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Sample records for disassembly facility nevada

  1. Final Status Survey Report for Corrective Action Unit 117 - Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gwin, Jeremy; Frenette, Douglas

    2010-01-01

    This document contains the process knowledge, radiological data and subsequent statistical methodology and analysis to support approval for the radiological release of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 117 - Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201 located in Area 26 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Preparations for release of the building began in 2009 and followed the methodology described in the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). MARSSIM is the DOE approved process for release of Real Property (buildings and landmasses) to a set of established criteria or authorized limits. The pre-approved authorized limits for surface contamination values and corresponding assumptions were established by DOE O 5400.5. The release criteria coincide with the acceptance criteria of the U10C landfill permit. The U10C landfill is the proposed location to dispose of the radiologically non-impacted, or ''clean,'' building rubble following demolition. However, other disposition options that include the building and/or waste remaining at the NNSS may be considered providing that the same release limits apply. The Final Status Survey was designed following MARSSIM guidance by reviewing historical documentation and radiological survey data. Following this review a formal radiological characterization survey was performed in two phases. The characterization revealed multiple areas of residual radioactivity above the release criteria. These locations were remediated (decontaminated) and then the surface activity was verified to be less than the release criteria. Once remediation efforts had been successfully completed, a Final Status Survey Plan (10-015, ''Final Status Survey Plan for Corrective Action Unit 117 - Pluto Disassembly Facility, Building 2201'') was developed and implemented to complete the final step in the MARSSIM process, the Final Status Survey. The Final Status Survey Plan consisted of categorizing each individual room into one

  2. Authorized Limits for the Release of a 25 Ton Locomotive, Serial Number 21547, at the Area 25 Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gwin, Jeremy; Frenette, Douglas

    2010-01-01

    This document contains process knowledge and radiological data and analysis to support approval for release of the 25-ton locomotive, Serial Number 21547, at the Area 25 Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (EMAD) Facility, located on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 25-ton locomotive is a small, one-of-a-kind locomotive used to move railcars in support of the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application project. This locomotive was identified as having significant historical value by the Nevada State Railroad Museum in Boulder City, Nevada, where it will be used as a display piece. A substantial effort to characterize the radiological conditions of the locomotive was undertaken by the NTS Management and Operations Contractor, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). During this characterization process, seven small areas on the locomotive had contamination levels that exceeded the NTS release criteria (limits consistent with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order DOE O 5400.5, 'Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment'). The decision was made to perform radiological decontamination of these known accessible impacted areas to further the release process. On February 9, 2010, NSTec personnel completed decontamination of these seven areas to within the NTS release criteria. Although all accessible areas of the locomotive had been successfully decontaminated to within NTS release criteria, it was plausible that inaccessible areas of the locomotive (i.e., those areas on the locomotive where it was not possible to perform radiological surveys) could potentially have contamination above unrestricted release limits. To access the majority of these inaccessible areas, the locomotive would have to be disassembled. A complete disassembly for a full radiological survey could have permanently destroyed parts and would have ruined the historical value of the locomotive. Complete disassembly would also add an unreasonable financial burden for the

  3. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 113: Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Building Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, J. L.

    2001-01-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the action necessary for the closure in place of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 113 Area 25 Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility (R-MAD). CAU 113 is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (NDEP, 1996). The CAU is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and consists of Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-04-01, R-MAD Facility (Figures 1-2). This plan provides the methodology for closure in place of CAU 113. The site contains radiologically impacted and hazardous material. Based on preassessment field work, there is sufficient process knowledge to close in place CAU 113 using the SAFER process. At a future date when funding becomes available, the R-MAD Building (25-3110) will be demolished and inaccessible radiologic waste will be properly disposed in the Area 3 Radiological Waste Management Site (RWMS)

  4. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 113: Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Building Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    J. L. Smith

    2001-01-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the action necessary for the closure in place of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 113 Area 25 Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility (R-MAD). CAU 113 is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (NDEP, 1996). The CAU is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and consists of Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-04-01, R-MAD Facility (Figures 1-2). This plan provides the methodology for closure in place of CAU 113. The site contains radiologically impacted and hazardous material. Based on preassessment field work, there is sufficient process knowledge to close in place CAU 113 using the SAFER process. At a future date when funding becomes available, the R-MAD Building (25-3110) will be demolished and inaccessible radiologic waste will be properly disposed in the Area 3 Radiological Waste Management Site (RWMS).

  5. Integrating Safeguards into the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, T.G.

    2002-01-01

    In September 2000, the United States and the Russian Federation entered into an agreement which stipulates each country will irreversibly transform 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium into material which could not be used for weapon purposes. Supporting the Department of Energy's (DOE) program to dispose of excess nuclear materials, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) is being designed and constructed to disassemble the weapon ''pits'' and convert the nuclear material to an oxide form for fabrication into reactor fuel at the separate Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. The PDCF design incorporates automation to the maximum extent possible to facilitate material safeguards, reduce worker dose, and improve processing efficiency. This includes provisions for automated guided vehicle movements for shipping containers, material transport via automated conveyor between processes, remote process control monitoring, and automated Nondestructive Assay product systems

  6. Status of the pit disassembly and conversion facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wood, Warren T.; Christensen, Lowell T.

    2000-01-01

    A planned new facility, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), will be used to disassemble the nation's inventory of surplus nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium from those pits into a form suitable for storage, international inspection, and final disposition. Sized to handle 35 metric tons of plutonium from pits and other sources over its 10-year operating life, the PDCF will apply the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) technology. ARIES process technology has been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and an integrated system is being demonstrated at LANL. The Los Alamos National Laboratory is the lead for technical design oversight of the PDCF. Technical data gained from the ARIES demonstrations is integral for the proper design of the PDCF

  7. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities: Decontamination, disassembly and waste management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    The term 'decommissioning', as used within the nuclear industry, means the actions taken at the end of a facility's useful life to retire the facility from service in a manner that provides adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning workers, the general public, and for the environment. These actions can range from merely closing down the facility and a minimal removal of radioactive material coupled with continuing maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the facility and its site. This latter condition, unrestricted use, is the ultimate goal of all decommissioning actions at retired nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to provide an information base on the considerations important to decommissioning, the methods available for decontamination and disassembly of a nuclear facility, the management of the resulting radioactive wastes, and the areas of decommissioning methodology where improvements might be made. Specific sections are devoted to each of these topics, and conclusions are presented concerning the present status of each topic. A summary of past decommissioning experience in Member States is presented in the Appendix. The report, with its discussions of necessary considerations, available operational methods, and waste management practices, together with supporting references, provides an appreciation of the activities that comprise decommissioning of nuclear facilities. It is anticipated that the information presented in the report should prove useful to persons concerned with the development of plans for the decommissioning of retired nuclear facilities

  8. Maintenance and disassembly considerations for the Technology Demonstration Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spampinato, P.T.

    1983-01-01

    The Technology Demonstration Facility (TDF) is a tandem-mirror design concept carried out under the direction of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. It was conceived as a near-term device with a mission of developing engineering technology in a D-T fusion environment. Overall maintenance and component disassembly were among the responsibilities of the Fusion Engineering Design Center (FEDC). A configuration evolved that was based on the operational requirements of the components, as well as the requirements for their replacements. Component lifetime estimates were used to estimate the frequency and the number of replacements. In addition, it was determined that the need for remote handling equipment followed within 1.5 years after initial start-up, emphasizing the direct relationship between developing maintenance scenarios/equipment and the device configuration. Many of the scheduled maintenance operations were investigated to first order, and preliminary handling equipment concepts were developed

  9. Alpha Decontamination and Disassembly Pilot Facility. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daugherty, B.A.; Clark, H.E.

    1985-04-01

    The Alpha Decontamination and Disassembly (AD and D) Pilot Facility was built to develop and demonstrate a reference process for the decontamination and size reduction of noncombustible transuranic (TRU) waste. The goals of the reference process were to remove >99% of the surface contamination to the high-level waste tanks, and to achieve volume reduction factors greater than 15:1. Preliminary bench-scale decontamination work was accomplished at Savannah River Laboratory (SRL), establishing a reference decontamination process. Initially, the pilot facility did not achieve the decontamination goals. As the program continued, and modifications to the process were made, coupon analysis idicated that 99% of the surface contamination was removed to the high-level drain system. Prior to the AD and D Pilot Facility, no size reduction work had been done at SRL. Several other Department of Energy (DOE) facilities were experimenting with plasma arc torches for size reduction work. Their methods were employed in the AD and D hot cell with moderate success. The experimental work concluded with recommendations for further testing of other size reduction techniques. 11 figs., 6 tabs

  10. Disassembly of JT-60 tokamak device and ancillary facilities for JT-60 tokamak

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okano, Fuminori; Ichige, Hisashi; Miyo, Yasuhiko; Kaminaga, Atsushi; Sasajima, Tadayuki; Nishiyama, Tomokazu; Yagyu, Jun-ichi; Ishige, Youichi; Suzuki, Hiroaki; Komuro, Kenichi; Sakasai, Akira; Ikeda, Yoshitaka

    2014-03-01

    The disassembly of JT-60 tokamak device and its peripheral equipments, where the total weight was about 5400 tons, started in 2009 and accomplished in October 2012. This disassembly was required process for JT-60SA project, which is the Satellite Tokamak project under Japan-EU international corroboration to modify the JT-60 to the superconducting tokamak. This work was the first experience of disassembling a large radioactive fusion device based on Radiation Hazard Prevention Act in Japan. The cutting was one of the main problems in this disassembly, such as to cut the welded parts together with toroidal field coils, and to cut the vacuum vessel into two. After solving these problems, the disassembly completed without disaster and accident. This report presents the outline of the JT-60 disassembly, especially tokamak device and ancillary facilities for tokamak device. (author)

  11. Pilot scale, alpha disassembly and decontamination facility at the Savannah River Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cadieux, J.R.; Becker, G.W. Jr.; Richardson, G.W.; Coogler, A.L.

    1982-01-01

    An alpha-contained pilot facility is being built at the Savannah River Laboratory (SRL) for research into the disassembly and dcontamination of noncombustible, Transuranic (TRU) waste. The design and program objectives for the facility are presented along with the initial test results from laboratory scale decontamination experiments with Pu-238 and Cm-244

  12. Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 113: Area 25 R-MAD Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 113: Area 25, Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility, Building 3110, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, DOE/NV--891-VOL I-Rev. 1, dated July 2003, provides details of demolition, waste disposal, and use restriction (UR) modification for Corrective Action Unit 113, Area 25 R-MAD Facility. Demolition was completed on July 15, 2010, when the last of the building debris was disposed. Final field activities were concluded on August 30, 2010, after all equipment was demobilized and UR signs were posted. This work was funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

  13. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 254: Area 25, R-MAD Decontamination Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    G. N. Doyle

    2002-02-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 254 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), approximately 100 kilometers (km) (62 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The site is located within the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly and Disassembly (R-MAD) compound and consists of Building 3126, two outdoor decontamination pads, and surrounding areas within an existing fenced area measuring approximately 50 x 37 meters (160 x 120 feet). The site was used from the early 1960s to the early 1970s as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station program to decontaminate test-car hardware and tooling. The site was reactivated in the early 1980s to decontaminate a radiologically contaminated military tank. This Closure Report (CR) describes the closure activities performed to allow un-restricted release of the R-MAD Decontamination Facility.

  14. Design-only conceptual design report for pit disassembly and conversion facility. Rev 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zygmunt, S.; Christensen, L.; Richardson, C.

    1997-01-01

    This design-only conceptual design report (DOCDR) was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy (DOE)-Office of Fissile Material Disposition (OFMD) for engineering design of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) Project No. 99-D-141. The PDCF will be used to disassemble the nation's inventory of surplus nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium recovered from those pits into a form suitable for storage, international inspection, and final disposition. The PDCF is a complex consisting of a hardened building that will contain the plutonium processes in a safe and secure manner, and conventional buildings and structures that will house support personnel, systems, and equipment. The PDCF uses the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES), a low waste, modular pyroprocessing system to convert pits to plutonium oxide. The PDCF project consists of engineering and design, and construction of the buildings and structures, and engineering and design, procurement, installation, testing and start-up of equipment to disassemble pits and convert plutonium in pits to oxide form. The facility is planned to operate for 10 years, averaging 3.5 metric tons (3.86 tons) of plutonium metal per year. On conclusion of operations, the PDCF will be decontaminated and decommissioned

  15. Design-only conceptual design report for pit disassembly and conversion facility. Rev 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zygmunt, S.; Christensen, L.; Richardson, C.

    1997-12-12

    This design-only conceptual design report (DOCDR) was prepared to support a funding request by the Department of Energy (DOE)-Office of Fissile Material Disposition (OFMD) for engineering design of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) Project No. 99-D-141. The PDCF will be used to disassemble the nation`s inventory of surplus nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium recovered from those pits into a form suitable for storage, international inspection, and final disposition. The PDCF is a complex consisting of a hardened building that will contain the plutonium processes in a safe and secure manner, and conventional buildings and structures that will house support personnel, systems, and equipment. The PDCF uses the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES), a low waste, modular pyroprocessing system to convert pits to plutonium oxide. The PDCF project consists of engineering and design, and construction of the buildings and structures, and engineering and design, procurement, installation, testing and start-up of equipment to disassemble pits and convert plutonium in pits to oxide form. The facility is planned to operate for 10 years, averaging 3.5 metric tons (3.86 tons) of plutonium metal per year. On conclusion of operations, the PDCF will be decontaminated and decommissioned.

  16. Rough order of magnitude cost estimate for immobilization of 50 MT of plutonium sharing existing facilities at Hanford with pit disassembly and conversion facility: alternative 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DiSabatino, A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this Cost Estimate Report is to identify preliminary capital and operating costs for a facility to immobilize 50 metric tons (nominal) of plutonium as a ceramic in an existing facility at Hanford, the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF). The Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF), which is being costed in a separate report by LANL, will also be located in the FMEF in this co-location option

  17. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 254: Area 25 R-MAD Decontamination Facility Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Obi, C.M.

    2000-01-01

    The Area 25 Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Decontamination Facility is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 254. CAU 254 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site and consists of a single Corrective Action Site CAS 25-23-06. CAU 254 will be closed, in accordance with the FFACO of 1996. CAU 254 was used primarily to perform radiological decontamination and consists of Building 3126, two outdoor decontamination pads, and surrounding soil within an existing perimeter fence. The site was used to decontaminate nuclear rocket test-car hardware and tooling from the early 1960s through the early 1970s, and to decontaminate a military tank in the early 1980s. The site characterization results indicate that, in places, the surficial soil and building materials exceed clean-up criteria for organic compounds, metals, and radionuclides. Closure activities are expected to generate waste streams consisting of nonhazardous construction waste. petroleum hydrocarbon waste, hazardous waste, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed waste. Some of the wastes exceed land disposal restriction limits and will require off-site treatment before disposal. The recommended corrective action was revised to Alternative 3- ''Unrestricted Release Decontamination, Verification Survey, and Dismantle Building 3126,'' in an addendum to the Correction Action Decision Document

  18. ARC: A compact, high-field, disassemblable fusion nuclear science facility and demonstration power plant

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sorbom, Brandon; Ball, Justin; Palmer, Timothy; Mangiarotti, Franco; Sierchio, Jennifer; Bonoli, Paul; Kasten, Cale; Sutherland, Derek; Barnard, Harold; Haakonsen, Christian; Goh, Jon; Sung, Choongki; Whyte, Dennis

    2014-10-01

    The Affordable, Robust, Compact (ARC) reactor conceptual design aims to reduce the size, cost, and complexity of a combined Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) and demonstration fusion pilot power plant. ARC is a 270 MWe tokamak reactor with a major radius of 3.3 m, a minor radius of 1.1 m, and an on-axis magnetic field of 9.2 T. ARC has Rare Earth Barium Copper Oxide (REBCO) superconducting toroidal field coils with joints to allow disassembly, allowing for removal and replacement of the vacuum vessel as a single component. Inboard-launched current drive of 25 MW LHRF power and 13.6 MW ICRF power is used to provide a robust, steady state core plasma far from disruptive limits. ARC uses an all-liquid blanket, consisting of low pressure, slowly flowing Fluorine Lithium Beryllium (FLiBe) molten salt. The liquid blanket acts as a working fluid, coolant, and tritium breeder, and minimizes the solid material that can become activated. The large temperature range over which FLiBe is liquid permits blanket operation at 800-900 K with single phase fluid cooling and allows use of a high-efficiency Brayton cycle for electricity production in the secondary coolant loop.

  19. Facility Closure Report for T-Tunnel (U12T), Area 12, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Facility Closure Report (FCR) has been prepared to document the actions taken to permanently close the remaining accessible areas of U12t-Tunnel (T-Tunnel) in Area 12 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The closure of T-Tunnel was a prerequisite to transfer facility ownership from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). Closure of the facility was accomplished with the cooperation and concurrence of both NNSA/NSO and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). The purpose of this FCR is to document that the closure of T-Tunnel complied with the closure requirements specified in the Facility Closure Plan for N- and T-Tunnels Area 12, Nevada Test Site (Appendix D) and that the facility is ready for transfer to NNSA/NSO. The Facility Closure Plan (FCP) is provided in Appendix D. T-Tunnel is located approximately 42 miles north of Mercury in Area 12 of the NTS (Figure 1). Between 1970 and 1987, T-Tunnel was used for six Nuclear Weapons Effects Tests (NWETs). The tunnel was excavated horizontally into the volcanic tuffs of Rainier Mesa. The T-Tunnel complex consists of a main access drift with two NWET containment structures, a Gas Seal Plug (GSP), and a Gas Seal Door (GSD) (Figure 2). The T-Tunnel complex was mothballed in 1993 to preserve the tunnel for resumption of testing, should it happen in the future, to stop the discharge of tunnel effluent, and to prevent unauthorized access. This was accomplished by sealing the main drift GSD

  20. Environmental Monitoring Plan, Nevada Test Site and support facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-11-01

    This Operational Area Monitoring Plan for environmental monitoring, is for EG ampersand G Energy Measurements, Inc. (EG ampersand G/EM) which operates several offsite facilities in support of activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). These facilities include: (1) Amador Valley Operations (AVO), Pleasanton, California; (2) Kirtland Operations (KO), Kirtland Air Force base, Albuquerque, New Mexico (KAFB); (3) Las Vegas Area Operations (LVAO), Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL), and North Las Vegas (NLV) Complex at Nellis Air Force Base (NAFB), North Las Vegas, Nevada; (4) Los Alamos Operations (LAO), Los Alamos, New Mexico; (5) Santa Barbara Operations (SBO), Goleta, California; (6) Special Technologies Laboratory (STL), Santa Barbara, California; (7) Washington Aerial Measurements Department (WAMD), Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; and, (8) Woburn Cathode Ray Tube Operations (WCO), Woburn, Massachusetts. Each of these facilities has an individual Operational Area Monitoring Plan, but they have been consolidated herein to reduce redundancy

  1. Mixed waste disposal facility at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, P.T.; Kendall, E.W.

    1987-01-01

    In 1984, a law suit brought against DOE resulted in the requirement that DOE be subject to regulation by the state and US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for all hazardous wastes, including mixed wastes. Therefore, all DOE facilities generating, storing, treating, or disposing of mixed wastes will be regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCTA). In FY 1985, DOE Headquarters requested DOE low-level waste (LLW) sites to apply for a RCRA Part B Permit to operate radioactive mixed waste facilities. An application for the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was prepared and submitted to the EPA, Region IX in November 1985 for review and approval. At that time, the state of Nevada had not yet received authorization for hazardous wastes nor had they applied for regulatory authority for mixed wastes. In October 1986, DOE Nevada Operations Office was informed by the Rocky Flats Plant that some past waste shipments to NTS contained trace quantities of hazardous substances. Under Colorado law, these wastes are defined as mixed. A DOE Headquarters task force was convened by the Under Secretary to investigate the situation. The task force concluded that DOE has a high priority need to develop a permitted mixed waste site and that DOE Nevada Operations Office should develop a fast track project to obtain this site and all necessary permits. The status and issues to be resolved on the permit for a mixed waste site are discussed

  2. Facility Closure Report for Tunnel U16a, Area 16, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    U16a is not listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The closure of U16a was sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and performed with the cooperation of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. This report documents closure of this site as identified in the DTRA Fiscal Year 2008 Statement of Work, Task 6.3. Closure activities included: (1) Removing and disposing of a shack and its contents; (2) Disposing of debris from within the shack and in the vicinity of the tunnel entrance; (3) Verifying that the tunnel is empty; (4) Welding screened covers over tunnel vent holes to limit access and allow ventilation; and (5) Constructing a full-tunnel cross-section fibercrete bulkhead to prevent access to the tunnel Field activities were conducted from July to August 2008.

  3. SOURCE AND PATHWAY DETERMINATION FOR BERYLLIUM FOUND IN BECHTEL NEVADA NORTH LAS VEGAS FACILITIES

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2004-07-01

    In response to the report ''Investigation of Beryllium Exposure Cases Discovered at the North Las Vegas Facility of the National Nuclear Security Administration'', published by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in August 2003, Bechtel Nevada (BN) President and General Manager Dr. F. A. Tarantino appointed the Beryllium Investigation & Assessment Team (BIAT) to identify both the source and pathway for the beryllium found in the North Las Vegas (NLV) B-Complex. From September 8 to December 18, 2003, the BIAT investigated the pathway for beryllium and determined that a number of locations existed at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) which could have contained sufficient quantities of beryllium to result in contamination if transported. Operations performed in the B-1 Building as a result of characterization activities at the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (EMAD); Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (RMAD); Test Cells A and C; and the Central Support Facility in Area 25 had the greatest opportunity for transport of beryllium. Investigative monitoring and sampling was performed at these sites with subsequent transport of sample materials, equipment, and personnel from the NTS to the B-1 Building. The timeline established by the BIAT for potential transport of the beryllium contamination into the B-1 Building was from September 1997 through November 2002. Based on results of recently completed swipe sampling, no evidence of transport of beryllium from test areas has been confirmed. Results less than the DOE beryllium action level of 0.2 ???g/100 cm2 were noted for work support facilities located in Area 25. All of the identified sites in Area 25 worked within the B-1 tenant's residency timeline have been remediated. Legacy contaminants have either been disposed of or capped with clean borrow material. As such, no current opportunity exists for release or spread of beryllium

  4. Evaluation of nuclear facility decommissioning projects. Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor defueling and disassembly. Summary status report. Volume 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doerge, D.H.; Miller, R.L.; Scotti, K.S.

    1986-05-01

    This document summarizes information relating to the preparations for defueling the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor and disassembly activities being performed concurrently with decontamination of the facility. Data have been collected from activity reports, reactor containment entry records, and other sources and entered in a computerized data sysem which permits extraction/manipulation of specific data which can be used in planning for recovery from a loss of coolant event similar to that experienced at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979. This report contains summaries of man-hours, manpower, and radiation exposures incurred during the period of April 23, 1979 to April 16, 1985, in the completion of activities related to preparation for reactor defueling. Support activities conducted outside of radiation areas are not included within the scope of this report. Computerized reports included in this document are: A chronological summary listing work performed for the period; and summary reports for each major task undertaken in connection with the specific scope of this report. Presented in chronological order for the referenced time period. Manually-assembled table summaries are included for: Labor and exposures by department; and labor and exposures by major activity

  5. STREAMLINED APPROACH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PLAN FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 116: AREA 25 TEST CELL C FACILITY NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan identifies the activities required for the closure of Corrective Action Unit 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. The Test Cell C Facility is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site approximately 25 miles northwest of Mercury, Nevada

  6. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 118: Area 27 Super Kukla Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mark Burmeister

    2007-01-01

    This CR provides documentation and justification for the closure of CAU 118 without further corrective action. This justification is based on process knowledge and the results of the investigative and closure activities conducted in accordance with the CAU 118 SAFER Plan: Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for CAU 118: Area 27 Super Kukla Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The SAFER Plan provides information relating to site history as well as the scope and planning of the investigation. This CR also provides the analytical and radiological survey data to confirm that the remediation goals were met as specified in the CAU 118 SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) approved the CAU 118 SAFER Plan (Murphy, 2006), which recommends closure in place with use restrictions (URs)

  7. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2011-09-29

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). CAU 116 consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 consisted of Building 3210 and the attached concrete shield wall. CAS 25-23-20 consisted of the nuclear furnace piping and tanks. Closure activities began in January 2007 and were completed in August 2011. Activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 116 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2008). This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provides data confirming that closure objectives for CAU 116 were met. Site characterization data and process knowledge indicated that surface areas were radiologically contaminated above release limits and that regulated and/or hazardous wastes were present in the facility.

  8. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 254: Area 25 R-MAD Decontamination Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies and rationalizes the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 254, R-MAD Decontamination Facility, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, CAU 254 is comprised of Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-23-06, Decontamination Facility. A corrective action investigation for this CAS as conducted in January 2000 as set forth in the related Corrective Action Investigation Plan. Samples were collected from various media throughout the CAS and sent to an off-site laboratory for analysis. The laboratory results indicated the following: radiation dose rates inside the Decontamination Facility, Building 3126, and in the storage yard exceeded the average general dose rate; scanning and static total surface contamination surveys indicated that portions of the locker and shower room floor, decontamination bay floor, loft floor, east and west decon pads, north and south decontamination bay interior walls, exterior west and south walls, and loft walls were above preliminary action levels (PALs). The investigation-derived contaminants of concern (COCs) included: polychlorinated biphenyls, radionuclides (strontium-90, niobium-94, cesium-137, uranium-234 and -235), total volatile and semivolatile organic compounds, total petroleum hydrocarbons, and total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (Metals). During the investigation, two corrective action objectives (CAOs) were identified to prevent or mitigate human exposure to COCs. Based on these CAOs, a review of existing data, future use, and current operations at the Nevada Test Site, three CAAs were developed for consideration: Alternative 1 - No Further Action; Alternative 2 - Unrestricted Release Decontamination and Verification Survey; and Alternative 3 - Unrestricted

  9. Development of a mixed waste management facility at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dodge, R.L.; Brich, R.F.

    1988-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) produces radioactive low-level wastes (LLW) which contain hazardous components as identified by 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 261. Management of those mixed wastes (MW) requires compliance with U.S.Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations for hazardous wastes and DOE regulations for LLW. In 1988, DOE's Nevada Operations Office (NV) began disposing of MW at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) under interim status as authorized by the state of Nevada. MW disposal is limited to Pit 3 while operating under interim status. This paper discusses how preparations for operation of a separate mixed waste management facility (MWMF) are underway. Those preparations include revising the NTS Part B Permit application, developing a MW certification program, developing and operating a vadose zone monitoring system, preparing an Environmental Assessment (EA), developing protocols for analysis of MW, and facility design and construction

  10. Environmental Monitoring Plan, Nevada Test Site and support facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-11-01

    This Environmental Monitoring Plan applies to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) operations on the Continental US (including Amchitka Island, Alaska) that are under the purview of the DOE Nevada Field Office (DOE/NV). The primary purpose of these operations is the conduct of the nuclear weapons testing program for the DOE and the Department of Defense. Since 1951, these tests have been conducted principally at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. In accordance with DOE Order 5400.1, this Environmental Monitoring Plan brings together in one document a description of the environmental activities conducted at the NTS by user organizations, operations support contractors, and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA conducts both the offsite environmental monitoring program around the NTS and post-operational monitoring efforts at non-NTS test locations used between 1961 and 1973 in other parts of the continental US. All of these monitoring activities are conducted under the auspices of the DOE/NV, which has the stated policy of conducting its operations in compliance with both the letter and the spirit of applicable environmental statutes, regulations, and standards

  11. Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noble, D.C.; Plouff, D.; Close, T.J.; Bergquist, J.R.; Neumann, T.R.

    1987-01-01

    The part of the High Rock Late Wilderness Study Area, requested for mineral surveys by the Bureau of Land Management, encompasses 14,000 acres in the northern part of the Calico Mountains, Northwest Nevada. No resources were identified in the study area; however, there is low potential throughout the study area for volcanic-hosted deposits of mercury, uranium, and disseminated gold. The northern part of the study area has low potential for geothermal energy

  12. Assessment of the facilities on Jackass Flats and other Nevada Test Site facilities for the new nuclear rocket program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chandler, G.; Collins, D.; Dye, K.; Eberhart, C.; Hynes, M.; Kovach, R.; Ortiz, R.; Perea, J.; Sherman, D.

    1992-01-01

    Recent NASA/DOE studies for the Space Exploration Initiative have demonstrated a critical need for the ground-based testing of nuclear rocket engines. Experience in the ROVER/NERVA Program, experience in the Nuclear Weapons Testing Program, and involvement in the new nuclear rocket program has motivated our detailed assessment of the facilities used for the ROVER/NERVA Program and other facilities located at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The ROVER/NERVA facilities are located in the Nevada Research L, Development Area (NRDA) on Jackass Flats at NTS, approximately 85 miles northwest of Las Vegas. To guide our assessment of facilities for an engine testing program we have defined a program goal, scope, and process. To execute this program scope and process will require ten facilities. We considered the use of all relevant facilities at NTS including existing and new tunnels as well as the facilities at NRDA. Aside from the facilities located at remote sites and the inter-site transportation system, all of the required facilities are available at NRDA. In particular we have studied the refurbishment of E-MAD, ETS-1, R-MAD, and the interconnecting railroad. The total cost for such a refurbishment we estimate to be about $253M which includes additional contractor fees related to indirect, construction management, profit, contingency, and management reserves. This figure also includes the cost of the required NEPA, safety, and security documentation

  13. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gustafason, D.L.

    2001-01-01

    This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996. This CAP provides the methodology for implementing the approved corrective action alternative as listed in the Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 2000). The CAU includes two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 25-23-09, Contaminated Waste Dump Number 1; and 25-23-03, Contaminated Waste Dump Number 2. Investigation of CAU 143 was conducted in 1999. Analytes detected during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against preliminary action levels to determine constituents of concern for CAU 143. Radionuclide concentrations in disposal pit soil samples associated with the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility West Trenches, the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility East Trestle Pit, and the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility Trench are greater than normal background concentrations. These constituents are identified as constituents of concern for their respective CASs. Closure-in-place with administrative controls involves use restrictions to minimize access and prevent unauthorized intrusive activities, earthwork to fill depressions to original grade, placing additional clean cover material over the previously filled portion of some of the trenches, and placing secondary or diversion berm around pertinent areas to divert storm water run-on potential

  14. POST-CLOSURE INSPECTION REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 92: AREA 6 DECON PAD FACILITY, NEVADA. TEST SITE NEVADA, FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 2004 - DECEMBER 2004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2005-01-01

    This Post-Closure Inspection Report provides an analysis and summary of inspections for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. CAU 92 was closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B Operational Permit (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, 1995) and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 on May 11, 1999. CAU 92 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 06-04-01, Decon Pad oil/Water Separator; and CAS 06-05-02, Decontamination Pond (RCRA). Both CASs have use restrictions; however, only CAS 06-05-02, Decontamination Pond (RCRA), requires post-closure inspections. CAS 06-04-01, Decon Pad Oil/Water Separator, is located inside the fence at the Building 6-605 compound. This report covers the annual period January 2004 through December 2004

  15. Addendum to environmental monitoring plan Nevada Test Site and support facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1992-11-01

    This 1992 Addendum to the ``Environmental Monitoring Plan Nevada Test Site and Support Facilities -- 1991,`` Report No. DOE/NV/1 0630-28 (EMP) applies to the US Department of Energy`s (DOE`s) operations on the Continental US (including Amchitka Island, Alaska) that are under the purview of the DOE Nevada Field Office (DOE/NV). The primary purpose of these operations is the conduct of the nuclear weapons testing program for the DOE and the Department of Defense. Since 1951, these tests have been conducted principally at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. In accordance with DOE Order 5400.1, this 1992 Addendum to the EMP brings together, in one document, updated information and/or new sections to the description of the environmental activities conducted at the NTS by user organizations, operations support contractors, and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) originally published in the EMP. The EPA conducts both the offsite environmental monitoring program around the NTS and post-operational monitoring efforts at non-NTS test locations used between 1961 and 1973 in other parts of the continental US All of these monitoring activities are conducted under the auspices of the DOE/NV, which has the stated policy of conducting its operations in compliance with both the letter and the spirit of applicable environmental statutes, regulations, and standards.

  16. Addendum to Environmental Monitoring Plan, Nevada Test Site and Support Facilities; Addendum 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1993-11-01

    This 1993 Addendum to the ``Environmental Monitoring Plan Nevada Test Site and Support Facilities -- 1991,`` Report No. DOE/NV/10630-28 (EMP) applies to the US Department of Energy`s (DOE`s) operations on the Continental US (including Amchitka Island, Alaska) that are under the purview of the DOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV). The primary purpose of these operations is the conduct of the nuclear weapons testing program for the DOE and the Department of Defense. Since 1951, these tests have been conducted principally at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. In accordance with DOE Order 5400.1, this 1993 Addendum to the EMP brings together, in one document, updated information and/or new sections to the description of the environmental activities conducted at the NTS by user organizations, operations support contractors, and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) originally published in the EMP. The EPA conducts both the offsite environmental monitoring program around the NTS and post-operational monitoring efforts at non-NTS test locations used between 1961 and 1973 in other parts of the continental US. All of these monitoring activities are conducted under the auspices of the DOE/NV, which has the stated policy of conducting its operations in compliance with both the letter and the spirit of applicable environmental statutes, regulations, and standards.

  17. Addendum to Environmental Monitoring Plan, Nevada Test Site and Support Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-11-01

    This 1993 Addendum to the ''Environmental Monitoring Plan Nevada Test Site and Support Facilities -- 1991,'' Report No. DOE/NV/10630-28 (EMP) applies to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) operations on the Continental US (including Amchitka Island, Alaska) that are under the purview of the DOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV). The primary purpose of these operations is the conduct of the nuclear weapons testing program for the DOE and the Department of Defense. Since 1951, these tests have been conducted principally at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. In accordance with DOE Order 5400.1, this 1993 Addendum to the EMP brings together, in one document, updated information and/or new sections to the description of the environmental activities conducted at the NTS by user organizations, operations support contractors, and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) originally published in the EMP. The EPA conducts both the offsite environmental monitoring program around the NTS and post-operational monitoring efforts at non-NTS test locations used between 1961 and 1973 in other parts of the continental US. All of these monitoring activities are conducted under the auspices of the DOE/NV, which has the stated policy of conducting its operations in compliance with both the letter and the spirit of applicable environmental statutes, regulations, and standards

  18. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobiason, D. S.

    2002-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for the Area 25 Contaminated Waste Dumps (CWD), Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 143 in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order [FFACO] (FFACO, 1996) and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 143: Area 25, Contaminated Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. CAU 143 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 25-23-09 CWD No.1, and 25-23-03 CWD No.2. The Area 25 CWDs are historic disposal units within the Area 25 Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD), and Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) compounds located on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The R-MAD and E-MAD facilities originally supported a portion of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station in Area 25 of the NTS. CWD No.1 CAS 25-23-09 received solid radioactive waste from the R-MAD Compound (East Trestle and West Trench Berms) and 25-23-03 CWD No.2 received solid radioactive waste from the E-MAD Compound (E-MAD Trench)

  19. Conceptual Design Report: Nevada Test Site Mixed Waste Disposal Facility Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Environmental cleanup of contaminated nuclear weapons manufacturing and test sites generates radioactive waste that must be disposed. Site cleanup activities throughout the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex are projected to continue through 2050. Some of this waste is mixed waste (MW), containing both hazardous and radioactive components. In addition, there is a need for MW disposal from other mission activities. The Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision designates the Nevada Test Site (NTS) as a regional MW disposal site. The NTS has a facility that is permitted to dispose of onsite- and offsite-generated MW until November 30, 2010. There is not a DOE waste management facility that is currently permitted to dispose of offsite-generated MW after 2010, jeopardizing the DOE environmental cleanup mission and other MW-generating mission-related activities. A mission needs document (CD-0) has been prepared for a newly permitted MW disposal facility at the NTS that would provide the needed capability to support DOE's environmental cleanup mission and other MW-generating mission-related activities. This report presents a conceptual engineering design for a MW facility that is fully compliant with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and DOE O 435.1, 'Radioactive Waste Management'. The facility, which will be located within the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the NTS, will provide an approximately 20,000-cubic yard waste disposal capacity. The facility will be licensed by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)

  20. Development of a mixed waste management facility at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dolenc, M.R.; Kendall, E.W.

    1989-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) produces some radioactive low-level wastes (LLW) which contain hazardous components. By definition, the management of those mixed wastes (MW) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) requires compliance with US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state of Nevada regulations for hazardous wastes, and DOE regulations for LLW. Preparations for operation of a separate Mixed Waste Management Unit (MWMU) in the 1990s are underway. The 167-acre MWMU will be a part of the 732-acre Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The MWMU is being developed in response to a DOE Office of Defense Waste and Transporation Management need to provide enhanced capabilities and facilities for safe, secure, and efficient disposal of defense-related MW in accordance with DOE, EPA, and state of Nevada requirements. Planned activities relating to the development of the MWMU include completing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements; responding to any notices of deficiencies (NODs) on the NTS Part B Permit application; conducting generator audits as part of the NTS MW certification program; optimizing the design and operation of the vadose zone monitoring system; developing protocols for the sampling and analysis of MW, and facility construction. This paper describes the permitting and regulatory environment, the specific application of the permit process to the NTS, and the phased development of an MWMU at the NTS

  1. AGC-2 Disassembly Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    William Windes

    2014-05-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Graphite Research and Development (R&D) Program is currently measuring irradiated material properties for predicting the behavior and operating performance of new nuclear graphite grades available for use within the cores of new very high temperature reactor designs. The Advanced Graphite Creep (AGC) experiment, consisting of six irradiation capsules, will generate irradiated graphite performance data for NGNP reactor operating conditions. The AGC experiment is designed to determine the changes to specific material properties such as thermal diffusivity, thermal expansion, elastic modulus, mechanical strength, irradiation induced dimensional change rate, and irradiation creep for a wide variety of nuclear grade graphite types over a range of high temperature, and moderate doses. A series of six capsules containing graphite test specimens will be used to expose graphite test samples to a dose range from 1 to 7 dpa at three different temperatures (600, 900, and 1200°C) as described in the Graphite Technology Development Plan. Since irradiation induced creep within graphite components is considered critical to determining the operational life of the graphite core, some of the samples will also be exposed to an applied load to determine the creep rate for each graphite type under both temperature and neutron flux. All six AGC capsules in the experiment will be irradiated in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). AGC-1 and AGC-2 will be irradiated in the south flux trap and AGC-3–AGC-6 will be irradiated in the east flux trap. The change in flux traps is due to NGNP irradiation priorities requiring the AGC experiment to be moved to accommodate Fuel irradiation experiments. After irradiation, all six AGC capsules will be cooled in the ATR Canal, sized for shipment, and shipped to the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) where the capsule will be disassembled in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF). During disassembly, the metallic

  2. Calendar Year 2004 annual site environmental report : Tonopah Test Range, Nevada & Kauai Test Facility, Hawaii.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Montoya, Amber L.; Wagner, Katrina; Goering, Teresa Lynn; Koss, Susan I.; Salinas, Stephanie A.

    2005-09-01

    Tonopah Test Range (TTR) in Nevada and Kauai Test Facility (KTF) in Hawaii are government-owned, contractor-operated facilities operated by Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Sandia Site Office (SSO), in Albuquerque, NM, manages TTR and KTF's operations. Sandia Corporation conducts operations at TTR in support of DOE/NNSA's Weapons Ordnance Program and has operated the site since 1957. Westinghouse Government Services subcontracts to Sandia Corporation in administering most of the environmental programs at TTR. Sandia Corporation operates KTF as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility. This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) summarizes data and the compliance status of the environmental protection and monitoring program at TTR and KTF through Calendar Year (CY) 2004. The compliance status of environmental regulations applicable at these sites include state and federal regulations governing air emissions, wastewater effluent, waste management, terrestrial surveillance, and Environmental Restoration (ER) cleanup activities. Sandia Corporation is responsible only for those environmental program activities related to its operations. The DOE/NNSA, Nevada Site Office (NSO) retains responsibility for the cleanup and management of ER TTR sites. Currently, there are no ER Sites at KTF. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program (DOE 2005) and DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting (DOE 2004b).

  3. Calendar Year 2004 annual site environmental report : Tonopah Test Range, Nevada and Kauai Test Facility, Hawaii

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montoya, Amber L.; Wagner, Katrina; Goering, Teresa Lynn; Koss, Susan I.; Salinas, Stephanie A.

    2005-01-01

    Tonopah Test Range (TTR) in Nevada and Kauai Test Facility (KTF) in Hawaii are government-owned, contractor-operated facilities operated by Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Sandia Site Office (SSO), in Albuquerque, NM, manages TTR and KTF's operations. Sandia Corporation conducts operations at TTR in support of DOE/NNSA's Weapons Ordnance Program and has operated the site since 1957. Westinghouse Government Services subcontracts to Sandia Corporation in administering most of the environmental programs at TTR. Sandia Corporation operates KTF as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility. This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) summarizes data and the compliance status of the environmental protection and monitoring program at TTR and KTF through Calendar Year (CY) 2004. The compliance status of environmental regulations applicable at these sites include state and federal regulations governing air emissions, wastewater effluent, waste management, terrestrial surveillance, and Environmental Restoration (ER) cleanup activities. Sandia Corporation is responsible only for those environmental program activities related to its operations. The DOE/NNSA, Nevada Site Office (NSO) retains responsibility for the cleanup and management of ER TTR sites. Currently, there are no ER Sites at KTF. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program (DOE 2005) and DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting (DOE 2004b)

  4. Potential sites for a spent unreprocessed fuel facility (SURFF), southwesten part of the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoover, D.L.; Eckel, E.B.; Ohl, J.P.

    1978-01-01

    In the absence of specific criteria, the topography, geomorphology, and geology of Jackass Flats and vicinity in the southwestern part of the Nevada Test Site are evaluated by arbitrary guidelines for a Spent Unreprocessed Fuel Facility. The guidelines include requirements for surface slopes of less than 5%, 61 m of alluvium beneath the site, an area free of active erosion or deposition, lack of faults, a minimum area of 5 km 2 , no potential for flooding, and as many logistical support facilities as possible. The geology of the Jackass Flats area is similar to the rest of the Nevada Test Site in topographic relief (305-1,200 m), stratigraphy (complexly folded and faulted Paleozoic sediments overlain by Tertiary ash-flow tuffs and lavas overlain in turn by younger alluvium), and structure (Paleozoic thrust faults and folds, strike-slip faults, proximity to volcanic centers, and Basin and Range normal faults). Of the stratigraphic units at the potential Spent Unreprocessed Fuel Facility site in Jackass Flats, only the thickness and stability of the alluvium are of immediate importance. Basin and Range faults and a possible extension of the Mine Mountain fault need further investigation. The combination of a slope map and a simplified geologic and physiographic map into one map shows several potential sites for a Spent Unreprocessed Fuel Facility in Jackass Flats. The potential areas have slopes of less than 5% and contain only desert pavement or segmented pavement--the two physiographic categories having the greatest geomorphic and hydraulic stability. Before further work can be done, specific criteria for a Spent Unreprocessed Fuel Facility site must be defined. Following criteria definition, potential sites will require detailed topographic and geologic studies, subsurface investigations (including geophysical methods, trenching, and perhaps shallow drilling for faults in alluvium), detailed surface hydrologic studies, and possibly subsurface hydrologic studies

  5. Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations: Exploratory Shaft Facility fluids and materials evaluation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    West, K.A.

    1988-11-01

    The objective of this study was to determine if any fluids or materials used in the Exploratory Shaft Facility (ESF) of Yucca Mountain will make the mountain unsuitable for future construction of a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain, an area on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada, USA, is a candidate site for permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power and defense nuclear activities. To properly characterize Yucca Mountain, it will be necessary to construct an underground test facility, in which in situ site characterization tests can be conducted. The candidate repository horizon at Yucca Mountain, however, could potentially be compromised by fluids and materials used in the site characterization tests. To minimize this possibility, Los Alamos National Laboratory was directed to evaluate the kinds of fluids and materials that will be used and their potential impacts on the site. A secondary objective was to identify fluids and materials, if any, that should be prohibited from, or controlled in, the underground. 56 refs., 19 figs., 11 tabs.

  6. Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations: Exploratory Shaft Facility fluids and materials evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    West, K.A.

    1988-11-01

    The objective of this study was to determine if any fluids or materials used in the Exploratory Shaft Facility (ESF) of Yucca Mountain will make the mountain unsuitable for future construction of a nuclear waste repository. Yucca Mountain, an area on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada, USA, is a candidate site for permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power and defense nuclear activities. To properly characterize Yucca Mountain, it will be necessary to construct an underground test facility, in which in situ site characterization tests can be conducted. The candidate repository horizon at Yucca Mountain, however, could potentially be compromised by fluids and materials used in the site characterization tests. To minimize this possibility, Los Alamos National Laboratory was directed to evaluate the kinds of fluids and materials that will be used and their potential impacts on the site. A secondary objective was to identify fluids and materials, if any, that should be prohibited from, or controlled in, the underground. 56 refs., 19 figs., 11 tabs

  7. POST-CLOSURE INSPECTION REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 92: AREA 6 DECON POND FACILITY, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Post-Closure Inspection Report provides an analysis and summary of inspections for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. CAU 92 was closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B Operational Permit (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), 1995) and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996. Closure activities were completed on February 16, 1999, and the Closure Report (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999) was approved and a Notice of Completion issued by the NDEP on May 11, 1999. CAU 92 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 06-04-01, Decon Pad Oil/Water Separator; and CAS 06-05-02, Decontamination Pond (RCRA). Both CASs have use restrictions; however, only CAS 06-05-02 requires post-closure inspections. Visual inspections of the cover and fencing at CAS 06-05-02 are performed quarterly. Additional inspections are conducted if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.28 centimeters (cm) (0.50 inches [in]) in a 24-hour period. This report covers calendar year 2005. Quarterly site inspections were performed in March, June, September, and December of 2005. All observations indicated the continued integrity of the unit. No issues or concerns were noted, and no corrective actions were necessary. Copies of the inspection checklists and field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix A. Five additional inspections were performed after precipitation events that exceeded 1.28 cm (0.50 in) within a 24-hour period during 2005. No significant changes in site conditions were noted during these inspections, and no corrective actions were necessary. Copies of the inspection checklists and field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix A. Precipitation records for 2005 are included in Appendix C

  8. Surficial geology and performance assessment for a Radioactive Waste Management Facility at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Snyder, K.E.; Gustafson, D.L.; Huckins-Gang, H.E.; Miller, J.J.; Rawlinson, S.E.

    1995-02-01

    At the Nevada Test Site, one potentially disruptive scenario being evaluated for the Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) Facility Performance Assessment is deep post-closure erosion that would expose buried radioactive waste to the accessible environment. The GCD Facility located at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) lies at the juncture of three alluvial fan systems. Geomorphic surface mapping in northern Frenchman Flat indicates that reaches of these fans where the RWMS is now located have been constructional since at least the middle Quaternary. Mapping indicates a regular sequence of prograding fans with entrenchment of the older fan surfaces near the mountain fronts and construction of progressively younger inset fans farther from the mountain fronts. At the facility, the oldest fan surfaces are of late Pleistocene and Holocene age. More recent geomorphic activity has been limited to erosion and deposition along small channels. Trench and pit wall mapping found maximum incision in the vicinity of the RWMS to be less than 1.5 m. Based on collected data, natural geomorphic processes are unlikely to result in erosion to a depth of more than approximately 2 m at the facility within the 10,000-year regulatory period

  9. Environmental Assessment for the LGF Spill Test Facility at Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patton, S.E.; Novo, M.G.; Shinn, J.H.

    1986-04-01

    The LGF Spill Test Facility at Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site, is being constructed by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). In this Environmental Assessment, environmental consequences of spilling hazardous materials in the Frenchman Flat basin are evaluated and mitigations and recommendations are stated in order to protect natural resources and reduce land-use impacts. Guidelines and restrictions concerning spill-test procedures will be determined by the LGF Test Facility Operations Manager and DOE based on toxicity documentation for the test material, provided by the user, and mitigations imposed by the Environmental Assessment. In addition to Spill Test Facility operational procedures, certain assumptions have been made in preparation of this document: no materials will be considered for testing that have cumulative, long-term persistence in the environment; spill tests will consist of releases of 15 min or less; and sufficient time will be allowed between tests for recovery of natural resources. Geographic limits to downwind concentrations of spill materials were primarily determined from meteorological data, human occupational exposure standards to hazardous materials and previous spill tests. These limits were established using maximum spill scenarios and environmental impacts are discussed as worst case scenarios; however, spill-test series will begin with smaller spills, gradually increasing in size after the impacts of the initial tests have been evaluated.

  10. Environmental Assessment for the LGF Spill Test Facility at Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patton, S.E.; Novo, M.G.; Shinn, J.H.

    1986-04-01

    The LGF Spill Test Facility at Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site, is being constructed by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). In this Environmental Assessment, environmental consequences of spilling hazardous materials in the Frenchman Flat basin are evaluated and mitigations and recommendations are stated in order to protect natural resources and reduce land-use impacts. Guidelines and restrictions concerning spill-test procedures will be determined by the LGF Test Facility Operations Manager and DOE based on toxicity documentation for the test material, provided by the user, and mitigations imposed by the Environmental Assessment. In addition to Spill Test Facility operational procedures, certain assumptions have been made in preparation of this document: no materials will be considered for testing that have cumulative, long-term persistence in the environment; spill tests will consist of releases of 15 min or less; and sufficient time will be allowed between tests for recovery of natural resources. Geographic limits to downwind concentrations of spill materials were primarily determined from meteorological data, human occupational exposure standards to hazardous materials and previous spill tests. These limits were established using maximum spill scenarios and environmental impacts are discussed as worst case scenarios; however, spill-test series will begin with smaller spills, gradually increasing in size after the impacts of the initial tests have been evaluated

  11. Design for Disassembly

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Beim, Anne

    2018-01-01

    ‘Design for Disassembly’ is becoming a familiar part of discourses on environmental strategies for construction and sustainable design. The concept originates in industrial design and pertains to a wide range of strategies for reuse and recycling, all of which highlight a whole-of-life approach t...... to materials and buildings. Design for Disassembly is particularly relevant to prefabricated and industrialized construction; as such methodologies already contain within them the possibility for easy deconstruction, whether for maintenance, refurbishment or reuse....

  12. Second performance assessment iteration of the Greater Confinement Disposal facility at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baer, T.A.; Emery, J.N.; Price, L.L.; Olague, N.E.

    1994-04-01

    The Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) facility was established in Area 5 at the Nevada Test Site for containment of waste inappropriate for shallow land burial. Some transuranic (TRU) waste has been disposed of at the GCD facility, and compliance of this disposal system with EPA regulation 40 CFR 191 must be evaluated. We have adopted an iterative approach in which performance assessment results guide site data collection, which in turn influences the parameters and models used in performance assessment. The first iteration was based upon readily available data, and indicated that the GCD facility would likely comply with 40 CFR 191 and that the downward flux of water through the vadose zone (recharge) had a major influence on the results. Very large recharge rates, such as might occur under a cooler, wetter climate, could result in noncompliance. A project was initiated to study recharge in Area 5 by use of three environmental tracers. The recharge rate is so small that the nearest groundwater aquifer will not be contaminated in less than 10,000 years. Thus upward liquid diffusion of radionuclides remained as the sole release pathway. This second assessment iteration refined the upward pathway models and updated the parameter distributions based upon new site information. A new plant uptake model was introduced to the upward diffusion pathway; adsorption and erosion were also incorporated into the model. Several modifications were also made to the gas phase radon transport model. Plutonium solubility and sorption coefficient distributions were changed based upon new information, and on-site measurements were used to update the moisture content distributions. The results of the assessment using these models indicate that the GCD facility is likely to comply with all sections of 40 CFR 191 under undisturbed conditions

  13. Second performance assessment iteration of the Greater Confinement Disposal facility at the Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baer, T.A.; Emery, J.N. [GRAM, Inc., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Price, L.L. [Science Applications International Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Olague, N.E. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-04-01

    The Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) facility was established in Area 5 at the Nevada Test Site for containment of waste inappropriate for shallow land burial. Some transuranic (TRU) waste has been disposed of at the GCD facility, and compliance of this disposal system with EPA regulation 40 CFR 191 must be evaluated. We have adopted an iterative approach in which performance assessment results guide site data collection, which in turn influences the parameters and models used in performance assessment. The first iteration was based upon readily available data, and indicated that the GCD facility would likely comply with 40 CFR 191 and that the downward flux of water through the vadose zone (recharge) had a major influence on the results. Very large recharge rates, such as might occur under a cooler, wetter climate, could result in noncompliance. A project was initiated to study recharge in Area 5 by use of three environmental tracers. The recharge rate is so small that the nearest groundwater aquifer will not be contaminated in less than 10,000 years. Thus upward liquid diffusion of radionuclides remained as the sole release pathway. This second assessment iteration refined the upward pathway models and updated the parameter distributions based upon new site information. A new plant uptake model was introduced to the upward diffusion pathway; adsorption and erosion were also incorporated into the model. Several modifications were also made to the gas phase radon transport model. Plutonium solubility and sorption coefficient distributions were changed based upon new information, and on-site measurements were used to update the moisture content distributions. The results of the assessment using these models indicate that the GCD facility is likely to comply with all sections of 40 CFR 191 under undisturbed conditions.

  14. Volcanic harzards studies tailored to future populations and facilities: Yucca Mountain, Nevada, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keating, Gordon N.; Perry, Frank V.; Harrington, Charles; Krier, Don; Valentine, Greg A.; Gaffney, Edward; Cline, Mike

    2004-01-01

    The evaluation of impacts of potential volcanic eruptions on populations and facilities far in the future may involve detailed volcanological studies that differ from traditional hazards analyses. The proximity of Quaternary volcanoes to a proposed repository for disposal of the USA's high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, has required in-depth study of probability and consequences of basaltic igneous activity. Because of the underground nature of the repository, evaluation of the potential effects of dike intrusion and interaction with the waste packages stored in underground tunnels (dnfts) as well as effects of eruption and ash dispersal have been important. These studies include analyses of dike propagation, dike-drift intersection, flow of magma into dnfts, heat and volcanic gas migration, atmospheric dispersal of tephra, and redistribution of waste-contaminated tephra by surficial processes. Unlike traditional volcanic hazards studies that focus on impacts on housing, transportation, communications, etc. (to name a small subset), the igneous consequences studies at Yucca Mountain have focused on evaluation of igneous impacts on nuclear waste packages and implications for enhanced radioactive dose on a hypothetical future ((le) 10000 yrs) local population. Potential exposure pathways include groundwater (affected by in-situ degradation of waste packages by igneous heat and corrosion) and inhalation, ingestion, and external exposure due to deposition and redistribution of waste-contaminated tephra

  15. Hydrogeology of the unsaturated zone, North Ramp area of the Exploratory Studies Facility, Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rousseau, J.P.; Kwicklis, E.M.; Gillies, D.C. [eds.

    1999-03-01

    Yucca Mountain, in southern Nevada, is being investigated by the US Department of Energy as a potential site for a repository for high-level radioactive waste. This report documents the results of surface-based geologic, pneumatic, hydrologic, and geochemical studies conducted during 1992 to 1996 by the US Geological Survey in the vicinity of the North Ramp of the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) that are pertinent to understanding multiphase fluid flow within the deep unsaturated zone. Detailed stratigraphic and structural characteristics of the study area provided the hydrogeologic framework for these investigations. Shallow infiltration is not discussed in detail in this report because the focus in on three major aspects of the deep unsaturated-zone system: geologic framework, the gaseous-phase system, and the aqueous-phase system. However, because the relation between shallow infiltration and deep percolation is important to an overall understanding of the unsaturated-zone flow system, a summary of infiltration studies conducted to date at Yucca Mountain is provided in the section titled Shallow Infiltration. This report describes results of several Site Characterization Plan studies that were ongoing at the time excavation of the ESF North Ramp began and that continued as excavation proceeded.

  16. Establishment of a facility for intrusive characterization of transuranic waste at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foster, B.D.; Musick, R.G.; Pedalino, J.P.; Cowley, J.L.; Karney, C.C.; Kremer, J.L.

    1998-01-01

    This paper describes design and construction, project management, and testing results associated with the Waste Examination Facility (WEF) recently constructed at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The WEF and associated systems were designed, procured, and constructed on an extremely tight budget and within a fast track schedule. Part 1 of this paper focuses on design and construction activities, Part 2 discusses project management of WEF design and construction activities, and Part 3 describes the results of the transuranic (TRU) waste examination pilot project conducted at the WEF. In Part 1, the waste examination process is described within the context of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) characterization requirements. Design criteria are described from operational and radiological protection considerations. The WEF engineered systems are described. These systems include isolation barriers using a glove box and secondary containment structure, high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration and ventilation systems, differential pressure monitoring systems, and fire protection systems. In Part 2, the project management techniques used for ensuring that stringent cost/schedule requirements were met are described. The critical attributes of these management systems are described with an emphasis on team work. In Part 3, the results of a pilot project directed at performing intrusive characterization (i.e., examination) of TRU waste at the WEF are described. Project activities included cold and hot operations. Cold operations included operator training, facility systems walk down, and operational procedures validation. Hot operations included working with plutonium contaminated TRU waste and consisted of waste container breaching, waste examination, waste segregation, data collection, and waste repackaging

  17. Final environmental assessment for a refinement of the power delivery component of the Southern Nevada Water Authority Treatment and Transmission Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    The Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA) is designing and constructing a system of regional water supply facilities to meet current and projected water demands and increase system reliability. The existing Southern Nevada Water system is being upgraded with a number of improvements to increase the capacity of the system. However, even the expanded system is expected to be unable to meet projected peak daily water demands by the year 1999. As a result, new facilities are being designed and constructed to operate in conjunction with the upgraded Southern Nevada Water system. These new facilities, known as the Southern Nevada Water Authority Treatment and Transmission Facility (SNWA-TTF), include four primary components: a new raw water intake; new transmission facilities including below ground pipelines, tunnels, and above ground pumping stations; a water treatment facility; and new power supply facilities. Because existing power supplies would not be adequate for the new water treatment facilities, new power facilities, consisting of two new 230 kV-69 kV substations and new 69 and 230 kV power lines, are being constructed. This environmental assessment is specifically on the new power facilities

  18. The National Criticality Experiments Research Center at the Device Assembly Facility, Nevada National Security Site: Status and Capabilities, Summary Report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bragg-Sitton, S.; Bess, J.; Werner, J.

    2011-01-01

    The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) was officially opened on August 29, 2011. Located within the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), the NCERC has become a consolidation facility within the United States for critical configuration testing, particularly those involving highly enriched uranium (HEU). The DAF is a Department of Energy (DOE) owned facility that is operated by the National Nuclear Security Agency/Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). User laboratories include the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Personnel bring their home lab qualifications and procedures with them to the DAF, such that non-site specific training need not be repeated to conduct work at DAF. The NNSS Management and Operating contractor is National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec) and the NNSS Safeguards and Security contractor is Wackenhut Services. The complete report provides an overview and status of the available laboratories and test bays at NCERC, available test materials and test support configurations, and test requirements and limitations for performing sub-critical and critical tests. The current summary provides a brief summary of the facility status and the method by which experiments may be introduced to NCERC.

  19. The 1993 baseline biological studies and proposed monitoring plan for the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woodward, B.D.; Hunter, R.B.; Greger, P.D.; Saethre, M.B.

    1995-02-01

    This report contains baseline data and recommendations for future monitoring of plants and animals near the new Device Assembly Facility (DAF) on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The facility is a large structure designed for safely assembling nuclear weapons. Baseline data was collected in 1993, prior to the scheduled beginning of DAF operations in early 1995. Studies were not performed prior to construction and part of the task of monitoring operational effects will be to distinguish those effects from the extensive disturbance effects resulting from construction. Baseline information on species abundances and distributions was collected on ephemeral and perennial plants, mammals, reptiles, and birds in the desert ecosystems within three kilometers (km) of the DAF. Particular attention was paid to effects of selected disturbances, such as the paved road, sewage pond, and the flood-control dike, associated with the facility. Radiological monitoring of areas surrounding the DAF is not included in this report.

  20. Calendar year 2007 annual site environmental report for Tonopah Test Range, Nevada and Kauai Test Facility, Hawaii,

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Agogino, Karen [Department of Energy, Albuquerque, NM (United States). National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); Sanchez, Rebecca [Sandia Corp., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2008-09-30

    Tonopah Test Range (TTR) in Nevada and Kauai Test Facility (KTF) in Hawaii are government-owned, contractor-operated facilities operated by Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Sandia Site Offi ce (SSO), in Albuquerque, NM, administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at TTR and KTF. Sandia manages and conducts operations at TTR in support of the DOE/NNSA’s Weapons Ordnance Program and has operated the site since 1957. Washington Group International subcontracts to Sandia in administering most of the environmental programs at TTR. Sandia operates KTF as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility. This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) summarizes data and the compliance status of the environmental protection and monitoring program at TTR and KTF through Calendar Year (CY) 2007. The compliance status of environmental regulations applicable at these sites include state and federal regulations governing air emissions, wastewater effluent, waste management, terrestrial surveillance, and Environmental Restoration (ER) cleanup activities. Sandia is responsible only for those environmental program activities related to its operations. The DOE/NNSA/Nevada Site Offi ce (NSO) retains responsibility for the cleanup and management of ER TTR sites. Currently, there are no ER Sites at KTF. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE Order 450.1, Environmental Protection Program (DOE 2007a) and DOE Manual 231.1-1A, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting Manual (DOE 2007).

  1. Calendar year 2002 annual site environmental report for Tonopah Test Range, Nevada and Kauai Test Facility, Hawaii.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wagner, Katrina; Sanchez, Rebecca V.; Mayeux, Lucie; Koss, Susan I.; Salinas, Stephanie A.

    2003-09-01

    Tonopah Test Range (TTR) in Nevada and Kauai Test Facility (KTF) in Hawaii are government-owned, contractor-operated facilities operated by Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Sandia Site Office (SSO), in Albuquerque, NM, oversees TTR and KTF's operations. Sandia Corporation conducts operations at TTR in support of DOE/NNSA's Weapons Ordnance Program and has operated the site since 1957. Westinghouse Government Services subcontracts to Sandia Corporation in administering most of the environmental programs at TTR. Sandia Corporation operates KTF as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility. This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) summarizes data and the compliance status of the environmental protection and monitoring program at TTR and KTF through Calendar Year (CY) 2002. The compliance status of environmental regulations applicable at these sites include state and federal regulations governing air emissions, wastewater effluent, waste management, terrestrial surveillance, and Environmental Restoration (ER) cleanup activities. Sandia Corporation is responsible only for those environmental program activities related to its operations. The DOE/NNSA, Nevada Site Office (NSO) retains responsibility for the cleanup and management of ER TTR sites. Currently, there are no ER Sites at KTF. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE Order 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program (DOE 1990) and DOE Order 231.1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting (DOE 1996).

  2. 2013 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories Tonopah Test Range Nevada & Kauai Test Facility Hawaii

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Griffith, Stacy Rene [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Agogino, Karen [National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Washington, DC (United States); Li, Jun [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); White, Nancy [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Minitrez, Alexandra [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Avery, Penny [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Bailey-White, Brenda [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Bonaguidi, Joseph [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Catechis, Christopher [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); duMond, Michael [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Eckstein, Joanna [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Evelo, Stacie [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Forston, William [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Herring, III, Allen [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Lantow, Tiffany [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Martinez, Reuben [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Mauser, Joseph [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Miller, Amy [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Miller, Mark [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Payne, Jennifer [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Peek, Dennis [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Reiser, Anita [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Ricketson, Sherry [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Roma, Charles [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Salinas, Stephanie [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Ullrich, Rebecca [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2014-08-01

    Tonopah Test Range (TTR) in Nevada and Kauai Test Facility (KTF) in Hawaii are government-owned, contractor-operated facilities managed and operated by Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), through the Sandia Field Office (SFO), in Albuquerque, New Mexico, administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at TTR and KTF. Sandia manages and conducts operations at TTR in support of the DOE/NNSA’s Weapons Ordnance Program and has operated the site since 1957. Navarro Research and Engineering subcontracts to Sandia in administering most of the environmental programs at TTR. Sandia operates KTF as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility. This Annual Site Environmental Report summarizes data and the compliance status of the sustainability, environmental protection, and monitoring program at TTR and KTF through Calendar Year 2013. The compliance status of environmental regulations applicable at these sites include state and federal regulations governing air emissions, wastewater effluent, waste management, terrestrial surveillance, Environmental Restoration (ER) cleanup activities, and the National Environmental Policy Act. Sandia is responsible only for those environmental program activities related to its operations. The DOE/NNSA/Nevada Field Office retains responsibility for the cleanup and management of TTR ER sites. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE Order 231.1B, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting (DOE 2012).

  3. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 92: Area 6 Decon Pond Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    This Post-Closure Inspection Report provides an analysis and summary of inspections for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility. CAU 92 was closed according to the ''Resource Conservation and Recovery Act'' (RCRA) Part B Operational Permit (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP], 1995) and the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). Closure activities were completed on February 16, 1999, and the Closure Report (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999) was approved and a Notice of Completion issued by NDEP on May 11, 1999. CAU 92 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), CAS 06-04-01, Decon Pad Oil/Water Separator; and CAS 06-05-02, Decontamination Pond (RCRA). Both CASs have use restrictions; however, only CAS 06-05-02 requires post-closure inspections. Visual inspections of the cover and fencing at CAS 06-05-02 are performed quarterly. Additional inspections are conducted if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.28 centimeters (cm) (0.50 inches [in.]) in a 24-hour period. This report covers calendar year 2006. Quarterly site inspections were performed in March, June, September, and December of 2006. All observations indicated the continued integrity of the unit. No issues or concerns were noted, and no corrective actions were necessary. Copies of the inspection checklists and field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix A of this report, and photographs taken during the site inspections are included in Appendix B of this report. One additional inspection was performed after a precipitation event that exceeded 1.28 cm (0.50 in.) within a 24-hour period during 2006. No significant changes in site conditions were noted during this inspection, and no corrective actions were necessary. A copy of the inspection checklist and field notes completed during this additional inspection is included in Appendix A of this report. Precipitation records for 2006

  4. CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 115: AREA 25 TEST CELL A FACILITY, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) describes the activities performed to close CAU 115, Area 25 Test Cell A Facility, as presented in the NDEP-approved SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2004). The SAFER Plan includes a summary of the site history, process knowledge, and closure standards. This CR provides a summary of the completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and analytical and radiological data to confirm that the remediation goals were met and to document final site conditions. The approved closure alternative as presented in the SAFER Plan for CAU 115 (NNSA/NSO, 2004) was clean closure; however, closure in place was implemented under a Record of Technical Change (ROTC) to the SAFER Plan when radiological surveys indicated that the concrete reactor pad was radiologically activated and could not be decontaminated to meet free release levels. The ROTC is included as Appendix G of this report. The objectives of closure were to remove any trapped residual liquids and gases, dispose regulated and hazardous waste, decontaminate removable radiological contamination, demolish and dispose aboveground structures, remove the dewar as a best management practice (BMP), and characterize and restrict access to all remaining radiological contamination. Radiological contaminants of concern (COCs) included cobalt-60, cesium-137, strontium-90, uranium-234/235/236/238, and plutonium-239/240. Additional COCs included Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and asbestos

  5. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. B. Campbell email = campbek@nv.doe.gov

    2002-01-01

    This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provides selected corrective action alternatives and proposes the closure methodology for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 262, Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point. CAU 262 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. Remediation of CAU 262 is required under the FFACO. CAU 262 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), approximately 100 kilometers (km) (62 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs) within CAU 262 are located in the Nuclear Rocket Development Station complex. Individual CASs are located in the vicinity of the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD); Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD); and Test Cell C compounds. CAU 262 includes the following CASs as provided in the FFACO (1996); CAS 25-02-06, Underground Storage Tank; CAS 25-04-06, Septic Systems A and B; CAS 25-04-07, Septic System; CAS 25-05-03, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-05, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-06, Leachfield; CAS 25-05-08, Radioactive Leachfield; CAS 25-05-12, Leachfield; and CAS 25-51-01, Dry Well. Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the locations of the R-MAD, the E-MAD, and the Test Cell C CASs, respectively. The facilities within CAU 262 supported nuclear rocket reactor engine testing. Activities associated with the program were performed between 1958 and 1973. However, several other projects used the facilities after 1973. A significant quantity of radioactive and sanitary waste was produced during routine operations. Most of the radioactive waste was managed by disposal in the posted leachfields. Sanitary wastes were disposed in sanitary leachfields. Septic tanks, present at sanitary leachfields (i.e., CAS 25-02-06,2504-06 [Septic Systems A and B], 25-04-07, 25-05-05,25-05-12) allowed solids to settle out of suspension prior to entering the leachfield. Posted leachfields do not contain septic tanks. All CASs located in CAU 262 are

  6. Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This document supersedes DOE/NV/25946--801, 'Nevada Test Site Radiological Control Manual,' Revision 1 issued in February 2010. Brief Description of Revision: A complete revision to reflect a recent change in name for the NTS; changes in name for some tenant organizations; and to update references to current DOE policies, orders, and guidance documents. Article 237.2 was deleted. Appendix 3B was updated. Article 411.2 was modified. Article 422 was re-written to reflect the wording of DOE O 458.1. Article 431.6.d was modified. The glossary was updated. This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection.' Programs covered by this manual are located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS); Nellis Air Force Base and North Las Vegas, Nevada; Santa Barbara and Livermore, California; and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. In addition, fieldwork by NNSA/NSO at other locations is covered by this manual. Current activities at NNSS include operating low-level radioactive and mixed waste disposal facilities for United States defense-generated waste, assembly and execution of subcritical experiments, assembly/disassembly of special experiments, the storage and use of special nuclear materials, performing criticality experiments, emergency responder training, surface cleanup and site characterization of contaminated land areas, environmental activity by the University system, and nonnuclear test operations, such as controlled spills of hazardous materials at the Hazardous Materials Spill Center. Currently, the major potential for occupational radiation exposure is associated with the burial of

  7. Nevada National Security Site Radiological Control Manual

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Radiological Control Managers’ Council

    2012-03-26

    This document supersedes DOE/NV/25946--801, 'Nevada Test Site Radiological Control Manual,' Revision 1 issued in February 2010. Brief Description of Revision: A complete revision to reflect a recent change in name for the NTS; changes in name for some tenant organizations; and to update references to current DOE policies, orders, and guidance documents. Article 237.2 was deleted. Appendix 3B was updated. Article 411.2 was modified. Article 422 was re-written to reflect the wording of DOE O 458.1. Article 431.6.d was modified. The glossary was updated. This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection.' Programs covered by this manual are located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS); Nellis Air Force Base and North Las Vegas, Nevada; Santa Barbara and Livermore, California; and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. In addition, fieldwork by NNSA/NSO at other locations is covered by this manual. Current activities at NNSS include operating low-level radioactive and mixed waste disposal facilities for United States defense-generated waste, assembly and execution of subcritical experiments, assembly/disassembly of special experiments, the storage and use of special nuclear materials, performing criticality experiments, emergency responder training, surface cleanup and site characterization of contaminated land areas, environmental activity by the University system, and nonnuclear test operations, such as controlled spills of hazardous materials at the Hazardous Materials Spill Center. Currently, the major potential for occupational radiation exposure is associated with the burial of

  8. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. The Test Cell C (TCC) Facility is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 25 miles northwest of Mercury, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 116 is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (as amended February 2008) and consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping; and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 is described in the FFACO as the TCC Facility but actually includes Building 3210 and attached concrete shield wall only. CAU 116 will be closed by demolishing Building 3210, the attached concrete shield wall, and the nuclear furnace piping. In addition, as a best management practice (BMP), Building 3211 (moveable shed) will be demolished due to its close proximity to Building 3210. This will aid in demolition and disposal operations. Radiological surveys will be performed on the demolition debris to determine the proper disposal pathway. As much of the demolition debris as space allows will be placed into the Building 3210 basement structure. After filling to capacity with demolition debris, the basement structure will be mounded or capped and closed with administrative controls. Prior to beginning demolition activities and according to an approved Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP), representative sampling of surface areas that are known, suspected, or have the potential to contain hazardous constituents such as lead or polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) will be performed throughout all buildings and structures. Sections 2.3.2, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3, 4.3, and 6.2.6.1 address the methodologies employed that assure the solid debris placed in the basement structure will not contain contaminants of concern (COCs) above hazardous waste levels. The anticipated post

  9. Design cost scoping studies. Nevada Test Site Terminal Waste Storage Program, Subtask 1.3: facility hardening studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yanev, P.I.; Owen, G.N.

    1978-04-01

    As part of a program being conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, to determine the feasibility of establishing a terminal waste storage repository at the Nevada Test Site, URS/John A. Blume and Associates, Engineers, made approximate determinations of the additional costs required to provide protection of structures against seismic forces. A preliminary estimate is presented of the added costs required to harden the surface structures, underground tunnels and storage rooms, and vertical shafts of the repository against ground motion caused by earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). The conceptual design of all of the structures was adapted from proposed bedded-salt waste-isolation repositories. Added costs for hardening were calculated for repositories in three candidate geological materials (Eleana argillite, Climax Stock granite, and Jackass Flats tuff) for several assumed peak ground accelerations caused by earthquakes (0.3g, 0.5g, and 0.7g) and by UNEs (0.5g, 0.7g, and 1.0g). Hardening procedures to protect the tunnels, storage rooms, and shafts against incremental seismic loadings were developed from (1) qualitative considerations of analytically determined seismic stresses and (2) engineering evaluations of the dynamic response of the rock mass and the tunnel support systems. The added costs for seismic hardening of the surface structures were found to be less than 1% of the estimated construction cost of the surface structures. For the underground structures, essentially no hardening was required for peak ground accelerations up to 0.3g; however, added costs became significant at 0.5g, with a possible increase in structural costs for the underground facilities of as much as 35% at 1.0g

  10. Hydrogeology of the unsaturated zone, North Ramp area of the Exploratory Studies Facility, Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rousseau, Joseph P.; Kwicklis, Edward M.; Gillies, Daniel C.; Rousseau, Joseph P.; Kwicklis, Edward M.; Gillies, Daniel C.

    1999-01-01

    Yucca Mountain, in southern Nevada, is being investigated by the U.S. Department of Energy as a potential site for a repository for high-level radioactive waste. This report documents the results of surface-based geologic, pneumatic, hydrologic, and geochemical studies conducted during 1992 to 1996 by the U.S. Geological Survey in the vicinity of the North Ramp of the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) that are pertinent to understanding multiphase fluid flow within the deep unsaturated zone. Detailed stratigraphic and structural characteristics of the study area provided the hydrogeologic framework for these investigations. Multiple lines of evidence indicate that gas flow and liquid flow within the welded tuffs of the unsaturated zone occur primarily through fractures. Fracture densities are highest in the Tiva Canyon welded (TCw) and Topopah Spring welded (TSw) hydrogeologic units. Although fracture density is much lower in the intervening nonwelded and bedded tuffs of the Paintbrush nonwelded hydrogeologic unit (PTn), pneumatic and aqueous-phase isotopic evidence indicates that substantial secondary permeability is present locally in the PTn, especially in the vicinity of faults. Borehole air-injection tests indicate that bulk air-permeability ranges from 3.5x10-14 to 5.4x10-11 square meters for the welded tuffs and from 1.2x10-13 to 3.0x10-12 square meters for the non welded and bedded tuffs of the PTn. Analyses of in-situ pneumatic-pressure data from monitored boreholes produced estimates of bulk permeability that were comparable to those determined from the air-injection tests. In many cases, both sets of estimates are two to three orders of magnitude larger than estimates based on laboratory analyses of unfractured core samples. The in-situ pneumatic-pressure records also indicate that the unsaturated-zone pneumatic system consists of four subsystems that coincide with the four major hydrogeologic units of the unsaturated zone at Yucca Mountain. In

  11. Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit 143: Area 25 contaminated waste dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1 (with Record of Technical Change No. 1 and 2)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    USDOE Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV)

    1999-06-28

    This plan contains the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate correction action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 143 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 143 consists of two waste dumps used for the disposal of solid radioactive wastes. Contaminated Waste Dump No.1 (CAS 25-23-09) was used for wastes generated at the Reactor Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (R-MAD) Facility and Contaminated Waste Dump No.2 (CAS 25-23-03) was used for wastes generated at the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) Facility. Both the R-MAD and E-MAD facilities are located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site. Based on site history, radionuclides are the primary constituent of concern and are located in these disposal areas; vertical and lateral migration of the radionuclides is unlikely; and if migration has occurred it will be limited to the soil beneath the Contaminated Waste Disposal Dumps. The proposed investigation will involve a combination of Cone Penetrometer Testing within and near the solid waste disposal dumps, field analysis for radionuclides and volatile organic compounds, as well as sample collection from the waste dumps and surrounding areas for off-site chemical, radiological, and geotechnical analyses. The results of this field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.

  12. Radiological Dose Calculations And Supplemental Dose Assessment Data For Neshap Compliance For SNL Nevada Facilities 1996.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2017-05-01

    Operations of Sandia National Laboratories, Nevada (SNL/NV) at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) resulted in no planned point radiological releases during 1996. Other releases from SNL/NV included diffuse transuranic sources consisting of the three Clean Slate sites. Air emissions from these sources result from wind resuspension of near-surface transuranic contaminated soil particulates. The total area of contamination has been estimated to exceed 20 million square meters. Soil contamination was documented in an aerial survey program in 1977 (EG&G 1979). Surface contamination levels were generally found to be below 400 pCi/g of combined plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-240, and americium-241 (i.e., transuranic) activity. Hot spot areas contain up to 43,000 pCi/g of transuranic activity. Recent measurements confirm the presence of significant levels of transuranic activity in the surface soil. An annual diffuse source term of 0.39 Ci of transuranic material was calculated for the cumulative release from all three Clean Slate sites. A maximally exposed individual dose of 1.1 mrem/yr at the TTR airport area was estimated based on the 1996 diffuse source release amounts and site-specific meteorological data. A population dose of 0.86 person-rem/yr was calculated for the local residents. Both dose values were attributable to inhalation of transuranic contaminated dust.

  13. Evaluation of the location and recency of faulting near prospective surface facilities in Midway Valley, Nye County, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Swan, F.H.; Wesling, J.R.; Angell, M.M.; Thomas, A.P.; Whitney, J.W.; Gibson, J.D.

    2002-01-17

    Evaluation of surface faulting that may pose a hazard to prospective surface facilities is an important element of the tectonic studies for the potential Yucca Mountain high-level radioactive waste repository in southwestern Nevada. For this purpose, a program of detailed geologic mapping and trenching was done to obtain surface and near-surface geologic data that are essential for determining the location and recency of faults at a prospective surface-facilities site located east of Exile Hill in Midway Valley, near the eastern base of Yucca Mountain. The dominant tectonic features in the Midway Valley area are the north- to northeast-trending, west-dipping normal faults that bound the Midway Valley structural block-the Bow Ridge fault on the west side of Exile Hill and the Paint-brush Canyon fault on the east side of the valley. Trenching of Quaternary sediments has exposed evidence of displacements, which demonstrate that these block-bounding faults repeatedly ruptured the surface during the middle to late Quaternary. Geologic mapping, subsurface borehole and geophysical data, and the results of trenching activities indicate the presence of north- to northeast-trending faults and northwest-trending faults in Tertiary volcanic rocks beneath alluvial and colluvial sediments near the prospective surface-facilities site. North to northeast-trending faults include the Exile Hill fault along the eastern base of Exile Hill and faults to the east beneath the surficial deposits of Midway Valley. These faults have no geomorphic expression, but two north- to northeast-trending zones of fractures exposed in excavated profiles of middle to late Pleistocene deposits at the prospective surface-facilities site appear to be associated with these faults. Northwest-trending faults include the West Portal and East Portal faults, but no disruption of Quaternary deposits by these faults is evident. The western zone of fractures is associated with the Exile Hill fault. The eastern

  14. Evaluation of the location and recency of faulting near prospective surface facilities in Midway Valley, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swan, F.H.; Wesling, J.R.; Angell, M.M.; Thomas, A.P.; Whitney, J.W.; Gibson, J.D.

    2002-01-01

    Evaluation of surface faulting that may pose a hazard to prospective surface facilities is an important element of the tectonic studies for the potential Yucca Mountain high-level radioactive waste repository in southwestern Nevada. For this purpose, a program of detailed geologic mapping and trenching was done to obtain surface and near-surface geologic data that are essential for determining the location and recency of faults at a prospective surface-facilities site located east of Exile Hill in Midway Valley, near the eastern base of Yucca Mountain. The dominant tectonic features in the Midway Valley area are the north- to northeast-trending, west-dipping normal faults that bound the Midway Valley structural block-the Bow Ridge fault on the west side of Exile Hill and the Paint-brush Canyon fault on the east side of the valley. Trenching of Quaternary sediments has exposed evidence of displacements, which demonstrate that these block-bounding faults repeatedly ruptured the surface during the middle to late Quaternary. Geologic mapping, subsurface borehole and geophysical data, and the results of trenching activities indicate the presence of north- to northeast-trending faults and northwest-trending faults in Tertiary volcanic rocks beneath alluvial and colluvial sediments near the prospective surface-facilities site. North to northeast-trending faults include the Exile Hill fault along the eastern base of Exile Hill and faults to the east beneath the surficial deposits of Midway Valley. These faults have no geomorphic expression, but two north- to northeast-trending zones of fractures exposed in excavated profiles of middle to late Pleistocene deposits at the prospective surface-facilities site appear to be associated with these faults. Northwest-trending faults include the West Portal and East Portal faults, but no disruption of Quaternary deposits by these faults is evident. The western zone of fractures is associated with the Exile Hill fault. The eastern

  15. Evaluation of the Location and Recency of Faulting Near Prospective Surface Facilities in Midway Valley, Nye County, Nevada

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swan, F.H.; Wesling, J.R.; Angell, M.M.; Thomas, A.P.; Whitney, J.W.; Gibson, J.D.

    2001-01-01

    Evaluation of surface faulting that may pose a hazard to prospective surface facilities is an important element of the tectonic studies for the potential Yucca Mountain high-level radioactive waste repository in southwestern Nevada. For this purpose, a program of detailed geologic mapping and trenching was done to obtain surface and near-surface geologic data that are essential for determining the location and recency of faults at a prospective surface-facilities site located east of Exile Hill in Midway Valley, near the eastern base of Yucca Mountain. The dominant tectonic features in the Midway Valley area are the north- to northeast-trending, west-dipping normal faults that bound the Midway Valley structural block-the Bow Ridge fault on the west side of Exile Hill and the Paint-brush Canyon fault on the east side of the valley. Trenching of Quaternary sediments has exposed evidence of displacements, which demonstrate that these block-bounding faults repeatedly ruptured the surface during the middle to late Quaternary. Geologic mapping, subsurface borehole and geophysical data, and the results of trenching activities indicate the presence of north- to northeast-trending faults and northwest-trending faults in Tertiary volcanic rocks beneath alluvial and colluvial sediments near the prospective surface-facilities site. North to northeast-trending faults include the Exile Hill fault along the eastern base of Exile Hill and faults to the east beneath the surficial deposits of Midway Valley. These faults have no geomorphic expression, but two north- to northeast-trending zones of fractures exposed in excavated profiles of middle to late Pleistocene deposits at the prospective surface-facilities site appear to be associated with these faults. Northwest-trending faults include the West Portal and East Portal faults, but no disruption of Quaternary deposits by these faults is evident. The western zone of fractures is associated with the Exile Hill fault. The eastern

  16. Simulation-based disassembly systems design

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ohlendorf, Martin; Herrmann, Christoph; Hesselbach, Juergen

    2004-02-01

    Recycling of Waste of Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) is a matter of actual concern, driven by economic, ecological and legislative reasons. Here, disassembly as the first step of the treatment process plays a key role. To achieve sustainable progress in WEEE disassembly, the key is not to limit analysis and planning to merely disassembly processes in a narrow sense, but to consider entire disassembly plants including additional aspects such as internal logistics, storage, sorting etc. as well. In this regard, the paper presents ways of designing, dimensioning, structuring and modeling different disassembly systems. Goal is to achieve efficient and economic disassembly systems that allow recycling processes complying with legal requirements. Moreover, advantages of applying simulation software tools that are widespread and successfully utilized in conventional industry sectors are addressed. They support systematic disassembly planning by means of simulation experiments including consecutive efficiency evaluation. Consequently, anticipatory recycling planning considering various scenarios is enabled and decisions about which types of disassembly systems evidence appropriateness for specific circumstances such as product spectrum, throughput, disassembly depth etc. is supported. Furthermore, integration of simulation based disassembly planning in a holistic concept with configuration of interfaces and data utilization including cost aspects is described.

  17. SAVANNAH RIVER SITE R REACTOR DISASSEMBLY BASIN IN SITU DECOMMISSIONING

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Langton, C.; Blankenship, J.; Griffin, W.; Serrato, M.

    2009-12-03

    The US DOE concept for facility in-situ decommissioning (ISD) is to physically stabilize and isolate in tact, structurally sound facilities that are no longer needed for their original purpose of, i.e., generating (reactor facilities), processing(isotope separation facilities) or storing radioactive materials. The 105-R Disassembly Basin is the first SRS reactor facility to undergo the in-situ decommissioning (ISD) process. This ISD process complies with the105-R Disassembly Basin project strategy as outlined in the Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis for the Grouting of the R-Reactor Disassembly Basin at the Savannah River Site and includes: (1) Managing residual water by solidification in-place or evaporation at another facility; (2) Filling the below grade portion of the basin with cementitious materials to physically stabilize the basin and prevent collapse of the final cap - Sludge and debris in the bottom few feet of the basin will be encapsulated between the basin floor and overlying fill material to isolate if from the environment; (3) Demolishing the above grade portion of the structure and relocating the resulting debris to another location or disposing of the debris in-place; and (4) Capping the basin area with a concrete slab which is part of an engineered cap to prevent inadvertent intrusion. The estimated total grout volume to fill the 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin is 24,424 cubic meters or 31,945 cubic yards. Portland cement-based structural fill materials were design and tested for the reactor ISD project and a placement strategy for stabilizing the basin was developed. Based on structural engineering analyses and work flow considerations, the recommended maximum lift height is 5 feet with 24 hours between lifts. Pertinent data and information related to the SRS 105-R-Reactor Disassembly Basin in-situ decommissioning include: regulatory documentation, residual water management, area preparation activities, technology needs, fill material designs

  18. Centralized disassembly and packaging of spent fuel in the DOE spent fuel management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, E.R.

    1986-01-01

    In October 1984, E.R. Johnson Associates, Inc. (JAI) initiated a study of the prospective use of a centralized facility for the disassembly and packaging of spent fuel to support the various elements of the US Dept. of Energy (DOE) spent fuel management system, including facilities for monitored retrievable storage (MRS) and repositories. It was DOE's original plan to receive spent fuel at each repository where it would be disassembled and packaged (overpacked) for disposal purposes. Subsequently, DOE considered the prospective use of MRS of spent fuel as an option for providing safe and reliable management of spent fuel. This study was designed to consider possible advantages of the use of centralized facilities for disassembly and packaging of spent fuel at whose location storage facilities could be added as required. The study was divided into three principal technical tasks that covered: (a) development of requirements and criteria for the central disassembly and packaging facility and associated systems. (2) Development of conceptual designs for the central disassembly and packaging facility and associated systems. (3) Estimation of capital and operating costs involved for all system facilities and determination of life cycle costs for various scenarios of operation - for comparison with the reference system

  19. Microcanonical simulation of nuclear disassembly

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koonin, S.E.; Randrup, J.

    1986-01-01

    There is considerable interest in the disassembly of the hot nuclear matter produced in high-energy nuclear collisions. A particular stimulus has been the prospect of observing a nuclear liquid-gas phase transition. On rather general grounds, such a transition is expected to occur in nuclear matter at subsaturation densities with temperatures of 10-20 MeV. However, virtually all previous discussions of this phenomenon have been based on thermodynamical considerations valid for infinite, non-interacting systems and the qualitative validity of the results has not been ascertained for the relatively small, finite, interacting systems of practical relevance. Nor is it clear how the occurrence of the phase transition will manifest itself in the asymptotically observed fragment distribution. To progress in these matters, the authors have formulated a microcanonical simulation of the disassembly process, including interfragment interactions. It is a natural refinement of the grand canonical model first presented in [1] and further developed in [2] and is also a exact version of the model developed in [3] for the generation of complete multifragment events in medium-energy collisions. In this contribution, the authors give a brief description of the key ingredients in the model and its numerical implementation

  20. Interim guidance risk assessment of the device assembly facility at the Nevada test site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altenbach, T.J.

    1996-05-01

    The risks of plutonium dispersal and/or high explosive detonation from nuclear explosive operations at the Device Assembly Facility were examined in accordance with DOE Order 5610.11 and the Interim Guidance. The assessment consisted of a qualitative task and hazards analysis, and a quantitative risk screening. Results are displayed on risk matrices for the major types of operations. Most accident scenarios were considered to have Low risk; a few scenarios have Moderate risk; and none have High risk. The highest risk scenarios (Moderate category) consist of a high explosive detonation during assembly operations in a cell, with bare conventional high explosive surrounding the pit

  1. Modeling operational behavior of a disassembly line

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kizilkaya, Elif A.; Gupta, Surendra M.

    2004-12-01

    In this paper we present a dynamic kanban (pull) system specifically developed for disassembly lines. This type of kanban system is much more complex than the traditional kanban system used in assembly lines. For instance, unlike the assembly line where the external demand occurs only at the last station, the demands in the disassembly case also occur at any of the intermittent stations. The reason is that as a product moves on the disassembly line, various parts are disassembled at every station and accumulated at that station. Therefore, there are as many demand sources as there are number of parts. We consider a case example involving the end-of-life products. Based on the precedence relationships and other criteria such as hazardous properties of the parts, we balance the disassembly line. The results of the disassembly line-balancing problem (DLBP) are used as input to the proposed dynamic kanban system for disassembly line (DKSDL). We compare the performance of the DKSDL to the modified kanban system for disassembly line (MKSDL), which was previously introduced by the authors. We show, via simulation, that the DKSDL is far superior to MKSDL considered.

  2. Illustrating the disassembly of 3D models

    KAUST Repository

    Guo, Jianwei; Yan, Dongming; Li, Er; Dong, Weiming; Wonka, Peter; Zhang, Xiaopeng

    2013-01-01

    We present a framework for the automatic disassembly of 3D man-made models and the illustration of the disassembly process. Given an assembled 3D model, we first analyze the individual parts using sharp edge loops and extract the contact faces

  3. 1994 Baseline biological studies for the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Townsend, Y.E. [ed.; Woodward, B.D.; Hunter, R.B.; Greger, P.D.; Saethre, M.B.

    1995-02-01

    This report describes environmental work performed at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) in 1994 by the Basic Environmental Monitoring and Compliance Program (BECAMP). The DAF is located near the Mojave-Great Basin desert transition zone 27 km north of Mercury. The area immediately around the DAF building complex is a gentle slope cut by 1 to 3 m deep arroyos, and occupied by transitional vegetation. In 1994, construction activities were largely limited to work inside the perimeter fence. The DAF was still in a preoperational mode in 1994, and no nuclear materials were present. The DAF facilities were being occupied so there was water in the sewage settling pond, and the roads and lights were in use. Sampling activities in 1994 represent the first year in the proposed monitoring scheme. The proposed biological monitoring plan gives detailed experimental protocols. Plant, lizard, tortoise, small mammal, and bird surveys were performed in 1994. The authors briefly outline procedures employed in 1994. Studies performed on each taxon are reviewed separately then summarized in a concluding section.

  4. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 135: Areas 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    D. H. Cox

    2001-06-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 135, Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, was closed in accordance with the approved Corrective Action Plan (DOE/NV, 2000). CAU 135 consists of three Corrective Action Sites (CAS). Two of these CAS's were identified in the Corrective Action Investigation Data Quality Objective meeting as being improperly identified as underground storage tanks. CAS 25-02-03 identified as the Deluge Valve Pit was actually an underground electrical vault and CAS 25-02-10 identified as an Underground Storage Tank was actually a former above ground storage tank filled with demineralized water. Both of these CAS's are recommended for a no further action closure. CAS 25-02-01 the Underground Storage Tanks commonly referred to as the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault was closed by decontaminating the vault structure and conducting a radiological verification survey to document compliance with the Nevada Test Site unrestricted use release criteria. The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, (CAS 25-02-01), referred to as the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault, were used to receive liquid waste from all of the radioactive and cell service area drains at the E-MAD Facility. Based on the results of the Corrective Action Investigation conducted in June 1999, discussed in ''The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'' (DOE/NV, 199a), one sample from the radiological survey of the concrete vault interior exceeded radionuclide preliminary action levels. The analytes from the sediment samples exceeded the preliminary action levels for polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, and radionuclides. The CAU 135 closure activities consisted of scabbling radiological ''hot spots

  5. Alteration history studies in the Exploratory Studies Facility, Yucca Mountain, Nevada, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Levy, S.S.; Chipera, S.J.; Norman, D.I.

    1996-01-01

    By mid-1995, the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) extended about 1. 1 km from Exile Hill westward toward Yucca Mountain, mostly within densely welded, devitrfied Tiva Canyon Tuff. Secondary mineral occurrences in this unit include breccia cements of mordenite, a fibrous zeolite, and vapor-phase deposits of silica, alkali feldspar, apatite, hollandite, amphibole, and zircon. Calcite is also a common secondary mineral in faults and fractures. Studies of water and gas contents in fluid inclusions in calcites from a fault in nonwelded tuff and a fracture in densely welded tuff suggest mineral deposition under transient locally saturated conditions. Calcite in the nonwelded tuff incorporated air from the unsaturated tuff adjacent to the fault. A highly altered interval within pre-Pah Canyon tuffs just above the top of the Topopah Spring Tuff may be a fossil fumarole or other hydrothermal feature associated with cooling pyroclastic deposits, overprinted by later zeolitic alteration. The observed quartz, cristobalite, opal-CT, and fluorite have been widely identified as products of syngenetic devitrification and vapor-phase alteration in and above the Topopah Spring Tuff. Smectite, also an abundant secondary mineral at the ESF site, has been observed elsewhere at this stratigraphic level. Zeolitic alteration of nonwelded tuffs above the Topopah Spring Tuff, as seen in the ESF, has also been noted in drill core and outcrop at northeastern Yucca Mountain. The hydrologic and geochemical conditions that favored zeolitization only in certain areas of this stratigraphic interval have yet to be determined

  6. Chlorine-36 investigations of groundwater infiltration in the Exploratory Studies Facility at Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Levy, S.S.; Fabryka-Martin, J.T.; Dixon, P.R.; Liu, B.; Turin, H.J.; Wolfsberg, A.V.

    1997-01-01

    Chlorine-36, including the natural cosmogenic component and the component produced during atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1950's and 1960's (bomb pulse), is being used as an isotopic tracer for groundwater infiltration studies at Yucca Mountain, a potential nuclear waste repository. Rock samples have been collected systematically in the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF), and samples were also collected from fractures, faults, and breccia zones. Isotopic ratios indicative of bomb-pulse components in the water ( 36 Cl/Cl values > 1,250 x 10 -15 ), signifying less than 40-yr travel times from the surface, have been detected at a few locations within the Topopah Spring Tuff, the candidate host rock for the repository. The specific features associated with the high 36 Cl/Cl values are predominantly cooling joints and syngenetic breccias, but most of the sites are in the general vicinity of faults. The non-bomb pulse samples have 36 Cl/Cl values interpreted to indicate groundwater travel times of at least a few thousand to possibly several hundred thousand years. Preliminary numerical solute-travel experiments using the FEHM (Finite Element Heat and Mass transfer) code demonstrate consistency between these interpreted ages and the observed 36 Cl/Cl values but do not validate the interpretations

  7. Geology of the ECRB Cross Drift-Exploratory Studies Facility, Yucca Mountain Project, Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DOE

    1999-01-01

    The Enhanced Characterization of the Repository Block Cross Drift (Cross Drift) excavated at Yucca Mountain is being studied to determine its suitability as a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository. This report presents a summary of data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) personnel on behalf of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for the Department of Energy in the Cross Drift from Sta. 00+00 to 26+64. This report includes descriptions of lithostratigraphic units, an analysis of data from full-periphery geologic maps (FPGM) and detailed line survey (DLS) data, a detailed description of the Solitario Canyon Fault zone (SCFZ), and an analysis of geotechnical and engineering characteristics. The Cross Drift is excavated entirely within the Topopah Spring Tuff formation of the Paintbrush Group. Units exposed in the crystal-poor member of the Topopah Spring Tuff, include the Topopah Spring crystal-poor upper lithophysal zone (Tptpul) (Sta. 0+00 to 10+15), the Topopah Spring crystal-poor middle nonlithophysal zone (Tptpmn) (Sta. 10+15 to 14+44), the Topopah Spring crystal-poor lower lithophysal zone (Tptpll) (Sta. 14+44 to 23+26), and the Topopah Spring crystal-poor lower nonlithophysal zone (Tptpln) (Sta. 23+26 to 25+85). The lower portion of the Topopah Spring crystal-rich lithophysal transition subzone (Tptrl1) is exposed on the west side of the Solitario Canyon fault from Sta. 26+57.5 to 26+64. Lithologically, the units exposed in the Cross Drift are similar in comparable stratigraphic intervals of the Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF), particularly in terms of welding, secondary crystallization, fracturing, and type, size, color, and abundance of pumice and lithic clasts. The most notable difference is the lack of the intensely fractured zone (IFZ) in the Cross Drift. The as-built cross section and the pre-construction cross section compare favorably. Lithostratigraphic contacts and structures on the pre-construction cross section were

  8. Disassembly automation automated systems with cognitive abilities

    CERN Document Server

    Vongbunyong, Supachai

    2015-01-01

    This book presents a number of aspects to be considered in the development of disassembly automation, including the mechanical system, vision system and intelligent planner. The implementation of cognitive robotics increases the flexibility and degree of autonomy of the disassembly system. Disassembly, as a step in the treatment of end-of-life products, can allow the recovery of embodied value left within disposed products, as well as the appropriate separation of potentially-hazardous components. In the end-of-life treatment industry, disassembly has largely been limited to manual labor, which is expensive in developed countries. Automation is one possible solution for economic feasibility. The target audience primarily comprises researchers and experts in the field, but the book may also be beneficial for graduate students.

  9. Generation of control sequences for a pilot-disassembly system

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seliger, Guenther; Kim, Hyung-Ju; Keil, Thomas

    2002-02-01

    Closing the product and material cycles has emerged as a paradigm for industry in the 21st century. Disassembly plays a key role in a life cycle economy since it enables the recovery of resources. A partly automated disassembly system should adapt to a large variety of products and different degrees of devaluation. Also the amounts of products to be disassembled can vary strongly. To cope with these demands an approach to generate on-line disassembly control sequences will be presented. In order to react on these demands the technological feasibility is considered within a procedure for the generation of disassembly control sequences. Procedures are designed to find available and technologically feasible disassembly processes. The control system is formed by modularised and parameterised control units in the cell level within the entire control architecture. In the first development stage product and process analyses at the sample product washing machine were executed. Furthermore a generalized disassembly process was defined. Afterwards these processes were structured in primary and secondary functions. In the second stage the disassembly control at the technological level was investigated. Factors were the availability of the disassembly tools and the technological feasibility of the disassembly processes within the disassembly system. Technical alternative disassembly processes are determined as a result of availability of the tools and technological feasibility of processes. The fourth phase was the concept for the generation of the disassembly control sequences. The approach will be proved in a prototypical disassembly system.

  10. Recycling of electrical motors by automatic disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Karlsson, Björn; Järrhed, Jan-Ove

    2000-04-01

    This paper presents a robotized workstation for end-of-life treatment of electrical motors with an electrical effect of about 1 kW. These motors can, for example, be found in washing machines and in industry. There are two main steps in the work. The first step is an inspection whereby the functionality of the motor is checked and classification either for re-use or for disassembly is done. In the second step the motors classified for disassembly are disassembled in a robotized automatic station. In the initial step measurements are performed during a start-up sequence of about 1 s. By measuring the rotation speed and the current and voltage of the three phases of the motor classification for either reuse or disassembly can be done. During the disassembly work, vision data are fused in order to classify the motors according to their type. The vision system also feeds the control system of the robot with various object co-ordinates, to facilitate correct operation of the robot. Finally, tests with a vision system and eddy-current equipment are performed to decide whether all copper has been removed from the stator.

  11. RCRA Permit for a Hazardous Waste Management Facility Permit Number NEV HW0101 Annual Summary/Waste Minimization Report Calendar Year 2012, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arnold, P. M.

    2013-02-21

    This report summarizes the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identification number of each generator from which the Permittee received a waste stream, a description and quantity of each waste stream in tons and cubic feet received at the facility, the method of treatment, storage, and/or disposal for each waste stream, a description of the waste minimization efforts undertaken, a description of the changes in volume and toxicity of waste actually received, any unusual occurrences, and the results of tank integrity assessments. This Annual Summary/Waste Minimization Report is prepared in accordance with Section 2.13.3 of Permit Number NEV HW0101, issued 10/17/10.

  12. Illustrating the disassembly of 3D models

    KAUST Repository

    Guo, Jianwei

    2013-06-11

    We present a framework for the automatic disassembly of 3D man-made models and the illustration of the disassembly process. Given an assembled 3D model, we first analyze the individual parts using sharp edge loops and extract the contact faces between each pair of neighboring parts. The contact faces are then used to compute the possible moving directions of each part. We then present a simple algorithm for clustering the sets of the individual parts into meaningful sub-assemblies, which can be used for a hierarchical decomposition. We take the stability of sub-assemblies into account during the decomposition process by considering the upright orientation of the input models. Our framework also provides a user-friendly interface to enable the superimposition of the constraints for the decomposition. Finally, we visualize the disassembly process by generating an animated sequence. The experiments demonstrate that our framework works well for a variety of complex models. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd.

  13. Nuclear fuel bundle disassembly and assembly tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yates, J.; Long, J.W.

    1975-01-01

    A nuclear power reactor fuel bundle is described which has a plurality of tubular fuel rods disposed in parallel array between two transverse tie plates. It is secured against disassembly by one or more locking forks which engage slots in tie rods which position the transverse plates. Springs mounted on the fuel and tie rods are compressed when the bundle is assembled thereby maintaining a continual pressure against the locking forks. Force applied in opposition to the springs permits withdrawal of the locking forks so that one tie plate may be removed, giving access to the fuel rods. An assembly and disassembly tool facilitates removal of the locking forks when the bundle is to be disassembled and the placing of the forks during assembly of the bundle. (U.S.)

  14. Accomplishment of JT-60U disassembly work dealing with radioactive components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikeda, Yoshitaka

    2015-01-01

    The upgrade of the JT-60U to the superconducting tokamak 'JT-60SA' has been carried out to contribute the early realization of fusion energy by addressing key physics issues relevant for ITER and DEMO. Disassembly of the JT-60U tokamak was required so as to newly install the JT-60SA torus at the same position in the torus hall. The JT-60U tokamak was featured by the complicated and welded structure against the strong electromagnetic force, and by the radioactivation due to deuterium-deuterium (D-D) reactions of 1.5x10"2"0 (n) in total. Since this work was the first experience of disassembling a large radioactivated fusion device in Japan, careful preparations of disassembly activities, including treatment of the radioactivated materials and safety work, have been made. About 13,000 components with a total weight of more than 5,400 tonnes were removed from the torus hall and stored safely in storage facilities. All disassembly components were stored with recording the data such as dose rate, weight and kind of material, so as to apply the clearance level regulation in future. It was confirmed that the main radioactive material of the disassembly components was the stainless steel and that its dose rate was almost background level (∼0.1 μSv/h) at ∼10 m far from the vacuum vessel. It seems that the disassembly components with background dose level are in the clearance level. The assembly of JT-60SA tokamak has started in January 2013 after this disassembly of the JT-60U tokamak. (author)

  15. 2016 Annual Site Environmental report Sandia National Laboratories Tonopah Test Range Nevada & Kaua'i Test Facility Hawai'i.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Salas, Angela Maria [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Griffith, Stacy R. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2017-07-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under contract DE-NA0003525. The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the SNL, Tonopah Test Range (SNL/TTR) in Nevada and the SNL, Kaua‘i Test Facility (SNL/KTF) in Hawai‘i. SNL personnel manage and conduct operations at SNL/TTR in support of the DOE/NNSA’s Weapons Ordnance Program and have operated the site since 1957. Navarro Research and Engineering personnel perform most of the environmental programs activities at SNL/TTR. The DOE/NNSA/Nevada Field Office retains responsibility for cleanup and management of SNL/TTR Environmental Restoration sites. SNL personnel operate SNL/KTF as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility. This Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) summarizes data and the compliance status of sustainability, environmental protection, and monitoring programs at SNL/TTR and SNL/KTF during calendar year 2016. Major environmental programs include air quality, water quality, groundwater protection, terrestrial and biological surveillance, waste management, pollution prevention, environmental restoration, oil and chemical spill prevention, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. This ASER is prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting.

  16. Computed distributions of residual shaft drilling and construction water in the exploratory facilities at Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eaton, R.R.; Peterson, A.C.

    1989-01-01

    The Yucca Mountain Project is studying the feasibility of constructing a high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in southwest Nevada. One activity of site characterization is the construction of two exploratory shafts. This paper contains the results of engineering analytical calculations of the potential distribution of residual construction water in the exploratory shafts and drifts and numerical calculations of the movement of the residual water and how the movement is affected by drift ventilation. In all cases the increase in rock saturation resulting from the construction water was extremely small. 11 refs., 15 figs., 1 tab

  17. Geologic evaluation of six nonwelded tuff sites in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain, Nevada for a surface-based test facility for the Yucca Mountain Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broxton, D.E.; Chipera, S.J.; Byers, F.M. Jr.; Rautman, C.A.

    1993-10-01

    Outcrops of nonwelded tuff at six locations in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, were examined to determine their suitability for hosting a surface-based test facility for the Yucca Mountain Project. Investigators will use this facility to test equipment and procedures for the Exploratory Studies Facility and to conduct site characterization field experiments. The outcrops investigated contain rocks that include or are similar to the tuffaceous beds of Calico Hills, an important geologic and hydrologic barrier between the potential repository and the water table. The tuffaceous beds of Calico Hills at the site of the potential repository consist of both vitric and zeolitic tuffs, thus three of the outcrops examined are vitric tuffs and three are zeolitic tuffs. New data were collected to determine the lithology, chemistry, mineralogy, and modal petrography of the outcrops. Some preliminary data on hydrologic properties are also presented. Evaluation of suitability of the six sites is based on a comparison of their geologic characteristics to those found in the tuffaceous beds of Calico Hills within the exploration block

  18. Climax Granite, Nevada Test Site, as a host for a rock mechanics test facility related to the geologic disposal of high level nuclear wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heuze, F.E.

    1981-02-01

    This document discusses the potential of the Climax pluton, at the Nevada Test Site, as the host for a granite mechanics test facility related to the geologic disposal of high-level nuclear waste. The Climax granitic pluton has been the site of three nuclear weapons effects tests: Hard Hat, Tiny Tot, and Piledriver. Geologic exploration and mapping of the granite body were performed at the occasion of these tests. Currently, it is the site Spent Fuel Test (SFT-C) conducted in the vicinity of and at the same depth as that of the Piledriver drifts. Significant exploration, mapping, and rock mechanics work have been performed and continue at this Piledriver level - the 1400 (ft) level - in the context of SFT-C. Based on our technical discussions, and on the review of the significant geological and rock mechanics work already achieved in the Climax pluton, based also on the ongoing work and the existing access and support, it is concluded that the Climax site offers great opportunities for a rock mechanics test facility. It is not claimed, however, that Climax is the only possible site or the best possible site, since no case has been made for another granite test facility in the United States. 12 figures, 3 tables

  19. Closure Strategy for a Waste Disposal Facility with Multiple Waste Types and Regulatory Drivers at the Nevada Test Site - 8422

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D Wieland; V Yucel; L Desotell; G Shott; J Wrapp

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) plans to close the waste and classified material storage cells in the southeast quadrant of the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS), informally known as the '92-Acre Area', by 2011. The 25 shallow trenches and pits and the 13 Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) borings contain various waste streams including low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), transuranic (TRU), mixed transuranic (MTRU), and high specific activity LLW. The cells are managed under several regulatory and permit programs by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Although the specific closure requirements for each cell vary, 37 closely spaced cells will be closed under a single integrated monolayer evapotranspirative (ET) final cover. One cell will be closed under a separate cover concurrently. The site setting and climate constrain transport pathways and are factors in the technical approach to closure and performance assessment. Successful implementation of the integrated closure plan requires excellent communication and coordination between NNSA/NSO and the regulators

  20. Preliminary evaluation of 30 potential granitic rock sites for a radioactive waste storage facility in southern Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boardman, C.R.; Knutson, C.F.

    1978-02-15

    Results of preliminary study are presented which was performed under subtask 2.7 of the NTS Terminal Waste Storage Program Plan for 1978. Subtask 2.7 examines the feasibility of locating a nuclear waste repository in a granitic stock or pluton in southern Nevada near the Nevada Test Site (NTS). It is assumed for the purposes of this study that such a repository cannot be located at NTS. This assumption may or may not be correct. This preliminary report does not identify a particular site as being a suitable location for a repository. Nor does it absolutely eliminate a particular site from further consideration. It does, however, answer the basic question of probable suitability of some of the sites and present a systematic method for site evaluation. Since the findings of this initial study have been favorable, it will be followed by more exhaustive and detailed studies of the original 30 sites and perhaps others. In future studies some of the evaluation criteria used in the preliminary study may be modified or eliminated, and new criteria may be introduced.

  1. Preliminary evaluation of 30 potential granitic rock sites for a radioactive waste storage facility in southern Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boardman, C.R.; Knutson, C.F.

    1978-01-01

    Results of preliminary study are presented which was performed under subtask 2.7 of the NTS Terminal Waste Storage Program Plan for 1978. Subtask 2.7 examines the feasibility of locating a nuclear waste repository in a granitic stock or pluton in southern Nevada near the Nevada Test Site (NTS). It is assumed for the purposes of this study that such a repository cannot be located at NTS. This assumption may or may not be correct. This preliminary report does not identify a particular site as being a suitable location for a repository. Nor does it absolutely eliminate a particular site from further consideration. It does, however, answer the basic question of probable suitability of some of the sites and present a systematic method for site evaluation. Since the findings of this initial study have been favorable, it will be followed by more exhaustive and detailed studies of the original 30 sites and perhaps others. In future studies some of the evaluation criteria used in the preliminary study may be modified or eliminated, and new criteria may be introduced

  2. Methods for otpimum and near optimum disassembly sequencing

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Lambert, A.J.D.; Gupta, S.M.

    2008-01-01

    This paper considers disassembly sequencing problems subjected to sequence dependent disassembly costs. In practice, the methods for dealing with such problems rely mainly on metaheuristic and heuristic methods, which intrinsically generate suboptimum solutions. Exact methods are NP-hard and

  3. Task-failure-driven rebalancing of disassembly lines

    OpenAIRE

    Altekin, Fatma Tevhide; Akkan, Can

    2011-01-01

    Many reverse-logistics systems that collect and reprocess end-of-life products require a disassembly stage. The nature of variability in incoming products, and damages, which are more likely to occur during disassembly than assembly, create a significant uncertainty in disassembly tasks, namely, possibility of failed tasks. Such failures may lead to some successor tasks being infeasible, which changes work contents of downstream stations. To improve the profitability of such a disassembly lin...

  4. Multi-kanban mechanism for appliance disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Udomsawat, Gun; Gupta, Surendra M.

    2005-11-01

    The use of household appliances continues to rise every year. A significant number of End-Of-Life (EOL) appliances are generated because of the introduction of newer models that are more attractive, efficient and affordable. Others are, of course, generated when they become non-functional. Many regulations encourage recycling of EOL appliances to reduce the amount of waste sent to landfills. In addition, EOL appliances offer the appliance manufacturing and remanufacturing industries a source of less expensive raw materials and components. For this reason product recovery has become a subject of interest during the past decade. In this paper, we study the disassembly line for appliance disassembly. We discuss and incorporate some of the complications that are inherent in disassembly line including product arrival, demand arrival, inventory fluctuation and production control mechanisms. We show how to overcome such complications by implementing a multi-kanban system in the appliance disassembly line setting. The multi-kanban system (MKS) relies on dynamic routing of kanbans according to the state of the system. We investigate the multi-kanban mechanism using simulation and explore the effect of product mix on performance of the traditional push system (TPS) and MKS in terms of controlling the system's inventory while attempting to achieve a decent customer service level.

  5. Three-dimensional modeling of unsaturated flow in the vicinity of proposed exploratory shaft facilities at Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rockhold, M.L.; Sagar, B.; Connelly, M.P.

    1992-04-01

    This report describes the results of a study to investigate the influence of proposed exploratory shafts on the moisture distribution within unsaturated, fractured rock at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The long-term effects of exploratory shafts at Yucca Mountain are important in the estimation of potential waste migration and fate, while short-term effects may be important in the planning and interpretation of tests performed at the site. The PORFLO-3 computer code was used for simulation of moisture flow through the geologic units adjacent to the ESF. Rather than represent fractures as discrete elements, an equivalent continuum was stipulated, in which the fractured units were assigned equivalent or composite hydrologic properties. Explicit treatment of fractures is not feasible because of the extremely large number of fractures contained in the site-scale problem and the difficulties in characterizing and modeling the fracture geometries

  6. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, D. H.

    2000-01-01

    The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks site Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 135 will be closed by unrestricted release decontamination and verification survey, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consert Order (FFACO, 1996). The CAU includes one Corrective Action Site (CAS). The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, (CAS 25-02-01), referred to as the Engine-Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault, were used to receive liquid waste from all of the radioactive drains at the E-MAD Facility. Based on the results of the Corrective Action Investigation conducted in June 1999 discussed in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (DOE/NV,1999a), one sample from the radiological survey of the concrete vault interior exceeded radionuclide preliminary action levels. The analytes from the sediment samples that exceeded the preliminary action levels are polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, and radionuclides. Unrestricted release decontamination and verification involves removal of concrete and the cement-lined pump sump from the vault. After verification that the contamination has been removed, the vault will be repaired with concrete, as necessary. The radiological- and chemical-contaminated pump sump and concrete removed from the vault would be disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. The vault interior will be field surveyed following removal of contaminated material to verify that unrestricted release criteria have been achieved

  7. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    D. H. Cox

    2000-07-01

    The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks site Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 135 will be closed by unrestricted release decontamination and verification survey, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consert Order (FFACO, 1996). The CAU includes one Corrective Action Site (CAS). The Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, (CAS 25-02-01), referred to as the Engine-Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) Waste Holdup Tanks and Vault, were used to receive liquid waste from all of the radioactive drains at the E-MAD Facility. Based on the results of the Corrective Action Investigation conducted in June 1999 discussed in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 135: Area 25 Underground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (DOE/NV,1999a), one sample from the radiological survey of the concrete vault interior exceeded radionuclide preliminary action levels. The analytes from the sediment samples that exceeded the preliminary action levels are polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel-range organics, and radionuclides. Unrestricted release decontamination and verification involves removal of concrete and the cement-lined pump sump from the vault. After verification that the contamination has been removed, the vault will be repaired with concrete, as necessary. The radiological- and chemical-contaminated pump sump and concrete removed from the vault would be disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. The vault interior will be field surveyed following removal of contaminated material to verify that unrestricted release criteria have been achieved.

  8. Facility Decontamination and Decommissioning Program Surveillance and Maintenance Plan, Revision 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poderis, Reed J. [NSTec; King, Rebecca A. [NSTec

    2013-09-30

    This Surveillance and Maintenance (S&M) Plan describes the activities performed between deactivation and final decommissioning of the following facilities located on the Nevada National Security Site, as documented in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order under the Industrial Sites program as decontamination and decommissioning sites: ? Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (EMAD) Facility: o EMAD Building (Building 25-3900) o Locomotive Storage Shed (Building 25-3901) ? Test Cell C (TCC) Facility: o Equipment Building (Building 25-3220) o Motor Drive Building (Building 25-3230) o Pump Shop (Building 25-3231) o Cryogenic Lab (Building 25-3232) o Ancillary Structures (e.g., dewars, water tower, piping, tanks) These facilities have been declared excess and are in various stages of deactivation (low-risk, long-term stewardship disposition state). This S&M Plan establishes and implements a solid, cost-effective, and balanced S&M program consistent with federal, state, and regulatory requirements. A graded approach is used to plan and conduct S&M activities. The goal is to maintain the facilities in a safe condition in a cost-effective manner until their final end state is achieved. This plan accomplishes the following: ? Establishes S&M objectives and framework ? Identifies programmatic guidance for S&M activities to be conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) ? Provides present facility condition information and identifies hazards ? Identifies facility-specific S&M activities to be performed and their frequency ? Identifies regulatory drivers, NNSA/NFO policies and procedures, and best management practices that necessitate implementation of S&M activities ? Provides criteria and frequencies for revisions and updates ? Establishes the process for identifying and dispositioning a condition that has not been previously identified or

  9. United States Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Environmental Compliance Handbook. Third edition

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-03-01

    The Environment, Safety and Health Division (ESHD) of the Nevada Operations Office has prepared this Environmental Compliance Handbook for all users of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and other US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) facilities. The Handbook gives an overview of the important environmental laws and regulations that apply to the activities conducted by the Nevada Operations Office and other users of DOE/NV facilities in Nevada

  10. United States Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office Environmental Compliance Handbook. Third edition

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-03-01

    The Environment, Safety & Health Division (ESHD) of the Nevada Operations Office has prepared this Environmental Compliance Handbook for all users of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and other US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) facilities. The Handbook gives an overview of the important environmental laws and regulations that apply to the activities conducted by the Nevada Operations Office and other users of DOE/NV facilities in Nevada.

  11. SAVANNAH RIVER SITE R-REACTOR DISASSEMBLY BASIN IN-SITU DECOMMISSIONING -10499

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Langton, C.; Serrato, M.; Blankenship, J.; Griffin, W.

    2010-01-04

    The US DOE concept for facility in-situ decommissioning (ISD) is to physically stabilize and isolate intact, structurally sound facilities that are no longer needed for their original purpose, i.e., generating (reactor facilities), processing(isotope separation facilities) or storing radioactive materials. The 105-R Disassembly Basin is the first SRS reactor facility to undergo the in-situ decommissioning (ISD) process. This ISD process complies with the 105-R Disassembly Basin project strategy as outlined in the Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis for the Grouting of the R-Reactor Disassembly Basin at the Savannah River Site and includes: (1) Managing residual water by solidification in-place or evaporation at another facility; (2) Filling the below grade portion of the basin with cementitious materials to physically stabilize the basin and prevent collapse of the final cap - Sludge and debris in the bottom few feet of the basin will be encapsulated between the basin floor and overlying fill material to isolate it from the environment; (3) Demolishing the above grade portion of the structure and relocating the resulting debris to another location or disposing of the debris in-place; and (4) Capping the basin area with a concrete slab which is part of an engineered cap to prevent inadvertent intrusion. The estimated total grout volume to fill the 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin is 24,384 cubic meters or 31,894 cubic yards. Portland cement-based structural fill materials were designed and tested for the reactor ISD project, and a placement strategy for stabilizing the basin was developed. Based on structural engineering analyses and material flow considerations, maximum lift heights and differential height requirements were determined. Pertinent data and information related to the SRS 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin in-situ decommissioning include: regulatory documentation, residual water management, area preparation activities, technology needs, fill material

  12. Pit disassembly and conversion demonstration environmental assessment and research and development activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-08-01

    A significant portion of the surplus plutonium is in the form of pits, a nuclear weapons component. Pits are composed of plutonium which is sealed in a metallic shell. These pits would need to be safely disassembled and permanently converted to an unclassified form that would be suitable for long-term disposition and international inspection. To determine the feasibility of an integrated pit disassembly and conversion system, a Pit Disassembly and Conversion Demonstration is proposed to take place at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This demonstration would be done in existing buildings and facilities, and would involve the disassembly of up to 250 pits and conversion of the recovered plutonium to plutonium metal ingots and plutonium dioxide. This demonstration also includes the conversion of up to 80 kilograms of clean plutonium metal to plutonium dioxide because, as part of the disposition process, some surplus plutonium metal may be converted to plutonium dioxide in the same facility as the surplus pits. The equipment to be used for the proposed demonstration addressed in this EA would use some parts of the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) capability, other existing equipment/capacities, plus new equipment that was developed at other sites. In addition, small-scale R and D activities are currently underway as part of the overall surplus plutonium disposition program. These R and D activities are related to pit disassembly and conversion, MOX fuel fabrication, and immobilization (in glass and ceramic forms). They are described in Section 7.0. On May 16, 1997, the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD) notified potentially affected states and tribes that this EA would be prepared in accordance with NEPA. This EA has been prepared to provide sufficient information for DOE to determine whether a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) is warranted or whether an EIS must be prepared

  13. Summary and evaluation of existing geological and geophysical data near prospective surface facilities in Midway Valley, Yucca Mountain Project, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibson, J.D.; Swan, F.H.; Wesling, J.R.; Bullard, T.F.; Perman, R.C.; Angell, M.M.; DiSilvestro, L.A.

    1992-01-01

    Midway Valley, located at the eastern base of the Yucca Mountain in southwestern Nevada, is the preferred location of the surface facilities for the potential high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. One goal in siting these surface facilities is to avoid faults that could produce relative displacements in excess of 5 cm in the foundations of the waste-handling buildings. This study reviews existing geologic and geophysical data that can be used to assess the potential for surface fault rupture within Midway Valley. Dominant tectonic features in Midway Valley are north-trending, westward-dipping normal faults along the margins of the valley: the Bow Ridge fault to the west and the Paintbrush Canyon fault to the east. Published estimates of average Quaternary slip rates for these faults are very low but the age of most recent displacement and the amount of displacement per event are largely unknown. Surface mapping and interpretive cross sections, based on limited drillhole and geophysical data, suggest that additional normal faults, including the postulated Midway Valley fault, may exist beneath the Quaternary/Tertiary fill within the valley. Existing data, however, are inadequate to determine the location, recency, and geometry of this faulting. To confidently assess the potential for significant Quaternary faulting in Midway Valley, additional data are needed that define the stratigraphy and structure of the strata beneath the valley, characterize the Quaternary soils and surfaces, and establish the age of faulting. The use of new and improved geophysical techniques, combined with a drilling program, offers the greatest potential for resolving subsurface structure in the valley. Mapping of surficial geologic units and logging of soil pits and trenches within these units must be completed, using accepted state-of-the-art practices supported by multiple quantitative numerical and relative age-dating techniques

  14. Disassembly and removal of sodium instrumentation test loop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ishikawa, Okinobu; Onojima, Takamitu; Nagai, Keiichi

    2000-07-01

    In 1999, the Sodium Instrumentation Test Loop was disassembled and removed. This report describes the tasks and experiences obtained in removing sodium from a storage tank, disassembling, and cleansing components and related activities. Overall the disassembly, handling and cleansing tasks proceeded as planned and the activities were carried out efficiently and safely. Documentation of the process is meant to establish not only a procedure, but also a guideline for future similar tasks. (author)

  15. Multikanban model for disassembly line with demand fluctuation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Udomsawat, Gun; Gupta, Surendra M.; Al-Turki, Yousef A. Y.

    2004-02-01

    In recent years, the continuous growth in consumer waste and dwindling natural resources has seriously threatened the environment. Realizing this, several countries have passed regulations that force manufacturers not only to manufacture environmentally conscious products, but also to take back their used products from consumers so that the components and materials recovered from the products may be reused and/or recycled. Disassembly plays an important role in product recovery. A disassembly line is perhaps the most suitable setting for disassembly of products in large quantities. Because a disassembly line has a tendency to generate excessive inventory, employing a kanban system can reduce the inventory level and let the system run more efficiently. A disassembly line is quite different from an assembly line. For example, not only can the demand arrive at the last station, it can also arrive at any of the other stations in the system. The demand for a component on the disassembly line could fluctuate widely. In fact, there are many other complicating matters that need to be considered to implement the concept of kanbans in such an environment. In this paper, we discuss the complications that are unique to a disassembly line. We discuss the complications in utilizing the conventional production control mechanisms in a disassembly line setting. We then show how to overcome them by implementing kanbans in a disassembly line setting with demand fluctuation and introduce the concept of multi-kanban mechanism. We demonstrate its effectiveness using a simulation model. An example is presented to illustrate the concept.

  16. Impact of different disassembly line balancing algorithms on the performance of dynamic kanban system for disassembly line

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kizilkaya, Elif A.; Gupta, Surendra M.

    2005-11-01

    In this paper, we compare the impact of different disassembly line balancing (DLB) algorithms on the performance of our recently introduced Dynamic Kanban System for Disassembly Line (DKSDL) to accommodate the vagaries of uncertainties associated with disassembly and remanufacturing processing. We consider a case study to illustrate the impact of various DLB algorithms on the DKSDL. The approach to the solution, scenario settings, results and the discussions of the results are included.

  17. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision No. 1 (9/2001)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This corrective action investigation plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 262 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 262 consists of nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): Underground Storage Tank (25-02-06), Septic Systems A and B (25-04-06), Septic System (25-04-07), Leachfield (25-05-03), Leachfield (25-05-05), Leachfield (25-05-06), Radioactive Leachfield (25-05-08), Leachfield (25-05-12), and Dry Well (25-51-01). Situated in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), sites addressed by CAU 262 are located at the Reactor-Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD); Test Cell C; and Engine-Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) facilities. The R-MAD, Test Cell C, and E-MAD facilities supported nuclear rocket reactor and engine testing as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station. The activities associated with the testing program were conducted between 1958 and 1973. Based on site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) for the site include oil/diesel-range total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, polychlorinated biphenyls, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, and gamma-emitting radionuclides, isotopic uranium, isotopic plutonium, strontium-90, and tritium. The scope of the corrective action field investigation at the CAU will include the inspection of portions of the collection systems, sampling the contents of collection system features in situ of leachfield logging materials, surface soil sampling, collection of samples of soil underlying the base of inlet and outfall ends of septic tanks and outfall ends of diversion structures and distribution boxes, collection of soil samples from biased or a combination of

  18. The assembly and disassembly of ecological networks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bascompte, Jordi; Stouffer, Daniel B

    2009-06-27

    Global change has created a severe biodiversity crisis. Species are driven extinct at an increasing rate, and this has the potential to cause further coextinction cascades. The rate and shape of these coextinction cascades depend very much on the structure of the networks of interactions across species. Understanding network structure and how it relates to network disassembly, therefore, is a priority for system-level conservation biology. This process of network collapse may indeed be related to the process of network build-up, although very little is known about both processes and even less about their relationship. Here we review recent work that provides some preliminary answers to these questions. First, we focus on network assembly by emphasizing temporal processes at the species level, as well as the structural building blocks of complex ecological networks. Second, we focus on network disassembly as a consequence of species extinctions or habitat loss. We conclude by emphasizing some general rules of thumb that can help in building a comprehensive framework to understand the responses of ecological networks to global change.

  19. Disassembly and Sanitization of Classified Matter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stockham, Dwight J.; Saad, Max P.

    2008-01-01

    The Disassembly Sanitization Operation (DSO) process was implemented to support weapon disassembly and disposition by using recycling and waste minimization measures. This process was initiated by treaty agreements and reconfigurations within both the DOD and DOE Complexes. The DOE is faced with disassembling and disposing of a huge inventory of retired weapons, components, training equipment, spare parts, weapon maintenance equipment, and associated material. In addition, regulations have caused a dramatic increase in the need for information required to support the handling and disposition of these parts and materials. In the past, huge inventories of classified weapon components were required to have long-term storage at Sandia and at many other locations throughout the DoE Complex. These materials are placed in onsite storage unit due to classification issues and they may also contain radiological and/or hazardous components. Since no disposal options exist for this material, the only choice was long-term storage. Long-term storage is costly and somewhat problematic, requiring a secured storage area, monitoring, auditing, and presenting the potential for loss or theft of the material. Overall recycling rates for materials sent through the DSO process have enabled 70 to 80% of these components to be recycled. These components are made of high quality materials and once this material has been sanitized, the demand for the component metals for recycling efforts is very high. The DSO process for NGPF, classified components established the credibility of this technique for addressing the long-term storage requirements of the classified weapons component inventory. The success of this application has generated interest from other Sandia organizations and other locations throughout the complex. Other organizations are requesting the help of the DSO team and the DSO is responding to these requests by expanding its scope to include Work-for- Other projects. For example

  20. Disassembling and modification of RA-3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tarizzo, R.D.

    1990-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to describe the partial disassembling and modification of RA-3, called the Modernization Project. It comprises all the technical and administrative steps directly related with this task. The improvement of RA-3 is a result of the lack of 90% enriched uranium obliging a change over to 20% enriched uranium. This brought about design modifications both in fuel elements and the reactor. The presentation of documents for the licensing authority as well as are detailed separately. The modernization project was divided in 25 tasks: 1) changing fuel element support table, 2) changing heat exchanger, 3) repairing of cooling towers, 4) repairing of primary circuit valves, 5) repairing of irradiation channels, 6) construction of a new sampler, 7) changing tangential channel, 8) cleaning and disassembling of reactor (inside), 9) changing continuous demineralizer (ion exchange column), 10) detection of failure in fuel elements, 11) modification of nuclear instrumentation, 12) modification of conventional instrumentation, 13) modification of electrical system, 14) changing telemanipulators, 15) construction of mechanism bridge, 16) changing a primary circuit valve when the heat exchanger is changed too, 17) painting ground floor, hall floor, and pump room floor with epoxy resin levelling, 18) installation of fire alarm system, 19) radioactive liquid discharge, 20) modification of secondary circuit (This task involves: a) installation of a third secondary pump, b) extension of this piping, c) installation of two 12 inch valves to the present cooling towers pools independent, d) installation of filtering system), 21) optimization hot water bed, 22) changing detector support table, 23) removal, decontamination and reinstallation of shielding, 25) changing pneumatic system

  1. Montmorillonite-induced Bacteriophage φ6 Disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Trusiak, A.; Gottlieb, P.; Katz, A.; Alimova, A.; Steiner, J. C.; Block, K. A.

    2012-12-01

    It is estimated that there are 1031 virus particles on Earth making viruses an order of magnitude more prevalent in number than prokaryotes with the vast majority of viruses being bacteriophages. Clays are a major component of soils and aquatic sediments and can react with RNA, proteins and bacterial biofilms. The clays in soils serve as an important moderator between phage and their host bacteria, helping to preserve the evolutionary balance. Studies on the effects of clays on viral infectivity have given somewhat contradictory results; possibly a consequence of clay-virus interactions being dependent on the unique structure of particular viruses. In this work, the interaction between montmorillonite and the bacteriophage φ6 is investigated. φ6 is a member of the cystovirus family that infects Pseudomonas syringe, a common plant pathogen. As a member of the cystovirus family with an enveloped structure, φ6 serves as a model for reoviruses, a human pathogen. Experiments were conducted with φ6 suspended in dilute, purified homoionic commercial-grade montmorillonite over a range of virus:clay ratios. At a 1:100000 virus:clay ratio, the clay reduced viral infectivity by 99%. The minimum clay to virus ratio which results in a measurable reduction of P. syringae infection is 1:1. Electron microscopy demonstrates that mixed suspensions of smectite and virus co-aggregate to form flocs encompassing virions within the smectite. Both free viral particles as well as those imbedded in the flocs are seen in the micrographs to be missing the envelope- leaving only the nucleocapsid (NC) intact; indicating that smectite inactivates the virus by envelope disassembly. These results have strong implications in the evolution of both the φ6 virus and its P. syringae host cells. TEM of aggregate showing several disassembled NCs.

  2. A Taxonomy and Comparison of Haptic Actions for Disassembly Tasks

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Bloomfield, Aaron; Deng, Yu; Wampler, Jeff; Rondot, Pascale; Harth, Dina; McManus, Mary; Badler, Norman

    2003-01-01

    .... We conducted a series of human subject experiments to compare user performance and preference on a disassembly task with and without haptic feedback using CyberGlove, Phantom, and SpaceMouse interfaces...

  3. Systems impacts of spent fuel disassembly alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-07-01

    Three studies were completed to evaluate four alternatives to the disposal of intact spent fuel assemblies in a geologic repository. A preferred spent fuel waste form for disposal was recommended on consideration of (1) package design and fuel/package interaction, (2) long-term, in-repository performance of the waste form, and (3) overall process performance and costs for packaging, handling, and emplacement. The four basic alternative waste forms considered were (1) end fitting removal, (2) fission gas venting, (3) disassembly and close packing, and (4) shearing/immobilization. None of the findings ruled out any alternative on the basis of waste package considerations or long-term performance of the waste form. The third alternative offers flexibility in loading that may prove attractive in the various geologic media under consideration, greatly reduces the number of packages, and has the lowest unit cost. These studies were completed in October, 1981. Since then Westinghouse Electric Corporation and the Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation have completed studies in related fields. This report is now being published to provide publicly the background material that is contained within. 47 references, 28 figures, 31 tables

  4. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 127: Areas 25 and 26 Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0, August 2002)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NNSA/NV

    2002-01-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Offices's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 127 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 127 is located on the Nevada Test Site approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of 12 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located at Test Cell C; the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) Facility; the X-Tunnel in Area 25; the Pluto Disassembly Facility; the Pluto Check Station; and the Port Gaston Training Facility in Area 26. These CASs include: CAS 25-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank (AST); CAS 25-02-02, Underground Storage Tank (UST); CAS 25-23-11, Contaminated Materials; CAS 25-12-01, Boiler; CAS 25-01-06, AST; CAS 25-01-07, AST; CAS 25-02-13, UST; CAS 26- 01-01, Filter Tank (Rad) and Piping; CAS 26-01-02, Filter Tank (Rad); CAS 26-99-01, Radioactively Contaminated Filters; CAS 26-02-01, UST; CAS 26-23-01, Contaminated Liquids Spreader. Based on site history, process knowledge, and previous field efforts, contaminants of potential concern for CAU 127 include radionuclides, metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, asbestos, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Additionally, beryllium may be present at some locations. The sources of potential releases are varied, but releases of contaminated liquids may have occurred and may have migrated into and impacted soil below and surrounding storage vessels at some of the CASs. Also, at several CASs, asbestos-containing materials may be present on the aboveground structures and may be friable. Exposure pathways are limited to ingestion, inhalation, and dermal contact (adsorption) of soils/sediments or liquids, or inhalation of contaminants by site workers due to disturbance of

  5. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 127: Areas 25 and 26 Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. No.: 0, August 2002)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NNSA/NV

    2002-08-27

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Offices's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 127 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 127 is located on the Nevada Test Site approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU is comprised of 12 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located at Test Cell C; the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) Facility; the X-Tunnel in Area 25; the Pluto Disassembly Facility; the Pluto Check Station; and the Port Gaston Training Facility in Area 26. These CASs include: CAS 25-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank (AST); CAS 25-02-02, Underground Storage Tank (UST); CAS 25-23-11, Contaminated Materials; CAS 25-12-01, Boiler; CAS 25-01-06, AST; CAS 25-01-07, AST; CAS 25-02-13, UST; CAS 26- 01-01, Filter Tank (Rad) and Piping; CAS 26-01-02, Filter Tank (Rad); CAS 26-99-01, Radioactively Contaminated Filters; CAS 26-02-01, UST; CAS 26-23-01, Contaminated Liquids Spreader. Based on site history, process knowledge, and previous field efforts, contaminants of potential concern for CAU 127 include radionuclides, metals, total petroleum hydrocarbons, volatile organic compounds, asbestos, and polychlorinated biphenyls. Additionally, beryllium may be present at some locations. The sources of potential releases are varied, but releases of contaminated liquids may have occurred and may have migrated into and impacted soil below and surrounding storage vessels at some of the CASs. Also, at several CASs, asbestos-containing materials may be present on the aboveground structures and may be friable. Exposure pathways are limited to ingestion, inhalation, and dermal contact (adsorption) of soils/sediments or liquids, or inhalation of contaminants by site workers due to disturbance of

  6. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 151, Septic Systems and Discharge Area, is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). CAU 151 consists of eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 2, 12, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada

  7. A symbolic methodology to improve disassembly process design.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rios, Pedro; Blyler, Leslie; Tieman, Lisa; Stuart, Julie Ann; Grant, Ed

    2003-12-01

    Millions of end-of-life electronic components are retired annually due to the proliferation of new models and their rapid obsolescence. The recovery of resources such as plastics from these goods requires their disassembly. The time required for each disassembly and its associated cost is defined by the operator's familiarity with the product design and its complexity. Since model proliferation serves to complicate an operator's learning curve, it is worthwhile to investigate the benefits to be gained in a disassembly operator's preplanning process. Effective disassembly process design demands the application of green engineering principles, such as those developed by Anastas and Zimmerman (Environ. Sci. Technol. 2003, 37, 94A-101A), which include regard for product complexity, structural commonality, separation energy, material value, and waste prevention. This paper introduces the concept of design symbolsto help the operator more efficiently survey product complexity with respect to location and number of fasteners to remove a structure that is common to all electronics: the housing. With a sample of 71 different computers, printers, and monitors, we demonstrate that appropriate symbols reduce the total disassembly planning time by 13.2 min. Such an improvement could well make efficient the separation of plastic that would otherwise be destined for waste-to-energy or landfill. The symbolic methodology presented may also improve Design for Recycling and Design for Maintenance and Support.

  8. Disassembling and rebuilding 900 MW unit fuel assemblies in Celimene

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Giquel, G.; Leseur, A.; Pillet, C.; Van Craeynest, J.C.

    1987-01-01

    The Celimene high activity laboratory, in the Nuclear Research Centre of Saclay, has equipment for and experience of disassembling and rebuilding fuel assemblies from 900 MW light water reactors. These operations have been performed for R and D purposes; they allow removal for investigation of some of the fuel rods and examination of the skeleton. The rebuilt assemblies are sent to the fuel reprocessing plant. Reirradiation of these assemblies has not been considered so far and would require modifications of the procedure and of parts of the new skeleton. Disassembling and rebuilding have already been performed on three assemblies and a fourth one will be rebuilt in the coming months [fr

  9. Interim report on flash floods, Area 5 - Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    French, R.H.

    1980-09-01

    Examination of the presently available data indicates that consideration must be given to the possibility of flash floods when siting waste management facilities in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site. 6 figures, 7 tables

  10. Nevada Test Site Radiological Control Manual, Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Management. The NTS has been the primary location for testing nuclear explosives in the continental United States since 1951. The topographical and geological characteristics of the NTS afford some protection to the inhabitants of the surrounding areas from potential radiation exposure as a result of release of radioactivity or contamination from nuclear testing operations. Historically, testing programs at the NTS have included atmospheric testing in the 1950s and early 1960s; underground testing in drilled, vertical holes and horizontal tunnels; earth-cratering experiments; and open air nuclear reactor and engine testing. Current activities include operating low-level radioactive and mixed waste disposal facilities for United States defense-generated waste, assembly and execution of subcritical experiments, assembly/disassembly of special experiments, the storage and use of special nuclear materials, performing criticality experiments, emergency responder training, surface cleanup and site characterization of contaminated land areas, environmental activity by the University system, and nonnuclear test operations, such as controlled spills of hazardous materials at the Hazardous Materials Spill Center. Currently, the major potential for occupational radiation exposure is associated with the burial of low-level radioactive waste and the handling of radioactive sources. Remediation of contaminated land areas may also result in radiological exposures. The Tenant Organizations (TOs) that are responsible for conducting operations, according to this manual, include National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Desert Research Institute, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Navarro Nevada Environmental Services, LLC, Sandia National Laboratories, and WSI. These organizations operate under this manual only when they are performing activities under the purview of NNSA/NSO. To ensure that the appropriate procedures

  11. Mathematical and Simulation Modelling of Moisture Diffusion Mechanism during Plastic IC Packages Disassembly

    OpenAIRE

    Peng Mou; Dong Xiang; Guanghong Duan

    2013-01-01

    Reuse of plastic IC packages disassembled from printed circuit boards (PCBs) has significant environmental benefits and economic value. The interface delamination caused by moisture diffusion is the main failure mode of IC packages during the disassembling process, which greatly reduces the reusability and reliability of disassembled IC packages. Exploring moisture diffusion mechanism is a prerequisite to optimize prebaking processes before disassembling that is an effective way to avoid the ...

  12. Desmosome Assembly and Disassembly Are Membrane Raft-Dependent

    Science.gov (United States)

    Faundez, Victor; Koval, Michael; Mattheyses, Alexa L.; Kowalczyk, Andrew P.

    2014-01-01

    Strong intercellular adhesion is critical for tissues that experience mechanical stress, such as the skin and heart. Desmosomes provide adhesive strength to tissues by anchoring desmosomal cadherins of neighboring cells to the intermediate filament cytoskeleton. Alterations in assembly and disassembly compromise desmosome function and may contribute to human diseases, such as the autoimmune skin blistering disease pemphigus vulgaris (PV). We previously demonstrated that PV auto-antibodies directed against the desmosomal cadherin desmoglein 3 (Dsg3) cause loss of adhesion by triggering membrane raft-mediated Dsg3 endocytosis. We hypothesized that raft membrane microdomains play a broader role in desmosome homeostasis by regulating the dynamics of desmosome assembly and disassembly. In human keratinocytes, Dsg3 is raft associated as determined by biochemical and super resolution immunofluorescence microscopy methods. Cholesterol depletion, which disrupts rafts, prevented desmosome assembly and adhesion, thus functionally linking rafts to desmosome formation. Interestingly, Dsg3 did not associate with rafts in cells lacking desmosomal proteins. Additionally, PV IgG-induced desmosome disassembly occurred by redistribution of Dsg3 into raft-containing endocytic membrane domains, resulting in cholesterol-dependent loss of adhesion. These findings demonstrate that membrane rafts are required for desmosome assembly and disassembly dynamics, suggesting therapeutic potential for raft targeting agents in desmosomal diseases such as PV. PMID:24498201

  13. Multi-kanban mechanism for personal computer disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Udomsawat, Gun; Gupta, Surendra M.; Kamarthi, Sagar V.

    2004-12-01

    The use of personal computers (PCs) continues to increase every year. According to a 1999 figure, 50 percent of all US households owned PCs, a figure that continues to rise every year. With continuous development of sophisticated software, PCs are becoming increasingly powerful. In addition, the price of a PC continues to steadily decline. Furthermore, the typical life of a PC in the workplace is approximately two to three years while in the home it is three to five years. As these PCs become obsolete, they are replaced and the old PCs are disposed of. It is estimated that between 14 and 20 million PCs are retired annually in the US. While 20 to 30% of the units may be resold, the others are discarded. These discards represent a significant potential source of lead for the waste stream. In some communities, waste cathode ray tubes (CRTs) represent the second largest source of lead in the waste stream after vehicular lead acid batteries. PCs are, therefore, not suitable for dumping in landfills. Besides, several components of a PC can be reused and then there are other valuable materials that can also be harvested. And with the advent of product stewardship, product recovery is the best solution for manufacturers. Disassembly line is perhaps the most suitable set up for disassembling PCs. However, planning and scheduling of disassembly on a disassembly line is complicated. In this paper, we discuss some of the complications including product arrival, demand arrival, inventory fluctuation and production control mechanisms. We then show how to overcome them by implementing a multi-kanban mechanism in the PC disassembly line setting. The multi-kanban mechanism relies on dynamic routing of kanbans according to the state of the system. We investigate the multi-kanban mechanism using simulation and demonstrate that this mechanism is superior to the traditional push system in terms of controlling the system"s inventory while maintaining a decent customer service level.

  14. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 398: Area 25 Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. B. Campbell

    2001-01-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) plan addresses the activities necessary to close Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 398: Area 25 Spill Sites. CAU 398, located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site, is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996), and consists of the following 13 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) (Figure 1): (1) CAS 25-44-01 , a fuel spill on soil that covers a concrete pad. The origins and use of the spill material are unknown, but the spill is suspected to be railroad bedding material. (2) CAS 25-44-02, a spill of liquid to the soil from leaking drums. (3) CAS 25-44-03, a spill of oil from two leaking drums onto a concrete pad and surrounding soil. (4) CAS 25-44-04, a spill from two tanks containing sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide used for a water demineralization process. (5) CAS 25-25-02, a fuel or oil spill from leaking drums that were removed in 1992. (6) CAS 25-25-03, an oil spill adjacent to a tipped-over drum. The source of the drum is not listed, although it is noted that the drum was removed in 1991. (7) CAS 25-25-04, an area on the north side of the Engine-Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) facility, where oils and cooling fluids from metal machining operations were poured directly onto the ground. (8) CAS 25-25-05, an area of oil and/or hydraulic fluid spills beneath the heavy equipment once stored there. (9) CAS 25-25-06, an area of diesel fuel staining beneath two generators that have since been removed. (10) CAS 25-25-07, an area of hydraulic oil spills associated with a tunnel-boring machine abandoned inside X-Tunnel. (11) CAS 25-25-08, an area of hydraulic fluid spills associated with a tunnel-boring machine abandoned inside Y-Tunnel. (12) CAS 25-25-16, a diesel fuel spill from an above-ground storage tank located near Building 3320 at Engine Test Stand-1 (ETS-1) that was removed in 1998. (13) CAS 25-25-17, a hydraulic oil spill

  15. Assessment of the impacts of spent fuel disassembly alternatives on the Nuclear Waste Isolation System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-07-01

    The objective of this report was to evaluate four possible alternative methods of preparing and packaging spent fuel assemblies for geologic disposal against the Reference Process of unmodified spent fuel. The four alternative processes were: (1) End fitting removal, (2) Fission gas venting and resealing, (3) Fuel bundle disassembly and close packing of fuel pins, and (4) Fuel shearing and immobilization. Systems analysis was used to develop a basis of comparison of the alternatives. Conceptual processes and facility layouts were devised for each of the alternatives, based on technology deemed feasible for the purpose. Assessments were made of 15 principal attributes from the technical, operational, safety/risk, and economic considerations related to each of the alternatives, including both the surface packaging and underground repository operations. Specific attributes of the alternative processes were evaluated by assigning a number for each that expressed its merit relative to the corresponding attribute of the Reference Process. Each alternative process was then ranked by summing the numbers for attributes in each of the four assessment areas and collectively. Fuel bundle disassembly and close packing of fuel pins was ranked the preferred method of disposal of spent fuel. 63 references, 46 figures, 46 tables

  16. Performance assessment of the Greater Confinement Disposal facility on the Nevada Test Site: Comparing the performance of two conceptual site models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baer, T.A.; Price, L.L.; Gallegos, D.P.

    1993-01-01

    A small amount of transuranic (TRU) waste has been disposed of at the Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) site located on the Nevada Test Site's (NTS) Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The waste has been buried in several deep (37 m) boreholes dug into the floor of an alluvial basin. For the waste to remain in its current configuration, the DOE must demonstrate compliance of the site with the TRU disposal requirements, 40 CFR 191. Sandia's approach to process modelling in performance assessment is to use demonstrably conservative models of the site. Choosing the most conservative model, however, can be uncertain. As an example, diffusion of contaminants upward from the buried waste in the vadose zone water is the primary mechanism of release. This process can be modelled as straight upward planar diffusion or as spherical diffusion in all directions. The former has high fluxes but low release areas, the latter has lower fluxes but is spread over a greater area. We have developed analytic solutions to a simple test problem for both models and compared the total integrated discharges. The spherical diffusion conceptual model results in at least five times greater release to the accessible environment than the planar model at all diffusivities. Modifying the planar model to allow for a larger release, however, compensated for the smaller original planar discharge and resulted in a new planar model that was more conservative that the spherical model except at low diffusivities

  17. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wills (editor), Cathy [National Security Technologies, LLC. (NSTec), Mercury, NV (United States)

    2017-09-07

    This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2016 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and its two Nevada-based support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. In addition to the NNSA itself, the six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for its multiple

  18. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 124, Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada with Errata Sheet, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alfred Wickline

    2008-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 124, Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This report complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996; as amended January 2007). This CR provides documentation and justification for the closure of CAU 124 without further corrective action. This justification is based on process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities conducted in accordance with the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 124: Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The SAFER Plan provides information relating to site history as well as the scope and planning of the investigation. Therefore, this information will not be repeated in this CR.

  19. Preliminary topical report on comparison reactor disassembly calculations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, T.P.

    1975-11-01

    Preliminary results of comparison disassembly calculations for a representative LMFBR model (2100-l voided core) and arbitrary accident conditions are described. The analytical methods employed were the computer programs: FX2-POOL, PAD, and VENUS-II. The calculated fission energy depositions are in good agreement, as are measures of the destructive potential of the excursions, kinetic energy, and work. However, in some cases the resulting fuel temperatures are substantially divergent. Differences in the fission energy deposition appear to be attributable to residual inconsistencies in specifying the comparison cases. In contrast, temperature discrepancies probably stem from basic differences in the energy partition models inherent in the codes. Although explanations of the discrepancies are being pursued, the preliminary results indicate that all three computational methods provide a consistent, global characterization of the contrived disassembly accident

  20. Capillarity-induced disassembly of virions in carbon nanotubes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fan Xiaobin; Peng Wenchao; Li Yang; Li Xianyu; Zhang Guoliang; Zhang Fengbao [School of Chemical Engineering and Technology, Tianjin University, Tianjin (China); Barclay, J Elaine; Evans, David J [Department of Biological Chemistry, John Innes Centre, Norwich Research Park, Norwich NR4 7UH (United Kingdom)], E-mail: fbzhang@tju.edu.cn

    2008-04-23

    Studying the transport and fate of viruses through nanochannels is of great importance. By using the nanochannel of a carbon nanotube (CNT) as an ideal model, we evaluated the possibility of capillarity-induced viral transport through a closely fitting nanochannel and explored the mechanisms involved. It is shown both experimentally and theoretically that Cowpea mosaic virus can enter CNTs by capillarity. However, when introduced into a nanotube the protein capsid may disassemble. During the initial capillary filling stage, anomalous needle-shaped high pressure exists in the centre of the nanotube's entrance. This high pressure, combining with the significant negative pressure within the nanotube, may account for the disassembly of the virions.

  1. Meiotic Clade AAA ATPases: Protein Polymer Disassembly Machines.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Monroe, Nicole; Hill, Christopher P

    2016-05-08

    Meiotic clade AAA ATPases (ATPases associated with diverse cellular activities), which were initially grouped on the basis of phylogenetic classification of their AAA ATPase cassette, include four relatively well characterized family members, Vps4, spastin, katanin and fidgetin. These enzymes all function to disassemble specific polymeric protein structures, with Vps4 disassembling the ESCRT-III polymers that are central to the many membrane-remodeling activities of the ESCRT (endosomal sorting complexes required for transport) pathway and spastin, katanin p60 and fidgetin affecting multiple aspects of cellular dynamics by severing microtubules. They share a common domain architecture that features an N-terminal MIT (microtubule interacting and trafficking) domain followed by a single AAA ATPase cassette. Meiotic clade AAA ATPases function as hexamers that can cycle between the active assembly and inactive monomers/dimers in a regulated process, and they appear to disassemble their polymeric substrates by translocating subunits through the central pore of their hexameric ring. Recent studies with Vps4 have shown that nucleotide-induced asymmetry is a requirement for substrate binding to the pore loops and that recruitment to the protein lattice via MIT domains also relieves autoinhibition and primes the AAA ATPase cassettes for substrate binding. The most striking, unifying feature of meiotic clade AAA ATPases may be their MIT domain, which is a module that is found in a wide variety of proteins that localize to ESCRT-III polymers. Spastin also displays an adjacent microtubule binding sequence, and the presence of both ESCRT-III and microtubule binding elements may underlie the recent findings that the ESCRT-III disassembly function of Vps4 and the microtubule-severing function of spastin, as well as potentially katanin and fidgetin, are highly coordinated. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  2. On the optimal design of the disassembly and recovery processes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xanthopoulos, A; Iakovou, E

    2009-05-01

    This paper tackles the problem of the optimal design of the recovery processes of the end-of-life (EOL) electric and electronic products, with a special focus on the disassembly issues. The objective is to recover as much ecological and economic value as possible, and to reduce the overall produced quantities of waste. In this context, a medium-range tactical problem is defined and a novel two-phased algorithm is presented for a remanufacturing-driven reverse supply chain. In the first phase, we propose a multicriteria/goal-programming analysis for the identification and the optimal selection of the most 'desirable' subassemblies and components to be disassembled for recovery, from a set of different types of EOL products. In the second phase, a multi-product, multi-period mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model is presented, which addresses the optimization of the recovery processes, while taking into account explicitly the lead times of the disassembly and recovery processes. Moreover, a simulation-based solution approach is proposed for capturing the uncertainties in reverse logistics. The overall approach leads to an easy-to-use methodology that could support effectively middle level management decisions. Finally, the applicability of the developed methodology is illustrated by its application on a specific case study.

  3. On the optimal design of the disassembly and recovery processes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xanthopoulos, A.; Iakovou, E.

    2009-01-01

    This paper tackles the problem of the optimal design of the recovery processes of the end-of-life (EOL) electric and electronic products, with a special focus on the disassembly issues. The objective is to recover as much ecological and economic value as possible, and to reduce the overall produced quantities of waste. In this context, a medium-range tactical problem is defined and a novel two-phased algorithm is presented for a remanufacturing-driven reverse supply chain. In the first phase, we propose a multicriteria/goal-programming analysis for the identification and the optimal selection of the most 'desirable' subassemblies and components to be disassembled for recovery, from a set of different types of EOL products. In the second phase, a multi-product, multi-period mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model is presented, which addresses the optimization of the recovery processes, while taking into account explicitly the lead times of the disassembly and recovery processes. Moreover, a simulation-based solution approach is proposed for capturing the uncertainties in reverse logistics. The overall approach leads to an easy-to-use methodology that could support effectively middle level management decisions. Finally, the applicability of the developed methodology is illustrated by its application on a specific case study

  4. Impacts of transportation on a test and evaluation facility for nuclear waste disposal: a systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varadarajan, R.V.; Peterson, R.W.; Joy, D.S.; Gibson, S.M.

    1983-01-01

    An essential element of the Test and Evaluation Facility (TEF) is a waste packaging facility capable of producing a small number Test and Evaluation Facility of packages consisting of several different waste forms. The study envisions three scenarios for such a packaging facility: (1) modify an existing hot cell facility such as the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (EMAD) facility at the Nevada Test Site so that it can serve as a packaging facility for the TEF. This scenario is referred to as the EMAD Option. (2) Build a new generic packaging facility (GPF) at the site of the TEF. In other words, colocate the GPF and the TEF. This scenario is referred to as the GPF Option, and (3) utilize the EMAD facility in conjunction with a colocated GPF (of minimal size and scope) at the TEF. This scenario is referred to as the Split Option. The results of the system study clearly bring out the fact that transportation has a significant impact on the selection and siting of the waste packaging facility. Preliminary conclusions, subject to the assumptions of the study, include the following: (1) regardless of the waste form, the GPF option is preferable to the other two in minimizing both transportation costs and logistical problems, (2) for any given scenario and choice of waste forms, there exists a candidate TEF location for which the transportation costs are at a minimum compared to the other locations, (3) in spite of the increased transportation costs and logistical complexity, the study shows that the overall system costs favor modification of an existing hot cell facility for the particular case considered

  5. Disassembly Control of Saccharide-Based Amphiphiles Driven by Electrostatic Repulsion.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamada, Taihei; Kokado, Kenta; Sada, Kazuki

    2017-03-14

    According to the design of disassembly using electrostatic repulsion, novel amphiphiles consisting of a lipophilic ion part and a hydrophilic saccharide part were synthesized via the facile copper-catalyzed click reaction, and their molecular assemblies in water and chloroform were studied. The amphiphiles exhibited a molecular orientation opposite to that of the conventional amphiphiles in each case. ζ Potential measurements indicated that the lipophilic ion part is exposed outside in chloroform. The size of a solvophobic part in the amphiphiles dominates the size of an assembling structure; that is, in water, these amphiphiles tethering different lengths of the saccharide part exhibited almost identical assembling size, whereas in chloroform, the size depends on the length of the saccharide part in the amphiphiles.

  6. Safety assessment document for spent fuel handling, packaging, and storage demonstrations at the E-MAD facility on the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-04-01

    The objectives for spent fuel handling and packaging demonstration are to develop the capability to satisfactorily encapsulate typical commercial nuclear reactor spent fuel assemblies and to establish the suitability of interim dry surface and near surface storage concepts. To accomplish these objectives, spent fuel assemblies from a pressurized water reactor have been received, encapsulated in steel canisters, and emplaced in on-site storage facilities and subjected to other tests. As an essential element of these demonstrations, a thorough safety assessment of the demonstration activities conducted at the E-MAD facility has been completed. This document describes the site location and characteristics, the existing E-MAD facility, and the facility modifications and equipment additions made specifically for the demonstrations. The document also summarizes the Quality Assurance Program utilized, and specifies the principal design criteria applicable to the facility modifications, equipment additions, and process operations. Evaluations have been made of the radiological impacts of normal operations, abnormal operations, and postulated accidents. Analyses have been performed to determine the affects on nuclear criticality safety of postulated accidents and credible natural phenomena. The consequences of postulated accidents resulting in fission product gas release have also been estimated. This document identifies the engineered safety features, procedures, and site characteristics that (1) prevent the occurrence of potential accidents or (2) assure that the consequences of postulated accidents are either insignificant or adequately mitigated

  7. Transportation of radioactive materials routing analysis: The Nevada experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ardila-Coulson, M.V.

    1991-01-01

    In 1987, the Nevada State Legislature passed a Bill requiring the Nevada Dept. of Transportation to develop and enforce a plan for highway routing of highway route controlled quantity shipments of radioactive materials and high-level radioactive waste. A large network with all the major highways in Nevada was created and used in a computer model developed by Sandia National Labs. Twenty-eight highway parameters that included geometrics, traffic characteristics, environment and special facilities were collected. Alternative routes were identified by minimizing primary parameters (population density and accident rates). An analysis using the US DOT Guidelines were performed to identify a preferred route from the alternative routes

  8. Proposed Operational Base Site, Steptoe Valley, Ely Area, Nevada.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1980-03-31

    1629, respectively (White Pine Chamber of Commerce , WPCC, 1980). The city of Ely is incorporated; the suburb of East Ely is not. For purposes of this...Site SAF Security Alert Facility WPCC White Pine Chamber of Commerce WPPP White Pine Power Project IL__ _ FN-TR-35 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY Cardinalli, J., 1979...Nevada Forecasts for the Future--Agriculture, State Engineer’s Office, Carson City, Nevada. *1 White Pine Chamber of Commerce , 1980, Oral

  9. The Nevada initiative: A risk communication Fiasco

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flynn, J.; Solvic, P.; Mertz, C.K.

    1993-01-01

    The U.S. Congress has designated Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the only potential site to be studied for the nation's first high-level nuclear waste repository. People in Nevada strongly oppose the program, managed by the U.S. Department of Energy. Survey research shows that the public believes there are great risks from a repository program, in contrast to a majority of scientists who feel the risks are acceptably small. Delays in the repository program resulting in part from public opposition in Nevada have concerned the nuclear power industry, which collects the fees for the federal repository program and believes it needs the repository as a final disposal facility for its high-level nuclear wastes. To assist the repository program, the American Nuclear Energy Council (ANEC), an industry group, sponsored a massive advertising campaign in Nevada. The campaign attempted to assure people that the risks of a repository were small and that the repository studies should proceed. The campaign failed because its managers misunderstood the issues underlying the controversy, attempted a covert manipulation of public opinion that was revealed, and most importantly, lacked the public trust that was necessary to communicate credibly about the risks of a nuclear waste facility. This article describes the advertising campaign and its effects. The manner in which the ANEC campaign itself became a controversial public issue is reviewed. The advertising campaign is discussed as it relates to risk assessment and communication. 29 refs., 2 tabs

  10. Spent fuel disassembly and canning programs at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Townes, G.A.

    1979-10-01

    Methods of disassembling and canning spent fuel to allow more efficient storage are being investigated at the BNFP. Studies and development programs are aimed at dry disassembly of fuel to allow storage and shipment of fuel pins rather than full fuel assemblies. Results indicate that doubling existing storage capacity or tripling the carrying capacity of existing transportation equipment is achievable. Disassembly could be performed in the BNFP hot cells at rates of about 12 to 15 assemblies per day

  11. Application of industrial robots in automatic disassembly line of waste LCD displays

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Sujuan

    2017-11-01

    In the automatic disassembly line of waste LCD displays, LCD displays are disassembled into plastic shells, metal shields, circuit boards, and LCD panels. Two industrial robots are used to cut metal shields and remove circuit boards in this automatic disassembly line. The functions of these two industrial robots, and the solutions to the critical issues of model selection, the interfaces with PLCs and the workflows were described in detail in this paper.

  12. Corrosion of aluminum alloys in a reactor disassembly basin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howell, J.P.; Zapp, P.E.; Nelson, D.Z.

    1992-01-01

    This document discusses storage of aluminum clad fuel and target tubes of the Mark 22 assembly takes place in the concrete-lined, light-water-filled, disassembly basins located within each reactor area at the Savannah River Site (SRS). A corrosion test program has been conducted in the K-Reactor disassembly basin to assess the storage performance of the assemblies and other aluminum clad components in the current basin environment. Aluminum clad alloys cut from the ends of actual fuel and target tubes were originally placed in the disassembly water basin in December 1991. After time intervals varying from 45--182 days, the components were removed from the basin, photographed, and evaluated metallographically for corrosion performance. Results indicated that pitting of the 8001 aluminum fuel clad alloy exceeded the 30-mil (0.076 cm) cladding thickness within the 45-day exposure period. Pitting of the 1100 aluminum target clad alloy exceeded the 30-mil (0.076 cm) clad thickness in 107--182 days exposure. The existing basin water chemistry is within limits established during early site operations. Impurities such as Cl - , NO 3 - and SO 4 - are controlled to the parts per million level and basin water conductivity is currently 170--190 μmho/cm. The test program has demonstrated that the basin water is aggressive to the aluminum components at these levels. Other storage basins at SRS and around the US have successfully stored aluminum components for greater than ten years without pitting corrosion. These basins have impurity levels controlled to the parts per billion level (1000X lower) and conductivity less than 1.0 μmho/cm

  13. Nevada Operations overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Church, B.W.

    1981-01-01

    A brief overview is given of weapon test site decontamination activities carried out by Nevada Operations Office. Tabulated data is given of event name, date, location, year of cleanup, and radioisotopes that were present, activity levels, and cost of cleanup

  14. Special Nevada report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1991-09-23

    This report is submitted to Congress by the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to Section 6 of the Military Lands Withdrawal Act of 1986. It contains an analysis and evaluation of the effects on public health and safety resulting from DOD and Department of Energy (DOE) military and defense-related uses on withdrawn public lands in the State of Nevada and in airspace overlying the State. This report describes the cumulative impacts of those activities on public and private property in Nevada and on plants, fish and wildlife, cultural, historic, scientific, recreational, wilderness and other resources of the public lands of Nevada. An analysis and evaluation of possible measures to mitigate the cumulative effects of the withdrawal of lands and the use of airspace in Nevada for defense-related purposes was conducted, and those considered practical are listed.

  15. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wills, Cathy

    2012-01-01

    This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.' Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2011 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory-Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

  16. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cathy Wills, ed

    2012-09-12

    This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, 'Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.' Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2011 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory-Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

  17. Nevada state revenues analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-06-01

    This report analyzes the major sources of revenue to the Nevada State General Fund for purposes of estimating impacts associated with the siting of a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in Nye County, Nevada. Each major revenue source is analyzed to identify relationships among the economic or demographic base, the revenue base, and the revenues generated. Trends and changes in the rates and/or base are highlighted. A model is developed for each revenue source to allow impact estimation

  18. Use of a scenario-development procedure to identify potentially disruptive scenarios, Greater Confinement Disposal facility, Area 5, Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guzowski, R.V.; Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM

    1994-01-01

    The Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) facility includes four boreholes that contain transuranic (TRLT) waste. Presence of the TRU waste means that this facility must comply with the US Environmental Protection Agency's Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Waste-Final Rule 40 CFR Part 191. To comply with the Containment Requirements of this rule, all potentially disruptive events and processes, and by implication all potentially disruptive combinations of events and processes (scenarios), must be identified for possible inclusion in performance assessments. Screening of the FEPs identified four events for scenario development: exploratory drilling for natural resources, drilling withdrawal wells, irrigation, and subsidence. Recent environmental-isotope analyses of the vadose zone suggest that radionuclide transport from the boreholes to the water table by infiltration is not a feasible transport mechanism within the time frame of regulatory concern. For this reason, the event of drilling withdrawal wells was merged with exploratory drilling for resources. The descriptions of the remaining three events were modified slightly to aid in estimation of event probabilities and consequence analyses. The three events are: exploratory drilling for resources penetrates a TRU borehole, irrigation occurs at the Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS), and subsidence occurs at the RWMS. Use of a logic diagram with these three events resulted in the construction of eight scenarios, including base-case (undisturbed) conditions. Screening these scenarios at this stage of scenario development was beyond the scope of this task. Based on the implementation assumptions, this scenario-development procedure produced a comprehensive set of mutually exclusive scenarios that are reproducible and auditable for use in GCD performance assessments

  19. Phosphorylation and disassembly of intermediate filaments in mitotic cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chou, Yinghao; Rosevear, E.; Goldman, R.D.

    1989-01-01

    As baby hamster kidney (BHK-21) cells enter mitosis, networks of intermediate filaments (IFs) are transformed into cytoplasmic aggregates of protofilaments. Coincident with this morphological change, the phosphate content of vimentin increases from 0.3 mol of P i per mol of protein in interphase to 1.9 mol of P i per mol of protein in mitosis. A similar increase in phosphate content is observed with desmin, from 0.5 mol of P i per mol of protein to 1.5 mol of P i per mol of protein. Fractionation of mitotic cell lysates by hydroxylapatite column chromatography reveals the presence of two IF protein kinase activities, designated as IF protein kinase I and IF protein kinase II. Comparison of two-dimensional 32 P-labeled phosphopeptide maps of vimentin and desmin phosphorylated in vivo in mitosis, and in vitro using partially purified kinase fractions, reveals extensive similarity in the two sets of phosphorylation sites. Phosphorylation of in vitro polymerized IFs by IF protein kinase II induces complete disassembly as determined by negative-stain electron microscopy. The results support the idea that the disassembly of IFs in mitosis is regulated by the phosphorylation of its subunit proteins

  20. Digital mock-up for the spent fuel disassembly processes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J. Y.; Kim, S. H.; Song, T. G.; Kim, Y. H.; Hong, D. H.; Yoon, J. S.

    2000-12-01

    In this study, the graphical design system is developed and the digital mock-up is implemented for designing the spent fuel handling and disassembly processes. The system consists of a 3D graphical modeling system, a devices assembling system, and a motion simulation system. This system is used throughout the design stages from the conceptual design to the motion analysis. By using this system, all the process involved in the spent fuel handling and disassembly processes are analyzed and optimized. Also, this system is used in developing the on-line graphic simulator which synchronously simulates the motion of the equipment in a real time basis by connecting the device controllers with the graphic server through the TCP/IP network. This simulator can be effectively used for detecting the malfunctions of the process equipment which is remotely operated. Thus, the simulator enhances the reliability and safety of the spent fuel handling process by providing the remote monitoring function of the process. The graphical design system and the digital mock-up system can be effectively used for designing the process equipment, as well as the optimized process and maintenance process. And the on-line graphic simulator can be an alternative of the conventional process monitoring system which is a hardware based system

  1. Assembly and disassembly of the nucleolus during the cell cycle.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hernandez-Verdun, Danièle

    2011-01-01

    The nucleolus is a large nuclear domain in which transcription, maturation and assembly of ribosomes take place. In higher eukaryotes, nucleolar organization in three sub-domains reflects the compartmentation of the machineries related to active or inactive transcription of the ribosomal DNA, ribosomal RNA processing and assembly with ribosomal proteins of the two (40S and 60S) ribosomal subunits. The assembly of the nucleoli during telophase/early G(1) depends on pre-existing machineries inactivated during prophase (the transcription machinery and RNP processing complexes) and on partially processed 45S rRNAs inherited throughout mitosis. In telophase, the 45S rRNAs nucleate the prenucleolar bodies and order the dynamics of nucleolar assembly. The assembly/disassembly processes of the nucleolus depend on the equilibrium between phosphorylation/dephosphorylation of the transcription machinery and on the RNP processing complexes under the control of the CDK1-cyclin B kinase and PP1 phosphatases. The dynamics of assembly/disassembly of the nucleolus is time and space regulated.

  2. ARIES pit disassembly-safeguards issues for transparency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fearey, B.L.; Cremers, T.L.

    1995-01-01

    Historic changes are now occurring in U.S. nonproliferation and arms control policy. The quantity of nuclear weapons required to provide a deterrence has decreased (especially with the end of the Cold War). Further, various bilateral and multilateral treaties now require the removal of numerous nuclear weapons from the U.S. stockpile. Although the removal of such weapons appears straightforward, the final disposition of the surplus weapons-grade nuclear material must be carefully considered. Domestically, several plutonium disposition plans are now under consideration concerning long-term safety, materials accounting, environmental impact, accessibility, and long-term containment. The Automated Retirement and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) currently under development at Los Alamos National Laboratory is one such disposition method for the disassembly of plutonium weapons components (pits). The ARIES system integrates and automates several features: disassembly of pits, consolidation of the plutonium material, on-line measurement of final products, waste streams, and long-term packaging. Clearly, in any plutonium disposition plan, the safeguards aspects of materials control and accounting and the security aspects must be carefully considered and evaluated

  3. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wills, Cathy

    2013-09-11

    This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) (formerly designated as the Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO]). The new field office designation occurred in March 2013. Published reports cited in this 2012 report, therefore, may bear the name or authorship of NNSA/NSO. This and previous years’ reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NFO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2012 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NFO is

  4. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 168: Areas 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. 0) includes Record of Technical Change No. 1 (dated 8/28/2002), Record of Technical Change No. 2 (dated 9/23/2002), and Record of Technical Change No. 3 (dated 6/2/2004)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada

    2001-11-21

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's approach to collect data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit 168 under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 168 consists of a group of twelve relatively diverse Corrective Action Sites (CASs 25-16-01, Construction Waste Pile; 25-16-03, MX Construction Landfill; 25-19-02, Waste Disposal Site; 25-23-02, Radioactive Storage RR Cars; 25-23-18, Radioactive Material Storage; 25-34-01, NRDS Contaminated Bunker; 25-34-02, NRDS Contaminated Bunker; CAS 25-23-13, ETL - Lab Radioactive Contamination; 25-99-16, USW G3; 26-08-01, Waste Dump/Burn Pit; 26-17-01, Pluto Waste Holding Area; 26-19-02, Contaminated Waste Dump No.2). These CASs vary in terms of the sources and nature of potential contamination. The CASs are located and/or associated wit h the following Nevada Test Site (NTS) facilities within three areas. The first eight CASs were in operation between 1958 to 1984 in Area 25 include the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility; the Missile Experiment Salvage Yard; the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility; the Radioactive Materials Storage Facility; and the Treatment Test Facility Building at Test Cell A. Secondly, the three CASs located in Area 26 include the Project Pluto testing area that operated from 1961 to 1964. Lastly, the Underground Southern Nevada Well (USW) G3 (CAS 25-99-16), a groundwater monitoring well located west of the NTS on the ridgeline of Yucca Mountain, was in operation during the 1980s. Based on site history and existing characterization data obtained to support the data quality objectives process, contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) for CAU 168 are primarily radionuclide; however, the COPCs for several CASs were not defined. To address COPC

  5. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cathy Wills

    2008-09-01

    The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007 (NTSER) was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). This Executive Summary presents the purpose of the document, the major programs conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), NTS key environmental initiatives, radiological releases and potential doses to the public resulting from site operations, a summary of nonradiological releases, implementation status of the NTS Environmental Management System, a summary of compliance with environmental regulations, pollution prevention and waste minimization accomplishments, and significant environmental accomplishments. Much of the content of this Executive Summary is also presented in a separate stand-alone pamphlet titled Nevada Test Site Environmental Report Summary 2007. This NTSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting. Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NTS Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This report meets these objectives for the NTS and three offsite Nevada facilities mentioned in this report.

  6. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cathy Wills

    2008-01-01

    The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007 (NTSER) was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec). This Executive Summary presents the purpose of the document, the major programs conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), NTS key environmental initiatives, radiological releases and potential doses to the public resulting from site operations, a summary of nonradiological releases, implementation status of the NTS Environmental Management System, a summary of compliance with environmental regulations, pollution prevention and waste minimization accomplishments, and significant environmental accomplishments. Much of the content of this Executive Summary is also presented in a separate stand-alone pamphlet titled Nevada Test Site Environmental Report Summary 2007. This NTSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order 231.1A, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting. Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NTS Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This report meets these objectives for the NTS and three offsite Nevada facilities mentioned in this report

  7. On the benefits of an integrated nuclear complex for Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blink, J.A.; Halsey, W.G.

    1994-01-01

    An integrated nuclear complex is proposed for location at the Nevada Test Site. In addition to solving the nuclear waste disposal problem, this complex would tremendously enhance the southern Nevada economy, and it would provide low cost electricity to each resident and business in the affected counties. Nuclear industry and the national economy would benefit because the complex would demonstrate the new generation of safer nuclear power plants and revitalize the industry. Many spin-offs of the complex would be possible, including research into nuclear fusion and a world class medical facility for southern Nevada. For such a complex to become a reality, the cycle of distrust between the federal government and the State of Nevada must be broken. The paper concludes with a discussion of implementation through a public process led by state officials and culminating in a voter referendum

  8. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 330: Areas 6, 22, and 23 Tanks and Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    A. T. Urbon

    2003-07-01

    This Closure Report (CR) documents the activities performed to close Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 330: Areas 6, 22, and 23 Tanks and Spill Sites, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO of 1996), and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for CAU 330: Areas 6, 22, and 23 Tanks and Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operation Office [NNSA/NV], 2001). CAU 330 consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 06-02-04, 22-99-06, 23-01-02, and 23-25-05 (Figure 1).

  9. Movement and equipositioning of plasmids by ParA filament disassembly

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ringgaard, Simon; van Zon, Jeroen; Howard, Martin

    2009-01-01

    , plasmids consistently migrate behind disassembling ParA cytoskeletal structures, suggesting that ParA filaments pull plasmids by depolymerization. The perpetual cycles of ParA assembly and disassembly result in continuous relocation of plasmids, which, on time averaging, results in equidistribution...

  10. Coordination of substrate binding and ATP hydrolysis in Vps4-mediated ESCRT-III disassembly.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Davies, Brian A; Azmi, Ishara F; Payne, Johanna; Shestakova, Anna; Horazdovsky, Bruce F; Babst, Markus; Katzmann, David J

    2010-10-01

    ESCRT-III undergoes dynamic assembly and disassembly to facilitate membrane exvagination processes including multivesicular body (MVB) formation, enveloped virus budding, and membrane abscission during cytokinesis. The AAA-ATPase Vps4 is required for ESCRT-III disassembly, however the coordination of Vps4 ATP hydrolysis with ESCRT-III binding and disassembly is not understood. Vps4 ATP hydrolysis has been proposed to execute ESCRT-III disassembly as either a stable oligomer or an unstable oligomer whose dissociation drives ESCRT-III disassembly. An in vitro ESCRT-III disassembly assay was developed to analyze Vps4 function during this process. The studies presented here support a model in which Vps4 acts as a stable oligomer during ATP hydrolysis and ESCRT-III disassembly. Moreover, Vps4 oligomer binding to ESCRT-III induces coordination of ATP hydrolysis at the level of individual Vps4 subunits. These results suggest that Vps4 functions as a stable oligomer that acts upon individual ESCRT-III subunits to facilitate ESCRT-III disassembly.

  11. Disassembly for remanufacturing: A systematic literature review, new model development and future research needs

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anjar Priyono

    2016-11-01

    Full Text Available Purpose: Disassembly is an important process that distinguishes remanufacturing from conventional manufacturing. It is a unique process that becomes focus of investigation from many scholars. Yet, most scholars investigate disassembly from technical and operational standpoint that lack of strategic perspective. This paper attempts to fill this gap by looking at disassembly from a strategic perspective by considering organisational characteristics, process choices and product attributes. To be more specific, this paper has three objectives. First, to gain understanding what has been done, and what need to be done in the field of disassembly in remanufacturing. Second, to conduct a systematic literature review for identifying the factors affecting disassembly for remanufacturing. Third, to propose a new model of disassembly for remanufacturing and also to provide avenues for future research. Design/methodology/approach: This study used a systematic literature review method. A series of steps were undertaken during the review. The study was started with determining the purpose of the study, selecting appropriate keywords, and reducing the selected papers using a number of criteria. A deeper analysis was carried out on the final paper that meets the criteria for this review. Findings: There are two main findings of this study. First, a list of factors affecting disassembly in remanufacturing is identified. The factors can be categorised into three groups: organisational factors, process choices and product attributes. Second, using factors that have been identified, a new model of disassembly process for remanufacturing is developed. Current studies only consider disassembly as a physical activity to break down products into components. In the new model, disassembly is viewed as a process that converts into into output, which consist of a series of steps. Research limitations/implications: The opportunities for future research include: the need to

  12. Disassembly for remanufacturing: A systematic literature review, new model development and future research needs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Priyono, A.; Ijomah, W.; Bititci, U.

    2016-01-01

    Purpose: Disassembly is an important process that distinguishes remanufacturing from conventional manufacturing. It is a unique process that becomes focus of investigation from many scholars. Yet, most scholars investigate disassembly from technical and operational standpoint that lack of strategic perspective. This paper attempts to fill this gap by looking at disassembly from a strategic perspective by considering organisational characteristics, process choices and product attributes. To be more specific, this paper has three objectives. First, to gain understanding what has been done, and what need to be done in the field of disassembly in remanufacturing. Second, to conduct a systematic literature review for identifying the factors affecting disassembly for remanufacturing. Third, to propose a new model of disassembly for remanufacturing and also to provide avenues for future research. Design/methodology/approach: This study used a systematic literature review method. A series of steps were undertaken during the review. The study was started with determining the purpose of the study, selecting appropriate keywords, and reducing the selected papers using a number of criteria. A deeper analysis was carried out on the final paper that meets the criteria for this review. Findings: There are two main findings of this study. First, a list of factors affecting disassembly in remanufacturing is identified. The factors can be categorised into three groups: organisational factors, process choices and product attributes. Second, using factors that have been identified, a new model of disassembly process for remanufacturing is developed. Current studies only consider disassembly as a physical activity to break down products into components. In the new model, disassembly is viewed as a process that converts into into output, which consist of a series of steps. Research limitations/implications: The opportunities for future research include: the need to develop an index of

  13. Disassembly for remanufacturing: A systematic literature review, new model development and future research needs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Priyono, A.; Ijomah, W.; Bititci, U.

    2016-07-01

    Purpose: Disassembly is an important process that distinguishes remanufacturing from conventional manufacturing. It is a unique process that becomes focus of investigation from many scholars. Yet, most scholars investigate disassembly from technical and operational standpoint that lack of strategic perspective. This paper attempts to fill this gap by looking at disassembly from a strategic perspective by considering organisational characteristics, process choices and product attributes. To be more specific, this paper has three objectives. First, to gain understanding what has been done, and what need to be done in the field of disassembly in remanufacturing. Second, to conduct a systematic literature review for identifying the factors affecting disassembly for remanufacturing. Third, to propose a new model of disassembly for remanufacturing and also to provide avenues for future research. Design/methodology/approach: This study used a systematic literature review method. A series of steps were undertaken during the review. The study was started with determining the purpose of the study, selecting appropriate keywords, and reducing the selected papers using a number of criteria. A deeper analysis was carried out on the final paper that meets the criteria for this review. Findings: There are two main findings of this study. First, a list of factors affecting disassembly in remanufacturing is identified. The factors can be categorised into three groups: organisational factors, process choices and product attributes. Second, using factors that have been identified, a new model of disassembly process for remanufacturing is developed. Current studies only consider disassembly as a physical activity to break down products into components. In the new model, disassembly is viewed as a process that converts into into output, which consist of a series of steps. Research limitations/implications: The opportunities for future research include: the need to develop an index of

  14. An Entropy-Based Adaptive Hybrid Particle Swarm Optimization for Disassembly Line Balancing Problems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Shanli Xiao

    2017-11-01

    Full Text Available In order to improve the product disassembly efficiency, the disassembly line balancing problem (DLBP is transformed into a problem of searching for the optimum path in the directed and weighted graph by constructing the disassembly hierarchy information graph (DHIG. Then, combining the characteristic of the disassembly sequence, an entropy-based adaptive hybrid particle swarm optimization algorithm (AHPSO is presented. In this algorithm, entropy is introduced to measure the changing tendency of population diversity, and the dimension learning, crossover and mutation operator are used to increase the probability of producing feasible disassembly solutions (FDS. Performance of the proposed methodology is tested on the primary problem instances available in the literature, and the results are compared with other evolutionary algorithms. The results show that the proposed algorithm is efficient to solve the complex DLBP.

  15. Innovation and employee injury risk in automotive disassembly operations

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Neumann, W. Patrick; Winkel, Jørgen; Palmerud, Gunnar

    2018-01-01

    to control injury hazards as part of the development and design process. These cases suggest how failure to manage RSI hazards in the innovation process may allow increases of injury risks that can compromise operational performance. This ‘innovation pitfall’ has implications for operator health...... increased movement speeds and reduced muscular recovery opportunities, implying increased RSI risk. This case study reveals a mechanism by which innovation may increase RSI risks for operators. Managers responsible for engineering innovation should ensure their teams have the tools and mandate necessary......Engineering innovations in car disassembly systems are studied for affects on system operators’ risk of repetitive strain injury (RSI). Objective instrumented measures of injury risk factors with synchronised video-based task analyses were used to examine changes in operators’ RSI risk during...

  16. Introductory Education for Mechanical Engineering by Exercise in Mechanical Disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matsui, Yoshio; Asakawa, Naoki; Iwamori, Satoru

    An introductory program “Exercise for engineers in mechanical disassembly” is an exercise that ten students of every team disassemble a motor scooter to the components and then assemble again to the initial form in 15 weeks. The purpose of this program is to introduce mechanical engineering by touching the real machine and learning how it is composed from various mechanical parts to the students at the early period after the entrance into the university. Additional short lectures by young teachers and a special lecture by a top engineer in the industry encourage the students to combine the actual machine and the mechanical engineering subjects. Furthermore, various educations such as group leader system, hazard prediction training, parts filing are included in this program. As a result, students recognize the importance of the mechanical engineering study and the way of group working.

  17. Knowledge of damage identification about tensegrities via flexibility disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jiang, Ge; Feng, Xiaodong; Du, Shigui

    2017-12-01

    Tensegrity structures composing of continuous cables and discrete struts are under tension and compression, respectively. In order to determine the damage extents of tensegrity structures, a new method for tensegrity structural damage identification is presented based on flexibility disassembly. To decompose a tensegrity structural flexibility matrix into the matrix represention of the connectivity between degress-of-freedoms and the diagonal matrix comprising of magnitude informations. Step 1: Calculate perturbation flexibility; Step 2: Compute the flexibility connectivity matrix and perturbation flexibility parameters; Step 3: Calculate the perturbation stiffness parameters. The efficiency of the proposed method is demonstrated by a numeical example comprising of 12 cables and 4 struts with pretensioned. Accurate identification of local damage depends on the availability of good measured data, an accurate and reasonable algorithm.

  18. Workshop on instrumentation of the disassembled BER II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jauch, W.; Steiner, M.

    1982-01-01

    A workshop on the instrumentation of a disassembled BER II-reactor took place in the Hahn-Meitner-Institute in Berlin on April 19 and 20, 1982. Invited were all groups that are promoted by the associations 'Neutron Scattering for Investigation of Condensed Substance' and 'Neutron Scattering and Complementary Methods in Chemistry and Biology', along with experts for neutron spectrometers. 40 foreign scientists from 22 different institutes had accepted the invitation. The actual questions were treated in 13 presentations and a certain number of posters, with the latter also comprising activation analysis. The present report contains the presentations submitted, the final discussion minutes and a summary from HMI-view. (orig./RW) [de

  19. A reactor vessel and its internals disassembled and packaged

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eisenmann, B.; Prechtl, E.; Suessdorf, W.

    2008-01-01

    2007 was a successful year for the Disassembly Unit of the Karlsruhe Research Center: dismantling the highly activated Karlsruhe Multipurpose Research Reactor (MZFR) was completed successfully and without any incident. A vote of thanks is expressed at this point to all staff members, participating industries and institutions for their extraordinary commitment and their outstanding innovation and work. Preserving and advancing existing knowledge is one of the important pillars securing a sustainable future for generations to come in Germany. Securing and advancing know-how in nuclear technology was defined as a major duty last in late January 2008 by Dr. Peter Fritz, Chairman of the Kerntechnische Gesellschaft e.V. (KTG) and member of the Executive Board of the Karlsruhe Research Center, for instance, in cooperation between the KERNTECHNIK (i.e. nuclear technology) Southwestern Research and Teaching Association and the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). The borders of Germany do not constitute a natural radiological barrier, despite the efforts by political groups in this country to convey this impression. This report therefore is to document that the demolition of a nuclear reactor with a high radioactivity inventory can be managed safely. In the light of the experience accumulated with the MZFR, this is feasible only if demolition is carried out immediately instead of the 'problem' of disassembly and conditioning being shifted to future generations. The article is also meant to be a piece of advice by showing the unplannable difficulties which came up, and the technical solutions implemented by the competence team successfully and efficiently. (orig.)

  20. Sequential phosphorylation of GRASP65 during mitotic Golgi disassembly

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Danming Tang

    2012-09-01

    GRASP65 phosphorylation during mitosis and dephosphorylation after mitosis are required for Golgi disassembly and reassembly during the cell cycle. At least eight phosphorylation sites on GRASP65 have been identified, but whether they are modified in a coordinated fashion during mitosis is so far unknown. In this study, we raised phospho-specific antibodies that recognize phosphorylated T220/T224, S277 and S376 residues of GRASP65, respectively. Biochemical analysis showed that cdc2 phosphorylates all three sites, while plk1 enhances the phosphorylation. Microscopic studies using these antibodies for double and triple labeling demonstrate sequential phosphorylation and dephosphorylation during the cell cycle. S277 and S376 are phosphorylated from late G2 phase through metaphase until telophase when the new Golgi is reassembled. T220/224 is not modified until prophase, but is highly modified from prometaphase to anaphase. In metaphase, phospho-T220/224 signal localizes on both Golgi haze and mitotic Golgi clusters that represent dispersed Golgi vesicles and Golgi remnants, respectively, while phospho-S277 and S376 labeling is more concentrated on mitotic Golgi clusters. Expression of a phosphorylation-resistant GRASP65 mutant T220A/T224A inhibited mitotic Golgi fragmentation to a much larger extent than the expression of the S277A and S376A mutants. In cytokinesis, T220/224 dephosphorylation occurs prior to that of S277, but after S376. This study provides evidence that GRASP65 is sequentially phosphorylated and dephosphorylated during mitosis at different sites to orchestrate Golgi disassembly and reassembly during cell division, with phosphorylation of the T220/224 site being most critical in the process.

  1. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2009

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cathy Wills, ed.

    2010-09-13

    The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2009 was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years’ Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs) are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx. This NTSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1A, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NTSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2009 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL)-Nellis. It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

  2. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 134: Aboveground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 134 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Aboveground Storage Tanks' and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3, 15, and 29 of the Nevada Test Site: (1) CAS 03-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; (2) CAS 03-01-04, Tank; (3) CAS 15-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank; and (4) CAS 29-01-01, Hydrocarbon Stain

  3. Environmental Assessment for Enhanced Use Lease of U.S. Air Force Lands to the City of North Las Vegas for Construction and Operation of a Water Reclamation Facility, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-01-01

    associated thermal spring systems within the Warm Springs in Nevada. No - Project area located west of the Muddy River. Lahontan cutthroat trout ...include a section to address how the source intends to mitigate for odor (i.e. mercaptans, indoles, skatoles, and amines) or destruction of digester

  4. A methodological approach for designing and sequencing product families in Reconfigurable Disassembly Systems

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ignacio Eguia

    2011-10-01

    Full Text Available Purpose: A Reconfigurable Disassembly System (RDS represents a new paradigm of automated disassembly system that uses reconfigurable manufacturing technology for fast adaptation to changes in the quantity and mix of products to disassemble. This paper deals with a methodology for designing and sequencing product families in RDS. Design/methodology/approach: The methodology is developed in a two-phase approach, where products are first grouped into families and then families are sequenced through the RDS, computing the required machines and modules configuration for each family. Products are grouped into families based on their common features using a Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm. The optimal sequence of the product families is calculated using a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming model minimizing reconfigurability and operational costs. Findings: This paper is focused to enable reconfigurable manufacturing technologies to attain some degree of adaptability during disassembly automation design using modular machine tools. Research limitations/implications: The MILP model proposed for the second phase is similar to the well-known Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP and therefore its complexity grows exponentially with the number of products to disassemble. In real-world problems, which a higher number of products, it may be advisable to solve the model approximately with heuristics. Practical implications: The importance of industrial recycling and remanufacturing is growing due to increasing environmental and economic pressures. Disassembly is an important part of remanufacturing systems for reuse and recycling purposes. Automatic disassembly techniques have a growing number of applications in the area of electronics, aerospace, construction and industrial equipment. In this paper, a design and scheduling approach is proposed to apply in this area. Originality/value: This paper presents a new concept called Reconfigurable Disassembly System

  5. Nevada Isostatic Gravity Grid

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce — A 2 kilometer Isostatic anomaly grid for the state of Nevada. Number of columns is 269 and number of rows is 394. The order of the data is from the lower left to the...

  6. Environmental assessment for liquid waste treatment at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    This environmental assessment (EA) examines the potential impacts to the environment from treatment of low-level radioactive liquid and low-level mixed liquid and semi-solid wastes generated at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The potential impacts of the proposed action and alternative actions are discussed herein in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended in Title 42 U.S.C. (4321), and the US Department of Energy (DOE) policies and procedures set forth in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1021 and DOE Order 451.1, ''NEPA Compliance Program.'' The potential environmental impacts of the proposed action, construction and operation of a centralized liquid waste treatment facility, were addressed in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Nevada Test Site and Off-Site Locations in the State of Nevada. However, DOE is reevaluating the need for a centralized facility and is considering other alternative treatment options. This EA retains a centralized treatment facility as the proposed action but also considers other feasible alternatives

  7. Development of remote disassembly technology for liquid-metal reactor (LMR) fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bradley, E.C.; Evans, J.H.; Metz, C.F. III; Weil, B.S.

    1990-01-01

    A major objective of the Consolidated Fuel Reprocessing Program (CFRP) is to develop equipment and demonstrate technology to reprocess fast breeder reactor fuel. Experimental work on fuel disassembly cutting methods began in the 1970s. High-power laser cutting was selected as the preferred cutting method for fuel disassembly. Remotely operated development equipment was designed, fabricated, installed, and tested at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Development testing included remote automatic operation, remote maintenance testing, and laser cutting process development. This paper summarizes the development work performed at ORNL on remote fuel disassembly. 2 refs., 1 fig

  8. Operational radioactive waste management plan for the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-11-01

    The Operational Radioactive Waste Management Plan for the Nevada Test Site establishes procedures and methods for the safe shipping, receiving, processing, disposal, and storage of radioactive waste. Included are NTS radioactive waste disposition program guidelines, procedures for radioactive waste management, a description of storage and disposal areas and facilities, and a glossary of specifications and requirements

  9. Disassembly of Bacterial Biofilms by the Self-Assembled Glycolipids Derived from Renewable Resources.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prasad, Yadavali Siva; Miryala, Sandeep; Lalitha, Krishnamoorthy; Ranjitha, K; Barbhaiwala, Shehnaz; Sridharan, Vellaisamy; Maheswari, C Uma; Srinandan, C S; Nagarajan, Subbiah

    2017-11-22

    More than 80% of chronic infections of bacteria are caused by biofilms. It is also a long-term survival strategy of the pathogens in a nonhost environment. Several amphiphilic molecules have been used in the past to potentially disrupt biofilms; however, the involvement of multistep synthesis, complicated purification and poor yield still remains a major problem. Herein, we report a facile synthesis of glycolipid based surfactant from renewable feedstocks in good yield. The nature of carbohydrate unit present in glycolipid influence the ring chain tautomerism, which resulted in the existence of either cyclic structure or both cyclic and acyclic structures. Interestingly, these glycolipids self-assemble into gel in highly hydrophobic solvents and vegetable oils, and displayed foam formation in water. The potential application of these self-assembled glycolipids to disrupt preformed biofilm was examined against various pathogens. It was observed that glycolipid 6a disrupts Staphylococcus aureus and Listeria monocytogenes biofilm, while the compound 6c was effective in disassembling uropathogenic E. coli and Salmonella enterica Typhimurium biofilms. Altogether, the supramolecular self-assembled materials, either as gel or as surfactant solution could be potentially used for surface cleansing in hospital environments or the food processing industries to effectively reduce pathogenic biofilms.

  10. AGR-3/4 Irradiation Test Train Disassembly and Component Metrology First Look Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stempien, John Dennis [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Rice, Francine Joyce [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Harp, Jason Michael [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Winston, Philip Lon [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2016-09-01

    The AGR-3/4 experiment was designed to study fission product transport within graphitic matrix material and nuclear-grade graphite. To this end, this experiment consisted of 12 capsules, each fueled with 4 compacts containing UCO TRISO particles as driver fuel and 20 UCO designed-to-fail (DTF) fuel particles in each compact. The DTF fuel was fabricated with a thin pyrocarbon layer which was intended to fail during irradiation and provide a source of fission products. These fission products could then migrate through the compact and into the surrounding concentric rings of graphitic matrix material and/or nuclear graphite. Through post-irradiation examination (PIE) of the rings (including physical sampling and gamma scanning) fission product concentration profiles within the rings can be determined. These data can be used to elucidate fission product transport parameters (e.g. diffusion coefficients within the test materials) which will be used to inform and refine models of fission product transport. After irradiation in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) had been completed in April 2014, the AGR-3/4 experiment was shipped to the Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) for inspection, disassembly, and metrology. The AGR-3/4 test train was received at MFC in two separate shipments between February and April 2015. Visual examinations of the test train exterior did not indicate dimensional distortion, and only two small discolored areas were observed at the bottom of Capsules 8 and 9. No corresponding discoloration was found on the inside of these capsules, however. Prior to disassembly, the two test train sections were subject to analysis via the Precision Gamma Scanner (PGS), which did not indicate that any gross fuel relocation had occurred. A series of specialized tools (including clamps, cutters, and drills) had been designed and fabricated in order to carry out test train disassembly and recovery of capsule components (graphite

  11. AGR-3/4 Irradiation Test Train Disassembly and Component Metrology First Look Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stempien, John Dennis [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Rice, Francine Joyce [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Harp, Jason Michael [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Winston, Philip Lon [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2016-03-01

    The AGR-3/4 experiment was designed to study fission product transport within graphitic matrix material and nuclear-grade graphite. To this end, this experiment consisted of 12 capsules, each fueled with 4 compacts containing UCO TRISO particles as driver fuel and 20 UCO designed-to-fail (DTF) fuel particles in each compact. The DTF fuel was fabricated with a thin pyrocarbon layer which was intended to fail during irradiation and provide a source of fission products. These fission products could then migrate through the compact and into the surrounding concentric rings of graphitic matrix material and/or nuclear graphite. Through post-irradiation examination (PIE) of the rings (including physical sampling and gamma scanning) fission product concentration profiles within the rings can be determined. These data can be used to elucidate fission product transport parameters (e.g. diffusion coefficients within the test materials) which will be used to inform and refine models of fission product transport. After irradiation in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) had been completed in April 2014, the AGR-3/4 experiment was shipped to the Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF) at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) for inspection, disassembly, and metrology. The AGR-3/4 test train was received at MFC in two separate shipments between February and April 2015. Visual examinations of the test train exterior did not indicate dimensional distortion, and only two small discolored areas were observed at the bottom of Capsules 8 and 9. No corresponding discoloration was found on the inside of these capsules, however. Prior to disassembly, the two test train sections were subject to analysis via the Precision Gamma Scanner (PGS), which did not indicate that any gross fuel relocation had occurred. A series of specialized tools (including clamps, cutters, and drills) had been designed and fabricated in order to carry out test train disassembly and recovery of capsule components (graphite

  12. Biologic overview for the Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Collins, E.; O'Farrell, T.P.; Rhoads, W.A.

    1982-01-01

    The Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations project study area includes five major vegetation associations characteristic of the transition between the northern extent of the Mojave Desert and the southern extent of the Great Basin Desert. A total of 32 species of reptiles, 66 species of birds, and 46 species of mammals are known to occur within these associations elsewhere on the Nevada Test Site. Ten species of plants, and the mule deer, wild horse, feral burro, and desert tortoise were defined as possible sensitive species because they are protected by federal and state regulations, or are being considered for such protection. The major agricultural resources of southern Nye County included 737,000 acres of public grazing land managed by the Bureau of Land Management, and 9500 acres of irrigated crop land located in the Beatty/Oasis valleys, the Amargosa Valley, and Ash Meadows. Range lands are of poor quality. Alfalfa and cotton are the major crops along with small amounts of grains, Sudan grass, turf, fruits, and melons. The largest impacts to known ecosystems are expected to result from: extensive disturbances associated with construction of roads, seismic lines, drilling pads, and surface facilities; storage and leaching of mined spoils; disposal of water; off-road vehicle travel; and, over several hundred years, elevated soil temperatures. Significant impacts to off-site areas such as Ash Meadows are anticipated if new residential developments are built there to accommodate an increased work force. Several species of concern and their essential habitats are located at Ash Meadows. Available literature contained sufficient baseline information to assess potential impacts of the proposed project on an area-wide basis. It was inadequate to support analysis of potential impacts on specific locations selected for site characterization studies, mining an exploratory shaft, or the siting and operation of a repository

  13. Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1 ROTC-1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Farnham, Irene [Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2016-08-01

    This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. The Frenchman Flat CAU was the site of 10 underground nuclear tests, some of which have impacted groundwater near the tests. This work was performed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from the impacted groundwater

  14. Underground Test Area (UGTA) Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 1 ROTC-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farnham, Irene

    2016-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. The Frenchman Flat CAU was the site of 10 underground nuclear tests, some of which have impacted groundwater near the tests. This work was performed as part of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from the impacted groundwater

  15. Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 570: Area 9 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matthews, Patrick [Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2013-11-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 570: Area 9 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The purpose of the CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed.

  16. Balancing Disassembly Line in Product Recovery to Promote the Coordinated Development of Economy and Environment

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jia Liu

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available For environmentally conscious and sustainable manufacturing, many more manufacturers are acting to recycle and remanufacture their post-consumed products. The most critical process of remanufacturing is disassembly, since it allows for the selective extraction of the valuable components and materials from returned products to reduce the waste disposal volume. It is, therefore, important to design and balance the disassembly line to work efficiently due to its vital role in effective resource usage and environmental protection. Considering the disassembly precedence relationships and sequence-dependent parts removal time increments, this paper presents an improved discrete artificial bee colony algorithm (DABC for solving the sequence-dependent disassembly line balancing problem (SDDLBP. The performance of the proposed algorithm was tested against nine other approaches. Computational results evidently indicate the superior efficiency of the proposed algorithm for addressing the environmental and economic concerns while optimizing the multi-objective SDDLBP.

  17. Disassembly Properties of Cementitious Finish Joints Using an Induction Heating Method

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ahn, Jaecheol; Noguchi, Takafumi; Kitagaki, Ryoma

    2015-01-01

    Efficient maintenance and upgrading of a building during its lifecycle are difficult because a cementitious finish uses materials and parts with low disassembly properties. Additionally, the reuse and recycling processes during building demolition also present numerous problems from the perspective of environmental technology. In this study, an induction heating (IH) method was used to disassemble cementitious finish joints, which are widely used to join building members and materials. The IH rapidly and selectively heated and weakened these joints. The temperature elevation characteristics of the cementitious joint materials were measured as a function of several resistor types, including wire meshes and punching metals, which are usually used for cementitious finishing. The disassembly properties were evaluated through various tests using conductive resistors in cementitious joints such as mortar. When steel fiber, punching metal, and wire mesh were used as conductive resistors, the cementitious modifiers could be weakened within 30 s. Cementitious joints with conductive resistors also showed complete disassembly with little residual bond strength.

  18. Direct measurement of conformational strain energy in protofilaments curling outward from disassembling microtubule tips.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Driver, Jonathan W; Geyer, Elisabeth A; Bailey, Megan E; Rice, Luke M; Asbury, Charles L

    2017-06-19

    Disassembling microtubules can generate movement independently of motor enzymes, especially at kinetochores where they drive chromosome motility. A popular explanation is the 'conformational wave' model, in which protofilaments pull on the kinetochore as they curl outward from a disassembling tip. But whether protofilaments can work efficiently via this spring-like mechanism has been unclear. By modifying a previous assay to use recombinant tubulin and feedback-controlled laser trapping, we directly demonstrate the spring-like elasticity of curling protofilaments. Measuring their mechanical work output suggests they carry ~25% of the energy of GTP hydrolysis as bending strain, enabling them to drive movement with efficiency similar to conventional motors. Surprisingly, a β-tubulin mutant that dramatically slows disassembly has no effect on work output, indicating an uncoupling of disassembly speed from protofilament strain. These results show the wave mechanism can make a major contribution to kinetochore motility and establish a direct approach for measuring tubulin mechano-chemistry.

  19. Disassembled DJ-1 high molecular weight complex in cortex mitochondria from Parkinson's disease patients

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Adler Charles

    2009-07-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Correction to Nural H, He P, Beach T, Sue L, Xia W, Shen Y. Disassembled DJ-1 high molecular weight complex in cortex mitochondria from Parkinson's disease patients Molecular Neurodegeneration 2009, 4:23.

  20. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2007 Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cathy Wills

    2008-09-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) directs the management and operation of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is the nation's historical testing site for nuclear weapons from 1951 through 1992 and is currently the nation's unique site for ongoing national-security related missions and high-risk operations. NNSA/NSO strives to provide to the public an understanding of the current activities on the NTS, including environmental monitoring and compliance activities aimed at protecting the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from nonradiological impacts. This document is a summary of the Nevada Test Site Environmental Report (NTSER) for calendar year 2007 (see attached compact disc on inside back cover). The NTSER is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NTS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. It is prepared annually to meet the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the information needs of NNSA/NSO stakeholders. To provide an abbreviated and more readable version of the NTSER, this summary report is produced. This summary does not include detailed data tables, monitoring methods or design, a description of the NTS environment, or a discussion of all environmental program activities performed throughout the year. The reader may obtain a hard copy of the full NTSER as directed on the inside front cover of this summary report.

  1. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report Summary 2009

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cathy Wills, ed.

    2010-09-13

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) directs the management and operation of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). NNSA/NSO prepares the Nevada Test Site Environmental Report (NTSER) to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the NTS to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from nonradiological impacts. The NTSER is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NTS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. It is prepared annually to meet the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the information needs of NNSA/NSO stakeholders. This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the NTSER. It does not contain detailed descriptions or presentations of monitoring designs, data collection methods, data tables, the NTS environment, or all environmental program activities performed throughout the year. The reader may obtain a hard copy of the full NTSER as directed on the inside front cover of this summary report.

  2. Spent-fuel disassembly and canning programs at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Townes, G.A.

    1980-02-01

    Doubling pool storage and tripling truck cask shipping capability appear feasible based on preliminary development work performed at the BNFP. This would be accomplished by disassembly of the fuel assembly and canning of the fuel pins. The dry, remote disassembly and canning in the headend cells offer adequate rates, easily controlled operator exposure, and visual inspection of the fuel pins and operations through shielded windows

  3. The effect of sudden server breakdown on the performance of a disassembly line

    Science.gov (United States)

    Udomsawat, Gun; Gupta, Surendra M.

    2005-11-01

    Product and material recovery relies on the disassembly process to separate target components or materials from the end-of-life (EOL) products. Disassembly line is especially effective when products in large quantity are disassembled. Unlike an assembly line, a disassembly line is more complex and is subjected to numerous uncertainties including stochastic and multi-level arrivals of component demands, stochastic arrival times for EOL products, and process interruption due to equipment failure. These factors seriously impair the control mechanism in the disassembly line. A common production control mechanism is the traditional push system (TPS). TPS responds to the aforementioned complications by carrying substantial amounts of inventories. An alternative control mechanism is a newly developed multi-kanban pull system (MKS) that relies on dynamic routing of kanbans, which tends to minimize the system's inventories while maintaining demand serviceability. In this paper we explore the impact of sudden breakdown of server on the performance of a disassembly line. We compare the overall performances of the TPS and MKS by considering two scenarios. We present the solution procedure and results for these cases.

  4. Studies of fast reactor disassembly using a Bethe-Tait computer code

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ludwig, J.C.

    1978-10-01

    The advantages of the fast reactor are given and the general design outlined. Loss of Flow and Transient Overpower faults are possible; the potential consequences of such incidents are analysed using a deterministic approach. The course of an incident is split into several stages; of these only predisassembly and disassembly are considered. Predisassembly computer codes are described in general, and several particular codes are examined in more detail, based on a literature survey. The results and implications of disassembly calculations using the code EXTRA are presented. Here, the effects of several factors, such as the presence of retained fission gases and possible restraints on fuel motion, are investigated. Some comparisons are made with published results from the VENUS-II disassembly code. A general conclusion is that under some circumstances, the yield predicted during disassembly is relatively insensitive to modelling assumptions, and a simple code such as EXTRA may prove adequate if explicit core displacements are not required. A major factor in determining the yield of the disassembly phase is confirmed as being the rate of reactivity insertion during disassembly, as predicted by a predisassembly code. (U.K.)

  5. Out pile test of a disassembly tool for the intermediate examination of nuclear fuel rods

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, Jintae; Joung, Chang-Young; Ahn, Sung-Ho; Yang, Tae-Ho; Jang, Seo-Yoon; Park, Seung-Jae [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The two fuel rod assemblies are assembled with a bayonet coupler, and the non-instrumented fuel rod assembly can be disassembled for intermediate examination. A tool to disassemble the non-instrumented fuel rod assembly from the test rig was developed, and steel wires are connected to the tool to operate release function. In this study, an assembly plug with a quick plug typed bayonet coupler and the accompanying disassembly tool was designed to prevent the interference problem. A test rig mockup was fabricated, and performance test was carried out in the laboratory. And, the out pile test was also carried out in the single channel test loop established in the KAERI. In this study, a modified coupler design to disassemble the non-instrumented fuel rod assembly from the test rig for the intermediate examination was suggested to solve interference problem of previous design. The performance of the modified design was verified by test mockup fabricated with the modified coupler design and accompanied disassembly tool design. Finally, out pile test was carried out in the single channel test loop in the KAERI, and the test rig and the disassembly tool showed good performance and reliability. The developed technique will be useful to the periodic intermediate examination of nuclear fuel rods.

  6. Out pile test of a disassembly tool for the intermediate examination of nuclear fuel rods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, Jintae; Joung, Chang-Young; Ahn, Sung-Ho; Yang, Tae-Ho; Jang, Seo-Yoon; Park, Seung-Jae

    2016-01-01

    The two fuel rod assemblies are assembled with a bayonet coupler, and the non-instrumented fuel rod assembly can be disassembled for intermediate examination. A tool to disassemble the non-instrumented fuel rod assembly from the test rig was developed, and steel wires are connected to the tool to operate release function. In this study, an assembly plug with a quick plug typed bayonet coupler and the accompanying disassembly tool was designed to prevent the interference problem. A test rig mockup was fabricated, and performance test was carried out in the laboratory. And, the out pile test was also carried out in the single channel test loop established in the KAERI. In this study, a modified coupler design to disassemble the non-instrumented fuel rod assembly from the test rig for the intermediate examination was suggested to solve interference problem of previous design. The performance of the modified design was verified by test mockup fabricated with the modified coupler design and accompanied disassembly tool design. Finally, out pile test was carried out in the single channel test loop in the KAERI, and the test rig and the disassembly tool showed good performance and reliability. The developed technique will be useful to the periodic intermediate examination of nuclear fuel rods

  7. Effects of reactive oxygen species on cellular wall disassembly of banana fruit during ripening.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cheng, Guiping; Duan, Xuewu; Shi, John; Lu, Wangjin; Luo, Yunbo; Jiang, Weibo; Jiang, Yueming

    2008-07-15

    Fruit softening is generally attributed to cell wall disassembly. Experiments were conducted to investigate effects of various reactive oxygen species (ROS) on in vitro cellular wall disassembly of harvested banana fruit. The alcohol-extracted insoluble residue (AEIR) was obtained from the pulp tissues of banana fruit at various ripening stages and then used to examine the disassembly of cellular wall polysaccharides in the presence of superoxide anion (O2(-)), hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) or hydroxyl radical (OH) and their scavengers. The presence of OH accelerated significantly disassembly of cellular wall polysaccharides in terms of the increase in contents of total sugars released and uronic acid, and the decrease in molecular mass of soluble polysaccharides, using gel permeation chromatography. However, the treatment with H2O2 or O2(-) showed no significant effect on the disassembly of cellular wall polysaccharides. Furthermore, the degradation of the de-esterified AEIR was more susceptible to OH attack than the esterified AEIR. In addition, the effect of OH could be inhibited in the presence of OH scavenger. This study suggests that disassembly of cellular wall polysaccharides could be initiated by OH as the solublisation of the polysaccharides increased, which, in turn, accelerated fruit softening. Copyright © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  8. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2008-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) documents closure activities for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543, Liquid Disposal Units, according to the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) and the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 543 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2007). CAU 543 is located at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada (Figure 1), and consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad; CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank; CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank; CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area; CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping; and CAS 06-07-01 is located at the Decontamination Facility in Area 6, adjacent to Yucca Lake. The remaining CASs are located at the former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm in Area 15. The purpose of this CR is to provide a summary of the completed closure activities, to document waste disposal, and to present analytical data confirming that the remediation goals were met. The closure alternatives consisted of closure in place for two of the CASs, and no further action with implementation of best management practices (BMPs) for the remaining five CASs.

  9. Housekeeping Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 119: Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order was entered into by the State of Nevada, US Department of Energy, and US Department of Defense to identify sites of potential historical contamination and implement corrective actions based on public health and environmental considerations. The facilities subject to this agreement include the Nevada Test Site (NTS), parts of the Tonopah Test Range, parts to the Nellis Air Force Range, the Central Nevada Test Area, and the Project Shoal Area. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) are areas potentially requiring corrective actions and may include solid waste management units, individual disposal, or release sites. Based on geography, technical similarity, agency responsibility, or other appropriate reasons, CASs are grouped together into Corrective Action Units (CAUs) for the purpose of determining appropriate corrective actions. This report contains the Closure Verification Forms for cleanup activities that were performed at 19 CASs with in CAU 119 on the NTS. The form for each CAS provides the location, directions to the site, general description, and photographs of the site before and after cleanup activities. Activities included verification of the prior removal of both aboveground and underground gas/oil storage tanks, gas sampling tanks, pressure fuel tanks, tank stands, trailers, debris, and other material. Based on these former activities, no further action is required at these CASs

  10. Defense waste management operations at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, R.E.; Kendall, E.W.

    1988-01-01

    Waste management activities were initiated at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) to dispose of low-level wastes (LLW) produced by the Department of Energy's (DOE's) weapons testing program. Disposal activities have expanded from the burial of atmospheric weapons testing debris to demonstration facilities for greater-than-Class C (GTCC) waste, transuranic (TRU) waste storage and certification, and the development of a mixed waste (MW) facility. Site specific operational research projects support technology development required for the various disposal facilities. The annual cost of managing the facilities is about $6 million depending on waste volumes and types

  11. Selenide isotope generator for the Galileo mission. GDS disassembly report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The GDS-1 was disassembled to determine the cause for the rapid degradation of the output power. Unfortunately, it was not possible to relate the observations to direct causes for the degradation. However, some positive statements can be made which have an impact on the flight program. First, the outgassing and gas management techniques were shown to be adequate to maintain clean conditions within the generator. Second, the non-modular components within the generator including the receptacles on the housing were not affected by the thermal environment during operation of GDS-1. Third, a significant amount of sublimation of the P-legs has occurred during the relatively short life of 2000 + hours as shown by the bullet nosing of the legs and deposits on the cold end hardware. The fact that the generator atmosphere was not 100% xenon may have some bearing on this observation but the statement is still accurate. Fourth, all exposed N-legs display cracks and/or chips. Fifth, a great deal of misalignment of both N and P-legs was seen both visually and with radiographs. Although no definite conclusions can be made concerning the cause for the rapid degradation of performance, several of the observed conditions within the module could possibly contribute to that fact. They are: cracks in N-legs (increased resistance); deposits on edges of BeO discs (shorting of thermoelectric circuit); and bullet nosing of P-legs (increased resistance). It remains to be shown if any of these effects or the follower hangup described earlier contributed to the poor performance of GDS-1 or if another effect as yet unknown was the important factor

  12. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boehlecke, Robert F.

    2004-01-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 551, Area 12 muckpiles, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the 'Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 551 is located in Area 12 of the NTS, which is approximately 110 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Area 12 is approximately 40 miles beyond the main gate to the NTS. Corrective Action Unit 551 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) 12-01-09, Aboveground Storage Tank and Stain; (2) 12-06-05, Muckpile; (3) 12-06-07, Muckpile; and (4) 12-06-08, Muckpile. Corrective Action Site 12-01-09 is located in Area 12 and consists of an above ground storage tank (AST) and associated stain. Corrective Action Site 12-06-05 is located in Area 12 and consists of a muckpile associated with the U12 B-Tunnel. Corrective Action Site 12-06-07 is located in Area 12 and consists of a muckpile associated with the U12 C-, D-, and F-Tunnels. Corrective Action Site 12-06-08 is located in Area 12 and consists of a muckpile associated with the U12 B-Tunnel. In keeping with common convention, the U12B-, C-, D-, and F-Tunnels will be referred to as the B-, C-, D-, and F-Tunnels. The corrective action investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, and sampling of media, where appropriate. Data will also be obtained to support waste management decisions

  13. Nevada Test Site, site treatment plan 1999 annual update

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    A Site Treatment Plan (STP) is required for facilities at which the US Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) generates or stores mixed waste (MW), defined by the Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFC Act) as waste containing both a hazardous waste subject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and a radioactive material subject to the Atomic Energy Act. This STP was written to identify specific treatment facilities for treating DOE/NV generated MW and provides proposed implementation schedules. This STP was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and provided the basis for the negotiation and issuance of the FFC Act Consent Order (CO) dated March 6, 1996, and revised June 15, 1998. The FFC Act CO sets forth stringent regulatory requirements to comply with the implementation of the STP

  14. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 553: Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al Wickline

    2007-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 553: Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 553 are located within Areas 19 and 20 of the Nevada Test Site. Corrective Action Unit 553 is comprised of the following CASs: 19-99-01, Mud Spill 19-99-11, Mud Spill 20-09-09, Mud Spill 20-99-03, Mud Spill. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 553 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were or will be performed: Review the current site conditions including the concentration and extent of contamination. Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. Document the Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 553 to be issued by Nevada Division of Environmental Protection

  15. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 554: Area 23 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boehlecke, Robert F.

    2004-01-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 554: Area 23 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. Information presented in this CAIP includes facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for the selection and evaluation of environmental samples. Corrective Action Unit 554 is located in Area 23 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 554 is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS), which is: 23-02-08, USTs 23-115-1, 2, 3/Spill 530-90-002. This site consists of soil contamination resulting from a fuel release from underground storage tanks (USTs). Corrective Action Site 23-02-08 is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation prior to evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for this CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document for CAU 554. Corrective Action Site 23-02-08 will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on July 15, 2004, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; and contractor personnel. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 554. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to CAS 23-02-08. The scope of the corrective action investigation

  16. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 321: Area 22 Weather Station Fuel Storage, Nevada Test Site, Nevada; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO (1996), CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. A CAU consists of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at the CAU 321 Area 22 Weather Station Fuel Storage, CAS 22-99-05 Fuel Storage Area. For purposes of this discussion, this site will be referred to as either CAU 321 or the Fuel Storage Area. The Fuel Storage Area is located in Area 22 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles[mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1) (DOE/NV, 1996a). The Fuel Storage Area (Figure 1-2) was used to store fuel and other petroleum products necessary for motorized operations at the historic Camp Desert Rock facility which was operational from 1951 to 1958 at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The site was dismantled after 1958 (DOE/NV, 1996a)

  17. A Label Correcting Algorithm for Partial Disassembly Sequences in the Production Planning for End-of-Life Products

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pei-Fang (Jennifer Tsai

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Remanufacturing of used products has become a strategic issue for cost-sensitive businesses. Due to the nature of uncertain supply of end-of-life (EoL products, the reverse logistic can only be sustainable with a dynamic production planning for disassembly process. This research investigates the sequencing of disassembly operations as a single-period partial disassembly optimization (SPPDO problem to minimize total disassembly cost. AND/OR graph representation is used to include all disassembly sequences of a returned product. A label correcting algorithm is proposed to find an optimal partial disassembly plan if a specific reusable subpart is retrieved from the original return. Then, a heuristic procedure that utilizes this polynomial-time algorithm is presented to solve the SPPDO problem. Numerical examples are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of this solution procedure.

  18. Overview of Low-Level Waste Disposal Operations at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Environmental Management Program is charged with the responsibility to carry out the disposal of on-site and off-site generated low-level radioactive waste at the Nevada Test Site. Core elements of this mission are ensuring that disposal take place in a manner that is safe and cost-effective while protecting workers, the public, and the environment. This paper focuses on giving an overview of the Nevada Test Site facilities regarding currant design of disposal. In addition, technical attributes of the facilities established through the site characterization process will be further described. An update on current waste disposal volumes and capabilities will also be provided. This discussion leads to anticipated volume projections and disposal site requirements as the Nevada Test Site disposal operations look towards the future

  19. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2010

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    C. Wills, ed.

    2011-09-13

    This NNSSER was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the NNSA/NSO Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2010 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) and its two support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Through a Memorandum of Agreement, NNSA/NSO is responsible for the oversight of TTR ER projects, and the Sandia Site Office of NNSA (NNSA/SSO) has oversight of all other TTR activities. NNSA/SSO produces the TTR annual environmental report available at http://www.sandia.gov/news/publications/environmental/index.html.

  20. Shape memory polymer nanocomposites for application of multiple-field active disassembly: experiment and simulation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carrell, John; Zhang, Hong-Chao; Wang, Shiren; Tate, Derrick

    2013-11-19

    Active disassembly (AD) uses innovative materials that can perform a designed disassembly action by the application of an external field. AD provides improvements over current disassembly processes by limiting machine or manual labor and enabling batch processing for end-of-life products. With improved disassembly operations, more reuse of components and purer recycling streams may be seen. One problem with AD, however, has been with the single-field actuation because of the probability of accidental disassembly. This presentation will discuss the application of shape memory polymer (SMP) nanocomposites in a new AD process. This novel AD process requires multiple-field actuation of the SMP nanocomposite fastener. In the analysis of this AD process, thermal and magnetic field tests were performed on the SMP nanocomposite. From these tests, finite-element analysis was performed to model and simulate the multiple-field AD process. The results of the simulations provide performance variables for the AD process and show a better performance time for the SMP nanocomposite fastener than for a comparable SMP fastener.

  1. Mathematical and Simulation Modelling of Moisture Diffusion Mechanism during Plastic IC Packages Disassembly

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Peng Mou

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Reuse of plastic IC packages disassembled from printed circuit boards (PCBs has significant environmental benefits and economic value. The interface delamination caused by moisture diffusion is the main failure mode of IC packages during the disassembling process, which greatly reduces the reusability and reliability of disassembled IC packages. Exploring moisture diffusion mechanism is a prerequisite to optimize prebaking processes before disassembling that is an effective way to avoid the interface delamination. To this end, a computational model with variable boundary conditions is developed based on the different combination state of water in IC packages. The distribution characteristics and mechanism of moisture diffusion behavior are analyzed including the humidity distribution field and the relation among baking temperature, water loss rate, and baking time during baking process, and then the results are validated by FEA simulation based on the improved definition of relative moisture concentration. Baking under variable temperature is proposed and compared with the baking process and baking efficiency under constant temperature to find out the optimized baking parameters. Finally, a set of curves which indicate the relation between baking energy consumption and temperature are determined under actual industrial baking experiments, which could be used as references to develop industrial standards for PCB disassembling process.

  2. An Intelligent Agent-Controlled and Robot-Based Disassembly Assistant

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jungbluth, Jan; Gerke, Wolfgang; Plapper, Peter

    2017-09-01

    One key for successful and fluent human-robot-collaboration in disassembly processes is equipping the robot system with higher autonomy and intelligence. In this paper, we present an informed software agent that controls the robot behavior to form an intelligent robot assistant for disassembly purposes. While the disassembly process first depends on the product structure, we inform the agent using a generic approach through product models. The product model is then transformed to a directed graph and used to build, share and define a coarse disassembly plan. To refine the workflow, we formulate “the problem of loosening a connection and the distribution of the work” as a search problem. The created detailed plan consists of a sequence of actions that are used to call, parametrize and execute robot programs for the fulfillment of the assistance. The aim of this research is to equip robot systems with knowledge and skills to allow them to be autonomous in the performance of their assistance to finally improve the ergonomics of disassembly workstations.

  3. SP-100 reactor disassembly remote handling test program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilson, C.E.; Potter, J.D.; Maiden, G.E.; Vader, D.P.

    1991-01-01

    This paper is presented as an overview of the remote handling equipment validation testing, which will be conducted before installation and use in the ground engineering test facility. This equipment will be used to defuel the SP-100 reactor core after removing it from the Test Assembly following nuclear testing. A series of full scale mock-up operational tests will be conducted at a Hanford Site facility to verify equipment design, operation, and capabilities

  4. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2006-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543, Liquid Disposal Units, is listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996. CAU 543 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 6 and 15 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 543 consists of the following seven CASs: (sm b ullet) CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad (sm b ullet) CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield (sm b ullet) CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank (sm b ullet) CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area (sm b ullet) CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping From January 24, 2005 through April 14, 2005, CAU 543 site characterization activities were conducted, and are reported in Appendix A of the CAU 543 Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2005). The recommended corrective action as stated in the approved CADD is No Further Action for five of the CAU 543 CASs, and Closure In Place for the remaining two CASs

  5. Closure Plan for Corrective Action Unit 109: U-2bu Subsidence Crater Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shannon Parsons

    1999-03-01

    The U-2bu subsidence crater, Corrective Action Unit 109, will be closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection operational permit, and the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order. The U-2bu subsidence crater is located in Area 2 of the Nevada Test Site. It was created in 1971 by an underground nuclear test with the name Miniata. The crater has a diameter of 288 meters (944 feet) and an approximate depth of 35 meters (115 feet). The subsidence crater was used as a land disposal unit for radioactive and hazardous waste from 1973 to 1988. Site disposal history is supported by memorandums, letters, and personnel who worked at the Nevada Test Site at the time of active disposal. Closure activities will include the excavation and disposal of impacted soil form the tip of the crater. Upon completion of excavation, verification samples will be collected to show that lead has been removed to concentrations be low regulatory action level. The area will then be backfilled and a soil flood diversion berm will be constructed, and certified by an independent professional engineer as to having followed the approved Closure Plan.

  6. Design and analysis of sustainable computer mouse using design for disassembly methodology

    Science.gov (United States)

    Roni Sahroni, Taufik; Fitri Sukarman, Ahmad; Agung Mahardini, Karunia

    2017-12-01

    This paper presents the design and analysis of computer mouse using Design for Disassembly methodology. Basically, the existing computer mouse model consist a number of unnecessary part that cause the assembly and disassembly time in production. The objective of this project is to design a new computer mouse based on Design for Disassembly (DFD) methodology. The main methodology of this paper was proposed from sketch generation, concept selection, and concept scoring. Based on the design screening, design concept B was selected for further analysis. New design of computer mouse is proposed using fastening system. Furthermore, three materials of ABS, Polycarbonate, and PE high density were prepared to determine the environmental impact category. Sustainable analysis was conducted using software SolidWorks. As a result, PE High Density gives the lowers amount in the environmental category with great maximum stress value.

  7. Development of the spent fuel disassembling process by utilizing the 3D graphic design technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, T. K.; Lee, J. Y.; Kim, S. H.; Yun, J. S.

    2001-01-01

    For developing the spent fuel disassembling process, the 3D graphic simulation has been established by utilizing the 3D graphic design technology which is widely used in the industry. The spent fuel disassembling process consists of a downender, a rod extraction device, a rod cutting device, a pellet extracting device and a skeleton compaction device. In this study, the 3D graphical design model of these devices is implemented by conceptual design and established the virtual workcell within kinematics to motion of each device. By implementing this graphic simulation, all the unit process involved in the spent fuel disassembling processes are analyzed and optimized. The 3D graphical model and the 3D graphic simulation can be effectively used for designing the process equipment, as well as the optimized process and maintenance process

  8. Advanced disassembling technique of irradiated driver fuel assembly for continuous irradiation of fuel pins

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ichikawa, Shoichi; Haga, Hiroyuki; Katsuyama, Kozo; Maeda, Koji; Nishinoiri, Kenji

    2012-01-01

    It was necessary to carry out continuous irradiation tests in order to obtain the irradiation data of high burn-up fuel and high neutron dose material for FaCT (Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development) project. There, the disassembling technique of an irradiated fuel assembly was advanced in order to realize further continuous irradiation tests. Although the conventional disassembling technique had been cutting a lower end-plug of a fuel pin needed to fix fuel pins to an irradiation vehicle, the advanced disassembling technique did not need cutting a lower end-plug. As a result, it was possible to supply many irradiated fuel pins to various continuous irradiation tests for FaCT project. (author)

  9. Nevada Transportation Options Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    P. GEHNER; E.M. WEAVER; L. FOSSUM

    2006-01-01

    This study performs a cost and schedule analysis of three Nevada Transportation options that support waste receipt at the repository. Based on the U.S. Department of Energy preference for rail transportation in Nevada (given in the Final Environmental Impact Statement), it has been assumed that a branch rail line would be constructed to support waste receipt at the repository. However, due to potential funding constraints, it is uncertain when rail will be available. The three Nevada Transportation options have been developed to meet a varying degree of requirements for transportation and to provide cost variations used in meeting the funding constraints given in the Technical Direction Letter guidelines for this study. The options include combinations of legal-weight truck, heavy-haul truck, and rail. Option 1 uses a branch rail line that would support initial waste receipt at the repository in 2010. Rail transportation would be the primary mode, supplemented by legal weight trucks. This option provides the highest level of confidence in cost and schedule, lowest public visibility, greatest public acceptability, lowest public dose, and is the recommended option for support of waste receipt. The completion of rail by 2010 will require spending approximately $800 million prior to 2010. Option 2 uses a phased rail approach to address a constrained funding scenario. To meet funding constraints, Option 2 uses a phased approach to delay high cost activities (final design and construction) until after initial waste receipt in 2010. By doing this, approximately 95 percent of the cost associated with completion of a branch rail line is deferred until after 2010. To support waste receipt until a branch rail line is constructed in Nevada, additional legal-weight truck shipments and heavy-haul truck shipments (on a limited basis for naval spent nuclear fuel) would be used to meet the same initial waste receipt rates as in Option 1. Use of heavy-haul shipments in the absence

  10. Sierra Nevada Subregional Boundary - Sierra Nevada Conservancy [ds542

    Data.gov (United States)

    California Natural Resource Agency — Sierra Nevada Conservancy (SNC) boundary. The boundary was mapped to correspond with statute AB 2600 (2004) and as re-defined in AB 1201 (2005). Work on the boundary...

  11. Large coil test facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelms, L.W.; Thompson, P.B.

    1980-01-01

    Final design of the facility is nearing completion, and 20% of the construction has been accomplished. A large vacuum chamber, houses the test assembly which is coupled to appropriate cryogenic, electrical, instrumentation, diagnostc systems. Adequate assembly/disassembly areas, shop space, test control center, offices, and test support laboratories are located in the same building. Assembly and installation operations are accomplished with an overhead crane. The major subsystems are the vacuum system, the test stand assembly, the cryogenic system, the experimental electric power system, the instrumentation and control system, and the data aquisition system

  12. Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada. Final environmental impact statement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-09-01

    This environmental statement for the Nevada Test Site (NTS) considers underground nuclear detonations with yields of one megaton or less, along with the preparations necessary for such detonations. The testing activities considered also include other continuing and intermittent activities, both nuclear and nonnuclear, which can best be conducted in the remote and controlled area of the Nevada Test Site. These activities are listed, with emphasis on weapons testing programs which do not remain static

  13. Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada. Final environmental impact statement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1977-09-01

    This environmental statement for the Nevada Test Site (NTS) considers underground nuclear detonations with yields of one megaton or less, along with the preparations necessary for such detonations. The testing activities considered also include other continuing and intermittent activities, both nuclear and nonnuclear, which can best be conducted in the remote and controlled area of the Nevada Test Site. These activities are listed, with emphasis on weapons testing programs which do not remain static.

  14. Nevada`s role in the hydrogen economy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vaeth, T. [Dept. of Energy, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    1997-12-31

    The paper discusses the promise of hydrogen and its possible applications, barriers to its development, the role that the Nevada Test Site could play if it were made more available to public and private institutions for research, and the ``clean city`` concept being developed jointly with California, Utah, and Nevada. This concept would create a ``clean corridor`` along the route from Salt Lake City through Reno to Sacramento, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and back to Salt Lake City.

  15. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232: Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office; the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; and the U. S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 232 consists of Corrective Action Site 25-03-01, Sewage Lagoon. Corrective Action Unit 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, received sanitary effluent from four buildings within the Test Cell ''C'' Facility from the mid-1960s through approximately 1996. The Test Cell ''C'' Facility was used to develop nuclear propulsion technology by conducting nuclear test reactor studies. Based on the site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern include volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, pesticides, herbicides, gamma emitting radionuclides, isotopic plutonium, isotopic uranium, and strontium-90. A detailed conceptual site model is presented in Section 3.0 and Appendix A of this Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The conceptual model serves as the basis for the sampling strategy. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, the Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Field work will be conducted following approval of the plan. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the Corrective Action Decision Document

  16. CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 204: STORAGE BUNKERS, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 330 consists of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 6, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The unit is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) as CAU 330: Areas 6, 22, and 23 Tanks and Spill Sites. CAU 330 consists of the following CASs: CAS 06-02-04, Underground Storage Tank (UST) and Piping CAS 22-99-06, Fuel Spill CAS 23-01-02, Large Aboveground Storage Tank (AST) Farm CAS 23-25-05, Asphalt Oil Spill/Tar Release

  17. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 240: Area 25 Vehicle Washdown, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    US Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office

    1999-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Offices's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 240: Area 25 Vehicle Washdown, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This corrective action investigation was conducted in accordance with the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for CAU 240 as developed under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 25 at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, CAU 240 is comprised of three Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 25-07-01, Vehicle Washdown Area (Propellant Pad); 25-07-02, Vehicle Washdown Area (F and J Roads Pad); and 25-07-03, Vehicle Washdown Station (RADSAFE Pad). In March 1999, the corrective action investigation was performed to detect and evaluate analyte concentrations against preliminary action levels (PALs) to determine contaminants of concern (COCs). There were no COCs identified at CAS 25-07-01 or CAS 25-07-03; therefore, there was no need for corrective action at these two CASs. At CAS 25-07-02, diesel-range organics and radionuclide concentrations in soil samples from F and J Roads Pad exceeded PALs. Based on this result, potential CAAs were identified and evaluated to ensure worker, public, and environmental protection against potential exposure to COCs in accordance with Nevada Administrative Code 445A. Following a review of potential exposure pathways, existing data, and future and current operations in Area 25, two CAAs were identified for CAU 240 (CAS 25-07-02): Alternative 1 - No Further Action and Alternative 2 - Clean Closure by Excavation and Disposal. Alternative 2 was identified as the preferred alternative. This alternative was judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated, compliance with all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site, as well as minimizing potential future exposure

  18. Nevada Thickness of Cenozoic Deposits

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce — This study of gravity data from Nevada is part of a statewide analysis of mineral resources. The main objective of the gravity study were: 1) to infer the structure...

  19. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543: Liquid Disposal Units is listed in Appendix III of the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) which was agreed to by the state of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). CAU 543 sites are located in Areas 6 and 15 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 543 consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) (Figure 1): CAS 06-07-01, Decon Pad; CAS 15-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; CAS 15-04-01, Septic Tank; CAS 15-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 15-08-01, Liquid Manure Tank; CAS 15-23-01, Underground Radioactive Material Area; and CAS 15-23-03, Contaminated Sump, Piping. All Area 15 CASs are located at the former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm, which operated from 1963 to 1981 and was used to support animal experiments involving the uptake of radionuclides. Each of the Area 15 CASs, except CAS 15-23-01, is associated with the disposal of waste effluent from Building 15-06, which was the primary location of the various tests and experiments conducted onsite. Waste effluent disposal from Building 15-06 involved piping, sumps, outfalls, a septic tank with leachfield, underground storage tanks, and an aboveground storage tank (AST). CAS 15-23-01 was associated with decontamination activities of farm equipment potentially contaminated with radiological constituents, pesticides, and herbicides. While the building structures were removed before the investigation took place, all the original tanks, sumps, piping, and concrete building pads remain in place. The Area 6 CAS is located at the Decontamination Facility in Area 6, a facility which operated from 1971 to 2001 and was used to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, clothing, and other materials that had become contaminated during nuclear testing activities. The CAS includes the effluent collection and distribution systems for Buildings

  20. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 542: Disposal Holes, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laura Pastor

    2006-01-01

    locate previously unidentified features at CASs 03-20-07, 03-20-09, 03-20-10, 03-20-11, and 06-20-03. (4) Perform field screening. (5) Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. (6) Collect quality control samples for laboratory analyses to evaluate the performance of measurement systems and controls based on the requirements of the data quality indicators. (7) If COCs are present at the surface/near surface (< 15 feet below ground surface), collect additional step-out samples to define the extent of the contamination. (8) If COCs are present in the subsurface (i.e., base of disposal hole), collect additional samples to define the vertical extent of contamination. A conservative use restriction will be used to encompass the lateral extent of subsurface contamination. (9) Stake or flag sample locations in the field, and record coordinates through global positioning systems surveying. (10) Collect samples of investigation-derived waste, as needed, for waste management and minimization purposes. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Under the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'', this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Field work will be conducted following approval of the plan

  1. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 137: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wickline, Alfred

    2005-01-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 137: Waste Disposal Sites. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 137 contains sites that are located in Areas 1, 3, 7, 9, and 12 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 137 is comprised of the eight corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; (2) CAS 03-23-01, Waste Disposal Site; (3) CAS 03-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (4) CAS 03-99-15, Waste Disposal Site; (5) CAS 07-23-02, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (6) CAS 09-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (7) CAS 12-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; and (8) CAS 12-23-07, Waste Disposal Site. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 137 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI before evaluating and selecting corrective action

  2. Phosphatase PP2A and microtubule-mediated pulling forces disassemble centrosomes during mitotic exit

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stephen J. Enos

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Centrosomes are microtubule-nucleating organelles that facilitate chromosome segregation and cell division in metazoans. Centrosomes comprise centrioles that organize a micron-scale mass of protein called pericentriolar material (PCM from which microtubules nucleate. During each cell cycle, PCM accumulates around centrioles through phosphorylation-mediated assembly of PCM scaffold proteins. During mitotic exit, PCM swiftly disassembles by an unknown mechanism. Here, we used Caenorhabditis elegans embryos to determine the mechanism and importance of PCM disassembly in dividing cells. We found that the phosphatase PP2A and its regulatory subunit SUR-6 (PP2ASUR-6, together with cortically directed microtubule pulling forces, actively disassemble PCM. In embryos depleted of these activities, ∼25% of PCM persisted from one cell cycle into the next. Purified PP2ASUR-6 could dephosphorylate the major PCM scaffold protein SPD-5 in vitro. Our data suggest that PCM disassembly occurs through a combination of dephosphorylation of PCM components and force-driven fragmentation of the PCM scaffold.

  3. Optimization of Two-Level Disassembly/Remanufacturing/Assembly System with an Integrated Maintenance Strategy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zouhour Guiras

    2018-04-01

    Full Text Available With an increase of environmental pressure on economic activities, reverse flow is increasingly important. It seeks to save resources, eliminate waste, and improve productivity. This paper investigates the optimization of the disassembly, remanufacturing and assembly system, taking into account assembly-disassembly system degradation. An analytical model is developed to consider disassembly, remanufacturing of used/end-of-life product and assembly of the finished product. The finished product is composed of remanufactured and new components. A maintenance policy is sequentially integrated to reduce the system unavailability. The aim of this study is to help decision-makers, under certain conditions, choose the most cost-effective process for them to satisfy the customer as well as to adapt to the potential risk that can perturb the disassembly-assembly system. A heuristic is developed to determine the optimal ordered date of the used end-of-life product as well as the optimum release dates of new external components. The results reveal that considering some remanufacturing and purchase components costs, the proposed model is more economical in comparison with a model without remanufactured parts. Numerical results are provided to illustrate the impact of the variation of the ordering cost and quality of the used end-of-life product on the system profitability. Finally, the risk due to system repair periods is discussed, which has an impact on managerial decision-making.

  4. Improved Nondestructive Disassembly Process using Augmented Reality and RFID Product/Part Tracking

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ile Mircheski

    2017-11-01

    Full Text Available The waste from electric and electronic equipment and discarded automobiles in the past grew rapidly and resulted with waste in billions of tones. The aim of this paper is to present an improved non-destructive disassembly process of electromechanical products using augmented reality based devices, such as glasses, tablets or mobile phones, and RFID technology for valuable product/part tracking. The proposed method includes tagging of components of interest in the product assembly by using a RFID tag. The valuable product is marked with specific ID number written in the RFID tag, in order to declare the product. The relevant data such as material and weight of components, guidelines for non-destructive disassembly for the valuable product and removing of component of interest will be obtained with the assistance of RFID tag and a centralized database. This modular system offers guidelines for the non-destructive disassembly process for obtaining valuable component of interest intended for easy repairs, remanufacture, reuse or recycling. The guidelines are in video presentation format using augmented reality for easy visualization of non-destructive disassembly process. The benefits of proposed modular system includes biggest percentage of reuse of the valuable components, easy maintaining, improved material recycling, environmental protection and greater total return form end of life products.

  5. Hybrid disassembly system for cellular telephone end-of-life treatment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kniebel, M.; Basdere, B.; Seliger, G. [Technical Univ. Berlin, Inst. for Machine Tools and Factory Management, Dept. of Assembly Technology and Factory Management, Berlin (Germany)

    2004-07-01

    Concern over the negative environmental impacts associated with the production, use, and end-of-life (EOL) of cellular telephones is particularly high due to large production volumes and characteristically short time scales of technological and stylistic obsolescence. Landfilled or incinerated cellular telephones create the potential for release of toxic substances. The European legislation has passed the directive on Waste of Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) to regulate their collection and appropriate end-of-life treatment. Manufacturers must conduct material recycling or remanufacturing processes to recover resources. While recovery rates can hardly be met economically by material recycling, remanufacturing and reusing cellular phones is developing into a reasonable alternative. Both end-of-life options require disassembly processes for WEEE compliant treatment. Due to the high number of different cell phone variants and their typical design that fits components into tight enclosing spaces, cellular phone disassembly becomes a challenging task. These challenges and the expected high numbers of phones to be returned in the course of the WEEE urges for automated disassembly. A hybrid disassembly system has been developed to ensure the mass-treatment of obsolete cellular phones. It has been integrated into a prototypical remanufacturing factory for cellular phones that has been planned based on market data. (orig.)

  6. Conceptual design report for the mechanical disassembly of Fort St. Vrain fuel elements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lord, D.L. [Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Co., Inc., Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Wadsworth, D.C.; Sekot, J.P.; Skinner, K.L. [EG and G Idaho, Inc., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    1993-04-01

    A conceptual design study was prepared that: (1) reviewed the operations necessary to perform the mechanical disassembly of Fort St. Vrain fuel elements; (2) contained a description and survey of equipment capable of performing the necessary functions; and (3) performed a tradeoff study for determining the preferred concepts and equipment specifications. A preferred system was recommended and engineering specifications for this system were developed.

  7. Nano-functionalized filamentous fungus hyphae with fast reversible macroscopic assembly & disassembly features.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Haiying; Li, Xiaorui; Chai, Liyuan; Zhang, Liyuan

    2015-05-18

    A uniform decoration of hyphae by polyaniline nanoparticles (PANI NPs) was achieved here. This novel hybrid structure can be effectively assembled into a film by filtration and disassembled in water by shaking. This reversible process is very fast, which promises applications in nanomaterials including adsorption.

  8. Conceptual design report for the mechanical disassembly of Fort St. Vrain fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lord, D.L.; Wadsworth, D.C.; Sekot, J.P.; Skinner, K.L.

    1993-04-01

    A conceptual design study was prepared that: (1) reviewed the operations necessary to perform the mechanical disassembly of Fort St. Vrain fuel elements; (2) contained a description and survey of equipment capable of performing the necessary functions; and (3) performed a tradeoff study for determining the preferred concepts and equipment specifications. A preferred system was recommended and engineering specifications for this system were developed

  9. DISA- a computer code for accident analysis of fast reactor during disassembly phase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yadav, R.D.S.; Gupta, H.P.

    2005-01-01

    Analysis of the hypothetical transients in fast rectors that result in the disassembly of the reactor generally consists of three phases. In the phase-l, some initiating event like control rod ejection, coolant pump failure etc. is assumed to have taken place which leads the reactor to prompt critical state where fuel melting, sodium voiding etc. take place. In fast reactor normally the fuel is not in the optimum shape and further positive reactivity may be introduced into the system due to fuel melting. Fuel slumping is assumed to take place in this phase. If prompt criticality is reached as a result of the first phase, then disassembly phase is assumed to start. In this phase the neutron transient is followed till it is terminated by the disassembly of the core which takes place due to generation of high pressure gradients and which lead the core material to move from more worth region to less worth region. Doppler feed back is taken into account and reactivity feedback due to material movement is calculated by solving the hydrodynamics equations. The third phase will calculate the effect of this transient on the reactor vessel and containment. A computer code DISA for fast reactor DISAssembly phase, which is similar to the well known code VENUS has been developed. (author)

  10. Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Waste Acceptance Criteria

    1999-01-01

    This document provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive and mixed waste for disposal; and transuranic and transuranic mixed waste for interim storage at the Nevada Test Site

  11. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 166: Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    David Strand

    2006-01-01

    contaminants of concern are present. (5) If contaminants of concern are present, collect additional step-out samples to define the extent of the contamination. (6) Collect samples of investigation-derived waste, as needed, for waste management and minimization purposes. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Under the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'', this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, and field work will commence following approval

  12. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobiason, D. S.

    2003-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) documents the activities undertaken to close Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 262: Area 25 Septic Systems and Underground Discharge Point, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. Site closure was performed in accordance with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 262 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office [NNSA/NV, 2002a]). CAU 262 is located at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 262 consists of the following nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the NTS: CAS 25-02-06, Underground Storage tank CAS 25-04-06, Septic Systems A and B CAS 25-04-07, Septic System CAS 25-05-03, Leachfield CAS 25-05-05, Leachfield CAS 25-05-06, Leachfield CAS 25-05-08, Radioactive Leachfield CAS 25-05-12, Leachfield CAS 25-51-01, Dry Well

  13. Disassembly and physical separation of electric/electronic components layered in printed circuit boards (PCB).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lee, Jaeryeong; Kim, Youngjin; Lee, Jae-chun

    2012-11-30

    Although printed circuit boards (PCBs) contain various elements, only the major elements (i.e., those with content levels in wt% or over grade) of and precious metals (e.g., Ag, Au, and platinum groups) contained within PCBs can be recycled. To recover other elements from PCBs, the PCBs should be properly disassembled as the first step of the recycling process. The recovery of these other elements would be beneficial for efforts to conserve scarce resources, reuse electric/electronic components (EECs), and eliminate environmental problems. This paper examines the disassembly of EECs from wasted PCBs (WPCBs) and the physical separation of these EECs using a self-designed disassembling apparatus and a 3-step separation process of sieving, magnetic separation, and dense medium separation. The disassembling efficiencies were evaluated by using the ratio of grinding area (E(area)) and the weight ratio of the detached EECs (E(weight)). In the disassembly treatment, these efficiencies were improved with an increase of grinder speed and grinder height. 97.7% (E(area)) and 98% (E(weight)) could be accomplished ultimately by 3 repetitive treatments at a grinder speed of 5500 rpm and a grinder height of 1.5mm. Through a series of physical separations, most groups of the EECs (except for the diode, transistor, and IC chip groups) could be sorted at a relatively high separation efficiency of about 75% or more. To evaluate the separation efficiency with regard to the elemental composition, the distribution ratio (R(dis)) and the concentration ratio (R(conc)) were used. 15 elements could be separated with the highest R(dis) and R(conc) in the same separated division. This result implies that the recyclability of the elements is highly feasible, even though the initial content in EECs is lower than several tens of mg/kg. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  14. Modelling disassembled fuel bundles using CATHENA MOD-3.5a under LOCA/LOECC conditions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lei, Q M; Sanderson, D B; Dutton, R [Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Pinawa, MB (Canada). Whiteshell Labs.

    1996-12-31

    CATHENA MOD-3.5a is a multipurpose thermalhydraulic computer code developed primarily to analyse postulated loss-of-coolant scenarios for CANDU nuclear reactors. The code contains a generalized heat transfer package that enables it to model the behaviour of a fuel channel in great detail. Throughout the development of the CATHENA code, considerable effort has been devoted to evaluating, validating and documenting its overall capability as a design and safety assessment tool. Specific attention has focused on its ability to predict fuel channel behaviour under postulated accident conditions. This paper describes an investigation of CATHENA`s ability to predict the thermal-chemical responses of a fuel channel in which the 37-element bundles were assumed to disassemble and rearrange into a closed-packed stack of elements at the bottom of the pressure tube. A representative disassembled bundle geometry was modelled during a simulated loss-of-coolant accident scenario using CATHENA MOD-3.5a/Rev 0, with superheated steam being the only coolant available. Thermal conduction in the radial and circumferential directions was calculated for individual fuel elements, the pressure tube, and the calandria tube. Radiation view factors for the intact and disassembled bundle geometries were calculated using a CATHENA utility program. Inter-element metal-to-metal contact was accounted for using the CATHENA solid-solid contact model. An offset pressure-tube configuration, representing a partially sagged pressure tube, and the effect of steam starvation on the exothermic zirconium-steam reaction, were included in the CATHENA model. The CATHENA-predicted results show a dramatic suppression of heat generation from the zirconium-steam reaction when bundle disassembly is initiated. The predicted results show a smaller temperature increase in the fuel sheaths and the pressure tube for the disassembled bundle geometry, compared to the temperature excursion for the intact bundle. (author

  15. Low cytoplasmic pH reduces ER-Golgi trafficking and induces disassembly of the Golgi apparatus

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Soonthornsit, Jeerawat [Laboratory for Cell and Developmental Biology, Department of Molecular Biosciences, Faculty of Life Sciences, Kyoto Sangyo University, Motoyama, Kamigamo, Kita, Kyoto 603-8555 (Japan); Yamaguchi, Yoko; Tamura, Daisuke [Division of Life Sciences, Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology, Kanazawa University, Kakuma, Kanazawa 920-1192 (Japan); Ishida, Ryuichi; Nakakoji, Yoko; Osako, Shiho [Laboratory for Cell and Developmental Biology, Department of Molecular Biosciences, Faculty of Life Sciences, Kyoto Sangyo University, Motoyama, Kamigamo, Kita, Kyoto 603-8555 (Japan); Yamamoto, Akitsugu [Department of Animal Bioscience, Nagahama Institute of Bio-Science and Technology, 266 Tamura, Nagahama, Shiga, 526‐0829 (Japan); Nakamura, Nobuhiro, E-mail: osaru3@cc.kyoto-su.ac.jp [Laboratory for Cell and Developmental Biology, Department of Molecular Biosciences, Faculty of Life Sciences, Kyoto Sangyo University, Motoyama, Kamigamo, Kita, Kyoto 603-8555 (Japan); Division of Life Sciences, Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology, Kanazawa University, Kakuma, Kanazawa 920-1192 (Japan)

    2014-11-01

    The Golgi apparatus was dramatically disassembled when cells were incubated in a low pH medium. The cis-Golgi disassembled quickly, extended tubules and spread to the periphery of cells within 30 min. In contrast, medial- and trans-Golgi were fragmented in significantly larger structures of smaller numbers at a slower rate and remained largely in structures distinct from the cis-Golgi. Electron microscopy revealed the complete disassembly of the Golgi stack in low pH treated cells. The effect of low pH was reversible; the Golgi apparatus reassembled to form a normal ribbon-like structure within 1–2 h after the addition of a control medium. The anterograde ER to Golgi transport and retrograde Golgi to ER transport were both reduced under low pH. Phospholipase A{sub 2} inhibitors (ONO, BEL) effectively suppressed the Golgi disassembly, suggesting that the phospholipase A{sub 2} was involved in the Golgi disassembly. Over-expression of Rab1, 2, 30, 33 and 41 also suppressed the Golgi disassembly under low pH, suggesting that they have protective role against Golgi disassembly. Low pH treatment reduced cytoplasmic pH, but not the luminal pH of the Golgi apparatus, strongly suggesting that reduction of the cytoplasmic pH triggered the Golgi disassembly. Because a lower cytoplasmic pH is induced in physiological or pathological conditions, disassembly of the Golgi apparatus and reduction of vesicular transport through the Golgi apparatus may play important roles in cell physiology and pathology. Furthermore, our findings indicated that low pH treatment can serve as an important tool to analyze the molecular mechanisms that support the structure and function of the Golgi apparatus. - Highlights: • The Golgi apparatus reversibly disassembles by low pH treatment. • The cis-Golgi disassembles quickly generating tubular structures. • Both anterograde and retrograde transport between the ER and the Golgi apparatus are reduced. • Phospholipase A{sub 2} inhibitors (ONO

  16. Nevada test site low-level and mixed waste repository design in the unsaturated zone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawamura, T.A.; Warren, D.M.

    1989-01-01

    The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is used for shallow land disposal of Low-Level Radioactive (LLW) and for retrievable disposal of Mixed Wastes (MW) from various Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. The site is situated in southern Nevada, one of the most arid regions of the United States. Design considerations include vadose zone monitoring in lieu of groundwater monitoring, stringent waste acceptance and packaging criteria, a waste examination and real-time radiography facility, and trench design. 4 refs

  17. Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project

    2008-06-01

    This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC). The NTSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive (LLW) and LLW Mixed Waste (MW) for disposal.

  18. Environmental overview of geothermal development: northern Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Slemmons, D.B.; Stroh, J.M.; Whitney, R.A. (eds.)

    1980-08-01

    Regional environmental problems and issues associated with geothermal development in northern Nevada are studied to facilitate environmental assessment of potential geothermal resources. The various issues discussed are: environmental geology, seismicity of northern Nevada, hydrology and water quality, air quality, Nevada ecosystems, noise effects, socio-economic impacts, and cultural resources and archeological values. (MHR)

  19. Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project

    2008-01-01

    This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC). The NTSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive (LLW) and LLW Mixed Waste (MW) for disposal

  20. Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-12-01

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) Resource Management Plan (RMP) describes the NTS Stewardship Mission and how its accomplishment will preserve the resources of the ecoregion while accomplishing the objectives of the mission. The NTS Stewardship Mission is to manage the land and facilities at the NTS as a unique and valuable national resource. The RMP has defined goals for twelve resource areas based on the principles of ecosystem management. These goals were established using an interdisciplinary team of DOE/NV resource specialists with input from surrounding land managers, private parties, and representatives of Native American governments. The overall goal of the RMP is to facilitate improved NTS land use management decisions within the Great Basin and Mojave Desert ecoregions.

  1. Defense waste management operations at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, R.E.; Kendall, E.W.

    1988-01-01

    Waste management activities were initiated at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) to dispose of low-level wastes (LLW) produced by the Department of Energy's (DOE's) weapons testing program. Disposal activities have expanded from the burial of atmospheric weapons testing debris to demonstration facilities for greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) waste, transuranic (TRU) waste storage and certification, and the development of a mixed waste (MW) facility. Site specific operational research projects support technology development required for the various disposal facilities. The annual cost of managing the facilities is about $6 million depending on waste volumes and types. The paper discusses site selection; establishment of the Radioactive Waste Management Project; operations with respect to low-level radioactive wastes, transuranic waste storage, greater confinement disposal test, and mixed waste management facility; and related research activities such as tritium migration studies, revegetation studies, and in-situ monitoring of organics

  2. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232: Area 25 Sewage Lagoons Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    DOE/NV Operations Office

    1999-05-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense. The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO, CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites. A CAU consists of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at CAU 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons. Corrective Action Unit 232 consists of CAS 25-03-01, Sewage Lagoon, located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1) (DOE/NV, 1996a). The Area 25 Sewage Lagoons (Figure 1-2) (IT, 1999b) are located approximately 0.3 mi south of the Test Cell 'C' (TCC) Facility and were used for the discharge of sanitary effluent from the TCC facility. For purposes of this discussion, this site will be referred to as either CAU 232 or the sewage lagoons.

  3. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Hot Creek Valley in Nye County, Nevada, and consisting of three separate land withdrawal areas (UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4), CAU 417 is comprised of 34 corrective action sites (CASs) including 2 underground storage tanks, 5 septic systems, 8 shaker pad/cuttings disposal areas, 1 decontamination facility pit, 1 burn area, 1 scrap/trash dump, 1 outlier area, 8 housekeeping sites, and 16 mud pits. Four field events were conducted between September 1996 and June 1998 to complete a corrective action investigation indicating that the only contaminant of concern was total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH) which was found in 18 of the CASs. A total of 1,028 samples were analyzed. During this investigation, a statistical approach was used to determine which depth intervals or layers inside individual mud pits and shaker pad areas were above the State action levels for the TPH. Other related field sampling activities (i.e., expedited site characterization methods, surface geophysical surveys, direct-push geophysical surveys, direct-push soil sampling, and rotosonic drilling located septic leachfields) were conducted in this four-phase investigation; however, no further contaminants of concern (COCs) were identified. During and after the investigation activities, several of the sites which had surface debris but no COCs were cleaned up as housekeeping sites, two septic tanks were closed in place, and two underground storage tanks were removed. The focus of this CADD was to identify CAAs which would promote the prevention or mitigation of human exposure to surface and subsurface soils with contaminant

  4. Low cytoplasmic pH reduces ER-Golgi trafficking and induces disassembly of the Golgi apparatus.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Soonthornsit, Jeerawat; Yamaguchi, Yoko; Tamura, Daisuke; Ishida, Ryuichi; Nakakoji, Yoko; Osako, Shiho; Yamamoto, Akitsugu; Nakamura, Nobuhiro

    2014-11-01

    The Golgi apparatus was dramatically disassembled when cells were incubated in a low pH medium. The cis-Golgi disassembled quickly, extended tubules and spread to the periphery of cells within 30 min. In contrast, medial- and trans-Golgi were fragmented in significantly larger structures of smaller numbers at a slower rate and remained largely in structures distinct from the cis-Golgi. Electron microscopy revealed the complete disassembly of the Golgi stack in low pH treated cells. The effect of low pH was reversible; the Golgi apparatus reassembled to form a normal ribbon-like structure within 1-2h after the addition of a control medium. The anterograde ER to Golgi transport and retrograde Golgi to ER transport were both reduced under low pH. Phospholipase A2 inhibitors (ONO, BEL) effectively suppressed the Golgi disassembly, suggesting that the phospholipase A2 was involved in the Golgi disassembly. Over-expression of Rab1, 2, 30, 33 and 41 also suppressed the Golgi disassembly under low pH, suggesting that they have protective role against Golgi disassembly. Low pH treatment reduced cytoplasmic pH, but not the luminal pH of the Golgi apparatus, strongly suggesting that reduction of the cytoplasmic pH triggered the Golgi disassembly. Because a lower cytoplasmic pH is induced in physiological or pathological conditions, disassembly of the Golgi apparatus and reduction of vesicular transport through the Golgi apparatus may play important roles in cell physiology and pathology. Furthermore, our findings indicated that low pH treatment can serve as an important tool to analyze the molecular mechanisms that support the structure and function of the Golgi apparatus. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  5. Nevada Test Site Site Treatment Plan. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-03-01

    Treatment Plans (STPS) are required for facilities at which the US Department of Energy (DOE) or stores mixed waste, defined by the Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCAct) as waste containing both a hazardous waste subject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and a radioactive material subject to the Atomic Energy Act. On April 6, 1993, DOE published a Federal Register notice (58 FR 17875) describing its proposed process for developing the STPs in three phases including a Conceptual, a Draft, and a Proposed Site Treatment Plan (PSTP). All of the DOE Nevada Operations Office STP iterations have been developed with the state of Nevada's input. The options and schedules reflect a ''bottoms-up'' approach and have been evaluated for impacts on other DOE sites, as well as impacts to the overall DOE program. Changes may have occurred in the preferred option and associated schedules between the PSTP, which was submitted to the state of Nevada and US Environmental Protection Agency April 1995, and the Final STP (hereafter referred to as the STP) as treatment evaluations progressed. The STP includes changes that have occurred since the submittal of the PSTP as a result of state-to-state and DOE-to-state discussions

  6. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 552: Area 12 Muckpile and Ponds, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1 with ROTC 1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David A. Strand

    2005-01-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 552: Area 12 Muckpile and Ponds, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 552 is comprised of the one Corrective Action Site which is 12-23-05, Ponds. One additional CAS, 12-06-04, Muckpile (G-Tunnel Muckpile), was removed from this CAU when it was determined that the muckpile is an active site. A modification to the FFACO to remove CAS 12-06-04 was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on December 16, 2004. The G-Tunnel ponds were first identified in the 1991 Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., Inc. document entitled, ''Nevada Test Site Inventory of Inactive and Abandoned Facilities and Waste Sites'' (REECo, 1991). Corrective Action Unit 552 is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Therefore, additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) prior to evaluating and selecting the corrective action alternatives for the site. The CAI will include field inspections, radiological surveys, and sampling of appropriate media. Data will also be obtained to support investigation-derived waste (IDW) disposal and potential future waste management decisions.

  7. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 145: Wells and Storage Holes, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David A. Strand

    2004-09-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 145: Wells and Storage Holes. Information presented in this CAIP includes facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for the selection and evaluation of environmental samples. Corrective Action Unit 145 is located in Area 3 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 145 is comprised of the six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 03-20-01, Core Storage Holes; (2) 03-20-02, Decon Pad and Sump; (3) 03-20-04, Injection Wells; (4) 03-20-08, Injection Well; (5) 03-25-01, Oil Spills; and (6) 03-99-13, Drain and Injection Well. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) prior to evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. One conceptual site model with three release scenario components was developed for the six CASs to address all releases associated with the site. The sites will be investigated based on data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on June 24, 2004, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and Bechtel Nevada. The DQOs process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 145.

  8. Corrective action investigation plan for Corrective Action Unit 342: Area 23 Mercury Fire Training Pit, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-03-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the US Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV); the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP); and the US Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The CAIP is a document that provides or references all of the specific information for investigation activities associated with Corrective Action Units (CAUs) or Corrective Action Sites (CASs). According to the FFACO, CASs are sites potentially requiring corrective action(s) and may include solid waste management units or individual disposal or release sites (FFACO, 1996). Corrective Action Units consist of one or more CASs grouped together based on geography, technical similarity, or agency responsibility for the purpose of determining corrective actions. This CAIP contains the environmental sample collection objectives and the criteria for conducting site investigation activities at CAU 342, the Area 23 Mercury Fire Training Pit (FTP), which is located in Area 23 at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is approximately 88 km (55 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 342 is comprised of CAS 23-56-01. The FTP is an area approximately 100 m by 140 m (350 ft by 450 ft) located west of the town of Mercury, Nevada, which was used between approximately 1965 and 1990 to train fire-fighting personnel (REECo, 1991; Jacobson, 1991). The surface and subsurface soils in the FTP have likely been impacted by hydrocarbons and other contaminants of potential concern (COPC) associated with burn activities and training exercises in the area.

  9. Studies and research concerning BNFP design and construction of a spent-fuel disassembly/encapsulation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dabolt, R.J.

    1981-04-01

    Commercial light water power reactor operation in the United States is developing a cumbersome inventory of spent fuel. Systems for interim storage and handling of this fuel are being developed by the Federal Government and industry. Disassembly and canning of the spent fuel elements is one of these systems. It has the potential to double the storage capacity of a prereprocessing storage facility or to triple the capacity of conventional shipping casks. Prototype equipment and controls required to perform this operation in a dry environment have been primarily designed and fabricated at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP). Ridihalgh, Eggers, and Associates have provided design support and fabrication of the control system. This system is capable of extracting and canning the fuel pins and compacting the nonfuel-bearing components of spent fuel assemblies at processing rates of 10 to 12 assemblies per day. The process also provides the potential for enhanced inspection and assay of spent fuel by reducing the interference encountered from the high gamma fields of the nonfuel bearing hardware

  10. Nevada local government revenues analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-06-01

    This report analyzes the major sources of revenue for Nevada local government for purposes of estimating the impacts associated with the siting of a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. Each major revenue source is analyzed separately to identify relationships between the economic or demographic base, the revenue base and the revenues generated. Trends and changes in the rates and/or base are highlighted. A model is developed for each component to allow impact estimation. This report is a companion to the report Nevada State Revenues Analysis

  11. DUPIC facility engineering

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, J S; Choi, J W; Go, W I; Kim, H D; Song, K C; Jeong, I H; Park, H S; Im, C S; Lee, H M; Moon, K H; Hong, K P; Lee, K S; Suh, K S; Kim, E K; Min, D K; Lee, J C; Chun, Y B; Paik, S Y; Lee, E P; Yoo, G S; Kim, Y S; Park, J C

    1997-09-01

    In the early stage of the project, a comprehensive survey was conducted to identify the feasibility of using available facilities and of interface between those facilities. It was found out that the shielded cell M6 interface between those facilities. It was found out that the shielded cell M6 of IMEF could be used for the main process experiments of DUPIC fuel fabrication in regard to space adequacy, material flow, equipment layout, etc. Based on such examination, a suitable adapter system for material transfer around the M6 cell was engineered. Regarding the PIEF facility, where spent PWR fuel assemblies are stored in an annex pool, disassembly devices in the pool are retrofitted and spent fuel rod cutting and shipping system to the IMEF are designed and built. For acquisition of casks for radioactive material transport between the facilities, some adaptive refurbishment was applied to the available cask (Padirac) based on extensive analysis on safety requirements. A mockup test facility was newly acquired for remote test of DUPIC fuel fabrication process equipment prior to installation in the M6 cell of the IMEF facility. (author). 157 refs., 57 tabs., 65 figs.

  12. DUPIC facility engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J. S.; Choi, J. W.; Go, W. I.; Kim, H. D.; Song, K. C.; Jeong, I. H.; Park, H. S.; Im, C. S.; Lee, H. M.; Moon, K. H.; Hong, K. P.; Lee, K. S.; Suh, K. S.; Kim, E. K.; Min, D. K.; Lee, J. C.; Chun, Y. B.; Paik, S. Y.; Lee, E. P.; Yoo, G. S.; Kim, Y. S.; Park, J. C.

    1997-09-01

    In the early stage of the project, a comprehensive survey was conducted to identify the feasibility of using available facilities and of interface between those facilities. It was found out that the shielded cell M6 interface between those facilities. It was found out that the shielded cell M6 of IMEF could be used for the main process experiments of DUPIC fuel fabrication in regard to space adequacy, material flow, equipment layout, etc. Based on such examination, a suitable adapter system for material transfer around the M6 cell was engineered. Regarding the PIEF facility, where spent PWR fuel assemblies are stored in an annex pool, disassembly devices in the pool are retrofitted and spent fuel rod cutting and shipping system to the IMEF are designed and built. For acquisition of casks for radioactive material transport between the facilities, some adaptive refurbishment was applied to the available cask (Padirac) based on extensive analysis on safety requirements. A mockup test facility was newly acquired for remote test of DUPIC fuel fabrication process equipment prior to installation in the M6 cell of the IMEF facility. (author). 157 refs., 57 tabs., 65 figs

  13. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 536 is located in Area 3 of the Nevada Test Site. CAU 536 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Area 3 Release Site, and comprises a single Corrective Action Site (CAS): (sm b ullet) CAS 03-44-02, Steam Jenny Discharge The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CAS 03-44-02 is clean closure. Closure activities included removing and disposing of total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH)- and polyaromatic hydrocarbon (PAH)-impacted soil, soil impacted with plutonium (Pu)-239, and concrete pad debris. CAU 536 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 536 Corrective Action Plan (CAP), with minor deviations as approved by NDEP. The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 536 Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2004). This Closure Report documents CAU 536 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 1,000 cubic yards (yd3) of hydrocarbon waste in the form of TPH- and PAH-impacted soil and debris, approximately 8 yd3 of Pu-239-impacted soil, and approximately 100 yd3 of concrete debris were generated, managed, and disposed of appropriately. Additionally, a previously uncharacterized, buried drum was excavated, removed, and disposed of as hydrocarbon waste as a best management practice. Waste minimization techniques, such as the utilization of laboratory analysis to characterize and classify waste streams, were employed during the performance of closure

  14. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 151 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as Septic Systems and Discharge Area. CAU 151 consists of the following eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 12, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada: (1) CAS 02-05-01, UE-2ce Pond; (2) CAS 12-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (6); (3) CAS 12-04-01, Septic Tanks; (4) CAS 12-04-02, Septic Tanks; (5) CAS 12-04-03, Septic Tank; (6) CAS 12-47-01, Wastewater Pond; (7) CAS 18-03-01, Sewage Lagoon; and (8) CAS 18-99-09, Sewer Line (Exposed). CAU 151 closure activities were conducted according to the FFACO (FFACO, 1996; as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 151 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2007) from October 2007 to January 2008. The corrective action alternatives included no further action, clean closure, and closure in place with administrative controls. CAU 151 closure activities are summarized in Table 1. Closure activities generated liquid remediation waste, sanitary waste, hydrocarbon waste, and mixed waste. Waste generated was appropriately managed and disposed. Waste that is currently staged onsite is being appropriately managed and will be disposed under approved waste profiles in permitted landfills. Waste minimization activities included waste characterization sampling and segregation of waste streams. Some waste exceeded land disposal restriction limits and required offsite treatment prior to disposal. Other waste meeting land disposal restrictions was disposed of in appropriate onsite or offsite landfills. Waste disposition documentation is included as Appendix C

  15. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 516 is located in Areas 3, 6, and 22 of the Nevada Test Site. CAU 516 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Septic Systems and Discharge Points, and is comprised of six Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (sm b ullet) CAS 03-59-01, Bldg 3C-36 Septic System (sm b ullet) CAS 03-59-02, Bldg 3C-45 Septic System (sm b ullet) CAS 06-51-01, Sump and Piping (sm b ullet) CAS 06-51-02, Clay Pipe and Debris (sm b ullet) CAS 06-51-03, Clean Out Box and Piping (sm b ullet) CAS 22-19-04, Vehicle Decontamination Area The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 06-51-02 and 22-19-04 is no further action. The NDEP-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 03-59-01, 03-59-02, 06-51-01, and 06-51-03 is clean closure. Closure activities included removing and disposing of total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH)-impacted septic tank contents, septic tanks, distribution/clean out boxes, and piping. CAU 516 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 516 Corrective Action Plan (CAP). The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 516 Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2004). This Closure Report documents CAU 516 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 186 tons of hydrocarbon waste in the form of TPH-impacted soil and debris, as well as 89 tons of construction debris, were generated and managed and disposed of appropriately. Waste minimization techniques, such as field screening of soil samples and the utilization of laboratory analysis to characterize and classify waste streams, were employed during the performance of closure work

  16. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-07-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139, Waste Disposal Sites, is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). CAU 139 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 139 consists of the following CASs: CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit; CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; CAS 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and CAS 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. Details of the site history and site characterization results for CAU 139 are provided in the approved Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006) and in the approved Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The purpose of this Corrective Action Plan (CAP) is to present the detailed scope of work required to implement the recommended corrective actions as specified in Section 4.0 of the approved CADD (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The approved closure activities for CAU 139 include removal of soil and debris contaminated with plutonium (Pu)-239, excavation of geophysical anomalies, removal of surface debris, construction of an engineered soil cover, and implementation of use restrictions (URs). Table 1 presents a summary of CAS-specific closure activities and contaminants of concern (COCs). Specific details of the corrective actions to be performed at each CAS are presented in Section 2.0 of this report.

  17. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 151: Septic Systems and Discharge Area, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2008-04-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 151 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as Septic Systems and Discharge Area. CAU 151 consists of the following eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 12, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada: (1) CAS 02-05-01, UE-2ce Pond; (2) CAS 12-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (6); (3) CAS 12-04-01, Septic Tanks; (4) CAS 12-04-02, Septic Tanks; (5) CAS 12-04-03, Septic Tank; (6) CAS 12-47-01, Wastewater Pond; (7) CAS 18-03-01, Sewage Lagoon; and (8) CAS 18-99-09, Sewer Line (Exposed). CAU 151 closure activities were conducted according to the FFACO (FFACO, 1996; as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 151 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2007) from October 2007 to January 2008. The corrective action alternatives included no further action, clean closure, and closure in place with administrative controls. CAU 151 closure activities are summarized in Table 1. Closure activities generated liquid remediation waste, sanitary waste, hydrocarbon waste, and mixed waste. Waste generated was appropriately managed and disposed. Waste that is currently staged onsite is being appropriately managed and will be disposed under approved waste profiles in permitted landfills. Waste minimization activities included waste characterization sampling and segregation of waste streams. Some waste exceeded land disposal restriction limits and required offsite treatment prior to disposal. Other waste meeting land disposal restrictions was disposed of in appropriate onsite or offsite landfills. Waste disposition documentation is included as Appendix C.

  18. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139, Waste Disposal Sites, is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). CAU 139 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is located approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 139 consists of the following CASs: CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit; CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; CAS 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and CAS 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. Details of the site history and site characterization results for CAU 139 are provided in the approved Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006) and in the approved Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The purpose of this Corrective Action Plan (CAP) is to present the detailed scope of work required to implement the recommended corrective actions as specified in Section 4.0 of the approved CADD (NNSA/NSO, 2007). The approved closure activities for CAU 139 include removal of soil and debris contaminated with plutonium (Pu)-239, excavation of geophysical anomalies, removal of surface debris, construction of an engineered soil cover, and implementation of use restrictions (URs). Table 1 presents a summary of CAS-specific closure activities and contaminants of concern (COCs). Specific details of the corrective actions to be performed at each CAS are presented in Section 2.0 of this report

  19. Cleaning, disassembly, and requalification of the FFTF in vessel handling machine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coops, W.J.

    1977-10-01

    The Engineering Model In Vessel Handling Machine (IVHM) was successfully removed, cleaned, disassembled, inspected, reassembled and reinstalled into the sodium test vessel at Richland, Washington. This was the first time in the United States a full size operational sodium wetted machine has been cleaned by the water vapor nitrogen process and requalified for operation. The work utilized an atmospheric control system during removal, a tank type water vapor nitrogen cleaning system and an open ''hands on'' disassembly and assembly stand. Results of the work indicate the tools, process and equipment are adequate for the non-radioactive maintenance sequence. Additionally, the work proves that a machine of this complexity can be successfully cleaned, maintained and re-used without the need to replace a large percentage of the sodium wetted parts

  20. Assembly, operation and disassembly manual for the Battelle Large Volume Water Sampler (BLVWS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, V.W.; Campbell, R.M.

    1984-12-01

    Assembly, operation and disassembly of the Battelle Large Volume Water Sampler (BLVWS) are described in detail. Step by step instructions of assembly, general operation and disassembly are provided to allow an operator completely unfamiliar with the sampler to successfully apply the BLVWS to his research sampling needs. The sampler permits concentration of both particulate and dissolved radionuclides from large volumes of ocean and fresh water. The water sample passes through a filtration section for particle removal then through sorption or ion exchange beds where species of interest are removed. The sampler components which contact the water being sampled are constructed of polyvinylchloride (PVC). The sampler has been successfully applied to many sampling needs over the past fifteen years. 9 references, 8 figures

  1. A Trio-Rac1-PAK1 signaling axis drives invadopodia disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Moshfegh, Yasmin; Bravo-Cordero, Jose Javier; Miskolci, Veronika; Condeelis, John; Hodgson, Louis

    2014-01-01

    Rho family GTPases control cell migration and participate in the regulation of cancer metastasis. Invadopodia, associated with invasive tumor cells, are crucial for cellular invasion and metastasis. To study Rac1 GTPase in invadopodia dynamics, we developed a genetically-encoded, single-chain Rac1 Fluorescence Resonance Energy Transfer (FRET) biosensor. The biosensor shows Rac1 activity exclusion from the core of invadopodia, and higher activity when invadopodia disappear, suggesting that reduced Rac1 activity is necessary for their stability, and Rac1 activation is involved in disassembly. Photoactivating Rac1 at invadopodia confirmed this previously-unknown Rac1 function. We built an invadopodia disassembly model, where a signaling axis involving TrioGEF, Rac1, PAK1, and phosphorylation of cortactin, causing invadopodia dissolution. This mechanism is critical for the proper turnover of invasive structures during tumor cell invasion, where a balance of proteolytic activity and locomotory protrusions must be carefully coordinated to achieve a maximally invasive phenotype. PMID:24859002

  2. Early cysteine-dependent inactivation of 26S proteasomes does not involve particle disassembly

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Martín Hugo

    2018-06-01

    Full Text Available Under oxidative stress 26S proteasomes suffer reversible disassembly into its 20S and 19S subunits, a process mediated by HSP70. This inhibits the degradation of polyubiquitinated proteins by the 26S proteasome and allows the degradation of oxidized proteins by a free 20S proteasome. Low fluxes of antimycin A-stimulated ROS production caused dimerization of mitochondrial peroxiredoxin 3 and cytosolic peroxiredoxin 2, but not peroxiredoxin overoxidation and overall oxidation of cellular protein thiols. This moderate redox imbalance was sufficient to inhibit the ATP stimulation of 26S proteasome activity. This process was dependent on reversible cysteine oxidation. Moreover, our results show that this early inhibition of ATP stimulation occurs previous to particle disassembly, indicating an intermediate step during the redox regulation of the 26S proteasome with special relevance under redox signaling rather than oxidative stress conditions.

  3. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 481: Area 12 T-Tunnel Conditional Release Storage Yard, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 481 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as Area 12 T-Tunnel Conditional Release Storage Yard. CAU 481 is located in Area 12 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. This CAU consists of one Corrective Action Site (CAS), CAS 12-42-05, Housekeeping Waste. CAU 481 closure activities were conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency from August 2007 through July 2008 according to the FFACO and Revision 3 of the Sectored Clean-up Work Plan for Housekeeping Category Waste Sites. Closure activities included removal and disposal of construction debris and low-level waste. Drained fluids, steel, and lead was recycled as appropriate. Waste generated during closure activities was appropriately managed and disposed.

  4. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 190: Contaminated Waste Sites Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wickline, Alfred

    2006-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 190 is located in Areas 11 and 14 of the Nevada Test Site, which is 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 190 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 11-02-01, Underground Centrifuge; (2) 11-02-02, Drain Lines and Outfall; (3) 11-59-01, Tweezer Facility Septic System; and (4) 14-23-01, LTU-6 Test Area. These sites are being investigated because existing information is insufficient on the nature and extent of potential contamination to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives. Additional information will be obtained before evaluating corrective action alternatives and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI). The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable corrective action alternatives that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on August 24, 2006, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture, and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 190. The scope of the CAU 190 CAI includes the following activities: (1) Move surface debris and/or materials, as needed, to facilitate sampling; (2) Conduct radiological and geophysical surveys; (3) Perform field screening; (4) Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present; (5) If COCs are present, collect additional step-out samples to define the lateral and vertical extent of the contamination; (6) Collect samples of source material, if present

  5. Underwater Nuclear Fuel Disassembly and Rod Storage Process and Equipment Description. Volume II

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Viebrock, J.M.

    1981-09-01

    The process, equipment, and the demonstration of the Underwater Nuclear Fuel Disassembly and Rod Storage System are presented. The process was shown to be a viable means of increasing spent fuel pool storage density by taking apart fuel assemblies and storing the fuel rods in a denser fashion than in the original storage racks. The assembly's nonfuel-bearing waste is compacted and containerized. The report documents design criteria and analysis, fabrication, demonstration program results, and proposed enhancements to the system

  6. Remote disassembly of radioactively contaminated vessels by means of an arc saw

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beitel, G.A.

    1977-01-01

    The arc saw, a newly developed tool, is a toothless circular saw which cuts by means of an electric arc. Cutting speeds between 20 to 30 cm 2 /S and depths up to 45 cm are possible. There is no mechanical contact between blade and work piece, no binding, and no blade breakage. The arc saw will be applied to the rapid and remote disassembly of multiple ton, contaminated stainless steel vessels

  7. Artificial biofilms establish the role of matrix interactions in staphylococcal biofilm assembly and disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stewart, Elizabeth J.; Ganesan, Mahesh; Younger, John G.; Solomon, Michael J.

    2015-01-01

    We demonstrate that the microstructural and mechanical properties of bacterial biofilms can be created through colloidal self-assembly of cells and polymers, and thereby link the complex material properties of biofilms to well understood colloidal and polymeric behaviors. This finding is applied to soften and disassemble staphylococcal biofilms through pH changes. Bacterial biofilms are viscoelastic, structured communities of cells encapsulated in an extracellular polymeric substance (EPS) comprised of polysaccharides, proteins, and DNA. Although the identity and abundance of EPS macromolecules are known, how these matrix materials interact with themselves and bacterial cells to generate biofilm morphology and mechanics is not understood. Here, we find that the colloidal self-assembly of Staphylococcus epidermidis RP62A cells and polysaccharides into viscoelastic biofilms is driven by thermodynamic phase instability of EPS. pH conditions that induce phase instability of chitosan produce artificial S. epidermidis biofilms whose mechanics match natural S. epidermidis biofilms. Furthermore, pH-induced solubilization of the matrix triggers disassembly in both artificial and natural S. epidermidis biofilms. This pH-induced disassembly occurs in biofilms formed by five additional staphylococcal strains, including three clinical isolates. Our findings suggest that colloidal self-assembly of cells and matrix polymers produces biofilm viscoelasticity and that biofilm control strategies can exploit this mechanism. PMID:26272750

  8. What if the hand piece spring disassembles during robotic radical prostatectomy?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Akbulut, Ziya; Canda, Abdullah Erdem; Atmaca, Ali Fuat; Asil, Erem; Isgoren, Egemen; Balbay, Mevlana Derya

    2011-01-01

    Robot-assisted laparoscopic radical prostatectomy (RALRP) is successfully being performed for treating prostate cancer (PCa). However, instrumentation failure associated with robotic procedures represents a unique new problem. We report the successful completion of RALRP in spite of a disassembled hand piece spring during the procedure. A PubMed/Medline search was made concerning robotic malfunction and robot-assisted laparoscopic radical prostatectomy to discuss our experience. We performed RALRP in a 60-year-old male patient with localized PCa. During the procedure, the spring of the hand piece disassembled, and we were not able to reassemble it. We completed the procedure successfully however without fixing the disassembled hand piece spring. We were able to grasp tissue and needles when we brought our fingers together. The only movement we needed to do was to move fingers apart to release tissue or needles caught by robotic instrument. Although malfunction risk related to the da Vinci Surgical System seems to be very low, it might still occur. Sometimes, simple maneuvers may compensate for the failed function as occurred in our case. However, patients should be informed before the operation about the possibility of converting their procedure to laparoscopic or open due to robotic malfunction.

  9. Phosphorylation of p37 is important for Golgi disassembly at mitosis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaneko, Yayoi; Tamura, Kaori; Totsukawa, Go; Kondo, Hisao

    2010-01-01

    Research highlights: → p37 is phosphorylated on Serine-56 and Threonine-59 by Cdc2 at mitosis. → Phosphorylated p37 does not bind to Golgi membranes. → p37 phosphorylation inhibits p97/p37-mediated Golgi membrane fusion. -- Abstract: In mammals, the Golgi apparatus is disassembled at early mitosis and reassembled at the end of mitosis. For Golgi disassembly, membrane fusion needs to be blocked. Golgi biogenesis requires two distinct p97ATPase-mediated membrane fusion, the p97/p47 and p97/p37 pathways. We previously reported that p47 phosphorylation on Serine-140 by Cdc2 results in mitotic inhibition of the p97/p47 pathway . In this study, we demonstrate that p37 is phosphorylated on Serine-56 and Threonine-59 by Cdc2 at mitosis, and this phosphorylated p37 does not bind to Golgi membranes. Using an in vitro Golgi reassembly assay, we show that mutated p37(S56D, T59D), which mimics mitotic phosphorylation, does not cause any cisternal regrowth, indicating that p37 phosphorylation inhibits the p97/p37 pathway. Our results demonstrate that p37 phosphorylation on Serine-56 and Threonine-59 is important for Golgi disassembly at mitosis.

  10. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 555: Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0 with Errata

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pastor, Laura

    2005-01-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 555: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 555 is located in Areas 1, 3 and 6 of the NTS, which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and is comprised of the five corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-59-01, Area 1 Camp Septic System; (2) CAS 03-59-03, Core Handling Building Septic System; (3) CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well; (4) CAS 06-59-01, Birdwell Septic System; and (5) CAS 06-59-02, National Cementers Septic System. An FFACO modification was approved on December 14, 2005, to include CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well, as part of the scope of CAU 555. The work scope was expanded in this document to include the investigation of CAS 06-20-05. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 555 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI

  11. 2010 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Management

    2011-03-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs) in fiscal year (FY) 2010. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2010 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R&D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R&D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

  12. 2010 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed an annual review of the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) Performance Assessments (PAs) and Composite Analyses (CAs) in fiscal year (FY) 2010. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2010 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors (e.g., waste forms and containers, facility design, and waste receipts), closure plans, monitoring results, and research and development (R and D) activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R and D activities were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the CAs.

  13. Residential Energy Efficiency Potential: Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wilson, Eric J [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

    2017-11-16

    Energy used by Nevada single-family homes that can be saved through cost-effective improvements. Prepared by Eric Wilson and Noel Merket, NREL, and Erin Boyd, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis.

  14. Closure plan for Corrective Action Unit 109: U-2bu subsidence crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    The U-2bu subsidence crater, Corrective Action Unit 109, will be closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection operational permit, and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The U-2bu subsidence crater is located in Area 2 of the Nevada Test Site. It was created in 1971 by an underground nuclear test with the name Miniata. The crater has a diameter of 288 meters (944 feet) and an approximate depth of 35 meters (115 feet). Based on the results of the analyses reported in the site characterization report, the only constituents of concern in the U-2bu subsidence crater include leachable lead and total petroleum hydrocarbons. Closure activities will include the excavation and disposal of impacted soil from the top of the crater. Upon completion of excavation, verification samples will be collected to show that the leachable lead has been removed to concentrations below the regulatory action level. After sample results show that the lead has been removed, the excavated area will be backfilled and a soil flood diversion berm will be constructed as a best management practice. An independent registered professional engineer will certify the site was closed following the approved Closure Plan. Post-closure care is not warranted for this site because closure activities will involve removal of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act constituents of concern

  15. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 107: Low Impact Soil Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 107 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Low Impact Soil Sites' and consists of the following 15 Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site: CAS 01-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site - High Alt; CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2); CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm; CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area; CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area; CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area; CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area; CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area; CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area; CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area; CAS 04-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site T4-a; CAS 05-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site; CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil; CAS 10-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site M-10; and CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky). Closure activities were conducted from February through April 2009 according to the FFACO (1996; as amended February 2008) and Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 107 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2009). The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Closure activities are summarized.

  16. 1984 Biotic Studies of Yucca Mountain, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Collins, E.; O'Farrell, T.P.

    1985-02-01

    A portion of Yucca Mountain on and adjacent to the US Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, is being considered as a possible location for a national high-level radioactive waste repository. The geologic and environmental characteristics of the site are being investigated to determine its suitability for further characterization. Goals of biotic studies were to identify species of concern, describe major floral and faunal associations, determine exposure levels of external background radiation, and assess possible impacts of characterization and operational activities. The species composition of dominant small mammals inhabiting major vegetation associations in 1984 varied little compared with results of similar surveys conducted in 1982 and 1983. Total captures were lower and reproduction was apparently curtailed. Merriam's kangaroo rat and the long tailed pocket mouse continued to be the most abundant species. Diversity of resident species did not differ significantly between the trapping lines. The composition and relative abundance of associated species was more variable. Western harvest mice were trapped for the first time, but pinyon mice, which were present in prior years, were not trapped. Five desert tortoises were observed during surveys of possible sites for repository surface facilities. 25 refs., 4 figs., 5 tabs

  17. Underground Test Area Activity Preemptive Review Guidance Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Farnham, Irene [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States); Rehfeldt, Kenneth [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2016-10-01

    Preemptive reviews (PERs) of Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity corrective action unit (CAU) studies are an important and long-maintained quality improvement process. The CAU-specific PER committees provide internal technical review of ongoing work throughout the CAU lifecycle. The reviews, identified in the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (Sections 1.3.5.1 and 3.2), assure work is comprehensive, accurate, in keeping with the state of the art, and consistent with CAU goals. PER committees review various products, including data, documents, software/codes, analyses, and models. PER committees may also review technical briefings including Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO)-required presentations to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and presentations supporting key technical decisions (e.g., investigation plans and approaches). PER committees provide technical recommendations to support regulatory decisions that are the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) and NDEP.

  18. Closure plan for Corrective Action Unit 109: U-2bu subsidence crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-03-01

    The U-2bu subsidence crater, Corrective Action Unit 109, will be closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection operational permit, and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The U-2bu subsidence crater is located in Area 2 of the Nevada Test Site. It was created in 1971 by an underground nuclear test with the name Miniata. The crater has a diameter of 288 meters (944 feet) and an approximate depth of 35 meters (115 feet). Based on the results of the analyses reported in the site characterization report, the only constituents of concern in the U-2bu subsidence crater include leachable lead and total petroleum hydrocarbons. Closure activities will include the excavation and disposal of impacted soil from the top of the crater. Upon completion of excavation, verification samples will be collected to show that the leachable lead has been removed to concentrations below the regulatory action level. After sample results show that the lead has been removed, the excavated area will be backfilled and a soil flood diversion berm will be constructed as a best management practice. An independent registered professional engineer will certify the site was closed following the approved Closure Plan. Post-closure care is not warranted for this site because closure activities will involve removal of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act constituents of concern.

  19. Application of laser processing for disassembly of nuclear power plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baranov, Gennady A.; Zinchenko, A. V.; Arutyunyan, R. B.

    1998-12-01

    Provision of safety and drop of ecological risk at salvaging of nuclear submarines (NSM) of Russia Navy Forces represents one of the most actual problems of nowadays. It is necessary to remove from services of Russian Navy Forces 170 - 180 nuclear submarines by 2000. At salvaging of Russian Navy Forces NSM it should be necessary to cut out reactor compartments with more than 150 thousand tons of gross weight and to fragment terminal carcasses of submarines with gross weight of 2 million tons. Taking into account overall dimensions of salvaging objects and Euro-standard requirement on the sizes of carcass fragments, for salvaging of one NSM it is necessary to execute more than 10 km of cuts. Using of conventional methods of gas and plasma cutting of ship constructions and equipment polluted with radioactive oxides and bedding of insulation and paint and varnish materials causes contamination of working zones and environment by a mix of radioactive substances and highly toxic combustion products, nomenclature of which includes up to 50 names. Calculations carried out in the Institute of industrial and Marine Medicine have shown that salvage of just one NSM with using of gas and plasma cutting are accompanied by discharge into an environment of up to 11.5 kg of chromium oxides, up to 22.5 kg of manganese oxides, up to 97 kg of carbon oxides and up to 650 kg of nitrogen oxides. Fragmentation of such equipment by a method of directional explosion or hydraulic jet is problematic because of complexity of treated constructions and necessity to create special protective facilities, which will accumulate a bulk of radioactive and toxic discharges, as a consequence of the explosion and spreaded by shock waves and water deluges. In a number of new technological processes the cutting with using of high-power industrial lasers radiation stands out. As compared with other technological processes, laser cutting has many advantages determined by such unique properties of laser

  20. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 300: Surface Release Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 300 is located in Areas 23, 25, and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, which is located approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 300 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Surface Release Areas and is comprised of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs), which are associated with the identified Building (Bldg): (sm b ullet) CAS 23-21-03, Bldg 750 Surface Discharge (sm b ullet) CAS 23-25-02, Bldg 750 Outfall (sm b ullet) CAS 23-25-03, Bldg 751 Outfall (sm b ullet) CAS 25-60-01, Bldg 3113A Outfall (sm b ullet) CAS 25-60-02, Bldg 3901 Outfall (sm b ullet) CAS 25-62-01, Bldg 3124 Contaminated Soil (sm b ullet) CAS 26-60-01, Bldg 2105 Outfall and Decon Pad The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 23-21-03, 23-25-02, and 23-25-03 is no further action. As a best management practice, approximately 48 feet of metal piping was removed from CAS 23-25-02 and disposed of as sanitary waste. The NDEP-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 25-60-01, 25-60-02, 25-62-01, and 26-60-01, is clean closure. Closure activities for these CASs included removing and disposing of soil impacted with total petroleum hydrocarbons-diesel range organics (TPH-DRO), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and cesium (Cs)-137, concrete impacted with TPH-DRO, and associated piping impacted with TPH-DRO. CAU 300 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 300 Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006). The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 300 Corrective Action Decision Document (NNSA/NSO, 2005). This Closure Report documents CAU 300 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 40 cubic yards (yd3) of low-level waste consisting of TPH

  1. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 547 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 547 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; AND (3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly Closure activities began in August 2011 and were completed in June 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 547 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 was closure in place with administrative controls. The following closure activities were performed: (1) Open holes were filled with concrete; (2) Steel casings were placed over vertical expansion joints and filled with cement; (3) Engineered soil covers were constructed over piping and exposed sections of the gas sampling system components; (4) Fencing, monuments, Jersey barriers, radiological postings, and use restriction (UR) warning signs were installed around the perimeters of the sites; (5) Housekeeping debris was picked up from around the sites and disposed; and (6) Radiological surveys were performed to confirm final radiological postings. UR documentation is included in Appendix D. The post-closure plan was presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 547 and is included as

  2. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 562: Waste Systems, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2012-08-15

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 562, Waste Systems, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 562 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 562 consists of the following 13 Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: · CAS 02-26-11, Lead Shot · CAS 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drain · CAS 02-59-01, Septic System · CAS 02-60-01, Concrete Drain · CAS 02-60-02, French Drain · CAS 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain · CAS 02-60-04, French Drain · CAS 02-60-05, French Drain · CAS 02-60-06, French Drain · CAS 02-60-07, French Drain · CAS 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall · CAS 23-99-06, Grease Trap · CAS 25-60-04, Building 3123 Outfalls Closure activities began in October 2011 and were completed in April 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 562 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The corrective actions included No Further Action and Clean Closure. Closure activities generated sanitary waste and hazardous waste. Some wastes exceeded land disposal limits and required offsite treatment prior to disposal. Other wastes met land disposal restrictions and were disposed in appropriate onsite or offsite landfills. NNSA/NSO requests the following: · A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 562 · The transfer of CAU 562 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO

  3. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2012-07-17

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 547 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 547 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; AND (3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly Closure activities began in August 2011 and were completed in June 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 547 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 was closure in place with administrative controls. The following closure activities were performed: (1) Open holes were filled with concrete; (2) Steel casings were placed over vertical expansion joints and filled with cement; (3) Engineered soil covers were constructed over piping and exposed sections of the gas sampling system components; (4) Fencing, monuments, Jersey barriers, radiological postings, and use restriction (UR) warning signs were installed around the perimeters of the sites; (5) Housekeeping debris was picked up from around the sites and disposed; and (6) Radiological surveys were performed to confirm final radiological postings. UR documentation is included in Appendix D. The post-closure plan was presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 547 and is included as

  4. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 224: Decon Pad and Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 224 is located in Areas 02, 03, 05, 06, 11, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site, which is situated approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 224 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 as Decon Pad and Septic Systems and is comprised of the following nine Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 02-04-01, Septic Tank (Buried); CAS 03-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 05-04-01, Septic Tanks (4)/Discharge Area; CAS 06-03-01, Sewage Lagoons (3); CAS 06-05-01, Leachfield; CAS 06-17-04, Decon Pad and Wastewater Catch; CAS 06-23-01, Decon Pad Discharge Piping; CAS 11-04-01, Sewage Lagoon; and CAS 23-05-02, Leachfield. The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 02-04-01, 03-05-01, 06-03-01, 11-04-01, and 23-05-02 is no further action. As a best management practice, the septic tanks and distribution box were removed from CASs 02-04-01 and 11-04-01 and disposed of as hydrocarbon waste. The NDEP-approved correction action alternative for CASs 05-04-01, 06-05-01, 06-17-04, and 06-23-01 is clean closure. Closure activities for these CASs included removing and disposing of radiologically and pesticide-impacted soil and debris. CAU 224 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 224 Corrective Action Plan (CAP). The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 224 Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2005). This Closure Report documents CAU 224 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 60 cubic yards (yd3) of mixed waste in the form of soil and debris; approximately 70 yd 3 of sanitary waste in the form of soil, liquid from septic tanks, and concrete debris; approximately 10 yd 3 of hazardous waste in the form of pesticide-impacted soil; approximately 0.5 yd 3 of universal waste in the form of

  5. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 300: Surface Release Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-07-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 300 is located in Areas 23, 25, and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, which is located approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 300 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Surface Release Areas and is comprised of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs), which are associated with the identified Building (Bldg): {sm_bullet} CAS 23-21-03, Bldg 750 Surface Discharge {sm_bullet} CAS 23-25-02, Bldg 750 Outfall {sm_bullet} CAS 23-25-03, Bldg 751 Outfall {sm_bullet} CAS 25-60-01, Bldg 3113A Outfall {sm_bullet} CAS 25-60-02, Bldg 3901 Outfall {sm_bullet} CAS 25-62-01, Bldg 3124 Contaminated Soil {sm_bullet} CAS 26-60-01, Bldg 2105 Outfall and Decon Pad The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 23-21-03, 23-25-02, and 23-25-03 is no further action. As a best management practice, approximately 48 feet of metal piping was removed from CAS 23-25-02 and disposed of as sanitary waste. The NDEP-approved corrective action alternative for CASs 25-60-01, 25-60-02, 25-62-01, and 26-60-01, is clean closure. Closure activities for these CASs included removing and disposing of soil impacted with total petroleum hydrocarbons-diesel range organics (TPH-DRO), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and cesium (Cs)-137, concrete impacted with TPH-DRO, and associated piping impacted with TPH-DRO. CAU 300 was closed in accordance with the NDEP-approved CAU 300 Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006). The closure activities specified in the CAP were based on the recommendations presented in the CAU 300 Corrective Action Decision Document (NNSA/NSO, 2005). This Closure Report documents CAU 300 closure activities. During closure activities, approximately 40 cubic yards (yd3) of low-level waste consisting of TPH-DRO-, PCB

  6. Operational radioactive defense waste management plan for the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-07-01

    The Operational Radioactive Defense Waste Management Plan for the Nevada Test Site establishes procedures and methods for the safe shipping, receiving, processing, disposal, and storage of radioactive waste. Included are NTS radioactive waste disposition program guidelines, procedures for radioactive waste management, a description of storage and disposal areas and facilities, and a glossary of specifications and requirements

  7. 76 FR 18921 - Land Disposal Restrictions: Nevada and California; Site Specific Treatment Variances for...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-04-06

    ... final actions to both issue a site- specific treatment variance to U.S. Ecology Nevada (USEN) in Beatty... Facility is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays. The... action and anticipate no adverse comment. Based on the information and data submitted by the petitioner...

  8. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Summary 2016

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wills, Cathy [National Security Technologies, LLC. (NSTec), Mercury, NV (United States)

    2017-09-07

    This document is a summary of the full 2016 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/ NFO). This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the full NNSSER. NNSA/NFO prepares the NNSSER to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from potential nonradiological impacts. It is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. The NNSS is currently the nation’s unique site for ongoing national security–related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access as well as by lands that are open to public entry. In 2016, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), was the NNSS Management and Operations Contractor accountable for ensuring work was performed in compliance with environmental regulations. NNSS activities in 2016 continued to be diverse, with the primary goal to ensure that the existing U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons remains safe and reliable. Other activities included weapons of mass destruction first responder training; the controlled release of hazardous material at the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC); remediation of legacy contamination sites; characterization of waste destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or the Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho Falls, Idaho; disposal of low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste; and environmental research. Facilities and

  9. AGR-2 Irradiated Test Train Preliminary Inspection and Disassembly First Look

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ploger, Scott [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Demkowciz, Paul [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Harp, Jason [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2015-05-01

    The AGR 2 irradiation experiment began in June 2010 and was completed in October 2013. The test train was shipped to the Materials and Fuels Complex in July 2014 for post-irradiation examination (PIE). The first PIE activities included nondestructive examination of the test train, followed by disassembly of the test train and individual capsules and detailed inspection of the capsule contents, including the fuel compacts and their graphite fuel holders. Dimensional metrology was then performed on the compacts, graphite holders, and steel capsule shells. AGR 2 disassembly and metrology were performed with the same equipment used successfully on AGR 1 test train components. Gamma spectrometry of the intact test train gave a preliminary look at the condition of the interior components. No evidence of damage to compacts or graphite components was evident from the isotopic and gross gamma scans. Disassembly of the AGR 2 test train and its capsules was conducted rapidly and efficiently by employing techniques refined during the AGR 1 disassembly campaign. Only one major difficulty was encountered while separating the test train into capsules when thermocouples (of larger diameter than used in AGR 1) and gas lines jammed inside the through tubes of the upper capsules, which required new tooling for extraction. Disassembly of individual capsules was straightforward with only a few minor complications. On the whole, AGR 2 capsule structural components appeared less embrittled than their AGR 1 counterparts. Compacts from AGR 2 Capsules 2, 3, 5, and 6 were in very good condition upon removal. Only relatively minor damage or markings were visible using high resolution photographic inspection. Compact dimensional measurements indicated radial shrinkage between 0.8 to 1.7%, with the greatest shrinkage observed on Capsule 2 compacts that were irradiated at higher temperature. Length shrinkage ranged from 0.1 to 0.9%, with by far the lowest axial shrinkage on Capsule 3 compacts

  10. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232: Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    USDOE/NV

    1999-05-01

    The Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office; the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection; and the U. S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 232 consists of Corrective Action Site 25-03-01, Sewage Lagoon. Corrective Action Unit 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, received sanitary effluent from four buildings within the Test Cell ''C'' Facility from the mid-1960s through approximately 1996. The Test Cell ''C'' Facility was used to develop nuclear propulsion technology by conducting nuclear test reactor studies. Based on the site history collected to support the Data Quality Objectives process, contaminants of potential concern include volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, petroleum hydrocarbons, polychlorinated biphenyls, pesticides, herbicides, gamma emitting radionuclides, isotopic plutonium, isotopic uranium, and strontium-90. A detailed conceptual site model is presented in Section 3.0 and Appendix A of this Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The conceptual model serves as the basis for the sampling strategy. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, the Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Field work will be conducted following approval of the plan. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the Corrective Action Decision Document.

  11. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Septic Systems' and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site: (1) CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank; (2) CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool; (3) CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks; and (4) CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls Closure activities were conducted from September to November 2009 in accordance with the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 563. The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action and Clean Closure.

  12. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2010-02-28

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as “Septic Systems” and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site: · CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank · CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool · CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks · CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls Closure activities were conducted from September to November 2009 in accordance with the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 563. The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action and Clean Closure.

  13. A ground-based magnetic survey of Frenchman Flat, Nevada National Security Site and Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada: data release and preliminary interpretation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Phillips, Jeffrey D.; Burton, Bethany L.; Curry-Elrod, Erika; Drellack, Sigmund

    2014-01-01

    The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) is located in southern Nevada approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas. Frenchman Flat is a sedimentary basin located on the eastern edge of NNSS and extending eastward into the adjacent Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR).

  14. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011 Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cathy Wills, ed

    2012-09-12

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) directs the management and operation of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). NNSA/NSO prepares the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the NNSS to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from nonradiological impacts. The NNSSER is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. It is prepared annually to meet the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the information needs of NNSA/NSO stakeholders. This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the NNSSER. It does not contain detailed descriptions or presentations of monitoring designs, data collection methods, data tables, the NNSS environment, or all environmental program activities performed throughout the year. The NNSS is currently the nation's unique site for ongoing national security-related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access, as well as by lands that are open to public entry.

  15. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2011 Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wills, Cathy

    2012-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) directs the management and operation of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). NNSA/NSO prepares the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the NNSS to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from nonradiological impacts. The NNSSER is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. It is prepared annually to meet the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the information needs of NNSA/NSO stakeholders. This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the NNSSER. It does not contain detailed descriptions or presentations of monitoring designs, data collection methods, data tables, the NNSS environment, or all environmental program activities performed throughout the year. The NNSS is currently the nation's unique site for ongoing national security-related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access, as well as by lands that are open to public entry.

  16. Evaluation of habitat restoration needs at Yucca Mountain, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitchell, D.L.

    1984-04-01

    Adverse environmental impacts due to site characterization and repository development activities at Yucca Mountain, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nye County, Nevada, must be minimized and mitigated according to provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The natural Transition Desert ecosystem in the 27.5-sq-mi Yucca Mountain project area is now and will continue to be impacted by removal of native vegetation and topsoil and the destruction and/or displacement of faunal communities. Although it is not known at this time exactly how much land will be affected, it is estimated that about 300 to 400 acres will be disturbed by construction of facility sites, mining spoils piles, roadways, and drilling pads. Planned habitat restoration at Yucca Mountain will mitigate the effects of plant and animal habitat loss over time by increasing the rate of plant succession on disturbed sites. Restoration program elements should combine the appropriate use of native annual and perennial species, irrigation and/or water-harvesting techniques, and salvage and reuse of topsoil. Although general techniques are well-known, specific program details (i.e., which species to use, methods of site preparation with available equipment, methods of saving and applying topsoil, etc.) must be worked out empirically on a site-specific basis over the period of site characterization and any subsequent repository development. Large-scale demonstration areas set up during site characterization will benefit both present abandonments and, if the project is scaled up to include repository development, larger facilities areas including spoils piles. Site-specific demonstration studies will also provide information on the costs per acre associated with alternative restoration strategies

  17. Disposal Activities and the Unique Waste Streams at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arnold, P.

    2012-01-01

    This slide show documents waste disposal at the Nevada National Security Site. Topics covered include: radionuclide requirements for waste disposal; approved performance assessment (PA) for depleted uranium disposal; requirements; program approval; the Waste Acceptance Review Panel (WARP); description of the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP); facility evaluation; recent program accomplishments, nuclear facility safety changes; higher-activity waste stream disposal; and, large volume bulk waste streams

  18. Preliminary mapping of surficial geology of Midway Valley Yucca Mountain Project, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wesling, J.R.; Bullard, T.F.; Swan, F.H.; Perman, R.C.; Angell, M.M.; Gibson, J.D.

    1992-04-01

    The tectonics program for the proposed high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain in southwestern Nevada must evaluate the potential for surface faulting beneath the prospective surface facilities. To help meet this goal, Quaternary surficial mapping studies and photolineament analyses were conducted to provide data for evaluating the location, recency, and style of faulting with Midway Valley at the eastern base of Yucca Mountain, the preferred location of these surface facilities. This interim report presents the preliminary results of this work

  19. NEVADA TEST SITE WASTE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, NEVADA SITE OFFICE

    2005-01-01

    This document establishes the U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) waste acceptance criteria (WAC). The WAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site will accept low-level radioactive and mixed waste for disposal. Mixed waste generated within the State of Nevada by NNSA/NSO activities is accepted for disposal. It includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the Nevada Test Site Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site for storage or disposal

  20. Nevada may lose nuclear waste funds

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, E.

    1988-01-01

    The people of Nevada are concerned that a cut in DOE funding for a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada will result in cuts in the state monitoring program, e.g. dropping a seismic monitoring network and a sophisticated drilling program. Economic and social impact studies will be curtailed. Even though a provision to curtail local research forbids duplication of DOE's work and would limit the ability of Nevada to go out an collect its own data, Nevada State University at Las Vegas would receive a nice plum, a top-of-the-line supercomputer known as the ETA-10 costing almost $30 million financed by DOE

  1. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1, 2, and Errata

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wickline, Alfred

    2004-04-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 204 Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE); and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) north of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). The Corrective Action Sites (CASs) within CAU 204 are located in Areas 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the NTS, in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1-2). Corrective Action Unit 204 is comprised of the six CASs identified in Table 1-1. As shown in Table 1-1, the FFACO describes four of these CASs as bunkers one as chemical exchange storage and one as a blockhouse. Subsequent investigations have identified four of these structures as instrumentation bunkers (CASs 01-34-01, 02-34-01, 03-34-01, 05-33-01), one as an explosives storage bunker (CAS 05-99-02), and one as both (CAS 05-18-02). The six bunkers included in CAU 204 were primarily used to monitor atmospheric testing or store munitions. The ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada'' (NNSA/NV, 2002a) provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, it will not be repeated in this CADD. This CADD identifies potential corrective action alternatives and provides a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for each CAS within CAU 204. The evaluation of corrective action alternatives is based on process knowledge and the results of investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NV, 2002a) that was approved prior to the start of the Corrective Action Investigation (CAI). Record of Technical Change (ROTC) No. 1 to the CAIP (approval pending) documents changes to the preliminary action levels

  2. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0, Including Errata Sheet

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

    2004-04-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document identifies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's corrective action alternative recommendation for each of the corrective action sites (CASs) within Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 204: Storage Bunkers, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. An evaluation of analytical data from the corrective action investigation, review of current and future operations at each CAS, and a detailed comparative analysis of potential corrective action alternatives were used to determine the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. There are six CASs in CAU 204, which are all located between Areas 1, 2, 3, and 5 on the NTS. The No Further Action alternative was recommended for CASs 01-34-01, 02-34-01, 03-34-01, and 05-99-02; and a Closure in Place with Administrative Controls recommendation was the preferred corrective action for CASs 05-18-02 and 05-33-01. These alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated as well as applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the sites and will eliminate potential future exposure pathways to the contaminated media at CAU 204.

  3. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 528: Polychlorinated Biphenyls Contamination, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

    2003-05-08

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 528, Polychlorinated Biphenyls Contamination (PCBs), Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in the southwestern portion of Area 25 on the NTS in Jackass Flats (adjacent to Test Cell C [TCC]), CAU 528 consists of Corrective Action Site 25-27-03, Polychlorinated Biphenyls Surface Contamination. Test Cell C was built to support the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (operational between 1959 and 1973) activities including conducting ground tests and static firings of nuclear engine reactors. Although CAU 528 was not considered as a direct potential source of PCBs and petroleum contamination, two potential sources of contamination have nevertheless been identified from an unknown source in concentrations that could potentially pose an unacceptable risk to human health and/or the environment. This CAU's close proximity to TCC prompted Shaw to collect surface soil samples, which have indicated the presence of PCBs extending throughout the area to the north, east, south, and even to the edge of the western boundary. Based on this information, more extensive field investigation activities are being planned, the results of which are to be used to support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.

  4. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 552: Area 12 Muckpile and Ponds, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

    2004-04-06

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach for collecting the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 552: Area 12 Muckpile and Ponds, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Area 12 on the NTS, CAU 552 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 12-06-04, Muckpile; 12-23-05, Ponds. Corrective Action Site 12-06-04 in Area 12 consists of the G-Tunnel muckpile, which is the result of tunneling activities. Corrective Action Site 12-23-05 consists of three dry ponds adjacent to the muckpile. The toe of the muckpile extends into one of the ponds creating an overlap of two CASs. The purpose of the investigation is to ensure that adequate data are collected to provide sufficient and reliable information to identify, evaluate, and select technic ally viable corrective actions. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document.

  5. Phase II Transport Model of Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gregg Ruskuaff

    2010-01-01

    This document, the Phase II Frenchman Flat transport report, presents the results of radionuclide transport simulations that incorporate groundwater radionuclide transport model statistical and structural uncertainty, and lead to forecasts of the contaminant boundary (CB) for a set of representative models from an ensemble of possible models. This work, as described in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) strategy (FFACO, 1996; amended 2010), forms an essential part of the technical basis for subsequent negotiation of the compliance boundary of the Frenchman Flat corrective action unit (CAU) by Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). Underground nuclear testing via deep vertical shafts was conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) from 1951 until 1992. The Frenchman Flat area, the subject of this report, was used for seven years, with 10 underground nuclear tests being conducted. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), NNSA/NSO initiated the UGTA Project to assess and evaluate the effects of underground nuclear tests on groundwater at the NTS and vicinity through the FFACO (1996, amended 2010). The processes that will be used to complete UGTA corrective actions are described in the “Corrective Action Strategy” in the FFACO Appendix VI, Revision No. 2 (February 20, 2008).

  6. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC-1, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mark Krauss

    2011-06-01

    lead shot • PCB-contaminated soil • Radiologically contaminated filters and equipment • Fuels, lubricants, engine coolants, and oils • Lead debris • Electrical and lighting components assumed to be potential source materials, including - fluorescent light bulbs - mercury switches (thermostats) - circuit boards - PCB-containing ballasts Closure of CAU 566 was achieved through a combination of removal activities and closure in place. Corrective actions to remove COCs, and known and assumed potential source materials, were implemented as was practical. The PCBs remaining at the site are bounded laterally, but not vertically, within CAS 25-99-20 based upon step-out sampling; the sources (e.g., PCB transformer oils, diesel fuel from locomotive reservoirs) have been removed; the practice of the application of PCB-containing oils for soil stabilization has ceased; and the COCs are not readily mobile in the environment. Closure in place is necessary, and future land use of the site will be restricted from intrusive activities. This will effectively eliminate inadvertent contact by humans with the contaminated media. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at CAS 25-99-20. • Closure in place of CAS 25-99-20. • A use restriction is required at CAU 566. • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 566. • Corrective Action Unit 566 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

  7. Nevada Test Site closure program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shenk, D.P.

    1994-08-01

    This report is a summary of the history, design and development, procurement, fabrication, installation and operation of the closures used as containment devices on underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site. It also addresses the closure program mothball and start-up procedures. The Closure Program Document Index and equipment inventories, included as appendices, serve as location directories for future document reference and equipment use

  8. Final environmental impact statement for the Nevada Test Site and off-site locations in the State of Nevada. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    This sitewide EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of four possible land-use alternatives being considered for the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Tonopah Test Range, and the formerly operated DOE sites in the state of Nevada: the Project Shoal Area, the Central Nevada Test Area, and portions of the Nellis Air Force Range Complex. Three additional sites in Nevada-Eldorado Valley, Dry Lake Valley, and Coyote Spring Valley-are evaluated for collocation of solar energy production facilities. The four alternatives include Continue Current Operations (No Action, continue to operate at the level maintained for the past 3 to 5 years); Discontinue Operations 1 (discontinue operations and interagency programs); Expanded Use (increased use of NTS and its resources to support defense and nondefense programs); and Alternate Use of Withdrawn Lands (discontinue all defense-related activities at NTS; continue waste management operations in support of NTS environmental restoration efforts; expand nondefense research). Environmental impacts were assessed for each alternative by analyzing, to the extent possible, the discrete and cumulative environmental impacts associated with Defense Waste Management, Environmental Restoration, Nondefense Research and Development, and Work for Others Programs. A framework for a Resource Management Plan is included as Volume 2 of this EIS and represents the development of an ecosystem based planning process closely integrated with the National Environmental Policy Act process. This EIS, among other things, analyzed the impacts of transportation of low level waste, and site characterization activities related to the Yucca Mountain Project but did not analyze the suitability of the site as a repository. This EIS does not analyze the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site as a repository as this is an action beyond the scope of the EIS. Volume 3 of this EIS contains the public comments and the responses to the comments

  9. Connexin43 hemichannels contributes to the disassembly of cell junctions through modulation of intracellular oxidative status

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yuan Chi

    2016-10-01

    Full Text Available Connexin (Cx hemichannels regulate many cellular processes with little information available regarding their mechanisms. Given that many pathological factors that activate hemichannels also disrupts the integrity of cellular junctions, we speculated a potential participation of hemichannels in the regulation of cell junctions. Here we tested this hypothesis. Exposure of renal tubular epithelial cells to Ca2+-free medium led to disassembly of tight and adherens junctions, as indicated by the reduced level of ZO-1 and cadherin, disorganization of F-actin, and severe drop in transepithelial electric resistance. These changes were preceded by an activation of Cx43 hemichannels, as revealed by extracellular efflux of ATP and intracellular influx of Lucifer Yellow. Inhibition of hemichannels with chemical inhibitors or Cx43 siRNA greatly attenuated the disassembly of cell junctions. Further analysis using fetal fibroblasts derived from Cx43 wide-type (Cx43+/+, heterozygous (Cx43+/- and knockout (Cx43-/- littermates showed that Cx43-positive cells (Cx43+/+ exhibited more dramatic changes in cell shape, F-actin, and cadherin in response to Ca2+ depletion, as compared to Cx43-null cells (Cx43-/-. Consistently, these cells had higher level of protein carbonyl modification and phosphorylation, and much stronger activation of P38 and JNK. Hemichannel opening led to extracellular loss of the major antioxidant glutathione (GSH. Supplement of cells with exogenous GSH or inhibition of oxidative sensitive kinases largely prevented the above-mentioned changes. Taken together, our study indicates that Cx43 hemichannels promote the disassembly of cell junctions through regulation of intracellular oxidative status.

  10. The United States pit disassembly and conversion project -- Meeting the MOX fuel specification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nelson, T.O.; James, C.A.; Kolman, D.G.

    1998-01-01

    The US is actively involved in demonstrating the disassembly of nuclear weapons pits to an unclassified form readied for disposition. The MOX option is the most likely path forward for plutonium that originated from nuclear weapon pits. The US demonstration line for pit disassembly and conversion is known as ARIES, the advanced recovery and integrated extraction system. The ARIES demonstration line is being used to gather data in an integrated fashion of the technologies needed for pit disassembly and conversion. These activities include the following modules: pit bisection, hydride-dehydride, oxide conversion, canning, electrolytic decontamination, and nondestructive assay (NDA). Pit bisection swages in a pit in half. Hydride-dehydride converts the pit plutonium metal to an unclassified metal button. To convert the plutonium metal to an oxide the US is investigating a number of options. The primary oxide conversion approach involves variations of combining plutonium hydriding and subsequent oxidation. Another approach is to simply oxidize the metal under controlled conditions-direct metal oxidation (DMO). To remove the gallium from the plutonium oxide, a thermal distillation approach is being used. These pyrochemical approaches will substantially reduce the wastes produced for oxide conversion of weapon plutonium, compared to traditional aqueous processing. The packaging of either the plutonium metal or oxide to long term storage criteria involves the canning and electrolytic decontamination modules. The NDA suite of instruments is then used to assay the material in the containers, which enables international verification without the need to open the containers and repackage them. All of these processes are described

  11. Interactive domains in the molecular chaperone human alphaB crystallin modulate microtubule assembly and disassembly.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Joy G Ghosh

    2007-06-01

    Full Text Available Small heat shock proteins regulate microtubule assembly during cell proliferation and in response to stress through interactions that are poorly understood.Novel functions for five interactive sequences in the small heat shock protein and molecular chaperone, human alphaB crystallin, were investigated in the assembly/disassembly of microtubules and aggregation of tubulin using synthetic peptides and mutants of human alphaB crystallin.The interactive sequence (113FISREFHR(120 exposed on the surface of alphaB crystallin decreased microtubule assembly by approximately 45%. In contrast, the interactive sequences, (131LTITSSLSSDGV(142 and (156ERTIPITRE(164, corresponding to the beta8 strand and the C-terminal extension respectively, which are involved in complex formation, increased microtubule assembly by approximately 34-45%. The alphaB crystallin peptides, (113FISREFHR(120 and (156ERTIPITRE(164, inhibited microtubule disassembly by approximately 26-36%, and the peptides (113FISREFHR(120 and (131LTITSSLSSDGV(142 decreased the thermal aggregation of tubulin by approximately 42-44%. The (131LTITSSLSSDGV(142 and (156ERTIPITRE(164 peptides were more effective than the widely used anti-cancer drug, Paclitaxel, in modulating tubulinmicrotubule dynamics. Mutagenesis of these interactive sequences in wt human alphaB crystallin confirmed the effects of the alphaB crystallin peptides on microtubule assembly/disassembly and tubulin aggregation. The regulation of microtubule assembly by alphaB crystallin varied over a narrow range of concentrations. The assembly of microtubules was maximal at alphaB crystallin to tubulin molar ratios between 1:4 and 2:1, while molar ratios >2:1 inhibited microtubule assembly.Interactive sequences on the surface of human alphaB crystallin collectively modulate microtubule assembly through a dynamic subunit exchange mechanism that depends on the concentration and ratio of alphaB crystallin to tubulin. These are the first

  12. [PHAHs levels in soil samples from the E-waste disassembly sites and their sources allocation].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhao, Gao-Feng; Wang, Zi-Jian

    2009-06-15

    Soil samples (each with 3 replicates of - 1 kg, at the top 0-5 cm layer) were collected from each of the e-waste disassembly sites and the control site. Also obtained from each disassembly site were samples (each weighing - 0.2 kg) of cable coating,stuffing powder, and circuit boards chipping. The contents of 23 PBB congeners, 12 PBDE congeners, and 27 PCB congeners in soil and in their potential sources, including e-waste residues, were measured using the GC-MS5975B technique. The highest level of PBBs was found in the cable coating among the three e-waste residues, with a concentration of 35.25 ng x g(-1). The contents of low-brominated PBBs (including monobromobiphenyls and dibromobiphenyls) accounted for 38% of the total PBBs concentration observed in cable coating sample. The highest levels of PBDEs and PBDE209 were found in the stuffing powder for electronic component among the collected e-waste residues, with a concentration of 29.71 and 4.19 x 10(3) ng x g(-1). PBDE153 and PBDE183 were the most predominant PBDE congeners, with their concentration accounting for 43% and 24% of the total PBDEs concentration observed in the stuffing powder sample, respectively. Levels of PCBs in cable coating were the highest in these e-waste residues, with a concentration of 680.02 ngx g(-1). The observed values of the three PHAHs in soils from the disassembly site were considerably higher than their corresponding values observed in the control site (p < 0.05), which indicates that these PHAHs from e-waste is the pollution source of local environment.

  13. Development of disassembly and pin chopping technology for FBR spent fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobayashi, Tsuguyuki; Namba, Takashi; Kawabe, Yukinari; Washiya, Tadahiro

    2008-01-01

    Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) and Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) have been developing fuel disassembly and fuel pin chopping systems for a future Japanese commercial FBR. At first, the wrapper tube is cut by the slit-cut to pull it out, then the fuel pins are cut by the crop-cut at their end-plugs to separate them from the entrance nozzle. The pins are transferred to the magazine of the chopping machine. A series of tests were performed to develop this procedure. As the result of mechanical cutting tests, the CBN wheel was selected. The slit-cut tests were carried out to evaluated the cutting performance of the wheel. The wrapper tube is normally slit-cut in the circumferential direction. One CBN wheel could cut more than 5 fuel assemblies in this direction. The slit-cut in the axial direction is prepared as provision when the tube is difficult to put out. More work is needed to cut 5mm thick PNC-FMS plate in this direction without damaging the pins beneath it. As the result of the crop-cut tests of end-plugs made of ODS steel, the CBN wheel could cut the 61 pin bundle by two strokes. More work is needed to cut the 217 pin bundle. Fuel pin handling tests were performed to transfer them from the disassembly machine to the chopping machine. The Saucer tray was selected to receive the disassembled pins. All the pins were transferred and loaded into a magazine of the chopping machine. Fuel pin loading tests were conducted to optimize the magazine configuration to make the chopping length within 1.0±0.5 cm. In order to decrease the disturbance during chopping, the width of the magazine was adjusted to be 12 cm and installation of a height adjuster is favourable to control the free space above the pins. (author)

  14. Development of a design basis tornado and structural design criteria for the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McDonald, J.R.; Minor, J.E.; Mehta, K.C.

    1975-06-01

    In order to evaluate the ability of critical facilities at the Nevada Test Site to withstand the possible damaging effects of extreme winds and tornadoes, parameters for the effects of tornadoes and extreme winds and structural design criteria for the design and evaluation of structures were developed. The meteorological investigations conducted are summarized, and techniques used for developing the combined tornado and extreme wind risk model are discussed. The guidelines for structural design include methods for calculating pressure distributions on walls and roofs of structures and methods for accommodating impact loads from wind-driven missiles. Calculations for determining the design loads for an example structure are included

  15. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 366: Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None, None

    2013-12-31

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366, Area 11 Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 366 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended).

  16. Expert System analysis of non-fuel assembly hardware and spent fuel disassembly hardware: Its generation and recommended disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williamson, D.A.

    1991-01-01

    Almost all of the effort being expended on radioactive waste disposal in the United States is being focused on the disposal of spent Nuclear Fuel, with little consideration for other areas that will have to be disposed of in the same facilities. one area of radioactive waste that has not been addressed adequately because it is considered a secondary part of the waste issue is the disposal of the various Non-Fuel Bearing Components of the reactor core. These hardware components fall somewhat arbitrarily into two categories: Non-Fuel Assembly (NFA) hardware and Spent Fuel Disassembly (SFD) hardware. This work provides a detailed examination of the generation and disposal of NFA hardware and SFD hardware by the nuclear utilities of the United States as it relates to the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program. All available sources of data on NFA and SFD hardware are analyzed with particular emphasis given to the Characteristics Data Base developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the characterization work performed by Pacific Northwest Laboratories and Rochester Gas ampersand Electric. An Expert System developed as a portion of this work is used to assist in the prediction of quantities of NFA hardware and SFD hardware that will be generated by the United States' utilities. Finally, the hardware waste management practices of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, and Japan are studied for possible application to the disposal of domestic hardware wastes. As a result of this work, a general classification scheme for NFA and SFD hardware was developed. Only NFA and SFD hardware constructed of zircaloy and experiencing a burnup of less than 70,000 MWD/MTIHM and PWR control rods constructed of stainless steel are considered Low-Level Waste. All other hardware is classified as Greater-ThanClass-C waste

  17. KADIS: a program to analyse the disassembly phase of hypothetical accidents in LMFBRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmuck, P.; Jacobs, G.; Arnecke, G.

    1977-11-01

    The program KADIS models the disassembly phase during power excursions in LMFBR hypothetical accidents. KADIS is based on point kinetics in the neutronics part and on a 2-dimensional representation of the reactor core in the hydrodynamics part. The core is modeled as an ideal, compressible fluid which is heated up adiabatically during the excursion. KADIS was built up with the help of the VENUS program of Argonne National Laboratory. Several important features were added to the basic VENUS model. Therefore we give first a complete description of the mathematical models used. Secondly we provide the user with the necessary information to handle the input/output of KADIS. (orig.) [de

  18. Engineering scale tests of mechanical disassembly and short stroke shearing systems for FBR fuel assembly

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higuchi, Hidetoshi; Kitagaki, Toru; Koizumi, Kenji; Hirano, Hiroyasu; Takeuchi, Masayuki; Washiya, Tadahiro; Kawabe, Yukinari; Kobayashi, Tsuguyuki

    2011-01-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and The Japan Atomic Power Company (JAPC) have been developing an advanced head-end process based on mechanical disassembly and short stroke shearing systems as a part of Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development (FaCT). Fuel pins for a fast reactor are installed within a hexagonal shaped wrapper tube made of stainless steel. In order to reprocess the fast reactor fuel pins, they must be removed from the wrapper tube and transported to the shearing system without failure. In addition, the advanced aqueous reprocessing process, called 'NEXT' (New Extraction System for TRU Recovery) process requires a solution of the spent fuel with relatively high concentration (500g/L). JAEA and JAPC have developed the mechanical disassembly and the short stroke shearing technology which is expected to make fragmented fuel to satisfy these requirements. This paper reports the results of engineering scale tests on the mechanical disassembly and short stroke shearing systems. These tests were carried out with simulated FBR fuel assembly and removed pins. The mechanical cutting method has been developed to avoid fuel pin failure during disassembly operation. The cutting process is divided into two modes, so called 'slit-cut' for cutting the wrapper tube and 'crop-cut' for the end plug region of the fuel pin bundle. In the slit-cut mode, the depth of cutting was automatically controlled based on the calculated wastage of the cutting tool and deformation of the wrapper tube which had been measured before the cutting. This procedure was confirmed to minimize the fuel pin failure which was hard to prevent in the case of laser cutting. The cutting speed was also controlled automatically by the electric current of the cutting motor to lower the load of the cutting tool. The removed fuel pins were transported to the shearing machine, whose fuel shearing magazine width was set to be narrow to realize the suitable configuration for the short stroke shearing

  19. Nuclear disassembly of the (Pb+Au) system at Elab=29 MeV per nucleon

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piasecki, E.; Kordyasz, A.; Bresson, S.; Crema, E.; Galin, J.; Guerreau, D.; Morjean, M.; Paulot, C.; Pouthas, J.; Jastrzebski, J.; Pienkowski, L.; Skulski, W.; Lott, B.; Quednau, B.; Schroder, W.U.; Toeke, J.

    1990-01-01

    Nuclei, with Z up to 82, emitted in the 208 Pb+ 197 Au reaction at E lab =29 MeV per nucleon, have been measured as a function of the associated neutron multiplicity. The data reveal the presence of strong correlations between character of a collision and neutron multiplicity. The trends suggest a disassembly of the nuclear system into a large number of nucleons and small fragments in the events with the highest neutron multiplicity. In such events, approximately one third of the neutrons are released from the system and fragments yields decrease in an exponential fashion with increasing mass

  20. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada Appendix D - Corrective Action Investigation Report, Central Nevada Test Area, CAU 417

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative (CAA) appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Hot Creek Valley in Nye County, Nevada, and consisting of three separate land withdrawal areas (UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4), CAU 417 is comprised of 34 corrective action sites (CASs) including 2 underground storage tanks, 5 septic systems, 8 shaker pad/cuttings disposal areas, 1 decontamination facility pit, 1 burn area, 1 scrap/trash dump, 1 outlier area, 8 housekeeping sites, and 16 mud pits. Four field events were conducted between September 1996 and June 1998 to complete a corrective action investigation indicating that the only contaminant of concern was total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH) which was found in 18 of the CASs. A total of 1,028 samples were analyzed. During this investigation, a statistical approach was used to determine which depth intervals or layers inside individual mud pits and shaker pad areas were above the State action levels for the TPH. Other related field sampling activities (i.e., expedited site characterization methods, surface geophysical surveys, direct-push geophysical surveys, direct-push soil sampling, and rotosonic drilling located septic leachfields) were conducted in this four-phase investigation; however, no further contaminants of concern (COCs) were identified. During and after the investigation activities, several of the sites which had surface debris but no COCs were cleaned up as housekeeping sites, two septic tanks were closed in place, and two underground storage tanks were removed. The focus of this CADD was to identify CAAs which would promote the prevention or mitigation of human exposure to surface and subsurface soils with contaminant

  1. Nevada, the Great Recession, and Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Verstegen, Deborah A.

    2013-01-01

    The impact of the Great Recession and its aftermath has been devastating in Nevada, especially for public education. This article discusses the budget shortfalls and the impact of the economic crisis in Nevada using case study methodology. It provides a review of documents, including Governor Gibbon's proposals for the public K-12 education system…

  2. Helping Nevada School Children Become Sun Smart

    Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Podcasts

    This podcast features Christine Thompson, Community Programs Manager at the Nevada Cancer Coalition, and author of a recent study detailing a school-based program to help Nevada school children establish healthy sun safety habits and decrease UV exposure. Christine answers questions about her research and what impact her what impact the program had on children's skin health.

  3. Dismantling of nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tallec, M.; Kus, J.P.

    2009-01-01

    Nuclear facilities have a long estimable lifetime but necessarily limited in time. At the end of their operation period, basic nuclear installations are the object of cleansing operations and transformations that will lead to their definitive decommissioning and then to their dismantling. Because each facility is somewhere unique, cleansing and dismantling require specific techniques. The dismantlement consists in the disassembly and disposing off of big equipments, in the elimination of radioactivity in all rooms of the facility, in the demolition of buildings and eventually in the reconversion of all or part of the facility. This article describes these different steps: 1 - dismantling strategy: main de-construction guidelines, expected final state; 2 - industries and sites: cleansing and dismantling at the CEA, EDF's sites under de-construction; 3 - de-construction: main steps, definitive shutdown, preparation of dismantling, electromechanical dismantling, cleansing/decommissioning, demolition, dismantling taken into account at the design stage, management of polluted soils; 4 - waste management: dismantlement wastes, national policy of radioactive waste management, management of dismantlement wastes; 5 - mastery of risks: risk analysis, conformability of risk management with reference documents, main risks encountered at de-construction works; 6 - regulatory procedures; 7 - international overview; 8 - conclusion. (J.S.)

  4. Nevada Test Site site treatment plan. Final annual update. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-04-01

    A Site Treatment Plan (STP) is required for facilities at which the US Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) generates or stores mixed waste (MW), defined by the Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCAct) as waste containing both a hazardous waste subject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and a radioactive material subject to the Atomic Energy Act. This STP was written to identify specific treatment facilities for treating DOE/NV generated MW and provides proposed implementation schedules. This STP was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and provided the basis for the negotiation and issuance of the FFCAct Consent Order (CO) dated March 6, 1996. The FFCAct CO sets forth stringent regulatory requirements to comply with the implementation of the STP

  5. Nevada commercial spent nuclear fuel transportation experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    The purpose of this report is to present an historic overview of commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments that have occurred in the state of Nevada, and to review the accident and incident experience for this type of shipments. Results show that between 1964 and 1990, 309 truck shipments covering approximately 40,000 miles moved through Nevada; this level of activity places Nevada tenth among the states in the number of truck shipments of SNF. For the same period, 15 rail shipments moving through the State covered approximately 6,500 miles, making Nevada 20th among the states in terms of number of rail shipments. None of these shipments had an accident or an incident associated with them. Because the data for Nevada are so limited, national data on SNF transportation and the safety of truck and rail transportation in general were also assessed

  6. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2005-01-01

    The ''Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2004'' was prepared by Bechtel Nevada (BN) to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. This Executive Summary presents the purpose of the document, the major programs conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), NTS key environmental initiatives, radiological releases and potential doses to the public resulting from site operations, a summary of non-radiological releases, implementation status of the NTS Environmental Management System, and significant environmental accomplishments. Much of the content of this Executive Summary is also presented in a separate stand-alone pamphlet titled ''Nevada Test Site Environmental Report Summary 2004''. It was produced this year to provide a more cost-effective and wider distribution of a hardcopy summary of the ''Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2004'' to interested DOE stakeholders

  7. Streamlined approach for environmental restoration closure report for Corrective Action Unit 120: Areas 5 and 6 aboveground storage tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-01

    This Closure Report provides documentation for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 120 of the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 120 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 5 and 6 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which are approximately 130 kilometers (80 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAS 05-01-01 is located in Area 5 and consists of three 45,800-liter (12,100-gallon) aboveground storage tanks (ASTs), piping, and debris associated with Well RNM-1. CAS 06-01-01 consists of two ASTs and two tanker trailers (all portable) that were originally located at the Area 6 Cp-50 Hot Park and which had been moved to the Area 6 Waste Handling Facility. All of the items in CAU 120 have been used to contain or convey radiologically contaminated fluid that was generated during post-nuclear event activities at the NTS.

  8. Streamlined approach for environmental restoration closure report for Corrective Action Unit 120: Areas 5 and 6 aboveground storage tanks Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    This Closure Report provides documentation for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 120 of the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 120 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 5 and 6 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which are approximately 130 kilometers (80 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAS 05-01-01 is located in Area 5 and consists of three 45,800-liter (12,100-gallon) aboveground storage tanks (ASTs), piping, and debris associated with Well RNM-1. CAS 06-01-01 consists of two ASTs and two tanker trailers (all portable) that were originally located at the Area 6 Cp-50 Hot Park and which had been moved to the Area 6 Waste Handling Facility. All of the items in CAU 120 have been used to contain or convey radiologically contaminated fluid that was generated during post-nuclear event activities at the NTS

  9. Prey and mound disassembly, manipulation and transport by fire ant collectives

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dutta, Bahnisikha; Monaenkova, Daria; Goodisman, Michael A.; Goldman, Daniel

    Fire ants inhabit subterranean nests covered by a hemispherical mound of soil permeated by narrow ( 1 body length diameter) tunnels. Fire ants can use their mound for long-term food storage [Gayahan &Tschinkel, J. Insect Sci.,2008]. Since mound tunnels are narrow, we expect that in addition to prey manipulation, mound reconfiguration could also be an important aspect of the food storage strategy. Ant colonies collected from wild were allowed to build nests in containers filled with clay soil in the laboratory. These colonies were offered diverse prey embedded with lead markers, including mealworms, crickets and shrimp. Ant-prey-soil interactions on the nest surface were recorded using overhead video and subsurface using x-ray imaging. Individual ants involved in prey storage exhibited three distinct behaviors: prey maneuvering, prey dissection and mound reconfiguration. Small prey (e.g. mealworms) were collectively carried intact into the mound through a tunnel, and then disassembled within the mound. Larger prey (e.g. shrimp) were dismantled into small pieces above the surface and carried to mound tunnels. The bodies of hard medium-sized prey (e.g. crickets) were buried after limb removal and then disassembled and moved into tunnels. Soil reconfiguration occurred in all cases.

  10. Cofilin phosphorylation is elevated after F-actin disassembly induced by Rac1 depletion.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Linna; Li, Jing; Zhang, Liwang; Zhang, Feng; Zhang, Rong; Chen, Xiang; Brakebusch, Cord; Wang, Zhipeng; Liu, Xinyou

    2015-01-01

    Cytoskeletal reorganization is essential to keratinocyte function. Rac1 regulates cytoskeletal reorganization through signaling pathways such as the cofilin cascade. Cofilin severs actin filaments after activation by dephosphorylation. Rac1 was knocked out in mouse keratinocytes and it was found that actin filaments disassembled. In the epidermis of mice in which Rac1 was knocked out only in keratinocytes, cofilin phosphorylation was aberrantly elevated, corresponding to repression of the phosphatase slingshot1 (SSH1). These effects were independent of the signaling pathways for p21-activated kinase/LIM kinase (Pak/LIMK), protein kinase C, or protein kinase D or generation of reactive oxygen species. Similarly, when actin polymerization was specifically inhibited or Rac1 was knocked down, cofilin phosphorylation was enhanced and SSH1 was repressed. Repression of SSH1 partially blocked actin depolymerization induced by Rac1 depletion. Therefore, aberrant cofilin phosphorylation that induces actin polymerization might be a consequence of actin disassembly induced by the absence of Rac1. © 2015 International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology.

  11. Asymmetric ring structure of Vps4 required for ESCRT-III disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Caillat, Christophe; Macheboeuf, Pauline; Wu, Yuanfei; McCarthy, Andrew A.; Boeri-Erba, Elisabetta; Effantin, Gregory; Göttlinger, Heinrich G.; Weissenhorn, Winfried; Renesto, Patricia

    2015-12-01

    The vacuolar protein sorting 4 AAA-ATPase (Vps4) recycles endosomal sorting complexes required for transport (ESCRT-III) polymers from cellular membranes. Here we present a 3.6-Å X-ray structure of ring-shaped Vps4 from Metallosphera sedula (MsVps4), seen as an asymmetric pseudohexamer. Conserved key interface residues are shown to be important for MsVps4 assembly, ATPase activity in vitro, ESCRT-III disassembly in vitro and HIV-1 budding. ADP binding leads to conformational changes within the protomer, which might propagate within the ring structure. All ATP-binding sites are accessible and the pseudohexamer binds six ATP with micromolar affinity in vitro. In contrast, ADP occupies one high-affinity and five low-affinity binding sites in vitro, consistent with conformational asymmetry induced on ATP hydrolysis. The structure represents a snapshot of an assembled Vps4 conformation and provides insight into the molecular motions the ring structure undergoes in a concerted action to couple ATP hydrolysis to ESCRT-III substrate disassembly.

  12. Plastics disassembly versus bulk recycling: engineering design for end-of-life electronics resource recovery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rios, Pedro; Stuart, Julie Ann; Grant, Ed

    2003-12-01

    Annual plastic flows through the business and consumer electronics manufacturing supply chain include nearly 3 billion lb of high-value engineering plastics derived from petroleum. The recovery of resource value from this stream presents critical challenges in areas of materials identification and recycling process design that demand new green engineering technologies applied together with life cycle assessment and ecological supply chain analysis to create viable plastics-to-plastics supply cycles. The sustainable recovery of potentially high-value engineering plastics streams requires that recyclers either avoid mixing plastic parts or purify later by separating smaller plastic pieces created in volume reduction (shredding) steps. Identification and separation constitute significant barriers in the plastics-to-plastics recycling value proposition. In the present work, we develop a model that accepts randomly arriving electronic products to study scenarios by which a recycler might identify and separate high-value engineering plastics as well as metals. Using discrete eventsimulation,we compare current mixed plastics recovery with spectrochemical plastic resin identification and subsequent sorting. Our results show that limited disassembly with whole-part identification can produce substantial yields in separated streams of recovered engineering thermoplastics. We find that disassembly with identification does not constitute a bottleneck, but rather, with relatively few workers, can be configured to pull the process and thus decrease maximum staging space requirements.

  13. Stimuli-disassembling gold nanoclusters for diagnosis of early stage oral cancer by optical coherence tomography

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Chang Soo; Ingato, Dominique; Wilder-Smith, Petra; Chen, Zhongping; Kwon, Young Jik

    2018-01-01

    A key design consideration in developing contrast agents is obtaining distinct, multiple signal changes in diseased tissue. Plasmonic gold nanoparticles (Au NPs) have been developed as contrast agents due to their strong surface plasmon resonance (SPR). This study aims to demonstrate that stimuli-responsive plasmonic Au nanoclusters (Au NCs) can be used as a contrast agent for optical coherence tomography (OCT) in detecting early-stage cancer. Au NPs were clustered via acid-cleavable linkers to synthesize Au NCs that disassemble under mildly acidic conditions into individual Au NPs, simultaneously diminishing SPR effect (quantified by scattering intensity) and increasing Brownian motion (quantified by Doppler variance). The acid-triggered morphological and accompanying optico-physical property changes of the acid-disassembling Au NCs were confirmed by TEM, DLS, UV/Vis, and OCT. Stimuli-responsive Au NCs were applied in a hamster check pouch model carrying early-stage squamous carcinoma tissue. The tissue was visualized by OCT imaging, which showed reduced scattering intensity and increased Doppler variance in the dysplastic tissue. This study demonstrates the promise of diagnosing early-stage cancer using molecularly programmable, inorganic nanomaterial-based contrast agents that are capable of generating multiple, stimuli-triggered diagnostic signals in early-stage cancer.[Figure not available: see fulltext.

  14. Engineering multifunctional protein nanoparticles by in vitro disassembling and reassembling of heterologous building blocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Unzueta, Ugutz; Serna, Naroa; Sánchez-García, Laura; Roldán, Mónica; Sánchez-Chardi, Alejandro; Mangues, Ramón; Villaverde, Antonio; Vázquez, Esther

    2017-12-01

    The engineering of protein self-assembling at the nanoscale allows the generation of functional and biocompatible materials, which can be produced by easy biological fabrication. The combination of cationic and histidine-rich stretches in fusion proteins promotes oligomerization as stable protein-only regular nanoparticles that are composed by a moderate number of building blocks. Among other applications, these materials are highly appealing as tools in targeted drug delivery once empowered with peptidic ligands of cell surface receptors. In this context, we have dissected here this simple technological platform regarding the controlled disassembling and reassembling of the composing building blocks. By applying high salt and imidazole in combination, nanoparticles are disassembled in a process that is fully reversible upon removal of the disrupting agents. By taking this approach, we accomplish here the in vitro generation of hybrid nanoparticles formed by heterologous building blocks. This fact demonstrates the capability to generate multifunctional and/or multiparatopic or multispecific materials usable in nanomedical applications.

  15. Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 190: Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alfred Wickline

    2008-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 190, Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (1996, as amended January 2007). Corrective Action Unit 190 is comprised of the following four corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 11-02-01, Underground Centrifuge; (2) 11-02-02, Drain Lines and Outfall; (3) 11-59-01, Tweezer Facility Septic System; (4) 14-23-01, LTU-6 Test Area The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation for closure of CAU 190 with no further corrective action. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from March 21 through June 26, 2007. All CAI activities were conducted as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 190: Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective process: (1) Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. (2) If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. (3) Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. The CAU 190 dataset from the investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the dataset for use in fulfilling the data quality objective data needs

  16. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 356: Mud Pits and Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 356, Mud Pits and Disposal Sites, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. This CAU is located in Areas 3 and 20 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 356 consists of seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 03-04-01, Area 3 Change House Septic System; 03-09-01, Mud Pit Spill Over; 03-09-03, Mud Pit; 03-09-04, Mud Pit; 03-09-05, Mud Pit; 20-16-01, Landfill; and 20-22-21, Drums. This CR identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office's (NNSA/NV's) recommendation that no further corrective action and closure in place is deemed necessary for CAU 356. This recommendation is based on the results of field investigation/closure activities conducted November 20, 2001, through January 3, 2002, and March 11 to 14, 2002. These activities were conducted in accordance with the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan (SAFER) for CAU 356. For CASs 03-09-01, 03-09-03, 20-16-01, and 22-20-21, analytes detected in soil during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against Preliminary Action Levels (PALs) and it was determined that no Contaminants of Concern (COCs) were present. Therefore, no further action is necessary for the soil at these CASs. For CASs 03-04-01, 03-09-04, and 03-09-05, analytes detected in soil during the corrective action investigation were evaluated against PALs and identifies total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPHs) and radionuclides (i.e., americium-241 and/or plutonium 239/240) as COCs. The nature, extent, and concentration of the TPH and radionuclide COCs were bounded by sampling and shown to be relatively immobile. Therefore, closure in place is recommended for these CASs in CAU 356. Further, use restrictions are not required at this CAU beyond the NTS use restrictions identified in

  17. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 537: Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 537 is identified in the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) of 1996 as Waste Sites. CAU 537 is located in Areas 3 and 19 of the Nevada Test Site, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 03-23-06, Bucket; Yellow Tagged Bags; and CAS 19-19-01, Trash Pit. CAU 537 closure activities were conducted in April 2007 according to the FFACO and Revision 3 of the Sectored Clean-up Work Plan for Housekeeping Category Waste Sites (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2003). At CAS 03-23-06, closure activities included removal and disposal of a 15-foot (ft) by 15-ft by 8-ft tall wooden shed containing wood and metal debris and a 5-gallon plastic bucket containing deteriorated plastic bags with yellow radioactive contamination tape. The debris was transported to the Area 9 U10c Landfill for disposal after being screened for radiological contamination according to the ''NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual'' (NNSA/NSO, 2004). At CAS 19-19-01, closure activities included segregation, removal, and disposal of non-friable, non-regulated asbestos-containing material (ACM) and construction debris. The ACM was determined to be non-friable by waste characterization samples collected prior to closure activities. The ACM was removed and double-bagged by licensed, trained asbestos workers and transported to the Area 9 U10c Landfill for disposal. Construction debris was transported in end-dump trucks to the Area 9 U10c Landfill for disposal. Closure activities generated sanitary waste/construction debris and ACM. Waste generated during closure activities was appropriately managed and disposed. Waste characterization sample results are included as Appendix A of this report, and waste disposition documentation is included as Appendix B of this report. Copies of the Sectored Housekeeping Site Closure

  18. Flood potential of Topopah Wash and tributaries, eastern part of Jackass Flats, Nevada Test Site, southern Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, R.C.; Spahr, N.E.

    1980-01-01

    Guidelines for evaluating potential surface facilities to be used for the storage of high-level radioactive wastes on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada include the consideration of the potential for flooding. Those floods that are considered to constitute the principal flood hazards for these facilities are the 100- and 500-year floods, and the maximum potential flood. Flood-prone areas for the three floods with present natural-channel conditions were defined for the eastern part of Jackass Flats in the southwestern part of the Nevada Test Site. The 100-year flood-prone areas would closely parallel most stream channels with very few occurrences of out-of-bank flooding between adjacent channels. Out-of-bank flooding would occur at depths of less than 2 feet with mean velocities as much as 7 feet per second. Channel flood depths would range from 1 to 9 feet and mean velocities would range from 3 to 9 feet per second. The 500-year flood would exceed the discharge capacities of all channels except for Topopah Wash and some channels in the upstream reaches of a few tributaries. Out-of-bank flows between adjacent channels would occur at depths as much as 3 feet with mean velocities of more than 7 feet per second. Channel flood depths would range from 1 to 12 feet and mean velocities would range from 3 to 13 feet per second. The maximum potential flood would inundate most of the study area. Excluded areas would be those located immediately east of the upstream reach of Topopah Wash and between upstream channel reaches of some tributaries. Out-of-bank flows between adjacent channels would occur at depths as much as 5 feet with mean velocities as much s 13 feet per second. Channel flood depth would range from 2 to 23 feet and mean velocities would range from 4 to 26 feet per second

  19. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 137: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.:0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wickline, Alfred

    2005-12-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 137: Waste Disposal Sites. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 137 contains sites that are located in Areas 1, 3, 7, 9, and 12 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 137 is comprised of the eight corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; (2) CAS 03-23-01, Waste Disposal Site; (3) CAS 03-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (4) CAS 03-99-15, Waste Disposal Site; (5) CAS 07-23-02, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (6) CAS 09-23-07, Radioactive Waste Disposal Site; (7) CAS 12-08-01, Waste Disposal Site; and (8) CAS 12-23-07, Waste Disposal Site. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 137 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by conducting a CAI before evaluating and selecting

  20. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with Errata

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boehlecke, Robert

    2004-11-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 536 is comprised of a single Corrective Action Site (CAS), 03-44-02, Steam Jenny Discharge, and is located in Area 3 of the NTS (Figure 1-2). The CAU was investigated in accordance with the Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) and Record of Technical Change (ROTC) No. 1 (NNSA/NV, 2003). The CADD provides or references the specific information necessary to support the recommended corrective action alternative selected to complete closure of the site. The CAU 536, Area 3 Release Site, includes the Steam Jenny Discharge (CAS 03-44-02) that was historically used for steam cleaning equipment in the Area 3 Camp. Concerns at this CAS include contaminants commonly associated with steam cleaning operations and Area 3 Camp activities that include total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), unspecified solvents, radionuclides, metals, and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The CAIP for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NV, 2003), provides additional information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, it will not be repeated in this CADD. This CADD identifies potential corrective action alternatives and provides a rationale for the selection of a recommended corrective action alternative for the CAS within CAU 536. The evaluation of corrective action alternatives is based on process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NV, 2003) that was approved prior to the start of the

  1. Rural migration in southern Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mosser, D.; Soden, D.L.

    1993-01-01

    This study reviews the history of migration in two rural counties in Southern Nevada. It is part of a larger study about the impact of a proposed high-level nuclear waste repository on, in and out-migration patterns in the state. The historical record suggests a boom and bust economic cycle has predominated in the region for the past century creating conditions that should be taken into account, by decision makers, when ascertaining the long-term impacts of the proposed repository

  2. Quaternary environments in Sierra Nevada

    OpenAIRE

    Oliva, Marc; Gómez Ortiz, Antonio; Palacios Estremera, David; Salvador Franch, Ferran; Salvà Catarineu, Monserrat

    2016-01-01

    El conocimiento relativo a la evolución ambiental cuaternaria en las montañas de la Península Ibérica ha avanzado sustancialmente en las últimas décadas. Particularmente significativos son los progresos realizados en el macizo de Sierra Nevada, en el sur peninsular. En este caso, los investigadores se han servido de registros naturales y fuentes documentales para reconstruir la dinámica ambiental desde la Última Glaciación y posterior deglaciación del macizo hasta su evolución reciente. Los c...

  3. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 166: Storage Yards and Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    David Strand

    2006-06-01

    contaminants of concern are present. (5) If contaminants of concern are present, collect additional step-out samples to define the extent of the contamination. (6) Collect samples of investigation-derived waste, as needed, for waste management and minimization purposes. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Under the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'', this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, and field work will commence following approval.

  4. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 538: Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alfred Wickline

    2006-04-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions necessary for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 538: Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. It has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. A SAFER may be performed when the following criteria are met: (1) Conceptual corrective actions are clearly identified (although some degree of investigation may be necessary to select a specific corrective action before completion of the Corrective Action Investigation [CAI]). (2) Uncertainty of the nature, extent, and corrective action must be limited to an acceptable level of risk. (3) The SAFER Plan includes decision points and criteria for making data quality objective (DQO) decisions. The purpose of the investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for either clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. This SAFER Plan identifies decision points developed in cooperation with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and where DOE will reach consensus with NDEP before beginning the next phase of work.

  5. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 168: Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, REV 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 168 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps. CAU 168 consists of twelve Corrective Action Sites (CASs) in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The CASs contain surface and subsurface debris, impacted soil, and contaminated materials. Site characterization activities were conducted in 2002, and the results are presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) for CAU 168 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006). Site characterization results indicated that soil at several sites exceeded the clean-up criteria for total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and radionuclides. The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection approved the proposed corrective actions specified in the CADD (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The approved corrective actions include no further action, clean closure, and closure in place with administrative controls

  6. Seismic evaluation of critical facilities at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murray, R.C.; Tokarz, F.J.

    1976-01-01

    The performance of critical facilities at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) are being evaluated for severe earthquake loading. Facilities at Livermore, Site-300 and the Nevada Test Site are included in this study. These facilities are identified, the seismic criteria used for the analysis are indicated, the various methods used for structural analysis are discussed and a summary of the results of facilities analyzed to date are presented

  7. Polygons and adhesion plaques and the disassembly and assembly of myofibrils in cardiac myocytes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lin, Z X; Holtzer, S; Schultheiss, T; Murray, J; Masaki, T; Fischman, D A; Holtzer, H

    1989-06-01

    Successive stages in the disassembly of myofibrils and the subsequent assembly of new myofibrils have been studied in cultures of dissociated chick cardiac myocytes. The myofibrils in trypsinized and dispersed myocytes are sequentially disassembled during the first 3 d of culture. They split longitudinally and then assemble into transitory polygons. Multiples of single sarcomeres, the cardiac polygons, are analogous to the transitory polygonal configurations assumed by stress fibers in spreading fibroblasts. They differ from their counterparts in fibroblasts in that they consist of muscle alpha-actinin vertices and muscle myosin heavy chain struts, rather than of the nonmuscle contractile protein isoforms of stress fiber polygons. EM sections reveal the vertices and struts in cardiac polygons to be typical Z and A bands. Most cardiac polygons are eliminated by day 5 of culture. Concurrent with the disassembly and elimination of the original myofibrils new myofibrils are rapidly assembled elsewhere in the same myocyte. Without exception both distal tips of each nascent myofibril terminate in adhesion plaques. The morphology and composition of the adhesion plaques capping each end of each myofibril are similar to those of the termini of stress fibers in fibroblasts. However, whereas the adhesion complexes involving stress fibers in fibroblasts consist of vinculin/nonmuscle alpha-actinin/beta- and gamma-actins, the analogous structures in myocytes involving myofibrils consist of vinculin/muscle alpha-actinin/alpha-actin. The addition of 1.7-2.0 microns sarcomeres to the distal tips of an elongating myofibril, irrespective of whether the myofibril consists of 1, 10, or several hundred tandem sarcomeres, occurs while the myofibril appears to remain linked to its respective adhesion plaques. The adhesion plaques in vitro are the equivalent of the in vivo intercalated discs, both in terms of their molecular composition and with respect to their functioning as initiating

  8. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 240: Area 25 Vehicle Washdown Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gustafason, D.L.

    2001-01-01

    The Area 25 Vehicle Washdown, Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 240, was clean-closed following the approved Corrective Action Decision Document closure alternative and in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996). The CAU consists of thee Corrective Action Sites (CASs): 25-07-01 - Vehicle Washdown Area (Propellant Pad); 25-07-02 - Vehicle Washdown Area (F and J Roads Pad); and 25-07-03 - Vehicle Washdown Station (RADSAFE Pad). Characterization activities indicated that only CAS 25-07-02 (F and J Roads Pad) contained constituents of concern (COCs) above action levels and required remediation. The COCs detected were Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (TPH) as diesel, cesium-137, and strontium-90. The F and J Roads Pad may have been used for the decontamination of vehicles and possibly disassembled engine and reactor parts from Test Cell C. Activities occurred there during the 1960s through early 1970s. The F and J Roads Pad consisted of a 9- by 5-meter (m) (30- by 15-foot [ft]) concrete pad and a 14- by 13-m (46-by 43-ft) gravel sump. The clean-closure corrective action consisted of excavation, disposal, verification sampling, backfilling, and regrading. Closure activities began on August 21, 2000, and ended on September 19, 2000. Waste disposal activities were completed on December 12, 2000. A total of 172 cubic meters (223 cubic yards) of impacted soil was excavated and disposed. The concrete pad was also removed and disposed. Verification samples were collected from the bottom and sidewalls of the excavation and analyzed for TPH diesel and 20-minute gamma spectroscopy. The sample results indicated that all impacted soil above remediation standards was removed. The closure was completed following the approved Corrective Action Plan. All impacted waste was disposed in the Area 6 Hydrocarbon Landfill. All non-impacted debris was disposed in the Area 9 Construction Landfill and the Area 23 Sanitary Landfill

  9. Atmospheric overview for the Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowen, J.L.; Egami, R.T.

    1983-11-01

    This report discusses atmospheric considerations for a nuclear waste repository at NTS. It presents the climatology of Nevada, and NTS in particular, including paleoclimatology for past climatic changes, present climatology for mean meterological conditions, feature climatological expectations, and occurrence of extreme weather. It discusses air quality aspects including an estimation of present air quality and possible dispersion conditions on NTS. It briefly assesses noise problems. It outlines a plan for an Environmental Impact Statement and covers the federal and state regulations for air quality. It identifies data for climatology and air quality and evaluates their applicability to nuclear waste repository

  10. Nevada Applied Ecology Information Center: a prototype

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pfuderer, H.A.

    1978-01-01

    The Nevada Applied Ecology Group (NAEG) was exceptionally farsighted in establishing the Nevada Applied Ecology Information Center in January 1972, not long after the Nevada Test Site research programs began. Since its inception, the Data Base on the Environmental Aspects of the Transuranics has been proven to be a useful tool to a wide range of researchers and planners, both nationally and internationally, in addition to those associated with the NAEG. Because of its versatility and ease of access, the Data Base on the Environmental Aspects of the Transuranics has played a major role in the development of new projects by the Ecological Sciences Information Center

  11. Evaluations of Yucca Mountain survey findings about the attitudes, opinions, and evaluations of nuclear waste disposal and Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flynn, J.H.; Slovic, P.; Mertz, C.K.; Toma, J.

    1990-09-01

    This report provides findings from three surveys conducted during the Fall 1989 as part of the socioeconomic research program sponsored by the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects. The US Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) in 1982 and defined specific oversight responsibilities, including studies of socioeconomic effects and impacts, to the states in which potential high-level nuclear waste repositories might be located. The NWPA was amended in 1987 and Yucca Mountain, Nevada was designated as the only site to be characterized (studied in detail) as a location for the nation's first repository. These surveys were conducted so they could provide information to the state of Nevada in its evaluation of the Yucca Mountain project. This report presents information from these surveys on two major areas. First, respondent evaluations of environmental hazards, especially nuclear waste facilities are reported. Second, an analysis is made of the Nevada State Survey to examine the public response to the positions taken by the officials and institutions of Nevada in regard to the Yucca Mountain project. The survey data support a finding that the respondents from all three surveys are seriously concerned about the environmental effects of technological facilities and hazards. The evaluations of a nuclear waste repository especially is viewed as likely to produce adverse events and impacts in every aspect of its implementation, operation or long-term existence. When compared to other industrial or technological activities, a high-level nuclear waste repository is seen as the most feared and least acceptable. 36 tabs

  12. Annotated bibliography for biologic overview for the Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Collins, E.; O'Farrell, T.P.; Rhoads, W.A.

    1981-12-01

    This annotated bibliography was compiled to accompany the Biologic Overview for the Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, EG and G, Santa Barbara Operations Report No. EGG 1183-2443, which documents and synthesizes important biotic information related to Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations (NNWSI). As such, it is an important part of the NNWSI screening process that was designed to include a systematic, traceable, defensible, and documented basis for a decision to proceed or not with site-specific phases on NTS. Included are all published, and available but unpublished, baseline information on life histories, habitat requirements, distributions, and ecological relationships of the flora and fauna of the region. Special effort was made to include information on endangered, threatened, or sensitive species. 131 references

  13. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 555: Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0 with Errata

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pastor, Laura

    2005-12-01

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) contains project-specific information including facility descriptions, environmental sample collection objectives, and criteria for conducting site investigation activities at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 555: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. This CAIP has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. Corrective Action Unit 555 is located in Areas 1, 3 and 6 of the NTS, which is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, and is comprised of the five corrective action sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: (1) CAS 01-59-01, Area 1 Camp Septic System; (2) CAS 03-59-03, Core Handling Building Septic System; (3) CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well; (4) CAS 06-59-01, Birdwell Septic System; and (5) CAS 06-59-02, National Cementers Septic System. An FFACO modification was approved on December 14, 2005, to include CAS 06-20-05, Birdwell Dry Well, as part of the scope of CAU 555. The work scope was expanded in this document to include the investigation of CAS 06-20-05. The Corrective Action Investigation (CAI) will include field inspections, radiological surveys, geophysical surveys, sampling of environmental media, analysis of samples, and assessment of investigation results, where appropriate. Data will be obtained to support corrective action alternative evaluations and waste management decisions. The CASs in CAU 555 are being investigated because hazardous and/or radioactive constituents may be present in concentrations that could potentially pose a threat to human health and the environment. Existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for the CASs. Additional information will be generated by

  14. pH-Sensitive Reversible Programmed Targeting Strategy by the Self-Assembly/Disassembly of Gold Nanoparticles.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ma, Jinlong; Hu, Zhenpeng; Wang, Wei; Wang, Xinyu; Wu, Qiang; Yuan, Zhi

    2017-05-24

    A reversible programmed targeting strategy could achieve high tumor accumulation due to its long blood circulation time and high cellular internalization. Here, targeting ligand-modified poly(ethylene glycol) (PEG-ligand), dibutylamines (Bu), and pyrrolidinamines (Py) were introduced on the surface of gold nanoparticles (Au NPs) for reversible shielding/deshielding of the targeting ligands by pH-responsive self-assembly. Hydrophobic interaction and steric repulsion are the main driving forces for the self-assembly/disassembly of Au NPs. The precise self-assembly (pH ≥ 7.2) and disassembly (pH ≤ 6.8) of Au NPs with different ligands could be achieved by fine-tuning the modifying molar ratio of Bu and Py (R m ), which followed the formula R m = 1/(-0.0013X 2 + 0.0323X + 1), in which X is the logarithm of the partition coefficient of the targeting ligand. The assembled/disassembled behavior of Au NPs at pH 7.2 and 6.8 was confirmed by transmission electron microscopy and dynamic light scattering. Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays and cellular uptake studies showed that the ligands could be buried inside the assembly and exposed when disassembled. More importantly, this process was reversible, which provides the possibility of prolonging blood circulation by shielding ligands associated with the NPs that were effused from tumor tissue.

  15. Ufd1-Npl4 Recruit Cdc48 for Disassembly of Ubiquitylated CMG Helicase at the End of Chromosome Replication

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marija Maric

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available Disassembly of the Cdc45-MCM-GINS (CMG DNA helicase is the key regulated step during DNA replication termination in eukaryotes, involving ubiquitylation of the Mcm7 helicase subunit, leading to a disassembly process that requires the Cdc48 “segregase”. Here, we employ a screen to identify partners of budding yeast Cdc48 that are important for disassembly of ubiquitylated CMG helicase at the end of chromosome replication. We demonstrate that the ubiquitin-binding Ufd1-Npl4 complex recruits Cdc48 to ubiquitylated CMG. Ubiquitylation of CMG in yeast cell extracts is dependent upon lysine 29 of Mcm7, which is the only detectable site of ubiquitylation both in vitro and in vivo (though in vivo other sites can be modified when K29 is mutated. Mutation of K29 abrogates in vitro recruitment of Ufd1-Npl4-Cdc48 to the CMG helicase, supporting a model whereby Ufd1-Npl4 recruits Cdc48 to ubiquitylated CMG at the end of chromosome replication, thereby driving the disassembly reaction.

  16. Neuroprotective Effects against POCD by Photobiomodulation: Evidence from Assembly/Disassembly of the Cytoskeleton

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ann D. Liebert

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available Postoperative cognitive dysfunction (POCD is a decline in memory following anaesthesia and surgery in elderly patients. While often reversible, it consumes medical resources, compromises patient well-being, and possibly accelerates progression into Alzheimer's disease. Anesthetics have been implicated in POCD, as has neuroinflammation, as indicated by cytokine inflammatory markers. Photobiomodulation (PBM is an effective treatment for a number of conditions, including inflammation. PBM also has a direct effect on microtubule disassembly in neurons with the formation of small, reversible varicosities, which cause neural blockade and alleviation of pain symptoms. This mimics endogenously formed varicosities that are neuroprotective against damage, toxins, and the formation of larger, destructive varicosities and focal swellings. It is proposed that PBM may be effective as a preconditioning treatment against POCD; similar to the PBM treatment, protective and abscopal effects that have been demonstrated in experimental models of macular degeneration, neurological, and cardiac conditions.

  17. Chain Assembly and Disassembly Processes Differently Affect the Conformational Space of Ubiquitin Chains.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kniss, Andreas; Schuetz, Denise; Kazemi, Sina; Pluska, Lukas; Spindler, Philipp E; Rogov, Vladimir V; Husnjak, Koraljka; Dikic, Ivan; Güntert, Peter; Sommer, Thomas; Prisner, Thomas F; Dötsch, Volker

    2018-02-06

    Ubiquitination is the most versatile posttranslational modification. The information is encoded by linkage type as well as chain length, which are translated by ubiquitin binding domains into specific signaling events. Chain topology determines the conformational space of a ubiquitin chain and adds an additional regulatory layer to this ubiquitin code. In particular, processes that modify chain length will be affected by chain conformations as they require access to the elongation or cleavage sites. We investigated conformational distributions in the context of chain elongation and disassembly using pulsed electron-electron double resonance spectroscopy in combination with molecular modeling. Analysis of the conformational space of diubiquitin revealed conformational selection or remodeling as mechanisms for chain recognition during elongation or hydrolysis, respectively. Chain elongation to tetraubiquitin increases the sampled conformational space, suggesting that a high intrinsic flexibility of K48-linked chains may contribute to efficient proteasomal degradation. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. TRIM15 is a focal adhesion protein that regulates focal adhesion disassembly

    Science.gov (United States)

    Uchil, Pradeep D.; Pawliczek, Tobias; Reynolds, Tracy D.; Ding, Siyuan; Hinz, Angelika; Munro, James B.; Huang, Fang; Floyd, Robert W.; Yang, Haitao; Hamilton, William L.; Bewersdorf, Joerg; Xiong, Yong; Calderwood, David A.; Mothes, Walther

    2014-01-01

    ABSTRACT Focal adhesions are macromolecular complexes that connect the actin cytoskeleton to the extracellular matrix. Dynamic turnover of focal adhesions is crucial for cell migration. Paxillin is a multi-adaptor protein that plays an important role in regulating focal adhesion dynamics. Here, we identify TRIM15, a member of the tripartite motif protein family, as a paxillin-interacting factor and a component of focal adhesions. TRIM15 localizes to focal contacts in a myosin-II-independent manner by an interaction between its coiled-coil domain and the LD2 motif of paxillin. Unlike other focal adhesion proteins, TRIM15 is a stable focal adhesion component with restricted mobility due to its ability to form oligomers. TRIM15-depleted cells display impaired cell migration and reduced focal adhesion disassembly rates, in addition to enlarged focal adhesions. Thus, our studies demonstrate a cellular function for TRIM15 as a regulatory component of focal adhesion turnover and cell migration. PMID:25015296

  19. Electrostatic assembly/disassembly of nanoscaled colloidosomes for light-triggered cargo release

    KAUST Repository

    Li, Song

    2015-04-27

    Colloidosome capsules possess the potential for the encapsulation and release of molecular and macromolecular cargos. However, the stabilization of the colloidosome shell usually requires an additional covalent crosslinking which irreversibly seals the capsules, and greatly limits their applications in large-cargos release. Herein we report nanoscaled colloidosomes designed by the electrostatic assembly of organosilica nanoparticles (NPs) with oppositely charged surfaces (rather than covalent bonds), arising from different contents of a bridged nitrophenylene-alkoxysilane [NB; 3-nitro-N-(3-(triethoxysilyl)propyl)-4-(((3-(triethoxysilyl)propyl)-amino)methyl)benzamid] derivative in the silica. The surface charge of the positively charged NPs was reversed by light irradiation because of a photoreaction in the NB moieties, which impacted the electrostatic interactions between NPs and disassembled the colloidosome nanosystems. This design was successfully applied for the encapsulation and light-triggered release of cargos. © 2015 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

  20. Acoustically Triggered Disassembly of Multilayered Polyelectrolyte Thin Films through Gigahertz Resonators for Controlled Drug Release Applications

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zhixin Zhang

    2016-11-01

    Full Text Available Controlled drug release has a high priority for the development of modern medicine and biochemistry. To develop a versatile method for controlled release, a miniaturized acoustic gigahertz (GHz resonator is designed and fabricated which can transfer electric supply to mechanical vibrations. By contacting with liquid, the GHz resonator directly excites streaming flows and induces physical shear stress to tear the multilayered polyelectrolyte (PET thin films. Due to the ultra-high working frequency, the shear stress is greatly intensified, which results in a controlled disassembling of the PET thin films. This technique is demonstrated as an effective method to trigger and control the drug release. Both theory analysis and controlled release experiments prove the thin film destruction and the drug release.

  1. Cofilin phosphorylation is elevated after F-actin disassembly induced by Rac1 depletion

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Liu, Linna; Li, Jing; Zhang, Liwang

    2015-01-01

    Cytoskeletal reorganization is essential to keratinocyte function. Rac1 regulates cytoskeletal reorganization through signaling pathways such as the cofilin cascade. Cofilin severs actin filaments after activation by dephosphorylation. Rac1 was knocked out in mouse keratinocytes and it was found...... that actin filaments disassembled. In the epidermis of mice in which Rac1 was knocked out only in keratinocytes, cofilin phosphorylation was aberrantly elevated, corresponding to repression of the phosphatase slingshot1 (SSH1). These effects were independent of the signaling pathways for p21-activated kinase....../LIM kinase (Pak/LIMK), protein kinase C, or protein kinase D or generation of reactive oxygen species. Similarly, when actin polymerization was specifically inhibited or Rac1 was knocked down, cofilin phosphorylation was enhanced and SSH1 was repressed. Repression of SSH1 partially blocked actin...

  2. Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) management at the Nevada Test Site (NTS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker, B.D.; Gertz, C.P.; Clayton, W.A.; Crowe, B.M.

    1998-01-01

    In 1978, the Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV), established a managed LLW disposal project at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Two, sites which were already accepting limited amounts of on-site generated waste for disposal and off-site generated Transuranic Waste for interim storage, were selected to house the disposal facilities. In those early days, these sites, located about 15 miles apart, afforded the DOE/NV the opportunity to use at least two technologies to manage its waste cost effectively. The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) uses engineered shallow-land burial cells to dispose packaged waste while the Area 3 RWMS uses subsidence craters formed from underground testing of nuclear weapons for the disposal of packaged and unpackaged bulk waste. The paper describes the technical attributes of both Area 5 and Area 3 facilities, the acceptance process, the disposal processes, and present and future capacities of both sites

  3. Nevada Isostatic Residual Gravity Over Basement

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce — This study of gravity data from Nevada is part of a statewide analysis of mineral resources. The main objective of the gravity study were: 1) to infer the structure...

  4. Gravity Data for the State of Nevada

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce — Gravity data for the entire state of Nevada and adjacent parts of California, Utah, and Arizona are presented. About 80,000 gravity stations were compiled primarily...

  5. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2003

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bechtel Nevada

    2004-10-01

    The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2003 was prepared by Bechtel Nevada to meet the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy and the information needs of the public. This report is meant to be useful to members of the public, public officials, regulators, and Nevada Test Site contractors. The Executive Summary strives to present in a concise format the purpose of the document, the NTS mission and major programs, a summary of radiological releases and doses to the public resulting from site operations, a summary of non-radiological releases, and an overview of the Nevada Test Site Environmental Management System. The Executive Summary, combined with the following Compliance Summary, are written to meet all the objectives of the report and to be stand-alone sections for those who choose not to read the entire document.

  6. Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2013

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wills, C.

    2014-09-09

    This report was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) (formerly designated as the Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO]). The new field office designation occurred in March 2013. Published reports cited in this 2013 report, therefore, may bear the name or authorship of NNSA/NSO. This and previous years’ reports, called Annual Site Environmental Reports (ASERs), Nevada Test Site Environmental Reports (NTSERs), and, beginning in 2010, Nevada National Security Site Environmental Reports (NNSSERs), are posted on the NNSA/NFO website at http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx.

  7. Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 529: Area 25 Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert F. Boehlecke

    2004-11-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 529, Area 25 Contaminated Materials, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-23-17, Contaminated Wash, is the only CAS in CAU 529 and is located in Area 25 of the NTS, in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1-2). Corrective Action Site 25-23-17, Contaminated Wash, was divided into nine parcels because of the large area impacted by past operations and the complexity of the source areas. The CAS was subdivided into separate parcels based on separate and distinct releases as determined and approved in the Data Quality Objectives (DQO) process and Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP). Table 1-1 summarizes the suspected sources for the nine parcels. Corrective Action Site 25-23-17 is comprised of the following nine parcels: (1) Parcel A, Kiwi Transient Nuclear Test (TNT) 16,000-foot (ft) Arc Area (Kiwi TNT); (2) Parcel B, Phoebus 1A Test 8,000-ft Arc Area (Phoebus); (3) Parcel C, Topopah Wash at Test Cell C (TCC); (4) Parcel D, Buried Contaminated Soil Area (BCSA) l; (5) Parcel E, BCSA 2; (6) Parcel F, Borrow Pit Burial Site (BPBS); (7) Parcel G, Drain/Outfall Discharges; (8) Parcel H, Contaminated Soil Storage Area (CSSA); and (9) Parcel J, Main Stream/Drainage Channels.

  8. Remote waste handling at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaughn, M.E.

    1982-01-01

    Radioactive solid wastes, some of which are combustible, are generated during disassembly and examination of irradiated fast-reactor fuel and material experiments at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF). These wastes are remotely segregated and packaged in doubly contained, high-integrity, clean, retrievable waste packages for shipment to the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). This paper describes the equipment and techniques used to perform these operations

  9. Swimming Upstream: Tobacco Policy Making in Nevada

    OpenAIRE

    Tung, Gregory MPH; Glantz, Stanton A. Ph.D.

    2008-01-01

    The tobacco industry is a major political force in Nevada. The industry dominated state politics through a combination of strategic alliances with the hospitality and gaming industries and campaign contributions. From 1990-2006 the tobacco industry contributed $552,111 to the state political parties and individuals running for state office. In 1975, health groups in Nevada attempted to pass a legislative proposal, AB 17, that would have required smoking and non-smoking sections in al...

  10. Closure report for CAU No. 450: Historical UST release sites, Nevada Test Site. Volume 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    This report addresses the closure of 11 historical underground storage tank release sites within various areas of the Nevada Test Site. This report contains remedial verification of the soil sample analytical results for the following: Area 11 Tweezer facility; Area 12 boiler house; Area 12 service station; Area 23 bypass yard; Area 23 service station; Area 25 power house; Area 25 tech. services building; Area 25 tech. operations building; Area 26 power house; and Area 27 boiler house

  11. Determination of Rock Mass Modulus Using the Plate Loading Method at Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finley, R.E.; George, J.T.; Riggins, M.

    1999-01-01

    A suite of plate loading tests has recently been conducted by Sandia National Laboratories at the Exploratory Studies Facility at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Fielding of these in situ tests as well as other approaches undertaken for the determination of rock mass modulus are described. The various methodologies are evaluated and their data compared. Calculation by existing empirical methods and numerical modeling are compared to each other as well as to field data

  12. PMF (probable maximum flood) study for Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigation Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bullard, K.L.

    1986-01-01

    This document estimates the risk of flooding in the high-level radioactive waste depository proposed for the Yucca Mountain of Nevada. Described are the general features of the proposed site, the drainage pattern of the surrounding area, the historical pattern of precipitation, and an estimate of future precipitation trends. Information from this report will be used in decisions on flood protection construction at this facility. 10 refs., 61 figs., 42 tabs

  13. Housekeeping Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 463: Areas 2, 3, 9, and 25 Housekeeping Waste Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order was entered into by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy, and U.S. Department of Defense to identify sites of potential historical contamination and implement corrective actions based on public health and environmental considerations. The facilities subject to this agreement include the Nevada Test Site (NTS), parts of the Tonopah Test Range, parts of the Nellis Air Force Range, the Central Nevada Test Area, and the Project Shoal Area. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) are areas potentially requiring corrective actions and may include solid waste management units, individual disposal, or release sites. Based on geography, technical similarity, agency responsibility, or other appropriate reasons, CASs are grouped together into Corrective Action Units (CAUs) for the purposes of determining corrective actions. This report contains the Closure Verification Forms for cleanup activities that were performed at 13 CASs within CAU 463 on the NTS. The Housekeeping Closure Verification Form for each CAS provides the location, directions to the site, general description, and photographs of the site before and after cleanup activities. Housekeeping activities at these sites included removal of debris (e.g., wooden pallets, metal, glass, and trash) and other material. In addition, these forms confirm prior removal of other contaminated materials such as metal drums or buckets, transformers, lead bricks, batteries, and gas cylinders. Based on these activities, no further action is required at these CASs

  14. Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 232: Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    US Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office

    1999-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report (CADD/CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 232, Area 25 Sewage Lagoons, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located at the Nevada Test Site in Nevada, approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, CAU 232 is comprised of Corrective Action Site 25-03-01, Sewage Lagoon. This CADD/CR identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office's (DOE/NV's) recommendation that no corrective action is deemed necessary for CAU 232. The Corrective Action Decision Document and Closure Report have been combined into one report because sample data collected during the July 1999 corrective action investigation (CAI) activities disclosed no evidence of contamination at the site. Contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) addressed during the CAI included total volatile organic compounds, total semivolatile organic compounds, total Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals, total pesticides, total herbicides, total petroleum hydrocarbons (gasoline and diesel/oil range), polychlorinated biphenyls, isotopic uranium, isotopic plutonium, strontium-90, and gamma-emitting radionuclides. The data confirmed that none of the COPCs identified exceeded preliminary action levels outlined in the CAIP; therefore, no corrective actions were necessary for CAU 232. After the CAI, best management practice activities were completed and included installation of a fence and signs to limit access to the lagoons, cementing Manhole No. 2 and the diverter box, and closing off influent and effluent ends of the sewage lagoon piping. As a result of the CAI, the DOE/NV recommended that: (1) no further actions were required; (2) no Corrective Action Plan would be required; and (3) no use restrictions were required to be placed on the CAU

  15. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

    2004-04-28

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) identifies and rationalizes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's selection of a recommended corrective action alternative appropriate to facilitate the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 516: Septic Systems and Discharge Points, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Located in Areas 3, 6, and 22 on the NTS, CAU 516 includes six Corrective Action Sites (CASs) consisting of two septic systems, a sump and piping, a clean-out box and piping, dry wells, and a vehicle decontamination area. Corrective action investigation activities were performed from July 22 through August 14, 2003, with supplemental sampling conducted in late 2003 and early 2004. The potential exposure pathways for any contaminants of concern (COCs) identified during the development of the DQOs at CAU 516 gave rise to the following objectives: (1) prevent or mitigate exposure to media containing COCs at concentrations exceeding PALs as defined in the corrective action investigation plan; and (2) prevent the spread of COCs beyond each CAS. The following alternatives have been developed for consideration at CAU 516: Alternative 1 - No Further Action; Alternative 2 - Clean Closure; and Alternative 3 - Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Alternative 1, No Further Action, is the preferred corrective action for two CASs (06-51-02 and 22-19-04). Alternative 2, Clean Closure, is the preferred corrective action for four CASs (03-59-01, 03-59-02, 06-51-01, and 06-51-03). The selected alternatives were judged to meet all requirements for the technical components evaluated, as well as meeting all applicable state and federal regulations for closure of the site and will further eliminate the contaminated media at CAU 516.

  16. A Historical Evaluation of the U15 Complex, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Drollinger, Harold [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Holz, Barbara A. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Bullard, Thomas F. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Goldenberg, Nancy G. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Ashbaugh, Laurence J. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Griffin, Wayne R. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States)

    2014-01-01

    This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the

  17. A Historical Evaluation of the U15 Complex, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Drollinger, Harold [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Holz, Barbara A. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Bullard, Thomas F. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Goldenberg, Nancy G. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Ashbaugh, Laurence J. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States); Griffin, Wayne R. [Desert Research Inst., Nevada University, Reno, NV (United States)

    2014-01-09

    This report presents a historical evaluation of the U15 Complex on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Three underground nuclear tests and two underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were conducted at the complex. The nuclear tests were Hard Hat in 1962, Tiny Tot in 1965, and Pile Driver in 1966. The Hard Hat and Pile Driver nuclear tests involved different types of experiment sections in test drifts at various distances from the explosion in order to determine which sections could best survive in order to design underground command centers. The Tiny Tot nuclear test involved an underground cavity in which the nuclear test was executed. It also provided data in designing underground structures and facilities to withstand a nuclear attack. The underground nuclear fuel storage experiments were Heater Test 1 from 1977 to 1978 and Spent Fuel Test - Climax from 1978 to 1985. Heater Test 1 was used to design the later Spent Fuel Test - Climax experiment. The latter experiment was a model of a larger underground storage facility and primarily involved recording the conditions of the spent fuel and the surrounding granite medium. Fieldwork was performed intermittently in the summers of 2011 and 2013, totaling 17 days. Access to the underground tunnel complex is sealed and unavailable. Restricted to the surface, four buildings, four structures, and 92 features associated with nuclear testing and fuel storage experiment activities at the U15 Complex have been recorded. Most of these are along the west side of the complex and next to the primary access road and are characteristic of an industrial mining site, albeit one with scientific interests. The geomorphological fieldwork was conducted over three days in the

  18. Geologic map of the Paintbrush Canyon Area, Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickerson, R.P.; Drake, R.M. II

    1998-01-01

    This geologic map is produced to support site characterization studies of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, site of a potential nuclear waste storage facility. The area encompassed by this map lies between Yucca Wash and Fortymile Canyon, northeast of Yucca Mountain. It is on the southern flank of the Timber Mountain caldera complex within the southwest Nevada volcanic field. Miocene tuffs and lavas of the Calico Hills Formation, the Paintbrush Group, and the Timber Mountain Group crop out in the area of this map. The source vents of the tuff cones and lava domes commonly are located beneath the thickest deposits of pyroclastic ejecta and lava flows. The rocks within the mapped area have been deformed by north- and northwest-striking, dominantly west-dipping normal faults and a few east-dipping normal faults. Faults commonly are characterized by well developed fault scarps, thick breccia zones, and hanging-wall grabens. Latest movement as preserved by slickensides on west-dipping fault scarps is oblique down towards the southwest. Two of these faults, the Paintbrush Canyon fault and the Bow Ridge fault, are major block-bounding faults here and to the south at Yucca Mountain. Offset of stratigraphic units across faults indicates that faulting occurred throughout the time these volcanic units were deposited

  19. Geologic map of the Paintbrush Canyon Area, Yucca Mountain, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dickerson, R.P. [Geological Survey, Denver, CO (United States); Drake, R.M. II [Pacific Western Technologies, Ltd., Lakewood, CO (United States)

    1998-11-01

    This geologic map is produced to support site characterization studies of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, site of a potential nuclear waste storage facility. The area encompassed by this map lies between Yucca Wash and Fortymile Canyon, northeast of Yucca Mountain. It is on the southern flank of the Timber Mountain caldera complex within the southwest Nevada volcanic field. Miocene tuffs and lavas of the Calico Hills Formation, the Paintbrush Group, and the Timber Mountain Group crop out in the area of this map. The source vents of the tuff cones and lava domes commonly are located beneath the thickest deposits of pyroclastic ejecta and lava flows. The rocks within the mapped area have been deformed by north- and northwest-striking, dominantly west-dipping normal faults and a few east-dipping normal faults. Faults commonly are characterized by well developed fault scarps, thick breccia zones, and hanging-wall grabens. Latest movement as preserved by slickensides on west-dipping fault scarps is oblique down towards the southwest. Two of these faults, the Paintbrush Canyon fault and the Bow Ridge fault, are major block-bounding faults here and to the south at Yucca Mountain. Offset of stratigraphic units across faults indicates that faulting occurred throughout the time these volcanic units were deposited.

  20. Nevada State plan; final approval determination. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), U.S. Department of Labor. Final State plan approval--Nevada.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2000-04-18

    This document amends OSHA's regulations to reflect the Assistant Secretary's decision granting final approval to the Nevada State plan. As a result of this affirmative determination under section 18(e) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Federal OSHA's standards and enforcement authority no longer apply to occupational safety and health issues covered by the Nevada plan, and authority for Federal concurrent jurisdiction is relinquished. Federal enforcement jurisdiction is retained over any private sector maritime employment, private sector employers on Indian land, and any contractors or subcontractors on any Federal establishment where the land is exclusive Federal jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction remains in effect with respect to Federal government employers and employees. Federal OSHA will also retain authority for coverage of the United States Postal Service (USPS), including USPS employees, contract employees, and contractor-operated facilities engaged in USPS mail operations.

  1. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 415: Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion (NTTR) Nevada Test and Training Range, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC-1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sloop, Christina

    2017-12-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415: Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion, which is located on Range 4808A of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. CAU 415 comprises one corrective action site (CAS): NAFR-23-02, Pu Contaminated Soil. The purpose of this CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 415 based on the implementation of the corrective action of Closure in Place.

  2. Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 370: T-4 Atmospheric Test Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patrick Matthews

    2009-05-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 370, T-4 Atmospheric Test Site, located in Area 4 at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 370 is comprised of Corrective Action Site (CAS) 04-23-01, Atmospheric Test Site T-4. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 370 due to the implementation of the corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls. To achieve this, corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from June 25, 2008, through April 2, 2009, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 370: T-4 Atmospheric Test Site and Record of Technical Change No. 1.

  3. Threatened plant species of the Nevada Test Site, Ash Meadows, central-southern Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Beatley, J.C.

    1977-04-01

    This report is a companion one to Endangered Plant Species of the Nevada Test Site, Ash Meadows, and Central-Southern Nevada (COO-2307-11) and deals with the threatened plant species of the same area. The species are those cited in the Federal Register, July 1, 1975, and include certain ones listed as occurring only in California or Arizona, but which occur also in central-southern Nevada. As with the earlier report, the purpose of this one is to record in detail the location of the past plant collections which constitute the sole or principal basis for defining the species' distributions and frequency of occurrence in southern Nye County, Nevada, and to recommend the area of the critical habitat where this is appropriate. Many of the species occur also in southern California, and for these the central-southern Nevada records are presented for consideration of the overall status of the species throughout its range.

  4. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site, Nevada: Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

    2004-05-03

    The general purpose of this Corrective Action Investigation Plan is to ensure that adequate data are collected to provide sufficient and reliable information to identify, evaluate, and select technically viable corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 543: Liquid Disposal Units, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. Located in Areas 6 and 15 on the NTS, CAU 543 is comprised of a total of seven corrective action sites (CASs), one in Area 6 and six in Area 15. The CAS in Area 6 consists of a Decontamination Facility and its components which are associated with decontamination of equipment, vehicles, and materials related to nuclear testing. The six CASs in Area 15 are located at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Farm and are related to waste disposal activities at the farm. Sources of possible contamination at Area 6 include potentially contaminated process waste effluent discharged through a process waste system, a sanitary waste stream generated within buildings of the Decon Facility, and radiologically contaminated materials stored within a portion of the facility yard. At Area 15, sources of potential contamination are associated with the dairy operations and the animal tests and experiments involving radionuclide uptake. Identified contaminants of potential concern include volatile organic compounds, semivolatile organic compounds, petroleum hydrocarbons, pesticides, herbicides, polychlorinated biphenyls, metals, and radionuclides. Three corrective action closure alternatives - No Further Action, Close in Place, or Clean Closure - will be recommended for CAU 543 based on an evaluation of all the data quality objective-related data. Field work will be conducted following approval of the plan. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document.

  5. Closure Report Central Nevada Test Area Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443 January 2016

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Findlay, Rick [US Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States). Office of Legacy Management

    2015-11-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) prepared this Closure Report for the subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site. CNTA was the site of a 0.2- to 1-megaton underground nuclear test in 1968. Responsibility for the site’s environmental restoration was transferred from the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration process and corrective action strategy for CAU 443 are conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 1996, as amended 2011) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. This Closure Report provides justification for closure of CAU 443 and provides a summary of completed closure activities; describes the selected corrective action alternative; provides an implementation plan for long-term monitoring with well network maintenance and approaches/policies for institutional controls (ICs); and presents the contaminant, compliance, and use-restriction boundaries for the site.

  6. EnergyFit Nevada (formerly known as the Nevada Retrofit Initiative) final report and technical evaluation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carvill, Anna; Bushman, Kate; Ellsworth, Amy

    2014-06-17

    The EnergyFit Nevada (EFN) Better Buildings Neighborhood Program (BBNP, and referred to in this document as the EFN program) currently encourages Nevada residents to make whole-house energy-efficient improvements by providing rebates, financing, and access to a network of qualified home improvement contractors. The BBNP funding, consisting of 34 Energy Efficiency Conservation Block Grants (EECBG) and seven State Energy Program (SEP) grants, was awarded for a three-year period to the State of Nevada in 2010 and used for initial program design and implementation. By the end of first quarter in 2014, the program had achieved upgrades in 553 homes, with an average energy reduction of 32% per home. Other achievements included: Completed 893 residential energy audits and installed upgrades in 0.05% of all Nevada single-family homes1 Achieved an overall conversation rate of 38.1%2 7,089,089 kWh of modeled energy savings3 Total annual homeowner energy savings of approximately $525,7523 Efficiency upgrades completed on 1,100,484 square feet of homes3 $139,992 granted in loans to homeowners for energy-efficiency upgrades 29,285 hours of labor and $3,864,272 worth of work conducted by Nevada auditors and contractors4 40 contractors trained in Nevada 37 contractors with Building Performance Institute (BPI) certification in Nevada 19 contractors actively participating in the EFN program in Nevada 1 Calculated using 2012 U.S. Census data reporting 1,182,870 homes in Nevada. 2 Conversion rate through March 31, 2014, for all Nevada Retrofit Initiative (NRI)-funded projects, calculated using the EFN tracking database. 3 OptiMiser energy modeling, based on current utility rates. 4 This is the sum of $3,596,561 in retrofit invoice value and $247,711 in audit invoice value.

  7. 2004 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vefa Yucel

    2005-01-01

    The Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site (Bechtel Nevada, 2000) requires an annual review to assess the adequacy of the performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) for each of the facilities, and reports the results in an annual summary report to the U.S. Department of Energy Headquarters. The Disposal Authorization Statements for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) also require that such reviews be made and that secondary or minor unresolved issues be tracked and addressed as part of the maintenance plan (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]). The U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office performed annual reviews in fiscal year (FY) 2004 by evaluating operational factors and research results that impact the continuing validity of the PA and CA results. This annual summary report presents data and conclusions from the FY 2004 review, and determines the adequacy of the PAs and CAs. Operational factors, such as the waste form and containers, facility design, waste receipts, closure plans, as well as monitoring results and research and development (R and D) activities were reviewed in FY 2004 for the determination of the adequacy of the PAs. Likewise, the environmental restoration activities at the Nevada Test Site relevant to the sources of residual radioactive material that are considered in the CAs, the land-use planning, and the results of the environmental monitoring and R and D activities were reviewed for the determination of the adequacy of the CAs

  8. Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan: Annual summary, January 2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan published in December of 1998 (DOE/NV--518) describes the Nevada Test Site stewardship mission and how its accomplishment will preserve the resources of the ecoregion while accomplishing the objectives of the mission. As part of the Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan, DOE Nevada Operations Office has committed to perform and publish an annual summary review of DOE Nevada Operations' stewardship of the Nevada Test Site. This annual summary includes a description of progress made toward the goals of the Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan, pertinent monitoring data, actions that were taken to adapt to changing conditions, and any other changes to the Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan

  9. Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan: Annual summary, January 2000

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-01-01

    The Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan published in December of 1998 (DOE/NV--518) describes the Nevada Test Site stewardship mission and how its accomplishment will preserve the resources of the ecoregion while accomplishing the objectives of the mission. As part of the Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan, DOE Nevada Operations Office has committed to perform and publish an annual summary review of DOE Nevada Operations' stewardship of the Nevada Test Site. This annual summary includes a description of progress made toward the goals of the Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan, pertinent monitoring data, actions that were taken to adapt to changing conditions, and any other changes to the Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan.

  10. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2011-08-31

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574, Neptune. CAU 574 is included in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996 [as amended March 2010]) and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This plan provides the methodology for the field activities that will be performed to gather the necessary information for closure of the two CASs. There is sufficient information and process knowledge regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 574 using the SAFER process. Based on historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, photographs, field screening, analytical results, the results of the data quality objective (DQO) process (Section 3.0), and an evaluation of corrective action alternatives (Appendix B), closure in place with administrative controls is the expected closure strategy for CAU 574. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation to verify and support the expected closure strategy and provide a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. This will be presented in a Closure Report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval.

  11. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 261: Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. M. Fitzmaurice

    2000-08-01

    This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for the Corrective Action Unit (CAU)261 Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System in accordance with the Federal Facility and Consent Order (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP] et al., 1996). This CAP provides the methodology for implementing the approved corrective action alternative as listed in the Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999). Investigation of CAU 261 was conducted from February through May of 1999. There were no Constituents of Concern (COCs) identified at Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-05-07 Acid Waste Leach Pit (AWLP). COCs identified at CAS 25-05-01 included diesel-range organics and radionuclides. The following closure actions will be implemented under this plan: Because COCs were not found at CAS 25-05-07 AWLP, no action is required; Removal of septage from the septic tank (CAS 25-05-01), the distribution box and the septic tank will be filled with grout; Removal of impacted soils identified near the initial outfall area; and Upon completion of this closure activity and approval of the Closure Report by NDEP, administrative controls, use restrictions, and site postings will be used to prevent intrusive activities at the site.

  12. Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 261: Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    T. M. Fitzmaurice

    2000-01-01

    This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) has been prepared for the Corrective Action Unit (CAU)261 Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System in accordance with the Federal Facility and Consent Order (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection[NDEP] et al., 1996). This CAP provides the methodology for implementing the approved corrective action alternative as listed in the Corrective Action Decision Document (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999). Investigation of CAU 261 was conducted from February through May of 1999. There were no Constituents of Concern (COCs) identified at Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-05-07 Acid Waste Leach Pit (AWLP). COCs identified at CAS 25-05-01 included diesel-range organics and radionuclides. The following closure actions will be implemented under this plan: Because COCs were not found at CAS 25-05-07 AWLP, no action is required; Removal of septage from the septic tank (CAS 25-05-01), the distribution box and the septic tank will be filled with grout; Removal of impacted soils identified near the initial outfall area; and Upon completion of this closure activity and approval of the Closure Report by NDEP, administrative controls, use restrictions, and site postings will be used to prevent intrusive activities at the site

  13. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 357: Mud Pits and Waste Dump, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Laura A. Pastor

    2005-04-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 357: Mud Pits and Waste Dump, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. The CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). Corrective Action Unit 357 is comprised of 14 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, and 25 of the NTS (Figure 1-1). The NTS is located approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 357 consists of 11 CASs that are mud pits located in Areas 7, 8, and 10. The mud pits were associated with drilling activities conducted on the NTS in support of the underground nuclear weapons testing. The remaining three CASs are boxes and pipes associated with Building 1-31.2el, lead bricks, and a waste dump. These CAS are located in Areas 1, 4, and 25, respectively. The following CASs are shown on Figure 1-1: CAS 07-09-02, Mud Pit; CAS 07-09-03, Mud Pit; CAS 07-09-04, Mud Pit; CAS 07-09-05, Mud Pit; CAS 08-09-01, Mud Pit; CAS 08-09-02, Mud Pit; CAS 08-09-03, Mud Pit; CAS 10-09-02, Mud Pit; CAS 10-09-04, Mud Pit; CAS 10-09-05, Mud Pit; CAS 10-09-06, Mud Pit, Stains, Material; CAS 01-99-01, Boxes, Pipes; CAS 04-26-03, Lead Bricks; and CAS 25-15-01, Waste Dump. The purpose of the corrective action activities was to obtain analytical data that supports the closure of CAU 357. Environmental samples were collected during the investigation to determine whether contaminants exist and if detected, their extent. The investigation and sampling strategy was designed to target locations and media most likely to be contaminated (biased sampling). A general site conceptual model was developed for each CAS to support and guide the investigation as outlined in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2003b). This CR

  14. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 261: Area 25 Test Cell A Leachfield System, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. M. Fitzmaurice

    2001-04-01

    The purpose of this Closure Report (CR) is to provide documentation of the completed corrective action at the Test Cell A Leachfield System and to provide data confirming the corrective action. The Test Cell A Leachfield System is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 261. Remediation of CAU 261 is required under the FFACO (1996). CAU 261 is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) which is approximately 140 kilometers (87 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 261 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASS): CAS 25-05-01, Leachfield; and CAS 25-05-07, Acid Waste Leach Pit (AWLP) (Figures 2 and 3). Test Cell A was operated during the 1960s and 1970s to support the Nuclear Rocket Development Station. Various operations within Building 3124 at Test Cell A resulted in liquid waste releases to the Leachfield and the AWLP. The following existing site conditions were reported in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office [DOE/NV], 1999): Soil in the leachfield was found to exceed the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) Action Level for petroleum hydrocarbons, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) preliminary remediation goals for semi volatile organic compounds, and background concentrations for strontium-90; Soil below the sewer pipe and approximately 4.5 meters (m) (15 feet [ft]) downstream of the initial outfall was found to exceed background concentrations for cesium-137 and strontium-90; Sludge in the leachfield septic tank was found to exceed the NDEP Action Level for petroleum hydrocarbons and to contain americium-241, cesium-137, uranium-234, uranium-238, potassium-40, and strontium-90; No constituents of concern (COC) were identified at the AWLP. The NDEP-approved CADD (DOWNV, 1999) recommended Corrective Action Alternative 2, ''Closure of the Septic Tank and Distribution Box

  15. VENUS-2, Reactor Kinetics with Feedback, 2-D LMFBR Disassembly Excursions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jackson, J.F.; Nicholson, R.B.; Weber, D.P.

    1980-01-01

    1 - Description of problem or function: VENUS-2 is an improved edition of the VENUS fast-reactor disassembly program. It is a two- dimensional (r-z) coupled neutronics-hydrodynamics code that calculates the dynamic behavior of an LMFBR during a prompt-critical disassembly excursion. It calculates the power history and fission energy release as well as the space-time histories of the fuel temperatures, core material pressures, and core material motions. Reactivity feedback effects due to Doppler broadening and reactor material motion are taken into account. 2 - Method of solution: The power and energy release are calculated using a point-kinetics formulation with up to six delayed neutron groups. The reactivity is a combination of an input driving function and feedback effects due to Doppler broadening and material motion. An adiabatic model is used to calculate the temperature increase throughout the reactor based on an initial temperature distribution and power profile provided as input data. These temperatures are, in turn, converted to fuel pressures through one of several equation of state options provided. The material motion that results from the pressure buildup is calculated by a direct finite difference solution of a set of two-dimensional (r-z) hydrodynamics equations. This is done in Lagrangian coordinates. The reactivity change associated with this motion is calculated by first-order perturbation theory. The displacements are also used to adjust the fuel densities as required for the density dependent equation-of- state option. An automatic time-step-size selection scheme is provided. 3 - Restrictions on the complexity of the problem: VENUS-2 is written so that the dimensions of the storage arrays can be readily changed to accommodate a broad range of problem sizes. In the base version, the total number of mesh intervals is restricted such that (NR+3)*(NZ+3) is less than 700, where NR and NZ are the total number of mesh intervals in the r and z

  16. Assembly/disassembly of a complex icosahedral virus to incorporate heterologous nucleic acids

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pascual, Elena; Mata, Carlos P.; Carrascosa, José L.; Castón, José R.

    2017-12-01

    Hollow protein containers are widespread in nature, and include virus capsids as well as eukaryotic and bacterial complexes. Protein cages are studied extensively for applications in nanotechnology, nanomedicine and materials science. Their inner and outer surfaces can be modified chemically or genetically, and the internal cavity can be used to template, store and/or arrange molecular cargos. Virus capsids and virus-like particles (VLP, noninfectious particles) provide versatile platforms for nanoscale bioengineering. Study of capsid protein self-assembly into monodispersed particles, and of VLP structure and biophysics is necessary not only to understand natural processes, but also to infer how these platforms can be redesigned to furnish novel functional VLP. Here we address the assembly dynamics of infectious bursal disease virus (IBDV), a complex icosahedral virus. IBDV has a ~70 nm-diameter T  =  13 capsid with VP2 trimers as the only structural subunits. During capsid assembly, VP2 is synthesized as a precursor (pVP2) whose C terminus is cleaved. The pVP2 C terminus has an amphipathic helix that controls VP2 polymorphism. In the absence of the VP3 scaffolding protein, necessary for control of assembly, 466/456-residue pVP2 intermediates bearing this helix assemble into VLP only when expressed with an N-terminal His6 tag (the HT-VP2-466 protein). HT-VP2-466 capsids are optimal for genetic insertion of proteins (cargo space ~78 000 nm3). We established an in vitro assembly/disassembly system of HT-VP2-466-based VLP for heterologous nucleic acid packaging and/or encapsulation of drugs and other molecules. HT-VP2-466 (empty) capsids were disassembled and reassembled by dialysis against low-salt/basic pH and high-salt/acid pH buffers, respectively, thus illustrating the reversibility in vitro of IBDV capsid assembly. HT-VP2-466 VLP also packed heterologous DNA by non-specific confinement during assembly. These and previous results establish the bases

  17. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Waste Disposal Sites' and consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site: CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit; CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; CAS 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and CAS 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. Closure activities were conducted from December 2008 to April 2009 according to the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 139 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2007b). The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Closure activities are summarized. CAU 139, 'Waste Disposal Sites,' consists of seven CASs in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the NTS. The closure alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. This CR provides a summary of completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and confirmation that remediation goals were met. The following site closure activities were performed at CAU 139 as documented in this CR: (1) At CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit, soil and debris were removed and disposed as LLW, and debris was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (2) At CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site, an administrative UR was implemented. No postings or post-closure monitoring are required. (3) At CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris, soil and debris were removed and disposed as LLW, and debris was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (4) At CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit, no work was performed. (5) At CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches, a native soil cover was installed, and a UR was

  18. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2009-07-31

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Waste Disposal Sites' and consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site: CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit; CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; CAS 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and CAS 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. Closure activities were conducted from December 2008 to April 2009 according to the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 139 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2007b). The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Closure activities are summarized. CAU 139, 'Waste Disposal Sites,' consists of seven CASs in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the NTS. The closure alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. This CR provides a summary of completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and confirmation that remediation goals were met. The following site closure activities were performed at CAU 139 as documented in this CR: (1) At CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit, soil and debris were removed and disposed as LLW, and debris was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (2) At CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site, an administrative UR was implemented. No postings or post-closure monitoring are required. (3) At CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris, soil and debris were removed and disposed as LLW, and debris was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (4) At CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit, no work was performed. (5) At CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches, a native soil cover was installed

  19. Environmental Survey preliminary report, Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-04-01

    This report presents the preliminary findings from the first phase of the Environmental Survey of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Nevada Test Site (NTS), conducted June 22 through July 10, 1987. The Survey is being conducted by a multidisciplinary team of environmental specialists led and managed by the Office of Environment, Safety and Health's Office of Environmental Audit. Individual team members are outside experts being supplied by a private contractor. The objective of the Survey is to identify environmental problems and areas of environmental risk associated with the NTS. The Survey covers all environment media and all areas of environmental regulation. It is being performed in accordance with the DOE Environmental Survey Manual. This phase of the Survey involves the review of existing site environmental data, observations of the operations and activities performed at the NTS, and interviews with site personnel. The Survey team developed a Sampling and Analysis Plan to assist in further assessing certain environmental problems identified during its on-site activities. The Sampling and Analysis Plan is being executed by the Battelle Columbus Division under contract with DOE. When completed, the results will be incorporated into the NTS Environmental Survey Interim Report. The Interim Report will reflect the final determinations of the NTS Survey. 165 refs., 42 figs., 52 tabs

  20. Environmental Survey preliminary report, Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1988-04-01

    This report presents the preliminary findings from the first phase of the Environmental Survey of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Nevada Test Site (NTS), conducted June 22 through July 10, 1987. The Survey is being conducted by a multidisciplinary team of environmental specialists led and managed by the Office of Environment, Safety and Health's Office of Environmental Audit. Individual team members are outside experts being supplied by a private contractor. The objective of the Survey is to identify environmental problems and areas of environmental risk associated with the NTS. The Survey covers all environment media and all areas of environmental regulation. It is being performed in accordance with the DOE Environmental Survey Manual. This phase of the Survey involves the review of existing site environmental data, observations of the operations and activities performed at the NTS, and interviews with site personnel. The Survey team developed a Sampling and Analysis Plan to assist in further assessing certain environmental problems identified during its on-site activities. The Sampling and Analysis Plan is being executed by the Battelle Columbus Division under contract with DOE. When completed, the results will be incorporated into the NTS Environmental Survey Interim Report. The Interim Report will reflect the final determinations of the NTS Survey. 165 refs., 42 figs., 52 tabs.

  1. Concentrating Solar Power Projects - Nevada Solar One | Concentrating Solar

    Science.gov (United States)

    Power | NREL Nevada Solar One This page provides information on Nevada Solar One, a concentrating solar power (CSP) project, with data organized by background, participants, and power plant configuration. Acciona Energy's Nevada Solar One is the third largest CSP plant in the world and the first plant

  2. 40 CFR 52.1477 - Nevada air pollution emergency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Nevada air pollution emergency plan. 52.1477 Section 52.1477 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) AIR PROGRAMS (CONTINUED) APPROVAL AND PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (CONTINUED) Nevada § 52.1477 Nevada air pollution emergency plan. Section 6.1.5 of...

  3. Ecosystem stressors in southern Nevada [Chapter 2] (Executive Summary)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burton K. Pendleton; Jeanne C. Chambers; Matthew L. Brooks; Steven M. Ostoja

    2013-01-01

    Southern Nevada ecosystems are subject to a number of stressors that range in scope from local to regional to global. At the regional scale, human population growth and related activities constitute a major stressor. Nevada has undergone significant change due to unprecedented population growth and ongoing global change processes. Nevada’s growth rate has been the...

  4. CP-50 calibration facility radiological safety assessment document

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chilton, M.W.; Hill, R.L.; Eubank, B.F.

    1980-03-01

    The CP-50 Calibration Facility Radiological Safety Assessment document, prepared at the request of the Nevada Operations Office of the US Department of Energy to satisfy provisions of ERDA Manual Chapter 0531, presents design features, systems controls, and procedures used in the operation of the calibration facility. Site and facility characteristics and routine and non-routine operations, including hypothetical incidents or accidents are discussed and design factors, source control systems, and radiation monitoring considerations are described

  5. Gravity and magnetic data of Midway Valley, southwest Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ponce, D.A.; Langenheim, V.E.; Sikora, R.F.

    1993-01-01

    Detailed gravity and ground magnetic data collected along five traverses across Midway Valley on the eastern flank of Yucca Mountain in southwest Nevada are described. These data were collected as part of an effort to evaluate faulting in the vicinity of proposed surface facilities for a potential nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain. Geophysical data show that Midway Valley is bounded by large gravity and magnetic anomalies associated with the Bow Ridge and Paintbrush Canyon faults, on the west side of Exile Hill and on the west flank of Fran Ridge, respectively. In addition, Midway Valley itself is characterized by a number of small-amplitude anomalies that probably reflect small-scale faulting beneath Midway Valley

  6. Native American plant resources in the Yucca Mountain Area, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stoffle, R.W.; Evans, M.J.; Halmo, D.B.

    1989-11-01

    This report presents Native American interpretations of and concerns for plant resources on or near Yucca Mountain, Nevada. This one of three research reports regarding Native American cultural resources that may be affected by site characterization activities related to the Yucca Mountain high-level radioactive waste disposal facility. Representatives of the sixteen involved American Indian tribes identified and interpreted plant resources as part of a consultation relationship between themselves and the US Department of Energy (DOE). Participants in the ethnobotany studies included botanists who have conducted, and continue to conduct, botanical studies for the Yucca Mountain Project. This report is to be used to review research procedures and findings regarding the process of consulting with the sixteen tribes, interviews with tribal plant specialists and elders, and findings from the ethnobotanical visits with representatives of the sixteen tribes. An annual report will include a chapter that summarizes the key findings from this plant resources study. 23 refs., 75 figs., 39 tabs

  7. Native American plant resources in the Yucca Mountain Area, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stoffle, R.W.; Evans, M.J.; Halmo, D.B. [Michigan Univ., Ann Arbor, MI (USA). Inst. for Social Research; Niles, W.E.; O`Farrell, J.T. [EG and G Energy Measurements, Inc., Goleta, CA (USA)

    1989-11-01

    This report presents Native American interpretations of and concerns for plant resources on or near Yucca Mountain, Nevada. This one of three research reports regarding Native American cultural resources that may be affected by site characterization activities related to the Yucca Mountain high-level radioactive waste disposal facility. Representatives of the sixteen involved American Indian tribes identified and interpreted plant resources as part of a consultation relationship between themselves and the US Department of Energy (DOE). Participants in the ethnobotany studies included botanists who have conducted, and continue to conduct, botanical studies for the Yucca Mountain Project. This report is to be used to review research procedures and findings regarding the process of consulting with the sixteen tribes, interviews with tribal plant specialists and elders, and findings from the ethnobotanical visits with representatives of the sixteen tribes. An annual report will include a chapter that summarizes the key findings from this plant resources study. 23 refs., 75 figs., 39 tabs.

  8. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 425: Area 9 Main Lake Construction Debris Disposal Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. B. Campbell

    2003-03-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 425 is located on the Tonopah Test Range, approximately 386 kilometers (240 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 425 is listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996) and is comprised of one Corrective Action Site (CAS). CAS 09-08-001-TA09 consisted of a large pile of concrete rubble from the original Hard Target and construction debris associated with the Tornado Rocket Sled Tests. CAU 425 was closed in accordance with the FFACO and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection-approved Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 425: Area 9 Main Lake Construction Debris Disposal Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 2002). CAU 425 was closed by implementing the following corrective actions: The approved corrective action for this unit was clean closure. Closure activities included: (1) Removal of all the debris from the site. (2) Weighing each load of debris leaving the job site. (3) Transporting the debris to the U.S. Air Force Construction Landfill for disposal. (4) Placing the radioactive material in a U.S. Department of Transportation approved container for proper transport and disposal. (5) Transporting the radioactive material to the Nevada Test Site for disposal. (6) Regrading the job site to its approximate original contours/elevation.

  9. Nevada Test Site Area 25. Radiological survey and cleanup project, 1974-1983. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKnight, R.K.; Rosenberry, C.E.; Orcutt, J.A.

    1984-01-01

    This report describes radiological survey, decontamination and decommissioning of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) Area 25 facilities and land areas incorporated in the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS). Buildings, facilities and support systems used after 1959 for nuclear reactor and engine testing were surveyed for the presence of radioactive contamination. The cleanup was part of the Surplus Facilities Management Program funded by the Department of Energy's Richland Operations Office. The radiological survey portion of the project encompassed portable instrument surveys and removable contamination surveys (swipe) for alpha and beta plus gamma radiation contamination of facilities, equipment and land areas. Soil sampling was also accomplished. The majority of Area 25 facilities and land areas have been returned to unrestricted use. Remaining radiologically contaminated areas are posted with warning signs and barricades. 12 figures

  10. Characterization of the disassembly and reassembly of the HBV glycoprotein surface antigen, a pliable nanoparticle vaccine platform

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallagher, John R.; Torian, Udana; McCraw, Dustin M.; Harris, Audray K.

    2017-01-01

    While nanoparticle vaccine technology is gaining interest due to the success of vaccines like those for the human papillomavirus that is based on viral capsid nanoparticles, little information is available on the disassembly and reassembly of viral surface glycoprotein-based nanoparticles. One such particle is the hepatitis B virus surface antigen (sAg) that exists as nanoparticles. Here we show, using biochemical analysis coupled with electron microscopy, that sAg nanoparticle disassembly requires both reducing agent to disrupt intermolecular disulfide bonds, and detergent to disrupt hydrophobic interactions that stabilize the nanoparticle. Particles were otherwise resistant to salt and urea, suggesting the driving mechanism of particle formation involves hydrophobic interactions. We reassembled isolated sAg protein into nanoparticles by detergent removal and reassembly resulted in a wider distribution of particle diameters. Knowledge of these driving forces of nanoparticle assembly and stability should facilitate construction of epitope-displaying nanoparticles that can be used as immunogens in vaccines.

  11. [Study on the liver-protective and choleretic effect of zhizi baipi soup and its disassembled prescription].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xiao, Xu; Zhu, Ji-Xiao; Luo, Guang-Ming; Li, Lei; Zhu, Yu-Ye; Zeng, Jin-Xiang; Wang, Xiao-Yun; Wu, Bo

    2013-07-01

    To investigate the effect of Zhizi Baipi soup and its disassembled prescription on protecting liver and improving choleresis and explore the regularity of Zhizi Baipi soup composition. The model of mouse liver injury induced by carbon tetraehlofide (CCl4) was used to observe the effects of Zhizi Baipi soup and its disassembled prescription by oral adminstration, the bile volume was determinied by common bile duct drainage. Zhizi Baipi soup and each treatment group with gardenia could significantly inhibit the increased serum ATL and AST activities, reduce liver MDA level, and significantly promote the bile flow and bilirubin in bile in normal rats. Zhizi Baipi soup has effects on protecting liver and increasing bile secretion, its monarch drug, gardenia plays an important role in the decoction, the effect of eliminating dampness and heat are mainly ascribed to the synergic effect of gardenia and phellodendron.

  12. The development of underwater remote cutting method for the disassembling of rotary specimen rack KRR-1 and 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, D. K.; Jung, K. H.; Lee, K. W.; Oh, W. J. [KAERI, Taejon (Korea, Republic of); Lee, K. Y. [Korea Institute of Industrial Technology, Kwangju (Korea, Republic of)

    2004-07-01

    The Rotary Specimen Racks (RSRs) were highly activated and then classified intermediate level radioactive waste for the decommissioning of KRR-1anel2. The RSR can be treated as low level radioactive waste after removing stainless steel parts. To reduce the volume of intermediate level radioactive waste, underwater cutting is required to separate stainless steel parts from RSR because of high radioactivity. In this study, the automatic remote cutting method was developed to disassemble RSR under water. For automatic remote cutting processes, a CAM (Computer Aided Manufacturing) system is employed. A computer inputs NC (Numerical Control) codes to the controller, which are based on CAM model, and the controller instructs the equipment to process according to NC codes automatically. And the cutting force model was improved to cut RSR stably. The automatic cutting was conducted using imitation of RSR and then it was resulted that the developed automatic cutting method can be safely disassemble stainless steel parts of RSR under water.

  13. Characterization of the disassembly and reassembly of the HBV glycoprotein surface antigen, a pliable nanoparticle vaccine platform

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gallagher, John R.; Torian, Udana; McCraw, Dustin M.; Harris, Audray K., E-mail: harrisau@mail.nih.gov

    2017-02-15

    While nanoparticle vaccine technology is gaining interest due to the success of vaccines like those for the human papillomavirus that is based on viral capsid nanoparticles, little information is available on the disassembly and reassembly of viral surface glycoprotein-based nanoparticles. One such particle is the hepatitis B virus surface antigen (sAg) that exists as nanoparticles. Here we show, using biochemical analysis coupled with electron microscopy, that sAg nanoparticle disassembly requires both reducing agent to disrupt intermolecular disulfide bonds, and detergent to disrupt hydrophobic interactions that stabilize the nanoparticle. Particles were otherwise resistant to salt and urea, suggesting the driving mechanism of particle formation involves hydrophobic interactions. We reassembled isolated sAg protein into nanoparticles by detergent removal and reassembly resulted in a wider distribution of particle diameters. Knowledge of these driving forces of nanoparticle assembly and stability should facilitate construction of epitope-displaying nanoparticles that can be used as immunogens in vaccines.

  14. Compilation of modal analyses of volcanic rocks from the Nevada Test Site area, Nye County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Page, W.R.

    1990-01-01

    Volcanic rock samples collected from the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, between 1960 and 1985 were analyzed by thin section to obtain petrographic mode data. In order to provide rapid accessibility to the entire database, all data from the cards were entered into a computerized database. This computer format will enable workers involved in stratigraphic studies in the Nevada Test Site area and other locations in southern Nevada to perform independent analyses of the data. The data were compiled from the mode cards into two separate computer files. The first file consists of data collected from core samples taken from drill holes in the Yucca Mountain area. The second group of samples were collected from measured sections and surface mapping traverses in the Nevada Test Site area. Each data file is composed of computer printouts of tables with mode data from thin section point counts, comments on additional data, and location data. Tremendous care was taken in transferring the data from the cards to computer, in order to preserve the original information and interpretations provided by the analyzer. In addition to the data files above, a file is included that consists of Nevada Test Site petrographic data published in other US Geological Survey and Los Alamos National Laboratory reports. These data are presented to supply the user with an essentially complete modal database of samples from the volcanic stratigraphic section in the Nevada Test Site area. 18 refs., 4 figs

  15. United States Geological Survey, programs in Nevada

    Science.gov (United States)

    ,

    1995-01-01

    The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has been collecting and interpreting natural-resources data in Nevada for more than 100 years. This long-term commitment enables planners to manage better the resources of a State noted for paradoxes. Although Nevada is one of the most sparsely populated States in the Nation, it has the fastest growing population (fig. 1). Although 90 percent of the land is rural, it is the fourth most urban State. Nevada is the most arid State and relies heavily on water resources. Historically, mining and agriculture have formed the basis of the economy; now tourism and urban development also have become important. The USGS works with more than 40 local, State, and other Federal agencies in Nevada to provide natural-resources information for immediate and long-term decisions.Subjects included in this fact sheet:Low-Level Radioactive-Waste DisposalMining and Water in the Humboldt BasinAquifer Systems in the Great BasinWater Allocation in Truckee and Carson BasinsNational Water-Quality Assessment ProgramMinerals Assessment for Land ManagementIrrigation DrainageGround-Water Movement at Nevada Test SiteOil and Gas ResourcesNational Mapping ProgramDigital Mapping and Aerial PhotographyCollection of Hydrologlc DataGeologic MappingEarthquake HazardsAssessing Mineral Resources of the SubsurfaceEarth Observation DataCooperative Programs

  16. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2004

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2005-10-01

    The ''Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2004'' was prepared by Bechtel Nevada (BN) to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. This Executive Summary presents the purpose of the document, the major programs conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), NTS key environmental initiatives, radiological releases and potential doses to the public resulting from site operations, a summary of non-radiological releases, implementation status of the NTS Environmental Management System, and significant environmental accomplishments. Much of the content of this Executive Summary is also presented in a separate stand-alone pamphlet titled ''Nevada Test Site Environmental Report Summary 2004''. It was produced this year to provide a more cost-effective and wider distribution of a hardcopy summary of the ''Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2004'' to interested DOE stakeholders.

  17. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Neptune' and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); and (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This Closure Report presents information supporting closure of CAU 574 according to the FFACO (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]) and the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 574 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The following activities were performed to support closure of CAU 574: (1) In situ external dose rate measurements were collected using thermoluminescent dosimeters at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). (2) Total effective dose rates were determined at both sites by summing the internal and external dose rate components. (3) A use restriction (UR) was implemented at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune). Areas that exceed the final action level (FAL) of 25 millirems per year (mrem/yr) based on the Occasional Use Area exposure scenario are within the existing use restricted area for CAU 551. The 25-mrem/yr FAL is not exceeded outside the existing CAU 551 UR for any of the exposure scenarios (Industrial Area, Remote Work Area, and Occasional Use Area). Therefore, the existing UR for CAU 551 is sufficient to bound contamination that exceeds the FAL. (4) An administrative UR was implemented at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca) as a best management practice (BMP). The 25-mrem/yr FAL was not exceeded for the Remote Work Area or Occasional Use Area exposure scenarios; therefore, a UR is not required. However, because the 25-mrem/yr FAL was exceeded for the Industrial Area exposure scenario, an administrative UR was established as a BMP. UR documentation is included as Appendix B. The UR at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune

  18. Spent fuel disassembly hardware and other non-fuel bearing components: characterization, disposal cost estimates, and proposed repository acceptance requirements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Luksic, A.T.; McKee, R.W.; Daling, P.M.; Konzek, G.J.; Ludwick, J.D.; Purcell, W.L.

    1986-10-01

    There are two categories of waste considered in this report. The first is the spent fuel disassembly (SFD) hardware. This consists of the hardware remaining after the fuel pins have been removed from the fuel assembly. This includes end fittings, spacer grids, water rods (BWR) or guide tubes (PWR) as appropriate, and assorted springs, fasteners, etc. The second category is other non-fuel-bearing (NFB) components the DOE has agreed to accept for disposal, such as control rods, fuel channels, etc., under Appendix E of the standard utiltiy contract (10 CFR 961). It is estimated that there will be approximately 150 kg of SFD and NFB waste per average metric ton of uranium (MTU) of spent uranium. PWR fuel accounts for approximately two-thirds of the average spent-fuel mass but only 50 kg of the SFD and NFB waste, with most of that being spent fuel disassembly hardware. BWR fuel accounts for one-third of the average spent-fuel mass and the remaining 100 kg of the waste. The relatively large contribution of waste hardware in BWR fuel, will be non-fuel-bearing components, primarily consisting of the fuel channels. Chapters are devoted to a description of spent fuel disassembly hardware and non-fuel assembly components, characterization of activated components, disposal considerations (regulatory requirements, economic analysis, and projected annual waste quantities), and proposed acceptance requirements for spent fuel disassembly hardware and other non-fuel assembly components at a geologic repository. The economic analysis indicates that there is a large incentive for volume reduction.

  19. Substantiation of the admissable concentration of radionuclides in the utilization of concrete from disassembled reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engovatov, I.A.; Mashkovich, V.P.; Morev, M.N.

    1995-01-01

    The complete or partial disassembly of the buildings and systems of a modern nuclear power plant results in the formation of hundreds of thousands of tons of wastes. More than 90% of this mass consists of reinforced concrete. Only a small fraction of these materials is contaminated and/or activated up to high level and must be treated as radioactive wastes that must be buried. For this reason, it is helpful to consider a variant of recycling of some of the wastes and secondary utilization of these wastes in different industrial production processes. In this paper, we analyze the concrete that is freed when a nuclear power plant is decommissioned, and in particular, we examine three scenarios: (1) stockpiling and long-term storage of concrete at an industrial site, (2) highway construction, and (3) industrial building construction. Admissable radionuclide concentrations of several isotopes are tabulated for each scenario, and the results provide the basic information for the development of standards for the utilization of the concrete wastes produced during the decommissioning of nuclear power plants

  20. Analysis of the stress-deformed condition of the disassembly parabolic antenna

    Science.gov (United States)

    Odinets, M. N.; Kaygorodtseva, N. V.; Krysova, I. V.

    2018-01-01

    Active development of satellite communications and computer-aided design systems raises the problem of designing parabolic antennas on a new round of development. The aim of the work was to investigate the influence of the design of the mirror of a parabolic antenna on its endurance under wind load. The research task was an automated analysis of the stress-deformed condition of various designs of computer models of a paraboloid mirror (segmented or holistic) at modeling the exploitation conditions. The peculiarity of the research was that the assembly model of the antenna’s mirror was subjected to rigid connections on the contacting surfaces of the segments and only then the finite element grid was generated. The analysis showed the advantage of the design of the demountable antenna, which consists of cyclic segments, in front of the construction of the holistic antenna. Calculation of the stress-deformed condition of the antennas allows us to conclude that dividing the design of the antenna’s mirror on parabolic and cyclic segments increases it strength and rigidity. In the future, this can be used to minimize the mass of antenna and the dimensions of the disassembled antenna. The presented way of modeling a mirror of a parabolic antenna using to the method of the finite-element analysis can be used in the production of antennas.

  1. Disassembly of actin structures by nanosecond pulsed electric field is a downstream effect of cell swelling.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pakhomov, Andrei G; Xiao, Shu; Pakhomova, Olga N; Semenov, Iurii; Kuipers, Marjorie A; Ibey, Bennett L

    2014-12-01

    Disruption of the actin cytoskeleton structures was reported as one of the characteristic effects of nanosecond-duration pulsed electric field (nsPEF) in both mammalian and plant cells. We utilized CHO cells that expressed the monomeric fluorescent protein (mApple) tagged to actin to test if nsPEF modifies the cell actin directly or as a consequence of cell membrane permeabilization. A train of four 600-ns pulses at 19.2 kV/cm (2 Hz) caused immediate cell membrane poration manifested by YO-PRO-1 dye uptake, gradual cell rounding and swelling. Concurrently, bright actin features were replaced by dimmer and uniform fluorescence of diffuse actin. To block the nsPEF-induced swelling, the bath buffer was isoosmotically supplemented with an electropore-impermeable solute (sucrose). A similar addition of a smaller, electropore-permeable solute (adonitol) served as a control. We demonstrated that sucrose efficiently blocked disassembly of actin features by nsPEF, whereas adonitol did not. Sucrose also attenuated bleaching of mApple-tagged actin in nsPEF-treated cells (as integrated over the cell volume), although did not fully prevent it. We conclude that disintegration of the actin cytoskeleton was a result of cell swelling, which, in turn, was caused by cell permeabilization by nsPEF and transmembrane diffusion of solutes which led to the osmotic imbalance. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  2. Role of a reducing environment in disassembly of the herpesvirus tegument

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Newcomb, William W. [Department of Microbiology Immunology and Cancer Biology, University of Virginia Health System, Box 800734, University of Virginia Health System, 1300 Jefferson Park Ave. Charlottesville, VA 22908 (United States); Jones, Lisa M. [Department of Chemistry, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130 (United States); Dee, Alexander [Department of Molecular, Microbial and Structural Biology, University of Connecticut Health Center, Farmington, CT 06030 (United States); Chaudhry, Farid [Department of Microbiology Immunology and Cancer Biology, University of Virginia Health System, Box 800734, University of Virginia Health System, 1300 Jefferson Park Ave. Charlottesville, VA 22908 (United States); Brown, Jay C., E-mail: JCB2G@VIRGINIA.EDU [Department of Microbiology Immunology and Cancer Biology, University of Virginia Health System, Box 800734, University of Virginia Health System, 1300 Jefferson Park Ave. Charlottesville, VA 22908 (United States)

    2012-09-15

    Initiation of infection by herpes family viruses involves a step in which most of the virus tegument becomes detached from the capsid. Detachment takes place in the host cell cytosol near the virus entry site and it is followed by dispersal of tegument proteins and disappearance of the tegument as a distinct entity. Here we describe the results of experiments designed to test the idea that the reducing environment of the cytosol may contribute to tegument detachment and disassembly. Non-ionic detergent was used to remove the membrane of purified herpes simplex virus under control and reducing conditions. The effects on the tegument were then examined by SDS-PAGE and electron microscopy. Protein analysis demonstrated that most major tegument proteins were removed under both oxidizing and reducing conditions except for UL49 which required a reducing environment. It is proposed therefore that the reducing conditions in the cytosol are involved in removal of UL49 protein. Electron microscopic analysis revealed that capsids produced under oxidizing conditions contained a coating of protein that was absent in reduced virions and which correlated uniquely with the presence of UL49. This capsid-associated layer is suggested to be the location of UL49 in the extracted virion.

  3. The Southern Nevada Agency Partnership Science and Research Synthesis: Science to support land management in Southern Nevada

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jeanne C. Chambers; Matthew L. Brooks; Burton K. Pendleton; Carol B. Raish

    2013-01-01

    This synthesis provides information related to the Southern Nevada Agency Partnership (SNAP) Science and Research Strategy Goal 1 - to restore, sustain and enhance southern Nevada’s ecosystems - and Goal 2 - to provide for responsible use of southern Nevada’s lands in a manner that preserves heritage resources and promotes an understanding of human interaction with the...

  4. The Southern Nevada Agency Partnership Science and Research Synthesis: Science to support land management in Southern Nevada - Executive Summary

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jeanne C. Chambers; Matthew L. Brooks; Burton K. Pendleton; Carol B. Raish

    2013-01-01

    This synthesis provides information related to the Southern Nevada Agency Partnership (SNAP) Science and Research Strategy Goal 1 - to restore, sustain and enhance southern Nevada’s ecosystems - and Goal 2 - to provide for responsible use of southern Nevada’s lands in a manner that preserves heritage resources and promotes an understanding of human interaction with the...

  5. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 407: Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fitzmaurice, T. M.

    2001-01-01

    This closure report (CR) provides documentation for the closure of the Roller Coaster RADSAFE Area (RCRSA) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 407 identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP] et al., 1996). CAU 407 is located at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. The TTR is approximately 225 kilometers (km) (140 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). The RCRSA is located on the northeast comer of the intersection of Main Road and Browne's Lake Road, which is approximately 8 km (5 mi) south of Area 3 (Figure 1). The RCRSA was used during May and June of 1963 to decontaminate vehicles, equipment, and personnel from the Double Tracks and Clean Slate tests. Investigation of the RCRSA was conducted from June through November of 1998. A Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office [DOEN], 1999) was approved in October of 1999. The purpose of this CR is to: Document the closure activities as proposed in the Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (DOEM, 2000). Obtain a Notice of Completion from the NDEP. Recommend the movement of CAU 407 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO. The following is the scope of the closure actions implemented for CAU 407: Removal and disposal of surface soils which were over three times background for the area. Soils identified for removal were disposed of at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Excavated areas were backfilled with clean borrow soil located near the site. A soil cover was constructed over the waste disposal pit area, where subsurface constituents of concern remain. The site was fenced and posted as an ''Underground Radioactive Material'' area

  6. Nevada Test Site Wetlands Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    D. J. Hansen

    1997-05-01

    This report identifies 16 Nevada Test Site (NTS) natural water sources that may be classified by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as jurisdictional wetlands and identifies eight water sources that may be classified as waters of the United States. These water sources are rare, localized habitats on the NTS that are important to regional wildlife and to isolated populations of water tolerant plants and aquatic organisms. No field investigations on the NTS have been conducted in the past to identify those natural water sources which would be protected as rare habitats and which may fall under regulatory authority of the Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1997. This report identifies and summarizes previous studies of NTS natural water sources, and identifies the current DOE management practices related to the protection of NTS wetlands. This report also presents management goals specific for NTS wetlands that incorporate the intent of existing wetlands legislation, the principles of ecosystem management, and the interests of regional land managers and other stakeholders.

  7. The Effect of Uncertain End-of-Life Product Quality and Consumer Incentives on Partial Disassembly Sequencing in Value Recovery Operations

    OpenAIRE

    Rickli, Jeremy Lewis

    2013-01-01

    This dissertation addresses gaps in the interaction between End-of-Life (EoL) product acquisition systems and disassembly sequencing. The research focuses on two remanufacturing research problems; 1) modeling uncertain EoL product quality, quantity, and timing in regards to EoL product acquisition and disassembly sequencing and 2) designing EoL product acquisition schemes considering EoL product uncertainty. The main research objectives within these areas are; analyzing, predicting, and contr...

  8. Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Management

    2010-09-03

    This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

  9. Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

  10. Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

  11. Closure Plan for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Management

    2008-01-01

    The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RMWS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is managed and operated by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This document is the first update of the preliminary closure plan for the Area 5 RWMS at the NTS that was presented in the Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (DOE, 2005a). The major updates to the plan include a new closure schedule, updated closure inventory, updated site and facility characterization data, the Title II engineering cover design, and the closure process for the 92-Acre Area of the RWMS. The format and content of this site-specific plan follows the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans (DOE, 1999a). This interim closure plan meets closure and post-closure monitoring requirements of the order DOE O 435.1, manual DOE M 435.1-1, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 40 CFR 265, Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) 444.743, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements as incorporated into NAC 444.8632. The Area 5 RWMS accepts primarily packaged low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), and asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) for disposal in excavated disposal cells

  12. Groundwater Monitoring Report Central Nevada Test Area, Corrective Action Unit 443

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    2008-04-01

    This report presents the 2007 groundwater monitoring results collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) for the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443. Responsibility for the environmental site restoration of the CNTA was transferred from the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) to DOE-LM on October 1, 2006. Requirements for CAU 443 are specified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 2005) entered into by DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the State of Nevada and includes groundwater monitoring in support of site closure. This is the first groundwater monitoring report prepared by DOE-LM for the CNTA The CNTA is located north of U.S. Highway 6, approximately 30 miles north of Warm Springs in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). Three emplacement boreholes, UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4, were drilled at the CNTA for underground nuclear weapons testing. The initial underground nuclear test, Project Faultless, was conducted in borehole UC-1 at a depth of 3,199 feet (ft) (975 meters) below ground surface on January 19, 1968. The yield of the Project Faultless test was estimated to be 0.2 to 1 megaton (DOE 2004). The test resulted in a down-dropped fault block visible at land surface (Figure 2). No further testing was conducted at the CNTA, and the site was decommissioned as a testing facility in 1973.

  13. Closure Plan for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Management

    2008-09-01

    The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RMWS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is managed and operated by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This document is the first update of the preliminary closure plan for the Area 5 RWMS at the NTS that was presented in the Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (DOE, 2005a). The major updates to the plan include a new closure schedule, updated closure inventory, updated site and facility characterization data, the Title II engineering cover design, and the closure process for the 92-Acre Area of the RWMS. The format and content of this site-specific plan follows the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans (DOE, 1999a). This interim closure plan meets closure and post-closure monitoring requirements of the order DOE O 435.1, manual DOE M 435.1-1, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 40 CFR 265, Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) 444.743, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements as incorporated into NAC 444.8632. The Area 5 RWMS accepts primarily packaged low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), and asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) for disposal in excavated disposal cells.

  14. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 553: Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No. 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boehlecke, Robert F.

    2006-01-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions necessary for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 553: Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. It has been developed in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. A SAFER may be performed when the following criteria are met: (1) Conceptual corrective actions are clearly identified (although some degree of investigation may be necessary to select a specific corrective action before completion of the Corrective Action Investigation [CAI]); (2) Uncertainty of the nature, extent, and corrective action must be limited to an acceptable level of risk; (3) The SAFER Plan includes decision points and criteria for making data quality objective (DQO) decisions. The purpose of the investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; to affirm the decision for clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient data to implement the corrective action. The actual corrective action selected will be based on characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan. This SAFER Plan identifies decision points developed in cooperation with the Nevada Department of Environmental Protection (NDEP), where the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) will reach consensus with the NDEP before beginning the next phase of work. Corrective Action Unit 553 is located in Areas 19 and 20 of the NTS, approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 553 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below: 19-99-01, Mud Spill; 19-99-11, Mud Spill; 20-09-09, Mud Spill; and 20-99-03, Mud Spill. There is sufficient information and process

  15. CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 165: AREA 25 AND 26 DRY WELL AND WASH DOWN AREAS, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2005-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) documents the closure activities for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 165, Area 25 and 26 Dry Well and Washdown Areas, according to the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. CAU 165 consists of 8 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is located approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, nevada. Site closure activities were performed according to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 165. CAU 165 consists of the following CASs: (1) CAS 25-07-06, Train Decontamination Area; (2) CAS 25-07-07, Vehicle Washdown; (3) CAS 25-20-01, Lab Drain Dry Well; (4) CAS 25-47-01, Reservoir and French Drain; (5) CAS 25-51-02, Drywell; (6) CAS 25-59-01, Septic System; (7) CAS 26-07-01, Vehicle Washdown Station; and (8) CAS 26-59-01, Septic System. CAU 165, Area 25 and 26 Dry Well and Washdown Areas, consists of eight CASs located in Areas 25 and 26 of the NTS. The approved closure alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls

  16. POST CLOSURE INSPECTION AND MONITORING REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 417: CENTRAL NEVADA TEST AREA - SURFACE, HOT CREEK VALLEY, NEVADA, FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2004

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BECHTEL NEVADA; NNSA NEVADA SITE OFFICE

    2005-04-01

    This post-closure inspection and monitoring report has been prepared according to the stipulations laid out in the Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417, Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA)--Surface (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office [NNSA/NV], 2001), and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996). This report provides an analysis and summary of site inspections, subsidence surveys, meteorological information, and soil moisture monitoring data for CAU 417, which is located in Hot Creek Valley, Nye County, Nevada. This report covers Calendar Year 2004. Inspections at CAU 417 are conducted quarterly to document the physical condition of the UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4 soil covers, monuments, signs, fencing, and use restricted areas. The physical condition of fencing, monuments, and signs is noted, and any unusual conditions that could impact the integrity of the covers are reported. The objective of the soil moisture monitoring program is to monitor the stability of soil moisture conditions within the upper 1.2 meters (m) (4 feet [ft]) of the UC-1 Central Mud Pit (CMP) cover and detect changes that may be indicative of moisture movement exceeding the cover design performance expectations.

  17. CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT165: AREA 25 AND 26 DRY WELL AND WASH DOWN AREAS, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2005-12-01

    This Closure Report (CR) documents the closure activities for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 165, Area 25 and 26 Dry Well and Washdown Areas, according to the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996. CAU 165 consists of 8 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The NTS is located approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, nevada. Site closure activities were performed according to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for CAU 165. CAU 165 consists of the following CASs: (1) CAS 25-07-06, Train Decontamination Area; (2) CAS 25-07-07, Vehicle Washdown; (3) CAS 25-20-01, Lab Drain Dry Well; (4) CAS 25-47-01, Reservoir and French Drain; (5) CAS 25-51-02, Drywell; (6) CAS 25-59-01, Septic System; (7) CAS 26-07-01, Vehicle Washdown Station; and (8) CAS 26-59-01, Septic System. CAU 165, Area 25 and 26 Dry Well and Washdown Areas, consists of eight CASs located in Areas 25 and 26 of the NTS. The approved closure alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls.

  18. Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. 0 / June 2003), Including Record of Technical Change No. 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    2003-06-27

    This Corrective Action Investigation Plan contains the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office's approach to collect the data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) appropriate for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 536: Area 3 Release Site, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 536 consists of a single Corrective Action Site (CAS): 03-44-02, Steam Jenny Discharge. The CAU 536 site is being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of possible contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives for CAS 03-44-02. The additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation (CAI) prior to evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for this CAS. The results of this field investigation are to be used to support a defensible evaluation of corrective action alternatives in the corrective action decision document. Record of Technical Change No. 1 is dated 3-2004.

  19. Nevada Test Site Radiation Protection Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Radiological Control Managers' Council, Nevada Test Site

    2007-08-09

    Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 835, 'Occupational Radiation Protection', establishes radiation protection standards, limits, and program requirements for protecting individuals from ionizing radiation resulting from the conduct of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) activities. 10 CFR 835.101(a) mandates that DOE activities be conducted in compliance with a documented Radiation Protection Program (RPP) as approved by DOE. This document promulgates the RPP for the Nevada Test Site (NTS), related (onsite or offsite) DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) operations, and environmental restoration offsite projects.

  20. Helping Nevada School Children Become Sun Smart

    Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Podcasts

    2017-11-28

    This podcast features Christine Thompson, Community Programs Manager at the Nevada Cancer Coalition, and author of a recent study detailing a school-based program to help Nevada school children establish healthy sun safety habits and decrease UV exposure. Christine answers questions about her research and what impact her what impact the program had on children’s skin health.  Created: 11/28/2017 by Preventing Chronic Disease (PCD), National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP).   Date Released: 11/28/2017.

  1. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2008

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cathy A. Wills

    2009-09-01

    The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report (NTSER) 2008 was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years’ NTSERs are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx.

  2. Nevada Test Site Environmental Report 2008 Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cathy A. Wills

    2009-09-01

    The Nevada Test Site Environmental Report (NTSER) 2008 was prepared to meet the information needs of the public and the requirements and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for annual site environmental reports. It was prepared by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This and previous years’ NTSERs are posted on the NNSA/NSO website at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/aser.aspx.

  3. Colloid research for the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bryant, E.A.

    1992-05-01

    Research is needed to understand the role of particulates in the migration of radionuclides away from the sites of nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site. The process of testing itself may produce a reservoir of particles to serve as vectors for the transport of long-lived radionuclides in groundwater. Exploratory experiments indicate the presence of numerous particulates in the vicinity of the Cambric test but a much lower loading in a nearby well that has been pumped continuously for 15 years. Recent groundwater colloid research is briefly reviewed to identify sampling and characterization methods that may be applicable at the Nevada Test Site

  4. Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    U. S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office

    2005-01-01

    This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) waste acceptance criteria (WAC). The WAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site (NTS) will accept low-level radioactive (LLW) and mixed waste (MW) for disposal. It includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NTS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) for storage or disposal

  5. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kauss, Mark

    2011-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 539 are located within Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada National Security Site. Corrective Action Unit 539 comprises the following CASs: (1) 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks; and (2) 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 539 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: (1) Reviewed documentation on historical and current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination; (2) Conducted radiological walkover surveys of railroad tracks in both Areas 25 and 26; (3) Collected ballast and soil samples and calculated internal dose estimates for radiological releases; (4) Collected in situ thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements and calculated external dose estimates for radiological releases; (5) Removed lead bricks as potential source material (PSM) and collected verification samples; (6) Implemented corrective actions as necessary to protect human health and the environment; (7) Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation wastes; and (8) Implemented an FFACO use restriction (UR) for radiological contamination at CAS 25-99-21. The approved UR form and map are provided in Appendix F and will be filed in the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Facility Information Management System; the FFACO database; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. From

  6. Well Completion Report for Corrective Action Unit 447, Project Shoal Area, Churchill County, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rick Findlay

    2006-01-01

    This Well Completion Report is being provided as part of the implementation of the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 447 (NNSA/NSO, 2006a). The CADD/CAP is part of an ongoing U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) funded project for the investigation of CAU 447 at the Project Shoal Area (PSA). All work performed on this project was conducted in accordance with the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) (1996), and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. Investigation activities included the drilling, construction, and development of three monitoring/validation (MV) wells at the PSA. This report summarizes the field activities and data collected during the investigation

  7. 2008 Groundwater Monitoring Report Central Nevada Test Area, Corrective Action Unit 443

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    2009-03-01

    This report presents the 2008 groundwater monitoring results collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) for the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443. Responsibility for the environmental site restoration of the CNTA was transferred from the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) to DOE-LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration process and corrective action strategy for CAU 443 are conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 2005) entered into by DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the State of Nevada. The corrective action strategy for the site includes proof-of-concept monitoring in support of site closure. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 443 that were conducted at the site during fiscal year 2008. This is the second groundwater monitoring report prepared by DOE-LM for the CNTA.

  8. 2008 Groundwater Monitoring Report Central Nevada Test Area, Corrective Action Unit 443

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This report presents the 2008 groundwater monitoring results collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) for the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443. Responsibility for the environmental site restoration of the CNTA was transferred from the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) to DOE-LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration process and corrective action strategy for CAU 443 are conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 2005) entered into by DOE, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the State of Nevada. The corrective action strategy for the site includes proof-of-concept monitoring in support of site closure. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 443 that were conducted at the site during fiscal year 2008. This is the second groundwater monitoring report prepared by DOE-LM for the CNTA

  9. Bibliography with abstracts of geological literature pertaining to southern Nevada with particular reference to the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Connolly, J.R.; Hicks, R.T.; Emmanuel, K.M.; Cappon, J.P.; Sinnock, S.

    1983-05-01

    This bibliography (with abstracts) of geological literature pertains to the Nevada Test Site and its southern Nevada environs. Its purpose is to provide a convenient, general reference document for published geological information potentially useful for radioactive waste studies conducted by the Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigation project at the Nevada Test Site. It is organized so that users of geological information about southern Nevada may find subject matter in their areas or topics of interest. The most current published literature included is dated 1980

  10. Final environmental impact statement for the Nevada Test Site and off-site locations in the State of Nevada. Volume 1, Appendices A-F

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    This sitewide EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of four possible land-use alternatives being considered for the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Tonopah Test Range, and the formerly operated DOE sites in the state of Nevada: the Project Shoal Area, the Central Nevada Test Area, and portions of the Nellis Air Force Range Complex. Three additional sites in Nevada-Eldorado Valley, Dry Lake Valley, and Coyote Spring Valley-are evaluated for collocation of solar energy production facilities. The four alternatives include Continue Current Operations (No Action, continue to operate at the level maintained for the past 3 to 5 years); Discontinue Operations 1 (discontinue operations and interagency programs); Expanded Use (increased use of NTS and its resources to support defense and nondefense programs); and Alternate Use of Withdrawn Lands (discontinue all defense-related activities at NTS; continue waste management operations in support of NTS environmental restoration efforts; expand nondefense research). Environmental impacts were assessed for each alternative by analyzing, to the extent possible, the discrete and cumulative environmental impacts associated with Defense Waste Management, Environmental Restoration, Nondefense Research and Development, and Work for Others Programs. A framework for a Resource Management Plan is included as Volume 2 of this EIS and represents the development of an ecosystem based planning process closely integrated with the National Environmental Policy Act process. This EIS, among other things, analyzed the impacts of transportation of low level waste, and site characterization activities related to the Yucca Mountain Project but did not analyze the suitability of the site as a repository. This EIS does not analyze the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site as a repository as this is an action beyond the scope of the EIS. Volume 3 of this EIS contains the public comments and the responses to the comments

  11. Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wickline, Alfred

    2006-11-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 551, Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. The corrective actions proposed in this document are in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 551 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) that are shown on Figure 1-2 and listed below: CAS 12-01-09, Aboveground Storage Tank and Stain; CAS 12-06-05, U-12b Muckpile; CAS 12-06-07, Muckpile; and CAS 12-06-08, Muckpile. A detailed discussion of the history of this CAU is presented in the ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles'' (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This CADD/CR provides justification for the closure of CAU 551 in place with administrative controls. This justification is based upon process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NSO, 2004). The CAIP provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, this information will not be repeated in the CADD/CR. Corrective Action Unit 551, Area 12 Muckpiles, consists of four inactive sites located in the southwestern portion of Area 12. The four CAU 551 sites consist of three muckpiles, and an aboveground storage tank (AST) and stain. The CAU 551 sites were all used during underground nuclear testing at the B-, C-, D- and F-Tunnels in the late 1950s and early 1960s and have mostly remained inactive since that period.

  12. Final environmental impact statement for the Nevada Test Site and off-site locations in the State of Nevada. Volume 1, Chapters 1-9

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-08-01

    This sitewide EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of four possible land-use alternatives being considered for the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Tonopah Test Range, and the formerly operated DOE sites in the state of Nevada: the Project Shoal Area, the Central Nevada Test Area, and portions of the Nellis Air Force Range Complex. Three additional sites in Nevada-Eldorado Valley, Dry Lake Valley, and Coyote Spring Valley-are evaluated for collocation of solar energy production facilities. The four alternatives include Continue Current Operations (No Action, continue to operate at the level maintained for the past 3 to 5 years); Discontinue Operations 1 (discontinue operations and interagency programs); Expanded Use (increased use of NTS and its resources to support defense and nondefense programs); and Alternate Use of Withdrawn Lands (discontinue all defense-related activities at NTS; continue waste management operations in support of NTS environmental restoration efforts; expand nondefense research). Environmental impacts were assessed for each alternative by analyzing, to the extent possible, the discrete and cumulative environmental impacts associated with Defense Waste Management, Environmental Restoration, Nondefense Research and Development, and Work for Others Programs. A framework for a Resource Management Plan is included as Volume 2 of this EIS and represents the development of an ecosystem based planning process closely integrated with the National Environmental Policy Act process. This EIS, among other things, analyzed the impacts of transportation of low level waste, and site characterization activities related to the Yucca Mountain Project but did not analyze the suitability of the site as a repository. This EIS does not analyze the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site as a repository as this is an action beyond the scope of the EIS. Volume 3 of this EIS contains the public comments and the responses to the comments

  13. Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Rev. No.: 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wickline, Alfred

    2006-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 551, Area 12 Muckpiles, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada. The corrective actions proposed in this document are in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense (FFACO, 1996). The NTS is approximately 65 miles (mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1). Corrective Action Unit 551 is comprised of the four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) that are shown on Figure 1-2 and listed below: CAS 12-01-09, Aboveground Storage Tank and Stain; CAS 12-06-05, U-12b Muckpile; CAS 12-06-07, Muckpile; and CAS 12-06-08, Muckpile. A detailed discussion of the history of this CAU is presented in the ''Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP) for Corrective Action Unit 551: Area 12 Muckpiles'' (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This CADD/CR provides justification for the closure of CAU 551 in place with administrative controls. This justification is based upon process knowledge and the results of the investigative activities conducted in accordance with the CAIP (NNSA/NSO, 2004). The CAIP provides information relating to the history, planning, and scope of the investigation; therefore, this information will not be repeated in the CADD/CR. Corrective Action Unit 551, Area 12 Muckpiles, consists of four inactive sites located in the southwestern portion of Area 12. The four CAU 551 sites consist of three muckpiles, and an aboveground storage tank (AST) and stain. The CAU 551 sites were all used during underground nuclear testing at the B-, C-, D- and F-Tunnels in the late 1950s and early 1960s and have mostly remained inactive since that period

  14. CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 528: POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS CONTAMINATION NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2006-09-01

    This Closure Report (CR) describes the closure activities performed at CAU 528, Polychlorinated Biphenyls Contamination, as presented in the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (US. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSAINSO], 2005). The approved closure alternative was closure in place with administrative controls. This CR provides a summary of the completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and analytical data to confirm that the remediation goals were met.

  15. Separating defence and civilian radioactive waste programs in Nevada: can the public navigate the maze?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nielsen, R.A.

    1999-01-01

    Nevada is at the centre of public policy debate with regards to high and low level radioactive waste disposal. Nevada's Yucca Mountain is the only site under consideration for a US geologic repository for commercial spent nuclear fuel and defence high level waste. The Nevada Test Site (NTS) has long been a low level waste (LLW) disposal facility for the Department of Energy (DOE) defence waste and is now expected to take even more LLW as the preferred site for a regional or centralised disposal facility. Furthermore, the primary mission at NTS, defence, continues to add more contamination to the site. Combined, these facts present a public policy enigma, confused further by the intentional separation of the programs by DOE, even though all are essentially conducted at the same site. Involving the public in policy decisions for these programs is a dilemma because the public does not make the same artificial distinctions between them as DOE, DOE credibility suffers from past public involvement efforts conducted during an era of Cold War secrecy and because DOE public involvement programs are operated independently, with little or no co-operation between programs. The public does not know where it fits into the DOE decision-making process or if it impacts the policy decisions being made that affect it. This paper examines the complex maze of radioactive policy and bureaucracy in order to unveil the enigma Nevada residents face. Are they able to navigate this maze to effectively participate in government policy and decision-making? Or, will they remain confused by the government bureaucracy which deliberately makes a mess of the situation and seeks to exploit a politically weak state with large tracts of federally controlled land? lt further evaluates the effect this enigma has in producing acceptable public policy for radioactive waste disposal in the US, the role of public participation in that policy, and the reason the public is disillusioned and disengaged in the

  16. Liquefied Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-02-01

    The US Department of Energy's liquefied Gaseous Fuels Spill Test Facility is a research and demonstration facility available on a user-fee basis to private and public sector test and training sponsors concerned with safety aspects of hazardous chemicals. Though initially designed to accommodate large liquefied natural gas releases, the Spill Test Facility (STF) can also accommodate hazardous materials training and safety-related testing of most chemicals in commercial use. The STF is located at DOE's Nevada Test Site near Mercury, Nevada, USA. Utilization of the Spill Test Facility provides a unique opportunity for industry and other users to conduct hazardous materials testing and training. The Spill Test Facility is the only facility of its kind for either large- or small-scale testing of hazardous and toxic fluids including wind tunnel testing under controlled conditions. It is ideally suited for test sponsors to develop verified data on prevention, mitigation, clean-up, and environmental effects of toxic and hazardous gaseous liquids. The facility site also supports structured training for hazardous spills, mitigation, and clean-up. Since 1986, the Spill Test Facility has been utilized for releases to evaluate the patterns of dispersion, mitigation techniques, and combustion characteristics of select materials. Use of the facility can also aid users in developing emergency planning under US P.L 99-499, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) and other regulations. The Spill Test Facility Program is managed by the US Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Fossil Energy (FE) with the support and assistance of other divisions of US DOE and the US Government. DOE/FE serves as facilitator and business manager for the Spill Test Facility and site. This brief document is designed to acquaint a potential user of the Spill Test Facility with an outline of the procedures and policies associated with the use of the facility

  17. New findings on the onset of thermal disassembly in spallation reactions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Napolitani, P.

    2004-09-01

    Thermal multifragmentation is the process of multi body disassembly of a hot nucleus when the excitation is almost purely thermal i.e. dynamical effects like compression (characteristic of ion-ion collisions at Fermi energy) are negligible. Suited reactions are proton induced collision or ion-ion abrasion at relativistic incident energy. Thus we measured four systems at FRS (Fragment separator, GSI, Darmstadt) in inverse kinematics: Fe 56 +p, Fe 56 +Ti(nat), Xe 136 +p, Xe 136 +Ti(nat) a 1 A*GeV. The inverse kinematics allows to observe all particles without any threshold in energy. This is a great advantage compared to experiments in direct kinematics, because only in inverse kinematics it is possible to obtain complete velocity spectra (without a hole for low velocities) for fully identified isotopes. The complex shape of the velocity spectra allows to identify the different deexcitation channels and it clearly shows the transition from a chaotic-dominated process (Gaussian cloud in velocity space) to a direct Coulomb- (or eventually expansion-) dominated process (shell of a sphere in velocity space). Different possible descriptions of the reaction process are discussed, based either on asymmetric fission or multifragmentation. The resulting physical picture is especially interesting for the Fe 56 +p, and Xe 136 +p systems: proton induced collisions could result in the split of the system in two or more fragments due to a fast break-up process. In this case, the configuration of the break-up partition is very asymmetric. The discussion will be extended to other characteristics, like the restoring of nuclear structure features in the isotopic production and the temperature dependence of the isotopic composition of the residues. (author)

  18. Sodium removal disassembly and examination of the Fermi secondary sodium pump

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maffei, H.P.; Funk, C.W.; Ballif, J.L.

    1974-01-01

    The Fermi secondary pump is a centrifugal single stage design. The pump had been operated more than 42,000 hours between 450 and 800 0 F. Sodium was drained from the pump in 1973 and the system was back filled with carbon dioxide. The pump was fabricated for 2.25 Cr-1 Mo Croloy steel. Prior to cleaning the pump was inerted and heated with 150 0 F nitrogen using the pump casing as the containment vessel. The water-vapor-nitrogen process was used in three increasing stages of water concentration. The hydrogen concentration in the discharge line was followed as an indicator of the sodium-water reaction rate. Upon completion of the hydrogen evolution, the pump was rinsed several times with hot water. Six pounds of sodium were removed from the pump during a process cycle of 79 hours including rinsing. The maximum pump temperature recorded was 175 0 F with no variation exceeding 10 0 F. The hydrogen concentration in the effluent provided a very satisfactory index for control of the reaction by adjustment of the water-vapor concentration feed to the system. Rinsing effectiveness was limited by a pool of water in the volute that was not drainable with the available system hook up. Sodium and its compounds were removed from all internal surfaces that could be observed by the first stage of disassembly. All such surfaces were coated with a black deposit. Areas above the sodium liquid level were coated with a vermillion colored oxide. Sodium was found on the (1) threads of the impeller nut lock screw, (2) impeller nut-tapered shaft interface, and (3) vapor deposited sodium was found in the oil seal

  19. Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 562: Waste Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mark Krause

    2010-08-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) presents information supporting the selection of corrective action alternatives (CAAs) leading to the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 562, Waste Systems, in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 562 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-26-11, Lead Shot • 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drain • 02-59-01, Septic System • 02-60-01, Concrete Drain • 02-60-02, French Drain • 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain • 02-60-04, French Drain • 02-60-05, French Drain • 02-60-06, French Drain • 02-60-07, French Drain • 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall • 23-99-06, Grease Trap • 25-60-04, Building 3123 Outfalls The purpose of this CADD is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of CAAs for the 13 CASs within CAU 562. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 27, 2009, through May 12, 2010, as set forth in the CAU 562 Corrective Action Investigation Plan. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill the following data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process: • Determine whether COCs are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent. • Provide sufficient information and data to complete appropriate corrective actions. A data quality assessment (DQA) performed on the CAU 562 data demonstrated the quality and acceptability of the data for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the COCs for each CAS. The results of the CAI identified COCs at 10 of the 13 CASs in CAU 562, and thus corrective

  20. Nevada Administrative Code for Special Education Programs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nevada State Dept. of Education, Carson City. Special Education Branch.

    This document presents excerpts from Chapter 388 of the Nevada Administrative Code, which concerns definitions, eligibility, and programs for students who are disabled or gifted/talented. The first section gathers together 36 relevant definitions from the Code for such concepts as "adaptive behavior,""autism,""gifted and…

  1. Nevada Kids Count Data Book, 1997.

    Science.gov (United States)

    We Can, Inc., Las Vegas, NV.

    This Kids Count data book is the first to examine statewide indicators of the well being of Nevada's children. The statistical portrait is based on 15 indicators of child well being: (1) percent low birth-weight babies; (2) infant mortality rate; (3) percent of children in poverty; (4) percent of children in single-parent families; (5) percent of…

  2. Invasive species in southern Nevada [Chapter 4

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mathew L. Brooks; Steven M. Ostoja; Jeanne C. Chambers

    2013-01-01

    Southern Nevada contains a wide range of topographies, elevations, and climatic zones emblematic of its position at the ecotone between the Mojave Desert, Great Basin, and Colorado Plateau ecoregions. These varied environmental conditions support a high degree of biological diversity (Chapter 1), but they also provide opportunities for a wide range of invasive species...

  3. Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Managers' Council, Radiological Control

    2018-03-12

    This is a shared document required by 10 CFR 835 for all contractors conducting radiological work at the Nevada National Security Site. Please record the Author as "Radiological Control Managers' Council" for consistency with previous RPPs and Rad Con Manuals.

  4. Southern Nevada ecosystem stressors [Chapter 2

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burton K. Pendleton; Jeanne C. Chambers; Mathew L. Brooks; Steven M. Ostoja

    2013-01-01

    Southern Nevada ecosystems and their associated resources are subject to a number of global and regional/local stressors that are affecting the sustainability of the region. Global stressors include elevated carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations and associated changes in temperature and precipitation patterns and amounts, solar radiation, and nutrient cycles (Smith and...

  5. Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan, Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Farnham, Irene

    2018-03-01

    The purpose is to provide a comprehensive, integrated approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the needs and objectives of the DOE/EM Nevada Program’s UGTA Activity. Implementation of this Plan will provide high-quality data required by the UGTA Activity for ensuring public protection in an efficient and cost-effective manner. The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (NNSA/NFO, 2015); Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended); and DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE, 2013). The Plan’s scope comprises sample collection and analysis requirements relevant to assessing both the extent of groundwater contamination from underground nuclear testing and impact of testing on water quality in downgradient communities. This Plan identifies locations to be sampled by CAU and location type, sampling frequencies, sample collection methodologies, and the constituents to be analyzed. In addition, the Plan defines data collection criteria such as well purging, detection levels, and accuracy requirements/recommendations; identifies reporting and data management requirements; and provides a process to ensure coordination between NNSS groundwater sampling programs for sampling analytes of interest to UGTA. Information used in the Plan development—including the rationale for selection of wells, sampling frequency, and the analytical suite—is discussed under separate cover (N-I, 2014) and is not reproduced herein. This Plan does not address compliance for those wells involved in a permitted activity. Sampling and analysis requirements associated with these wells are described in their respective permits and are discussed in NNSS environmental reports (see Section 5.2). In addition, sampling for UGTA CAUs that are in the Closure Report (CR) stage are not i