the considerable contribution to the balancing inaccuracy. An estimate of the balancing inaccuracy on the basis of the measuring uncertainties to be expected in the light of the present status of technology indicated values between 0.2 and 0.3% relative to the feed flow with semi-annual inventory-taking. However, this is based on the condition that the experiments planned to determine the inventories of cryogenic separators confirm the measuring uncertainties underlying the calculation

  8. AUTOMATED PROCESS MONITORING: APPLYING PROVEN AUTOMATION TECHNIQUES TO INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS NEEDS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    O'Hara, Matthew J.; Durst, Philip C.; Grate, Jay W.; Devol, Timothy A.; Egorov, Oleg; Clements, John P.

    2008-01-01

    Identification and quantification of specific alpha- and beta-emitting radionuclides in complex liquid matrices is highly challenging, and is typically accomplished through laborious wet chemical sample preparation and separations followed by analysis using a variety of detection methodologies (e.g., liquid scintillation, gas proportional counting, alpha energy analysis, mass spectrometry). Analytical results may take days or weeks to report. Chains of custody and sample security measures may also complicate or slow the analytical process. When an industrial process-scale plant requires the monitoring of specific radionuclides as an indication of the composition of its feed stream or of plant performance, radiochemical measurements must be fast, accurate, and reliable. Scientists at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have assembled a fully automated prototype Process Monitor instrument capable of a variety of tasks: automated sampling directly from a feed stream, sample digestion/analyte redox adjustment, chemical separations, radiochemical detection and data analysis/reporting. The system is compact, its components are fluidically inter-linked, and analytical results could be immediately transmitted to on- or off-site locations. The development of a rapid radiochemical Process Monitor for 99Tc in Hanford tank waste processing streams, capable of performing several measurements per hour, will be discussed in detail. More recently, the automated platform was modified to perform measurements of 90Sr in Hanford tank waste stimulant. The system exemplifies how automation could be integrated into reprocessing facilities to support international nuclear safeguards needs

  9. A safeguards verification technique for solution homogeneity and volume measurements in process tanks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suda, S.; Franssen, F.

    1987-01-01

    A safeguards verification technique is being developed for determining whether process-liquid homogeneity has been achieved in process tanks and for authenticating volume-measurement algorithms involving temperature corrections. It is proposed that, in new designs for bulk-handling plants employing automated process lines, bubbler probes and thermocouples be installed at several heights in key accountability tanks. High-accuracy measurements of density using an electromanometer can now be made which match or even exceed analytical-laboratory accuracies. Together with regional determination of tank temperatures, these measurements provide density, liquid-column weight and temperature gradients over the fill range of the tank that can be used to ascertain when the tank solution has reached equilibrium. Temperature-correction algorithms can be authenticated by comparing the volumes obtained from the several bubbler-probe liquid-height measurements, each based on different amounts of liquid above and below the probe. The verification technique is based on the automated electromanometer system developed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL). The IAEA has recently approved the purchase of a stainless-steel tank equipped with multiple bubbler and thermocouple probes for installation in its Bulk Calibration Laboratory at IAEA Headquarters, Vienna. The verification technique is scheduled for preliminary trials in late 1987

  10. Filtering with the Centered Moving Median to Effectively Monitor Solution Processes for Safeguard Purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richir, Patrice; Dzbikowicz, Zdzislaw [Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre (JRC), European Commission, Ispra, Varese (Italy)

    2012-06-15

    Reprocessing plants require continuous and integrated safeguards activities by inspectors of the IAEA and Euratom because of their proliferation-sensitivity as complex facilities handling large quantities of direct use nuclear material. In support of both organizations, the JRC has developed a solution monitoring software package (DAI, Data Analysis and Interpretation) which has been implemented in the main commercial European reprocessing plants and which allows enhanced monitoring of nuclear materials in the processed solutions. This tool treats data acquired from different sensor types (e.g. from pressure transducers monitoring the solution levels in tanks). Collected signals are often noisy because of the instrumentation itself and/or because of ambient and operational conditions (e.g. pumps, ventilation systems or electromagnetic interferences) and therefore require filtering. Filtering means reduction of information and has to be applied correctly to avoid misinterpretation of the process steps. This paper describes the study of some filters one of which is the centered moving median which has been revealed as a powerful tool for solution monitoring.

  11. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  12. A study on the direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. DUPIC facility engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Hyun Soo; Lee, Jae Sul; Choi, Jong Won [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-07-01

    This report summarizes the second year progress of phase II of DUPIC program which aims to verify experimentally the feasibility of direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors. The project is to provide the experimental facilities and technologies that are required to perform the DUPIC experiment. As an early part of the project, engineering analysis of those facilities and construction of mock-up facility are described. Another scope of the project is to assess the DUPIC fuel cycle system and facilitate international cooperation. The progresses in this scope of work made during the fiscal year are also summarized in the report. 38 figs, 44 tabs, 8 refs. (Author).

  13. Spectroscopic methods of process monitoring for safeguards of used nuclear fuel separations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Warburton, Jamie Lee

    To support the demonstration of a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel processing plant, techniques and instrumentation to allow the real-time, online determination of special nuclear material concentrations in-process must be developed. An ideal materials accountability technique for proliferation resistance should provide nondestructive, realtime, on-line information of metal and ligand concentrations in separations streams without perturbing the process. UV-Visible spectroscopy can be adapted for this precise purpose in solvent extraction-based separations. The primary goal of this project is to understand fundamental URanium EXtraction (UREX) and Plutonium-URanium EXtraction (PUREX) reprocessing chemistry and corresponding UV-Visible spectroscopy for application in process monitoring for safeguards. By evaluating the impact of process conditions, such as acid concentration, metal concentration and flow rate, on the sensitivity of the UV-Visible detection system, the process-monitoring concept is developed from an advanced application of fundamental spectroscopy. Systematic benchtop-scale studies investigated the system relevant to UREX or PUREX type reprocessing systems, encompassing 0.01-1.26 M U and 0.01-8 M HNO3. A laboratory-scale TRansUranic Extraction (TRUEX) demonstration was performed and used both to analyze for potential online monitoring opportunities in the TRUEX process, and to provide the foundation for building and demonstrating a laboratory-scale UREX demonstration. The secondary goal of the project is to simulate a diversion scenario in UREX and successfully detect changes in metal concentration and solution chemistry in a counter current contactor system with a UV-Visible spectroscopic process monitor. UREX uses the same basic solvent extraction flowsheet as PUREX, but has a lower acid concentration throughout and adds acetohydroxamic acid (AHA) as a complexant/reductant to the feed solution to prevent the extraction of Pu. By examining

  14. Minor isotope safeguards techniques (MIST): Analysis and visualization of gas centrifuge enrichment plant process data using the MSTAR model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shephard, Adam M.; Thomas, Benjamin R.; Coble, Jamie B.; Wood, Houston G.

    2018-05-01

    This paper presents a development related to the use of minor isotope safeguards techniques (MIST) and the MSTAR cascade model as it relates to the application of international nuclear safeguards at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The product of this paper is a derivation of the universal and dimensionless MSTAR cascade model. The new model can be used to calculate the minor uranium isotope concentrations in GCEP product and tails streams or to analyze, visualize, and interpret GCEP process data as part of MIST. Applications of the new model include the detection of undeclared feed and withdrawal streams at GCEPs when used in conjunction with UF6 sampling and/or other isotopic measurement techniques.

  15. Assessment of CANDU-6 reactivity devices for DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Chang Joon; Choi, Hang Bok

    1998-11-01

    Reactivity device characteristics for a CANDU 6 reactor loaded with DUPIC fuel have been assessed. The lattice parameters were generated by WIMS-AECL code and the core calculations were performed by RFSP code with a 3-dimensional full core model. The reactivity devices studied are the zone controller, adjusters, mechanical control absorber and shutoff rods. For the zone controller system, damping capability for spatial oscillation was investigated. For the adjusters, the restart capability was investigated. For the adjusters, the restart capability was investigated. The shin operation and power stepback calculation were also performed to confirm the compatibility of the current adjuster system. The mechanical control absorber was assessed for the function of compensating temperature reactivity feedback following a power reduction. And shutoff rods were also assessed to investigate the following a power reduction. And shutoff rods were also assessed to investigate the static reactivity worth. This study has shown that the current reactivity device system of CANDU-6 core with the DUPIC fuel. (author). 9 refs., 17 tabs., 7 figs

  16. Study of burnable poison in the dupic cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Silva, Clarysson A.M. da; Almeida, Michel C.B. de; Faria, Rochkhudson B. de; Moreira, Arthur P.C.; Pereira, Claubia, E-mail: clarysson@nuclear.ufmg.br, E-mail: claubia@nuclear.ufmg.br [Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, MG (Brazil). Departamento de Engenharia Nuclear

    2017-07-01

    Recent studies confirm the potential of using reprocessed PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) fuels in the CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium) reactor fuel cycle. An important proposal is the 'Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU' (DUPIC) cycle, where spent fuels from a PWR are packaged into a CANDU fuel bundle with only mechanical reprocessing (cut into pieces) but no chemical reprocessing. The fissile contents of the spent fuel from Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) are about 1.5 wt%, which is higher than that of the fuel of CANDU. When this reactor is reload with reprocessed fuel, the reactivity of system will increase and this behavior may affect the safety parameters of reactor. To reduce the initial reactivity, Burnable Poison (BP) can be inserted in the fuel bundle of CANDU. In this way, the present paper evaluates the insertion of the different types of BP considering the DUPIC cycle. The following BPs were evaluated: Boron, Cadmium, Dysprosium, Erbium, Europium, Gadolinium, Hafnium and Samarium. The goal is to verify the neutronic behavior of the fuel bundle at steady state and during the reactor burnup. The SCALE 6.0 (Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation) code was employed to model a standard CANDU-6 fuel element. (author)

  17. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  18. Progress of the DUPIC fuel compatibility analysis (II) - thermal-hydraulics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Joo Hwan; Choi, Hang Bok

    2005-03-01

    Thermal-hydraulic compatibility of the DUPIC fuel bundle with a 713 MWe Canada deuterium uranium (CANDU-6) reactor was studied by using both the single channel and sub-channel analysis methods. The single channel analysis provides the fuel channel flow rate, pressure drop, critical channel power, and the channel exit quality, which are assessed against the thermal-hydraulic design requirements of the CANDU-6 reactor. The single channel analysis by the NUCIRC code showed that the thermal-hydraulic performance of the DUPIC fuel is not different from that of the standard CANDU fuel. Regarding the local flow characteristics, the sub-channel analysis also showed that the uncertainty of the critical channel power calculation for the DUPIC fuel channel is very small. As a result, both the single and sub-channel analyses showed that the key thermal-hydraulic parameters of the DUPIC fuel channel do not deteriorate compared to the standard CANDU fuel channel.

  19. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  20. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  1. An assessment of thermal behavior of the DUPIC fuel bundle by subchannel analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jee Won.

    1997-12-01

    Thermal behavior of the standard DUPIC fuel has been assessed. The DUPIC fuel bundle has been modeled for a subchannel analysis using the ASSERT-IV code which was developed by AECL. From the calculated mixture enthalpy, equilibrium quality and void fraction distributions of the DUPIC fuel bundle, it is found that net buoyancy effect is pronounced in the central region of the DUPIC fuel bundle when compared with the standard CANDU fuel bundle. It is also found that the central region of the DUPIC fuel bundle can be cooled more efficiently than that of the standard fuel bundle. Based upon the subchannel modeling used in this study, the location of minimum CHFR in the DUPIC fuel bundle has been found to be very similar to that of the standard fuel. From the calculated mixture enthalpy distribution at the exit of the fuel channel, it is found that the mixture enthalpy and void fraction can be highest in the peripheral region of the DUPIC fuel bundle. On the other hand, the enthalpy and the void fraction was found to be highest in the central region of the standard CANDU fuel bundle at the exit of the fuel channel. Since the transverse interchange model between subchannels is important for the behavior of these variables, it is needed to put more effort in validating the transverse interchange model. For the purpose of investigating influence of thermal-hydraulic parameter variations of the DUPIC fuel bundle, four different values of the channel flow rates were used in the subchannel analysis. The effect of the channel flow reduction on thermal-hydraulic parameters have been presented. This study shows that the subchannel analysis is very useful in assessing thermal behavior of the fuel bundles in CANDU reactors. (author). 12 refs., 3 tabs., 17 figs

  2. Compatibility analysis of DUPIC fuel (Part II) - Reactor physics design and analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Chang Joon; Choi, Hang Bok; Rhee, Bo Wook; Roh, Gyu Hong; Kim, Do Hun [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    2000-03-01

    The compatibility analysis of the DUPIC fuel in a CANDU reactor has been assessed. This study includes the fuel composition adjustment, comparison of lattice properties, performance analysis of reactivity devices, determination of regional over-power (ROP) trip setpoint, and uncertainty estimation of core performance parameters. For the DUPIC fuel composition adjustment, three options have been proposed, which can produce uniform neutronic characteristics of the DUPIC fuel. The lattice analysis has shown that the characteristics of the DUPIC fuel is compatible with those of natural uranium fuel. The reactivity devices of the CANDU-6 reactor maintain their functional requirements even for the DUPIC fuel system. The ROP analysis has shown that the trip setpoint is not sacrificed for the DUPIC fuel system owing to the power shape that enhances more thermal margin. The uncertainty analysis of the core performance parameter has shown that the uncertainty associated with the fuel composition variation is reduced appreciably, which is primarily due to the fuel composition adjustment and secondly the on-power refueling feature and spatial control function of the CANDU reactor. The reactor physics calculation has also shown that it is feasible to use spent PWR fuel directly in CANDU reactors without deteriorating the CANDU-6 core physics design requirements. 29 refs., 67 figs., 60 tabs. (Author)

  3. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  4. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  5. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  6. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  7. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  8. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  9. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  10. A study on the thermal expansion characteristics of simulated spent fuel and simulated DUPIC fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kang, Kweon Ho; Ryu, H. J.; Kim, H. S.; Song, K. C.; Yang, M. S.

    2001-10-01

    Thermal expansions of simulated spent PWR fuel and simulated DUPIC fuel were studied using a dilatometer in the temperature range from 298 to 1900 K. The densities of simulated spent PWR fuel and simulated DUPIC fuel used in the measurement were 10.28 g/cm3 (95.35 % of TD) and 10.26 g/cm3 (95.14 % of TD), respectively. Their linear thermal expansions of simulated fuels are higher than that of UO2, and the difference between these fuels and UO2 increases progressively as temperature increases. However, the difference between simulated spent PWR fuel and simulated DUPIC fuel can hardly be observed. For the temperature range from 298 to 1900 K, the values of the average linear thermal expansion coefficients for simulated spent PWR fuel and simulated DUPIC fuel are 1.391 10-5 and 1.393 10-5 K-1, respectively. As temperature increases to 1900 K, the relative densities of simulated spent PWR fuel and simulated DUPIC fuel decrease to 93.81 and 93.76 % of initial densities at 298 K, respectively

  11. Regional overpower protection system analysis for a DUPIC fuel CANDU core

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Chang Joon; Choi, Hang Bok; Park, Jee Won

    2003-06-01

    The regional overpower protection (ROP) system was assessed a CANDU 6 reactor with the DUPIC fuel, including the validation of the WIMS/RFSP/ROVER-F code system used for the estimation of ROP trip setpoint. The validation calculation has shown that it is valid to use the WIMS/RFSP/ROVER-F code system for ROP system analysis of the CANDU 6 core. For the DUPIC core, the ROP trip setpoint was estimated to be 125.7%, which is almost the same as that of the standard natural uranium core. This study has shown that the DUPIC fuel does not hurt the current ROP trip setpoint designed for the natural uranium CANDU 6 reactor

  12. Development of the high temperature sintering furnace for DUPIC fuel fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jung Won; Kim, B. G.; Park, J. J.; Yang, M. S.; Kim, K. H.; Kim, J. H.; Cho, K. H.; Lee, D. Y.; Lee, Y. S.

    1998-11-01

    This report describes the development of the high temperature sintering furnace for manufacturing DUPIC (Direct Use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors) fuel pellets. The furnace has to be remotely operated and maintained in a high radioactive hot cell using master-slave manipulators. The high temperature sintering furnace for manufacturing DUPIC fuel pellets, which is satisfied with the requirements of remote operation and maintenance in a hot cell, was successfully developed and installed in the M6 hot cell at IMEF (Irradiated Material Examination Facility). The functional and thermal performance test was also successfully completed. The technology accumulated during developing this sintering furnace became the basis of other DUPIC equipment development, and will be very helpful in the development of equipment for use in hot cell in the future. (author). 20 figs

  13. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  14. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  15. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  16. Sensitivity analysis on various parameters for lattice analysis of DUPIC fuel with WIMS-AECL code

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Roh, Gyu Hong; Choi, Hang Bok; Park, Jee Won [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1997-12-31

    The code WIMS-AECL has been used for the lattice analysis of DUPIC fuel. The lattice parameters calculated by the code is sensitive to the choice of number of parameters, such as the number of tracking lines, number of condensed groups, mesh spacing in the moderator region, other parameters vital to the calculation of probabilities and burnup analysis. We have studied this sensitivity with respect to these parameters and recommend their proper values which are necessary for carrying out the lattice analysis of DUPIC fuel.

  17. Sensitivity analysis on various parameters for lattice analysis of DUPIC fuel with WIMS-AECL code

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Roh, Gyu Hong; Choi, Hang Bok; Park, Jee Won [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1998-12-31

    The code WIMS-AECL has been used for the lattice analysis of DUPIC fuel. The lattice parameters calculated by the code is sensitive to the choice of number of parameters, such as the number of tracking lines, number of condensed groups, mesh spacing in the moderator region, other parameters vital to the calculation of probabilities and burnup analysis. We have studied this sensitivity with respect to these parameters and recommend their proper values which are necessary for carrying out the lattice analysis of DUPIC fuel.

  18. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  19. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  20. Status of safeguards instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing safeguards at some nuclear power reactors, 50 bulk processing facilities, and 170 research facilities. Its verification activities require the use of instruments to measure nuclear materials and of surveillance instruments to maintain continuity of knowledge of the locations of nuclear materials. Instruments that are in use and under development to measure weight, volume, concentration, and isotopic composition of nuclear materials, and the major surveillance instruments, are described in connection with their uses at representative nuclear facilities. The current status of safeguards instrumentation and the needs for future development are discussed

  1. AECL's progress in developing the DUPIC fuel fabrication process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, J.D.; Cox, D.S.

    1995-01-01

    Spent Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel can be used directly in CANDU reactors without the need for wet chemical reprocessing or reenrichment. Considerable experimental progress has been made in verifying the practicality of this fuel cycle, including hot-cell experiments using spent PWR fuels and out-cell trials using surrogate fuels. This paper describes the current status of these experiments. (author)

  2. 45 CFR 310.15 - What are the safeguards and processes that comprehensive Tribal IV-D agencies must have in place...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false What are the safeguards and processes that... IV-D Systems and Office Automation? 310.15 Section 310.15 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to... AND OFFICE AUTOMATION Requirements for Computerized Tribal IV-D Systems and Office Automation § 310.15...

  3. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  4. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  5. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

    2013-01-01

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  6. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petit, A.

    1991-01-01

    The IAEA has now 200 Inspectors or so, and Euratom a similar number. People in Vienna are talking about increases of this staff, in the range of a possible doubling in the five years to come, although even an immediate restart of the expansion of nuclear industry, would not materialize significantly within this period. This means that keeping the same safeguarding approach would probably lead to another doubling of such staff in the ten following years, which is completely unrealistic. Such a staff is our of proportion with those of national inspectorates in other fields. The paper analyzes the basic irrealistic dogma which have hindered the progress of international safeguards, and recall the suggestions made since ten years to improve them

  7. The Design Features of the Double-Banked AMBIDEXTER Utilizing DUPIC Fuel

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ham, Tae Kyu [KHNP Central Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, Young Joon; Hong, Sung Taek [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Seo, Myung Hwan [Korea Radioactive Waste Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kwon, Tae An [KHNP, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Oh, Se Kee [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Since the on-site spent fuel storage capabilities at reactors in Korea are expected to be saturated in a few years, the government has been pressed to find a solution for the spent nuclear fuel. So far one of workable means for reducing the load would be utilizing DUPIC fuel cycle technology. The technology was developed through Korea-Canada-U.S. collaboration to utilize the LWR spent fuel for the CANDU reactor. However, by various sociopolitical reasons, the DUPIC technology has not been yet commercialized. As the other alternatives to use the DUPIC technology, Gen-IV reactors would be pertinent. In the following session, the design features of a molten salt reactor system that can burn DUPIC fuel are explained. The followings are derived as conclusions after considering all the factors; The AMDEC, compared to ORIGEN2 simulations, can calculate the nuclides concentration changes within 1% deviation in various core zones and reactor system components by using different library sets which are weighted with each neutron spectrum; Fuel-flow effects coupled with nuclear reactions is well reflected in the AMDEC.

  8. The installation and performance test of the surveillance system for DUPIC facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Dong Young; Kim, Ho Dong; Cha, Hong Ryul

    2000-07-01

    We have developed the real time surveillance system, named by DSSS, for DUPIC test facility. The system acquires data from He-3 neutron monitors(DSNM) and CCD cameras to automatically diagnose the transportation status of nuclear material. This technical report shortly illustrates important features of hardware and software of the system

  9. The installation and performance test of the surveillance system for DUPIC facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Dong Young; Kim, Ho Dong; Cha, Hong Ryul

    2000-07-01

    We have developed the real time surveillance system, named by DSSS, for DUPIC test facility. The system acquires data from He-3 neutron monitors(DSNM) and CCD cameras to automatically diagnose the transportation status of nuclear material. This technical report shortly illustrates important features of hardware and software of the system.

  10. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

  11. Knowledge-based inspection:modelling complex processes with the integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abazi, F.

    2011-01-01

    Increased level of complexity in almost every discipline and operation today raises the demand for knowledge in order to successfully run an organization whether to generate profit or to attain a non-profit mission. Traditional way of transferring knowledge to information systems rich in data structures and complex algorithms continue to hinder the ability to swiftly turnover concepts into operations. Diagrammatic modelling commonly applied in engineering in order to represent concepts or reality remains to be an excellent way of converging knowledge from domain experts. The nuclear verification domain represents ever more a matter which has great importance to the World safety and security. Demand for knowledge about nuclear processes and verification activities used to offset potential misuse of nuclear technology will intensify with the growth of the subject technology. This Doctoral thesis contributes with a model-based approach for representing complex process such as nuclear inspections. The work presented contributes to other domains characterized with knowledge intensive and complex processes. Based on characteristics of a complex process a conceptual framework was established as the theoretical basis for creating a number of modelling languages to represent the domain. The integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM) is formalized through an integrated meta-model. The diagrammatic modelling languages represent the verification domain and relevant nuclear verification aspects. Such a meta-model conceptualizes the relation between practices of process management, knowledge management and domain specific verification principles. This fusion is considered as necessary in order to create quality processes. The study also extends the formalization achieved through a meta-model by contributing with a formalization language based on Pattern Theory. Through the use of graphical and mathematical constructs of the theory, process structures are formalized enhancing

  12. Safeguards through secure automated fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMerschman, A.W.; Carlson, R.L.

    1982-01-01

    Westinghouse Hanford Company, a prime contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, is constructing the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) line for fabrication of mixed oxide breeder fuel pins. Fuel processing by automation, which provides a separation of personnel from fuel handling, will provide a means whereby advanced safeguards concepts will be introduced. Remote operations and the inter-tie between the process computer and the safeguards computer are discussed

  13. Solution Monitoring Evaluated by Proliferation Risk Assessment and Fuzzy Optimization Analysis for Safeguards in a Reprocessing Process

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mitsutoshi Suzuki

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Solution monitoring (SM has been used in a nuclear reprocessing plant as an additional measure to provide assurance that the plant is operated as declared. The inline volume and density monitoring equipment with dip tubes is important for safety and safeguards purposes and is a typical example of safeguards by design (SBD. Recently safety, safeguards, and security by design (3SBD are proposed to promote an efficient and effective generation of nuclear energy. In 3SBD, proliferation risk assessment has the potential to consider likelihood of the incidence and proliferation risk in safeguards. In this study, risk assessment methodologies for safeguards and security are discussed and several mathematical methods are presented to investigate risk notion applied to intentional acts of facility misuse in an uncertainty environment. Proliferation risk analysis with the Markov model, deterrence effect with the game model, and SBD with fuzzy optimization are shown in feasibility studies to investigate the potential application of the risk and uncertainty analyses in safeguards. It is demonstrated that the SM is an effective measurement system using risk-informed and cost-effective SBD, even though there are inherent difficulties related to the possibility of operator’s falsification.

  14. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  15. J. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    Like many drugs, poisons, and explosives in common use in our society today, nuclear materials are dangerous. This was recognised well before the advent of nuclear power, and precautions have been taken to isolate the substances from the environment. The expected expansion of nuclear power generation, and consequent proliferation of the materials, has caused opponents of the industry to voice pessimism over the ability of the authorities to contain these substances. The author discusses the dangers associated with the illicit use of nuclear materials, and the safeguards employed to minimise the risks arising from the commercial exploitation of nuclear power

  16. The use of safeguards data for process monitoring in the Advanced Test Line for Actinide Separations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnes, J.W.; Yarbro, S.L.

    1987-01-01

    Los Alamos is constructing an integrated process monitoring/materials control and accounting (PM/MC and A) system in the Advanced Testing Line for Actinide Separations (ATLAS) at the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility. The ATLAS will test and demonstrate new methods for aqueous processing of plutonium. The ATLAS will also develop, test, and demonstrate the concepts for integrated process monitoring/materials control and accounting. We describe how this integrated PM/MC and A system will function and provide benefits to both process research and materials accounting personnel

  17. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron

    2008-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant's large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis

  18. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  19. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  20. Process control and safeguards system plutonium inventory conrol for MOX fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishima, T.; Aoki, M.; Muto, T.; Amanuma, T.

    1979-01-01

    The plutonium inventory control (PINC) system is a real-time material accountability control system that is expected to be applied to a new large-scale plutonium fuel production facility for both fast breeder reactor and heavy water reactor at the Power Reactor and Nuclear Development Corporation. The PINC is basically a system for material control but is expected to develop into a whole facility control system, including criticality control, process control, quality control, facility protection, and so forth. Under PINC, every process and storage area is divided into a unit area, which is the smallest unit for both accountability and process control. Item and material weight automatically are accounted for at every unit area, and data are simultaneously treated by a computer network system. Sensors necessary for the system are being developed. 9 figures

  1. The IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

    1976-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

  2. A Trusted Autonomic Architecture to Safeguard Cyber-Physical Control Leaf Nodes and Protect Process Integrity

    OpenAIRE

    Chiluvuri, Nayana Teja

    2015-01-01

    Cyber-physical systems are networked through IT infrastructure and susceptible to malware. Threats targeting process control are much more safety-critical than traditional computing systems since they jeopardize the integrity of physical infrastructure. Existing defence mechanisms address security at the network nodes but do not protect the physical infrastructure if network integrity is compromised. An interface guardian architecture is implemented on cyber-physical control leaf nodes to mai...

  3. Application Security for the Android Platform Processes, Permissions, and Other Safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Six, Jeff

    2011-01-01

    This book will educate readers on the need for application security and secure coding practices when designing any app. No prior knowledge of security or secure programming techniques is assumed. The book will discuss the need for such practices, how the Android environment is structured with respect to security considerations, what services and techniques are available on the platform to protect data, and how developers can build and code applications that address the risk to their applications and the data processed by them. This text is especially important now, as Android is fast becoming

  4. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chare, P.; Dutrannois, A.; Kloeckner, W.; Swinhoe, M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  5. Economic compensation standard for irrigation processes to safeguard environmental flows in the Yellow River Estuary, China

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pang, Aiping; Sun, Tao; Yang, Zhifeng

    2013-03-01

    SummaryAgriculture and ecosystems are increasingly competing for water. We propose an approach to assess the economic compensation standard required to release water from agricultural use to ecosystems while taking into account seasonal variability in river flow. First, we defined agricultural water shortage as the difference in water volume between agricultural demands and actual supply after maintaining environmental flows for ecosystems. Second, we developed a production loss model to establish the relationship between production losses and agricultural water shortages in view of seasonal variation in river discharge. Finally, we estimated the appropriate economic compensation for different irrigation stakeholders based on crop prices and production losses. A case study in the Yellow River Estuary, China, demonstrated that relatively stable economic compensation for irrigation processes can be defined based on the developed model, taking into account seasonal variations in river discharge and different levels of environmental flow. Annual economic compensation is not directly related to annual water shortage because of the temporal variability in river flow rate and environmental flow. Crops that have stable planting areas to guarantee food security should be selected as indicator crops in economic compensation assessments in the important grain production zone. Economic compensation may be implemented by creating funds to update water-saving measures in agricultural facilities.

  6. Development of remote equipment for a DUPIC fuel fabrication at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jungwon; Kim, Kiho; Park, Geunil; Yang, Myungseung; Song, Keechan

    2007-01-01

    The DUPIC (Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactors) technology is to directly refabricate CANDU fuel from spent PWR fuel without any separation of the fissile materials and fission products. Thus, the DUPIC fuel material always remains in a highly radioactive state, which requires a remote fuel fabrication in a hot-cell. About 25 pieces of remote equipment including auxiliary systems such as a hot-cell shield plug were developed and installed in a hot cell. In order to supply a high electric current to a sintering furnace in-cell from an outside cell, a shield plug was developed. It consists of three components - a steel shield plug with an embedded spiral cooling line, stepped copper bus bars, and a shielding lead block. Experiments to evaluate the performance of the sintering furnace with the developed shield plug were carried out. It was concluded that, from the experimental results, the newly developed hot-cell shield plug satisfied all the requirements for a remote operation on a sintering furnace. DUPIC fuel pellets and elements were successfully fabricated with the developed remote equipment. (authors)

  7. A collaboration on extended INPRO case study of the DUPIC fuel cycle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, J. H.; Yang, M. S.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-05-15

    Since 1992, KAERI, AECL, United States Department of States(USDOS) and IAEA have performed the DUPIC fuel cycle development activities as an international cooperative research program, which has now been chosen as a target nuclear system for an INPRO case study. This study will focus on a further improvement and modification of the basic principles, user requirements and acceptance limits, which are defined in the IAEA-TECDOC-1434 for an evaluation of its proliferation-resistance through a proliferation-resistance assessment of the whole fuel cycle of DUPIC based on the INPRO methodology. In order to further develop an evaluation method for a proliferation-resistance based on the INPRO methodology, the basic principles, user requirements and acceptance limits of a proliferation-resistance was reviewed and quantified. Then the evaluation model (material flow, facility scale, reference fuel, etc.) of the DUPIC fuel cycle was developed and a proliferation-resistance assessment of the DUPIC fuel cycle including the PWR fuel cycle was performed by using the revised INPRO methodology in the area of a proliferation resistance. Also, the recommendations for a further improvement of INPRO methodology were suggested through examining the INPRO methodology for a proliferation resistance assessment. Through the proliferation resistance assessment of the whole fuel cycle of DUPIC including the PWR fuel cycle, the proliferation-resistance methodology was updated and re-established. And based on its experience, The research results can be used not only to evaluate and determine the future domestic proliferation-resistant fuel cycles which were derived from the GEN{sub I}V or INPRO programs but also to improve a system design to enhance its proliferation resistance. The present results will be utilized for the development of an INPRO User's Manual which is being developed as an important issue by IAEA. The credibility of the research results were ensured by the IAEA

  8. A collaboration on extended INPRO case study of the DUPIC fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, J. H.; Yang, M. S.; Ko, W. I.

    2007-05-01

    Since 1992, KAERI, AECL, United States Department of States(USDOS) and IAEA have performed the DUPIC fuel cycle development activities as an international cooperative research program, which has now been chosen as a target nuclear system for an INPRO case study. This study will focus on a further improvement and modification of the basic principles, user requirements and acceptance limits, which are defined in the IAEA-TECDOC-1434 for an evaluation of its proliferation-resistance through a proliferation-resistance assessment of the whole fuel cycle of DUPIC based on the INPRO methodology. In order to further develop an evaluation method for a proliferation-resistance based on the INPRO methodology, the basic principles, user requirements and acceptance limits of a proliferation-resistance was reviewed and quantified. Then the evaluation model (material flow, facility scale, reference fuel, etc.) of the DUPIC fuel cycle was developed and a proliferation-resistance assessment of the DUPIC fuel cycle including the PWR fuel cycle was performed by using the revised INPRO methodology in the area of a proliferation resistance. Also, the recommendations for a further improvement of INPRO methodology were suggested through examining the INPRO methodology for a proliferation resistance assessment. Through the proliferation resistance assessment of the whole fuel cycle of DUPIC including the PWR fuel cycle, the proliferation-resistance methodology was updated and re-established. And based on its experience, The research results can be used not only to evaluate and determine the future domestic proliferation-resistant fuel cycles which were derived from the GEN I V or INPRO programs but also to improve a system design to enhance its proliferation resistance. The present results will be utilized for the development of an INPRO User's Manual which is being developed as an important issue by IAEA. The credibility of the research results were ensured by the IAEA Consultant

  9. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  10. IAEA safeguards: Staying ahead of the game

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    What are nuclear safeguards and why are they important? Answers are provided in the booklet, describing and explaining the fundamentals of the IAEA safeguards system and its role as a key element of international security, and addressing the system's implementation, costs, requirements, resources and historical development, with an emphasis on trends and strengthening measures over the past 10-15 years. Topics discussed include the safeguards State evaluation process and and the key requirements of the safeguards system including information sources (open source information, commercial satellite imagery and nuclear trade related information) and the state of the art equipment, techniques and technology (unattended and remote monitoring equipment, environmental sampling, etc.)

  11. Safeguards for the atom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-10-15

    the Agency to set up a system of safeguards that would guarantee that no nuclear material at all could be diverted to unauthorized use. What the Agency intends is to apply its safeguards in such a manner as to achieve a high probability of detecting the diversion of even small quantities of materials, and when larger quantities are involved, to make detection almost certain. The need for safeguards would obviously arise in the case of fissile materials, because of their possible use in the production of weapons. The Agency safeguards may, therefore, be applied - depending on the quantity and other factors involved - to all types of these materials, namely natural uranium, thorium, enriched uranium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and plutonium. The greater the quantity of the actual fissile substances involved and the greater the possibility of diversion, the greater will be the need for safeguards. Details of the safeguards procedures are yet to be finally approved. Broadly speaking, they are expected to provide, inter alia, for the approval by the Agency of designs of facilities or installations in which materials subject to Agency safeguards are to be used, processed, recovered, produced or stored; the maintenance by the State concerned of records concerning accountability, inventory, operation and waste disposal; submission of periodic reports to the Agency; the deposit of excess fissile materials with the Agency; and visits by Agency representatives to the locations where the materials or facilities provided by the Agency are in use. Procedures for the application of health and safety measures will be set out in similar detail. The Agency has already provided for the application of Agency safeguards to the project under which Japan has bought from it three tons of natural uranium for use in a research reactor. A number of bilateral agreements also contain clauses referring to the possible application of Agency safeguards to projects to be carried out under the

  12. Safeguards for the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    the Agency to set up a system of safeguards that would guarantee that no nuclear material at all could be diverted to unauthorized use. What the Agency intends is to apply its safeguards in such a manner as to achieve a high probability of detecting the diversion of even small quantities of materials, and when larger quantities are involved, to make detection almost certain. The need for safeguards would obviously arise in the case of fissile materials, because of their possible use in the production of weapons. The Agency safeguards may, therefore, be applied - depending on the quantity and other factors involved - to all types of these materials, namely natural uranium, thorium, enriched uranium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and plutonium. The greater the quantity of the actual fissile substances involved and the greater the possibility of diversion, the greater will be the need for safeguards. Details of the safeguards procedures are yet to be finally approved. Broadly speaking, they are expected to provide, inter alia, for the approval by the Agency of designs of facilities or installations in which materials subject to Agency safeguards are to be used, processed, recovered, produced or stored; the maintenance by the State concerned of records concerning accountability, inventory, operation and waste disposal; submission of periodic reports to the Agency; the deposit of excess fissile materials with the Agency; and visits by Agency representatives to the locations where the materials or facilities provided by the Agency are in use. Procedures for the application of health and safety measures will be set out in similar detail. The Agency has already provided for the application of Agency safeguards to the project under which Japan has bought from it three tons of natural uranium for use in a research reactor. A number of bilateral agreements also contain clauses referring to the possible application of Agency safeguards to projects to be carried out under the

  13. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Hebditch, David; Morgan, Jim; Meppen, Bruce; DeMuth, Scott; Ehinger, Michael; Hockert, John

    2008-01-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing 'nuclear security' risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as 'the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,' with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: (sm b ullet) Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, (sm b ullet) Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, (sm b ullet) Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of 'nuclear security' considerations as 'full and equal' partners in the design process, (sm b ullet) Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and (sm b ullet) Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic

  14. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krichinsky, Alan M.; Bates, Bruce E.; Chesser, Joel B.; Koo, Sinsze; Whitaker, J. Michael

    2009-01-01

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F and W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F and W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F and W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F and W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF 6 F and W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF 6 . The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under

  15. International safeguards 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1979-01-01

    First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

  16. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  17. IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

  18. A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

    2011-12-15

    Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

  19. A study on the direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU -A study on the radioactive waste management for DUPIC fuel cycle-

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Hyun Soo; Jun, Kwan Sik; Nah, Jung Won; Park, Jang Jin; Kim, Jong Hoh; Cho, Yung Hyun; Baek, Seung Woo; Shin, Jin Myung; Yang, Seung Yung [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1994-07-01

    The immobilization materials for radioactive wastes resulting from the DUPIC fuel manufacturing process were selected and their characteristics were evaluated. To predict the trapping behavior of the Ruthenium, a semi-volatile nuclide, its volatility was measured and thermogravimetric analysis were performed with simulated fuel. New Ruthenium trapping material was developed which is deposited on ceramic honey-comb monolith of cordierite. The base glass was manufactured with fly ash added to the borosilicate glass. The composition of the scrap waste was calculated based on the PWR spent fuel which has initial {sup 235}U content of 3.5%, burnup of 35,000 MWD/MTU and cooling time of 10 years. Simulated waste glass was manufactured, and its chemical durability was evaluated by soxhlet leach test. Radioactivity of non-oxidized cladding material were measured. The preliminary design criteria were prepared for off-gas treatment system in IMEF. 31 figs, 42 tabs, 51 refs. (Author).

  20. A study on the direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU -A study on the radioactive waste management for DUPIC fuel cycle-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Hyun Soo; Jun, Kwan Sik; Nah, Jung Won; Park, Jang Jin; Kim, Jong Hoh; Cho, Yung Hyun; Baek, Seung Woo; Shin, Jin Myung; Yang, Seung Yung

    1994-07-01

    The immobilization materials for radioactive wastes resulting from the DUPIC fuel manufacturing process were selected and their characteristics were evaluated. To predict the trapping behavior of the Ruthenium, a semi-volatile nuclide, its volatility was measured and thermogravimetric analysis were performed with simulated fuel. New Ruthenium trapping material was developed which is deposited on ceramic honey-comb monolith of cordierite. The base glass was manufactured with fly ash added to the borosilicate glass. The composition of the scrap waste was calculated based on the PWR spent fuel which has initial 235 U content of 3.5%, burnup of 35,000 MWD/MTU and cooling time of 10 years. Simulated waste glass was manufactured, and its chemical durability was evaluated by soxhlet leach test. Radioactivity of non-oxidized cladding material were measured. The preliminary design criteria were prepared for off-gas treatment system in IMEF. 31 figs, 42 tabs, 51 refs. (Author)

  1. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  2. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  3. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

  4. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

    1981-01-01

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  5. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-01-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

  6. A real-time material control concept for safeguarding special nuclear material in United States licensed processing facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, T.E.

    1976-01-01

    This paper describes general safeguards research being undertaken by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Efforts to improve the ability of United States licensed plants to contend with the perceived threat of covert material theft are emphasized. The framework for this improvement is to break down the internal control and accounting system into subsystems to achieve material isolation, inventory control, inventory characterization, and inventory containment analysis. A general programme is outlined to develop and evaluate appropriate mechanisms, integrate selected mechanisms into subsystems, and evaluate the subsystems in the context of policy requirements. (author)

  7. Strengthening safeguards information evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, J.; Hudson, P.

    2001-01-01

    The strengthening of safeguards should not be limited to the verification of explicit declarations made by the States. Additional information should guide the IAEA to set priorities for further investigations. Not only all aspects of the State's nuclear programme, including the application of safe, secure and transparent nuclear management, but also the level of compliance with other verifiable treaties, political motivation, economic capabilities, international relations and ties, co-operative attitude to safeguards, and general openness and transparency should be included. The evaluation of the diverse forms of information from different sources requires new reliable processes that will result in a high credibility and detection probability. The IAEA uses the physical model for the evaluation of the technical information, and proposed also Fuzzy Logic, or Calculation with Words, to handle the information. But for the evaluation it is questioned whether fuzziness could lead to a crisp judgement. In this paper an objective method of information evaluation is proposed, which allows to integrate different kinds of information and to include calibration and tests in the establishment of the evaluation process. This method, Delta, uses elicitation of a syndicate of experienced inspectors to integrate obvious indicators together with apparently innocent indicators, into a database that forms the core of the evaluation process. Nominal or ordinal scales could be applied to come to an objective and quantifiable result. Experience with this method can in the course of time result in predictive conclusions. 9 refs

  8. Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chapman, L.D.; Grady, L.M.; Bennett, H.A.; Sasser, D.W.; Engi, D.

    1978-08-01

    An automated approach to facility safeguards effectiveness evaluation has been developed. This automated process, called Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE), consists of a collection of a continuous stream of operational modules for facility characterization, the selection of critical paths, and the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness along these paths. The technique has been implemented on an interactive computer time-sharing system and makes use of computer graphics for the processing and presentation of information. Using this technique, a comprehensive evaluation of a safeguards system can be provided by systematically varying the parameters that characterize the physical protection components of a facility to reflect the perceived adversary attributes and strategy, environmental conditions, and site operational conditions. The SAFE procedure has broad applications in the nuclear facility safeguards field as well as in the security field in general. Any fixed facility containing valuable materials or components to be protected from theft or sabotage could be analyzed using this same automated evaluation technique

  9. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  10. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

    2010-01-01

    Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

  11. The future for safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zykov, S.

    2013-01-01

    The present paper presents some elements of an emerging vision of a new and updated potential role for safeguard instrumentation in the overall process of deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The paper focusses on installed, transportable and portable measurement systems and in-situ techniques for maintaining continuity of knowledge. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  12. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  13. Improving the Transparency of IAEA Safeguards Reporting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toomey, Christopher; Hayman, Aaron M.; Wyse, Evan T.; Odlaug, Christopher S.

    2011-01-01

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data.

  14. Refurbishment of isolation room and development of glove box for the DUPIC project in IMEF

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baek, S. Y.; Park, J. J.; Lee, H. H.; Hong, K. P.; Yang, M. S.; Min, D. K.

    2001-01-01

    To perform R and D of DUPIC (Direct Use of Spent PWR Fuel in CANDU Reactors), the high-radioactive shielding facility is necessary. IMEF(Irradiated Material Examination Facility) in KAERI has the high-radioactive shielding facility and some R and D such that the spent PWR fuel can be burned again in a PHWR by direct re-fabrication into CANDU-compatible DUPIC fuel bundles, is being carried out using the manipulator attached to the hotcell-M6. Although many testing equipment are located and are being operated in hotcell, it is not possible to work personally inside the hotcell due to the high radioactive contaminant. When they are out of order, the cleaned one can be maintained and repaired using the renovated isolation room located over the hotcell-M6 and the new devised glove box located at service area. Some lead-sheets and the lead glasses were fixed on the wall of the isolation room to improve the shielding capability and the roof door of hotcell-M6 can be open remotely. To maintain and repair the equipment of hotcell, a working desk was constructed in the isolation room. The glove box was also made to withdraw the disordered equipment of hotcell through the rear door

  15. Proliferation Resistance: Acquisition/Diversion Pathway Analysis for the DUPIC Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Won Il; Chang, Hong Lae; Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Ho Hee; Kwon, Eun Ha; Jeong, Chang Joon; Kim, Ho Dong

    2009-07-01

    Within the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), a methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance (INPRO PR methodology) has been developed. However, it remains to develop the methodology to evaluate User Requirements (UR) 4 regarding multiplicity and robustness of barriers against proliferation - innovative nuclear energy systems should incorporate multiple proliferation resistance features and measures. Since this requires an acquisition/diversion pathway analysis, this report describes a systematic approach developed for the identification and analysis of pathways for the acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material using the DUPIC fuel cycle system. At the first step, the objectives of the proliferation were identified, including the quality and quantity of the material, the time required to acquire the material for the proliferation, thr capability of the potential proliferant country, etc. At the second step, the possible strategies, which the potential proliferant country could adopt, were identified: undeclared removal of nuclear material from the fuel cycle facilities; and further treatment of the diverted nuclear materials needed to acquire weapons-usable materials. At the final step, a systematic approach to select the plausible pathways for the acquisition/diversion of nuclear material during the whole fuel cycle has been developed. The coarse material diversion pathways for the DUPIC fuel cycle and the approach developed was reviewed and discussed at the experts meeting at the IAEA for its appropriateness and comprehensiveness

  16. Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

    1999-01-01

    A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

  17. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  18. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  19. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  20. IAEA safeguards assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

  1. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  2. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  3. Safeguards research at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, D.R.; Huebel, J.G.; Poggio, A.J.

    1980-01-01

    The LLL safeguards research program includes inspection methods, facility assessment methodologies, value-impact analysis, vulnerability analysis of accounting systems, compliance with regulations, process monitoring, etc. Each of those projects is described as are their goals and progress

  4. The safeguards active response inventory system (SARIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.; Hairston, L.A.; O'Callaghan, P.B.; Grambihler, A.J.; Ruemmler, W.P.

    1987-01-01

    The Safeguards Active Response Inventory System (SARIS) is a computerized accountability system developed for nuclear materials control that incorporates elements of process monitoring, criticality safety, physical inventory and safeguards. It takes data from the process operations, stores it in an on-line database and translates the information into the formats needed by the various users. It traces the material through the process from feed to product; including recycle, waste and scraps streams. It models the process as the material changes form to ensure that artificial losses are not created. It automatically generates input to Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), performs checks to prevent the possibility of a criticality accident, prepares an audit trail for Safeguards, prints labels for nuclear material containers, and produces DOE/NRC 741 forms. SARIS has been installed at three laboratories across the country

  5. The Department of Safeguards Quality Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Konecni, S.

    2015-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards quality management system (QMS) provides the framework for all activities that support the Agency's commitment to providing soundly-based safeguards conclusions regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material. The focus of the QMS is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through defined, documented processes, routine oversight and continual improvement initiatives. In accordance with QMS principles, the high-level business processes representing the Department's activities are defined in procedures, guidelines and policies that are maintained in the Safeguards Document Manager. These processes form the basis for Department operations for drawing safeguards conclusions regarding State's compliance with their safeguards obligations. Oversight is provided through internal quality audits. These audits are targeted at processes selected by Senior Management with a focus on procedure compliance as well as customer expectations. Best practices and areas for improvement are assessed through continual improvement. Noncompliance and conditions that are adverse to quality are identified and analyzed in the Condition Report System. Root cause analysis and the implementation actions to eliminate the cause reduce the chance of condition recurrence. Through continual process improvement, processes are measured and analyzed to reduce process and administration waste. The improved processes improve efficiency while providing the desired results. Within the scope of the QMS, these tools support the performance of Departmental processes so that Safeguards products achieve the intended purpose. This paper describes how the various elements of the Department's QMS support safeguards implementation. (author)

  6. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  7. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  8. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  9. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  10. Transit Matching for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

    2015-01-01

    In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

  11. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

  12. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  13. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  14. Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varjoranta, Tero

    2016-01-01

    IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

  15. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  16. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  17. Safeguards uses of confirmatory measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coulter, C.A.

    1985-01-01

    An analysis is made of the role of shipper and receiver measurements in safeguarding special nuclear materials (SNM) transferred from one facility to another, with emphasis on the case where the receiver requires an analytical accounting measurement of the transferred SNM and does not need the material for process purposes at the time of receipt. Seven possible diversion periods are considered, ranging from the interval between the shipper's final accounting measurement on the material and the time it is placed in the shipper's vault, through the actual transport of the material between facilities, to the time the material is removed from the receiver's vault and placed in the process. The detection power of various combinations of six possible shipper/receiver measurements for these diversion opportunities is then evaluated; the measurements considered include the shipper's and receiver's accounting measurements, the latter at two possible times, and various nondestructive assay (NDA) confirmatory measurements. It is concluded that all safeguards measurement objectives can be met by a combination of a shipper's accounting measurement at the time the material is removed from the process, an appropriate shipper's NDA confirmatory measurement either immediately after canning or immediately before shipping, an equivalent receiver's NDA confirmatory measurement immediately after the material is received, and a receiver's accounting measurement when the material is placed in the process. Furthermore, it is found that a receiver's analytical accounting measurement immediately after receipt when the material is not yet required for process has dubious safeguards value

  18. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  19. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  20. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, Nicholas [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States); Poe, Sarah [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  1. Acquisition/Diversion Pathway Analysis of the DUPIC Fuel Cycle for the Assessment of Proliferation Resistance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Hong Lae; Ko, Won Il

    2008-01-01

    Within the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) of the IAEA, a methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance (INPRO PR methodology) has been developed in order to provide guidance in using the INPRO methodology. However, it remains to develop the methodology to evaluate User Requirements (UR) 4 regarding multiplicity and robustness of barriers against proliferation (innovative nuclear energy systems should incorporate multiple proliferation resistance features and measures). To develop the assessment procedure and metrics for User Requirement 4 (UR4), the coarse acquisition/ diversion pathway analysis of the DUPIC Fuel Cycle has been performed. The most plausible pathways for the acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material were identified and analyzed using a systematic approach herein, and future work to complete the assessment approach for the UR4 of the INPRO methodology regarding the multiplicity and robustness of barriers against proliferation are also proposed

  2. A study on decontamination and decommissioning of experimental DUPIC equipment at PIEF 9405 hot cell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, H. H.; Park, J. J.; Shin, J. M.; Yang, M. S.; Lee, H. S.; Lee, E. P.

    2000-09-01

    The characterization experiment for powder and sintered fuel had been performed using about 1 kg-U spent PWR fuel at No. 9405 hot-cell in PIEF(Post Irradiated Experiment Facility) since early in 1999. Currently, The experiments in PIEF have been completed. It is supposed to dismantle and decontaminate the installed equipment by the end of year 2000. Since all of DUPIC equipment in hot-cell are contaminated by high radioactive material, the decontamination and dismantlement must br performed remotely by M/S manipulator. During the radioactive waste packing and transportation, the reduction method of radiation exposure has to be considered. Firstly, This report describes the basic plan for dismantlement/decontamination of the characterization equipment(power and sintered fuel). And methods of measurement/packing/ transportation, method of dismantlement/decontamination of the experimental apparatus and the reduction method of radiation dose exposure, etc. are explained in order

  3. The results of decontamination and decommissioning of experimental DUPIC equipment at PIEF 9405 hot cell

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, H. H.; Park, J. J.; Shin, J. M.; Cho, K. H.; Yang, M. S.; Lee, E. P. [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejeon (Korea)

    2002-02-01

    The characterization experiment for powder and sintered fuel had been performed using about 1 kg-U spent PWR fuel at No. 9405 hot-cell in PIEF(Post Irradiated Experiment Facility) since early in 1999. Currently, the experiments in PIEF have been completed. Since all DUPIC equipment in hot-cell are contaminated by high radioactive material, the decontamination and dismantlement must be performed remotely by M/S manipulator. During the radioactive waste packing and transportation, the reduction method of radiation exposure has to be considered. This report describes the basic plan for dismantlement/decontamination of the characterization equipment (power and sintered fuel). And methods of measurement/packing/transportation, method of dismantlement/decontamination of the experimental apparatus and the reduction method of radiation dose exposure, etc. are explained in order. 7 refs., 42 figs., 10 tabs. (Author)

  4. Safeguards systems analysis research and development and the practice of safeguards at DOE facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Thomas, K.E.; Markin, J.T.; Tape, J.W.

    1991-01-01

    Los Alamos Safeguards Systems Group personnel interact with Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear materials processing facilities in a number of ways. Among them are training courses, formal technical assistance such as developing information management or data analysis software, and informal ad hoc assistance especially in reviewing and commenting on existing facility safeguards technology and procedures. These activities are supported by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Operations Offices, and contractor organizations. Because of the relationships with the Operations Office and facility personnel, the Safeguards Systems Group research and development (R and D) staff have developed an understanding of the needs of the entire complex. Improved safeguards are needed in areas such as materials control activities, accountability procedures and techniques, systems analysis and evaluation methods, and material handling procedures. This paper surveys the generic needs for efficient and cost effective enhancements in safeguards technologies and procedures at DOE facilities, identifies areas where existing safeguards R and D products are being applied or could be applied, and sets a direction for future systems analysis R and D to address practical facility safeguards needs

  5. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-01-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed

  6. The design of the DUPIC spent fuel bundle counter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menlove, H.O.; Rinard, P.M.; Kroncke, K.E.; Lee, Y.G.

    1997-05-01

    A neutron coincidence detector had been designed to measure the amount of curium in the fuel bundles and associated process samples used in the direct use of plutonium in Canadian deuterium-uranium (CANDU) fuel cycle. All of the sample categories are highly radioactive from the fission products contained in the pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent fuel feed stock. Substantial shielding is required to protect the He-3 detectors from the intense gamma rays. The Monte Carlo neutron and photon calculational code has been used to design the counter with a uniform response profile along the length of the CANDU-type fuel bundle. Other samples, including cut PWR rods, process powder, waste, and finished rods, can be measured in the system. This report describes the performance characteristics of the counter and support electronics. 3 refs., 23 figs., 6 tabs

  7. Economic Analysis on Direct Use of Spent Pressurized Water Reactor Fuel in CANDU Reactors - I: DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Cost

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Hangbok; Ko, Won Il; Yang, Myung Seung

    2001-01-01

    A preliminary conceptual design of a Direct Use of spent Pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel In Canada deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors (DUPIC) fuel fabrication plant was studied, which annually converts spent PWR fuel of 400 tonnes heavy element (HE) into CANDU fuel. The capital and operating costs were estimated from the viewpoint of conceptual design. Assuming that the annual discount rate is 5% during the construction (5 yr) and operation period (40 yr) and contingency is 25% of the capital cost, the levelized unit cost (LUC) of DUPIC fuel fabrication was estimated to be 616 $/kg HE, which is mostly governed by annual operation and maintenance costs that correspond to 63% of LUC. Among the operation and maintenance cost components being considered, the waste disposal cost has the dominant effect on LUC (∼49%). From sensitivity analyses of production capacity, discount rate, and contingency, it was found that the production capacity of the plant is the major parameter that affects the LUC

  8. Office of Safeguards and Security - Operational Interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammond, G.A.

    1987-01-01

    The mission of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), Department of Energy (DOE) is to: Develop policy and programs to protect DOE facilities, nuclear materials, and classified information; Provide oversight for safeguards and security operations; Direct research and development (RandD) to support the protection program; and Strengthen international safeguards in support of nonproliferation policy. Objectives are to maintain an integrated safeguards and security system that is effective against a wide range of threats, and do so in a manner to minimize impacts on facility operation. Implementation is the responsibility of field offices and contractors operating DOE facilities. The OSS-operational interface is the focus of this discussion with emphasis on RandD to meet user needs. The scope and project selection process will be discussed along with information required for evaluation, and field operational planning and budgeting commitments to permit implementation of successful RandD results

  9. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  10. Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogawa, T.

    2001-01-01

    Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

  11. Generation of consistent nuclear properties of DUPIC fuel by DRAGON with ENDF/B-VI nuclear data library

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shen, W.; Rozon, D.

    1998-01-01

    DRAGON code with 89-groups ENDF/B-VI cross section library was used in this paper to generate consistent nuclear properties of DUPIC fuel. The reference feed material used for the DUPIC fuel cycle is a 17x17 French standard 900 MWe PWR spent fuel assembly with 3.2 w/o initial enrichment and 32500 MWD/7 discharge burnup. The PWR fuel assembly was modeled by JPMT/SYBILT transport method in DRAGON to generate nuclide fields of spent PWR fuel. The resultant nuclide fields constitute the initial fuel composition files for reference DUPIC fuel which can be accessed by DRAGON for CANDU 2D cluster geometry depletion calculation and 3D supercell calculation. Because of uneven spatial power distribution in PWR assemblies and full core, unexpected transition cycle, and various fuel management strategy, the spent PWR fuel composition is expected to be different from one assembly to the next. This heterogeneity was characterized also by modeling various spent PWR fuel assembly types in the paper. (author)

  12. ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palacios, E.

    1998-01-01

    Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

  13. Simulation enabled safeguards assessment methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Bjornard, Trond; Larson, Tom

    2007-01-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wire-frame construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed. (authors)

  14. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-01-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed

  15. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  16. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-01-01

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R and D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  17. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  18. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  19. Part 7. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amundson, P.I.; Rusch, G.K.

    1980-01-01

    This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

  20. Application of safeguards procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

  1. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

  2. Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezniczek, A.

    2013-01-01

    Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  3. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  4. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  5. Safeguards and physics measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2002-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'

  6. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nardi, J.

    1984-01-01

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  7. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Sasha

    2011-01-01

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  8. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron; Charlton, William; Bean, Robert

    2008-01-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of 'non-traditional' operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes

  9. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  10. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  11. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  12. The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitworth, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

  13. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice.

  14. Safeguards culture on 3S interfaces

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yon Hong; Lee, Na Young; Han, Jae-Jun

    2015-01-01

    But when proliferation of nuclear weapon does happen due to violation of safeguards, the impact would be no smaller compare to the others. Therefore, it should be treated as important as the others. In fact, safeguards culture wasn't issued first time in this paper. However, the past safeguards culture only meant the conception based upon specific purpose. But it should be generalized to extend the target and scope enough to cover any possible misbehavior. The aforementioned NMAC will be a quite meaningful research subject not just for strengthening safeguards culture, but also for the security and safeguards interface. Recognizing the importance of this, the , IAEA has developed a set of technical criteria based on the IAEA implementing guide entitled Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities(in publication) and a methodology to assess the use of a facility's NMAC system for nuclear security. IAEA has established an expert team to continuously evaluate and apply NMAC systems going forward. In the process of such efforts, the ROK should work to select and apply appropriate features so as to build a more improved safeguards culture and to determine the best practice

  15. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  16. New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwanaga, Masayuki

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

  17. Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, Pierre

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

  18. Work Group 1: Future Directions for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Casterton, J.; Meylemans, P.

    2013-01-01

    The State-Level Concept (SLC) is a holistic approach to safeguards implementation, applicable to all States with safeguards agreements. It is based on a comprehensive and continuous State evaluation and a State level approach for each State, including a specific combination of safeguards measures. It is executed through an annual implementation plan. The SLC has the value of considering the State as a whole. It provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into account through all stages of safeguards implementation. The implementation of the SLC permits the IAEA to be responsive to all kinds of changes arising from continuous analysis. As a result the safeguards conclusions remain soundly based and up-to-date. The SLC is implemented by the IAEA as a continuous process involving three major components: establishing knowledge about the State and drawing conclusions, determining the specific State level approach, and planning and implementing safeguards activities. The major products that emerge from this process are the State level approach, the annual implementation plan that is the basis for implementing safeguards activities in a State on an annual basis, and the safeguards conclusions, which are set out in the Safeguards Implementation Report on an annual basis. A better cooperation between IAEA and SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material), RSAC (Regional State Systems of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material is important for developing and implementing SLC. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  19. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  20. The Legislative Process as a Safeguard of the Public Servant´S Right to Go on Strike

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Edilene Lôbo

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available The right to go on strike can only be realized after a specific national bill – such law has been denied for decades. Acknowledged the omission it should be remedied. The Supreme Court, nonetheless, declared the legislative gap but created, by analogy, rules and procedural issues, bestowing upon the remaining courts discretion to establish a stricter regime and erga omnes effect replacing the legislator. This work criticizes the right´s regulation through judicial rulings removed from the legislative process. The methodology utilized, supported by Estate´s  functions  separation  and  democratic  process  theories,  consisted  in  exam  of legislation, court rulings AND specialized literature.

  1. On-Line Monitoring for Process Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Streams at Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryan, S.; Levitskaia, T.; Casella, A.

    2015-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safe- guards standards for fissionable material at spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide a more timely, cost-effective and resource-efficient means for MC&A verification at such facilities. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including a spectroscopy-based monitoring system, to potentially reduce the time and re- source burden associated with current techniques. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals using ultra-violet and visible, near infrared and Raman spectroscopy. This paper will provide an overview of the methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies. Our ability to identify material intentionally diverted from a liquid-liquid solvent extraction contactor system was successfully tested using on-line process monitoring as a means to detect the amount of material diverted. A chemical diversion, and detection of that diversion, from a solvent extraction scheme was demonstrated using a centrifugal contactor system operating with the PUREX flowsheet. A portion of the feed from a counter-current extraction system was diverted while a continuous extraction experiment was underway. The amount observed to be diverted by on-line spectroscopic process monitoring was in excellent agreement with values based from the known mass of

  2. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.A.; Ervin, N.E.

    1988-02-01

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  3. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

    2010-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  4. Fuel cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-07-01

    In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

  5. Safeguarding arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, S.J.

    1988-01-01

    This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

  6. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  7. Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

    1977-05-01

    A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

  8. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2000-01-01

    SCK-CEN's department of Safeguards and Physics Measurements provides a wide variety of internal and external services including dosimetry, calibration, instrumentation, whole body counting, safeguards and non-destructive analysis. Main developments in these areas in 1999 are described

  9. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  10. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  11. Year 2000 experience with safeguards instruments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coffing, J.

    1999-01-01

    Presentation covers the following items concerning the experiences with safeguards instruments related to Y2K issues: initial Y2K evaluation process; improvement of Y2K testing procedure, policy of the Aquila Technologies Group, Inc. The results concerning Y2K evaluation are presented as designed in the manufacturing process in order to assure success

  12. Trade Analysis and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

    2010-01-01

    In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

  13. Australian nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerin, J.C.

    1988-01-01

    The Australian Government considers that allegations made by the West German magazine - Der Spiegel in its January and February 1988 editions, flow from a lack of understanding of the complexities of international trade in nuclear materials, confusion between internal and international flag swaps and failure to comprehend the equivalence principle used in nuclear materials accounting. The Ministerial statement briefly outlines these issues and concludes that there is no evidence that any material subject to Australia's bilateral safeguards agreement has been diverted from peaceful uses or that Australia's safeguard requirements have been breached

  14. Hot-cell shielding system for high power transmission in DUPIC fuel fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, K.; Lee, J.; Park, J.; Yang, M.; Park, H.

    2000-01-01

    This paper presents a newly designed hot-cell shielding system for use in the development of DUPIC (Direct Use of spent PWR fuel In CANDU reactors) fuel at KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute). This hot-cell shielding system that was designed to transmit high power to sintering furnace in-cell from the out-of-cell through a thick cell wall has three subsystems - a steel shield plug with embedded spiral cooling line, stepped copper bus bars, and a shielding lead block. The dose-equivalent rates of the hot-cell shielding system and of the apertures between this system and the hot-cell wall were calculated. Calculated results were compared with the allowable dose limit of the existing hot-cell. Experiments for examining the temperature changes of the shielding system developed during normal furnace operation were also carried out. Finally, gamma-ray radiation survey experiments were conducted by Co-60 source. It is demonstrated that, from both calculated and experimental results, the newly designed hot-cell shielding system meets all the shielding requirements of the existing hot-cell facility, enabling high power transmission to the in-cell sintering furnace. (author)

  15. Study on the characteristics and sinterability of DUPIC powder by using simulated fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jae-Won; Lee, Jung-Won; Kim, Jong-Ho; Yim, Sung-Paal; Lee, Young-Woo; Yang, Myung-Seung

    2002-01-01

    The sinterability of the OREOX (oxidation and reduction of oxide fuels) powder was investigated in terms of the number of the OREOX cycles and milling time using simulated spent fuel of an equivalent burnup of 35,000 MWD/MTU. Wet milled powder was prepared and sintered to compare the morphology and sinterability with the dry milled powder. Powders having a medium particle size of less than 1μm were obtained by dry milling of OREOX powders regardless of the number of cycles. The specific surface area of the simulated DUPIC powder was governed by the number of OREOX cycles rather than by milling time. The sound pellets with a sintered density of higher than 95% TD and average grain size of larger than 8μm were obtained with the dry milled powder after 1 cycle of OREOX treatment. The powders prepared by dry milling for a short time and wet milling for a long time after 3 cycles of OREOX treatment also produced pellets with a sintered density of higher than 95% TD and average grain size of larger than 8μm. (author)

  16. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  17. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  18. Spiritual Occlusion and Systemic Integrity: Legal Evaluations of Due Process Protections and Freedom of Religious Expression and Practices Safeguards

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jason R. Jolicoeur

    2018-05-01

    Full Text Available As is the case with other constitutionally protected rights, the freedom of religion is not unlimited nor without restriction or constraint. Rather, the courts have long held that the state may have legitimate reasons for placing reasonable restrictions on the otherwise free exercise of religious practice. The courts have also held that the state cannot restrict religious practice in a capricious or gratuitous manner. However, the courts have also held that individuals have a constitutional right to due process legal protections. In many instances, these two freedoms exist independently of each other. In instances when they intersect, conflict may result from one right seeking hegemony over the other. In instances such as these, the courts may have to resolve conflicts by establishing legal principles and precedents regarding which of these constitutional protections will be granted contextual prominence over the other. Thus far, the legal evaluation of this important question has been confused at best and contradictory at worst. This has resulted in a number of substantive outcomes that pose significant challenges to the practice and application of both rights and an underlying avoidance of broader constitutional questions.

  19. Safeguards system design methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cravens, M.N.; Winblad, A.E.

    1977-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing methods for the design of physical protection systems to safeguard special nuclear material and vital equipment at fixed sites. One method is outlined and illustrated with simplified examples drawn from current programs. The use of an adversary sequence diagram as an analysis tool is discussed

  20. Technical basis of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buechler, C.

    1975-01-01

    Definition of nuclear materials control. Materials accountancy and physical control as technical possibilities. Legal possibilities and levels of responsibility: material holders, national and international authority. Detection vs. prevention. Physical security and containment surveillance. Accountancy: materials balance concept. Materials measurement: inventory taking, flow determination. IAEA safeguards; verification of operator's statement. (HP) [de

  1. Nuclear safeguards project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mache, H.R.

    1978-10-01

    The present report describes the major activities carried out in 1977 in the framework of the Nuclear Safeguards Project by the institutes of the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Kernforschungsanlage Juelich, the European Institute of Transuranium Elements and some industrial firms. (orig.) 891 HP 892 AP [de

  2. Safeguards techniques and equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The current booklet is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. As new verification measures continue to be developed, the material in the booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. (author)

  3. IAEA safeguards technical manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-03-01

    Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

  4. The project 'nuclear safeguards'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.

    1976-01-01

    A survey is given on the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system which takes into account the economic needs of an expanding nuclear industry as well as the international monitoring commitments of the FRG under the Euratom and Non-Proliferation treaties. (RW) [de

  5. Brazilian reactors under safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1967-01-01

    Three nuclear reactors in Brazil have been placed under Agency safeguards against diversion to military use. They are used for research purposes under a bilateral treaty with the USA, and are located at Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte

  6. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  7. An analytical laboratory to facilitate international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, B.E.; Muellner, P.; Deron, S.

    1976-01-01

    Member States which have concluded safeguards agreements accept safeguards on part or all of their nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. The Agreements enable the Agency to make inspections in order to verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all safeguarded nuclear material. The independent analysis of samples of safeguards material is an essential part of the verification process. A new analytical laboratory has been made available to the Agency by the Austrian Government. This facility is staffed by the Agency with scientists and technicians from five Member States. Design criteria for the laboratory were defined by the Agency. Construction was carried out under the project management of the Oesterreichische Studiengesellschaft fuer Atomenergie Ges.m.b.H. Scientific equipment was procured by the Agency. Samples of feed and product material from the nuclear fuel cycle will constitute the main work load. Irradiated and unirradiated samples of uranium, plutonium and mixtures of both will be analysed for concentration and isotopic composition. Since highly diluted solutions of spent fuel will be the most active beta-gamma samples, shielded and remote manipulation facilities are not necessary. Ptentiometry, mass spectrometry and coulometry are the main techniques to be employed. Gravimetry, alpha and gamma spectrometry and emission spectroscopy will also be utilized as required. It is not intended that this laboratory, should carry the whole burden of the Agency's safeguards analytical work, but that it should function as a member of a network of international laboratories which has been set up by the Agency for this purpose. (author)

  8. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perricos, Demetrius

    2001-01-01

    ; qualitative and quantitative measurements of nuclear material; familiarity and access to sensitive technologies related to detection, unattended verification systems, containment/surveillance and sensors; examination and verification of design information of large and complex facilities; theoretical and practical aspects of technologies relevant to verification objectives; analysis of inspection findings and evaluation of their mutual consistency; negotiations on technical issues with facility operators and State authorities. This experience is reflected in the IAEA Safeguards Manual which sets out the policies and procedures to be followed in the inspection process as well as in the Safeguards Criteria which provide guidance for verification, evaluation and analysis of the inspection findings. The IAEA infrastructure and its experience with verification permitted in 1991 the organization to respond immediately and successfully to the tasks required by the Security Council Resolution 687(1991) for Iraq as well as to the tasks related to the verification of completeness and correctness of the initial declarations in the cases of the DPRK. and of S. Africa. In the case of Iraq the discovery of its undeclared programs was made possible through the existing verification system enhanced by additional access rights, information and application of modern detection technology. Such discoveries made it evident that there was a need for an intensive development effort to strengthen the safeguards system to develop a capability to detect undeclared activities. For this purpose it was recognized that there was need for additional and extended a) access to information, b) access to locations. It was also obvious that access to the Security Council, to bring the IAEA closer to the body responsible for maintenance of international peace and security, would be a requirement for reporting periodically on non-proliferation and the results of the IAEA's verification activities. While the case

  9. Safeguards decision making in the public and regulatory environment, and the potential role of quantitative approaches

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sherr, T.S.

    1981-01-01

    This paper briefly examines the nature of the safeguards program's objectives and constraints, and the inherent limitations on comprehensive quantification. It discusses the nature of the public and regulatory processes employed in safeguards decision making, and examines their implications regarding the potential role of quantitative approaches to safeguards policy and operational decision making

  10. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartan, F.O.

    1982-05-01

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

  11. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  12. Overview of simulation applications in safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dugan, V.L.

    1976-01-01

    The objective of society relative to the utilization of the nuclear fuel cycle is to maximize the benefits of the high quality energy which is available and to minimize the total ''costs'' associated with acquiring these benefits. The comparison of the resulting ''benefits'' to the ''costs'' must be sufficiently attractive for society to accept nuclear energy. In this paper a representation of the structure determined by the ''costs'' (economic, socio-political, institutional, environmental, and legal) associated with adversary action against the nuclear industry and with the measures implemented to deter, prevent, or recover from adversary actions (safeguards) is used to illustrate a broad view of a dynamic safeguards system. This system representation is then used to describe the subsystem areas to which simulation techniques are currently being applied and to suggest other areas in which various simulation applications may benefit the safeguards decision process

  13. Safeguards information treatment in NMCC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kojo, Yukiko; Tanigawa, Takanori; Iwai, Naobumi; Suzuki, Tsuneo

    1994-01-01

    The Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) has treated all information of the accounting reports, obligation control reports and plans of import/export or domestic receipt/shipment, etc. submitted by the facilities according to the domestic laws, and prepared the reports to provide the IAEA subject to the safeguards agreement and to provide the partner countries subject to the relevant bilateral agreements. The accounting reports are processed during two weeks in the latter half of month and dispatched to the IAEA by the 30th of the month. On the other hand, the obligation control reports are processed during two weeks in the first half of the next month. The other reports are processed on case's by case's basis and submitted to the IAEA or the partner countries at need. The data processing system consists of the quality check, database update, reporting and conversational inquiry sub-systems with the database management system (ADABAS) which keeps key indexes and summary database. (author)

  14. Material accountancy measurement techniques in dry-powdered processing of nuclear spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wolf, S. F.

    1999-01-01

    The paper addresses the development of inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICPMS), thermal ionization-mass spectrometry (TIMS), alpha-spectrometry, and gamma spectrometry techniques for in-line analysis of highly irradiated (18 to 64 GWD/T) PWR spent fuels in a dry-powdered processing cycle. The dry-powdered technique for direct elemental and isotopic accountancy assay measurements was implemented without the need for separation of the plutonium, uranium and fission product elements in the bulk powdered process. The analyses allow the determination of fuel burn-up based on the isotopic composition of neodymium and/or cesium. An objective of the program is to develop the ICPMS method for direct fissile nuclear materials accountancy in the dry-powdered processing of spent fuel. The ICPMS measurement system may be applied to the KAERI DUPIC (direct use of spent PWR fuel in CANDU reactors) experiment, and in a near-real-time mode for international safeguards verification and non-proliferation policy concerns

  15. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-12-15

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  16. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

  17. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  18. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S.; Smith, L.E.; Ehinger, M.; Dougan, A.; Cipiti, B.; Bakel, A.; Bean, R.

    2008-01-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  19. Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

    2015-01-01

    Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

  20. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S.

    2003-01-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection

  1. Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H.

    1981-11-01

    Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system

  2. Safeguarding of large scale reprocessing and MOX plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howsley, R.; Burrows, B.; Longevialle, H. de; Kuroi, H.; Izumi, A.

    1997-01-01

    In May 97, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the final measures of the ''93+2'' safeguards strengthening programme, thus improving the international non-proliferation regime by enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards verification. These enhancements are not however, a revolution in current practices, but rather an important step in the continuous evolution of the safeguards system. The principles embodied in 93+2, for broader access to information and increased physical access already apply, in a pragmatic way, to large scale reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In these plants, qualitative measures and process monitoring play an important role in addition to accountancy and material balance evaluations in attaining the safeguard's goals. This paper will reflect on the safeguards approaches adopted for these large bulk handling facilities and draw analogies, conclusions and lessons for the forthcoming implementation of the 93+2 Programme. (author)

  3. Safeguards and nonproliferation aspects of a dry fuel recycling technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory undertook an independent assessment of the proliferation potentials and safeguardability of a dry fuel recycling technology, whereby spent pressurized-water reactor (PWR) fuels are used to fuel canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. Objectives of this study included (1) the evaluation of presently available technologies that may be useful to safeguard technology options for dry fuel recycling (2) and identification of near-term and long-term research needs to develop process-specific safeguards requirements. The primary conclusion of this assessment is that like all other fuel cycle alternatives proposed in the past, the dry fuel recycle entails prolfferation risks and that there are no absolute technical fixes to eliminate such risks. This study further concludes that the proliferation risks of dry fuel recycling options are relatively minimal and presently known safeguards systems and technologies can be modified and/or adapted to meet the requirements of safeguarding such fuel recycle facilities

  4. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a State are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. The authors have examined safeguards approaches for a State nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the State. They have focused on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches

  5. Developing the information management system for safeguards national inspection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, S. J.; Jeon, I.; Park, W. S.; Min, K. S. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    2003-10-01

    The inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection is aimed to do the national safeguards inspection with efficiency, and to decrease the inspector's load to write inspection report by systematizing the inspection jobs and sharing the inspection data. National safeguards inspection is consisted two large jobs. The first is the national safeguards supporting job of managing to support the national inspection mission. The other is the writing a national inspection report after completing the national inspection. Before the developing of inspection information management system, the official tools(spread sheet, word processor) are usually used. But there is problem to share the data, to produce the statistics data. To solve the these problem, we developed the inspection information management system that process the job from initial to final inspection work, and opened user education. This paper explain the procedure of developing the inspection information management system for safeguards national inspection.

  6. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  7. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schanfein, Mark; Johnson, Shirley

    2012-01-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  8. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  9. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1983-01-01

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  10. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  11. Enhanced safeguards via solution monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.; Wangen, L.

    1996-09-01

    Solution monitoring is defined as the essentially continuous monitoring of solution level, density, and temperature in all tanks in the process that contain, or could contain, safeguards-significant quantities of nuclear material. This report describes some of the enhancements that solution monitoring could make to international safeguards. The focus is on the quantifiable benefits of solution monitoring, but qualitatively, solution monitoring can be viewed as a form of surveillance. Quantitatively, solution monitoring can in some cases improve diversion detection probability. For example, the authors show that under certain assumptions, solution monitoring can be used to reduce the standard deviation of the annual material balance, σ MB , from approximately 17 kg to approximately 4 kg. Such reduction in σ MB will not always be possible, as they discuss. However, in all cases, solution monitoring would provide assurance that the measurement error models are adequate so that one has confidence in his estimate of σ MB . Some of the results in this report were generated using data that were simulated with prototype solution monitoring software that they are developing. An accompanying document describes that software

  12. Reassessment of safeguards parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Richter, J.L.; Mullen, M.F.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is reassessing the timeliness and goal quantity parameters that are used in defining safeguards approaches. This study reviews technology developments since the parameters were established in the 1970s and concludes that there is no reason to relax goal quantity or conversion time for reactor-grade plutonium relative to weapons-grade plutonium. For low-enriched uranium, especially in countries with advanced enrichment capability there may be an incentive to shorten the detection time.

  13. International safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.; Curtis, H.B.

    1977-01-01

    To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

  14. Safeguarding research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powers, J.A.

    1983-03-01

    The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

  15. Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

    2015-01-01

    Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

  16. Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

    2008-01-01

    Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

  17. Information-Driven Safeguards: A Country Officer's Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gyane, E.

    2010-01-01

    Since the transition from 'traditional' to strengthened safeguards, the evaluation and analysis of information has played an increasingly important role in the Agency's safeguards activities. During the State evaluation process, the Agency utilizes all available information for drawing credible safeguards conclusions. Besides State declared information and data gathered during inspections, a large number of information sources are reviewed for any indications of safeguards relevance. The State level approach - in contrast to the facility-based approach under traditional safeguards - considers the acquisition paths available to a State and adjusts safeguards intensity accordingly. An additional protocol widens the information base available to the Agency for analysis and evaluation and it extends the Agency's access rights in the field. The use of information for determining safeguards activities is often referred to as 'information-driven safeguards'. Country officers are inspectors in the Department of Safeguards Operations Divisions who are responsible for States and thus form the base of the Agency's information chain. The information-driven safeguards approach has led to a significant change in the role of inspector country officers: While the verification of declared nuclear material remains the cornerstone of the IAEA Safeguards System, country officers are now not only expected to be knowledgeable about the inspection-related aspects in their countries. They also need to act on information on their States coming from a variety of sources on an ongoing basis, in order to identify proliferation indicators at an early stage. Country officers thus analyse developments in their States as well as their States' relations with other States. They review scientific literature for research that could potentially be of safeguards relevance. They observe their States' nuclear facilities from satellite imagery. They evaluate reports on nuclear trade between their States

  18. IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-10-01

    Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

  19. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-01-01

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  20. IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.

    1988-01-01

    The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

  1. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  2. Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

  3. Holdup-related issues in safeguarding of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-03-01

    Residual inventories of special nuclear materials (SNM) remaining in processing facilities (holdup) are recognized as an insidious problem for both safety and safeguards. This paper identifies some of the issues that are of concern to the safeguards community at-large that are related to holdup of SNM in large-scale process equipment. These issues range from basic technologies of SNM production to changing regulatory requirements to meet the needs of safeguarding nuclear materials. Although there are no magic formulas to resolve these issues, there are several initiatives that could be taken in areas of facility design, plant operation, personnel training, SNM monitoring, and regulatory guidelines to minimize the problems of holdup and thereby improve both safety and safeguards at nuclear material processing plants. 8 refs

  4. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  5. Neutron techniques in Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zucker, M.S.

    1982-01-01

    An essential part of Safeguards is the ability to quantitatively and nondestructively assay those materials with special neutron-interactive properties involved in nuclear industrial or military technology. Neutron techniques have furnished most of the important ways of assaying such materials, which is no surprise since the neutronic properties are what characterizes them. The techniques employed rely on a wide selection of the many methods of neutron generation, detection, and data analysis that have been developed for neutron physics and nuclear science in general

  6. Safeguarding aspects of large-scale commercial reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-03-01

    The paper points out that several solutions to the problems of safeguarding large-scale plants have been put forward: (1) Increased measurement accuracy. This does not remove the problem of timely detection. (2) Continuous in-process measurement. As yet unproven and likely to be costly. (3) More extensive use of containment and surveillance. The latter appears to be feasible but requires the incorporation of safeguards into plant design and sufficient redundancy to protect the operators interests. The advantages of altering the emphasis of safeguards philosophy from quantitative goals to the analysis of diversion strategies should be considered

  7. Remote monitoring for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1999-01-01

    Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards-relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these Geld trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology Fortunately, modem technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. (author)

  8. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

    1977-02-01

    A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques

  9. Coordinated safeguards for materials management in a mixed-oxide fuel facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shipley, J.P.; Cobb, D.D.; Dietz, R.J.; Evans, M.L.; Schelonka, E.P.; Smith, D.B.; Walton, R.B.

    1977-02-01

    A coordinated safeguards system is described for safeguarding strategic quantities of special nuclear materials in mixed-oxide recycle fuel fabrication facilities. The safeguards system is compatible with industrial process requirements and combines maximum effectiveness consistent with modest cost and minimal process interference. It is based on unit process accounting using a combination of conventional and state-of-the-art NDA measurement techniques. The effectiveness of the system against single and multiple thefts is evaluated using computer modeling and simulation techniques.

  10. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  11. Computer-based safeguards information and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Acquiring, processing and analysing information about inventories and flow of nuclear materials are essential parts of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards information originates from several sources. The information to be provided is specified in the various safeguards agreements between the States and the IAEA, including both NPT agreements and safeguards trilateral agreements. Most of the safeguards information currently received by the IAEA is contained in accounting reports from the States party to the NPT. Within the frame of the material balance concept of NPT, three types of reports are provided to the IAEA by the States: Physical Inventory Listings (PIL); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports (MBR). In addition, facility design information is reported when NPT safeguards are applied and whenever there is a change in the facility or its operation. Based on this data, an accounting system is used to make available such information as the book inventories of nuclear material as a function of time, material balance evaluations, and analysis of shipments versus receipts of nuclear material. A second source of NPT safeguards information is the inspection activities carried out in the field as a necessary counterpart for verification of the data presented by the States in their accounting reports. The processing of inspection reports and other inspection data is carried out by the present system in a provisional manner until a new system, which is under development is available. The major effort currently is directed not to computer processing but toward developing and applying uniform inspection procedures and information requirements. A third source of NPT safeguards information is advanced notifications and notifications of transfer of source materials before the starting point of safeguards. Since, however, the States are not completely aware of the need and requirement to provide these data, this is a point to be emphasized in future workshops and

  12. Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1999-01-01

    An NDT presupposes a fundamental commitment by all parties to its final objective and hence requires a high and sustained level of confidence amongst all states concerned. The appropriate format for an Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (NDT) would probably be a multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty must necessarily include the five nuclear weapon states and a procedure would have to be found for securing the ratification of the threshold states without conferring upon them the status of nuclear weapon states. While the IAEA may well be able to carry out the safeguards tasks required by an NDT it would probably be necessary to establish a new international organization to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The experience of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, and of the IAEA in the DPRK, have shown how difficult the verification of international obligations is in the absence of a commitment to disarm, while the experience of the INF and START treaties, and of the IAEA in South Africa have shown how much simpler it is when the parties concerned are fully committed to the process. Verifying and safeguarding an NDT would be largely an extrapolation of activities already carried out by the nuclear weapon states under the INF and START treaties and by the IAEA in the routine application of safeguards as well as in its less routine work in Iraq, South Africa and the DPRK. Both the verification and safeguarding tasks would be made very much easier if it were possible to bring down to a few hundred the number of nuclear warheads remaining in the hands of any avowed nuclear weapon state, and to conclude a cutoff convention. Experience is needed to show whether the additional safeguards authority accorded to the IAEA by 'programme 93+2' will enable it to effectively safeguard the facilities that would be decommissioned as a result of an NDT and those that would remain in operation to satisfy civilian needs. Subject to this rider and on condition that the IAEA

  13. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  14. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  15. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  16. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  17. Implementation of Safeguards for Romania National LOFs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popovici, I.

    2015-01-01

    The safe deployment of nuclear activities in Romania is provided by Law no. 111/1996. The Law was republished based on the provisions of Article II of Law no. 63/2006 for the amendment and addition and was modified and completed by the Law no. 378/2013. The competent national authority in the nuclear field, which has responsibilities of regulation, authorization and control as stipulated in this Law, is the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN). According to art. 2c), provisions of the Nuclear Law shall apply to production, sitting and construction, supply, leasing, transfer, handling, possession, processing, treatment, use, temporary storage or final disposal, transport, transit, import and export of radiological installations, nuclear and radioactive materials, including nuclear fuel, radioactive waste and ionizing radiation generating devices. With regards to the small holders of nuclear materials, the Romanian legislation takes into account the following safeguards objectives: · Establishing provisions governing the possession, use, transfer, import and export of nuclear materials; · Ensuring the implementation of the safeguards system for accountancy and control of nuclear materials: · Ensuring that all nuclear materials are reported under the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement; · Ensuring that all nuclear activities are declared under the provisions of the Additional Protocol; · Developing and implementing nuclear material accounting and control procedures at all small holders of nuclear materials; · Ensuring training for safeguards staff at all small holders. Based on the provision of Law no. 111/1996 CNCAN has issued a Guidelines for applying of the safeguards by the small holders of nuclear materials from Romania. The guidelines provide specific regulations regarding the movement of the nuclear materials, the accountancy and control of nuclear materials, the containment and surveillance systems for small holders of nuclear

  18. Measurements Matter in Nuclear Safeguards & Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aregbe, Y.; Jakopic, R.; Richter, S.; Schillebeeckx, P.; Hult, M.

    2015-01-01

    The deliverable of any laboratory is a measurement result with stated uncertainty and traceability (ISO/IEC 17025: 2005). Measurement results, particularly in safeguards, have to be accurate, comparable and traceable to a stated reference, preferably to the SI. Results provided by operator-, safeguards- or network laboratories have to be in compliance with specific quality goals for nuclear material and environmental sample analysis. Metrological quality control tools are prerequisites to build up confidence in measurement results that have to be translated into meaningful safeguards conclusions or to demonstrate conformity of findings with declared processes. The European Commission—Joint Research Centre (EC–JRC) has dedicated facilities, laboratories and projects to provide certified nuclear reference materials (CRM), to develop reference methods and to organize inter-laboratory comparisons (ILC) in compliance with ISO Guide 34, ISO17025 and ISO17043, including respective training. Recent examples are: – cooperation with the JAEA to investigate on the application of Neutron Resonance Densitometry (NRD) to quantify the amount of special nuclear material in particlelike debris of melted fuel as formed in the nuclear accident in Fukushima – training in metrology and gamma-ray spectrometry for EURATOM safeguards inspectors – development of uranium reference particle standards under a new EC support task to the IAEA. Currently, the JRC puts major efforts in producing CRMs and conformity assessment tools for “age-dating” of uranium and plutonium samples. They are needed for method validation in determining the date of the last chemical separation of uranium or plutonium from their daughter nuclides. These type of CRMs are not only needed in nuclear safeguards and forensics, but could support in the future a possible new type of “verification mechanism” as part of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), since measurements and measurement standards

  19. Safeguarding a future industrial reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    This paper is submitted to Working Group 5, Sub-Group B for information. It is being submitted to Working Group 4 for discussion at their meeting in January 1979 and shows that by a combination of accountancy, surveillance and containment a reliable safeguards system can be designed for the reprocessing of fuels of the BWR and PWR type. Its arguments can, in general terms, be applied to plants for reprocessing LMFBR fuels, with due allowance for future advances which should improve our overall knowledge of the reliability of safeguards systems. In the reprocessing of fast reactor (LMFBR) fuels, as compared with LWR fuels, the main differences are the higher plutonium concentration and lower heavy metal throughput in the early stages of the reprocessing operations. At later stages in the process (after plutonium/uranium separation) the plants could be similar and have similar safeguarding problems. Plants for reprocessing LMFBR on a commercial scale will not be in operation for a number of years. In these plants greater attention may have to be paid to safeguards at the early stages, especially to waste/raffinate streams, than in the PWR/BWR reprocessing plant. The actual balance between containment, surveillance and accountancy adopted will depend on the status of the technology of safeguards and reprocessing. It can be anticipated that improvements to measurement systems will be made which may allow greater reliance on actual measurement. Treatment and recycle of solid wastes will advance and could therefore lead to improvements in accountancy in, for example, the ''head-end''

  20. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, Nikolai

    2001-01-01

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  1. Safeguards operations in the integral fast reactor fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goff, K.M.; Benedict, R.W.; Brumbach, S.B.; Dickerman, C.E.; Tompot, R.W.

    1994-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is currently demonstrating the fuel cycle for the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), an advanced reactor concept that takes advantage of the properties of metallic fuel and liquid metal cooling to offer significant improvements in reactor safety, operation, fuel-cycle economics, environmental protection, and safeguards. The IFR fuel cycle employs a pyrometallurgical process using molten salts and liquid metals to recover actinides from spent fuel. The safeguards aspects of the fuel cycle demonstration must be approved by the United States Department of Energy, but a further goal of the program is to develop a safeguards system that could gain acceptance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency. This fuel cycle is described with emphasis on aspects that differ from aqueous reprocessing and on its improved safeguardability due to decreased attractiveness and diversion potential of all process streams, including the fuel product

  2. Remote monitoring in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1996-01-01

    In recent years, technology that permits the integration of monitoring sensors and instruments into a coherent network has become available. Such integrated monitoring systems provide a means for the automatic collection and assessment of sensor signals and instrument readings and for processing such signals and readings in near real time. To gain experience with the new monitoring system technology, the US Department of energy, through bilateral agreements with its international partners, has initiated a project to emplace demonstration systems in various nuclear facilities and conduct field trials of the technology. This effort is the International Remote Monitoring Project. Under this project, remote monitoring systems are being deployed around the world in an incremental manner. Each deployment is different and each offers lessons for improving the performance and flexibility of the technology. Few problems were encountered with the operation of the installations to date, and much has been learned about the operation and use of the new technology. In the future, the authors believe systems for safeguards applications should be capable of being monitored remotely, emphasize the use of sensors, and utilize selective triggering for recording of images. Remote monitoring across national borders can occur only in the context of a cooperative, nonadversarial implementation regime. However, significant technical and policy work remains to be done before widespread safeguards implementation of remote monitoring should be considered. This paper shows that an abundance of technology supports the implementation of integrated and remote monitoring systems. Current field trials of remote monitoring systems are providing practical data and operational experience to aid in the design of tomorrow's systems

  3. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

  4. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  5. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reid, Bruce D. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Anzelon, George A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Budlong-Sylvester, Kory [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-01

    broaden the IAEA safeguards toolbox, the study recommends that the Agency consider closing potential gaps in safeguards coverage by, among other things: 1) adapting its safeguards measures based on a case-by-case assessment; 2) using more frequent and expanded/enhanced mailbox declarations (ideally with remote transmission of the data to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna) coupled with short-notice or unannounced inspections; 3) putting more emphasis on the collection and analysis of environmental samples at hot cells and waste storage tanks; 4) taking Safeguards by Design into account for the construction of new research reactors and best practices for existing research reactors; 5) utilizing fully all legal authorities to enhance inspection access (including a strengthened and continuing DIV process); and 6) utilizing new approaches to improve auditing activities, verify reactor operating data history, and track/monitor the movement and storage of spent fuel.

  6. Improving technical support to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rundquist, D.

    1986-01-01

    Changes present new safeguards challenges and require that the entire safeguards process become more efficient. A development process has evolved at the Agency that aids in matching appropriate technology to the needs, primarily through the mechanism of voluntary Member States Support Programme, which gives IAEA access to many of the worlds finest nuclear laboratories. The function of these programs is discussed in this article with particular emphasis on the Agency's co-ordination role. Besides a description of the Member States Support Programme the problems involved (coordination and communication aspects) as well as the results achieved are indicated. The support is categorized under the following headlines: 1) Information and expertise; 2) Instrumentation, methods and techniques; 3) Training; 4) Test and calibration facilities. As mentioned in the article Member States also benefit from the Support Programme. Other means of technical support such as multi-national co-operation programmes and bilateral research agreements are mentioned

  7. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is an on-line accountability system used by Rocky Flats Plant to provide accountability control of its nuclear material inventory. The system is also used to monitor and evaluate the use of the nuclear material inventory against programmatic objectives for materials management. The SAN system utilizes two Harris 800 Computers as central processing units. Enhancement plans are currently being formulated to provide automated data collection from process operations on the shop floor and from non-destructive analysis safeguards instrumentation. SAN, discussed in this paper, is an excellent system for basic accountability control of nuclear materials inventories and is a quite useful tool in evaluating the efficient use of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant

  8. Safeguarding uranium enrichment facilities. Review and analysis of the status of safeguards technology for uranium enrichment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-09-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine critically the diversion potential at uranium enrichment facilities and to outline a basic safeguards strategy which counters all identified hazards as completely as possible yet with a minimum of non-essential redundancy. Where existing technology does not appear to be adequate for effective safeguards, the limitations are examined, and suggestions for further R and D effort are made. Parts of this report are generally applicable to all currently known enrichment processes, while other parts are specifically directed toward facilities based on the gas centrifuge process. It is hoped that additional sections discussing a safeguards strategy for gas diffusion facilities can be added later. It should be emphasized that this is a technical report, and does not reflect any legal positions. The safeguards strategy and subsequent inspection procedures are intended as guidelines, not as negotiating positions

  9. Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

  10. Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haginoya, Tohru

    1997-01-01

    INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

  11. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  12. Simulation of nuclear fuel reprocessing for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Dayem, H.A.; Kern, E.A.; Spannagel, G.

    1983-11-01

    For safeguarding the chemical process area of future reprocessing plants the near-real-time material accountancy (NRTMA) method might be applied. Experimental data are not yet available for testing the capability of the NRTMA method but can be simulated using a digital computer. This report describes the mathematical modeling of the Pu-bearing components of reprocessing plants and presents first results obtained by simulation models. (orig.) [de

  13. Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

    2015-01-01

    Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

  14. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  15. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  16. Safeguards approaches for conversion and gas centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanuch, C.; Whitaker, M.; Lockwood, D.; Boyer, B.

    2013-01-01

    This paper describes recent studies and investigations of new safeguards measures and inspection tools to strengthen international safeguards at GCEPs (Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants) and conversion plants. The IAEA has indicated that continuous, unattended process monitoring should play a central role in future safeguards approaches for conversion plants and GCEPs. Monitoring safeguards relevant information from accountancy scales, process load cells, and unit header pipes can make existing safeguards approaches more efficient by replacing repetitive, routine, labor-intensive inspection activities with automated systems. These systems can make the safeguards approach more effective by addressing more completely the safeguards objectives at these facilities. Automated collection and analysis of the data can further enable the IAEA to move towards a fully-information driven inspection regime with randomized (from the operator's perspective), short-notice inspections. The reduction in repetitive on-site inspection activities would also be beneficial to plant operators, but only if sensitive and proprietary information can be protected and the new systems prove to be reliable. New facilities that incorporate Safeguards by Design into the earliest design stages can facilitate the effective DIV (Design Information Verification) of the plant to allow the inspectors to analyze the capacity of the plant, to project maximum production from the plant, and to provide a focus on the areas in the plant where credible diversion scenarios could be attempted. Facilitating efficient nuclear material accountancy by simplifying process pipework and making flow measurement points more accessible can allow for easier estimation of plant holdup and a potential reduction in the number of person-days of inspection. Lastly, a universal monitoring standard that tracks the location, movement, and use of UF 6 cylinders may enhance the efficiency of operations at industry sites and would

  17. Radioactive Dry Process Material Treatment Technology Development

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, J. J.; Hung, I. H.; Kim, K. K. (and others)

    2007-06-15

    The project 'Radioactive Dry Process Material Treatment Technology Development' aims to be normal operation for the experiments at DUPIC fuel development facility (DFDF) and safe operation of the facility through the technology developments such as remote operation, maintenance and pair of the facility, treatment of various high level process wastes and trapping of volatile process gases. DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) can accommodate highly active nuclear materials, and now it is for fabrication of the oxide fuel by dry process characterizing the proliferation resistance. During the second stage from march 2005 to February 2007, we carried out technology development of the remote maintenance and the DFDF's safe operation, development of treatment technology for process off-gas, and development of treatment technology for PWR cladding hull and the results was described in this report.

  18. Reactor safeguards system assessment and design. Volume I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varnado, G.B.; Ericson, D.M. Jr.; Daniel, S.L.; Bennett, H.A.; Hulme, B.L.

    1978-06-01

    This report describes the development and application of a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear power reactor safeguards systems. Analytic techniques are used to identify the sabotage acts which could lead to release of radioactive material from a nuclear power plant, to determine the areas of a plant which must be protected to assure that significant release does not occur, to model the physical plant layout, and to evaluate the effectiveness of various safeguards systems. The methodology was used to identify those aspects of reactor safeguards systems which have the greatest effect on overall system performance and which, therefore, should be emphasized in the licensing process. With further refinements, the methodology can be used by the licensing reviewer to aid in assessing proposed or existing safeguards systems

  19. Authentication method for safeguards instruments securing data transmission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Neumann, G.; Gartner, K.J.

    1986-01-01

    Because of the worldwide increase in nuclear fuel cycle activities, the need arises to reduce inspection effort by increasing the inspection efficiency per facility. Therefore, more and more advanced safeguards instruments will be designed for automatic operation. In addition, sensoring and recording devices may be well separated from each other within the facility, while the data transmission medium is a cable. The basic problem is the authenticity of the transmitted information. It has to be ensured that no potential adversary is able to falsify the transmitted safeguards data, i.e. the data transmission is secured. At present, predominantly C/S-devices are designed for automatic and remote interrogation. Also in other areas of safeguards instrumentation authentication will become a major issue, in particular, where the facility operator may offer his process instrumentation to be used also for safeguards purposes. In this paper possibilities to solve the problem of authentication are analysed

  20. HARMONISASI REGULASI DAN EFEKTIVITAS KELEMBAGAAN SAFEGUARD DI INDONESIA

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Abdurrahman Alfaqiih

    2012-06-01

    Full Text Available The implementation of WTO agreement is not easy in accordance with the estabilished regulations, so deviations in the process of trade liberalization that press domestic indrusties will likely to take place. Therefore, it is necessary to have safety actions to actualize mutual benefits in international trade. There are many cases of safety actions conducted by many countries such as Argentine that implements safety actions to its footwear industries without adapting to WTO regulations which causes the country’s losses. The paper examines the consistency of safeguard regulations in Indonesia with safeguard regulations of WTO and its implementation reviewed from the law effectiveness. The result of the study shows that the safeguard regulations in Indonesia is in accordance with the safeguard regulations of WTO in the normative level, but in the implementation the policy is not done effectively.

  1. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  2. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fadden, M.; Yardumian, J.

    1993-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  3. IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

  4. Some reflections on nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, Ross.

    1981-01-01

    The author doubts whether, in view of the 1976 policy of requiring adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent IAEA safeguards, Canada still needs the 1974 policy of bilateral safeguards on technology as well as material. The opinion is expressed that bilateral safeguards create difficulties for the IAEA, and are resented by some potential customers. Much better, if it were achievable, would be a code agreed by a convention of vendors and customers alike, to include sanctions against transgressors. The author expresses confidence in the IAEA, but perceives a need for more men and money. Also needed are better instruments to account for materials

  5. Safeguards Accountability Network accountability and materials management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnival, G.J.; Meredith, E.M.

    1985-01-01

    The Safeguards Accountability Network (SAN) is a computerized on-line accountability system for the safeguards accountability control of nuclear materials inventories at Rocky Flats Plant. SAN is a dedicated accountability system utilizing source documents filled out on the shop floor as its base. The system incorporates double entry accounting and is developed around the Material Balance Area (MBA) concept. MBA custodians enter transaction information from source documents prepared by personnel in the process areas directly into the SAN system. This provides a somewhat near-real time perpetual inventory system which has limited interaction with MBA custodians. MBA custodians are permitted to inquire into the system and status items on inventory. They are also responsible for the accuracy of the accountability information used as input to the system for their MBA. Monthly audits by the Nuclear Materials Control group assure the timeliness and accuracy of SAN accountability information

  6. Physical protection in relation to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.

    1985-01-01

    In this session, physical protection, nuclear material accounting and control, and containment and surveillance have been discussed, with emphasis on the interactions of these measures within the context of IAEA safeguards. In addition, the current physical protection equipment and techniques have been reviewed. The interactions can be summarized as follows. Although physical protection is a fundamental element of IAEA safeguards, it is solely a state/facility operator responsibility. While the IAEA has an interest in promoting the implementation of effective physical protection systems, it serves only in an advisory capacity. Nuclear material accounting directly involves the state, facility operator, and the IAEA. Facility records and reports provided by the state are independently verified by the IAEA. The SSAC is of fundamental importance in this process. Containment and surveillance measures are used by the UAEA. Installation and routine use of C/S equipment must be approved by the state and facility operator, and must not affect facility operations or safety

  7. LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.; Farnitano, M.; Carelli, J.; Hazeltine, J.; Bailey, D.

    2001-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process

  8. Safeguards for special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1979-12-01

    Safeguards, accountability, and nuclear materials are defined. The accuracy of measuring nuclear materials is discussed. The use of computers in nuclear materials accounting is described. Measures taken to physically protect nuclear materials are described

  9. Nuclear safeguards - a new profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thorne, L.

    1984-01-01

    Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

  10. Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanchi, L.

    1991-01-01

    The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

  11. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-03-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  12. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-02-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  13. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  14. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested

  15. International safeguards: experience and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

    1982-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs

  16. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert S.; Hockert, John W.; Hebditch, David J.

    2009-01-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  17. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  18. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  19. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  20. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

  1. THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stanbro, W. D.

    1990-01-01

    The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

  2. Improved IAEA safeguards for closed nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    The paper recognises the limitations of nuclear material accountancy in applying safeguards to future large scale processing plants. For those plants the following will be necessary: (i) The inclusion of safeguards requirements in design criteria. (ii) Extensive application of containment and surveillance with monitors on personnel and goods exits, pipework, tanks, etc. (iii) Continuous inspectorate measurement of input and output flows. Local IAEA laboratories to ensure timeliness. (iv) Upgrading of process control information to enable the inspectorate to monitor the in-process inventory. The inspectorates knowledge of the in-process inventory will be valuable in their assessment of any alarms given by the containment-surveillance system

  3. Safety, security and safeguard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zakariya, Nasiru Imam; Kahn, M.T.E.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • The 3S interface in the design of PPS is hereby proposed. • The 3S synergy enhances the reduction in vulnerability and terrorism. • Highlighted were concept of detection, delay and response. - Abstract: A physical protection system (PPS) integrates people, procedures, and equipment for the protection of assets or facilities against theft, sabotage and terrorist attacks. Therefore, this paper proposes the use of a systematic and measurable approach to the design of PPS and its emphases on the concept of detection, delay and response. The proposed performance based PPS has the capability of defeating adversaries thereby achieving its targets. Therefore, timely detection of intrusion – based on the use of sensors, signal lines and alarm systems – is a major principle in the proposed system. Also the need for deterrence such as barriers in form of guards, access control, close circuit television (CCTV), strong policy and procedures, then the security culture amongst the facility workers was appropriately discussed. Since nuclear power is considered the only source that can provide large scale electricity with comparatively minimal impact on the environment, the paper also considered base guidelines for the application of PPS in any nuclear and radioactive facilities, followed with the necessity to incorporate inherent safety, security and safeguard (3S) synergy innovation in the physical protection system design and other characteristics that will enhance to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear facilities and materials to theft sabotage and terrorist attacks

  4. International nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syed Azmi Syed Ali

    1985-01-01

    History can be a very dull subject if it relates to events which have long since lost their relevance. The factors which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, are as important and relevant today as they were when the Agency was first created. Without understanding these factors it is impossible to realise how important the Agency is in the present world or to understand some of the controversies surrounding its future. Central to these controversies is the question of how best to promote the international transfer of nuclear technology without contributing further to the problem of proliferating nuclear explosives or explosive capabilities. One effective means is to subject nuclear materials (see accompanying article in box), which forms the basic link between the manufacture of nuclear explosives and nuclear power generation, to international safeguards. This was realized very early in the development of nuclear power and was given greater emphasis following the deployment of the first two atomic bombs towards the end of World War II. (author)

  5. Upgrading nuclear safeguards in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, Maribeth; Murakami, Kenji

    2005-01-01

    When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Kazakhstan inherited 1,410 nuclear warheads. Within three years, by 1994, Kazakhstan had formally acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and transferred its last nuclear warhead to Russia in April 1995. Its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA came into force in 1994 and all facilities are under safeguards. In February 2004 Kazakhstan signed the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, though this not yet in force. Kazakhstan played a key role during the Soviet era as a supplier and processor of uranium. The BN-350 fast reactor at Aktau (formerly Shevchenko), on the shore of the Caspian Sea, successfully produced up to 135 MWe of electricity and 80,000 m3/day of potable water over some 27 years until it was closed down in mid-1999. The IAEA being involved in upgrading the nuclear material accountancy and control systems of all Member States requested, Japan and Sweden to conduct independent evaluations at the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC), and specifically at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant (UMP) and identified areas that could be improved with respect to nuclear material accountancy and control. In June 2003 the Agency, with four Member States and the European Union, undertook a programme to upgrade the nuclear accountancy and control systems within Kazakhstan with special emphasis on the UMP in Ust-Kamenogorsk in northeast Kazakhstan. The current IAEA programme is focused on upgrading hardware and software systems and the training of personnel in Kazakhstan. Due to the complexity of the facility, special emphasis is on training personnel and upgrading systems at the UMP. At the UMP the focus is on reducing the uncertainty in the hold-up (material which cannot be cleaned out) in the process lines, better determining the amount of nuclear material that is released from the facility as waste or retained at the facility as waste, increasing the ability of the facility to more

  6. Strengthening of Organizational Infrastructure for Meeting IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Obligations: Bangladesh Perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mollah, A.S.

    2010-01-01

    Safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear reactor in Bangladesh achieved critically on September 14, 1986. Reactor Operation and Maintenance Unit routinely carries out certain international obligations which need to undertake as signatory of different treaties, agreements and protocols in the international safeguards regime. Pursuant to the relevant articles of these agreements/protocols, the reactor and associated facilities of Bangladesh (Facility code: BDA- and BDZ-) are physically inspected by the designated IAEA safeguards inspectors. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) has recently created a new division called 'Nuclear Safeguards and Security Division' for enhancing the safeguards activities as per international obligations. This division plays a leading role in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the BAEC's nuclear safeguards and nuclear security activities. This division is actively working with USDOE, IAEA and EU to enhance the nuclear safeguards and security activities in the following areas: - Analysis of nuclear safeguards related reports of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; - Upgrading of physical protection system of 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, gamma irradiation facilities, central radioactive storage and processing facility and different radiation oncology facilities of Bangladesh under GTRI programme; - Supervision for installation of radiation monitoring system of the Chittagong port under USDOE Megaports Initiative Programmes for detection of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials; - Development of laboratory capabilities for analysis of nuclear safeguards related samples; - Planning for development of organizational infrastructure to carry out safeguards related activities under IAEA different

  7. Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, Mary Alice

    2010-01-01

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC and A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC and A program. The MC and A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

  8. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  9. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  10. Equipment support for the implementation of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arlt, R.; Bosler, G.; Goldfarb, M.; Schanfein, M.; Whichello, J.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The provision of effective, reliable, and user-friendly equipment needed for the implementation of safeguards is one of the main objectives of the Division of Technical Services (SOTS) in the Department of Safeguards. As an outcome of a review by an independent external consultant firm, the instrumentation sections of the SGTS were reorganized in January 2001 into two new sections, the Section for NDA Systems and Seals (TNS) and Section for Installed Systems (TIE). Each section has 'cradle-to-grave' responsibilities for development, implementation, maintenance, and decommissioning of safeguards instruments and measurement systems. Unattended assay, monitoring and surveillance instruments are the responsibility of TIE while attended nondestructive assay (NDA) instruments and seals are handled by TNS. The principal goals of both sections are to define equipment requirements based on Departmental needs, to coordinate Support Programme tasks concerning development and implementation activities, to provide system engineering of commercial components, manage laboratory and to do field testing and prove system suitability for defined safeguards applications. In addition both sections coordinate equipment and supply needs for the Department, including acquisition, preparation, servicing, installation, commissioning, troubleshooting, maintenance and repair, ensuring their availability when needed. As required, TIE and TNS provide specialized field support to the Operations Divisions. Each section is working to standardize equipment as much as possible and reduce the number of instruments performing the same function. This reduces both inspector and technician training, required parts inventories, and overall life-cycle costs. Development based on User Needs from the Operations Divisions follows a strict quality control program that includes a thorough qualification testing procedure with the last phase being field-testing under actual facility conditions. A

  11. Maintaining continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franssen, F.; Islam, A.B.M.N.; Sonnier, C.; Schoeneman, J.L.; Baumann, M.

    1992-01-01

    The conclusions of the vulnerability test on VOPAN (verification of Operator's Analysis) as conducted at Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (ASA) at Seibersdorf, Austria in October 1990 and documented in STR-266, indicate that ''whenever samples are taken for safeguards purposes extreme care must be taken to ensure that they have not been interfered with during the sample taking, transportation, storage or sample preparation process.'' Indeed there exist a number of possibilities to alter the content of a safeguards sample vial from the moment of sampling up to the arrival of the treated (or untreated) sample at SAL. The time lapse between these two events can range from a few days up to months. The sample history over this period can be subdivided into three main sub-periods: (1) the period from when the sampling activities are commenced up to the treatment in the operator's laboratory, (2) during treatment of samples in the operator's laboratory, and finally, (3) the period between that treatment and the arrival of the sample at SAL. A combined effort between the Agency and the United States Support Program to the Agency (POTAS) has resulted in two active tasks and one proposed task to investigate improving the maintenance of continuity of knowledge on safeguards samples during the entire period of their existence. This paper describes the use of the Sample Vial Secure Container (SVSC), of the Authenticated Secure Container System (ASCS), and of the Secure Container for Storage and Transportation of samples (SCST) to guarantee that a representative portion of the solution sample will be received at SAL

  12. Safeguards information handling and treatment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.; Liu, J.; Ruan, D.

    2001-01-01

    the existence or development of a particular process. Each process for carrying out a given step is described and is characterized in terms of indicators of the existence of that process. The indicators for a process may be especially designed equipment, dual-use equipment, nuclear and non-nuclear material, environmental signatures, other observables, technology, training, R and D, etc. Moreover, the specificity of each indicator has been designated to a given nuclear activity and is used to determine the strength of an indicator. An indicator that is present only if the nuclear process exists or is under development, or whose presence is almost always accompanied by a nuclear activity is a strong indicator of that activity. Conversely, an indicator that is present for many other reasons, or is associated with many other activities, is a weak indicator. In between are medium indicators. Based on the above analysis, we introduce the multi-criteria, multi-expert evaluation method to get the overall linguistic value of assurance for a given process with consideration of all indicators related to this process by several experts. An example will be considered for the gaseous diffusion enrichment process. In conclusion, this method allows the evaluation of multi-criteria, multi-expert information in safeguards, taking into account the particular nature of the information and the specific differences among the experts through the aggregation process

  13. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  14. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards

  15. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

  16. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B. (comps.)

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  17. Safeguards surveillance equipment and data sharing between IAEA and a member state

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Seung Sik

    1999-01-01

    Efficiency and reliability are two prongs of implementation of safeguards policy. Unattended surveillance is getting wide acceptance through its field trials and technical advances. In achieving goal of safeguards, new safeguards system should provide less intrusiveness than conventional inspection. Unattended surveillance data share will be a major issue among some countries that have own national inspection scheme in place in parallel with international safeguards to check the resources consuming incurred by the repeated installations. Nonetheless, the issue has not been focussed yet among the States concerned, especially for the country like Korea with national inspection in operation. For balanced development in safeguards regime between IAEA and Korea, sharing of unattended surveillance data with SSAC needs to be worked out in conjunction with the joint use of safeguards instruments that is in the process

  18. Performance monitoring of safeguards equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sirisena, K.; Peltoranta, M.; Goussarov, V.; Vodrazka, P.

    1999-01-01

    SGTCS is responsible for monitoring and reporting the performance of the SG equipment. Performance monitoring (PM) has been implemented in most important safeguards equipment operating unattended in nuclear facilities. Inspectors acquire equipment performance data in facilities. After inspection, the data package is submitted to SGTCS for processing and analysis. The performance data is used for identification of systems or components, which should be changed in the field and for identification of modules which, should be diagnosed at HQ in order to determine the cause of failure. Moreover, the performance data is used for preventive maintenance and spares distribution planning, and to provide statistics for official reports and management decision making. An important part of the performance monitoring is reporting. Equipment performance reports contain information about equipment inventory, utilization, failure types, failure distribution, and reliability. Trends in performance are given in graphical form in cases, where past data is available. Reliability estimates such as expected times between failures are provided. The automated reporting tools are obtainable through EMIS database application. (author)

  19. Unattended safeguards instrumentation at centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, L. Eric; Lebrun, Alain R.; Labella, Rocco

    2014-01-01

    As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, particularly high‑capacity plants, while working within budgetary constraints. New safeguards approaches should meet the high‑level verification objectives for such facilities (i.e., timely detection of: diversion of declared material, excess production beyond declared amounts, and production of enrichment levels higher than declared), but should also strive for efficiency advantages in implementation, for both the IAEA and operators. Under the Agency’s State- level approach to safeguards implementation, the Agency needs a flexible toolbox of technologies, allowing tailoring of safeguards measures for each individual enrichment facility. In this paper, the potential roles and development status for three different types of unattended measurement instrumentation are discussed. On‑Line Enrichment Monitors (OLEM) could provide continuous enrichment measurement for 100% of the declared gas flowing through unit header pipes. Unattended Cylinder Verification Stations (UCVS) could provide unattended verification of the declared uranium mass and enrichment of 100% of the cylinders moving through the plant, but also apply and verify an ‘NDA Fingerprint’ to preserve verification knowledge on the contents of each cylinder throughout its life in the facility. Sharing of the operator’s load cell signals from feed and withdrawal stations could count all cylinders introduced to the process and provide periodic monitoring of the uranium mass balance for in‑process material. The integration of load cell, OLEM and UCVS data streams offers the possibility for 100% verification of declared cylinder flow, and enables the periodic verification of the declared 235 U mass balance in the plant. These new capabilities would enhance the IAEA

  20. To Russia with love: how the Australian Government's much vaunted safeguards policy has been watered down, step by step

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Milliken, R.

    1981-01-01

    Australia's uranium safeguards policy was announced in May 1977. The following conditions were included: no contracts could be signed until safeguards agreements had been concluded; uranium sold must remain Australian owned until it had been processed into a form attracting IAEA safeguards inspection; and prior Australian consent was required before a customer could reprocess Australian uranium, transfer it to a third country, or enrich it to a grade higher than that needed for normal power plants. Australia has signed 9 safeguards agreements and two more are due to be finalised soon. The author discusses changes in policy since the first agreement was signed. One problem has been conflict between commercial and safeguards issues

  1. Isotopic safeguards statistics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Timmerman, C.L.; Stewart, K.B.

    1978-06-01

    The methods and results of our statistical analysis of isotopic data using isotopic safeguards techniques are illustrated using example data from the Yankee Rowe reactor. The statistical methods used in this analysis are the paired comparison and the regression analyses. A paired comparison results when a sample from a batch is analyzed by two different laboratories. Paired comparison techniques can be used with regression analysis to detect and identify outlier batches. The second analysis tool, linear regression, involves comparing various regression approaches. These approaches use two basic types of models: the intercept model (y = α + βx) and the initial point model [y - y 0 = β(x - x 0 )]. The intercept model fits strictly the exposure or burnup values of isotopic functions, while the initial point model utilizes the exposure values plus the initial or fabricator's data values in the regression analysis. Two fitting methods are applied to each of these models. These methods are: (1) the usual least squares fitting approach where x is measured without error, and (2) Deming's approach which uses the variance estimates obtained from the paired comparison results and considers x and y are both measured with error. The Yankee Rowe data were first measured by Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) and remeasured by Nuclear Audit and Testing Company (NATCO). The ratio of Pu/U versus 235 D (in which 235 D is the amount of depleted 235 U expressed in weight percent) using actual numbers is the isotopic function illustrated. Statistical results using the Yankee Rowe data indicates the attractiveness of Deming's regression model over the usual approach by simple comparison of the given regression variances with the random variance from the paired comparison results

  2. Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1976-01-01

    With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

  3. A view to the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsuboi, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

  4. Future issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

  5. IAEA Guidance for Safeguards Implementation in Facility Design and Construction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprinkle, J.; Hamilton, A.; Poirier, S.; Catton, A.; Ciuculescu, C.; Ingegneri, M.; Plenteda, R.

    2015-01-01

    ), · International Safeguards in the Design of Conversion Plants (NF-T-4.8, tbd), · International Safeguards in the Design of Enrichment Plants (NF-T-4.9, tbd), · International Safeguards in the Design of Reprocessing Plants (NF-T-3.2, tbd), The presentation will address how these publications can be shared and promoted. It will include lessons learned and suggestions how to affect the new facility bidding process in a constructive way. (author)

  6. Dry Process Fuel Performance Evaluation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Song, K. C.; Moon, J. S. and others

    2005-04-15

    The objective of the project is to establish the performance evaluation system of DUPIC fuel during the Phase II R and D. In order to fulfil this objectives, irradiation test of DUPIC fuel was carried out in HANARO using the non-instrumented and SPND-instrumented rig. Also, the analysis on the in-reactor behavior analysis of DUPIC fuel, out-pile test using simulated DUPIC fuel as well as performance and integrity assessment in a commercial reactor were performed during this Phase. The R and D results of the Phase II are summarized as follows : - Performance evaluation of DUPIC fuel via irradiation test in HANARO - Post irradiation examination of irradiated fuel and performance analysis - Development of DUPIC fuel performance code (modified ELESTRES) considering material properties of DUPIC fuel - Irradiation behavior and integrity assessment under the design power envelope of DUPIC fuel - Foundamental technology development of thermal/mechanical performance evaluation using ANSYS (FEM package)

  7. Dry Process Fuel Performance Evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Myung Seung; Song, K. C.; Moon, J. S. and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of the project is to establish the performance evaluation system of DUPIC fuel during the Phase II R and D. In order to fulfil this objectives, irradiation test of DUPIC fuel was carried out in HANARO using the non-instrumented and SPND-instrumented rig. Also, the analysis on the in-reactor behavior analysis of DUPIC fuel, out-pile test using simulated DUPIC fuel as well as performance and integrity assessment in a commercial reactor were performed during this Phase. The R and D results of the Phase II are summarized as follows : - Performance evaluation of DUPIC fuel via irradiation test in HANARO - Post irradiation examination of irradiated fuel and performance analysis - Development of DUPIC fuel performance code (modified ELESTRES) considering material properties of DUPIC fuel - Irradiation behavior and integrity assessment under the design power envelope of DUPIC fuel - Foundamental technology development of thermal/mechanical performance evaluation using ANSYS (FEM package)

  8. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, pre-1990 alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  9. Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

    2011-09-01

    During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

  10. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Alexander, Joseph; Bean, Robert; Castle, Brian; DeMuth, Scott; Durst, Phillip; Ehinger, Michael; Golay, Michael; Hase, Kevin; Hebditch, David J.; Hockert, John; Meppen, Bruce; Morgan, James; Phillips, Jerry

    2009-01-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD's principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a 'SBD design loop' that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A 'Generic SBD Process' was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and participation in

  11. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  12. IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelly, P.

    1986-01-01

    The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

  13. Developing a simulation for border safeguarding

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Rooyen, S

    2011-09-01

    Full Text Available Border safeguarding is the defence of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and this is a joint responsibility of the military and the police. Military doctrine for conventional warfare is not sufficient for Border Safeguarding operations due...

  14. Integrated safeguards and the role of the SSAC: an Australian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, John

    1998-01-01

    'Classical' safeguards retain a strong emphasis on facility-based materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major efforts are being made to establish the Agency's capabilities in this regard. Current priorities include, ensuring the wide-spread conclusion of individual Additional Protocols so the Strengthened Safeguards System enters into general application without delay, and continuing the development of new methodologies - including associated quality assurance and evaluation. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalisation of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system is a matter of the highest priority to Australia. Australia has had a major influence in this process, that is provision of consultancy services to the Agency on new safeguards and analytical techniques, and in the development and field testing of new safeguards technology such as remote surveillance. (Yi, J. H.)

  15. International safeguards and nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moglewer, S.

    1987-01-01

    This report provides a critical review of the effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards against potential acts of nuclear terrorism. The author argues that IAEA safeguards should be made applicable to deterring diversions of nuclear materials from civil to weapons purposes by subnational groups as well as by nations. Both technical and institutional factors are considered, and suggestions for organizational restructuring and further technical development are made. Awareness of the necessity for effective preventive measures is emphasized, and possible directions for further effort are suggested

  16. Tour of safeguards equipment van

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, B.W.; Fager, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    Increasing use is being made of nondestructive assay instruments for identification and measurements of nuclear materials. Important advantages of NDA are: timeliness, portability, and ease of use. Recent development in computer systems and NDA allow for the integration of sample planning, control of NDA, and data analysis into one transportable system. This session acquainted the course participants with the use of mobile NDA safeguards measurement systems. This session considered the practical problems and the type of results that can be expected from field use of NDA instruments. An existing mobile safeguards system was used to demonstrate some of the differences between field and laboratory conditions

  17. Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J.

    2010-01-01

    The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

  18. Operationalizing social safeguards in REDD+: actors, interests and ideas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDermott, Constance L.; Coad, Lauren; Helfgott, Ariella; Schroeder, Heike

    2012-01-01

    “REDD+” is a mechanism created under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for Reducing {carbon} Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation and forest enhancement. In addition, REDD+ “safeguards” are intended to protect non-carbon forest values. While REDD+ countries are formally requested to provide information on safeguards, there is as yet no agreement on the relative priority of carbon versus non-carbon values, and the appropriate level of safeguard standardization. This, we argue, has allowed REDD+ to function as a “boundary object” spanning disparate priorities. Meanwhile, the contestation of these priorities has been displaced from intergovernmental processes to the various organizations involved in operationalizing REDD+ activities. This article applies a set of organizational, substantive and conceptual typologies to compare differences in the balance of actors, interests and ideas across these organizations. It finds that multi-lateral funding programs have drawn heavily on existing safeguards for international aid, while private certification schemes have specialized in different niche priorities at the project level. In regards to the substance of safeguard requirements, the involvement of donors and investors appears correlated with a stronger emphasis on carbon and risk mitigation while greater NGO involvement and the decoupling of safeguards design from REDD+ funding appear correlated with greater emphasis on social rights and benefits. These findings have several critical implications for future REDD+ activities. Firstly, the choice of organizations involved in defining, funding and verifying safeguard activities, and the balance of actors in their governing structures, are likely to influence the relative emphasis on non-carbon values. Secondly, a diversity of approaches to disbursing REDD+ incentives may be necessary to maintain widespread support for REDD+. Thirdly, it remains to be seen whether REDD

  19. IAEA safeguards and the additional protocol in the Eurasia Region

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murakami, K.

    2001-01-01

    Developing and implementing safeguards against misuse of nuclear material and facilities has always been the Agency's main activities. Like the nuclear non-proliferation regime itself, the development of the safeguards system has been an evolutionary process. The first safeguards inspection was carried out in 1962 (in Norway). In the sixties, the basic concepts behind safeguards were developed (INFCIRC/26, adopted in 1961, for some of you it might still have a familiar ring) and the number of inspections and types of facilities inspected grew slowly. With the advent of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, a more complete, albeit limited, system of safeguards covering nuclear material, equipment and facilities emerged. But the quantum leap came, of course, wit the entry into force of the NPT. Today, the IAEA has 224 safeguards agreements in force with 140 States. Nearly all of these States are NPT States. In the Eurasia Region, particularly the Newly Independent States (NIS) significant achievements have been made in the Safeguards Implementation. States with nuclear activities have the SG Agreement in force. Some states are already signing the Additional Protocol and it is in force in two of these States in the NIS region. Much progress has been made in the area of nuclear material and accountancy through the IAEA Coordinated Technical Support Programme (CTSP). The programme was organized to co-ordinate the donor states activities and has been successful for the last seven years in providing assistance in the area of nuclear legislation establishment of the State System of Accountancy of nuclear material (SSAC) and other related areas. Improvement is still foreseen in these areas, particularly as more states in the region will be signing and implementing the Additional Protocols

  20. Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ko, Won Il; Lee, S. Y.; Kim, H. D.; Ha, J. H.; Song, D. Y.; Lee, T. H

    2004-07-01

    The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility.

  1. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1978-06-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  2. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1976-01-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. A facilities safeguards system suitable for a production plant is described in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  3. Safeguardability of a commercial-scaled ACP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Won Il; Lee, S. Y.; Kim, H. D.; Ha, J. H.; Song, D. Y.; Lee, T. H.

    2004-07-01

    The Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process (ACP) is an electro-metallurgical treatment technique to convert oxide-type spent nuclear fuel into a metallic form. This report documents a preliminary study on the safeguardability of ACP. The sub-processes and material flow of the pilot scale ACP facility were designed for this study. Then, their Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Point (KMP) were defined based on diversion scenario analysis. Finally, the limit of error in the MUF value was estimated using international target values for the uncertainty of measurement methods. Based on the results of preliminary study, we concluded that the safeguards goals of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be met if the assumptions regarding measurement instruments can be achieved in a safeguards system for the ACP facility

  4. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  5. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  6. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  7. Nuclear recycling: costs, savings, and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spinrad, B.I.

    1985-01-01

    This chapter discusses the economics, physical and chemical processes, and safety of nuclear fuel recycling. The spent fuel must be chemically reprocessed in order to recover uranium and plutonium. Topics considered include indifference costs, recycling in light water reactors (LWRs), plutonium in fast reactors, the choice between recycling and storage, safeguards, and weapons proliferation. It is shown that the economics of recycling nuclear fuel involves the actual costs and savings of the recycling operation in terms of money spent, made, and saved, and the impact of the recycling on the future cost of uranium

  8. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  9. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagner, W.

    2000-01-01

    A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

  10. Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

  11. Remote monitoring in safeguards: Security of information and enhanced cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Galdoz, Erwin; Calzetta, Osvaldo; Fernández Moreno, Sonia; Llacer, Carlos; Díaz, Gustavo; Vigile, Sebastián; Brunhuber, Christoph

    2011-01-01

    Unattended systems with remote transmission capabilities (RM) have the potential to improve safeguards efficiency. Moreover, the evolution of technology and the steady growing of nuclear materials subject to control, lead modern safeguards increasingly utilizing unattended equipment with the capability to store relevant data for long periods of time coupled with the option of being remotely accessed and checked. Remote inspection is still a concept under development, but it may end to be a powerful more efficient verification modality in medium term future. An important part of drawing meaningful safeguards conclusions rests on authenticity and reliability of the information on nuclear material and facilities acquired through the various verification activities and measures applied by IAEA and regional safeguards organizations, like ABACC. The increasing utilization of such technology to further optimize safeguards responds to a multifaceted environment where security of information for all relevant parties is of utmost importance. From the point of view of the IAEA and ABACC, the use of any technology for safeguards application, and specially the use of RM, requires to ensure the security of data collected to guarantee the validity and veracity of such information throughout the whole process (e.g., from collecting to reviewing). This is also valid to the SSAC involved in the process. Information security is also relevant for States and Operators. Assurance should be given that the information could not be withdrawn by non-authorized entities and that facility data is also fully secured. Another important aspect related to RM that may also fall in the security aspect of safeguards relevant information that merits further consideration, is the sharing of information between organizations like ABACC and the IAEA as well as the possibility to make this data available for States authorities purposes. This paper discusses three main themes related to RM: (i) the extent

  12. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R.; Morgan, James B.; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L.

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  13. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D.

    2013-01-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers

  14. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D. [Sandia National Laboratories, PO Box 5800 MS 0747, Albuquerque, NM 87185 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  15. Safeguards against Takeover after Volkswagen

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Werlauff, Erik

    2009-01-01

    The article analyses the significance of the European Court's decision on the effects of the rules on the free movement of capital on the takeover safeguards in Volkswagen AG for restrictions on the right to vote, ownership ceilings, division into A and B share classes, increased majority require...

  16. Enrichment plant management and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, N.H.

    1978-01-01

    The next increment of enrichment at Portsmouth will be gas centrifuge. The safeguards program at Portsmouth is discussed, including the DYMCAS system, the computerization, and the detectors. Control of the material access areas is discussed. The licensee material surveillance and verification program is also described

  17. MACSSA (Macintosh Safeguards Systems Analyzer)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Kohl, M.

    1986-01-01

    This paper discusses MACSSA a fully interactive menu-driven software system for accountancy of nuclear safeguards systems written for Apple Macintosh. Plant inventory and inventory change records can be entered interactively or can be downloaded from a mainframe database. Measurement procedures and instrument parameters can be defined. Partial or total statistics on propagated errors is performed and shown in tabular or graphic form

  18. Safeguards Technology Strategic Planning Pentachart

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, C. J.

    2017-01-01

    Builds on earlier strategic planning workshops conducted for SGIT, SGTS, and SGCP. Many of recommendations from these workshops have been successfully implemented at the IAEA. Provide a context for evaluating new approaches for anticipated safeguards challenges of the future. Approach used by government and military to plan for an uncertain future. Uses consensus decision-making.

  19. Evaluation of excess nuclear materials suitability for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newton, J.W.; White, W.C.; Davis, R.M.; Cherry, R.C.

    1996-01-01

    President Clinton announced in March 1995 the permanent withdrawal of 200 tons of fissile material from the US nuclear stockpile. This action was made possible by the dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons stockpile size and a desire to demonstrate the US'' commitment to nonproliferation goals. To provide further assurance of that commitment, the US is addressing placement of these materials under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. An initial step of this overall assessment was evaluation of the nuclear materials'' suitability for international safeguards. US Department of Energy (DOE) field organizations reviewed a detailed listing of all candidate materials with respect to characterization status, security classification, and acceptability for international safeguards compared to specified criteria. These criteria included form, location, environment and safety considerations, measurability, and stability. The evaluation resulted in broad categorizations of all materials with respect to preparing and placing materials under IAEA safeguards and provided essential information for decisions on the timing for offering materials as a function of materials attributes. A plan is being prepared to determine the availability of these materials for IAEA safeguards considering important factors such as costs, processes and facilities required to prepare materials, and impacts on other programs

  20. Welcome from ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and Development Association)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Van der Meer, K.

    2015-01-01

    ESARDA, on the one hand being part of that European family and on the other hand working in practice to support peace by the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, can be considered as a perfect representative of that European peace process. Going now from the European to the global perspective, peace should be our motivating force and this is also expressed in the basis of safeguards: the non-proliferation Treaty. Several articles of the Treaty deal with not developing nuclear weapons and not supporting the development of nuclear weapons by other countries, and one article (Article VI) deals with the general and complete nuclear disarmament. What is ESARDA doing in practice- First we provide a forum to exchange scientific information for the benefit of all safeguards stakeholders. The most important forum is the biannual open ESARDA safeguards symposium that will be held next year from 19-21 May in Manchester. Next to the ESARDA symposia, we coordinate European safeguards research via our ESARDA Working Groups. Also non-members are welcome in these WG as observers. JRC Ispra maintains the ESARDA website that also supports exchange of safeguards information

  1. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for

  2. Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jarman, Kenneth D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Joslyn, Cliff A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kreyling, Sean J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sayre, Amanda M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Schanfein, Mark J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); West, Curtis L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Winters, Samuel T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2017-02-07

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

  3. Technical Solution for Improved Safeguards/State Cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, S.

    2015-01-01

    This paper will discuss an information technology solution to allow the IAEA Safeguards Department to improve cooperation with States. The solution will be a portal or hub to integrate the information, processes, and people between Safeguards and States. It will allow for two-way communication and collaboration between Safeguards staff and State representatives. This paper discusses the information security challenges inherent in building such a system. It proposes technical architectures that might allow the existing integration approach (e.g., encrypted email exchange) to be kept, while expanding it to include modern integration technologies (e.g., web services), as well explorer new collaborative web technologies. It looks at current Safeguards processes and approaches to cooperation and discusses efficiencies that could be achieved through the adoption of this technology solution. Example process areas for improvement include: a) Safeguards Agreements: States are obligated to submit data on their nuclear programme to the IAEA on a periodic basis. Declarations are received through two separate systems using encrypted email. The proposed solution would allow for enhanced exchange of declaration where States can submit any type of declaration using one system. When declarations are received and validated, an acknowledgement would automatically be sent to the State. The solution would provide the Safeguards Department the ability to ask for clarification as well as collaborate on the submitted declarations. Both the question and the response would be recorded in the system. The solution could also integrate tools allowing declarations to be added directly and validated before submission. b) Other areas that could benefit from this solution include declarations from States with small quantities protocol, facility declarations, as well as systems that support extra-budgetary funding (e.g., SPRICS). (author)

  4. International safeguards for critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.; Todd, J.L.

    1979-01-01

    A study was undertaken to investigate various approaches to provide international safeguards for critical facilities and to select an optimized system. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The goal of the study was to detect and confirm the protracted or abrupt diversion of 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately a week of the diversion. The general safeguards alternatives considered were (1) continuous inspections by resident inspectors, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, (2) periodic inspections by regional inspectors at varying time intervals, (3) unattended containment/surveillance measures, and (4) various combinations of the above. It was concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system can be achieved by employing a method of continuously monitoring facility activities which could lead to diversion. This is in addition to the routine inspections typical of current international safeguards. Monitoring detects inventory discrepancies and violations of agreed-upon procedural restrictions, as well as unauthorized removal of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). A special inventory is used following detection to confirm any suspected diversion. Comparison of 28 safeguards options led to the selection of a system for further development which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident IAEA personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and routine inventory sampling. A development programme is described which is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of several containment and surveillance measures proposed in the study. Included are a personnel portal and an instrument/material pass-through as well as associated recording and tamper-protection features. (author)

  5. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

    1996-12-01

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  6. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  7. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-01-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

  8. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  9. IAEA safeguards information system re-engineering project (IRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, G.; Becar, J.-M.; Ifyland, N.; Kirkgoeze, R.; Koevesd, G.; Szamosi, L.

    2007-01-01

    The Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities through the establishment of a new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. The Project provides a unique opportunity to enhance all of the information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance limited funds, available resources and Departmental priorities. To achieve its goals, the Project will require the participation of all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive plan that provides both a flexible and stable foundation for address changing business needs. The expectation is that high quality integrated information systems will be developed that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible on-line in a secure environment. (author)

  10. Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

  11. DOE enrichment plants-safeguards means business

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donnelly, R.

    1987-01-01

    The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, owned by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and operated by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., is a full service enrichment plant. Its long enriching cascade can process uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) feeds at almost any 235 U level and can produce UF 6 over the complete spectrum from depleted to very highly enriched uranium. The DOE uranium enrichment program is a government-owned enterprise operating as a business. The operating concerns of the DOE uranium enrichment plants and their safeguards programs have evolved together over the past three decades, and that evolution will likely continue. As the risk associated with possession, processing, and shipment of strategic nuclear material increased, the protection and control of it increased; as the value of the product grew with time, better ways were found to measure and conserve it. In each of these areas, safeguards objectives and the business requirements of the plant are complementary, and the progress made in one area has been reflected by progress in the other. The plant's material control and accountability program has become crucial to such business requirements as quantifying the enriched uranium (separative work units) produced in each monthly period and convincing financial auditors that the multibillion dollar enriched uranium assets located at the Portsmouth plant are properly stated

  12. Scientific data base for safeguards components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hall, R.C.; Jones, R.D.

    1978-01-01

    The need to store and maintain vast amounts of data and the desire to avoid nonfunctional redundancy have provided an impetus for modern data base technology. Large-scale data base management systems (DBMS) have emerged during the past two decades evolving from earlier generalized file processing systems. This evolution has primarily involved certain business applications (e.g., production control, payroll, order entry) because of their high volume data processing characterization. Current data base technology, however, is becoming increasingly concerned with generality. Many diverse applications, including scientific ones, are benefiting from the generalized data base management software which has resulted. The concept of a data base management system is examined. The three common models which have been proposed for organizing data and relationships are identified: the network model, the hierarchical model, and the relational model. A specific implementation using a hierarchical data base management system is described. This is the data base for safeguards components which has been developed at Sandia Laboratories using the System 2000 developed by MRI Systems Corporation. Its organization, components, and functions are presented. The various interfaces it permits to user programs (e.g., safeguards automated facility evaluation software) and interactive terminal users are described

  13. Safeguards by Design - Experiences from New Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.; Honkamaa, T.; Kuusi, A.; Rautjaervi, J.

    2010-01-01

    The experiences obtained from the current construction projects at Olkiluoto clearly point out the need to introduce the safeguards requirements into facility design process at an early stage. The early Design Information is completed, in principle, before the construction. However, during the design of containment, surveillance systems, and non-destructive assay equipment and their cabling, the design requirements for safeguards systems were not available either for the new reactor unit or for the disposal plant with a geological repository. Typically, the official Design Information documents are not available early enough for efficient integration of safeguards systems into new facilities. In case of the Olkiluoto projects, this was due to understandable reasons: at the new reactor unit the design acceptance by the ordering company and by the nuclear safety authorities was a long process, ongoing simultaneously with parts of the construction; and at the geological repository the national legislation assigns the repository the status of a nuclear facility only after the initial construction and research phase of the repository when the long-term safety of the disposal concept is demonstrated. As similar factors are likely to delay the completion of the official Design Information documents with any new reactor projects until the construction is well underway and efficient integration of safeguards systems is impossible. Therefore, the proliferation resistance of new nuclear installations should be addressed in the design phase before the official Design Information documents are finished. This approach was demonstrated with the enlargement of the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage building. For this approach to work, strong national contribution is needed to facilitate the early communication and exchange of information between the IAEA and the other stakeholders to enable the design of facilities that can be efficiently safeguarded. With the renaissance of nuclear

  14. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  15. An analysis of a regional nuclear safeguards organisation: the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the development of nuclear safeguards in Western Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howlett, Darryl.

    1988-08-01

    This thesis argues that the nuclear safeguards system implemented by EURATOM in Western Europe has come to fruition as a result of a complex political process. This process has involved negotiations over the exact limits on safeguards interventions into the nuclear affairs of the European Community. There are two dimensions to these negotiations. On the one hand, they involve EURATOM and its member states over the necessary limits on safeguards intervention in member states' domestic nuclear affairs. On the other, there are negotiations between EURATOM and several actors outside the region, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency. The thesis concludes by arguing that international safeguards organisations, of which EURATOM is a regional example, have made important contributions to arms control and international security. In the process, certain kinds of precedents and procedures which have potential for broader application have been established. (author)

  16. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallucci, N. [Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  17. Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. Safeguards and the role of the IAEA in physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smolej, M.

    1999-01-01

    The physical protection and security of nuclear facilities and materials concerns utilities, manufactures, the general public, and those who are responsible for licensing and regulating such facilities. The requirements and process to ensure an acceptable physical protection and security system have been evolutionary in nature. This paper reviews the first step of such process: the State's safeguards system and the international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the relationship between these two safeguards systems. The elements of these systems that are reviewed include the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, physical protection measures, and containment and surveillance measures. In addition, the interactions between the State, the facility operator, and the IAEA are described. The paper addresses the IAEA safeguards system, including material accountancy and containment and surveillance; the State safeguards system, including material control and accountancy, and physical protection; the role of the IAEA in physical protection; a summary of safeguards system interactions.(author)

  18. Machine safety: proper safeguarding techniques.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martin, K J

    1992-06-01

    1. OSHA mandates certain safeguarding of machinery to prevent accidents and protect machine operators. OSHA specifies moving parts that must be guarded and sets criteria for the guards. 2. A 1989 OSHA standard for lockout/tagout requires locking the energy source during maintenance, periodically inspecting for power transmission, and training maintenance workers. 3. In an amputation emergency, first aid for cardiopulmonary resuscitation, shock, and bleeding are the first considerations. The amputated part should be wrapped in moist gauze, placed in a sealed plastic bag, and placed in a container of 50% water and 50% ice for transport. 4. The role of the occupational health nurse in machine safety is to conduct worksite analyses to identify proper safeguarding and to communicate deficiencies to appropriate personnel; to train workers in safe work practices and observe compliance in the use of machine guards; to provide care to workers injured by machines; and to reinforce safe work practices among machine operators.

  19. Safeguards instrumentation: past, present, future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    1982-01-01

    Instruments are essential for accounting, for surveillance and for protection of nuclear materials. The development and application of such instrumentation is reviewed, with special attention to international safeguards applications. Active and passive nondestructive assay techniques are some 25 years of age. The important advances have been in learning how to use them effectively for specific applications, accompanied by major advances in radiation detectors, electronics, and, more recently, in mini-computers. The progress in seals has been disappointingly slow. Surveillance cameras have been widely used for many applications other than safeguards. The revolution in TV technology will have important implications. More sophisticated containment/surveillance equipment is being developed but has yet to be exploited. On the basis of this history, some expectations for instrumentation in the near future are presented

  20. Current technical issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.

    1977-01-01

    Safeguards systems, and the associated need for technical and systems development, reflect changing conditions and concerns associated with the nuclear fuel cycle and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. In particular, the implementation of international safeguards has led to the recognition of certain technical issues, both old and new, which are in need of resolution. These are: 1. The grading of nuclear materials and facilities with respect to their relative safeguards significance. 2. The extension and upgrading of safeguards techniques to maintain adequate protection in view of constantly increasing amounts of material to be safeguarded. 3. The balance between safeguards mechanisms based on physical protection and material accounting, and the role of surveillance and containment in each case. 4. The role of information systems as a basis for both analytical feedback and the determination of the factors affecting system effectiveness and their interrelationship. 5. A determination of the degree to which the overall technical effectiveness of international inspection activities can be quantified. Each of these technical issues must be considered in light of the specific objectives of international safeguards, which differ from domestic safeguards in terms of the level of the threat, the safeguards mechanisms available, and the diversion strategies assumed. Their resolution in this international context is essential if the effectiveness and viability of international safeguards are to be maintained