WorldWideScience

Sample records for contingent post-closure plan

  1. 40 CFR 264.228 - Closure and post-closure care.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... remaining wastes to a bearing capacity sufficient to support final cover; and (iii) Cover the surface....112 must include both a plan for complying with paragraph (a)(1) of this section and a contingent plan... practicably removed at closure; and (ii) The owner or operator must prepare a contingent post-closure plan...

  2. Unit-Specific Contingency Plan for the 183-H Solar Evaporation Basins

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edens, V.G.

    1998-04-01

    This document is a supplement to DOE/RL-93-75, 'Hanford Contingency Plan.' It provides the unit-specific information needed to fully comply with the Washington Administrative Code. General emergency and response information is contained in the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan and is not repeated in this supplement. The 183-H Solar Evaporation Basins were four concrete internal surfaces, which contained radiologically and hazardous contaminated waste. The 183-H Basin area is a final status treatment, storage, and disposal unit undergoing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act modified post- closure care

  3. 40 CFR 265.118 - Post-closure plan; amendment of plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... mail. In addition, for facilities without approved post-closure plans, it must also be provided during... requirements. At the end of the specified period of suspension, the Regional Ad-min-is-tra-tor would then...

  4. Interim status of closure/post-closure plan for 183-H solar evaporation basins

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-03-01

    This report describes a plan for decommissioning several solar evaporation basins on the Hanford reservation. The document describes procedures for sampling during decommissioning and a plan for certification of the resulting completed landfill. Additional plans deal with the training, security of the site, and post-closure monitoring

  5. Neither snow nor rain: contingency planning by a clinical reference laboratory courier service for weather related emergencies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bankson, Daniel D; Heim, Joseph A

    2014-01-01

    To optimize transportation processes, we present herein a contingency plan that coordinates interim measures used to ensure continued and timely services when climate based events might cause an interruption of the usual specimen transportation processes. As an example, we outline the implementation and effectiveness of a contingency plan for network laboratory courier automobile transportation during times of mountain pass highway closure. Data available from an approximately 3-year period from October 10, 2010 through August 29, 2013 revealed a total of 690 complete closures in the eastbound or westbound lanes of the Interstate-90 highway in the Snoqualmie Pass area in the state of Washington. Despite the frequency of closures, the Washington State Department of Transportation was effective in limiting the duration of closures. Road closures of less than 1 hour accounted for 58.7% of the total closures. No recorded closures prevented dispatched couriers from completing a prescheduled Snoqualmie Pass route. We identified no delays as being clinically significant, despite that there were 5 instances of delays greater than 4 hours. We implemented a contingency plan of aiding courier logistics during all times of pass closure. The plan includes an easy to interpret Condition Dashboard as a status indicator and a Decision Tree that references and summarizes information. Overall, the contingency plan allows for an objective, robust, proactive decision support system that has enabled operational flexibility and has contributed to continued safe, on-time specimen transportation; clients and courier and reference laboratory staff have appreciated these features and associated outcomes. Copyright© by the American Society for Clinical Pathology (ASCP).

  6. Hanford Facility contingency plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sutton, L.N.; Miskho, A.G.; Brunke, R.C.

    1993-10-01

    The Hanford Facility Contingency Plan, together with each TSD unit-specific contingency plan, meets the WAC 173-303 requirements for a contingency plan. This plan includes descriptions of responses to a nonradiological hazardous materials spill or release at Hanford Facility locations not covered by TSD unit-specific contingency plans or building emergency plans. This plan includes descriptions of responses for spills or releases as a result of transportation activities, movement of materials, packaging, and storage of hazardous materials

  7. Contingency Analysis Post-Processing With Advanced Computing and Visualization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chen, Yousu; Glaesemann, Kurt; Fitzhenry, Erin

    2017-07-01

    Contingency analysis is a critical function widely used in energy management systems to assess the impact of power system component failures. Its outputs are important for power system operation for improved situational awareness, power system planning studies, and power market operations. With the increased complexity of power system modeling and simulation caused by increased energy production and demand, the penetration of renewable energy and fast deployment of smart grid devices, and the trend of operating grids closer to their capacity for better efficiency, more and more contingencies must be executed and analyzed quickly in order to ensure grid reliability and accuracy for the power market. Currently, many researchers have proposed different techniques to accelerate the computational speed of contingency analysis, but not much work has been published on how to post-process the large amount of contingency outputs quickly. This paper proposes a parallel post-processing function that can analyze contingency analysis outputs faster and display them in a web-based visualization tool to help power engineers improve their work efficiency by fast information digestion. Case studies using an ESCA-60 bus system and a WECC planning system are presented to demonstrate the functionality of the parallel post-processing technique and the web-based visualization tool.

  8. Contingency planning: preparation of contingency plans

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Westergaard, J M

    2008-01-01

    . The risk of introducing disease pathogens into a country and the spread of the agent within a country depends on a number of factors including import controls, movement of animals and animal products and the biosecurity applied by livestock producers. An adequate contingency plan is an important instrument...... in the preparation for and the handling of an epidemic. The legislation of the European Union requires that all Member States draw up a contingency plan which specifies the national measures required to maintain a high level of awareness and preparedness and is to be implemented in the event of disease outbreak...

  9. Unit-specific contingency plan for the 183-H solar evaporation basins. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zoric, J.P.

    1996-03-01

    This document is a supplement to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan. It provides the unit-specific information needed to fully comply with the Washington Administrative Code, Chapter 173-303, ''Dangerous Waste Regulations,'' for contingency plans. General emergency and response information is contained in the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan and is not repeated in this supplement. The 183-H solar evaporation basins are four concrete internal surfaces which contained radiologically- and hazardous-contaminated waste. The 183-H basins are currently empty, inactive and designated as a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act interim-status treatment, storage, and disposal unit undergoing closure. There is no dangerous waste management actively occurring. There is very little likelihood of any incidents that would present hazards to public health or the environment occurring at the 183-H basins

  10. Unit-specific contingency plan for the 183-H Solar Evaporation Basins. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zoric, J.P.

    1997-01-01

    This document is a supplement to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan. It provides the unit-specific information needed to fully comply with the Washington Administrative Code, Chapter 173-303, ''Dangerous Waste Regulations,'' for contingency plans. General emergency and response information is contained in the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan and is not repeated in this supplement. The 183-H Solar Evaporation Basins are four concrete internal surfaces which contained radiologically- and hazardous-contaminated waste. The 183-H basins are currently empty, inactive and designated as a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act interim-status treatment, storage, and disposal unit undergoing closure. There is no dangerous waste management actively occurring. There is very little likelihood of any incidents that would present hazards to public health or the environment occurring at the 183-H basins

  11. 30 CFR 282.26 - Contingency Plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Contingency Plan. 282.26 Section 282.26 Mineral... § 282.26 Contingency Plan. (a) When required by the Director, a lessee shall include a Contingency Plan as part of its request for approval of a Delineation, Testing, or Mining Plan. The Contingency Plan...

  12. 49 CFR 1544.301 - Contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Contingency plan. 1544.301 Section 1544.301... COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Threat and Threat Response § 1544.301 Contingency plan. Each aircraft operator must adopt a contingency plan and must: (a) Implement its contingency plan when directed by TSA. (b) Ensure...

  13. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  14. Financial risks of post-closure custodial care for the Barnwell radioactive waste disposal facility - 16155

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baird, Robert D.; Newberry, William F.

    2009-01-01

    This paper reports evaluations of the adequacy of the Barnwell Extended Care Fund in light of identified risks, with the conclusion that the fund is sufficient to cover the costs and uncertainties associated with planned post-closure care of the Barnwell, South Carolina low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. It reviews background information pertinent to the facility's post-closure monitoring and maintenance and describes financial responsibility for post-closure activities. It identifies and briefly characterizes the activities planned to be conducted following facility closure and presents the midrange estimate of planned post-closure costs. The paper identifies and quantifies sources of uncertainty in activities and costs planned for post-closure care and presents 50-, 80-, and 95-percent confidence levels of planned costs. The fund is currently sufficient to cover some but not all of the costs that might be incurred as a result of unplanned events. The paper identifies, characterizes, and quantifies unplanned events, possible consequences, and probabilities of occurrence. The paper presents costs that might be incurred in responding to the unplanned initiating events and identifies levels of confidence that the fund is adequate to cover such costs. (authors)

  15. Yampa River Valley sub-area contingency plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-08-01

    The Yampa River Valley sub-area contingency plan (Contingency Plan) has been prepared for two counties in northwestern Colorado: Moffat County and Routt County. The Contingency Plan is provided in two parts, the Contingency Plan and the Emergency Response Action Plan (ERAP). The Contingency Plan provides information that should be helpful in planning to minimize the impact of an oil spill or hazardous material incident. It contains discussions of planning and response role, hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, risk analysis, cleanup, cost recovery, training, and health and safety. It includes information on the incident command system, notifications, response capabilities, emergency response organizations, evacuation and shelter-in-place, and immediate actions.

  16. 40 CFR 264.53 - Copies of contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 25 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Copies of contingency plan. 264.53... Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures § 264.53 Copies of contingency plan. A copy of the contingency plan... called upon to provide emergency services. [Comment: The contingency plan must be submitted to the...

  17. Appendix F - Sample Contingency Plan

    Science.gov (United States)

    This sample Contingency Plan in Appendix F is intended to provide examples of contingency planning as a reference when a facility determines that the required secondary containment is impracticable, pursuant to 40 CFR §112.7(d).

  18. 40 CFR 265.53 - Copies of contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 25 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Copies of contingency plan. 265.53... DISPOSAL FACILITIES Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures § 265.53 Copies of contingency plan. A copy of the contingency plan and all revisions to the plan must be: (a) Maintained at the facility; and (b...

  19. Network location theory and contingency planning

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakimi, S L

    1983-08-01

    A brief survey of results in network location theory is first presented. Then, a systems view of contingency planning is described. Finally, some results in location theory are re-examined and it is shown that they are motivated by contingency planning considerations. Some new issues and problems in location theory are described, which, if properly tackled, will have a substantial impact on contingency planning in transportation.

  20. 40 CFR 265.54 - Amendment of contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 25 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Amendment of contingency plan. 265.54... DISPOSAL FACILITIES Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures § 265.54 Amendment of contingency plan. The contingency plan must be reviewed, and immediately amended, if necessary, whenever: (a) Applicable regulations...

  1. 40 CFR 264.54 - Amendment of contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 25 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Amendment of contingency plan. 264.54 Section 264.54 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED) SOLID WASTES... Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures § 264.54 Amendment of contingency plan. The contingency plan must be...

  2. 49 CFR 1542.301 - Contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Contingency plan. 1542.301 Section 1542.301..., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY AIRPORT SECURITY Contingency Measures § 1542.301 Contingency plan. (a) Each airport operator required to have a security program under § 1542.103(a) and (b...

  3. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards contingency plan. 72.184 Section 72.184 Energy... Protection § 72.184 Safeguards contingency plan. (a) The requirements of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats and radiological sabotage must be as defined in appendix C to part...

  4. Closure Plan for Active Low Level Burial Grounds

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    SKELLY, W.A.

    2000-11-16

    This plan has been prepared in response to direction from the U.S. Department of Energy. The purpose of the plan is to define approaches that will be implemented to ensure protection of the public and the environment when active Low-Level Burial Grounds (LLBGs) at the Hanford Site are closed. Performance assessments for active burial grounds in the 200 East and West 200 Areas provide current estimates of potential environmental contamination and doses to the ''maximum exposed individual'' from burial ground operation and closure and compare dose estimates to performance objective dose limits for the facilities. This is an Operational Closure Plan. The intent of the guidance in DOE Order 435.1 is that this plan will be a living document, like the facility performance assessments, and will be revised periodically through the operational life of the LLBGs to reflect updated information on waste inventory. management practices, facility transition planning, schedule dates, assessments of post-closure performance, and environmental consequences. Out year dates identified in this plan are tentative. A Final Closure Plan will be prepared in the future when the timing and extent of closure-related activities for LLBGs can be established with greater certainty. After current operations at the LLBGs are concluded, this plan proposes transitioning of these facilities to the Environmental Restoration Program. This action will enable the Environmental Restoration Program to design and implement consistent and coordinated final remedial actions for active and inactive LLBGs. Active and inactive burial grounds in the 200 West and 200 East Areas are commingled. This plan describes approaches that will be implemented during Interim Closure, Final Closure, and Institutional Control Periods to prepare LLBGs for surface barriers, and the construction of barriers, as well as the scope of inspection, monitoring and maintenance practices that will be performed during

  5. 40 CFR 264.51 - Purpose and implementation of contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... contingency plan. 264.51 Section 264.51 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED... DISPOSAL FACILITIES Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures § 264.51 Purpose and implementation of contingency plan. (a) Each owner or operator must have a contingency plan for his facility. The contingency...

  6. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    This report provides the results of the semiannual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2006 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following nine CAUs: CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); CAU 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench (TTR); CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); CAU 423: Area 3 Underground Discharge Point, Building 0360 (TTR); CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR); CAU 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6 (TTR); CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR). Post-closure inspections were conducted on May 9, 2006, May 31, 2006, and November 15, 2006. All inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Attachment B, with the exception of CAU 400. CAU 400 does not require post-closure inspections, but inspections of the vegetation and fencing are conducted as a best management practice. The inspection checklists for each site inspection are included in Attachment C, the field notes are included in Attachment D, and the site photographs are included in Attachment E. Vegetation monitoring of CAU 400, CAU 404, CAU 407, and CAU 426 was performed in June 2006, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Attachment F. Maintenance and/or repairs were performed at CAU 400, CAU 407, CAU 426, CAU 453, and CAU 487 in 2006. During the May inspection of CAU 400, it was identified that the east and west sections of chickenwire fencing beyond the standard fencing were damaged; they were repaired in June 2006. Also in June 2006, the southeast corner fence post and one warning sign at CAU 407 were reinforced and reattached, the perimeter fencing adjacent to the gate at CAU 426 was tightened, and large animal

  7. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-06-01

    This report provides the results of the semiannual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2006 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following nine CAUs: CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); CAU 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench (TTR); CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); CAU 423: Area 3 Underground Discharge Point, Building 0360 (TTR); CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR); CAU 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6 (TTR); CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR). Post-closure inspections were conducted on May 9, 2006, May 31, 2006, and November 15, 2006. All inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Attachment B, with the exception of CAU 400. CAU 400 does not require post-closure inspections, but inspections of the vegetation and fencing are conducted as a best management practice. The inspection checklists for each site inspection are included in Attachment C, the field notes are included in Attachment D, and the site photographs are included in Attachment E. Vegetation monitoring of CAU 400, CAU 404, CAU 407, and CAU 426 was performed in June 2006, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Attachment F. Maintenance and/or repairs were performed at CAU 400, CAU 407, CAU 426, CAU 453, and CAU 487 in 2006. During the May inspection of CAU 400, it was identified that the east and west sections of chickenwire fencing beyond the standard fencing were damaged; they were repaired in June 2006. Also in June 2006, the southeast corner fence post and one warning sign at CAU 407 were reinforced and reattached, the perimeter fencing adjacent to the gate at CAU 426 was tightened, and large animal

  8. 40 CFR 264.227 - Emergency repairs; contingency plans.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 25 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Emergency repairs; contingency plans... FACILITIES Surface Impoundments § 264.227 Emergency repairs; contingency plans. (a) A surface impoundment... days after detecting the problem. (c) As part of the contingency plan required in subpart D of this...

  9. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Silvas, A. J. [National Security Technologies, LLC, Las Vegas, NV (United States). Nevada Test Site; Lantow, Tiffany A. [National Security Technologies, LLC, Las Vegas, NV (United States). Nevada Test Site

    2015-03-25

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2014 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs; CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The post-closure inspection plans and subsequent correspondence modifying the requirements for each CAU are included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C. Photographs taken during inspections are included in Appendix D. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 28, 2014. Maintenance was required at CAU 407. Animal burrows were backfilled and erosion repairs were performed. Vegetation monitoring was performed at CAU 407 in June 2014. The vegetation monitoring report is included in Appendix E.

  10. Developing standardized facility contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Davidson, D.A.

    1993-01-01

    Texaco consists of several operating departments that are, in effect, independent companies. Each of these departments is responsible for complying with all environmental laws and regulations. This includes the preparation by each facility to respond to an oil spill at that location. For larger spills, however, management of the response will rest with corporate regional response teams. Personnel from all departments make up the regional teams. In 1990, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act. In 1991, the US Coast Guard began developing oil spill response contingency plan regulations, which they are still working on. Meanwhile, four of the five west coast states have also passed laws requiring contingency plans. (Only Hawaii has chosen to wait and see what the federal regulations will entail). Three of the states have already adopted regulations. Given these laws and regulations, along with its corporate structure, Texaco addressed the need to standardize local facility plans as well as its response organization. This paper discusses how, by working together, the Texaco corporate international oil spill response staff and the Texaco western region on-scene commander developed: A standard contingency plan format crossing corporate boundaries and meeting federal and state requirements. A response organization applicable to any size facility or spill. A strategy to sell the standard contingency plan and response organization to the operating units

  11. 40 CFR 265.51 - Purpose and implementation of contingency plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... contingency plan. 265.51 Section 265.51 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED..., STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures § 265.51 Purpose and implementation of contingency plan. (a) Each owner or operator must have a contingency plan for his facility. The...

  12. Contingency planning in southern Africa: Events rather than processes?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elias Mabaso

    2013-09-01

    Full Text Available With the increasing frequency, magnitude and impact of disasters, there is growing focus on contingency planning as a tool for enhancing resilience. Yet, there is little empirical evidence that reflects on the practice of contingency planning systems within the context of disaster risk reduction. This article explores the practice of contingency planning in southern Africa, focussing on Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A qualitative comparative analysis informed by fieldwork was used. The findings show that (1 there was a wide gap between theory and practice in contingency planning, (2 response activities rarely reflected projected scenarios and (3 resources were inadequate for effective contingency planning. We conclude that unless these issues are addressed, contingency planning is likely to remain a theoretical rather than a practical tool for building disaster-resilient communities in southern African countries. Although a generalisation cannot be made on the status of contingency planning and practice in southern Africa without a wider analysis of more examples, the findings may apply beyond the examined contexts and also offer insights into research gaps.

  13. An approach to handling timescales in post-closure safety assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bailey, L.; Littleboy, A.

    2002-01-01

    Previous Nirex post-closure assessments of deep geological disposal have been based on the use of probabilistic safety analysis covering many millions of years. However, Nirex has also published an assessment methodology in which the assessment timescale is divided into a number of discrete periods of time (time frames). Nirex is currently at the stage of planning the next update to its generic post-closure performance assessment and is considering the merits of using an assessment methodology based on time frames, in order to improve links with operational assessments and the provision of advice on the packaging of wastes, and to encourage stakeholder dialogue. This paper has been prepared as part of Nirex's aim, wherever possible, to 'preview', or seek input from others on, its ideas for new work to generate discussion and feedback. It describes an evolution of Nirex's published assessment methodology and outlines how it could be applied in an updated post-closure performance assessment of the Nirex generic phased disposal concept. (authors)

  14. Final closure plan for the high-explosives open burn treatment facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Experimental Test Site 300

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mathews, S.

    1997-04-01

    This document addresses the interim status closure of the HE Open Bum Treatment Facility, as detailed by Title 22, Division 4.5, Chapter 15, Article 7 of the Califonia Code of Regulations (CCR) and by Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, Subpart G, ``Closure and Post Closure.`` The Closure Plan (Chapter 1) and the Post- Closure Plan (Chapter 2) address the concept of long-term hazard elimination. The Closure Plan provides for capping and grading the HE Open Bum Treatment Facility and revegetating the immediate area in accordance with applicable requirements. The Closure Plan also reflects careful consideration of site location and topography, geologic and hydrologic factors, climate, cover characteristics, type and amount of wastes, and the potential for contaminant migration. The Post-Closure Plan is designed to allow LLNL to monitor the movement, if any, of pollutants from the treatment area. In addition, quarterly inspections will ensure that all surfaces of the closed facility, including the cover and diversion ditches, remain in good repair, thus precluding the potential for contaminant migration.

  15. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2009

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2009 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following seven CAUs: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (3) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (4) CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR); (5) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); (6) CAU 484: Surface Debris, Waste Sites, and Burn Area (TTR); and (7) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR). The annual post-closure inspections were conducted May 5-6, 2009. All inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Attachment B, with the exception of CAU 400. CAU 400 does not require post-closure inspections, but inspections of the vegetation and fencing are conducted as a best management practice. The inspection checklists for each site inspection are included in Attachment C, the field notes are included in Attachment D, and the site photographs are included in Attachment E. Vegetation monitoring of CAU 400, CAU 404, CAU 407, and CAU 426 was performed in June 2009, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Attachment F. Maintenance was performed at CAU 453. Animal burrows observed during the annual inspection were backfilled, and a depression was restored to grade on June 25, 2009. Post-closure site inspections should continue as scheduled. Vegetation survey inspections have been conducted annually at CAUs 400, 404, 407, and 426. Discontinuation of vegetation surveys is recommended at the CAU 400 Bomblet Pit and CAU 426, which have been successfully revegetated. Discontinuation of vegetation surveys is also recommended at CAU 404, which has been changed to an administrative closure with no inspections

  16. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2009

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2010-05-28

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2009 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following seven CAUs: · CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) · CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) · CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) · CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR) · CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) · CAU 484: Surface Debris, Waste Sites, and Burn Area (TTR) · CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) The annual post-closure inspections were conducted May 5–6, 2009. All inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Attachment B, with the exception of CAU 400. CAU 400 does not require post-closure inspections, but inspections of the vegetation and fencing are conducted as a best management practice. The inspection checklists for each site inspection are included in Attachment C, the field notes are included in Attachment D, and the site photographs are included in Attachment E. Vegetation monitoring of CAU 400, CAU 404, CAU 407, and CAU 426 was performed in June 2009, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Attachment F. Maintenance was performed at CAU 453. Animal burrows observed during the annual inspection were backfilled, and a depression was restored to grade on June 25, 2009. Post-closure site inspections should continue as scheduled. Vegetation survey inspections have been conducted annually at CAUs 400, 404, 407, and 426. Discontinuation of vegetation surveys is recommended at the CAU 400 Bomblet Pit and CAU 426, which have been successfully revegetated. Discontinuation of vegetation surveys is also recommended at CAU 404, which has been changed to an administrative closure with no inspections required. Vegetation

  17. 40 CFR 300.210 - Federal contingency plans.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... contingency plans under the national response system: The National Contingency Plan, RCPs, and ACPs. These... discharge under § 300.324, and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge, from a vessel, offshore facility, or onshore facility operating in or near the area. (2) The areas of...

  18. 40 CFR 267.54 - When must I amend the contingency plan?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 26 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false When must I amend the contingency plan... STANDARDIZED PERMIT Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures § 267.54 When must I amend the contingency plan? You must review, and immediately amend the contingency plan, if necessary, whenever: (a) The facility...

  19. Addendum to the post-closure permit application for the Bear Creek hydrogeologic regime at the Y-12 plant: Walk-in pits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-04-01

    In June 1987, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Closure/Post-Closure Plan for the Bear Creek Burial Grounds (BCBG) located at the Y-12 Plant on the Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee was submitted to the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) for review and approval.The Closure Plan has been modified and revised several times. This document is an addendum to the Post-Closure Permit Application submitted to TDEC in June, 1994. This addendum contains information on the Walk-In Pits of the BCBG which is meant to supplement the information provided in the Post-Closure Permit Application submitted for the BCBG. This document is not intended to be a stand-alone document.

  20. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2008-01-01

    This report provides the results of the semiannual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2007 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following nine CAUs: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench (TTR); (3) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (4) CAU 423: Area 3 Underground Discharge Point, Building 0360 (TTR); (5) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (6) CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR); (7) CAU 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6 (TTR); (8) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and (9) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR). In a letter from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) dated December 5, 2006, NDEP concurred with the request to reduce the frequency of post-closure inspections of CAUs at TTR to an annual frequency. This letter is included in Attachment B. Post-closure inspections were conducted on May 15-16, 2007. All inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Attachment B, with the exception of CAU 400. CAU 400 does not require post-closure inspections, but inspections of the vegetation and fencing are conducted as a best management practice. The inspection checklists for each site inspection are included in Attachment C, the field notes are included in Attachment D, and the site photographs are included in Attachment E. Vegetation monitoring of CAU 400, CAU 404, CAU 407, and CAU 426 was performed in May 2007, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Attachment F. Maintenance and/or repairs were performed at CAU 453. Animal burrows observed during the annual inspection at CAU 453 were backfilled on August 1, 2007. At this time, the TTR post-closure site inspections should continue as

  1. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2007

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2008-06-01

    This report provides the results of the semiannual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2007 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following nine CAUs: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench (TTR); (3) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (4) CAU 423: Area 3 Underground Discharge Point, Building 0360 (TTR); (5) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (6) CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR); (7) CAU 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6 (TTR); (8) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and (9) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR). In a letter from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) dated December 5, 2006, NDEP concurred with the request to reduce the frequency of post-closure inspections of CAUs at TTR to an annual frequency. This letter is included in Attachment B. Post-closure inspections were conducted on May 15-16, 2007. All inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Attachment B, with the exception of CAU 400. CAU 400 does not require post-closure inspections, but inspections of the vegetation and fencing are conducted as a best management practice. The inspection checklists for each site inspection are included in Attachment C, the field notes are included in Attachment D, and the site photographs are included in Attachment E. Vegetation monitoring of CAU 400, CAU 404, CAU 407, and CAU 426 was performed in May 2007, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Attachment F. Maintenance and/or repairs were performed at CAU 453. Animal burrows observed during the annual inspection at CAU 453 were backfilled on August 1, 2007. At this time, the TTR post-closure site inspections should continue as

  2. Contingency planning in southern Africa: Events rather than processes?

    OpenAIRE

    Elias Mabaso; Siambabala B. Manyena

    2013-01-01

    With the increasing frequency, magnitude and impact of disasters, there is growing focus on contingency planning as a tool for enhancing resilience. Yet, there is little empirical evidence that reflects on the practice of contingency planning systems within the context of disaster risk reduction. This article explores the practice of contingency planning in southern Africa, focussing on Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A qualitative comparative analysis informed by fieldwork ...

  3. Post-Closure Strategy for Use-Restricted Sites on the Nevada National Security Site, Nevada Test and Training Range, and Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silvas, A. J.

    2014-01-01

    The purpose of this Post-Closure Strategy is to provide a consistent methodology for continual evaluation of post-closure requirements for use-restricted areas on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and Tonopah Test Range (TTR) to consolidate, modify, or streamline the program. In addition, this document stipulates the creation of a single consolidated Post-Closure Plan that will detail the current post-closure requirements for all active use restrictions (URs) and outlines its implementation and subsequent revision. This strategy will ensure effective management and control of the post-closure sites. There are currently over 200 URs located on the NNSS, NTTR, and TTR. Post-closure requirements were initially established in the Closure Report for each site. In some cases, changes to the post-closure requirements have been implemented through addenda, errata sheets, records of technical change, or letters. Post-closure requirements have been collected from these multiple sources and consolidated into several formats, such as summaries and databases. This structure increases the possibility of inconsistencies and uncertainty. As more URs are established and the post-closure program is expanded, the need for a comprehensive approach for managing the program will increase. Not only should the current requirements be obtainable from a single source that supersedes all previous requirements, but the strategy for modifying the requirements should be standardized. This will enable more effective management of the program into the future. This strategy document and the subsequent comprehensive plan are to be implemented under the assumption that the NNSS and outlying sites will be under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration for the foreseeable future. This strategy was also developed assuming that regulatory control of the sites remains static. The comprehensive plan is not

  4. Contingent post-closure plan, hazardous waste management units at selected maintenance facilities, US Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, is a US Army training installation that provides tactical experience for battalion/task forces and squadrons in a mid- to high-intensity combat scenario. Through joint exercises with US Air Force and other services, the NTC also provides a data source for improvements of training doctrines, organization, and equipment. To meet the training and operational needs of the NTC, several maintenance facilities provide general and direct support for mechanical devices, equipment, and vehicles. Maintenance products used at these facilities include fuels, petroleum-based oils, lubricating grease, various degreasing solvents, antifreeze (ethylene glycol), transmission fluid, brake fluid, and hydraulic oil. Used or spent petroleum-based products generated at the maintenance facilities are temporarily accumulated in underground storage tanks (USTs), collected by the NTC hazardous waste management contractor (HAZCO), and stored at the Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant (POL) Storage Facility, Building 630, until shipped off site to be recovered, reused, and/or reclaimed. Spent degreasing solvents and other hazardous wastes are containerized and stored on-base for up to 90 days at the NTC's Hazardous Waste Storage Facility, Building 703. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) performed an inspection and reviewed the hazardous waste management operations of the NTC. Inspections indicated that the NTC had violated one or more requirements of Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and as a result of these violations was issued a Notice of Noncompliance, Notice of Necessity for Conference, and Proposed Compliance Schedule (NON) dated October 13, 1989. The following post-closure plan is the compliance-based approach for the NTC to respond to the regulatory violations cited in the NON

  5. 100-D Ponds closure plan. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petersen, S.W.

    1997-09-01

    The 100-D Ponds is a Treatment, Storage, and Disposal (TSD) unit on the Hanford Facility that received both dangerous and nonregulated waste. This Closure Plan (Rev. 1) for the 100-D Ponds TSD unit consists of a RCRA Part A Dangerous Waste Permit Application (Rev. 3), a RCRA Closure Plan, and supporting information contained in the appendices to the plan. The closure plan consists of eight chapters containing facility description, process information, waste characteristics, and groundwater monitoring data. There are also chapters containing the closure strategy and performance standards. The strategy for the closure of the 100-D Ponds TSD unit is clean closure. Appendices A and B of the closure plan demonstrate that soil and groundwater beneath 100-D Ponds are below cleanup limits. All dangerous wastes or dangerous waste constituents or residues associated with the operation of the ponds have been removed, therefore, human health and the environment are protected. Discharges to the 100-D Ponds, which are located in the 100-DR-1 operable unit, were discontinued in June 1994. Contaminated sediment was removed from the ponds in August 1996. Subsequent sampling and analysis demonstrated that there is no contamination remaining in the ponds, therefore, this closure plan is a demonstration of clean closure

  6. Pension regulation and the market value of pension liabilities - A contingent claims analysis using Parisian options

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Broeders, D.; Chen, A.

    2008-01-01

    We analyze the market-consistent valuation of pension liabilities in a contingent claim framework whereby a knock-out barrier feature is applied to capture early regulatory closure of a pension plan. We investigate two cases which we call "immediate closure procedure" and "delayed closure

  7. Post-operative analgesic requirement in non-closure and closure of peritoneum during open appendectomy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, A.W.; Maqsood, R.; Saleem, M.M.

    2017-01-01

    To compare the mean post-operative analgesic requirement in non-closure and closure of peritoneum during open appendectomy. Study Design: Randomized controlled trial. Place and Duration of Study: Department of General Surgery Combined Military Hospital Quetta, from 1st August 2014 to 30th April 2015. Material and Methods: A total of 60 patients were included in this study and were divided into two groups of 30 each. Patients in group A underwent open appendectomy with closure of peritoneum while patients in group B had non-closure of peritoneum during the same procedure. Post-operatively, pain severity was assessed on visual analogue scale (VAS) numeric pain distress scale. On presence of VAS numeric pain distress scale between 5 to 7, intramuscular (IM) diclofenac sodium was given and on score >7, intravascular (IV) tramadol was given. The final outcome was measured at day 0 and day 1. Results: Pain score and analgesic requirements were significantly less in non-closure group than closure group on day 0 and day 1, showing statistically significant difference between the two groups. Conclusion: Mean post-operative analgesic requirement is significantly less in non-closure group as compared to closure group during open appendectomy. (author)

  8. Dengue Contingency Planning: From Research to Policy and Practice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Runge-Ranzinger, Silvia; Kroeger, Axel; Olliaro, Piero; McCall, Philip J.; Sánchez Tejeda, Gustavo; Lloyd, Linda S.; Hakim, Lokman; Bowman, Leigh R.; Horstick, Olaf; Coelho, Giovanini

    2016-01-01

    Background Dengue is an increasingly incident disease across many parts of the world. In response, an evidence-based handbook to translate research into policy and practice was developed. This handbook facilitates contingency planning as well as the development and use of early warning and response systems for dengue fever epidemics, by identifying decision-making processes that contribute to the success or failure of dengue surveillance, as well as triggers that initiate effective responses to incipient outbreaks. Methodology/Principal findings Available evidence was evaluated using a step-wise process that included systematic literature reviews, policymaker and stakeholder interviews, a study to assess dengue contingency planning and outbreak management in 10 countries, and a retrospective logistic regression analysis to identify alarm signals for an outbreak warning system using datasets from five dengue endemic countries. Best practices for managing a dengue outbreak are provided for key elements of a dengue contingency plan including timely contingency planning, the importance of a detailed, context-specific dengue contingency plan that clearly distinguishes between routine and outbreak interventions, surveillance systems for outbreak preparedness, outbreak definitions, alert algorithms, managerial capacity, vector control capacity, and clinical management of large caseloads. Additionally, a computer-assisted early warning system, which enables countries to identify and respond to context-specific variables that predict forthcoming dengue outbreaks, has been developed. Conclusions/Significance Most countries do not have comprehensive, detailed contingency plans for dengue outbreaks. Countries tend to rely on intensified vector control as their outbreak response, with minimal focus on integrated management of clinical care, epidemiological, laboratory and vector surveillance, and risk communication. The Technical Handbook for Surveillance, Dengue Outbreak

  9. Closure Plan for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Management

    2008-01-01

    The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RMWS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is managed and operated by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This document is the first update of the preliminary closure plan for the Area 5 RWMS at the NTS that was presented in the Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (DOE, 2005a). The major updates to the plan include a new closure schedule, updated closure inventory, updated site and facility characterization data, the Title II engineering cover design, and the closure process for the 92-Acre Area of the RWMS. The format and content of this site-specific plan follows the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans (DOE, 1999a). This interim closure plan meets closure and post-closure monitoring requirements of the order DOE O 435.1, manual DOE M 435.1-1, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 40 CFR 265, Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) 444.743, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements as incorporated into NAC 444.8632. The Area 5 RWMS accepts primarily packaged low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), and asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) for disposal in excavated disposal cells

  10. Closure Plan for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Management

    2008-09-01

    The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RMWS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is managed and operated by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This document is the first update of the preliminary closure plan for the Area 5 RWMS at the NTS that was presented in the Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (DOE, 2005a). The major updates to the plan include a new closure schedule, updated closure inventory, updated site and facility characterization data, the Title II engineering cover design, and the closure process for the 92-Acre Area of the RWMS. The format and content of this site-specific plan follows the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans (DOE, 1999a). This interim closure plan meets closure and post-closure monitoring requirements of the order DOE O 435.1, manual DOE M 435.1-1, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 40 CFR 265, Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) 444.743, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements as incorporated into NAC 444.8632. The Area 5 RWMS accepts primarily packaged low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), and asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) for disposal in excavated disposal cells.

  11. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2013

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Silvas, A. J.

    2014-03-03

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2013 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: • CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) • CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) • CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) • CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) • CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The post-closure inspection plans and subsequent correspondence modifying the requirements for each CAU are included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C. Field notes are included in Appendix D. Photographs taken during inspections are included in Appendix E. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 14, 2013. Maintenance was performed at CAU 400, CAU 424, and CAU 453. At CAU 400, animal burrows were backfilled. At CAU 424, erosion repairs were completed at Landfill Cell A3-3, subsidence was repaired at Landfill Cell A3-4, and additional lava rock was placed in high-traffic areas to mark the locations of the surface grade monuments at Landfill Cell A3-3 and Landfill Cell A3-8. At CAU 453, two areas of subsidence were repaired and animal burrows were backfilled. Vegetation monitoring was performed at the CAU 400 Five Points Landfill and CAU 407 in June 2013. The vegetation monitoring report is included in Appendix F.

  12. 40 CFR 267.53 - Who must have copies of the contingency plan?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... contingency plan? 267.53 Section 267.53 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (CONTINUED... UNDER A STANDARDIZED PERMIT Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures § 267.53 Who must have copies of the contingency plan? (a) You must maintain a copy of the plan with all revisions at the facility; and...

  13. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2011 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (3) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (4) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and (5) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C, field notes are included in Appendix D, and photographs taken during inspections are included in Appendix E. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted May 3 and 4, 2011. Maintenance was performed at CAU 424, CAU 453, and CAU 487. At CAU 424, two surface grade monuments at Landfill Cell A3-3 could not be located during the inspection. The two monuments were located and marked with lava rock on July 13, 2011. At CAU 453, there was evidence of animal burrowing. Animal burrows were backfilled on July 13, 2011. At CAU 487, one use restriction warning sign was missing, and wording was faded on the remaining signs. A large animal burrow was also present. The signs were replaced, and the animal burrow was backfilled on July 12, 2011. As a best management practice, the use restriction warning signs at CAU 407 were replaced with standard Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order signs on July 13, 2011. Vegetation monitoring was performed at the CAU 400 Five Points Landfill and CAU 407 in June 2011, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Appendix F.

  14. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2012-02-21

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2011 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (3) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (4) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and (5) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports. The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C, field notes are included in Appendix D, and photographs taken during inspections are included in Appendix E. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted May 3 and 4, 2011. Maintenance was performed at CAU 424, CAU 453, and CAU 487. At CAU 424, two surface grade monuments at Landfill Cell A3-3 could not be located during the inspection. The two monuments were located and marked with lava rock on July 13, 2011. At CAU 453, there was evidence of animal burrowing. Animal burrows were backfilled on July 13, 2011. At CAU 487, one use restriction warning sign was missing, and wording was faded on the remaining signs. A large animal burrow was also present. The signs were replaced, and the animal burrow was backfilled on July 12, 2011. As a best management practice, the use restriction warning signs at CAU 407 were replaced with standard Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order signs on July 13, 2011. Vegetation monitoring was performed at the CAU 400 Five Points Landfill and CAU 407 in June 2011, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Appendix F.

  15. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar Year 2000; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. B. Campbell

    2001-01-01

    Post-closure monitoring requirements for the Area 9 Unexploded Ordnance Landfill (Corrective Action Unit[CAU] 453) (Figure 1) are described in Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, report number DOE/NV-284. The Closure Report (CR) was submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on August 5,1999. The CR (containing the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan) was approved by the NDEP on September 10,1999. Post-closure monitoring at CAU 453 consists of the following: (1) Site inspections done twice a year to evaluate the condition of the unit; (2) Verification that the site is secure; (3) Notice of any subsidence or deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the unit; (4) Remedy of any deficiencies within 90 days of discovery; and (5) Preparation and submittal of an annual report. Site inspections were conducted on June 20, 2000 and November 21, 2000. Both site inspections were conducted after NDEP approval of the CR, and in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan in the NDEP-approved CR. This report includes copies of the inspection checklists, photographs, recommendations, and conclusions. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are found in Attachment A, a copy of the field notes is found in Attachment B, and inspection photographs are found in Attachment C

  16. Strategic Planning for Hot Cell Closure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LANGSTAFF, D.C.

    2001-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractor were remediating a large hot cell complex to mitigate the radiological hazard. A Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) closure unit was determined to be located within the complex. The regulator established a challenge to develop an acceptable closure plan on a short schedule (four months). The scope of the plan was to remove all excess equipment and mixed waste from the closure unit, establish the requirements of the legally binding Closure Plan and develop an acceptable schedule. The complex has several highly radioactive tanks, tank vaults, piping, and large hot cells containing complex chemical processing equipment. Driven by a strong need to develop an effective strategy to meet cleanup commitments, three principles were followed to develop an acceptable plan: (1) Use a team approach, (2) Establish a buffer zone to support closure, and (3) Use good practice when planning the work sequence. The team was composed of DOE, contractor, and Washington State Department of Ecology (Regulator) staff. The team approach utilized member expertise and fostered member involvement and communication. The buffer zone established an area between the unregulated parts of the building and the areas that were allegedly not in compliance with environmental standards. Introduction of the buffer zone provided simplicity, clarity, and flexibility into the process. Using good practice means using the DOE Integrated Safety Management Core Functions for planning and implementing work safely. Paying adequate attention to detail when the situation required contributed to the process credibility and a successful plan

  17. Amchitka Mud Pit Sites 2006 Post-Closure Monitoring and Inspection Report, Amchitka Island, Alaska, Rev. No.: 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matthews, Patrick

    2006-09-01

    In 2001, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA/NSO) remediated six areas associated with Amchitka mud pit release sites located on Amchitka Island, Alaska. This included the construction of seven closure caps. To ensure the integrity and effectiveness of remedial action, the mud pit sites are to be inspected every five years as part of DOE's long-term monitoring and surveillance program. In August of 2006, the closure caps were inspected in accordance with the ''Post-Closure Monitoring and Inspection Plan for Amchitka Island Mud Pit Release Sites'' (Rev. 0, November 2005). This post-closure monitoring report provides the 2006 cap inspection results.

  18. National Contingency Plan Subpart J

    Science.gov (United States)

    Subpart J of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) directs EPA to prepare a schedule of dispersants, other chemicals, and oil spill mitigating devices and substances that may be used to remove or control oil discharges.

  19. 200 West Ash Pit Demolition Site closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-11-01

    The Hanford Facility is owned by the US Government and operated by the US Department of Energy, Richland Field Office. Dangerous waste and mixed waste (containing both radioactive and dangerous components) are managed and produced on the Hanford Facility. Westinghouse Hanford Company is a major contractor to the US Department of Energy, Richland Field Office and serves as cooperator of the 200 West Ash Pit Demolition Site, the unit addressed in this closure plan. The 200 West Ash Pit Demolition Site Closure Plan consists of a Part A Permit Application (Revision 3) and a closure plan. An explanation of the Part A Permit Application revision is provided at the beginning of the Part A section. The closure plan consists of nine chapters and three appendices. This 200 West Ash Pit Demolition Site Closure Plan submittal contains information current as of October 15, 1992

  20. Public education programme for nuclear contingency planning in Hong Kong

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wong, M. C.; Li, S. W.

    2002-01-01

    Two nuclear power stations on the coast of southern China are situated some 50 kilometers to the northeast of Hong Kong. Although the stations are far away from Hong Kong, the construction and operation of the nuclear power stations have generated public anxiety locally, in particular, after the Chernobyl accident in 1986. A comprehensive contingency plan which takes into account such concerns of the public has been implemented in Hong Kong. Cooperation by the public is vital to the effective implementation of any contingency plan. Understanding of the basics of radiation protection as well as the contingency plan will help the public to appreciate the situation and react in a rational manner. A public education program to promote awareness of the contingency plan has been implemented in Hong Kong. In particular, a Virtual Exhibition Hall on radiation has been developed and launched in February 2002 for access by the public via Internet. A video and a set of web pages will be launched in the later part of 2002 to inform and educate the public on matters related to nuclear accident response in Hong Kong. This paper describes the public education programme in Hong Kong to promote public awareness and understanding of the nuclear contingency plan

  1. 40 CFR 265.280 - Closure and post-closure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... contaminants caused by wind erosion; and (4) Compliance with § 265.276 concerning the growth of food-chain... and post-closure care objectives of paragraph (a) of this section: (1) Type and amount of hazardous..., including amount, frequency, and pH of precipitation; (5) Geological and soil profiles and surface and...

  2. Hanford Patrol Academy Demolition Sites Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-11-01

    From 1975 to 1991 the Hanford Patrol Academy Demolition Sites (HPADS) were used for demolition events. These demolition events were a form of thermal treatment for spent or abandoned chemical waste. Because the HPADS will no longer be used for this thermal activity, the sites will be closed. Closure will be conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) Dangerous Waste Regulations, Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 and 40 CFR 270.1. Closure also will satisfy closure requirements of WAC 173-303-680 and for the thermal treatment closure requirements of 40 CFR 265.381. This closure plan presents a description of the HPADS, the history of the waste treated, and the approach that will be followed to close the HPADS. Because dangerous waste does not include the source, special nuclear, and by-product material components of mixed waste, radionuclides are not within the scope of WAC 173-303 or of this closure plan. The information on radionuclides is provided only for general knowledge where appropriate. Only dangerous constituents derived from HPADS operations will be addressed in this closure plan in accordance with WAC 173-303-610(2)(b)(i). The HPADS are actually two distinct soil closure areas within the Hanford Patrol Academy training area

  3. 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility Supplemental Information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE/RL-93-75)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edens, V.G.

    1998-05-01

    This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility and is intended to be used as a supplement to DOE/RL-93-75, Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE-RL 1993). This unit-specific plan is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements of Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303 for certain Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) waste management units.The LSFF occupied the former ventilation supply fan room and was established to provide a means of investigating fire and safety aspects associated with large sodium or other metal alkali fires. The unit was used to conduct experiments for studying the behavior of molten alkali metals and alkali metal fires. This unit had also been used for the storage and treatment of alkali metal dangerous waste. Additionally, the Fusion Safety Support Studies programs sponsored intermediate-size safety reaction tests in the LSFF with lithium and lithium-lead compounds. The LSFF, which is a RCRA site, was partially clean closed in 1995 and is documented in 'Transfer of the 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility to Bechtel Hanford, Inc.' (BHI 1998). In summary, the 105-DR supply fan room (1720-DR) has been demolished, and a majority of the surrounding soils were clean-closed. The 117-DR Filter Building, 116-DR Exhaust Stack, 119- DR Sampling Building, and associated ducting/tunnels were not covered under this closure

  4. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. For Calendar Year 2015, Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, Patrick; Petrello, Jaclyn

    2016-01-01

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed corrective action units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2015 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs; CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved closure reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The post-closure inspection plans and subsequent correspondence modifying the requirements for each CAU are included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C. Field notes are included in Appendix D. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 12, 2015. Maintenance was required at CAU 453. Cracking along the north trench was repaired. One monument is missing at CAU 424; it will be replaced in 2016. Postings at CAUs 407, 424, 453, and 487 contain contact information for TTR Security. It was noted that protocols may not be in place to ensure that the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) is notified if access is needed at these sites. NNSA/NFO is working with the U.S. Air Force and Sandia to determine whether more appropriate contact information or new protocols are warranted for each CAU. Based on these inspections, there has not been a significant change in vegetation, and vegetation monitoring was not recommended at CAU 400 or CAU 407 in 2015.

  5. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. For Calendar Year 2015, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matthews, Patrick [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States); Petrello, Jaclyn [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2016-03-01

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed corrective action units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2015 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs; CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved closure reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The post-closure inspection plans and subsequent correspondence modifying the requirements for each CAU are included in Appendix B. The inspection checklists are included in Appendix C. Field notes are included in Appendix D. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 12, 2015. Maintenance was required at CAU 453. Cracking along the north trench was repaired. One monument is missing at CAU 424; it will be replaced in 2016. Postings at CAUs 407, 424, 453, and 487 contain contact information for TTR Security. It was noted that protocols may not be in place to ensure that the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) is notified if access is needed at these sites. NNSA/NFO is working with the U.S. Air Force and Sandia to determine whether more appropriate contact information or new protocols are warranted for each CAU. Based on these inspections, there has not been a significant change in vegetation, and vegetation monitoring was not recommended at CAU 400 or CAU 407 in 2015.

  6. Radiological Contingency Planning for the Mars Science Laboratory Launch

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Paul P. Guss

    2008-04-01

    This paper describes the contingency planning for the launch of the Mars Science Laboratory scheduled for the 21-day window beginning on September 15, 2009. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), based in Las Vegas, Nevada, will support the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in its role for managing the overall radiological contingency planning support effort. This paper will focus on new technologies that NSTec’s Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) is developing to enhance the overall response capability that would be required for a highly unlikely anomaly. This paper presents recent advances in collecting and collating data transmitted from deployed teams and sensors. RSL is responsible to prepare the contingency planning for a range of areas from monitoring and assessment, sample collection and control, contaminated material release criteria, data management, reporting, recording, and even communications. The tools RSL has available to support these efforts will be reported. The data platform RSL will provide shall also be compatible with integration of assets and field data acquired with other DOE, National Space and Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), state, and local resources, personnel, and equipment. This paper also outlines the organizational structure for response elements in radiological contingency planning.

  7. 10 CFR 72.186 - Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Change to physical security and safeguards contingency... contingency plans. (a) The licensee shall make no change that would decrease the safeguards effectiveness of... licensee safeguards contingency plan without prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make...

  8. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 427: Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6 Tonopah Test Range, Nevada Calendar Year 2000; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. B. Campbell

    2001-01-01

    Post-closure inspection requirements for the Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6 (Corrective Action Unit[CAU] 427) (Figure 1) are described in Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 427. Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2 and 6. Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, report number DOE/NV-561. The Closure Report (CR) was submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on August 16, 1999. The CR (containing the Post-Closure Inspection Plan) was approved by the NDEP on August 27, 1999. The annual post-closure inspection at CAU 427 consists of the following: Verification of the presence of all leachfield and septic tank below-grade markers; Verification that the warning signs are in-place, intact, and readable; and Visual observation of the soil and asphalt cover for indications of subsidence, erosion, and unauthorized use. The site inspections were conducted on June 20, 2000, and November 21, 2000. All inspections were made after NDEP approval of the CR and were conducted in accordance with the Post-Closure Inspection Plan in the NDEP-approved CR. No maintenance or repairs were conducted at the site. This report includes copies of inspection checklists, photographs, recommendations, and conclusions. Copies of the Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are found in Attachment A, a copy of the field notes is found in Attachment B, and a copy of the inspection photographs is found in Attachments C

  9. Design Alternative Evaluation No. 3: Post-Closure Ventilation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Logan, R.C.

    1999-01-01

    The objective of this study is to provide input to the Enhanced Design Alternatives (EDA) for License Application Design Selection (LADS). Its purpose is to develop and evaluate conceptual designs for post-closure ventilation alternatives that enhance repository performance. Post-closure ventilation is expected to enhance repository performance by limiting the amount of water contacting the waste packages. Limiting the amount of water contacting the waste packages will reduce corrosion

  10. Robustness via Run-Time Adaptation of Contingent Plans

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bresina, John L.; Washington, Richard; Norvig, Peter (Technical Monitor)

    2000-01-01

    In this paper, we discuss our approach to making the behavior of planetary rovers more robust for the purpose of increased productivity. Due to the inherent uncertainty in rover exploration, the traditional approach to rover control is conservative, limiting the autonomous operation of the rover and sacrificing performance for safety. Our objective is to increase the science productivity possible within a single uplink by allowing the rover's behavior to be specified with flexible, contingent plans and by employing dynamic plan adaptation during execution. We have deployed a system exhibiting flexible, contingent execution; this paper concentrates on our ongoing efforts on plan adaptation, Plans can be revised in two ways: plan steps may be deleted, with execution continuing with the plan suffix; and the current plan may be merged with an "alternate plan" from an on-board library. The plan revision action is chosen to maximize the expected utility of the plan. Plan merging and action deletion constitute a more conservative general-purpose planning system; in return, our approach is more efficient and more easily verified, two important criteria for deployed rovers.

  11. 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-12-01

    Since 1987, Westinghouse Hanford Company has been a major contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office and has served as co-operator of the 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility, the waste management unit addressed in this closure plan. The closure plan consists of a Part A Dangerous waste Permit Application and a RCRA Closure Plan. An explanation of the Part A Revision (Revision 1) submitted with this document is provided at the beginning of the Part A section. The closure plan consists of 9 chapters and 5 appendices. The chapters cover: introduction; facility description; process information; waste characteristics; groundwater; closure strategy and performance standards; closure activities; postclosure; and references

  12. 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility Closure Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1991-12-01

    Since 1987, Westinghouse Hanford Company has been a major contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy-Richland Operations Office and has served as co-operator of the 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility, the waste management unit addressed in this closure plan. The closure plan consists of a Part A Dangerous waste Permit Application and a RCRA Closure Plan. An explanation of the Part A Revision (Revision 1) submitted with this document is provided at the beginning of the Part A section. The closure plan consists of 9 chapters and 5 appendices. The chapters cover: introduction; facility description; process information; waste characteristics; groundwater; closure strategy and performance standards; closure activities; postclosure; and references.

  13. Closure Plan for the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Management

    2007-09-01

    cover has been placed on unit U-3ax/bl (Corrective Action Unit 110) at the Area 3 RWMS. Monolayer-evapotranspirative closure cover designs for the U-3ah/at and U-3bh units are provided in this plan. The current-design closure cover thickness is 3 meters (10 feet). The final design cover will have an optimized cover thickness, which is expected to be less than 3 m (10 ft). Although waste operations at the Area 3 RWMS have ceased at the end of June 2006, disposal capacity is available for future disposals at the U-3ah/at and U-3bh units. The Area 3 RWMS is expected to start closure activities in fiscal year 2025, which include the development of final performance assessment and composite analysis documents, closure plan, closure cover design for construction, cover construction, and initiation of the post-closure care and monitoring activities. Current monitoring at the Area 3 RWMS includes monitoring the cover of the closed mixed waste unit U-3ax/bl as required by the Nevada Department of Environmental Protection, and others required under federal regulations and DOE orders. Monitoring data, collected via sensors and analysis of samples, are needed to evaluate radiation doses to the general public, for performance assessment maintenance, to demonstrate regulatory compliance, and to evaluate the actual performance of the RWMSs. Monitoring provides data to ensure the integrity and performance of waste disposal units. The monitoring program is designed to forewarn management and regulators of any failure and need for mitigating actions. The plan describes the program for monitoring direct radiation, air, vadose zone, biota, groundwater, meteorology, and subsidence. The requirements of post-closure cover maintenance and monitoring will be determined in the final closure plan.

  14. Closure Plan for the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Management

    2007-01-01

    cover has been placed on unit U-3ax/bl (Corrective Action Unit 110) at the Area 3 RWMS. Monolayer-evapotranspirative closure cover designs for the U-3ah/at and U-3bh units are provided in this plan. The current-design closure cover thickness is 3 meters (10 feet). The final design cover will have an optimized cover thickness, which is expected to be less than 3 m (10 ft). Although waste operations at the Area 3 RWMS have ceased at the end of June 2006, disposal capacity is available for future disposals at the U-3ah/at and U-3bh units. The Area 3 RWMS is expected to start closure activities in fiscal year 2025, which include the development of final performance assessment and composite analysis documents, closure plan, closure cover design for construction, cover construction, and initiation of the post-closure care and monitoring activities. Current monitoring at the Area 3 RWMS includes monitoring the cover of the closed mixed waste unit U-3ax/bl as required by the Nevada Department of Environmental Protection, and others required under federal regulations and DOE orders. Monitoring data, collected via sensors and analysis of samples, are needed to evaluate radiation doses to the general public, for performance assessment maintenance, to demonstrate regulatory compliance, and to evaluate the actual performance of the RWMSs. Monitoring provides data to ensure the integrity and performance of waste disposal units. The monitoring program is designed to forewarn management and regulators of any failure and need for mitigating actions. The plan describes the program for monitoring direct radiation, air, vadose zone, biota, groundwater, meteorology, and subsidence. The requirements of post-closure cover maintenance and monitoring will be determined in the final closure plan

  15. Integrating scientific results for a post-closure safety demonstration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, E.C.; Ramspott, L.D.; Sinnock, S.; Sprecher, W.M.

    1994-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing a nuclear waste management system that will accept high-level radioactive waste, transport it, store it, and ultimately emplace it in a deep geologic repository. The key activity now is determining whether Yucca Mountain, Nevada is suitable as a site for the repository. If so, the crucial technological advance will be the demonstration that disposal of nuclear waste will be safe for thousands of years after closure. Recent regulatory, legal, and scientific developments imply that the safety demonstration must be simple. The scientific developments taken together support a simple set of hypotheses that constitute a post-closure safety argument for a repository at Yucca Mountain. If the understanding of Yucca Mountain hydrology presented in the Site Characterization Plan proves correct, then these hypotheses might be confirmed by combining results of Surface-Based Testing with early testing results in the Exploratory Studies Facility

  16. 300 Area Process Trenches Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luke, S.N.

    1994-01-01

    Since 1987, Westinghouse Hanford Company has been a major contractor to the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office and has served as co-operator of the 300 Area Process Trenches, the waste management unit addressed in this closure plan. For the purposes of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Westinghouse Hanford Company is identified as ''co-operator.'' The 300 Area Process Trenches Closure Plan (Revision 0) consists of a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Part A Dangerous Waste Permit Application, Form 3 and a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Closure Plan. An explanation of the Part A Permit Application, Form 3 submitted with this document is provided at the beginning of the Part A Section. The closure plan consists of nine chapters and six appendices. The 300 Area Process Trenches received dangerous waste discharges from research and development laboratories in the 300 Area and from fuels fabrication processes. This waste consisted of state-only toxic (WT02), corrosive (D002), chromium (D007), spent halogenated solvents (F001, F002, and F003), and spent nonhalogented solvent (F005). Accurate records are unavailable concerning the amount of dangerous waste discharged to the trenches. The estimated annual quantity of waste (item IV.B) reflects the total quantity of both regulated and nonregulated waste water that was discharged to the unit

  17. Graded Approach to the Development of a Contingency Plan for On-Line Maintenance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chang, Hee Seung; Kim, Jung Wun; Song, Tae Young

    2012-01-01

    Many utilities perform preventive maintenance for safety systems during power operation to improve equipment reliability so as to focus on the work activities more easily and improve the quality of maintenance. Such a strategy can also reduce outage work activities, thus allowing resources to be utilized effectively. Preventive maintenance during power operation, known as on-line maintenance (OLM), requires an assessment and mitigation of risk, which can increase owing to out-of-service safety systems. One of the mitigation action plans is a contingency plan. EPRI recommends the development of a contingency plan for all planned system outages which include factors that strongly affect safety. The Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Company (KHNP) undertook the preventive maintenance of the Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) of a Westinghouse plant as a pilot OLM implementation. During the preparation of the work activities, a contingency plan was a pertinent issue during the discussions with regulators, especially regarding the scope and depth of the plan. This paper discusses the purpose of a contingency plan, including as examples some cases of US utilities, and proposes a graded approach to develop a contingency plan for OLM in consideration of the risks

  18. Hanford Patrol Academy demolition sites closure plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-09-30

    The Hanford Site is owned by the U.S. Government and operated by the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office. Westinghouse Hanford Company is a major contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office and serves as co-operator of the Hanford Patrol Academy Demolition Sites, the unit addressed in this paper. This document consists of a Hanford Facility Dangerous Waste Part A Permit Application, Form 3 (Revision 4), and a closure plan for the site. An explanation of the Part A Form 3 submitted with this closure plan is provided at the beginning of the Part A section. This Hanford Patrol Academy Demolition Sites Closure Plan submittal contains information current as of December 15, 1994.

  19. Environmental considerations in mine closure planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ricks, G.

    1997-01-01

    Mine closure planning considers the best ways to plan and manage the environmental changes and socio-economic effects associated with the closing of mines. While the criteria for judging successful closures may vary, it is particularly important for physical, chemical and biological stability to be achieved and for final land use to be appropriate. Trust funds are increasingly favoured as a practical means of fulfilling the requirement for a financial surety and of ensuring that financial provision is available at the end of the mine's life. (author)

  20. Contingency planning for nuclear emergencies in Hong Kong

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wong, M. C.

    2002-01-01

    Two nuclear power stations on the coast of southern China are situated some 50 kilometers to the northeast of Hong Kong. Although the stations are far away from Hong Kong, the construction and operation of the nuclear power stations have generated public anxiety locally, in particular, after the Chernobyl accident in 1986. A comprehensive contingency plan which takes into account such concerns of the public has been implemented in Hong Kong. This plan not only aims to ensure a quick and timely response to mitigate the health impact of any accidental release but also targets to re-assure the public that the territory is not contaminated when appropriate. This paper describes the principal elements of the nuclear contingency plan in Hong Kong, namely, an extensive environmental radiation monitoring programme and a proactive public communication programme

  1. Defense plan of Hydro-Quebec for extreme contingencies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trudel, Guilles; Bernard, Serge; Portales, Esteban

    2000-01-01

    In the last years, Hydro-Quebec it undertook an important program to improve the dependability of their net of energy transport. They concentrated the efforts on increasing the capacity of the net resist in the event of carries to an extreme contingency caused in general by multiple incidents or for successive disconnection of the lines of energy transport. To neutralize these contingencies, Hydro-Quebec it adopted a series of special measures that are contained under the general title of Plan of Defense for Extreme Contingencies. The objective of this plan is to detect the incidents that surpass the capacity of the net. It is completely automatic and it is based mainly in: A system of automatic disconnection of generation and tele-shot of loads; A system of automatic maneuver (opening and closing) of inductances shunt of 735 kw; A system of disconnection of loads for low voltage; A system of disconnection of loads for low frequency. The present document summarizes the orientations that there is taking Hydro-Quebec to protect its net in the event of extreme contingencies and it describes the different automatism that they are adopts, in particular the system automatic disconnection of generation and tele-shot of loads (RPTC) that is one of the main components of the defense plan. The system RPTC detects the simultaneous loss of several lines directly in 15 substations of 735 kw. It understands four places of automatic disconnection of generation and a centralized system of tele-shot of loads

  2. Environmental aspects of contingency planning and spill response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hillman, S.O.

    1993-01-01

    Alyeska Pipeline Service Company has implemented an incident command system (ICS) for crisis management within the company for response to spills at all company facilities including the Valdez Marine Terminal. The system is also used by Alyeska acting as the initial response contractor for TAPS laden tankers within Prince William Sound. During the past three years, Alyeska has undertaken a complete review of the spill prevention and response plans for these areas. This poster session focuses on the environmental aspects of the response planning efforts. Information is available on contingency planning updates in the areas of dispersant use, burning as a response tool, bioremediation of marine oil spills, waste management, permitting, coastal resource and sensitive habitat data base, and wildlife protection and management. All of these subjects are addressed in the resource documents (RD) supplementing the contingency plans. The RD revisions have been a coordinated effort, involving operators, agencies, and the public through the citizen advisory group

  3. Development of an arid site closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nyhan, J.W.; Barnes, F.J.

    1987-01-01

    This document describes the development of a prototype plan for the effective closure and stabilization of an arid low-level waste disposal site. This plan will provide demonstrated closure techniques for a trench in a disposal site at Los Alamos. The accuracy of modeling soil water storage by two hydrologic models, CREAMS and HELP, was tested by comparing simulation results with field measurements of soil moisture in eight experimental landfill cover systems having a range of well-defined soil profiles and vegetative covers. Regression analysis showed that CREAMS generally represented soil moisture more accurately than HELP simulations. Precautions for determining parameter values for model input and for interpreting simulation results are discussed. A specific example is presented showing how the field-validated hydrologic models can be used to develop a final prototype closure plan. 15 refs., 13 figs., 3 tabs

  4. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar Year 2000

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    K. B. Campbell

    2001-06-01

    Post-closure monitoring requirements for the Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench (Corrective Action Unit [CAW 404]) (Figure 1) are described in Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404, Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, report number DOE/NV--187. The Closure Report (CR) was submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on September 11, 1998. Permeability results of soils adjacent to the engineered cover and a request for closure of CAU 404 were transmitted to the NDEP on April 29, 1999. The CR (containing the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan) was approved by the NDEP on May 18, 1999. Post-closure monitoring at CAU 404 consists of the following: (1) Site inspections done twice a year to evaluate the condition of the unit; (2) Verification that the site is secure; (3) Notice of any subsidence or deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the unit; (4) Remedy of any deficiencies within 90 days of discovery; and (5) Preparation and submittal of an annual report. Site inspections were conducted on June 19, 2000, and November 21, 2000. The site inspections were conducted after completion of the revegetation activities (October 30, 1997) and NDEP approval of the CR (May 18, 1999). All site inspections were conducted in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan in the NDEP-approved CR. This report includes copies of inspection checklists, photographs, recommendations, and conclusions. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are found in Attachment A, a copy of the field notes is found in Attachment B, and copies of the inspection photographs are found in Attachment C.

  5. 300 Area waste acid treatment system closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LUKE, S.N.

    1999-01-01

    The Hanford Facility Dangerous Waste Permit Application is considered to be a single application organized into a General Information Portion (document number DOERL-91-28) and a Unit-Specific Portion. The scope of the Unit-Specific Portion includes closure plan documentation submitted for individual, treatment, storage, and/or disposal units undergoing closure, such as the 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System. Documentation contained in the General Information Portion is broader in nature and could be used by multiple treatment, storage, and/or disposal units (e.g., the glossary provided in the General Information Portion). Whenever appropriate, 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System documentation makes cross-reference to the General Information Portion, rather than duplicating text. This 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System Closure Plan (Revision 2) includes a Hanford Facility Dangerous Waste Permit Application, Part A, Form 3. Information provided in this closure plan is current as of April 1999

  6. 300 Area waste acid treatment system closure plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    LUKE, S.N.

    1999-05-17

    The Hanford Facility Dangerous Waste Permit Application is considered to be a single application organized into a General Information Portion (document number DOERL-91-28) and a Unit-Specific Portion. The scope of the Unit-Specific Portion includes closure plan documentation submitted for individual, treatment, storage, and/or disposal units undergoing closure, such as the 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System. Documentation contained in the General Information Portion is broader in nature and could be used by multiple treatment, storage, and/or disposal units (e.g., the glossary provided in the General Information Portion). Whenever appropriate, 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System documentation makes cross-reference to the General Information Portion, rather than duplicating text. This 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System Closure Plan (Revision 2) includes a Hanford Facility Dangerous Waste Permit Application, Part A, Form 3. Information provided in this closure plan is current as of April 1999.

  7. Getting help quickly: older people and community worker perspectives of contingency planning for falls management.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Charlton, Kimberly; Murray, Carolyn M; Kumar, Saravana

    2018-01-01

    Older people living in the community need to plan for getting help quickly if they have a fall. In this paper planning for falls is referred to as contingency planning and is not a falls prevention strategy but rather a falls management strategy. This research explored the perspectives of older people and community workers (CWs) about contingency planning for a fall. Using a qualitative descriptive approach, participants were recruited through a community agency that supports older people. In-depth interviews were conducted with seven older people (67-89 years of age) and a focus group was held with seven workers of mixed disciplines from the same agency. Older people who hadn't fallen were included but were assumed to be at risk of falls because they were in receipt of services. Thematic analysis and concept mapping combined the data from the two participant groups. Four themes including preconceptions about planning ahead for falling, a fall changes perception, giving, and receiving advice about contingency plans and what to do about falling. Both CWs and older people agree contingency planning requires understanding of individual identity and circumstances. CWs have limited knowledge about contingency planning and may be directive, informative, or conservative. Implications for Rehabilitation Falls can result in serious consequences for older people. There is an evidence-practice gap as availability of and access to contingency planning does not necessarily mean older people will use it in a falls emergency. Older people prefer community workers to be directive or informative about contingency planning options but they do want choice and control. Increased community workers knowledge of, and collaborative decision-making about, contingency planning may promote patient-centered services and assist in closing the evidence-practice gap.

  8. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar Year 2000; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. B. Campbell

    2001-01-01

    Post-closure monitoring requirements for the Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench (Corrective Action Unit[CAW 404]) (Figure 1) are described in Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404, Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, report number DOE/NV-187. The Closure Report (CR) was submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) on September 11, 1998. Permeability results of soils adjacent to the engineered cover and a request for closure of CAU 404 were transmitted to the NDEP on April 29, 1999. The CR (containing the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan) was approved by the NDEP on May 18, 1999. Post-closure monitoring at CAU 404 consists of the following: (1) Site inspections done twice a year to evaluate the condition of the unit; (2) Verification that the site is secure; (3) Notice of any subsidence or deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the unit; (4) Remedy of any deficiencies within 90 days of discovery; and (5) Preparation and submittal of an annual report. Site inspections were conducted on June 19, 2000, and November 21, 2000. The site inspections were conducted after completion of the revegetation activities (October 30, 1997) and NDEP approval of the CR (May 18, 1999). All site inspections were conducted in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan in the NDEP-approved CR. This report includes copies of inspection checklists, photographs, recommendations, and conclusions. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are found in Attachment A, a copy of the field notes is found in Attachment B, and copies of the inspection photographs are found in Attachment C

  9. 200 West Area Ash Pit Demolition Site closure plan. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruck, F.R.

    1994-01-01

    The Ash Pit Demolition Site had two known demolition events, the first occurred in November of 1984, and the second occurred in June of 1986. These demolition events were a form of thermal treatment for discarded explosive chemical products. Because the Ash Pit Demolition Site will no longer be used for this thermal activity, the site will be closed. Closure will be conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) ''Dangerous Waste Regulations'', Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 and 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 270.1. The 200 West Area Ash Pit Demolition Site Closure Plan consists of a Part A, Form 3, Dangerous Waste Permit Application (Revision 4) and a closure plan. An explanation of the Part A, Form 3, submitted with this closure plan is provided at the beginning of the Part A Section. The closure plan consists of nine chapters and five appendices. This closure plan presents a description of the Ash,Pit Demolition Site, the history of the waste treated, and the approach that will be followed to close the Ash Pit Demolition Site. Because there were no radioactively contaminated chemicals involved in the demolitions, the information on radionuclides is provided for ''information only''. Remediation of any radioactive contamination is not within the scope of this closure plan. Only dangerous constituents derived from Ash Pit Demolition Site operations will be addressed in this closure plan in accordance with WAC 173-303-610(2)(b)(i)

  10. Contingency planning at the flotilla level in the United States Coast Guard Auxiliary: flotilla 81-a case study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schooley, Shawn Erik

    2013-01-01

    This article presents a case study of United States Coast Guard Auxiliary Flotilla 81. Flotilla 81 created its first formal, single agency contingency plan. The research question addressed is "How can a flotilla successfully develop a contingency plan?" Five emergent themes are identified. They are offered as suggested promising practices for other flotillas in need of creating a contingency plan. Findings suggest successful contingency planning is a result of effective collaboration with community partners. Network management theory is a key to an effective contingency planning process.

  11. The Environmental Agency's Assessment of the Post-Closure Safety Case for the BNFL DRIGG Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Streatfield, I. J.; Duerden, S. L.; Yearsley, R. A.

    2002-01-01

    The Environment Agency is responsible, in England and Wales, for authorization of radioactive waste disposal under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993. British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) is currently authorized by the Environment Agency to dispose of solid low level radioactive waste at its site at Drigg, near Sellafield, NW England. As part of a planned review of this authorization, the Environment Agency is currently undertaking an assessment of BNFL's Post-Closure Safety Case Development Programme for the Drigg disposal facility. This paper presents an outline of the review methodology developed and implemented by the Environment Agency specifically for the planned review of BNFL's Post-Closure Safety Case. The paper also provides an overview of the Environment Agency's progress in its on-going assessment programme

  12. 218-E-8 Borrow Pit Demolition Site closure plan. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruck, F.R.

    1994-01-01

    The 218-E-8 Demolition Site was the site of a single demolition event in November of 1984. This demolition event was a form of thermal treatment for discarded explosive chemical products. Because the 218-E-8 Demolition Site will no longer be used for this thermal activity, the site will be closed. Closure will be conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) ''Dangerous Waste Regulations,'' Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 and 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 270.1. The 218-E-8 Borrow Pit Demolition Site Closure Plan consists of a Hanford Facility Dangerous Waste Part A Permit Application, Form 3, Revision 4, and a closure plan. An explanation of the Part A Form 3, submitted with this closure plan is provided at the beginning of the Part A Section. The closure plan consists of nine chapters and five appendices. This closure plan presents a description of the 218-E-8 Demolition Site, the history of the waste treated, and the approach that will be followed to close the 218-E-8 Demolition Site. Because there were no radioactively contaminated chemicals involved in t he demolitions at the 218-E-8 Borrow Pit site, the information on radionuclides is provided for ''information only.'' Remediation of any radioactive contamination is not within the scope of this closure plan. Only dangerous constituents derived from 218-E-8 Demolition Site operations will be addressed in this closure plan in accordance with WAC 173-303-610(2)(b)(i)

  13. Closure Plan for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cook, J.R.

    2000-10-30

    A closure plan has been developed to comply with the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy Order 435.2 Manual and Guidance. The plan is organized according to the specifications of the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans.

  14. Closure Plan for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cook, J.R.

    2000-01-01

    A closure plan has been developed to comply with the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy Order 435.2 Manual and Guidance. The plan is organized according to the specifications of the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans

  15. Improving environmental performance through mine closure planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKee, W.; McKenna, G.

    1998-01-01

    Syncrude has been investigating landscape redevelopment concepts since 1995 after a two-year tailings technology selection study resulted in a major shift in their long-term tailings disposal strategy. The change from fluid disposal to solid disposal of tailings leads to a different landscape, incorporating a new water material type, new landforms and a new schedule of reclamation activity. A multidisciplinary approach was needed to assess, design and develop the final landscape. Planning approach in progress at Syncrude Canada was described, and the basic concepts and tools of closure planning discovered to date were outlined. The economic impacts of closure planning on mining and tailings operations in general, were discussed. 14 refs

  16. Project Management Approach to Transition of the Miamisburg Closure Project From Environmental Cleanup to Post-Closure Operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carpenter, C.P.; Marks, M.L.; Smiley, S.L.; Gallaher, D.M.; Williams, K.D.

    2006-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) used a project management approach to transition the Miamisburg Closure Project from cleanup by the Office of Environmental Management (EM) to post-closure operations by the Office of Legacy Management (LM). Two primary DOE orders were used to guide the site transition: DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, for assessment and disposition of real property assets and DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for Acquisition of Capital Assets, for project closeout of environmental cleanup activities and project transition of post-closure activities. To effectively manage these multiple policy requirements, DOE chose to manage the Miamisburg Closure Project as a project under a cross-member transitional team using representatives from four principal organizations: DOE-LM, the LM contractor S.M. Stoller Corporation, DOE-EM, and the EM contractor CH2M Hill Mound Inc. The mission of LM is to manage the Department's post-transition responsibilities and long-term care of legacy liabilities and to ensure the future protection of human health and the environment for cleanup sites after the EM has completed its cleanup activities. (authors)

  17. 202-S Hexone Facility supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingle, S.J.

    1996-03-01

    This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the 202-S Hexone Facility and is intended to be used as a supplement to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan. This unit-specific plan is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements of WAC 173-303 for certain Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) waste management units. The 202-S Hexone Facility is not used to process radioactive or nonradioactive hazardous material. Radioactive, dangerous waste material is contained in two underground storage tanks, 276-S-141 and 276-S-142. These tanks do not present a significant hazard to adjacent facilities, personnel, or the environment. Currently, dangerous waste management activities are not being applied at the tanks. It is unlikely that any incidents presenting hazards to public health or the environment would occur at the 202-S Hexone Facility

  18. Influence of Closure & Non-Closure of the Visceral and Parietal Peritoneum on Post Cesarean Morbidity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tabasi Z.

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available AbstractBackground and Objectives: One of the most important issues in promoting mother and child health is reducing the morbidity rate after cesarean section. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of closure and non-closure of the visceral and parietal peritoneum on post cesarean morbidity in women attending Shabihkhani Maternity Hospital in Kashan, Iran.Methods: This study was conducted with a single blind randomized clinical trial method on 100 parturient women that underwent emergency or elective cesarean section. Patients with previous cesarean section and or abdominal surgery, diseases such as hypertension, diabetes mellitus and premature rupture of membrane and pre operative bleeding, were excluded from this study. Then, the participants were randomly divided into two groups: in one group both peritoneal layers were closed while in the other group, they were not closed. Post operative morbidity including fever, bleeding, post operative pain, analgesic consumption and time of operation were assessed. Data were analyzed with t-tests, and χ2 and a P<0.05 were considered significant.Results: In this study, there were no significant differences between the two groups with respect to age, gestational age, the reason for caesarean section and gravidity, nor were there any differences with respect to the incidence of fever or bleeding and was similar between the two groups, but there was a significant difference between the two groups regarding to feeling of severe pain (P=0.0003, analgesic consumption (P=0.0003 and time of operation (P=0.004. In the non-closure group, dose of analgesic drugs, pain severity and time of operation were less than those of the other group.Conclusion: The Findings showed that non-closure of peritoneal layers as a shorter and simpler procedure has no influence on increasing post cesarean morbidity. Therefore, due to maternal health promotion and early neonatal breastfeeding, non closure of peritoneal

  19. Transuranic Storage Area (TSA)-2 container storage unit RCRA closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodman, D.W.; Spry, M.J.; Nolte, E.P.; Barry, G.A.

    1992-11-01

    This document describes the proposed plans for closure of the Transuranic Storage Area (TSA)-2 container storage unit at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure requirements. The location, size, capacity, history, and current status of the unit are described. Future plans for the unit include incorporating the earthen-covered portion of the TSA-2 pad into a TSA retrieval enclosure along with the TSA-1 and TSAR pads, and closure of the portion of the TSA-2 pad under the Air Support Weather Shield (ASWS-2). This plan addresses closure of the ASWS-2 by decontaminating structures and equipment that may have contacted the waste. Sufficient sampling and documentation of all closure activities will be performed to demonstrate clean closure. A tentative schedule is provided in the form of a milestone chart

  20. 78 FR 73449 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-12-06

    ... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). This partial deletion pertains to the soil of 1,154 residential...] National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Partial Deletion of the Omaha Lead Superfund Site AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). ACTION: Final rule...

  1. 78 FR 11620 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-19

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List: Deletion of the Kerr... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA and the State of Illinois, through the Illinois... because we view this as a noncontroversial revision and anticipate no adverse comment. We have explained...

  2. 78 FR 69360 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-19

    ...] National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Partial... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of California... Corp Air Station Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent for Partial Deletion because EPA views...

  3. 76 FR 20605 - National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-04-13

    ... and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List: Deletion of the... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA and the State of Michigan, through the Michigan Department... Delete because we view this as a noncontroversial revision and anticipate no adverse comment. We have...

  4. 75 FR 43115 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-23

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Intent to Partially..., as amended, is an appendix of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan... Intent for Partial Deletion because EPA views this as a noncontroversial revision and anticipates no...

  5. Proposed energy conservation contingency plan: emergency restrictions on advertising lighting. Authorities, need, rationale, and operation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-04-01

    The emergency restrictions on advertising lighting proposed in Energy Conservation Contingency Plan No. 5 of 1977 are presented. A statement is given on the need for rationale and operation of the Contingency Plan.

  6. 78 FR 45905 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-30

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the Craig... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through the... Craig Farm Drum Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because we view this as a...

  7. 76 FR 45484 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-29

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Notice of Intent for..., as amended, is an appendix of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan... PBL Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent for Deletion because EPA views this as a...

  8. 76 FR 18136 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-04-01

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the Norwood... amended, is an appendix of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The... we view this as a noncontroversial revision and anticipate no adverse comment. We have explained our...

  9. 78 FR 47267 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-05

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the... Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of Oklahoma, through the Oklahoma Department of Environmental... without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because we view this as a noncontroversial revision and...

  10. 76 FR 51316 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-18

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the... Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, through the Puerto Rico Environmental... Site without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because we view this as a noncontroversial revision and...

  11. 78 FR 44512 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-24

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the Sola... Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of California, through the Regional Water Quality...., Inc. Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because we view this as a...

  12. 76 FR 32115 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-03

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Intent To Delete the... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of Delaware, through the Delaware... Delete because EPA views this as a noncontroversial revision and anticipates no adverse comment. We have...

  13. 76 FR 81904 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-29

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the Hipps..., as amended, is an appendix of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan... of Intent to Delete because we view this as a noncontroversial revision and anticipate no adverse...

  14. 78 FR 45167 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-26

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the Cannon... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of Massachusetts, through the...), Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because we view this as a noncontroversial revision...

  15. 77 FR 67783 - National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-11-14

    ... and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List: Deletion of the Waste... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA and the State of Michigan, through the...-Holland Lagoons Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because we view this as a...

  16. 75 FR 33747 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-15

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Notice of Intent for... Notice of Intent to Delete the soils of Operable Unit 1 and the underlying ground water of the... National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of Texas...

  17. 76 FR 45483 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-07-29

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Notice of Intent for... Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of Texas, through the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality... Notice of Deletion for SMPA Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent for Deletion because EPA views...

  18. 77 FR 43567 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-07-25

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the Fort... Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of New Jersey, through the NJ Department of Environmental... Intent to Delete because we view this as a noncontroversial revision and anticipate no adverse comment...

  19. 76 FR 50441 - National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-08-15

    ... and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of New Jersey, through the New Jersey... Deletion of the Sayreville Landfill Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because we view...

  20. 78 FR 66325 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-05

    ...] National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of South Carolina, through the South... because we view this as a noncontroversial revision and anticipate no adverse comment. We have explained...

  1. 78 FR 60721 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-02

    ...] National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the... final Notice of Deletion of the Ludlow Sand & Gravel Superfund Site (Site), located in the Town of Paris..., as amended, is an appendix of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan...

  2. Chemical Waste Landfill Annual Post-Closure Care Report Calendar Year 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mitchell, Michael Marquand [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Little, Bonnie Colleen [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2015-03-01

    The CWL is a 1.9-acre remediated interim status landfill located in the southeastern corner of SNL/NM Technical Area III (Figures 2-1 and 2-2) undergoing post-closure care in accordance with the PCCP (NMED October 2009 and subsequent revisions). From 1962 until 1981, the CWL was used for the disposal of chemical and solid waste generated by SNL/NM research activities. Additionally, a small amount of radioactive waste was disposed of during the operational years. Disposal of liquid waste in unlined pits and trenches ended in 1981, and after 1982 all liquid waste disposal was terminated. From 1982 through 1985, only solid waste was disposed of at the CWL, and after 1985 all waste disposal ended. The CWL was also used as a hazardous waste drum-storage facility from 1981 to 1989. A summary of the CWL disposal history is presented in the Closure Plan (SNL/NM December 1992) along with a waste inventory based upon available disposal records and information.

  3. Corrective Action Management Unit Report of Post-Closure Care Activities Calendar Year 2017.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ziock, Robert [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Little, Bonnie Colleen [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2018-02-01

    The Corrective Action Management Unit (CAMU) at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM) consists of a containment cell and ancillary systems that underwent regulatory closure in 2003 in accordance with the Closure Plan in Appendix D of the Class 3 Permit Modification (SNL/NM September 1997). The containment cell was closed with wastes in place. On January 27, 2015, the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Operating Permit (Permit) for Sandia National Laboratories (NMED January 2015). The Permit became effective February 26, 2015. The CAMU is undergoing post-closure care in accordance with the Permit, as revised and updated. This CAMU Report of Post-Closure Care Activities documents all activities and results for Calendar Year (CY) 2017 as required by the Permit. The CAMU containment cell consists of engineered barriers including a cover system, a bottom liner with a leachate collection and removal system (LCRS), and a vadose zone monitoring system (VZMS). The VZMS provides information on soil conditions under the cell for early leak detection. The VZMS consists of three monitoring subsystems, which include the primary subliner (PSL), a vertical sensor array (VSA), and the Chemical Waste Landfill (CWL) sanitary sewer (CSS) line. The PSL, VSA, and CSS monitoring subsystems are monitored quarterly for soil moisture concentration, the VSA is monitored quarterly for soil temperature, and the VSA and CSS monitoring subsystems are monitored annually for volatile organic compound (VOC) concentrations in the soil vapor at various depths. Baseline data for the soil moisture, soil temperature, and soil vapor were established between October 2003 and September 2004.

  4. Implications of Contingency Planning Support for Weather and Icing Information

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vigeant-Langlois, Laurence; Hansman, R. John, Jr.

    2003-01-01

    A human-centered systems analysis was applied to the adverse aircraft weather encounter problem in order to identify desirable functions of weather and icing information. The importance of contingency planning was identified as emerging from a system safety design methodology as well as from results of other aviation decision-making studies. The relationship between contingency planning support and information on regions clear of adverse weather was investigated in a scenario- based analysis. A rapid prototype example of the key elements in the depiction of icing conditions was developed in a case study, and the implications for the components of the icing information system were articulated.

  5. 78 FR 48844 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-12

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the Mosley... National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the State of Oklahoma... Deletion of the MRSL Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because we view this as a...

  6. 76 FR 70057 - National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-10

    ... and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Partial Deletion of the...). Refer to Figures 1 to 3 in the deletion docket to view the location of the two parcels being proposed... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). This direct final partial deletion is being published by EPA...

  7. 78 FR 60809 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-02

    ...] National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the... Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA and the State of New York, through the New York State... Deletion of the Site without prior Notice of Intent to Delete because EPA views this as a noncontroversial...

  8. 78 FR 53113 - Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; California; San Joaquin Valley; Contingency...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-28

    ...] Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; California; San Joaquin Valley; Contingency Measures for... California to address Clean Air Act nonattainment area contingency measure requirements for the 1997 annual... Air Act Requirements for Contingency Measures III. Review of the Submitted San Joaquin Valley PM 2.5...

  9. Influence of Closure & Non-Closure of the Visceral and Parietal Peritoneum on Post Cesarean Morbidity

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Z Tabasi

    2012-05-01

    Full Text Available

    Background and Objectives: One of the most important issues in promoting mother and child health is reducing the morbidity rate after cesarean section. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of closure and non-closure of the visceral and parietal peritoneum on post cesarean morbidity in women attending Shabihkhani Maternity Hospital in Kashan, Iran.

    Methods: This study was conducted with a single blind randomized clinical trial method on 100 parturient women that underwent emergency or elective cesarean section. Patients with previous cesarean section and or abdominal surgery, diseases such as hypertension, diabetes mellitus and premature rupture of membrane and pre operative bleeding, were excluded from this study. Then, the participants were randomly divided into two groups: in one group both peritoneal layers were closed while in the other group, they were not closed. Post operative morbidity including fever, bleeding, post operative pain, analgesic consumption and time of operation were assessed. Data were analyzed with t-tests, and χ2 and a P<0.05 were considered significant.

    Results: In this study, there were no significant differences between the two groups with respect to age, gestational age, the reason for caesarean section and gravidity, nor were there any differences with respect to the incidence of fever or bleeding and was similar between the two groups, but there was a significant difference between the two groups regarding to feeling of severe pain (P=0.0003, analgesic consumption (P=0.0003 and time of operation (P=0.004. In the non-closure group, dose of analgesic drugs, pain severity and time of operation were less than those of the other group.

    Conclusion: The
  10. POST-CLOSURE INSPECTION REPORT FOR THE TONOPAH TEST RANGE, NEVADA, FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2004

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2005-04-01

    This Post-Closure Inspection Report provides an analysis and summary of the semi-annual inspections conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) during Calendar Year 2004. The report includes the inspection and/or repair activities completed at the following nine Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located at TTR, Nevada: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench (TTR); (3) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (4) CAU 423: Area 3 Underground Discharge Point, Building 0360 (TTR) (5) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (6) CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR); (7) CAU 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2,6 (TTR); (8) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); and (9) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR). Site inspections were conducted on July 7,2004, and November 9-10,2004. All inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved Closure Reports (CRs). The post-closure inspection plan for each CAU is included in Appendix B, with the exception of CAU 400 and CAU 423. CAU 400 does not require post-closure inspections, but inspections of the vegetation and fencing are conducted as a best management practice. In addition, post-closure inspections are not currently required at CAU 423; however, the CR is being revised to include inspection requirements. The inspection checklists for each site inspection are included in Appendix C, the field notes are included in Appendix D, and the site photographs are included in Appendix E. Vegetation monitoring of CAU 400, CAU 404, CAU 407, and CAU 426 was performed in June 2004, and the vegetation monitoring report is included in Appendix F. In addition, topographic survey results of two repaired landfill cells in CAU 424 are included in Appendix G. Maintenance and/or repairs were performed at the CAU 400 Five Points Landfill, CAU 407, CAU 424, CAU 427, and CAU 487. CAU 400 repairs included mending the fence, reseeding of a flood damaged area, and

  11. 78 FR 16612 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Revision To Increase Public...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-18

    ... Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) to broaden the technology, to include computer... ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 40 CFR Part 300 [EPA-HQ-SFUND-2012-0738; FRL-9791-4] National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Revision To Increase Public Availability of the...

  12. Emergency evacuation/transportation plan update: Traffic model development and evaluation of early closure procedures. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1993-10-28

    Prolonged delays in traffic experienced by Laboratory personnel during a recent early dismissal in inclement weather, coupled with reconstruction efforts along NM 502 east of the White Rock Wye for the next 1 to 2 years, has prompted Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to re-evaluate and improve the present transportation plan and its integration with contingency plans maintained in other organizations. Facilities planners and emergency operations staff need to evaluate the transportation system`s capability to inefficiently and safely evacuate LANL under different low-level emergency conditions. A variety of potential procedures governing the release of employees from the different technical areas (TAs) requires evaluation, perhaps with regard to multiple emergency-condition scenarios, with one or more optimal procedures ultimately presented for adoption by Lab Management. The work undertaken in this project will hopefully lay a foundation for an on-going, progressive transportation system analysis capability. It utilizes microscale simulation techniques to affirm, reassess and validate the Laboratory`s Early Dismissal/Closure/Delayed Opening Plan. The Laboratory is required by Federal guidelines, and compelled by prudent practice and conscientious regard for the welfare of employees and nearby residents, to maintain plans and operating procedures for evacuation if the need arises. The tools developed during this process can be used outside of contingency planning. It is anticipated that the traffic models developed will allow site planners to evaluate changes to the traffic network which could better serve the normal traffic levels. Changes in roadway configuration, control strategies (signalization and signing), response strategies to traffic accidents, and patterns of demand can be modelled using the analysis tools developed during this project. Such scenarios typically are important considerations in master planning and facilities programming.

  13. Addendum to the post-closure permit application for the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime at the Y-12 Plant: Walk-in pits. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-04-01

    The revised Closure Plan was initially intended to apply to A Area, C-West, B Area, and the Walk-In Pits (WIPs) of the Bear Creek Burial Grounds (BCBG). However, a strategy was developed to include the B Area [a solid waste management unit (SWMU)] with the WIPs so that both areas would be closed under one cap. The plan was presented to the State of Tennessee on March 8, 1990, and the Department of Energy was requested to review other unique alternatives to close the site. Therefore, in November 1992, the Closure Plan for B Area and the WIPs was prepared separately from that of the other sites associated with the BCBG and was presented in a RCRA Closure Plan. The Closure Plan revision issued April 1993 was intended to reflect the placement of the Kerr Hollow Quarry debris at the WIPs, revise the closure data, and acknowledge that the disposition of a monitoring well within the closure site could not be verified. A Post-Closure Permit Application (PCPA) was to include the WIPs; however, at the time of submittal, closure of the WIPs had not been certified. This addendum contains information on the WIPs to accompany the BCBG PCPA. The purpose of this document is to supplement the information provided in the BCBG PCPA. This document is not intended to be a stand-alone document. Only additional information regarding the WIPs is included in the sections of this document, which correspond to sections of the PCPA submitted in June 1994

  14. 77 FR 76815 - Handling of Animals; Contingency Plans

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-31

    ... DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 9 CFR Parts 2 and 3 [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0159] RIN 0579-AC69 Handling of Animals; Contingency Plans AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: We are amending the Animal Welfare Act...

  15. 75 FR 54821 - National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List; Intent...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-09

    ... and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List; Intent for Partial... amended, is an Appendix of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The... Superfund Site without prior Notice of Intent for Partial Deletion because EPA views this as a...

  16. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B permit application for container storage units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-08-01

    This document contains Part B of the Permit Application for Container Storage Units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. Sections cover the following areas: Facility description; Waste characteristics; Process information; Ground water monitoring; Procedures to prevent hazards; Contingency plan; Personnel training; Closure plan, post closure plan, and financial requirements; Recordkeeping; Other federal laws; Organic air emissions; Solid waste management units; and Certification

  17. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B permit application for container storage units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1994-08-01

    This document contains Part B of the Permit Application for Container Storage Units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. Sections cover the following areas: Facility description; Waste characteristics; Process information; Ground water monitoring; Procedures to prevent hazards; Contingency plan; Personnel training; Closure plan, post closure plan, and financial requirements; Recordkeeping; Other federal laws; Organic air emissions; Solid waste management units; and Certification.

  18. 304 Concretion facility closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-04-01

    The Hanford Site, located northwest of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials. The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. Recyclable scrap uranium Zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/Zircaloy-2 alloy, and Zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets in the 304 Concretion Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/Zircaloy-2 alloy and Zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as low-level radioactive mixed waste (LLRMW) with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 304 Concretion Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of materials and wastes managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 304 Concretion Facility (304 Facility). Clean closure of the 304 Facility is the proposed method for closure of the facility. Justification for this proposal is presented. 15 refs., 22 figs., 4 tabs

  19. 76 FR 70105 - National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List: Partial...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-10

    ... and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List: Partial Deletion of the... appendix of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). EPA and the State... property PINs listed above. The deletion of these two parcels from the Site affects all surface soils...

  20. 75 FR 47521 - National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Intent...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-06

    ... and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Intent To Delete the... appendix of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The EPA and the... Corporation (Markhams) Superfund Site without prior notice of intent to delete because we view this as a...

  1. The 2002 Drigg post-closure safety case: implementation of a multiple factor safety case

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lean, C.B.; Grimwood, P.D.; Watts, L.; Fowler, L.; Thomson, G.; Kelly, E.; Hodgkinson, D.

    2004-01-01

    British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) owns and operates the Drigg disposal site, which is the UK's principal facility for the disposal of low level radioactive waste (LLW). Disposals are carried out under the terms of an authorization granted by the UK Environment Agency (the Agency). The Agency periodically reviews the authorization to take account of new information and any revisions to regulatory requirements. In September 2002 new Operational Environmental and Post-Closure Safety Cases (OESC and PCSC respectively) were submitted to the Agency to support the next authorization review. The OESC assesses radiological safety aspects up until closure of the site, including a post-operational management phase, whilst the PCSC considers the longer-term radiological safety. The Drigg disposal facility has been operational since 1959. For the first 3 decades of operations, disposals were solely by tumble tipping wastes into excavated trenches. This was phased out in favour of vault disposal and disposals to the trenches were completed in 1995. The first vault (Vault 8) commenced operations in 1988 and construction of future vaults is planned up to the estimated end of disposal operations in about 50 years time. This paper describes the main components of the 2002 Drigg PCSC and how they relate to each other. Central to the safety case is a systematic comprehensive post-closure radiological safety assessment (PCRSA). However, the importance of the more qualitative aspects of the safety case, including a demonstration of optimisation, is also highlighted. In addition, other confidence-building activities which are key to developing and presenting the safety case are discussed. (author)

  2. Thinking ahead about reproductive health: contingency planning and emergency preparedness in crisis situations (Iraq and West Africa).

    Science.gov (United States)

    DeLargy, Pamela; Alakbarov, Ramiz

    2004-09-01

    The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) coordinated efforts to integrate RH into contingency planning for the 2003 Iraq crisis and the 2003 regional response for displaced populations in West Africa. Using UNFPA's network of country offices in the Middle East, staff developed logistics plans, conducted workshops and pre-positioned RH supplies. Though refugee movements did not occur, the contingency planning enhanced the response capacity of UNFPA offices and made it possible to rapidly provide assistance inside Iraq. In West Africa, multi-country workshops and follow-up resulted in country-level and regional action plans useful during the renewed crises of 2003; scarce funding, however, limited their full implementation. UNFPA's experiences show that contingency planning requires committing resources for crises, some of which will not occur; new staff skills; and follow-up. Moreover, RH is considered by some to be additional to the core elements of contingency planning. RH's political sensitivity, particularly with certain donors, further complicated integrated planning.

  3. IDENTIFICATION OF DOE'S POST-CLOSURE MONITORING NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    M.A. Ebadian, Ph.D.

    1999-01-01

    The 2006 plan sets an ambitious agenda for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (EM) and the remediation of sites contaminated by decades of nuclear weapons production activities. The plan's primary objective is to reduce overall clean up costs by first eliminating the environmental problems that are most expensive to control and safely maintain. In the context of the 2006 Plan, closure refers to the completion of area or facility specific cleanup projects. The cleanup levels are determined by the planned future use of the site or facility. Use restrictions are still undecided for most sites but are highly probable to exclude residential or agricultural activities. Most of the land will be remediated to ''industrial use'' levels with access restrictions and some areas will be closed-off through containment. Portions of the site will be reserved for waste disposal, either as a waste repository or the in-situ immobilization of contaminated soil and groundwater, and land use will be restricted to waste disposal only. The land used for waste disposal will require monitoring and maintenance activities after closure. Most of the land used for industrial use may also require such postclosure activities. The required postclosure monitoring and maintenance activities will be imposed by regulators and stakeholders. Regulators will not approve closure plans without clearly defined monitoring methods using approved technologies. Therefore, among all other more costly and labor-intensive closure-related activities, inadequate planning for monitoring and lack of appropriate monitoring technologies can prevent closure. The purpose of this project is to determine, document, and track the current and evolving postclosure monitoring requirements at DOE-EM sites. This information will aid CMST-CP in guiding its postclosure technology development and deployment efforts.

  4. 324 Building REC and HLV Tank Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker-Khaleel, B.; Schlick, K.

    1995-12-01

    This closure plan describes the activities necessary to close the 324 Radiochemical Engineering Cells (REC) and High-Level Vault (HLV) in accordance with the Washington State Dangerous Waste regulations. To provide a complete description of the activities required, the closure plan relies on information contained in the 324 Building B-Cell Safety Cleanout Project (BCCP) plans, the 324 Building REC HLV Interim Waste Management Plan (IWMP), the Project Management Plan for Nuclear Facilities Management 300 Area Compliance Program, and the 324 High Level Vault Interim Removal Action Project (project management plan [PMP]). The IWMP addresses the management of mixed waste in accordance with state and federal hazardous waste regulations. It provides a strategy for managing high-activity mixed waste in compliance with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements or provides for an alternative management approach for the waste. The BCCP outlines the past, present, and future activities necessary for removing from B-Cell the solid waste, including mixed waste generated as a result of historical research and development (R ampersand D) activities conducted in the cell. The BCCP also includes all records and project files associated with the B-Cell cleanout. This information is referenced throughout the closure plan. The PMP sets forth the plans, organization, and systems that Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) will use to direct and control the 324 High-Level Vault Interim Removal Action Project. This project will develop and implement a treatment strategy that will remove and stabilize the inventory of liquid waste from the 324 HLV tanks. The PMP also provides for flushing and sampling the flush solution

  5. Consideration of post-closure controls for a near surface low level waste disposal site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clegg, R.; Pinner, A.; Smith, A.; Quartermaine, J.

    1997-01-01

    There is currently an ongoing programme of disposal of low level radioactive wastes by British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) at Drigg, Cumbria, and this programme is likely to continue through the first few decades of the 21st century. Although control of the site is anticipated for a period of about 100 years post-closure, eventually restrictions on access will lapse. Thereafter, the possibility of human actions leading to exposure to, and/or exhumation of, the wastes exists and has to be addressed in post-closure radiological performance assessments. Potential modes of intrusion into the Drigg site have been studied using a suite of computer codes developed specifically for this purpose. Required inputs to these codes include information on possible future uses of the site and the various human actions associated with those uses. This information was obtained from a group of experts using formal elicitation procedures. Although the most likely site uses, notably those involving agricultural activities, are unlikely to result in intrusion into the wastes, others, such a urban development, do have the potential to result in such intrusion. In these circumstances, it seemed appropriate to give consideration to the degree to which documentary records and markers could protect the Drigg site against intrusive activities. Overall, it is concluded that provided that a variety of documentary records are established, ranging from local council archives to mass produced maps, then memory of the site can realistically be assumed whilst civilization continues to exist. However, if this first line of defence fails, markers constitute a second warning system. Finally, assessment calculations can be used to demonstrate that, even if these two lines of defence fail, risks from intrusion and radiation doses contingent upon intrusive events having occurred would not be unacceptably large. (author). 10 refs, 1 fig., 1 tab

  6. National Contingency Plan (NCP) Subpart J Product Schedule Fact Sheet

    Science.gov (United States)

    This section of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan stipulates the criteria for listing and managing the use of dispersants and other chemical and biological agents used to mitigate oil spills.

  7. 40 CFR 146.73 - Financial responsibility for post-closure care.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ...-closure by using a trust fund, surety bond, letter of credit, financial test, insurance or corporate... 40 Protection of Environment 22 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Financial responsibility for post... Standards Applicable to Class I Hazardous Waste Injection Wells § 146.73 Financial responsibility for post...

  8. Hexone Storage and Treatment Facility closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-11-01

    The HSTF is a storage and treatment unit subject to the requirements for the storage and treatment of dangerous waste. Closure is being conducted under interim status and will be completed pursuant to the requirements of Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) Dangerous Waste Regulations, Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 and WAC 173-303-640. Because dangerous waste does not include the source, special nuclear, and by-product material components of mixed waste, radionuclides are not within the scope of WAC 173-303 or of this closure plan. The information on radionuclides is provided only for general knowledge where appropriate. The known hazardous/dangerous waste remaining at the site before commencing other closure activities consists of the still vessels, a tarry sludge in the storage tanks, and residual contamination in equipment, piping, filters, etc. The treatment and removal of waste at the HSTF are closure activities as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and WAC 173-303

  9. Transcatheter closure of post-operative residual ventricular septal defect using a patent ductus arteriosus closure device in an adult: a case report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Djer, Mulyadi M; Idris, Nikmah S; Alwi, Idrus; Wijaya, Ika P

    2014-07-01

    Transcatheter closure of perimembranous and muscular ventricular septal defect (VSD) has been performed widely and it has more advantages compare to surgery. However, transcatheter closure of residual VSD post operation of complex congenital heart disease is still challenging because of the complexity of anatomy and concern about device stability, so the operator should meticulously choose the most appropriate technique and device. We would like to report a case of transcatheter closure of residual VSD post Rastelli operation in a patient with double outlet right ventricle (DORV), sub-aortic VSD, severe infundibulum pulmonary stenosis (PS) and single coronary artery. The patient had undergone operations for four times, but he still had intractable heart failure that did not response to medications. On the first attempt. we closed the VSD using a VSD occluder, unfortunately the device embolized into the descending aorta, but fortunately we was able to snare it out. Then we decided to close the VSD using a patent ductus arteriosus (PDA occluder). On transesophageal echocardiography (TEE) and angiography evaluation, the device position was stable. Post transcatheter VSD closure, the patient clinical condition improved significantly and he could finally be discharged after a long post-surgery hospitalization. Based on this experience we concluded that the transcatheter closure of residual VSD in complex CHD using PDA occluder could be an effective alternative treatment.

  10. A successful environmental remediation program closure and post-closure activities (CAPCA) Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowers, M.H.

    1991-01-01

    The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) closure of eleven waste management units at the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant is nearing completion. The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant is managed by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. for the US Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC05-84OR21400. The Closure and Post Closure Program (CAPCA) has been accomplished on an accelerated schedule through the efforts of a dedicated team from several organizations. This paper relates experience gained from the program that can be of benefit on other DOE environmental remediation projects. Technical design and construction aspects, as well as project management considerations, are discussed

  11. A methodology to assist in contingency planning for protection of nuclear power plants against land vehicle bombs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    James, J.W.; Goldman, L.A.; Lobner, P.R.; Finn, S.P.; Koch, T.H.; Veatch, J.D.

    1989-04-01

    This report provides a methodology which could be used by operators of licensed nuclear power reactors to address issues related to contingency planning for a land vehicle bomb, should such a threat arise. The methodology presented in this report provides a structured framework for understanding factors to be considered in contingency planning for a land vehicle bomb including: (1) system options available to maintain a safe condition, (2) associated components and equipment, (3) preferred system options for establishing and maintaining a safe shutdown condition, and (4) contingency measures to preserve the preferred system options. Example applications of the methodology for a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) and Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) are provided along with an example of contingency plan changes necessary for implementation of this methodology, a discussion of some contingency measures that can be used to limit land vehicle access, and a bibliography. 2 refs., 11 figs., 6 tabs

  12. Land use-based landscape planning and restoration in mine closure areas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianjun; Fu, Meichen; Hassani, Ferri P; Zeng, Hui; Geng, Yuhuan; Bai, Zhongke

    2011-05-01

    Landscape planning and restoration in mine closure areas is not only an inevitable choice to sustain mining areas but also an important path to maximize landscape resources and to improve ecological function in mine closure areas. The analysis of the present mine development shows that many mines are unavoidably facing closures in China. This paper analyzes the periodic impact of mining activities on landscapes and then proposes planning concepts and principles. According to the landscape characteristics in mine closure areas, this paper classifies available landscape resources in mine closure areas into the landscape for restoration, for limited restoration and for protection, and then summarizes directions for their uses. This paper establishes the framework of spatial control planning and design of landscape elements from "macro control, medium allocation and micro optimization" for the purpose of managing and using this kind of special landscape resources. Finally, this paper applies the theories and methods to a case study in Wu'an from two aspects: the construction of a sustainable land-use pattern on a large scale and the optimized allocation of typical mine landscape resources on a small scale.

  13. Land Use-Based Landscape Planning and Restoration in Mine Closure Areas

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jianjun; Fu, Meichen; Hassani, Ferri P.; Zeng, Hui; Geng, Yuhuan; Bai, Zhongke

    2011-05-01

    Landscape planning and restoration in mine closure areas is not only an inevitable choice to sustain mining areas but also an important path to maximize landscape resources and to improve ecological function in mine closure areas. The analysis of the present mine development shows that many mines are unavoidably facing closures in China. This paper analyzes the periodic impact of mining activities on landscapes and then proposes planning concepts and principles. According to the landscape characteristics in mine closure areas, this paper classifies available landscape resources in mine closure areas into the landscape for restoration, for limited restoration and for protection, and then summarizes directions for their uses. This paper establishes the framework of spatial control planning and design of landscape elements from "macro control, medium allocation and micro optimization" for the purpose of managing and using this kind of special landscape resources. Finally, this paper applies the theories and methods to a case study in Wu'an from two aspects: the construction of a sustainable land-use pattern on a large scale and the optimized allocation of typical mine landscape resources on a small scale.

  14. The management of acute risks. Oil spill contingency planning and response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Monk, D.C.; Cormack, D.

    1992-01-01

    It is clear that the risks of environmental damage can be best minimized by preventing oil spills from occurring at all. Since absolute prevention is unrealistic, however, early detection is essential and aerial surveillance techniques are of great value in this connection. If spills do occur, proper contingency planning and clean-up techniques can minimize impacts, but will rarely avoid them completely if the spilled oil reaches the coastline. It is evident that a main priority should be to prevent spilled oil reaching the coastline. The way in which oil spill response strategy is implemented is discussed in detail. It is based on four key elements: the allocation of responsibilities; contingency planning; training and exercises; regular audit of plans and response mechanisms. A case study of the oil spill strategy employed at the Sullom Voe oil terminal in Shetland is used as an illustration. (UK)

  15. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2017, Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alvarado, Juan; Matthews, Patrick

    2018-05-01

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed corrective action units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This report covers calendar year 2017 and includes visual inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: • CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) • CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) • CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) • CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) • CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Visual inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved closure reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 23, 2017. No maintenance or repair issues were noted at CAU 400 and CAU 487. Maintenance items and subsequent repairs include the following: • CAU 407: A large animal burrow was observed in the southeast corner of the cover during the inspection. Two additional animal burrows were discovered during repair actions. All cover defects were repaired on January 9, 2018. • CAU 424: CAS 03-08-002-A304 (Landfill Cell A3-4): A new monument was installed and the subsidence area was repaired on January 9, 2018. • CAU 424: CAS 03-08-002-A308 (Landfill Cell A3-8): Lava rock, used to mark the two eastern monument locations, was noted as missing during the inspection. The lava rock was replaced on January 9, 2018. • CAU 453: Five large animal burrows, located near the east–central portion of cover, was noted during the inspection. Eight additional animal burrows were discovered during repair actions. All cover defects were repaired on January 9, 2018.

  16. Study on a monitoring strategy to support decision making for geological repository closure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suyama, Yasuhiro; Tanabe, Hiromi; Eto, Jiro; Yoshimura, Kimitaka

    2010-01-01

    Japan currently plans to dispose of high-level radioactive wastes (vitrified HLWs) produced from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in deep geological formations, in order to isolate the radioactive wastes from the human environment for tens of thousands of years. Such a geological repository must be designed to ensure operational safety and post-closure safety. Then, following the closure of the geological repository, post-closure safety will be provided by an engineered barrier system (EBS) and a natural barrier system (NBS) without relying on monitoring or institutional control. However, from a technical standpoint, monitoring has been required during backfilling in current studies. Additionally, there has been strong social pressure to continue monitoring during all the phases including post-closure. On the basis of the current situations, a monitoring strategy for geological disposal must be studied to ensure the long term safety of geological disposal. Focusing on decision making for geological repository closure, the authors have created a basic logical structure for the decision making process with the principles for ensuring safety and have developed a monitoring strategy based on the logical structure. The monitoring strategy is founded on three key aspects: the role of monitoring, boundary conditions of monitoring at the time of decision making, and a methodology for monitoring planning. Then, the monitoring strategy becomes a starting point of monitoring planning during site characterization, construction, operation and staged closure, as well as post-closure with institutional control, and of social science studies. (author)

  17. Pre/post-closure assessment of groundwater pharmaceutical fate in a wastewater‑facility-impacted stream reach

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bradley, Paul M.; Barber, Larry B.; Clark, Jimmy M.; Duris, Joseph W.; Foreman, William T.; Furlong, Edward T.; Givens, Carrie E.; Hubbard, Laura E.; Hutchinson, Kasey J.; Journey, Celeste A.; Keefe, Steffanie H.; Kolpin, Dana W.

    2016-01-01

    Pharmaceutical contamination of contiguous groundwater is a substantial concern in wastewater-impacted streams, due to ubiquity in effluent, high aqueous mobility, designed bioactivity, and to effluent-driven hydraulic gradients. Wastewater treatment facility (WWTF) closures are rare environmental remediation events; offering unique insights into contaminant persistence, long-term wastewater impacts, and ecosystem recovery processes. The USGS conducted a combined pre/post-closure groundwater assessment adjacent to an effluent-impacted reach of Fourmile Creek, Ankeny, Iowa, USA. Higher surface-water concentrations, consistent surface-water to groundwater concentration gradients, and sustained groundwater detections tens of meters from the stream bank demonstrated the importance of WWTF effluent as the source of groundwater pharmaceuticals as well as the persistence of these contaminants under effluent-driven, pre-closure conditions. The number of analytes (110 total) detected in surface water decreased from 69 prior to closure down to 8 in the first post-closure sampling event approximately 30 d later, with a corresponding 2 order of magnitude decrease in the cumulative concentration of detected analytes. Post-closure cumulative concentrations of detected analytes were approximately 5 times higher in proximal groundwater than in surface water. About 40% of the 21 contaminants detected in a downstream groundwater transect immediately before WWTF closure exhibited rapid attenuation with estimated half-lives on the order of a few days; however, a comparable number exhibited no consistent attenuation during the year-long post-closure assessment. The results demonstrate the potential for effluent-impacted shallow groundwater systems to accumulate pharmaceutical contaminants and serve as long-term residual sources, further increasing the risk of adverse ecological effects in groundwater and the near-stream ecosystem.

  18. 40 CFR 109.5 - Development and implementation criteria for State, local and regional oil removal contingency plans.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... regional oil removal contingency plans. Criteria for the development and implementation of State, local and... 40 Protection of Environment 21 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Development and implementation criteria for State, local and regional oil removal contingency plans. 109.5 Section 109.5 Protection of...

  19. 304 Concretion Facility Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-10-01

    The Hanford Site, located northwest of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials. The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. Recyclable scrap uranium with Zircaloy-2 and copper silicon allo , uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/Zircaloy-2 alloy, and Zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gal containers) in the 304 Concretion Facility (304 Facility), located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/Zircaloy-2 alloy and Zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as low-level radioactive mixed waste (LLRMW) with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 304 Concretion Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040 (Ecology 1991). This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of materials and wastes managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 304 Facility. The strategy for closure of the 304 Facility is presented in Section 6.0

  20. Interim Status Closure Plan Open Burning Treatment Unit Technical Area 16-399 Burn Tray

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vigil-Holterman, Luciana R. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-05-07

    This closure plan describes the activities necessary to close one of the interim status hazardous waste open burning treatment units at Technical Area (TA) 16 at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Facility), hereinafter referred to as the 'TA-16-399 Burn Tray' or 'the unit'. The information provided in this closure plan addresses the closure requirements specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 40, Part 265, Subparts G and P for the thermal treatment units operated at the Facility under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act. Closure of the open burning treatment unit will be completed in accordance with Section 4.1 of this closure plan.

  1. Closure plan for the proposed Millennium Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tuttle, S.; Sisson, R.

    1999-01-01

    A $2.2 billion expansion of the current oil sands operation has been proposed by Suncor Energy Inc. The expansion would more than double the productive capacity of the present facility. As part of the application for this expansion, called Project Millennium, a comprehensive closure plan has been developed and filed by the Corporation. The Plan includes a systematic evaluation of the area to be developed, a description of the development activities planned, and the goals and objectives of the Corporation in re-establishing the landforms and ecosystems concurrently with running the operation. The Plan envisages surface contouring as early as practicable during the mine development, soil reconstruction, and re-establishment of vegetation, surface drainage and wetlands. The Corporation undertakes to monitor the performance of the reclaimed areas based on landform performance, the impact of chemical constituents on the landscape and ecosystem sustainability. An annual monitoring report assessing herbaceous vegetation growth, major species composition, tree and shrub survival and growth rate, groundwater conditions, amount of precipitation, the utility of constructed wetlands for treatment of reclamation area seepage and runoff waters, and wildlife population changes, will be prepared annually. A future research program associated with the Reclamation and Closure Plan will also examine the effectiveness of the reclamation drainage system as fish habitat, and the potential of the proposed end-pit lake to provide a viable aquatic ecosystem. 8 refs., 2 figs

  2. Post-closure Safety of the Borehole Disposal Concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Little, R.

    2016-01-01

    Conclusion: • BDC post-closure safety assessments have been undertaken over last 15-20 years. • Consistent with best international practice and IAEA guidance: – used structure assessment approach; – peer reviewed; – iterative. • Built confidence in BDC as a safe long-term management option for DSRSs at both a generic and site-specific level

  3. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes Tonopah Test Range, Nevada Calendar Year 2001; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. B. Campbell

    2002-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 424, the Area 3 Landfill Complexes at Tonopah Test Range, consists of eight Corrective Action Sites (CASs), seven of which are landfill cells that were closed previously by capping. (The eighth CAS, A3-7, was not used as a landfill site and was closed without taking any corrective action.) Figure 1 shows the general location of the landfill cells. Figure 2 shows in more detail the location of the eight landfill cells. CAU 424 closure activities included removing small volumes of soil containing petroleum hydrocarbons, repairing cell covers that were cracked or had subsided, and installing above-grade and at-grade monuments marking the comers of the landfill cells. Post-closure monitoring requirements for CAU 424 are detailed in Section 5.0, Post-Closure Inspection Plan, contained in the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, report number DOE/NV-283, July 1999. The Closure Report (CR) was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) in July 1999. The CR includes compaction and permeability results of soils that cap the seven landfill cells. As stated in Section 5.0 of the NDEP-approved CR, post-closure monitoring at CAU 424 consists of the following: (1) Site inspections conducted twice a year to evaluate the condition of the unit. (2) Verification that landfill markers and warning signs are in-place, intact, and readable. (3) Notice of any subsidence, erosion, unauthorized use, or deficiencies that may compromise the integrity of the landfill covers. (4) Remedy of any deficiencies within 90 days of discovery. (5) Preparation and submittal of an annual report. Site inspections were conducted on May 16, 2001, and November 6, 2001. The inspections were preformed after the NDEP approval of the CR. This report includes copies of the inspection checklist, photographs, recommendations, and conclusions. The Post-Closure Inspection Checklists are found in

  4. Contingency plan improvement for managing oil spills in the coastal waters of Thailand.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Singkran, Nuanchan

    2014-12-15

    The estimated risks of being impacted by oil spills in the coastal waters were used to improve the oil spill contingency plan of Thailand. Functional roles of local agencies are integrated into the plan. Intensive measures are suggested for the coastal provinces located in high-very high risk zones, whereas light and moderate measures are suggested for the coastal provinces located in low and moderate risk zones, respectively. The estimated percentage risks due to simulated oil slicks hitting the coast and/or important resources (PRoilspill) were used to guide the year-round water activities that should be carefully handled at a certain radius with a low-moderate PRoilspill, whereas they should be avoided at a certain radius with a high-very high PRoilspill. Important measures before, during, and post periods of an oil spill incident are suggested to prevent and monitor oil spill incidents and mitigate their impacts on the environment. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  5. Thevenin Equivalent Method for Dynamic Contingency Assessment

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Møller, Jakob Glarbo; Jóhannsson, Hjörtur; Østergaard, Jacob

    2015-01-01

    A method that exploits Thevenin equivalent representation for obtaining post-contingency steady-state nodal voltages is integrated with a method of detecting post-contingency aperiodic small-signal instability. The task of integrating stability assessment with contingency assessment is challenged...... by the cases of unstable post-contingency conditions. For unstable postcontingency conditions there exists no credible steady-state which can be used for basis of a stability assessment. This paper demonstrates how Thevenin Equivalent methods can be applied in algebraic representation of such bifurcation...... points which may be used in assessment of post-contingency aperiodic small-signal stability. The assessment method is introduced with a numeric example....

  6. 324 Building radiochemical engineering cells, high-level vault, low-level vault, and associated areas closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnett, J.M.

    1998-01-01

    The Hanford Site, located adjacent to and north of Richland, Washington, is operated by the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL). The 324 Building is located in the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. The 324 Building was constructed in the 1960s to support materials and chemical process research and development activities ranging from laboratory/bench-scale studies to full engineering-scale pilot plant demonstrations. In the mid-1990s, it was determined that dangerous waste and waste residues were being stored for greater than 90 days in the 324 Building Radiochemical Engineering Cells (REC) and in the High-Level Vault/Low-Level Vault (HLV/LLV) tanks. [These areas are not Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) permitted portions of the 324 Building.] Through the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Milestone M-89, agreement was reached to close the nonpermitted RCRA unit in the 324 Building. This closure plan, managed under TPA Milestone M-20-55, addresses the identified building areas targeted by the Tri-Party Agreement and provides commitments to achieve the highest degree of compliance practicable, given the special technical difficulties of managing mixed waste that contains high-activity radioactive materials, and the physical limitations of working remotely in the areas within the subject closure unit. This closure plan is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1.0 provides the introduction, historical perspective, 324 Building history and current mission, and the regulatory basis and strategy for managing the closure unit. Chapters 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0 discuss the detailed facility description, process information, waste characteristics, and groundwater monitoring respectively. Chapter 6.0 deals with the closure strategy and performance standard, including the closure activities for the B-Cell, D-Cell, HLV, LLV; piping and miscellaneous associated building areas. Chapter 7.0 addresses the

  7. Percutaneous closure of a post-traumatic ventricular septal defect with a patent ductus arteriosus occluder

    OpenAIRE

    Xi, Er-Ping; Zhu, Jian; Zhu, Shui-Bo; Yin, Gui-Lin; Liu, Yong; Dong, Yong-Qiang; Zhang, Yu; Xia, Feng

    2012-01-01

    OBJECTIVE: Ventricular septal defects resulting from post-traumatic cardiac injury are very rare. Percutaneous closure has emerged as a method for treating this disorder. We wish to report our experience in three patients who underwent percutaneous closure of a post-traumatic ventricular septal defect with a patent ductus arteriosus occluder. METHODS: We treated three patients with post-traumatic ventricular septal defects caused by stab wounds with knives. After the heart wound was repaired,...

  8. Development of a unified federal/state coastal/inland oil and hazardous substance contingency plan for the state of Alaska

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lautenberger, C.; Pearson, L.

    1993-01-01

    Passage of the US Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990 expanded the existing federal planning and response framework in several ways. The OPA created a new requirement for facility and tank vessel response plans and creates an area-level planning and coordination structure to help supplement federal, regional, and local planning efforts. The OPA amended the existing Clean Water Act's section 311(j)(4), which establishes area committees and area contingency plans as primary components of this structure. In 1980, the Alaska legislature enacted legislation which defines the state's policies regarding oil spills. Following the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, additional legislation was passed to expand and strengthen the state's oil spill program. Specifically, in 1989 the Senate Bill 261 required the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation to develop, annually review, and revise the State Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plans (State Master and Regional Plans). State regional plans serve as annexes to the State Master Plan. The coordinated and cooperative efforts by government agencies and local entities toward creating a unified federal/state, coastal/inland Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan are presented, along with the development and progress of unified area/regional contingency plans for Alaska. 3 figs

  9. Safe disposal of radioactive waste. Post-closure safety assessment of permanent repository in Novi han

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mateeva, M.

    2007-01-01

    A presented material is the third part of the monograph with title 'Safe disposal of radioactive waste. Post-closure safety assessment of the permanent repository in Novi Han'. This part deals with review of the scenario selection procedure. The process system of permanent repository for radioactive waste is describing in details for different levels. Preliminary screening process of features, events and processes is presented here. Interaction matrixes for basic disposal system components are constructed. Final selection and grouping between the included features, events and processes is done. Selected and defined scenarios for post-closure safety assessment are presented too. Key words: post-closure safety assessment, scenario generation procedure, process system, process influence diagram, and interaction matrix

  10. Year 2000 Contingency Planning and Cost Reporting at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1998-01-01

    ...: complied with the requirements of the DoD Year 2000 Management Plan, prepared adequate Year 2000 system-level contingency plans, and reported complete and reliable Year 2000 system cost estimates...

  11. Fuzzy-set based contingency ranking

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hsu, Y.Y.; Kuo, H.C.

    1992-01-01

    In this paper, a new approach based on fuzzy set theory is developed for contingency ranking of Taiwan power system. To examine whether a power system can remain in a secure and reliable operating state under contingency conditions, those contingency cases that will result in loss-of-load, loss-of generation, or islanding are first identified. Then 1P-1Q iteration of fast decoupled load flow is preformed to estimate post-contingent quantities (line flows, bus voltages) for other contingency cases. Based on system operators' past experience, each post-contingent quantity is assigned a degree of severity according to the potential damage that could be imposed on the power system by the quantity, should the contingency occurs. An approach based on fuzzy set theory is developed to deal with the imprecision of linguistic terms

  12. Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) Interim Status Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    SIMMONS, F.M.

    2000-01-01

    This document describes the planned activities and performance standards for closing the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF). WESF is located within the 225B Facility in the 200 East Area on the Hanford Facility. Although this document is prepared based on Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 265, Subpart G requirements, closure of the storage unit will comply with Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 regulations pursuant to Section 5.3 of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Action Plan (Ecology et al. 1996). Because the intention is to clean close WESF, postclosure activities are not applicable to this interim status closure plan. To clean close the storage unit, it will be demonstrated that dangerous waste has not been left onsite at levels above the closure performance standard for removal and decontamination. If it is determined that clean closure is not possible or environmentally is impracticable, the interim status closure plan will be modified to address required postclosure activities. WESF stores cesium and strontium encapsulated salts. The encapsulated salts are stored in the pool cells or process cells located within 225B Facility. The dangerous waste is contained within a double containment system to preclude spills to the environment. In the unlikely event that a waste spill does occur outside the capsules, operating methods and administrative controls require that waste spills be cleaned up promptly and completely, and a notation made in the operating record. Because dangerous waste does not include source, special nuclear, and by-product material components of mixed waste, radionuclides are not within the scope of this documentation. The information on radionuclides is provided only for general knowledge

  13. Construction quality assurance closure report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site 300, Pits 1 and 7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-02-01

    This document presents the Final Construction Quality Assurance (CQA) report for the closure cover system of two mixed, low-level radioactive and hazardous waste landfills (pits) at Site 300. Site 300, operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), is located in the Altamont Hills, approximately 15 miles southeast of Livermore, California. The purpose of this report is to document the CQA program established to assure that construction is completed in accordance with the design intent and the approved Closure and Post Closure Plans dated May 1989 and revised January 1990 (EPA ID Number: CA 2890090002). Inclusive within the Closure and Post Closure Plan were the CQA Plan and the Technical Specifications for the final cover system. This report contains a complete narrative with photographic documentation of the construction activities and progress, problems encountered and solutions utilized, and third party testing and monitoring results, thus establishing the verification of compliance with the Quality Assurance Plan for the project

  14. Plutonium Finishing Plan (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit Interim Status Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    PRIGNANO, A.L.

    2000-01-01

    This document describes the planned activities and performance standards for closing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Treatment and Storage Unit. The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit is located within the 234-52 Building in the 200 West Area of the Hanford Facility. Although this document is prepared based upon Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 265, Subpart G requirements, closure of the unit will comply with Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 regulations pursuant to Section 5.3 of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) Action Plan (Ecology et al. 1996). Because the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit manages transuranic mixed (TRUM) waste, there are many controls placed on management of the waste. Based on the many controls placed on management of TRUM waste, releases of TRUM waste are not anticipated to occur in the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit. Because the intention is to clean close the PFP Treatment and Storage Unit, postclosure activities are not applicable to this closure plan. To clean close the unit, it will be demonstrated that dangerous waste has not been left onsite at levels above the closure performance standard for removal and decontamination. If it is determined that clean closure is not possible or is environmentally impractical, the closure plan will be modified to address required postclosure activities. The PFP Treatment and Storage Unit will be operated to immobilize and/or repackage plutonium-bearing waste in a glovebox process. The waste to be processed is in a solid physical state (chunks and coarse powder) and will be sealed into and out of the glovebox in closed containers. The containers of immobilized waste will be stored in the glovebox and in additional permitted storage locations at PFP. The waste will be managed to minimize the potential for spills outside the glovebox, and to preclude spills from reaching soil. Containment surfaces will be maintained to ensure

  15. Percutaneous closure of a post-traumatic ventricular septal defect with a patent ductus arteriosus occluder

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Er-Ping Xi

    2012-11-01

    Full Text Available OBJECTIVE: Ventricular septal defects resulting from post-traumatic cardiac injury are very rare. Percutaneous closure has emerged as a method for treating this disorder. We wish to report our experience in three patients who underwent percutaneous closure of a post-traumatic ventricular septal defect with a patent ductus arteriosus occluder. METHODS: We treated three patients with post-traumatic ventricular septal defects caused by stab wounds with knives. After the heart wound was repaired, patient examinations revealed ventricular septal defects with pulmonary/systemic flow ratios (Qp/Qs of over 1.7. The post-traumatic ventricular septal defects were closed percutaneously with a patent ductus arteriosus occluder (Lifetech Scientific (Shenzhen Co., LTD, Guangdong, China utilizing standard techniques. RESULTS: Post-operative transthoracic echocardiography revealed no residual left-to-right shunt and indicated normal ventricular function. In addition, 320-slice computerized tomography showed that the occluder was well placed and exhibited normal morphology. CONCLUSION: Our experiences indicate that closure of a post-traumatic ventricular septal defect using a patent ductus arteriosus occluder is feasible, safe, and effective.

  16. Percutaneous closure of a post-traumatic ventricular septal defect with a patent ductus arteriosus occluder.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xi, Er-Ping; Zhu, Jian; Zhu, Shui-Bo; Yin, Gui-Lin; Liu, Yong; Dong, Yong-Qiang; Zhang, Yu; Xia, Feng

    2012-11-01

    Ventricular septal defects resulting from post-traumatic cardiac injury are very rare. Percutaneous closure has emerged as a method for treating this disorder. We wish to report our experience in three patients who underwent percutaneous closure of a post-traumatic ventricular septal defect with a patent ductus arteriosus occluder. We treated three patients with post-traumatic ventricular septal defects caused by stab wounds with knives. After the heart wound was repaired, patient examinations revealed ventricular septal defects with pulmonary/systemic flow ratios (Qp/Qs) of over 1.7. The post-traumatic ventricular septal defects were closed percutaneously with a patent ductus arteriosus occluder (Lifetech Scientific (Shenzhen) Co., LTD, Guangdong, China) utilizing standard techniques. Post-operative transthoracic echocardiography revealed no residual left-to-right shunt and indicated normal ventricular function. In addition, 320-slice computerized tomography showed that the occluder was well placed and exhibited normal morphology. Our experiences indicate that closure of a post-traumatic ventricular septal defect using a patent ductus arteriosus occluder is feasible, safe, and effective.

  17. Decontamination and inspection plan for Phase 3 closure of the 300 area waste acid treatment system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LUKE, S.N.

    1999-01-01

    This decontamination and inspection plan (DIP) describes decontamination and verification activities in support of Phase 3 closure of the 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System (WATS). Phase 3 is the third phase of three WATS closure phases. Phase 3 attains clean closure conditions for WATS portions of the 334 and 311 Tank Farms (TF) and the 333 and 303-F Buildings. This DIP also describes designation and management of waste and debris generated during Phase 3 closure activities. Information regarding Phase 1 and Phase 2 for decontamination and verification activities closure can be found in WHC-SD-ENV-AP-001 and HNF-1784, respectively. This DIP is provided as a supplement to the closure plan (DOE/RL-90-11). This DIP provides the documentation for Ecology concurrence with Phase 3 closure methods and activities. This DIP is intended to provide greater detail than is contained in the closure plan to satisfy Ecology Dangerous Waste Regulations, Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 requirement that closure documents describe the methods for removing, transporting, storing, and disposing of all dangerous waste at the unit. The decontamination and verification activities described in this DIP are based on the closure plan and on agreements reached between Ecology and the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) during Phase 3 closure activity workshops and/or project manager meetings (PMMs)

  18. Closure of hazardous and mixed radioactive waste management units at DOE facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-06-01

    This is document addresses the Federal regulations governing the closure of hazardous and mixed waste units subject to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements. It provides a brief overview of the RCRA permitting program and the extensive RCRA facility design and operating standards. It provides detailed guidance on the procedural requirements for closure and post-closure care of hazardous and mixed waste management units, including guidance on the preparation of closure and post-closure plans that must be submitted with facility permit applications. This document also provides guidance on technical activities that must be conducted both during and after closure of each of the following hazardous waste management units regulated under RCRA

  19. Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE/RL-93-75)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingle, S.J.

    1996-05-01

    This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill and is intended to be used as a supplement to DOE/RL-93-75, 'Hanford Facility Contingency Plan.' This unit-specific plan is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements of the Washington Administrative Code, Chapter 173-303 for certain Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 waste management units. The Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill (located approximately 3.5 miles southeast of the 200 East Area at the Hanford Site) was used for disposal of nonradioactive dangerous waste from January 1975 to May 1985. Currently, there are no dangerous waste streams disposed in the Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill. Dangerous waste management activities are no longer required at the landfill. The landfill does not present a significant hazard to adjacent units, personnel, or the environment. It is unlikely that incidents presenting hazards to public health or the environment would occur at the Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Landfill

  20. Oil spill contingency planning for offshore oil fields - a new concept established for the Norwegian continental shelf

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singsaas, I.; Reed, M.; Nygaard, T.; Sundnes, G.Jr.

    1998-01-01

    The development of a new concept for oil spill contingency planning to be used for offshore oil fields on the Norwegian continental shelf was discussed. The factors which are important in developing a good oil spill contingency plan include a good understanding of: (1) the fate, behaviour and weathering of the specific oil, (2) relevant oil spill scenarios, (3) drift and spreading of the oil, and (4) specific requirements for the effectiveness of the chosen response options. The oil spill contingency and response (OSCAR) model was used for quantitative comparison of alternative response options. 21 refs., 2 tabs., 7 figs

  1. Coordinated Control of Distributed and Bulk Energy Storage for Alleviation of Post-Contingency Overloads

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yunfeng Wen

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available This paper presents a novel corrective control strategy that can effectively coordinate distributed and bulk energy storage to relieve post-contingency overloads. Immediately following a contingency, distributed batteries are implemented to provide fast corrective actions to reduce power flows below their short-term emergency ratings. During the long-term period, Pumped Hydro Storage units work in pumping or generation mode to aid conventional generating units keep line flows below the normal ratings. This problem is formulated as a multi-stage Corrective Security-constrained OPF (CSCOPF. An algorithm based on Benders decomposition was proposed to find the optimal base case solution and seek feasible corrective actions to handle all contingencies. Case studies based on a modified RTS-96 system demonstrate the performance and effectiveness of the proposed control strategy.

  2. Single-shell tank closure work plan. Revision A

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    In January 1994, the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Conset Order (Tri-Party Agreement) was amended to reflect a revised strategy for remediation of radioactive waste in underground storage tanks. These amendments include milestones for closure of the single-shell tank (SST) operable units, to be initiated by March 2012 and completed by September 2024. This SST-CWP has been prepared to address the principal topical areas identified in Tri-Party Agreement Milestone M-45-06 (i.e., regulatory pathway, operable unit characterization, waste retrieval, technology development, and a strategy for achieving closure). Chapter 2.0 of this SST-CWP provides a brief description of the environmental setting, SST System, the origin and characteristics of SST waste, and ancillary equipment that will be remediated as part of SST operable unit closure. Appendix 2A provides a description of the hydrogeology of the Hanford Site, including information on the unsaturated sediments (vadose zone) beneath the 200 Areas Plateau. Chapter 3.0 provides a discussion of the laws and regulations applicable to closure of the SST farm operable units. Chapter 4.0 provides a summary description of the ongoing characterization activities that best align with the proposed regulatory pathway for closure. Chapter 5.0 describes aspects of the SST waste retrieval program, including retrieval strategy, technology, and sequence, potential tank leakage during retrieval, and considerations of deployment of subsurface barriers. Chapter 6.0 outlines a proposed strategy for closure. Chapter 7.0 provides a summary of the programs underway or planned to develop technologies to support closure. Ca. 325 refs.

  3. Single-shell tank closure work plan. Revision A

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    In January 1994, the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Conset Order (Tri-Party Agreement) was amended to reflect a revised strategy for remediation of radioactive waste in underground storage tanks. These amendments include milestones for closure of the single-shell tank (SST) operable units, to be initiated by March 2012 and completed by September 2024. This SST-CWP has been prepared to address the principal topical areas identified in Tri-Party Agreement Milestone M-45-06 (i.e., regulatory pathway, operable unit characterization, waste retrieval, technology development, and a strategy for achieving closure). Chapter 2.0 of this SST-CWP provides a brief description of the environmental setting, SST System, the origin and characteristics of SST waste, and ancillary equipment that will be remediated as part of SST operable unit closure. Appendix 2A provides a description of the hydrogeology of the Hanford Site, including information on the unsaturated sediments (vadose zone) beneath the 200 Areas Plateau. Chapter 3.0 provides a discussion of the laws and regulations applicable to closure of the SST farm operable units. Chapter 4.0 provides a summary description of the ongoing characterization activities that best align with the proposed regulatory pathway for closure. Chapter 5.0 describes aspects of the SST waste retrieval program, including retrieval strategy, technology, and sequence, potential tank leakage during retrieval, and considerations of deployment of subsurface barriers. Chapter 6.0 outlines a proposed strategy for closure. Chapter 7.0 provides a summary of the programs underway or planned to develop technologies to support closure. Ca. 325 refs

  4. Fall 2010 Semiannual (III.H. and I.U.) Report for the HWMA/RCRA Post Closure Permit for the INTEC Waste Calcining Facility and the CPP 601/627/640 Facility at the INL Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boehmer, Ann

    2010-11-01

    The Waste Calcining Facility is located at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center. In 1999, the Waste Calcining Facility was closed under an approved Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (HWMA/RCRA) Closure Plan. Vessels and spaces were grouted and then covered with a concrete cap. The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality issued a final HWMA/RCRA post-closure permit on September 15, 2003, with an effective date of October 16, 2003. This permit sets forth procedural requirements for groundwater characterization and monitoring, maintenance, and inspections of the Waste Calcining Facility to ensure continued protection of human health and the environment. The post closure permit also includes semiannual reporting requirements under Permit Conditions III.H. and I.U. These reporting requirements have been combined into this single semiannual report, as agreed between the Idaho Cleanup Project and Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. The Permit Condition III.H. portion of this report includes a description and the results of field methods associated with groundwater monitoring of the Waste Calcining Facility. Analytical results from groundwater sampling, results of inspections and maintenance of monitoring wells in the Waste Calcining Facility groundwater monitoring network, and results of inspections of the concrete cap are summarized. The Permit Condition I.U. portion of this report includes noncompliances not otherwise required to be reported under Permit Condition I.R. (advance notice of planned changes to facility activity which may result in a noncompliance) or Permit Condition I.T. (reporting of noncompliances which may endanger human health or the environment). This report also provides groundwater sampling results for wells that were installed and monitored as part of the Phase 1 post-closure period of the landfill closure components in accordance with HWMA/RCRA Landfill Closure Plan for the CPP-601 Deep

  5. Contingency plan for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory liquid low-level waste system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DePaoli, S.M.; Ferrada, J.J.; Abraham, T.J.; Brown, C.H.; Lin, K.H.

    1989-12-01

    Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is one of the major Department of Energy (DOE) facilities that performs various research and development (R ampersand D) activities. Liquid low-level waste (LLLW) is generated in the course of this work. The primary objective of this task is to develop specific plans of action to be implemented, in the event that the storage space for the LLLW concentrate should approach the minimum value in the operational flexibility range or a problem should develop concerning storage space available for dilute LLLW. This report considers contingency plans/options in the light of six different scenarios, including ''normal operation'' and five others. Evaluation and prioritization of the options were carried out separately for each case. Brief discussions of these scenarios and contingency plans/options are presented. 20 refs., 14 figs., 14 tabs

  6. Corporate strategy and viable future land use: Planning for closure from the outset of mining

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warhurst, A.

    2000-01-01

    This paper provides an overview of the environmental impact of mining on viable future land use and underlines the imperative of improved environmental management and closure planning. It argues that pollution prevention, through planning for closure, can lead to cost-effective strategies for sustainable minerals development and viable future land use. This seems to be most true for greenfield sites since, generally, the earlier closure planning and pollution prevention is built into a project, the more cost-effective and environmentally benign closure will be. Further, for greenfield sites, pollution prevention techniques can be employed from the outset, at the stages of exploration and mine development, and then monitored and improved through the operation stage to closure, and can be kept in place to manage future land use. The paper discusses how global changes in the industry, following the liberalisation of investment regimes, and mergers and strategic alliances between key firms, has, by virtue of the diffusion of new technology, led to further opportunities to prevent pollution and optimise future land use through planning for closure from the outset. The objectives and components of closure plans are also reviewed as the paper draws on case studies to highlight some of the possible constraints and challenges to pollution prevention that may be faced at the level of both public policy and corporate strategy. The article concludes by suggesting a forward-looking approach to integrated environmental management and viable future land-use planning based on a dynamic model for environmental management. (author)

  7. Proposed modifications to the RCRA post-closure permit for the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime at the US Department of Energy Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-05-01

    This report presents proposed modifications to several conditions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Post-Closure Permit (PCP) for the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (BCHR). These permit conditions define the requirements for RCRA post-closure corrective action groundwater monitoring at the S-3 Ponds, the Oil Landfarm, and the Bear Creek Burial Grounds (units A, C-West, and Walk-in Pits). Modification of these PCP conditions is requested to: (1) clarify the planned integration of RCRA post-closure corrective action groundwater monitoring with the monitoring program to be established in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Record of Decision (ROD) for the Bear Creek Valley (BCV) Watershed, (2) revise several of the current technical requirements for groundwater monitoring based on implementation of the RCRA post-closure corrective action monitoring program during 1996, and (3) update applicable technical procedures with revised versions recently issued by the Y-12 Plant Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). With these modifications, the Y-12 Plant will continue to meet the full intent of all regulatory obligations for post-closure care of these facilities. Section 2.0 provides the technical justification for each proposed permit modification. The proposed changes to permit language are provided in Section 3.0 (S-3 Ponds), Section 4.0 (Oil Landfarm), and Section 5.0 (Bear Creek Burial Grounds). Sections 6.0 and 7.0 reference updated and revised procedures for groundwater sampling, and monitoring well plugging and abandonment, respectively. Appendix A includes all proposed revisions to the PCP Attachments

  8. Proposed modifications to the RCRA post-closure permit for the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime at the US Department of Energy Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-05-01

    This report presents proposed modifications to several conditions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Post-Closure Permit (PCP) for the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (BCHR). These permit conditions define the requirements for RCRA post-closure corrective action groundwater monitoring at the S-3 Ponds, the Oil Landfarm, and the Bear Creek Burial Grounds (units A, C-West, and Walk-in Pits). Modification of these PCP conditions is requested to: (1) clarify the planned integration of RCRA post-closure corrective action groundwater monitoring with the monitoring program to be established in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Record of Decision (ROD) for the Bear Creek Valley (BCV) Watershed, (2) revise several of the current technical requirements for groundwater monitoring based on implementation of the RCRA post-closure corrective action monitoring program during 1996, and (3) update applicable technical procedures with revised versions recently issued by the Y-12 Plant Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). With these modifications, the Y-12 Plant will continue to meet the full intent of all regulatory obligations for post-closure care of these facilities. Section 2.0 provides the technical justification for each proposed permit modification. The proposed changes to permit language are provided in Section 3.0 (S-3 Ponds), Section 4.0 (Oil Landfarm), and Section 5.0 (Bear Creek Burial Grounds). Sections 6.0 and 7.0 reference updated and revised procedures for groundwater sampling, and monitoring well plugging and abandonment, respectively. Appendix A includes all proposed revisions to the PCP Attachments.

  9. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B permit application for Production Associated Units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-05-01

    Attention is focused on permit applications for the following units: Building 9206 Container Storage Unit; Building 9212 Container Storage Unit; Building 9720-12 Container Storage Unit; and Cyanide Treatment Unit. This report addresses the following areas: facility description; waste characteristics; process information; ground water monitoring; procedures to prevent hazards; contingency plan; personnel training; closure plan, post closure plant, and financial requirements; record keeping; other federal laws; organic air emissions; solid waste management units; and certification

  10. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B permit application for Production Associated Units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-05-01

    Attention is focused on permit applications for the following units: Building 9206 Container Storage Unit; Building 9212 Container Storage Unit; Building 9720-12 Container Storage Unit; and Cyanide Treatment Unit. This report addresses the following areas: facility description; waste characteristics; process information; ground water monitoring; procedures to prevent hazards; contingency plan; personnel training; closure plan, post closure plant, and financial requirements; record keeping; other federal laws; organic air emissions; solid waste management units; and certification.

  11. Planning for the closure of uncontrolled landfills in Turkey to reduce environmental impacts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ergene Şentürk, Didar; Alp, Emre

    2016-11-01

    Landfilling is the most preferred solid waste disposal method in Turkey owing to both economic and technical reasons. However, beside the sanitary landfills there are also hundreds of uncontrolled waste sites located throughout Turkey, which are often left either abandoned or burning. Because there is a lack of legislative guidelines governing the closure and rehabilitation of these dumpsites, the municipalities that are responsible for waste management do not initiate the proactive strategies required for the closure of these sites. In this study, a method based on a multi-criteria analysis is conducted for different dumpsites in Turkey to evaluate the level of negative impacts on the environment. This method is based on the use of environmental indices for a quantitative assessment of the landfills, such as environmental interaction between the source and the receptors, environmental values of the receptors, and operational conditions. It was possible to assess the robustness of the proposed methodology since the pre- and post-groundwater quality monitoring data was available from the study sites that were closed and rehabilitated in 2014. The results of this study show that the method based on a multi-criteria analysis is an effective tool while in the preliminary planning stages of closure and rehabilitation activities of uncontrolled waste landfills. © The Author(s) 2016.

  12. 120-D-1 (100-D) Ponds supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petersen, S.W.; Zoric, J.P.

    1997-06-01

    This document is a supplement to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan and provides the unit-specific information needed to fully comply with the Washington Administrative Code 173-303 for contingency plans. The 100-D ponds are unlined surface impoundments that were mainly used to dispose of nondangerous wastewater, The ponds are designated as a single treatment, storage, and/or disposal unit because of potential corrosive characteristics of the wastewater. No waste is currently present at the 100-D Ponds

  13. 216-A-29 Ditch supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE/RL-93-75)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingle, S.J.

    1996-05-01

    This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the 216-A-29 Ditch and is intended to be used as a supplement to DOE/RL-93-75, Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE-RL 1993). This unit-specific plan is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements of the Washington Administrative Code, Chapter 173- 303 for certain Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 waste management units. The 216-A-29 Ditch is a surface impoundment that received nonregulated process and cooling water and other dangerous wastes primarily from operations of the Plutonium/Uranium Extraction Plant. Active between 1955 and 1991, the ditch has been physically isolated and will be closed. Because it is no longer receiving discharges, waste management activities are no longer required at the unit. The ditch does not present a significant hazard to adjacent units, personnel, or the environment. It is unlikely that any incidents presenting hazards to public health or the environment would occur at the 216-A-29 Ditch

  14. 216-U-12 Crib supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE/RL-93-75)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingle, S.J.

    1996-05-01

    This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the 216-U-12 Crib and is intended to be used as a supplement to DOE/RL-93-75, Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE-RL 1993). This unit-specific plan is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements of the Washington Administrative Code, Chapter 173- 303 for certain Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 waste management units. The 216-U-12 Crib is a landfill that received waste from the 291-U-1 Stack, 244-WR Vault, 244-U via tank C-5, and the UO 3 Plant. The crib pipeline was cut and permanently capped in 1988, and the crib has been backfilled. The unit will be closed under final facility standards. Waste management activities are no longer required at the unit. The crib does not present a significant hazard to adjacent units, personnel, or the environment. It is unlikely that any incidents presenting hazards to public health or the environment would occur at the 216-U-12 Crib

  15. Field test of a post-closure radiation monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reed, S.; Christy, C.E.; Heath, R.E.

    1995-01-01

    The DOE is conducting remedial actions at many sites contaminated with radioactive materials. After closure of these sites, long-term subsurface monitoring is typically required by law. This monitoring is generally labor intensive and expensive using conventional sampling and analysis techniques. The U.S. Department of Energy's Morgantown Energy Technology Center (METC) has contracted with Babcock and Wilcox to develop a Long-Term Post-Closure Radiation Monitoring System (LPRMS) to reduce these monitoring costs. A prototype LPRMS probe was built, and B ampersand W and FERMCO field tested this monitoring probe at the Fernald Environmental Management Project in the fall of 1994 with funding from the DOE's Office of Technology Development (EM-50) through METC. The system was used to measure soil and water with known uranium contamination levels, both in drums and in situ at depths up to 3 meters. For comparison purposes, measurements were also performed using a more conventional survey probe with a sodium iodide scintillator directly butt-coupled to detection electronics. This paper presents a description and the results of the field tests. The results were used to characterize the lower detection limits, precision and bias of the system, which allowed the DOE to judge the monitoring system's ability to meet its long-term post-closure radiation monitoring needs. Based on the test results, the monitoring system has been redesigned for fabrication and testing in a potential Phase III of this program. If the DOE feels that this system can meet its needs and chooses to continue into Phase III of this program, this redesigned full scale prototype system will be built and tested for a period of approximately a year. Such a system can be used at a variety of radioactively contaminated sites

  16. Planning for closures of hazardous waste land disposal units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welch, S.H.; Kelly, B.A.; DeLozier, M.F.P.; Manrod, W.E.

    1988-01-01

    Eight hazardous waste land disposal units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant are being closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) under an integrated multi-year program. The units, some of which date back to the early 1950s and include five surface impoundments, two landfills and a land treatment unit, have been used for the management of a variety of types of hazardous wastes. Closure plans for the units have been submitted and are in various stages of revision and regulatory review. The units will be closed by various combinations of methods, including liquid removal and treatment, sludge stabilization, contaminated sludge and/or soil removal, and capping. Closure of all eight units must be initiated by November 8, 1988. Funding for the eight closures is being provided by a new Department of Energy budget category, the environmental Restoration Budget Category (ERBC), which is intended to allow for a more rapid response to environmental problems and regulatory requirements. A major project, Closure and Post-Closure Activities (CAPCA) has been identified for ERBC funding to close the land disposal units in accordance with RCRA requirements. Establishing the project scope has required the development of a detailed set of assumptions and a confirmation program for each assumption. Other significant activities in the CAPCA project include risk assessments and the preparation of an integrated project schedule

  17. The Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories contingency plan -a brief description

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, J.M.

    1982-01-01

    A brief description of the contingency plan which deals with both the on-site and off-site consequences of a serious nuclear accident is given. The off-site consequences of different size releases and the subsequent action taken by employees, radiation protection experts, municipal, Provincial and Federal authorities is described and the interaction of the various groups is discussed. (author)

  18. Transuranic Storage Area (TSA)-3 container storage unit RCRA closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barry, G.A.; Lodman, D.L.; Spry, M.J.; Poor, K.J.

    1992-11-01

    This document describes the proposed plan for closure of the Transuranic Storage Area (TSA)-3 container storage unit at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure requirements. The location, size, capacity, history, and current status of the unit are described. The unit will be closed by decontaminating structures and equipment that may have contacted waste. Sufficient sampling and documentation of all activities will be performed to demonstrate clean closure. A tentative schedule is provided in the form of a milestone chart

  19. Contingency Contractor Optimization Phase 3 Sustainment Software Design Document - Contingency Contractor Optimization Tool - Prototype

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durfee, Justin David; Frazier, Christopher Rawls; Bandlow, Alisa; Jones, Katherine A

    2016-05-01

    This document describes the final software design of the Contingency Contractor Optimization Tool - Prototype. Its purpose is to provide the overall architecture of the software and the logic behind this architecture. Documentation for the individual classes is provided in the application Javadoc. The Contingency Contractor Optimization project is intended to address Department of Defense mandates by delivering a centralized strategic planning tool that allows senior decision makers to quickly and accurately assess the impacts, risks, and mitigation strategies associated with utilizing contract support. The Contingency Contractor Optimization Tool - Prototype was developed in Phase 3 of the OSD ATL Contingency Contractor Optimization project to support strategic planning for contingency contractors. The planning tool uses a model to optimize the Total Force mix by minimizing the combined total costs for selected mission scenarios. The model optimizes the match of personnel types (military, DoD civilian, and contractors) and capabilities to meet mission requirements as effectively as possible, based on risk, cost, and other requirements.

  20. HWMA/RCRA Closure Plan for the Basin Facility Basin Water Treatment System - Voluntary Consent Order NEW-CPP-016 Action Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, S. K.

    2007-01-01

    This Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure plan for the Basin Water Treatment System located in the Basin Facility (CPP-603), Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC), Idaho National Laboratory Site, was developed to meet future milestones established under the Voluntary Consent Order. The system to be closed includes units and associated ancillary equipment included in the Voluntary Consent Order NEW-CPP-016 Action Plan and Voluntary Consent Order SITE-TANK-005 Tank Systems INTEC-077 and INTEC-078 that were determined to have managed hazardous waste. The Basin Water Treatment System will be closed in accordance with the requirements of the Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as implemented by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 58.01.05.009 and 40 Code of Federal Regulations 265, to achieve 'clean closure' of the tank system. This closure plan presents the closure performance standards and methods of achieving those standards for the Basin Water Treatment Systems

  1. HWMA/RCRA Closure Plan for the Basin Facility Basin Water Treatment System - Voluntary Consent Order NEW-CPP-016 Action Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Evans, S. K.

    2007-11-07

    This Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure plan for the Basin Water Treatment System located in the Basin Facility (CPP-603), Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC), Idaho National Laboratory Site, was developed to meet future milestones established under the Voluntary Consent Order. The system to be closed includes units and associated ancillary equipment included in the Voluntary Consent Order NEW-CPP-016 Action Plan and Voluntary Consent Order SITE-TANK-005 Tank Systems INTEC-077 and INTEC-078 that were determined to have managed hazardous waste. The Basin Water Treatment System will be closed in accordance with the requirements of the Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as implemented by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 58.01.05.009 and 40 Code of Federal Regulations 265, to achieve "clean closure" of the tank system. This closure plan presents the closure performance standards and methods of achieving those standards for the Basin Water Treatment Systems.

  2. Failure of post-natal ductus arteriosus closure in prostaglandin transporter-deficient mice

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chang, Hee-Yoon; Locker, Joseph; Lu, Run; Schuster, Victor L.

    2010-01-01

    Background Prostaglandin E2 (PGE2) plays a major role both in maintaining patency of the fetal ductus arteriosus (DA) and in closure of the DA after birth. The rate- limiting step in PGE2 signal termination is PGE2 uptake by the transporter PGT. Methods and results To determine the role of PGT in DA closure, we used a gene-targeting strategy to produce mice in which PGT exon 1 was flanked by loxP sites. Successful targeting was obtained since neither mice hypomorphic at the PGT allele (PGT Neo/Neo) nor global PGT knockout mice (PGT −/−) exhibited PGT protein expression; moreover, embryonic fibroblasts isolated from targeted mice failed to exhibit carrier-mediated PGE2 uptake. Although born in a normal Mendelian ratio, no PGT −/− mice survived past post-natal day 1, and no PGT Neo/Neo mice survived past post-natal day 2. Necropsy revealed patent DA with normal intimal thickening but with dilated cardiac chambers. Both PGT Neo/Neo and PGT −/− mice could be rescued through the post-natal period by giving the mother indomethacin before birth. Rescued mice grew normally and had no abnormalities by gross and microscopic post-mortem analysis. In accord with PGT’s known role in metabolizing PGE2, rescued adult PGT −/− mice had lower plasma PGE2 metabolite levels, and higher urinary PGE2 excretion rates, than wild type mice. Conclusions PGT plays a critical role in closure of the DA after birth by ensuring a reduction in local and/or circulating PGE2 concentrations. PMID:20083684

  3. RIP Input Tables From WAPDEG for LA Design Selection: Continuous Post-Closure Ventilation Design- Open Loop

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K.G. Mon; P.K. Mast; R. Howard; J.H. Lee

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this calculation is to document (1) the Waste Package Degradation (WAPDEG) version 3.09 (CRWMS M and O 1998b). Software Routine Report for WAPDEG (Version 3.09) simulations used to analyze waste package degradation and failure under the repository exposure conditions characterized by the open loop option of the post-closure ventilation design and, (2) post-processing of these results into tables of waste package degradation time histories suitable for use as input into the Integrated Probabilistic Simulator for Environmental Systems version 5.19.0 1 (RIP) computer program (Golder Associates 1998). Specifically, the WAPDEG simulations discussed in this calculation correspond to waste package emplacement conditions (repository environment and design) defined in the Total System Performance Assessment-Viability Assessment (TSPA-VA), with the exception that the open loop option of the post-closure ventilation License Application Design Selection (LADS) Design Alternative (Design Alternative 3b) was analyzed. The open loop post-closure ventilation design alternative, under which airways to the surface remain open after repository closure, could result in substantial cooling and drying of the potential repository. In open loop post-closure ventilation, expanded air heated by waste decay would move up an exhaust shaft, pulling denser, cooler air into the repository through intake shafts. The exchange of air with the atmosphere could remove more heat and moisture. As a result of the enhanced ventilation relative to the TSPA-VA base-case design, different temperature and relative humidity time histories at the waste package surface are calculated (input to the WAPDEG simulations), and consequently different waste package failure histories (as calculated by WAPDEG) result

  4. Management of construction cost contingency covering upside and downside risks

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ibrahim Adel Eldosouky

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available Many contractors are of the opinion that adding contingency funds to the tender price of a project may lead to loss of the tender. This research is a trial to put an end to this incorrect opinion. A more mature attitude to risk would recognize that contingency exists to be spent in order to avoid or minimize threats and to exploit or maximize opportunities. This research proposes an approach for determination and monitoring of Cost Contingency Reserve (CCR for a project. Control of CCR is interfaced with Earned Value Management. Application to a real project is carried out. Post-mitigation simulations show that value of CCR is 2.88% of project cost but there is a potential saving due to opportunities. The project is monitored after eight months from its assumed start date with one assumed emergent risk. The final results are as follows: CCR is enough to cover project current and residual threats and the contractor has a considerable amount of money that will be transferred to his margin at project closure assuming the project will not be exposed to additional emergent risks. A contractor can balance project upside risks and its downsides to increase his chance to win tender of the project.

  5. The ex post use of formal contracts in high-tech alliances. A contingency perspective

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Jong, G. de; Klein Woolthuis, R.J.A.

    2010-01-01

    In this study we investigate key contingencies that determine the active use of a formal contract after the strategic alliance has started. The antecedents for this ex post contract use address the contracting process, the need to safeguard spill-over risks and the existence of trust. The model is

  6. 216-A-36B Crib supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE/RL-93-75)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingle, S.J.

    1996-05-01

    This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the 216-A-36B Crib and is intended to be used as a supplement to DOE/RL-93-75, Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE-RL 1993). This unit-specific plan is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements of the Washington Administrative Code, Chapter 173- 303 for certain Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 waste management units. The 216-A-36B Crib is a landfill that received ammonia scrubber waste from the 202-A Building (Plutonium/Uranium Extraction Plant) between 1966 and 1972. In 1982, the unit was reactivated to receive additional waste from Plutonium/Uranium Extraction operations. Discharges ceased in 1987, and the crib will be closed under final facility standards. Because the crib is not receiving discharges, waste management activities are no longer required. The crib does not present a significant hazard to adjacent units, personnel, or the environment. There is little likelihood that any incidents presenting hazards to public health or the environment would occur at the 216-A-36B Crib

  7. HWMA/RCRA Closure Plan for the TRA Fluorinel Dissolution Process Mockup and Gamma Facilities Waste System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    K. Winterholler

    2007-01-01

    This Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure plan was developed for the Test Reactor Area Fluorinel Dissolution Process Mockup and Gamma Facilities Waste System, located in Building TRA-641 at the Reactor Technology Complex (RTC), Idaho National Laboratory Site, to meet a further milestone established under the Voluntary Consent Order SITE-TANK-005 Action Plan for Tank System TRA-009. The tank system to be closed is identified as VCO-SITE-TANK-005 Tank System TRA-009. This closure plan presents the closure performance standards and methods for achieving those standards

  8. Post-closure permit application for the Chestnut Ridge Sediment Disposal Basin at the Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greer, J.K. Jr.; Kimbrough, C.W.

    1989-01-01

    This report contains information related to the closure and post closure of the Chestnut Ridge Sediment Disposal Basin of the Y-12 plant. Information concerning the background of the basin, geology, hydrology, and analysis of the sediments is included

  9. United Kingdom. Development plan for the eventual closure of the UK Drigg nuclear surface low level waste disposal facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The Drigg site, owned and operated by BNFL, is the UK's principal site for the disposal of low level radioactive waste. The site has operated since 1959 and receives wastes from a wide range of sources including nuclear power stations, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, isotope manufacturing sites, universities, general industry and cleanup of historically contaminated sites. Disposals until the late 1980s were solely by tipping essentially loose wastes into excavated trenches. More recently, trench disposals have been phased out in preference to emplacement of containerised, conditioned wastes in concrete vaults. The standardised wasteform consists of high force compacted (or non-compactable) waste immobilised within 20 m 3 steel overpack containers by the addition of cementitious grout. Larger items of wastes are grouted directly, in situ in the vault. The disposal trenches have been completed with an interim cap, as will the vaults when filled. It is currently estimated that sufficient capacity remains at Drigg for disposals to continue until at least 2050. Post-operations it is planned that the site will enter a phase including shut down of operational facilities, emplacement of long term site closure features including a final closure cap and then to an institutional management phase. Planning has therefore been carried out as to the strategy for eventual closure of the site. This closure strategy is also underpinned by an engineering evaluation studies programme to develop and evaluate appropriate closure measures including assessment of the long term performance of such measures. This appendix summarizes some of this work

  10. 300 Area waste acid treatment system closure plan. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-03-01

    This section provides a description of the Hanford Site, identifies the proposed method of 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System (WATS) closure, and briefly summarizes the contents of each chapter of this plan

  11. 300 Area waste acid treatment system closure plan. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1996-03-01

    This section provides a description of the Hanford Site, identifies the proposed method of 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System (WATS) closure, and briefly summarizes the contents of each chapter of this plan.

  12. Considerations for closure of low-level radioactive waste engineered disposal facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    Proper stabilization and closure of low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities require detailed planning during the early stages of facility development. This report provides considerations for host States, compact regions, and unaffiliated States on stabilization and closure of engineered low-level radioactive waste and mixed waste disposal facilities. A time line for planning closure activities, which identifies closure considerations to be addressed during various stages of a facility's development, is presented. Current Federal regulatory requirements and guidance for closure and post-closure are outlined. Significant differences between host State and Federal closure requirements are identified. Design features used as stabilization measures that support closure, such as waste forms and containers, backfill materials, engineered barrier systems, and site drainage systems, are described. These design features are identified and evaluated in terms of how they promote long-term site stability by minimizing water infiltration, controlling subsidence and surface erosion, and deterring intrusion. Design and construction features critical to successful closure are presented for covers and site drainage. General considerations for stabilization and closure operations are introduced. The role of performance and environmental monitoring during closure is described

  13. NEA perspectives on timescales and criteria in post-closure safety of geological disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preter, P. de; Smith, P.; Pescatore, C.; Forinash, B.

    2006-01-01

    A key challenge in the development of safety cases for geological repositories is associated with the long periods of time over which radioactive wastes that are disposed of in repositories remain hazardous. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has recently examined issues related to timescales in the context of two projects under the auspices of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC): the Timescales Initiative and the Long-Term Safety Criteria (LTSC) Initiative. These projects examine, respectively, the treatment of timescales in actual safety cases and in the development of radiological protection criteria for geological disposal. They treat different aspects of timescales but have some overlap and have shown some convergence of the results achieved to date. Based on these projects, this paper examines general considerations in the handling of timescales, including ethical principles, evolution of the hazards of radioactive waste over time, and uncertainty in the evolution of repository systems (including geological features). The implications of these considerations are examined in terms of repository siting; levels of protection in regulations; planning for pre-closure and post-closure actions; and development and presentation of safety cases. A comparison is made with previous NEA work related to timescales, in order to show evolutions in current understanding. (authors)

  14. NEA perspectives on timescales and criteria in post-closure safety of geological disposal

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Preter, P. de [ONDRAF/NIRAS, Brussels (Belgium); Smith, P. [Safety Assessment Management Ltd, SAM Ltd. (United Kingdom); Pescatore, C.; Forinash, B. [OECD/NEA, Nuclear Energy Agency, 92 - Issy les Moulineaux (France)

    2006-07-01

    A key challenge in the development of safety cases for geological repositories is associated with the long periods of time over which radioactive wastes that are disposed of in repositories remain hazardous. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has recently examined issues related to timescales in the context of two projects under the auspices of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC): the Timescales Initiative and the Long-Term Safety Criteria (LTSC) Initiative. These projects examine, respectively, the treatment of timescales in actual safety cases and in the development of radiological protection criteria for geological disposal. They treat different aspects of timescales but have some overlap and have shown some convergence of the results achieved to date. Based on these projects, this paper examines general considerations in the handling of timescales, including ethical principles, evolution of the hazards of radioactive waste over time, and uncertainty in the evolution of repository systems (including geological features). The implications of these considerations are examined in terms of repository siting; levels of protection in regulations; planning for pre-closure and post-closure actions; and development and presentation of safety cases. A comparison is made with previous NEA work related to timescales, in order to show evolutions in current understanding. (authors)

  15. The 300 area waste acid treatment system closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luke, S.N.

    1996-01-01

    The 300 Area Waste Acid Treatment System (WATS) is located within operable units 300-FF-2 (source) and 300-FF-5 (groundwater), as designated in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) . Operable units 300-FF-2 and 300-FF-5 are scheduled to be remediated using the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) process. Thus, any remediation of the 300 Area WATS with respect to contaminants not produced by those facilities and soils and groundwater will be deferred to the CERCLA RI/FS process. Final closure activities will be completed in 3 phases and certified in accordance with the 300 Area WATS closure plan by the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It is anticipated that the 300 Area WATS closure would take 2 years to complete

  16. Calculation of Post-Closure Natural Convection Heat and Mass Transfer in Yucca Mountain Drifts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Webb, S.; Itamura, M.

    2004-01-01

    Natural convection heat and mass transfer under post-closure conditions has been calculated for Yucca Mountain drifts using the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code FLUENT. Calculations have been performed for 300, 1000, 3000, and 10,000 years after repository closure. Effective dispersion coefficients that can be used to calculate mass transfer in the drift have been evaluated as a function of time and boundary temperature tilt

  17. Making the post-closure safety case for the proposed yucca mountain repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swift, P.; Van Luik, A.

    2008-01-01

    This presentation provided an overview of the Yucca Mountain repository post-closure safety case. The safety case concept is being integrated into the license application being prepared for Yucca Mountain, by giving particularly close attention to the treatment of uncertainties, thereby bringing available lines of evidence into the supporting information, as appropriate, to build a comprehensive argument for safety and regulatory compliance. For Yucca Mountain, it is expected that there will be open questions in the safety case to be presented to the regulator and a programme will be outlined on what information is to be gathered (and how) prior to the next iteration in the licensing process to address such open issues. A one-hundred year operational phase is foreseen and planned, and the changes in knowledge and approaches that occur over time will have to be accommodated through the formal licensing process. (authors)

  18. Soil sampling and analysis plan for the 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility closure activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sonnichsen, J.C.

    1997-05-01

    Amendment V.13.B.b to the approved closure plan (DOE-RL 1995a) requires that a soil sampling and analysis plan be prepared and submitted to the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) for review and approval. Amendment V.13.B.c requires that a diagram of the 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility unit (the treatment, storage, and disposal [TSD] unit) boundary that is to be closed, including the maximum extent of operation, be prepared and submitted as part is of the soil sampling and analysis plan. This document describes the sampling and analysis that is to be performed in response to these requirements and amends the closure plan. Specifically, this document supersedes Section 6.2, lines 43--46, and Section 7.3.6 of the closure plan. Results from the analysis will be compared to cleanup levels identified in the closure plan. These cleanup levels will be established using residential exposure assumptions in accordance with the Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) Cleanup Regulation (Washington Administrative Code [WAC] 173-340) as required in Amendment V.13.B.I. Results of all sampling, including the raw analytical data, a summary of analytical results, a data validation package, and a narrative summary with conclusions will be provided to Ecology as specified in Amendment V.13.B.e. The results and process used to collect and analyze the soil samples will be certified by a licensed professional engineer. These results and a certificate of closure for the balance of the TSD unit, as outlined in Chapter 7.0 of the approved closure plan (storage shed, concrete pad, burn building, scrubber, and reaction tanks), will provide the basis for a closure determination.

  19. Soil sampling and analysis plan for the 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility closure activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnichsen, J.C.

    1997-01-01

    Amendment V.13.B.b to the approved closure plan (DOE-RL 1995a) requires that a soil sampling and analysis plan be prepared and submitted to the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) for review and approval. Amendment V.13.B.c requires that a diagram of the 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility unit (the treatment, storage, and disposal [TSD] unit) boundary that is to be closed, including the maximum extent of operation, be prepared and submitted as part is of the soil sampling and analysis plan. This document describes the sampling and analysis that is to be performed in response to these requirements and amends the closure plan. Specifically, this document supersedes Section 6.2, lines 43--46, and Section 7.3.6 of the closure plan. Results from the analysis will be compared to cleanup levels identified in the closure plan. These cleanup levels will be established using residential exposure assumptions in accordance with the Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) Cleanup Regulation (Washington Administrative Code [WAC] 173-340) as required in Amendment V.13.B.I. Results of all sampling, including the raw analytical data, a summary of analytical results, a data validation package, and a narrative summary with conclusions will be provided to Ecology as specified in Amendment V.13.B.e. The results and process used to collect and analyze the soil samples will be certified by a licensed professional engineer. These results and a certificate of closure for the balance of the TSD unit, as outlined in Chapter 7.0 of the approved closure plan (storage shed, concrete pad, burn building, scrubber, and reaction tanks), will provide the basis for a closure determination

  20. Post-closure radiation dose assessment for Yucca Mountain repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jia Mingyan; Zhang Xiabin; Yang Chuncai

    2006-01-01

    A brief introduction of post-closure long-term radiation safety assessment results was represented for the yucca mountain high-level waste geographic disposal repository. In 1 million years after repository closure, for the higher temperature repository operating mode, the peak annual dose would be 150 millirem (120 millirem under the lower-temperature operating mode) to a reasonably maximally exposed individual approximately 18 kilometers (11 miles) from the repository. The analysis of a drilling intrusion event occurring at 30,000 years indicated a peak of the mean annual dose to the reasonably maximally exposed individual approximately 18 kilometers (11 miles) downstream of the repository would be 0.002 millirem. The analysis of an igneous activity scenario, including a volcanic eruption event and igneous intrusion event indicated a peak of the mean annual dose to the reasonably maximally exposed individual approximately 18 kilometers downstream of the repository would be 0.1 millirem. (authors)

  1. Proposed modifications to the RCRA post-closure permit for the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime at the U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-05-01

    This report presents proposed modifications to several conditions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Post-Closure Permit (PCP) for the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (CRHR) (permit number TNHW-088, EPA ID No. TN3 89 009 0001). These permit conditions define the requirements for RCRA post-closure detection groundwater monitoring at the Chestnut Ridge Sediment Disposal Basin (CRSDB) and Kerr Hollow Quarry (KHQ), and RCRA post-closure corrective action groundwater monitoring at the Chestnut Ridge Security Pits (CRSPs). Modification of these PCP conditions is requested to: (1) clarify the planned integration of RCRA post-closure corrective action groundwater monitoring at the CRSPs with the monitoring program to be established in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) record of decision (ROD), (2) revise several of the current technical requirements for groundwater monitoring based on implementation of the RCRA monitoring programs during 1996, (3) replace several of the technical procedures included in the PCP with updated versions recently issued by the Y-12 Plant Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP), and (4) correct inaccurate regulatory citations and references to permit conditions and permit attachments. With these modifications, the Y- 12 Plant will continue to meet the full intent of all regulatory obligations for post-closure care of these facilities. Section 2 provides the technical justification for each proposed permit modification. Section 3.0 contains proposed changes to Section II of the PCP. Modifications to site-specific permit conditions are presented in Section 4.0 (CRSDB), Section 5.0 (CRSPs), and Section 6.0 (KHQ). Sections 7.0 and 8.0 reference updated and revised procedures for groundwater sampling, and monitoring well plugging and abandonment, respectively. Appendix A includes all proposed revisions to the permit attachments

  2. Proposed modifications to the RCRA post-closure permit for the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime at the U.S. Department of Energy Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-05-01

    This report presents proposed modifications to several conditions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Post-Closure Permit (PCP) for the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (CRHR) (permit number TNHW-088, EPA ID No. TN3 89 009 0001). These permit conditions define the requirements for RCRA post-closure detection groundwater monitoring at the Chestnut Ridge Sediment Disposal Basin (CRSDB) and Kerr Hollow Quarry (KHQ), and RCRA post-closure corrective action groundwater monitoring at the Chestnut Ridge Security Pits (CRSPs). Modification of these PCP conditions is requested to: (1) clarify the planned integration of RCRA post-closure corrective action groundwater monitoring at the CRSPs with the monitoring program to be established in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) record of decision (ROD), (2) revise several of the current technical requirements for groundwater monitoring based on implementation of the RCRA monitoring programs during 1996, (3) replace several of the technical procedures included in the PCP with updated versions recently issued by the Y-12 Plant Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP), and (4) correct inaccurate regulatory citations and references to permit conditions and permit attachments. With these modifications, the Y- 12 Plant will continue to meet the full intent of all regulatory obligations for post-closure care of these facilities. Section 2 provides the technical justification for each proposed permit modification. Section 3.0 contains proposed changes to Section II of the PCP. Modifications to site-specific permit conditions are presented in Section 4.0 (CRSDB), Section 5.0 (CRSPs), and Section 6.0 (KHQ). Sections 7.0 and 8.0 reference updated and revised procedures for groundwater sampling, and monitoring well plugging and abandonment, respectively. Appendix A includes all proposed revisions to the permit attachments.

  3. Closure plan for the M-Area settling basin and vicinity at the Savannah River Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Colven, W.P.; Pickett, J.B.; Muska, C.F.; Boone, L.F.

    1988-03-01

    The closure plan for the M-Area settling basin and vicinity was originally submitted to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management in September 1984. The plan was revised in July and November 1985 in response to SCDHEC comments. After public comment in April through July 1986, the closure plan was conditionally approved by SCDHEC in March 1987. The conditions included (1) providing a temporary wastewater treatment facility to process the water remaining in the basin, (2) using a burn box to limit ash emissions from burning in the basin, (3) obtaining SCDHEC approval prior to operating the leach field, and (4) completing all closure activities within three years of the startup date

  4. 76 FR 56362 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-13

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List AGENCY: Environmental... protection, Air pollution control, Chemicals, Hazardous Waste, Hazardous substances, Intergovernmental... processing the deletion notice. The online Federal Document Management System (FDMS) did not include required...

  5. Annual report, RCRA post-closure monitoring and inspections for the mercury landfill hazardous waste trenches for the period October 1995--October 1996

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Emer, D.F.; Smith, J.L.

    1997-01-01

    The Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches were closed in-place in September 1993. Post-closure monitoring of the Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches began in October 1993. The post-closure monitoring program is used to verify that the Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trench covers are performing properly, and that there is no water infiltrating into the waste trenches. The performance of the Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches is currently monitored using 30 neutron access tubes positioned on and along the margins of the covers. Soil moisture measurements are obtained in the soils directly beneath the trenches and compared to baseline conditions from the first year of post-closure operation. This report documents the post-closure activities between October 1995 and October 1996.

  6. Annual report, RCRA post-closure monitoring and inspections for the mercury landfill hazardous waste trenches for the period October 1995--October 1996

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Emer, D.F.; Smith, J.L.

    1997-01-01

    The Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches were closed in-place in September 1993. Post-closure monitoring of the Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches began in October 1993. The post-closure monitoring program is used to verify that the Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trench covers are performing properly, and that there is no water infiltrating into the waste trenches. The performance of the Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches is currently monitored using 30 neutron access tubes positioned on and along the margins of the covers. Soil moisture measurements are obtained in the soils directly beneath the trenches and compared to baseline conditions from the first year of post-closure operation. This report documents the post-closure activities between October 1995 and October 1996

  7. 76 FR 56294 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-13

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan National Priorities List AGENCY: Environmental... pollution control, Chemicals, Hazardous Waste, Hazardous substances, Intergovernmental relations, Penalties... error in processing the direct- final rule. The online Federal Document Management System (FDMS) did not...

  8. Novi Han Radioactive Waste Repository post-closure safety assessment, ver.2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mateeva, M.

    2003-01-01

    The methodology for the post-closure safety assessment is presented. The assessment context includes regulatory framework (protection principles); scope and time frame; radiological and technical requirements; modeling etc. The description of the Novi Han disposal system contains site location. meteorological, hydrological and seismological characteristics; waste and repository description and human activities characteristics. The next step in the methodology is scenario development and justification. The systematic generation os exposure scenarios is considered as central to the post-closure safety assessment. The most important requirements for the systematic scenario generation approach are: transparency, comprehensiveness (all possible FEPs influencing the the disposal system and the radionuclide release should be considered); relevant future evolutions; identification of critical issues and investigation of the robustness of the system. For the source-pathway-receptor analysis the Process System is divided into near-field, geosphere/atmosphere and biosphere, describing the key facets controlling the potential radionuclide migration to the environment. The schematic division of the Novi Han near-field Process System into lower-level conceptual features is presented and discussed. As a result of the examinations of the FEPs three classes of scenarios are identified for the Novi Han post-closure safety assessment: Environmental evolution scenarios (geological change and climate change); future human action scenarios (human intrusion and archaeological action); Scenarios with very low probability (terrorism, crashes, explosions). The safety assessment iteration leads to identification of a modern scenario generation approach, assessment of key radionuclide releases, geological and hydrological evaluation, identification of the key parameters from sensitivity analysis etc. Examples of conceptual models are given. For the mathematical modeling the AMBER code is used

  9. Barriers and post-closure monitoring (AL121125)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bostick, K.V.; Janecky, D.

    1995-01-01

    This project focuses on the rapid implementation of near-surface barriers, biotreatment, and post-closure monitoring technology. It uses water-permeable and biologic barriers that chemically capture and/or degrade contaminants without significantly altering the natural water flow regime. Barrier approaches are being tested for two different applications. The first is the use of barriers for confinement of chemical contaminants for in-trench treatments with leach systems or an in-place bioreactor. The second is an enhancement of the current practice of emplacing grout or clay slurry walls into direct horizontal surface and subsurface water flows around a contaminated area by integrating permeable reactive barriers and petroleum reservoir gel/foam/polymer technology

  10. 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-11-01

    The Hanford Site, located northwest of the city of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials, as well as for activities associated with nuclear energy development. The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. The 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility (3718-F Facility), located in the 300 Area, was used to store and treat alkali metal wastes. Therefore, it is subject to the regulatory requirements for the storage and treatment of dangerous wastes. Closure will be conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 (Ecology 1989) and 40 CFR 270.1. Closure also will satisfy the thermal treatment facility closure requirements of 40 CFR 265.381. This closure plan presents a description of the 3718-F Facility, the history of wastes managed, and the approach that will be followed to close the facility. Only hazardous constituents derived from 3718-F Facility operations will be addressed

  11. 2727-S Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Storage Facility Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilczek, T.A.; Laws, J.R.; Izatt, R.D.

    1992-01-01

    This closure plan describes the activities for final closure of the 2727-S Nonradioactive Dangerous Waste Storage (NRDWS) Facility at the Hanford Site. The 2727-S NRDWS Facility provided container storage for nonradioactive dangerous and extremely hazardous wastes generated in the research and development laboratories, process operations, and maintenance and transportation functions throughout the Hanford Site. Storage operations began at the 2727-S NRDWS Facility March 14, 1983, and continued until December 30, 1986, when the last shipment of materials from the facility took place. These storage operations have been moved to the new 616 NRDWS Facility, which is an interim status unit located between the 200 East and 200 West Areas of the Hanford Site

  12. Performance Assessment of a Post-Closure Pyrophoric Event

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duguid, J.O.; Senger, R.K.; Leem, J.

    2002-01-01

    This paper describes analyses of a potential post-closure pyrophoric event in a waste package containing uranium metal spent fuel. The analyses include temperature at adjacent waste packages caused by the event and the dose to humans due to the event. The thermal analyses show that the event would not be expected to damage the adjacent waste packages. The dose analyses show that the doses due to the event are small. These analyses provide support to screening arguments used to demonstrate that the pyrophoric event should not be considered in the total system performance assessment model

  13. 75 FR 44920 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-30

    ... State Registry of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites as a ``Class 2 Inactive Hazardous Waste Site..., Chemicals, Hazardous waste, Hazardous substances, Intergovernmental relations, Natural resources, Oil... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Deletion of the SMS...

  14. Genesis Contingency Planning and Mishap Recovery: The Sample Curation View

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stansbery, E. K.; Allton, J. H.; Allen, C. C.; McNamara, K. M.; Calaway, M.; Rodriques, M. C.

    2007-01-01

    Planning for sample preservation and curation was part of mission design from the beginning. One of the scientific objectives for Genesis included collecting samples of three regimes of the solar wind in addition to collecting bulk solar wind during the mission. Collectors were fabricated in different thicknesses for each regime of the solar wind and attached to separate frames exposed to the solar wind during specific periods of solar activity associated with each regime. The original plan to determine the solar regime sampled for specific collectors was to identify to which frame the collector was attached. However, the collectors were dislodged during the hard landing making identification by frame attachment impossible. Because regimes were also identified by thickness of the collector, the regime sampled is identified by measuring fragment thickness. A variety of collector materials and thin films applied to substrates were selected and qualified for flight. This diversity provided elemental measurement in more than one material, mitigating effects of diffusion rates and/or radiation damage. It also mitigated against different material and substrate strengths resulting in differing effects of the hard landing. For example, silicon crystal substrates broke into smaller fragments than sapphire-based substrates and diamond surfaces were more resilient to flying debris damage than gold. The primary responsibility of the curation team for recovery was process documentation. Contingency planning for the recovery phase expanded this responsibility to include not only equipment to document, but also gather, contain and identify samples from the landing area and the recovered spacecraft. The team developed contingency plans for various scenarios as part of mission planning that included topographic maps to aid in site recovery and identification of different modes of transport and purge capability depending on damage. A clean tent, set-up at Utah Test & Training Range

  15. Standard format and content for radiological contingency plans for fuel cycle and materials facilities. Regulatory report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-07-01

    This report is issued as guidance to those fuel cycle and major materials licensees who are required by the NRC to prepare and submit a radiological contingency plan. This Standard Format has been prepared to help assure uniformity and completeness in the preparation of those plans

  16. 76 FR 510 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-05

    ..., Intergovernmental relations, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Superfund, Water pollution control... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Partial Deletion of the... Site is located in Albuquerque, Bernalillo County, New Mexico. After this deletion, this 62 acres will...

  17. 76 FR 11350 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-02

    ..., Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Superfund, Water pollution control, Water supply. Dated: February... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Partial Deletion of the... Mexico, from the National Priorities List (NPL). The NPL, promulgated pursuant to section 105 of the...

  18. Closure plan for Corrective Action Unit 109: U-2bu subsidence crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    The U-2bu subsidence crater, Corrective Action Unit 109, will be closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection operational permit, and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The U-2bu subsidence crater is located in Area 2 of the Nevada Test Site. It was created in 1971 by an underground nuclear test with the name Miniata. The crater has a diameter of 288 meters (944 feet) and an approximate depth of 35 meters (115 feet). Based on the results of the analyses reported in the site characterization report, the only constituents of concern in the U-2bu subsidence crater include leachable lead and total petroleum hydrocarbons. Closure activities will include the excavation and disposal of impacted soil from the top of the crater. Upon completion of excavation, verification samples will be collected to show that the leachable lead has been removed to concentrations below the regulatory action level. After sample results show that the lead has been removed, the excavated area will be backfilled and a soil flood diversion berm will be constructed as a best management practice. An independent registered professional engineer will certify the site was closed following the approved Closure Plan. Post-closure care is not warranted for this site because closure activities will involve removal of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act constituents of concern

  19. Closure plan for Corrective Action Unit 109: U-2bu subsidence crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-03-01

    The U-2bu subsidence crater, Corrective Action Unit 109, will be closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection operational permit, and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. The U-2bu subsidence crater is located in Area 2 of the Nevada Test Site. It was created in 1971 by an underground nuclear test with the name Miniata. The crater has a diameter of 288 meters (944 feet) and an approximate depth of 35 meters (115 feet). Based on the results of the analyses reported in the site characterization report, the only constituents of concern in the U-2bu subsidence crater include leachable lead and total petroleum hydrocarbons. Closure activities will include the excavation and disposal of impacted soil from the top of the crater. Upon completion of excavation, verification samples will be collected to show that the leachable lead has been removed to concentrations below the regulatory action level. After sample results show that the lead has been removed, the excavated area will be backfilled and a soil flood diversion berm will be constructed as a best management practice. An independent registered professional engineer will certify the site was closed following the approved Closure Plan. Post-closure care is not warranted for this site because closure activities will involve removal of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act constituents of concern.

  20. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 90: Area 2 Bitcutter Containment, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment, is identified in the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' of 1996. The post-closure requirements for CAU 90 are described in Section VII.B.8.b of the Nevada Test Site ''Resource Conservation and Recovery Act'' Permit for a Hazardous Waste Management Facility Number NEV HW0021, dated November 2005. Post-closure activities consist of the following: Semiannual inspections of the site using inspection checklists; Photographic documentation; Field note documentation; and Preparation and submittal of an annual Post-Closure Inspection Report. This annual report covers the period of July 2006 to June 2007 and consists of a summary of the results of the inspections, copies of the inspection checklists and field notes, maintenance and repair records (if any), photographs, and conclusions and recommendations. The inspection checklists are provided in Appendix A, a copy of the field notes is provided in Appendix B, and copies of photographs taken during the inspections are provided in Appendix C

  1. Post-closure performance assessment treatment of the biosphere

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Broderick, M A [UK Nirex Ltd., Harwell, Oxfordshire (United Kingdom); Egan, M J [AEA Technology, Risley, Cheshire (United Kingdom); Thorne, M C [Electrowatt, Horsham, Sussex (United Kingdom); Williams, J A [AEA Technology, Risley, Cheshire (United Kingdom)

    1996-07-01

    The Nirex strategy for radioactive waste disposal is based on a system of engineered and natural barriers, providing long-term isolation of the waste from those parts of the environment that are in contact with or readily available for use by humans (i.e. the biosphere). Even so, there remains the possibility that, on a timescale of thousands to tens of thousands of years, small quantities of poorly-sorbed, long-lived radionuclides may be released from the engineered disposal system, ultimately to emerge into the biosphere. Biosphere models are used in post-closure performance assessments to quantify the competing effects of dilution and accumulation processes on radionuclide concentrations in the accessible environment. Understanding biosphere processes and their time dependence is necessary not only to determine the radiological impact of possible future releases, but also to characterise the dynamics of transport in groundwater and the location, duration and extent of any such releases. Nirex is developing a new biosphere model for use in post-closure radiological assessments for the proposed Sellafield repository. A compartment modelling approach has been adopted, as in studies performed previously, but the system will be dynamic, allowing changes with time in both the properties of compartments and the transfers between compartments. The transport model considers both mass transport within the biosphere and the migration of radionuclides, thereby ensuring that a self-consistent description of the biosphere, in a spatially-extensive domain is maintained. The above approach is designed to link the assessment models used by the Nirex assessment team more closely into the Nirex biosphere research programme than has hitherto been possible with time-invariant assessment models. (author)

  2. Post-closure performance assessment treatment of the biosphere

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broderick, M.A.; Egan, M.J.; Thorne, M.C.; Williams, J.A.

    1996-01-01

    The Nirex strategy for radioactive waste disposal is based on a system of engineered and natural barriers, providing long-term isolation of the waste from those parts of the environment that are in contact with or readily available for use by humans (i.e. the biosphere). Even so, there remains the possibility that, on a timescale of thousands to tens of thousands of years, small quantities of poorly-sorbed, long-lived radionuclides may be released from the engineered disposal system, ultimately to emerge into the biosphere. Biosphere models are used in post-closure performance assessments to quantify the competing effects of dilution and accumulation processes on radionuclide concentrations in the accessible environment. Understanding biosphere processes and their time dependence is necessary not only to determine the radiological impact of possible future releases, but also to characterise the dynamics of transport in groundwater and the location, duration and extent of any such releases. Nirex is developing a new biosphere model for use in post-closure radiological assessments for the proposed Sellafield repository. A compartment modelling approach has been adopted, as in studies performed previously, but the system will be dynamic, allowing changes with time in both the properties of compartments and the transfers between compartments. The transport model considers both mass transport within the biosphere and the migration of radionuclides, thereby ensuring that a self-consistent description of the biosphere, in a spatially-extensive domain is maintained. The above approach is designed to link the assessment models used by the Nirex assessment team more closely into the Nirex biosphere research programme than has hitherto been possible with time-invariant assessment models. (author)

  3. 77 FR 31215 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-05-25

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Partial Deletion of the... the surface soil, unsaturated subsurface soil, surface water and sediments of Operable Unit (OU) 1...: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 8 announces the deletion of Operable Unit (OU) 1--the...

  4. POST-CLOSURE INSPECTION REPORT FOR THE TONOPAH TEST RANGE, NEVADA FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2005

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-06-01

    This post-closure inspection report includes the results of inspections, maintenance and repair activities, and conclusions and recommendations for Calendar Year 2005 for nine Corrective Action Units located on the Tonopah Test Range , Nevada.

  5. 77 FR 60319 - Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Plan; Coastal Gulf of Maine Closure Area Established With a...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-03

    ...-XC099 Harbor Porpoise Take Reduction Plan; Coastal Gulf of Maine Closure Area Established With a... Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce. ACTION: Establishment of the Coastal Gulf of Maine Closure Area... Service (NMFS) announces the establishment of the Coastal Gulf of Maine Closure Area under the Harbor...

  6. 75 FR 55479 - National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-13

    ... and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; National Priorities List: Partial Deletion of the... . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The portion of the site to be deleted from the NPL is the surface media (soil... further actions. List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 300 Environmental protection, Air pollution control...

  7. Oil spill contingency planning in the Ivory coast

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bender, K.; Jensen, S.K.; Ostergaerd, J.; Nogbou, P.

    1993-01-01

    The administrative center in charge of handling oil spill pollution situations on the Ivory Coast, West Africa, is named Centre Ivoirien Antipollution (CIAPOL). Its organizational structure has been reshuffled recently. CIAPOL now has three divisions: a laboratory division, a division for cleaning up oil and chemical pollution at sea, and an administrative division. The risk for oil pollution is known: within the past ten years five spills have been reported. All of these have been connected to operations relating to the refinery in Abidjan. More than 2,000 ships call at the port of Abidjan every year. Minor oil slicks are found almost permanently in the harbor and the lagoons around the harbor. Lumps of tar are rather common on the beaches all along the country's coast. This paper focuses on the background investigation in sensitive areas and risk analysis that led to a revision of the oil spill contingency plan, Plan Pollumar, and the recent purchase of oil spill cleanup equipment. The creation of a regional oil pollution response center at CIAPOL for all of the countries in West Africa, is proposed

  8. 303-K Radioactive Mixed-Waste Storage Facility closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-11-01

    The Hanford Site, located northwest of Richland, Washington, houses reactors chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production o special nuclear materials. The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. The 303-K Radioactive Mixed-Waste Storage Facility (303-K Facility) has been used since 1943 to store various radioactive,and dangerous process materials and wastes generated by the fuel manufacturing processes in the 300 Area. The mixed wastes are stored in US Department of Transportation (DOT)-specification containers (DOT 1988). The north end of the building was used for storage of containers of liquid waste and the outside storage areas were used for containers of solid waste. Because only the north end of the building was used, this plan does not include the southern end of the building. This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of materials and wastes managed, and a description of the procedures that will be followed to chose the 303-K Facility as a greater than 90-day storage facility. The strategy for closure of the 303-K Facility is presented in Chapter 6.0

  9. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 90: Area 2 Bitcutter Containment, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2008-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment, is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996, as amended February 2008. The post-closure requirements for CAU 90 are described in Section VII.B.8.b of the Nevada Test Site Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit for a Hazardous Waste Management Facility Number NEV HW0021, dated November 2005. Post-closure activities consist of the following: (1) Semiannual inspections of the site using inspection checklists; (2) Photographic documentation; (3) Field note documentation; and (4) Preparation and submittal of an annual Post-Closure Inspection Report. This annual report covers the period of July 2007 to June 2008 and consists of a summary of the results of the inspections, copies of the inspection checklists and field notes, maintenance and repair records (if any), photographs, and conclusions and recommendations. The inspection checklists are provided in Appendix A, a copy of the field notes is provided in Appendix B, and copies of photographs taken during the inspections are provided in Appendix C

  10. Study of the Model of Activating Contingency Plans within Disruptive Incidents by Stages%突发事件下分阶段启动应急预案模型研究

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    于辉; 江智慧

    2011-01-01

    经前期处置下,研究管理者面对突发事件应该何时启动前期处置方案和应急预案的问题.在完全没有突发事件持续时阎信息的条件下,利用局内决策理论与方法构建了企业何时启动前期处置方案和应急预案的分阶段启动模型,并利用"竞争比"说明该方案的有效性.在此基础上,进一步通过数值分析表明分阶段启动应急预案的重要意义.%The increased number of natural disasters has disrupted social and economic progress. Minimizing the impact of these disasters can bring stability to society. Emergency response systems have played an important role in achieving this goal. Since the "SARS" crisis in the year 2003, China has begun to focus on building emergency response systems. A national contingency plan system was established in 2004 according to the "Classification" rule. China initially formed a main emergency plan system,constituted by national overall emergency response plans, specific contingency plans, department emergency plans, local emergency plans, and contingency plans for enterprises with large-scale activities.Existing literature has focused on the importance of contingency plans, the assessment of contingency plans, and approaches to improving emergency preparedness. Few studies have addressed problems associated with the activation of contingency plans when the public administration is disrupted by natural disasters. This paper investigates how managers activate contingency plans at the predisposal stage and potential problems that may arise from disruption by natural disasters at this stage. Case studies are conducted and our analysis results show that activating contingency plans at the pre-disposition stage is effective at dealing with public crises caused by natural disasters. A mathematical model is constructed to provide information on when to activate contingency plans in different phases.Decision theories and methods are used to help propose an

  11. Contingency planning for nuclear plants: an approach for use in industrial plants and hazardous products storage facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carvalho, Paulo Roberto Werneck de, E-mail: paulo@pwerneck.com [Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), Angra dos Reis, RJ (Brazil); Hora, Antonio Ferreira da, E-mail: dahora@vm.uff.br [Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF), Niteroi, RJ (Brazil)

    2015-07-01

    The purpose of this paper is establishing a basic system model for the development of contingency plans for emergencies. This includes the identification of agents involved in aid and assistance planning, pointing out communication chains among them, the delegation of action coordination and control, as well as the composition and structure of crisis centers equipped with physical and technological resources, the development of emergency procedures, the training of the teams involved, drill planning, and a policy for interactions with community members and the media in the course of a crisis. This paper aims at proposing actions in case an emergency affects the surroundings areas to the accident site. The outlined propositions are not to be adopted only under nuclear or radiological emergencies, since Brazil has specific legislation for this purpose, as established in the Brazilian Nuclear Program Protection System (SIPRON), in addition to the structures and contingency plans currently implemented, validated and periodically tested. (author)

  12. Contingency planning for nuclear plants: an approach for use in industrial plants and hazardous products storage facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carvalho, Paulo Roberto Werneck de; Hora, Antonio Ferreira da

    2015-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is establishing a basic system model for the development of contingency plans for emergencies. This includes the identification of agents involved in aid and assistance planning, pointing out communication chains among them, the delegation of action coordination and control, as well as the composition and structure of crisis centers equipped with physical and technological resources, the development of emergency procedures, the training of the teams involved, drill planning, and a policy for interactions with community members and the media in the course of a crisis. This paper aims at proposing actions in case an emergency affects the surroundings areas to the accident site. The outlined propositions are not to be adopted only under nuclear or radiological emergencies, since Brazil has specific legislation for this purpose, as established in the Brazilian Nuclear Program Protection System (SIPRON), in addition to the structures and contingency plans currently implemented, validated and periodically tested. (author)

  13. The clinical effects of closure of the hernia gap after laparoscopic ventral hernia repair:

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Christoffersen, Mette W; Westen, Mikkel; Assadzadeh, Sami

    2014-01-01

    randomised controlled trials. The primary purpose of this paper is to compare early post-operative activity-related pain in patients undergoing laparoscopic ventral hernia repair with closure of the gap with patients undergoing standard laparoscopic ventral hernia repair (non-closure of the gap). Secondary...... outcomes are patient-rated cosmesis and hernia-specific quality of life. METHODS: A randomised, controlled, double-blinded study is planned. Based on power calculation, we will include 40 patients in each arm. Patients undergoing elective laparoscopic umbilical, epigastric or umbilical trocar-site hernia...... repair at Hvidovre Hospital and Herlev Hospital, Denmark, are invited to participate. CONCLUSION: The gap closure technique may induce more post-operative pain than the non-closure repair, but it may also be superior with regard to other important surgical outcomes. No studies have previously...

  14. Hanford tanks initiative alternatives generation and analysis plan for AX tank farm closure basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schaus, P.S.

    1997-01-01

    The purpose of this document is: (1) to review the HTI Mission Analysis and related documents to determine their suitability for use in developing performance measures for AX Tank Farm closure, (2) to determine the completeness and representativeness of selected alternative closure scenarios, (3) to determine the completeness of current plans for development of tank end-state criteria, and (4) to analyze the activities that are necessary and sufficient to recommend the end-state criteria and performance measures for the AX Tank Farm and recommend activities not currently planned to support establishment of its end-state criteria

  15. Criteria for selection of fuel cycle and major materials licenses needing radiological contingency plans. Regulatory report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fisher, F.D.

    1981-07-01

    Quantities of NRC-licensed radioisotopes requiring the licensee to develop and submit radiological contingency planning information to the NRC for review and approval are developed and presented as limiting possession limits and conditions of possession

  16. Post-closure resaturation of a deep radioactive waste repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cox, I.C.S.; Rodwell, W.R.

    1989-03-01

    The post-closure resaturation of a deep radioactive waste repository has been modelled for a number of generic disposal concepts. A combination of numerical ground water flow simulations and analytical calculations has been used to investigate the variation of repository fluid pressure and degree of water saturation with time, and to determine the factors influencing resaturation times. The host rock permeability was found to be the most important determining factor. For geological environments regarded as likely for a waste repository, resaturation is predicted to be a short term process compared with gas generation and contaminant migration timescales. (author)

  17. Surplus Facilities and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Closure program plan, fiscal year 1992

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hughes, M.C.; Wahlen, R.K.; Winship, R.A.

    1991-10-01

    The Surplus Facilities and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Closure program is responsible to US Department of Energy Field Office, Richland for the safe, cost-effective surveillance, maintenance, and decommissioning of surplus facilities at the Hanford Site. The Surplus Facilities and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Closure program is also responsible to US Department of Energy Field Office, Richland for the program management of specific Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closures at the Hanford Site. This program plan addresses only the surplus facilities. The criteria used to evaluate each factor relative to decommissioning are based on the guidelines presented by the US Department of Energy Field Office, Richland, Environmental Restoration Division. The guidelines are consistent with the Westinghouse Hanford Company commitment to decommission Hanford Site retired facilities in the safest and most cost-effective way achievable. This document outlines the plan for managing these facilities until disposal

  18. Contingent valuation of environmental goods - Closure of Barsebaeck

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jordal-Joergensen, J.

    1995-01-01

    Decisions in the community, are usually taken on the basis of economic calculations. Many environmental effects, however, are excluded from these calculations because it is often difficult to value environmental effects in monetary terms. Contingent valuation has recently become widespread in connection with this purpose, namely in the USA, but also in a number of European countries like, for example, Norway and Sweden. In Denmark the method has been applied sporadically in recent years. The purpose of this study is; to elucidate the problems associated with contingent valuation when the method is used in practice; to indicate study designs which can solve these problems; and draw attention to the reservations which must be made in respect of the results of these types of studies. The data material consists of 298 telephone interviews and 13 personal interviews. The interviewees all live in a radius of 30 km from Barsebaeck. The 311 interviews took place in the period of December 1993 to February 1994, approx. two months after extensive publicity concerning leakages at Barsebaeck. In the telephone interviews, 240 out of the 298 (80%) asked agreed to take part in the interviews. The conclusion cannot be directly transferred to other environmental goods. Barsebaeck was a special case because the risk was known prior to the study. In valuation of goods with which the respondents are not previously familiar, the greater need for information can necessitate using personal interviews. The method provides a better possibility of incorporating environmental effects directly in macroeconomic analyses. (EG)

  19. Multiple Re-entry Closures After TEVAR for Ruptured Chronic Post-dissection Thoraco-abdominal Aortic Aneurysm

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    R. Kinoshita

    Full Text Available Introduction: Although thoracic endovascular aortic repair (TEVAR has become a promising treatment for complicated acute type B dissection, its role in treating chronic post-dissection thoraco-abdominal aortic aneurysm (TAA is still limited owing to persistent retrograde flow into the false lumen (FL through abdominal or iliac re-entry tears. Report: A case of chronic post-dissection TAA treatment, in which a dilated descending FL ruptured into the left thorax, is described. The primary entry tear was closed by emergency TEVAR and multiple abdominal re-entries were closed by EVAR. In addition, major re-entries at the detached right renal artery and iliac bifurcation were closed using covered stents. To close re-entries as far as possible, EVAR was carried out using the chimney technique, and additional aortic extenders were placed above the coeliac artery. A few re-entries remained, but complete FL thrombosis of the rupture site was achieved. Follow-up computed tomography showed significant shrinkage of the FL. Discussion: In treating post-dissection TAA, entry closure by TEVAR is sometimes insufficient, owing to persistent retrograde flow into the FL from abdominal or iliac re-entries. Adjunctive techniques are needed to close these distal re-entries to obtain complete FL exclusion, especially in rupture cases. Recently, encouraging results of complete coverage of the thoraco-abdominal aorta with fenestrated or branched endografts have been reported; however, the widespread employment of such techniques appears to be limited owing to technical difficulties. The present method with multiple re-entry closures using off the shelf and immediately available devices is an alternative for the endovascular treatment of post-dissection TAA, especially in the emergency setting. Keywords: Aortic dissection, Ruptured aortic aneurysm, Post-dissection thoracoabdominal aortic aneurysm, Endovascular aortic repair, Reentry closure, Endovascular procedures

  20. Resource Estimations in Contingency Planning for Foot-and-Mouth Disease

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anette Boklund

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available Preparedness planning for a veterinary crisis is important to be fast and effective in the eradication of disease. For countries with a large export of animals and animal products, each extra day in an epidemic will cost millions of Euros due to the closure of export markets. This is important for the Danish husbandry industry, especially the swine industry, which had an export of €4.4 billion in 2012. The purposes of this project were to (1 develop an iterative tool with the aim of estimating the resources needed during an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD in Denmark, (2 identify areas, which can delay the control of the disease. The tool developed should easily be updated, when knowledge is gained from other veterinary crises or during an outbreak of FMD. The stochastic simulation model DTU-DADS was used to simulate spread of FMD in Denmark. For each task occurring during an epidemic of FMD, the time and personnel needed per herd was estimated by a working group with expertise in contingency and crisis management. By combining this information, an iterative model was created to calculate the needed personnel on a daily basis during the epidemic. The needed personnel was predicted to peak within the first week with a requirement of approximately 123 (65–175 veterinarians, 33 (23–64 technicians, and 36 (26–49 administrative staff on day 2, while the personnel needed in the Danish Emergency Management Agency (responsible for the hygiene barrier and initial cleaning and disinfection of the farm was predicted to be 174 (58–464, mostly recruits. The time needed for surveillance visits was predicted to be the most influential factor in the calculations. Based on results from a stochastic simulation model, it was possible to create an iterative model to estimate the requirements for personnel during an FMD outbreak in Denmark. The model can easily be adjusted, when new information on resources appears from management of other crisis or

  1. Australian contingency plans for emergency animal disease control: the role of antigen/vaccine banks.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tweddle, N E

    2004-01-01

    Vaccination is an important element of contingency plans for many animal diseases. The decision whether or not to use vaccine is complex, and must consider epidemiological, economic and social issues. Vaccines are rarely available in a country for emergency animal diseases unless a low pathogenicity strain of the agent is present or it is localised in carrier hosts. High quality commercial vaccine from overseas is often the preferred source of vaccine in an emergency, although less reliable sources may be used with additional safeguards. Alternatively, master seeds may be imported or developed for production within the country For contingency planning, diseases may be ranked according to the expected role of vaccine in the disease eradication strategy, with diseases for which vaccine is part of the initial response strategy receiving highest priority for action. A range of preparedness options is available, ranging from identifying producers of vaccine, obtaining permits for import and use from regulatory authorities, to establishing vaccine or antigen banks. Countries need to consider their individual situations and develop strategies to address the diseases of significance to them.

  2. Tonopah Test Range Post-Closure Inspection Annual Report, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Calendar Year 2003

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Bechtel Nevada

    2004-04-01

    This post-closure inspection report provides documentation of the semiannual inspection activities, maintenance and repair activities, and conclusions and recommendations for calendar year 2003 for eight corrective action units located on the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada.

  3. Performance Assessment of a Post-Closure Pyrophoric Event

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duguid, James; Senger, R.; Leem, J.

    2001-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) is categorized into eleven different spent fuel groups. Group 7, is predominantly uranium metal spent fuel from N Reactor that could oxidize rapidly in the presence of air when a waste package is breached. Such rapid oxidation constitutes a pyrophoric event. The consequences of a post closure pyrophoric event were evaluated in terms of its potential to damage adjacent waste packages and consequences of it in terms of long-term dose to humans. This work was conducted as part of the total system performance assessment (TSPA) of DOE spent fuel for the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program. These analyses were performed in support of the site recommendation for a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada

  4. 300 Area Process Trenches Modified Closure/Postclosure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    This chapter provides a brief summary of the contents of each chapter of this plan for the closure of the 300 Area Process Trenches (300 APT) treatment, storage, and/or disposal unit. It also provides background information for this unit and discusses how its closure will be integrated with the remedial action for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 300- FF-1 Operable Unit. The 300 APT is located within the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. This area contained reactor fuel fabrication facilities and research and development laboratories. The 300 APT was constructed and began operations in 1975 as the 316-5 Process Trenches. Effluent was discharged to the trenches by way of the 300 Area process sewer system, which has been the sole source of effluent for the 300 APT. The 316-5 Process Trenches gained Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) interim status as the 300 APT TSD unit on November 11, 1985. The unit has been administratively closed to discharges of dangerous waste since 1985

  5. 77 FR 30266 - Annual Updates to the Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan Formula for 2012; William D. Ford...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-05-22

    ... DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Annual Updates to the Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan Formula for 2012; William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program AGENCY: Federal Student Aid, Department of Education... announces the annual updates to the ICR plan formula for 2012. Under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan...

  6. 77 FR 20796 - Annual Updates to the Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan Formula for 2011; William D. Ford...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-04-06

    ... DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Annual Updates to the Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan Formula for 2011; William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program AGENCY: Federal Student Aid, Department of Education... announces the annual updates to the ICR plan formula for 2011. Under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan...

  7. 10 CFR 63.161 - Emergency plan for the geologic repository operations area through permanent closure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... Planning Criteria § 63.161 Emergency plan for the geologic repository operations area through permanent... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Emergency plan for the geologic repository operations area... may occur at the geologic repository operations area, at any time before permanent closure and...

  8. 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility Closure Plan. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1992-11-01

    The Hanford Site, located northwest of the city of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials, as well as for activities associated with nuclear energy development. The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. The 3718-F Alkali Metal Treatment and Storage Facility (3718-F Facility), located in the 300 Area, was used to store and treat alkali metal wastes. Therefore, it is subject to the regulatory requirements for the storage and treatment of dangerous wastes. Closure will be conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 (Ecology 1989) and 40 CFR 270.1. Closure also will satisfy the thermal treatment facility closure requirements of 40 CFR 265.381. This closure plan presents a description of the 3718-F Facility, the history of wastes managed, and the approach that will be followed to close the facility. Only hazardous constituents derived from 3718-F Facility operations will be addressed.

  9. 40 CFR 264.119 - Post-closure notices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ...) STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES Closure... closure of each hazardous waste disposal unit, the owner or operator must submit to the local zoning... disposal unit of the facility. For hazardous wastes disposed of before January 12, 1981, the owner or...

  10. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B permit application for tank storage units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-05-01

    In compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), this report discusses information relating to permit applications for three tank storage units at Y-12. The storage units are: Building 9811-1 RCRA Tank Storage Unit (OD-7); Waste Oil/Solvent Storage Unit (OD-9); and Liquid Organic Solvent Storage Unit (OD-10). Numerous sections discuss the following: Facility description; waste characteristics; process information; groundwater monitoring; procedures to prevent hazards; contingency plan; personnel training; closure plan, post closure plan, and financial requirements; record keeping; other federal laws; organic air emissions; solid waste management units; and certification. Sixteen appendices contain such items as maps, waste analyses and forms, inspection logs, equipment identification, etc

  11. Application of Planned Behavior Theory to Account for College Students' Occupational Intentions in Contingent Employment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huang, Jie-Tsuen

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of this study was to apply Ajzen's (1991) theory of planned behavior to examine college students' intentions to engage in contingent employment. Data were collected from 845 students in 8 colleges and universities in Taiwan. The results of structural equation modeling analyses indicated that both attitude and subjective norms were…

  12. Impacts of Base-Case and Post-Contingency Constraint Relaxations on Static and Dynamic Operational Security

    Science.gov (United States)

    Salloum, Ahmed

    Constraint relaxation by definition means that certain security, operational, or financial constraints are allowed to be violated in the energy market model for a predetermined penalty price. System operators utilize this mechanism in an effort to impose a price-cap on shadow prices throughout the market. In addition, constraint relaxations can serve as corrective approximations that help in reducing the occurrence of infeasible or extreme solutions in the day-ahead markets. This work aims to capture the impact constraint relaxations have on system operational security. Moreover, this analysis also provides a better understanding of the correlation between DC market models and AC real-time systems and analyzes how relaxations in market models propagate to real-time systems. This information can be used not only to assess the criticality of constraint relaxations, but also as a basis for determining penalty prices more accurately. Constraint relaxations practice was replicated in this work using a test case and a real-life large-scale system, while capturing both energy market aspects and AC real-time system performance. System performance investigation included static and dynamic security analysis for base-case and post-contingency operating conditions. PJM peak hour loads were dynamically modeled in order to capture delayed voltage recovery and sustained depressed voltage profiles as a result of reactive power deficiency caused by constraint relaxations. Moreover, impacts of constraint relaxations on operational system security were investigated when risk based penalty prices are used. Transmission lines in the PJM system were categorized according to their risk index and each category was as-signed a different penalty price accordingly in order to avoid real-time overloads on high risk lines. This work also extends the investigation of constraint relaxations to post-contingency relaxations, where emergency limits are allowed to be relaxed in energy market models

  13. Real-time laboratory exercises to test contingency plans for classical swine fever: experiences from two national laboratories.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Koenen, F; Uttenthal, A; Meindl-Böhmer, A

    2007-12-01

    In order to adequately and efficiently handle outbreaks of contagious diseases such as classical swine fever (CSF), foot and mouth disease or highly pathogenic avian influenza, competent authorities and the laboratories involved have to be well prepared and must be in possession of functioning contingency plans. These plans should ensure that in the event of an outbreak access to facilities, equipment, resources, trained personnel, and all other facilities needed for the rapid and efficient eradication of the outbreak is guaranteed, and that the procedures to follow are well rehearsed. It is essential that these plans are established during 'peace-time' and are reviewed regularly. This paper provides suggestions on how to perform laboratory exercises to test preparedness and describes the experiences of two national reference laboratories for CSF. The major lesson learnt was the importance of a well-documented laboratory contingency plan. The major pitfalls encountered were shortage of space, difficulties in guaranteeing biosecurity and sufficient supplies of sterile equipment and consumables. The need for a standardised laboratory information management system, that is used by all those involved in order to reduce the administrative load, is also discussed.

  14. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2012-07-17

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 547 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 547 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; AND (3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly Closure activities began in August 2011 and were completed in June 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 547 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 was closure in place with administrative controls. The following closure activities were performed: (1) Open holes were filled with concrete; (2) Steel casings were placed over vertical expansion joints and filled with cement; (3) Engineered soil covers were constructed over piping and exposed sections of the gas sampling system components; (4) Fencing, monuments, Jersey barriers, radiological postings, and use restriction (UR) warning signs were installed around the perimeters of the sites; (5) Housekeeping debris was picked up from around the sites and disposed; and (6) Radiological surveys were performed to confirm final radiological postings. UR documentation is included in Appendix D. The post-closure plan was presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 547 and is included as

  15. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 547 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 547 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; AND (3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly Closure activities began in August 2011 and were completed in June 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 547 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 was closure in place with administrative controls. The following closure activities were performed: (1) Open holes were filled with concrete; (2) Steel casings were placed over vertical expansion joints and filled with cement; (3) Engineered soil covers were constructed over piping and exposed sections of the gas sampling system components; (4) Fencing, monuments, Jersey barriers, radiological postings, and use restriction (UR) warning signs were installed around the perimeters of the sites; (5) Housekeeping debris was picked up from around the sites and disposed; and (6) Radiological surveys were performed to confirm final radiological postings. UR documentation is included in Appendix D. The post-closure plan was presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 547 and is included as

  16. Underground storage tank 431-D1U1, Closure Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mancieri, S.

    1993-09-01

    This document contains information about the decommissioning of Tank 431-D1U1. This tank was installed in 1965 for diesel fuel storage. This tank will remain in active usage until closure procedures begin. Soils and ground water around the tank will be sampled to check for leakage. Appendices include; proof of proper training for workers, health and safety briefing record, task hazard analysis summary, and emergency plans.

  17. 303-K Storage Facility closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    Recyclable scrap uranium with zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy, and zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gallon containers) in the 303-K Storage Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy and zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as mixed waste with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 303-K Storage Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040. This closure plan presents a description of the 303-K Storage Facility, the history of materials and waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 303-K Storage Facility. The 303-K Storage Facility is located within the 300-FF-3 (source) and 300-FF-5 (groundwater) operable units, as designated in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology et al. 1992). Contamination in the operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5 is scheduled to be addressed through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 remedial action process. Therefore, all soil remedial action at the 304 Facility will be conducted as part of the CERCLA remedial action of operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5

  18. A prospective randomized clinical study of the influence of primary closure or dressing on post-operative morbidity after mandibular third molar surgery

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Peter E Egbor

    2014-01-01

    Full Text Available Objective: The aim of the following study is to determine the effect of primary closure or dressing on post-operative morbidity after impacted lower third molar surgery. Materials and Methods: This was a randomized clinical study of 72 patients who had surgical extraction of impacted mandibular third molars. The subjects were divided into two groups of A and B. Group A had total closure (primary closure and Group B had whitehead varnish dressing of the socket. Pain, swelling and trismus were evaluated pre-operatively using visual analogue scale, flexible tape measuring method and inter-incisal distance measurement with Vernier Callipers respectively as well as post-operatively on 1 st , 2 nd , 3 rd , 5 th and 7 th day. Results: The study participants consisted of 27 males and 45 females in a ratio 1:1.7. With a mean age of 24.7 ± 4.9 years (range 19-33 years for Group A and 25.5 ± 4.3 years (range 20-39 years for Group B. Post-operative pain was not significantly affected by the closure techniques (P > 0.05. Dressing was found to significantly reduce the degree of swelling and trismus peaking on the 2 nd day (P = 0.0207 and P = 0.010 respectively. Conclusion: The use of dressing was more effective than primary closure to reduce the degree of swelling and trismus though its effect on post-operative pain reduction was not significant.

  19. Contingency proportion systematically influences contingency learning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Forrin, Noah D; MacLeod, Colin M

    2018-01-01

    In the color-word contingency learning paradigm, each word appears more often in one color (high contingency) than in the other colors (low contingency). Shortly after beginning the task, color identification responses become faster on the high-contingency trials than on the low-contingency trials-the contingency learning effect. Across five groups, we varied the high-contingency proportion in 10% steps, from 80% to 40%. The size of the contingency learning effect was positively related to high-contingency proportion, with the effect disappearing when high contingency was reduced to 40%. At the two highest contingency proportions, the magnitude of the effect increased over trials, the pattern suggesting that there was an increasing cost for the low-contingency trials rather than an increasing benefit for the high-contingency trials. Overall, the results fit a modified version of Schmidt's (2013, Acta Psychologica, 142, 119-126) parallel episodic processing account in which prior trial instances are routinely retrieved from memory and influence current trial performance.

  20. In patients with post-sternotomy mediastinitis is vacuum-assisted closure superior to conventional therapy?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yu, Angela W; Rippel, Radoslaw A; Smock, Elliott; Jarral, Omar A

    2013-11-01

    A best evidence topic in cardiac surgery was written according to a structured protocol. The question addressed was whether vacuum-assisted closure therapy (VAC) is superior to conventional therapy for treating post-sternotomy mediastinitis. Altogether >261 papers were found using the reported search, of which 9 represented the best evidence to answer the clinical question. The authors, journal, date and country of publication, patient group studied, study type, relevant outcomes and results of these papers are tabulated. Several studies indicate that VAC therapy is associated with shorter lengths of intensive care and in-hospital stay as well as faster rates of wound healing and fewer dressing changes. It has also been shown that VAC therapy is correlated with a statistically significant reduction in reinfection rates, particularly those that occur in the early postoperative period (at the 1-week follow-up). Patients can be discharged with the dressing in situ and managed in the community with a view to delayed closure or reconstruction. However, the studies comparing VAC with conventional therapy are all retrospective in nature and reinforce the need for randomized controlled trials in order to more accurately establish differences in outcomes between VAC and conventional therapy. Additionally, owing tło the variability of treatment protocols within the non-VAC arm, it is more challenging to draw definitive conclusions regarding the superiority of VAC therapy to every modality that is considered conventional treatment. We conclude that VAC therapy is a portable and an increasingly economical option for the treatment of post sternotomy mediastinitis. Although reductions in mortality rates were not reproduced in all studies, evidence suggests that VAC should still be considered as a first-line therapy for post-sternotomy mediastinitis and as a bridge therapy to musculocutaneous reconstruction or primary closure.

  1. Phacoemulsification with intraocular lens implantation in primary angle-closure suspect, primary angle-closure and primary angle-closure glaucoma with cataract

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kun Zeng

    2013-08-01

    Full Text Available AIM: To evaluate the features and clinical outcomes of cataract extraction by phacoemulsification with intraocular lens implantation in primary angle-closure suspect(PACS, primary angle-closure(PACand primary angle-closure glaucoma(PACGwith cataract.METHODS:Phacoemulsification with intraocular lens implantation was performed on 86 cases(86 eyesdiagnosed as PACS, PAC and PACG co-existing cataract from January to December 2012. All cases were followed up for 3 months to 1 year. Pre-operative and post-operative visual acuity, intraocular pressure(IOP, gonioscopy, ultrasound biomicroscopy(UBM, visual field and usage of anti-glaucomaous eye drops were recorded.RESULTS:Zonular dialysis existed in 19 eyes(22%. The post-operative visual acuity improved in 84 eyes(98%. The post-operative visual acuity was CONCLUSION: PACS, PAC and PACG co-existing zonular dialysis is common. Phacoemulsification with IOL implantation can reduce IOP, deepen anterior chamber and open angle.

  2. Closure plan for the M-Area settling basin and vicinity at the Savannah River Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Colven, W.P.; Pickett, J.B.

    1985-07-01

    The areas addressed in this closure plan include a process sewer line, surface impoundment (settling basin), overflow ditch, seepage area, and a Carolina Bay known as Lost Lake. Since it is proposed that the basin and vicinity be closed with the hazardous wastes placed and stabilized in the basin, it will be closed pursuant to regulations for closing a hazardous waste landfill. No free liquids will remain in the impoundment after closure is completed

  3. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) contingency plan for hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-08-01

    The Y-12 RCRA Contingency Plan will be continually reviewed and revised if any of the following occur: the facility permit is revised, the plan is inadequate in an emergency, the procedures can be improved, the operations of the facility change in a way that alters the plan, the emergency coordinator changes, or the emergency equipment list changes. Copies of the Y-12 Emergency Management Plan are available at the Plant Shift Superintendent's Office and the Emergency Management Office. This document serves to supplement the Y-12 Emergency Management Plan to be appropriate for all RCRA hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal units. The 90-day accumulation areas at the Y-12 Plant have a separate contingency supplement as required by RCRA and are separate from this supplement

  4. Resource Estimations in Contingency Planning for Foot-And-Mouth Disease

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Boklund, Anette; Sten, Mortensen; Holm Johansen, Maren

    Preparedness planning for a veterinary crisis is important to be fast and effective in the eradication of disease. For countries with a large export of animals and animal products, each extra day in an epidemic will cost millions of euros due to the closure of export markets. This is important....... It was estimated that the need for personnel would peak on day 7 with a requirement of approximately 170 veterinarians, 70 technicians and 45 administrative staff. However, the need for personnel in the Danish Emergency Management Agency (responsible for the hygiene barrier and initial cleaning and disinfection...

  5. RCRA closure of eight land-based units at the Y-12 plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stone, J.E.; Welch, S.H.

    1988-01-01

    Eight land-based hazardous waste management units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant are being closed under an integrated multi-year program. Closure plans for the units have been submitted and are in various stages of revision and regulatory review. These units will be closed by various combinations of methods, including liquid removal and treatment, sludge stabilization, contaminated sludge and/or soil removal, and capping. The closure of these sites will be funded by a new Department of Energy budget category, the Environmental Restoration Budget Category (ERBC), which is intended to provide greater flexibility in the response to closure and remedial activities. A major project, Closure and Post-Closure Activities (CAPCA), has been identified for ERBC funding to close and remediate the land units in accordance with RCRA requirements. Establishing the scope of this program has required the development of risk assessments and the preparation of an integrated schedule

  6. Considering timescales in the post-closure safety of geological disposal of radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    A key challenge in the development of safety cases for the deep geological disposal of radioactive waste is handling the long time frame over which the radioactive waste remains hazardous. The intrinsic hazard of the waste decreases with time, but some hazard remains for extremely long periods. Safety cases for geological disposal typically address performance and protection for thousands to millions of years into the future. Over such periods, a wide range of events and processes operating over many different timescales may impact on a repository and its environment. Uncertainties in the predictability of such factors increase with time, making it increasingly difficult to provide definite assurances of a repository's performance and the protection it may provide over longer timescales. Timescales, the level of protection and the assurance of safety are all linked. Approaches to handling timescales for the geological disposal of radioactive waste are influenced by ethical principles, the evolution of the hazard over time, uncertainties in the evolution of the disposal system (and how these uncertainties themselves evolve) and the stability and predictability of the geological environment. Conversely, the approach to handling timescales can affect aspects of repository planning and implementation including regulatory requirements, siting decisions, repository design, the development and presentation of safety cases and the planning of pre- and post-closure institutional controls such as monitoring requirements. This is an area still under discussion among NEA member countries. This report reviews the current status and ongoing discussions of this issue. (author)

  7. Power plant construction lead times: The value of contingency planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rubin, L.J.

    1985-01-01

    In this paper an analysis of two different approaches to the construction of a major power plant (nuclear) is presented. The analysis compares an accelerated, ''go-for-broke'' strategy-which has some risk of being delayed-with a more deliberate contingency construction schedule in terms of revenue requirements and costs of electricity. It is demonstrated that under a wide variety of circumstances there are important advantages to the contingency strategy, but that the magnitude of those advantages is sensitive to the character of the power system being examined and to the flexibility of the contingency approach

  8. ICPP calcined solids storage facility closure study. Volume II: Cost estimates, planning schedules, yearly cost flowcharts, and life-cycle cost estimates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-02-01

    This document contains Volume II of the Closure Study for the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant Calcined Solids Storage Facility. This volume contains draft information on cost estimates, planning schedules, yearly cost flowcharts, and life-cycle costs for the four options described in Volume I: (1) Risk-Based Clean Closure; NRC Class C fill, (2) Risk-Based Clean Closure; Clean fill, (3) Closure to landfill Standards; NRC Class C fill, and (4) Closure to Landfill Standards; Clean fill

  9. ICPP calcined solids storage facility closure study. Volume II: Cost estimates, planning schedules, yearly cost flowcharts, and life-cycle cost estimates

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-02-01

    This document contains Volume II of the Closure Study for the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant Calcined Solids Storage Facility. This volume contains draft information on cost estimates, planning schedules, yearly cost flowcharts, and life-cycle costs for the four options described in Volume I: (1) Risk-Based Clean Closure; NRC Class C fill, (2) Risk-Based Clean Closure; Clean fill, (3) Closure to landfill Standards; NRC Class C fill, and (4) Closure to Landfill Standards; Clean fill.

  10. Contingency Contracting within the Department of Defense: A Comparative Analysis

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    McMillion, Chester

    2000-01-01

    .... The thesis compares and contrasts the regulations governing the contingency contracting operations, the organization structure, contingency contracting support plans, and the training requirements...

  11. Environmental monitoring plan for Waste Area Grouping 6 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-09-01

    This document presents an Environmental Monitoring Plan (EMP) for Waste Area Grouping (WAG 6) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This document updates a draft monitoring plan developed in 1993. The draft plan was never finalized awaiting resolution of the mechanisms for addressing RCRA concerns at a site where the CERCLA process resulted in a decision to defer action, i.e., postpone closure indefinitely. Over the past two years the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), US Department of Energy (DOE), and US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region IV, have agreed that RCRA authority at the site will be maintained through a post- closure permit; ''closure'' in this case referring to deferred action. Both a Revised Closure Plan (DOE 1995a) and a Post-Closure Permit Application (DOE 1995b) have been developed to document this agreement; relevant portions of the EMP will be included in the RCRA Post-Closure Permit Application. As the RCRA issues were being negotiated, DOE initiated monitoring at WAG 6. The purpose of the monitoring activities was to (1) continue to comply with RCRA groundwater quality assessment requirements, (2) install new monitoring equipment, and (3) establish the baseline conditions at WAG 6 against which changes in contaminant releases could be measured. Baseline monitoring is scheduled to end September 30, 1995. Activities that have taken place over the past two years are summarized in this document

  12. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dave Madsen

    1998-08-01

    This Closure Report provides the documentation for closure of the Cactus Spring Waste Trenches Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 426. The site is located on the Tonopah Test Range, approximately 225 kilometers northwest of Las Vegas, NV. CAU 426 consists of one corrective action site (CAS) which is comprised of four waste trenches. The trenches were excavated to receive solid waste generated in support of Operation Roller Coaster, primary the Double Tracks Test in 1963, and were subsequently backfilled. The Double Tracks Test involved use of live animals to assess the biological hazards associated with the nonnuclear detonation of plutonium-bearing devices. The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP)which proposed ''capping'' methodology. The closure activities were completed in accordance with the approved CAP and consisted of constructing an engineered cover in the area of the trenches, constructing/planting a vegetative cover, installing a perimeter fence and signs, implementing restrictions on future use, and preparing a Post-Closure Monitoring Plan.

  13. 77 FR 33788 - Proposed Post Office Structure Plan

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-07

    ... Plan AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The Commission is noticing a recently-filed Postal Service request for an advisory opinion regarding its Post Office Structure Plan... Commission for an advisory opinion under 39 U.S.C. 3661 regarding its Post Office Structure Plan (POStPlan...

  14. ICPP tank farm closure study. Volume III: Cost estimates, planning schedules, yearly cost flowcharts, and life-cycle cost estimates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-02-01

    This volume contains information on cost estimates, planning schedules, yearly cost flowcharts, and life-cycle costs for the six options described in Volume 1, Section 2: Option 1 -- Total removal clean closure; No subsequent use; Option 2 -- Risk-based clean closure; LLW fill; Option 3 -- Risk-based clean closure; CERCLA fill; Option 4 -- Close to RCRA landfill standards; LLW fill; Option 5 -- Close to RCRA landfill standards; CERCLA fill; and Option 6 -- Close to RCRA landfill standards; Clean fill. This volume is divided into two portions. The first portion contains the cost and planning schedule estimates while the second portion contains life-cycle costs and yearly cash flow information for each option

  15. Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    S. E. Rawlinson

    2001-09-01

    Bechtel Nevada (BN) manages two low-level Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) (one site is in Area 3 and the other is in Area 5) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office (NNSA/NV). The current DOE Order governing management of radioactive waste is 435.1. Associated with DOE Order 435.1 is a Manual (DOE M 435.1-1) and Guidance (DOE G 435.1-1). The Manual and Guidance specify that preliminary closure and monitoring plans for a low-level waste (LLW) management facility be developed and initially submitted with the Performance Assessment (PA) and Composite Analysis (CA) for that facility. The Manual and Guidance, and the Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) issued for the Area 3 RWMS further specify that the preliminary closure and monitoring plans be updated within one year following issuance of a DAS. This Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (ICMP) fulfills both requirements. Additional updates will be conducted every third year hereafter. This document is an integrated plan for closing and monitoring both RWMSs, and is based on guidance issued in 1999 by the DOE for developing closure plans. The plan does not follow the format suggested by the DOE guidance in order to better accommodate differences between the two RWMSs, especially in terms of operations and site characteristics. The modification reduces redundancy and provides a smoother progression of the discussion. The closure and monitoring plans were integrated because much of the information that would be included in individual plans is the same, and integration provides efficient presentation and program management. The ICMP identifies the regulatory requirements, describes the disposal sites and the physical environment where they are located, and defines the approach and schedule for both closing and monitoring the sites.

  16. State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) Environmental Checklist Form 216-B-3 Expansion Ponds Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-12-01

    The 216-B-3 Expansion Ponds Closure Plan (Revision 1) consists of a Part A Dangerous Waste Permit Application and a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Closure Plan. An explanation of the Part A submitted with this document is provided at the beginning of the Part A Section. The closure plan consists of nine chapters and five appendices. The 216-B-3 Pond System consists of a series of four earthen, unlined, interconnected ponds and the 216-B-3-3 Ditch that receive waste water from various 200 East Area operating facilities. These four ponds, collectively. Waste water (primarily cooling water, steam condensate, and sanitary water) from various 200 East Area facilities is discharged to the 216-B-3-3 Ditch. Water discharged to the 216-8-3-3 Ditch flows directly into the 216-B-3 Pond. In the past, waste water discharges to B Pond and the 216-B-3-3 Ditch contained mixed waste (radioactive waste and dangerous waste). The radioactive portion of mixed waste has been interpreted by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to be regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; the nonradioactive dangerous portion of mixed waste is regulated under RCRA. Mixed waste also may be considered a hazardous substance under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) when considering remediation of waste sites

  17. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) general contingency plan for hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skaggs, B.E.

    1993-11-01

    The Y-12 RCRA Contingency Plan will be continually reviewed and revised if any of the following occur: the facility permit is revised, the plan is inadequate in an emergency, the procedures herein can be improved, the operations of the facility change in a way that alters the plan, the emergency coordinator changes, or the emergency equipment list changes. Copies of the Y-12 Emergency Management Plan are available at the Plant Shift Superintendent's Office and the Emergency Management Office. This document serves to supplement the Y-12 Emergency Management Plan to be appropriate for all RCRA hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal units. The 90-day accumulation areas at the Y-12 Plant have a separate contingency supplement as required by RCRA and are separate from this supplement

  18. 25 CFR 39.501 - What is an emergency or unforeseen contingency?

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false What is an emergency or unforeseen contingency? 39.501... EQUALIZATION PROGRAM Contingency Fund § 39.501 What is an emergency or unforeseen contingency? An emergency or unforeseen contingency is an event that meets all of the following criteria: (a) It could not be planned for...

  19. Environmental surveillance: An integral part of the spill contingency plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salinas, J.; Bozzo, W.

    1993-01-01

    Typically, the initial response to spills is directed at containing, controlling, and stopping the flow of spilled materials. The primary goal of such a response is to limit the spread and further impact of spilled material, and to initiate timely cleanup and recovery of affected areas. Surveillance of actual spill impacts has often followed an after the fact approach, using only immediately available resources. Surveillance may occur quickly after a spill, but in most incidents its occurs as a follow-up action after initial response and containment have been achieved. Insufficient planning may produce spill surveillance that inadequately assesses impacts, fails to incorporate baseline data, and does not clearly identify a cleanup recovery and endpoint. The management and operations contractor for the US Dept. of Energy's Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) conducts environmental surveillance activities in response to spill incidents when they occur at these facilities. These surveillance activities, when conducted as part of the response, are useful instruments in the initial assessment of spill incidents, management of spill response, containment, and cleanup activities, and for monitoring and documenting postspill impacts and recovery. An Environmental Surveillance Plan (ESP) incorporated in the SPR Spill Contingency Plan provides for initiation of environmental surveillance as part of the spill response. The ESP outlines, through alogic tree, conditions for activating the plan, key indicator parameters for evaluation, detailed methods for establishing surveillance stations, lists of key personnel, locations of equipment necessary to perform surveillance, and conditions for termination of environmental surveillance

  20. State-of-the-art risk-based approach to spill contingency planning and risk management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmidt Etkin, Dagmar; Reilly, Timothy; French McCay, Deborah

    2011-01-01

    The paper proposes incorporating a comprehensive examination of spill risk into risk management and contingency planning, and applying state-of-the-art modeling tools to evaluate various alternatives for appropriate spill response measures and optimize protective responses. The approach allows spill contingency planners and decision-makers to determine the types of spill scenarios that may occur in a particular location or from a particular source and calculate the probability distribution of the various scenarios. The spill probability information is useful in assessing and putting into perspective the various costs options for spill control systems that will be recommended ultimately. Using advanced modeling tools helps in estimating the potential environmental and socioeconomic consequences of each spill scenario based on location-specific factors over a range of stochastic possibilities, simulating spill scenarios and determining optimal responses and protection strategies. The benefits and costs of various response alternatives and variations in response time can be calculated and modeling tools for training and risk allocation/transfer purposes used.

  1. 78 FR 33395 - Annual Updates to the Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan Formula for 2013-William D. Ford...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-04

    ... DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Annual Updates to the Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Plan Formula for 2013--William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) Number... free, at 1- 800-877-8339. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan...

  2. Contingency plan for deployment of the void fraction instrument in Tank 241-AY-102

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    CONNER, J.M.

    1999-01-01

    High-heat producing sludge from tank 241-C-106 will be sluiced and transferred to tank 241-AY-102 beginning in October 1998. Safety analyses have postulated that after retrieval, the waste in 241-AY-102 may generate and retain unsafe levels of flammable gases (Noorani 1998, Pasamebmetoglu etal. 1997). Unsafe levels of retained gas are not expected, but cannot be ruled out because of the large uncertainty in the gas generation and retention rates. The Tank Waste Remediation System Basis for Interim Operation (Noorani 1998) identifies the need for a contingency plan to add void fraction monitoring to tank 241-AY-102 within 2 weeks of the identification of flammable gas buildup that would warrant monitoring. The Tank 241-C-106 Waste Retrieval Sluicing System Process Control Plan (Carothers et al. 1998) committed to providing a contingency plan for deployment of the void fraction instrument (VFI) in tank 241-AY-102. The VFI determines the local void fraction of the waste by compressing a waste sample captured in a gas-tight test chamber. The sample chamber is mounted on the end of a 76-cm (2.5-ft) arm that can be rotated from vertical to horizontal when the instrument is deployed. Once in the waste, the arm can be positioned horizontally and rotated to sample in different areas below the riser. The VFI is deployed using a crane. The VFI has been deployed previously in 241-AW, 241-AN, and 241-SY tank farms, most recently in tank 241-SY-101 in June and July 1998. An additional test in tank 241-SY-101 is planned in September 1998. Operating instructions for the VFI are included in the Void Fraction Instrument Operation and Maintenance Manual (Pearce 1994)

  3. Resource conversation and recovery act (RCRA) Contingency Plan for interim status or permitted units at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-08-01

    The official mission of the Y-12 Plant is to serve as a manufacturing technology center for key processes such that capabilities are maintained for safe, secure, reliable, and survivable nuclear weapons systems and other applications of national importance. The Y-12 RCRA Contingency Plan will be reviewed and revised if necessary if the facility RCRA operating permits are revised, the plan is inadequate in an emergency, the procedures herein can be improved, the facility's operations change in a manner that alters the plan, the emergency coordinator changes, or the emergency equipment list changes. Copies of the Y-12 Emergency Management Plan are available at the Plant Shift Superintendent's Office and the Emergency Preparedness Office. This document serves to supplement the Y-12 Emergency Management Plan to be appropriate for all RCRA hazardous waste interim status or permitted treatment, storage, or disposal facilities. The 90-day storage areas at the Y-12 Plant have a separate contingency supplement as required by RCRA and are separate from this supplement

  4. Supporting Fernald Site Closure with Integrated Health and Safety Plans as Documented Safety Analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kohler, S.; Brown, T.; Fisk, P.; Krach, F.; Klein, B.

    2004-01-01

    At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D and D) of over 200 structures, including eight major nuclear production plants. There is one of twelve nuclear facilities still remaining (Silos containing uranium ore residues) with its own safety basis documentation. This paper presents the status of the FCP's safety basis documentation program, illustrating that all of the former nuclear facilities and activities have now replaced. Basis of Interim Operations (BIOs) with I-HASPs as their safety basis during the closure process

  5. A High Performance System With Explicit Incorporation of ATC Regulations to Generate Contingency Plans for UAVs with Lost Communication, Phase I

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — We propose a comprehensive and systematic contingency plan generation framework to deal with lost communication in UAVs. ATC regulations are explicitly incorporated...

  6. Field Sampling Plan for the HWMA/RCRA Closure Certification of the TRA-731 Caustic and Acid Storage Tank System - 1997 Notice of Violation Consent Order

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, S.K.

    2002-01-01

    This Field Sampling Plan for the HWMA/RCRA Closure Certification of the TRA-731 Caustic and Acid Storage Tank System is one of two documents that comprise the Sampling and Analysis Plan for the HWMA/RCRA closure certification of the TRA-731 caustic and acid storage tank system at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. This plan, which provides information about sampling design, required analyses, and sample collection and handling procedures, is to be used in conjunction with the Quality Assurance Project Plan for the HWMA/RCRA Closure Certification of the TRA-731 Caustic and Acid Storage Tank System

  7. Post-Closure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 417: Central Nevada Test Area Surface, Hot Creek Valley, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2007

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    2008-09-01

    This report presents data collected during the annual post-closure site inspection conducted at the Central Nevada Test Area Surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417 in May 2007. The annual post-closure site inspection included inspections of the UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4 sites in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan provided in the CAU 417 Closure Report (NNSA/NV 2001). The annual inspection conducted at the UC-1 Central Mud Pit (CMP) indicated the site and soil cover were in good condition. No new cracks or fractures were observed in the soil cover during the annual inspection. A crack on the west portion of the cover was observed during the last quarterly inspection in December 2006. This crack was filled with bentonite as part of the maintenance activities conducted in February 2007 and will be monitored during subsequent annual inspections. The vegetation on the soil cover was adequate but showing signs of the area's ongoing drought. No issues were identified with the CMP fence, gate, or subsidence monuments. New DOE Office of Legacy Management signs with updated emergency phone numbers were installed as part of this annual inspection, no issues were identified with the warning signs and monuments at the other two UC-1 locations. The annual subsidence survey was conducted at UC-1 CMP and UC-4 Mud Pit C as part of the maintenance activities conducted in February 2007. The results of the subsidence surveys indicate that the covers are performing as expected, and no unusual subsidence was observed. A vegetation survey of the UC-1 CMP cover and adjacent areas was conducted as part of the annual inspection in May 2007. The vegetation survey indicated that revegetation continues to be successful, although stressed due to the area's prevailing drought conditions. The vegetation should continue to be monitored to document any changes in the plant community and to identify conditions that could potentially require remedial action to maintain a viable

  8. Analyzing Contingency Contracting Purchases for Operation Iraqi Freedom (Unrestricted Version)

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Baldwin, Laura H; Ausink, John A; Campbell, Nancy F; Drew, John G; Roll, Jr, Charles R

    2008-01-01

    ...) in an effort to determine the size and extent of contractor support, and how plans for and the organization and execution of contingency contracting activities might be improved so that Contingency...

  9. 241-CX-70, 241-CX-71, and 241-CX-72 underground storage tanks at the strontium semiworks facility supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingle, S.J.

    1996-03-01

    This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the underground storage tanks at the Strontium Semiworks Facility and is intended to be used as a supplement to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan. This unit-specific plan is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements of WAC 173-303 for certain Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) waste management units. Radioactive material is contained in three underground storage tanks: 241-CX-70, 241-CX-71, and 241-CX-72. Tank 241-CX-70 has been emptied, except for residual quantities of waste, and has been classified as an elementary neutralization tank under the RCRA. Tanks 241-CX-71 and 241-CX-72 contain radioactive and Washington State-only dangerous waste material, but do not present a significant hazard to adjacent facilities, personnel, or the environment. Currently, dangerous waste management activities are not being applied at the tanks. It is unlikely that any incidents presenting hazards to public health or the environment would occur at the Strontium Semiworks Facility

  10. Negotiating contingent knowledges in a time of epistemic doubt

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Phillips, Louise Jane

    How can/should we produce and communicate social scientific knowledge with authority under conditions of epistemic doubt? If all knowledge is contingent and if truth is a discursive effect rather than the final claim about reality - as post-foundationalism suggests - how can we formulate...... and provide support for contingent knowledge-claims? And how can the communication of social scientificknowlege be theorised and practised as the negotiation between social scientific knowledge and other forms of contingent knowledge rather than the one-way transmission of universal, value-free truth......-claims? In the paper, I outline an approach to addressing the final question. The approach is based on a combination of approaches to the production of knowledge developed in post-foundationalist sociology and philosophy of science, approaches to the communication of knowlege developed within communication studies...

  11. Quality Assurance Project Plan for the HWMA/RCRA Closure Certification of the TRA-731 Caustic and Acid Storage Tank System - 1997 Notice of Violation Consent Order; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, S.K.

    2002-01-01

    This Quality Assurance Project Plan for the HWMA/RCRA Closure Certification of the TRA- 731 Caustic and Acid Storage Tank System is one of two documents that comprise the Sampling and Analysis Plan for the HWMA/RCRA closure certification of the TRA-731 caustic and acid storage tank system at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. This plan, which provides information about the project description, project organization, and quality assurance and quality control procedures, is to be used in conjunction with the Field Sampling Plan for the HWMA/RCRA Closure Certification of the TRA-731 Caustic and Acid Storage Tank System. This Quality Assurance Project Plan specifies the procedures for obtaining the data of known quality required by the closure activities for the TRA-731 caustic and acid storage tank system

  12. Defense Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Enhance Oversight of Construction Projects Supporting Military Contingency Operations

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-01

    supporting documentation for reviews that the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan conducted beginning in November 2011 of planned or ongoing contingency ...12 Contingency basing includes the planning , designing, constructing, operating, managing, and transitioning or closing of a non-enduring location...2016). Background Definition of “ Contingency Construction” Project Page 7 GAO-16-406 Defense Infrastructure statutory authority

  13. Post-closure permit application for the Kerr Hollow Quarry at the Y-12 plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The Kerr Hollow Quarry (KHQ) is located on U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) property at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant was built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project. Until 1992, the primary mission of the Y-12 Plant was the production and fabrication of nuclear weapons components. Activities associated with these functions included production of lithium compounds, recovery of enriched uranium from scrap material, and fabrication of uranium and other materials into finished parts for assemblies. The Kerr Hollow Quarry was used for waste disposal of a variety of materials including water-reactive and shock-sensitive chemicals and compressed gas cylinders. These materials were packaged in various containers and sank under the water in the quarry due to their great weight. Disposal activities were terminated in November, 1988 due to a determination by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation that the quarry was subject to regulations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1993. Methods of closure for the quarry were reviewed, and actions were initiated to close the quarry in accordance with closure requirements for interim status surface impoundments specified in Tennessee Rules 1200-1-11-.05(7) and 1200-1-11-.05(11). As part of these actions, efforts were made to characterize the physical and chemical nature of wastes that had been disposed of in the quarry, and to remove any containers or debris that were put into the quarry during waste disposal activities. Closure certification reports (Fraser et al. 1993 and Dames and Moore 1993) document closure activities in detail. This report contains the post-closure permit application for the Kerr Hollow Quarry site

  14. Mobilization plan for the Y-12 9409-5 tank storage facility RCRA closure plan. Final report. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-11-01

    This mobilization plan identifies the activities and equipment necessary to begin the field sampling for the Oak Ridge Y-12 9409-5 Diked Tank Storage Facility (DTSF) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) closure. Elements of the plan outline the necessary components of each mobilization task and identify whether SAIC or the Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. Y-12 Environmental Restoration Division will be responsible for task coordination. Field work will be conducted in two phases: mobilization phase and soil sampling phase. Training and medical monitoring, access, permits and passes, decontamination/staging area, equipment, and management are covered in this document

  15. A guide to contingency planning for oil spills on water. V. 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The movement of oil from the dominant production centres of the world to the world-wide market is primarily achieved by the use of tankers and pipelines. The global pattern of marine transport is well established as shown in Figure 1, below. While the environmental priority for all tanker operations is the prevention of spills, it is recognized that marine spills are a factor for which management must plan. This report, which is prepared for those managements in industry and government, describes the elements of the contingency planning process. It stresses the importance of cooperative activity between industry and government. It presents a consensus view of the IPIECA membership which is representative of the international oil industry. It reflects current informed thinking in the light of the extensive individual company and industry organization reviews that have taken place since the Exxon Valdez and other major incidents in 1989/90. This report has drawn freely on many of these reviews, some of which have been published. (UK)

  16. Contingency plan for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Site 300, hazardous waste operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gonzalez, M.A.

    1983-01-01

    This contingency plan for hazardous waste release provides guidance for coordinating response efforts. With a goal to minimize hazards to human health and life; and protect livestock, wildlife, the environment, and property in the event of a fire, explosion, or any unplanned release of hazardous substances or mixtures to the air, water, or soil. In this document, hazardous waste includes all waste substances or mixtures that: contain any of the hazardous substances listed in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; have the characteristic of being toxic, flammable, reactive, corrosive, an irritant, and/or a strong sensitizer; are radioactive and are used in experiments at Site 300; or could have a significant effect on the environment. This Plan includes an overview of emergency response capabilities; and responsibilities assigned to both LLNL and non-LLNL emergency response personel

  17. RCRA land unit closures at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welch, S.H.; Kelly, B.A.; Delozier, M.F.P.; Manrod, W.E.

    1987-01-01

    Eight land-based hazardous waste management units at the Y-12 Plant are being closed under an integrated multi-year program. Closure plans for the units have been submitted and are in various stages of revision and regulatory review. These units will be closed by various combinations of methods, including liquid removal and treatment, sludge stabilization, contaminated sludge and/or soil removal, and capping. The closure of these sites will be funded by a new Department of Energy budget category, the Environmental Restoration Budget Category (ERBC), which is intended to provide greater flexibility in the response to closure and remedial activities. A major project, Closure and Post-Closure Activities (CAPCA), has been identified for ERBC funding to close and remediate the land units in accordance with RCRA requirements. Establishing the scope of this program has required the development of a detailed set of assumptions and a confirmation program for each assumption. Other significant activities in the CAPCA program include the development of risk assessments and the preparation of an integrated schedule

  18. Sweden; Financial Sector Assessment Program Update: Technical Note on Contingency Planning, Crisis Management and Bank Resolution

    OpenAIRE

    International Monetary Fund

    2011-01-01

    This abstract reviews the recommendations made in the FSAP Update for Sweden in the areas of contingency planning, crisis management, and bank resolution. Although Sweden crisis management fared well during the global financial crisis, its authorities are reviewing the framework for managing financial crises to incorporate crisis lessons. They recommend a domestic institutional framework, an effective cross-border cooperation, an emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), a deposit guarantee schem...

  19. Risk Assessment: Democratic Republic of Congo Post-Laurent ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    political system as opposed to the view that it was merely a power struggle between Kabila on the .... Local actors and international mining companies built alliances exploiting Congo's minerals to gain a ... They are preparing a contingency plan for their activities in the post-Laurent Kabila era, for ... small arms in the DRC.33.

  20. Contingency planning for oil spill response: A program of joint IMO/oil industry regional seminars

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bavister, R.; Wonham, J.

    1993-01-01

    Cooperative efforts between the oil industry and governments at the national and local levels have resulted in a series of reports for both technical and general audiences on subjects relating to oil spills, as well as an ongoing series of government/industry regional seminars for senior executives. The seminars emphasize the crucial importance of joint government/industry attention to contingency planning. These activities, which are continuing, are organized under the auspices of an International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association working group, and the International Maritime Organization. Feedback is solicited from seminar participants for use in planning further seminars and to give the IMO a clear picture of follow up activities that have resulted from the seminars

  1. HWMA/RCRA Closure Plan for the Fluorinel Dissolution Process Makeup and Cooling and Heating Systems Voluntary Consent Order SITE-TANK-005 Action Plan Tank Systems INTEC-066, INTEC-067, INTEC-068, and INTEC-072

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    M.E. Davis

    2007-01-01

    This Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure plan for the fluorinel dissolution process makeup and cooling and heating systems located in the Fluorinel Dissolution Process and Fuel Storage Facility (CPP-666), Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, Idaho National Laboratory Site, was developed to meet milestones established under the Voluntary Consent Order. The systems to be closed include waste piping associated with the fluorinel dissolution process makeup systems. This closure plan presents the closure performance standards and methods of achieving those standards

  2. HWMA/RCRA Closure Plan for the Fluorinel Dissolution Process Makeup and Cooling and Heating Systems Voluntary Consent Order SITE-TANK-005 Action Plan Tank Systems INTEC-066, INTEC-067, INTEC-068, and INTEC-072

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    M.E. Davis

    2007-05-01

    This Hazardous Waste Management Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure plan for the fluorinel dissolution process makeup and cooling and heating systems located in the Fluorinel Dissolution Process and Fuel Storage Facility (CPP-666), Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, Idaho National Laboratory Site, was developed to meet milestones established under the Voluntary Consent Order. The systems to be closed include waste piping associated with the fluorinel dissolution process makeup systems. This closure plan presents the closure performance standards and methods of achieving those standards.

  3. RCRA Closure Plan for the Bear Creek Burial Grounds B Area and Walk-In Pits at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-04-01

    In June 1987, the RCRA Closure/Postclosure Plan for the Bear Creek Burial Grounds (BCBG) was submitted to the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) for review and approval. TDEC modified and issued the plan approved on September 30, 1987. Y/TS-395 was initially intended to apply to A Area, C-West, B Area, and the Walk-In Pits of BCBG. However, a concept was developed to include the B Area (non-RCRA regulated) in the Walk-In Pits so that both areas would be closed under one cap. This approach included a tremendous amount of site preparation with an underlying stabilization base of 16 ft of sand for blast protection. In January 1993, the Closure Plan was revised to include inspection and maintenance criteria and to reflect that future monitoring and remediation would be conducted as part of the ongoing Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act activities at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. This Closure Plan revision is intended to reflect the placement of the Kerr Hollow Quarry debris at the Walk-In Pits, revise the closure dates, and acknowledge that the disposition of a monitoring well within the closure site cannot be verified

  4. 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility closure activities evaluation report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adler, J.G.

    1996-01-01

    This report evaluates the closure activities at the 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility. The closure activities discussed include: the closure activities for the structures, equipment, soil, and gravel scrubber; decontamination methods; materials made available for recycling or reuse; and waste management. The evaluation compares these activities to the regulatory requirements and closure plan requirements. The report concludes that the areas identified in the closure plan can be clean closed

  5. Contingency Management of Health Care Organizations: It Depends.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Olden, Peter C

    Managers in health care organizations (HCOs) must perform many processes and activities, such as planning goals, designing organization structure, leading people, motivating employees, making decisions, and resolving conflict. How they do all this strongly affects the performance and outcomes of their organizations and themselves. Some managers develop a usual way of performing their jobs and achieve some success with a preferred method of leading or a favorite approach to motivating. However, their success will be limited if they always rely on a standard "1-size-fits-all" approach. This is because contingency factors influence the effectiveness of a given approach to managing. The "best" approach depends on contingency factors, including the situation and the people involved. Managers should choose an approach to fit with the changing contingency factors. This article explains why and how managers should develop a contingency approach to managing HCOs. The development of contingency theory is briefly described. Practical application of contingency management is explained for leading, motivating, decision making, and resolving conflict. By using a contingency approach, managers can be more effective when managing their HCOs.

  6. Preliminary post-closure safety assessment of repository concepts for low level radioactive waste at the Bruce Site, Ontario

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Little, R.H.; Penfold, J.S.S.; Egan, M.J.; Leung, H.

    2005-01-01

    The preliminary post-closure safety assessment of permanent repository concepts for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) at the Ontario Power Generation (OPG) Bruce Site is described. The study considered the disposal of both short and long-lived LLW. Four geotechnically feasible repository concepts were considered (two near-surface and two deep repositories). An approach consistent with best international practice was used to provide a reasoned and comprehensive analysis of post-closure impacts of the repository concepts. The results demonstrated that the deep repository concepts in shale and in limestone, and the surface repository concept on sand should meet radiological protection criteria. For the surface repository concept on glacial till, it appears that increased engineering such as grouting of waste and voids should be considered to meet the relevant dose constraint. Should the project to develop a permanent repository for LLW proceed, it is expected that this preliminary safety assessment would need to be updated to take account of future site-specific investigations and design updates. (author)

  7. Detailed oil spill contingency analysis in establishment of preparedness plans for exploration drilling in environmentally sensitive areas: an integrated management process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Spikkerud, Cathrine S.; Skeie, Geir Morten; Brude, Odd Willy; Gravir, Gjermund [DNV Managing Risk, Oslo (Norway)

    2008-07-01

    This paper describes the integrated management process leading up to a dynamic oil spill preparedness plan based on detailed analysis of oil spill contingency requirements and environmental risk in environmentally sensitive areas. Starting with a detailed environmental risk and oil spill contingency analysis, oil spill preparedness plans are developed. These plans are generic for the area possibly affected by an oil spill, and are developed in detail for environmental 'hot spots' that are highly challenging in terms of oil spill response. The detailed plans make use of detailed data sets on shoreline substrate sensitivities and cleanup methodology, photographic inventory, logistical issues and access to real-time incident data for important areas. This detailed approach ensures sufficient knowledge about the sensitive area in advance to provide fast and correct strategic and tactical operational recovery decisions. A final element of the integrated process is a web based GIS, providing all parties involved with one common situation overview, ensuring that the facts remain in focus throughout the operation and that those responsible for informing stake-holders have access to correct and timely updated information. (author)

  8. 303-K Storage Facility closure plan. Revision 2

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-12-15

    Recyclable scrap uranium with zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy, and zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gallon containers) in the 303-K Storage Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy and zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as mixed waste with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 303-K Storage Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040. This closure plan presents a description of the 303-K Storage Facility, the history of materials and waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 303-K Storage Facility. The 303-K Storage Facility is located within the 300-FF-3 (source) and 300-FF-5 (groundwater) operable units, as designated in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology et al. 1992). Contamination in the operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5 is scheduled to be addressed through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 remedial action process. Therefore, all soil remedial action at the 304 Facility will be conducted as part of the CERCLA remedial action of operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5.

  9. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure plan for the Intermediate-Level Transuranic Storage Facility mixed waste container storage units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nolte, E.P.; Spry, M.J.; Stanisich, S.N.

    1992-11-01

    This document describes the proposed plan for clean closure of the Intermediate-Level Transuranic Storage Facility mixed waste container storage units at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure requirements. Descriptions of the location, size, capacity, history, and current status of the units are included. The units will be closed by removing waste containers in storage, and decontamination structures and equipment that may have contacted waste. Sufficient sampling and documentation of all activities will be performed to demonstrate clean closure. A tentative schedule is provided in the form of a milestone chart

  10. What do implementers need in terms of regulatory safety criteria for the post-closure phase?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cahen, B.

    2010-01-01

    Bruno Cahen, Director Safety Division (ANDRA) presented the point of view of the NEA Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) on 'What do implementers need in terms of regulatory safety criteria for the post-closure phase?' B. Cahen acknowledged that the national experience in siting and developing conceptual designs of geological disposal is growing rapidly. It implies increasing opportunities for interactions between implementers and regulators. There has been large development of international guidance in the recent years. Many regulators have already developed a regulatory framework. The implementers need practical, transparent and deliverable regulations. These regulations should draw on experiences gained from development of geological disposal projects. The IGSC has identified five key questions that the RF may focus on: 1. Over what time frame are the waste deemed to present a hazard? 2. Over what time frames are regulatory criteria applied and do they change over time? 3. Over what time frame(s) are safety assessments required to be conducted? 4. How do implementers have to address uncertainties in the long time frames? 5. What happens after cut-offs: are additional analyses needed? What types of arguments are to be used? Stable, understandable and practical criteria mean, namely, that they need to be developed on a strong scientific and societal basis, that there is consistency of safety options and requirements for different types of waste, that, in the longer time frames, the emphasis is given to robust systems, passive safety and multiple safety functions and that the criteria should fit the various phases of the project (siting, designing, operating, closure and post-closure). Experience feedback from safety cases shows that safety priorities depend very much on time frames. The derived safety criteria for the individual components should lead to measurable, verifiable specifications. The assessment of geological repository post-closure safety

  11. Contingency Teaching during Close Reading

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fisher, Douglas; Frey, Nancy

    2015-01-01

    12 teachers were interviewed and observed as they engaged students in close reading. We analyzed their responses and instruction to determine the scaffolds that were used as well as the contingency teaching plans they implemented when students were unable to understand the text.

  12. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2013-01-28

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2012 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: · CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) · CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) · CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) · CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) · CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR)

  13. Volcanic Eruption: Students Develop a Contingency Plan

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meisinger, Philipp; Wittlich, Christian

    2013-04-01

    , causing a blockage and afflux of the Rhine, which, due to the given conditions of a very narrow valley, would lead to excessive flooding affecting even the greater Rhine-Main-region. Not to mention the consequences of a pyroclastic flow, dropping volcanic bombs and further hazardous/disastrous consequences. In comparison to other "potentially active" or "active volcanoes", e.g. the Vesuvius, the Laacher See is scarcely monitored and according to recent publications poorly analyzed in terms of contingency and evacuation plans. This offers space for critical analysis and creative solutions to an existing problem. Short: We need geographers and their knowledge to provide help. Given these facts, the Laacher See could be the layout for a very interesting geography project bringing together previously gained knowledge and understanding of volcanic activities, their destructive powers, consequences and risks in case of an eruption in combination with their topographical characteristics. Your students thereby act the role of a geoscientist developing contingency plans and evacuation zones for the greater Laacher See area. This involves a detailed analysis of the topographical characteristics based on (classic) topographic maps or online via the use of a GIS (e.g. Google maps). In a second step students enlist the possible consequences they already know according to their range and copy them onto a transparency layer on the topographic map. Using such a layer technique students add population density, important topographic features and maybe even anticipated wind directions to their map. The information density and the specific layout of this map are thereby only determined by the student's previous knowledge, their personal abilities and skills and the amount of time provided. This offers the opportunities to even differentiate the task within your group and provide support adjusted to the individual students level. On the basis of their own thematic map your students should be

  14. Waste Dump Closure and Cost Estimates at AngloGold Ashanti ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Michael

    2017-12-02

    Dec 2, 2017 ... 2University of Mines and Technology, P.O. Box 237, Tarkwa, Ghana ... The mine has closure plans for the waste dumps and the closure activity ... incur additional cost, it was advised that the mine should execute the closure and reclamation plan without delay. .... Progressively rehabilitate the project area.

  15. Resource Management and Contingencies in Aerospace Concurrent Engineering

    Science.gov (United States)

    Karpati, Gabe; Hyde, Tupper; Peabody, Hume; Garrison, Matthew

    2012-01-01

    significant concern in designing complex systems implementing new technologies is that while knowledge about the system is acquired incrementally, substantial financial commitments, even make-or-break decisions, must be made upfront, essentially in the unknown. One practice that helps in dealing with this dichotomy is the smart embedding of contingencies and margins in the design to serve as buffers against surprises. This issue presents itself in full force in the aerospace industry, where unprecedented systems are formulated and committed to as a matter of routine. As more and more aerospace mission concepts are generated by concurrent design laboratories, it is imperative that such laboratories apply well thought-out contingency and margin structures to their designs. The first part of this publication provides an overview of resource management techniques and standards used in the aerospace industry. That is followed by a thought provoking treatise on margin policies. The expose presents the actual flight telemetry data recorded by the thermal discipline during several recent NASA Goddard Space Flight Center missions. The margins actually achieved in flight are compared against pre-flight predictions, and the appropriateness and the ramifications of having designed with rigid margins to bounding stacked worst case conditions are assessed. The second half of the paper examines the particular issues associated with the application of contingencies and margins in the concurrent engineering environment. In closure, a discipline-by-discipline disclosure of the contingency and margin policies in use at the Integrated Design Center at NASA s Goddard Space Flight Center is made.

  16. Closure and Sealing Design Calculation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    T. Lahnalampi; J. Case

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of the ''Closure and Sealing Design Calculation'' is to illustrate closure and sealing methods for sealing shafts, ramps, and identify boreholes that require sealing in order to limit the potential of water infiltration. In addition, this calculation will provide a description of the magma that can reduce the consequences of an igneous event intersecting the repository. This calculation will also include a listing of the project requirements related to closure and sealing. The scope of this calculation is to: summarize applicable project requirements and codes relating to backfilling nonemplacement openings, removal of uncommitted materials from the subsurface, installation of drip shields, and erecting monuments; compile an inventory of boreholes that are found in the area of the subsurface repository; describe the magma bulkhead feature and location; and include figures for the proposed shaft and ramp seals. The objective of this calculation is to: categorize the boreholes for sealing by depth and proximity to the subsurface repository; develop drawing figures which show the location and geometry for the magma bulkhead; include the shaft seal figures and a proposed construction sequence; and include the ramp seal figure and a proposed construction sequence. The intent of this closure and sealing calculation is to support the License Application by providing a description of the closure and sealing methods for the Safety Analysis Report. The closure and sealing calculation will also provide input for Post Closure Activities by describing the location of the magma bulkhead. This calculation is limited to describing the final configuration of the sealing and backfill systems for the underground area. The methods and procedures used to place the backfill and remove uncommitted materials (such as concrete) from the repository and detailed design of the magma bulkhead will be the subject of separate analyses or calculations. Post-closure monitoring will not

  17. 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-05-01

    The Hanford Site, located northwest of the city of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials, and activities associated with nuclear energy development. The 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility (LSFF), which was in operation from about 1972 to 1986, was a research laboratory that occupied the former ventilation supply room on the southwest side of the 105-DR Reactor facility. The LSFF was established to provide a means of investigating fire and safety aspects associated with large sodium or other metal alkali fires in the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) facilities. The 105-DR Reactor facility was designed and built in the 1950's and is located in the 100-D Area of the Hanford Site. The building housed the 105-DR defense reactor, which was shut down in 1964. The LSFF was initially used only for engineering-scale alkali metal reaction studies. In addition, the Fusion Safety Support Studies program sponsored intermediate-size safety reaction tests in the LSFF with lithium and lithium lead compounds. The facility has also been used to store and treat alkali metal waste, therefore the LSFF is subject to the regulatory requirements for the storage and treatment of dangerous waste. Closure will be conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610. This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the LSFF as an Alkali Metal Treatment Facility. No future use of the LSFF is expected

  18. 40 CFR 265.112 - Closure plan; amendment of plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... residues and contaminated containment system components, equipment, structures, and soils during partial... contaminated soils, methods for sampling and testing surrounding soils, and criteria for determining the extent of decontamination necessary to satisfy the closure performance standard; and (5) A detailed...

  19. 40 CFR 264.112 - Closure plan; amendment of plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... residues and contaminated containment system components, equipment, structures, and soils during partial... contaminated soils, methods for sampling and testing surrounding soils, and criteria for determining the extent of decontamination required to satisfy the closure performance standard; and (5) A detailed...

  20. Proposed energy conservation contingency plan: emergency restrictions on illuminated advertising and certain gas lighting. Economic impact analysis. Environmental impact assessment. Contingency plan No. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1976-09-01

    In the event of a severe energy supply disruption or in order to fulfill obligations of the U.S. under the International Energy Program, the President may implement one or more energy conservation contingency plans provided for in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975. This report describes the economic impact of restrictions on the use of illuminated advertising and certain gas lighting. The proposed plan would reduce demand for electricity and natural gas. The reduced demand for electricity would result in reduced demand for oil, natural gas, and other fuels used to generate electricity. Since oil and natural gas would be in short supply, the reduced use of these fuels in the generation of electricity could make supplies available to other industries. By contrast, the coal supply would not be affected by these conditions. However, the substitutability of coal for fuels in short supply (especially oil for electric generation) would tend to offset the impact of reduced demand for coal to generate electricity. Advertising expenditures would shift. Expenditures for illuminated outdoor signs would fall and expenditures for advertising in other media (e.g., radio, newspapers) would rise. No significant effect upon aggregate retail sales is anticipated. In summary, microeconomic effects of the measure are negligible and all effects are minor and/or beneficial. These effects are almost lost in the projected economic effects that would result from any severe supply interruption.

  1. Effective communications system for a national oil spill contingency plan in Nigeria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adeyemi-Wilson, O.A.

    1991-01-01

    This paper describes what constitute an Effective Communications System for a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan. It discusses the system available in Nigeria for the oil exploration and producing companies, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the only oil spill response cooperative, the Clean Nigeria Associates (CNA). The Emergency Communications System which the companies had in place for some time, but is no longer functioning because of bureaucratic problems, is mentioned. The paper also mentioned the need to integrate the various separate systems already in use to provide effective communication for proper oil spill response. It recognizes the need for support from the Ministry of Communications and the two government agencies, NITEL and NET which provide telephone services in Nigeria. A proposed Effective Communications System for Nigeria is described

  2. Closure plan for the Test Area North-726 chromate water storage and Test Area North-726A chromate treatment units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, P.J.; Van Brunt, K.M.

    1992-11-01

    This document describes the proposed plan for closure of the Test Area North-726 chromate water storage and Test Area North-726A chromate treatment units at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act interim status closure requirements. The location, size, capacity, and history of the units are described, and their current status is discussed. The units will be closed by treating remaining waste in storage, followed by thorough decontamination of the systems. Sufficient sampling and analysis, and documentation of all activities will be performed to demonstrate clean closure

  3. Engineering sustainable ecosystems: using GIS-based habitat modeling for oil sands mine reclamation and closure planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seel, K.

    1997-01-01

    A GIS model was built to predict the climax vegetation habitat types on reclaimed mine surfaces in the Fort McMurray region of the Mid-Boreal Mixedwood Ecoregion of northwestern Alberta. Regional vegetation habitat types were classified by digital remote sensing using Landsat Thematic Mapper satellite data. Terrain data was derived from a high-resolution digital elevation model. The validated model was applied to the GIS database of Syncrude Canada's Mildred Lake Mine to predict future vegetation patterns based on the final closure mine surface. The results were compared to revegetation and closure plans created by experts to analyze performance and sustainability of reclamation efforts

  4. RCRA closure plan for the Bear Creek Burial Grounds B Area and Walk- In Pits at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    In June 1987, the RCRA Closure/Postclosure Plan for the Bear Creek Burial Grounds (BCBG) was submitted to the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) for review and approval. TDEC modified and issued the plan approved on September 30, 1987. Subsequently, this plan was modified again and approved as Y/TS-395, Revised RCRA Closure Plan for the Bear Creek Burial Grounds (February 29, 1988). Y/TS-395 was initially intended to apply to A Area, C-West, B Area, and the Walk-In Pits of BCBG. However, a concept was developed to include the B Area (non-RCRA regulated) in the Walk-In Pits so that both areas would be closed under one cap. This approach included a tremendous amount of site preparation with an underlying stabilization base of 16 ft of sand for blast protection. The plan was presented to the state of Tennessee on March 8, 1990, and the Department of Energy was requested to review other unique alternatives to close the site. This amended closure plan goes further to include inspection and maintenance criteria along with other details

  5. Thomas Aquinas on Contingency of Nature

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Dvořák, Petr

    2008-01-01

    Roč. 5, č. 2 (2008), s. 185-196 ISSN 1214-8407 R&D Projects: GA AV ČR(CZ) IAA900090602 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z90090514 Keywords : Thomas Aquinas * determinism * contingency Subject RIV: AA - Philosophy ; Religion

  6. Contingency planning for rapid reduction of greenhouse gas emissions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Larsson, Nils K.

    2010-03-01

    Full Text Available The current and predicted levels of greenhouse gas (GHG emissions are, according to the best international scientific estimates, leading the world towards climate change that will have serious consequences for all countries. The problem is aggravated by the tendency of people and institutions not to take action until catastrophic consequences emerge. The history of crises in other sectors show us that reactions are likely to focus on ad-hoc reactions or using plans that are readily available, with negative results. However, the alternative of developing public plans for drastic and rapid reductions is not likely to gain support because of their radical nature. The author therefore proposes that large organizations with direct or indirect control over substantial GHG emissions should prepare private contingency plans for very rapid reductions in emissions, so that more rational and less destructive plans will be available when the appropriate moment comes for last-minute action. Examples of the type of specific plans that may be appropriate are suggested.

    Según las estimaciones científicas internacionales más optimistas, los niveles actuales y previstos de emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero (GEI están llevando al mundo hacia un cambio climático que tendrá graves consecuencias para todos los países. El problema se ve agravado por la tendencia de personas e instituciones a no tomar medidas hasta que no se perciben las catastróficas consecuencias. El historial de crisis ocurridas en otros sectores nos demuestra que las reacciones probablemente se centren en medidas ad hoc o en emplear planes que ya existían, pero sin resultados. Sin embargo, es poco probable que la alternativa al desarrollo de planes públicos para las reducciones drásticas y rápidas consiga el apoyo necesario, debido precisamente a su radicalidad. El autor recomienda por tanto que las grandes organizaciones que tengan control directo o indirecto sobre un

  7. Closure Report for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2012-02-21

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of the 92-Acre Area, which includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that the closure objectives were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). Closure activities began in January 2011 and were completed in January 2012. Closure activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2010). The following closure activities were performed: (1) Construct an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the boreholes, trenches, and pits in the 92-Acre Area; (2) Install use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; and (3) Establish vegetation on the covers. UR documentation is included as Appendix C of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in Revision 1 of the CADD/CAP for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111, and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. When the next request for modification of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit NEV HW0101 is submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), the requirements for post-closure monitoring of the 92-Acre Area will be included. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from NDEP to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 111; and (2) The transfer of CAU 111 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

  8. Closure Report for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of the 92-Acre Area, which includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that the closure objectives were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996 (as amended March 2010)). Closure activities began in January 2011 and were completed in January 2012. Closure activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), 2010). The following closure activities were performed: (1) Construct an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the boreholes, trenches, and pits in the 92-Acre Area; (2) Install use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; and (3) Establish vegetation on the covers. UR documentation is included as Appendix C of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in Revision 1 of the CADD/CAP for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111, and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. When the next request for modification of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit NEV HW0101 is submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), the requirements for post-closure monitoring of the 92-Acre Area will be included. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from NDEP to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 111; and (2) The transfer of CAU 111 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

  9. Contingency plans and successful response strategies for oil spills into rivers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Owens, Edward H. [Polaris Applied Sciences Inc., Bainbridge Island, WA (United States)]. E-mail: ehowens@polarisappliedsciences.com

    2003-07-01

    Oil spilled into a river enters a dynamic environment. An effective response can only succeed if the dynamics of the river system are understood and if the strategies and tactics are designed to match these conditions. Oil is transported downstream at the speed of the current, therefore, an estimate of the rate of movement is essential to identify effective intercept locations. Boom performance is affected by local surface water velocities as entrainment of oil typically begins when velocities exceed 0.4 m/s. However, boom configurations can be effective in current velocities as great as 2.5 m/s. Response operations can be successful if staging or control locations have been identified as part of contingency planning and if booms are deployed to take into account local surface current characteristics. Tracking and control of submerged or sunken oil is difficult and may not be practical. Recovery operations for sunken oil depend on the channel depth, current velocities, and on the distribution and concentration of the oil. (author)

  10. Scalp Wound Closure with K wires: An alternative easier method to scalp wound closure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ramesh, S; Ajik, S

    2012-12-01

    Scalp defects and lacerations present a reconstructive challenge to plastic surgeons. Many methods have been described from the use of skin grafting to rotation flaps. Here we present a method of closure of a contaminated scalp wound with the use of Kirschner wires. In our case, closure of scalp laceration was made possible with the use of 1.4 Kirschner wires and cable tie/ zip tie fasteners. The duration to closure of wound was 10 days. In reconstructing the scalp defect, this method was found to adhere to principles of scalp reconstruction. There were no post operative complications found from the procedure. On initial application on the edge of the wound, tension applied caused the K wires to cut through the wound edge. On replacement of K wires 1cm away from wound edge the procedure was not plagued by any further complication. In conclusion we find scalp closure with Kirschner wires are a simple and effective method for scalp wound closure.

  11. Evaluation of left ventricular function by tissue Doppler and speckle-derived strain rate echocardiography after percutaneous ductus closure.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Amoogzar, Hamid; Shakiba, Ali Mohammad; Derakhshan, Dorna; Ajami, Gholamhossein; Cheriki, Sirous; Borzouee, Mohammad; Edraki, Mohammad Reza; Mehdizadegan, Nima

    2015-01-01

    The aim of this study was to evaluate the left ventricular systolic and diastolic function before and after transcatheter percutaneous patent ductus arteriosus (PDA) closure. 21 children (age >6 months old) diagnosed with hemodynamically significant PDA underwent percutaneous PDA closure. Conventional, Doppler and tissue Doppler imaging and speckled-derived strain rate echocardiography were done at pre-closure, 1 day (early) and 1 month (late) post-closure. Mean age of the patients (female/male: 1.3) was 17.54 ± 24.7 months with the mean PDA diameter of 3.6 ± 0.8 mm. Systolic measures (ejection fraction, shortening fraction) reduced significantly early after PDA closure (P closure status. Early and late diastolic flow velocities of mitral (E M and A M) reduced considerably in early and late post-closure time (P closure. After 1 month, E'M increased considerably. (P = 0.01) but E'M/A'M had an insignificant rise (P > 0.05). E M/E'M ratio did not change in early post-closure but it had a considerable reduction in the subsequent month compared with the pre- and early post-closure (P closure (P closure causes a significant decrease in left ventricular performance early after PDA closure which recovers completely within 1 month. Also PDA size can affect post-closure left ventricular function.

  12. No funeral bells: Public reason in a 'post-truth' age.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jasanoff, Sheila; Simmet, Hilton R

    2017-10-01

    The label 'post-truth' signals for many a troubling turn away from principles of enlightened government. The word 'post', moreover, implies a past when things were radically different and whose loss should be universally mourned. In this paper, we argue that this framing of 'post-truth' is flawed because it is ahistorical and ignores the co-production of knowledge and norms in political contexts. Debates about public facts are necessarily debates about social meanings, rooted in realities that are subjectively experienced as all-encompassing and complete, even when they are partial and contingent. Facts used in policy are normative in four ways: They are embedded in prior choices of which experiential realities matter, produced through processes that reflect institutionalized public values, arbiters of which issues are open to democratic contestation and deliberation, and vehicles through which polities imagine their collective futures. To restore truth to its rightful place in democracy, governments should be held accountable for explaining who generated public facts, in response to which sets of concerns, and with what opportunities for deliberation and closure.

  13. Critical parameters and measurement methods for post closure monitoring: A review of the state of the art and recommendations for further studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morrison, H.F.; Majer, E.L.; Tsang, C.F.

    1987-05-01

    Both NRC and EPA regulations require programs of post closure monitoring to detect substantial and detrimental deviations from expected performance. The unexpected in this case would involve anomalous stress changes that might rupture the canisters or changes in the hydrologic regime that might accelerate corrosion. In the event of leakage brought about by any means transport of radionuclides to the accessible environment could occur through unexpected changes in the hydrologic flow regime caused either by the long term effects of the thermal loading by the waste or by changes in regional stress or hydrology. Studies of performance confirmation have identified six parameters or conditions that should be monitored that are associated with the thermal, mechanical and hydrologic phenomena introduced by the waste heat: temperature, stress, displacement, pore pressure, groundwater velocity and permeability. Since it is the thermal load that continues to increase after decommissioning, and which continues to alter the stress field and the hydrological regime, these same six parameters remain the critical ones in post closure monitoring. At two of the repository sites fractures have been clearly shown to be critical in modelling and performance confirmation; at the tuff site fluid saturation is also a critical parameter and for all the sites estimates of the groundwater velocity through the site are very important. Changes in fracture properties, saturation and fluid flow are thus of continuing importance in post closure monitoring. 14 refs., 19 figs

  14. Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2009-07-31

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NTS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative

  15. Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NTS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the

  16. Contingency Contractor Optimization Phase 3 Sustainment Platform Requirements - Contingency Contractor Optimization Tool - Prototype

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Durfee, Justin David [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Frazier, Christopher Rawls [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Bandlow, Alisa [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Gearhart, Jared Lee [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Jones, Katherine A. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2016-06-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) is in Phase 3 Sustainment of development of a prototype tool, currently referred to as the Contingency Contractor Optimization Tool - Prototype (CCOTP), under the direction of OSD Program Support. CCOT-P is intended to help provide senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders with comprehensive insight into the global availability, readiness and capabilities of the Total Force Mix. The CCOT-P will allow senior decision makers to quickly and accurately assess the impacts, risks and mitigating strategies for proposed changes to force/capabilities assignments, apportionments and allocations options, focusing specifically on contingency contractor planning. During Phase 2 of the program, conducted during fiscal year 2012, Sandia developed an electronic storyboard prototype of the Contingency Contractor Optimization Tool that can be used for communication with senior decision makers and other Operational Contract Support (OCS) stakeholders. Phase 3 used feedback from demonstrations of the electronic storyboard prototype to develop an engineering prototype for planners to evaluate. Sandia worked with the DoD and Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic planning community to get feedback and input to ensure that the engineering prototype was developed to closely align with future planning needs. The intended deployment environment was also a key consideration as this prototype was developed. Initial release of the engineering prototype was done on servers at Sandia in the middle of Phase 3. In 2013, the tool was installed on a production pilot server managed by the OUSD(AT&L) eBusiness Center. The purpose of this document is to specify the CCOT-P engineering prototype platform requirements as of May 2016. Sandia developed the CCOT-P engineering prototype using common technologies to minimize the likelihood of deployment issues. CCOT-P engineering prototype was architected and designed to be as independent as possible of the major deployment

  17. Effective operational oil spill response planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meyers, R.J.

    1991-01-01

    An operational Contingency Plan is one of the single most important aspects of effective oil spill response operations. It is a spill control game plan. A thorough contingency plan provides a set of guidelines that can be used to help direct all phases of spill response activities. More than simple a compilation of lists and rosters, the contingency plan reflects strategic and philosophical elements of spill response that help to ensure a viable response to any spill incident. Facilities and oil carrying vessels should have well maintained contingency plans with these features. This paper describes the requirement for effective oil spill response pans and the training required to exercise them

  18. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2009-07-31

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Waste Disposal Sites' and consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site: CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit; CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; CAS 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and CAS 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. Closure activities were conducted from December 2008 to April 2009 according to the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 139 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2007b). The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Closure activities are summarized. CAU 139, 'Waste Disposal Sites,' consists of seven CASs in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the NTS. The closure alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. This CR provides a summary of completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and confirmation that remediation goals were met. The following site closure activities were performed at CAU 139 as documented in this CR: (1) At CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit, soil and debris were removed and disposed as LLW, and debris was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (2) At CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site, an administrative UR was implemented. No postings or post-closure monitoring are required. (3) At CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris, soil and debris were removed and disposed as LLW, and debris was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (4) At CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit, no work was performed. (5) At CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches, a native soil cover was installed

  19. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 139: Waste Disposal Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 139 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Waste Disposal Sites' and consists of the following seven Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the Nevada Test Site: CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit; CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site; CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris; CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit; CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches; CAS 09-23-01, Area 9 Gravel Gertie; and CAS 09-34-01, Underground Detection Station. Closure activities were conducted from December 2008 to April 2009 according to the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 139 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, 2007b). The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. Closure activities are summarized. CAU 139, 'Waste Disposal Sites,' consists of seven CASs in Areas 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the NTS. The closure alternatives included No Further Action, Clean Closure, and Closure in Place with Administrative Controls. This CR provides a summary of completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and confirmation that remediation goals were met. The following site closure activities were performed at CAU 139 as documented in this CR: (1) At CAS 03-35-01, Burn Pit, soil and debris were removed and disposed as LLW, and debris was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (2) At CAS 04-08-02, Waste Disposal Site, an administrative UR was implemented. No postings or post-closure monitoring are required. (3) At CAS 04-99-01, Contaminated Surface Debris, soil and debris were removed and disposed as LLW, and debris was removed and disposed as sanitary waste. (4) At CAS 06-19-02, Waste Disposal Site/Burn Pit, no work was performed. (5) At CAS 06-19-03, Waste Disposal Trenches, a native soil cover was installed, and a UR was

  20. 190-C Facility <90 Day Storage Pad supplemental information to the Hanford facility contingency plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Little, N.C.

    1996-12-01

    The 190-C Facility <90 Day Storage Pad stores waste oils primarily contaminated with lead generated while draining equipment within the building of residual lubricating oils. Waste oils are packaged and stored in fifty-five gallon drums, or other containers permitted by the Site Specific Waste Management Instruction. Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI) manual BHI-EE-02, Environmental Requirements Procedures, references this document. This document is to be used to demonstrate compliance with the contingency plan requirements in Washington Administrative Code, Chapter 173-303, Dangerous Waste Regulations, for certain Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) waste management units (units). Refer to BHI-EE-02, for additional information

  1. Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NNSS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative

  2. Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2010-11-22

    This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NNSS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed

  3. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2010 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following seven CAUs: (1) CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR); (2) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR); (3) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR); (4) CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR); (5) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR); (6) CAU 484: Surface Debris, Waste Sites, and Burn Area (TTR); and (7) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR).

  4. Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bechtel Nevada

    2005-01-01

    This document is an integrated plan for closing and monitoring two low-level radioactive waste disposal sites at the Nevada Test Site. This document is an integrated plan for closing and monitoring two low-level radioactive waste disposal sites at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) are managed and operated by Bechtel Nevada (BN) for the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). The Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (ICMP) for these sites is based on guidance for developing closure plans issued by the DOE (DOE, 1999a). The plan does not closely follow the format suggested by the DOE guidance to better accommodate differences between the two RWMSs, especially in terms of operations and site characteristics. The modification reduces redundancy and provides a smoother progression of the discussion. Further, much of the information that would be included in the individual plans is the same, and integration provides efficient presentation. A cross-walk between the contents of the ICMP and the DOE guidance is given in Appendix A. Closure and monitoring were integrated because monitoring measures the degree to which the operational and closed disposal facilities are meeting performance objectives specified in the manual to DOE Order O 435.1. Department of Energy Order 435.1 governs management of radioactive waste, and associated with it are Manual DOE M 435.1-1 and Guidance DOE G 435.1-1. The performance objectives are intended to ensure protection of workers, the public, and the environment from radiological exposure associated with the RWMSs now and in the future

  5. Exacerbation of Brain Injury by Post-Stroke Exercise Is Contingent Upon Exercise Initiation Timing

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Fengwu Li

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available Accumulating evidence has demonstrated that post-stroke physical rehabilitation may reduce morbidity. The effectiveness of post-stroke exercise, however, appears to be contingent upon exercise initiation. This study assessed the hypothesis that very early exercise exacerbates brain injury, induces reactive oxygen species (ROS generation, and promotes energy failure. A total of 230 adult male Sprague-Dawley rats were subjected to middle cerebral artery (MCA occlusion for 2 h, and randomized into eight groups, including two sham injury control groups, three non-exercise and three exercise groups. Exercise was initiated after 6 h, 24 h and 3 days of reperfusion. Twenty-four hours after completion of exercise (and at corresponding time points in non-exercise controls, infarct volumes and apoptotic cell death were examined. Early brain oxidative metabolism was quantified by examining ROS, ATP and NADH levels 0.5 h after completion of exercise. Furthermore, protein expressions of angiogenic growth factors were measured in order to determine whether post-stroke angiogenesis played a role in rehabilitation. As expected, ischemic stroke resulted in brain infarction, apoptotic cell death and ROS generation, and diminished NADH and ATP production. Infarct volumes and apoptotic cell death were enhanced (p < 0.05 by exercise that was initiated after 6 h of reperfusion, but decreased by late exercise (24 h, 3 days. This exacerbated brain injury at 6 h was associated with increased ROS levels (p < 0.05, and decreased (p < 0.05 NADH and ATP levels. In conclusion, very early exercise aggravated brain damage, and early exercise-induced energy failure with ROS generation may underlie the exacerbation of brain injury. These results shed light on the manner in which exercise initiation timing may affect post-stroke rehabilitation.

  6. Revised RCRA closure plan for the Interim Drum Yard (S-030) at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, C.M.

    1994-09-01

    The Interim Drum Yard (IDY) facility is a containerized waste storage area located in the Y-12 exclusion area. It was used to store waste materials which are regulated by RCRA (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); uranyl nitrate solutions were also stored there. The closure plan outlines the actions required to achieve closure of IDY and is being submitted in accordance with TN Rule 1200-1-11.05(7) and 40 CFR 265.110

  7. The plan to coordinate NEHRP post-earthquake investigations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Holzer, Thomas L.; Borcherdt, Roger D.; Comartin, Craig D.; Hanson, Robert D.; Scawthorn, Charles R.; Tierney, Kathleen; Youd, T. Leslie

    2003-01-01

    This is the plan to coordinate domestic and foreign post-earthquake investigations supported by the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP). The plan addresses coordination of both the NEHRP agencies—Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Science Foundation (NSF), and U. S. Geological Survey (USGS)—and their partners. The plan is a framework for both coordinating what is going to be done and identifying responsibilities for post-earthquake investigations. It does not specify what will be done. Coordination is addressed in various time frames ranging from hours to years after an earthquake. The plan includes measures for (1) gaining rapid and general agreement on high-priority research opportunities, and (2) conducting the data gathering and fi eld studies in a coordinated manner. It deals with identifi cation, collection, processing, documentation, archiving, and dissemination of the results of post-earthquake work in a timely manner and easily accessible format.

  8. 216-A-10 Crib supplemental information to the Hanford Facility Contingency Plan (DOE/RL-93-75)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingle, S.J.

    1996-05-01

    This document is a unit-specific contingency plan for the 216-A-10 Crib. The Crib is a landfill that received process condensate from the 202-A building Plutonium/Uranium Extraction Plant from 1956 to 1987. The crib has not received waste since March 1987 and will be closed under final facility standards. Waste management activities are no longer required at the crib, and it does not present significant hazard to adjacent units, personnel or the environment. It is unlikely that any incidents presenting hazards to the public health or the environment would occur at the 216-A-10 Crib

  9. State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) Checklist for the 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility Closure Plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-09-01

    The Hanford Site, located northwest of the city of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials, as well as for activities associated with nuclear energy development. The 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility (LSFF), which was in operation from about 1972 to 1986, was a research laboratory that occupied the former ventilation supply room on the southwest side of the 105-DR Reactor facility. The LSFF was established to provide means of investigating fire and safety aspects associated with large sodium or other metal alkali fires in the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) facilities. The 105-DR Reactor facility was designed and built in the 1950's and is located in the 100-D Area of the Hanford Site. The building housed the DR defense reactor, which was shut down in 1964. The LSFF is subject to the regulatory requirements for the storage and treatment of dangerous wastes. Clean closure is the proposed method of closure for the LSFF. Closure will be conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610 (Ecology 1989). This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of wastes managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the LSFF as an Alkali Metal Treatment Facility. No future use of the LSFF is expected.

  10. Climate change and landscape development in post-closure safety assessment of solid radioactive waste disposal: Results of an initiative of the IAEA.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lindborg, T; Thorne, M; Andersson, E; Becker, J; Brandefelt, J; Cabianca, T; Gunia, M; Ikonen, A T K; Johansson, E; Kangasniemi, V; Kautsky, U; Kirchner, G; Klos, R; Kowe, R; Kontula, A; Kupiainen, P; Lahdenperä, A-M; Lord, N S; Lunt, D J; Näslund, J-O; Nordén, M; Norris, S; Pérez-Sánchez, D; Proverbio, A; Riekki, K; Rübel, A; Sweeck, L; Walke, R; Xu, S; Smith, G; Pröhl, G

    2018-03-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has coordinated an international project addressing climate change and landscape development in post-closure safety assessments of solid radioactive waste disposal. The work has been supported by results of parallel on-going research that has been published in a variety of reports and peer reviewed journal articles. The project is due to be described in detail in a forthcoming IAEA report. Noting the multi-disciplinary nature of post-closure safety assessments, here, an overview of the work is given to provide researchers in the broader fields of radioecology and radiological safety assessment with a review of the work that has been undertaken. It is hoped that such dissemination will support and promote integrated understanding and coherent treatment of climate change and landscape development within an overall assessment process. The key activities undertaken in the project were: identification of the key processes that drive environmental change (mainly those associated with climate and climate change), and description of how a relevant future may develop on a global scale; development of a methodology for characterising environmental change that is valid on a global scale, showing how modelled global changes in climate can be downscaled to provide information that may be needed for characterising environmental change in site-specific assessments, and illustrating different aspects of the methodology in a number of case studies that show the evolution of site characteristics and the implications for the dose assessment models. Overall, the study has shown that quantitative climate and landscape modelling has now developed to the stage that it can be used to define an envelope of climate and landscape change scenarios at specific sites and under specific greenhouse-gas emissions assumptions that is suitable for use in quantitative post-closure performance assessments. These scenarios are not predictions of the future, but

  11. Dynamic Contingency Analysis Tool

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    2016-01-14

    The Dynamic Contingency Analysis Tool (DCAT) is an open-platform and publicly available methodology to help develop applications that aim to improve the capabilities of power system planning engineers to assess the impact and likelihood of extreme contingencies and potential cascading events across their systems and interconnections. Outputs from the DCAT will help find mitigation solutions to reduce the risk of cascading outages in technically sound and effective ways. The current prototype DCAT implementation has been developed as a Python code that accesses the simulation functions of the Siemens PSS/E planning tool (PSS/E). It has the following features: It uses a hybrid dynamic and steady-state approach to simulating the cascading outage sequences that includes fast dynamic and slower steady-state events. It integrates dynamic models with protection scheme models for generation, transmission, and load. It models special protection systems (SPSs)/remedial action schemes (RASs) and automatic and manual corrective actions. Overall, the DCAT attempts to bridge multiple gaps in cascading-outage analysis in a single, unique prototype tool capable of automatically simulating and analyzing cascading sequences in real systems using multiprocessor computers.While the DCAT has been implemented using PSS/E in Phase I of the study, other commercial software packages with similar capabilities can be used within the DCAT framework.

  12. Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities for disused sealed radioactive sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Seunghee; Kim, Juyoul

    2017-01-01

    Highlights: • Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facility for DSRS was performed. • Engineered vault and rock-cavern type were considered for normal and well scenario. • 14 C, 226 Ra, 241 Am were primary nuclides contributing large portion of exposure dose. • Near surface disposal of DSRSs containing 14 C, 226 Ra and 241 Am should be restricted. - Abstract: Great attention has been recently paid to the post-closure safety assessment of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) around the world. Although the amount of volume of DSRSs generated from industry, medicine and research and education organization was relatively small compared with radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants, some DSRSs can pose a significant hazard to human health due to their high activities and long half-lives, if not appropriately managed and disposed. In this study, post-closure safety assessment was carried out for DSRSs generated from 1991 to 2014 in Korea in order to ensure long-term safety of near surface disposal facilities. Two kinds of disposal options were considered, i.e., engineered vault type disposal facility and rock-cavern type disposal facility. Rock-cavern type disposal facility has been under operation in Gyeongju city, republic of Korea since August 2015 and engineered vault type disposal facility will be constructed until December 2020 in the vicinity of rock-cavern disposal facility. Assessment endpoint was individual dose to the member of critical group, which was modeled by GoldSim, which has been widely used as probabilistic risk analysis software based on Monte Carlo simulation in the area of safety assessment of radioactive waste facilities. In normal groundwater scenario, the maximum exposure dose was extremely low, approximately 1 × 10 −7 mSv/yr, for both disposal options and satisfied the regulatory limit of 0.1 mSv/yr. However, in the

  13. National contingency plan product schedule data base

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Putukian, J.; Hiltabrand, R.R.

    1993-01-01

    During oil spills there are always proposals by the technical community and industry to use chemical agents to help in oil spill cleanups. Federal Clean Water Act regulations require that any chemical agents that the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC) wants to use for oil cleanup be listed on the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) National Contingency Plan (NCP) Product Schedule. Chemical countermeasures are among the most controversial, complex, and time-critical issues facing decision-making officials choosing response methods to use on coastal oil spills. There are situations in which dispersants are likely to be one of the most appropriate counter-measure strategies. Dispersants are most effective when applied to fresh oil, and their effectiveness dramatically decreases as the oil weathers, which can begin in as little as 24 hours. To logistically implement dispersant use, a decision would need to be made within roughly the first 4 hours after the release. Most of the information that the FOSC needs to make the determination to use a specific chemical agent exists in manuals, EPA bulletins, and the published literature. This information is not in an easy-to-use format under field emergency conditions. Hence the need to collect and disseminate the information in an automated data base. The sources for the information in this data base are the following. Published results of tests performed by Environment Canada; EPA bulletins associated with the NCP Product Schedule; Published results of tests by the chemical industry. The data base resides on a Macintosh computer and contains information about 70 NCP products, including dispersants, surface collecting agents, and biological additives. It contains information on physical properties, toxicity, heavy metal content, safety precautions, use conditions, etc

  14. Comparing over-the-scope clip versus endoloop and clips (KING closure) for access site closure: a randomized experimental study

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Martínek, J.; Ryska, O.; Tučková, I.; Filípková, T.; Doležel, R.; Juhás, Štefan; Motlík, Jan; Zavoral, M.; Ryska, M.

    2013-01-01

    Roč. 27, č. 4 (2013), s. 1203-1210 ISSN 0930-2794 R&D Projects: GA MZd NS9994 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z50450515 Keywords : NOTES * gastrotomy closure * rectotomy closure Subject RIV: FJ - Surgery incl. Transplants Impact factor: 3.313, year: 2013

  15. Temporal contingency.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gallistel, C R; Craig, Andrew R; Shahan, Timothy A

    2014-01-01

    Contingency, and more particularly temporal contingency, has often figured in thinking about the nature of learning. However, it has never been formally defined in such a way as to make it a measure that can be applied to most animal learning protocols. We use elementary information theory to define contingency in such a way as to make it a measurable property of almost any conditioning protocol. We discuss how making it a measurable construct enables the exploration of the role of different contingencies in the acquisition and performance of classically and operantly conditioned behavior. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  16. Temporal contingency

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gallistel, C.R.; Craig, Andrew R.; Shahan, Timothy A.

    2015-01-01

    Contingency, and more particularly temporal contingency, has often figured in thinking about the nature of learning. However, it has never been formally defined in such a way as to make it a measure that can be applied to most animal learning protocols. We use elementary information theory to define contingency in such a way as to make it a measurable property of almost any conditioning protocol. We discuss how making it a measurable construct enables the exploration of the role of different contingencies in the acquisition and performance of classically and operantly conditioned behavior. PMID:23994260

  17. Decentralized Planning for Pre-Conflict and Post-Conflict ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Decentralized Planning for Pre-Conflict and Post-Conflict Management in the Bawku Municipal ... institutional arrangements for conflict monitoring and evaluation. Such processes are 'sine qua non' to pre-conflict and post-conflict prevention.

  18. Hanford site post-NPH building inspection plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagenblast, G.R. Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-01-01

    This plan establishes consistent post-NPH building inspection procedures and defines a procedure for prioritization of buildings for inspection to ensure the safety of facilities prior to reentry. Qualification of systems for restart of operation is not included. This plan takes advantage, where possible, of existing national procedures for post-NPH inspection of buildings, of existing structural design and evaluation documentation of Hanford facilities, and current and proposed seismic instrumentation located throughout the Hanford site. A list of buildings, prioritized according to current building safety function and building vulnerability (without regard for or information about a damaging natural forces event) is provided

  19. Sustainable Mining Environment: Technical Review of Post-mining Plans

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Restu Juniah

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available The mining industry exists because humans need mining commodities to meet their daily needs such as motor vehicles, mobile phones, electronic equipment and others. Mining commodities as mentioned in Government Regulation No. 23 of 2010 on Implementation of Mineral and Coal Mining Business Activities are radioactive minerals, metal minerals, nonmetallic minerals, rocks and coal. Mineral and coal mining is conducted to obtain the mining commodities through production operations. Mining and coal mining companies have an obligation to ensure that the mining environment in particular after the post production operation or post mining continues. The survey research aims to examine technically the post-mining plan in coal mining of PT Samantaka Batubara in Indragiri Hulu Regency of Riau Province towards the sustainability of the mining environment. The results indicate that the post-mining plan of PT Samantaka Batubara has met the technical aspects required in post mining planning for a sustainable mining environment. Postponement of post-mining land of PT Samantaka Batubara for garden and forest zone. The results of this study are expected to be useful and can be used by stakeholders, academics, researchers, practitioners and associations of mining, and the environment.

  20. Monitoring calculation of closure change of Extradosed Cable-stayed Bridge

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shi, Jing Xian; Ran, Zhi Hong

    2018-06-01

    During the construction of extradosed cable-stayed bridge in Yunnan province, China, the construction unit has made certain changes in the construction process of the closure section due to environmental restrictions: remove the hanging basket after the closure, the sling shall not be provided in closure section, the function of the sling is realized by the hanging basket on the 16th beam. In case of this change, the bridge has been constructed to section 15th. In order to ensure the smooth and orderly progress of each stage in the closure phase, this article is arranged according to the construction plan, appropriate adjustment of related procedures, checking the bridge safety at all stages of construction, the stress and force of the main girder are compared to ensure the safety of the construction after closure changes. Adjust the height of the beam of the 16th and 17th to adapt the new construction plan, and the bridge closure smoothly.

  1. Evaluation of a modified contingency management intervention for consistent attendance in therapeutic workplace participants.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wong, Conrad J; Dillon, Erin M; Sylvest, Christine; Silverman, Kenneth

    2004-06-11

    In a therapeutic workplace business, drug abuse patients are hired as data entry operators and paid to perform data entry work contingent upon documented drug abstinence. Reliable attendance has been difficult to maintain despite the opportunity for operators to earn a living wage, 6 h per day, 5 days per week. A within-subject reversal design experiment evaluated a contingency management intervention that allowed for flexibility regarding when operators could arrive to work, yet maintained a contingency for reliable workplace attendance. Results from a within-subject reversal design experiment demonstrated the contingency management intervention to be effective in increasing the frequency of completed work shifts in four of five operators. Repeated measures ANOVA and Tukey's post-hoc tests of grouped data showed that the contingency management intervention significantly (P workplace participants.

  2. 105-DR large sodium fire facility closure Plan. Revision 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruck, F.A. III.

    1995-03-01

    The 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility (LSFF), which was operated 1972-1986, was a research laboratory that occupied the former ventilation supply room on the SW side of the 105-DR Reactor Facility. (The 105-DR defense reactor was shut down in 1964.) LSFF was used to investigate fire and safety aspects of large sodium or other metal alkali fires in the LMFBR facilities; it was also used to store and treat alkali metal waste. This closure plan presents a description of the unit, the history of the waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the LSFF as an Alkali Metal Treatment Facility. No future use of LSFF is expected. It is located within the 100-DR-2 (source) and 100-HR-3 (groundwater) operable units, which will be addressed through the RCRA facility investigation/corrective measures study process

  3. Project Rulison: post-shot plans and evaluations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1969-12-01

    Project Rulison post-shot plans and evaluations are discussed and include physical characteristics of the Rulison cavity; pressure and temperature expected in the cavity; amount, nature, and distribution of radioactivity in the cavity; reentry plan; radioactive species which may be encountered during reentry; public safety considerations arising from release of radioactivity; procedures to assure public safety; and the radiological safety plan. Maximum hypothetical accidents and ecological considerations are discussed in the appendices.

  4. Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facilities for disused sealed radioactive sources

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Seunghee; Kim, Juyoul, E-mail: gracemi@fnctech.com

    2017-03-15

    Highlights: • Post-closure safety assessment of near surface disposal facility for DSRS was performed. • Engineered vault and rock-cavern type were considered for normal and well scenario. • {sup 14}C, {sup 226}Ra, {sup 241}Am were primary nuclides contributing large portion of exposure dose. • Near surface disposal of DSRSs containing {sup 14}C, {sup 226}Ra and {sup 241}Am should be restricted. - Abstract: Great attention has been recently paid to the post-closure safety assessment of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) disposal facility for disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) around the world. Although the amount of volume of DSRSs generated from industry, medicine and research and education organization was relatively small compared with radioactive wastes from commercial nuclear power plants, some DSRSs can pose a significant hazard to human health due to their high activities and long half-lives, if not appropriately managed and disposed. In this study, post-closure safety assessment was carried out for DSRSs generated from 1991 to 2014 in Korea in order to ensure long-term safety of near surface disposal facilities. Two kinds of disposal options were considered, i.e., engineered vault type disposal facility and rock-cavern type disposal facility. Rock-cavern type disposal facility has been under operation in Gyeongju city, republic of Korea since August 2015 and engineered vault type disposal facility will be constructed until December 2020 in the vicinity of rock-cavern disposal facility. Assessment endpoint was individual dose to the member of critical group, which was modeled by GoldSim, which has been widely used as probabilistic risk analysis software based on Monte Carlo simulation in the area of safety assessment of radioactive waste facilities. In normal groundwater scenario, the maximum exposure dose was extremely low, approximately 1 × 10{sup −7} mSv/yr, for both disposal options and satisfied the regulatory limit

  5. [Post-marketing drug safety-risk management plan(RMP)].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ezaki, Asami; Hori, Akiko

    2013-03-01

    The Guidance for Risk Management Plan(RMP)was released by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in April 2012. The RMP consists of safety specifications, pharmacovigilance plans and risk minimization action plans. In this paper, we outline post-marketing drug safety operations in PMDA and the RMP, with examples of some anticancer drugs.

  6. Development of database and QA systems for post closure performance assessment on a potential HLW repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Y. S.; Kim, S. G.; Kang, C. H.

    2002-01-01

    In TSPA of long-term post closure radiological safety on permanent disposal of HLW in Korea, appropriate management of input and output data through QA is necessary. The robust QA system is developed using the T2R3 principles applicable for five major steps in R and D's. The proposed system is implemented in the web-based system so that all participants in TSRA are able to access the system. In addition, the internet based input database for TSPA is developed. Currently data from literature surveys, domestic laboratory and field experiments as well as expert elicitation are applied for TSPA

  7. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure report: Area 2, Bitcutter and Postshot Containment Shops

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Petrello, Jaclyn [Nevada Field Office, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    1996-12-01

    Post-closure monitoring requirements for CASs 02-20-01 (Bitcutter/Ps Inj.) and Wells (3) (RCRA) and CAS 02-20-03 (Wastewater Pit) are managed through the RCRA permit, which is renewed every 5 years. Post-closure monitoring requirements are described in that permit.

  8. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act closure report: Area 2, Bitcutter and Postshot Containment Shops

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petrello, Jaclyn

    1996-01-01

    Post-closure monitoring requirements for CASs 02-20-01 (Bitcutter/Ps Inj.) and Wells (3) (RCRA) and CAS 02-20-03 (Wastewater Pit) are managed through the RCRA permit, which is renewed every 5 years. Post-closure monitoring requirements are described in that permit.

  9. 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility closure plan. Revision 1

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-05-01

    The Hanford Site, located northwest of the city of Richland, Washington, houses reactors, chemical-separation systems, and related facilities used for the production of special nuclear materials, and activities associated with nuclear energy development. The 105-DR Large Sodium Fire Facility (LSFF), which was in operation from about 1972 to 1986, was a research laboratory that occupied the former ventilation supply room on the southwest side of the 105-DR Reactor facility. The LSFF was established to provide a means of investigating fire and safety aspects associated with large sodium or other metal alkali fires in the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) facilities. The 105-DR Reactor facility was designed and built in the 1950`s and is located in the 100-D Area of the Hanford Site. The building housed the 105-DR defense reactor, which was shut down in 1964. The LSFF was initially used only for engineering-scale alkali metal reaction studies. In addition, the Fusion Safety Support Studies program sponsored intermediate-size safety reaction tests in the LSFF with lithium and lithium lead compounds. The facility has also been used to store and treat alkali metal waste, therefore the LSFF is subject to the regulatory requirements for the storage and treatment of dangerous waste. Closure will be conducted pursuant to the requirements of the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-610. This closure plan presents a description of the facility, the history of waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the LSFF as an Alkali Metal Treatment Facility. No future use of the LSFF is expected.

  10. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2008

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2008 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following ten CAUs: CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) CAU 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench (TTR) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) CAU 423: Area 3 Underground Discharge Point, Building 0360 (TTR) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR) CAU 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6 (TTR) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) CAU 484: Surface Debris, Waste Sites, and Burn Area (TTR) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR)

  11. Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2008

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2009-03-19

    This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed Corrective Action Unit (CAU) sites located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. This report covers calendar year 2008 and includes inspection and repair activities completed at the following ten CAUs: CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) CAU 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench (TTR) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) CAU 423: Area 3 Underground Discharge Point, Building 0360 (TTR) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) CAU 426: Cactus Spring Waste Trenches (TTR) CAU 427: Area 3 Septic Waste Systems 2, 6 (TTR) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) CAU 484: Surface Debris, Waste Sites, and Burn Area (TTR) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR)

  12. 14 CFR 259.4 - Contingency plan for lengthy tarmac delays.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... (AVIATION PROCEEDINGS) ECONOMIC REGULATIONS ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR AIRLINE PASSENGERS § 259.4 Contingency..., assurance that the air carrier will provide adequate food and potable water no later than two hours after... flights covered in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, and for the trigger point for food and water covered...

  13. Repeated Activation of a CS-US-Contingency Memory Results in Sustained Conditioned Responding.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Joos, Els; Vansteenwegen, Debora; Vervliet, Bram; Hermans, Dirk

    2013-01-01

    Individuals seem to differ in conditionability, i.e., the ease by which the contingent presentation of two stimuli will lead to a conditioned response. In contemporary learning theory, individual differences in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders are, among others, explained by individual differences in temperamental variables (Mineka and Zinbarg, 2006). One such individual difference variable is how people process a learning experience when the conditioning stimuli are no longer present. Repeatedly thinking about the conditioning experience, as in worry or rumination, might prolong the initial (fear) reactions and as such, might leave certain individuals more vulnerable to developing an anxiety disorder. However, in human conditioning research, relatively little attention has been devoted to the processing of a memory trace after its initial acquisition, despite its potential influences on subsequent performance. Post-acquisition processing can be induced by mental reiteration of a conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus (CS-US)-contingency. Using a human conditioned suppression paradigm, we investigated the effect of repeated activations of a CS-US-contingency memory on the level of conditioned responding at a later test. Results of three experiments showed more sustained responding to a "rehearsed" CS+ as compared to a "non-rehearsed" CS+. Moreover, the second experiment showed no effect of rehearsal when only the CS was rehearsed instead of the CS-US-contingency. The third experiment demonstrated that mental CS-US-rehearsal has the same effect regardless of whether it was cued by the CS and a verbal reference to the US or by a neutral signal, making the rehearsal "purely mental." In sum, it was demonstrated that post-acquisition activation of a CS-US-contingency memory can impact conditioned responding, underlining the importance of post-acquisition processes in conditioning. This might indicate that individuals who are more prone to mentally

  14. Repeated activation of a CS-US-contingency memory results in sustained conditioned responding

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Els eJoos

    2013-05-01

    Full Text Available Individuals seem to differ in conditionability, i.e., the ease by which the contingent presentation of two stimuli will lead to a conditioned response. In contemporary learning theory, individual differences in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders are, among others, explained by individual differences in temperamental variables (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006. One such individual difference variable is how people process a learning experience when the conditioning stimuli are no longer present. Repeatedly thinking about the conditioning experience, as in worry or rumination, might prolong the initial (fear reactions and as such, might leave certain individuals more vulnerable to developing an anxiety disorder.However, in human conditioning research, relatively little attention has been devoted to the processing of a memory trace after its initial acquisition, despite its potential influences on subsequent performance. Post-acquisition processing can be induced by mental reiteration of a CS-US-contingency. Using a human conditioned suppression paradigm, we investigated the effect of repeated activations of a CS-US-contingency memory on the level of conditioned responding at a later test. Results of three experiments showed more sustained responding to a ‘rehearsed’ CS+ as compared to a ‘non-rehearsed’ CS+. Moreover, the second experiment showed no effect of rehearsal when only the CS was rehearsed instead of the CS-US-contingency. The third experiment demonstrated that mental CS-US-rehearsal has the same effect regardless of whether it was cued by the CS and a verbal reference to the US or by a neutral signal, making the rehearsal ‘purely mental’. In sum, it was demonstrated that post-acquisition activation of a CS-US-contingency memory can impact conditioned responding, underlining the importance of post-acquisition processes in conditioning. This might indicate that individuals who are more prone to mentally rehearse

  15. Repeated Activation of a CS-US-Contingency Memory Results in Sustained Conditioned Responding

    Science.gov (United States)

    Joos, Els; Vansteenwegen, Debora; Vervliet, Bram; Hermans, Dirk

    2013-01-01

    Individuals seem to differ in conditionability, i.e., the ease by which the contingent presentation of two stimuli will lead to a conditioned response. In contemporary learning theory, individual differences in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders are, among others, explained by individual differences in temperamental variables (Mineka and Zinbarg, 2006). One such individual difference variable is how people process a learning experience when the conditioning stimuli are no longer present. Repeatedly thinking about the conditioning experience, as in worry or rumination, might prolong the initial (fear) reactions and as such, might leave certain individuals more vulnerable to developing an anxiety disorder. However, in human conditioning research, relatively little attention has been devoted to the processing of a memory trace after its initial acquisition, despite its potential influences on subsequent performance. Post-acquisition processing can be induced by mental reiteration of a conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus (CS-US)-contingency. Using a human conditioned suppression paradigm, we investigated the effect of repeated activations of a CS-US-contingency memory on the level of conditioned responding at a later test. Results of three experiments showed more sustained responding to a “rehearsed” CS+ as compared to a “non-rehearsed” CS+. Moreover, the second experiment showed no effect of rehearsal when only the CS was rehearsed instead of the CS-US-contingency. The third experiment demonstrated that mental CS-US-rehearsal has the same effect regardless of whether it was cued by the CS and a verbal reference to the US or by a neutral signal, making the rehearsal “purely mental.” In sum, it was demonstrated that post-acquisition activation of a CS-US-contingency memory can impact conditioned responding, underlining the importance of post-acquisition processes in conditioning. This might indicate that individuals who are more prone

  16. Using contingent choice methods to assess consumer preferences about health plan design.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marquis, M Susan; Buntin, Melinda Beeuwkes; Kapur, Kanika; Yegian, Jill M

    2005-01-01

    American insurers are designing products to contain health care costs by making consumers financially responsible for their choices. Little is known about how consumers will view these new designs. Our objective is to examine consumer preferences for selected benefit designs. We used the contingent choice method to assess willingness to pay for six health plan attributes. Our sample included subscribers to individual health insurance products in California, US. We used fitted logistic regression models to explore how preferences for the more generous attributes varied with the additional premium and with the characteristics of the subscriber. High quality was the most highly valued attribute based on the amounts consumers report they are willing to pay. They were also willing to pay substantial monthly premiums to reduce their overall financial risk. Individuals in lower health were willing to pay more to reduce their financial risk than individuals in better health. Consumers may prefer tiered-benefit designs to those that involve overall increases in cost sharing. More consumer information is needed to help consumers better evaluate the costs and benefits of their insurance choices.

  17. Economic evaluation of closure cap barrier materials study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Serrato, M.G.; Bhutani, J.S.; Mead, S.M.

    1993-09-01

    Volume II of the Economic Evaluation of the Closure Cap Barrier Materials, Revision I contains detailed cost estimates for closure cap barrier materials. The cost estimates incorporate the life cycle costs for a generic hazardous waste seepage basin closure cap under the RCRA Post Closure Period of thirty years. The economic evaluation assessed six barrier material categories. Each of these categories consists of several composite cover system configurations, which were used to develop individual cost estimates. The information contained in this report is not intended to be used as a cost estimating manual. This information provides the decision makers with the ability to screen barrier materials, cover system configurations, and identify cost-effective materials for further consideration.

  18. Economic evaluation of closure cap barrier materials study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Serrato, M.G.; Bhutani, J.S.; Mead, S.M.

    1993-09-01

    Volume II of the Economic Evaluation of the Closure Cap Barrier Materials, Revision I contains detailed cost estimates for closure cap barrier materials. The cost estimates incorporate the life cycle costs for a generic hazardous waste seepage basin closure cap under the RCRA Post Closure Period of thirty years. The economic evaluation assessed six barrier material categories. Each of these categories consists of several composite cover system configurations, which were used to develop individual cost estimates. The information contained in this report is not intended to be used as a cost estimating manual. This information provides the decision makers with the ability to screen barrier materials, cover system configurations, and identify cost-effective materials for further consideration

  19. POST-CLOSURE INSPECTION REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 92: AREA 6 DECON POND FACILITY, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Post-Closure Inspection Report provides an analysis and summary of inspections for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. CAU 92 was closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B Operational Permit (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), 1995) and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996. Closure activities were completed on February 16, 1999, and the Closure Report (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999) was approved and a Notice of Completion issued by the NDEP on May 11, 1999. CAU 92 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 06-04-01, Decon Pad Oil/Water Separator; and CAS 06-05-02, Decontamination Pond (RCRA). Both CASs have use restrictions; however, only CAS 06-05-02 requires post-closure inspections. Visual inspections of the cover and fencing at CAS 06-05-02 are performed quarterly. Additional inspections are conducted if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.28 centimeters (cm) (0.50 inches [in]) in a 24-hour period. This report covers calendar year 2005. Quarterly site inspections were performed in March, June, September, and December of 2005. All observations indicated the continued integrity of the unit. No issues or concerns were noted, and no corrective actions were necessary. Copies of the inspection checklists and field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix A. Five additional inspections were performed after precipitation events that exceeded 1.28 cm (0.50 in) within a 24-hour period during 2005. No significant changes in site conditions were noted during these inspections, and no corrective actions were necessary. Copies of the inspection checklists and field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix A. Precipitation records for 2005 are included in Appendix C

  20. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) closure sumamry for the Uranium Treatment Unit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    This closure summary has been prepared for the Uranium Treatment Unit (UTU) located at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The actions required to achieve closure of the UTU area are outlined in the Closure Plan, submitted to and approved by the Tennessee Department of Environmental and Conservation staff, respectively. The UTU was used to store and treat waste materials that are regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. This closure summary details all steps that were performed to close the UTU in accordance with the approved plan

  1. Streamlined approach for environmental restoration work plan for Corrective Action Unit 126: Closure of aboveground storage tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-07-01

    This plan addresses the closure of several aboveground storage tanks in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site. The unit is currently identified as Corrective Action Unit 126 in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order and is listed as having six Corrective Action Sites. This plan addresses the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration closure for five of the six sites. Four of the CASs are located at the Engine Test Stand complex and one is located in the Central Support Area. The sites consist of aboveground tanks, two of which were used to store diesel fuel and one stored Nalcool (an antifreeze mixture). The remaining tanks were used as part of a water demineralization process and stored either sulfuric acid or sodium hydroxide, and one was used as a charcoal adsorption furnace. Closure will be completed by removal of the associated piping, tank supports and tanks using a front end loader, backhoe, and/or crane. When possible, the tanks will be salvaged as scrap metal. The piping that is not removed will be sealed using a cement grout

  2. [Scientific basis of environmental health contingency planning for a coastal oil spill].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Young Min; Cheong, Hae Kwan; Kim, Jong Ho; Kim, Jong Hun; Ko, Kumsook; Ha, Mina

    2009-03-01

    This study presents a scientific basis for the establishment of an environmental health contingency plan for dealing with accidental coastal oil spills and suggests some strategies for use in an environmental health emergency. We reviewed the existing literature, and analyzed the various fundamental factors involved in response strategies for oil spill. Our analysis included data derived from Hebei Spirit oil spill and used air dispersion modeling. Spill amounts of more than 1,000 kl can affect the health of residents along the coast, especially those who belong to vulnerable groups. Almost 30% of South Korean population lives in the vicinity of the coast. The area that is at the highest risk for a spill and that has the greatest number of people at risk is the stretch of coastline from Busan to Tongyeong. The most prevalent types of oil spilt in Korean waters have been crude oil and bunker-C oil, both of which have relatively high specific gravity and contain volatile organic compounds, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and metals. In the case of a spill of more than 1,000 kl, it may be necessary to evacuate vulnerable and sensitive groups. The government should establish environmental health planning that considers the spill amount, the types of oil, and the distance between the spot of the accident and the coast, and should assemble a response team that includes environmental health specialists to prepare for the future oil spill.

  3. POST-CLOSURE INSPECTION REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 92: AREA 6 DECON PAD FACILITY, NEVADA. TEST SITE NEVADA, FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 2004 - DECEMBER 2004

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2005-01-01

    This Post-Closure Inspection Report provides an analysis and summary of inspections for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. CAU 92 was closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B Operational Permit (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, 1995) and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 on May 11, 1999. CAU 92 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): CAS 06-04-01, Decon Pad oil/Water Separator; and CAS 06-05-02, Decontamination Pond (RCRA). Both CASs have use restrictions; however, only CAS 06-05-02, Decontamination Pond (RCRA), requires post-closure inspections. CAS 06-04-01, Decon Pad Oil/Water Separator, is located inside the fence at the Building 6-605 compound. This report covers the annual period January 2004 through December 2004

  4. INTEC CPP-603 Basin Water Treatment System Closure: Process Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kimmitt, Raymond Rodney; Faultersack, Wendell Gale; Foster, Jonathan Kay; Berry, Stephen Michael

    2002-09-01

    This document describes the engineering activities that have been completed in support of the closure plan for the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) CPP-603 Basin Water Treatment System. This effort includes detailed assessments of methods and equipment for performing work in four areas: 1. A cold (nonradioactive) mockup system for testing equipment and procedures for vessel cleanout and vessel demolition. 2. Cleanout of process vessels to meet standards identified in the closure plan. 3. Dismantlement and removal of vessels, should it not be possible to clean them to required standards in the closure plan. 4. Cleanout or removal of pipelines and pumps associated with the CPP-603 basin water treatment system. Cleanout standards for the pipes will be the same as those used for the process vessels.

  5. Online Work Force Analyzes Social Media to Identify Consequences of an Unplanned School Closure - Using Technology to Prepare for the Next Pandemic.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rainey, Jeanette J; Kenney, Jasmine; Wilburn, Ben; Putman, Ami; Zheteyeva, Yenlik; O'Sullivan, Megan

    During an influenza pandemic, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) may recommend school closures. These closures could have unintended consequences for students and their families. Publicly available social media could be analyzed to identify the consequences of an unplanned school closure. As a proxy for an unplanned, pandemic-related school closure, we used the district-wide school closure due to the September 10-18, 2012 teachers' strike in Chicago, Illinois. We captured social media posts about the school closure using the Radian6 social media-monitoring platform. An online workforce from Amazon Mechanical Turk categorized each post into one of two groups. The first group included relevant posts that described the impact of the closure on students and their families. The second group included irrelevant posts that described the political aspects of the strike or topics unrelated to the school closure. All relevant posts were further categorized as expressing a positive, negative, or neutral sentiment. We analyzed patterns of relevant posts and sentiment over time and compared our findings to household surveys conducted after other unplanned school closures. We captured 4,546 social media posts about the district-wide school closure using our search criteria. Of these, 930 (20%) were categorized as relevant by the online workforce. Of the relevant posts, 619 (67%) expressed a negative sentiment, 51 (5%) expressed a positive sentiment, and 260 (28%) were neutral. The number of relevant posts, and especially those with a negative sentiment, peaked on day 1 of the strike. Negative sentiment expressed concerns about childcare, missed school lunches, and the lack of class time for students. This was consistent with findings from previously conducted household surveys. Social media are publicly available and can readily provide information on the impact of an unplanned school closure on students and their families. Using social media to

  6. Sustainable closure of construction materials quarries in Cuba

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Julio Montero-Matos

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available The inclusion of effective mine closure plans in the exploitation project is the way to compensate for the harmful effect of this activity. Based on a diagnosis carried out in 11 sites in operation, belonging to the company Canteras, a methodology was designed with a systemic and integral approach that consists of five stages and allows the execution of quarry closures in a sustainable manner. The Delphi method was applied to select the criteria that directly affect the sustainable closure of quarries in such a way that it considers the essential postulates of the Cuban Economic Model (MEC. The proposed methodology represents a contribution to the planning and design of the mining closure in Cuban non-metallic deposits to guarantee the reduction of the environmental impacts caused during its operation and the reduction, to the lesser extent possible, of negative socio-economic effects for the workers and the community located in the area of influence of the quarries. Currently applied in the quarry of San José, in Mayabeque province.

  7. 40 CFR Appendix 1 to Part 3 - Priority Reports

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    .... Response Plan Cover Sheet Oil Pollution Prevention certification to the truth and accuracy of information... 146.71. Certification of Closure and Post Closure Care, Post-Closure Notices Certification that... post-closure plan 264.115, 264.119, 264.119(b)(2), 264.120, 265.115, 265.119(b)(2), 265.120, 265.19...

  8. Guidance for closure of existing DOE LLW disposal sites

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blanchfield, L.

    1987-01-01

    During FY 1986, a closure guidance document was developed. The purpose of this document is to provide guidance in support of DOE Order 5820.2 to site operating contractors for the stabilization and closure of existing low-level waste (LLW) shallow land disposal sites at US Department of Energy (DOE) facilities. Guidance is provided to aid operators in placing existing LLW sites in a closed conditions, i.e., a condition in which a nonoperational site meets postclosure performance requirements and can be shown, within a high degree of confidence, to perform as anticipated in the future, under the most cost-effective maintenance approach. Guidance is based on the philosophy that closure should be planned and performed using a systems approach. Plans for FY 1987 call for revision of the document to incorporate more information on closure of LLW sites also containing radioactive mixed waste and/or transuranic waste. 4 references, 3 figures, 2 tables

  9. Online Work Force Analyzes Social Media to Identify Consequences of an Unplanned School Closure – Using Technology to Prepare for the Next Pandemic

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rainey, Jeanette J.; Kenney, Jasmine; Wilburn, Ben; Putman, Ami; Zheteyeva, Yenlik; O’Sullivan, Megan

    2016-01-01

    Background During an influenza pandemic, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) may recommend school closures. These closures could have unintended consequences for students and their families. Publicly available social media could be analyzed to identify the consequences of an unplanned school closure. Methods As a proxy for an unplanned, pandemic-related school closure, we used the district-wide school closure due to the September 10–18, 2012 teachers’ strike in Chicago, Illinois. We captured social media posts about the school closure using the Radian6 social media-monitoring platform. An online workforce from Amazon Mechanical Turk categorized each post into one of two groups. The first group included relevant posts that described the impact of the closure on students and their families. The second group included irrelevant posts that described the political aspects of the strike or topics unrelated to the school closure. All relevant posts were further categorized as expressing a positive, negative, or neutral sentiment. We analyzed patterns of relevant posts and sentiment over time and compared our findings to household surveys conducted after other unplanned school closures. Results We captured 4,546 social media posts about the district-wide school closure using our search criteria. Of these, 930 (20%) were categorized as relevant by the online workforce. Of the relevant posts, 619 (67%) expressed a negative sentiment, 51 (5%) expressed a positive sentiment, and 260 (28%) were neutral. The number of relevant posts, and especially those with a negative sentiment, peaked on day 1 of the strike. Negative sentiment expressed concerns about childcare, missed school lunches, and the lack of class time for students. This was consistent with findings from previously conducted household surveys. Conclusion Social media are publicly available and can readily provide information on the impact of an unplanned school closure on students

  10. Planning and management of uranium mine and mill closures. Proceedings of a technical committee meeting held in Liberec, Czech Republic, 3-6 May 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-09-01

    The Technical Committee Meeting on Planning and Management of Uranium Mine and Mill Closures was held in Liberec, Czech Republic from 3 to 6 May 1994. A total of 30 participants from nine countries attended the meeting. Nineteen papers were presented. Most of these papers dealt with the concept of and experiences in planning for and the subsequent decommissioning and rehabilitation of uranium mines and mills in Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the USA. Two papers discussed the government`s role and relevant regulations related to the closures, decommissioning and remediation of uranium production facilities. Of particular interest to the participants was a non-technical paper presented by the Mayor of the city of Andujar, Spain, describing the negative political and socio-economic impacts associated with closure and decommissioning of an uranium mine/mill facility. The highlights of the meeting were the field visits to the uranium production facilities and rehabilitation programme sites of DIAMO and WISMUT companies, located respectively in Straz, Czech Republic and Koenigstein, Germany. Refs, figs and tabs.

  11. 33 CFR 154.1030 - General response plan contents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... and health plan. (vi) List of acronyms and definitions. (vii) A geographic-specific appendix for each... the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (40 CFR part 300) and the Area Contingency Plan(s) (ACP) covering the area in which the facility operates. Facility owners or...

  12. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Closure Plan for the Y-12 9409-5 Tank Storage Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    This document presents information on the closure of the Y-12 9409-5 Tank Storage Facility. Topics discussed include: facility description; closure history; closure performance standard; partial closure; maximum waste inventory; closure activities; schedule; and postclosure care

  13. Simplifying documentation while approaching site closure: integrated health and safety plans as documented safety analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, Tulanda

    2003-01-01

    At the Fernald Closure Project (FCP) near Cincinnati, Ohio, environmental restoration activities are supported by Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs) that combine the required project-specific Health and Safety Plans, Safety Basis Requirements (SBRs), and Process Requirements (PRs) into single Integrated Health and Safety Plans (I-HASPs). By isolating any remediation activities that deal with Enriched Restricted Materials, the SBRs and PRs assure that the hazard categories of former nuclear facilities undergoing remediation remain less than Nuclear. These integrated DSAs employ Integrated Safety Management methodology in support of simplified restoration and remediation activities that, so far, have resulted in the decontamination and demolition (D and D) of over 150 structures, including six major nuclear production plants. This paper presents the FCP method for maintaining safety basis documentation, using the D and D I-HASP as an example

  14. Post-Closure Inspection Report for Corrective Action Unit 92: Area 6 Decon Pond Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, for Calendar Year 2006

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NSTec Environmental Restoration

    2007-01-01

    This Post-Closure Inspection Report provides an analysis and summary of inspections for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility. CAU 92 was closed according to the ''Resource Conservation and Recovery Act'' (RCRA) Part B Operational Permit (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP], 1995) and the ''Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order'' (FFACO) of 1996 (FFACO, 1996). Closure activities were completed on February 16, 1999, and the Closure Report (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, 1999) was approved and a Notice of Completion issued by NDEP on May 11, 1999. CAU 92 consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), CAS 06-04-01, Decon Pad Oil/Water Separator; and CAS 06-05-02, Decontamination Pond (RCRA). Both CASs have use restrictions; however, only CAS 06-05-02 requires post-closure inspections. Visual inspections of the cover and fencing at CAS 06-05-02 are performed quarterly. Additional inspections are conducted if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.28 centimeters (cm) (0.50 inches [in.]) in a 24-hour period. This report covers calendar year 2006. Quarterly site inspections were performed in March, June, September, and December of 2006. All observations indicated the continued integrity of the unit. No issues or concerns were noted, and no corrective actions were necessary. Copies of the inspection checklists and field notes completed during each inspection are included in Appendix A of this report, and photographs taken during the site inspections are included in Appendix B of this report. One additional inspection was performed after a precipitation event that exceeded 1.28 cm (0.50 in.) within a 24-hour period during 2006. No significant changes in site conditions were noted during this inspection, and no corrective actions were necessary. A copy of the inspection checklist and field notes completed during this additional inspection is included in Appendix A of this report. Precipitation records for 2006

  15. Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, for Fiscal Year 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Silvas, Alissa J. [Nevada Field Office, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2015-01-01

    This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for several Corrective Action Units (CAUs). The locations of the sites are shown in Figure 1. This report covers fiscal year 2014 (October 2013–September 2014). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted semiannually at CAUs 90 and 91 and quarterly at CAUs 92, 110, 111, and 112. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 0.50 inches (in.) in a 24-hour period and at CAU 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 in. in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. In addition to visual inspections, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, and subsidence surveys are conducted at CAU 110. At CAU 111, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, subsidence surveys, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are conducted. The results of the vegetation surveys and an analysis of the soil moisture monitoring data at CAU 110 are presented in this report. Results of additional monitoring at CAU 111 are documented annually in the Nevada National Security Site Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites and in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, which will be prepared in approximately June 2015. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. It is recommended to continue

  16. Development of a prototype plan for the effective closure of a waste disposal site in Los Alamos, New Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nyhan, J.; Barnes, F.

    1989-02-01

    The purpose of this study was to develop a prototype plan for the effective closure and stabilization of a semiarid low-level waste disposal site. This prototype plan will provide demonstrated closure techniques for a trench in a disposal site at Los Alamos based on previous shallow land burial (SLB) field research both at the Los Alamos Experimental Engineered Test Facility (EETF), and at a waste disposal area at Los Alamos. The accuracy of modeling soil water storage by two hydrologic models was tested by comparing simulation results with field measurements of soil moisture in eight experimental landfill cover systems at Waste Disposal Area B having a range of well-defined soil profiles and vegetative covers. Regression analysis showed that one of the two models tested represented soil moisture more accurately than the second model. The accuracy of modeling all of the parameters of the water balance equation was then evaluated using field data from the Integrated Systems Demonstration plots at the EETF. Optimized parameters were developed for one model to describe observed values of deep percolation, evapotranspiration, and runoff from the field plots containing an SLB trench cap configuration

  17. Learning, awareness, and instruction: subjective contingency awareness does matter in the colour-word contingency learning paradigm.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schmidt, James R; De Houwer, Jan

    2012-12-01

    In three experiments, each of a set colour-unrelated distracting words was presented most often in a particular target print colour (e.g., "month" most often in red). In Experiment 1, half of the participants were told the word-colour contingencies in advance (instructed) and half were not (control). The instructed group showed a larger learning effect. This instruction effect was fully explained by increases in subjective awareness with instruction. In Experiment 2, contingency instructions were again given, but no contingencies were actually present. Although many participants claimed to be aware of these (non-existent) contingencies, they did not produce an instructed contingency effect. In Experiment 3, half of the participants were given contingency instructions that did not correspond to the correct contingencies. Participants with these false instructions learned the actual contingencies worse than controls. Collectively, our results suggest that conscious contingency knowledge might play a moderating role in the strength of implicit learning. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  18. Procedures and techniques for closure of near surface disposal facilities for radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-12-01

    The overall objective of this report is to provide Member States with guidance on planning and implementation of closure of near surface disposal facilities for low and intermediate level radioactive waste. The specific objectives are to review closure concepts, requirements, and components of closure systems; to discuss issues and approaches to closure, including regulatory, economic, and technical aspects; and to present major examples of closure techniques used and/or considered by Member States. Some examples of closure experience from Member States are presented in the Appendix and were indexed separately

  19. T-tube vs Primary Common Bile Duct Closure

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    M R Joshi

    2010-09-01

    Full Text Available INTRODUCTION: Closure of the common bile duct over T-tube after exploration is a widely practiced traditional method. However, its use may give rise to many complications. We do primary closure of common bile duct after exploration. Aim of the study is to see the efficacy and safety of the primary closure. METHODS: Study was carried out to compare the results of both the techniques from 2006 to 2009 in the cases proven to have common bile duct stone with or without the features of obstructive jaundice. Post operative hospital stay and morbidities related to both the groups were recorded and analyzed. RESULTS: There were total 71 cases included in the study. Thirty one in T-tube group and 40 in primary closure group. T-tube was removed in most of the cases after three weeks where as average time of drain removal in primary closure group is 5.79 +/-1.79 days. Incidence of retained stone was equal in each group. Major complication in T-tube group is biliary peritonitis in four patients at the time of T-tube removal whereas none of the patient from primary closure group suffered from such major complication. CONCLUSIONS: Primary closure after the common bile duct exploration is safe and it helps to avoid the morbidities related to T-tube. Keywords: Choledocholithiasis, Primary closure, retained stone, T-tube, Ureterorenoscope.

  20. Closure of shallow underground injection wells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Veil, J.A.; Grunewald, B.

    1993-01-01

    Shallow injection wells have long been used for disposing liquid wastes. Some of these wells have received hazardous or radioactive wastes. According to US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, Class IV wells are those injection wells through which hazardous or radioactive wastes are injected into or above an underground source of drinking water (USDW). These wells must be closed. Generally Class V wells are injection wells through which fluids that do not contain hazardous or radioactive wastes are injected into or above a USDW. Class V wells that are responsible for violations of drinking water regulations or that pose a threat to human health must also be closed. Although EPA regulations require closure of certain types of shallow injection wells, they do not provide specific details on the closure process. This paper describes the regulatory background, DOE requirements, and the steps in a shallow injection well closure process: Identification of wells needing closure; monitoring and disposal of accumulated substances; filling and sealing of wells; and remediation. In addition, the paper describes a major national EPA shallow injection well enforcement initiative, including closure plan guidance for wells used to dispose of wastes from service station operations

  1. 300 Area Process Trenches Supplemental Information to the Hanford Contingency Plan (DOE/RL-93-75)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    R.A. Carlson

    1997-01-01

    The 300 Area Process Trenches are surface impoundments which were used to receive routine discharges of nonregulated process cooling water from operations in the 300 Area and dangerous waste from several research and development laboratories and the 300 Area Fuels Fabrication process. Discharges to the trenches ceased in 1994, and they were physically isolated in 1995. Remediation of the trenches is scheduled to begin during July 1997. Currently, there are no waste management activities required at the 300 Area Process Trenches and the unit does not present any significant hazards to adjacent units, personnel, or the environment. It is unlikely that any incidents presenting hazards to public health or the environment would occur at the 300 Area Process Trenches, however, during remediation, exposure, spill, fire, and industrial hazards will exist. This contingency plan addresses the emergency organization, equipment and evacuation routes pertinent to the process trenches during remediation

  2. Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. The Test Cell C (TCC) Facility is located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) approximately 25 miles northwest of Mercury, Nevada (Figure 1). CAU 116 is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) of 1996 (as amended February 2008) and consists of two Corrective Action Sites (CASs): (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping; and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 is described in the FFACO as the TCC Facility but actually includes Building 3210 and attached concrete shield wall only. CAU 116 will be closed by demolishing Building 3210, the attached concrete shield wall, and the nuclear furnace piping. In addition, as a best management practice (BMP), Building 3211 (moveable shed) will be demolished due to its close proximity to Building 3210. This will aid in demolition and disposal operations. Radiological surveys will be performed on the demolition debris to determine the proper disposal pathway. As much of the demolition debris as space allows will be placed into the Building 3210 basement structure. After filling to capacity with demolition debris, the basement structure will be mounded or capped and closed with administrative controls. Prior to beginning demolition activities and according to an approved Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP), representative sampling of surface areas that are known, suspected, or have the potential to contain hazardous constituents such as lead or polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) will be performed throughout all buildings and structures. Sections 2.3.2, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3, 4.3, and 6.2.6.1 address the methodologies employed that assure the solid debris placed in the basement structure will not contain contaminants of concern (COCs) above hazardous waste levels. The anticipated post-closure-posting

  3. Fernald - Developing and Executing an Accelerated Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nixon, D.A.

    2006-01-01

    In November 2000 the Department of Energy (DOE) and Fluor Fernald entered into a closure contract that incited Fluor Fernald to reduce the cost and schedule of the Fernald site cleanup. The contract established a target schedule and target cost and how Fluor Fernald performs against these targets determines the amount of fee the company earns. In response to these new challenges, Fluor Fernald developed a 13-part strategy to safely accelerate work and more efficiently utilize the available funding. Implementation of this strategy required a dramatic culture change at Fernald - from a 'government job mind set' to an entrepreneurial/commercial model. Fluor Fernald's strategy and culture change has proved to be successful as the company is on track to close the site ahead of the target schedule at a total project cost less than the target cost. The elements of Fluor Fernald's strategy and the lessons learned during implementation provide valuable information that could be utilized by other DOE sites that will be undergoing closure over the next decade. (authors)

  4. Counterfactual reasoning for regretted situations involving controllable versus uncontrollable events: the modulating role of contingent self-esteem.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wilkinson, Meredith R; Ball, Linden J; Alford, David

    2015-01-01

    We report a study that examined the modulating impact of contingent self-esteem on regret intensity for regretted outcomes associated with controllable versus uncontrollable events. The Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (e.g., Kernis & Goldman, 2006) was used to assess the extent to which a person's sense of self-worth is based on self and others' expectations. We found that there was an influence of self-esteem contingency for controllable but not for uncontrollable regret types. For controllable regret types individuals with a high contingent (i.e., unstable) self-esteem reported greater regret intensity than those with a low contingent (i.e., stable) self-esteem. We interpret this finding as reflecting a functional and adaptive role of high contingent self-esteem in terms of mobilizing the application of counterfactual reasoning and planning mechanisms that can enable personal expectations to be achieved in the future.

  5. Biomechanics Strategies for Space Closure in Deep Overbite

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Harryanto Wijaya

    2013-07-01

    Full Text Available Space closure is an interesting aspect of orthodontic treatment related to principles of biomechanics. It should be tailored individually based on patient’s diagnosis and treatment plan. Understanding the space closure biomechanics basis leads to achieve the desired treatment objective. Overbite deepening and losing posterior anchorage are the two most common unwanted side effects in space closure. Conventionally, correction of overbite must be done before space closure resulted in longer treatment. Application of proper space closure biomechanics strategies is necessary to achieve the desired treatment outcome. This cases report aimed to show the space closure biomechanics strategies that effectively control the overbite as well as posterior anchorage in deep overbite patients without increasing treatment time. Two patients who presented with class II division 1 malocclusion were treated with fixed orthodontic appliance. The primary strategies included extraction space closure on segmented arch that employed two-step space closure, namely single canine retraction simultaneously with incisors intrusion followed by enmasse retraction of four incisors by using differential moment concept. These strategies successfully closed the space, corrected deep overbite and controlled posterior anchorage simultaneously so that the treatment time was shortened. Biomechanics strategies that utilized were effective to achieve the desired treatment outcome.

  6. RCRA closure plan for the Bear Creek Burial Grounds B Area and Walk-In Pits at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-11-01

    The Bear Creek Burial Grounds (BCBG) are located on the southwest flank of Pine Ridge ∼1.5 miles west of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant in Bear Creek Valley. This facility consists of several contiguous disposal sites identified as Burial Grounds A, B, C, and D. Each burial site consists of a series of trenches used for disposal of solid wastes and, in some cases, liquid wastes. Initially, the RCRA Closure/Postclosure plan for the BCBG was intended to apply to A Area, C-West, B Area, and the walk-in pits for BCBG. However, a plan was provided to include the B Area in the walk-in pits so that both areas cold be closed under one cap. The closure plan for B Area and the walk-in pits is presented in this document. The actual quantity and identity of materials is uncertain. The largest volume of material disposed in BCBG consists of uranium-contaminated industrial trash (paper, wood, steel, glass, and rubble)

  7. Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Fiscal Year 2015 (October 2014-September 2015), Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matthews, Patrick

    2016-01-01

    This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs); CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report covers fiscal year 2015 (October 2014 through September 2015). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report.

  8. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matthews, Patrick [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2017-03-01

    This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. CAU 573 comprises the two corrective action sites (CASs): 05-23-02-GMX Alpha Contaminated Are-Closure in Place and 05-45-01-Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton- Clean Closure. The purpose of this CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 573 based on the implementation of the corrective actions. Corrective action activities were performed at Hamilton from May 25 through June 30, 2016; and at GMX from May 25 to October 27, 2016, as set forth in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. Verification sample results were evaluated against data quality objective criteria developed by stakeholders that included representatives from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) during the corrective action alternative (CAA) meeting held on November 24, 2015. Radiological doses exceeding the final action level were assumed to be present within the high contamination areas associated with CAS 05-23-02, thus requiring corrective action. It was also assumed that radionuclides were present at levels that require corrective action within the soil/debris pile associated with CAS 05-45-01. During the CAU 573 CAA meeting, the CAA of closure in place with a use restriction (UR) was selected by the stakeholders as the preferred corrective action of the high contamination areas at CAS 05-23-02 (GMX), which contain high levels of removable contamination; and the CAA of clean closure was selected by the

  9. Development and Presentation of the Drigg Post-Closure Safety Case

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelly, Eugene; Watts, Len; Grimwood, Paul

    2001-01-01

    Drigg is an operational facility for the near-surface disposal of solid low level radioactive waste (LLW). The disposal facility is located in Cumbria, north-west England, near the Sellafield nuclear site, and is owned and operated by British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL). Disposals at Drigg are carried out under the terms of an authorisation granted by the UK Environment Agency. Periodically the Drigg authorisation is subject to formal regulatory review. The current regulatory guidance, 'Disposal Facilities on Land for Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Wastes: Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation' (the GRA) was published in 1997 and contains guidance on the principles and requirements against which the Environment Agency will consider applications for disposal authorisation. BNFL has undertaken to produce an updated Drigg postclosure safety case (PCSC) in September 2002 to support the next authorisation review. In preparation for this, BNFL published a 'Status Report on the Development of the 2002 Drigg PCSC' in March 2000. This paper discusses the main components of the Drigg PCSC and how they relate to each other. Central to the safety case will be a systematic, post-closure radiological safety assessment (PCRSA). However the main focus of this paper is on the other main components of the PCSC which are presented in conjunction with the PCRSA to make a complete and integrated safety case. In addition other confidence building activities which are key to developing and presenting the safety case are discussed, in particular communications with the stakeholders

  10. Contingency Contractor Optimization Phase 3 Sustainment Verification and Validation V&V) Report - Contingency Contractor Optimization Engineering - Prototype

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bandlow, Alisa [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Operations Research and Computational Analysis; Durfee, Justin David [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Operations Research and Computational Analysis; Frazier, Christopher Rawls [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Operations Research and Computational Analysis; Gearhart, Jared Lee [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Operations Research and Computational Analysis; Jones, Katherine A. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Operations Research and Computational Analysis; Adair, Kristin Lynn [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Operations Research and Computational Analysis; Turgeon, Jennifer [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). High Confidence System Environments

    2016-04-01

    The reports and test plans contained within this document serve as supporting materials to the activities listed within the “Contingency Contractor Optimization Tool – Prototype (CCOT-P) Verification & Validation Plan” [1]. The activities included test development, testing, peer reviews, and expert reviews. The engineering prototype reviews were done for both the software and the mathematical model used in CCOT-P. Section 2 includes the peer and expert review reports, which summarize the findings from each of the reviews and document the resolution of any issues. Section 3 details the test plans that were followed for functional testing of the application through the interface. Section 4 describes the unit tests that were run on the code.

  11. Counterfactual Reasoning for Regretted Situations Involving Controllable Versus Uncontrollable Events: The Modulating Role of Contingent Self-Esteem

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wilkinson, Meredith R.; Ball, Linden J.; Alford, David

    2015-01-01

    We report a study that examined the modulating impact of contingent self-esteem on regret intensity for regretted outcomes associated with controllable versus uncontrollable events. The Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (e.g., Kernis & Goldman, 2006) was used to assess the extent to which a person’s sense of self-worth is based on self and others’ expectations. We found that there was an influence of self-esteem contingency for controllable but not for uncontrollable regret types. For controllable regret types individuals with a high contingent (i.e., unstable) self-esteem reported greater regret intensity than those with a low contingent (i.e., stable) self-esteem. We interpret this finding as reflecting a functional and adaptive role of high contingent self-esteem in terms of mobilizing the application of counterfactual reasoning and planning mechanisms that can enable personal expectations to be achieved in the future. PMID:25883697

  12. CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 528: POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS CONTAMINATION NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    BECHTEL NEVADA

    2006-09-01

    This Closure Report (CR) describes the closure activities performed at CAU 528, Polychlorinated Biphenyls Contamination, as presented in the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP)-approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) (US. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSAINSO], 2005). The approved closure alternative was closure in place with administrative controls. This CR provides a summary of the completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and analytical data to confirm that the remediation goals were met.

  13. Percutaneous closure of patent ductus arteriosus in children: Immediate and short-term changes in left ventricular systolic and diastolic function

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Saurabh Kumar Gupta

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available Objective: To evaluate the effect of percutaneous closure of patent ductus arteriosus (PDA on left ventricular (LV systolic and diastolic function in children. Background: Limited studies are available on alteration in LV hemodynamics, especially diastolic function, after PDA closure. Methods: Thirty-two consecutive children with isolated PDA treated by trans-catheter closure were studied. The LV systolic and diastolic function were assessed by two-dimensional (2D echocardiography and tissue Doppler imaging 1 day before the PDA closure, on day 1, and on follow-up. Results: At baseline, none of the patients had LV systolic dysfunction. On day 1 post-PDA closure, 8 (25% children developed LV systolic dysfunction. The baseline LV ejection fraction (LVEF, LV end-systolic dimension (LVESD, and PDA diastolic gradient predicted the post-closure LVEF. Patients who developed post-closure LV systolic dysfunction had poorer LV diastolic function than those who did not. LV diastolic properties improved after PDA closure; however, the improvement in LV diastolic properties lagged behind the improvement in the LV systolic function. All children were asymptomatic and had normal LVEF on follow up of >3 months. Conclusions: Percutaneous closure of PDA is associated with the reversible LV systolic dysfunction. Improvement in the LV diastolic function lags behind that in the LV systolic function.

  14. Percutaneous closure of patent ductus arteriosus in children: Immediate and short-term changes in left ventricular systolic and diastolic function.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gupta, Saurabh Kumar; Krishnamoorthy, Km; Tharakan, Jaganmohan A; Sivasankaran, S; Sanjay, G; Bijulal, S; Anees, T

    2011-07-01

    To evaluate the effect of percutaneous closure of patent ductus arteriosus (PDA) on left ventricular (LV) systolic and diastolic function in children. Limited studies are available on alteration in LV hemodynamics, especially diastolic function, after PDA closure. Thirty-two consecutive children with isolated PDA treated by trans-catheter closure were studied. The LV systolic and diastolic function were assessed by two-dimensional (2D) echocardiography and tissue Doppler imaging 1 day before the PDA closure, on day 1, and on follow-up. At baseline, none of the patients had LV systolic dysfunction. On day 1 post-PDA closure, 8 (25%) children developed LV systolic dysfunction. The baseline LV ejection fraction (LVEF), LV end-systolic dimension (LVESD), and PDA diastolic gradient predicted the post-closure LVEF. Patients who developed post-closure LV systolic dysfunction had poorer LV diastolic function than those who did not. LV diastolic properties improved after PDA closure; however, the improvement in LV diastolic properties lagged behind the improvement in the LV systolic function. All children were asymptomatic and had normal LVEF on follow up of >3 months. Percutaneous closure of PDA is associated with the reversible LV systolic dysfunction. Improvement in the LV diastolic function lags behind that in the LV systolic function.

  15. Standard format and content of a licensee physical protection plan for strategic special nuclear material in transit - April 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    A predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events is required to be prepared, based on personnel and other physical protection resources described in the Physical Protection Plan for strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in transit. Specific requirements for the contingency plan are provided in Appendix C. Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans, to 10 CFR Part 73. Regulatory Guide 5.56, Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans for Transportation, provides guidance for the preparation of transportation contingency plans. Licensee is reminded that all three submissions - the Physical Protection Plan, the Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments, and the Safeguards Contingency Plan - together describe the system for physical protection of each particular shipment. They should be developed and maintained to be completely consistent with each other for each shipment

  16. Waste Management Project Contingency Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Edward L. Parsons, Jr.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide the office of Waste Management (WM) with recommended contingency calculation procedures for typical WM projects. Typical projects were defined as conventional construction-type activities that use innovative elements when necessary to meet the project objectives. Projects involve treatment, storage, and disposal of low level, mixed low level, hazardous, transuranic, and high level waste. Cost contingencies are an essential part of Total Cost Management. A contingency is an amount added to a cost estimate to compensate for unexpected expenses resulting from incomplete design, unforeseen and unpredictable conditions, or uncertainties in the project scope (DOE 1994, AACE 1998). Contingency allowances are expressed as percentages of estimated cost and improve cost estimates by accounting for uncertainties. The contingency allowance is large at the beginning of a project because there are more uncertainties, but as a project develops, the allowance shrinks to adjust for costs already incurred. Ideally, the total estimated cost remains the same throughout a project. Project contingency reflects the degree of uncertainty caused by lack of project definition, and process contingency reflects the degree of uncertainty caused by use of new technology. Different cost estimation methods were reviewed and compared with respect to terminology, accuracy, and Cost Guide standards. The Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering (AACE) methods for cost estimation were selected to represent best industry practice. AACE methodology for contingency analysis can be readily applied to WM Projects, accounts for uncertainties associated with different stages of a project, and considers both project and process contingencies and the stage of technical readiness. As recommended, AACE contingency allowances taper off linearly as a project nears completion

  17. Responsibility modelling for civil emergency planning

    OpenAIRE

    Sommerville, Ian; Storer, Timothy; Lock, Russell

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents a new approach to analysing and understanding civil emergency planning based on the notion of responsibility modelling combined with HAZOPS-style analysis of information requirements. Our goal is to represent complex contingency plans so that they can be more readily understood, so that inconsistencies can be highlighted and vulnerabilities discovered. In this paper, we outline the framework for contingency planning in the United Kingdom and introduce the notion of respons...

  18. Temporary abdominal closure in the critically ill patients with an open abdomen.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ghodratollah Maddah

    2014-05-01

    Full Text Available The emergent abdominal surgeries from either of traumatic or non traumatic causes can result in situations in which the abdominal wall cannot initially be closed. Many techniques have been reported for temporary coverage of the exposed viscera, but the result of various techniques remains unclear. During 94 months, 19 critically ill patients whit an open abdomen underwent surgery using plastic bags (Bogotá bag. The study population comprised of 11 (57.9% male and 8 (42.1% female with an average age of 32.26+14.8 years. The main indications for temporary abdominal coverage were as follows: planned reoperation in 11 (57.9% patients, subjective judgment that the fascia closure is too tight in 6 (31.6% patient's damage control surgery in one patient (5.3% and development of abdominal compartment surgery in one patient (5.3%. Surgical conditions requiring temporary abdominal closure was severe post operative peritonitis in 9 (47.4% patients, post operative intestinal fistula in 4 (21.1% patients, post traumatic intra abdominal bleeding in 3 (15.8% patients and intestinal obstructions in 3 (15.8% patients. Length of hospitalization was 45+23.25 days and the mean total number of laparotomies was 6.2+3.75 times per patient. Three bowel fistulas occurred due to a missed injury at the time of initial operation that was discovered during changing the plastic sheet. They were unrelated to coverage technique. All of them were treated by repair of the defect and serosal patch by adjacent bowel loop. Only one (10.0% patient underwent definitive closure within 6 months of initial operation. The remaining survivor has declined to have hernia repaired. There were 4 (%21.1 early postoperative deaths that were not related to the abdominal coverage technique. Also, there were 5 (26.3% late deaths that were due to dissemination of malignancy with a mean survival time of 20.8+13 (range 2-54 months. Currently 10 patients (52.6% are alive at a follow up of 45 (range 1

  19. Contingency plan for the Old Hydrofracture Facility tanks sluicing project at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-10-01

    Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), plans to begin a sluicing (flushing) and pumping project to remove the contents from five inactive, underground storage tanks at the Old Hydrofracture Facility (OHF) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The tank contents will be transferred to the Melton Valley Storage Tanks, which are part of the active waste treatment system at ORNL. The purpose of the project is to minimize the risk of leaking the highly radioactive material to the environment. The five OHF tanks each contain a layer of sludge and a layer of supernatant. Based on a sampling project undertaken in 1995, the sludge in the tanks has been characterized as transuranic and mixed waste and the supernatants have been characterized as mixed waste. The combined radioactivity of the contents of the five tanks is approximately 29,500 Ci. This contingency plan is based on the preliminary design for the project and describes a series of potential accident/release scenarios for the project. It outlines Energy Systems' preliminary plans for prevention, detection, and mitigation. Prevention/detection methods range from using doubly contained pipelines to alarmed sensors and automatic pump cutoff systems. Plans for mitigation range from pumping leaked fluids from the built-in tank drainage systems and cleaning up spilled liquids to personnel evacuation

  20. Future Contingents

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Øhrstrøm, Peter; Hasle., Per F. V.

    2015-01-01

    contingent statements. The problem of future contingents is interwoven with a number of issues in theology, philosophy, logic, semantics of natural language, computer science, and applied mathematics. The theological issue of how to reconcile the assumption of God's foreknowledge with the freedom and moral...... accountability of human beings has been a main impetus to the discussion and a major inspiration to the development of various logical models of time and future contingents. This theological issue is connected with the general philosophical question of determinism versus indeterminism. Within logic, the relation...... about the future. Finally, it should be mentioned that temporal logic has found a remarkable application in computer science and applied mathematics. In the late 1970s the first computer scientists realised the relevance of temporal logic for the purposes of computer science (see Hasle and Øhrstrøm 2004)....

  1. Future Contingents

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Øhrstrøm, Peter; Hasle., Per F. V.

    2011-01-01

    contingent statements. The problem of future contingents is interwoven with a number of issues in theology, philosophy, logic, semantics of natural language, computer science, and applied mathematics. The theological issue of how to reconcile the assumption of God's foreknowledge with the freedom and moral...... accountability of human beings has been a main impetus to the discussion and a major inspiration to the development of various logical models of time and future contingents. This theological issue is connected with the general philosophical question of determinism versus indeterminism. Within logic, the relation...... about the future. Finally, it should be mentioned that temporal logic has found a remarkable application in computer science and applied mathematics. In the late 1970s the first computer scientists realised the relevance of temporal logic for the purposes of computer science (see Hasle and Øhrstrøm 2004)....

  2. Contingent negative variation of mood disorder patients

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Yingzhi Lu; Wenbin Zong; Qingtao Ren; Jinyu Pu; Jun Chen; Juan Li; Xingshi Chen; Yong Wang

    2011-01-01

    Studies on brain-evoked potential and contingent negative variation (CNV) in mood disorder remain controversial. To date, no CNV difference between unipolar and bipolar depression has been reported. Brain-evoked potentials were measured in the present study to analyze CNV in three subtypes of mood disorder (mania, unipolar depression, and bipolar depression), and these results were compared with normal controls. In the mania group, CNV amplitude B was greater than in controls, and the depression group exhibited lower CNV amplitude B and smaller A-S'2 area, and prolonged post-imperative negative variation latency. The CNV comparison between unipolar and bipolar depression found that the prolonged post-imperative negative variation latency was only in unipolar depression. These results suggest that prolonged post-imperative negative variation latency is a characteristic of unipolar depression, and CNV amplitude change is a state characteristic of mood disorder patients.

  3. Decontamination Study for Mixed Waste Storage Tanks RCRA Closure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leaphart, D.M.; Reed, S.R.; Rankin, W.N.

    1995-01-01

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) plans to close six underground tanks storing mixed waste under RCRA regulations. In support of this closure effort, a study was performed to determine the optimal method of decontaminating these tanks to meet the closure requirements. Items consaidered in the evaluation of the decontamination methods included effectiveness, compatibility with existing waste residues, possible cleaning solution disposal methods, and cost

  4. Closure Plan for Corrective Action Unit 109: U-2bu Subsidence Crater Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Shannon Parsons

    1999-03-01

    The U-2bu subsidence crater, Corrective Action Unit 109, will be closed in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection operational permit, and the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order. The U-2bu subsidence crater is located in Area 2 of the Nevada Test Site. It was created in 1971 by an underground nuclear test with the name Miniata. The crater has a diameter of 288 meters (944 feet) and an approximate depth of 35 meters (115 feet). The subsidence crater was used as a land disposal unit for radioactive and hazardous waste from 1973 to 1988. Site disposal history is supported by memorandums, letters, and personnel who worked at the Nevada Test Site at the time of active disposal. Closure activities will include the excavation and disposal of impacted soil form the tip of the crater. Upon completion of excavation, verification samples will be collected to show that lead has been removed to concentrations be low regulatory action level. The area will then be backfilled and a soil flood diversion berm will be constructed, and certified by an independent professional engineer as to having followed the approved Closure Plan.

  5. Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Fiscal Year 2015 (October 2014–September 2015), Revision 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Matthews, Patrick [Navarro, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    2016-03-01

    This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs); CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report covers fiscal year 2015 (October 2014 through September 2015). The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section in Section 1.0 of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report.

  6. CLOSURE REPORT FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION UNIT 115: AREA 25 TEST CELL A FACILITY, NEVADA TEST SITE, NEVADA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This Closure Report (CR) describes the activities performed to close CAU 115, Area 25 Test Cell A Facility, as presented in the NDEP-approved SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2004). The SAFER Plan includes a summary of the site history, process knowledge, and closure standards. This CR provides a summary of the completed closure activities, documentation of waste disposal, and analytical and radiological data to confirm that the remediation goals were met and to document final site conditions. The approved closure alternative as presented in the SAFER Plan for CAU 115 (NNSA/NSO, 2004) was clean closure; however, closure in place was implemented under a Record of Technical Change (ROTC) to the SAFER Plan when radiological surveys indicated that the concrete reactor pad was radiologically activated and could not be decontaminated to meet free release levels. The ROTC is included as Appendix G of this report. The objectives of closure were to remove any trapped residual liquids and gases, dispose regulated and hazardous waste, decontaminate removable radiological contamination, demolish and dispose aboveground structures, remove the dewar as a best management practice (BMP), and characterize and restrict access to all remaining radiological contamination. Radiological contaminants of concern (COCs) included cobalt-60, cesium-137, strontium-90, uranium-234/235/236/238, and plutonium-239/240. Additional COCs included Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) metals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and asbestos

  7. Corrective Action Plan for CAU No. 95: Area 15 EPA Farm Laboratory Building, Decontamination and Demolition Closure Activities - Nevada Test Site. Rev. 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olson, A.L.; Nacht, S.J.

    1997-11-01

    This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provides the selected corrective action alternative and proposes the closure implementation methodology for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm Laboratory Building 15-06 located in Area 15 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nye County, Nevada. The facility is part of the Environmental Restoration Project managed by the U.S. Department of Energy/Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) under the Decontamination and Decommissioning (D ampersand D) Subproject which serves to manage and dispose of surplus facilities at the NTS in a manner that will protect personnel, the public, and the environment. It is identified as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 95 in Appendix III of the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). In July 1997, the DOE/NV verbally requested approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for the closure schedule to be accelerated. Currently, field activities are anticipated to be completed by September 30, 1997. In order to meet this new schedule NDEP has agreed to review this document as expeditiously as possible. Comments will be addressed in the Closure Report after field activities have been completed, unless significant issues require resolution during closure activities

  8. Corrective Action Plan for CAU No. 95: Area 15 EPA Farm Laboratory Building, Decontamination and Demolition Closure Activities - Nevada Test Site. Rev. 0

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Olson, A.L.; Nacht, S.J.

    1997-11-01

    This Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provides the selected corrective action alternative and proposes the closure implementation methodology for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Farm Laboratory Building 15-06 located in Area 15 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nye County, Nevada. The facility is part of the Environmental Restoration Project managed by the U.S. Department of Energy/Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) under the Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) Subproject which serves to manage and dispose of surplus facilities at the NTS in a manner that will protect personnel, the public, and the environment. It is identified as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 95 in Appendix III of the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). In July 1997, the DOE/NV verbally requested approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for the closure schedule to be accelerated. Currently, field activities are anticipated to be completed by September 30, 1997. In order to meet this new schedule NDEP has agreed to review this document as expeditiously as possible. Comments will be addressed in the Closure Report after field activities have been completed, unless significant issues require resolution during closure activities.

  9. Estimating the costs of school closure for mitigating an influenza pandemic

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Adams Elisabeth J

    2008-04-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background School closure is a key component of many countries' plans to mitigate the effect of an influenza pandemic. Although a number of studies have suggested that such a policy might reduce the incidence, there are no published studies of the cost of such policies. This study attempts to fill this knowledge gap Methods School closure is expected to lead to significant work absenteeism of working parents who are likely to be the main care givers to their dependent children at home. The cost of absenteeism due to school closure is calculated as the paid productivity loss of parental absenteeism during the period of school closure. The cost is estimated from societal perspective using a nationally representative survey. Results The results show that overall about 16% of the workforce is likely to be the main caregiver for dependent children and therefore likely to take absenteeism. This rises to 30% in the health and social care sector, as a large proportion of the workforce are women. The estimated costs of school closure are significant, at £0.2 bn – £1.2 bn per week. School closure is likely to significantly exacerbate the pressures on the health system through staff absenteeism. Conclusion The estimates of school closure associated absenteeism and the projected cost would be useful for pandemic planning for business continuity, and for cost effectiveness evaluation of different pandemic influenza mitigation strategies.

  10. 30 CFR 71.301 - Respirable dust control plan; approval by District Manager and posting.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-01

    ... District Manager and posting. 71.301 Section 71.301 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION... plan; approval by District Manager and posting. (a) The District Manager will approve respirable dust control plans on a mine-by-mine basis. When approving respirable dust control plans, the District Manager...

  11. Underground storage tank 291-D1U1: Closure plan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mancieri, S.; Giuntoli, N.

    1993-09-01

    The 291-D1U1 tank system was installed in 1983 on the north side of Building 291. It supplies diesel fuel to the Building 291 emergency generator and air compressor. The emergency generator and air compressor are located southwest and southeast, respectively, of the tank (see Appendix B, Figure 2). The tank system consists of a single-walled, 2,000- gallon, fiberglass tank and a fuel pump system, fill pipe, vent pipe, electrical conduit, and fuel supply and return piping. The area to be excavated is paved with asphalt and concrete. It is not known whether a concrete anchor pad is associated with this tank. Additionally, this closure plan assumes that the diesel tank is below the fill pad. The emergency generator and air compressor for Building 291 and its associated UST, 291-D1U1, are currently in use. The generator and air compressor will be supplied by a temporary above-ground fuel tank prior to the removal of 291-D1U1. An above-ground fuel tank will be installed as a permanent replacement for 291-D1U1. The system was registered with the State Water Resources Control Board on June 27, 1984, as 291-41D and has subsequently been renamed 291-D1U1. Figure 1 (see Appendix B) shows the location of the 291-D1U1 tank system in relation to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Figure 2 (see Appendix B) shows the 291-D1U1 tank system in relation to Building 291. Figure 3 (see Appendix B) shows a plan view of the 291-D1U1 tank system.

  12. Post-Closure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 110: Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Bechtel Nevada

    2006-08-01

    This Post-Closure Inspection and Monitoring Report provides the results and inspections and monitoring for Corrective Action Unit 110: Area 3 Waste Management Division U-3ax/bl Crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. This report includes an analysis and summary of the site inpsections, repairs and maintenance, meteorological information, and soil moisture monitoring data obtained at Corrective Action Unit 110, for the annual period July 2005 thrugh June 2006.

  13. ANALISIS SENSITIVITAS LINGKUNGAN OSCP (OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLAN DI PESISIR SELATAN DELTA MAHAKAM, PROVINSI KALIMANTAN TIMUR

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mursalin Mursalin

    2014-07-01

    Full Text Available The research was one part of oil spill contingency plan (OSCP developed for Delta Mahakam area, where oil & gas exploration and exploitation linked with rich biodiversity supporting coastal community livelihood. Environmental sensitivity  analysis for OSCP only do two early stages of OSCP scope, which integrated with the dangers of coastal vulnerability. This analysis mapped environmental component from oil pollution become sensitivity rangking as an effort to support response development strategies and priorities for the coastal resources protection. The aims of this research were (1 to establish environment sensitivity rank and (2 to identify primary factor supporting the environmental sensitivity for OSCP in south Delta Mahakam area. The result of analysis showed environmenal sensitivity was 62.37% (517.52 km, its mean very high sensitivity. Then the high sensitivity criteria was 11.31% (94 km. The criteria of medium sensitivity was 11.92% (99 km. While for low sensitivity and very low sensitivity respectively were 1.78% (15 km and 12.64% (105 km. Based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA, 36.01%  variability was explained by axis of factor 1. The others variability 18.53% and 13.93% were explained by axis of the factor 2 and factor 3. Axis of factor 1 for coastal exposure (EK, oil residence index (OR, coastal type (TP, and biological resources (SH had a quite large linear combinations coefficient, amounted to 0.94 (EK&OR, 0.83 (TP and 0.75 (SH. This indicated a very high contribution for environmental sensitivity OSCP level drafting. On axis of factor 2, the linear coeffisien combinations for the resource utilization of port (PL was 0.83 and settlement (PM was 0.85. Axis of factor 3 contributed 0.75 and 0.66 on migas platform (PO and placement of passive fishing gear/catchment area (AT. However, the utilization of coastal resources for PL, PM, PO and AT were on axis of factor 2 and factor 3 had a considerable distance with its SI variable

  14. Tethered Satellite System Contingency Investigation Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    1992-11-01

    The Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis (STS-46) on July 31, 1992. During the attempted on-orbit operations, the Tethered Satellite System failed to deploy successfully beyond 256 meters. The satellite was retrieved successfully and was returned on August 6, 1992. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Associate Administrator for Space Flight formed the Tethered Satellite System (TSS-1) Contingency Investigation Board on August 12, 1992. The TSS-1 Contingency Investigation Board was asked to review the anomalies which occurred, to determine the probable cause, and to recommend corrective measures to prevent recurrence. The board was supported by the TSS Systems Working group as identified in MSFC-TSS-11-90, 'Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Contingency Plan'. The board identified five anomalies for investigation: initial failure to retract the U2 umbilical; initial failure to flyaway; unplanned tether deployment stop at 179 meters; unplanned tether deployment stop at 256 meters; and failure to move tether in either direction at 224 meters. Initial observations of the returned flight hardware revealed evidence of mechanical interference by a bolt with the level wind mechanism travel as well as a helical shaped wrap of tether which indicated that the tether had been unwound from the reel beyond the travel by the level wind mechanism. Examination of the detailed mission events from flight data and mission logs related to the initial failure to flyaway and the failure to move in either direction at 224 meters, together with known preflight concerns regarding slack tether, focused the assessment of these anomalies on the upper tether control mechanism. After the second meeting, the board requested the working group to complete and validate a detailed integrated mission sequence to focus the fault tree analysis on a stuck U2 umbilical, level wind mechanical interference, and slack tether in upper tether

  15. Local-scale modelling of density-driven flow for the phases of repository operation and post-closure at Beberg

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaquet, O.; Siegel, P.

    2004-09-01

    A hydrogeological model was developed for Beberg with the aim of evaluating the impact of a repository (for the operational and post-closure phases) while accounting for the effects of density-driven flow. Two embedded scales were taken into account for this modelling study: a local scale at which the granitic medium was considered as a continuum and a repository scale, where the medium is fractured and therefore was regarded to be discrete. The following step-wise approach was established to model density-driven flow at both repository and local scale: (a) modelling fracture networks at the repository scale, (b) upscaling the hydraulic properties to a continuum at local scale and (c) modelling density-driven flow to evaluate repository impact at local scale. The results demonstrate the strong impact of the repository on the flow field during the phase of operation. The distribution of the salt concentration is affected by a large upcoming effect with increased relative concentration and by the presence of fracture zones carrying freshwater from the surface. The concentrations obtained for the reference case, expressed in terms of percentage with respect to the maximum (prescribed) value in the model, are as follows: ca 30% for the phase of desaturation, and ca 20% for the resaturation phase. For the reference case, the impact of repository operations appears no longer visible after a resaturation period of about 20 years after repository closure; under resaturation conditions, evidence of the operational phase has already disappeared in terms of the observed hydraulic and concentration fields. Sensitivity calculations have proven the importance of explicitly discretising repository tunnels when assessing resaturation time and maximum concentration values. Furthermore, the definition of a fixed potential as boundary condition along the model's top surface is likely to provide underestimated values for the maximum concentration and overestimated flow rates in the

  16. Decentralized Planning for Pre-Conflict and Post-Conflict ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    2012-10-02

    Oct 2, 2012 ... Such processes are 'sine qua non' to pre-conflict and post-conflict prevention. .... A Basic Approach to Pre-Conflict Management Planning ... and also factor in an evaluation of perception variables that help us to understand ...

  17. Supervisory Styles: A Contingency Framework

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boehe, Dirk Michael

    2016-01-01

    While the contingent nature of doctoral supervision has been acknowledged, the literature on supervisory styles has yet to deliver a theory-based contingency framework. A contingency framework can assist supervisors and research students in identifying appropriate supervisory styles under varying circumstances. The conceptual study reported here…

  18. Significant others and contingencies of self-worth: activation and consequences of relationship-specific contingencies of self-worth.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Horberg, E J; Chen, Serena

    2010-01-01

    Three studies tested the activation and consequences of contingencies of self-worth associated with specific significant others, that is, relationship-specific contingencies of self-worth. The results showed that activating the mental representation of a significant other with whom one strongly desires closeness led participants to stake their self-esteem in domains in which the significant other wanted them to excel. This was shown in terms of self-reported contingencies of self-worth (Study 1), in terms of self-worth after receiving feedback on a successful or unsatisfactory performance in a relationship-specific contingency domain (Study 2), and in terms of feelings of reduced self-worth after thinking about a failure in a relationship-specific contingency domain (Study 3). Across studies, a variety of contingency domains were examined. Furthermore, Study 3 showed that failing in an activated relationship-specific contingency domain had negative implications for current feelings of closeness and acceptance in the significant-other relationship. Overall, the findings suggest that people's contingencies of self-worth depend on the social situation and that performance in relationship-specific contingency domains can influence people's perceptions of their relationships.

  19. Rapid Automated Mission Planning System, Phase II

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — The proposed innovation is an automated UAS mission planning system that will rapidly identify emergency (contingency) landing sites, manage contingency routing, and...

  20. Single loop-and-clips technique (KING closure) for gastrotomy closure after transgastric ovariectomy: a survival experiment

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Ryska, O.; Martinek, J.; Filípková, T.; Doležel, R.; Juhásová, Jana; Motlík, Jan; Zavoral, M.; Ryska, M.

    2012-01-01

    Roč. 7, č. 4 (2012), s. 233-239 ISSN 1895-4588 R&D Projects: GA MZd NS9994 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z50450515 Keywords : natural orifice transluminal endoscopic surgery * gastric closure * clips * endoloop Subject RIV: FJ - Surgery incl. Transplants Impact factor: 0.757, year: 2012

  1. Planning of an organisational and post-structure for the Bureau of ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    The topic of this article is the planning and management of a lexicographical project, especially the planning of its organisational and post structure. Although it here concerns the planning ... (ii) The editorial process should be accelerated with the aid of technology and editorial methodology;. (iii) Contextual relevance of the ...

  2. 2101-M pond closure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-06-01

    This document describes activities for the closure of a surface impoundment (2101-M Pond) at the Hanford Site. The 2101-H Pond was initially constructed in 1953 to serve as a drainage collection area for the 2101-H Building. (Until the Basalt Waste Isolation Project (BWIP) Laboratory was constructed in the 2101-M Building in 1979--1981, the only source contributing discharge to the pond was condensate water from the 2101-H Building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system. The drains for the BWIP Laboratory rooms were plumbed into a 4-in., cast-iron, low-pressure drain pipe that carries waste water from the HVAC system to the pond. During the active life of the BWIP Laboratory, solutions of dissolved barium in groundwater samples were discharged to the 2101-M Pond via the laboratory drains. As a result of the discharges, a Part A permit application was initially submitted to the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) in August 1986 which designates the 2101-M Pond as a surface impoundment

  3. Closure certification report: TA-35 TSL-125 surface impoundment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    This closure report documents closure activities for the TA-35 TSL-125 surface impoundment and associated structures at Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory). Prior to formal approval of the closure plan, the decision was made to proceed with closure activities to prevent any further releases from the site following informal discussions with New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) personnel. The closure plan is a revision of the previously submitted draft dated July 1988. Clean closure of the TSL-125 site was accomplished through: Removal and proper disposal of all wastes contained within the surface impoundment system; Decontamination and/or removal and proper disposal of the surface impoundment, its associated structures, and contaminated soil underlying the impoundment area; Sampling and analysis of soil to determine the presence and concentrations of any hazardous constituents remaining in the soil at the TSL-125 site; and Demonstration through a risk assessment that any constituents remaining in the soil at the TSL-125 site pose no threat to human health and the environment. All remaining soil concentrations of hazardous constituents were below health-based action levels. Analytical results indicated that benzidine, n-nitrosodimethylamine, and n-nitrosodi-n-propylamine were not detected at or above their limits of quantitation and beryllium was not present at or above its laboratory detection limit. However, the limits of quantitation and detection for these constituents were greater than their calculated health-based action levels. To demonstrate that these constituents were not present, historical data was researched and it was determined that the constituents were not utilized at the Building 125 site. 4 refs., 8 figs., 1 tab

  4. Contingent Conspiracies: Art, Philosophy, Science

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Wilson, Alexander

    2013-01-01

    The question of whether creativity comes from being “open” or “closed” to contingent processes, deeply intersects art-historical discourse on authorship, style, technique and practice: from the Greek notion of the Daimon, through commedia dell'arte’s improvised styles and romanticism’s investment......, Hegel) contain a deeper tension between contingency and necessity, often revealed in correlate discussions of the sublime. But as artists find themselves returning again to a concern or care for contingency (a thread running through Heidegger, Levinas and Derrida) or the question how to conspire...... with contingency (Negarestani), they do so today with a new paradigm of scientific knowledge at their disposal. For science too has increasingly been forced to respond to the notion of contingency. Progressively discovering the ubiquity of non-linear dynamics, deterministic chaos and emergent complexity...

  5. Liquid effluent retention facility final-status groundwater monitoring plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sweeney, M.D.; Chou, C.J.; Bjornstad, B.N.

    1997-09-01

    The following sections describe the groundwater-monitoring program for the Liquid Effluent Retention Facility (LERF). The LERF is regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). The LERF is included in the open-quotes Dangerous Waste Portion of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit for the Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Dangerous Waste, Permit WA890008967close quotes, (referred to herein as the Permit) (Ecology 1994) and is subject to final-status requirements for groundwater monitoring (WAC 173-303-645). This document describes a RCRA/WAC groundwater detection-monitoring program for groundwater in the uppermost aquifer system at the LERF. This plan describes the LERF monitoring network, constituent list, sampling schedule, statistical methods, and sampling and analysis protocols that will be employed for the LERF. This plan will be used to meet the groundwater monitoring requirements from the time the LERF becomes part of the Permit and through the post-closure care period, until certification of final closure

  6. Contingency diagrams as teaching tools

    OpenAIRE

    Mattaini, Mark A.

    1995-01-01

    Contingency diagrams are particularly effective teaching tools, because they provide a means for students to view the complexities of contingency networks present in natural and laboratory settings while displaying the elementary processes that constitute those networks. This paper sketches recent developments in this visualization technology and illustrates approaches for using contingency diagrams in teaching.

  7. Efficacy and haemodynamic effects of vacuum-assisted closure for post-sternotomy mediastinitis in children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Takahara, Shingo; Sai, Sadahiro; Kagatani, Tomoaki; Konishi, Akinobu

    2014-10-01

    Post-sternotomy mediastinitis is a significant morbidity with controversial management. Vacuum-assisted closure (VAC) has been used to treat mediastinitis, with many reports documenting its efficacy and feasibility, particularly in adults. However, its use is not prevalent in the paediatric population because of concerns that it may deteriorate haemodynamics. This study aimed to evaluate outcomes and effects of VAC on the haemodynamics of paediatric patients with post-sternotomy mediastinitis. Six patients were treated with VAC between April 2005 and March 2013. We retrospectively investigated their profiles, clinical outcomes and haemodynamic changes, including mean blood pressure (MBP), mean heart rate (MHR), urinary output, amount of diuretics and vasoactive-inotropic score (VIS), before and after VAC initiation. The median age and body weight of patients were 6.4 months and 4.5 kg, respectively. Three patients (50%) had single ventricular physiology. The median VAC duration was 12 days. One patient died of pulmonary venous obstruction after mediastinitis was cured. The average MBPs in every 8-h period were examined, and there were no significant changes (P = 0.773); the average MHRs were examined in the same manner and they decreased significantly after initiation of VAC (P = 0.032). Only 2 patients required vasoactive agents. The VIS did not change in 1 patient and decreased in the other. The mean amount of diuretics administered and urinary output per body weight did not change significantly (P = 0.395 and 0.273, respectively). In conclusion, the haemodynamics of children were not significantly affected by the negative pressure of VAC, indicating that this therapy may be safe and effective for post-sternotomy mediastinitis, even in small children with complex cardiac anomalies. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Association for Cardio-Thoracic Surgery. All rights reserved.

  8. Closure Plan for Corrective Action Unit 110: Area 3 RWMS U-3ax/bl Disposal Unit, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fitzmaurice, T. M.

    2000-01-01

    This Closure Plan has been prepared for the Area 3 RWMS U-3ax/bl Disposal Unit Corrective Action Unit 110 in accordance with the Federal Facility and Consent Order (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP] et al., 1996). The U-3ax/bl is a historic disposal unit within the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site located on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The unit, which was formed by excavating the area between two subsidence craters (U-3ax and U-3bl), was operationally closed in 1987. The U-3ax/bl disposal unit is scheduled for permanent closure under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as a hazardous waste landfill. Existing records indicate that, from July 1968 to December 1987, U-3ax/bl received 2.3 x 10 5 cubic meters (8.12 x 10 6 cubic feet) of waste. NTS nuclear device testing generated approximately 95 percent of the total volume disposed of in U-3ax/bl, the majority of which came from the Waste Consolidation Project (80 percent of the total volume) (Elletson and Johnejack, 1995). Area 3 is located in Yucca Flat, within the northeast quadrant of the NTS. The Yucca Flat watershed is a structurally closed basin encompassing an area of approximately 780 square kilometers (300 square miles). The structural geomorphology of Yucca Flat is typical of the Basin and Range Physiographic Province. Yucca Flat lies in one of the most arid regions of the country. Water balance calculations for Area 3 indicate that it is continuously in a state of moisture deficit. The U-3ax/bl Disposal Unit will be closed in place by installing a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act equivalent cover. Following cover construction a fence will be installed around the cover to prevent accidental damage to the cover. Post-closure monitoring will consist of site inspections to determine the condition of the engineered cover and cover performance monitoring using Time-Domain Reflectometry arrays to monitor moisture migration in the cover. Any identified maintenance and repair

  9. Closure Plan for Corrective Action Unit 110: Area 3 RWMS U-3ax/bl Disposal Unit, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. M. Fitzmaurice

    2000-08-01

    This Closure Plan has been prepared for the Area 3 RWMS U-3ax/bl Disposal Unit Corrective Action Unit 110 in accordance with the Federal Facility and Consent Order (Nevada Division of Environmental Protection [NDEP] et al., 1996). The U-3ax/bl is a historic disposal unit within the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site located on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The unit, which was formed by excavating the area between two subsidence craters (U-3ax and U-3bl), was operationally closed in 1987. The U-3ax/bl disposal unit is scheduled for permanent closure under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as a hazardous waste landfill. Existing records indicate that, from July 1968 to December 1987, U-3ax/bl received 2.3 x 10{sup 5} cubic meters (8.12 x 10{sup 6} cubic feet) of waste. NTS nuclear device testing generated approximately 95 percent of the total volume disposed of in U-3ax/bl, the majority of which came from the Waste Consolidation Project (80 percent of the total volume) (Elletson and Johnejack, 1995). Area 3 is located in Yucca Flat, within the northeast quadrant of the NTS. The Yucca Flat watershed is a structurally closed basin encompassing an area of approximately 780 square kilometers (300 square miles). The structural geomorphology of Yucca Flat is typical of the Basin and Range Physiographic Province. Yucca Flat lies in one of the most arid regions of the country. Water balance calculations for Area 3 indicate that it is continuously in a state of moisture deficit. The U-3ax/bl Disposal Unit will be closed in place by installing a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act equivalent cover. Following cover construction a fence will be installed around the cover to prevent accidental damage to the cover. Post-closure monitoring will consist of site inspections to determine the condition of the engineered cover and cover performance monitoring using Time-Domain Reflectometry arrays to monitor moisture migration in the cover. Any identified maintenance and

  10. 75 FR 54773 - Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Minnesota; Carbon Monoxide (CO...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-09-09

    .... Monitoring Network and Verification of Continued Attainment 4. Contingency Plan 5. Conformity Determination... maintenance plan to EPA on June 16, 2010. B. Limited Maintenance Plan The definition, general requirements... Continued Attainment, Contingency Plan, and Conformity Determinations Under Limited Maintenance Plans. These...

  11. The impact of rural hospital closures on equity of commuting time for haemodialysis patients: simulation analysis using the capacity-distance model

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Matsumoto Masatoshi

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Frequent and long-term commuting is a requirement for dialysis patients. Accessibility thus affects their quality of lives. In this paper, a new model for accessibility measurement is proposed in which both geographic distance and facility capacity are taken into account. Simulation of closure of rural facilities and that of capacity transfer between urban and rural facilities are conducted to evaluate the impacts of these phenomena on equity of accessibility among dialysis patients. Methods Post code information as of August 2011 of all the 7,374 patients certified by municipalities of Hiroshima prefecture as having first or third grade renal disability were collected. Information on post code and the maximum number of outpatients (capacity of all the 98 dialysis facilities were also collected. Using geographic information systems, patient commuting times were calculated in two models: one that takes into account road distance (distance model, and the other that takes into account both the road distance and facility capacity (capacity-distance model. Simulations of closures of rural and urban facilities were then conducted. Results The median commuting time among rural patients was more than twice as long as that among urban patients (15 versus 7 minutes, p  Conclusions Closures of dialysis facilities in rural areas have a substantially larger impact on equity of commuting times among dialysis patients than closures of urban facilities. The accessibility simulations using thecapacity-distance model will provide an analytic framework upon which rational resource distribution policies might be planned.

  12. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 118: Area 27 Super Kukla Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mark Burmeister

    2007-01-01

    This CR provides documentation and justification for the closure of CAU 118 without further corrective action. This justification is based on process knowledge and the results of the investigative and closure activities conducted in accordance with the CAU 118 SAFER Plan: Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for CAU 118: Area 27 Super Kukla Facility, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The SAFER Plan provides information relating to site history as well as the scope and planning of the investigation. This CR also provides the analytical and radiological survey data to confirm that the remediation goals were met as specified in the CAU 118 SAFER Plan (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) approved the CAU 118 SAFER Plan (Murphy, 2006), which recommends closure in place with use restrictions (URs)

  13. Planning for closure and deactivation of the EBR-II complex

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Michelbacher, J.A.; Henslee, S.P.; Poland, H.F.; Wells, P.B.

    1997-01-01

    In January 1994, DOE terminated the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) Program. Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) prepared a detailed plan to put Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) in a safe condition, including removal of irradiated fueled subassemblies from the plant, transfer of subassemblies, and removal and stabilization of primary and secondary sodium liquid heat transfer metal. The goal of deactivation is to stabilize the EBR-II complex until decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D) is implemented, thereby minimizing maintenance and surveillance. Deactivation of a sodium cooled reactor presents unique concerns. Residual sodium in the primary and secondary systems must be either reacted or inerted to preclude concerns with explosive sodium-air reactions. Also, residual sodium on components will effectively solder these items in place, making removal unfeasible. Several special cases reside in the primary system, including primary cold traps, a cesium trap, a cover gas condenser, and systems containing sodium-potassium alloy. The sodium or sodium-potassium alloy in these components must be reacted in place or the components removed. The Sodium Components Maintenance Shop at ANL-W provides the capability for washing primary components, removing residual quantities of sodium while providing some decontamination capacity. Considerations need to be given to component removal necessary for providing access to primary tank internals for D ampersand D activities, removal of hazardous materials, and removal of stored energy sources. ANL-W's plan for the deactivation of EBR-II addresses these issues, providing for an industrially and radiologically safe complex, requiring minimal surveillance during the interim period between deactivation and D ampersand D. Throughout the deactivation and closure of the EBR-II complex, federal environmental concerns will be addressed, including obtaining the proper permits for facility condition and waste processing

  14. Treatment of severe refractory epistaxis in hereditary hemorrhagic telangiectasia using a two-flap nasal closure method

    Science.gov (United States)

    Timmins, Benjamin H.; Hunter, Benjamin N.; Wilson, Kevin F.; Ward, P. Daniel

    2016-01-01

    Background Nasal closure has been shown to effectively manage severe epistaxis refractory to other treatments in patients with hereditary hemorrhagic telangiectasia (HHT). The nasal closure procedure may be underutilized due to its surgical complexity and flap breakdown. Methods Retrospective review of thirteen HHT patients treated for severe epistaxis with nasal closure between 2005 and 2013. Operating room (OR) time, need for revision surgery, pre- and post-procedure epistaxis severity score (ESS), complete blood count values, and Glasgow Benefit Inventory (GBI) questionnaire results were collected for each patient. The technique is described. We characterize a typical nasal closure patient and compare outcomes based on our experience with the traditional three-flap closure and a simplified two-flap nasal closure procedure. Results The average candidate for nasal closure in this series had an ESS of 7.88, Hgb of 8.3 g/dL, and received multiple transfusions, iron therapy, and cautery/coagulation procedures. Average ESS subsequent to nasal closure using the two flap method is 0.92 and mean GBI score is 56.3. Comparison of five patients who underwent the traditional three-flap nasal closure procedure and eight patients receiving the two flap nasal closure showed no significant difference in post-op ESS or GBI metrics. Mean operating room times of the traditional and simplified methods were 3.12 hours and 1.44 hours (p=0.0001). Mean time to first revision for eight nasal closure patients is 21.5 months. Conclusion In short-term follow-up, the two-flap procedure has shown comparable effectiveness with significantly reduced complexity and operative time compared to the traditional nasal closure method. PMID:26751606

  15. Stomal Closure: Strategies to Prevent Incisional Hernia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harries, Rhiannon L.; Torkington, Jared

    2018-01-01

    Incisional hernias following ostomy reversal occur frequently. Incisional hernias at the site of a previous stoma closure can cause significant morbidity, impaired quality of life, lead to life-threatening hernia incarceration or strangulation and result in a significant financial burden on health care systems Despite this, the evidence base on the subject is limited. Many recognised risk factors for the development of incisional hernia following ostomy reversal are related to patient factors such as age, malignancy, diabetes, COPD, hypertension and obesity, and are not easily correctable. There is a limited amount of evidence to suggest that prophylactic mesh reinforcement may be of benefit to reduce the post stoma closure incisional hernia rate but a further large scale randomised controlled trial is due to report in the near future. There appears to be weak evidence to suggest that surgeons should favour circular, or “purse-string” closure of the skin following stoma closure in order to reduce the risk of SSI, which in turn may reduce incisional hernia formation. There remains the need for further evidence in relation to suture technique, skin closure techniques, mechanical bowel preparation and oral antibiotic prescription focusing on incisional hernia development as an outcome measure. Within this review, we discuss in detail the evidence base for the risk factors for the development of, and the strategies to prevent ostomy reversal site incisional hernias. PMID:29670882

  16. Stomal Closure: Strategies to Prevent Incisional Hernia

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rhiannon L. Harries

    2018-04-01

    Full Text Available Incisional hernias following ostomy reversal occur frequently. Incisional hernias at the site of a previous stoma closure can cause significant morbidity, impaired quality of life, lead to life-threatening hernia incarceration or strangulation and result in a significant financial burden on health care systems Despite this, the evidence base on the subject is limited. Many recognised risk factors for the development of incisional hernia following ostomy reversal are related to patient factors such as age, malignancy, diabetes, COPD, hypertension and obesity, and are not easily correctable. There is a limited amount of evidence to suggest that prophylactic mesh reinforcement may be of benefit to reduce the post stoma closure incisional hernia rate but a further large scale randomised controlled trial is due to report in the near future. There appears to be weak evidence to suggest that surgeons should favour circular, or “purse-string” closure of the skin following stoma closure in order to reduce the risk of SSI, which in turn may reduce incisional hernia formation. There remains the need for further evidence in relation to suture technique, skin closure techniques, mechanical bowel preparation and oral antibiotic prescription focusing on incisional hernia development as an outcome measure. Within this review, we discuss in detail the evidence base for the risk factors for the development of, and the strategies to prevent ostomy reversal site incisional hernias.

  17. Contingency planning for electronic health record-based care continuity: a survey of recommended practices.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sittig, Dean F; Gonzalez, Daniel; Singh, Hardeep

    2014-11-01

    Reliable health information technology (HIT) in general, and electronic health record systems (EHRs) in particular are essential to a high-performing healthcare system. When the availability of EHRs are disrupted, alternative methods must be used to maintain the continuity of healthcare. We developed a survey to assess institutional practices to handle situations when EHRs were unavailable for use (downtime preparedness). We used literature reviews and expert opinion to develop items that assessed the implementation of potentially useful practices. We administered the survey to U.S.-based healthcare institutions that were members of a professional organization that focused on collaboration and sharing of HIT-related best practices among its members. All members were large integrated health systems. We received responses from 50 of the 59 (84%) member institutions. Nearly all (96%) institutions reported at least one unplanned downtime (of any length) in the last 3 years and 70% had at least one unplanned downtime greater than 8h in the last 3 years. Three institutions reported that one or more patients were injured as a result of either a planned or unplanned downtime. The majority of institutions (70-85%) had implemented a portion of the useful practices we identified, but very few practices were followed by all organizations. Unexpected downtimes related to EHRs appear to be fairly common among institutions in our survey. Most institutions had only partially implemented comprehensive contingency plans to maintain safe and effective healthcare during unexpected EHRs downtimes. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. The impact of rural hospital closures on equity of commuting time for haemodialysis patients: simulation analysis using the capacity-distance model.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Matsumoto, Masatoshi; Ogawa, Takahiko; Kashima, Saori; Takeuchi, Keisuke

    2012-07-23

    Frequent and long-term commuting is a requirement for dialysis patients. Accessibility thus affects their quality of lives. In this paper, a new model for accessibility measurement is proposed in which both geographic distance and facility capacity are taken into account. Simulation of closure of rural facilities and that of capacity transfer between urban and rural facilities are conducted to evaluate the impacts of these phenomena on equity of accessibility among dialysis patients. Post code information as of August 2011 of all the 7,374 patients certified by municipalities of Hiroshima prefecture as having first or third grade renal disability were collected. Information on post code and the maximum number of outpatients (capacity) of all the 98 dialysis facilities were also collected. Using geographic information systems, patient commuting times were calculated in two models: one that takes into account road distance (distance model), and the other that takes into account both the road distance and facility capacity (capacity-distance model). Simulations of closures of rural and urban facilities were then conducted. The median commuting time among rural patients was more than twice as long as that among urban patients (15 versus 7 minutes, psimulation, when five rural public facilitiess were closed, Gini coefficient of commuting times among the patients increased by 16%, indicating a substantial worsening of equity, and the number of patients with commuting times longer than 90 minutes increased by 72 times. In contrast, closure of four urban public facilities with similar capacities did not affect these values. Closures of dialysis facilities in rural areas have a substantially larger impact on equity of commuting times among dialysis patients than closures of urban facilities. The accessibility simulations using the capacity-distance model will provide an analytic framework upon which rational resource distribution policies might be planned.

  19. The treatment of climate-driven environmental change and associated uncertainty in post-closure assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmot, R.D.

    1993-01-01

    The post-closure performance of radioactive waste repositories is influenced by a range of processes such as groundwater flow and fracture movement which are in turn affected by conditions in the surface environment. For deep repositories the period for which an assessment must be performed is in the order of 10 6 years. The geological record of the last 10 6 years shows that surface environmental conditions have varied considerably over such time-scales. A model of surface environmental change, known as TIME4, has been developed on behalf of the UK Department of the Environment for use with the probabilistic risk assessment code VANDAL. This paper describes the extent of surface environmental change, discusses possible driving mechanisms for such changes and summarises the processes which have been incorporated within the TIME4 model. The underlying cause of change in surface environment sub-systems is inferred to be climate change but considerable uncertainty remains over the mechanisms of such change. Methods for treating these uncertainties are described. (author)

  20. Seven-year follow-up of percutaneous closure of patent foramen ovale.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mirzada, Naqibullah; Ladenvall, Per; Hansson, Per-Olof; Johansson, Magnus Carl; Furenäs, Eva; Eriksson, Peter; Dellborg, Mikael

    2013-12-01

    Observational studies favor percutaneous closure of patent foramen ovale (PFO) over medical treatment to reduce recurrent stroke while randomized trials fail to demonstrate significant superiority of percutaneous PFO closure. Few long-term studies are available post PFO closure. This study reports long-term clinical outcomes after percutaneous PFO closure. Between 1997 and 2006, 86 consecutive eligible patients with cerebrovascular events, presumably related to PFO, underwent percutaneous PFO closure. All 86 patients were invited to a long-term follow-up, which was carried out during 2011 and 2012. Percutaneous PFO closure was successfully performed in 85 of 86 patients. The follow-up rate was 100%. No cardiovascular or cerebrovascular deaths occurred. Two patients (both women) died from lung cancer during follow-up. Follow-up visits were conducted for 64 patients and the remaining 20 patients were followed up by phone. The mean follow-up time was 7.3 years (5 to 12.4 years). Mean age at PFO closure was 49 years. One patient had a minor stroke one month after PFO closure and a transient ischemic attack (TIA) two years afterwards. One other patient suffered from a TIA six years after closure. No long-term device-related complications were observed. Percutaneous PFO closure was associated with very low risk of recurrent stroke and is suitable in most patients. We observed no mortality and no long-term device-related complications related to PFO closure, indicating that percutaneous PFO closure is a safe and efficient treatment even in the long term.

  1. Successful completion of a RCRA closure for the Fernald Environmental Management Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lippitt, J.M.; Kolthoff, K.

    1995-01-01

    This paper discusses the successful completion of a RCRA (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) closure of a HF (hydrofluoric acid) tank car at FEMP, which is on the national priorities list of hazardous waste sites and is undergoing CERCLA remediation. The HF tank car closure was conducted by FERMCO. Through a combination of sound planning and team work, the HF tank car was closed safely and ahead of schedule. During > 22,000 hr field work required for construction modifications and neutralization of 9,600 gallons of HF and decontamination rinseates, there were no OSHA recordable incidents. The system design avoided additional costs by maximizing use of existing equipment and facilities. This successful closure of the HF tank car demonstrates FEMP's commitment to reducing risks and cleaning up the facility in a manner consistent with objectives of RCRA regulations and the Ohio EPA hazardous waste rules. This in turn facilitated ongoing negotiations with Ohio EPA to integrate RCRA closure and the ongoing CERCLA remediation activities. This paper addresses why the unit was clean closed under an approved RCRA Closure Plan. Integration of EPA regulations for RCRA and CERCLA programs and the DOE-Orders impacting design, construction and operation of an acid neutralization system is also reviewed. The paper concludes with a discussion of lessons learned in the process in preparing the closure plant and through final project close out

  2. Development of a long-term post-closure radiation monitor: Phase 2, Topical report, March 1994--July 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reed, S.E.

    1995-07-01

    The long-term monitoring of a hazardous waste site for migration of radionuclides requires installation of radiation sensors at a large number of subsurface locations. The concept under development employs a passive in-ground measurement probe which contains a scintillator coupled to an optical lightguide. The overall goal of the Long-Term Post-Closure Radiation Monitor System (LPRMS) development program is to configure a long-term radiation monitor using commercially available, demonstrated components to the largest extent possible. The development program is planned as a three phase program spanning a total time of 53 months. The problems to be solved during Phase 1 were primarily those associated with selection of the most appropriate components (scintillator, coupling optics, optical fiber, and opto-electronics) to maximize the signal reaching the detectors and thereby minimizing the integration time required to obtain a reliable measure of radiation. Phase 2 (the current Phase) encompassed the fabrication and testing of the prototype LPRMS probe at a contaminated DOE site, the Fernald Environmental Management Project, in southwestern Ohio. Uranium isotopes are the primary contaminants of concern at this site. The single probe and opto-electronic device were used to made measurements in-situ at relatively shallow subsurface depths. The end objective of Phase 2 was the design of a full-scale prototype system which incorporates all the features expected to be necessary on a commercial system, including 50 meter depth of measurement, multiplexing of multiple probes, and remote transmission of data. This full-scale prototype will be fabricated and field tested for 12 months during Phase 3, and a commercial design will be developed based upon the data gathered and experience gained during the entire program

  3. Contingencies of Value

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Strandvad, Sara Malou

    2014-01-01

    Based on a study of the admission test at a design school, this paper investigates the contingencies of aesthetic values as these become visible in assessment practices. Theoretically, the paper takes its starting point in Herrnstein Smith’s notion of ‘contingencies of values’ and outlines...... a pragmatist ground where cultural sociology and economic sociology meet. Informed by the literature on cultural intermediaries, the paper discusses the role of evaluators and the devices which accompany them. Whereas studies of cultural intermediaries traditionally apply a Bourdieusian perspective, recent......, the paper does not accept this storyline. As an alternative, the paper outlines the contingencies of values which are at play at the admission test, composed of official assessment criteria and scoring devices together with conventions within the world of design, and set in motion by interactions...

  4. Shuttle Planning for Link Closures in Urban Public Transport Networks

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van der Hurk, E.; Koutsopoulos, H.; Wilson, N.H.M.; Kroon, L.G.; Maroti, G.

    2016-01-01

    Urban public transport systems must periodically close certain links for maintenance, which can have significant effects on the service provided to passengers. In practice, the effects of closures are mitigated by replacing the closed links with a simple shuttle service. However, alternative shuttle

  5. 48 CFR 18.201 - Contingency operation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Contingency operation. 18... METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES EMERGENCY ACQUISITIONS Emergency Acquisition Flexibilities 18.201 Contingency operation. (a) Contingency operation is defined in 2.101. (b) Micro-purchase threshold. The threshold...

  6. Suction Cup Induced Palatal Fistula: Surgical Closure by Palatal ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    1Department of Pediatrics, Pragna Children's Hospital, Hyderabad, ... Eluru, 4Department of Conservative Dentistry and Endodontics, KIMS Dental College and ... The surgical closure of palatal fistula planned under general anesthesia.

  7. Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as 'Neptune' and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); and (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This Closure Report presents information supporting closure of CAU 574 according to the FFACO (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]) and the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 574 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The following activities were performed to support closure of CAU 574: (1) In situ external dose rate measurements were collected using thermoluminescent dosimeters at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). (2) Total effective dose rates were determined at both sites by summing the internal and external dose rate components. (3) A use restriction (UR) was implemented at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune). Areas that exceed the final action level (FAL) of 25 millirems per year (mrem/yr) based on the Occasional Use Area exposure scenario are within the existing use restricted area for CAU 551. The 25-mrem/yr FAL is not exceeded outside the existing CAU 551 UR for any of the exposure scenarios (Industrial Area, Remote Work Area, and Occasional Use Area). Therefore, the existing UR for CAU 551 is sufficient to bound contamination that exceeds the FAL. (4) An administrative UR was implemented at CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca) as a best management practice (BMP). The 25-mrem/yr FAL was not exceeded for the Remote Work Area or Occasional Use Area exposure scenarios; therefore, a UR is not required. However, because the 25-mrem/yr FAL was exceeded for the Industrial Area exposure scenario, an administrative UR was established as a BMP. UR documentation is included as Appendix B. The UR at CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune

  8. Problems with Contingency Theory: Testing Assumptions Hidden within the Language of Contingency "Theory".

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schoonhoven, Clausia Bird

    1981-01-01

    Discusses problems in contingency theory, which relates organizational structure to the tasks performed and the information needed. Analysis of data from 17 hospitals suggests that traditional contingency theory underrepresents the complexity of relations among technological uncertainty, structure, and organizational effectiveness. (Author/RW)

  9. Optimal self-esteem is contingent: Intrinsic versus extrinsic and upward versus downward contingencies

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Vonk, R.; Smit, H.M.M.

    2012-01-01

    We argue that noncontingent, unconditional self-esteem is not optimal but defensive. We introduce the concept of intrinsic contingency, where self-esteem is affected by whether one's actions are self-congruent and conducive to personal growth. Whereas external contingencies, especially social and

  10. 48 CFR 218.201 - Contingency operation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Contingency operation. 218... Flexibilities 218.201 Contingency operation. (1) Selection, appointment, and termination of appointment... in a contingency contracting force. See 201.603-2(2). (2) Policy for unique item identification...

  11. Contingency interim measure for the public water supply at Barnes, Kansas.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    LaFreniere, L. M.; Environmental Science Division

    2009-07-09

    This document presents a conceptual design for a contingency interim measure (IM) for treatment of the public water supply system at Barnes, Kansas, should this become necessary. The aquifer that serves the public water supply system at Barnes has been affected by trace to low concentrations of carbon tetrachloride and its degradation product, chloroform. Investigations conducted on behalf of the CCC/USDA by Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne 2008a) have demonstrated that groundwater at the Barnes site is contaminated with carbon tetrachloride at concentrations exceeding the Kansas Tier 2 risk-based screening level (RBSL) and the EPA maximum contaminant level (MCL) of 5.0 {micro}g/L for this compound. The Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (CCC/USDA) formerly operated a grain storage facility in Barnes, approximately 800 ft east-southeast of the public water supply wells. Carbon tetrachloride was used in the treatment of grain. Another potential source identified in an investigation conducted for the KDHE (PRC 1996) is the site of a former agriculture building owned by the local school district (USD 223). This building is located immediately east of well PWS3. The potential contingency IM options evaluated in this report include the treatment of groundwater at the public water supply wellheads and the provision of an alternate water supply via Washington County Rural Water District No.2 (RWD 2). This document was developed in accordance with KDHE Bureau of Environmental Remediation (BER) Policy No.BER-RS-029 (Revised) (KDHE 2006a), supplemented by guidance from the KDHE project manager. Upon the approval of this contingency IM conceptual design by the KDHE, the CCC/USDA will prepare a treatment system design document that will contain the following elements: (1) Description of the approved contingency IM treatment method; (2) Drawings and/or schematics provided by the contractor and/or manufacturer of the approved technology; (3) A

  12. State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) environmental checklist forms for 304 Concretion Facility Closure Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-11-01

    The 300 Area of the Hanford Site contains reactor fuel manufacturing facilities and several research and development laboratories. Recyclable scrap uranium with zircaloy-2 and copper silicon alloy, uranium-titanium alloy, beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy, and zircaloy-2 chips and fines were secured in concrete billets (7.5-gallon containers) in the 304 Facility, located in the 300 Area. The beryllium/zircaloy-2 alloy and zircaloy-2 chips and fines are designated as mixed waste with the characteristic of ignitability. The concretion process reduced the ignitability of the fines and chips for safe storage and shipment. This process has been discontinued and the 304 Facility is now undergoing closure as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) Dangerous Waste Regulations, WAC 173-303-040. This closure plan presents a description of the 304 Facility, the history of materials and waste managed, and the procedures that will be followed to close the 304 Facility. The 304 Facility is located within the 300-FF-3 (source) and 300-FF-5 (groundwater) operable units, as designated in the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) (Ecology et al. 1992). Contamination in the operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5 is scheduled to be addressed through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 remedial action process. Therefore, all soil remedial action at the 304 Facility will be conducted as part of the CERCLA remedial action of operable units 300-FF-3 and 300-FF-5

  13. Household responses to school closure resulting from outbreak of influenza B, North Carolina.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, April J; Moore, Zack S; Edelson, Paul J; Kinnane, Lynda; Davies, Megan; Shay, David K; Balish, Amanda; McCarron, Meg; Blanton, Lenee; Finelli, Lyn; Averhoff, Francisco; Bresee, Joseph; Engel, Jeffrey; Fiore, Anthony

    2008-07-01

    School closure is a proposed strategy for reducing influenza transmission during a pandemic. Few studies have assessed how families respond to closures, or whether other interactions during closure could reduce this strategy's effect. Questionnaires were administered to 220 households (438 adults and 355 children) with school-age children in a North Carolina county during an influenza B virus outbreak that resulted in school closure. Closure was considered appropriate by 201 (91%) households. No adults missed work to solely provide childcare, and only 22 (10%) households required special childcare arrangements; 2 households incurred additional costs. Eighty-nine percent of children visited at least 1 public location during the closure despite county recommendations to avoid large gatherings. Although behavior and attitudes might differ during a pandemic, these results suggest short-term closure did not cause substantial hardship for parents. Pandemic planning guidance should address the potential for transmission in public areas during school closure.

  14. The Necessity of Contingency or Contingent Necessity: Meillassoux, Hegel, and the Subject

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    John Van Houdt

    2011-06-01

    Full Text Available This article addresses the relationship of contingency to necessity as developed by Quentin Meillassoux and G.W.F. Hegel. Meillassoux criticizes the restriction of possibility by modern philosophy to the conditions of the transcendental subject, which he calls ‘correlationism’, and opposes to this correlationism, mathematics as an absolute form of thought. The arch-figure of a metaphysical version of correlationism for Meillassoux is Hegel. This article argues that, while Meillassoux is right to criticize a version of correlationism for restricting the range of contingency, he overlooks Hegel’s unique contribution to this issue. Hegel provides us a version of necessity modeled on the mathematical proof which answers Meillassoux’s concerns about correlationist versions of necessity but does not altogether jettison the concept of the subject. Instead, the subject in Hegel is a contingent interruption which emerges from the breaks in the kinds of necessity we posit about the world. Hegel offers us a way of tying these two concepts together in what I call ‘contingent necessity’.

  15. Contingency Operations of Americas Next Moon Rocket, Ares V

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jaap, John; Richardson, Lea

    2010-01-01

    and cause of a partially separated payload shroud. Other mitigations are really alternate missions; example, an engine out on during ascent resulted in insufficient propellant for the lunar mission, but the on-orbit vehicle stack is otherwise perfect and can pursue an alternate mission, such as a high ballistic trajectory to test the high-speed atmospheric reentry of Orion. Evaluation and presentation of contingency operations at this early stage of the development of the Ares V rocket will improve the design of the vehicle and lay the groundwork for the exhaustive contingency planning which must be done after the vehicle is built as preparations for operations.

  16. Consideration of timescales in post-closure safety of geological disposal of radioactive waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-11-01

    by a number of general considerations, which are described first. Three broad areas in the regulation and practice of repository planning and implementation affected by timescales issues are then discussed: - repository siting and design and the levels of protection required in regulation; - the planning of pre- and post-closure actions; and - developing and presenting a safety case. Finally, a synthesis of findings is made, including a review of the statements made in the 2004 'lessons learnt' report in light of the discussions contained in the present report. Many of the issues treated in the course of the project are subject to various interpretations, and remain under discussion in national programmes, as well as internationally. Therefore, the findings in this report should not be viewed as conclusive, but rather as a contribution in moving ahead the debate and understanding the similarities and differences among approaches in national programmes. (authors)

  17. Visits to Australia by nuclear powered or armed vessels: contingency planning for the accidental release of ionizing radiation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The report refers to the adequacy of current contingency planning by the Australian Federal and Senate authorities to deal with the accidental release of ionizating radiation from visiting nuclear powered or armed vessels in Australian waters and ports. Much of the material was obtained in response to questions put in writing by the Senate Standing Committee to the Department of Defence, ANSTO and others. In addition, the report contains relevant information from Commonwealth documents as well as the Committee findings and recommendations. Issues considered include: types of visiting nuclear powered vessels, accident likelihood and consequences, differences between naval and land-based reactors, safety records. The persons or organizations who made submissions or appeared in all public hearings are listed in the appendixes, along with all visits to Australian ports by nuclear powered warships from 1976 to 1988

  18. Some Tests for Evaluation of Contingency Tables (for Biomedical Applications)

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Kalina, Jan

    2011-01-01

    Roč. 7, č. 1 (2011), s. 37-50 ISSN 1336-9180 R&D Projects: GA MŠk(CZ) 1M06014 Institutional research plan: CEZ:AV0Z10300504 Keywords : contingency tables * hypothesis testing Subject RIV: BB - Applied Statistics , Operational Research http://jamsi.fpv.ucm.sk/docs/v07n01_05_2011/v07_n01_03_KALINA.pdf

  19. 76 FR 17801 - Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; New York Reasonable Further Progress Plans...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-31

    ..., Contingency Measures and Motor Vehicle Emissions Budgets AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). ACTION... plan, and the contingency measures as they relate to the New York portion of the New York- Northern New... individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section to view the hard copy of the docket. You may...

  20. Design, permitting, and construction issues associated with closure of the Panna Maria uranium tailings impoundment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strachan, C.L.; Raabe, K.L.

    1997-01-01

    In 1992, Panna Maria Uranium Operations (PMUO) initiated licensing and engineering activities for closure of the Panna Maria mill and 150-acre tailings impoundment located in southeast Texas. Closure of the tailings impoundment is permitted by license amendment through the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (TNRCC), and based on closure criteria outlined in Texas regulations. The closure plan for the Panna Maria tailings impoundment was submitted for Texas regulatory agency review in April 1993, with details of the closure plan modified in 1994, 1995, and 1996. The closure plan included a multi-layered cover over the regraded tailings surface which was designed for long-term isolation of tailings, reduction of radon emanation to regulated levels, and reduction of infiltration to TNRCC-accepted levels. The cover and embankment slope surfaces and surrounding areas were designed to provide acceptable erosional stability as compared to runoff velocities from the Probable Maximum Precipitation event. Cover materials were selected from on-site materials and evaluated for suitability based on permeability, radon attenuation, and soil dispersivity characteristics. Off-site materials were used when necessary. The cover over the tailings has a maximum slope of 0.5 percent, and the regraded embankment slopes outside the perimeter of the impoundment have a maximum slope of 20 percent. All reclaimed slopes are covered with topsoil and revegetated. A riprap-lined channel is to be used to convey runoff from within the perimeter of the reclaimed impoundment to the north of the impoundment